

## THE FORBIDDEN CITY

The Forbidden City, within the area of Peking which was the center of Imperial rule (The Imperial City), is the site used as the residence of the Emperor and his household during various dynasties over the past 800 years. Common people were forbidden access to this residential area, with its single story dwellings, paved courtyards, and imperial reception rooms such as the Hall of Supreme Harmony and the Hall of Mental Cultivation.

The Forbidden City was first opened to the public by foreign powers who suppressed the Boxer Rebellion. On August 28, 1900 the allied forces\* staged a victory parade across the main courtyards. When the Emperor resumed his residency in 1902, however, the gates were again closed. Chinese royalty finally ceased living in the palaces on November 5, 1924, when former Emperor Hsuan T'ung was summarily evicted from the Forbidden City by the warlord Yu-hsiang, also known as the "Christian General". The palaces were later re-opened to the public and have remained accessible except during the Cultural Revolution.

The Imperial Palace has stood in roughly the same place since the Yuan dynasty (1276-1368). When the third Ming Emperor, Yung Lo, decided to establish the capital of the Empire at Peking (1403), the palace was entirely rebuilt on a new plan, the general outline of which survives today. The work lasted from 1407 to 1420, and over 200,000 workmen were employed.

The Forbidden City is surrounded by a moat 160 feet wide and by walls more than 35 feet high. Covering a 250-acre expanse in the geographical center of Peking, it comprised about one-sixth of the former Imperial city, which housed the administrative and maintenance organizations, granaries, stables, orchards, parks, residences of officials and princes, and some of the palaces and pleasure gardens of the Emperor.

The outer buildings became a museum in 1914. Over 20,000 relics, excavated during the Cultural Revolution, are on display in the Imperial Palace Museum. All of these were discovered by accident during the construction of roads, irrigation channels, buildings and military installations. Perhaps the most exciting discoveries came from the tomb of a Western Han prince and his wife (100 B. C. or earlier): two jade bodysuits joined with fine gold wire--the first of

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\* British, French, Russian, German, Japanese and American

this type of burial dress ever to be excavated. The bodies were apparently enclosed in the jade cases to preserve them. These "jade caskets" served as the burial dress of the great nobility, such as the Emperor, the kings and feudal princes of the Han dynasty. In addition to these treasures, the tomb contained more than 2,800 funerary objects, including bronze vessels, gold, silver and jade objects, pottery lacquer ware, silk fabrics, and chariots and harnesses.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE CEREMONY  
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP  
TO THE PRC

INCLEMENT WEATHER PLAN

Thursday, February 17, 1972

10:10 A.M.

The East Room

THE PRESIDENT:

9:55 a.m.

The Congressional Leadership meeting in the Cabinet Room concludes.

You depart and proceed directly to the private residence where you meet the First Lady.

Those attending the Congressional Leadership meeting will be escorted into the East Room where they will join Members of the Cabinet and their wives in a receiving line along the center of the East Wall.

Also in attendance will be members of the White House staff and guests from the Federal Departments and Agencies.

10:10 a.m.  
(approx.)

You and the First Lady proceed to the State Floor via the elevator and move to the northwest door to the East Room (the door at the head of the stairs leading from the ground level to the first floor).

You and Mrs. Nixon pause for announcement and then enter the East Room, moving through the cordoned-off White House staff and guests, to the east wall where you will shake hands first with Members of the Cabinet and their wives, and the Congressional leaders who attended the earlier meeting.

After moving to the end of the line, you return to the center of the East Room wall, with the Congressmen behind you, and deliver brief remarks to the Press, using a single stand-up microphone.

FULL PRESS COVERAGE, INCLUDING LIVE TV.

10:15 a. m.

Remarks conclude.

You and Mrs. Nixon proceed out of the East Room via the same route by which you entered, move directly to the elevator, and proceed out to the helicopter (or motorcade, should weather prohibit flying) for departure.

10:20 a. m.

Helicopter (or motorcade) departs en route Andrews Air Force Base.

PRESS PHOTO COVERAGE of helicopter or motorcade departing.

  
Stephen Bull

FRIDAY - FEBRUARY 18, 1972

REMAIN IN HAWAII.

PERSONAL/STAFF TIME.

OVERNIGHT.

