

Chron

May 8, 1970
12:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Telephone Call from Secretary Finch

I took a call to you from Bob Finch earlier this morning. He merely wanted to report that the "Under Secretaries' meeting" at HEW went very well and that a release was put out to the effect that the President had asked Administration representatives to be made available to listen to the grievances of outside groups, answer their questions, etc.

Apart from the above, he wanted to know what your plans were with regard to the White House Fellows' function at Airlie House this coming Sunday. He said he thought it would be a good idea to at least show up -- if only for a while. He would like to go along with you (if you're going) and would be willing to make the trip down and back anytime Saturday night or Sunday ... perhaps by chopper. Although he was in no hurry for a response, I told him one of us would get back to him on the matter before the end of the day.

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Material

Here are the latest figures indicating U. S. troop successes
in Cambodia.


Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

PERSONAL

08:00 a.m., May 11, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons	6,184	
Crew Served Weapons	827	
Bunkers Destroyed	2,779	
Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	8,286,909	✓
Machine Gun Rounds	6,579,132	✓
Rifle Rounds	1,607,777	✓
Grenades	11,455	
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	3,120	
Mortar Rounds	6,888	
Large Rocket Rounds	814	
Smaller Rocket Rounds	8,929	
Recoilles Rifle Rounds	9,366	
Rice (lbs)	3,514,000	
Man Months	78,038	
Vehicles	146	
Boats	40	
Enemy KIA	4,543	✓
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,240	✓
US KIA	85	
ARVN KIA	249	

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Material

Here are the most recently compiled statistics on the
Cambodian operation.

Alexander P. Butterfield
Alexander P. Butterfield

Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

PERSONAL

08:00 a.m., May 12, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons	7,068
Crew Served Weapons	964
Bunkers Destroyed	3,237
Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	8,458,325
Machine Gun Rounds	6,709,086
Rifle Rounds	1,749,239
Grenades	11,610
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	3,120
Mortar Rounds	10,441
Large Rocket Rounds	814
Smaller Rocket Rounds	8,535
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	9,512
Rice (lbs)	3,692,000
Man Months	83,149
Vehicles	167
Boats	40
Enemy KIA	5,004
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,360
US KIA	89
ARVN KIA	268

Chua

May 12, 1970

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Individual Efforts of Cabinet Members
to Support the President's Cambodian
Action

Here it is Tuesday morning and there is pitifully little to show for my direct request of each Cabinet member that he cite the actions he personally has taken to support the President's decision to move against the Cambodian border sanctuaries. (See attached material.) I feel certain that those who didn't come through had good intentions but simply "forgot" to pass their reports my way.

Of course, as you said yourself on Saturday morning, the phone calls alone made "the point" and most certainly should have served to generate some noticeable rallying to the cause.

Attachments

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary William P. Rogers

-- Will support the President's position in a talk to the
Business Council Saturday evening at Hot Springs.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Secretary David M. Kennedy

- Appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 6th and used that forum to express his support for the President's decision . . . and to encourage the Committee's support.
- Will support the President's position in a talk to the Business Council Saturday night at Hot Springs.

Under Secretary Charls E. Walker

- Strongly supported the President's position in a speech to business students at the University of Missouri, in a speech to the National Association of Business Writers and during a press conference in Boston.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT

Postmaster General Winton M. Blount

- Called Governors Kirk, Rockefeller, Holton, Bartlett and Nunn ... and received favorable responses from each.
- Strongly supported the President's decision in a talk to the Detroit Economic Club.
- Held editorial meetings with each of the Detroit newspapers (Free Press and News) and emphasized wisdom of President's decision.
- Held press conference in Detroit.
- Addressed group of 40 college students and reaffirmed the wisdom of the President's decision to hit supply areas along the Cambodia-South Vietnam border. (Comments during this discussion carried in two newspapers, on three TV stations, and on 3 radio broadcasts.)
- Scheduled to meet for a "general discussion" with 15 students from Princeton University. (Date as yet uncertain -- Meeting to be part of Project Update -- Will strongly support the President.)

Assistant Postmaster General Frank Nunlist

- Addressed the Kentucky Chapter of the National Association of Postmasters and devoted considerable time to stressing the importance of the President's decision. (Talk was favorably received by entire group.)

Assistant Postmaster General Ron Lee

- Spoke before graduate students at Syracuse University. Emphasized wisdom of President's decision during question-and-answer period.

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Secretary Clifford M. Hardin

- Called Dean Grether, University of Nebraska, concerning request from Dean McKay of NYU for closing of Law Schools and elimination of final exams as a part of protest re Cambodia. Dean Grether opposes McKay's request.
- Called President Henry, University of Illinois, concerning campus tensions. He is trying to help us.
- Spent one hour with Cornell University students discussing Vietnam-Cambodia situation and attempting to put our actions in historical perspective.
- Briefed Mr. William McMillen, Executive Vice President of the American National Cattlemen's Association, re Vietnam-Cambodia. Emphasized key points in President's rationale re recent decision.
- Have explained correctness of President's decision in personal conversations with Governors Tiemann, Farrar and LeVander.

Under Secretary J. Phil Campbell

- Visited University of Georgia and talked to students. Emphasized reasons for President's position on Cambodia.
- Held numerous discussions in the State of Georgia with businessmen and farmers. In all cases, the salient points in the President's April 30th talk were stressed. (Almost all of the persons spoken to felt that the President knew what he was doing and indicated a complete willingness to trust him with national security decisions.

Assistant Secretary Clarence Palmby

- Supported the President's decision in separate discussions with seven German agricultural business leaders, delegats of the American Meat Institute, and Congresswoman Catherine May.

Assistant Secretary T. K. Cowden

- Spoke to three college Administrators at Michigan State University and attempted to explain the reasons for the President's Cambodian action. (The group was not sympathetic but more because of what they termed "the treatment the colleges have received -- and the comments directed to college youth by the President and the Vice President" than because of a lack of understanding of international political realities.)

