

*chron*

*Red Tag*

June 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

The President is becoming increasingly concerned over repeated reports of contradictions within the intelligence community ... reports which make for headlines such as this one (found on Page 2 of yesterday's NEW YORK TIMES) -- "Nixon Critics Say Intelligence Gap Clouds ABM Issue". The thrust, of course, is that the arguments being made by Secretary Laird about the SS-9 threat are being contradicted by secret CIA briefings given to Safeguard critics in the Senate. According to the TIMES, "as seen by ABM opponents, this 'intelligence gap' goes to the heart of the argument over whether or not there is a military necessity to start immediate deployment of the Safeguard system."

He would like your opinion right away as to what should be done.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



Chrom

Red Fax

June 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

In his morning news summary the President read an account from the current U.S. News and World Report's "Washington Whispers" column which says that behind Attorney General Mitchell's assertion that outside forces are financing some revolutionary student groups is this fact: "The U. S. Government has been given what officials consider 'ironclad proof' that Red China and Communist Cuba have helped bankroll nationally-coordinated campus disorders."

The President would like you to gather all the information you can on this matter and give him a report ... while he is in California, if possible. He believes we may have some use for it in view of the difficulties Nelson Rockefeller is having in Latin America, and other troubles.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



Chv

June 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

As you may recall, the final paragraph of Arthur Burns' May 26 memo for the President concerning campus disorders reads as follows:

"The government should inform the nation about the nature of SDS and its goals, so that students, faculty, and others can distinguish between legitimate issues and the demands of a group whose ultimate goal is destruction rather than reform. If the government's information concerning the SDS and related groups is not sufficient, it should be quickly augmented. It is essential to know the exact nature of this new, rather frightening, movement."

With reference to this particular portion of Arthur's memo, the President addressed these comments to you:

"John -

"(1) Will the Senate or House investigation meet this need?

"(2) Could Justice or HEW do anything on it?

"(3) Possibly a University indigenous group should investigate and report...or perhaps a respected newspaper team."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*Chron*

June 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

This morning the President read a news summary account which said that Texas GOP Congressman Jim Collins is still irritated at the Administration's opposition to his attempts to pass an anti-bussing law.

The President said, "John -- I am not opposed to this kind of Bill. Call off the dogs."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



June 2, 1969

PERSONAL/PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Further to the subject of Supreme Court nominations, the President passed this comment to you: "John -- If we can't find a Republican young enough, Justice Dyer in Miami is the best of the Democrats. He is a long-time RN supporter."

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

PERSONAL/PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



chem

June 2, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

There is a piece in the current NEWSWEEK which says that some reporters covering the East Wing are complaining about Gerry Van der Heuvel ... saying she is "so protective of the Nixons that she is choking off legitimate information." The reporters allege that Gerry has not made Mrs. Nixon "come alive". The article goes on to say, "The ironic thing is that if there is one thing the Nixons need, it's humanizing."

With reference to the "need for humanizing the Nixons", the President definitely does not agree. He wants you to know that he would just as soon keep the society reporters away altogether if there were some way that we could get away with it.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Ziegler

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



Chen

June 2, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,  
EDUCATION AND WELFARE

MR. EHRLICHMAN

Max Ascoli, former editor of the Reporter, had an article on campus disorders in the May 27th issue of the Wall Street Journal ... the essence of which appears below:

"One hopes that the President is exerting a wise, harmonizing influence on the Congressional committees engaged in preparing legislation on campus or racial disorders. He can also urge the local or state authorities to act." Cornell's guns are recalled; "Harvard students who thre the nine deans out have not been suspended or expelled." "When a community ceases to be a university, then the Attorney General should find a way to put it into receivership." Ike sent troops to Little Rock despite Faubus' displeasure. "The N. Y. Times, the most authoritative organ of wooly thinking in our country" says by ending the war we'll "appease the students and other riotous groups ... Yet the President can be sure that the domestic Viet Cong will never make peace, even after Ho enters Saigon, and every single GI is back from Vietnam" .... Lincoln should be kept constantly in mind. He took extreme liberties with the Nation's laws "but he saved the Union. President Nixon faces an even harder task, for he must save the Union not from a civil but a guerrilla war."

The President wants each of you to know that he shares this view -- and that in his opinion we may soon have to face up to more than "dialogue".

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President



chron

June 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Bob --

A few quick items:

- (1) I am attaching two copies of the Final News Plan for the period June 8-14 ... one for you and one for the President (although I am sure that for the next few days at least he'll be preoccupied with foreign policy matters). You will note that, other than a possible Presidential message on June 13th, nothing appears under the "White House Press Releases" column. You may wish to have Ron Ziegler or Jerry Warren give whatever appropriate inputs they might have to Elmer Juanich ... who could type them in in a matter of minutes.
- (2) The President's talks at GBC and the AFA were really outstanding -- precisely what most real Americans with their country's best long-range interests at heart feel so deeply ... and wanted so badly to hear him say. Of course, I do think that both talks, especially the one delivered at the Academy, sufficiently defined the President's views and forthcoming positions vis-a-vis the issues concerned to buy their fair share of trouble from those relatively liberal elements with whom he had pretty well established a sort of marginal acceptance. But I for one feel better now. The old positions were precarious at best and could not have lasted for very long. This new approach is clearly honest and as right as rain.
- (3) I am enclosing three cc's of memos to others which may be of interest to you.
- (4) All is well here.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



chron

June 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

While in California the President reviewed your June 5th memorandum concerning Communist financial support of campus disorders. His comments, addressed back to you, appear below:

- "John -- (1) Please keep after this.
- (2) Give Huston the job of developing hard evidence of this probable support activity (. . . or if not Huston, someone with his toughness and brains).
- (3) Please get with Bryce Harlow on this. I want him to pass the information to Senators Mundt and McClellan. "

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Harlow



chron

June 10, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The President read in a recent news summary that many of his critics complain about the Administration's not being "as open as promised." His only comment, addressed to you, appears below:

"John -- Tell Herb and Ron to ignore this kind of criticism. The fact of the matter is that we are far too open. If we treat the press with a little more contempt we'll probably get better treatment."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Klein  
Mr. Ziegler

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



June 10, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The following paragraph appeared in one of the news summaries prepared for the President during his visit to the West coast:

Recent ABC film footage showed Senator Proxmire expressing the opinion that "there is waste in the military," and saying that he intends to keep exposing it. Proxmire goes on to tell the public that if the President intends to question the loyalty of the people conducting such investigations he (the President) can expect a fight from Congress.

