

CRW
August 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUCHANAN

The President asked me to remind you of a point which he made to you previously ... i.e. in the future, editorials and columns from the New York Times and the Washington Post need not be included in the news summaries which you prepare daily for his review.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Personnel Status Report No. 26 (as of August 8, 1969)

The consolidation of weekly personnel reports from the 12 major Departments indicates that:

(a) 233 positions at Level V and above have been filled out of 266 such positions designated (... a completion percentage of 87.6).


(b) There are 1,993 non-career positions available.

(c) Incumbents of 1,622 of the 1,993 non-career positions have been or are to be replaced.

--Incumbents of 1,252 of the 1,622 non-career positions have been replaced (... a completion percentage of 77):

--Incumbents of 370 of the 1,622 non-career positions are to be replaced.

(d) Of the 1,252 appointments made, 983 were to Republicans, 92 were to Democrats, 74 were to Independents, and 103 were to persons of unknown political affiliation (including 49 FSO's).


ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Flemming
Mr. Trent

9/4/1969

VI-3A 16-SEATER


2

SEATING ASSIGNMENTS

1. Mrs. Mitchell
2. Attorney General
3. Ambassador Mosbacher
4. Mrs. Mosbacher
5. Senator Baker
6. Bryce Harlow
7. H. R. Haldeman
8. Mrs. Harlow
9. H. Kissinger
10. J. Ehrlichman
11. A. Butterfield
12. D. Chapin
13. P. Vaky
14. Hartley
15. T. Lake
16. Thawley

Date: September 8, 1969


Trip Description: Del Rio
to dam and return.



2ND DRAFT (SEPT 16TH 1969)

REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

————— general supervisory channels
 - - - - - administrative channels



The President's Advisory Council on Exec Organization is working on this structure and will present its plan o/A Sept. 20. (The BOB would become a part of this office)

Essentially as now organized.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Initial Action Plan to Follow Your SST Announcement

Immediately subsequent to your 9:00 a.m. SST announcement follow-up action will begin. Planned events, in their chronological order, are listed below:

1. At his own press conference in the Roosevelt Room (after your departure to the Oval office) Secretary Volpe will elaborate as is necessary and answer questions put to him by press corps members. 9:05 a.m.
Tues.
2. Chairman Morton will release a supporting statement from the National Committee Headquarters. 10:00 a.m.
Tues.
3. Bryce Harlow's staff (Nofziger et al) will deliver to predesignated members of the Congress -- Senator Scott and others -- one, two, and three paragraph statements citing the wisdom of your decision and emphasizing the international leadership aspect, etc. (These statements and fact sheets were prepared last night at the Department of Transportation ... under the personal supervision of Jim Beggs.) 10:00-11:00 a.m.
Tues.
4. Chairman Morton will back your SST decision, and emphasize its advantages to the nation, during his taping of a "talk show" which is scheduled to be nationally televised later in the week. 11:00 a.m.
Tues.

5. An edited transcript of your comments, and those of Secretary Volpe (including the question-answer session) will be forwarded to all major aviation publications, and to editorial writers. Tues.
6. Carlyle Jones, the Washington, D. C. Director of Aerospace magazine, will devote full time to insuring that the transcribed material gets to aerospace industry leaders. Tues.
7. FAA will hold a special backgrounder for aviation writers -- one which enlarges on today's Roosevelt Room session. Tues.
8. FAA will select a briefing team and an itinerary of its planned visits to the media in key aerospace cities for the purpose of providing background information on the SST program. Tues. -
Wed.
9. The Department of Transportation will deliver to the National Committee sufficient fact sheet material for circulation by the committee to Republican leaders and Governors throughout the country. Tues. -
Wed.
10. Herb Klein will hold a press conference in New York City late Wednesday morning, and speak at noon to the PR Society of America. During both events he will emphasize the benefits to be derived from the SST program and your decision to move forward into Phase III.* Wed.

*Somewhat unlike the Safeguard decision of March 14th, this morning's announcement makes known your decision to move from Phase II to Phase III of an existing (US-SST) program... albeit the previous Administration allowed the program to slip into limbo for an inexcusably long period. (Ph. I -- design competition, Lockheed vs. Boeing, etc; Ph. II -- defining airframe, engine, etc. configurations and specifications; Ph. III -- actually "cutting metal" and manufacturing the hardware; Ph. IV -- aircraft production)

- W* 11. Press kits, more elaborate than the regular fact sheet material, will be mailed to editors and publishers nationwide ... with particular emphasis being given to the cities and areas identified with the aerospace industry (Washington, Texas, California, etc.). Wed.
- W* 12. Financial and business editors of the country's leading newspapers will be brought in and given a backgrounder (probably at the White House). Wed.
- W* 13. Boeing Aircraft Company will furnish Klein's office with samples of supporting literature designed for wide circulation. Wed. - Thurs.
- W* 14. Herb Klein will devote time to the SST topic during a televised address in Detroit to the Radio and TV News Directors Association. Thurs.
- W* 15. Secretary Laird will devote time to favorable comment on your SST decision during his address to the National Press Club (Washington, D. C.) Thurs.
- W* 16. Nofziger will arrange for Congressional praise of your SST decision in newsletters and other media used by Congressmen to inform their constituents of key events. Thurs.
- W* 17. Either FAA Administrator Shaffer or his Chief Engineer, Charles Blake, (or both) will be scheduled to discuss the meaning and future of the US-SST project on locally and nationally televised programs. Thurs. - Fri.
- W* 18. Herb Klein will talk about the SST program and its importance to the maintenance of our international leadership during a dinner address to the San Francisco Press Club. Fri.
- W* 19. Lyn Nofziger will see to it that follow-on statements are provided key Congressmen and that all are kept abreast of SST developments. Fri.

Mr 20. The Republican National Committee's weekly news
bulletin, "Monday", will feature your SST announce- Mon.
ment (circulation 15,000).

Back 21. The Vice President will give solid support to your
SST decision during his televised talk to the Execu- Mon.
tive Club of Chicago.

Because of our purposely delayed notification of your announce-
ment schedule to staff and department personnel - several of
whom are being held responsible for completion of the actions
outlined above - this plan can be considered only a "starter", a
preliminary step to get the ball rolling. A more complete
revision will be prepared and forwarded to you on Thursday. It
will be based on the news media reactions of Tuesday and

Wd
Wednesday.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Progress Report on Press Conference Support Plan

You asked for a report by 8:45 this morning which would give you clearly and factually the status and results to date of pre-planned press conference support activities. That information appears below.

Planning Efforts -- General

On Thursday afternoon I met with personally, or contacted by phone, Keogh, Dent, Nofziger, Costello (because Klein was in Detroit), Ziegler, Chapin, and Garbett (because Rog Morton was not available). Each was reminded of the time and place of the press conference and asked to:

- "Think of and jot down now" the most effective ways in which his office could promote your press conference responses, i.e. by accentuating to the maximum all positive points and playing down or eliminating anything which might come across negatively.
- Personally observe the press conference and as many news analyses as possible during the half hour immediately following.
- Meet with six other staff members and me at 1:00 p.m. to discuss the conference and present orally the list of "things to be done by his office" ... for which he will be responsible.

On Friday morning each game plan participant was called again and reminded of the importance of having his basic plan drawn up before the press conference started ... so that only press conference substance need be considered, and appropriate modifications applied, at the 1:00 p.m. meeting.

On Saturday morning each game plan participant (except Harry Dent) was called again, and each reported that his portion of the plan was being implemented. Additionally, at your direction, Pat Buchanan was told to contact Buckley and Kilpatrick and to get a "special letter" out to Seavareid and one or two others.

Report from Garbett (on Rog Morton's Staff)

The most positive portions of the press conference transcript were inserted in the Committee's weekly publication, "Monday", which went to press at 4:00 Friday afternoon. The publication, with a circulation of some 15,000, emphasized your call for a united front on America's Vietnam position and your statement to the effect that the Republican party is a national party. A copy of "Monday" is attached.

Rog Morton spoke, as planned, on Saturday morning to the National Federation of Republican Women's convention. The group of 2,700 was assembled along with more than 3,000 guests at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Rog emphasized a number of the points you made in your press conference -- especially your appeal for a united front. The talk was most favorably received.

Jim Allison spoke, as planned, in Midland, Texas. He too emphasized your call for unity and the highlights of his talk appeared in the Midland Reporter Telegram and the Lubbock Avalanche Journal. Additionally, they were carried by the AP state wire. Allison reported from Texas last night that your press conference had received extremely wide TV coverage throughout Texas and that general comment was very favorable.

Saturday morning the Committee sent out copies of the complete press conference transcript to all national Committeemen and women, and to all State Chairmen. Enclosed with each transcript was a letter suggesting that your responses to questions be reiterated and emphasized publicly at every opportunity over the next 7-10 day period with thought given to the probable public appeal by area and region.

Report from Klein and Costello

Herb Klein spoke, as planned, to the San Francisco Press Club and emphasized a number of your press conference responses as well as your smooth performance and sincerity. He said that all went well in California and that he had checked newspaper press

coverage throughout the country and found it to be (in his opinion) the "widest possible". He said that you could not have come out any better in the news and that your press conference had resulted in an average of five separate stories on Page 1 of the nation's leading newspapers.

Herb Klein talked to Kaplow and Chancellor after the press conference and before he took off for California. He said that both of them expressed the opinion that your press conference "was great", but that the business about Laos might cause a stir.

