

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Memo	W. Richard Howard to Alex Butterfield re: Laotian Operation, 9 pp. with attachment	3/31/1971	B
2	Memo	Henry A. Kissinger to White House Staff re: Contacts with Diplomatic and Official Representatives of the USSR and Soviet Bloc Governments. 1 p.	8/6/1971	B
3	Report	Metropolitan Police Department, Statement of Facts re: Committing an indecent and obscene act, 1 p.	3/23/1961	D
4	Schedule	Detailed Staff Schedule, President's Visit to Wright Patterson Air Force Base, pp. 4-5	9/2/1971	A
5	Memo	Alfred Wong to Alexander P. Butterfield re: Construction Proposals for Protective Purposes, 2 pp.	9/14/1971	A & B
6	List	United States Intelligence Board Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, 11 pp.	10/1971	A & B
7	Memo	To Richard Helms re: Membership in the Technical Surveillance Countermeasure Committee, 1 p.	n.d.	B

COLLECTION TITLE

WHCF: SMOF: Alexander Butterfield

BOX NUMBER

7

FOLDER TITLE

1971 Inbound to APB Part 1: Jan.-Dec. 1971

PRMPA RESTRICTION CODES:

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
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C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
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E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DEED OF GIFT RESTRICTION CODES:

DOG Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

Bob Haldeman

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1971

A
This needs to be worked out
H

MEMORANDUM TO RON ZIEGLER

FROM: CONSTANCE STUART

SUBJECT: Coverage of White House Social Events

As a result of our conversation on Saturday concerning coverage of White House social events, I'd like to outline some of my thoughts on the subject.

There is no question that the Nixons are being reported as the family to entertain most in the White House. A new edition of Marie Smith's book "Entertaining at the White House" has just been published with a new chapter on the Nixons which is quite glowing. Mrs. Nixon was very pleased with it. I worked with Bonnie Angelo on a piece about entertaining in the White House during Christmas, but it got chopped up considerably before it appeared in the American Notes section of Time, but Bonnie emphasizes how much entertaining the Nixons have done.

Get it to P.

I do think there are some ways in which we can improve the situation:

1. In the first place, there is more coverage of social events than some White House Staff members realize. The President's News Summary very rarely reflects social coverage either in the papers or on TV. My office has to use our own very poor resources to collect information on coverage. We keep Mrs. Nixon informed and occasionally try to put together our own news summary on these events. We'll try to do this a little more regularly if there is interest among any White House Staff members.
2. When we have entertainment in the White House we have got to get drama, music, dance and TV critics to cover. I invited Ben Gross of the New York Daily News to cover the David Frost Show and he wrote a glowing piece. These critics, of course, do not cover on a regular basis and the only way to get them here is to extend an official invitation and put them on the guest list. We should include the local Washington critics and critics from major city newspapers. We've got to get coverage of these events not only on the women's pages but on the entertainment pages.

3. We need to encourage the men reporters to cover these events, not just the Washington women's press corps. For instance the UN dinner should have been covered by men reporters as a news story, not as just a social event. If the wires and newspapers will only assign women to cover these events then we must once again extend an invitation to the men reporters to attend as guests.

4. To draw wider coverage of entertainment at the White House, perhaps we should consider giving "East Side" releases to the men's press corps and perhaps I should brief occasionally at one of your briefings, to draw more attention to these activities, particularly when we have a name performer.

5. Mrs. Nixon and I have discussed at length the practice of coverage of rehearsals. We are going to subtly turn off this kind of coverage, which sometimes leads to unfortunate quotes on the part of the performer, and encourage coverage of the event and the performance itself.

6. Most critical to coverage of events such as "Evenings at the White House" is to open up the coverage for photographs and TV. On the David Frost Show we were allowed no coverage of the performance except by the social reporters. There should be an opportunity for hand held reels and still photographers to get a picture of the President with the performer at the "curtain call." We used to do this early in the series of "Evenings", but for some reason such coverage is not now allowed.

7. Which brings us to the point of coverage in general. We did not get as much coverage out of Christmas as we should have. Of the eleven major social events, coverage was permitted at only five. The six not covered include two congressional receptions, two White House Staff receptions, one top Administration officials reception and the White House Press reception. Mrs. Nixon opened up her activities to full coverage and did two events just strictly for the press: i.e. the arrival of the Christmas tree and her tour of the decorated White House. The credit for the coverage of Christmas at the White House such as it was should go to Mrs. Nixon. Even if reporters had not been allowed to cover all of the receptions, certainly photographers and TV reels should have had some opportunity for pictures. Our requests for such coverage were turned down.

If the President and his staff are interested in better coverage of social events, I need to seek your help for more discriminating decisions on the use of still photographers and TV reels to cover.

cc: Bob Haldeman, ✓ Herb Klein



TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Presidential Protective
Division

January 11, 1971

Personal: *Julius Pineau*
File No.

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Alexander P. Butterfield
SUBJECT : Unpaid Invoices from San Clemente Police
Department for Services Rendered to
Dr. Kissinger.

I have received information indicating that three (3) invoices dated July 6, 1970, September 22, 1970, and January 8, 1971, for police services furnished Dr. Kissinger are asyet unpaid. The total due, according to my information, is in the neighborhood of \$871.63.

I have brought this to the attention of Mr. Chapin before orally and have reiterated the information that when these services were originally arranged, Mr. Chapin and Dr. Kissinger were advised by this office that the services of a San Clemente Police Officer were to be paid by the White House at a rate, at that time, of approximately \$6.50 per hour, which was determined by the officers' hourly salary and related costs.

✓ The payment of these bills is way too long overdue and reflects badly on the White House and on the Secret Service since we were in on the original arrangements.

Please advise me at your earliest convenience if these bills will be paid, for if they are not I shall recommend the Police Department discontinue further similar services.

Robert H. Taylor

Robert H. Taylor
Special Agent in Charge

Do I have to pay this?

AK



3264

CITY OF SAN CLEMENTE 100 AVENIDA PRESIDIO, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA - 492-5101

July 6, 1970

Mr. Dwight Chapin
Special Assistant to The President
Washington, D. C. 20500

10 - 309.2


Special Police service rendered 6/29/70 through 7/4/70

at 3822 Calle Arriana, San Clemente, Cal. 26 hrs. @ \$6.50

\$169.00

Total due = \$169.00

3349



CITY OF SAN CLEMENTE 100 AVENIDA PRESIDIO, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA - 492-5101

Mr. Dwight Chapin
Special Assistant to the President
Washington, D. C. 20500

A/C 10-363.2

September 22, 1970

Special Police Service Rendered 8/22/70 Through 9/5/70:


65 Hours @ \$6.50

\$422.50

Invoice of July 6, 1970, No. 3264, in the amount of \$169.00 remains unpaid.

Total due = \$ 591.50

3461



CITY OF SAN CLEMENTE 100 AVENIDA PRESIDIO, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA - 492-5101

Mr. Dwight Chapin
Special Assistant to the President
Washington, D. C. 20500

A/C 10-363.2

January 8, 1971

Special Police Service Rendered 12/28/70 - 1/2/71:

42 $\frac{3}{4}$ Hours @ \$6.50
Expenses

\$274.63
5.50


Total

\$280.13
=====

Invoice #3264 of 7/6/70 in amount of \$169.00 and Invoice #3349 of 9/23/70 in amount of \$422.50 remain unpaid.

Total due = \$871.63

3349



CITY OF SAN CLEMENTE 100 AVENIDA PRESIDIO, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA - 492-5101

Mr. Dwight Chapin
Special Assistant to the President
Washington, D. C. 20500

A/C 10-363.2

September 22, 1970

©

Special Police Service Rendered 8/22/70 Through 9/5/70:

65 Hours @ \$6.50

\$422.50

Invoice of July 6, 1970, No. 3264, in the amount of \$169.00 remains unpaid.

3264



CITY OF SAN CLEMENTE

100 AVENIDA PRESIDIO, SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA - 492-5101

July 6, 1970

Mr. Dwight Chapin
Special Assistant to The President
Washington, D. C. 20500

10 - 363.2


Special Police service rendered 6/29/70 through 7/4/70

at 3822 Calle Ariana, San Clemente, Cal. 26 hrs. @ \$6.50

\$169.00

JULIETREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICEPresidential Protective
Division

October 6, 1970



MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dwight Chapin

Attached is Invoice No. 3349 from the San Clemente Police Department received by us from your office.

You will recall that when services of the Police Department were initially arranged for Dr. Kissinger, I mentioned to you (and I also told Dr. Kissinger) that the services would be reimbursible from whatever funds were available to you or Dr. Kissinger. Attention is invited to the notation that Invoice No. 3264 dated July 6, 1970, is still unpaid and the total amount due now appears to be \$591.50.

If you desire any further information regarding details necessary for payment of this bill, please advise as we are, of course, in close touch with Chief Clifford Murray of the San Clemente Police Department.

Robert H. Taylor
Special Agent in Charge

Enclosure



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 15, 1971

NOTE TO ALEX BUTTERFIELD

Enclosed is being sent per Larry Higby's
telephone call at request of
H. R. Haldeman.

FM

Fred Malek

MANAGEMENT OF NON-CAREER PERSONNEL

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

DECEMBER 18, 1970

(REVISED JANUARY 6,
1971)

MANAGEMENT OF NON-CAREER PERSONNEL:

Summary of Recommendations

In the two years of the Nixon Administration, the difficulty in effectively managing the Federal Government has become increasingly apparent. The relative lack of control at the top and the non-responsive-ness of many people in the bureaucracy have resulted in Presidential directives not being carried out, counter-productive efforts taking place inside a number of Agencies, and a general failure to carry out initiatives and achieve planned goals. While the causes of this problem are varied and complex, the President can do much to solve it by strengthening his management control over the key positions in the Executive Branch.

A detailed report, Management of Non-Career Personnel: Recommendations for Improvement, suggests how the President can establish such management control. This paper summarizes the major recommendation and arguments of that report. Our intention has not been to evaluate the effectiveness of past operations, but to outline what is currently needed to serve the President's immediate needs. The report does this in three sections:

- Background Information, which indicates the magnitude of the task
- Analysis and Recommendations, which suggests specific ways to overcome the problems
- Organization and Implementation, which outlines the White House and Departmental organizational requirements and implementation steps necessary to fulfill the recommendations.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The challenge of managing non-career personnel is tremendous in terms of volume alone. There are nearly 3,000 full-time non-career positions, excluding certain categories which by definition are not policy-making positions. As might be expected in a political environment, the turnover in these full-time positions is high -- over 31% per year.

Full-Time Appointments

	<u>Number of Positions</u>	<u>Annual Turnover</u>
Presidential and Executive Level Appointments	1470	360
-- Executive Office, Departments, Agencies and Regulatory Commissions	643	192
-- Ambassadors, Judges, U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Marshalls	827	168
Other Supergrades	569	295
Other Schedule C (GS-15 and below)	<u>915</u>	<u>275</u>
Total Non-Career	2954	930

There are approximately 12,000 part-time positions.

The replacement rate of this group is even higher, with an annual rate of over 40%.

Part-Time Appointments

	<u>Number of Positions</u>	<u>Annual Turnover</u>
Presidential	2,235	1,340
Non-Presidential	<u>10,000</u>	<u>3,730</u>
Total	12,235	5,070

In addition, there is a monthly workload of some 500 unsolicited applications sent to the White House. Nearly two-thirds of these have political sponsorship.

With this type of volume, therefore, it is critical to focus the limited White House resources on particular components of personnel management to achieve the desired management control.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To effectively allocate White House resources, two fundamental issues must be resolved: (1) What basic strategy should the White House use to exercise management control, and (2) How should personnel decisions be made within the White House. After suggesting answers to these two issues, the paper outlines recommendations to strengthen executive search, clearance, personnel administration, and patronage for full-time positions. Because of the special characteristics of part-time positions, these are discussed separately at the end of this section.

Basic Strategy to Exercise Management Control

Turning first to the strategy issue, the White House Personnel Operation (WHPO) currently exercises control primarily through the clearance process without trying to influence other important phases of an appointee's career (e.g., selection, performance evaluation, recognition, promotion or removal.)