Deputy Under Secretary William Galbraith

- Attended National Executive Committee Meetings of the American Legion Advisory Committee at Indianapolis May 4-6 and while there:
 - Endorsed President's position on Cambodia with representatives of all States in U. S.
 - Helped draft a resolution supporting the President's decision.
 - Made telephone calls to numerous Congressmen and Senators in effort to encourage support for defeat of the Reid amendment.

Executive Assistant E. F. Behrens

- Sent background materials re Vietnam and Cambodia to the 300 members of the Spitzer Agribusiness Group. (A copy of this fact sheet package is attached.)

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Secretary George W. Romney

- Met with group of student journalists studying Federal government operations under a Ford grant. Resume' of remarks appears below:

ON VIETNAM -- "We shouldn't have gotten in there in the first place and should get out as soon as possible." Supported the President's Vietnamization program and noted that our demands at the Paris negotiations have been reduced to an irreducible tolerable minimum.

ON CAMBODIA -- Supported the President on these grounds.

- (1) We cannot continue to allow the North Vietnamese to attack American forces with impunity from privileged sanctuaries if we expect to maintain the withdrawal of our forces from South Vietnam.
- (2) The Cambodian Government has not objected to the presence of our forces.
- (3) We responded to illegal acts by the North Vietnamese.

Noted student protest over the moves in Cambodia and wondered where those protests were when the Russians moved into Czechoslovakia.

ON THE HICKEL LETTER -- Refused to comment other than to say that he viewed himself as a "member of the President's team" ... and that when he wished to communicate his views to the President, he would do so privately.

- Spoke before members of the American Medical Association at the Statler-Hilton. About 50% of talk devoted to putting our Cambodian action in historical perspective and emphasizing correctness of the President's decision. (Presentation taped and made available to radio stations as of 4:00 p.m., May 8th. Eleven requests for material had been received by 6:00 p.m. this date.)

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May 13, 1970

Mr. George Meany
AFL-CIO
815 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Meany:

The President asked me to send you the attached report on U. S. troop successes along the Cambodia border. As you will note, the figures were just compiled ... as of 4:00 p.m. EDT today.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

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May 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE: Grass Roots Support for Your
Cambodia Decision

Despite the wild strafing operation being conducted by the news media, the silent majority is still very much with you and your Vietnam peace plan.

Just since Monday I've received 7 phone calls, 2 wires, and 1 letter from friends and acquaintances all expressing their support and that of others for the strong position you have taken against the Communist forces in Southeast Asia.

Chicago friend: Said his entire office is for you ... executives down through large group of young secretaries.

Scottsdale friend: Said nearly all of his community are with you 100%.

Denver friend (Jack Wogan, whom you met in your office late one afternoon. He's the fellow who sent you the 6,200 supporters' names by wire at noon on November 3rd.): Said he had just sent Hugh Scott a list of 5,000 Denver area supporters for your Cambodia action.

Three POW wives (Separate phone calls -- Calif., Va., and Minn.): All 3 applauded your strong stand in Southeast Asia and said that most other POW wives are equally avid supporters. They believe the action against border sanctuaries will have generally beneficial affects on the prisoner issue.

Pentagon friend: Wanted to convey message that not only DoD officials but the young clerks and secretaries there are solidly behind you.

Dr. Everett S. Graffam (Executive V.P., World Relief Commission): Wrote letter to say that he and the World Relief Commission and the National Association of Evangelicals are in complete agreement with the plan you are following to achieve an early peace in Southeast Asia.

New York friend: Sent telegram of support (attached).

Paul Bradley (President, National Council, People-to-People Program): Sent telegram of support (attached).

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1970

FYI copies sent to:

Messrs. Bull
Chapin
Chotiner
Colson
Klein
Magruder
Nofziger
Odle
Ziegler
General Hughes

Chrou

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT:

Key Points Concerning the Cambodia
Operation

This memorandum reiterates most of the key points made in my correspondence to you of 8:00 a.m. May 7th:

- Basic U.S. policy in Vietnam remains unchanged.
Our goal is to:
 - End American involvement by withdrawing our forces
 - End the war as soon as possible.
- Vietnamization, the process of training the Vietnamese to defend themselves, is moving forward ahead of schedule.
- In the ten days after the President's April 20 speech in which he announced plans for withdrawal of 150,000 American troops within a year, the North Vietnamese changed completely the military situation in Cambodia. They moved out of their sanctuaries and threatened to form a belt of military force down the entire 600-mile length of the Cambodia-South Vietnam border. Any even mild success of such a plan would result in an unacceptable threat to American and allied forces in Vietnam, and particularly to those forces which remained after our next withdrawal increment had departed for home.
- The North Vietnamese changed the political situation also. While Sihanouk was in power we refrained from attacking the base areas because of Cambodian

PERSONAL

neutrality and because the North Vietnamese were generally confined within the sanctuaries. But suddenly, with Sihanouk gone and the North Vietnamese thrusting out of the sanctuary boundaries, we found that we faced the prospect of Cambodia becoming a single large base area for attacks along the entire Cambodia-South Vietnam frontier.

- The President considered several proposed courses of counter-action, and all possible alternatives. Then he decided to act, by authority of his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief, to save the lives of American servicemen in Vietnam.
- The prime purpose of the thrusts into Cambodia is to destroy the enemy's logistics system, facilities, supplies and equipment. The operation will make it impossible for the enemy to use these supply areas effectively for many months. And the rainy season, which will begin in 3-4 weeks, will stretch the period of ineffectiveness and delay to 10-11 months for the simple reason that equipment and materials for whatever rebuilding is contemplated must be brought down to the border territories from North Vietnam.
- This interim time period will give the U. S. and South Vietnam vital additional time to prepare the South Vietnamese to handle their own defense.
- We can state without equivocation that:
 - Our forces will withdraw from Cambodia, back into South Vietnam, within 8 weeks of the starting date of this operation.
 - Vietnamization of the war can and will continue
 - American withdrawals can and will go forward as scheduled.