Herb's staff has not yet called all of the Public Affairs officers in the Federal departments and agencies. Costello said that three or four had been called and that the balance would be contacted Monday morning.

Costello did call, as planned, fifteen key friendly big-city newspaper editors and he did review with them the high points of the transcript. (Some of the cities include Chicago, Detroit, Columbus, Ohio, Dallas and Houston.) Costello said that it was too early to give an accurate report on the results of this action. He did say however -- and Herb confirmed this later last night -- that results as indicated by excerpts from these fifteen "big city" newspapers would be the subject of a separate report to you on Tuesday afternoon.

Klein's staff did mail, as planned, complete press conference transcripts to over 1,000 editors, editorial writers and columnists. Results of this effort will be included in his Tuesday report (mentioned above).

Klein's staff has not yet zeroed in on the Negro press but assured me last night that this pre-planned action will be accomplished today.

Klein taped a 12-minute interview which will play this week on CBS stations across the country ... and which he thinks will be helpful.

Report from Harry Dent

Harry called a number of Party chairmen and instructed them to use excerpts of the press conference transcript as most appropriate for their particular areas. His efforts were put forth in conjunction with actions taken by the National Committee. It is significant to add, however, that Harry spent the weekend in South Carolina. He said that portions of your press conference appeared on TV throughout Saturday and Sunday and that comment throughout all of the South

was very favorable. Emphasis in that part of the country was given, of course, to your support for Haynsworth and your middle-of-the-road position on desegregation. Harry said these two points received top billing in the newspapers as well as on TV.

Report from Lyn Nofziger

Gerry Ford and Les Arends did support your press conference highlights, as planned, with written handouts to the press. I should add, however, that both Congressmen expressed some disappointment at the lack of press play which resulted.

Although Hugh Scott's press man was anxious for press conference material for the Senator to use on the floor Friday afternoon, there is nothing in the Congressional Record of that date to indicate that anything at all was said. But the Record did reveal supporting statements by Senator Cliff Hansen of Wyoming and Senator Miller of Iowa.

On Friday afternoon Senator Hruska did issue, as planned, public statements in support of Haynsworth ... as a follow-up to your press conference comments. Hruska's statements were buried rather deeply in a Washington Post article.

Report from John Whitaker

Highlights of your press conference were telephoned to Volpe's press secretary in Chicago where he (Volpe) was speaking at a large luncheon gathering hosted by Mayor Daley. The notes were handed to Volpe in time for him to reiterate your call for unity on the Vietnam issue. The remark received enthusiastic applause. Secretary Volpe spoke again, later in the day, back here in Washington. On this occasion, speaking to the Massachusetts delegation of the National Federation of Republican Women, he followed through with a number of your press conference topics.

Report from Ron Ziegler

Ron spoke, as planned, to Associated Press publishers in Monterey, California. He hit hard in support of the points you made in your press conference and his comments were carried by the AP wire.

Jerry Warren reported that most of the White House Press Corps expressed the opinion that your performance on Friday "was brilliant". Jerry said that highly complimentary remarks came from John Cauley

of the Kansas City Star, Bob Young of the Chicago Tribune, Sim Fentress of TIME magazine, and Nancy Dickerson of NBC.

Report from Jim Keogh

Jim Keogh is in the process of working with Lyn Nofziger. Jim is underscoring press conference highlights and forwarding 1, 2, and 3 paragraph comments on each to Nofziger's office for immediate follow-up use by selected Senators and Congressmen.

Report from Pat Buchanan

I was unable to contact Pat Buchanan last night but did learn from Mort Allin that Pat's analysis of press conference news nationwide would be on your desk this morning. Allin knew of the requirement for Pat to write a letter to Seavareid and one or two others but he did not know the status of the project.

Conclusion

It is all too obvious that there are weaknesses in our pre-planning and follow-through "project support" programs. Whereas I must assume responsibility for the mediocrity of the press conference game plan I believe our over-all problem as a staff is due to (1) a lack of thorough advance planning as a group and (2) a general lack of discipline. Several of us (Dwight, Ken Cole, Bob and I) are working on ideas for improved procedures -- a system which will insure automatic support in proportion to the significance and/or potential of an event.

September 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense

This memorandum concerns Mr. Charles J. West, Jr., a consultant on Bryce Harlow's staff who has been very helpful to us, in a number of ways, since his initial assignment last February. West's contract is due to expire tomorrow, September 30 -- but both Bryce and Ken BeLieu have just informed me that because of the importance of his current project it will be to the decided advantage of the Administration to retain his consultant services through the end of the calendar year. In that West's project is directly related to Defense and DoD interests I would like to ask you to agree to his transfer to your rolls effective October 1st. His present salary is \$100 per day and expenses.

It is my understanding that Carl Wallace has talked to Ken BeLieu on this and is familiar with the circumstances.

H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to the President

By: APB

Cherry

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield *A*

Subject: Plan for Implementing and Promoting the Listening
Post Proposal

Len Garment and Bud Wilkinson have put their heads together and come up with the major portions of the following plan for implementing and promoting (initially on a pilot project basis) your pre-inaugural Listening Post proposal.

Selected Subject Area of Interest: Housing and Urban Development

Key Participants: Secretary Romney should lead the first tour and Pat Moynihan should participate as the White House representative.

- A White House Staff member on the travelling team will insure White House identity and Presidential interest.

Selected Locale: Philadelphia ... with Chicago serving as an alternate site.

- Dick Van Dusen advises that Philadelphia is one of the "central" cities of the new regional plan, that it has numerous HUD projects in progress, and that Secretary Romney has not yet visited that city's regional office.

Prime Objectives: To promote efficiency and higher morale within the regional offices, to generate constructive ideas, to give visibility to the Federal government's community interests and prove its accessibility to citizens at the local level, and of course to enhance nationwide the image of the President and the Administration.

The Advance Team: A highly competent HUD representative selected in close coordination with Secretary Romney and/or Dick Van Dusen (to lead); a White House Fellow assigned to HUD; a HUD, OEO, or White House (from Moynihan's staff) representative experienced in pulling

together crowds and audiences; and a good PIO man who thoroughly understands how to work with local news media personnel and how to get the most PR mileage out of any event.

- The team should go to Philadelphia at least ten days prior to the scheduled listen-in.
- They should inspect thoroughly all HUD projects in progress and all regional office activities.
- They should get to know the people with whom they will be dealing and gain at least a feel for the personalities and moods of the local citizenry.
- They should make a special point of identifying any and all problems which Secretary Romney might be able to quickly alleviate.
- They should select an appropriate public meeting place.
- They should contact informally local press personnel and brief them via backgrounders as to the project's mission and purpose. (Nothing during this advance period should be given to the press in the way of a formal announcement. Great care must be taken in the establishment of these news media contacts.)
- They should select individual citizens, and possibly two or three small groups of citizens, from the community to meet with Secretary Romney.
- They should prepare statements for Secretary Romney as appropriate.
- They should consider and pre-arrange for logistic support.
- They should return to Washington in sufficient time to brief the Secretary thoroughly and to travel with him during his Philadelphia visit.

The Formal Announcement: By Secretary Romney at HUD, or by the President and Secretary Romney together here at the White House.

- It should make the purposes of the project very clear to all.

- It should clarify the direct relationship between the listen-in project and the President's pre-inaugural proposal.
- It should state the experimental nature of the program ... that it is being undertaken on this occasion on a pilot project basis.
- It should take place only after the advance work has been completed ... and has confirmed the probable success of each aspect of this or a modified plan.
- It should be followed up actively by the news media.

The Travelling Party: Secretary Romney, Moynihan, the local Congressman, a HUD photographer, and the four advance men previously mentioned.

The Schedule of Events: Secretary Romney's visit to Philadelphia need not exceed one day in duration. It should include:

- A visit to the HUD regional office and discussions there with the regional staff on current problems and future goals.
- A walking tour through the area to visit all urban (HUD-related) projects and to meet a cross-section of the citizenry.
- A public meeting with community leaders -- a meeting which includes but is not confined to local officials. (See next paragraph for details.)
- A press conference which will announce as widely as possible-- via radio, TV, and newspaper -- what the Secretary heard, saw and learned. Moynihan and probably the local Congressman should participate in this press conference.

The Public Meeting: The major event ... and should be considered and planned as such.

- It should be arranged as a constructive session ... but with the understanding that most of it will involve the airing of complaints.
- An effort should be made to assemble a true cross-section of affected persons within the community.

- There should be welcoming remarks by a moderator ... appropriately the regional director.
- There should be opening remarks by Secretary Romney and Presidential Assistant Moynihan. Together they should explain the program in its most basic and simple terms, i.e. "we are not here to lecture but to listen," etc.
- The moderator should be prepared to take questions and comments from the floor and see that they are properly directed to Romney, Moynihan, and possibly the local Congressman.
- The moderator should be prepared in advance to move the discussion from one subtopic to another until the main interests of the audience are covered.
- There should be a closing statement by Secretary Romney, and the moderator afterwards should invite the audience to leave their names and addresses so that edited summaries of the highlights of the meeting can be sent to them through the mail.
- Note: The full format of the meeting will have to be worked out between the advance team, Moynihan, and Secretary Romney. Although the meeting should allow for freedom of comment, the moderator should be familiar with some pre-arranged subject matter framework within which he plans to operate. For example, in the Housing and Urban Development subject area there might well be four sub-topics -- local Federally-financed projects, welfare, public safety, and urban environment. Each of these sub-topics could be the subject of discussion for 20-30 minutes before proceeding to another.

