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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching the report I have with regard to the number of personnel at Key Biscayne on Christmas Day. As I am sure you will agree, when we think of a thinned-down staff for occasions of this type, this is a pretty big number. I realize that the number of Secret Service, Communications Office, Helicopter Crew and Air Force Crew are the lowest they will give you. On the other hand, I want you to talk to the people involved in each organization and see if we can't cut about 50%, particularly in the future when I may want to make a trip to Florida for at most two to three days. If, when I make a movement of this sort, 125 to 150 people are involved, I simply am not going to do it.

An indication of the imbalance here is that, when I wanted to dictate a special message with regard to the Nicaraguan earthquake, I found that we did not have on board one of the top secretaries or a civilian aide.

As you know, I have the greatest respect for those in the military office. On the other hand, whenever I make any movement in the future it is essential that I have one top secretary who, in the event of an unexpected development, will be on hand in the event I have to dictate something and one civilian aide other than those who are attached to the Press Office. This does not mean, of course, that somebody at your level would have to go, but somebody at the level of Steve Bull or his replacement should be on hand at all times wherever I go for an overnight stay.

On another matter, I sent you Maury Stans' request for invitations to the White House for those who had been major contributors to the campaign in 1972. When I added up all the requests that he made and doubled the number so as to include wives, it could come out at slightly more than 2,000 invitations we would have to give for White House dinners or White House social affairs during the year 1973. Even if we assumed that all invitations except for the official party were to go to financial contributors, we could not reach this goal. For example, we will never have more than 10 White House dinners in one year. At least 30 to 40 of those invitations will have to go to officials of the visiting Head of Government and to our own officials. We then have to make room for at least a few

members of the House and Senate. This will leave at most around 40 for each dinner to be distributed among non-governmental and non-official guests. This means that we have approximately 400 who could possibly be invited in this category to the White House to dinners in the year 1973. Even if we gave all of these invitations to satisfy Maury's request, we would only get one-fourth at most of those he felt should receive invitations. We have to remember that, in addition to the pressure we have from him, we have over 200 celebrities and their wives which means a total of 400 in addition to several hundred political types who were not contributors from the MacGregor and Party organizations, and in addition several hundred from the Connally/Colson Democrats, labor and other groups who supported us in 1972.

It appears to me that we have a major problem with regard to these invitations which can only be solved by your setting up at the highest level a task force in which this matter is frankly discussed and a recommendation is made to me. Obviously Rose should be a member of this group, Julie should represent the East Wing and you should act as moderator to see that all the various competing groups are properly represented.

It is really not fair to Maury to leave him under the impression that we will be able to issue over 2,000 invitations to those who did contribute so much financially to the campaign in 1972. In addition, it is not fair to Colson, Connally, MacGregor, Mitchell, Timmons and all others concerned that we not let them know what our limitations are in this respect so that we don't get hammered from one side to the other whenever we have dinners or other events at the White House.

The thing to do is to get the numbers down to some manageable proportions where all groups are fairly represented and then set up priorities based upon those events that I will be able to do.

I would have to agree that perhaps two or three Evenings at the White House would be in order, but here we are only talking about an additional 600 invitations at most, although I would think that Evenings would be much better than dinners since at least you do not have to have the government officials at such affairs.

One rule I think we should initiate immediately for the year 1973 is that any White House or governmental personnel who have attended previous functions at the White House should expect that they will not be invited to any functions in 1973 unless their presence is critically required because of the nature of the group which will be there. I think we have gone overboard in the past in including White House personnel as well as Administration and governmental personnel on some occasions. I know the argument is that the guests often like to meet and see top people in the Administration at such affairs. On the other hand, when we have such an overwhelming number of demands on us, I think we have just got to work it out so that we perhaps have one or at most two representing the White House on each occasion, and perhaps a couple of Cabinet officers, until we get through this enormous list of political people, financial contributors, etc. for the election campaign of 1972. We are in a very different situation from where we were in 1969 when none of our White House personnel or Administration people had been at White House dinners before. Now, those who have been there don't have any status problems to deal with and I think we can get a lot of extra invitations by simply cutting the number down to a bare minimum whatever the event is--a dinner, an Evening at the White House, or a Church Service.

Give me a recommendation on all this shortly after the first of the year after Julie returns from Europe when you can get her input as well as Rose's to have for my consideration.

All of this points up the critical necessity of our examining my schedule demands for the next year. As you know, Henry is in with a number of requests for State Visits, Timmons is pounding on the door for more meetings with Congressmen and Senators, the Governors are also making their demands. I want to do everything I can to be cooperative but my first responsibility of course is to do the job, and I am not going to allow these social events to interfere with that responsibility.

The White House,

19


To the


Senate of the United States.

I nominate Alexander P. Butterfield, of California,

to be Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, vice

John H. Shaffer, resigned.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely of Richard Nixon, written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with a prominent initial 'R' and a long, sweeping tail.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... 

THE USES OF PATRONAGE

a chapter from

PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

by

Richard C. Peet

*H - a very thoughtful
piece ~~which~~ which Malah
Ash et al should
have in mind in
recruiting people*

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Richard C. Peet
4442 Hawthorne St.
Northwest
tel: 244-8194

Washington D.C. 20016

CHAPTER VII

THE USES OF PATRONAGE

Probably no factor figures so strongly in the development of young scientists as the inspiration that comes from association with a first-rate mind. One finds among Nobel Prize winners in science, for example, case after case where both teacher and pupil became laureates.

Alan Waterman

Director, National Science Foundation

Patronage is the term used to describe the process of distributing political jobs and honors through the power of appointment.

The patronage process can best be described by the functions served by it. There are five primary ones:

- to supply managers and administrators for government,
- to train political leaders and spokesmen,
- to maintain party cohesiveness and discipline,
- to staff the Federal Judiciary, and
- to develop political fourth estates.