By this morning, the campaign had proved highly successful. The latest statistics appear on the attached sheet.



Alexander P. Butterfield

Deputy Assistant to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1970

ACTION



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD 

RE: Agenda for May 19th Cabinet Meeting

Of the two proposals which follow, I recommend your approval of "A" because:

- May 19
- Shultz plans to be in the Bahamas Tuesday... on a short vacation; and many of the Cabinet members will hear his productivity briefing at today's CCEP meeting.
 - You said in mid-March that a Cabinet presentation by Chairman Hampton would be appropriate. He would touch on unfilled vacancies, lack of communications between Cabinet officers and regional staffs, prevalent attitudes, and pending reforms of the personnel system.

Proposal A

10:00- Economic Outlook -- McCracken
10:15 (15 min. incl. discussion)

10:15- Family Assistance Plan -- Finch
10:40 (25 min. incl. discussion)

10:40- Civil Service Commission
10:55 Report -- Hampton
(15 min. incl. discussion)

Proposal B

Economic Outlook -- McCracken
(15 min. incl. discussion)


Family Assistance Plan -- Finch
(25 min. incl. discussion)

Productivity -- Shultz
(15 min. incl. discussion)

10:55-11:00 --- The President Departs ---

11:00- Cambodia Operation -- Rogers/Laird
11:30

11:30-- --- Executive Session ---

APPROVE "A" 

APPROVE "B" _____

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1970
9:00 A.M.


PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Material

The attached sheet lists the latest statistics on the Cambodia operation.


Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

PERSONAL

8:00 a.m., May 14, 1970

<u>Total Operations</u>		<u>24-Hour Change</u>
Individual Weapons	7,540	+266
Crew-Served Weapons	1,071	+59
Bunkers Destroyed	3,318	+24
Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	8,474,425	+98,000
Machine Gun Rounds	6,861,388	Unchanged
Rifle Rounds	1,613,037	+98,500
Grenades	12,843	+82
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	4,072	Unchanged
Mortar Rounds	13,384	+153
Large Rocket Rounds	869	Unchanged
Smaller Rocket Rounds	8,536	+380
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	9,418	+56
Rice (lbs)	4,998,000	+218,000
Man Months	109,956	+4,796
Vehicles	178	+7
Boats	40	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	5,404	+226
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,431	+32
US KIA	110	+9
ARVN KIA	285	+10
Mines	1,384	+184

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8:15 A.M.
May 15, 1970

Memo for: Members of the Cabinet

Subject: Briefing Material

I am attaching the latest statistical report on U.S. troop successes in Cambodia.

det
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

08:00 a.m., May 15, 1970

<u>Total Operations</u>		<u>24-Hour Change</u>
Individual Weapons	8,102	+562
Crew Served Weapons	1,046	-25
Bunkers Destroyed	3,410	+92
Machine Gun Rounds	6,867,639	+6251
Rifle Rounds	1,614,364	+1327
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	8,482,003	+7578
Grenades	13,442	+599
Mines	1,448	+64
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	4,072	Unchanged
Mortar Rounds	13,857	+527
Large Rocket Rounds	874	+5
Smaller Rocket Rounds	8,980	+444
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	9,541	+123
Rice (lbs)	5,492,000	+494,000
Man Months	120,824	+10,868
Vehicles	193	+15
Boats	40	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	5,614	+210
POWs (includes Detainees)	1,478	+47
US KIA	125	+15
ARVN KIA	294	+9

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Henry Ford II and Bud Wilkinson
May 19, 1970
4:30 p.m. (15 minutes)

I. PURPOSE

To discuss with Henry Ford and Bud Wilkinson the "game plan" for the National Center for Voluntary Action. Mr. Ford is the new Chairman of the Board of the National Center.

II. BACKGROUND

The President will meet with Mr. Ford and Mr. Wilkinson following the meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Center.

The Executive Committee, which is empowered to act for the Board, will finalize operational plans at its meeting.

The Center's immediate objectives are:

1. To make the Clearinghouse of Information on Voluntary Programs fully operational by the middle of August.
2. To encourage the establishment of "local voluntary action centers" in every community throughout the country.
3. To help the local centers get organized by making expert consultants and a training program available to them.
4. To popularize the concept of volunteering through an Advertising Council campaign.

III. POINTS OF DISCUSSION

The President should thank Mr. Ford for his willingness to take on the important task of serving as Board Chairman of the National Center, and for making available the resources of his organization to help achieve the objectives listed above.

The President may wish to discuss the fact that some communities may need financial support to set up voluntary action centers. This support could be furnished by private foundations or by an experimental program conducted by OEO.

A related subject is the fact that many Americans with low incomes are finding it difficult to serve as volunteers because of out-of-pocket expenses for transportation, baby sitters, meals away from home, etc. The National Center is discussing ways of helping these Americans to become volunteers.

The President may also want to refer to Mr. Ford's recent rejection of a request by Moscow to build a truck factory in the Soviet Union.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8:30 A.M., May 16th

Memo for: Members of the Cabinet
Subject: Briefing Material

The attached sheet provides our most recently compiled statistics on U.S. troop successes in Cambodia.

Because of difficulties encountered trying to reach each of you by special messenger last Sunday, I plan to skip tomorrow's report. The Monday morning compilation will be dispatched next.