There are two problems with this limited approach. First, it tends to foster conflict between the White House and the Departments.* Currently the White House plays the role of a cop or spoiler -- rejecting candidates without offering constructive assistance to solve knotty personnel problems. This creates a natural adversary type of relationship. Moreover, it does not afford the WHPO an opportunity to become involved early enough in the hiring process to spot and head off possible crises or to contribute in the formative stages before the Departments become locked in. If the WHPO and the Departments were to work together in identifying and selecting candidates, both sides would be better able to understand the political and substantive trade-offs. This mutual understanding would result in better decisions. Additionally, while disagreements would naturally continue to occur, potential major confrontations should be spotted early in the process and avoided.

* The term Department is used in this summary to refer to the Independent Agencies as well as the twelve Executive Departments.

The second problem with relying primarily on clearance to achieve management control is that the White House foregoes opportunities to exert influence both before and after the appointment. The objective, of course, is for the President to effectively manage the government, not just to be able to veto appointments. To achieve this management control, the WHPO must be able to take the initiative in seeking out well qualified, loyal individuals and to strengthen their responsiveness and loyalty after appointment. Therefore, the White House strategy for management control should be expanded from its current focus on clearance. However, with the vast number of non-career personnel, the White House must concentrate on key positions, delegating the remainder to the Departments.

There are three basic levels of full-time non-career employees over which control could be exercised. The first level includes 1,500 Presidential appointees and Executive level positions. Of these, some 650 are policy-making and operating positions in the Executive Departments, Agencies and Regulatory Commissions and are the principal positions through which the President exercises management control. The remaining 850 positions at the Presidential appointee level are Ambassadors, Judges, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshalls. The second level contains some 600 supergrades. These are the second echelon policy makers and managers. They constitute the primary link between the top level and the career employees. Thirdly, with some notable exceptions the 900 Schedule C (GS 15 and below) appointments are mostly special or confidential staff assistants to Presidential appointees.

The strategy for exercising management control should reflect the differing importance of these three levels. Consequently, we recommend that the White House exercise management control by (1) influencing top level personnel actions across the board, e.g., selection, clearance, performance evaluation, recognition, and promotion or removal and (2) concentrating primarily on the 650 key Presidential appointee and Executive level positions and secondarily on supergrades. While clearance authority should be retained at the White House level, personnel actions on lower level positions should generally be delegated to the Departments.

Personnel Decision Process

The second fundamental issue is how personnel decisions should be made within the White House. Virtually every White House office thinks it should have some degree of influence in personnel decisions. In most cases, this reflects a legitimate desire to be consulted on a decision before it is finalized, we generally agree. To make effective personnel decisions, it is essential that all relevant political and substantive information be considered.

In some cases, however, White House staff members not connected with the WHPO assume a primary role on personnel decisions. Such a diffusion of responsibility causes several problems. One problem is that commitments are sometimes made without proper coordination, and subsequently, prove embarrassing. A related problem is that Departments sometimes try to appeal personnel decisions with which they disagree. When successful, such a reversal undermines the authority and credibility of the White House. Thirdly, diffuse responsibility encourages lobbying within the White House, creating needless friction and wasting staff time.

To overcome these problems and ensure proper coordination we recommend that the responsibility for coordinating, recommending and making all personnel decisions for Departments, Agencies, Regulatory Commissions and advisory bodies reside in one office, the White House Personnel Operation.

Building upon these two fundamental recommendations, we now outline specific ways to strengthen the management of non-career personnel, starting with executive search and selection.

Executive Search and Selection

Currently the Departments have responsibility to recruit for positions under their jurisdiction. With limited assistance from the WHPO, they tend to rely on their line officials as the major source of candidates.

While this process has had some success, there are also some problems with it. It reinforces a Departmental orientation rather than an Administration-wide perspective. Some key vacancies have remained unfilled for an unreasonable length of time.

The WHPO does not currently have the capacity to overcome these difficulties. The White House talent bank does not contain many highly qualified candidates, and too few unsolicited resumes of highly-qualified candidates are received to fill the need. In some cases the WHPO staff has been helpful in identifying candidates, but the volume is too great to handle in this informal manner. Consequently, we recommend that a professional (i.e., full-time) executive search capability be established at the White House and concentrate its efforts on the 650 key Presidential and Executive level positions.

This approach would have several advantages over the present system. First, since filling vacancies would be the full-time responsibility of executive searchers, this important activity would receive priority attention rather than being shunted aside by other problems, as all too frequently happens when recruiting is performed by the line officials. As a practical matter, there now exists special urgency in recruiting which only a special effort could fulfill. It will be increasingly difficult to attract good candidates as the President's current term of office approaches the end. It is therefore important to ensure that all current vacancies are filled and candidates recruited for other contemplated top level personnel changes as soon as possible.

A second advantage is that an executive search operation in the White House provides the Administration with an improved outreach capability. It could search systematically for the best talent available in the country to fill key Presidential appointments -- not only within the Departments but also for Agency Heads and Regulatory Commissions.

Finally, an executive search capability at the White House would enable the President to exert more influence over the substantive and political qualifications of candidates and would assist the Department Heads in building a well-qualified team, loyal to the President.

However, at least one significant hurdle must be overcome if the White House is to be successful in establishing such a recruiting capability. Some Department Heads may be reluctant to accept assistance from the White House in recruiting candidates for positions under their jurisdiction. To overcome this problem, the Department Heads should clearly understand that (as described below) they would still have the primary responsibility in final selection. As a matter of fact, several Department Heads have already asked for executive search

assistance. Nevertheless, it no doubt would be appropriate for the President to emphasize to the Cabinet his legitimate concern about and strong interest in top level appointments.

In the search for the key Presidential and Executive level appointees, initial responsibility for identifying candidates would lie with the Department Head. (In some cases, however, the Department Head may ask the WHPO to take the complete responsibility.) The WHPO would also be responsible for developing candidates. This effort will augment the search activities of the Department Head and will provide additional candidates for his consideration. In addition, the White House recruiters would contact any other individuals whom the Department Head thought would be good sources. Drawing from all these various sources, the WHPO would then develop a final list of three to five prime candidates from which the Department Head would choose his nominee. Before submitting his selection to the White House, the Department Head might want to touch base with appropriate Congressional and interest group representatives. To facilitate coordination in clearance (discussed subsequently) the Departments should inform the WHPO of what contacts have been made. (The senior White House staff would make the final selection in the case of Regulatory Commissioners or Agency Heads.)

Resumes on final candidates would be reviewed at the White House by appropriate substantive, political and personnel staffs. An interview would be held if deemed appropriate by any one of these offices. If there is agreement on the candidate, the WHPO would initiate clearance. If there is disagreement that cannot be resolved, the issue would be submitted in a decision paper to the President. Before final selection the President himself may want to interview candidates for some of the most important positions, e. g., Chairmen of Regulatory Commissions, Heads of Major Agencies.

To supplement the White House effort, we recommend that the WHPO work with the Departments to ensure that an appropriate executive search capability is established to recruit for vacancies below Executive level. Departments would identify final supergrade candidates whose resumes would then be reviewed by the WHPO before a final selection decision is made. For positions below supergrade, the Departments would assume full responsibility for recruitment and selection.

After selection, the candidates for positions at all levels are cleared.

Clearance

Clearance is the process for making final political and security checks prior to nomination to the Senate or appointment. It consists of two phases: (1) information gathering (e.g., contacting home State Congressmen and State Chairmen), and (2) evaluating the information and making a decision. We propose some minor modifications to the current procedures which should save White House staff time and streamline the process without relinquishing needed controls. More importantly the suggested changes should help reduce tension between the Departments and the White House over the length of time required for clearance.

Approximately 30 clearances per month are made on Presidential and Executive level candidates. Currently, for this group both the information gathering and clearance decision are performed by the WHPO (Ambassadors, Judges, U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshalls are an exception. For these positions, clearance contacts with the Congressional Committee are performed by the employing Department.) Because of the importance of these positions and their close public association with the President, it is appropriate for the White House to perform the final information gathering and make the decision as it currently does.

Instead of having the WHPO make all clearance contacts for these positions, we recommend that (1) the Political Liaison Office* make the Gubernatorial and GOP field contacts, and (2) the Organizational Liaison Office make contacts with special interest groups where it is deemed necessary to augment checks by the Department. In both instances, their offices are the best qualified to evaluate contact information and sell the candidate, if required. Involving the liaison offices in clearance may add a few extra days to the political aspect of the clearance process. However, since the full field security investigation required on all Presidential appointees takes three to four weeks, any small delay in gathering political information should not delay the overall clearance decision.

The WHPO would continue to perform Congressional contacts, since soliciting clearances could hinder Congressional Relations' ability to

*It is uncertain at this time how the Political Liaison function will be eventually organized in the White House. Nevertheless, in our opinion this and subsequent recommendations would still be valid, however it is organized.

perform its legislative responsibilities. The Congressional Relations Office would, of course, be contacted on any problems arising from Congressional clearances.

As mentioned previously, in some cases the Departments will touch base with appropriate Congressional and interest group representatives prior to final selection. Such prior contacts would be taken into account before proceeding with the White House contacts. In both Congressional and Organizational Liaison, flexibility must be maintained to ensure proper handling of special cases.

About 50 clearances per month are currently processed by the WHPO for non-career supergrades and Schedule C's (GS 15 and below.) Currently the Departments make all Congressional contacts before submittal to the WHPO. The WHPO spot checks Congressional contacts, makes GOP field contacts, and then makes the final clearance decision.

For these two categories of positions -- supergrades and Schedule C (GS 15 and below) -- we recommend that all clearance contacts be performed by the Departments. The WHPO should spot check the contact information and retain the final clearance decision. In this way the White House can retain control with a minimum investment of staff time. Such a reassignment would add a minimal additional burden to the individual Departments, since they already make the Congressional contacts and some also perform GOP field contacts on an informal basis. Having the clearance request fully staffed prior to submittal would reduce the amount of time the White House takes to clear a candidate. Except in problem cases (approximately 10 percent) clearance should only take a day or two. This change should help reduce a source of some friction between the WHPO and the Departments.

To further encourage Departmental cooperation, consideration should be given to delegating clearances on GS-15's and below to those Departments whose capability and performance warrant the increased responsibility. Typically, these positions are personal assistants and do not have any significant line responsibilities. While there would be some risk of a modest political embarrassment, clearance decisions on these positions could be delegated with minimal substantive risk. Moreover, delegating this authority could be used as an inducement for obtaining Departmental cooperation in other personnel areas. Judgements on these delegations would be made on a selective basis after a few months of experience under the new arrangements.

Personnel Administration

After a candidate's appointment, the President should utilize tools at his disposal to strengthen his loyalty and to ensure that his talents are utilized effectively. These goals can be accomplished through strengthening non-career personnel administration.

Shortly after their appointment, we recommend that Presidential appointees participate in an orientation program which will be developed. This program would include in-depth discussion with the appropriate substantive and political offices to give the new appointee guidelines on the President's policies and what the White House expects from him. Additionally, each Presidential appointee should have an opportunity to meet with the President. Many Assistant Secretaries have never met the President except at the Christmas Party. Such meetings strengthen the appointee's loyalty to the President as a personal leader rather than as a dignitary read about in the newspaper. They also provide an opportunity for individual pictures to be taken with the President. Ten minute meetings during open time would be held every two weeks and would each include approximately six Presidential appointees.

Drawing from Departmental, White House staff, and OMB sources, the WHPO should systematically evaluate performance of Presidential and Executive level appointees and supergrades: These evaluations should be based on three general criteria: (1) political loyalty to the President, (2) substantive performance, and (3) ability to work effectively with the Executive Office staff. Performance evaluation will be performed in two phases. First, Department Heads and appropriate Executive Office sources will be interviewed to establish initial rankings of appointees, as outstanding, average, or poor performers. Second, detailed information will be gathered on those identified as outstanding or poor to confirm or refute the initial readings. This information will then be reviewed by the senior White House staff and Department Heads as appropriate for a final decision. Outstanding performers would be promoted or given attractive transfers within the Executive Branch. Poor performers would be subject to transfer to a less responsible position or removal.

Closely related to the performance evaluation is recognition. Outstanding performers should be systematically identified, and letters from the President and appropriate social invitations should be arranged accordingly. These steps are easily taken but will go a long way to strengthen loyalty to the President and motivate top performance.