DEPARTURE FOR GUAM

HAWAII

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1972

1:20 p.m. You and Mrs. Nixon depart by motorcade  
en route Kaneohe MCAS.

1:25 p.m. Motorcade arrives Kaneohe MCAS.

A CROWD IS EXPECTED

PRESS PHOTO POOL COVERAGE  
THERE WILL BE NO OFFICIAL CEREMONY.

Senator Hiram L. Fong (R-Hawaii),  
Admiral McCain and General Armstrong  
will bid you farewell at the foot of the  
ramp.

1:30 p.m. You board S '76 and depart Hawaii en route  
Guam International Airport.

(Flying Time: 7 hrs. 45 mins.)  
(Time Change: - 4 hours)  
(CROSS INTERNATIONAL DATE LINE)

PRESIDENTIAL GUESTS

Secretary of State William P. Rogers  
Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green

DEPARTURE REMARKS -- HAWAII

In 1905 Theodore Roosevelt predicted that "our history will be more determined by our position on the Pacific facing China than by our position on the Atlantic facing Europe."

It is fitting that the last American State we visit on this journey is the westernmost American State, the one with the closest historic and cultural ties to the great peoples of Asia. As we depart, we ask for your support and your prayers -- that our mission will be a success, so that this greatest of oceans can truly be what its name portends -- a sea of peace for all peoples.

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SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1972

5:15 p.m.  
Guam Time  
(9:15 p.m. Sat.  
Feb. 19 Hawaii  
Time)

S '76 arrives Guam International Airport.

A CROWD IS EXPECTED.

PRESS PHOTO POOL COVERAGE.

As you and Mrs. Nixon disembark, the band will play Ruffles and Flourishes and "Hail to the Chief".

You are greeted by:

Governor and Mrs. Carlos Camacho (R)

You and Mrs. Nixon and Governor and Mrs. Camacho, followed by the official party, proceed through a 21-man all service honor guard.

Governor Camacho introduces you and Mrs. Nixon to the following:

Mr. and Mrs. Edward Johnson, High Commissioner,  
The Trust Territories

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1972 - Continued

Lt. Gen. and Mrs. Gerald W. Johnson,  
Commanding General, 3rd Air Division  
Rear Adm. and Mrs. Paul E. Pugh, Commander,  
Naval Forces, Marianas  
Lt. Governor and Mrs. Kurt Moylan  
Senator and Mrs. F. Ramierz, Speaker, Guam  
Legislature

A microphone will be available should you  
wish to make any remarks.

(Suggested remarks attached.)

At the conclusion of the introductions,  
Mrs. Nixon will receive a traditional floral  
lei from Miss Guam, Jeanie Perez.

5:25 p.m.

Board motorcade and depart en route  
Admiral Pugh's residence where you will  
remain overnight.

(Driving Time: 15 minutes)

5:40 p.m.

PERSONAL/STAFF TIME.

DEPARTURE FROM GUAM  
FOR SHANGHAI AND PEKING, CHINA

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1972

6:45 a.m. You and Mrs. Nixon depart via motorcade  
en route Guam International Airport.

7:00 a.m. Arrive Guam International Airport .

A CROWD IS EXPECTED.

PRESS PHOTO POOL COVERAGE.

7:05 a.m. Board S'76 and depart en route Shanghai,  
PRC.

(Flying Time: 3 hrs. 55 mins.)

(Time Change: -2 hours.)

PRESIDENTIAL GUESTS

Secretary Rogers  
Assistant Secretary Green  
Director Jenkins

FOLDERS AND THEIR CONTENTS  
FOR PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

February 17 - 29, 1972

1. Thursday, February 17 and Friday, February 18

Departure from Washington/Arrival in Hawaii

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Departure Scenario  
(Inclement Weather Departure Scenario)
- (c) Remarks for South Lawn

2. Saturday, February 19 and Sunday, February 20

Departure for Guam

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Departure Remarks from Hawaii

3. Monday, February 21

Departure from Guam for Shanghai and Peking

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Departure Remarks from Guam
- (c) Toast for Welcoming Banquet (text)
- (d) Background on Great Hall

4. Tuesday, February 22

Meeting with P.M. Chou  
Cultural Event

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Background on Cultural Event

5. Wednesday, February 23

Meeting with P.M. Chou  
Gymnastic Event

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Background on Gymnastic Event

6. Thursday, February 24

Tour of Great Wall and Ming Tombs  
Meeting with P.M. Chou

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Background on Great Wall and Ming Tombs

7. Friday, February 25

Tour of Forbidden City  
Meeting with P.M. Chou  
Reciprocal Banquet

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Background on Forbidden City
- (c) Scenario for Banquet
- (d) Toast for Banquet (text)

8. Saturday, February 26

Arrival in Hang-Chou

Tour of West Lake

Provincial Revolutionary Committee Banquet

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Background on West Lake
- (c) Toast for Banquet (remarks)

9. Sunday, February 27

Arrival in Shanghai

Industrial Exhibition

Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee Banquet  
and Cultural Show

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Toast for banquet (remarks)

10. Monday, February 28

Departure from Shanghai for Elmendorf AFB, Alaska

Arrival Ceremony at Andrews AFB, Maryland

- (a) Schedule
- (b) Arrival Ceremony Scenario - Andrews AFB
- (c) Arrival Remarks (President)
- (d) Arrival Remarks (First Lady)

Issued:  
Feb. 15, 1972  
5:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE  
FOR THE TRIP TO  
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
FEBRUARY 17 - 28, 1972

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1972 - DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON

10:00 a.m.

You and Mrs. Nixon depart the Diplomatic Entrance and bid farewell to the Cabinet, other selected guests, and Congressional Leadership on the South Lawn.

(DEPARTURE SCENARIO ATTACHED)

FULL PRESS COVERAGE  
INCLUDING LIVE TELEVISION

10:10 a.m.

You and Mrs. Nixon board Marine One and depart South Lawn en route Andrews AFB.

PRESIDENTIAL GUEST

Secretary of State William P. Rogers

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1972 - Continued

10:25 a.m.

Arrive Andrews AFB.

PRESS PHOTO POOL COVERAGE.

10:30 a.m.

Board S '76 and depart en route Kaneohe  
MCAS, Hawaii.

(Flying Time: 10 hours)  
(Time Change: - 5 hours)

PRESIDENTIAL GUESTS

Secretary of State William P. Rogers  
Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green

3:30 p.m.  
Hawaii Time  
(8:30 p.m. EST)

S '76 arrives Kaneohe Marine Corps  
Air Station.

A CROWD IS EXPECTED.

FULL PRESS COVERAGE.

As you and Mrs. Nixon disembark, the band  
will play Ruffles and Flourishes and "Hail  
to the Chief".

At the foot of the ramp, you will be  
greeted by:

Gov. and Mrs. John A. Burns (D)  
Sen. and Mrs. Hiram L. Fong (R)  
Mayor and Mrs. Frank F. Fasi (D)  
Admiral and Mrs. John S. McCain, Jr.  
General and Mrs. Victor Armstrong  
Rev. and Mrs. Abraham Akaka

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1972 - Continued

Mrs. Nixon will receive a traditional floral lei.

You and Mrs. Nixon, followed by the official party and reception committee, proceed through a cordon of troops.

A microphone will be available should you wish to make remarks.

(Suggested remarks attached)

3:40 p.m.

You and Mrs. Nixon board motorcade and depart en route General Armstrong's residence.

(Driving Time: 10 minutes)

3:50 p.m.

PERSONAL/STAFF TIME.

OVERNIGHT.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DEPARTURE CEREMONY  
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP  
TO THE PRC

Thursday, February 17, 1972

10:10 A.M.

The South Lawn

THE PRESIDENT:

9:55 a.m.

The Congressional Leadership meeting in the Cabinet Room concludes.

You depart and proceed to the private residence where you meet the First Lady.

Those attending the Congressional Leadership meeting will be escorted out to the south lawn where they will join members of the Cabinet and their wives in a receiving line. Also in attendance at the south lawn will be members of the White House staff and guests from the Federal Departments and Agencies.

Marine One will be positioned at the lower end of the south lawn so as to permit the presence of guests on the lawn for the departure.

10:10 a.m.  
(approx.)

You and the First Lady depart the Residence via the Diplomatic Entrance and pass down the receiving line to a position about 75 feet out onto the south lawn.

The Press will be positioned in a cordoned-off area opposite the line of dignitaries to whom you will be bidding farewell.

Departure Ceremony for the  
President's Trip to the PRC  
Thursday, February 17, 1972

Should you so desire, a microphone will be available for you to make brief remarks to the Press. The microphone will be positioned in front of the Congressional leaders. (Suggested remarks attached.)

10:15 a.m.

You and Mrs. Nixon proceed down the south lawn to the cordon of troops that will be on either side of a red carpet leading to the helicopter. (Note: All accompanying you on Marine One, with the exception of Secretary Rogers, will already have boarded the helicopter via the rear entrance.)

Helicopter departs for Andrews Air Force Base.

Press Plan:

There will be full Press coverage, including live TV, of your departure.

  
Stephen Bull

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 28, 1972

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *AK*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Congressional Leadership  
on Your China Trip

I. TALKING POINTS

General

.. I am very pleased with the results of this mission. I believe that the discussions with the Chinese leaders have accomplished all that we could and did expect.

.. As demonstrated in the Communique, we now have both (1) a better understanding of each other's views and our differences; and (2) areas of common ground and a future means of communication.

.. The Communique reflects the substance and mood of the private discussions. There were no secret deals or agreements.

.. After 23 years of isolation and antagonism we have set a new direction and started a process.

Differences and Taiwan

.. Where we disagreed we stated our views frankly with no intention of manufacturing artificial compromises either privately or publicly. Each side stood both by its principles and by its friends.

.. I believe these candid exchanges lessened the risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding and thus strengthened the long-term prospects for peace.

.. Taiwan is obviously the most difficult issue for both sides. It is enormously sensitive for the People's Republic of China who consider Taiwan an internal matter, and it is very difficult for us because of our close friendship and ties with the Republic of China.

-- Each side approached the issue with a reasonable understanding of the other's problem. The resulting Communique language, I believe, is fair.

-- We leave this question to the parties on both sides of the Strait to resolve and we reaffirm our interest that this be done peacefully.

-- As Dr. Kissinger made clear in his press briefing in Shanghai, our position remains as stated in my world report: we will maintain our defense commitment, our diplomatic relations and our friendship with the Republic of China.

-- There are two parts with regard to our military presence on Taiwan. First, we affirm our ultimate objective to withdraw, which is organically linked to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question. Second, we are prepared to reduce our forces gradually as tensions in the area diminish, which is a statement of the Nixon Doctrine.

#### Agreed Principles

-- We found several areas of common ground. Thus the Chinese and we agreed on the following principles of international conduct:

. International disputes should be settled without the use or threat of force; we are prepared to apply that to our mutual relations.

. Normalization of our relations will be carried out in the interest of all countries and should help reduce tensions in the Far East.

. Neither of us -- or any other major power -- should seek hegemony in Asia.

. Neither of us will negotiate on behalf of other countries.

. Major countries should not collude with one another against others.

-- After such a wide gulf of communication and our differences notwithstanding, it is significant that the two sides have found these principles to which they could jointly subscribe.

### Improving Relations

-- We have agreed on a range of steps to broaden understanding between our peoples and improve relations between our countries.

-- We will maintain contact through various channels. One will be direct communication in a third country capital. We should be able to announce the details within a couple of weeks. In addition, I will send a high-level U.S. representative to the People's Republic of China from time to time for authoritative talks.

-- We will open up trade between us. We cannot expect the volume to be great in the near future, but we have marked a new departure.

-- There will be increased contact between our peoples, with exchanges in such fields as culture, science, technology, journalism and sports.

### Conclusion

-- We have made an important, and potentially historic, beginning. We have done so without either side's abandoning its principles or its friends.

-- The crucial question is what we do in the months and years ahead. The road will be long and gradual. But I believe history will record that this past week we set out on this road and that it should lead to a more peaceful world.

## II. POINTS TO AVOID

-- Repeated, high-key emphasis on our Taiwan defense commitment.

-- The claim that the People's Republic of China has renounced the use of force with respect to Taiwan.

-- Any implication that the People's Republic of China will do anything about the Indochina negotiations.

-- Any indication that the Soviet Union was discussed in anything but the most general terms.

.. Any elaboration on third country issues beyond what is in the Communique .. Indochina, Japan, Korea and South Asia.

.. The extremes either that exchanges and trade will start flowing in great numbers or that little will happen for a long time in these fields.

.. Any suggestion that the People's Republic of China will act on Downey or the other prisoners.

Question: Has the U. S. by this Communique committed itself to withdrawal of all its forces from Taiwan?

Answer: We have always maintained forces based on our assessment of the general situation. Our statement is a reiteration of our continuing policy, not a mutual PRC-US decision. The Communique says:

-- First, with respect to withdrawals, the U.S. affirms the ultimate objective of withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Taiwan but related to the prospect of a peaceful settlement. In other words, our ultimate long-term goal is to return all our forces from Taiwan if there is a peaceful settlement between the two sides.

-- Second, we will progressively reduce our forces as tensions in the area diminish. Any reduction we make is conditioned on our assessment of progress in reducing tensions.

(FYI: There are approximately 8,000 American military personnel on Taiwan of which two-thirds are related to the Indochina conflict. The remainder are non-combatant, technical personnel, mostly for intelligence purposes.)

Question: What area are we referring to when we say reduce forces "as tension in the area diminishes"?

Answer: We are talking about the general state of relationships in Asia and, for that matter, in the world. It is our assessment of the larger situation and especially of the danger that force might be used to settle particular disputes.

Question: Why did we not positively reaffirm our defense commitment to the Republic of China?

Answer: The joint communique was a significant document between nations which have been hostile and isolated for more than two decades. The issue of Taiwan is a deep emotional one with the Chinese. In the PRC's eyes, the U.S. is presently occupying part of their country. In this context, they did not denounce our treaty in their statement of their own views and we did not reaffirm it specifically.

However, we did affirm our interest in a peaceful solution in the communique and in his briefing on the record in Shanghai before a large PRC and U.S. press contingent, Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed our commitment.

Question: Is the general thrust of our statement a message to the Republic of China that they must settle with the People's Republic of China?

Answer: No, we have simply reaffirmed that we believe that the Taiwan question should be resolved peacefully. We have stated this many times. In my report to the Congress, for example, I stated that "a peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would do much to reduce tension in the Far East. We are not, however, urging either party to follow any particular course." Nothing has changed in our view of that problem.

Question: By expressing our desire for normalization of relations does this imply that we are committed to eventual recognition of the PRC? Do we have a timetable in mind?

Answer: We have no time frame in mind for the evolution of our relations. We are only at the beginning of a process which, given the complex difficulties involved, will undoubtedly be slow and gradual.

Question: How are our Asian allies reacting to this solution?

Answer: In general, I believe they welcome the visit as a reflection of improved relations which can result in a reduction of tensions throughout Asia. As the communique states, the U.S. and PRC agree that:

- progress toward normalization of relations is in the interest of all countries.
- we both wish to reduce the danger of international conflict.
- significantly, it states that international disputes should be settled without resort to the use or threat of force.

Thus, two powers with very different ideologies after a long period of intense hostility have confirmed that force is not the answer to solving world problems. I believe this is an important step toward achieving greater stability in Asia and the world.

I have sent Assistant Secretary Green to consult the Asian leaders on our discussions with the PRC and I believe they will be even more reassured when these consultations are completed.

Q: Did you make any secret commitments to the PRC that are not expressed in the communique?

A: No.

Q: Were Vietnam POWs or those Americans being held in the PRC mentioned in the talks?

A: Vietnam was discussed and I am sure you know I would not discuss it without reiterating our concern about American prisoners. As the communique states, the PRC supports the Vietcong position.

As far as our citizens held in the PRC are concerned, this is of course another important concern of mine. The PRC regards their sentences as a domestic legal problem.

[I think on both these problems the greater understanding achieved by the frank exchange of views on our many differences cannot help but make some indirect contribution to solution of these problems. However, I am concerned that any speculation in this regard would only lengthen the process and jeopardize any indirect influence that we might be able to eventually have on these problems.]

Question: Are other trips to the PRC planned?

Answer: The Communique indicates agreement on the sending of a U. S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations. We are not ready yet to announce when and who will make the trip, but I believe further visits will help build on the process we have just begun.

Question: How will both countries facilitate trade and exchanges in fields such as science, technology, culture, sports, etc. ?

Answer: A contact will be established within the next two weeks where the details will be worked out.

Question: Will the contacts be made in the US?

