

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Memo	SAIC Towns to SAIC Taylor re: Proposed Trips of the President to Indianapolis and Chicago, 2 pp.	1/19/1970	A
2	Letter	Jeffrey Darman to Alexander Butterfield re: Uncle's future, 2 pp.	2/6/1970	D
3	Letter	Tom Keneally to Alec re: Review of my book, 1 p.	6/22/1970	G
4	Notes	Handwritten notes re: Mrs. Bruce Raab, 3 pp.	n.d.	D
5	Letter	J. Edgar Hoover to Alexander P. Butterfield re: Harriet S. Van Tassel, 4 pp.	3/25/1970	D & F
6	Memo	Lilburn E. Boggs to Egil Krogh, Jr., re: Precautions taken by the Secret Service, 8 pp.	3/23/1970	A & B

COLLECTION TITLE

WHCF: SMOF: Alexander Butterfield

BOX NUMBER

6

FOLDER TITLE

1970 Inbound to APB Part 1: Jan. to June 1970

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FROM THE DESK OF

Frank R. Barnett

January 7, 1970


Dear Alex:

Here is a copy of the Memo I mentioned to you on the phone.

It suggests a "control mechanism" by which various parallel operations can be protected from eccentric donors, hostile Big Media and imperfect staff directors.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Frank", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Enc. (1)

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

130 EAST 67th STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

Area Code 212 861-8260

29 December 1969

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Assistants to the President

*Also Directors

Mr. Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D. C.

Dear Chuck:

As a foundation executive and fund-raiser for the past fifteen years, may I offer herewith a possible formula for getting \$25 million worth of impact out of a \$5 million investment. The Formula tries to take into account (a) eccentric donors, (b) imperfect staff directors, (c) the law of diminishing returns in all Public Affairs Corporations, and (d) the wisdom of capitalizing on America's diversity and pluralism.

Perhaps this letter-Memo, composed over the Christmas Holidays, should include an Annex entitled: "Melancholy Reflections on the Apparent Non-Transferability of Business Talent to the Public Affairs Bullring." (If the press accounts of the Donor's doings in SE Asia are misleading, I may be unduly pessimistic; but anyone who opens with a bid to help captured GI's and closes by offering the same food to Hanoi's homeless orphans worries me a bit, unless this is a carefully programmed ploy, and Mr. Texas is only pretending to be an Amateur?)

Since the Memo I prepared is entirely too long, let me hazard your misunderstanding by summarizing a Devil's Advocate position as follows:

- #1. Given a universe, beclouded with hostile Big Media and eccentric donors, it is probably a mistake (in the first year) to "centralize" operations in any single Committee. The alleged advantages of span-of-control and "efficiency" may quickly be offset by (a) disagreements between prime Donors and the Crew or (b) the discrediting of a single Establishment Organization by the fusillades from the New York Times, Esquire, The Washington Post, Harpers, Atlantic, N.Y. Review of Books and 250 units of the underground

GENE E. BRADLEY*
Washington Vice President
(202) 393-4353

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JOHN H. BERNARD
810 18th St., N.W.
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INTERPROFESSIONAL COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

(Partial List)

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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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29 December 1969

press, etc. /plus the Senate Foreign Relations Committee/.

#2. If one immediate goal is to recruit, equip and activate myriad battalions of the "Silent Majority," the Crew should carefully consider whether the following components of the "SM" can really be motivated by the same semantics and similar projects coming from a single Headquarters:

- a. perhaps 4-5 million of the people who voted for George Wallace;
- b. passionate Barry Goldwater/John Tower/Strom Thurmond Republicans;
- c. Dean Acheson/Dean Rusk/Scoop Jackson Democrats;
- d. the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Legion and VFW;
- e. George Meany labor leaders;
- f. John Roche/Paul Douglas/Sidney Hook "liberal anti-Communists" (but Fabian Socialists in their domestic politics);
- g. Young Americans for Freedom and Young Republicans (conservative wing);
- h. Sen. Javits/Sen. Brooke/Charles Rhyne Republicans;
- i. 4-5 million "New Culture" young people who don't agree with SDS but also automatically tune out all "squares" (whether President Nixon, or Dean Acheson, or Gen. Clay, or Scoop Jackson et al.);