A/

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Issued 8:00 a.m. May 16, 1970

Total Operations

24-Hour Change

Individual Weapons	8,595	+493
Crew Served Weapons	1,139	+93
Bunkers Destroyed	3,927	+517
Machine Gun Rounds	6,867,639	Unchanged
Rifle Rounds	1,688,304	+74,060
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	8,555,943	+74,060
Grenades	13,442	Unchanged
Mines	1,448	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	4,237	+165
Mortar Rounds	14,193	+336
Large Rocket Rounds	874	Unchanged
Smaller Rocket Rounds	13,760	+4,780
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	9,631	+90
Rice (lbs)	6,068,000	+576,000
Man Months	133,492	+12,668
Vehicles	197	+4
Boats	40	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	6,096	+482
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,538	+60
US KIA	138	+13
ARVN KIA	317	+23

chron

8:00 a.m., May 19, 1970

Total Operations

24-Hour Change

Individual Weapons	9,494	+385
Crew Served Weapons	1,584	+351
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	4,779	+128
Machine Gun Rounds	7,812,464	Unchanged
Rifle Rounds	3,770,996	+80,720
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	11,583,460	+80,720
Grenades	6,925	+3
Mines	1,865	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	159,047	Unchanged
Mortar Rounds	18,459	-20,420*
Large Rocket Rounds	971	+128
Smaller Rocket Rounds	15,931	+1,011
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	13,567	-729**
Rice (lbs)	6,662,000	+52,000
Man Months	146,564	+1,144
Vehicles	206	-5**
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	142	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	6,882	+387
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,614	+38
US KIA	155	+5
ARVN KIA	353	+22

* Reporting error

** Decreases attributable to MACV figure adjustments

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1970


PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Cambodia Operation

Here is the latest statistical report on the Cambodia operation.


Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

PERSONAL

8:00 a.m., May 21, 1970

Total Operations

Individual Weapons	10,019	+406
Crew Served Weapons	1,640	+32
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	5,287	+20
Machine Gun Rounds	7,812,464	Unchanged
Rifle Rounds	3,834,760	+32,504
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Rounds)	11,647,224	+32,504
Grenades	7,811	+746
Mines	1,894	+10
Satchel Charges	500	Unchanged
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs)	72,000	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	159,027	-20
Mortar Rounds	20,526	+163
Large Rocket Rounds	978	+6
Smaller Rocket Rounds	17,135	+438
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	13,718	+91
Rice (lbs)	7,402,000	+168,000
Man Months	162,844	+3,696
Vehicles	220	+5
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	175	+6
Enemy KIA	7,177	+151
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,759	+28
US KIA	166	+4
ARVN KIA	386	+6

Medical Supplies (lbs) 32,000

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1970
9:00 a.m.


PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials

I am enclosing 3 separate papers: this morning's statistical report on the Cambodia operation, a resume of how severely the first three weeks of that military operation have crippled the enemy, and a copy of a typically objective Denis Warner article taken from the May 11th Denver Post. (Warner is an Australian widely known and generally respected by academicians and journalists for his knowledge of Southeast Asian affairs.)


Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachments

PERSONAL

8:00 a.m., May 25, 1970

* Field Adjustments
Total Operations

Individual Weapons	10,942	+48
Crew Served Weapons	1,618	+22
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	6,630	+215
Machine Gun Rounds	2,592,504	+88,570
Rifle Rounds	5,094,288	+293,710
* Total Small Arms Ammunition (Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)	7,686,792	+382,280
Grenades	12,309	+1,036
Mines	2,826	+15
Satchel Charge	500	Unchanged
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs)	72,000	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	127,353	+381
Mortar Rounds	26,749	+2,142
- Large Rocket Rounds	1,090	Unchanged
Smaller Rocket Rounds	14,799	+97
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	18,552	+441
Rice (lbs)	9,034,000	+578,000
Man Months	198,748	+12,716
Vehicles	264	+8
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	179	Unchanged
Medical Supplies (lbs)	36,000	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	7,857	+139
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,770	-87*
US KIA	196	+3
ARVN KIA	451	+14

* Figures indicating total small arms ammunition captured were erroneous early last week. The correction was made on Thursday, May 21, the day on which you did not receive a report. *NY*

May 23, 1970

Three weeks ago, President Nixon announced to the American people that Allied forces had launched attacks to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. The President explained that our purpose was not to occupy the sanctuary areas, but to quickly drive out the enemy forces and destroy their military supplies.

Now, after three weeks of this limited operation, it is abundantly clear that the enemy has been struck a devastating blow.

We have captured nearly 15 million rounds of ammunition for machine guns, rifles and small arms. That means nearly 15 million bullets that will not be fired at our servicemen and our allies.

We have captured nearly 39,000 mortar and rocket rounds. That means nearly 39,000 blasts that cannot go ripping into Saigon and into American and South Vietnamese bases.

We have captured more than 125,000 anti-aircraft rounds. That means more than 125,000 rounds that cannot be fired at our planes.

We have captured nearly eight million pounds of rice -- enough to feed for more than four months the North Vietnamese forces that were estimated to be in Cambodia at the start of the operation.

We have destroyed more than 5,500 of their bunkers and structures -- mostly military installations.

We have seized nearly 11,000 individual weapons and more than 1,500 big, crew-served weapons -- enough to equip some 20 North Vietnamese infantry battalions at full strength.

While the purpose of this operation has been to destroy the enemy sanctuary bases and capture supplies, and not necessarily to engage the enemy in combat, they have taken a disastrous loss of manpower. At the end of three weeks, 7,552 of the enemy had been killed in action and 1,788 captured. This amounts to a crushing figure of more than 23 percent of the forces the enemy was estimated to have in the area.

We have disrupted the enemy's logistics network and lines of communication. We have struck a heavy blow at his offensive capability. Some American forces already have withdrawn and all will be out of the sanctuaries by June 30.

There can be no doubt now that the results of this operation will reinsure the President's announced withdrawal and Vietnamization programs and will hasten the day when all American forces can safely return home.

#####

Red Buildup Gave Nixon A 'Win or Lose' Choice

By DENIS WARNER

CANBERRA, Australia — The Cambodians were so short of defensive equipment when the war began that on the road leading northeast from Phnom Penh to Kompong Cham, the military built road blocks out of large porcelain jars filled with stones.

At Kompong Cham they moved concrete park benches into the middle of the road. And beyond, on the east bank of the Mekong, troops were at work one day with split bamboo and barbed wire in a futile effort to build cage-like barriers to block the advance.

It did not seem to occur to them that the Viet Cong would come through the paddy fields and plantations and forests and not along the roads. Thus, towns and villages that seemed to be secure one day became islands the next and disappeared under the tide on the third.

