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October 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. GARMENT

Len:

I am attaching to this memorandum two papers from Bob Hampton, both pertaining to the Civil Service Commission's suggested expansion and implementation of the Federal Information Center (FIC) concept. In view of our earlier proposal to announce this FIC program in conjunction with formal announcement of the Listening Post project, I think it would be appropriate for you and Bud to staff Hampton's material and return it to me through the Staff Secretary along with your first "Listening Post" progress report. However, if this would present a problem to you, and/or you feel that the Information Centers should not be tied to our listen-ins, please give me a call.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attachments

8-1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield *APB*
Subject: Plan for Implementing and Promoting the Listening
Post Proposal

Len Garment and Bud Wilkinson have put their heads together and come up with the major portions of the following plan for implementing and promoting (initially on a pilot project basis) your pre-inaugural Listening Post proposal.

Selected Subject Area of Interest: Housing and Urban Development

Key Participants: Secretary Romney should lead the first tour and Pat Moynihan should participate as the White House representative.

- A White House Staff member on the travelling team will insure White House identity and Presidential interest.

Selected Locale: Philadelphia ... with Chicago serving as an alternate site.

- Dick Van Dusen advises that Philadelphia is one of the "central" cities of the new regional plan, that it has numerous HUD projects in progress, and that Secretary Romney has not yet visited that city's regional office.

Prime Objectives: To promote efficiency and higher morale within the regional offices, to generate constructive ideas, to give visibility to the Federal government's community interests and prove its accessibility to citizens at the local level, and of course to enhance nationwide the image of the President and the Administration.

The Advance Team: A highly competent HUD representative selected in close coordination with Secretary Romney and/or Dick Van Dusen (to lead); a White House Fellow assigned to HUD; a HUD, OEO, or White House (from Moynihan's staff) representative experienced in pulling

together crowds and audiences; and a good PIO man who thoroughly understands how to work with local news media personnel and how to get the most PR mileage out of any event.

- The team should go to Philadelphia at least ten days prior to the scheduled listen-in.
- They should inspect thoroughly all HUD projects in progress and all regional office activities.
- They should get to know the people with whom they will be dealing and gain at least a feel for the personalities and moods of the local citizenry.
- They should make a special point of identifying any and all problems which Secretary Romney might be able to quickly alleviate.
- They should select an appropriate public meeting place.
- They should contact informally local press personnel and brief them via backgrounders as to the project's mission and purpose. (Nothing during this advance period should be given to the press in the way of a formal announcement. Great care must be taken in the establishment of these news media contacts.)
- They should select individual citizens, and possibly two or three small groups of citizens, from the community to meet with Secretary Romney.
- They should prepare statements for Secretary Romney as appropriate.
- They should consider and pre-arrange for logistic support.
- They should return to Washington in sufficient time to brief the Secretary thoroughly and to travel with him during his Philadelphia visit.

The Formal Announcement: By Secretary Romney at HUD, or by the President and Secretary Romney together here at the White House.

- It should make the purposes of the project very clear to all.

- It should clarify the direct relationship between the listen-in project and the President's pre-inaugural proposal.
- It should state the experimental nature of the program ... that it is being undertaken on this occasion on a pilot project basis.
- It should take place only after the advance work has been completed ... and has confirmed the probable success of each aspect of this or a modified plan.
- It should be followed up actively by the news media.

The Travelling Party: Secretary Romney, Moynihan, the local Congressman, a HUD photographer, and the four advance men previously mentioned.

The Schedule of Events: Secretary Romney's visit to Philadelphia need not exceed one day in duration. It should include:

- A visit to the HUD regional office and discussions there with the regional staff on current problems and future goals.
- A walking tour through the area to visit all urban (HUD-related) projects and to meet a cross-section of the citizenry.
- A public meeting with community leaders -- a meeting which includes but is not confined to local officials. (See next paragraph for details.)
- A press conference which will announce as widely as possible-- via radio, TV, and newspaper -- what the Secretary heard, saw and learned. Moynihan and probably the local Congressman should participate in this press conference.

The Public Meeting: The major event ... and should be considered and planned as such.

- It should be arranged as a constructive session ... but with the understanding that most of it will involve the airing of complaints.
- An effort should be made to assemble a true cross-section of affected persons within the community.

- There should be welcoming remarks by a moderator ... appropriately the regional director.
- There should be opening remarks by Secretary Romney and Presidential Assistant Moynihan. Together they should explain the program in its most basic and simple terms, i.e. "we are not here to lecture but to listen," etc.
- The moderator should be prepared to take questions and comments from the floor and see that they are properly directed to Romney, Moynihan, and possibly the local Congressman.
- The moderator should be prepared in advance to move the discussion from one subtopic to another until the main interests of the audience are covered.
- There should be a closing statement by Secretary Romney, and the moderator afterwards should invite the audience to leave their names and addresses so that edited summaries of the highlights of the meeting can be sent to them through the mail.
- Note: The full format of the meeting will have to be worked out between the advance team, Moynihan, and Secretary Romney. Although the meeting should allow for freedom of comment, the moderator should be familiar with some pre-arranged subject matter framework within which he plans to operate. For example, in the Housing and Urban Development subject area there might well be four sub-topics -- local Federally-financed projects, welfare, public safety, and urban environment. Each of these sub-topics could be the subject of discussion for 20-30 minutes before proceeding to another.

Communications: A detailed communications plan will emerge from the work of the advance team. Herb Klein should have a hand in this, either assisting or working actively with HUD personnel. There will be numerous photo and text opportunities during and after the Secretary's one-day visit to Philadelphia ... most of them related to the public meeting and the Romney-Moynihan press conference. Communications programmers should consider:

- The wisdom of announcing in Philadelphia -- immediately on the heels of Secretary Romney's departure -- fast

remedial action to be taken on some specific problem discussed at the public meeting (e.g., more money for site reclamation, expeditious rectification of local Federal procedures, etc.).

- Arranging for post-visit TV and radio interviews of the principals who participated in the listen-in.
- Thorough photo coverage of the walking tour and the public meeting.
- The preparing and mailing of Presidential letters of commendation to various local persons.
- Distribution to local civic groups of films of various portions of the one-day visit ... introduced by a brief opening message from the President.
- Post-visit backgrounders in Washington with national press representatives ... to discuss results of this first listen-in and plans for more in the future.

Added Note:

In the conduct of their Listening Post research, Messrs. Garment and Wilkinson stumbled onto an interesting piece of information ... and an idea.

The GSA and Civil Service Commission are setting up Federal information centers with direct phone lines to agency offices for the purpose of responding to citizens' questions and complaints.

It would seem that the announcement of this program could and should be tied to the formal announcement of the Listening Post project. If it is, considerable weight is given to the proposal that it be a Presidential announcement from the White House (with Romney present).