Communications: A detailed communications plan will emerge from the work of the advance team. Herb Klein should have a hand in this, either assisting or working actively with HUD personnel. There will be numerous photo and text opportunities during and after the Secretary's one-day visit to Philadelphia ... most of them related to the public meeting and the Romney-Moynihan press conference. Communications programmers should consider:

- The wisdom of announcing in Philadelphia -- immediately on the heels of Secretary Romney's departure -- fast

remedial action to be taken on some specific problem discussed at the public meeting (e.g., more money for site reclamation, expeditious rectification of local Federal procedures, etc.).

- Arranging for post-visit TV and radio interviews of the principals who participated in the listen-in.
- Thorough photo coverage of the walking tour and the public meeting.
- The preparing and mailing of Presidential letters of commendation to various local persons.
- Distribution to local civic groups of films of various portions of the one-day visit ... introduced by a brief opening message from the President.
- Post-visit backgrounders in Washington with national press representatives ... to discuss results of this first listen-in and plans for more in the future.

Added Note:

In the conduct of their Listening Post research, Messrs. Garment and Wilkinson stumbled onto an interesting piece of information ... and an idea.

The GSA and Civil Service Commission are setting up Federal information centers with direct phone lines to agency offices for the purpose of responding to citizens' questions and complaints.

It would seem that the announcement of this program could and should be tied to the formal announcement of the Listening Post project. If it is, considerable weight is given to the proposal that it be a Presidential announcement from the White House (with Romney present).

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Press Conference Support Plan

You will recall that in my memorandum of September 25 I assured you that:

- Today's press conference would receive full staff and Administration support
- A number of preliminary steps already had been taken
- A follow-through plan would be drawn up and reviewed for maximum (PR) effectiveness by eight of your key staff personnel, and in your hands prior to 5:00 p. m.

Pre and post-press conference actions are listed below.

BEFORE

1. John Whitaker called Cabinet members in whose areas we anticipated key questions and alerted them to their probable opportunities to emphasize during their own near-future public activities the more positive points made during the conference. Sep 25
2. Governor Nils Boe called 15 Republican governors. All were receptive, but special enthusiasm came from Peterson of Delaware, Ray of Iowa, Knowles of Wisconsin, Sargent of Massachusetts, and Cargo of New Mexico. Each of these governors urged that we keep up the system of calling them and soliciting their public support for Administration actions. Sep 25
They were flattered to have been called and promised to get out and create occasions and forums at which to highlight key Presidential comments.

3. Twelve city mayors were called, among them the mayors of Charlotte, Syracuse, Grand Rapids, Indianapolis, Hartford, Houston, Oakland, Charlottesville, and Overland, Missouri. They, along with more than twenty county officials also contacted by telephone, responded with more than a perfunctory okay. They indicated a really spirited willingness to help. Sep 25
4. Harry Dent called party chairmen. Sep 25
5. Herb Klein prepared a telephone list to use for calls to publishers, editors and columnists. He also made ready his mailing list materials so that there would be minimum delay in getting out to the appropriate people press conference transcripts. Sep 25
6. Lyn Nofziger and Walter Mote (in the Vice President's office) contacted selected Senators and Congressmen and readied them for fast support. Sep 25
7. Eight key members of the White House staff geared themselves to carefully observe the press conference and to cover, by way of specific individual assignments, all immediately subsequent radio and TV analyses of the event. Sep 25

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE

12:00-12:30 P.M. EDT

September 26

RADIO AND TV NEWS ANALYSES

12:30-1:00 P.M. EDT

September 26

AFTER

1. The eight staff members met at 1:00 p.m., compared notes, and collectively passed judgments as to the positive and negative aspects of your 23 responses. Sep 26
2. Herb Klein will reiterate your most positive points in a speech he is making tonight in San Francisco. Sep 26

3. Ron Ziegler will highlight your press conference transcript during a speech he is making tonight in Monterey, California. Sep 26
4. Secretary Volpe will publicly support your press conference while in Chicago. Sep 26
5. Herb Klein's staff will call the Public Affairs office at each of the departments and agencies to insure their inserting supporting statements in the public addresses to be made by their respective officials during the next 3-4 days. Sep 26
6. Mr. Garbett, an assistant to Rog Morton at the National Committee, will feature appropriate portions of the press conference transcript in the Committee's weekly publication, "Monday", which goes to press at 4:00 p. m. today (circulation 15,000). Sep 26
7. Paul Costello on Herb Klein's staff will call fifteen key friendly "big city" newspaper editors and review with them the high points of the transcript. Sep 26
8. Harry Dent will continue to call State Chairmen and review with them those portions of the press conference transcript which are most appropriate for public release in their areas (i. e. united front -- nationwide; Haynesworth support -- southern states; etc.) Sep 26
9. Governor Nils Boe will proceed with the balance of his calls to Republican governors. Sep 26
10. Jim Allison of the RNC will strongly support your press conference performance during a speech he is making tonight at Midland, Texas. Sep 26
11. Governor Cargo of New Mexico will elaborate on the salient points of your press conference -- and your straightforward manner -- during a fund-raising speech tonight in his home state. Sep 26
12. Senator Hruska will make a public statement today supporting Judge Haynesworth. His remarks will complement your press conference remarks. Sep 26

13. Hugh Scott will support your press conference performance on the floor of the Senate this afternoon (House not in session). Sep 26
14. Gerry Ford and Les Arends will support your press conference highlights with written handouts. Sep 26
15. Jim Keogh will prepare short papers underscoring press conference highlights and forward them to Lyn Nofziger for use by selected Senators and Congressmen. Sep 26-27
16. Herb Klein's staff will mail complete press conference transcripts to over 1,000 editors, editorial writers and columnists. Sep 27
17. Herb Klein's staff will zero in on the Negro press and insure that all key publications receive appropriate excerpts of the transcript. Sep 27
18. Harry Dent will mail complete transcripts to all Party Chairmen with instructions for each to use excerpts as appropriate. Sep 27
19. Rog Morton will highlight today's event during a talk he will be making Saturday morning to the National Women's Federation Convention. Sep 27
20. Secretary Laird will support your press conference comments -- especially those relating to DoD issues -- during a ship christening talk tomorrow in Connecticut. Sep 27
21. Lyn Nofziger will insure that there is substantial follow-up support on the floors of the House and Senate on Monday. Sep 29
22. The Vice President will be alerted to make supporting statements, if the opportunity arises, during an interview Monday on the Irv Kupcinet show in Chicago ... to later appear in U.S. News and World Report. Sep 29

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield *APB*

Subject: Support for Your September 26th Press Conference

I am writing this memorandum to assure you that your Friday noon press conference will receive full staff and Administration support.

A number of preliminary steps already have been taken. Lyn Nofziger has contacted selected Senators and Congressmen and readied them for fast support. John Whitaker has called Cabinet members in whose areas we anticipate key questions and alerted them to their probable opportunities to assist. Nils Boe is putting through calls to Republican governors as well as to trusted mayors and county officials. Harry Dent, Jim Keogh, Herb Klein's people, et al are likewise at work preparing telephone and mailing lists, lining up resources, and in various other ways spring-loading themselves for follow-on efforts tomorrow afternoon and throughout the weekend.

Immediately after your press conference and the televised analyses of your remarks (i.e. promptly at 1:00 p.m.), I will meet in the Roosevelt Room with Klein, Ziegler, Chapin, Dent, Nofziger, Whitaker, and Keogh. Each attendee will state the actions which he believes to be most appropriate and which his office is prepared to take in order to accentuate the positive and, if necessary, eliminate the negative. I will have drawn up a game plan outline. After the group has discussed each proposal -- and scheduled it into the overall plan so as to achieve maximum (PR) effectiveness -- I will put the outline in final form and get it to you before your 5:00 p.m. departure for Camp David.

**RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 24, 1969

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHARLES WILKINSON
MR. LEN GARMENT

Subject: Listening Posts

Your August 25th memorandum to Bob Haldeman -- the one which covered your recommendations for implementing on a pilot project basis the Listening Post proposals -- has been carefully considered by several members of the staff and discussed at some length with the President. This note is to inform you that all concerned are in agreement with your appraisal of the program: that it would very definitely promote efficiency and higher morale within the regional offices; that this and the quite probable favorable publicity will reap sizable rewards for the Administration; and that in consideration of these facts and probabilities, it will be well worthwhile to move ahead now ... in accordance with your outline. Additionally these comments were made:

- Careful consideration should be given to the structuring of the meeting part of the program (i.e. the actual "listen-in" sessions) so that it results in constructive discussion rather than in the lodging of a series of gripes.
- Some thought should be given to the inclusion of a White House Staff member on the travelling team -- this, of course, to achieve White House identity and Presidential interest.
- Finally, it should be borne in mind that the really prime objective (as each of you knows so well) is to create the maximum in good public relations ... to enhance nationwide the image of the President and the Administration.