Even if the Cambodians had possessed much higher military skills and had been much more adequately equipped to cope with this invasion, their numbers were far from sufficient. Against the perhaps 40,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops engaged against them, they either had to risk defeat in detail by trying to defend too much territory, or to pull back and concentrate on the defense of the capital, and a few vital lines of communication, especially the road and railway to Sihanoukville.

Just how long they might have been able to hold out even here depended primarily on Hanoi's inclinations.

It was a reasonable assumption only two weeks ago that the creation of a People's Republic of Cambodia, imposed by Vietnamese force of arms, and under the name of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was only a matter of time.

I USED to question quite seriously how much military aid the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese received through Sihanoukville before March 13. I know now that a first-class fleet of 150 trucks was working full-time in Cambodia to meet the military and economic needs of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in the Saigon and Mekong delta area.

All the military supplies came from China through Sihanoukville.

I am convinced that South Vietnam could not survive the withdrawal of the American forces if Sihanoukville were to become another Haiphong. Under the circumstances, then, President Nixon had to act or to admit defeat.

Measured against the bitter opposition he knew he would encounter in the United States, his decision to attack

the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia is one of the boldest and bravest political acts of our times.

If it has helped to enlarge the Vietnam war, it has at the same time put the power of the United States in the path of an act of aggression that seemed certain to capture Cambodia and to destroy all hopes for the Vietnamization program in South Vietnam.

On the eve of Nixon's speech I met a distinguished Southeast Asian neutral leader and formerly a close friend of Sihanouk's who sensed that American inaction would set the dominoes falling.

"Go back to Canberra," he said, "and tell the Australian government it ought to push every bit of military equipment it can find into Phnom Penh. It's about the only hope left."

His worries about the situation in Cambodia were fully justified. The Cambodian army has not been trained for war. It was not equipped for war. It did not expect to go to war.

NOTHING teaches more quickly than experience in battle and last week the Cambodians began to fight with greater professionalism. Against the best guerrilla and non-conventional forces in the world, however, they had little hope.

At the same time, it is not easy to be confident that the present action will produce the sort of results that the American public will be looking for as a sign of success. Aerial photography, sensors and ground reconnaissance have pinpointed the bases and much is known about their whereabouts, nature and size.

But the move out of the sanctuaries began as early as March 20 and was no doubt accelerated by an early, and apparently unreported, South Vietnamese air attack. Great supplies of weapons, and communications equipment, will certainly be captured, but the birds in COSVN, Hanoi's command post for South Vietnam, were always fairly well decentralized, as were the installations in which they operated.

Though the American action will help Cambodian

morale and slow down North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military actions around Phnom Penh, these are not results that can be precisely determined. Nor do they seem likely to change North Vietnam's will to win.

The seizure by Communist forces of Attapeu in southern Laos is one sure indication of Hanoi's intent: continuing actions against the heartland of Cambodia.

It may yet begin to appear, then, that the Nixon bid has been a failure. But for Nixon not to have tried would have been a catastrophe.

Register & Tribune Syndicate

5/11 Denver Post

CHRON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Cambodia Operation

I am attaching the latest statistical report on our military operation in Cambodia. You should note that there was an error in the third paragraph of the 2-page resume I sent to you yesterday. We have not captured nearly 15 million rounds of small arms ammunition. The total figure, as it appears on today's report, is 7,816,562 ... of which 2,689,724 rounds are machine gun ammunition and 5,126,838 rounds are rifle ammunition.

A
Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

PERSONAL

8:00 a.m., May 26, 1970

Total Operations

24-Hour Change

Individual Weapons	11,064	+122
Crew-Served Weapons	1,846	+228
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	6,643	+13
Machine Gun Rounds	2,689,724	+97,220
Rifle Rounds	5,126,838	+32,550
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)	7,816,562	+129,770
Grenades	12,574	+265
Mines	2,966	+140
Satchel Charge	500	Unchanged
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs)	72,000	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	130,567	+3,214
Mortar Rounds	29,311	+2,562
Large Rocket Rounds	1,090	Unchanged
Smaller Rocket Rounds	15,061	+262
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	19,565	+1,013
Rice (lbs)	9,120,000	+86,000
Man Months	200,640	+1,892
Vehicles	305	+41
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	179	Unchanged
Medical Supplies (lbs)	36,000	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	8,044	+187
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,773	+3
US KIA	210	+14
ARVN KIA	457	+6

chron

May 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Miscellaneous Items

The Gardener at San Clemente -- Simon Romero, the gardener you wanted hired by the Secret Service, has been hired and is now on the job.

Presidential Protection and Internal Security -- I met before the weekend of May 9-10 with Director Rowley, Pat Boggs, Vince Mroz (the Secret Service official who is directly in charge of the Executive Protective Service), and Bob Taylor to emphasize the importance of precluding complacency by periodically (and frequently) double-checking the validity and effectiveness of procedures with an eye toward achieving maximum efficiency in all things for which they are being held responsible especially, in these times, Presidential protection and internal security in the White House complex. Already the EPS has taken 4 separate actions to improve internal security, and the Secret Service is up-dating its closed-circuit television system so it will provide better vision during hours of darkness and more coverage at all times.

General Department of Secret Service Agents -- Bob Taylor has again spoken to all of his Agents and stressed the importance of their maintaining a relatively soldierly bearing while standing in the West Wing and EOB office areas on duty and their maintaining a position of "military attention" at the appropriate times during ceremonies and other events. He fully agrees that they can do this without degrading their "protective efficiency".

Coffee Cups for the Cabinet Room -- Ron Jackson has received the Franciscan china he ordered some time ago for use during special

occasions ... including meetings of the Cabinet. It is just like the china used aboard SEQUOIA -- off-white in color and bearing a silver Presidential seal. It will be used hereafter at Cabinet Meetings.