Unsolicited Applications and Patronage

Each month the WHPO receives approximately 500 unsolicited applications for employment. Since nearly two-thirds of these have political backing, their handling is closely tied to patronage. The key in handling this volume successfully is to be able to identify and take appropriate action on the few truly outstanding political or substantive cases. Consequently, there are two steps to focus on: evaluation and follow-through.

We recommend two changes in the evaluation step. First, the rating designation (e.g., must, priority placement, etc.) should be modified to distinguish between the political and substantive qualifications of a candidate and to clearly indicate what action should be taken. The suggested rating scheme is outlined in the report.

A second and more important recommendation is that the political evaluation should be performed initially by those offices having liaison responsibility with the sources of patronage requests, (i.e., Political Liaison, Congressional Relations, and Organizational Liaison.)

A weekly political personnel coordination meeting would be held to establish overall patronage priorities (e.g., number placed from Congressional vs. those placed from Republican officials) and resolve disagreements between offices on specific cases. These changes in the evaluation process should sharpen the ability to identify truly outstanding cases for appropriate action.

We also recommend two changes in the follow-through step. First, we propose that the Departments and the WHPO establish informal goals on how many patronage placements the Department can absorb. Obtaining a commitment such as this would negate the reluctance which Departments currently have in placing individuals on a case by case basis. As currently happens, must placements would be referred to appropriate Departments based upon the qualifications of the individual and the characteristics of the job opportunities in the Departments. In cases where the candidate turned out to be completely unqualified, the referral would be reviewed. Otherwise, the Departments would be expected to place the individual within a reasonably short period of time.

Secondly, to monitor Departmental performance, we recommend bi-weekly status reports on the status of patronage referrals be submitted to the WHPO. In addition, the Departments would notify the WHPO immediately on the placement of any must or priority candidates. These reports would be used to closely monitor progress on patronage referrals to ensure that an appropriate, timely placement is made.

Management of Part-Time Positions

Part-time positions consist primarily of Boards and Commissions and represent a special aspect of non-career personnel. They are an excellent means for rewarding Presidential supporters. They offer significant prestige without the commitment of a full-time position, and in many cases do not have demanding substantive requirements. Normally only a minimal effort is required to identify and attract qualified candidates.

There are over 2,200 Presidentially appointed positions and probably more than 10,000 Departmental positions. The Presidential positions are more prestigious, often have high visibility on important issues, and are sometimes expected to perform a demanding assignment. Departmental positions are less prestigious, usually focus on a narrow technical area within the Department, and are generally of an advisory nature.

The key needs in this area are to ensure that (1) the potential to reward Nixon supporters is fully tapped, (2) appointees have appropriate substantive qualifications, and (3) appointments, especially on Presidential Boards and Commissions, are not political liabilities to the President. These needs are met reasonably well by the existing procedures.

In staffing Presidential Boards and Commissions, the WHPO generally coordinates and makes the final decision after soliciting candidates from various sources, e.g., appropriate White House substantive and political offices and any Departments which would be affected by the Commission. In selected cases where the Commission is oriented primarily to a single Department and that Department has competence, the WHPO delegates the responsibility for developing an initial slate of candidates. To further conserve on WHPO staff time, we recommend that this concept be expanded. The initial staffing for all Presidential Boards and Commissions which are primarily oriented to one Department should be delegated to Departments as their capabilities warrant it.

Such delegation would not inhibit patronage placements. In cases where placement on a Presidential Board or Commission is desirable for political purposes, the Departments would be told to include that individual. To ensure the President receives credit for part-time appointments, the WHPO would retain responsibility for contacting all candidates to ascertain their willingness to serve, if asked. Subsequently,

clearance information would be gathered by the Departments but the WHPO would retain the final clearance authority.

Staffing of Departmental Boards and Commissions is currently performed by the Departments. For some of these Boards the Departments now make clearance contacts and then submit the candidates to the WHPO for final clearance approval. In practice, this final clearance decision by the WHPO consists of a brief review of such things as political affiliation, geographic distribution, etc. Because the volume is great and because these Boards and Commissions are primarily associated with the Department Head rather than the President, we recommend that the clearance decision be delegated to the Departments.

Submitting Departmental Boards and Commissions to the White House for clearance approval has been resented by the Departments. Redelegating this authority would be an inducement to have the Departments accept other changes in procedures and responsibility emanating from this report. Guidelines would be established for the Departments to follow in staffing and clearing these Boards and Commissions. Also, to tap the reward potential on behalf of the President, Departments would be made to place priority individuals referred to them by the WHPO.

ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

If the recommendations contained in this report are accepted, changes in responsibilities, procedures, and decision-making process will be required both at the White House and at the Departments. Full implementation would require approximately 10 weeks and is covered at the end of this section.

White House Personnel Operation

The WHPO should be organized into three major components: executive search, Departmental liaison, and administration. This organization would help focus WHPO effort on the critical functions of recruiting, coordinating selection and clearance decisions, evaluating performance, and monitoring Departmental non-career personnel operations.

To assume the revised responsibilities as outlined in this report, it is estimated that the WHPO staff would have to be increased from the present level of sixteen to nineteen. This increase is the net amount needed from devoting six individuals (professional and clerical) to the recruiting function and freeing the time of three people due to delegation of responsibilities to the Departments e.g., clearance information gathering, preliminary staffing of Presidential Boards and Commissions, clearance decisions on Departmental Boards and Commissions, and maintenance of a talent bank for candidates whose potential is below Executive level positions.

Upgrading Departments' Non-Career Personnel Operations

The recommendations affect the Departments in two ways: (1) they will be expected to assume greater responsibility, e. g., clearance contacts and patronage placements, and (2) they will be expected to strengthen their capabilities in such areas as recruiting and performance evaluation. Consequently, most of the Departments will have to reorganize and upgrade their non-career personnel operations.

Currently the Departmental personnel contacts are not generally at the decision-making level. Their access to the decision-making level varies greatly. Therefore, we recommend that the Departments' management of non-career personnel be upgraded to function at two levels: First, an appropriate assistant to the Department Head should be the primary contact and be responsible for Departmental performance in managing non-career personnel. This individual should have the confidence of the Department Head and sufficient clout within the Department to enact decisions. Secondly, reporting to this individual should be a staff sufficient for handling the day-to-day operations, e. g., recruiting, clearances, reports to the White House, follow-through on patronage placements, etc. In addition, the Department Head would naturally be involved in the critical activities, e. g., selection of the final candidate for top positions, performance evaluation of his immediate subordinates, and removal decisions.

Procedures enabling the WHPO to monitor Departments' performance should be developed having two dimensions: (1) establishing clear guidelines for Departments to follow (e. g., handling of clearance contacts, determining number of patronage placements to be absorbed by the Departments, etc.), and (2) reviewing performance relative to these guidelines via control reports submitted by the Departments and via spot checks. Should the guidelines be violated, appropriate action would be taken ranging from withdrawing of delegated authority to removal in the case of a totally uncooperative staff member.

Implementation

Implementing the recommendations requires (1) informing the White House staff and the Departments of the changes and their

rationale, (2) developing and installing the new procedures within the White House, and (3) upgrading Departmental non-career personnel operations and delegating responsibilities when appropriate.

An implementation plan has been developed to accomplish these three interrelated steps. Most of the changes can be accomplished in one month, but full implementation will carry over a period of 10 weeks.

There is, however, one important aspect of implementation and continued operation which is critical and deserves special emphasis -- the involvement of the President. Throughout the report, it is assumed that the President would take a personal interest in key personnel matters in four areas: (1) interviewing final candidates for selected critical positions (i.e., Cabinet officers, Heads of major Independent Agencies, Under Secretaries, and Chairmen of Regulatory Commissions); (2) selecting the nominee for important PAS positions where there are two or more highly qualified candidates or a disagreement exists between the Department Head and the WHPO, (3) reviewing overall progress on non-career personnel goals, e.g., status of recruiting candidates for vacancies, and (4) meeting with groups of Presidential appointees for 10 minutes approximately every two weeks.

The President can exert great leverage over the Federal Government by strengthening his management control over non-career personnel. Fully capitalizing on this potential requires the personal leadership of the President.

MANAGEMENT OF NON-CAREER PERSONNEL:

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

December 18, 1970

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MANAGEMENT OF NON-CAREER PERSONNEL

Recommendations for Improvement

In the two years of the Nixon Administration, the difficulty in effectively managing the Federal Government has become increasingly apparent. The Executive Branch has not galvanized sufficiently as a team implementing Presidential policy. In some cases, Presidential directives have not been carried out, and counter-productive efforts have taken place within a number of Departments.

While the causes of this problem are varied and complex, the President can do much to solve it by increasing his direct management control over appointees to non-career positions in the Executive Branch. Such management control can be achieved by attracting the best qualified individuals who are philosophically compatible with and loyal to the President, placing them in leadership positions, motivating them by recognizing and promoting outstanding performers, and removing any whose performance is poor. At the same time, personnel decisions should be made and announced to maximize political benefit and minimize political costs.

This report will recommend ways in which the President can better manage and control selected non-career positions in the Executive Branch.* It should be clear that this report will not evaluate past practices, good or bad. Rather, it will outline what we believe is needed at this point to serve the President's needs.

To cover the subject, this report is divided into three main chapters:

1. Background information
2. Analysis and recommendations
3. Organization and implementation steps

*Hereafter in the report, the term non-career positions or personnel will refer to Presidential Appointments, Supergrades, and Schedule C positions. While there are additional categories of non-career positions (e. g., Schedule A and B) they are not normally of a confidential or policy determining nature, and hence, are excluded from our consideration.

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This chapter covers two areas of general background information (1) scope of responsibility, and (2) key functions.

SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY

The responsibility for management of non-career personnel in the Executive Branch is tremendous. There are approximately 3,000 full-time non-career positions and some 12,000 part-time appointee positions. The full-time positions include the key line and staff jobs in the Departments, Agencies, and Commissions, as well as Judges, U.S. Marshalls, U.S. Attorneys, and Ambassadors. Reflecting the high degree of executive mobility in a political environment, there is a great deal of turnover in these positions. The number of non-career positions and estimated annual turnover are shown below.

	<u>Full-Time Appointments</u>		<u>Annual</u> <u>Turnover</u>
	<u>Number of Positions</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Rate</u>
Presidential and Executive Level Appointments	1470	360	25%
- Departments and Executive Office	469	138	30%
- Independent Agencies and Regulatory Commissions	174	54	27%
- Ambassadors	103	30	30%
- Judges, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshalls	724	138	19%
Other Supergrades	569	295	52%
Other Schedule C (GS-15 and below)	915	275	30%
Total Non-Career	2954	930	

The non-career positions fall into three distinct categories. The Presidential and Executive level positions are politically identified with the President and represent his primary instruments for making policy and exercising operational control. The supergrade positions have primarily a Departmental focus and represent the Administration's principal interface with the career employees. The Schedule C (GS-15 and below) positions are essentially the confidential and personal staff of the first two categories of appointees.

The turnover in full-time positions is due to many causes: retirement, accepting a new job outside of government, dismissals, promotions, transfers, and reorganization. While some of these causes do not create vacancies, most do. Consequently, identifying and attracting this many qualified individuals is a tremendous job. In fact, merely clearing and processing this many appointments is quite an administrative burden.

Similarly, staffing part-time positions, primarily advisory Boards and Commissions, is also a sizable task. The number of Presidential and Departmental positions on advisory Boards and Commissions and their annual turnover are estimated below:

	<u>Number of positions</u>	<u>Annual Turnover</u>
Presidential	2,235	1,340
Departmental	<u>10,000</u>	<u>3,730</u>
Total	12,235	5,070

The Presidential Boards are generally quite prestigious, and since the substantive requirements are usually modest, provide an excellent opportunity for political appointments. The Departmental positions are less prestigious and often are expected to provide advisory services in specific functional areas.

Adding to this workload, there are an estimated 6,000 unsolicited applications received annually by the White House Personnel Operation (WHPO). (This figure does not include applications that come directly to the Civil Service Commission or to the Departments.*) Skillfully evaluating and processing this number of applicants is a large administrative

* Hereafter in this report the term Departments will be used to refer to the Independent Agencies as well as the twelve Executive Departments.

task by itself. In addition, since nearly two-thirds of the applications to the White House have political sponsors, astute political judgment must be exercised. In most cases, of course, these are routine requests. In selected cases, however, a deft patronage placement can be extremely helpful in promoting an Administration program, or the failure to honor certain patronage requests can result in adverse political consequences.