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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- j. Ethnic groups (Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Ukrainians, et al.) who tend to despise all forms of Communism but are suspicious of Republican WASPS and the prose style of the Racquet Club;
 - k. devoted subscribers to The Reader's Digest;
 - l. partially effete snobs (reasonably open-minded on Vietnam) who will only read Foreign Affairs and regard articles in the Digest as on a par with a Billy Graham sermon -- i.e. not up to the Jesuit tastes;
 - m. etc.
- #3. In a public opinion "battle," it should be recognized that some Organizations are expendable. Therefore, why even try to structure (at this time) a permanent Institution? During 1970-71, it may be sounder strategy to finance "commando units" that, admittedly, will be used up in political battles against the SDS, SANE, the Institute of Policy Studies, The Moratorium Committees, concerned clergy, et al.
- #4. Thus, instead of funding something massive and monolithic, it might be more prudent to invest comparatively small sums in 6-7 existing organizations which already have a performance record and diverse constituencies.
- #5. Possible Allocations for 1970-71 to Diverse Operations by "Expendable" Units

<u>Existing Unit</u>	<u>Prime Targets And Missions</u>	<u>Suggested Annual Budget</u>	<u>Key Men</u>
American Friends of Vietnam	Students and Professors (Monographs, Newsletter, Campus Workshops)	\$100,000	William Henderson Dr. Frank Trager

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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<u>Existing Unit</u>	<u>Prime Targets And Missions</u>	<u>Suggested Annual Budget</u>	<u>Key Men</u>
Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy (Dean Acheson/ Paul Nitze Group organized on ABM issue)	Seminars and Salons for Democrats on the Hill, Intel- lectuals and Press Pundits, Young Democrats on campus	\$ 75,000	Cliff Hynning
Tell It to Hanoi! (William Casey Group)	Ads, petitions and pamphlets for the Spiro Agnew/Sen. Goldwater/John Tower/Reserve Of- ficers/VFW/ American Legion, etc. constitu- encies	200,000	David Martin? (Sen.Dodd's Adminis- trative As- sistant) Charles West
Citizens Com- mittee for Peace With Freedom in Vietnam (Tyroler- Washburn Group)	National Lecture Bureau; Position Papers; Press Conferences by Dignitaries (Gen. Clay, Mary Lord, Neil McElroy, George Meany, et al.)	250,000	Martin Connell Peter White? Sam Ishmael?
Freedom House (This is run by "liberals" who are low key anti-Communists. John Richardson, now an Asst.Secy of State is a key member; so are Roscoe Drummond and Paul Douglas)	New York City Intellectuals, Overseas Press Club, Book Pub- lishers, ETV in New York City, Educators	100,000	Leonard Sussman (Director) Gerald Steibel (Research Institute of America)

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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<u>Existing Unit</u>	<u>Prime Targets And Missions</u>	<u>Suggested Annual Budget</u>	<u>Key Men</u>
John Fisher's Operations (American Security Council and Institute for American Strategy)	Radio programs and Newsletter for conservative constituencies	\$100,000	John Fisher
A Youth Consortium YAF (conservative) YPSL (socialist but anti-Communist) Student Coordinating Committee Freedom Leadership Foundation (religious) Association of Student Governments	Silent Majority on Campus	100,000 (provided they can form the Consortium)	Roy Godson Neil Salonen Herman Pirchner Charles Stephens

#6. If diverse operations are encouraged, what may then be required is an institutional device -- probably a Foundation controlled by the Crew -- which can:

- serve as a buffer between eccentric donors and operating mechanisms;
- ensure quality control by controlling finances;
- plan long-range strategy;
- shift assets from a "diminishing return" operation to something new that may appear as a result of "spontaneous vitality" in the private sector;
- recruit, evaluate and (if necessary) quietly replace personnel.