With reference to this item -- and directing his question to you -- the President asked, "Who is informing Proxmire of RN's statements ... specifically of the intimation that RN says that waste in the military is okay?" The President went on to comment that one of our Senators should have nailed Proxmire on this one.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Harlow

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



June 11, 1969

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Safeguard Compromise

Reference: Your approval of Ken Belieu's June 10th suggestion that we get together with Mel Laird and Henry Kissinger and work out some "modification language" with which we can easily live.

Under most circumstances I appreciate the desirability of being prepared and having a contingency plan available, but in the case of our Safeguard campaign I believe any talk -- even any consideration -- of "compromise" (at this time) is unjustified and extremely risky. My concern stems from the fact that a leak is almost inevitable -- and news of that kind in enemy hands would not only serve to discredit you personally and the Administration generally but it would deal a really devastating blow to our admittedly slight but definite position of advantage.

A victory on this controversial issue is more than important; it is absolutely essential. Whereas you know that better than anyone, most of the rest of us thoroughly understand. We have gradually -- (perhaps all too gradually at times) -- picked off several of the target Senators and are now, in my opinion, on the threshold of breaking the opposition's back. They are beginning to show signs of "running scared"; they are openly conceding some 50 votes; and although I don't know what success you had with Margaret Smith earlier tonight, I do know that a new rumor is out to the effect that even Muskie might come our way "if we handle things properly." Why then should we now get out the white flag? Whether we intend to wave it once, twice, or not at all, the mere knowledge of its existence will excite and energize the other side and seriously threaten a

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

reversal of the currently favorable trends. In short, the whole business worries me. With the strength of those convictions which were ours on March 14th, continued concentration on influencing the uncommitted, and some quite intensive but very adroit stroking of those who are wholly or only partially with us, we can win without a compromise.

In that this memorandum is for your information and consideration only I am not going to conclude with a specific recommendation. However, early next week you may wish to consider one of the following courses of action:

- (1) Call a halt to the "compromise" contingency preparations, and thereby nip in the bud all possible murmurings or outright charges of our having in hand a fallback position;
- (2) Alter slightly the instructions to proceed with a "compromise" contingency plan by excluding DoD's participation ... because that Department's involvement increases by a considerable factor the chances of a security breach; or
- (3) Leave things as they are, at least for the time being.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL



chron

June 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KLEIN

The President wants you to arrange to have the Democrats on the (pro-ABM) Citizens Committee For Peace With Security buy an ad in the POST blasting that newspaper for ignoring them in its weekend articles reporting Committee membership.

Please have a progress report ready for the President by June 13.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. BeLieu



June 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHAPIN

I am not sure how the attached letter found its way into my "in-basket" ... but because it concerns a request for an appointment with the President, I am passing it on to you for whatever action you deem appropriate.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



churn

June 11, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

On June 10th Harry Dent sent a memorandum to the President concerning National Committeeman Tom Reed's warning that Reagan could well become the "Eugene McCarthy of the Republican Party" after he is re-elected in 1970. The memo goes on to say that Reed was referring specifically to the Reagan-Finch feud and a probable near-future confrontation which would in no way benefit the Administration. (The original correspondence is in Elmer's file of red-checked memos.)

With reference to this general topic the President wants you to talk to Bob Finch -- then give him a report as to how we might best build a better bridge to Reagan.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DELIVER BY HAND

June 11, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS VERY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HARLOW  
MR. BeLIEU

The President has approved the suggestion (contained in paragraph 4 of Ken BeLieu's June 10th memorandum for the President) that we very quietly and with maximum security develop some "slight compromise" language with which we can easily live. Together, you are cleared to discuss this matter with Henry Kissinger and Mel Laird, but only with the understanding that the purpose of this action at this time is to prepare ourselves for probable future queries by Senator Stennis ... and that (as you said in your memo) we continue to display for the time being a public attitude of "no compromise".

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Dr. Kissinger

PLEASE TREAT AS VERY CONFIDENTIAL



June 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Subject: Comment from the President (Information Only)

The President is interested in your noting the fact that virtually all of the press are crying in their beer because their dire predictions of "RN-Thieu troubles" did not surface.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN (info only)  
MR. CHARLES B. WILKINSON (info only)

The President's only comment after reading of Joe Namath's plan to retire from professional football rather than bow to Pete Rozelle's ultimatum: "Good riddance."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



chron

June 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Melvin R. Laird  
Secretary of Defense

Dr. Henry Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

Subject: Comment by the President (Information Only)

Last night CBS/TV presented a filmed interview with a young soldier who had been wounded in the Hamburger Hill battle and was back home with his family in Grand Rapids. The soldier made a very effective television case against the Hamburger Hill operation, saying that it was "a turkey shoot ... and we were the turkeys." The lad went on to say that he and "most of his buddies" had cried all night after the battle because so many of their good friends had been badly shot up in the "seemingly senseless exercise." What really made the piece effective was the fact that the young man, when asked, said that he was wholly in favor of the war, and that he felt that we had to be there ... in Vietnam. He was no hippy or peacenik -- "just an average young guy."

The President's only comment, which he asked be passed to each of you: "A pretty sad commentary on our public relations effort."

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

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Chrm

June 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

Senator Goodell has been making news lately ... saying that some of the things about this Administration which bother him are the Otepka appointment, Senator Dirksen's blocking of the Knowles appointment, and our lack of action to help Biafra.