KEY ACTIVITIES

Given the needs of the President and the nature of the workload, there are four activities which are critical to effective non-career personnel management.

1. Executive Search and Selection - Systematically identifying and attracting top quality individuals and then matching them to the large number of positions becoming vacant annually.
2. Clearance - Contacting selected political officials and performing background checks prior to appointment to avoid appointing individuals who are security risks or political liabilities to the Administration.
3. Patronage - Placing selected individuals in positions to gain political benefit for the President.
4. Personnel Administration - Strengthening loyalty and responsiveness of appointees to the President's direction through orientation and recognition programs, evaluating performance, promoting individuals who demonstrate a capability to assume greater responsibility and removing those who do not perform.

Analyses and recommendations on how to carry out these activities are contained in the following chapter.

2. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter initially covers two fundamental issues which, when resolved, will form the basis for all other recommendations. These issues are:

1. What basic strategy should the White House follow in using its limited resources to control non-career personnel?
2. How should personnel decisions be made within the White House?

Building upon the recommendations drawn from analyzing these two issues, this chapter discusses executive search and selection, clearance, personnel administration, and handling of patronage requests for full-time positions. Appointments to part-time positions -- primarily Boards and Commissions -- are covered separately in the last section of this chapter.

Strategy for Exercising Control

Given the desire for the President to use his authority over non-career personnel to more effectively manage the Government, one major issue is how to maximize the effect of limited White House resources.

The White House could exercise various degrees of control over any of the activities involved in managing non-career personnel. These activities include initial identification of candidates for a vacancy, selection of the final candidate, clearance, performance evaluation, recognition, and promotion or removal. With the large number of positions, it is neither feasible nor desirable for the White House to exercise direct control over each activity for all levels of non-career personnel.

Currently, the WHPO exercises strong control over clearances for all levels of non-career appointments. Other activities are left primarily to the Departments. This strategy is analogous to the President's merely exercising approval or veto authority over Congressional legislation without taking the initiative of introducing or influencing legislation as it moves through the Congress, or without exercising control over how legislation is implemented. There are two problems with this approach.

First, it enhances the potential for conflict between the White House and Departments. While the Departments tend naturally to resent any effort by the White House to control personnel decisions, concentrating White House attention only on clearances maximizes this natural resentment.

The Departments see the White House as always acting negatively (by sometimes refusing to clear their candidates) and rarely offering constructive assistance in other personnel activities. Currently, the WHPO and the Departments view each other with considerable suspicion, each accusing the other of having too narrow perspective -- the WHPO is accused of being purely partisan and the Departments are accused of ignoring political realities in personnel decisions.

By assisting in the selection and evaluation processes, the WHPO should better understand the Departments' point of view on personnel matters. Conversely, working more closely with the WHPO should make the Departments sensitive to the White House's perspective. Increased awareness of the political and substantive trade-offs by all participants should lead to more cooperation and result in improved decisions.

The second problem with relying primarily on clearance to achieve control is that the White House foregoes opportunities to assert influence both before and after the appointment. Having only a veto power late in the selection process gives the WHPO little or no ability to see that well qualified candidates are identified. The WHPO can only assure that very poor candidates are not selected. In practice, it is sometimes quite difficult to exercise even this veto without being able to suggest a qualified alternative candidate. Also, after the appointment much can be done to influence appointees during the course of their career through orientation, performance evaluation, recognition, promotion or removal.

Therefore, the White House strategy for management control should be expanded to include more than just clearance. (Specific recommendations on what roles the White House assumes in recruiting, selection, recognition, etc., are contained in subsequent sections.) However, as mentioned previously, with the vast number of appointees, the White House must focus only on the key decisions, delegating the remainder to the Departments.

The most important positions to achieve management control are the 1,500 Presidential and Executive level positions. Of the 1,500, 650 are in the Executive Office, Executive Departments, Independent Agencies, Boards and Regulatory Commissions. This group constitutes the top level policy-making and operating positions, and it is primarily through this group that the President manages the Executive Branch. In addition, this group of appointments has the highest political visibility. The 850

judicial and Ambassadorial positions are highly prestigious but with notable exceptions (e.g., Supreme Court, Ambassadors to key countries) have somewhat less visibility and offer less opportunity for direct policy-making and operation control. Nonetheless, since these positions are directly associated with the President, especially the 90% which require formal Senate confirmation, they are all important to the President.

Consequently, we recommend that the White House exercise greater management control across the range of personnel activities and concentrate its efforts primarily on the Presidential and Executive level appointments and in particular on the group of 650 key positions. This recommendation is based on the premise that Departmental personnel management capabilities will be upgraded so that the Departments can assume greater responsibility and be held accountable for the range of personnel activities at lower levels.

Strengthened Coordination and Consolidation of Personnel Decisions

A second fundamental issue is how personnel decisions should be made within the White House. Virtually every White House office thinks it should have some degree of influence in personnel decisions. In most cases, this reflects a desire to be consulted on a decision before it is finalized. To make effective personnel decisions, it is essential that all relevant political and substantive information from these offices be considered. For example, offices having liaison responsibility with the Congress, Republican Party, and special interest groups should make the judgements on the political aspect of personnel decisions, e.g., evaluation of patronage requests, clearances, etc. Substantive inputs should be incorporated from the Domestic Council, National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget, e.g., guidance on recruiting for top positions and passing on final candidates for top level positions.

In some cases, White House staff members not connected with the WHPO assume a primary role on personnel decisions. Such a diffusion of responsibility causes problems. One problem is that commitments are sometimes made without proper coordination and subsequently, prove embarrassing. For example, individuals have been hired who have not been cleared or who have been rejected for political reasons. In addition, individuals have been told their jobs were safe when they were about to be fired. A second related problem with diffused responsibility is that the Departments sometimes appeal personnel decisions with which they disagree.

Typically, this occurs when a candidate has been rejected by the WHPO but the Department feels that the candidate's substantive qualifications override his political liabilities. In such cases, the Department tries to find a "friend in court" to reconsider and overturn the original decision. When this is successful, it undermines the authority and credibility of the WHPO. A third problem with diffuse responsibility is that it encourages extensive lobbying on personnel issues within the White House. This lobbying not only creates needless friction, it also wastes much of the top and middle echelon's time in resolving these disputes.

To overcome these problems and to ensure proper coordination is made, we recommend that the responsibility for coordinating and making personnel decisions be placed in one office, the White House Personnel Operation. This responsibility would include working closely with political and substantive White House offices, making routine decisions, and referring to the President those selection and clearance decisions appropriate for his consideration.

Coordination between the WHPO and the offices having liaison responsibility with the Congress, Republican Party, and special interest groups would be accomplished by reinitiating weekly political personnel meetings. These would cover vacancies, patronage priorities, final candidates for politically sensitive positions, and clearance problems.

* * * * *

The following sections, starting with Executive Search and Selection, reflect the recommendations developed in discussing these two fundamental issues.

Executive Search and Selection

This section covers the process of identifying, attracting, and selecting substantially qualified and politically loyal individuals to fill full-time, non-career positions in the Administration. It covers

- Background information
- Establishing a recruiting capability
- Selection process

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

There are 2,954 authorized full-time, non-career positions in the Federal Government. These positions are categorized by type in the following table:

<u>Type of position</u>	<u>Number</u>
Presidential Appointee (line and staff positions in the Departments, Agencies, Regulatory Commissions, and the Executive Office)	557
Ambassadors, Judges, U. S. Attorneys, U. S. Marshalls	827
Other Executive Level (non-PAS/PA)	86
Supergrades (non-PAS/PA)	569
GS-15 and below	<u>915</u> *
Total	2954

* Does not include 425 additional authorities which are currently not utilized.

Excluding Ambassadors, Judges, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshalls because they have little or no management responsibility, there are only about 2,000 appointees through which the President can exercise control of the huge Federal bureaucracy employing some five million people. Consequently, the very limited number of non-career appointments available to the President should be made with extreme care.

During the past six months, the annual rate of turnover among persons occupying these positions (excluding Ambassadors, Judges, U.S. Attorneys and U.S. Marshalls) has been about 36 percent. Thus, if the past six months can be considered typical, there is a need to fill non-career positions at a rate of 750-800 annually.

Currently, the Departments have responsibility to recruit for positions under their jurisdiction. With limited assistance from the WHPO, they tend to rely primarily on the contacts of their line officials as the major source of candidates. This process has had some success, but has also resulted in problems such as the following:

- It reinforces orientation and loyalty to the Departments rather than to the President.
- A number of key positions have remained unfilled for a considerable length of time.
- Too many of the appointments were only of mediocre substantive quality.

Therefore, the Departmental recruiting effort should be supplemented. However, the existing WHPO capability is not sufficient to fill the need. Because recruiting has been a Departmental responsibility, the WHPO has not established an executive search capability. The White House talent bank -- the Executive Biographic Index (EBI) -- does not contain enough highly qualified candidates to fill key non-career vacancies. The EBI currently contains approximately 2,700 resumes of possible candidates. However, a preliminary analysis of the EBI shows that, although it does contain some good candidates for middle and lower level positions, most of the candidates are not qualified to fill the top positions (i. e., Presidential appointee and other Executive level). The EBI is covered in more depth in a following section entitled "Handling of Unsolicited Applications and Patronage."

Although numerous unsolicited resumes are received each month by the WHPO, only about 200 unsolicited candidates per year are considered to have exceptional ability (for positions at all levels). This figure contrasts poorly with the need for some 750-800 new appointees annually for non-career positions. While in some cases the WHPO staff has been helpful in identifying additional candidates, the volume is too great to handle in this informal manner.

Thus, there is a large gap between the need for candidates and those available through existing White House sources. This gap can be expected to increase over the next few months because, as the Nixon Administration nears the two-year mark, those appointees who made only a two-year commitment are likely to return to private life. Also, unfortunately, identifying and attracting highly qualified people is likely to be more difficult over the next two years than it has over the past two years. The surge of interest in joining a new Administration has diminished. The exceptional candidates who were interested in joining the Administration or known to Administration officials have most likely already been identified and placed.

Nevertheless, the President must have assurance that his system for identifying and placing individuals in key positions in the Administration is adequate for the task ahead.

ESTABLISHING A RECRUITING CAPABILITY

We feel that a professional (i. e., full-time) executive search capability should be established and that such an approach would have four distinct advantages over the present system:

1. Since filling vacancies would be the full-time responsibility of the executive searchers, this key activity would receive the priority attention it deserves rather than being shunted aside by other problems as too frequently happens when recruiting is performed by line officials. As a practical matter, there now exists a special urgency in recruiting which only a special effort could fulfill. Some candidates may be reluctant to accept an appointment with less than 18 months remaining in the President's current term of office. It is therefore important to ensure that all current vacancies are filled and candidates recruited for other contemplated top level personnel changes within six months.
2. An executive search operation would give the Administration an improved outreach capability and allow the identification of highly qualified candidates from a much wider range of sources than at present.

3. With executive searchers systematically following up on referrals by present Administration officials, this important source of candidates would be much more effectively tapped.

4. The amount of time line officials now spend in identifying candidates, performing background checks, conducting initial interviews, etc., would be freed up by an executive search operation. Line officials would only be making the final selection decisions and would not have to get involved in the tedious and time consuming recruiting process.

Given the need for an executive search capability, there are two interrelated issues to be addressed:

- whether it should be located in the White House, in the Departments, or some combination of both;
- how much capability is needed.

As argued previously, if Presidential appointees are to be oriented to the Administration as a whole rather than solely to the Department Head, the White House must have more than merely a veto over a nominee. A search conducted by the White House demonstrates to the candidate the President's interest in these top positions and will enhance his future responsiveness to the President and the White House. More importantly, establishing an executive search capability would enable the White House to exercise considerably more influence than is presently possible over the substantive and political qualifications of candidates. If Departmental sources do not produce a qualified candidate, the White House can find one through its own sources.