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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- #7. This "control" Foundation might have a small Board of Directors (4-5 men), all close friends, 100% compatible and reliable. It might be incorporated as, say, The American Purpose Foundation with a broad charter to educate the general public in national goals, both foreign and domestic.
- #8. Various Big Donors should be encouraged to make immediate and large grants to this Foundation. Donors should be told that a \$5 million bank will ensure a three-year "systems" approach that will have the continuity and magnitude required to attract first-rate staff. The Foundation could then exert quality control over half a dozen operating Committees by dispensing quarterly grants (which could be terminated during any 90-day period).
- #9. A Big Donor could have the fun of serving on one of the operating Committees -- but not on all of them. (Nor should Big Donors be on the Board of the control Foundation, which should be as anonymous as possible, shunning all publicity and reflecting all "credit" on the operating Committees which it finances.)
- #10. This strategy would give the Crew maximum flexibility to shift assets, as some men and operations fall short and others prove to be more effective than anticipated -- or as targets of opportunity emerge.
- #11. Since the operating Committees would derive grants from the control Foundation, Committee Staff Directors would be somewhat insulated from the whims and blandishments of Big Donors.
- #12. Moreover, while "expendable" units are waging the battles of public opinion (chiefly on Vietnam throughout 1970-71), the Crew could be structuring a long-range program designed to continue the overall struggle throughout the '70's on National Defense and National Goals in General.
- #13. The same control Foundation could subsidize
 - a. producers of documentary films (Airlie House, for example, whose chief executive -- Dr. Murdock Head -- is well-known to Secretary Laird and Ambassador Ellsworth);

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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- b. 8-9 university think-tanks which are doing objective work;
- c. radio and tv programs;
- d. patriotic folk-singers (there are some!);
- e. Record Albums on "The Future of the Republic" by President Nixon, LBJ, Gerald Ford, Dean Rusk, Secretary Laird, et al.;
- f. Special pro-America pageants at half-times of important sports events (arranged by Bud Wilkinson, et al.);
- g. National Defense Programs sponsored by the Jaycees, American Bar Association, General Federation of Women's Clubs, etc.

#14. If something similar to the structure suggested above proves feasible, the Staff Directors of the various operating Committees need not be of towering stature or Renaissance capability. So long as each is competent to service a particular constituency, the goal can be achieved. (One or two "generalists" in the control Foundation could maintain quality in the operating Committees -- or replace Staffs that don't measure up -- or cut off funds.)

#15. The multiplicity of operating groups will make it difficult for hostile captains of Big Media to zero in all their intellectual artillery on a single Headquarters. Moreover, the credibility of Group A can be strengthened by virtue of the fact that Groups B through G are saying substantially the same thing (although some on FM and in color, and others on AM and in black and white).

#16. Since the \$5 million "bank" would be in the hands of the Crew at the control Foundation (and grants would be made on a quarterly basis), the worst that could happen is that one unsuccessful operation might waste \$75,000. (By way of contrast, if \$1 million is committed to some presumed Blue Chip Organization -- only to discover that Donors, Democrats and the Crew don't really see eye-to-eye -- the resulting unpleasantness could discourage everybody.)

Mr. Charles W. Colson

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29 December 1969

Postscript

I have a back-up Memo on all this if you want to see it, or talk.

With best regards, I am

Faithfully,

Frank R. Barnett

FRB:mmcg

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The Urban Coalition

2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 293-7625

Chairman John W. Gardner
Co-chairmen Andrew Heiskell
A. Philip Randolph

January 16, 1970

The Honorable Alexander Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Alex:

Are you alive and well and living at the White House?


I was recently vacationing in the Virgin Islands and picked up the New York Times and who did I see but the enclosed picture of your close friend.

Chuck tells me that Tom Kenneally's book is out ~~about~~ ^{and} the antarctic ^{is} dedicated to Bill.