Ceremonial Police Hats -- The purchase transaction has been completed. One cap has been delivered to Lucy Ferguson (for eventual deposit in the Richard Nixon Library); one cap in an old box will be delivered to your office this afternoon; one cap in an old box will be delivered to John Ehrlichman's office this afternoon; and two caps, each gift wrapped, will be kept under lock and key in Steve Bull's office.

Chateau-Margaux '59 -- In accordance with the President's instruction one case of Chateau-Margaux '59 (for personal use) was taken to Key Biscayne two weeks ago. Another case will be taken to San Clemente tomorrow.

chron

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By JHS NARA Date 3/25/2016

May 27, 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lieutenant General R. G. Stilwell
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Room 3E-648, The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20310

Dear General Stilwell:

I just came across this book in my file
and hasten now to return it to your office. It
served its purpose well at this end of the line
and, along with my apologies for not getting it
back to you months ago, I want to thank you and
your staff for putting it together so efficiently
and dispatching it so quickly at the time of our
request.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

chron

May 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
MR. SAFIRE

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

RE: Suggested Remarks for the President
Thursday Evening, May 28th

The President has just reviewed Bill Safire's "suggested remarks" for tomorrow night. Whereas he said that he did not plan to "go into anything that deeply, or go on for that long", he thought they were fine as "suggested remarks" ... and that no more need be done.

cc: Mr. Keogh

chron

May 27, 1970

PERSONAL

Major Glenard E. Lanier
Commanding Officer
Executive Protective Service
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Major Lanier:

You will be pleased to know that those who served with the White House Police will not have to relinquish their old badges when the new EPS badges are issued.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

PERSONAL

Chrov

May 27, 1970

Mr. George Meany
President, AFL-CIO
815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Meany:

Here is another statistical report
on U. S. successes in the Cambodia
operation. These are the latest figures --
current as of 8:00 a.m. today.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

Chron

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1970


PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Material

Here is another statistical report on U. S. successes in the Cambodia operation. These are the latest figures -- current as of 8:00 a.m. today.


Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

PERSONAL

8:00 a.m., May 27, 1970

<u>Total Operations</u>		<u>24-Hour Change</u>
Individual Weapons	11,845	+811
Crew-Served Weapons	2,031	+185
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	6,986	+343
Machine Gun Rounds	3,085,724	+396,000
Rifle Rounds	5,719,718	+592,880
<u>Total Small Arms Ammunition</u> (Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)	<u>8,805,442</u>	+988,880
Grenades	16,790	+4,216
Mines	3,102	+36
Satchel Charge	500	Unchanged
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs)	72,000	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	134,299	+3,732
Mortar Rounds	29,537	+266
Large Rocket Rounds	1,097	+7
Smaller Rocket Rounds	16,107	+1,046
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	20,500	+935
Rice (lbs)	9,556,000	+436,000
Man Months	210,232	+9,592
Vehicles	310	+5
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	180	+1
Medical Supplies (lbs)	36,000	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	8,171	+127
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,777	+4
US KIA	219	+9
ARVN KIA	465	+8

Chow

May 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUGH SLOAN

FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Hugh:

Because the attached telegram to the President was dispatched from Boston on May 26th, I believe that Dr. Turgeon (the sender) deserves an answer today -- either by wire or by telephone.

Many thanks.

Attachment

Chen

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 28, 1970

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

SUBJECT: Briefing Material

Here is today's statistical report on the US-ARVN successes in Cambodia. (The next such report will be dispatched on June 2.)

I am also enclosing two especially good articles by Peregrine Worsthorne, both taken from London's "Sunday Telegraph" ... one on May 3rd and one on May 10th.

Alexander P. Butterfield

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachments

PERSONAL

<u>Total Operations</u>		<u>24-Hour Change</u>
Individual Weapons	11,976	+131
Crew-Served Weapons	2,100	+69
Bunkers/Structures Destroyed	7,101	+115
Machine Gun Rounds	3,176,512	+90,808
Rifle Rounds	5,822,903	+103,185
Total Small Arms Ammunition (Machine Gun & Rifle Rounds)	8,999,415	+193,973
Grenades	20,973	+4,183
Mines	3,204	+102
Satchel Charge	500	Unchanged
Miscellaneous Explosives (lbs)	72,000	Unchanged
Anti-Aircraft Rounds	134,299	Unchanged
Mortar Rounds	31,470	+1,933
Large Rocket Rounds	1,097	Unchanged
Smaller Rocket Rounds	17,952	+1,845
Recoilless Rifle Rounds	20,395	-105
Rice (lbs)	9,790,000	+2,340,000
Man Months	215,380	+5,148
Vehicles	317	+7
Boats	40	Unchanged
Generators	36	Unchanged
Radios	180	Unchanged
Medical Supplies (lbs)	36,000	Unchanged
Enemy KIA	8,128	-43
POWs (Includes Detainees)	1,797	+20
US KIA	225	+6
ARVN KIA	467	+2

NIXON'S FATEFUL CHOICE

PEREGRINE WORSTHORNE sees Cambodia as an optimist's gamble, a gesture of supreme courage and confidence

FOOLHARDY, politically perilous, militarily rash—such descriptions can properly be applied to President Nixon's action in ordering American troops to engage the Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia. But it is also bold, resolute and high-principled. Here is a national leader doing what duty demands, in defiance of every conceivable calculation of caution, inclination and personal advantage. It is, in this sense, an amazing decision. Who would have thought that President Nixon, the Tricky Dicky of old, would show such conspicuous courage?

The language he used on television chilled the blood. But then our blood is thin. We are unaccustomed to the rhetoric of rectitude. It is meant to be out of fashion. "I would rather be a one-term President and do what is right than be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history." It is magnificent; not, admittedly, the language of diplomacy or prevarication or compromise, still less of a country preparing to scuttle. Not since the splendid days of the Cuban missile crisis has the voice of America sounded so convinced and convincing.

Already, needless to say, cries of indignation and alarm can be heard across the world, not least from the Labour party here. Alarm is reasonable. It is alarming to see the war extended. But there are no possible grounds for indignation.