In addition, there are three other advantages to establishing an executive search capability at the White House. First, it could assist in seeking candidates for Regulatory Commissions and Agency Head positions. Secondly, a wider scope from the White House viewpoint would provide greater opportunities to match skills with job requirements for top-level people. Last, an executive search capability at the White House would make it easier to achieve a desired mix of appointees within the Administration, e.g., by geographic region, type of training and experience, educational background, sex, ethnic characteristics, etc.

At least one hurdle must be overcome if the White House is to establish an executive search capability. There may be reluctance on the part of

Department Heads to accept assistance from the White House in recruiting candidates for positions under their jurisdiction. Many of them feel they are responsible for hiring their own people and that any significant role played by the White House would dilute their authority. To overcome this feeling it would be necessary for the President to stress his legitimate concern for and strong interest in Presidential appointments. In addition, it should be possible to convince Department Heads that White House assistance in recruiting is of value to them because of the time of their line officials that would be freed for other activities. Indeed, some Department Heads have already asked for such assistance from the White House. Finally, it should be stressed that, even though the White House would provide assistance in recruiting, the Department Head would still have the primary role in final selection from among the candidates identified by the White House.

We believe the advantages greatly outweigh the drawbacks. Consequently, we recommend that an executive search capability be established at the White House.

The next issue is how much capability should be established. The following table shows three staffing options, assuming different numbers of positions for which the White House would assume responsibility:

<u>Recruiting for:*</u>	<u>Number of Positions</u>	<u>Est. Annual Vacancies</u>	<u>Recruiting Prof.</u>	<u>Recruiting Clerical</u>
1. PAS, PA, other Executive Level and Supergrade	1212	485	8	9
2. PAS, PA, and other Executive Level	643	190	3	3
3. PAS & PA only	557	170	3	3

These estimates of recruiting resources are considerably less than would be required under normal circumstances where recruiters would be seeking candidates for each vacancy. In many cases the Departments suggest qualified candidates whom we would appoint without further searching. Also, we expect a number of internal promotions to the higher level positions, negating the need to recruit in these cases. Finally, we assume that we would delegate the recruiting responsibilities for selected lower priority

*In each option, Ambassadors, Judges, U.S. Marshalls and U.S. Attorneys are excluded.

positions back to the Departments and Agencies as necessary.

The first option -- recruiting for all non-career positions down through supergrades -- would give the White House the greatest degree of control but would require considerable resources. We do not think it is desirable to devote this number of White House staff positions solely to recruiting. Neither do we think it is necessary for the White House to recruit down to the supergrade level in order to maintain a reasonable degree of control over appointments to these positions. Final candidates for supergrade positions, recruited by the Departments, would be reviewed by the WHPO before selection and interviewed if there is any question. Although the Department Heads would still have the authority for final selection recommendation, the WHPO would have a chance to interview and clear the candidate before the selection is finalized.

The second and third options are very similar, differing only in whether or not the White House recruits for the relatively few executive level positions which are not Presidential appointees. Because some of these non-Presidential executive level positions are even more important than some Presidential appointee positions, and because there are so few of them, we believe that the White House recruit for these other executive level positions as well as all Presidential appointee positions (Option 2).

Thus, we recommend that the WHPO recruit only for positions at the Presidential appointee and executive level -- approximately 650 positions -- and that a staff of three professionals and three secretaries be devoted to this function. Recruiting for selected positions which are not key can be delegated to the Departments at the discretion of the WHPO as necessary.

In addition, we recommend that the WHPO work with the Departments to ensure that each establish a professional executive recruiting capability to recruit for vacancies among (a) non-career supergrade positions, (b) higher level non-career positions the White House may wish to delegate, and (c) key career positions.

To consolidate the executive search function, we also recommend that the WHPO assume primary responsibility for identifying candidates for Regulatory Commissions and non-career Ambassadors and for making recommendations for final selection to the President. To avoid

confusion both within and outside of the White House, one office should perform the recruiting and screening for all positions for which the White House assumes responsibility. To identify candidates, the WHPO would naturally draw heavily from the White House staff and, in the case of non-career Ambassadors, the State Department.

The process for selecting appointees to Regulatory Commissions would be essentially the same as that described below for Presidential appointee positions except there would normally be no involvement of people outside the White House in the selection process. Recruiting and selecting judges, U.S. Attorneys, and U.S. Marshalls should continue to be the responsibility of the Justice Department. Similarly, the State Department should continue to be responsible for selecting career Ambassadors.

SELECTION PROCESS

The recommended process for identifying and selecting candidates for Presidential appointee and other Executive level positions is described below.

When a vacancy in a Presidential appointee position is anticipated, the Department would notify the WHPO as far in advance as possible and outline in detail the requirements for the position. In addition, the Department would submit any candidates it wishes to have considered.

The WHPO would then solicit candidates and seek guidance as appropriate from White House substantive and political offices* on the type of individuals who should be considered for the position. Depending on the requirements for the position and the type of individuals to be considered, the WHPO would seek candidates from other sources as needed, e.g., a talent bank to be developed specializing in candidates with potential top level position and a network of outside sources.

The WHPO would, through reviews of qualifications and initial interviews, narrow the field of potential candidates to 3-5 prime candidates who are substantively qualified for the position. The WHPO would then perform preliminary, informal political and security (name) checks on these prime candidates. Assuming the prime candidates pass the preliminary political

* At this point we do not know how the White House political liaison activities will be organized. Nevertheless, we believe that our recommendations would be valid regardless of whether this function stays entirely within the White House or parts of it are assigned by the Republican National Committee.

and security checks, their qualifications would be discussed with the head of the Departments and interviews arranged.

Departmental officials would interview these 3-5 prime candidates, and the Department Head would make the selection of his nominee from this group of candidates. At this stage, it is important to ensure that all appropriate viewpoints, especially within the White House, are considered in a systematic manner before a final selection is made. Thus, we recommend that appropriate substantive, political, and personnel staffs within the White House review the qualifications of all final candidates for Presidential appointee and Executive level positions, interview if there is some question, and approve the choice before final selection. In addition, we recommend that the qualifications of all final candidates for non-career supergrade positions be reviewed (and interviewed if there is some question) by the WHPO before final selection.

If there is unanimous concurrence on the final candidate, his name would be entered into the formal political and security clearance process. If he clears, a recommendation would be sent to the President. If there is disagreement on whether the final candidate should be appointed, a decision paper would be prepared by the WHPO presenting the different points of view to the President for final decision.

The President himself may want to interview candidates for some of the most important positions before final selection. Such positions might include Cabinet officers, Under Secretaries, Agency Heads, and Chairmen of Regulatory Commissions.

In summary, under our recommendations

- for Presidential appointees and other Executive level positions, the WHPO would identify qualified candidates. The Department Head would interview the candidates identified by the WHPO and select the top candidate whose qualifications would then be reviewed by White House staff. If there is general agreement on the candidate, the WHPO would initiate clearance. If there is a disagreement, the issue will be submitted to the President for final decision,
- for supergrade positions, the Departments would identify candidates whose qualifications would be reviewed by the WHPO before a final selection decision is made,
- for GS-15 (and below) positions, the Departments would eventually assume full responsibility for recruitment and selection.

Once the final selection is made, the candidate enters clearance which is discussed in the following section.

Clearance

This section covers the process for performing a final political and security check on full-time candidates prior to nomination to the Senate or appointment. First, background material will be covered, then recommendations presented.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The clearance process has two phases. The first is the gathering of political and security oriented information on the candidate. On the political side, contacts are made with Congress (home State GOP Congressmen and appropriate Congressional Committees for some positions) and with the GOP field organization. As might be expected, the clearance increases in comprehensiveness as the importance of the position increases. The second phase is evaluating the information and making the clearance decision.

Approximately 40% of the full-time clearances, about 30 per month, are performed on Presidential and Executive level candidates. Clearances for supergrade and Schedule C positions average about 25 per month for each category. It is estimated that about 5% of the clearances submitted for full-time positions are rejected, primarily in the supergrade and Schedule C categories.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary questions in clearance are who should make the clearance contacts for the three categories of positions and who should make the clearance decision? The answers to these questions should reflect the differences in categories of positions, especially their importance to the President, and the amount of staff required to perform it. Thus, the recommendations are tailored to the three main categories of non-career positions:

- (1) Presidential and Executive level positions
- (2) Supergrades
- (3) Schedule C (GS-15 and below)

Presidential and Executive Level Positions

Currently, for the group of policy-making and operating Presidential appointments, both the information gathering and the clearance decision

are performed by the WHPO. In the case of Ambassadors, U. S. Attorneys, and U. S. Marshalls, the employing Department (State or Justice) has the primary responsibility for clearing with the appropriate substantive and appropriations Congressional Committees and overseeing the security checks.

As discussed previously, Presidential and Executive level positions are closely associated with and vitally important to the President's program and political welfare. Consequently, the clearance of appointments to these positions should continue to be primarily the responsibility of the White House. The clearance contacts should be made by those members of the White House staff who are in the best position to sell the candidate and to evaluate the information received. Consequently, we recommend that both the clearance contacts and decision on Presidential and Executive level positions remain at the White House. State political contacts would be made by the Political Liaison Office. The Organizational Liaison Office (Chuck Colson) would determine and make what clearances were appropriate with interest groups. Since there are only about 30 candidates per month being cleared for these top level positions, the delegation of some contact responsibility to these liaison offices would require a minimal amount of staff time. However, rather than transferring Congressional clearance contacts to Congressional Relations, the WHPO would retain the responsibility, (except for Ambassadors and Judges, U.S. Marshalls, and U. S. Attorneys which would continue to be performed by State and Justice.) The WHPO should perform the Congressional contacts since soliciting clearances could hinder Congressional Relations' ability to perform its legislative responsibilities. The Congressional Relations Office would, of course, be contacted on any problems arising from Congressional clearances.

While the involvement of the White House liaison offices may result in some additional time for clearance contacts, the overall clearance process should not be delayed, since the full-field security check for all Presidential appointees takes 3-4 weeks.

The FBI field security checks for Presidential appointments would continue to be coordinated by the WHPO. Justice and State would continue to oversee the security checks for Judges, etc., and Ambassadors.

Clearance problems would be discussed at the weekly political coordination meetings. If it is decided to object to a candidate on political grounds, the problem would be reviewed with the appropriate White House substantive office and the affected Department. If a conflict continued to exist, the WHPO would prepare a decision paper for the President.

Supergrades

There are roughly 600 non-career supergrade positions for which about 25 clearances per month are processed. While supergrades have important policy-making and operational responsibilities, they are less closely identified with and less critical to the President than the higher level positions discussed above. Appointments to these positions are usually made by the Department.

Currently, the Departments make all Congressional clearance contacts for these positions before the submission to the WHPO. The WHPO then makes the State clearance contacts. In addition, the WHPO rechecks any questionable information with Congressional contacts. Some Departments now make informal State checks. As a consequence, the Department could easily make the formal State contact before submission to the WHPO. This would involve little, if any, extra effort for the Departments and would allow the WHPO to simply review all the contact information, make spot checks if necessary, and then make the clearance decision. If additional State contacts are desired which are considered too sensitive to inform the Departments about, they are retained by the WHPO and contacted during the final review.

Consequently, for supergrades, we recommend that the Departments be delegated the responsibility for making all clearance checks, security and political, but that the WHPO should retain the final clearance authority. In this way, reasonable control over supergrade appointments can be retained with a minimal investment of White House staff time.

By having the Departments make all contacts before submittal to the WHPO, the in-process time at the White House should be shortened in those cases (perhaps 80-90%) where all inputs are positive. This would largely eliminate the current Departmental criticism that the WHPO clearance takes too long.

The failure of the Departments to adhere to WHPO procedures for clearance contacts or the instance of a Department misrepresenting information would result in stern measures, e. g. , firing of candidate misrepresented, suspension of delegations to the Department, or other appropriate action.

In cases where there was no derogatory information, clearance would be granted immediately upon receipt of the documentation. Any questionable cases would be brought to the attention of the White House

political liaison staffs at the weekly review meeting. It is expected that most of these cases would be resolved among the WHPO, White House staffs, and Departments. If, as recommended, supergrade candidates are reviewed by a WHPO liaison officer prior to selection, disputes at the clearance stage should be minimal.

Schedule C (GS-15 and below)

There are about 1,340 authorized Schedule C positions. Currently, about 423 of these authorized positions are not being utilized. About 25 clearances per month are now being handled for these positions.