Recruiting superior men to help manage the governmental enterprise is an important function of patronage. This is so because in running for office, a candidate champions causes, espouses policies and promotes interests at odds with his opponent -- be he incumbent or otherwise. In casting their ballots for him, voters, in effect, accord him a

mandate
to give direction, provide control and effect change in accordance with pledges made. This is true at every political level. But it is especially true where the presidency is concerned.

Practically speaking, however, whether a new chief executive can satisfy legitimate expectations by pursuing promised ends is, in large measure, determined by the degree of control he is able to exercise over the multi-faceted governmental apparatus he Constitutionally commands. Achieving effective control is far from easy. The Federal monolith is so vast, its activities so diverse, its reach so pervasive, its operations so complicated, its inertia so great, that one man, operating alone, cannot possibly manage^{it} no matter his will or determination. He needs assistance — lots of it.

His dilemma is common to all large enterprises. It arises from the fact that old managers, imbued with old ideas and old ways, seldom adjust efficiently or willingly to change. The problem is compounded in government where bureaucratized civil servants are insulated in their positions, and, hence, frequently unresponsive to political leadership.

In recognition of this problem, chief executives have long been empowered to appoint a limited number of subordinates to assist in carrying out their managerial and adminis-

trative responsibilities. Euphemistically known as the 'family of the executive', these associates and advisors occupy key positions in the hundreds of departments, agencies, bureaus and commissions that comprise the Federal establishment. Their task is to supply the creative talents and energies needed by a President to carry out his electoral mandate. Practically speaking, the infusion of such new blood provides the only means available for overcoming the
the
natural inertia of/bureaucracy.

Significantly, of the more than three million civil servants, a mere 6,000 fall into the 'family of the Executive' category. As a practical matter, however, far fewer than this number, at any given time, actually qualify as the President's own.

Despite their scarcity of numbers, however, these individuals play a critical role in making the system work. Through them, the Federal government takes on the political coloration and causes of the party in power. Patently, only when this happens does the promise of governmental institutions responsive to the will of the electorate become meaningful to both the majority and minority of the voters.

A second primary function of patronage involves the systematic recruitment and advancement of new generations of political leaders. Just as parents have an obligation to

educate their progeny, politicians have a duty to advance the careers of promising members of their own political families. A child, without education, can seldom realize his potential. By the same token, an aspiring politician, denied the opportunity of service and experience can seldom realize his. Appointment of young and energetic individuals to positions of public trust and political responsibility assures the development of that cadre of substantive leaders and spokesmen needed to articulate and promote what parties stand for and against to the people.

Whether in office or opposition, a party's duty to educate and illuminate remains paramount. An electorate must be informed to fulfill its sovereign responsibilities wisely and well. Qualified and credentialed spokesmen are essential for this task. Unless they are qualified, they are not worth listening to; unless they are credentialed, they will not be.

But substantive spurs do not come easily. Ordinarily, they can only be won through governmental service at an appropriate level. Consequently, the party that fails to train new leaders and spokesmen while in power, usually finds itself without them when out of it.

Closely akin to the foregoing is a third function of patronage — maintaining party cohesiveness and discipline.

People who make common cause together must necessarily surrender a measure of their independence of action in return for the advantages of collective strength. But such surrenders presuppose that in return they may reasonably expect to share in the control and management of the political enterprise. A balanced distribution of jobs and honors is the means for according them a role.

In this sense, patronage is a two-edged sword. Favors can be withheld, as well as, dispensed. In fact, aside from the threat of direct purge, the withholding power is perhaps the most effective tool available to presidents and parties for countering or checking those tugs of conscience or lures of special advantage which, from time to time, tempt officeholders and politicians to stray from the fold. Put another way, the ability to reward or punish the party faithful is the surest way of keeping them faithful.

"I don't mind saying," that consummate politician and long-time chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Jim Farley, candidly acknowledged, "that I used the power of patronage to get the bills through. We withheld -- until we got the program. We did it because we felt it was in the best interests of the country."

To the uninitiated, the Farley method may seem questionable. But where two (or even three or four) political combinations attempt to rationalize and represent the aspirations and ambitions of myriads of interests and tens of millions of people, some means for encouraging loyalty and regularity are essential. Patronage provides it.

Note

Unfortunately, despite the sine qua non role it plays in making the system work, a myth persists that patronage is an evil thing; that bestowing jobs and honors for services rendered to a candidate or cause somehow or other compromises that candidate or cause. This, of course, presumes that corrupt designs are more prevalent and harder to unmask among those with a prior record of public service than those lacking one.

Note

With the caveat that the level of appointment should never exceed the capabilities of the appointee, it would seem that errors of judgment on that score are more likely to occur with political unknowns than with time-honored and tested activists. One thing is certain: An ambitious party will seldom knowingly appoint unqualified people to high office for the simple reason that it is loathe to place its future in incompetent or unscrupulous hands.

Nevertheless, the myth persists that a record of prior indifference to politics and government somehow or other

*E+H
notes*

guarantees that an aspirant for appointive office will prove more able, honest and efficient than an activist rival.

This assumption flies in the face of reality, however. For the most part, nonparticipants come to government with little knowledge or understanding of how the system really works.

Many come at great personal financial sacrifice (always a ground for suspicion) and, because of this, their tenure is usually short, averaging under two years. As their records of performance make quite clear, this is an insufficient period

of apprenticeship for learning the intricacies of their respective jobs. Under the circumstances, no matter how talented they may be, their prospects for rendering conspicuous public service are slim at best.