Happy new year to you and your family.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,


Jeffrey Darman
Assistant to the
Executive Vice President

JD:ed

Enclosure

The National Urban Coalition

2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 293-7625

Chairman
John W. Gardner

Co-chairmen
Andrew Heiskell
A. Philip Randolph
Whitney M. Young, Jr.
W. D. Eberle

April 22, 1970

The Honorable Alexander Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Alex:

Just thought I'd drop a note to say I'm still
waiting for us to get together for lunch again.
(If I wait much longer I'll starve to death!).

Seriously, though, let's get together one day and
catch up on what we're both doing.

I came across a story of possible interest to you as
a PR angle the other day. To make a long story short
it concerns a friend of a friend who had a practical
joke played on her by someone who invited her to
The White House for dinner. Alas, he was a fictitious
character and so she didn't get to go and lived
unhappily ever after. Maybe a note from someone over
there might give her a thrill - anyhow if it sounds
at all of interest I'll fill you in on the details.

Well, take care and give my best to Charlotte and
the kids...and let's do try and catch a drink or
something one day.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,



Jeffrey S. Darman
Assistant to the Executive
Vice President

June 8, 1970

The Honorable Alexander Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President
The White House

Dear Alex:

Sorry I didn't get to see you at the Blackman wedding. It was good to see Charlotte and the kids though. I've been reading about you in the "liberal" press (New Republic, Time). The diagram in Time should be turned over to Milton Bradley. I'm sure he could devise a new game that would sell in the thousands with that maze as its base. I hope you get a red arrow some day. Well enough facetiousness.

Charlotte, Larry Wilson, his wife and I had an interesting discussion about today's youth, etc. I mentioned to Charlotte an article concerning protest which you both might find of interest. It was done by a young "radical" acquaintance of yours.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,



Jeffrey S. Darman

Confessions of an effete snob

By JEFFREY S. DARMAN

THIS WRITER is now classified by the Vice President of the United States as an effete snob since I have demonstrated against the war in Vietnam. I wonder if my parents are now ashamed to have produced such a disgraceful product.

My past mode of living would not have classified me as a "radical." What has changed me? One thing is the inherent danger in President Nixon's acquiescence to the pronouncements of Vice President Agnew, Attorney General Mitchell and other administration officials, which impugn the reputations, virility and patriotism of many Americans, famous and not so famous, Democrats and Republicans alike, who wish us to withdraw from South Vietnam.

The great danger in the "non-dialogue" that is going on is that the invectives hurled by the administration force Americans to choose sides—and the teams are being portrayed as only good and bad, patriotic and unpatriotic. There is great danger in this. For a President responsible to *all* the citizens of this country, it is to me a dereliction of duty to allow it to occur. Especially for a President who liked the ring of the slogan, "Bring us together."

To try to simplify the war protest movement as just college students who have become a vocal minority is ludicrous. The movement is made up of students, clergymen, businessmen, former government officials, ex-military men, social scientists and just plain Americans trying to arouse this country's attention. To try to silence them with such inane slogans as "America—Love it or leave it" is childish to say the least.

What the protest movement is saying is: "America—Yes, we love it, but we want to change it." We want to make it more responsive to

the needs of a changing society and changing world.

Our country was founded on protest. Our history books are full of this. Why should people now feel that the cry for change is unpatriotic?

Those of us who love our country and protest some of its policies do so because of some of the hypocrisy we see around us. Many of the "super-patriots" of the veterans organizations fought in World War II in an army that segregated its black members and its Japanese-American members. That is how they fought for freedom! The idealists of today remember this, and so do not consider these people pillars of virtue.

Many of the critics of the anti-war movement are the so-called blue collar workers who deride the movement leaders and the occasional violence that ensues. Yet some of these same workers, when on strike, are at times involved in, or bystanders to, violence outside the plant gates. Does this mean unions are unpatriotic, or do not serve any useful purposes, or are Communist-controlled?

The generation gap is not a gap of years. It is a gap in thinking. The times have changed, but many people think as they did 20 or 30 years ago. This country is beset by problems. Those in the so-called "vocal minority" are attempting to solve them. Many are young, confused and upset. Their parents often do not attempt either to understand, or even more importantly join them, in looking for solutions. All the answers are not on one side—but the majority of those looking for them are.