Except for a few of the GS-15 positions, these positions generally are not important policy-making or operational positions. They typically are the personal staff of higher level non-career officials, e.g., special assistants, confidential assistants, secretaries, etc. Usually the appointees have been personally associated with the principal in past positions.

While the appointments to these positions should not be a source of embarrassment to the Administration, little benefit is derived from closely controlling their clearances through the WHPO.

Consequently, we recommend that the Departments should be delegated the responsibility for performing all Schedule C clearance contacts; the WHPO should initially retain the decision authority and subsequently delegate it to those Departments whose capability and performance warrant the increased responsibility.

This strategy will enable the White House to retain control over these appointments until such time as the Departments can be depended upon to assiduously avoid appointments which could prove embarrassing to the President. Additionally, holding out this possibility to the Departments should help to obtain their cooperation on other non-career personnel matters.

As with the supergrades the Departments now make the Congressional contacts and the WHPO makes the State contacts. Again, the delegation of responsibility for State contacts to the Departments would not create a significant additional effort, since some contacts are already being done informally. Spot checks would be made by the WHPO on clearance contacts done by the Departments to maintain quality control. The misrepresentation of information or failure to adhere to WHPO clearance procedures would lead to dismissals, suspension of all clearances, or other appropriate action.

In summary, we think the recommended changes will yield significant benefits in terms of better coordinated clearance decisions on Presidential and Executive level candidates, freeing up scarce WHPO staff time and reducing a source of tension between the Departments and the WHPO. Nevertheless, the recommendations call for only a modest change to the current procedures -- delegation of responsibility for making State clearance contacts from the WHPO to the Political Liaison Office or the Departments. For all categories of positions, control over the final decision remains in the WHPO.

* * *

Once the appointment is made, the steps should be taken to motivate the appointee to perform effectively and strengthen his loyalty and responsiveness to the President. The following section outlines recommendations in this general area.

Personnel Administration

Once an individual has been appointed to a non-career position, a system for non-career personnel administration should orient him to the Government and to his new job, motivate him to perform well, continue to develop and train him, evaluate his performance, promote him to greater responsibility if he performs well, and remove him if he performs poorly.

Reflecting the current strategy of exercising control primarily through clearance, very little is done along these lines. No doubt we should be doing more to insure we are getting the most out of our top political management. The following sections set forth recommendations in each of the areas of orientation, development and training, evaluation, and recognition and rewards.

ORIENTATION

Our orientation program for non-career employees should accomplish two fundamental purposes. First, it should help a new appointee reduce his start-up time and become effective more quickly. A minimum start-up time is particularly important because of the relatively short tenure of most non-career employees and the monumental complexities and problems many of them face. Second, our orientation program should help strengthen the loyalty of a non-career appointee to the President rather than to the particular Department in which he will be working. He should be made to feel from the beginning that he is a part of a larger effort than he will see within his Department.

We recommend that three primary methods of orienting new appointees be utilized. First, to strengthen a new employee's relationship with the White House he should have personal interviews with appropriate White House staff members. Some candidates for Presidential appointee and other Executive level positions would be interviewed by interested White House staff members before they are appointed. Others should have a chance to meet appropriate White House staff members shortly after their appointments. These sessions would not only give White House staff members a chance to meet and get to know new appointees, they also give the White House staff a chance to tell the new appointee something about (a) how the White House operates, (b) what he is likely to face in his new position, (c) major policy directions he should be aware of, and (d) what is expected of him substantively and politically. The White House Personnel Operation (WHPO) would arrange these interviews with other White House staff members as appropriate.

Second, we recommend that the President meet with each new Presidential appointee in small groups shortly after appointment. There are roughly 200 such appointments each year (excluding Ambassadors, U.S. Attorneys, Judges, and U.S. Marshalls), which would mean about four each week on the average. The President could set aside ten minutes every other week during the "open hour" to meet with (and have his picture taken individually with) these new appointees in groups of six or so. We believe this would help show that the President is personally interested in each appointment and would be an extremely effective initial motivating factor.

Third, we recommend that briefing sessions at the White House be conducted monthly to orient new non-career appointees at the supergrade level and above. Each session would be conducted by representatives from the White House staff, the Office of Management and Budget, the Domestic Council staff, the National Security Council staff, and the Civil Service Commission, and the Republican National Committee. About 40 new appointees would be in attendance each month. The purpose of these sessions would be to brief the new appointees on:

- the organization of the Executive Branch and the major White House and Executive Office staffs;
- key aspects of the Civil Service system;
- major domestic and foreign policies of the Administration such as, for example,
 - . the economic game plan,
 - . the Nixon Doctrine in foreign policy;
- dealing with the press, the public, and the Congress;
- political responsibilities of non-career appointees.

The Regional Directors in the domestic Departments should be included in these sessions even though most of them are technically career employees. Organizing and making necessary arrangements for all of these sessions would be the responsibility of the WHPO. Although the sessions would probably consume one day a month, we feel they would be extremely valuable to those with no previous experience in the Federal Government

EVALUATION

There are two primary purposes to be served by a system for evaluating the performance of non-career employees. First, it should identify outstanding performers who should be considered for promotion to more responsible positions. Second, it should identify inadequate performers who should either be removed or transferred to positions more in line with their capabilities. Of course, at the same time, it should help motivate all non-career officials to strive for top performance.

At present there are few, if any, systematic processes in use at any level to evaluate the performance of non-career employees. Because of the need to weed out the poor performers and the desirability of identifying outstanding performers already in the Administration to fill anticipated vacancies among higher level positions, our capability to evaluate the performance of key officials should be upgraded significantly.

There are at least four unique difficulties, however, in trying to establish such a performance evaluation system for non-career officials:

1. Any information gathered on the performance of key non-career appointees will be extremely sensitive and will have to be treated accordingly. Much of this kind of information cannot be written down.
2. Quantitative performance measures are almost non-existent. The criteria for evaluation will tend to be very subjective and fall into three basic categories:
 - political loyalty to the Administration,
 - substantive performance,
 - ability to work effectively with the White House staff and other appointees.
3. Evaluation of performance will generally have to be based on relatively short histories because of the rapid turnover among non-career employees.
4. The always troublesome problem of obtaining negative information is made more difficult in this political environment where loyalty among close associates is fundamental to success.

Thus, we feel that the most practical approach to evaluation is to limit our attention to individuals who stand out at either end of the performance spectrum and give considerably less attention to the majority of satisfactory, but not particularly noteworthy performers. The major issue, therefore, is how to go about, on a regular basis, initially gathering enough preliminary information to sort out possible outstanding and very bad performers, and then gathering enough additional information on those few people to substantiate or refute initial impressions.

Gathering Preliminary Information

There are a number of potential sources of information on performance:

- selected officials within the Department
- the White House staff, the OMB, the Domestic Council staff, and the National Security Council staff;
- Congressional contacts; and
- outside constituent groups such as industry associations, labor unions, lobbyists, etc.

Of course, information may be solicited from any of these sources either in writing or orally.

We recommend that the sources of initial, rough information to identify the potentially highest and lowest performers be limited to personal interviews by the WHPO with selected officials in the Departments, the White House staff, the OMB, and the staffs of the Domestic Council and the National Security Council. These interviews would take the form of informal, face-to-face discussions with officials who are in the best positions to observe and judge the performance of large numbers of individuals. The discussions would consist of going over a list of names and asking an official to classify each person whom he knows on the list in one of three categories: outstanding, average, or poor performer. We feel that these informal discussions would provide a much greater likelihood of gathering negative as well as positive information than written evaluations from Departmental and other officials. Gathering such sensitive information orally also involves considerably less risk than asking for written evaluations.

Because the White House would be seeking candidates for promotion to Executive levels, the WHPO should assume primary responsibility for

gathering and analyzing information on the performance of individuals in non-career positions down through the supergrade level. The Departments would be expected to evaluate the performance of individuals below supergrade level.

Gathering Additional Information on Selected Individuals

Once this initial sort has been performed, more in-depth information will have to be gathered and analyzed by the WHPO concerning the possible highest and lowest performers. We recommend here also that the primary method for gathering information should be personal interviews with key officials in the Departments and in the White House. However, for those identified as possible outstanding performers, written evaluations by top officials should be utilized in order to minimize the WHPO staff time involved. Also, other information sources, such as Congressional sources and outside constituent groups, might be useful on a very selective basis at this stage -- especially in gathering more information about potentially poor performers.

When the WHPO reaches a conclusion that an individual is indeed an outstanding performer and should be considered for higher level responsibilities within the Administration, his file should be given to the White House executive search staff as a potentially good candidate for the jobs they are attempting to fill.

The following is a general procedure for reaching a final decision on whether to remove (or transfer) an individual whose performance the WHPO feels is unacceptable. As a first step, the head of the White House Personnel Operation would discuss the recommendation with the relevant Department Head. During this discussion, the Department Head may bring up information which was not previously considered and which overturns the recommendation. Then, if there is agreement to remove the individual, a plan would be jointly worked out to take some appropriate action, e.g., reassignment, transfer, resignation, etc. Finally, if there is disagreement, the issue will be submitted to the President, giving the Secretary or Agency Head an opportunity to make his opinion known.

DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING

There are several important purposes a program for developing and training non-career employees should accomplish. First, it should help broaden both the political and functional perspectives of non-career officials so that they can better serve the President and not just a single Department. Second, such a program should help us retain our people longer -- by providing opportunities for them to advance personally and professionally without having to leave the Administration. Third, a program for

development and training aimed specifically at our younger non-career employees, should provide the additional benefit of building a cadre of trained Republicans who will be well qualified to exercise positions of leadership in the future.

We recommend that the following four methods be utilized to develop and train non-career personnel. First, we feel that a planned progression of jobs with increasing responsibility is very important in the development of outstanding young non-career employees. The files of the outstanding young employees who have been identified in the supergrade and Executive levels should be kept in a White House talent pool so that they may be considered for promotion to greater responsibility as positions open up. These files should be reviewed periodically to insure that sufficient opportunities for advancement are being afforded this special group. The sub-section above on "Evaluation" sets forth how we might go about identifying such people.

Second, the transfer of non-career people among the White House and the Departments should be strongly encouraged. It should be made a White House policy that no one will be hired from outside to fill a staff job unless all possibilities of filling the job with someone from a Department have first been exhausted. Such a policy would not only have the benefit of giving people who are now working in the Departments a broader perspective and wider experience, it would also keep the White House staff more informed of the realities of the problems faced by the Departments and Agencies. In addition, outstanding White House staff members should be considered for positions in the Departments as they become open. They should be included in the White House talent pool just as other outstanding Administration performers are. Finally, Department Heads should be encouraged to allow their non-career people to accept positions in other Departments and to seek candidates from other Departments to fill their own vacancies. The WHPO should continually be on the alert for opportunities for non-career employees to transfer among Departments and Agencies.

Third, the periodic briefings for key Administration officials which were begun last year at the State Department should be reinstated. Such briefings by top officials, explaining important policies of the Administration in depth, could prove extremely useful to these people who are called upon every day to represent the Administration on a variety of issues outside their fields of expertise. These sessions would also help foster a feeling of a single Administration rather than a multitude of Departments acting almost totally independently. The WHPO should take the lead in planning and organizing these sessions.

Fourth, a series of training sessions, led by White House and Executive Office staffs, should be instituted in various functional areas where there tend to be strong similarities in the job to be done across all Departments -- such as personnel, Congressional Relations and Public Affairs. Such sessions would help officials in each of these areas better perform their functions as well as develop a spirit of commanderie which transcends Departmental lines. These sessions would also aid the White House in providing leadership and guidance outside the normal chain of command where needed in these speciality areas.

RECOGNITION AND REWARDS

There are two major benefits to be gained from recognizing and rewarding superior performance among non-career employees. First, recognition and reward for a job well done is an important tool in motivating high performance. Since there are very few motivational tools available in the Federal Government, we must make the best possible use of those few tools we do have. The second major benefit to be gained from recognizing and rewarding outstanding performance from the White House is promoting a closer relationship of non-career employees with the President and the Administration as a whole rather than with a particular Department.