Cambodia, a member of the United Nations, an independent neutral State, is in danger of falling victim to North Vietnamese aggression. There is no question about this. It is possible to argue that Vietnam itself is one country and that American intervention there is unjustified interference in a civil war. But intervention in defence of Cambodia cannot be faulted in principle. Right in this case is clearly and unequivocally on the American side. Wisdom may not be. That remains to be seen.

The danger, of course, is that American troops will get bogged down in Cambodia, as they have been in South Vietnam. If this were to happen, and the promised withdrawal of American troops had to be cancelled, President Nixon would suffer grievous political damage. But the danger would have been equally great without intervention, since if Cambodia had been allowed to fall to Viet Cong attack this would have posed such a dire threat to South Vietnam security as to rule out American withdrawal for many years to come.

Hanoi, in ordering the attack on Phnom Penh, was seeking a short cut to complete victory; was assuming that America's will to continue the war had been broken. President Nixon's reaction has proved this assumption wrong.

Everything now depends on the speed and skill of the American military operation. If it proves successful it could decisively shorten the war, just as if unsuccessful it can do the

opposite. The Cambodia sanctuary has been a major source of Communist strength. If removed, it will make the South Vietnamese task infinitely easier. If the Americans fail to remove it, then their task and that of the South Vietnamese becomes infinitely harder.

Presumably the American military authorities are confident of success. Yet they have often been wrong before. President Johnson was repeatedly promised military successes which never materialised. If President Nixon now suffers the same experience his political fate at home will be as unenviable as that of his predecessor.

Nothing is served by underestimating the extreme gravity of the risks involved. Any result short of a swift and decisive American victory will mean prolongation of the war and hideous political trouble at home. Victory, on the other hand, will decisively shorten the war, and allow America to carry on with the planned withdrawal against a background of military success which will restore her confidence and reputation.

It is deplorable, in these circumstances, that the British Government should be so slow to lend backing to America's action. The coup against Prince Sihanouk was a major event, opening up prospects for a catastrophic worsening of the American position—by giving the Communists an excuse for taking over the country—or for a triumphant improvement, by obliging Americans to try to drive the Communists out once and for all.

A demoralised American Administration would undoubtedly have resigned itself to the first alternative, much to the Labour party's satisfaction. No doubt Mr. Wilson would have acclaimed such a course as the higher statesmanship. Senator Fulbright, too, would have applauded. In the event, however, Mr. Nixon has reacted like a hawk rather than a dove, summoning the American people to one last great effort to conclude the war on a note of glory.

His courage may be rewarded. Clearly the Communists may not have expected this bold riposte. Their headquarters in Cambodia, from which operations in South Vietnam are controlled and sup-

plied, could be in grave jeopardy; so also their reserves. The Americans, in short, may be poised on the edge of a decisive victory.

After such endless disappointments, the thought of success is difficult to believe. The world is inured to American failure, resigned to the flood of defeatism. But this is what makes the President's action so notable. It is an optimist's gamble, a gesture of supreme courage and confidence, a sign of unflinching determination, a reminder to the world of America's continued resilience and fortitude.

The implications, of course, are world-wide. This is President Nixon's Cuba, his first deadly challenge. If he had turned aside, the Russians would have been quick to take the lesson to heart. As it is, they will have learnt that it is unwise to take him for granted—a lesson, one can hope, with particular relevance at the present time to the deteriorating situation in the Middle East.

Britain can do little except hold her breath, an exercise in self-restraint that the Labour party is congenitally unsuited to make. No one can imagine that the United States Government is unaware of the dangers it is running. Nothing but direst necessity would have prompted the President to put his political future so direly in jeopardy.

This is not an action of a trigger-happy nation in search of imperial kicks. No nation is so clearly trigger-unhappy as America today. But she is responding to the call of duty. There is something rather rare and marvellous in this spectacle. The giant is weary but unbowed, disillusioned but not cowed, wary but not craven. She needs our prayers, which is all we have to give, not recrimination or condemnation.

If the President has miscalculated he will suffer enough at the hands of his own people. Let our message be clear: admiration for his courage, and fervent hope for the success of a venture that is rooted in high principle and noble purpose.

THE SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH
MAY 3, 1970

} London,
England

No White House

PEREGRINE WORSTHORNE says the North Vietnamese will find that in President Nixon they face a man who will not let go

Weakling

THE first and perhaps the most important point to notice about the American crisis over Cambodia is that the man in charge, President Nixon, is not what most of the American and British Press say he is—a weakling posing as a warrior, a panicky opportunist trying to prove himself a heroic statesman, a chronic trickster reverting to form. His critics might be better off if he were, since weaklings, opportunists and tricksters are at least flexible and tend to bend before the wind, without waiting to be broken.

Mr. Nixon, however, is a man who does not easily give way, whose political reputation was originally made by refusing to give way; by refusing to give way, moreover, to precisely those forces of political liberalism, ideological dissent and youthful idealism which are today once again ranging themselves against him in furious condemnation.

The original occasion, of course, was the case of the American traitor Alger Hiss, hero of the American "establishment", whom Mr. Nixon single-handedly exposed, defying the whole massed weight of "informed" opinion which was convinced of his innocence.

I was in Washington during those years. Richard Nixon was the victim then of a sustained and vitriolic smear campaign. Polite society refused to touch him with a barge-pole, let alone the hand of friendship. He was a social and political pariah, shunned and derided. Yet he refused to bend, and was eventually proved abundantly right, although never forgiven by those he proved wrong.

This was the beginning of the myth of "Tricky Dicky". What is the point of recalling this story today? Because it shows Mr. Nixon to be the very opposite of what his detractors accuse him of being. It

shows him to be determined to the point of obstinacy, thick-skinned, single-minded and, once convinced of the rightness of his cause, relentless and ruthless in his pursuit.