Addressing his comment to you, the President said that we should stay out of Goodell's primary race.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Dent



Cham

June 16, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS VERY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The President is very concerned at the moment about staff loyalty -- and for good reason.

A news account late last week told of new problems facing the Administration -- the Consumer Price Index, rampant campus dissent, etc. It said the Hamburger Hill battle and the Midway meeting have brought the specter of the credibility gap right up to the doorstep of the Oval Office ... and concluded with the statement that two men "very close to the President" had "conveyed the chill of pessimism."

Another news item -- this one from Newsweek -- reported that several of the President's more conservative top aides are allegedly saying in private that Secretary Rogers has been won over to the side of the doves ... and that when the President talks of "flexibility" he is really saying that he has come to agree with Rogers. One of these aides went so far as to predict that Henry Kissinger would "walk out of the Administration if the President comes to accept Rogers' point of view."

And a third news article -- in the latest issue of Time -- expresses the opinion that the President failed at Colorado Springs to quiet criticism of the military, and adds that a few of his own staff even admitted, in private, that some of the language of the Air Academy speech was "unfortunate."

With reference to these particular reports (but no doubt influenced somewhat by other similar reports of past months) the President said that he wants you to see to it that the entire White House staff is questioned ... "on an urgent basis". Although he feels that it should be unnecessary, he wants you to reiterate to all the importance of their being loyal.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

PLEASE TREAT AS VERY CONFIDENTIAL

cc: Mr. Haldeman



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN  
MR. KLEIN

The following extracts from recent Presidential news summaries reveal Newsweek magazine's anti-Administration bias:

- (On the Midway meeting). Newsweek boiled down the meaning of Midway by quoting Senator Gore, with whom it evidently agrees, saying that the outcome of the Nixon-Thieu meeting would determine whether eventually we get a negotiated peace or "more of the same".
- (On the General Beadle College and Air Academy speeches). As for the two speeches which preceded Midway, Newsweek reported them as "curiously hard-line". The magazine went on to ask if the speeches were made in earnest ... or intended merely to "smooth the feathers of the hawks before undertaking some dovish maneuvers."
- (On Dirksen). In its most recent issue Newsweek levels its big guns on Everett Dirksen ... implying the he is a "cynical opportunist serving special interests only."

With reference to these and other similar reports by the Newsweek staff, the President said that it was high time "we cut them off", and that he wanted the magazine's representatives henceforth "cut out of any backrounders."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Dr. Kissinger  
Mr. Ziegler

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN  
DR. KISSINGER  
MR. KLEIN

A recent news summary prepared for the President reviewed some of TIME magazine's comments relative to the June 4th address delivered to the Air Force Academy's graduating class. The essence of that review appears below:

In a hard-hitting speech last week, the President came to the defense of the defenders -- and by the aggressiveness of his counterattack almost certainly widened the polarization of American opinion. Mr. Nixon set up "straw men" ... i.e. the skeptics and the neo-isolationists, but they are not really significant in the national debate. Responsible critics (skeptics) advocate neither unilateral disarmament nor withdrawal from foreign alliances. They merely raise questions and tactics and costs. The dominant new mood in Congress is one of sober questioning, and the President's intemperate remarks hit the wrong note.

With reference to this report and particularly to the "sober questioning of the Congress", the President directed these comments to each of you: "Obviously TIME has a man here who is trying to chop us up. Let's find out who covered this event and see to it that he is "cut out of things".

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Determined to be an  
Administrative Marking  
Not National Security Information  
By JUS NARA Date 3/21/2010

June 16, 1969

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
MR. HARLOW  
MR. BELIEU

Over the weekend the President made a number of comments concerning our Safeguard campaign. Particular emphasis was placed on these points:

- (1) "There must be absolutely no talk of compromise with the Defense Department (... and particularly none with Dave Packard).
- (2) "Bryce -- On a completely Top Secret basis you should talk with Stennis to see what he advises.
- (3) "Henry -- Keep in close touch with Aiken. He would like an excuse to come over to our side.
- (4) "Let's not waste any more time with Saxbe, Schweiker, et al.
- (5) "From here on in we should play a hard line publicly ... and a very very careful explanatory line privately."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

~~SECRET~~



June 17, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

As you will recall, Tom Huston's special report on "The McNamara Legacy" suggested that Mel Laird must surely have some "goodies on the McNamara years" stashed away in his Defense files ... some things which Mollenhoff and others might well be able to use with effectiveness in our campaign to stir up activity and show the opposition that we mean business.

The President would like you to get together with Henry Kissinger and check on this discreetly.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Dr. Kissinger

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



*chron*

June 17, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The President wants you to look over Tom Huston's special report, entitled "The McNamara Legacy", a copy of which is attached. Then -- along the lines of the report's last paragraph recommendation -- he wants you to get Huston and Buchanan lined up to work with Defense and Congress ... in an effort to stir up some action.

(For your information, the President asked that copies of this "special report" be sent to Mel Laird, Rogers Morton, and Bryce Harlow ... which I have just done.)

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment

cc: Dr. Kissinger  
Mr. Keogh

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By 345 NARA Date 3/21/2016

June 20, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL / FOR ADDRESSEE ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable John N. Mitchell  
The Attorney General

The following paragraph summarizes a Pearlstine-Lawson article which appeared in the June 13th Wall Street Journal.

The chieftan of the Baton Rouge Teamsters, Edward Partin, has had an extensive criminal record and currently there are charges outstanding against him for embezzlement. He was the government's key witness against Hoffa and is said to have "become something of a hero to men who worked for RFK." And such is the reason offered for Partin's "seeming good fortune" at staying out of jail for the past several years. Gov. McKeithan and "others in high academic, corporate and governmental positions" in Louisiana feel that Partin has "been put above the law for his aid in convicting Hoffa." Justice "vehemently denies that such is the case.... But talk of immunity persists confronting John Mitchell with a potentially explosive problem." A complete review of Partin has been ordered and "there are hints his luck may be running out." Several Justice officials are mentioned as "friends" of the Teamster official.