It was such considerations that prompted pundit Walter Lippmann to observe that "on the whole, it is better to fill higher offices with men whose main work in life has been in politics and the public service." He reasoned that "public service is a profession and an art which must be acquired by long experience in public life." This led him to conclude that "the art of governing men is a great art itself -- perhaps the greatest, as it surely is the most momentous of all the arts, and a lifetime is not too long a time in which to learn it."

Good men enter politics in order to serve; bad men, to plunder; little men, to feel important. If there are no rewards for service in the form of promotions and recognition

good men will surely follow other pursuits, thus opening the doors to bad and little men. The inevitable result -- mediocrity and corruption.

This observation bears directly on a fourth function of patronage -- staffing the Federal Judiciary. The Courts constitute an independent branch of our tripartite system of government. Like the 'family of the Executive', however, judges are appointed by the President. He fills all vacancies arising at all judicial levels during his incumbency (with the advice and consent of the Senate). Since the courts are vested with the ultimate responsibility for deciding 'cases and controversies' which arise within our Federal system of government, a President's judicial selections, particularly for the Supreme Court, are of crucial importance. As the final arbiters of our Constitution, laws and customs, justices are continually embroiled in questions of great political moment. In deciding them, they, of course, rely on legal precedents. But their decisions also reflect personal beliefs and convictions. They would hardly be human if they did not.

To suggest this does not impugn the integrity or disinterest of judges. Nor does it imply that they are wont to substitute partisan considerations for the public interest. Rather, it means simply that the philosophy judges bring to the

court and the legal principles they adhere to and apply
are necessarily conditioned and tempered by their personal
background and experience.

"The law is what the judges say it is," runs the old legal adage and, where essentially political questions are at issue, as they often are, what they say and do is largely determined by who they are and what they stand for. In other words, the shape of the law is determined by the men who make it.

History confirms this view. Take President Franklin Roosevelt's Depression-inspired attempt to reorder the Nation's economic life in the Thirties. For years, his reform efforts were thwarted by an unsympathetic Supreme Court whose members, appointed by predecessors, repeatedly struck down New Deal legislation. To outflank his judicial foes, FDR formulated a plan whose aim was to reconstitute the high tribunal, staffing it with men more attuned to his political ends. Although his attempt to 'pack' it failed, the Court itself, sensing that 'a switch in time saves nine', knuckled
under. In a dramatic turnabout, it reversed prior rulings to approve theretofore 'unconstitutional' nostrums. In the event, FDR and the New Deal emerged triumphant.

Nor was this the only instance of the courts playing an activist political role. Time and again, throughout out history, from Dred Scott to Brown, they have rendered decisions which worked radical transformations in our laws and society. Frequently, their activism has been so pronounced that they have been charged with operating as a third, albeit unelected, arm of the national legislature.

Under the circumstances, the critical importance of making wise judicial appointments can be readily understood. A hostile court can be a burden to any administration; a friendly one, an invaluable ally.

A fifth and final function of patronage relates to the development and promotion of political fourth estates. This seemingly peripheral, and primarily non-governmental, application of the power of appointment is rarely thought of as a proper function of patronage. Yet, as much as any other, it is.

The news media, the foundations, the universities, indeed the entire business of culture, including education -- are all quasi-political in nature. Try as they may, the pivotal people who control these influential instrumentalities cannot submerge their politics in professionalism. The reason is that most became what they are because of a com-

pulsive urge to advance their own special views and visions of the world. Not surprisingly, under the circumstances, the news published, the grants made, the tenure conferred, the authors lionized, the prizes given mirror their own special outlook and temperament. But the most crucial way their orientation and predilections are reflected is in the people they recruit, train and place.

Individuals understandably prefer to promote and perpetuate those whose views comport, rather than clash, with their own. Those in communications, education and culture are no exception. They would hardly be human, and certainly not comfortable, otherwise.

Since aspiring reporters, teachers, authors and artists must 'publish or perish', they are constantly baring their biases and beliefs for all to see. In doing so, they inevitably ally or alienate those in a position to advance or retard their careers. The result is that, for good or ill, what amounts to a de facto system of patronage exists in the realm of fourth estates — one which for ultimate influence and impact on the political process has no rival.

* * * * *

In the final analysis, the successful political party in a democratic society represents a synergism of two interacting dynamics -- interests and patronage. Conjoining

interests, and the ambitions they reflect, work to bring a party together. The intelligent use of patronage, by constructively channeling the competition and rivalries such interests inevitably produce, helps to keep it together.

In the absence of interests as the centrifugal force of politics, there is only ideology. In the absence of patronage, there is only spoils -- in one form or other.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Dep-
I think do follow
might find this view
interest;*

*Finch
Gannett
Condon
Chambers
Sofus
Moore*

INFORMATION

Tonsor's Paper on the Student Revolt

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chairman McCracken has forwarded a paper entitled "The Student Revolt -- Who has Failed?" by S. J. Tonsor of the University of Michigan. You may remember that in April 1969 you read an earlier speech by Tonsor, "Alienation and Relevance in Higher Education," and recommended that it be forwarded to certain staff members stating: "This happens to be my view." It is "the most perceptive analysis of what is wrong with our approach to higher education."

Tonsor's latest paper presents his views on many of the causes of campus unrest. Tonsor states that the student revolt is not a result of the Vietnam war, the Vice President, or racial antagonism. Rather, he feels that the causes are:

- Use of drugs - which have entrenched a sense of paranoia, despair and utopianism on the campuses.
- Influence of liberal, establishment upper-class parents.
- University environment - an atmosphere of left liberal intelligentsia that often leads to an abandonment of rationality.
- Age of interventionism - an era Tonsor characterizes as the alliance forged in the early 1900's between the practical politician and the left liberal intelligentsia which provided the rationale for the centralization of big government in Washington and attempted to transform America with programs of elitist planners. Tonsor believes that this era is ending.