We look at the law and order advocates today and I ask them, where were you when Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman were killed in Mississippi; when little

girls were bombed in classrooms in Alabama; when Emmett Till was hanged? Where are you when synagogues are defaced? Where are these super-patriots who have all the answers while our cities are decaying, millions of our citizens are living in substandard housing, getting inadequate education? Stand up, you fine citizens who allow our black and brown brothers to have an infant mortality rate *twice* that of white America.

Where are these people, this "silent majority"? They are hiding behind their white picket fences—real or make-believe ones. They should be ashamed. I am only ashamed that it took me 25 years to begin speaking and taking a firm stand. As I said before, unfortunately, I believe this country is being divided into two camps. I hope this trend can be stopped. But if it cannot, then I at least know where and for what I stand.

Those of us who protest this nation's domestic and foreign policies do not have a monopoly on solutions, but those who do nothing are a major part of the problem.

I think it is time for many of my fellow citizens to recall the question Thoreau asked Emerson when Thoreau was put in jail for a gesture of civil disobedience: "What are you doing in there?" asked Emerson. "What are you doing out there?" asked Thoreau. □

Mr. Darman, born and raised in Rhode Island, currently is working in Washington as assistant to the executive vice president of the Urban Coalition.

(The Rhode Islander will pay \$50 for expressions of opinion accepted for publication. Maximum length is 500 words. Rejected manuscripts will be returned only if accompanied by a

5617 Warwick Place
Chevy Chase, Md. 20015

June 26, 1970

Mr. Alexander Butterfield
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Alex:

For a good many weeks now, I have been in serious dialogue with the Office of Population of A.I.D.'s Technical Assistance Program. It's Communications Section has a senior vacancy (GS-15) ~~for~~ which they believe me to be eminently qualified (over a good many other applicants), and have been pushing my papers through their personnel labyrinths for several weeks.

Now, I have been advised that an endorsement from within the Administration would be most helpful, perhaps even essential. The job has a terrific potential and a recognized importance as it deals with public affairs programs affecting population growth in developing countries. I would like to tackle it as much as the office concerned wants me. What I would like of you is a letter on my behalf to the appropriate office.

It should go to Mr. Bert M. Tollefson, Jr., Assistant Administrator, Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, Agency for International Development, Washington, D. C., something along these lines:

I am informed that Mr. Charles F. Blackman is a candidate for a position in the Office of Population of your Technical Assistance Program, where there is a current vacancy. I am further informed that the Office of Population is well disposed toward Mr. Blackman's qualifications over a number of other applicants it has examined.


I would like to commend him to you for the position under consideration and would appreciate it if you would let me know the outcome. I have known Mr. Blackman for some time as an outstanding public servant whose contribution would be considerable to any challenging program within his wide range of proven talents.

There is no pride of authorship; the suggested wording comes primarily from A.I.D. associates who wish to bring me aboard. I hope you do not mind my asking.

While I am about it, I think I should mention that I am still pursuing other avenues, one of which is The President's Council on Environmental Quality which has informed me that it may have something in August or September. Not too encouraging, but a little. They have my resume. Did you ever get a chance to mention my interest to its Chairman, Mr. Russell Train?

With personal thanks and best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Chuck", written in dark ink.

Charles F. Blackman

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THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20226

March 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

Attention: Trudy Brown

From: Alfred Wong
Special Agent in Charge
Technical Security Division

Re: Use of Volunteers

We would like to work out with you some orderly procedure with respect to the use of volunteers in the White House Complex.

We are aware that there have been some volunteers working in the Complex from time to time since the change of Administration, but that these persons were cleared through your office and you authorized the necessary passes after appropriate checks.


However, a situation now exists where an office in the Complex is using a large number of volunteers on a frequently recurring basis. They are being cleared in as appointments and the office is furnishing information to this office for name checks.

This started just before Christmas when special arrangements were made through this office to clear 52 volunteers to assist in the addressing of Christmas cards. It was not intended that these 52 volunteers would then be approved for recurring access without concurrence by your office.