After reading this account the President's written comment to you was, "John -- Let's go after Partin."

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

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June 21, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KLEIN

A television news analysis prepared for the President on June 18th told of an NBC report which gave a full five minutes to Clark Clifford and high praise for his article in Foreign Affairs.

After reading this the President asked why we can't get "one of our guys on in opposition" ... and suggested someone like Bill Buckley.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



Chron

June 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The President wants you to obtain copies of Len Garment's June 21st memorandum for Bob Haldeman concerning his recent nationwide press conference ... and pass them discreetly to some of the key members of our staff. The point is that he believes most of us pussyfoot around more than is necessary ... that we're too timid. He thinks we need to be a bit more gutsy at times.

Further to the content of the Garment memo, the President wonders why we can't get some of this kind of reaction publicly, i.e. out in the open. He said that the Kennedys always managed to do so and that in his opinion we have failed in the endeavor thus far.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



chron

June 23, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

After reviewing the memorandum on bank robbery violations which you forwarded from the Attorney General on June 18th, the President made these comments:

"John -- Talk to John Mitchell. It is very important for us to take credit now -- and get full publicity -- for this significant reduction in bank robbery violations. Don't be concerned about the future. I think we have to gamble more. Let's get a story out; perhaps by Senator Hruska. (What do you think?)"

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



Chen

June 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Dr. Arthur F. Burns  
Counsellor to the President

The President has reviewed Tom Huston's June 18th memorandum concerning foundations which are financing left-wing causes with the taxpayers' money. His comments: "Arthur -- Good! But I want action! Please have Huston follow up hard on this one ... under your supervision, of course."

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President



Chen

June 23, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Once again pessimism, self-condemnation, and other spineless comments are credited to "White House staffers" ... this time by Flora Lewis in the June 12th issue of the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. She writes:

"Privately, everybody in official Washington, including White House staffers, admits that Gov. Rockefeller's whole elaborate venture in Latin America has been a shameful fiasco. The sad fact is that the trips were so badly conceived, so foolishly advertised and so absurdly made that nothing but trouble could have been expected."

You can guess the President's reaction. He wanted this report brought to your attention right away -- and to Henry's also -- and added that a hard talk to the staff is urgent ... one in which we really "spell it out" to everyone.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Dr. Kissinger

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



chron

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

In commenting on the President's news conference statement about troop withdrawals, John Scali is reported to have said that the President now realizes he made a mistake and is afraid he has encouraged Hanoi to keep up the fight. The President circled this item while looking through his news summary today and remarked to you that to his way of thinking it represented another obvious staff leak.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



Chiron

June 25, 1969

Mrs. Nixon:

Yet another very generous article by Wauhilla La Hay which the President wanted you to see. This one appeared in Scripps-Howard newspapers on June 21st. The summary, as prepared by Pat Buchanan for the President's daily news digest, appears below:

"Those who have described Mrs. Nixon as shy, unresponsive and wary of personal contacts are wrong, or thinking of the 'old' Pat Nixon." During her trip, "reporters saw her embrace and kiss countless children while visiting schools in deprived areas.... They watched her greet volunteers warmly and display an obvious interest in what they had to tell .... She generated in the volunteer workers a strong feeling that she cared, that she was truly concerned.... She has always taken her responsibilities seriously -- both as wife and mother." Moreover, Mrs. Nixon has been a most "gracious hostess" at the White House and is "emerging as a lively person who isn't afraid today of saying what she thinks, doing what she wants to do, going where she wants to go."

Alexander P. Butterfield



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN  
MR. HALDEMAN

The President read this morning in his daily news summary that both the Baltimore Sun and the New York Times gave Page 1 space to the report that the Administration is ready to lift deadlines for desegregation in most Southern school districts. Extracts from the Sun's story: "As the reports leaked out, President Nixon came under public and private pressure to step in and reverse the decision." .... "Well informed sources who oppose the plan, but had been expecting it to be announced since the beginning of the week, professed a flicker of encouragement at the delay -- although there is still a strong general feeling that the current decision will be final." Marjorie Hunter of the Times said, "While some Administration officials are continuing to oppose any easing of the desegregation policies, the principal fight now centers on which of two plans to adopt."

"Who leaked this and why?", was the President's comment -- and although it was addressed to no one in particular I pass it on to each of you as documentary proof of his continued concern about the irresponsible and/or purposely disloyal mouthings of Administration officials ... and for whatever action you think appropriate.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



June 27, 1969

Mrs. Nixon:

The President thought you would be interested in the following short paragraph which appeared in his morning news summary:

"A former secretary to Mrs. Jacqueline Onassis says that she spent \$40,000 on clothes in one year while JFK was President. And the ex-secretary reports that Jackie spent over \$121,000 on family expenses in 1962. The details are in an article in the current issue of Ladies Home Journal. The financial situation became so acute that Mrs. Kennedy told the White House staff to limit guests at official functions to two cocktails apiece."

Alexander P. Butterfield



chrn

June 30, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ZIEGLER

In yesterday's news summary there was a short resume describing Frank Reynolds' "almost unbelievable sarcasm" in reporting Ev Dirksen's alleged influence in the cases of both Otepka and Knowles.

The President's comment to you: "Ron -- This is something to remember."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Klein

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



chron

June 30, 1969

Mrs. Nixon:

The President thought you would like to see his News Summary's report on Tricia's London arrival:

"Tricia Nixon arrived and stole the spotlight from Humphrey, Elizabeth Taylor and Britain's own Princess Anne. BBC announced Tricia's arrival ahead of its report on Princess Anne attending a ball in Paris Saturday night. Humphrey got no mention at all. The social race was on. British society was pulling strings for invitations to the parties Miss Nixon will be attending. Elizabeth Taylor fell far behind in the party sweepstakes."