WASHING
INFORM
Student

-- University and college administrators - the "technicians of adjustment" have fostered campus violence because of their permissiveness, lack of responsibility, and inability to stand firm. Tonsor believes the solution to this problem lies in a new breed of administrators - men who can combine understanding, toughness, and educational vision.

Tonsor feels the upsurge in the politics of confrontation, the language of violence and obscenity, and the employment of terror are manifestations of the collapse of the alliance between the left-liberal intelligentsia and the practical politicians because their vision of American life was not congruent with the needs and hopes of ordinary Americans.

Tonsor sees a return to an earlier idea of what America should be - a place where variety, diversity, free choice, and the individual solution of problems are recognized as the only workable approach.

You may wish to read Mr. Tonsor's comments (Tab A). Pat Buchanan was given a copy.


John D. Ehrlichman

7-31-72-

Carlos - 3 years old -

H-

Who goes to convention? -

D.P. N's staff - (Thank you notes)

Pat - don't put out - Texas - Calif -

Calif. organization:

you -

Region -

Dem organization

Pat is to be the

Specified on
Tax reform -
No incentive not
to show wealth.

Quality of Life:
quit attending each
other as groups.
Attach our common
problem

Called for columns on M's handling of
Cylinder

~~H. C. ...~~

~~Review ... for ... at C.D.~~

~~...~~

Quote Ltr to Humphrey

Paul
Bering sets lunch
Pearl ...

"Harris
Change That Works"

Premise to work
for Peace
We worked for it
We are closer to it

Economic growth
abroad - (Don't
Come home -

① Don't give in
② Don't beg
We didn't give in
We didn't beg -
We achieved
mutual respect

Economy:

Phase II is pro
Big Business -
Blame for problem
for high local prices -

Defense Expenditure

Tax -

Abortion -

Pat - protection
law -

~~Army~~ -

Don't attack
line on abortion

Nat + Defense

Tax reform -

Cut Defense -

Stands for Change

Energy - Arms is great
Honest cooperation

Altogether

"Dear Mr. President:

"Accept our congratulations on the occasion of your reelection to the office of President of the United States of America.

"Noting with satisfaction the process already undertaken of restructuring relations between our countries, for which the May encounter in Moscow laid a solid foundation, we would like to express confidence that in the period ahead Soviet-American relations will receive further favorable development in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples, in the interest of safeguarding international security and the approach of peace for the whole world."

N. Podgornii
President of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR

No RN markings
in this exhibit

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
5
GAMES

3. We speeded up the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces.

(1) This has two purposes.

1. One is to diminish Hanoi's hope that time is on its side.

2. The other purpose is to enable the South Vietnamese troops to assume an increasing responsibility for the conduct of the war.

(1) President Thieu has indicated they are prepared to do this as they become trained and equipped.

As a result,
(2) General Abrams reported to me on Monday that progress in this training program has been excellent, and that apart from what will develop from the negotiations, the time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans.

No RN

Our deepest concern has been the development of a coherent peace policy, so that our various moves would reinforce each other.

Box 48
Folder 1
P. Sp. File

1. When it comes to maintaining peace, "prestige" is not an empty word.

(1) I am not speaking of false pride or bravado -- they should have no place in our policies.

(2) I speak rather of the respect that one nation has for another's integrity in defending its principles and meeting its obligations.

(4) If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

Another reason stems from debates within the Communist world between those who argue for a policy of confrontation with the United States and those who argue against it.

1. If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force -- even after the power of the United States had been engaged -- it would greatly strengthen those *leaders* who scorn negotiation, who advocate aggression, who *in the world* minimize the risks of confrontation.

2. It would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later.

Box 48
Folder 11
P 5 F

If we are to move successfully from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation, then we have to demonstrate -- at the point at which confrontation is being tested -- that confrontation is costly and unrewarding.

Almost without exception, the leaders of non-communist Asia have ^{Told me} ~~made clear~~ -- ~~in private if not in public~~ -- that they would consider a one-sided American withdrawal from Vietnam to be a threat to the security of their own nations.

In determining what choices would be acceptable, we have to understand our essential objective:

1. We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.
2. Let me put it plainly:
 - (1) What the United States wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing.
 - (2) What North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing.
 - (3) What is important is what the people of South Vietnam

Box 48
Folder 1
P 57

The United States has suffered over two million casualties in four wars in this century.

1. Whatever faults we may have as a nation, we have asked nothing for ourselves in return for these sacrifices.

(1) We have been generous toward those whom we have fought, helping former foes, as well as friends, in the task of reconstruction.

1. We are proud of this record, and we bring the same attitude to our search for a settlement in Vietnam.

In this spirit, let me be explicit about several points:

1. We seek no bases *in Vietnam*,
2. We insist on no military ties.
3. We are willing to agree to neutrality if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.
4. We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without

Box 48
Folder 1,
DS F



5. We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that result from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.
6. We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion.
7. We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of South Vietnam and North Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned. * Insert

In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic formula.

1. Peace could be achieved by a formal negotiated settlement.
2. Peace could be achieved by an informal understanding, provided that the understanding is clear, and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed.
3. Peace on paper is not as important as peace in fact.

Box 48
Folder 11
PSF

Then on page nine

✓ where it says "we seek no bases" -- insert the words "in Vietnam"

then on page ten

after the words -- "we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice

of the people concerned." At this point I would like to add a personal

Insert word based on many visits to South Vietnam over the past five years.

This is the most difficult war in America's history, fought against a savage and utterly ruthless enemy. I am proud of our men who have carried the terrible burden of this war with dignity and courage, despite the division and massive opposition to the war in the United States.

~~Never have American fighting men fought so bravely for more unselfish goals than have our men in Vietnam~~ History will record that never have America's fighting men fought more bravely for more unselfish goals than our men in Vietnam. It is our responsibility to see that they shall not have fought in vain.

Box 48
Folder 11
PSF

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE FACTS ON SALARIES

Re: Unclassified Non-Commissioned
Professionals Only

1. 25 got 5.5% increase 1/9/72.
2. 46 didn't get 5.5% increase.
3. Total cost to extend to other 46 would be \$32,266 for FY 72 and \$67,170 for FY 73, and since we have to go for Supplemental for the classifieds that got increase, this is no problem.

January 1, 1972

STAFF ASSISTANTS (47)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Title</u> | <u>Salary</u> | <u>Grade</u> | <u>Reports To</u> |
|--------------|--|---------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Howard | Staff Assistant | \$31,523 | Uncl. | Colson |
| Marumoto | Staff Assistant | \$29,000 | Uncl. | Malek |
| Cheney | Staff Assistant | \$28,317 | Uncl. | Rumsfeld |
| Clarke | Staff Assistant | \$28,000 | Uncl. | Malek |
| Loken | Staff Assistant | \$27,061 | Uncl. | Flanigan |
| Erb | Staff Assistant | \$27,000 | Uncl. | Flanigan |
| Horton | Staff Assistant | \$26,700 | Uncl. | Malek |
| Koch | Staff Assistant | \$26,675 | Uncl. | Price |
| Walker | Staff Assistant | \$26,547 | Uncl. | Chapin |
| Crawford | Staff Assistant | \$25,867 | Uncl. | Flanigan |
| Higby | Staff Assistant | \$25,059 | Uncl. | Haldeman |
| Parker | Staff Assistant | \$25,059 | Uncl. | Chapin |
| Millspaugh | Staff Assistant | \$25,000 | Uncl. | Dent |
| Clower | Staff Assistant | \$24,000 | Uncl. | Chapin |
| Herringer | Staff Assistant | \$24,000 | Uncl. | Malek |
| Jones | Staff Assistant | \$24,000 | Uncl. | Malek |
| O'Donnell | Staff Assistant | \$24,000 | Uncl. | Colson |
| Anderson | Staff Assistant | \$23,000 | Uncl. | Malek |
| Bull | Staff Assistant | \$22,897 | Uncl. | Chapin |
| Rhatican | Staff Assistant | \$22,897 | Uncl. | Colson |
| Schrauth | Staff Assistant | \$22,500 | Uncl. | Chapin |
| -Henkel | Staff Assistant | \$22,497 | 13/9 | Chapin |
| Henley | Staff Assistant | \$22,000 | Uncl. | Dent |
| -Caulfield | Staff Assistant | \$21,905 | 13/8 | Dean |
| -Foust | Staff Assistant | \$21,509 | 14/2 | Chapin |
| -Raoul-Duval | Staff Assistant | \$21,509 | 14/2 | Chapin |
| -Allin | Staff Assistant | \$20,129 | 13/5 | Buchanan |
| Hoopes | Staff Assistant | \$20,000 | Uncl. | Butterfield |
| Strachan | Staff Assistant | \$20,000 | Uncl. | Haldeman |
| Bellinger | Staff Assistant (Research) | \$18,996 | Uncl. | Price |
| Hasek | Staff Assistant (Writing and Editing) | \$18,000 | Uncl. | Price |
| -Khachigian | Staff Assistant | \$17,761 | 13/1 | Buchanan |
| -McDermott | Staff Assistant | \$17,761 | 13/1 | Flanigan |
| Andrews | Staff Assistant | \$17,500 | Uncl. | Price |
| Price | Staff Assistant | \$17,000 | Uncl. | Farrell |
| -Smith | Staff Assistant (Secretarial) | \$16,543 | 12/4 | Dent |
| Karalekas | Staff Assistant | \$16,000 | Uncl. | Colson |
| Kinsey | Staff Assistant | \$16,000 | Uncl. | Dean |
| -Allin | Staff Assistant | \$15,541 | 12/2 | Price |
| -Higgins | Staff Assistant | \$15,541 | 12/2 | Price |
| -Brown | Staff Assistant (Security) | \$15,040 | 12/1 | Butterfield |
| -Blecksmith | Staff Assistant | \$15,040 | 12/1 | Klein |
| -Deane | Staff Assistant | \$15,040 | 12/1 | MacGregor |
| -Wilson | Staff Assistant | \$14,205 | 10/8 | Dean |
| -Gergen | Staff Assistant | \$14,205 | 10/8 | Price |
| -Bloch | Staff Assistant for Special Projects | \$13,457 | 11/3 | Malek |
| -Lezar | Staff Assistant | \$11,168 | 9/3 | Price |

