



PLAYBOY

September 17, 1969

Dear Mr. Butterfield;

It is our pleasure to send you the enclosed article "Experts And Expertise" by Eliot Janeway, reprinted from our October issue.

We would be delighted to hear -- and would certainly value -- any comments you have concerning the article which we might use in our Letters to the Editor column.


Sincerely,

A. C. Spector sky

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Editorial Director

EXPERTS AND EXPERTISE

a president's decisions, the policies he forges and his place in the judgments of history depend not on the electorate or its chosen leaders but on his own selection of advisors on whose counsel he relies



article **BY ELIOT JANEWAY**

"THIS WHOLE JOB, which is never easy, will be a lot less difficult if you can figure out a way to run it without the help of expert advice—something I have never been able to do."

Lyndon Johnson was within days of finishing his term as President when he volunteered this advice to his successor. Bitter experience had qualified him to testify as an expert on experts. For while Johnson could thank his own native shrewdness for his success in accumulating power, he had good reason to blame his failure to hold it on "the Harvard crowd," which was his generic term for any experts who had been trained north-

east of Southwest Texas State Teachers College.

"Your job will be a damn sight easier," he told the heir to his misfortune, during their running dialog over the impending changing of the guard, "if you can get rid of, at the start, all of your technicians, including Dave Kennedy."

A wide range of experts had earned Johnson's mistrust, but he felt a peculiar resentment against the practitioners of economic occultism, as he showed when he singled out the Secretary-of-the-Treasury-designate for special mention among all the experts to whose expertise he attributed his fall. For one thing, the awe in which Johnson held money, and the insecurity with which he regarded

intellectuals, led him to confuse the opinions of bank chairmen with the recommendations of economic advisors. When Walter Heller, Johnson's holdover chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, resigned in order to "go private" and make some money, Johnson made a man-bites-dog joke. "My economic advisor needs an economic advisor," he said. So it seemed natural for Johnson to lump bank chairman Kennedy together with the economists. But the irony of Johnson's mention of Kennedy was meant to convey a cabalistic warning to his successor. For, as the incoming President well knew, Johnson had been on the verge of asking the select club of major

commercial bank chairmen to nominate one of their number to serve as his own next Secretary of the Treasury, if he had run for another term. And, as Nixon also knew, the designee of the group had been David M. Kennedy. The banker expert who was the special target of Johnson's sharp tongue was the very one Johnson would have picked to serve him, if the cards had fallen differently.

Johnson spoke as the last individualist in the age of organization men when he singled out the experts as the villains responsible for his undoing. But Johnson had never been fooled by experts in fields he knew more about than economics. Throughout his political career, he had known better than to let pundits and pollsters mislead him about elections. And early in his Congressional experience, he had learned to scrutinize military experts with tightly narrowed eyes. From the day in 1937 when he arranged his assignment as a freshman member of the House to its Naval Affairs Committee (as it then was), he began to build a distinctive if small power base within the still tiny military establishment; and his power there grew steadily with the military's power over the Federal budget. At the climax of Johnson's Congressional career, his power was so conspicuous that its sources were easily overlooked or forgotten; and at the climax of his Presidential career, Johnson was so emotionally involved in the bitter controversy over the Vietnam war that to his critics—especially the younger ones—he seemed merely the dupe of the “military-industrial-university complex.” He was in some ways, though, much more its master.

While the generals and the admirals had learned to count on Johnson to be their best friend where preparedness was concerned, they had also learned to fear him as their severest critic where unpreparedness could be made an issue. Over the years, Senator Johnson used his strategic vantage point in the Congressional establishment controlling military appropriations to establish himself first as the protégé of his seniors and then as “Mr. Defense Appropriations” in his own right, with whom those who wanted slices of the defense pie would have to deal in order to get anything. Like the beadles in the New England Puritan churches, who policed the aisles armed with a double-purpose implement for tickling dozing ladies and slapping dozing gentlemen, Johnson used his large influence over defense expenditures to favor his allies, while simultaneously investigating miscalculations by the beneficiaries of this patronage inside the “Chair Corps,”

which was his derisive term for the brass during the Korean War.

In 1954, when Johnson sat in executive session with his senior colleague, Chairman Richard Russell of the Senate Armed Services Committee (both of them acting as the all-powerful check-issuing duo of the Appropriations Subcommittee), Johnson had not felt the need to consult any experts before he vetoed an interesting request from President Eisenhower, personally conveyed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The request was for Congressional acquiescence in America's first commitment to South Vietnam. It was the considered decision of Senators Russell and Johnson to reject Dulles' request and immediately adjourn the 1954 session—in order to free themselves from further pressure from the President. As they were informed to their dismay a few weeks later, their action prompted President Eisenhower's decision to initiate America's original involvement in Vietnam, without Congressional concurrence, through the commitment of funds for which no Congressional grant was required. To Eisenhower's credit, he at least instructed Dulles to tell Russell and Johnson what he had done. A decade later, Johnson would not be so considerate.

The military, who ended up being held responsible for the Vietnam escalation, never believed in—and always resisted—the battle plan for a land war in Asia, especially a war to be escalated on the installment plan. It was Johnson who ordered the step-up and at the same time restrained its effectiveness.

The dim view Johnson had learned to take of military expertise during his 23 years in Congress was unforgettably confirmed during the first of his three years of captivity in the Vice-Presidency. As John F. Kennedy's visible but silenced partner, he saw from the inside the disastrous Bay of Pigs episode, which was an entrapment Kennedy had invited as the result of his reliance upon military advisors whose credentials seemed unimpeachable because they commanded bipartisan acceptance and enjoyed bipartisan continuity. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger's definitive account of the Kennedy Administration, *A Thousand Days*, Kennedy exclaimed in uncharacteristically illiterate dismay, “My God, the bunch of advisors we inherited. . . . Can you imagine being President and leaving behind someone like all those people there?” Johnson felt entitled to add, “I told you so,” and he made the point whenever the opportunity presented itself. Schlesinger adds: “My impression is that, among these advisors, the joint chiefs had dis-

appointed him most for their cursory review of the military plans. About [Allen] Dulles and [Richard] Bissell [of the CIA], he said little. I think he had made up his mind at once that, when things settled down, they would have to go. . . . He set quietly to work to make sure that nothing like the Bay of Pigs could happen to him again. The first lesson was never to rely on the experts.”

Unfortunately, Kennedy found this easier said than done. He soon discovered that the White House cannot be run without experts. By Kennedy's time, a President's administrative ability had come to be measured by the reputation of the White House staff for expertise; and with inescapable administrative dependence on experts had come irresistible political incentives to operate behind a screen of continuity. A commitment to continuity with the source of his predecessor's frustrations was enough to insulate a new President from blame if he failed to solve problems he had inherited. Although Kennedy lacked Johnson's experience in auditing the propensity of military experts to err, he was quick to see that, just because they were a necessary evil, the safest experts to have on display would be those whose presence supported a plea of innocence by association with Eisenhower. In other words, the experts Kennedy decided to depend on were the same ones who had persuaded Eisenhower to adopt their blueprints for the liberation of Cuba. When Kennedy took office, Eisenhower's name still carried the imprimatur of authority stamped on it during World War Two, the controversy over original sin in Vietnam not yet having carried back far enough to have compromised the reputation for expertise he had brought home from Europe. At that time, he was still the principal military man in politics.

But the public wanted more than the assurance of continuity from Kennedy, whose success story, after all, announced the long-awaited take-over by the now-mature post-War generation. The excitement of change and the promise of accomplishment were expected, too. How to select the areas holding the promise of new accomplishment, and how to differentiate them from the atmosphere of assured continuity, always constitute the acid test of a new President's judgment.