Please put your heads together and by the close of business on Friday draw up and forward to me a step-by-step plan for accomplishing one complete Listening Post project ... to be conducted by either Romney, Volpe, or Rumsfeld. Be certain to include in your blueprint whatever actions you and your staff members think should be taken -- before, during and after -- to best exploit the project's good features (those mentioned above as well as those peculiar to whichever organization you select), so that we are certain to "get the most for our money".


ALEXANDER F. BUTTERFIELD

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Security Considerations during Prime Minister Meir's
Arrival Ceremony

Protective Intelligence has reported to me the planned "demonstration" actions of two conflicting groups, each to be staged immediately outside the White House grounds in protest of Prime Minister Meir.

One group, to be composed of some 150 Jews, is expected to come to Washington from New York and congregate near the Pennsylvania Avenue entrances during and after the Meir arrival ceremony. The other element, to be composed of approximately 100 Arab members of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, is expected to protest at the same time and place.

The Secret Service anticipates at least some trouble (between the demonstrators and passersby and/or between the two protest groups), and because of the proximity of the South lawn to these unpredictable and potentially dangerous persons recommends that the gates not be open to the public ... as is being considered.

Under the circumstances I concur with that recommendation.

det
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Further concur _____

H concurred orally - Sept 24th

Open Gates _____

Please see me _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: A Plan to Counter Assertions of An Ineffective
Vietnam Policy

Despite the fact that Senator Kennedy's September 18th dinner speech in Boston constituted a rather sharp attack against Administration efforts to end the Vietnam dilemma, it is significant to note at the outset of this memorandum that except for a few columns in Boston newspapers and a paragraph in Time magazine his comments were given relatively little play by the news media nationwide. This is not to say that we should take the incident lightly for certainly Teddy's theme has widespread support. But I do think that we should avoid, on this occasion, taking aim at Teddy. To do so would reveal our reaction to the particular individual, and thereby lend more than a fair share of substance to his remarks. Besides, it is late.

To my way of thinking it would be more fruitful now to zero in on the questions of "progress made" and "progress being made", and direct our counterattack at that element of the populace which finds it so easy to criticize our solutions while generalizing its own. Simultaneously, of course, we should hammer home the theme that by your series of bold foreign policy initiatives you have seized world leadership and won world respect ... and in the process given us our best chances to date for achieving peace with honor.

Taking this basic approach I recommend the following actions:

1. Jim Keogh's staff, with the assistance of Henry Kissinger's people, should develop a fact sheet similar to that which I have attached at Tab A (Assertions versus The Facts of the Matter).

2. Bryce Harlow's staff should circulate the fact sheet -- along with a number of "one liners" and other material highlighting the "progress" theme -- among predesignated members of the Congress.
3. The Secretary of State (and the Under Secretary) should be scheduled for more national television appearances and speeches. Together, they can serve as a leading factor in the development and sale of our theme. (It seems that each has been used very little for this sort of thing in the past.)
4. The Vice President should develop the theme and use it in near future addresses ... to include those he will be making to Republican fund-raising and other such programs this fall.
5. The National Committee should print, publish and distribute a 4-5 page pamphlet featuring your foreign policy initiatives and elaborating on each. The booklet should bear an appropriate title -- "Leadership Toward Peace" -- or something along that line.
6. Henry Kissinger should be scheduled for a thorough back-grounder, with full press representation, so that he can dovetail this "progress" theme with support for our draft program and Administration efforts to reduce campus unrest.
7. Chairman Morton and Harry Dent should insure that the campaign is carried into the field -- to the governors and the party chairmen -- and White House staffers should be alert to stress key points in conversations with (or announcements to) columnists and commentators. Herb Klein should assume responsibility for the appropriate mailing of printed material.

Meanwhile, not to forget Teddy altogether, I recommend further that an early agreement be reached among the Leadership that Senator Kennedy not be considered sacrosanct for any reason ... and that he be attacked (quickly) whenever he is seen to be vulnerable. Under no circumstances should he be allowed to discuss with impunity the great issues of war and peace ... and of honor and decency.

FACT SHEET

Assertion: Despite Administration rhetoric there has been no change in the Vietnam situation.

Fact: Since January the outlook for a settlement in Vietnam has changed for the better in a number of ways. Among them:

A new flexibility has been created in U.S. policy, a flexibility without compromise of basic principles. This has been done by:

- Explicitly ruling out attempts to impose a purely military solution.
- Taking a new position on mutual withdrawal. (We have proposed that this start simultaneously and that it proceed rapidly through agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable.)
- Proposing an international supervisory body for verifying withdrawals and overseeing elections. (It could participate also in arranging a supervised ceasefire.)
- Beginning a reduction of U.S. troop strength in Vietnam, to include combat troops.
- Reaffirming our willingness to accept any outcome arrived at through free elections. (We have proposed that the elections be supervised by an international body to assure fairness.)

Both sides have exposed their basic negotiating positions in detail.

In South Vietnam, the GVN's political position has been greatly strengthened through pacification gains and a growth in the stability and efficiency of the central government. The GVN not only controls or exercises primary influence over most of the rural populace, but also enjoys increasing support from the countryside.

TAB A

The South Vietnamese army has increased greatly in strength and capability. It can now replace as many as 60,000 U.S. troops.

The GVN irregular forces -- the regional and popular troops which provide the basic security for the rural villages -- have vastly improved.

The enemy force has lost much of its 1968 combat punch. It is no longer able to mount the massive offensives which caused great casualties and losses among the rural and urban populace.

As a result of developments, security in the countryside is substantially improved. More lines of communication are open and commerce and agricultural production are improving.

There are growing signs that the other side is beginning to recognize that the military and political tide has turned. The enemy force is preparing to de-emphasize military action and shift to political competition instead. (This could mean that the level of hostilities will decrease substantially.)

Assertion: Our troop withdrawals are token gestures -- made purely for political benefit.

Fact: By his troop withdrawal decisions, the President has cut U.S. military strength in Vietnam by nearly 20 percent. The reduction in combat forces has been greater than the reduction in support forces.

Assertion: Saigon has refused to allow peace-seeking non-Communist elements to share in governing the South Vietnamese people.

Fact: The GVN has carried out an election in which all parties were free to be represented in the National Assembly. President Thieu has attempted to gain broader representation in his new cabinet from Buddhists and opposition groups, but most of the prospective candidates have demanded unreasonably high prices in terms of policy control as a precondition to their appointments.

Assertion: We have refused to compromise on the question of who might govern South Vietnam during an election.

Fact: The GVN has offered to negotiate the terms of supervision during an election; however, the other side has rejected every plan put forward and demanded not only a share in the administration but a totally new "revolutionary regime" which would not recognize the present government structure in any form whatever.

Assertion: We are still trying to win a military victory in Vietnam.

Fact: The Administration has ruled out military victory as a solution to the Vietnam dilemma. The President made this clear in his speech of May 14th.

Assertion: The high costs of the war are not only cutting severely into domestic programs but are leading us down the path to economic disaster.

Fact: The President's recent troop withdrawal decisions, and other measures, are gradually reducing the total costs of the Vietnam war. Moreover, our GNP rises each year by a greater amount than our annual Vietnam expenditures.

Chm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Initial Action Plan to Follow Your SST Announcement

Immediately subsequent to your 9:00 a.m. SST announcement follow-up action will begin. Planned events, in their chronological order, are listed below:

1. At his own press conference in the Roosevelt Room (after your departure to the Oval office) Secretary Volpe will elaborate as is necessary and answer questions put to him by press corps members. 9:05 a.m.
Tues.
2. Chairman Morton will release a supporting statement from the National Committee Headquarters. 10:00 a.m.
Tues.
3. Bryce Harlow's staff (Nofziger et al) will deliver to predesignated members of the Congress -- Senator Scott and others -- one, two, and three paragraph statements citing the wisdom of your decision and emphasizing the international leadership aspect, etc. (These statements and fact sheets were prepared last night at the Department of Transportation ... under the personal supervision of Jim Beggs.) 10:00-11:00 a.m.
Tues.
4. Chairman Morton will back your SST decision, and emphasize its advantages to the nation, during his taping of a "talk show" which is scheduled to be nationally televised later in the week. 11:00 a.m.
Tues.

5. An edited transcript of your comments, and those of Secretary Volpe (including the question-answer session) will be forwarded to all major aviation publications, and to editorial writers. Tues.
6. Carlyle Jones, the Washington, D. C. Director of Aerospace magazine, will devote full time to insuring that the transcribed material gets to aerospace industry leaders. Tues.
7. FAA will hold a special backgrounder for aviation writers -- one which enlarges on today's Roosevelt Room session. Tues.
8. FAA will select a briefing team and an itinerary of its planned visits to the media in key aerospace cities for the purpose of providing background information on the SST program. Tues.-
Wed.
9. The Department of Transportation will deliver to the National Committee sufficient fact sheet material for circulation by the committee to Republican leaders and Governors throughout the country. Tues.-
Wed.
10. Herb Klein will hold a press conference in New York City late Wednesday morning, and speak at noon to the PR Society of America. During both events he will emphasize the benefits to be derived from the SST program and your decision to move forward into Phase III.* Wed.