Average Salary: \$21,108

Median Salary: \$21,905

January 1, 1972

OTHER PROFESSIONALS (24)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Title</u> | <u>Salary</u> | <u>Grade</u> | <u>Reports To</u> |
|-------------|--|---------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Atkins | Official White House Photographer | \$32,000 | Uncl. | Ziegler |
| James | Deputy Special Assistant to the President | \$32,000 | Uncl. | Malek |
| Scott | Assistant to the Director of Communications | \$32,000 | Uncl. | Klein |
| Elliott | | \$30,000 | Uncl. | Price |
| McLaughlin | Deputy Special Assistant to the President | \$30,000 | Uncl. | Price |
| Stuart | Staff Director for Mrs. Nixon | \$30,000 | Uncl. | First Lady |
| Nidecker | Deputy Special Assistant to the President | \$28,000 | Uncl. | MacGregor |
| Shumway | Assistant to the Director of Communications | \$27,061 | Uncl. | Klein |
| Snyder | Assistant to the Director of Communications | \$27,000 | Uncl. | Klein |
| Fielding | Associate Counsel | \$25,000 | Uncl. | Dean |
| Winchester | Social Secretary | \$25,000 | Uncl. | First Lady |
| - Fox | Administrative Officer | \$24,979 | 14/7 | First Lady |
| Elbourne | Press Assistant | \$24,000 | Uncl. | Ziegler |
| Huebner | Deputy Special Assistant to the President | \$24,000 | Uncl. | Price |
| Waldron | Assistant to the Press Secretary | \$23,648 | Uncl. | Ziegler |
| White | Assistant Deputy Director of Communications | \$22,309 | Uncl. | Klein |
| - Jones | Confidential Assistant | \$19,537 | 13/4 | Finch |
| - Knudsen | Photographer | \$18,945 | 13/3 | Ziegler |
| - Yates | Confidential Assistant | \$18,353 | 13/2 | Chapin |
| D'Arcy | Press Advance Man | \$18,000 | Uncl. | Ziegler |
| - Gemmell | Assistant Chief, Social Entertainments Office | \$16,543 | 12/4 | First Lady |
| - McFadden | Confidential Assistant | \$16,543 | 12/4 | Flanigan |
| - King | Director of Correspondence for Mrs. Nixon | \$16,042 | 12/3 | First Lady |
| - Smith | Assistant Press Secretary | \$16,042 | 12/3 | First Lady |

Average Salary: \$24,042

Median Salary: \$24,489

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONVERSATION WITH DAN RATHER

Sunday, January 2, 1972

Oval Office

9:30 PM

THE PRESIDENT:

PURPOSE:

To hold a live television interview with CBS White House Correspondent Dan Rather.

BACKGROUND:

This interview will be the third in the series of exclusive television appearances committed to the three major networks. It will originate from the fireplace end of the Oval Office, with chairs located in the approximate positions used for photographs with visiting Heads of State. The length of the program will be one hour, and it will air live at 9:30 PM EST in most of the country. (A video tape of the program will be broadcast on the West Coast at 9:30 PST). No restrictions have been placed on the range of questions.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- 9:05 PM Drop by the Oval Office for an inspection of the set-up. Carruthers and I will be present to answer questions and implement any changes you may request.
- 9:10 PM Make-up application. Ray Voege will be set in Alex Butterfield's office.
- 9:20 PM Personal Time.
- 9:26 PM Move to Oval Office for placement of lavalier microphone and preparation for opening of telecast. Still photos will be taken at this time by Ollie Atkins, the two wire services, and CBS.

9:30 PM Telecast begins.
10:29 PM Telecast concludes.

Mark Goode

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM: DOUG HALLETT

Broder's and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians and the People" are the following:

- (1) People are less angry, less passionate, less pessimistic about the future than they were a year ago. What was analyzed last year as fear about the future has now turned to apprehension. While two-thirds of the people surveyed still feel the country is no better off than it was in 1968, there is less immediate concern about short-run disintegration and collapse.
- (2) The President's strength has increased considerably as a by-product of the China trip, the new economic policy, etc. On the other hand, the President's initiatives have also made him seem more unpredictable, more mysterious, more inconsistent than he did before to many Americans. He is the first choice of a minority of the electorate. At a time when people are looking for direction and purpose in their leaders, the President remains a remote and uncertain figure.
- (3) There is considerable confusion and indecision about 1972. Never have political loyalties and allegiances been weaker. Party structures are almost meaningless in most areas of the country. People want to vote for the man, not the party. With the possible exception of the economy, no clear-cut issues are likely to stand out this election year.
- (4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. People are alienated from their government; they feel powerless; they question whether their leaders can respond to their fundamental concerns. 60 percent do not believe their leaders tell them the truth.
- (5) The youth vote is likely to be smaller than the vote of the electorate-at-large and young people are not likely to participate in large numbers in the political process. While young people are hostile to the President, they will not have a significant effect on the election.

(6) Muskie is the only Democratic contender both known to a majority of the electorate and known positively. Kennedy and Humphrey are better known, but less liked. While he has potential, however, Muskie has not yet developed the broad base of support and respect he would need to defeat the President.

(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders. While many people agree with their statements, they sense they are not tolerant enough to be President. Wallace and Agnew are too sure of themselves.

It is important to note that Broder's and Johnson's conclusions are based on a distorted sampling of the electorate. They interviewed only 300 people. All pollsters agree that in-depth interviews with only a small sampling permits the interviewers to reinforce their own preconceived notions. Broder's and Johnson's sample does break down parallel to the 1968 election results, but it is far from representative. Only one Southern state was included in the survey. 26 percent of the sample were new voters -- and half of these were college students. These and other distortions have led to conclusions at variance with more scientific polls. Whereas polls indicate that blacks have gained confidence in the system in recent years, for example, Broder and Johnson assert they are more alienated.

On the other hand, I think the basic theme of the articles -- the alienation issue is accurately portrayed. Nothing else could account for the wide variation between popular support for the President's basic stands and support for his leadership. Nothing else could account for the President's dominance of the issues and his relatively weak showing, both in the trial heats and in the confidence polls.

The following is my point-by-point analysis:

(1) People are less pessimistic about the future -- This is true. The campuses have calmed. The doomsday rhetoric has quieted. People are beginning to believe, for the first time, that the war is ending and that the economy will not fall apart. Such events as the Moscow and Peking trips even show promise of leading the way to a better future.

Unfortunately, however, the President's success in the areas listed above is not necessarily translatable into votes at the polls. The President's support is based on professionalism, not on any personal or psychic or intellectual loyalty. People expect the President to be an effective tactician. Inversely, if he is not -- if his professionalism shows any weakness -- his base of support is likely to decline. While it will be hard for the Democrats to

counter if everything is going alright next fall, it one or more of the above issues have gone bad the President may not receive credit for anything he has done. One weakness in the chain will cast into doubt the long-run viability of every link, leading the way to such questions as: "Why couldn't we have gotten out of Vietnam faster? Why didn't the President impose wage-price controls earlier?"