The sustained ring of Eisenhower's 1952 call for Peace and Prosperity limited Kennedy's freedom of action in 1961. His choice of where to promise change and where to preserve continuity was dictated by the circumstances of his election victory. Kennedy's youth had been a decisive asset during the campaign of 1960. The Affluent Society, whose Philis-

tine achievements John Kenneth Galbraith had memorialized during the quiet Eisenhower years, had become ready for a cultural revolution, and Kennedy spoke with the voice it wanted to hear. Kennedy found the Affluent Society taking Eisenhower's peace-keeping operation for granted but complaining about the lean ration of the prosperity it delivered. By 1961, the country had come to feel that it was stuck in a rut and it was increasingly impatient with the Republican Administration's obsessive fear of inflation, an inflation that, in fact, was not to reach pernicious proportions for a decade after premonitions of it sent Eisenhower into a panic and prompted him to permit the Federal Reserve Board to plunge the country's markets into a recession in 1957. During the 1960 Presidential campaign, the overconservative miscalculations of Eisenhower's economic advisors had swung the delicate Election Day balance from Nixon's to Kennedy's favor. The country was ready for the stir and bustle of inflation—in ideals and aspirations as well as in incomes and profits. Kennedy's memorable campaign promise "to get the country moving again" exploited popular dissatisfaction with Eisenhower's economic advisors and freed Kennedy from any temptation to select them or their economic theories as the area of continuity.

At the same time, Kennedy's youth had burdened him with a corresponding liability. Johnson had blown it up to potentially embarrassing proportions in his challenge to Kennedy's nomination in Los Angeles, where he warned that "no man is qualified to be President in the nuclear age who does not have a touch of gray in his hair." So while Kennedy selected his own advisory corps of new economists to emphasize the changes he meant to make, he elected to establish continuity with General Eisenhower's old team of military advisors to show his maturity. Even after the Bay of Pigs, notwithstanding his angry outburst against Eisenhower for "leaving behind someone like all those people there," Kennedy disregarded the moral Schlesinger reports that he drew from the debacle his experts had organized. In fact, Kennedy's failure to make a success of the Cuban liberation plan, formulated by Eisenhower's military advisors, put him in even greater need of the protective cover of continuity after the Bay of Pigs than before. Consequently, he let them lead him further down the road that Eisenhower, disregarding the veto of Senators Russell and Johnson, had let the advisors pave for him into the Asiatic land bog.

The new practice of delegating Presidential responsibilities to specialized

teams of "the best brains" was made to order as a protective device for Johnson when his turn came to make the same choices between continuity and change. Ever since his emergence as a national figure, he had complained of his inability to win credit for his accomplishments—or to avoid blame for his methods. The rise of the expert as a priestly caste, privileged to administer power by advising politicians on the uses of power, offered him an overdue opportunity to redress the inequity in his public relations. Unfortunately, although Johnson had learned the easy way what Kennedy had learned the hard way—never to trust experts—he failed to apply his knowledge beyond the specialized areas where he knew enough to mistrust them. Johnson's approach to the Presidency was conditioned by the circumstances under which he took over. As with Kennedy before him, his chance of vaulting onto the right side of any potential plausibility gap hinged on his shrewdness in selecting areas of continuity and of change. Johnson decided that continuity called for a fight to put Kennedy's program across and, meanwhile, to keep Kennedy's expert staff—his link with Kennedy's constituency. At the same time, he bet that the demand for change would be satisfied by a demonstration that he could succeed where Kennedy had failed—first, in moving the complicated, inertia-bound machinery of government and, then, in winning the support of business. Johnson killed both birds with one stone. Moreover, he got the stone back when he showed the country that he could produce a pragmatic consensus within Washington. The evidence that he did won him an emotional consensus outside Washington. Kennedy had failed to keep his promise to get the country moving because he had failed to work with Congress. Johnson kept Kennedy's promise because he managed with Congress where Kennedy had not known how to try.

Because Congress is oriented to serve the special interests of its constituents, business is sympathetically oriented toward Congress. Johnson's success with Congress won him a double success with business. In fact, Johnson's success in winning the confidence of the business and financial establishment at the outset of his Presidency was so electrifying that it prompted him to return the compliment and express his confidence in business—by giving his confidence to its economic advisors. Although Johnson regarded experts on political theory with contempt, and experts on military theory with suspicion, he became vulnerable to the claims and presumptions of the fraternity of economic advisors. Their more prominent spokesmen commanded ready access to him.

For 26 years Johnson had worked in complete isolation from the influence of economists, while he built his personal empire inside other people's power structures. Suddenly, he found himself catapulted into personal control of a two-platoon team of economists—one playing by the rules of the old economics, the other by the rules of the new. The business and banking representatives—devotees of the old economics—worried about inflation and "fiscal responsibility." The academic types—advocates of the new economics—sought to extend the real success of Keynes' contribution in preventing mass unemployment into a fanciful ability to "fine tune" the economy, as if the interplay between the way it performed and the way people expected it to perform could be governed by a computer.

Johnson was shrewd enough to know how to play on the politics of expectations more expertly than the economists had yet learned how to calculate the economics of expectations. On the tragic night of Kennedy's assassination, when Johnson established his first connection across the airwaves with a shocked and overwrought public, he was quick to shift his appeal from animal faith to the less chancy area of the pocketbook. He passed from eulogy to practicality and, by way of assuring the country that it was going to "get moving again," he cited Dr. Pierre Rinfret, then still a comparatively unknown young economist, for his encouraging (and, as it turned out, accurate) forecast that "capital expenditures in 1964 alone will be 20 percent higher than last year." The country had been shocked into a state of desperate susceptibility to any concrete reassurance that bore the mark of officialdom. Johnson's stratagem worked.

"Follow the leader" being the name of the game the Wall Street money managers play, the stock market reacted to the word that corporate management was putting up its money by doing the same. The game even extended to Congress. Opinion on Capitol Hill took this joint and spontaneous expression of confidence from corporate managements and investors as evidence that Johnson's persuasiveness, which they recalled so vividly, was working with businessmen as they had seen it work in the Congressional cloakrooms. So the legislative consensus decided that the old Johnson magic would prevail on business to keep the money coming, and Congress jumped aboard the new Johnson band wagon, relieved to think that this increasingly unpopular responsibility would no longer fall upon it. When the new academic economists saw the business establishment lead Johnson's legislative cronies onto the band wagon, they made the vote of confidence unanimous, on the practical enough assumption that, if

more business investment would substitute for more Government spending, the most fruitful contribution Government could make would, indeed, be the tax cut they had been advocating anyway.

Johnson's new best friends in the business establishment and the Kennedy academics he inherited shared a common enthusiasm for strong stock markets, the corporate executives because they wanted stock prices to go up enough to make their options worth exercising and the new economists because they wanted their new boss to trust their recommendations. But if sometimes the two groups agreed, other times they did not. At the outset, Johnson was not aware that he was better off when his old and his new economists disagreed, neutralizing each other and insuring him against the high cost of acting on the advice of either. Not until it was too late for him to recoup his losses did he realize that any time a President acts on a consensus of old and new economists—as Johnson did in going all out for his ill-timed and ineffective surtax of 1968—he takes his political life in his hands.

Where Johnson all along handled assurances from the military with care, and kept his military advisors on a tight rein from the day he took office (going as far during the Vietnam war as to veto decisions on which hills to bomb and specifying at what angles airmen were to circle authorized targets), he was as reckless at the outset in acting on the assurances of his economic advisors as any eager stock-market newcomer ever was in mistaking a hot tip as a certainty. Where Johnson's sophisticated sense of the military power structure alerted him to the built-in class distinction between presentation makers and decision makers, his parting shot at Nixon's incoming Secretary of the Treasury revealed that he was unaware of a corresponding class distinction between advisors and chiefs in the financial power structure. Johnson made the double mistake of treating his military chiefs as if they were personal instruments whom he could control once they were activated, while he treated his economic advisors as gurus whom he could count on for infallible guidance.

In short, Johnson behaved as if he were unaware of the existence of the war he was masterminding on his own private wires. Because he looked down on military expertise from his own experience of it, he underestimated the power that gravitates to the military in time of war, even when the orders they follow limit their freedom of action. And because Johnson looked up to economic expertise as long as he remained innocent of firsthand experience of it, he

overestimated the capacity of the economic mind to function in the political jungle under wartime conditions—especially when it did not know that there was a war on and when he had no intention of telling it that there was. The old saw about no one being able to pull out of a hat anything that wasn't in it to begin with applies to computers: No matter how high-powered they may be, their findings are only as usable as the premises that are fed into them. Johnson jammed the computers of his economists by dictating the premises to be used. Little wonder that at the end he felt disserved and actually cheated when the conclusions they fed back to "their President" failed to alert him to the consequences of his own deception. Clients consult counsel at their peril when they fail to tell counsel what it must know in order to serve them. Johnson's arrogant handling of his military advisors and his prayerful reliance on his economic counselors exposed him to double jeopardy. Right down to his last day in office, his generals took his orders as unflaggingly as he took the advice of his economists. The war was lost in Vietnam and the Affluent Society was defeated at home—all because of what was essentially an error in programing.