*Somewhat unlike the Safeguard decision of March 14th, this morning's announcement makes known your decision to move from Phase II to Phase III of an existing (US-SST) program... albeit the previous Administration allowed the program to slip into limbo for an inexcusably long period. (Ph. I -- design competition, Lockheed vs. Boeing, etc; Ph. II -- defining airframe, engine, etc. configurations and specifications; Ph. III -- actually "cutting metal" and manufacturing the hardware; Ph. IV -- aircraft production)

11. Press kits, more elaborate than the regular fact sheet material, will be mailed to editors and publishers nationwide ... with particular emphasis being given to the cities and areas identified with the aerospace industry (Washington, Texas, California, etc.). Wed.
12. Financial and business editors of the country's leading newspapers will be brought in and given a backgrounder (probably at the White House). Wed.
13. Boeing Aircraft Company will furnish Klein's office with samples of supporting literature designed for wide circulation. Wed. - Thurs.
14. Herb Klein will devote time to the SST topic during a televised address in Detroit to the Radio and TV News Directors Association. Thurs.
15. Secretary Laird will devote time to favorable comment on your SST decision during his address to the National Press Club (Washington, D. C.) Thurs.
16. Nofziger will arrange for Congressional praise of your SST decision in newsletters and other media used by Congressmen to inform their constituents of key events. Thurs.
17. Either FAA Administrator Shaffer or his Chief Engineer, Charles Blake, (or both) will be scheduled to discuss the meaning and future of the US-SST project on locally and nationally televised programs. Thurs. - Fri.
18. Herb Klein will talk about the SST program and its importance to the maintenance of our international leadership during a dinner address to the San Francisco Press Club. Fri.
19. Lyn Nofziger will see to it that follow-on statements are provided key Congressmen and that all are kept abreast of SST developments. Fri.

20. The Republican National Committee's weekly news bulletin, "Monday"; will feature your SST announcement (circulation 15,000). Mon.
21. The Vice President will give solid support to your SST decision during his televised talk to the Executive Club of Chicago. Mon.

Because of our purposely delayed notification of your announcement schedule to staff and department personnel - several of whom are being held responsible for completion of the actions outlined above - this plan can be considered only a "starter", a preliminary step to get the ball rolling. A more complete revision will be prepared and forwarded to you on Thursday. It will be based on the news media reactions of Tuesday and Wednesday.

Chen

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WHITAKER

As you may know, Secretary Laird is scheduled to address the National Press Club here in Washington, D. C. on Thursday, September 25th. I would appreciate your checking with Carl Wallace and arranging for Laird to devote at least a few minutes of that address to favorable comment on the President's SST decision. The Department of Transportation (through Joe Bosco) is putting out some one, two, and three paragraph fact sheets which Laird, or Wallace, may find useful. Meanwhile, for your general information, our follow-through actions are emphasizing these points:

- Unlike the Safeguard decision of March 14th, this morning's announcement made known the President's decision to move from Phase II to Phase III of an existing (US-SST) program ... but one which the previous Administration allowed to slip into limbo for an inexcusably long period. (Ph. I -- design competition, Lockheed vs. Boeing, etc; Ph. II -- defining airframe, engine, etc. configurations and specifications; Ph. III -- actually "cutting metal" and manufacturing the hardware; Ph. IV -- aircraft production)
- The Soviet Union and a British-French combine have been moving ahead with SST development while the U.S. has been procrastinating.
- If we put off our final decision again, the delay will be tantamount to abandoning the project, and consigning to the U.S. a back seat in aviation history for the next decade ... and quite possibly for the balance of this century.
- It is only a matter of a few years before SSTs will be flying the inter-oceanic and trans-polar routes. If the President had not moved ahead we would have found it necessary later on to spend hundreds of millions of dollars abroad buying SSTs made by others. Now we can build them ourselves and sell them abroad ... and thereby strengthen our balance of payments position.

-- As the President is inclined to respond to those who voice disapproval over our spending money on such things as exploring outer space and developing SSTs rather than focussing on problems at home, "I believe that to argue this is to pose a false choice between meeting the challenges of the world and meeting challenges at home. I believe we shall meet them both or we shall meet neither. If we turn away from efforts which give us a major role in international progress, it is unlikely that we will muster the spirit and energy to meet the crises of our society."

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. BURNS
MR. MORTON
MR. KLEIN
MR. DENT
MR. NOFZIGER
MR. ZIEGLER
MR. GARBETT

Listed below are several of the points we are emphasizing in our follow-through actions in support of the President's decision to move from Phase II to Phase III in the SST program.

- Unlike the Safeguard decision of March 14th, this morning's announcement made known the President's decision to move from Phase II to Phase III of an existing (US-SST) program ... a program which the previous Administration allowed to slip into limbo for an inexcusably long period of time. (Phase I -- design competition, Lockheed vs. Boeing, etc; Phase II -- defining airframe, engine, etc. configurations and specifications; Phase III -- actually "cutting metal" and manufacturing the hardware; Phase IV -- aircraft production)
- If we put off our final decision again, the delay will be tantamount to abandoning the project, and consigning to the U.S. a back seat in aviation history for the next decade .. and quite possibly for the balance of this century.
- The Soviet Union and a British-French combine have been moving ahead with SST development while the U.S. has been procrastinating.
- It is only a matter of a few years before SSTs will be flying the inter-oceanic and trans-polar routes. If the President had not moved ahead we would find it necessary later on to spend hundreds of millions of dollars abroad buying SSTs for our use. Now we can build them ourselves and sell them abroad ... and thereby strengthen our balance of payments position.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- As the President is inclined to respond to those who voice disapproval over our spending money on such things as exploring outer space and developing SSTs rather than focussing on problems at home, "I believe that to argue this is to pose a false choice between meeting the challenges of the world and meeting challenges at home. I believe we shall meet them both or we shall meet neither. If we turn away from efforts which give us a major role in international progress, it is unlikely that we will muster the spirit and energy to meet the crises of our society."

ABT
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

chron -
No dist made
H & E

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

I am citing below an example of one of our problems.

- At 1:30 p. m. today Dwight Chapin told me that I was to assume responsibility for a game plan on follow-through action relative to "tomorrow noon's announcement".
- By 2:00 p. m. I had notified seven persons of an important 3:00 p. m. meeting in my office ... without stating the meeting's purpose.
- At 2:10 p. m. Ken Cole came to my office to tell me that "absolutely nothing" was to be done for the time being, and that I would probably get further word around 6:00 or 6:30 p. m. (This message puzzled me for it seemed that at least some of the wheels could be moving during the coming 4-hour period.)
- By 2:20 p. m. I had called off the meeting ... without volunteering any explanations.
- At 3:45 p. m. Dwight called to say that "the announcement" was to be made at 9:00 a. m. the following day. He seemed to think (as I myself thought) that I should be "doing something", and was surprised to hear that my last instructions were to do "absolutely nothing".
- At 3:50 p. m. I checked with Ken Cole to see if he had received any instructions which were in accord with Dwight's message and/or superceded his earlier instructions for me. He had heard nothing.
- At 3:55 p. m. I asked Elmer Juanich to get word to Bob Haldeman that I wanted to see or talk to him as soon as possible in order to verify what precisely was expected of me, who specifically knew about the announcement, and who could be informed beforehand.
- At 4:00 p. m. I went to Ken's office and obtained from him a copy of the 2-page announcement -- the first material I had seen on the subject.

-- I then sat down and began to outline -- in the briefest form -- my own thoughts on what might be done to (1) avoid adverse publicity, (2) gain maximum favorable publicity, and (3) drive home to the public the wisdom of the President's decision. But without knowing who could and who could not be let in on preparatory plans, I didn't expect much in the way of results. For example, if it seemed a good idea to have aviation writers into the White House for a briefing, how could the most appropriate briefer be identified and lined up ... and how could the aviation writers be notified ... without giving the secret away; if it were decided to put together press kits, who would do the work if Herb Klein wasn't to be notified; etc.

-- 4:55 p.m. A funny thing just happened: Ron Ziegler just announced to the press that the President would be announcing his SST decision tomorrow morning at 9:00 a.m.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

chron

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Bob:

It is my understanding that Scoop Jackson and Governor Evans will be in attendance in the Roosevelt Room when the President makes his SST announcement early tomorrow morning. To my way of thinking, this is a mistake. There will probably be a good bit of adverse publicity (despite our game plan) over the costs of going ahead with the SST and the fact that such substantial amounts of money are being diverted from urban development and other domestic projects ... and it only adds fuel to the fire to allow the Washington state dignitaries to appear along with the President and Volpe. It smacks just a little (but enough) of commercialism ... of a payoff to the state, or to Jackson. It should be played purely as a national interest event -- the President and his Transportation Secretary only. Jackson's appearance counters the objectives of our game plan somewhat -- and Evans' attendance, in addition, hurts even more.

It is 8:00 p.m. now and probably much too late to make a change even if one were approved, but I want to pass this note on to you nevertheless ... for whatever consideration it might merit in your view.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

(Butterfield) AB

September 22, 1969

Suggested Revision to Remarks for SST Announcement

The United States has led the world in the great development and progress of aviation. But for several years now this country has wavered or procrastinated in making a final go or no-go decision on whether to develop one of the great aircraft of the future -- the supersonic transport -- SST. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and a British-French combine have been going ahead. We have reached a point where we cannot put off a decision any longer.

If we decide to go ahead with a stretched-out program -- we are inviting far higher cost and far greater competitive risks than can be justified. On the other hand, if we put off our final decision again, the delay will be tantamount to abandoning the project, and consigning to the United States a back seat in aviation history for the next decade ... and quite possibly for the balance of this century.