Indeed, the President's successes may even work against him in a curious sense. In 1968, the President was acceptable to many people to whom he would not normally be acceptable. People such as Walter Lippman were for him because they thought we needed a tough, flexible operator to deal with the kind of problems we had then. Now that the immediate technical problems have been solved, now that the wounds have been healed to some degree, we can afford -- we may need -- other kinds of leadership. The same people who wanted an operational President in 1968 may be looking for a philosophical one in 1972. They are no longer scared about the present; they are concerned about the future -- and they want someone who can help define it for them. As it stands, the President does not fill the bill.

(2) The President's strength has increased as a result of dramatic new initiatives, but these same initiatives have made him a more remote figure to many Americans. I don't think there is any question but that the President has gained as a result of his initiatives and is much better positioned for the campaign than he was six months ago. What is remarkable is that he has gained so little, standing now only 2 or 3 points above where he was six months ago.

In my view, this is our fault. Given the President's public personality when he entered office, given the over-inflated rhetoric of the sixties, it is not surprising that people were suspicious of promise and waiting for performance when the President took office. We recognized this in the first six months to a year of the administration. In the last two years, however, we have done virtually everything imaginable to undermine our own credibility and consistency.

In 1969, we were going "forward together." In 1970, we had a "New Federalism." By 1971, we had hyped it up to a "New American Revolution." Who knows what it will be this year? The Second Coming, perhaps?

We show no consistency of effort and commitment. The welfare program is pronounced the greatest domestic program since the New Deal, but we expend far more effort trying to place G. Harrold Carswell on the Supreme Court. We start off with a very exciting and challenging commitment to

the first five years of life, but denounce day-care (no, middle-class day-care) as committing the government to communal living.

Even our major efforts have a tinsely glow to them. The China trip and the economic policy may be admirable in themselves -- they are certainly incredible as they were ballyhooed by us. And all the time we are doing this, we tell the American people it was the previous administration which is responsible for overheated rhetoric and expectations -- and that we are the ones who are calming things down.

In the short run, of course, there have been benefits from our dodges and turns and from our Junior Chamber of Commerce boosterism. Maybe Agnew has even scored once or twice. But in the long run, I think, we have undermined the seriousness of the President and his Presidency. It is no wonder that today we find the public doubting anything we do, seeing in us instability when their greatest want -- greater than any special-interest need -- is for just the opposite.

(3) 1972 is uncertain. With the possible exception of the economy, no issue -- concern, no political allegiance, no party-loyalty seems likely to dominate. There is opportunity in the disintegration of the nation's institutions -- church, family, town, university, union. There is opportunity to reach and win over large numbers of newly-independent voters. It is not opportunity of which we have taken the fullest advantage. We have not allowed ourselves to restructure public dialogue, provide new direction and new loyalties. While we have solved short-term problems and may benefit from having done so, we have not added new certainty or direction to the public mood.

Just the reverse, in fact. We have remained committed to all the folderol of the past -- superficial "Presidentialism," Billy Graham home-town religion, We're no. 1, partisam excess -- at the same time we do everything possible to undermine the past's core. Substantively, we have been by-and large on track (although we are not dealing seriously with the economy, a problem which is structural not cosmetic). P. R. -- wise, we have behaved as village burghers, testing the wind, dragged into every reform, declining to identify ourselves with our own concerns, failing to recognize the coherency and broader meaning of our own programs.

Take our non-fiscal justification for vetoing day-care, for instance. In the days of farms and small villages, having mothers bring children up at home made sense. Women were intimately involved in the production process of the farm. Children were able to roam and learn in a broadly educational environment. But now? Homes are isolated from places of work; staying

home means staying uninvolved. As for children, staying home means remaining in a sterile, homogenous suburban neighborhood or an even more confining urban apartment. Of course we need day-care -- massive day-care. Far from committing government to communal living, day-care means, instead, committing government to preserving some semblance of the community bringing-up process which we have enjoyed for most of our national history and giving women the same opportunity to feel productive and useful that their grandmothers had.

On many other issues, we exhibit the same kind of narrow provincialism -- even when we are on the right side of the issue. I don't believe people buy it anymore. Even when it is the best they can articulate, I think they expect more from their leaders. We have failed to give it to them -- and are, I think, paying the price.

(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. I don't think it is quite as dominant as Broder and Johnson do, but I think it is much more important that we generally acknowledge. People don't "feel" the President's leadership -- except for a few brief moments such as the China announcements. The strongest, most memorable statements the President has made while in office have been statements of anger or know-nothingism or blatant politics; i. e. Carswell defeat, Calley conviction, Cambodia, vetoing day-care, pornography, abortion. They have not been devoted to explaining what the President is and what he is trying to do.

This is more than charisma -- at least charisma in the John Lindsay sense. It involves finding words and mediums which express the core of the President's character. Lyndon Johnson is not a superficially charismatic man, yet in his early years, before the war wore him down, his speech and his actions reflected a personal force that we never get from the President. Eisenhower could garble every other sentence, but, when you watched him on television, you knew he was a leader. Even Truman, haberdasher that he is, was able to express to his constituency a raw cussedness which was central to his leadership.

Richard Nixon? Man on the make; ashamed of and constantly running away from his past; manipulator; unsure of his convictions; tactician instead of strategist; Grand Vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for eloquence. That is the public impression. And that is why he is weak today. By 50 percent to 40 percent, the American people do not think he has any broad conceptual framework, any sense of direction or purpose.