The unmistakable mark of both programmer and expert, as well as their fatal flaw, is a willingness to execute assignments rather than questioning the policy behind them. Errors on the part of the experts are generally small enough to be quantitative and are more or less cheaply corrected without forcing sea changes in social direction. When the economic experts set their sights on a four percent rate of unemployment among a work force of 75,042,000 and a 3½ percent rate results instead, the miscalculation stirs up more or less good-natured second-guessing among the professional fraternity, but no permanent harm is done and no upheaval is forced. But when the complaint is tolerated at the policy level and the need for a cure is denied until the numbers themselves become less important than the condition of joblessness, the problem outgrows the reach of quantitative analysis and its solution becomes dependent upon a new qualitative analysis—by new policy makers. Social breakdowns big enough to be demoralizing result from policy failures: like the Depression, these are breakdowns too big to need measuring.

If experts at the computer-tending level could only be assured that their clients at the policy-making level would ask them the relevant questions, they could assure their clients that they would always come up with workable recommendations. The difficulty built into communication between experts and their clients—partic-

ularly between economic and military experts and their political clients—arises from the fact that the formulation of policy generally requires an exercise in qualitative analysis, while its implementation at the working level always calls for quantification by the technical staff. But again and again, the politicians put their experts to work quantifying old problems after the politicians have already moved on to the formulation of new ones. This was what went wrong during the formative phase of the Vietnam crisis. It was where Johnson went wrong and it was how he misled his experts. After he set out to win the war in Vietnam, he told his economic advisors to take the measurements of the Great Society—as if he meant to keep the war small enough to spare the economists the need to worry about it. Moreover, he neglected to alert his economic advisors to the advice he was getting from his military chiefs that the war was winnable. The patter of his running dialog with the members of his Pentagon team went on about "how much more we need to do to scare them off" and "if we do a little more, maybe they'll back off." Bill Moyers, who was Johnson's most intimate staff aide at that stage of his Presidential career, and also the one most alert to the entrapment threatening in Vietnam and most anxious for a commitment of priorities to domestic welfare projects, looked back on what happened during that fateful time as "an expression of the worst side of Johnson's nature, as a commitment to action for action's sake. He got in too deep and kept getting in deeper," Moyers recalled early in the Nixon Administration, "without having any idea how he meant to get out." At the same time, the better side of Johnson's nature led him to reach, with frenetic overenthusiasm, for sycophantic exercise in utopianism, publicized at the time as "the TVA on the Mekong Delta." A former New Deal assistant to Abe Fortas, by that time a permanent United Nations official, had presented the Mekong Delta project to Johnson as reassurance that, like Roosevelt before him, he could, indeed, keep his war an authentic New Deal crusade. Of course, his economic advisors could meanwhile have read in the public prints that General Goodpaster was insisting publicly, as all the generals were advising Johnson in private, that "Victory can be won in Vietnam."

As the great debate over Vietnam flared up and superseded every other consideration, first establishing the war as the issue and then focusing on Johnson's plausibility as the issue overshadowing even the war, Johnson's most authoritative spokesman was Defense Sec-

retary Robert McNamara. By that time, McNamara had become *de facto* deputy President by virtue of his self-advertised, officially respected and properly accepted reputation for expertise in quantitative analysis. McNamara employed the logic of the computer to minimize the importance of Vietnam. The smaller he claimed it to be in public (while in private supporting the assertions of the generals that making it bigger was the way to win it), the less of a diversion his critics could charge it was from the mandate Johnson had won in 1964. McNamara's response to the passions stirred up by the Administration's miscalculation in Vietnam was to present a ratio: If the Gross National Product had come to be counted in the hundreds of billions, the budgeted cost of Vietnam could still be reckoned as a nominal percentage (which he originally calculated at nine percent when Vietnam was admitted to be costing only 20 billion dollars a year, and which he adjusted downward by something like half when the real cost of the war was admitted to be something like twice as much, justifying the statistical exercise because the resultant inflation had driven the Gross National Product up more). If the budgeted cost of Vietnam was admittedly creeping upward, McNamara argued, nevertheless the Gross National Product was continuing to jump by tens of billions at a time, guaranteeing to keep the burden minor. In other words, McNamara invoked the very inflation Vietnam had irritated to talk down the alarm the war provoked and to demonstrate that its impact was easing when, in fact, it was sharpening.

Despite the pretensions of the war-game players, the logic of the computer is singularly unsuited for analyzing the complicated phenomenon of warmaking. War is not an abstract hypothesis or a rigorously rational proposition. Wars and crises are infections, and their logic is the logic of pathology. The question about a war or a crisis arising from a war is whether the head of the government has the power to localize it—as, for example, Bismarck demonstrated that he had and as, in fact, Johnson admitted that he did not, when he and McNamara based their dealings with Russia on the assumption that she would take time out from arming his enemy to end his war for him. A war is the military equivalent of an infection. If localized, it calms down and is forgotten; if not, it flares up and becomes a carrier of poison throughout the system. McNamara's blunder lay in confusing the algebra measuring the infected area with the pathology of the infectious process. Truman had managed

to localize his Korean War militarily, even though his economic mobilization for war represented a studied exercise in expansion. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the massive inflationary consequences of the Korean economic mobilization, the crisis was limited in its military, political and economic consequences, so that the test of strength in Korea did not weaken the American social system to the point of exposing it to an infection too virulent to be confined.

The paradox of Johnson's Vietnam war (he bitterly resented that designation, insisting that it was "America's war" just as American opinion was repudiating the war) was that, while it remained limited militarily, it did not remain limited socially. More paradoxical yet, the restraint that limited its military scope was the very infection its economic and intellectual backlash spread through America's social system. The infection proved fatal to Johnson's promise to create a Great Society and, in the process, it killed America's older promise to administer the *Pax Americana*.

Because McNamara's appeal to the quantitative logic of the computer ignored the qualitative logic of the spread of a virulent infection, Johnson was unprepared to see his commitment to Vietnam become so overpowering that it reversed his domestic priorities and frustrated his original commitments to stabilize the economy and to expand it to the ghetto. The ideals of America's Affluent Society had wandered far afield in the decade since its age of innocence, when, under the protective cover of Eisenhower's assurance of Peace and Prosperity, Galbraith had discussed its conspicuous virtues. Johnson's calculated exercise in political deception—no doubt it was also an exercise in personal self-deception—rationalized the propaganda about pacification in Vietnam as if Saigon could be merchandised as a model city for democracy in the Asiatic jungle. This bet that it could doomed the hope that America could finance model cities for itself in time to shield its affluence from the despair and violence latent in American society. Johnson's miscalculations reversed the terms of the test of strength he had set out to impose on Vietnam. The question he had originally posed—about how long North Vietnam could stand the strain—became the question he forced America to ponder for itself.

Johnson's failure, which led to Nixon's take-over, confronted not merely Nixon but every participant in the crisis over which Nixon found himself presiding. Johnson had left a legacy of "instant lawmanship": Pass a law and solve a problem. Actually, this was something

of an American tradition, far predating Lyndon Johnson. Slavery had represented an obvious abuse; and, after the abolitionists and the moderates had finally combined at great cost to legislate a prohibition against it, it remained an obvious abuse, but at least it was illegal. In the post-Civil War era, big-business combinations had made too much of a good thing for themselves and enough of a bad thing for others to pose a problem. Legislation—all the way from the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the reduction of the tariff—had promised to solve the problem. But, as the lawyers say, the case was won and the client remained in litigation.

The most celebrated fiasco of instant lawmanship was staged during the combined phase of synthetic hedonism and puritanical revival that maintained the "noble experiment," as it was called, in the prohibition of alcoholic beverages. Alcoholism had been identified as a social abuse, and therefore the hoodlums made common cause with the reformers to pass a law that made the bootleggers rich and gave organized crime its start as a major growth business.

Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal was addicted to instant lawmanship—it was sophisticated in its standard technique of mobilizing redundant legislative programs to fill the gap left by ineffective and self-contradictory economic policies. Roosevelt's repeated response to evidence of sluggishness in the economy was to pass a new set of laws to create a new set of alphabet agencies, instead of groping for simple policies that would avoid such increasingly complicated and unworkable administrative complexes. Truman had an alibi for his systematic retreat from policy making to slogan slinging while he out-Roosevelted Roosevelt in his advocacy of instant lawmanship. He was happily spared the responsibility for administering the lost causes that he fought for during his term.

When Eisenhower's turn came, he hewed stubbornly to one policy line: never to yield to the temptation to be drawn openly into a military engagement. (His start-up venture in Vietnam was an exception to his policy only in substance, because the commitment was kept secret.) In the domestic area, he substituted drift for both policies and programs.

Kennedy had captured the imagination of the country on TV at a time of critical transition from the years of Eisenhower's passivity, when the overorganization of society had left the individuals in it haunted by a sense of inadequacy, if not downright irrelevance. At the level of popular fantasy, Jack and Jackie had staged a revival of the glamorous legend

of Camelot, in modern dress and in real life, for everyone to see. To their fellow adventurers in opinion making, they had promised, as Gloria Steinem said, nothing less than a new Periclean age.

Like Kennedy, Johnson started out by capturing the imagination of the country. Unlike Kennedy, he owed the hold he won on public confidence to no glamorous posturings. On the contrary, his personality was downright repulsive, embodying the typical television watcher's caricature of a political wheeler-dealer. But for just this reason, Johnson generated a distinctive and respectful appeal, which was irresistible while it lasted. The public's confidence in Johnson lasted as long as Johnson's political magic worked where it counted—with Congress—and not a day longer. Kennedy had represented a reversion to the Truman technique of instant lawmanship advocated but not passed—and thus not needing to be administered. Johnson represented a reversion to Roosevelt's reliance upon legislative overkill; like Roosevelt, Johnson got his laws passed, and thus was held responsible for administering them. And like Roosevelt, Johnson ran his version of instant lawmanship without policy guidance. No one could have passed more laws than Johnson, but the policies he stumbled into finally negated the benevolent thrust of them all.

Looking back on Johnson's 1964 honeymoon with Congress, while he was still persuading his former associates to legislate Kennedy's programs, one after the other, Daniel Patrick Moynihan recalled that what surfaced as the all-important poverty legislation "represented not a choice among policies so much as a collection of them." Legislative action for action's sake, Moynihan complained, came to dominate a program-packaging operation, so that priority of purpose was lost in the ensuing shuffle of excitement.

The average voters who gave Johnson a good "job rating"—until they turned against him and wanted him fired—did not know how Johnson did his job any more than he knew how to explain it to them. They were the members of what David Riesman called "the lonely crowd"; and they participated in its moods and decisions in the solitary confinement of their living rooms, linked to one another, to the White House and to the violence in Vietnam and in the streets by the television tube. The institutionalization of the modern television audience built a sensitive and continuous new dependence on political management into economic society. Many provocative old themes and slogans won an uneasy new lease on life—subject to the moods and whims of the well-fed, respectable, tranquilized mob whose mem-

bers depended on television for their connection with the worlds of both reality and make-believe. A continuous circus was staged. The spectators could not be manipulated by rations of bread—they had all the cake they could eat.

Every man's home had become a castle crackling with power. Every man could play at being a king, sitting in front of the tube, enforcing his decrees on politicians, policies, products and the pollsters who rate them all. The kingfish in the White House was on notice that any management failure on his part would turn the lonely crowd into a lynch mob. To keep them quiet and watching from outside the orbit of power, a manipulator was wanted at its center—and, in the person of Lyndon Johnson, he was appreciated for what he was as long as he functioned as what he was. Before the loose alliance of the establishment of bigness—beginning with Big Government, including Big Business, Big Labor, Big Agriculture, and by no means excluding Big Education and Big Welfare—faced the challenge to grow into the Great Society, it had come to be held together by the belief that a master politician could be trusted to hold it together and by the evidence that the economic pudding being enjoyed by everyone had been baked by the experts who talked only to him. Earlier societies had tried and failed to fulfill the promise of continuous movement toward a better life for their citizens. But they, less ambitious than the Affluent Society, had aspired merely to continuous betterment, not absolute greatness.

In order to tranquilize and lead the Affluent Society, Johnson needed only to finance his programs to provide policy continuity for his experts and atmospheric continuity for his crowd of silent followers. The mechanics of fiscal politics had replaced the need for any philosophy of social purpose—that is, as long as the mechanics of fiscal politics worked. The mechanics of fiscal politics had become the crucial framework holding the Affluent Society together as the plausible precursor to that Great Society over the horizon. And, for a brief time, fiscal politics *did* work, in miraculous defiance of remembered assertions and expected reassertions about the economic equivalent of the law of gravity. Suddenly, what went up did not come crashing down. As long as these policies worked, the momentum of money flows animating the economy was accepted as a reliable measure of the effectiveness of national purpose.

If, however, the methods of politics once failed to finance the continuous circus, and if the lonely, well-fed, well-housed, tranquilized, respectable army participating in the TV fun turned violent and took to the streets, no counter-

violence ordered from Washington could hope to rule it. But as long as the Big Society looked better than it was and had a chance to grow into a Great Society without falling apart, Johnson was free to govern its members, to keep his mandate and to hold the Affluent Society together as a going society. It was intelligible philosophically and it was doable politically. It was not too good to be true, but it did depend on what Lyndon Johnson's sponsor and mentor, Franklin Roosevelt, liked to call "an iffy proposition." For the trouble was that the independence that the Affluent Society gave its President from the politics of principle left him dependent on the experts who dominated the practical mechanics—specifically those of fiscal politics. Politically, Johnson was as vulnerable to violent change as he seemed invulnerable, as long as he operated behind the façade of continuity. Socially, the veneer of the Affluent Society was as flimsy as it seemed solid. When the political storm that drove Johnson from power cracked society's surface, it revealed a whirl of confusion and activity against a background that was big, rich and prone to violence—but no longer a society.

Johnson's failure determined the shape of the challenge Richard Nixon found awaiting him. In assessing the options open to him for selecting the areas of continuity and change, instant lawmanship obviously seemed the course to avoid. For after a full generation of growth, the apparatus of Big Government had taken on elephantine proportions. Every one of its functions—from the making of strategic policy to manning the endless crazy quilt of duplicative and competing welfare agencies, and including the agencies wielding the authority to regulate the various sectors of the economy and to finance the Government—had lost the capacity to work with one another, much less to work toward the solution of the problems plaguing American society. Kennedy's characteristically ironical complaint, uttered in reaction to his own recognition that his Administration was developing into an exercise in showmanship rather than performance, was that the President, although expected to run the Government, could no longer even find out what was going on inside it. Johnson subsequently insisted that he not only could manage Government by meddling in it at all levels but that he meant to know every last detail of what was going on inside it, right down to what he could fathom from personal scrutiny of the daily logs the White House drivers turned in, in order that he might check up on who had been driven where and when. The reaction of the Nixon Administration was less personal and more in keeping with the professional character of auditors; namely, that merely to

identify the endless administrative arms of the Federal apparatus was enough to explain the impossibility of making any of them work.

In an interview I published with Dr. Arthur Burns, President Nixon's counselor, in the May 8, 1969, *Chicago Tribune*, Burns summed up a new Administration's problems in this way:

There is an extraordinary continuity in American government. This is both good and bad. A new Administration appoints new Cabinet members. They come from all walks of life and at the start know very little about the intricacies of their new jobs. They depend on assistants to fill them in, and these in turn depend on their assistants. Consequently, you get a cadre of career staff people who stay on from Administration to Administration and provide continuity. The drawback is that they become entrenched and given to doing things in their own way, so that when a new Cabinet member wants to make changes, he has trouble getting his staff to go along.

The pendulum had, indeed, swung since Roosevelt had set out in 1933 to make Government effective by giving it more jobs to do. Nixon set out to make Government more effective by stripping it down to workable simplicity. The root of the difficulties Nixon faced grew from three decades of simplistic faith in instant lawmanship. Each new assurance, from Roosevelt to Johnson, that a problem had been solved because a law had been passed achieved a brief public-relations success for the lawmaker; and each success transferred the burden of responsibility—and the onus of prospective bankruptcy—to the innocent and helpless arms of the bureaucratic octopus charged with fulfilling the promises of instant lawmanship. Roosevelt made the most of this buck-passing process to shift the burden of responsibility from his Presidency to the Government bureaus for which the people's Congress appropriated their money. In his Senate days, Johnson had parlayed his power-oriented legislative leadership and a passive Presidency into an empire strong enough to supplement, if not actually to rival, the Presidency itself. But when he fell heir to the Presidency, he, too, exploited the technique of instant lawmanship to saddle the executive apparatus with the responsibility for future aimlessness of purpose and paralysis of function. The achievements of instant lawmanship proved easier to legislate than to operate.