There are a number of methods which the President can use to recognize and reward outstanding performance on the part of both non-career and career employees. We believe the greater use of methods such as (a) individual or group meetings with the President for those who have done something particularly noteworthy, (b) letters of congratulation and appreciation from the President for a job well done, or (c) invitations to prestigious social functions at the White House, could greatly enhance the feeling of teamwork within the Administration and closeness to the President. Such things would help break down parochial feelings within the Departments and greatly enhance the President's influence over the key officials throughout the government.

The WHPO should be given the responsibility for identifying people deserving of such rewards and for seeing that appropriate rewards are given in a timely fashion. The primary method of identifying people for such rewards would be the performance evaluation process described in the "Evaluation" subsection above. In addition, the President should encourage all Administration officials to be continually on the alert for someone who has done a particularly outstanding job and feed such information to the WHPO.

Patronage and Unsolicited Applications

This section covers the process for screening, evaluating, and taking appropriate action on all applications received by the WHPO through incoming correspondence and other sources. Many of these applications are actually patronage requests. The principal tasks involved in handling these applications are (1) making political evaluations, and (2) ensuring that appropriate action is taken. The handling of patronage requests and other applications for part-time positions is generally the same as for full-time positions, but part-time positions will be addressed in a subsequent section of the report. This section deals only with full-time positions. A brief background on current operations is provided below and is followed by recommendations for improvement.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Each month the WHPO receives about 500-600 unsolicited applications. These applications must be evaluated for their political worth to the Administration and processed in a manner consistent with the evaluation. A breakdown of this unsolicited correspondence by source and recipient has been estimated to be as follows:

<u>Source</u>		<u>Recipient</u>	
Congressional	40%	President	42%
Self-Applicant	35%	Harry Flemming	36%
GOP	15%	Harry Flemming's Staff	10%
Interest Group	5%	White House Congressional Liaison Office	5%
White House Staff	5%	White House Political Relations Office	3%
		Other White House Staff	4%

This correspondence is currently rated by the WHPO with Mrs. Bruce Bardwell currently performing about 90% of the ratings. The ratings designate (a) the political and/or substantive worth, and (b) type of position sought (full-time, part-time, secretarial) and are used to determine appropriate routing. About 65% of all correspondence received by the WHPO is now forwarded to the Departments based upon one of four different ratings.

A "must" placement to a full-time position is determined by Harry Flemming based upon political information from his staff and other appropriate White House sources. An average of 10 "musts" are designated each month of which about four are high priority. In addition, about 20 "special attention" applications are designated each month by the WHPO staff. All "must" and "special attention" referrals are monitored by a member of the WHPO staff. Routine candidates referred to the Departments are followed up only if a special inquiry is received.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Coding System for Unsolicited Applications. The coding of applications should clearly distinguish between political and substantive worth. All handling the applications should be aware of the coding and should understand what action is required. The current codes do not always differentiate between political and substantive worth. In addition, the Departments are only notified of the WHPO evaluation and required action for the "musts" and "special attentions," which represent less than 10% of all correspondence forwarded to the Departments.

Consequently, we recommend that the current coding system should be modified to assign both a political and a substantive rating to each candidate which would clearly establish priority and action required for each applicant. The recommended coding system for political evaluation is as follows:

1. "Must" - must be corresponded to, interviewed, and offered position.
2. "High Priority" - must be corresponded to, interviewed, and offered opportunity to compete for position. Approximately 50 percent of these should be placed.

3. "Courtesy Political Referral" - must be corresponded to, and in some cases, offered an opportunity to interview. If equal in other respects, should be offered the position over other candidates.
4. "Non-political" - would be given routine processing through Government channels.
5. "Political Problem" - signal to WHPO to hold all action pending resolution of dispute or uncertainty regarding candidate.
6. "Politically Undesirable" - No action.

In addition to the political rating, a separate rating would convey an evaluation of the candidate's substantive worth. This rating, which would be designated by the recruiting section of the WHPO after the political rating has been determined, would indicate whether the applicant is qualified for an Executive level position.

Thus, there would only be two substantive ratings:

- A. Possible candidate for high-level position, Presidential or non-Presidential Executive level
- B. All others

Specific criteria for determining Executive level qualifications will be developed by the recruiting section of the WHPO.

The criteria for both political and substantive ratings would be distributed to the Departments. The WHPO political and substantive ratings would be recorded on every application forwarded to a Department.

In cases where the applicant is seeking a specific job, the coding will have to be augmented by a more detailed evaluation of the individual's substantive qualifications for the job in question and the political importance of the candidate and/or the sponsor. These cases would be addressed at the weekly political evaluation meeting which would include representatives from the White House liaison staffs. White House substantive staff members and Departmental representatives might also be included, depending upon the specific position involved.

Evaluation of Applicants. Since almost all of the unsolicited applications have political/Congressional backing or involvement, the evaluation of applications should draw upon the best available sources of political judgement. Currently, the WHPO makes both the political and substantive evaluation of all unsolicited applicants. "Musts" and "special attentions" are designated by Harry Flemming and his staff after discussion with a number of political sources including various White House staffs. But, the capability of the WHPO to allocate scarce patronage/placements appropriately has depended to a large extent upon Harry Flemming's political judgement and broad range of personal contacts.

In order to obtain the best possible political evaluation of unsolicited applicants, we recommend that the White House liaison offices should evaluate all patronage requests and assist the WHPO in developing placement priorities. This involvement would be obtained by the initial routing of correspondence as follows:

<u>Source</u>	<u>Routing for Initial Political Review and Recommendation</u>
Congressional	Congressional Liaison Office and Political Liaison Office or Republican National Committee
Self-Applicant	WHPO screens and forwards to a White House liaison office as appropriate
GOP	Political Liaison Office (or Republican National Committee)
Interest Groups	Organizational Liaison Office
White House Staff	WHPO screens and forwards to a White House Liaison Office as appropriate

All applicants rated "must" by one office would be circulated to the other offices for review. Based upon a review of all inputs, the WHPO would make a final determination of priorities. Any disagreements or problems would be addressed at the weekly political evaluation meeting held by the chief of the WHPO with representatives from the White House liaison staffs.

The benefits obtained from the participation of the liaison offices in the evaluation process would be:

- (a) better determination of priorities, since these offices presumably are more informed of the President's legislative and political needs and should be more capable of evaluating patronage benefits,
- (b) increased knowledge on part of liaison offices of constituent patronage placement desires,
- (c) potential for liaison offices to shape patronage goals to support President's legislative program and political objectives,
- (d) opportunity to detect sharp disagreement over priority of candidate by divergent sources at an early stage.

The workload associated with evaluation of these applicants by the White House liaison offices would be minimal, less than an hour a day in all cases.

After receiving a political rating, all applicants would be reviewed by the recruiting section of the WHPO. The White House recruiter section would retain "A" candidates (probably only about 10-15 per month from unsolicited applicants) in their own talent bank. The "B" candidates would be sent to the Departments and handled according to the political rating and the Department's substantive evaluation.

The Executive Biographic Index (EBI) would not be maintained. It would be the responsibility of each Department to maintain a talent bank of its own for supergrade and GS-15/below positions. The primary benefit of the EBI was during the transition period. The relatively few openings now available and the increasing obsolescence of much of the information in the EBI are combining to diminish its utility. In addition, the coding procedures for determining entry into the EBI data base have been somewhat erratic, and some important biographic information (e.g., most recent position and employer) is not systematically coded. The elimination of the EBI should save some WHPO staff time and Office of Emergency Planning data processing support valued at about \$40,000 per year.

Accountability and Follow-Through. Currently, information on the status and disposition of "must" and "special attention" referrals is received by the WHPO but the disposition of other referrals is generally not reported. As a consequence, the White House does not now know the full extent of the patronage placements and what overall success has been achieved for individual Congressmen or States. In addition, the President does not know which of the Departments are strongly supporting patronage efforts or which are not "carrying their share." Consequently, we recommend that patronage quotas be set for each Department and that information on patronage placements be gathered by the WHPO to monitor Departmental performance and to determine success in meeting overall patronage objectives.

The Departments would report the status of all political ratings of 1 and 2 to the WHPO on a bi-weekly basis and notify the WHPO immediately upon appointment of a candidate with a political rating of 1 or 2. For these placements, the WHPO would notify the appropriate White House liaison office. A monthly report, submitted by each Department would contain information on (a) disposition of all candidates with political rating of 1, 2, and 3, and (b) the placements made by sponsor and State. This monthly report would be the primary means of measuring the Department's performance against its patronage quotas. This report would also be useful to the White House liaison offices in determining if the distribution of patronage placements is consistent with the President's political and legislative objectives.

In summary, the changes recommended to the current system consist of (a) a modified coding system, (b) political evaluations performed by the White House liaison staffs and substantive evaluations performed by the recruiting section of the WHPO, and (c) more complete follow-up on placements. These changes are basically designed to strengthen the ability of the WHPO to control personnel decisions, to draw more extensively on the available sources of information, and to place increased responsibility for action to the Departments.

Management of Part-Time Positions

The management of part-time positions, primarily on advisory Boards and Commissions, differs from that for full-time non-career positions in several important ways: (a) minimal effort is required for the search and attraction of qualified candidates, (b) excellent opportunities exist for rewarding past Presidential supporters or obligating potential ones, (c) significant prestige can accrue to appointees without commitment of a full-time position, and (d) frequently there is less requirement for specific substantive qualifications.

However, the major functional components of the part-time personnel system are basically the same as for the full-time system - selection, clearance, and processing.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The part-time positions are divided into two major groups, (1) Presidential Boards and Commissions and (2) Departmental Boards and Commissions. There are over 2,200 Presidential appointee positions and probably more than 10,000 Departmental positions. The Presidential Boards are the more prestigious, often have high visibility on important issues, and are sometimes required to perform a specific substantive task. The Departmental Boards are generally less prestigious, focus upon specific technical areas within a Department, and are usually of an advisory nature.

The Presidential Boards and Commissions fall into two main categories. The first category includes approximately 10 - 15% of the Presidential Boards and Commissions which necessitate the direct involvement of White House staff personnel. These Boards have special characteristics such as: (a) direct White House staff or Presidential interest in their function (e.g., Violence, Campus Unrest), (b) a broad interdepartmental perspective to function (e.g., Ash Council), and (c) not logically related to any particular Department (e.g., Little Hoover Commission).

The second category, approximately 85 - 90%, would consist of Presidential Boards and Commissions which are primarily related to the function of one or two Departments.

The Departmental Boards and Commissions also fall into two categories: those which are cleared through the WHPO and those which are not. For each Department, the determination of which appointments are submitted to the WHPO for clearance is negotiated between the Department and the WHPO. The general criterion has been that Secretarial-appointed Boards are submitted to the WHPO and sub-Secretarial appointments are not.

The WHPO attempts to place at least one woman, one ethnic, and one laborite on each Presidential Board. In addition, a broad regional distribution is sought. It is believed that reasonable success has been obtained, but statistics have not been compiled. The Departments do not have specific appointment goals for regional balance, labor, etc., but the WHPO clearance of Secretarial Boards attempts to take these considerations into account.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our recommendations address the amount of control required by the White House for these four categories of positions and the best approach to achieving such control. For each category there are generally three alternative approaches to the distribution of responsibility and control: (1) have White House staff do all work and make decisions, (2) have Departments do work and have White House staff make final decisions, and (3) have Departments do all work and make decisions.

Presidential Boards and Commissions with White House Focus

Appointments to these Presidential Boards average about 15 - 20 per month. Currently, the WHPO is responsible for the selection of candidates and draws upon (a) unsolicited patronage applicants, (b) inputs requested from White House staffs, and (c) special lists of patronage candidates, e. g., financial contributors, political supporters. The

unsolicited applicants for part-time positions would have gone through the same political evaluation process (coding and routing) as applicants for full-time positions. Based upon guidance from the White House political and organizational liaison offices, placement goals for special groups (women, labor, etc.) should be continued. However, the final decision on selection should clearly reflect any special White House interest and achieve the maximum patronage placement benefit for the President.

After selection, the candidates must be politically cleared and then processed. Both of these operations are now performed by the WHPO. The clearance contact and decision making should be done in a manner which ensures that all candidates are thoroughly screened by persons who are knowledgeable concerning the President's interest. Processing, at the White House level which includes notification of the appointees and sponsors, enables the prestige of the President to be associated with the appointment.