Alexander P. Butterfield



Jun '69



Chen  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


June 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable Melvin R. Laird  
Secretary of Defense

Dr. Henry Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

This memorandum (also to be treated as Confidential) is enclosed only for your general information. It bears directly on the President's concern about our public relations activities, or lack thereof, and the comment which he passed to each of you.

  
Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment



June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable Robert P. Mayo  
Director, Bureau of the Budget

The President wants to review, by country, the total numbers of overseas U. S. civilian personnel assigned to CIA, USIA, AID and the Peace Corps. Additionally, he wants the U. S. military personnel totals for all foreign countries except Vietnam and Korea ... with forces specifically assigned to NATO excluded from NATO-country totals.

Would you please provide this information in any format whatever (the attached being merely a suggestion) by Monday, July 14.

Thank you.

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment

cc: Mr. James W. Clark



# U. S. PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO DUTY OVERSEAS

| Country of Assignment | Organizational Categories |      |     |             |                |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|------|-----|-------------|----------------|
|                       | CIA                       | USIA | AID | Peace Corps | U. S. Mil Pers |
| Argentina             |                           |      |     |             |                |
| Australia             |                           |      |     |             |                |
| Austria               |                           |      |     |             |                |
| Etc.                  |                           |      |     |             |                |
| W. Germany            |                           |      |     |             | (total)*       |
| Greece                |                           |      |     |             | (total)*       |
| Etc.                  |                           |      |     |             |                |
| Japan                 |                           |      |     |             |                |
| Korea                 |                           |      |     |             | **             |
| Etc.                  |                           |      |     |             |                |
| S. Vietnam            |                           |      |     |             | **             |
| Etc.                  |                           |      |     |             |                |

\* Excludes forces specifically assigned to NATO

\*\* Omitted by request



*Chen*

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

As you will note, the President wants a copy of Richard Rosecrance's essay, "U. S. Strategy and the New Administration", returned for his reading file.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



chron

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Paul W. McCracken  
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Herbert Koshetz had an article in the June 26th New York Times,  
the essence of which appears below:

Pierre Rinfret says that the Administration's program for holding down inflation is entirely ineffective, and that there will be no halt in the upward spiral for a minimum of five years. He said that businessmen who are holding back on expansion are unrealistic because money will not get any cheaper under current government policies.

After reading this report the President directed these comments to you:

"Paul -- I have a great regard for Rinfret personally. It might be a good idea to get him in for a talk ... and a brief visit with me afterward."

Please coordinate with Dwight Chapin on this matter.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Chapin



*Chron*

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Paul W. McCracken  
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

The following item, subtitled "Economy", appeared in the President's June 30th news summary:

Walter Heller accused President Nixon of contributing to inflation by failing to insist on voluntary wage and price restraint. Heller called for an "economic disarmament agreement" among Government, business and organized labor to act in concert to halt the wage-price spiral. He also said the Nixon Administration should "stop talking and start acting" to provide protection for the lowest paid workers, who he said would be the first to suffer if anti-inflation efforts begin to pay off. Interviewed on "Meet the Press" Heller said Nixon's own economic aides had made some mistakes, but he reserved his strongest criticism for the President himself. "We are not getting Presidential leadership in setting down some ground rules for voluntary restraint," he said. He and Arthur Burns rejected wage and price controls. Burns said on "Issues and Answers" that there "flatly" would be no such controls. He expressed confidence that the Administration's anti-inflation program would work without producing "significant" unemployment. Burns predicted that interest rates would be lower by the end of the year.

With reference to the entire paragraph generally, but the first sentence specifically, the President asked what our reaction should be. He would appreciate your views on the matter.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

This is merely to report the fact that I met with Bob Mayo and John Ehrlichman last week concerning ways and means of best, and most expeditiously, implementing an effective "overseas personnel reduction program". The meeting concluded with the agreement that Mayo would submit to John a (draft) memorandum for the President outlining some of the staff's thoughts on the matter, and attach to it a draft implementing Presidential memorandum addressed to all heads of executive departments and agencies. At this point I think it best for me to sit back -- at least for a few days -- and observe. This is not to say that I no longer consider myself the "herd-rider", but there is little that I, or anyone, can do now until the President gives us some indication as to his receptivity ... by responding to my memorandum and/or the Mayo-Ehrlichman memorandum which is probably enroute to you now.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Bob:

As you will note by reading my June 27th memorandum to Pat Buchanan (attached), I interpreted the President's instructions to mean that he wanted a copy of the full 10-part series of Anatole Shub's articles, rather than a return copy of Pat Buchanan's "special report" ... which I now attach.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachments



*chron*

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

Over the weekend the President reviewed your June 26th memorandum concerning television station WPIX in New York City. He appreciated your passing on the facts of the matter and asked that you follow up by keeping abreast of the issue and reporting to him. He is especially interested in knowing whether or not "Forum", the ultra-liberal outfit, gets the license.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Flanigan



*Chen*

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN

Subject: Your June 30th memorandum to me concerning  
Clinton Anderson

As indicated on Page 1 of my June 19th memorandum for the President (Subject: Current Status Report on Specific Senators re Safeguard Issue), Scoop Jackson is "in charge" of Senator Anderson and is aware of the importance of riding herd on Anderson in order to ensure his supporting vote.

I have just double checked this matter with Ken BeLieu who said that both he and Jackson are keeping a watchful eye on the elderly Senator, and that as recently as Friday he (BeLieu) had lunched with Anderson and come away feeling that things were still on track. BeLieu is fully aware of the dangers of complacency and (along with Scoop) is placing a high priority on frequent contacts with, and appropriate actions toward, Senator Anderson.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*chron*

June 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUCHANAN

The President was especially interested in the 5-page "special report" concerning the Soviet Union and its leadership which you prepared and forwarded to him as a part of today's news summary. He has asked that a copy be sent to Henry Kissinger -- which I have just done -- and that by the morning of July 1st he (the President) be furnished the full 10-part series of Anatole Shub's articles.