Nixon was shrewd enough to opt for policy making as the source of his own expertise. He stood pat on programs and concentrated on finding policy priorities. The prudence that prompted Nixon to draw back from the expected speculation on instant lawmanship drew critical fire. But his selection of priorities drew the lines of battle for the 1972 Presidential contest before 1969 was many months old. "Do-nothingism" was not the issue raised against Nixon. On balance, he had far and away the winning side of the argument provoked by his renunciation of instant lawmanship. His critics benefited from the freedom his emphasis on policy gave them to concentrate their fire on his priorities; and his policy-making operation benefited reciprocally from their criticism. The old war he had inherited in Vietnam started out claiming his top priority; and the new war he had proclaimed against inflation claimed his second priority. "People" finished a poor third. But the experts in each area finished first—both in the department of policy making and in the department of policy implementation, where the experts are pre-eminent. Altogether, therefore, while Nixon's strategy for harnessing the uses of Presidential power benefited from Johnson's failure, he himself had ignored Johnson's advice.



FORMAT -- PRESIDENTIAL MEETING BRIEF

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with (Name of Individual or Group)
September 26, 1969 (Date)
10:00 a.m. (20 minutes)
(Time meeting to start and, in parenthesis,
time allotted for President's participation)

I. PURPOSE

State concisely (in one or two sentences) the true purpose or purposes of the meeting.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background: Pertinent general background information which you feel the President should be aware of before the meeting ... if any. But include here at least a short statement telling who requested the meeting. If necessary to submit more than 3-4 sentences of background information, attach other than the most essential details at a Tab, and so indicate.

B. Participants: A listing of all programmed participants and a very brief identification of each. List too the name(s) of the staff member(s) who will sit in. (Always confirm these names with Mr. Chapin's office during final preparation of the paper.)

If there are to be more than 5 total participants, attach the list of names at a Tab, and so indicate.

When the President should know of particular personal matters relevant to one or more of the participants, such information should be included in this section.

C. Press Plan: State very simply the press plan which has been coordinated and approved; for example -- "There will be a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting, and Messrs. Shultz and Ehrlichman will brief the press afterward" or "Ollie Atkins will take 2-3 quick photos" or "After a mid-meeting photo opportunity you will state to the press the purpose of the conference and the goals of the two task forces" or "No photos; no press involvement" with Mr. Ziegler,

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NOTE: Continue numbering in order, but beyond this point include only the appropriate sections.

III. ACTION SEQUENCE
(optional)

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IV. PROBABLE TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION) OF VISITOR(S), AND RECOMMENDED RESPONSES (RR)
(optional)

- A. A major talking point or point of discussion which you expect the visitor to bring up.

RR: State concisely the response recommended for the President.

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V. RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION)
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- A. Identify a recommended talking point or point of discussion preferably in words sufficient only to convey the thought or idea.
- B. Identify the next topic or talking point.

VI. OTHER POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE
(optional)

- A. A statement relative perhaps to a personal matter if the President's mentioning the subject will serve a worthwhile purpose.
- B. A word or two about a particular administration program or policy, or about a legislative matter, when doing so will be beneficial.

VII.
(optional)

ISSUES (TOPICS, POINTS, ITEMS, etc.) TO AVOID

- A. Cite only those subjects which should not be discussed ... (or mentioned).
- B. State the reason(s) for your word of caution if you believe that information will be important to the President.

VIII.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1969

TO: JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM: BUD KROGH *BK*
SUBJECT: SIX MONTH OBJECTIVES

I DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

- A. To insure that the subway and freeway systems proceed according to schedule.
- B. To rectify current unacceptable staffing in the District of Columbia Government.
- C. To pursue all measures available to reduce crime in the District of Columbia.

II JUSTICE DEPARTMENT

- A. To urge quick implementation of improving correctional techniques in the federal penal system.
- B. To insure that a high-level effort to curtail heroin smuggling is begun and showing substantial results by the six months period ending in April.

III INTERIOR

- A. To develop a comprehensive effort on environmental improvement working with OST and other departments as well as Interior. To insure that a satisfactory structure is located in the Executive Office of the President which can consider broad-gauge environmental questions.
- B. To put together an effective water pollution abatement program consistent with our budgetary restrictions.

IV TRANSPORTATION

- A. To insure that legislation to increase the weight, width, and length of buses and trucks is not based on any form inconsistent with the President's position.
- B. To follow implementation of the urban mass-transit program introduced by the President in July.


MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1969

TO: TOD HULLIN

FROM: EDWARD L. MORGAN 

SUBJECT: SIX MONTH OBJECTIVES

The following are the most important goals and objectives of this office for the coming six-month period, October '69 through March '70:

1. Complete hearings on Welfare legislation
2. Evaluate interim reports on, and determine future course for:
Ghetto Insurance
Drugs under Medicare
3. Complete proposals for revamping the service provisions of the Social Security Act
4. Complete the President's 1969 tax return and transfer all bookkeeping to Kalmbach's office.
5. Complete appraisal of Presidential Papers
6. Present for the President's signature a new Executive Order on Emergency Preparedness
7. Continue review of Executive Orders, CAB Recommendations, and other legal matters referred to this office for handling.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1969

TO: JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM: HENRY C. CASHEN II ¹ ₂ ³ ₄
SUBJECT: Six-Month Objectives

1. Better and more efficient coordination and cooperation between the various departments and agencies and the White House. This would include framing Administration policy, resolution of interagency conflicts, clearing testimony, etc.. Generally, insure that we know what the departments are doing before it happens and also that the departments know where to go at the White House to present their problems.

2. An evaluation of the present model cities program to determine (a) whether the program can be improved and exist successfully; or (b) whether it should be slowly phased out. A good deal of this will depend upon the report of the Banfield task force and give us leverage to move either way.

3. Determination as to whether the antitrust policy presently voiced by Justice is headed in the right direction and if not how should the policy be so adjusted to reflect Administration positions. McLaren, Commerce and the Council of Economic Advisers all being queried.

4. Continued coordination with the BOB and the departments and agencies to do whatever possible to remain within the projected fiscal budgets.

This list could keep going with issue comments but as we have discussed paragraph 1 presents our basic objective.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1969

FOR: Alex Butterfield

FROM: Bud Wilkinson *(W)*

The goals for this office during the next six months are as follows:

1. To bring into being the recommendations of our memorandum to the President of September 18, 1969, urging the establishment of youth affairs offices in the appropriate departments and agencies, and the creation of a quasi-governmental youth council.
2. To develop a basic Administration policy on the misuse of drugs that would be supported by all concerned departments and agencies. (I chair an ad hoc committee on drug abuse that is now working on this problem.) In addition, this office will see that the Ad Council's campaign on drug abuse gets under way.
3. To work closely with Secretary Romney to see that the National Program of Voluntary Action is launched in the near future. This office will continue to direct the college volunteer program until the National Program can take it over.
4. To be sure that the 1970 White House Conference on Children and Youth is organized effectively and focuses on meaningful problems. We have already made considerable progress on this point.
5. To oversee the operations of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, which must report to the President by July 4, 1970.
6. To work with the U. S. Olympic Committee, the sports federations and the AAU to settle the current athletic controversy. (We are now working on our plan to solve the problem, and are prepared to supply full details.)
7. If approved by the White House, to set up a plan for visits to various campuses by appropriate White House staff members.
8. To develop more effective summer programs for the President's Council on Youth Opportunity. (I now serve as vice chairman of the Council.)

Mr. Alexander Butterfield--2

October 10, 1969

9. To improve the executive intern and White House intern programs for next summer.

10. To continue to represent the Administration through political speeches and appearances on TV shows.

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TO: ALEX BUTTERFIELD (For the President)

FROM: P. J. BUCHANAN

NEWS SUMMARY

November 29, 1969
(AP & UPI, 11/27)

VIETNAM

The S. Vietnamese government repeated that it will never accept a coalition government in any form or grant territorial concessions to the Viet Cong. The Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement to clear up what it termed a misunderstanding of remarks by Ambassador Lodge after the Paris talks Wednesday.

* *

Izvestia blamed "the highest authorities of the U.S." for the alleged massacre. Izvestia also said the incident was not "the sole case of genocide" committed by U.S. troops in Vietnam. "If we are to trace the whole chain of events, it was the highest authorities of the United States that were behind Lieutenant Calley," the paper said.

* *

Cyrus Eaton said he is going to Hanoi "to find out what the U.S. should do to end the war."

* *

Theodore Sorensen said he fears the alleged massacre may tend to revive isolationism "as the details sink into the American public." "The people did not fully grasp the horror of what happened in at least one village and possibly in others," Sorensen said. "I am afraid America may have already lost her soul."

* *

Porno publisher Ralph Ginzburg accused the Army with refusing to investigate charges that American helicopter pilots have been killing Vietnamese civilians "for sport." Ginzburg said the charges were made in a 1967 article in his avant-garde magazine, "But were completely ignored." "Apparently the Army wanted to hush up the charges in the same way that it hushed up the Song My massacre for nearly two years," Ginzburg said.

* *

A former infantryman says he "witnessed many civilians being shot down like clay pigeons" while he served in the Chu Lai area. In one incident U.S. troops "shot into the village at people walking around. There you are with machine guns and they have none." Afterward, Reid said, "We counted 60 dead bodies -- women, children and maybe a few old and decrepit men." He said that he witnessed action by U.S. soldiers that "turned my stomach." "I, with many of my comrades, had seen at least 100 Vietnamese lying in rice paddies shot -- women taken for intercourse and then shot. A private cannot get up and say what he thinks. You are a puppet on a string, especially in a war zone. What I learned out of war is that man does what he believes in. If I had been a man, I probably would have gone to jail for five years. So I played the game in order to get home."

* * * *

NATO

Brussels -- the US and its Western Allies plan a new peace bid to the Soviet Union to end the cold war in Europe, responsible Western allied sources said. They will do so at the annual session of NATO Dec. 3-5. The Alliance plans to call on the Soviets and their Warsaw pact allies to join it in balanced mutual reduction of armed forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain in Europe. It also will call on Moscow to join in a serious effort to reduce the causes of East-West tensions on the continent.

* * * *

MIDEAST

London diplomatic sources said US-USSR efforts to work out a joint peace formula for the Middle East have all but foundered. Prospects for any early successful initiatives by the two powers are dim in view of the worsening of the Arab-Israeli crisis.

* * * *

HUNGER

Dr. Mayer has warned the head of a private anti-hunger organization that it could lose its tax-exempt status if it continues to attack White House aides and Congressmen. The warning went to John Kramer, Executive Director of the National Council on Hunger and Malnutrition. An exchange of sharply worded letters between the two was made public by the Wash. Star. "I think the time has come," Kramer wrote Mayer, "for you to decide whether your conference, as opposed to the rest of the government, is going to be closed society. That is the policy adopted in June when you excluded everybody but your close personal friends from the planning structure for the conference... Mayer said Kramer was complaining that he was not involved. He also said that Kramer told him "that you disliked our national administration so much that you hated to think of anything it did succeeding, even the conference. You have followed up your candid statement with a most thorough hatchet job... "

* * * *

FCC

The FCC absolved the Post-Newsweek radio and television stations of charges of news distortion and undue concentration of media control. It voted 5-0 to renew for three years the licenses of WTOP-AM, FM and TV. The stations are owned by the Washington Post.

* * * *

AGNEW

The ACLU said Vice President Agnew's criticisms of the media represent "a deliberate and concerted attack... on a central American freedom." The ACLU letter to "friends of the first amendment"

said Agnew's attacks indicate he and his supporters "either do not understand or do not believe in the free press." It asked newsmen and editors to "stand firm in their rights to resist pressures from the government which intrudes upon professional news judgment."

* *

55% questioned in a Sindlinger poll said they believed VP Agnew was doing a good job as Vice President and agreed with his attacks on network news. 86% correctly identified Agnew as Vice President or a government official. 14% said he was doing a bad job overall and 31% gave no opinion.

* * * *

MINERS

Government investigators said that United Mine Workers president Tony Boyle raised salaries of some union officials without the required approval of the Executive Board. The Labor Department also said that union officials were routinely approved for unvarified expenses. In addition, the Department reported that the top three union officers had set up a \$1.5 million fund to give themselves retirement pensions at full salary, and that a number of relatives of Boyle, other top union officers were on the union payroll.

* * * *

COURT

At least three women are among those being considered for nomination to the Supreme Court now that Haynsworth has been rejected, Attorney General Mitchell said. Mitchell said he believes a law against appointing members of Congress to positions for which they have voted a pay raise would rule any lawmaker out. "If you had a college professor, you wouldn't have the same problem of going through Court cases for possible conflict," Mitchell said. He quickly added that no inference should be drawn that a non-Judge was a frontrunner for the nomination.

* *

The Attorney General smilingly attributed the controversial comments of his wife about "liberal communists" to the fact "she doesn't understand the vernacular." He said he had read some of the letters to the editor in the Washington Post about Mrs. Mitchell and chuckled over one which compared her to Marie Antoinette.

* *

James Allison, Deputy Chairman of the RNC, said he thinks Mrs. Mitchell "went a little too far" in quoting her husband.

* * * *

FESTIVAL

Gov. Kirk paid a call on thousands of youths massed for a mud-bogged rock festival and ordered one of them arrested with a warning that he wouldn't tolerate Florida becoming a playground for hippies. He ordered the boy's arrest following a brief conversation in which he asked the long-haired youngster how he felt. The teenager responded "pretty good" but refused to tell Kirk where he was from. "Take him," said Kirk, gesturing to the sheriff. "These kids think they can play in Florida," Kirk said. "Well, they are wrong. You can't play anywhere in this State or in Palm Beach County." (also reported by CBS)

* * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

December 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Additional Information on
My Lai Incident

Attached are some additional chronologies
on the Department of the Army's handling
of the My Lai incident.

Attachment

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

3 December 1969

SENSITIVE

Captain Murphy:

Attached, in response to your request, are two chronologies:

1. IG investigation into the My Lai (4) incident, and
2. CID phase of the My Lai (4) incident.

K. B. Cooper, Colonel, GS
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

SENSITIVE

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1 December 1969

SUBJECT: IG Investigation into My Lai (4) Incident

The Secretary of the General Staff referred Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour's letter to the Inspector General on 23 April 1969 and directed him to conduct an investigation concerning the allegations contained in the letter and related matters. The Inspector General's investigation was conducted by Colonel William V. Wilson, one of the three field inspectors in the Office of The Inspector General, between 23 April and 4 August 1969. It resulted in the collection of more than 1000 pages of testimony and the referral of the case to The Provost Marshal General.

A total of thirty-six (36) witnesses (twelve (12) civilians and twenty-four (24) military) from all parts of the country were questioned during The Inspector General's investigation.

Discussion

Following the referral of Ridenhour's letter to The Inspector General on 23 April, the investigation proceeded as rapidly as could be expected. Ridenhour was interviewed in Phoenix, Arizona, on 29 April, Gruver (3 May - Oklahoma City); Terry (2 May - Orem, Utah); Doherty (5 May - Fort Hood, Texas), LaCroix (2 May - Fort Carson, Colorado); and Bernhardt (8 May - The Pentagon), all of whom were referred to in Ridenhour's letter were interviewed shortly thereafter. During the course of Colonel Wilson's investigation, he learned the names of other possible witnesses. It took a

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substantial amount of time to interview these individuals, particularly in view of the considerable amount of travel time involved because of dispersion of the witnesses. (A list of the persons interviewed and the location of the interview is attached.) The last two witnesses (Meadlo and Storms) were interviewed in Terre Haute, Indiana, on 16 July. Colonel Wilson's report was prepared and arrangements were made to transfer the case and all relevant documentation to the Provost Marshal General between 16 July and 4 August.

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23 July 1969

LIST OF WITNESSES

(Pinkville Case)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Place Interviewed (Duty Station)</u>	<u>Date</u>
1. Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour	Phoenix, Ariz.	29 Apr
2. Mr. Michael B. Terry	Orem, Utah	1 May
3. SGT (E-5) Lawrence C. La Croix	Ft Carson, Colo.	2 May
4. Mr. Charles D. Gruver	Oklahoma City, Okla.	3 May
5. Mr. Richard Wayne Wyatt	Oklahoma City, Okla.	3 May
6. SP 4 William F. Doherty	Ft Hood, Texas	5 May
7. CPT Thomas K. Willingham	OTIG (Ft Meade)	8 May
8. SGT Michael A. Bernhardt	OTIG (Ft Dix)	8 May
9. CPT Robert L. Hauck	Ft Benning, Ga.	12 May
10. CPT Ernest L. Medina	Ft Benning, Ga.	13 May
11. SSG Manuel Lopez	Ft Benning, Ga.	13 May
12. MAJ Charles C. Calhoun	OTIG (Ft Monroe)	19 May
13. SGT Jay A. Buchanan	OTIG (Ft Bragg)	20 May
14. SGT L. G. Bacon	Ft Jackson, S. C.	22 May
15. SFC Isaiah Cowan	Ft Jackson, S. C.	23 May
16. COL Oran K. Henderson	OTIG (USARHAW)	26 May
17. SSG David Mitchell	OTIG (Ft Hood)	26 May
18. LTC William D. Guinn, Jr.	OTIG (Pentagon)	28 May
19. MAJ Frederic W. Watke	OTIG (Ft Leavenworth)	2-3 Jun
20. 1LT William L. Calley, Jr.	OTIG (Ft Benning)	9 Jun

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Name	Place Interviewed (Duty Station)	Date
21. CW2 Hugh C. Thompson, Jr.	OTIG (Ft Rucker)	11,12,13 Jun
22. Mr. Roy L. A. Wood	Richmond, Va.	11 Jun
23. Mr. Roger D. Murray	Waukegan, Ill.	14 Jun
24. Mr. John H. Paul	OTIG (West Collings- wood, N. J.)	16 Jun
25. CW2 Dan R. Millians	OTIG (Ft Wolters)	18 Jun
26. PFC Lawrence M. Colburn	OTIG (Ft Hood)	19 Jun
27. SGT Esequiel Torres	OTIG (Ft Bragg)	20 Jun
28. CPT Stephen J. Gamble	OTIG (Ft Sill)	23 Jun
29. MAJ Glen D. Gibson	OTIG (HQ Sixth US Army)	25 Jun
30. Mr. Ronald D. Grzesik	Springfield, Mass.	26 Jun
31. Mr. Dennis R. Vazquez	Williamsburg, Va.	1 Jul
32. Mr. Diego Rodriguez	Fort Worth, Texas	9 Jul
33. Mr. Andress Delgado	Uvalde, Texas	10 Jul
34. Mr. Frederick Joseph Widmer	New Kensington, Pa.	15 Jul
35. Mr. Paul D. Meadlo	Terre Haute, Ind.	16 Jul
36. Mr. David M. Storms	Terre Haute, Ind.	16 Jul

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3 December 1969

TALKING PAPER

CID Phase of the My Lai (4) Investigation

The Inspector General's investigation revealed that acts in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may have been committed. Accordingly, on 5 August, the Provost Marshal General assumed responsibility for continuing the Department of the Army investigation. The Provost Marshal General directed his Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to proceed immediately with a thorough and detailed criminal investigation. The early part of August was spent reviewing the testimony of witnesses interviewed during the course of the Inspector General's investigation. However, additional interviews, particularly with persons not interviewed during the course of the Inspector General's investigation, were conducted.* By mid-October five individuals assigned to the CID were working on the case on a full time basis. One of the five arrived in South Vietnam on 17 October to coordinate the investigation in that country. The CID group charged with the responsibility for conducting this investigation has recently been augmented. On 1 December a CONUS task force consisting of 20 individuals was assigned to help pursue the investigation. This augmentation will

*Lt. Calley was charged with murder on 5 Sept 69 and on 6 Sept 69 a story appeared in the Columbus, Ga. Inquirer. The charge was confirmed by the public information officer at Ft. Benning pursuant to information provided by the Department of the Army on 4 Sept 69.

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make available at least five additional field investigators.

Additionally, a task force consisting of an additional nine individuals is being organized in Vietnam this week to expand the investigation there. To date, more than 80 individuals, military and civilian, have been interviewed during the CID phase of the Department of the Army's investigation (A list of those interviewed to date is attached). Every effort is being made to develop all the evidence relating to the facts and circumstances involving the incident in My Lai (4). This is a complicated, sensitive, and demanding effort which is being conducted as rapidly as a thorough and professional investigation will permit.

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AUG.

Haeberle, Ronald Lawrence	25 Aug 69	N. Ridgeville, Ohio 5763 Creekside Lane
Simone, Daniel (NMN)	27 Aug 69	22 Englewood Blvd, Trenton, New Jersey
Allen, Joseph Boyce	28 Aug 69	502 Brinley Avenue, Bradley Beach, N. J.
Dursi, James Joseph	29 Aug 69	715 E. 42nd St. Brooklyn, N. Y. 11203
Olsen, Gregory Thomas	30 Aug 69	296th MP Company, 392nd MP Bn, Fort Lewis, Washington

SEPT.

Sledge, Charles (NMI)	1 Sep 69	Route 2, Box 576, Sardis, Mississippi
Roberts, Jay Alfred	12 Sep 69	4814 South 1st Street, Arlington, Va. 22204
Garza, George Arsenio	17 Sep 69	507th Med Co (AA), Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234
Lee, Robert James	17 Sep 69	CO A, 1st Bn, Medical Field Service School, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas 78234
Flores, Abel Jr.	18 Sep 69	1135 NW 36th St. San Antonio, Texas 78228
Mauro, Robert Martin	18 Sep 69	1516 West 4th Street Brooklyn, N. Y. 11204
Meadlo, Paul David	18 Sep 69	Route 4, Box 533, West Terre Haute, Indiana 47885

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Maples, Robert Earl	18 Sep 69	40 1/2 Avenue A, Freehold, N. J. 07728
Santellana, Eusebio Banda Jr.	19 Sep 69	1546 W Pyron Ave, San Antonio, Texas 78211
La Cross, Jeffrey Urban	19 Sep 69	Lake Leelanau, Michigan
Polston, Larry Owen	20 Sep 69	Co A, 7th Bn, 6th Inf, 2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood, Texas 76547
Bain, Chester Mack	20 Sep 69	Hq & Hq Co, 1st Arm Div, Ft Hood, Texas 76545
Starkie, Preston Harris	21 Sep 69	Hq & A Co, 124th Maint B 2d Armd Div, Fort Hood, Texas
Oliphent, John Lewis	21 Sep 69	C Co, 2nd Bn, 46th Inf, 1st Ard Div, Fort Hood, Texas
Cabral, George Joseph Jr.	22 Sept 69	HHC, 7th Bn, 6th Inf, 2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood Texas 76546
Lamartina, Salvatore Sgt.	22 Sep 69	HHC, 7th Bn, 6th Inf, Fort Hood, Texas 76546
Fagan, Martin Edward	22 Sep 69	Co C, 4th Bn, 46th Inf, 3rd Bde, 1st AD, Fort Hood, Texas 76544
Maroney, Leo Milton	23 Sep 69	Co B, 1st Bn, 41st Inf, 2nd AD, Fort Hood, Texas 76544

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OCTOBER

Emerson, James Henry	6 Oct 69	123 Middle St. Old Town, Maine
Mower, John Richard	6 Oct 69	P.O. Box 107, Shippenburg Pa. 17257
Holland, David	7 Oct 69	821 - 3d Ave. , Duncanville, P
Grezesik, Ronald David	8 October	469 Beech St., Holyoke, Mass.
Widmer, Fredrick Joseph	8 Oct 69	221 Crescent Drive, Lower Burrell, Pa.
Tucker, Robert James	9 Oct 69	228 Janet St. Auburn, New York
Fastiggi, Kim	10 Oct 69	688 Ringwood Avenue, Wanaque, N.J.
Cox, Bruce Umber	10 Oct 69	89 Burgundy Terrace, Amherst, N.Y. 14120
Delpome, Peter Robert	10 Oct 69	Newark, N.J.
Widmer, Joseph P.	11 Oct 69	221 Crescent Drive, Lower Burrell, Pa. 15068
Holland, Howard David	11 Oct 69	821 3rd Avenue Duncanville, Pa, 16635
McBreen, James Michael Jr.	11 Oct 69	177 Covert St., Elmont, N.Y.
Stanley, Harry	14 Oct 69	Apt 28, 1324 Peterson St., Long Beach, Calif.
Lagunoy (Aquilino), Lenny Battallones	15 Oct 69	94459 Kahualena St. Waipahu, Oahu, Hawaii 96797
Marshall, Richard Grant	15 Oct 1969	230 Joseph St. San Jose Calif., 95110
Webster, Jimmy Nolan	16 Oct 69	Intelligence Division, G2, HQ, USARPAC, APO SF 96558