Therefore, it is recommended that all aspects of the personnel process for Presidential Boards with White House focus should remain the responsibility of the WHPO. Any conflicts or questions concerning selection or clearance would be addressed at the weekly political evaluating with White House liaison staff representatives. It is anticipated that all questions of priority, acceptability, etc., would be resolved at this level.

Presidential Boards and Commissions with Departmental Focus

Currently, about 75 - 100 appointments per month are being made by the WHPO to this type of Board and Commission. In cases where confidence exists in the Departments, the WHPO now informally delegates some responsibility for staffing, but retains the final decision on selection and in every case handles all aspects of clearance and processing.

For some Boards the substantive requirements for appointment are rather demanding and the bulk of the positions are filled by candidates

recommended by functional personnel in the Departments. Other Boards, less substantive in nature, represent a better opportunity for important patronage placements.

The clearance of candidates for these positions should be thorough, but if a skillful job has been done in selection, the formal clearance is a rather routine matter. Since all of the appointments carry Presidential prestige, the processing should be done in a manner that will benefit the President.

Consequently, we recommend that primary responsibility for selecting candidates for substantive positions be delegated to the Departments, but that the WHPO retain the ability to select positions for patronage placements. The Departments should be delegated the responsibility for all clearance contacts but the WHPO would retain the responsibility for the final clearance decision and processing.

For these Presidential Boards, the WHPO would first have to determine the patronage potential for each Board. Perhaps, a fixed number of positions would be purely patronage with candidates selected by the WHPO while the remainder of the positions would be staffed by the Departments within the framework of WHPO general guidelines, e. g., all Republicans, one woman, regional distribution, etc. The WHPO would continue to draw inputs from the White House staffs and patronage lists and would retain the authority to replace a Departmental candidate with a patronage placement.

The clearance contact procedures would be specified by the WHPO and contacts would be spot-checked occasionally. The failure of the Departments to effectively perform these tasks would lead to greater control by the WHPO of the activity or punitive actions in other areas of non-career personnel control.

Conflicts arising from selection or clearance would be addressed with the Department and/or with the White House liaison staffs at the weekly review meeting. For all cases the final decision would be made by the WHPO.

Departmental Boards and Commissions (Secretarial)

Approximately 300 appointments per month are now being processed through the WHPO for positions on these Departmental Boards and Commissions. Many of these Boards are for technical advisory purposes and have much less prestige than Presidential Boards.

The positions represent an opportunity for bringing a large number of individuals into a formal association with the Nixon Administration. While the selection of these candidates is often based upon specific functional requirements, it is important that patronage considerations be incorporated to the extent possible. Currently, selections are made by the Department but reviewed by the WHPO during the clearance process.

Although these positions are not closely associated with the President, the clearance procedures should ensure that appointments are never embarrassing or harmful to the Administration. The Departments now make clearance contacts, and the candidates are submitted to the WHPO for final clearance. This is essentially a cosmetic device, since the WHPO review is very cursory.

All processing is now handled by the Departments. The primary requirement for processing is that the appointments should be handled in a manner designed to bring maximum credit to the Administration.

It is recommended that the Departments retain all their current responsibilities for these positions and that submittal to the WHPO for final clearance should be discontinued. The WHPO should establish staffing goals (e. g. , 90% Republicans, one woman on every Board, regional distribution, etc.) and monitor the Departments through monthly reports which measure performance against the goals. In addition, the WHPO would issue procedural guidelines for making clearance contacts and decisions. In general, the large numbers of positions with rather limited political value do not require the commitment of White House staff resources.

A submittal of candidates to the WHPO for final clearance would not be required. This change would be used as an inducement to obtain Departmental acceptance of greater White House involvement in other personnel matters (e.g., recruiting for full-time positions).

Departmental Boards and Commissions (Sub-Secretarial)

The number of positions or turnover in these categories are not known. Conservative estimates would indicate several thousand positions with several hundred appointments each month. These Boards have very modest political value and are usually related to narrow technical areas. Frequently, qualified candidates would only be known to Departmental personnel who operate in the functional area.

As a consequence, we recommend that the Departments retain responsibility for all personnel decisions for these positions. However, the WHPO should require that the Departments prepare a periodic inventory of these Boards and review the decision concerning whether these Boards have any potential political value. A lower priority project for the Departments and the WHPO would be to investigate whether minimum goals might be established for staffing these positions (e.g., political affiliation, geographic distribution).

In summary, the changes recommended in this report represent relatively modest modifications to the current WHPO procedures. The major changes are the greater Departmental role in staffing and clearing Presidential Boards and greater delegation of responsibility for Departmental Boards. Under the proposed recommendations, the WHPO would retain about the same degree of control now held but would exercise this control through retaining final decision-making authority, setting appointment goals and receiving reports of achievements.

3. ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

If the recommendations contained in this report are accepted, changes in responsibilities, communications, and decision-making processes will be required. This chapter outlines briefly the organization and coordinating procedures necessary to fulfill the recommendations and a plan for implementation. It covers:

- (1) Reorganizing the WHPO
- (2) Upgrading Department non-career personnel
- (3) Reporting to the President and senior White House staff
- (4) Implementing the recommendations

REORGANIZING THE WHPO

The WHPO should be reorganized into three major components: executive search, departmental liaison, and administration. (See Exhibit I for revised organization chart.) These units would report to the WHPO chief, who in addition to supervisory responsibilities, would decide on all routine clearance, patronage, and selection matters and refer important decisions to the senior White House staff. He would also interview Presidential and Executive level appointees and deal with Department heads on performance evaluation and other key personnel matters.

This organization should focus WHPO effort on the critical functions of recruiting, coordinating selection and clearance decisions, evaluating performance, and monitoring Department non-career personnel operations.

The major responsibilities for each component would be as follows:

1. Executive Search. Working closely with the Departments and drawing guidance from the White House political and substantive staffs, this group would identify and recruit candidates for the most important Presidential appointee and Executive level positions. The recruiters would specialize by Department and would work closely with the Departmental liaison unit described below.
2. Department Liaison. The primary contact between the Department and the WHPO would be through Departmental liaison. Two teams would be established, each consisting of the primary contact, and assistant, and secretary. Each team would be responsible for one-half of the Departments.

The liaison activities would include monitoring Department performance on recruiting, clearances, and patronage placements; evaluating performance of super-grade appointees and below; coordination on clearance problems; and staffing Presidential Boards and Commissions.

3. Administrative Section. This group would ensure personnel decisions are properly coordinated, prepare and monitor receipt of reports, perform some clearance contacts, spot-check Departmental clearances, route and initiate responses to correspondence, and administer the orientation and recognition programs.

These responsibilities would require a slight addition in the overall WHPO staff, primarily due to the staffing of the executive search section. This addition would be partially offset by the freeing of staff time through delegating some responsibilities to the Departments. As outlined in the recommendations, the major savings would be in the following areas: clearance contacts on supergrades and below, preliminary staffing of some Presidential Boards and Commissions, clearance decisions on Departmental Boards and Commissions, and maintenance of a talent bank on individuals whose potential is below Executive level positions. The current and proposed WHPO staffing structure is indicated below

WHPO Staffing

	<u>Current</u>	<u>Proposed</u>
Professional	6	7
Semi-professional	4	5
Secretary/clerical	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	16	19

UPGRADING DEPARTMENTAL NON-CAREER PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

Many of the recommendations in the report call for the delegation of responsibilities and tasks to the Departments and Agencies. For the delegation to be successful, it will be necessary to upgrade the Departmental capabilities and establish clear lines of authority and responsibility.

Currently the Departmental personnel contacts are not generally at the decision-making level. Their access to the decision-making level varies greatly. Because we expect the Departments to assume greater responsibility and be held accountable for a wider range of personnel activities, the primary contact on non-career personnel matters should be someone who has decision-making authority and direct access to the Department Head. For day-to-day matters, the WHPO should deal with a lower staff level.

The primary contact would have the major responsibility for all matters involving non-career personnel. This individual should ensure that the Department is appropriately staffed to assume the increased responsibilities.

The Department staff, in addition to providing an executive search capability, would handle the bulk of the routine work such as clearance contacts, staffing of boards, handling patronage requests, preparing reports to the WHPO, and administering Departmental recognition programs.

As discussed previously, we would expect the Department Head to take an active interest in non-career personnel matters. At a minimum, he would be responsible for making the final selection decisions on Presidential appointments to his Department, evaluating the performance of key officials, and in shaping promotion and removal decisions.

The WHPO would work with the Departments in the establishment of (1) guidelines for operational procedures (e.g., who should be contacted on clearances), and (2) specific goals (e.g., number of patronage placements). The WHPO would monitor adherence to these guidelines by periodic reports and spot checks. Appropriate action would be taken in situations where guidelines are violated. Such actions could range from withdrawing some of the delegated authorities to removing uncooperative Departmental personnel.

REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR WHITE HOUSE STAFF

In addition to participating in key personnel decisions, the President and the Senior White House staff would be sent reports to keep them informed on non-career personnel matters.

While these reports would be tailored to the interests and needs of this group, they would probably include information such as the following:

- Status of recruiting for key vacancies.
- Status of progress in placing politically important candidates, e.g., selected unsuccessful GOP candidates.
- Listing and summary statistics on Presidential appointees and Executive level positions, including biographic characteristics of incumbents (e.g., geographical origin, party registration, sex, professional background, etc.).
- Summary of biographic characteristics of appointees to Presidential Boards and Commissions.
- Candidates being cleared for Presidential appointee, Executive level and supergrade positions.

In addition, the WHPO would develop several indicators to evaluate its performance in selection, patronage, clearance, and personnel administration. While these indicators will be designed to meet internal WHPO management needs, it may be appropriate to summarize the results for the senior White House staff and the President to provide them with a means of evaluating the personnel operation.

IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

This section discusses a general plan for implementing the changes recommended in this report. Implementation, taking approximately ten weeks, requires three basic steps (see Exhibit II for more detail):

- informing the White House staffs and the Departments of the changes to take place and of the President's endorsement,
- developing and installing the new procedures within the White House, and

- upgrading Departmental operations and delegating responsibility when possible.

This plan will be refined and developed in greater detail over the next few weeks, but the overall schedule for implementation should not change significantly. Implementation would be phased so that functions will not be delegated to the Departments before we are confident they have the capability to handle the increased responsibilities. For example, the gathering of all clearance information for Schedule C (GS-15 and below) appointments will first be delegated to the Departments to see how it is handled before authority to make final clearance decisions is delegated.

Exhibit I

ORGANIZATION CHART WHPO




EXHIBIT II

PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATION
TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT OF NON-CAREER PERSONNEL

<u>Action Step:</u>	<u>Start Date:</u>	<u>Finish Date:</u>
I. INFORMING THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE CHANGES AND THE PRESIDENT'S ENDORSEMENT	12/21	1/22
A. If desired, prepare and give a briefing to the President		
B. Communicate the President's endorsement to Department Heads at a Cabinet Meeting or by memorandum. Communicate the President's endorsement to the White House staff by memorandum		
C. Brief Department Heads and primary personnel contact in each Department		
D. Brief other groups:		
1. Civil Service Commission		
2. Republican National Committee		
3. Congress (a strategy for informing Congress will be worked out with Bill Timmons)		
II. DEVELOPING AND INSTALLING NEW PROCEDURES WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE	12/21	2/5
A. Establish a permanent executive search capability		
1. Select permanent recruiters		
2. Develop internal administrative procedures		

Start Date: Finish Date:

B. Reorganize WHPO

C. Develop and implement revised administrative procedures for:

1. Obtaining recruiting guidance and soliciting candidates from White House staff offices
2. Selecting the final candidate
3. Making clearances
4. Evaluating patronage clearances
5. Staffing part-time Boards and Commissions

III. UPGRADE DEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONS
AND DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITIES

1/11

3/15

- A. Develop and distribute guidelines for revised Departmental operations
- B. Work with Departments to develop implementation and staffing plans
- C. Monitor progress of Departmental upgrading and delegate responsibilities (e.g., for clearances and staffing part-time Boards and Commissions) to individual Departments as they can assume it
- D. Departments begin reporting, e.g., status of patronage requests, GS-15 and below appointments, Departmental Board and Commission appointments
- E. Work with Departments to develop operating goals, e.g., number of patronage placements, mix of full-time and part-time appointees, positions to be upgraded