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield *ky*
Subject: Second Progress Report on Press Conference
Support Plan

The following results of press conference follow-up actions were reported to me today. (Back-up material is attached at the tabs as indicated.)

From Herb Klein: Extracts from 21 favorable columns and editorials, with the articles appended ... Tab A

From Lyn Nofziger: Eighteen supporting statements by Congressmen, and an Evening Star account of comments by Scott and Ford ... Tab B

From Harry Dent: Governor Tom McCall's telegram to the President which appeared in most Oregon newspapers, and which will be aired by 30 radio stations (statewide) this week -- along with other favorable comments -- on a program called "Report to the People" ... Tab C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a sample of some of the editorial opinion from your press conference. As you know, calls were made to the following newspapers which resulted in favorable editorials.

Philadelphia Inquirer
Hearst
Detroit News
Nashville Banner
New York Daily News
Milwaukee Sentinel
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Chicago Tribune
Christian Science Monitor
Phoenix Gazette
Birmingham News
San Diego Union
Dallas Morning News
Dallas Times
Kansas City Star
Columbus Dispatch
Manchester Union Leader

The most unfavorable editorials were in Newsday regarding integration, Boston Globe, St. Louis Dispatch and the Miami Hearld on Vietnam. There was one very negative column by Martin Nolan in the Boston Globe. I have written a strong letter to Tom Winship regarding this.

In addition, Cabinet members were called and all have inserted comments on the unity theme in their speeches. We have asked for speech copy to document this.

We have taken your comments on the Philadelphia Plan and sent them along with the "New Federalism" booklet to the Black Press and to the Mexican-American Press through Martin Castillo.

Elliot Richardson will appear on the new nationwide Martin Agronsky TV show this Saturday to emphasize your position on Vietnam and the need for unity.

Bud Wilkinson will tape a fifteen minute ABC radio show next Monday, October 6, 1969, which goes to over two hundred outlets throughout the nation. He will stress unity and the draft.

We are arranging for Senator Scott to appear on TV this week or next and the Vice President is stressing the unity theme on his speaking tour.

Hub Klein

Herbert G. Klein

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL editorial (9/27) -- "It is not enough, however, merely to give silent support to Mr. Nixon in his efforts to bring this tragic war to a speedy end. He could use an outpouring of letters and telegrams letting him know that many, many Americans recognize that he is doing his best to end the war and that they will back him to the hilt. Send your message of support to the White House, Washington, D.C.

"Such an outpouring not only would encourage America's leadership in these trying times but it could signal to the Communists that the defeatists in our midst, for all their noise, are not going to prevail."

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR by David Lawrence (9/29) -- "A careful examination of the transcript of the session Nixon had with newsmen last Friday reveals clearly that the Chief Executive today is involved in so many delicate and intricate problems that, if he wishes to wait till the stage of decision has been reached on a given subject, he should not be sniped at during the interim."

BOSTON GLOBE by Robert Healy (9/29) -- "There is a difference between President Nixon's policies and President Johnson's. Up until the time that Mr. Johnson withdrew from the presidential contest in March, 1968, the war had gone in one direction - escalation. President Nixon has changed the direction. As he said at his press conference Friday, 60,000 American soldiers will return from Vietnam."

THE KANSAS CITY STAR by John R. Cauley (9/27) -- "The cynics around this town still don't like to believe it but President Nixon put on another virtuoso performance yesterday at his news conference at the White House. This was Nixon's first formal meeting with reporters since June 19th. After the way he handled himself yesterday and on the previous occasions, one wonders why he doesn't do it more often."

NASHVILLE BANNER editorial (9/27) -- "There is confidence on the part of the nation, too, on the broad scope of policy yesterday reviewed - not as a rehearsed performance, but as the impressive and informed answers to pertinent questions."

No President has been more completely conversant with the vast range of public business within the structure of executive responsibility.

No President has been more concerned with keeping constituents abreast of developments, and policy involving their personal and national interest.

No President has surpassed the ability - and determination - of Richard M. Nixon to tell it as it is."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR editorial (9/29) -- "President Nixon has made expert use of his press conference sounding board to state what should be evident, on reflection, to anyone concerning Vietnam peace prospects. And that is, that if the President doesn't have major support at home for his end-the-war policy ... then Hanoi will consider that it can successfully 'wait out' the President and take all.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE editorial (9/27) -- "Mr. Nixon's courageous stand, in defiance of all this pressure, should convince Hanoi that he means it when he says the United States will not surrender.

RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH editorial (9/27) -- "It undoubtedly is true, as the President declared yesterday, that the war can be brought to an end much sooner 'if we can have a united front' here at home for support of U.S. proposals. Regrettably, experience does not encourage one to hope that Mr. Nixon's efforts won't continue to be the target for attacks here on the home front."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR by Richard L. Strout (9/29) -- "He spoke easily, calmly, and goodnaturedly with an emotion that scarcely showed itself, save when he thrice gave the equivalent of an appeal for a 'united front' by the nation over his efforts to extricate America from Vietnam."

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL (9/26) -- "Despite his long summer layoff, President Nixon was in mid-season form for his first scrimmage with newsmen in three months. Like the professional quarterback who has mastered the knack of non-chalance in the face of imminent destruction, Nixon kept his cool through a half-hour barrage of questions about everything from basic Vietnam policy to a Pentagon official who had aroused the ire of a lady reporter.

As usual, he seemed to be in command of his facts and able to think ahead. Frequently, he was looking for another questioner as he was finishing the last reply."

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER editorial (9/27) -- "As the President said at his conference: 'Any incentive for the enemy to negotiate is destroyed if he is told in advance that if he waits for 18 months, we'll be out anyway.' That should be apparent to anyone, but congressmen, especially those with elections soon coming up, sometimes let logic go out of the window in favor of political expediency: that is, they may say almost anything to attract votes."

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS editorial (9/27) -- "President Richard M. Nixon - calmly, candidly and we think brilliantly - covered a lot of important ground in his televised White House news conference yesterday. We particularly admired his booting into the middle of next week the current dove demands that a definite date be set for a complete U.S. troop pullout from Vietnam.

.... That, said the President with obvious truth, would only encourage the enemy to hang of until the stated day.

.... Our reaction: with every news conference, this President looks greater and greater. Let's be thankful for that."

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR editorial (9/26) -- "We have an obligation to the people of South Vietnam, because of our encouragement of their firm anti-Communist stand. We have an obligation to millions of free men in Asia to refrain from demonstrating, by a loss of courage now, that they stand completely alone and friendless against the overwhelming presence of China. We have an obligation to the servicemen we have sent to Vietnam not to expose those who remain to the end of enemy attack during a precipitous pullout.

-- Individual congressmen are doing the country no service by seeking to fan the smoldering public discontent into a fire or by trying to enlist the Congress as a whole in an unconditional legislative surrender."