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Keogh



chron

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

The President had a chance over the weekend to read the June 20th letter from Robert Howse (Vice-President of the U. S. Golf Association) which in such glowing terms describes the reaction of U. S. Open Champion Orville Moody to his long distance person-to-person phone call during the "presentation ceremony" at Houston. Additionally, Howse told of the "beautiful" affect of the call on Mrs. Moody and the children ... and on the assembled throng of golfing fans when news of the telephone call was announced.

He wants all of us to be on the lookout for similar events and to try to arrange more calls like this one.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Haldeman  
Mr. John Brown  
Mr. Chapin  
Miss Woods  
Mr. Klein  
Mr. Keogh



Chen

June 30, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

Writing in the Christian Science Monitor on June 26th Joseph C. Harsch said of Hickel: "Events so far indicate Hickel is a very good Secretary. There are some watchers of Interior who think he may turn out to be better than his predecessor. So far as I can determine he has not made a single mistake yet. He is trying hard to make a good record."

The President seemed to be more worried than heartened by these words and said, "John -- Wally may be caving in too much to his critics."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Haldeman

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
MR. KLEIN

This is just a short note to tell you of the President's pleasure when he read a recent headline in the Charlotte Observer -- "If Reds Escalate, Hanoi in Danger" ... and another in the Miami Herald -- "Nixon to Bomb Again if Reds Step Up War". This is the kind of news he wants us to be getting across to the public, and he thought James McCartney put things especially well in a June 26th article carried by most of the Knight papers. A resume follows:

The President is prepared to resume the bombing of N. Vietnam -- "with no strings attached" -- if the Communists escalate the war in response to U.S. troop withdrawals .... It is, in effect, an ace in the hole Nixon is keeping in case his main strategy doesn't work. While no troops will be returned after they've once been withdrawn, the Administration will "take the gloves off" if necessary to protect those left in Vietnam. It is also important to realize that "the withdrawal program is actually far more sophisticated, and planning is far more advanced, than has been generally recognized".... If all goes according to plan the numbers would mount rapidly to more than 200,000 by the end of 1970.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Ehrlichman  
Mr. Ziegler  
Mr. Keogh



*Chron*

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN  
MR. DENT

Yesterday the President had a chance to look over Harry Dent's June 28th memorandum concerning his recent meeting with the Republican National Committee. With reference specifically to the report that there is still much discontent among State Chairmen, Committeemen, etc. over "numerous appointments of Democrats", the President said, "Once again, this is due primarily to our own failure to get across to these Committeemen and others Peter Flanigan's very good story."

  
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Haldeman  
Mr. Flanigan



*chron*

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. LEONARD GARMENT  
DR. D. P. MOYNIHAN

The President had a chance over the weekend to review your June 24th memorandum, jointly prepared. He liked your idea of assembling a respectable list "with a minimum of soul searching this time around," and asked that you forward your suggested names to him along with final recommendations as to when, where, and how the presentations should be made.

  
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*Chron*

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

The President wants an immediate re-examination of our policy opposing Saigon's proposal to send high-ranking Communist defectors to the U. S. to help counter Viet Cong propaganda. Please report directly to the President your findings and/or personal views.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*Chen*

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State

The President was pleased to learn of your recent session with PR aides, and your efforts to instill in them some understanding of the importance of effective news conferences and the necessity for thorough advance planning. He was equally appreciative of your stern warnings against unauthorized release of classified information.

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President



Chen

June 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MISS ROSE MARY WOODS

Lenore Romney wrote a letter to the Washington Post editor which appeared in that newspaper's June 27th issue (see attached). The President would appreciate your preparing for his signature a short note along these lines: "Dear Lenore -- Thank you for an excellent 'letter to the editor' in the June 27th Washington Post. You really put our critics on the spot!"

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



chron  
June 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

The President was especially interested in the attached "special report" written by Pat Buchanan. He wanted you to be sure to read it.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



*chem*

June 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HARLOW

As you will note, the President disapproved your suggested letter to House Republican Members.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHAPIN

In accordance with the agreement reached during our telephone conversation this morning I am sending to you (or Nell) the home address of Mr. Harold K. Bell, President Nixon's former Burning Tree golf caddy. It is:

1204-42nd Place, N.E.  
Washington, D. C. 20019

It is my understanding that his business address is c/o The D. C. Department of Recreation.

Arranging for the "quick handshake and hello" office call is now in your hands and, in accordance with the President's wishes, I will contact Herb Klein with regard to public release of the two letters.

Thanks.

*ABT*  
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Klein  
Mr. Ziegler



MEMORANDUM

Churn

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KLEIN

Subject: Mr. Harold K. Bell

Reference: My memorandum to you of June 24th ... same subject.

Attached to the referenced memorandum was a letter to President Nixon from Mr. Harold K. Bell, a former golf caddy at the Burning Tree Country Club. A copy of the President's reply is attached to this memorandum. Please hold both letters until Dwight Chapin has had a chance to line up a date for the short office call by Bell. Then, but not before, we can prepare for public release of the letters.

Many thanks.

  
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment

cc: Mr. Chapin  
Mr. Ziegler



chron

June 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE STAFF SECRETARY

The President has just read the attached memorandum from the Postmaster General.

Please prepare for the President's signature a short note to former President Truman saying, "I was most pleased to learn from the Postmaster General that . . . ."

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
MR. HARLOW

The President has just reviewed copies of Mike Mansfield's recent letters to Sihanouk and Chou En-lai. He wants to be sure that the two of you coordinate with each other so as to ascertain that the Senator is informed of our new economic moves toward the Chi-coms. Additionally, he wants Bryce to tell Mansfield that he is most pleased with these initiatives.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*chm*

June 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE STAFF SECRETARY

This is to inform you that I have complied with the President's request as stated in your Action Memorandum (Log Nr. 404) of June 25th.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*chem*

June 25, 1969

Mr. William J. Casey  
Citizens Committee for Peace with Security  
768 Fifth Avenue, Suite 723  
New York, New York 10019

Dear Bill:

The President asked specifically that I send you the attached material. As you will note, it contains excerpts of a memorandum from the Washington State Democratic Council ... I suppose to any and every one within reach. With reference chiefly to the paragraphs outlined in pencil on Page 6, the President remarked that this is a good example of the woolly thinking of the opposition, and that it might be of some value to you in your work.