It is too early to be sure that the Cambodian operation is such a cause. The signs from Washington still suggest a certain Presidential ambivalence. But if the President has set his heart on it, no amount of protest will deflect him from it.

Compared to both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, each of whose political careers was marked by extreme political deviousness, Richard Nixon stands out as having always been remarkably consistent; consistently anti-Communist, starting long before it was fashionable to be so, long before Joe McCarthy. Nixon did not climb on to a bandwagon. When he started his campaign to bring Hiss to justice anti-Communism was a derelict, miserable wheelbarrow.

This, then, is the man in charge at the White House today, not the caricature presented by so much of the Press. Hitherto the Vietnam war has not been Mr. Nixon's war. This might not matter if he really were "Tricky Dicky", since such a President, recognising the weight of opposition mounting against him, or recognising that the military gamble had failed, would have no scruples about getting out. But the real Mr. Nixon is not a type to let go easily.

The danger is that the North Vietnamese may have grievously miscalculated, encouraged to believe that they were dealing with a caricature rather than the reality. The overthrow of Prince Sihanouk presented them with a great temptation: to make a bid for total control of Cambodia, with all this would mean in rendering the American position in South Vietnam untenable. But in giving way to this temptation, thereby provoking the American reaction,

the hawkish camp, without perhaps realising what this may mean.

How could they be expected to realise, since the picture painted of the President in his own country is so grossly misleading? They probably still believe that they are dealing with a weakling posing as a warrior. This mistake, for which the American Press must bear the responsibility, could cost the world a tragically high price.

But the highest price for this misunderstanding may well be paid by America herself. One reads the *New York Times*, for example, with dreadful fascination as it trots out all the arguments most certain to inflame student opinion against the Cambodian operation, practically encouraging them to take to the streets and campuses in violent opposition. Does this organ of the liberal establishment not realise what manner of President they are inciting the students to confront?

The *New York Post*, another such organ, sought to suggest last week that Mr. Nixon's Cambodian foray was the action of an impotent man seeking to demonstrate his virility, the implication he could easily be

frightened off by a show of real strength. This is playing with fire with a vengeance. So also is our own *New Statesman's* ludicrous comparison between the Nixon of today and the Anthony Eden of the Suez period.

Can the Anglo-American liberal establishment not realise that the man now in the White House is a formidable figure, who has to be taken seriously—a President who believes in his cause just as passionately as they believe in theirs, and who will prove just as relentless, yes and just as violent in opposing them as they are likely to be in opposing him?

Unfortunately it is not the editors of these liberal organs who will be in the firing-line. They merely incite the students from the safe sanctuary of their editorial ivory towers. It is the students who will pay the price, as is already bloodily apparent. Such is the terrible, inexorable logic that flows from the false premise of the "Tricky Dicky" legend, propagation of which it games the public not only to hate their President, which is crazy enough, but also to underestimate him, which could prove calamitous.

Mr. Nixon is not Lyndon B. Johnson. He will not abdicate. Nor can he. It is madness to suppose that the forces of protest can humiliate two Presidents in swift succession, without calling into question the very basis of constitutional government. Even if his character did not incline him to be tough, his situation forces him to be so. For a second President to allow his foreign policy to be shaped by campus pressure would turn America into a kindergarten State. Better a divided America, convulsed in tumult, than one united under the domination of student princes whose idea of statecraft is inspired by nothing weightier than John Lennon's melody "All We Are Saying Is Give Peace a Chance."

That, believe it or not, is the refrain that they will be singing this weekend in front of the White House. Presumably the Labour party Left will find the spectacle deeply moving. Others, however, would not wish to see the free world's shield reduced to a sound-ing-board for current "Top of the Pops", the voice of America taken

over by the sound of beat—in every sense—music.

This is what is now at stake in the United States. Of course the Cambodian operation is a gamble. Nobody can be confident of its successful outcome. But it is part of a coherent and potentially statesmanlike strategy to enable South Vietnam, and indeed South-East Asia generally, to develop in its own way, without having the political patterns determined—as they have been in Eastern Europe—by the presence of a Red Army. The strategy can be debated and criticised, and plainly it is desirable that it should be.

But student protest has to be recognised for what it has become: a totally irrational and hysterical escape into unreality. It is not based on any coherent alternative foreign policy. If the student will is allowed to prevail, a situation will develop wherein the strongest power the world has ever known is reduced literally to puerility.

What is so terrifying is that influential figures on both sides of the Atlantic are prepared to urge the President to make concessions, to take the protest seriously, all in the name of avoiding strife and turmoil. The great organs of the American East Coast Press lend the students their support. This is inexcusable irresponsibility. It is silly enough for students to claim, and be encouraged in so doing, to run the universities. But they are now claiming to run American foreign policy, indeed the American Government. Such is the really terrifying escalation not of the war but of the movement against the war. This is what has got to be halted, peacefully if possible—the President is clearly not seeking a confrontation—but with force if necessary.

"Tricky Dicky" would certainly not be the man to stand up to the challenge. That is why it is so important that everybody should realise—and the sooner the better—that the man in the White House is not "Tricky Dicky" but somebody whose true measure his enemies both at home and abroad have always failed to take, as they may, with luck, be about to discover.

Chron

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By JUS NARA Date 3/25/2016

May 28, 1970

PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
FROM: ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
RE: Secretary of Commerce

You may recall my memorandum expressing concern over the obvious moves being made by the liberal press to discredit Maury Stans. (A copy is attached.) Those I spoke to about this matter seemed to agree readily that the situation was worthy of concern ... and some remedial action designed (preferably) to portray a close personal relationship between Maury and the President.

If we're serious about this we can move directly into Act One today. Maury is scheduled to deliver the commencement address at the University of San Diego tomorrow, Friday, May 29th. His traveling west with the President on Air Force one, and appearing at Billy Graham's rally at Knoxville enroute, would go far toward countering the press reports that he is falling out of favor.

If you think this plan has merit and want to put it into effect, but need extra space on the airplane to do so (which is my guess), I'll very willingly drop out.

Attachment

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