DETROIT NEWS editorial (9/27) -- "We, too, expect results as well as promises from this administration but we don't expect Mr. Nixon magically to solve problems that have been decades and in some cases centuries in the making and which resisted the best efforts of several of his predecessors.

- When he makes mistakes - and he has already made his share of them - President Nixon deserves criticism. But his opposition cannot expect him to cure in less than a year all the ills which could not be cured by several previous presidents blessed with Congress of their own party."

THE HEARST PAPERS column by William Randolph Hears, Jr. (9/28) -- "All in all, it was another triumphal performance by a man who is sure he knows what he is doing and can fire back answers - right on target - whenever he decides to give the press a chance to challenge him.

....'We need more support,' he said simply. What the President said was said softly, but it was the grim and bitter truth. It is the war critics in America who are responsible for the tough enemy positions and there is no question about it. Even the enemy, in its own propaganda statements, declares openly that it is counting on antiwar sentiment in this nation to grow so strong that an ignominious withdrawal of all our forces will become imperative.

- The more our critics come out with demands for wholesale early withdrawal, the more unyielding the communists at the Paris talks become. In the past few weeks their stand has become tougher than it has ever been. President Nixon said he thought the recent demands by some congressmen for an early Vietnam pull-out deadline were made with the best of intentions. As for myself, the intellectual integrity of these demands is highly questionable."

PHOENIX GAZETTE editorial (9/30) -- "We would have a healthier political climate in this country if the George McGovern's of the Nation would begin to say what they mean about Vietnam, which is that America ought to turn tail, desert its allies, and leave the whole small Southeast Asian Nations to the Communists.

- President Nixon was too kind in his press conference of last week when he answered such proposals as Senator McGovern made to set cutoff date (1971) by which all American troops would be pulled out of Vietnam. The President pointed out quite correctly that to set or announce any such date would merely result in encouraging the North Vietnamese Communists to hang on in their aggressions until the happy (for them) hour came."

KANSAS CITY STAR editorial (9/27) -- "But, Mr. Nixon was saying that he is trying to find peace and that while Congress can discuss and debate and hold hearings, it cannot safely assume for itself the responsibility of doing what he, and most Americans want so badly."

DALLAS TIMES HERALD editorial (9/30) -- ". . . Surely the war critics, intelligent men as they are, cannot be unaware that Mr. Nixon's arguments are valid. Moreover, they must know their proposals haven't a chance in Congress."

SAN DIEGO UNION editorial (9/27) -- "They want total victory, and ideas such as those advanced by Senator Goodell play into their hands and erode the very national unity which the President urged in his press conference yesterday."

BIRMINGHAM NEWS editorial (9/30) -- "And so, instead of urging Hanoi to take reciprocal steps to match the U.S. troop withdrawal ordered by President Nixon, the critics have branded him for not moving faster "to disengage." Some of them even wanted to impose arbitrary deadline on the U.S. presence in Vietnam. . . .

- This preposterous proposal won't shape, of course, but even to suggest that we put a time limit on the war and to have that suggestion seriously debated in the U.S. Senate, won't help but persuade the other side that time is on its side--that if only it will continue to mouth its lies and refuse to budge an inch in the Paris peace talks, the U.S. will lose heart and go home."

THE MANCHESTER UNION LEADER -- Due to pressing local issues, favorable editorial on press conference postponed until late this week.

COLUMBUS DISPATCH - Favorable editorial appearing later this week.

On Monday, September 29th -- on the floors of the House and Senate -- the Congressmen whose names appear below supported the President's press conference responses as indicated:

- | | |
|--|---|
| Sen. Bob Griffin | - Commended Frank Church for his (Church's) criticism of Democrats in the Congress who seem bent on making the Vietnam issue a partisan affair; was critical of Sen. Harris's partisan attack on the President; was critical of the planned student moratorium approach; urged the Congress and the American people to stand behind the President |
| Sen. Henry Belmon | - Decried Senator Harris's statements against the President; not speaking for Oklahoma but as Democratic National Chairman |
| Rep. Louis Wyman | - Opposed reckless talk by some Members of Congress concerning Vietnam withdrawal policy |
| Sen. Bob Dole | - Cited isolationist hysteria by some; inserted editorial indicating smallness of U.S. activities in Laos |
| Sen. Hugh Scott | - Applauded the President's attempts at peace in Vietnam |
| Rep. Gerald Ford | - Criticized Senator Harris's remarks limiting the President's options to end the war |
| Rep. Cornelius E. Gallagher,
(Dem. - N. J.) | - Urged support behind the President |
| Rep. Fletcher Thompson | - " |
| Rep. Don Clausen | - " |
| Rep. Ben Blackburn | - Supported President's efforts; urged American people to rally behind him |

Rep. William Scott	- Supported President's efforts; urged American people to rally behind him
Rep. Dan Kuykendall	- "
Rep. David Dennis	- "
Rep. John Rarick, (Dem. - La.)	- "
Rep. Larry Hogan	- "
Rep. Larry Winn	- "
Rep. Les Arends	- Commended the President's forthright answers at press conference
Rep. Charles Wiggins	- Criticized those who advocate complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam saying that only plays into Hanoi's hands; urged support of the President's efforts

Evening Star account of press conference support rendered by GOP leadership.

Sen. Hugh Scott, the new Senate Republican leader, and House Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford assailed various resolutions pending in Congress to set a deadline for withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam.

Ford said such resolutions "in effect close the door to peace" until the end of next year or later.

Asserting that the Nixon administration is "on a peace course," Scott said he is confident the American people oppose "these cut-and-run or bug-out" resolutions.

Scott referred directly to plans for a massive nationwide protest set for Oct. 15 and labeled the Vietnam Moratorium.

"As regards the Oct. 15 demonstrations," he said, "I would suggest that those people who want to demonstrate, ought to demonstrate against Hanoi."

He added that "very few of these volunteer advice-givers who will gather on Oct. 15 seem to have thought that it is Hanoi that is inflexible and not the U.S."

Asked if he was trying to shut off dissent, Scott said that on the other hand "I would defend to death the right of every man

and woman in this country to be foolish if they wish."

Ford said those demonstrating on Oct. 15 "could accomplish much more if they directed their pleas to Hanoi."

Scott told reporters that the suggestion that he and Senate Minority Whip Robert P. Griffin made yesterday for a 60-day moratorium on public criticism of Nixon's Vietnam policy was their own idea and "not a request of the President."

He said their aim was to deprive Hanoi of being able to cite divisiveness in America as a reason why American negotiators in Paris should not be listened to.

Ford said discussion of the situation in Vietnam with the President brought out some encouraging factors, such as lower infiltration rates, decreased enemy activity and lower American casualties.