We simply cannot keep the future at arm's length forever. SSTs are being developed; within a few years they will be flying the inter-oceanic and trans-polar routes. And so, the question is whether the United States will wait ... then later spend hundreds of millions of dollars abroad buying these planes -- or whether we shall be building them ourselves and selling them in other countries. Our balance of payments alone argues convincingly for going ahead.

I intend to ask Congress for \$96 million for this fiscal year to go ahead with a normal program of development of the SST. We are going to build a supersonic transport; we are going to have a prototype flying by the end of 1972; we are going to have a commercial fleet in the air by the end of 1978.

Some of the criticism of the SST comes from the same quarters who think we ought not to be spending money sending men to explore outer space -- that we ought to focus all our resources on the problems at home. As I have stated before, I believe that to argue this is to pose a false choice between meeting the challenges of the world and the challenges at home. I believe we shall meet them both or we shall meet neither. If we turn away from efforts that give us a major role in international progress, it is unlikely that we will muster the spirit and energy to meet the crises of our own society.

#

chron

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. STEVE BULL

I am attaching to this memorandum a note which I just received from Mrs. Lucy Erickson, owner and/or manager of the Panorama Apartments in San Clemente. Her information is quite complete and I thought that you might want to file it away (along with the picture postcard) for future reference.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachments

Cham

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

I will assume action responsibility for the game plan requested by the President in Ken Cole's September 19th memorandum to you and Bob Haldeman. However, I must have from your staff by the close of business today a simple list (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) of the ways in which the Vietnam Conflict -- i.e. the total Vietnam situation, to include the outlook for an eventual cessation of hostilities -- has changed for the better since January of this year.

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Chron

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KLEIN

I have been asked to prepare by noon tomorrow a game plan which will outline our actions to counter Senator Kennedy's recent public statements (in a Boston speech) to the effect that the total Vietnam situation has in no way changed for the better since January of this year. Henry Kissinger's staff is going to provide the substance, and I would appreciate your staff outlining the most appropriate steps for disseminating our material to the public via Administration speeches, news columnists, and radio and TV commentators. I will need your input by the close of business today.

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

chron

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. WHITAKER

I have been asked to prepare by noon tomorrow a game plan which will outline our actions to counter Senator Kennedy's recent public statements (in a Boston speech) to the effect that the total Vietnam situation has in no way changed for the better since January of this year. Henry Kissinger's staff is going to provide the substance, and I would appreciate your suggestions as to how we might best disseminate our material to the public via the Cabinet officers. I will need your input by the close of business today.

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

chron

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HARLOW

I have been asked to prepare by noon tomorrow a game plan which will outline our actions to counter Senator Kennedy's recent public statements (in a Boston speech) to the effect that the total Vietnam situation has in no way changed for the better since January of this year. Henry Kissinger's staff is going to provide the substance, and I would appreciate your staff outlining the most appropriate steps for disseminating our material to the public via the GOP leaders. I will need your input by the close of business today.

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

chron

September 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

This is just a quick note to confirm that the Presidential directive concerning the coordination of activities between the Federal government and the Governor's Emergency Council for rehabilitating Mississippi disaster areas, and mentioning Fred LaRue's official liaison capacity, went out to all Executive departments and agencies (as well as to Governor John Bell Williams) on September 16th ... and was dated that same day. Further, Fred's commission as Special Consultant to the President was signed by the President today (September 19th), but was backdated to the 16th.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

September 16, 1969

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Any or all of the women named below would, in my opinion, serve with exceptional competence and loyalty within the East Wing complex:

(1) Mrs. Virginia Durbeck

- About 48-50 years of age.
- Married to a retired Air Force Colonel living in the immediate area. (Alexandria, Virginia I believe)
- All children are away at school or married.
- Absolutely outstanding as a "likable organizer"
- Very creative ... can design and make anything, especially ladies' hats!!
- Has set up from scratch and operated her own businesses (shops, etc.)
- Was taken on some 3 years ago as a gift shop manager at the Smithsonian Institution and almost overnight was promoted to a position which called for her supervision of all such shops within the Institution.

(2) Mrs. Signe Larson

- About 47-48 years of age
- Married to an active-duty Air Force Brigadier General living in the immediate area
- Absolutely outstanding as an organizer; an extremely orderly person.

(42-43)

(3) Mrs. Lynn Clark

- About 37 years of age; part Filipino; looks much like Queen Sirikit of Thailand
- Married to a retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel living in the Seattle, Washington area
- All three children are in school but this has not kept Mrs. Clark from a full-time job throughout the past 18 months.
- Absolutely outstanding as an organizer; an extremely orderly person
- Worked as a secretary in the White House (prior to her marriage) during the Eisenhower years; known and probably remembered by Bryce Harlow and Sally Studebaker.
- A fanatically devout member of the Republican party, a strong campaigner and committeewoman for Governor Evans and President Nixon. **STATE DELEGATE**
- Known slightly by John and Jean Ehrlichman; a very impressive person.

I have been giving considerable thought to our "East Wing" discussion of past weeks and know of no three women who would be greater assets to the White House staff than those mentioned above. Only Lynn Clark is a good friend; the other two women are merely acquaintances. But all three enjoy solid reputations as ~~being~~ thinkers, movers, and doers. All are "idea women", and all are congenial, ladylike, members of happy homes ... and certainly worth interviewing.

I strongly recommend that we keep these names on file. Virginia Durbeck would serve best as our Chief of Staff ... or in a position close to the top. Lynn Clark would serve best as an immediate deputy to the Chief of Staff ... as would Signe Larson, but because ~~of~~ Signe's husband is still on active duty I would think of her more in terms of a temporary assistant to the Chief of Staff during the first 6, 8 or 12 months following an East Wing reorganization.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. COLE
MR. CHAPIN

I have just this moment received a carbon copy of Bob Haldeman's September 15th memorandum to each of you -- the one in which he states the necessity for thorough planning prior to forwarding to the President recommended phone calls and asks for a system which will easily accommodate and interpret priority levels.

For what it might be worth to you, let me suggest this procedure:

- By memorandum from the Staff Secretary remind all staff members once again of the requirement ... and the importance to the President of their combined thoughts and recommendations.
- Include in the memorandum format instructions which are similar to those now being followed, but ask that recommendations (like all other Presidential correspondence) be forwarded to the Staff Secretary rather than to Dwight Chapin.
- Direct that each recommendation carry a designated priority ... in accordance with something along the lines of the following:


President's Priority

Recipient's Priority

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 (Directly or indirectly in the interests of national security ... a serious and/or major issue ... to avoid certain embarrassment to self and/or Office of President) | A (Call definitely expected) |
| | B (Call possibly or probably expected) |
| | C (Call definitely not expected) |
| 2 (Positive enhancement to passage of legislation, political base, Nixon image, etc... a major issue) | |
| 3 (Probable or possible enhancement to passage of legislation, political base, Nixon image, etc... not a major issue) | |

(Thus priorities would be listed as 2A, 1A, 3B, etc.)

- The Staff Secretary or his representative should review recommendations and quickly staff them by phone or in person through Rose Mary Woods and Dwight Chapin, then send them to the President along with the midday dispatch enclosed in a folder which by its color distinguishes its contents from other Presidential business.
- The out-basket custodian (Cole or Brown) should send each "recommendation sheet" found in the out-basket to Elmer Juanich (as has been done in past months) and notify the originator of the recommendation -- by telephone call, handwritten note, or typed memo -- as to action taken by the President, e.g. call made, RN said no, RN wants letter instead, RN wants letter also, re-submit after weekend, called but no answer, etc.


ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

chron

September 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MISS ROSE MARY WOODS

The following persons are suggested as guests of the President and Mrs. Nixon at the September 25th State Dinner honoring Prime Minister Meir:

Dinner:

Mr. Louis Marx	or
99 Weaver Street	200 Fifth Avenue
Scarsdale, New York	New York City

Mr. and Mrs. David Marx
200 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Mr. and Mrs. Louis Marx, Jr.
New York City
(Nick Ruwe has address)

Mr. and Mrs. Philip Iselin	
198 Portaupeck	or
Oceanport, New Jersey	New York City

Mr. and Mrs. (Sonny) Werblin
New York City

Mr. and Mrs. (Toots) Shor
New York City

After Dinner:

Mr. and Mrs. Aaron J. Cohen
(Office of the Comptroller, Dept. of the Navy)
3305 Sleepy Hollow Road
Falls Church, Virginia 22044

Mr. and Mrs. James Weiner
(Communications Manager, AT&T)
The Towers - 4201 Cathedral Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
(have been after dinner guests once previously)

Mr. Jeffrey Darman (young bachelor, about 25)
(Assistant to Exec. Vice President,
National Urban Coalition)
2000 N Street, N.W., Apt 207
Washington, D. C.