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Martin, Louis Bernard	16 Oct 69	Apt 202, 623 Tully Road Modesto, Calif. 95350
Blackledge, Richard Kurt	17 Oct 69	500th MI Group, Ford Island APO SF 96558
Johnson, John Parker Jr. (SPS)	20 Oct 69	Fort Hauchuca, Arizona
Roberts, Randal Wayne	20 Oct 69	1709 Boyden St., Greensboro, N.C.
Alaux, Roger L. Jr.	21 Oct 69	416 W. Parkway Blvd, Tempe, Arizona
Partsch, Thomas Richard	21 Oct 69	12720 Wanda Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio 44135
Stewart, Johnathan	21 Oct 69	3721 146th St., Cleveland Ohio
Winninger, Randy M.	23 Oct 69	72 Hamilton Park, Columbus, Ohio
Oden, Leonard Guy	23 Oct 69	10324 Eastwood St. Dallas, Texas
Hall, Charles Wayne	24 Oct 69	144 Calshan Rd, Columbus, Ohio 43207
Moss, Tommy Lee	25 Oct 69	380 Caulder Avenue, Spartanburg, S. C.
Doines, Rennard	25 Oct 69	2709 Belzise Terrace Fort Worth, Texas
Konwinski, Joseph Norbert	26 Oct 69	HHC, 11th BDE, Americal Div, APO 96217
Johnson, Dennis Harvey	27 Oct 69	Co D, USINTS, Fort Holabird, Md.
PHU, Nguyen Denk (SGT)	27 Oct 69	CHU LAI, South Vietnam
Wood, Roy Lee Augustus	28 Oct 69	302 West Baker Street, Richmond, Virginia
Hutson, Max Dean	28 Oct 69	Company A, Infantry School Battalion, The Student Brigade Fort Benning, Georgia

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Burnett, Henry Jr. (PSG)	29 Oct 69	The Student Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia
Lopez, Manuel (PSG)	29 Oct 69	Fort Benning, Georgia
Wan, Isaiah (NMN)	30 Oct 69	Company E. 10th Bn, 2d Bde, BCT, Ft Jackson, S. C.
Conti, Dennis Irving	30 Oct 69	HHC, USA Depot, Qui Nhon, APO 96216
Brown, Harold (NMN)	30 Oct 69	Company A, 10th Bn, 2d BCT Bde, Fort Jackson S. C.

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NOV.

Buchanon, Jay (1SG)	3 Nov 69	Fort Bragg, N. C.
Bergthold, James Robert	3 Nov 69	624 6th St. Niagara Falls, New York
Flynn, James Michael	3 Nov 69	207 Paramount Pky Kenmore, N. Y.
Schiel, Kenneth (NMN)	3 Nov 69	Hq Hq Co, 1st Bn, 504th Inf, 82 Abn Div, Fort Bragg, N. C.
Stevenson, Leon James	3 Nov 69	B Troop, 7th of the 1st Air Squadron, 1st Avn Bde APO SF 96357
Anderson, Bruce Michael	4 Nov 69	374 Foxhurst Rd, Oceanside, N. Y.
Cornwell, Smith William	5 Nov 69	6 Baily Drive, Amityville, Long Island, N. Y. 11701
Hunley, Ronnie Victor	5 Nov 69	761 Prospect Place Brooklyn, N. Y.
Carter, Herbert Louis	6 Nov 69	Hou-Tex Hotel, 1206 1/2 Prairie St., Houston, Texas
Graham, Robert B.	6 Nov 69	82d MP Det, 6th Spec Fcs, Ft Bragg, N. C.
Millians, Dan Richard	7 Nov 69	Flight Department A, Flight A-3, US Army Primary Helicopter School & Center, Ft. Wolters, Texas
Thiele, Patrick Allen	7 Nov 69	HHC, 1st Bn, 299th Inf. Schofield Barracks, APO 96557

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Brown, Jimmy L (CW2)	7 Nov 69	Ft. Wolters, Texas
Poteete, Wallace F (CW 2)	7 Nov 69	Ft. Wolters, Texas
Carney, Billy Earl	9 Nov 69	1203 22d Avenue Meridian, Miss 39301
Simpson, Varnado (NMN)	9 Nov 69	1815 Ave K, Jackson, Mississippi 39213
Lloyd, William Calvin	10 Nov 69	4005 34th Street, Tampa, Florida 33610
Jolly, Joe Ted	11 Nov 69	677 Avenue B, S. W. Winterhaven, Fla.
Van Toan, Nguyen BG	15 Nov 69	Commanding General 2nd ARVN Infantry Division
Hutto, Charles Edward	17 Nov 69	Hq & Hq Co, 3rd AIR Bde, Ft Lewis, WA 98433
Bernhardt, Michael Arnold	20 Nov 69	Co A, 1st Bn, 3rd Bde, USATC, Ft. Dix, N. J.
Trinkle, Patrick M.	24 Nov 69	Department of Tactics, USMA, West Point, N. Y.
Koster, Samuel William (MG)	24 Nov 69	Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York 10996

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TALKING PAPER

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Mauro, Robert Martin	18 Sep 69	1516 West 4th Street Brooklyn, N. Y. 11204
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Fagan, Martin Edward	22 Sep 69	Co C, 4th Bn, 46th Inf, 3rd Bde, 1st AD, Fort Hood, Texas 76544
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Wood, Roy Lee Augustus	28 Oct 69	302 West Baker Street, Richmond, Virginia
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Conti, Dennis Irving	30 Oct 69	HHC, USA Depot, Qui Nhon, APO 96216
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Schiel, Kenneth (NMN)	3 Nov 69	Hq Hq Co, 1st Bn, 504th Inf, 82 Abn Div, Fort Bragg, N. C.
Stevenson, Leon James	3 Nov 69	B Troop, 7th of the 1st Air Squadron, 1st Avn Bde APO SF 96357
Anderson, Bruce Michael	4 Nov 69	374 Foxhurst Rd, Oceanside, N. Y.
Cornwell, Smith William	5 Nov 69	6 Baily Drive, Amityville, Long Island, N. Y. 11701
Hunley, Ronnie Victor	5 Nov 69	761 Prospect Place Brooklyn, N. Y.
Carter, Herbert Louis	6 Nov 69	Hou-Tex Hotel, 1206 1/2 Prairie St., Houston, Texas
Graham, Robert B.	6 Nov 69	82d MP Det, 6th Spec Fcs, Ft Bragg, N. C.
Millians, Dan Richard	7 Nov 69	Flight Department A, Flight A-3, US Army Primary Helicopter School & Center, Ft. Wolters, Texas
Thiele, Patrick Allen	7 Nov 69	HHC, 1st Bn, 299th Inf. Schofield Barracks, APO 96557

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Brown, Jimmy L (CW2)	7 Nov 69	Ft. Wolters, Texas
Poteete, Wallace F (CW 2)	7 Nov 69	Ft. Wolters, Texas
Carney, Billy Earl	9 Nov 69	1203 22d Avenue Meridian, Miss 39301
Simpson, Varnado (NMN)	9 Nov 69	1815 Ave K, Jackson, Mississippi 39213
Lloyd, William Calvin	10 Nov 69	4005 34th Street, Tampa, Florida 33610
Jolly, Joe Ted	11 Nov 69	677 Avenue B, S. W. Winterhaven, Fla.
Van Toan, Nguyen BG	15 Nov 69	Commanding General 2nd ARVN Infantry Division
Hutto, Charles Edward	17 Nov 69	Hq & Hq Co, 3rd AIR Bde, Ft Lewis, WA 98433
Bernhardt, Michael Arnold	20 Nov 69	Co A, 1st Bn, 3rd Bde, USATC, Ft. Dix, N. J.
Trinkle, Patrick M.	24 Nov 69	Department of Tactics, USMA, West Point, N. Y.
Koster, Samuel William (MG)	24 Nov 69	Superintendent, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York 10996

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