But he said the Communists' "hard line at Paris is discouraging." He said that at least for the time being the new leaders in Hanoi are apparently "more adamant" than the late Ho Chi Minh.

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THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

THIS IS TO PLEDGE ALL SUPPORT I CAN GENERATE AS A CITIZEN
3 AND GOVERNOR TO YOUR CALL FOR AMERICANS TO UNITE BEHIND YOUR
VIETNAM PEACE POLICIES. IF ANYTHING, SOME OF THESE POLICIES
GIVE MUCH TOO LIBERAL CONSIDERATION TO NORTH VIETNAM AND SEEM TO
2 GIVE TOO LITTLE REGARD TO PROTECTING OUR FORCES NOT
WITHDRAWN FROM VIETNAM.

THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, YOUR GENERAL PROGRAM IS AS LOGICAL
AND POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE AS ANY IT IS POSSIBLE TO STRUCTURE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IT CAN GET THE JOB DONE -- CAN GET OUR
BOYS HOME IN DUE TIME, AND CAN AVOID COLLAPSE AND BLOODBATH
IN THE SOUTH. BUT YOUR TEN-POINT PLAN CAN ACHIEVE THESE GOALS
5 ONLY TO THE DEGREE THAT OUR NATION RALLIES BEHIND IT. TO SET
A DEFINITE DATE IN THE 70'S FOR OUR DEFINITE WITHDRAWAL AS
SOME RECOMMEND IS TO SET A CERTAIN TIME FOR OUR SURRENDER.
2 DEMANDS FOR INSTANT ACTION TO END A GRISLY INVOLVEMENT

ARE UNDERSTANDABLE. HOWEVER, WHILE ABRUPT QUITTING ANSWERS THE
PUBLIC URGES FOR A MOMENT, IT LOSES COUNTLESS OTHERS HURT BY OUR
LOSS OF WORLD LEADERSHIP.

HANOI'S INTRANSIGENCE ALREADY HAS WON FAR TOO MANY
CONCESSIONS FROM WISHFUL-THINKING AMERICANS. EACH NEW POLICY,
LIKE THE PROPOSED DEDICATION FOR OUR CAPITULATION, ONLY FUELS
3 HANOI'S GLEE AND PROMOTES DIVISION AND RESENTMENT AT HOME.

I BELIEVE THAT THE MAJORITY OF OREGON'S CITIZENS FAVOR
YOUR APPROACH AS THE LESSER OF ALL EVILS AND I WILL WORK TO
2 BROADEN ITS SUPPORT IN OUR AREA, SEEKING THE INCREASED UNITY

SO ESSENTIAL TO ITS SUCCESS

RESPECTFULLY

TOM MCCALL GOVERNOR.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Progress Report on Press Conference Support Plan

You asked for a report by 8:45 this morning which would give you clearly and factually the status and results to date of pre-planned press conference support activities. That information appears below.

Planning Efforts -- General

On Thursday afternoon I met with personally, or contacted by phone, Keogh, Dent, Nofziger, Costello (because Klein was in Detroit), Ziegler, Chapin, and Garbett (because Rog Morton was not available). Each was reminded of the time and place of the press conference and asked to:

- "Think of and jot down now" the most effective ways in which his office could promote your press conference responses, i. e. by accentuating to the maximum all positive points and playing down or eliminating anything which might come across negatively.
- Personally observe the press conference and as many news analyses as possible during the half hour immediately following.
- Meet with six other staff members and me at 1:00 p. m. to discuss the conference and present orally the list of "things to be done by his office" ... for which he will be responsible.

On Friday morning each game plan participant was called again and reminded of the importance of having his basic plan drawn up before the press conference started ... so that only press conference substance need be considered, and appropriate modifications applied, at the 1:00 p. m. meeting.

On Saturday morning each game plan participant (except Harry Dent) was called again, and each reported that his portion of the plan was being implemented. Additionally, at your direction, Pat Buchanan was told to contact Buckley and Kilpatrick and to get a "special letter" out to Seavareid and one or two others.

Report from Garbett (on Rog Morton's Staff)

The most positive portions of the press conference transcript were inserted in the Committee's weekly publication, "Monday", which went to press at 4:00 Friday afternoon. The publication, with a circulation of some 15,000, emphasized your call for a united front on America's Vietnam position and your statement to the effect that the Republican party is a national party. A copy of "Monday" is attached.

Rog Morton spoke, as planned, on Saturday morning to the National Federation of Republican Women's convention. The group of 2,700 was assembled along with more than 3,000 guests at the Washington Hilton Hotel. Rog emphasized a number of the points you made in your press conference -- especially your appeal for a united front. The talk was most favorably received.

Jim Allison spoke, as planned, in Midland, Texas. He too emphasized your call for unity and the highlights of his talk appeared in the Midland Reporter Telegram and the Lubbock Avalanche Journal. Additionally, they were carried by the AP state wire. Allison reported from Texas last night that your press conference had received extremely wide TV coverage throughout Texas and that general comment was very favorable.

Saturday morning the Committee sent out copies of the complete press conference transcript to all national Committeemen and women, and to all State Chairmen. Enclosed with each transcript was a letter suggesting that your responses to questions be reiterated and emphasized publicly at every opportunity over the next 7-10 day period with thought given to the probable public appeal by area and region.

Report from Klein and Costello

Herb Klein spoke, as planned, to the San Francisco Press Club and emphasized a number of your press conference responses as well as your smooth performance and sincerity. He said that all went well in California and that he had checked newspaper press

coverage throughout the country and found it to be (in his opinion) the "widest possible". He said that you could not have come out any better in the news and that your press conference had resulted in an average of five separate stories on Page 1 of the nation's leading newspapers.

Herb Klein talked to Kaplow and Chancellor after the press conference and before he took off for California. He said that both of them expressed the opinion that your press conference "was great", but that the business about Laos might cause a stir.

Herb's staff has not yet called all of the Public Affairs officers in the Federal departments and agencies. Costello said that three or four had been called and that the balance would be contacted Monday morning.

Costello did call, as planned, fifteen key friendly big-city newspaper editors and he did review with them the high points of the transcript. (Some of the cities include Chicago, Detroit, Columbus, Ohio, Dallas and Houston.) Costello said that it was too early to give an accurate report on the results of this action. He did say however -- and Herb confirmed this later last night -- that results as indicated by excerpts from these fifteen "big city" newspapers would be the subject of a separate report to you on Tuesday afternoon.

Klein's staff did mail, as planned, complete press conference transcripts to over 1,000 editors, editorial writers and columnists. Results of this effort will be included in his Tuesday report (mentioned above).

Klein's staff has not yet zeroed in on the Negro press but assured me last night that this pre-planned action will be accomplished today.

Klein taped a 12-minute interview which will play this week on CBS stations across the country ... and which he thinks will be helpful.