In the last four to six weeks an additional 44 persons have been used and have submitted information for name checks. We are now running these 44 names through the FBI and our own indexes. These persons are apparently being recruited by Anne Higgins of Mr. Melencamp's office.

Our office has no knowledge of what the need is to have these uncleared persons working in the Complex, but we feel that approval for this operation should rest with you.

I would be glad to discuss this matter with you further.



Alfred Wong
Special Agent in Charge

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

FROM: TRUDY BROWN

RE: Richard Bruce Rabb

Earlier this week Bob Haynes of FBI asked if I knew that Bruce Rabb had recently been married. I did not but offered to find out for him. I checked Personnel and they did not know but later found out for me. Attached is a report from FBI on Bruce Rabb's wife, who is of interest to the FBI.

Trudy Brown

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MEMORANDUM

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By JAS NARA Date 4/17/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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
MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD

SUBJECT: SECRET SERVICE SUGGESTIONS FOR
IMPROVED WHITE HOUSE SECURITY

A couple of weeks ago, John Ehrlichman asked me to determine what additional precautions the Secret Service were taking in light of threatened terrorist attacks. Pat Moynihan remarked to the President a while back that we should anticipate an attempt on the President's life or someone close to him by a terrorist group sometime this year.

We asked the Secret Service for a rundown on the protective measures which they took for a typical Presidential trip. The attached memorandum dated March 23, 1970, was their response. They made a number of suggestions on Pages 7 and 8 of the memorandum which struck me as important enough to study and perhaps implement right away.

Accordingly, I have asked to meet with Pat Boggs, you, John Davies, Jack Caulfield this coming Friday to discuss the extent of terrorist activity around the country and how it may impinge on security of the White House complex. I see this meeting as involving both your and my jurisdiction with regard to the Secret Service. We might establish a working group to study the question of White House security on an ongoing basis.



Bud Krogh

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK CAULFIELD

SUBJECT: SECRET SERVICE SUGGESTIONS FOR
IMPROVED WHITE HOUSE SECURITY

I have reviewed the Secret Service memorandum of March 23, 1970. It strikes me that we should immediately convene a meeting of John Davies, Pat Boggs, Alex Butterfield, you and me to discuss what change procedures might be in order given the apparently greater threat from terrorist activities.

I would appreciate your arranging for a meeting to be held in my office this coming Friday with these people for discussion of these suggestions. I would foresee the selection of a working group from the various offices involved to continuously think through the problems of White House complex security.

Bud Krogh

cc: Alex Butterfield

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1970

8:00 a.m.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MEMBERS OF THE CABINET

Here is some background information on the Cambodian action -- all drawn from recent briefings:

- The decision to go into the North Vietnamese-occupied sanctuaries in Cambodia was for the purpose not of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and protecting the lives of 450,000 Americans who are stationed there. The decision was made under the Constitutional power and responsibility of the President as Commander-in-Chief to take measures for the defense of American men when they come under attack any place in the world.
- If we had done nothing, the North Vietnamese-occupied sanctuaries would have been linked up into a belt covering the entire border area between Cambodia and South Vietnam -- with the result that after we pulled out our next 150,000 men (leaving by that time well less than half of our ground combat strength of a year ago) the enemy could have launched a massive attack, one which would not only have risked American lives but destroyed the pacification and Vietnamization programs, and over-run Vietnam. In other words, the immediate decision was whether to do something against the sanctuaries or face up to the fact that we would have to withdraw. Doing nothing would mean that we should withdraw all American forces now to prevent the situation just described.
- The decision is limited both as to the extent of territory it is to cover and as to the time involved. Our troops and the South Vietnamese troops will go into Cambodia up to a maximum depth of 21 miles. In most cases, they have to

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go in only five to six miles. Most of the operations will take 10-14 days to complete. The great majority of American forces will be out of Cambodia by the middle of June and all will be out by July 1st at the latest. There will be no American forces whatever in Cambodia after that time because our operations will be completed.