Answer: As you know, the fact that the Republic of China is represented in Washington makes official contacts in the U. S. difficult for Peking. Therefore, it is likely that these contacts will be made in a third country.

Question: Is our movement toward the People's Republic of China directed at the Soviet Union?

Answer: We have often stated that our developing relationship with the People's Republic of China is not directed against the Soviet Union and I do not believe the People's Republic of China is motivated by the effect a warming of relations with us may have on their dispute with the Soviet Union.

Obviously, a world in which relations between the U. S. and PRC are improved does not conform to the earlier bipolar era. We believe that the steps in the past week represent a concrete step toward building a more stable structure of peace in the world.

Question: Who will get the Pandas?

Answer: It has not been decided. What are your views?  
Perhaps the National Zoo in Washington is the most appropriate place since it is a gift to all Americans.

HIGH PRIORITY

Determined to be an  
Administrative Marking  
Not National Security Information  
By J45 NARA Date 3/17/2016

March 6, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. JOHN SCALI

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

We're not doing as good a job as possible from a PR standpoint of getting across the story of the President's handling of the situations he faced in China. The main thing for us out of China is the President's position in the big leagues. We need to make the point that the President has done this for years, his unusual world statesman capabilities, and the personal qualities of the man.

This trip should be referred to as a classic battle between a couple of heavyweights, each with his own style. We should get off the issues and on to the man, get the man above the battle, analyze the trip in that way.

We should emphasize the President's enormous background, experience, subtlety, toughness, and the Kissinger feeling as he expresses it after he sits in meetings with the President.

Also, the fact that both the President and Chou En-lai lower their voices when they get to things that are tough, etc.

Would you please take this on as a personal project, putting together a complete orchestrated effort on how we should get this out through columns, talking to commentators, etc. Obviously this should be worked in conjunction with Ziegler, Safire, Colson, et al, but we need to move now toward emphasizing this area.

Please let me know what your plan is by Wednesday, March 8.

bcc: Mr. Ronald Ziegler

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

March 7, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR : BRIGADIER GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM : H. R. HALDEMAN  
SUBJECT : Operation at Key Biscayne

I don't know if we encountered uncommon bad luck, or if there has been a general deterioration in the operation of Key Biscayne. In either case, I want to report the latest trip to you so that if there is an operational problem, it can be quickly corrected and Key Biscayne can be returned to its previous standard of operation.

The following were specific incidents:

1. The car that was assigned to me did not contain a radio, so I called and asked that one be ~~put~~ installed. Early that evening I checked to see if a radio had been installed (one of the WHCA people). I was told that it had been. However, when I went out to my car that evening I found that it still did not have a radio.
2. When the radio was installed, the WHCA personnel took it upon themselves to lock the car, and at the same time locked the keys in the car.
3. The car that was assigned to John Ehrlichman had a weak battery and went dead when I drove it over to the President's house. (My car was still locked with the keys inside). This was reported to the Aide's office and they indicated the battery would be fixed. The battery was (supposedly) fixed and the car was returned to Mr. Ehrlichman, only to have the battery go dead again less than 24 hours later.

Though we only took a small group of people to Key Biscayne, there apparently were not enough cars to be assigned to everyone involved without seriously limiting the car pool capability.

4. And, of course the most obvious incident involved was some loose boards around the edge of the helicopter pad that nearly resulted in the President falling into the bay. This incident, resulted in some very unpleasant stories and was totally unnecessary.

All of these seemingly minor incidents when added up in the context of a Presidential visit to a facility that is only occasionally used, yet-manned full time, would indicate to me some serious operational problems.

I trust you share my concern over these incidents and will move to have their causes corrected immediately.

✓ bc: Alex Butterfield

EYES ONLY

March 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR :

DR. KISSINGER

FROM :

H.R. HALDEMAN

I thought it might be helpful to try to summarize some of the points that we've been discussing over the last weeks in regard to the points that still need emphasis regarding the China trip, because as yet, they have not come through in any clear way to the general public.

The television coverage of the trip itself certainly established a basis of the dignity of the President and the manner in which he conducted the public part of the activities, and this will be very valuable in the long term.

On the other hand, there is still a great deal of mystery about how the President, Chou En-lai, and Mao Tse-tung, conducted themselves in their private meetings, and particularly, how the President handled the approach to and conduct of, these meetings.