Report from Harry Dent

Harry called a number of Party chairmen and instructed them to use excerpts of the press conference transcript as most appropriate for their particular areas. His efforts were put forth in conjunction with actions taken by the National Committee. It is significant to add, however, that Harry spent the weekend in South Carolina. He said that portions of your press conference appeared on TV throughout Saturday and Sunday and that comment throughout all of the South

was very favorable. Emphasis in that part of the country was given, of course, to your support for Haynsworth and your middle-of-the-road position on desegregation. Harry said these two points received top billing in the newspapers as well as on TV.

Report from Lyn Nofziger

Gerry Ford and Les Arends did support your press conference highlights, as planned, with written handouts to the press. I should add, however, that both Congressmen expressed some disappointment at the lack of press play which resulted.

Although Hugh Scott's press man was anxious for press conference material for the Senator to use on the floor Friday afternoon, there is nothing in the Congressional Record of that date to indicate that anything at all was said. But the Record did reveal supporting statements by Senator Cliff Hansen of Wyoming and Senator Miller of Iowa.

On Friday afternoon Senator Hruska did issue, as planned, public statements in support of Haynsworth ... as a follow-up to your press conference comments. Hruska's statements were buried rather deeply in a Washington Post article.

Report from John Whitaker

Highlights of your press conference were telephoned to Volpe's press secretary in Chicago where he (Volpe) was speaking at a large luncheon gathering hosted by Mayor Daley. The notes were handed to Volpe in time for him to reiterate your call for unity on the Vietnam issue. The remark received enthusiastic applause. Secretary Volpe spoke again, later in the day, back here in Washington. On this occasion, speaking to the Massachusetts delegation of the National Federation of Republican Women, he followed through with a number of your press conference topics.

Report from Ron Ziegler

Ron spoke, as planned, to Associated Press publishers in Monterey, California. He hit hard in support of the points you made in your press conference and his comments were carried by the AP wire.

Jerry Warren reported that most of the White House Press Corps expressed the opinion that your performance on Friday "was brilliant". Jerry said that highly complimentary remarks came from John Cauley

of the Kansas City Star, Bob Young of the Chicago Tribune, Sim Fentress of TIME magazine, and Nancy Dickerson of NBC.

Report from Jim Keogh

Jim Keogh is in the process of working with Lyn Nofziger. Jim is underscoring press conference highlights and forwarding 1, 2, and 3 paragraph comments on each to Nofziger's office for immediate follow-up use by selected Senators and Congressmen.

Report from Pat Buchanan

I was unable to contact Pat Buchanan last night but did learn from Mort Allin that Pat's analysis of press conference news nationwide would be on your desk this morning. Allin knew of the requirement for Pat to write a letter to Seavareid and one or two others but he did not know the status of the project.

Conclusion

It is all too obvious that there are weaknesses in our pre-planning and follow-through "project support" programs. Whereas I must assume responsibility for the mediocrity of the press conference game plan I believe our over-all problem as a staff is due to (1) a lack of thorough advance planning as a group and (2) a general lack of discipline. Several of us (Dwight, Ken Cole, Bob and I) are working on ideas for improved procedures -- a system which will insure automatic support in proportion to the significance and/or potential of an event.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Press Conference Support Plan

You will recall that in my memorandum of September 25 I assured you that:

- Today's press conference would receive full staff and Administration support
- A number of preliminary steps already had been taken
- A follow-through plan would be drawn up and reviewed for maximum (PR) effectiveness by eight of your key staff personnel, and in your hands prior to 5:00 p. m.

Pre and post-press conference actions are listed below.

BEFORE

1. John Whitaker called Cabinet members in whose areas we anticipated key questions and alerted them to their probable opportunities to emphasize during their own near-future public activities the more positive points made during the conference. Sep 25
2. Governor Nils Boe called 15 Republican governors. All were receptive, but special enthusiasm came from Peterson of Delaware, Ray of Iowa, Knowles of Wisconsin, Sargent of Massachusetts, and Cargo of New Mexico. Each of these governors urged that we keep up the system of calling them and soliciting their public support for Administration actions. They were flattered to have been called and promised to get out and create occasions and forums at which to highlight key Presidential comments. Sep 25

3. Twelve city mayors were called, among them the mayors of Charlotte, Syracuse, Grand Rapids, Indianapolis, Hartford, Houston, Oakland, Charlottesville, and Overland, Missouri. They, along with more than twenty county officials also contacted by telephone, responded with more than a perfunctory okay. They indicated a really spirited willingness to help. Sep 25
4. Harry Dent called party chairmen. Sep 25
5. Herb Klein prepared a telephone list to use for calls to publishers, editors and columnists. He also made ready his mailing list materials so that there would be minimum delay in getting out to the appropriate people press conference transcripts. Sep 25
6. Lyn Nofziger and Walter Mote (in the Vice President's office) contacted selected Senators and Congressmen and readied them for fast support. Sep 25
7. Eight key members of the White House staff geared themselves to carefully observe the press conference and to cover, by way of specific individual assignments, all immediately subsequent radio and TV analyses of the event. Sep 25

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE

12:00-12:30 P. M. EDT

September 26

RADIO AND TV NEWS ANALYSES

12:30-1:00 P. M. EDT

September 26

AFTER

1. The eight staff members met at 1:00 p. m., compared notes, and collectively passed judgments as to the positive and negative aspects of your 23 responses. Sep 26
2. Herb Klein will reiterate your most positive points in a speech he is making tonight in San Francisco. Sep 26

3. Ron Ziegler will highlight your press conference transcript during a speech he is making tonight in Monterey, California. Sep 26
4. Secretary Volpe will publicly support your press conference while in Chicago. Sep 26
5. Herb Klein's staff will call the Public Affairs office at each of the departments and agencies to insure their inserting supporting statements in the public addresses to be made by their respective officials during the next 3-4 days. Sep 26
6. Mr. Garbett, an assistant to Rog Morton at the National Committee, will feature appropriate portions of the press conference transcript in the Committee's weekly publication, "Monday", which goes to press at 4:00 p. m. today (circulation 15,000). Sep 26
7. Paul Costello on Herb Klein's staff will call fifteen key friendly "big city" newspaper editors and review with them the high points of the transcript. Sep 26
8. Harry Dent will continue to call State Chairmen and review with them those portions of the press conference transcript which are most appropriate for public release in their areas (i. e. united front -- nationwide; Haynesworth support -- southern states; etc.) Sep 26
9. Governor Nils Boe will proceed with the balance of his calls to Republican governors. Sep 26
10. Jim Allison of the RNC will strongly support your press conference performance during a speech he is making tonight at Midland, Texas. Sep 26
11. Governor Cargo of New Mexico will elaborate on the salient points of your press conference -- and your straightforward manner -- during a fund-raising speech tonight in his home state. Sep 26
12. Senator Hruska will make a public statement today supporting Judge Haynesworth. His remarks will complement your press conference remarks. Sep 26