Major General Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (bachelor)
(Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations,
Department of the Air Force)
1400 South Joyce Street, Apt A-313
Arlington, Virginia 22202

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

September 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Listed below are proposed new procedures for the preparation and publication of the weekly news plan:

- The preparation, publication, and distribution of the news plans will be the responsibility of the Director of Communications for the Executive Branch.
- The plan will be devised weekly -- for a 14-day period, i.e. from Sunday through the second Saturday.
- The basic planning or drafting session for each news plan will be held prior to the close of business every Thursday, preferably at a regularly scheduled time and place. Principals (Messrs. Klein, Chapin, Ziegler and Cole) or their representatives will be present, the principals named being responsible for their office's representation and participation.
- These weekly drafting sessions will be chaired by Mr. Klein or his representative (who will be responsible for providing whatever secretarial assistance might be required).
- Mr. Klein will be responsible for insuring that drafters do not submit to the tendency to simply compile lists of programmed events, but instead give continued attention to the planning function ... the objectives of which are (1) a continual flow, and relatively equal daily distribution, of Presidential and Administration news items; and (2) projection of the President and the Administration in the best possible (i.e. most favorable) light.
- Upon completion of the drafting session the resultant 14-day plan will be typed and proofread, then submitted for review and approval to each or all of the principals (named above) who were not in attendance at that Thursday meeting.

- Distribution will be made to the following persons only, on Friday morning -- never later than 10:00 A.M. -- with the President's copy being routed through the Staff Secretary: Bull, Butterfield, Chapin, Cole (2 copies), Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Keogh, Klein, Warren, M. White, and Ziegler.
- The Staff Secretary will route one copy of the approved plan to Central Files with instructions to the Chief of that office (Mr. Frank Matthews) to treat the report as officially classified "Confidential" material and to release information from back issues only when requested to do so personally by individuals whose names appear on the limited distribution list.

I recommend that you approve these proposals and authorize me to issue an implementing memorandum to all concerned.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Approve _____

Give both overall project and responsibility for revision of procedures to Herb Klein _____

See me _____

chron

September 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BRYCE HARLOW

Subject: Termination of Consultative Services of Mr. Charles West

In view of Mr. Ken BeLieu's estimate of September 10th that the bulk of Mr. Charles West's consultative services will be finished by September 30th (the date, incidentally, of expiration of West's White House security pass), please take appropriate action to insure that official termination, or transfer to Department of Defense auspices, is effected on or before that date.

I know from my own personal observations that Mr. West has devoted far more hours, and more enthusiasm, to assigned duties than was expected of him. Moreover, it is my recent understanding that because of his loyalty to the President, and what has been described to me as a uniquely intense preoccupation with passage of the President's Safe-guard program, he allowed the extended period of leave granted by the National Strategy Information Center in New York City (of which he was Executive Vice President) to lapse .. and thereby lost his employment status with that organization. If this information is accurate, I hope we will express adequately our deep appreciation, and that of the President, for these personal sacrifices.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Ken BeLieu
Mr. Carson Howell

Shirley

September 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Charles West

As you may recall from one of our discussions at San Clemente I mentioned the Harlow-BeLieu insistence that West be retained in his current capacity until about September 30th, and the apprehension each registered when I suggested West's immediate transfer to the Defense Department payroll. However, BeLieu did agree to look into the matter and let me know the results of his investigation by September 10th.

Today's check with Ken revealed that no "payroll transfer" arrangements have been made because Baroody -- Ken's prime contact in DoD -- has been ill and out of circulation. Meanwhile West has been (or today is being) issued a two-week extension to his White House security pass.

Ken now believes that West need not remain with this project for more than another two weeks -- the precise time span of the security pass extension. In consideration of this fact, and Bryce's earlier apprehension about the payroll transfer idea, I recommend that we live with West until the end of the month, but no longer ... and so notify Harlow and BeLieu. If you approve I will get word to the appropriate parties without delay.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

See Me: _____

chron

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 9, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Sojourn at San Clemente -- A Brief Appraisal

It is obvious that our month at the Western White House afforded you, the staff and the Cabinet ample opportunities for rest and relaxation -- or if not that for some, then at least it offered healthy diversions from the tedium of Washington work days. But there is more to consider. News coverage greatly increased in that it became truly nationwide. Countless radio and TV stations and news publications west of the Potomac and Hudson Rivers awakened to this unprecedented shift in the locus of Government and devoted more time and space to Executive branch activities. By making real people of names in the news they brought the Government closer to millions of Americans who previously had thought of it as an integral part of the Washington scene unable to function elsewhere. Moreover, in its description of events -- the gala "Astronauts Dinner", the State Dinner for Park, field trips by Cabinet members, tours and fashion shows for the ladies, sailing excursions from Balboa, the day with LBJ, festively-clad mariachis, fringed-top golf carts, poolside parties, and attendance at weekend ball games -- the news media projected color, flair and fun in sufficient magnitude to invalidate at least for a time the "dullsville" charges heard early in the summer. Simultaneously the broad scope of your appointment schedule made clear the fact that you would not consider for a moment leaving the helm unattended. While the nation fully appreciated your need for a rest it likewise applauded your understanding of the fact that production must not suffer. I estimate that unfavorable publicity (most of it mild) accounted for no more than 7-8 percent of the total. "State Dinner" criticism is not worth discussing, and speculation over total operating costs was irritating to some only because it came at a time when taxes were of major concern. Publicly written and spoken comments dating from August 6th were well summarized in two statements in last week's LIFE magazine: (1) Despite the leisurely pace the work got done. (2) Even if the cost ran into the millions it was worth it if it lightened for a while the burdens of the President.

Apart from news-generated gains and losses the staff undoubtedly learned that great savings in time and effort accrue to those who see issues in their proper perspectives and assign priorities appropriately. And finally, the general success of the project can speak only well of your staff's efficiency and competence.

chron

September 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Mr. Charles West

Since writing an August 29th memorandum to you on the subject of Mr. West I have spoken again to Bryce, and to BeLieu, concerning CW's transfer to the Defense Department's payroll. Both feel strongly that such a move would be dangerous right now in that "it might cause a stir". They believe it wise to hold off on any actions involving Charles West for another "10-15 days ... at least until the authorization bill is safely through the Senate."

Frankly, I cannot see how a stir could possibly result from a discreet transfer of West's name from our payroll to DoD's. Bryce seemed a little more nervous about my proposal than did Ken, so as a minimum step toward persevering I asked Ken to check out the details of such an arrangement with the appropriate people at the Defense Department and be ready either to act or justify inaction by September 10th.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

August 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Mr. Charles West

You will recall that during one of our Washington-San Clemente telephone conversations last week I said that West was putting together a report, in book form, on all that transpired during the ABM debate ... i.e. which Senators supported deployment, which were opposed, which are usually opposed to defense spending, etc. I said also that Harlow and BeLieu were away on vacation, and you agreed that the matter of West's retention or release should be left until one of them returned to work.

Today I spoke to Bryce and he believes that West should stay -- at least until he (West) finishes a compilation of "ABM papers". Bryce understands our concern for economy of staff operations but he feels that current anti-defense sentiment throughout the nation warrants more serious consideration (on our part) of the importance of West's current task. He said that he had just spoken with Mel Laird about the obviously well-financed and powerful attacks being leveled at the military from all quarters, but most significantly from an ever-increasing number of U.S. Representatives and Senators. Laird believes the situation is fast approaching dangerous proportions -- that the ABM issue is only one in a series of similar events, most of them yet to come -- that Congressional efforts to reduce our sea power, eliminate the Army's prime battle tank, and cut C-5A production represent the mere beginnings of concerted moves to transfer exorbitant quantities of budget money from defense projects to urban and other domestic needs. What is required (they say) is a "war plan" rather than just a "game plan" -- and Charlie West is working on what will amount to the plan's first draft.

West's estimate of his completion date is September 30. (This year? Yes, I think so.)

If September 30 seems to you to be an unnecessarily late date and you feel (as I do) that DoD could and should assume this "war plan" responsibility, I suggest we give West a fair 1-week notice to wrap things up and terminate by September 8 ... or, to stay on until September 30 ... but under DoD auspices.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

August 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Pierre Rinfret

On July 14, Paul McCracken sent a memorandum to you which expressed his reservations about having Pierre Rinfret in for consultative discussions. Paul's reservations were based essentially on a Rinfret newsletter which he attached to his memorandum for your review. It was a scathing piece on the Administration's economic policies -- irrational, emotional almost pathological in its presentation. You replied that under such circumstances you certainly agreed with Paul; and you added that meanwhile Len Garment should try to "cool Rinfret off."

The attached memorandum from Len Garment indicates that Pierre has pretty well simmered down.

August 18, 1969

Mr. James Gehrig
Senate Space Committee
Room 231 - Old Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gehrig:

This is just a short note to tell you how much I appreciate your perseverance in tracking me down. I can't imagine why the Riggs Bank and White House operator weren't more cooperative in giving out the information you sought -- especially when your purpose was to return lost articles. At any rate, I know from talking to Mrs. Robbins that you took a considerable amount of your own time to locate me and I am indeed grateful.

I hope to have an opportunity to thank you in person sometime soon.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

August 18, 1969

Mr. Doyle Martin
Polish Desk Officer
Room 5221, New State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Doyle:

It was really good seeing and being
with you the other day during our lunch
with Bruce Loxton.

You'll recall that we talked about
Romania and precisely why the President
chose that country to visit ... at this time.
I think the enclosed article by Roscoe and
Geoffrey Drummond comes as close to
hitting the nail on the head as anything I've
seen in print to date.

Hope to see you again soon.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

Enclosure

August 18, 1969

Memorandum for: Mr. Whitaker

John:

I am attaching to this note the "summer plans" for each of the 17 members of the Cabinet. Some may have changed by now for my last check was made on Monday, August 11th ... just prior to my departure for San Clemente. Steve Bull has most of these on file, and I am sending the balance out to him on Tuesday evening's courier.