The communique itself has been now discussed at such great length that the average person is undoubtedly tired of hearing about it. In the backgrounders and certainly on the television broadcasts that you do, the background-type of information will be of much more interest to the viewer than will the substantive details of the content.

It would seem to me that some of the points we've talked about ~~that~~ would be well to emphasize are the following:

1. RN goes into meetings of this kind better prepared than anyone who has ever held the Presidential office. He does this by taking the voluminous briefing materials that are prepared by the NSC staff, and by the State Department, reading them all, plus reading a lot of other materials, and then he talks to a great number of people about the various aspects of the briefings in which he is particularly interested.

2. He then sits down and in painstaking detail, makes up his own mind as to what his approach should be. He does not memorize his speeches, etc. He does not follow a predictable pattern and as a result he is able to handle any of the questions that come up on the spot without being frozen into an untenable position. This, of course, is a tremendous advantage to him in all meetings, but particularly in summit meetings with skillful leaders like Chou En-lai.
3. RN has the tremendous advantage of an exceptional knowledge of world problems which he gained in his eight years in the Vice Presidency, plus eight years of travel while he was out of office, plus the three years that he has been in office as President. In other words, he has been up against big league pitching in the foreign policy field for a longer period of time than any other world leader. He has had extended conversations with the great leaders of our time -- DeGaulle, DeGasperi, Adenauer, Khrushchev, Nehru, Hoshida, Sakarno, Churchill -- not to mention the current batch of leaders from both the large and small countries, whom he has met as President.
4. An interesting mark of his style is that he treats all leaders whether from large or small countries, with equal dignity and respect.
5. As far as tactics are concerned, he never gives an inch on principle. As a matter of fact, he is probably more rigid on principle than many of his advisors would want him to be.
6. He never quibbles over debating points. Instead, he always keeps his eye on the main goal and constantly finds ways to bring the subject back to that goal rather than being diverted into argumentative discussions that would have no effect as far as achieving our main purpose.
7. He has great qualities of subtlety and humor - he is never belligerent - but is very tough. He has developed the quality of speaking most quietly when he is making his strongest points - a quality also observed in Chou En-lai.
8. He has the quality of knowing the other man and all of his positions as well as he knows his own. This, incidentally, also

characterized Chou En-lai and was a factor which made the meeting between the two of them such a fascinating discussion.

He has a quality of absolute discipline which goes clear back to the time when he had the seven hour luncheon with Krushchev, and has carried through all the many summits he's held as President, including the meetings with the Chinese.

He never takes a drink during the course of the meetings or prior to any important conversation, and he even carries this to the extent of resisting the temptation which was so obviously presented to him, particularly with the Chinese, of eating nuts and candies, etc., that were put before him during the course of the discussion. His personal theory is that either drinking or eating tends to dull the reaction time as far as he's concerned. Although, of course, he would not apply this same test to others for whom either eating or drinking may help their reactions, as was presumably the case with Churchill and some others.

9. He has a remarkable quality of candor, used not for the purpose of embarrassing his opposite number, but for the purpose of establishing a degree of mutual trust and confidence which is so essential for any meaningful discussion.

10. The quality of stamina. He has an ability to perform at his peak level regardless of the length of the session. This is a very important quality, of course, in dealing with the Chinese, and will be with the Soviets.

All of these above points are things that you and the President have often raised in the conversations about the summit meetings, and it would be extremely valuable if some of this kind of information would get into the public domain.

If you can, you should review your notes to see how many personal tidbits you could use to bear out these points without revealing the substance of the conversations.

I don't think you should limit this to the discussions with Chou En-lai. You could go back to specifics on the meetings with DeGaulle, Wilson, Pompidou, Ceausescu, Tito, etc. to make some of these points.

Also, you are uniquely able to make the point that RN has acquired a great deal of respect from world leaders because of his conduct of these sessions without resorting to staff or notes.

I'm sure it's presumptuous of me to raise these points, but I thought they might be helpful. I have the very strong feeling that the most good you can do in talking with private groups and certainly in your appearance on television, will be in the area of establishing public confidence in the President as a man, and as President, rather than in the area of explaining further, the ramifications of the content of the communique, or the substance of the talks leading to it.

HRH:pm