In a sense, the nature of leadership is not nearly so important as its fact. That has been our mistake. We have adopted a pacification strategy, this

for that group, that for this, with deliberable avoidance of controversial intellectual and social stands, trying to reassure the left, which cares everything about words, with substance, trying to reassure the right, which cares everything about substance, with words. We have ended up alienating everyone -- and we will not be able to correct that until we start realizing that tomorrow's headline is not nearly so important as next fall's "impression"; that next week's tactical advantage may come at the expense of next November's strategic victory.

(5) The youth vote is likely to be relatively unimportant in 1972. Broder and Johnson confirm two of our own opinions: young people are going to vote less frequently than the rest of the population and they are not going to work in significant numbers for political candidates. Broder and Johnson are victims of their own distorted sample on their third point. Their analysis that young people are far more hostile to the President than the population-at-large is not born out by the polls. Kennedy has a substantial lead over the President in the trial heats, but he is the only Democrat who has any lead among the youth vote.

On the other hand, once the Democrats nominate one man and he has achieved a visible, stylish identity, he could take the same kind of lead among youth Kennedy now has. The President's support in this group is thin because of Vietnam, unemployment, etc.

(6) Muskie is the only Democrat both known to a majority of the electorate and known positively to it, but does not yet have the strategic advantage over the President. One of the most disturbing factors in our approach as we enter the campaign year is our gross underestimation of Muskie. He has been brilliant, as good as the President was in 1968, and he shows promise of being far more effective than the President has ever been in the public phase of his campaign. If he has not yet emerged as the President's equal, he also does not yet approximate the President's stature as he will as a nominated candidate for President.

People around here counting on a significant fourth party are, I think, crazy. Muskie is going to do so well in the primaries that no one will join McCarthy even if he does do it. Without irreparably damaging his right flank, Muskie has moved far enough left to have the tacit support of somebody like Al Lowenstein. Establishment reformers like Gilligan are already in his corner publicly. The Democrats want to win this year -- I don't think they're going to allow themselves to destroy their chances with suicidal splintering.

Most important of all, Muskie's public image is everything the President's is not: strong, reflective, prudent, even wise. The President could not maintain early leads against Pat Brown and Hubert Humphrey. How in the hell we think he's going to do better against an Ed Muskie with his usual plastic statesman, say-nothing strategy is beyond me.

(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders. More evidence for the alienation theory. It is not just that Wallace and Agnew are too strident -- it is also that they are somehow too facile, too quick, too simplistic. People know that what they have traditionally believed -- and what Agnew and Wallace preach -- is not right anymore; that it needs replacement; that the society has changed and that their public leaders must deal with those changes even if they can't.

The lesson of Wallace and Agnew is that people want to be led -- they don't want to see their leaders mouth the same idiocies they do over a Saturday night beer. Yet that is exactly what we try to do -- elevating the idiocies into wordy, billowy speeches, to be sure -- practically every time the President makes a prepared, public statement.

I would caution, however, that Agnew's unsuitability for the Presidency does not mean he should be replaced as Vice-President. This should be decided on the basis of comprehensive polling this spring. There are too many people who say they would vote for the President, but "not that Agnew." On the other hand, I would regret very much having Governor Connally on the ticket, not just because I would hate to seem him close to the White House, but, more importantly, because he would overshadow -- and thus undermine -- the President. The President was right in his original intent with Agnew -- he runs better with nobody.

Conclusion: The same as usual: Not all the foreign trips to all the foreign capitals in the world are going to help the President unless they are coupled with a far more serious effort to deal with his very weak relationship with the American people.

The following steps should be taken:

(1) Get new speechwriters -- this is the most important. This President has the least experienced, least able group of speechwriters in recent history. We need guys with clout, who are involved and know a lot about substance, and who can put stuff together which is coherent, purposeful, and comprehensive -- which will have the same effect as the President's masterful desegregation statement.

Ideally, we would have guys like Daniel Boorstin, Irving Kristol, Edward Banfield, and Nathan Glazer. We probably can't get them, but the President ought to speak to Moynihan about it. We need and want people from that Public Interest - Commentary School and Moynihan would know where to locate good people whom we could get.

- (2) Calm the P. R., stop getting overexcited about each new issue, and instill some consistency and follow-through in our P. R. -- political operation. We should not be aiming at taking advantage of each new issue by itself, but at taking advantage of each new issue as it relates to the President's over-all approach. Above all, avoid the cheap-shot, the head-line hunt, the simple slogan.
- (3) Realize that what is important about the President is that he is the first President to realize that the hyper-individualistic -- "We're No. 1" -- frontier American philosophy is bankrupt and outdated. The President is the first President to comprehend that internally and externally this country and its people are part of a community structure -- as such, the President is the first real conservative President the country has ever had. He has readjusted both foreign and domestic policy away from twentieth century liberalism, realizing that an unbridled commitment to individualism in the modern world is enslaving and destructive; that both Vietnam and the war on poverty are symbols of its bankruptcy; that real freedom and real individualism cannot be conferred from above, but must be worked out organically within a community structure by community norms -- hence an incomes-decentralization strategy instead of a services strategy in domestic policy, hence the Nixon Doctrine instead of Wilsonian zealotry in foreign affairs. This should be the basic theme in every utterance made by this Administration.
- (4) Stop displaying the President as if he had a stick up his ass. Put him in gutsy, colorful, photographic situations with people. Take him out of airplanes, hotels, and military reservations and put him in hospitals, police cars, outdoors, in urban areas, at local union meetings, on tough university campuses, at Indian reservations, etc. Use the White House more imaginatively.
- (5) A more imaginative use of media -- we shouldn't be afraid to put the President in conflict situations -- the Rather thing was good insofar as it went (by far the best of conversations), but we can go farther. Show that the President can handle both his enemies and the people by putting him in situations with them. We should also be hitting much more the prestige mags with prestige pieces. Personally, I thought the President's 1967 Foreign Affairs article was more a travelog than an analysis, but even it has had impact far beyond its immediate readership.