13. Hugh Scott will support your press conference performance on the floor of the Senate this afternoon (House not in session). Sep 26
14. Gerry Ford and Les Arends will support your press conference highlights with written handouts. Sep 26
15. Jim Keogh will prepare short papers underscoring press conference highlights and forward them to Lyn Nofziger for use by selected Senators and Congressmen. Sep 26-27
16. Herb Klein's staff will mail complete press conference transcripts to over 1,000 editors, editorial writers and columnists. Sep 27
17. Herb Klein's staff will zero in on the Negro press and insure that all key publications receive appropriate excerpts of the transcript. Sep 27
18. Harry Dent will mail complete transcripts to all Party Chairmen with instructions for each to use excerpts as appropriate. Sep 27
19. Rog Morton will highlight today's event during a talk he will be making Saturday morning to the National Women's Federation Convention. Sep 27
20. Secretary Laird will support your press conference comments -- especially those relating to DoD issues -- during a ship christening talk tomorrow in Connecticut. Sep 27
21. Lyn Nofziger will insure that there is substantial follow-up support on the floors of the House and Senate on Monday. Sep 29
22. The Vice President will be alerted to make supporting statements, if the opportunity arises, during an interview Monday on the Irv Kupcnet show in Chicago ... to later appear in U.S. News and World Report. Sep 29

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield *APB*

Subject: Support for Your September 26th Press Conference

I am writing this memorandum to assure you that your Friday noon press conference will receive full staff and Administration support.

A number of preliminary steps already have been taken. Lyn Nofziger has contacted selected Senators and Congressmen and readied them for fast support. John Whitaker has called Cabinet members in whose areas we anticipate key questions and alerted them to their probable opportunities to assist. Nils Boe is putting through calls to Republican governors as well as to trusted mayors and county officials. Harry Dent, Jim Keogh, Herb Klein's people, et al are likewise at work preparing telephone and mailing lists, lining up resources, and in various other ways spring-loading themselves for follow-on efforts tomorrow afternoon and throughout the weekend.

Immediately after your press conference and the televised analyses of your remarks (i.e. promptly at 1:00 p.m.), I will meet in the Roosevelt Room with Klein, Ziegler, Chapin, Dent, Nofziger, Whitaker, and Keogh. Each attendee will state the actions which he believes to be most appropriate and which his office is prepared to take in order to accentuate the positive and, if necessary, eliminate the negative. I will have drawn up a game plan outline. After the group has discussed each proposal -- and scheduled it into the overall plan so as to achieve maximum (PR) effectiveness -- I will put the outline in final form and get it to you before your 5:00 p.m. departure for Camp David.

Viet-
nam
Policy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: A Plan to Counter Assertions of An Ineffective
Vietnam Policy

Despite the fact that Senator Kennedy's September 18th dinner speech in Boston constituted a rather sharp attack against Administration efforts to end the Vietnam dilemma, it is significant to note at the outset of this memorandum that except for a few columns in Boston newspapers and a paragraph in Time magazine his comments were given relatively little play by the news media nationwide. This is not to say that we should take the incident lightly for certainly Teddy's theme has widespread support. But I do think that we should avoid, on this occasion, taking aim at Teddy. To do so would reveal our reaction to the particular individual, and thereby lend more than a fair share of substance to his remarks. Besides, it is late.

To my way of thinking it would be more fruitful now to zero in on the questions of "progress made" and "progress being made", and direct our counterattack at that element of the populace which finds it so easy to criticize our solutions while generalizing its own. Simultaneously, of course, we should hammer home the theme that by your series of bold foreign policy initiatives you have seized world leadership and won world respect ... and in the process given us our best chances to date for achieving peace with honor.

Taking this basic approach I recommend the following actions:

1. Jim Keogh's staff, with the assistance of Henry Kissinger's people, should develop a fact sheet similar to that which I have attached at Tab A (Assertions versus The Facts of the Matter).

2. Bryce Harlow's staff should circulate the fact sheet -- along with a number of "one liners" and other material highlighting the "progress" theme -- among predesignated members of the Congress.
3. The Secretary of State (and the Under Secretary) should be scheduled for more national television appearances and speeches. Together, they can serve as a leading factor in the development and sale of our theme. (It seems that each has been used very little for this sort of thing in the past.)
4. The Vice President should develop the theme and use it in near future addresses ... to include those he will be making to Republican fund-raising and other such programs this fall.
5. The National Committee should print, publish and distribute a 4-5 page pamphlet featuring your foreign policy initiatives and elaborating on each. The booklet should bear an appropriate title -- "Leadership Toward Peace" -- or something along that line.
6. Henry Kissinger should be scheduled for a thorough back-grounder, with full press representation, so that he can dovetail this "progress" theme with support for our draft program and Administration efforts to reduce campus unrest.
7. Chairman Morton and Harry Dent should insure that the campaign is carried into the field -- to the governors and the party chairmen -- and White House staffers should be alert to stress key points in conversations with (or announcements to) columnists and commentators. Herb Klein should assume responsibility for the appropriate mailing of printed material.

Meanwhile, not to forget Teddy altogether, I recommend further that an early agreement be reached among the Leadership that Senator Kennedy not be considered sacrosanct for any reason ... and that he be attacked (quickly) whenever he is seen to be vulnerable. Under no circumstances should he be allowed to discuss with impunity the great issues of war and peace ... and of honor and decency.

A

FACT SHEET

Assertion: Despite Administration rhetoric there has been no change in the Vietnam situation.

Fact: Since January the outlook for a settlement in Vietnam has changed for the better in a number of ways. Among them:

A new flexibility has been created in U.S. policy, a flexibility without compromise of basic principles. This has been done by:

- Explicitly ruling out attempts to impose a purely military solution.
- Taking a new position on mutual withdrawal. (We have proposed that this start simultaneously and that it proceed rapidly through agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable.)
- Proposing an international supervisory body for verifying withdrawals and overseeing elections. (It could participate also in arranging a supervised ceasefire.)
- Beginning a reduction of U.S. troop strength in Vietnam, to include combat troops.
- Reaffirming our willingness to accept any outcome arrived at through free elections. (We have proposed that the elections be supervised by an international body to assure fairness.)

Both sides have exposed their basic negotiating positions in detail.

In South Vietnam, the GVN's political position has been greatly strengthened through pacification gains and a growth in the stability and efficiency of the central government. The GVN not only controls or exercises primary influence over most of the rural populace, but also enjoys increasing support from the countryside.

TAB A

The South Vietnamese army has increased greatly in strength and capability. It can now replace as many as 60,000 U.S. troops.

The GVN irregular forces -- the regional and popular troops which provide the basic security for the rural villages -- have vastly improved.

The enemy force has lost much of its 1968 combat punch. It is no longer able to mount the massive offensives which caused great casualties and losses among the rural and urban populace.

As a result of developments, security in the countryside is substantially improved. More lines of communication are open and commerce and agricultural production are improving.

There are growing signs that the other side is beginning to recognize that the military and political tide has turned. The enemy force is preparing to de-emphasize military action and shift to political competition instead. (This could mean that the level of hostilities will decrease substantially.)

Assertion: Our troop withdrawals are token gestures -- made purely for political benefit.

Fact: By his troop withdrawal decisions, the President has cut U.S. military strength in Vietnam by nearly 20 percent. The reduction in combat forces has been greater than the reduction in support forces.

Assertion: Saigon has refused to allow peace-seeking non-Communist elements to share in governing the South Vietnamese people.

Fact: The GVN has carried out an election in which all parties were free to be represented in the National Assembly. President Thieu has attempted to gain broader representation in his new cabinet from Buddhists and opposition groups, but most of the prospective candidates have demanded unreasonably high prices in terms of policy control as a precondition to their appointments.

Assertion: We have refused to compromise on the question of who might govern South Vietnam during an election.

Fact: The GVN has offered to negotiate the terms of supervision during an election; however, the other side has rejected every plan put forward and demanded not only a share in the administration but a totally new "revolutionary regime" which would not recognize the present government structure in any form whatever.

Assertion: We are still trying to win a military victory in Vietnam.

Fact: The Administration has ruled out military victory as a solution to the Vietnam dilemma. The President made this clear in his speech of May 14th.

Assertion: The high costs of the war are not only cutting severely into domestic programs but are leading us down the path to economic disaster.

Fact: The President's recent troop withdrawal decisions, and other measures, are gradually reducing the total costs of the Vietnam war. Moreover, our GNP rises each year by a greater amount than our annual Vietnam expenditures.

SST

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Initial Action Plan to Follow Your SST Announcement

Immediately subsequent to your 9:00 a.m. SST announcement follow-up action will begin. Planned events, in their chronological order, are listed below:

1. At his own press conference in the Roosevelt Room (after your departure to the Oval office) Secretary Volpe will elaborate as is necessary and answer questions put to him by press corps members. 9:05 a.m.
Tues.
2. Chairman Morton will release a supporting statement from the National Committee Headquarters. 10:00 a.m.
Tues.
3. Bryce Harlow's staff (Nofziger et al) will deliver to predesignated members of the Congress -- Senator Scott and others -- one, two, and three paragraph statements citing the wisdom of your decision and emphasizing the international leadership aspect, etc. (These statements and fact sheets were prepared last night at the Department of Transportation ... under the personal supervision of Jim Beggs.) 10:00-11:00 a.m.
Tues.
4. Chairman Morton will back your SST decision, and emphasize its advantages to the nation, during his taping of a "talk show" which is scheduled to be nationally televised later in the week. 11:00 a.m.
Tues.

5. An edited transcript of your comments and those of Secretary Volpe (including the question-answer session) will be forwarded to all major aviation publications, and to editorial writers. Tues.
6. Carlyle Jones, the Washington, D. C. Director of Aerospace magazine, will devote full time to insuring that the transcribed material gets to aerospace industry leaders. Tues.
7. FAA will hold a special backgrounder for aviation writers -- one which enlarges on today's Roosevelt Room session. Tues.
8. FAA will select a briefing team and an itinerary of its planned visits to the media in key aerospace cities for the purpose of providing background information on the SST program. Tues.-
Wed.
9. The Department of Transportation will deliver to the National Committee sufficient fact sheet material for circulation by the committee to Republican leaders and Governors throughout the country. Tues.-
Wed.
10. Herb Klein will hold a press conference in New York City late Wednesday morning, and speak at noon to the PR Society of America. During both events he will emphasize the benefits to be derived from the SST program and your decision to move forward into Phase III.* Wed.

*Somewhat unlike the Safeguard decision of March 14th, this morning's announcement makes known your decision to move from Phase II to Phase III of an existing (US-SST) program... albeit the previous Administration allowed the program to slip into limbo for an inexcusably long period. (Ph. I -- design competition, Lockheed vs. Boeing, etc; Ph. II -- defining airframe, engine, etc. configurations and specifications; Ph. III -- actually "cutting metal" and manufacturing the hardware; Ph. IV -- aircraft production)

11. Press kits, more elaborate than the regular fact sheet material, will be mailed to editors and publishers nationwide ... with particular emphasis being given to the cities and areas identified with the aerospace industry (Washington, Texas, California, etc.). Wed.
12. Financial and business editors of the country's leading newspapers will be brought in and given a backgrounder (probably at the White House). Wed.
13. Boeing Aircraft Company will furnish Klein's office with samples of supporting literature designed for wide circulation. Wed. - Thurs.
14. Herb Klein will devote time to the SST topic during a televised address in Detroit to the Radio and TV News Directors Association. Thurs.
15. Secretary Laird will devote time to favorable comment on your SST decision during his address to the National Press Club (Washington, D. C.) Thurs.
16. Nofziger will arrange for Congressional praise of your SST decision in newsletters and other media used by Congressmen to inform their constituents of key events. Thurs.
17. Either FAA Administrator Shaffer or his Chief Engineer, Charles Blake, (or both) will be scheduled to discuss the meaning and future of the US-SST project on locally and nationally televised programs. Thurs. - Fri.
18. Herb Klein will talk about the SST program and its importance to the maintenance of our international leadership during a dinner address to the San Francisco Press Club. Fri.
19. Lyn Nofziger will see to it that follow-on statements are provided key Congressmen and that all are kept abreast of SST developments. Fri.

20. The Republican National Committee's weekly news bulletin, "Monday", will feature your SST announcement (circulation 15,000). Mon.
21. The Vice President will give solid support to your SST decision during his televised talk to the Executive Club of Chicago. Mon.

Because of our purposely delayed notification of your announcement schedule to staff and department personnel - several of whom are being held responsible for completion of the actions outlined above - this plan can be considered only a "starter", a preliminary step to get the ball rolling. A more complete revision will be prepared and forwarded to you on Thursday. It will be based on the news media reactions of Tuesday and Wednesday.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander P. Butterfield

Subject: Reduction of U. S. Personnel Overseas

Bob Haldeman asked me to pull together a status report on Administration efforts to comply with your pre-Inaugural directive that U. S. personnel strengths in non-combat overseas areas be reduced by one-third -- and to present that information to you along with a fast-action game plan.