- These operations are directed primarily against North Vietnamese materiel and logistics bases, not against North Vietnamese personnel. Of course, this does not mean that no enemy troops will lose their lives. Already some 2500 of the enemy have been killed ... and over 500 have been captured.
- The weapons, the rice and the other logistic supplies which we are uncovering and capturing have taken 4-5 months to come down the Ho Chi Minh trail. When one adds to that the 4 months of rainy season which will begin in about 3 weeks, it becomes obvious that we have bought precious time (9-10 months), time which is absolutely essential for the success of our withdrawal program. Ten months to a year from now the ARVN will be ready to take on more of the responsibility for its own defense. It will be a formidable fighting force.
- As a result of our program, these things have been accomplished already:
 - The enemy's timetable has been completely disrupted and we have bought the precious time necessary for the Vietnamization and withdrawal programs to go forward.
 - The withdrawal of 150,000 Americans over the next year will go forward.
 - American casualties will be reduced.

On this latter point, it is very important to point out that already 3,000 individual weapons and over 200 crew served weapons have been captured. More graphically it can be pointed

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out that 600,000 rounds of small arms ammunition have been captured ... along with 1039 mortar rounds and 3000 rockets. The 600,000 rounds of small arms ammunition could have and would have killed American men; the mortar rounds could have been and would have been lobbed into our base camps killing American men. The rockets could have been and would have been lobbed into our base camps and into the cities of South Vietnam killing Americans as well as Vietnamese. Everything that we have captured in the way of weapons has saved American lives and Vietnamese lives.

- In the final analysis, this decision was made by the President as Commander-in-Chief because of his conclusion that failing to make it would endanger the lives of American men, completely disrupt our withdrawal program and inevitably result in an ignominious defeat and precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.
- On the plus side -- and particularly on the diplomatic side -- it should be pointed out that the credibility of American power in Vietnam as well as in other places in the world has now been re-established. The President warned in his speeches of November 3, December 15 and April 20 that if the enemy took actions in Cambodia, Laos or North Vietnam which he considered endangered American men, he would react strongly. By his (the President's) reacting this way in Cambodia, the enemy now knows that if he comes across the DMZ, if he escalates our casualties in Vietnam, if he tries to disrupt our withdrawal program (with Cambodia no longer a privileged sanctuary) he will encounter many serious problems in other parts of his long front. For the past five years, great nations as well as small nations have had serious doubt that any American President would have the will to use his Executive powers for the defense of U.S. interests. Now that doubt has been dispelled. This does not mean that we will become engaged in more conflicts; but rather, that we will deter conflicts. In this respect, the lesson of Korea comes to mind.

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-- To make some fairly hard-hitting points, you can say very bluntly:

- "Look, you can vote against the war in Vietnam and vote against the war in Cambodia, but there are 450,000 American men there, so don't tie the hands of our Commander-in-Chief. If you do, then you must assume responsibility for their lives rather than leaving such responsibility, and the decisions connected with it, to him.
- "Don't stab our men in the back while they are fighting for this country in Vietnam.
- "Don't take any actions on the floor of Congress which will give aid and comfort to the enemy and encourage that enemy to launch more offensives and kill more Americans."

- One final point that should be made concerns public reaction. You can and should point out that the Gallup Poll indicated the American people favored the President's policy 51% to 35%; that the CBS poll showed 62% of the people favored the President's move in Cambodia; that the Chilton Research Poll, with over 1000 samples taken immediately after the speech on Friday, showed 65% of the American people favored the action taken by the President in Cambodia.
- You should put squarely on the back of the Congress responsibility for risking American lives and responsibility for an ignominious American defeat if it succeeds in tying the President's hands through a Congressional appropriation route.
- You should lean hard on the fact that this decision rejected our getting pulled into another war in Cambodia.

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It rejected also a huge arms program for Cambodia. It rejected sending American men in to defend Cambodia. What we are protecting are American men whose lives are threatened by an enemy perched in privileged North Vietnamese-occupied sanctuaries along South Vietnam's borders with Cambodia and Laos.

Alexander P. Butterfield
Alexander P. Butterfield

Deputy Assistant to the President