If you have any special thoughts on the matter, or any return message which you would like me to relay to the President, please give me a call.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

P.S. To ensure your early receipt of this material I am sending a copy to both your law office and the Citizens Committee.



June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Today's resume of televised news programs tells of Howard K Smith's report to the effect that attempts by Presidential aides to clear up what the President said at the news conference may only tend to prolong the controversy over the meaning of his statement on troop withdrawals.

The President's comment to this: "He may be right. Tell Herb Klein et al to pipe down."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD



*Chron*

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHAPIN

The President wants you to make arrangements to have Harold K. Bell (a former caddy at the Burning Tree golf course and originator of the attached letter) drop by the office for a very brief handshake and photograph. Incidentally, he (the President) sent an information copy of the letter to Secretary Rogers.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



chron

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KLEIN

The President seemed quite interested in the attached letter from a former golf caddy, Mr. Harold K. Bell. He has sent an information copy to Secretary Rogers and asked Dwight Chapin to arrange to have Bell drop by the office for a quick handshake.

Additionally, he would like you to review the letter and put it out publicly at some appropriate near-future time.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachment



Chron

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Honorable William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State

The President thought you might find the attached letter interesting.

(Incidentally, he is going to invite Bell to drop by the office for a picture sometime in the near future.)

Alexander P. Butterfield  
Deputy Assistant to the President

Attachment



*chem*

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE STAFF SECRETARY

A short item in the President's morning news summary told of Senator Pastore's reference to President Nixon as a "man of peace" who should be given time to seek an honorable end to the Vietnam war. Pastore said that the President's chances of reaching a peaceful settlement will be greatly improved if critics of the war will not try to set their own deadlines.

The President would like a letter of thanks written to Senator Pastore for these understanding comments. He said further that we should be on the lookout for items similar to this and come forward with letters for his signature when the occasions so warrant.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Harlow  
Mr. BeLieu



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN  
MR. KLEIN

The following account appeared in the President's morning news summary:

Americans apparently are almost equally divided on two important issues -- Vietnam policy and the ABM. This is indicated by figures from a recent AP cross-sectional survey which covered more than 400 citizens.

After reading this obvious bit of propaganda, the President made these comments:

- (1) "John -- This is a 'job'! Get our poll out again by ads."
- (2) "Herb -- Get some AP clients to object ... and give me a report."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. BeLieu



Chron

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. EHRLICHMAN

There was a short piece in the President's news summary this morning which told of the Viet Cong spreading the word to its followers in South Vietnam that important U.S. political leaders and great numbers of American people "are standing up against Nixon and his war policy. "

With reference to this account -- and undoubtedly a number of similar reports -- the President asked that you contact Bill Casey and get him to set up a pro-Vietnam committee.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Flanigan



June 24, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Today on page 2 of the Baltimore Sun Paul Ward reported that the U. S. is considering withdrawing the Consular mission it established in Rhodesia before that country declared itself independent in November of 1965. A statement dictated to newsmen yesterday by Carl Bartch, acting chief State Department press officer, said that the "Administration deplores the fact that Constitutional proposals clearly designed to intensify and institutionize political control by the small white minority population in Southern Rhodesia are now about to be given effect as a result of the referendum."

After reading an account of this item in his daily news summary, the President wanted you to know that he wholly disagrees with this line. He said, "If we have a mission in Hungary, we'll have one here. This is an order."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL



*Chron*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Reduction of U. S. Personnel Overseas

Bob Haldeman asked me to pull together a status report on Administration efforts to comply with your pre-Inaugural directive that U. S. personnel strengths in non-combat overseas areas be reduced by one-third -- and to present that information to you along with a fast-action game plan.

Events to date:

- (1) In mid-April John Ehrlichman sent out several queries as to suggested procedures for instituting an effective "reductions" program.
- (2) Mayo, Kissinger, and Elliot Richardson responded to Ehrlichman's solicitations and expressed on paper a number of good thoughts and sound ideas.
- (3) Early May memoranda from Flanigan to you and State indicated that you and Elliot Richardson mutually agreed to the appointment of Graham Martin as



Ambassador-at-Large with the assigned task of reducing military and civil components of U.S. Government staffs abroad. (It is my understanding that Secretary Rogers is not amenable to this proposed duty assignment and, at this writing, neither the appointment nor the duty has been formalized.)

- (4) Frank Shakespeare has begun an independent review of USIA's organizational structure and manpower needs.

Past programs worth mentioning:

- (1) "Operation TOPSY", Ambassador Tuthill's 1967 reduction effort in Brazil, was designed to exclude locally employed foreign nationals and to include contract personnel and planned and vacant direct-hire positions. Whereas the (optimistic) goal was a 50% cut and the final report claimed 33%, actual in-country American strength was reduced by a mere 16%.
- (2) The BALPA plan, President Johnson's 1968 endeavor to enhance our international balance of payments position, is still in progress and has resulted in some quite substantial decreases. Contrary to TOPSY, the BALPA effort does include employed



foreign nationals, and is based on "body-count" strength rather than "authorized" strength. Aimed only at those persons employed under direct U.S. Ambassadorial jurisdiction, the implementing Presidential order was for an 18% reduction in Americans and a 16% reduction in "locals". At the time of the order each percentage figure was equivalent to approximately 4000 persons. Decreases under BALPA (now about 90% completed) are scheduled to continue until September 30. On that date, if programmed actions are closely followed, some 8000 USG employees will have been deleted from the "overseas rolls" in a 21-month period. Despite the fact that the Southeast Asia dilemma and various other contingencies arising from Communist bloc activities have generated over the years a gradual increase in the grand total of USG employees on foreign soil, the BALPA results are at least appreciable. The following figures indicate the extent of American employee reductions in major USG organizations:



| <u>Organization</u>                 | <u>Strength<br/>Jan '68</u> | <u>Cut as of<br/>Today</u> | <u>Total Cut<br/>Planned</u> | <u>% Decrease<br/>by Sep 30</u> |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Defense                             | 7,337                       | 1,020                      | 1,900                        | 25%                             |
| State                               | 7,412                       | 710                        | 827                          | 11%                             |
| AID                                 | 3,668                       | 456                        | 630                          | 17%                             |
| USIA                                | 1,258                       | 147                        | 171                          | 14%                             |
| Peace Corps                         | 544                         | 48                         | 49                           | 9%                              |
| HEW                                 | 69                          | 28                         | 30                           | 43%                             |
| Commerce                            | 83                          | 9                          | 9                            | 11%                             |
| Justice                             | 196                         | 20                         | 23                           | 12%                             |
| Transportation                      | 163                         | 29                         | 36                           | 22%                             |
| Agriculture                         | 198                         | 20                         | 30                           | 15%                             |
| *Affiliates (DoD,<br>State and AID) | 1,656                       | 261                        | 347                          | 21%                             |

|                             |       |     |     |     |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|
| Average for<br>this listing | 2,053 | 250 | 368 | 18% |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----|-----|-----|

And here are BALPA's decrease percentages for American employees in countries of probable special interest:

| <u>Country</u>              | <u>Strength<br/>Jan '68</u> | <u>% Decrease<br/>by Sep 30</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Japan                       | 488                         | 30%                             |
| Germany                     | 1,173                       | 26%                             |
| Peru                        | 270                         | 24%                             |
| Spain                       | 294                         | 24%                             |
| France                      | 383                         | 23%                             |
| Italy                       | 409                         | 23%                             |
| Iran                        | 967                         | 21%                             |
| Greece                      | 425                         | 19%                             |
| India                       | 571                         | 17%                             |
| Philippines                 | 610                         | 16%                             |
| United Kingdom              | 435                         | 12%                             |
| Average for<br>this listing | 548                         | 21%                             |

\*Details are classified.



Recommended game plan guidelines:

- (1) BALPA should not be disrupted, but allowed to terminate as planned on September 30, 1969.
- (2) The forthcoming "Bunker" plan and a possible "Unger" plan -- although not within the purview of this memorandum in that your directive to me specified only non-combat zone considerations -- should be integrated into whatever worldwide personnel reduction program we undertake.
- (3) The public should be told why reductions are being made. Is it a political move, a budgetary action, an effort to lower U.S. military and/or civilian visibility in foreign lands ... or what? Despite the political, economic, "image" and other benefits which might well come our way as a result of any meaningful American exodus, the most appropriate theme, and certainly one in keeping with other Administration initiatives, is "good management". It is important for us to emphasize (and sell) the point that our overseas reduction program is nothing more or less than a normal response to the dictates of efficient resource management ... and that it in no way compromises the security of the nation.



- (4) A large-scale review of the entire international scene should be conducted from Washington, preferably at the White House level. This board of reviewers should look closely at the current and forecast climate in each country which hosts American employees. In accordance with our most up-to-date international political objectives the reviewers must determine which countries will accept U. S. reductions ... and in what magnitudes.
- (5) Every department and agency which stands to be affected by personnel reductions in foreign lands should be given responsibility for conducting a separate check and review of its own overseas mission (or missions) and forwarding the resultant personnel strength recommendations to the aforementioned review board.
- (6) Armed with department and agency manpower recommendations, as well as with its own assessments of political moods in the host nations, the review board should begin a more intensified, country-by-country force study -- again in full consideration of U. S. foreign policy objectives. The purpose here is to determine the accuracy of roles and missions assignments and in that way judge the relative need for each U. S. in-country civil and military element.



- (7) Although it is probable that a meat-axe job will be necessary, it is essential that we avoid a meat-axe approach. Our reductions must be organized, controlled, and systematic.
- (8) We should be careful that in our efforts to reduce the numbers of U. S. employees we do not become overzealous and, as a consequence, take excessive swipes at locally employed foreign nationals. It would seem wise indeed to concentrate on USG-employed Americans and leave the char force, messenger, driver, gardener, and other such duties to the indigenes. As a matter of fact, in many countries local hire personnel are quite capable of assuming advanced clerical and even junior executive positions. More judicious exploitation of these situations will allow for even greater reductions in U. S. personnel.

Recommended game plan actions:

- (1) Officially appoint Graham Martin Ambassador-at-Large and follow through with the earlier proposal to put him full time (for now) on overseas personnel reductions.
- (2) Direct the Bureau of the Budget to prepare for your signature an implementing memorandum addressed



to all Federal departments and agencies concerned.

The memorandum should:

- (a) In the interests of better management of our manpower resources, state clearly your express desire for a meaningful reduction (e.g. 30%) in our overseas manpower ceilings;
- (b) In view of the magnitude of the planned reduction, admit to a slight modification of U. S. foreign policy (but only as it relates to a modification of resource management), and convincingly deny any change whatever in the direction of that foreign policy -- or any lack of resolve on the part of this Government to fully honor its international commitments;
- (c) Establish an NSC-staffed Review Board, chaired by Henry Kissinger ... or possibly co-chaired by Henry Kissinger and either Elliot Richardson or Graham Martin;
- (d) Charge the Review Board Chairman (or co-chairmen) with responsibility for the conduct and success of the total program; and



- (e) Assign a reasonably high priority to orderly and timely completion of the project.

You should know that in an effort to get the "status report" portion of this paper to you with minimum delay, the game plan guidelines and recommendations received only limited study and were not fully coordinated with all persons and staffs concerned. Undoubtedly there are many good ideas which might be applied in addition, or alternatively, to the proposals mentioned. John Ehrlichman has scheduled a Thursday afternoon meeting at which he, Mayo, Kissinger and I will further discuss ways and means of best implementing an immediate and effective program.