Events to date:

- (1) In mid-April John Ehrlichman sent out several queries as to suggested procedures for instituting an effective "reductions" program.
- (2) Mayo, Kissinger, and Elliot Richardson responded to Ehrlichman's solicitations and expressed on paper a number of good thoughts and sound ideas.
- (3) Early May memoranda from Flanigan to you and State indicated that you and Elliot Richardson mutually agreed to the appointment of Graham Martin as

Ambassador-at-Large with the assigned task of reducing military and civil components of U.S. Government staffs abroad. (It is my understanding that Secretary Rogers is not amenable to this proposed duty assignment and, at this writing, neither the appointment nor the duty has been formalized.)

- (4) Frank Shakespeare has begun an independent review of USIA's organizational structure and manpower needs.

Past programs worth mentioning:

- (1) "Operation TOPSY", Ambassador Tuthill's 1967 reduction effort in Brazil, was designed to exclude locally employed foreign nationals and to include contract personnel and planned and vacant direct-hire positions. Whereas the (optimistic) goal was a 50% cut and the final report claimed 33%, actual in-country American strength was reduced by a mere 16%.
- (2) The BALPA plan, President Johnson's 1968 endeavor to enhance our international balance of payments position, is still in progress and has resulted in some quite substantial decreases. Contrary to TOPSY, the BALPA effort does include employed

foreign nationals, and is based on "body-count" strength rather than "authorized" strength. Aimed only at those persons employed under direct U.S. Ambassadorial jurisdiction, the implementing Presidential order was for an 18% reduction in Americans and a 16% reduction in "locals". At the time of the order each percentage figure was equivalent to approximately 4000 persons. Decreases under BALPA (now about 90% completed) are scheduled to continue until September 30. On that date, if programmed actions are closely followed, some 8000 USG employees will have been deleted from the "overseas rolls" in a 21-month period. Despite the fact that the Southeast Asia dilemma and various other contingencies arising from Communist bloc activities have generated over the years a gradual increase in the grand total of USG employees on foreign soil, the BALPA results are at least appreciable. The following figures indicate the extent of American employee reductions in major USG organizations:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Strength Jan '68</u>	<u>Cut as of Today</u>	<u>Total Cut Planned</u>	<u>% Decrease by Sep 30</u>
Defense	7,337	1,020	1,900	25%
State	7,412	710	827	11%
AID	3,668	456	630	17%
USIA	1,258	147	171	14%
Peace Corps	544	48	49	9%
HEW	69	28	30	43%
Commerce	83	9	9	11%
Justice	196	20	23	12%
Transportation	163	29	36	22%
Agriculture	198	20	30	15%
*Affiliates (DoD, State and AID)	1,656	261	347	21%

Average for this listing	2,053	250	368	18%
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And here are BALPA's decrease percentages for American employees in countries of probable special interest:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Strength Jan '68</u>	<u>% Decrease by Sep 30</u>
Japan	488	30%
Germany	1,173	26%
Peru	270	24%
Spain	294	24%
France	383	23%
Italy	409	23%
Iran	967	21%
Greece	425	19%
India	571	17%
Philippines	610	16%
United Kingdom	435	12%
Average for this listing	548	21%

*Details are classified.

Recommended game plan guidelines:

- (1) BALPA should not be disrupted, but allowed to terminate as planned on September 30, 1969.
- (2) The forthcoming "Bunker" plan and a possible "Unger" plan -- although not within the purview of this memorandum in that your directive to me specified only non-combat zone considerations -- should be integrated into whatever worldwide personnel reduction program we undertake.
- (3) The public should be told why reductions are being made. Is it a political move, a budgetary action, an effort to lower U.S. military and/or civilian visibility in foreign lands ... or what? Despite the political, economic, "image" and other benefits which might well come our way as a result of any meaningful American exodus, the most appropriate theme, and certainly one in keeping with other Administration initiatives, is "good management". It is important for us to emphasize (and sell) the point that our overseas reduction program is nothing more or less than a normal response to the dictates of efficient resource management ... and that it in no way compromises the security of the nation.

- (4) A large-scale review of the entire international scene should be conducted from Washington, preferably at the White House level. This board of reviewers should look closely at the current and forecast climate in each country which hosts American employees. In accordance with our most up-to-date international political objectives the reviewers must determine which countries will accept U. S. reductions ... and in what magnitudes.
- (5) Every department and agency which stands to be affected by personnel reductions in foreign lands should be given responsibility for conducting a separate check and review of its own overseas mission (or missions) and forwarding the resultant personnel strength recommendations to the aforementioned review board.
- (6) Armed with department and agency manpower recommendations, as well as with its own assessments of political moods in the host nations, the review board should begin a more intensified, country-by-country force study -- again in full consideration of U. S. foreign policy objectives. The purpose here is to determine the accuracy of roles and missions assignments and in that way judge the relative need for each U. S. in-country civil and military element.

- (7) Although it is probable that a meat-axe job will be necessary, it is essential that we avoid a meat-axe approach. Our reductions must be organized, controlled, and systematic.
- (8) We should be careful that in our efforts to reduce the numbers of U. S. employees we do not become overzealous and, as a consequence, take excessive swipes at locally employed foreign nationals. It would seem wise indeed to concentrate on USG-employed Americans and leave the char force, messenger, driver, gardener, and other such duties to the indigenes. As a matter of fact, in many countries local hire personnel are quite capable of assuming advanced clerical and even junior executive positions. More judicious exploitation of these situations will allow for even greater reductions in U. S. personnel.

Recommended game plan actions:

- (1) Officially appoint Graham Martin Ambassador-at-Large and follow through with the earlier proposal to put him full time (for now) on overseas personnel reductions.
- (2) Direct the Bureau of the Budget to prepare for your signature an implementing memorandum addressed

to all Federal departments and agencies concerned.

The memorandum should:

- (a) In the interests of better management of our manpower resources, state clearly your express desire for a meaningful reduction (e.g. 30%) in our overseas manpower ceilings;
- (b) In view of the magnitude of the planned reduction, admit to a slight modification of U. S. foreign policy (but only as it relates to a modification of resource management), and convincingly deny any change whatever in the direction of that foreign policy -- or any lack of resolve on the part of this Government to fully honor its international commitments;
- (c) Establish an NSC-staffed Review Board, chaired by Henry Kissinger ... or possibly co-chaired by Henry Kissinger and either Elliot Richardson or Graham Martin;
- (d) Charge the Review Board Chairman (or co-chairmen) with responsibility for the conduct and success of the total program; and

- (e) Assign a reasonably high priority to orderly and timely completion of the project.

You should know that in an effort to get the "status report" portion of this paper to you with minimum delay, the game plan guidelines and recommendations received only limited study and were not fully coordinated with all persons and staffs concerned. Undoubtedly there are many good ideas which might be applied in addition, or alternatively, to the proposals mentioned. John Ehrlichman has scheduled a Thursday afternoon meeting at which he, Mayo, Kissinger and I will further discuss ways and means of best implementing an immediate and effective program.