Alexander P. Butterfield

Attachment

August 18, 1969

SECRET - When With Attachments

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Holdridge
NSC Staff

I am attaching to this memorandum two packets of classified materials which concern Prime Minister Gorton and Australia. One was sent to me by Dick Sneider just prior to Gorton's early April visit to Washington; the other was put together this past week -- from my own classified files -- for whatever use you might be able to make of the contents. Although written some 12-14 months ago, the (legal sized) papers on "Australian Defense Policy and Posture" are particularly interesting.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachments

SECRET - When With Attachments

August 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHAPIN

This is just a reminder of our Washington-San Clemente telecon of last week -- the one during which we discussed the probability of the President attending the Eisenhower Birthday Dinner (October 14th). As you will recall, the dinner - a fund-raiser for Eisenhower College - is to be held at the Smithsonian Institute.

You will no doubt want to keep in touch with George Champion on this one in that you told him in a May 22nd letter that you would re-check the matter later and let him know. For your further information, Arthur Burns is an "interested party", and seems to maintain an open line of communications to Champion.

It's your action now so I'll step to one side.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Chen

August 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUCHANAN

With reference to the contradictory memoranda on guidelines for your preparation of the President's Daily News Summary, you should assume that his (the President's) hand-written note to you supersedes my correspondence of August 6th. In other words, the understanding which you outlined in your August 7th memorandum to Bob Haldeman is correct.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander P. Butterfield *APB*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting at 9:30 a.m. with the Cabinet
Committee on Economic Policy

Secretary Stans and Chairman McCracken urged a meeting of this Committee for early August in order to put before you and its members some very pressing export trade matters. The following paragraph outlines the crux of the problem:

We have become accustomed to a trade surplus to help offset other overseas cash drains such as the "travel gap", overseas military facilities, THE Vietnam war, foreign aid shipments, and overseas U.S. business investment. In 1968 the trade balance dropped sharply to less than a billion dollars. Exports increased about 10% but imports were up 24%. This year we expect the trade balance to be no better -- the six months annual rate is only \$300 million.

The agenda is attached.

CABINET COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC POLICY

August 12, 1969
9:30 a.m.

REVISED AGENDA

(See note under Agenda Item I)

9:30-9:50 a.m.: I - U.S. WHEAT PRICES TO JAPAN
AND LATIN AMERICA

Secretary Hardin

Dr. Hendrik (Hank) Houthakker

NOTE: It is important that this item
be the first discussed, for a decision
on wheat export prices must be reached
by 11:00 a.m., PDT (1:00 p.m., EDT).
The enclosure to this Revised Agenda
outlines the issue at hand.

9:50-10:40 a.m.: II - THE EXPANSION OF EXPORTS AND
FINANCING PROBLEMS

Secretary Stans

Mr. Henry Kearns (Chairman and
President,
EXIM Bank)

Asst. Sec. Commerce for
Domestic and International
Business, Hon. Ken Davis

--introduction to the problems of a
diminishing trade balance

--reactivation of the Interagency
Committee on Export Expansion

--export credit

--export development programs

9:40-11:00 a.m.: III - REPORT ON POST-VIETNAM ECONOMIC
POLICY

Herbert Stein

Phillip Hughes

--budget priorities in the post-
Vietnam period

11:00-11:15 a.m.: IV - ADJUSTING TO A LESS INFLATIONARY
ECONOMY

Dr. Paul McCracken

--specific report on what can be
done about the runaway costs
and wage increases in the
construction industry

11:15-11:20 a.m.: V - CLOSING REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT

ENCLOSURE

U.S. wheat prices to Japan and Latin America

As you will recall, on July 18th we announced a reduction of U.S. wheat export prices . . . but only for Europe and the Mediterranean. Our exclusion of the Far East (Japan) and Latin America has since led to difficulties.

--Japan is complaining bitterly of discrimination and has taken steps to buy more wheat from the EEC and Eastern Europe. (And we have a tacit agreement, or understanding, with the Japanese that they will buy about one-half of their very considerable wheat imports from the U.S. . . . "provided our prices are reasonable.")

--Brazil, our prime market in Latin America, is complaining also. (Meanwhile, the EEC has cut its wheat prices in Brazil.)

Members of the Interagency Task Force on Agricultural Trade, who have been charged with formulating U.S. policy toward the International Grains Arrangement (IGA), have come to the unanimous conclusion that our wheat prices should be reduced in Japan and Latin America.

--Advantages:

-Good commercial reasons . . . we cannot afford to lose these markets.

-We would eliminate discrimination among importers and make our wheat, at least temporarily, more competitive.

-The action would not preclude our re-negotiating the IGA once the climate becomes more favorable.

--Disadvantages:

-It might be another step toward a wheat price war in which we stand to gain very little.

-EEC would protest vociferously (but Canada and Australia would no doubt acquiesce).

-It would mean the end of current technical discussions in London, which serve now as the principal avenue for revising the IGA.

There is one alternative to the "price reductions" action: We could restore (raise) our price in Europe to the pre-July 18th level . . . but This would undoubtedly lead to matching increases by other exporters.

CABINET COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC POLICY

Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

McCracken (Chairman)

The Vice Presidentwill not be present

Counselor Burns

Secretary Hardin

Secretary Kennedy

Budget Director Mayowill be represented
by his Deputy,
Mr. Sam Hughes

UAC Moynihan

Deputy Under Secy. State for Economic Affairs,

Nathaniel Samuels

Secretary Shultz

Secretary Stans

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Personnel Status Report No. 26 (as of August 8, 1969)

The consolidation of weekly personnel reports from the 12 major Departments indicates that:

(a) 233 positions at Level V and above have been filled out of 266 such positions designated (... a completion percentage of 87.6).

(b) There are 1,993 non-career positions available.

(c) Incumbents of 1,622 of the 1,993 non-career positions have been or are to be replaced.

--Incumbents of 1,252 of the 1,622 non-career positions have been replaced (... a completion percentage of 77).

--Incumbents of 370 of the 1,622 non-career positions are to be replaced.

(d) Of the 1,252 appointments made, 983 were to Republicans, 92 were to Democrats, 74 were to Independents, and 103 were to persons of unknown political affiliation (including 49 FSO's).

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Flanigan
Mr. Flemming
Mr. Trent

Can St

August 9, 1969

Mr. Stephen B. Bull
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Steve:

Just a quickie (only six days late)
to express my appreciation for the many
phone calls you placed and running around
you did in the interest of assisting with the
crowd-building efforts of last weekend.
Looking back at the conditions which pre-
vailed and what was accomplished, I would
say that all was worthwhile.

Again, my thanks.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

92
August 9, 1969

Mr. Hugh W. Sloan, Jr.
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Hugh:

Thanks a million for your very willing assistance in building a crowd for the President's arrival at Andrews last Sunday evening. Although I'm pretty new at the game, I don't know of any stones which were left unturned during that weekend period. Rest assured that every idea you advanced and action you took contributed to the turnout and the warm welcome which awaited the President and his party.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

22
August 9, 1969

Mr. Edward L. Morgan
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

Just a short note -- long overdue --
to thank you for the several good ideas you
advanced last weekend concerning crowd-
building techniques. You were very helpful
and I appreciate the time you took from your
briefing preparations.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

41
August 9, 1969

Mrs. Virginia S. Savell
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ginger:

I am embarrassed that it's taken me six full days to pause and thank you for your really invaluable assistance to our crowd-building efforts of last weekend. Of all who helped this oh-so-novice political coordinator, you were far and away the key person responsible for what I am forced to term "fantastic results" ... under more than one adverse circumstance.

Please convey my gratitude to the many persons who so willingly gave you a hand. They all did a great job.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President

chron

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Nomination of Representative and
Appointment of Alternate Represent-
ative to Serve on the Executive
Board of the World Health
Organization (WHO)

Discussion:

The United States was elected to membership on the WHO Executive Board for a three year term beginning July 28, 1969. Public Law 643 - 80th Congress requires that the President shall nominate the Representative by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall appoint the Alternate Representative.

Recommendation:

I recommend that you give your informal approval for the nomination of Dr. S. Paul Ehrlich, Jr., Deputy Director, Office of International Health, United States Public Health Service as Representative on the Executive Board of the World Health and the appointment of Dr. Benjamin D. Blood, Associate Director, International Organizations Affairs, Office of International Health, United States Public Health Service as Alternate Representative. I make these recommendations with the concurrence of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.


Acting Secretary

Approve AP Butterfield Acty Sec to the Cabinet (AUG 11, 1969)

Disapprove _____

PAS

*Put
Into Clearance
Sum 1 of Gm 2*

August 4, 1969

[Handwritten mark]

*OK
AB*

MEMORANDUM FOR: John C. Whitaker
Secretary to the Cabinet

SUBJECT: Nomination of Representative and
Appointment of Alternate Represent-
ative to Serve on the Executive
Board of the World Health
Organization (WHO)

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum for the President seeking his informal approval for the nomination of Dr. S. Paul Ehrlich, Jr. as Representative on the Executive Board of the World Health and the appointment of Dr. Benjamin D. Blood as Alternate Representative.

Carleton S. Coon, Jr.
Director
Presidential Appointments Staff

Attachment:

As stated.

cc: ~~Peter~~ Planigan
Assistant to the President

Harry Flemming
Special Assistant to the President

Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs