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| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|--|------------|-------------|
| 1 | Memo | Henry A. Kissinger to the President re: Soviet Jewry, 4 pp. | 10/5/1972 | B |
| 2 | Memo | Rose Mary Woods to the President re: Mrs. Nixon's thoughts, 1 p. | 3/22/1971 | G |
| 3 | Memo | Henry A. Kissinger to the President re: Initial Contacts with East Germany, 3 pp. | 12/20/1972 | B |
| 4 | Memo | Henry A. Kissinger to the President re: Meeting with Republic of China Ambassador James C. H. Shen..., 4 pp. | 3/6/1972 | B |

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| COLLECTION TITLE WHCF: SMOF: Alexander Butterfield | BOX NUMBER 5 |
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FOLDER TITLE
1972 WH Correspondence To/From Others Part 2: July-Dec. 1972

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

(Per HRH)

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960:

First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?

A) Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate, if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention, but not a Nixon voter at heart.

B) We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North, who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our opportunity is renewed.)

The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls. Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide" that might have been.

But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings in 1968. Basically, they were these:

a) A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.

Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing, he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.

On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges, to attract interest.

b) The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press. Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition, I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at election time.

What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story, The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two. Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through late in the game.

c) But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my view is:

THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964

If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:

- 1) We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order," and our issue hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
- 2) We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in 1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning is essential; plans are worthless." We should have a mapped-out game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at least once a week.
- 3) While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
- 4) We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the press and media between now and November. In my view, we have discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years -- indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc -- because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national polls by a single cubit.

5) We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.

In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent, we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.

Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this in mind.

To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Capers, which they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues and his positions -- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."

6) One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of McGovern, if nominated, being cast into the role of "under-dog" "anti-Establishment," "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human interest than ours.

We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average Man against the Establishment and the Radical Chic.


Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles this will determine much. The media could treat McGovern like Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog" like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.

7) As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning." However Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.

8) Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities, Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that 20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of the North we never carried before.


9) Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.


Buchanan



Gallup Poll - 1960
 Nixon · JFK · Und.

| | Nixon | JFK | Und. |
|------------|-------|-----|------|
| Early June | 48% | 52% | |
| Late June | 48 | 52 | |
| July | 50 | 44 | 6 |
| August | 47 | 47 | 6 |
| September | 47 | 48 | 5 |
| October | 48 | 48 | 4 |
| November | 48 | 49 | 3 |





~~TOP SECRET~~

To: Mr. Haldeman
FYI
(Σ has original)

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By JCS NARA Date 5/6/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1972

INDEX TO SAN CLEMENTE

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

FROM: John C. Whitaker *John C. Whitaker*

In view of the Russian grain deal, Tod says tentatively a Peterson/Butz announcement might go this Saturday (in San Clemente I hope). I think the right time has come to do the attached schedule proposal -- the Bondurant, Iowa stop.

RECOMMENDATION

President stop enroute back from San Clemente, Monday, July 17? Advance team go in now and survey it with Don Brock (Secretary Butz' AA), a very sharp young man. This would be undercover that this is a potential stop for Secretary Butz.

OR Tues, July 1

Maybe revise Tab A to the following:

- 1/2 hour: President arrives - meets with midwest Governors, Butz and Peterson - closed meeting.
- 1/2 hour: President talks to press -- gives background that set the stage for the grain agreement -- not Q & A -- leaves Butz and Peterson to brief -- entire farm media invited -- President on staff time while briefing completed.
- 1/2 hour: President tours Ray Elston's farm (one of four national winners selected by U.S. Jaycees) and does some color for film clips and goes on to Washington.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Send Peterson, Butz and lesser lights
in USDA back to each Governor's home and
do TV talk show on "how it was with RN in
Iowa yesterday -- Butz with Ogilvie in
Springfield, Illinois, in particular. Ogilvie
having his problems with farmers and both
Ogilvie and RN need every Illinois farmer
we can get.

John E. If you like could
you get the advanced
team doing the
survey - have no idea
what facilities we have
in Bondurant Iowa -
may be like face of the
moon - JCC

P.S. HAK, Peterson & Butz going round
round with Resseis on how & where
a message may be made - JCC

COPY

May 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVE PARKER

FROM JOHN C. WHITAKER

SUBJECT Presidential Farm Scenario (written on the assumption there is a Russian grain deal)

JUNE 12: Midday event after Houston. Bondurant, Iowa, farm of Ray Elson, selected as one of four outstanding young farmers by U. S. Jaycees. Secretary Butz does farm media briefing on this farm before President arrives. Theme - farm exports and the details of the Russian grain negotiations. Governors from corn and wheat belt - both Republican and Democrat invited:

John Gilligan, D - Ohio
Richard Ogilvie, R - Illinois
William Milliken, R - Michigan
Edgar Whitcomb, R - Indiana
James Exon, D - Nebraska
Patrick Lucey, D - Wisconsin
Wendell Anderson, D - Minnesota
Robert Docking, D - Kansas
Warren Hearnes, D - Missouri
William Guy, D - North Dakota
Richard Kneip, D. - South Dakota

President arrives and does "how it was in Russia" speech with moderate focus of grain negotiation and maximum focus on what the grain export means to corn and wheat belt. One option would be to also include remarks by Secretary Rogers as "bait" to get farm media to come. President does tour of farm for photo opportunity.

Republican Governors return to their states. Colson's operation programs local TV talk show featuring Governor and USDA spokesman.

~~TOP SECRET~~

May 26, 1972

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DOCUMENTARY FILMING

Friday, July 7, 1972

10:00 A.M.

The President's Study
La Casa Pacifica

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.....

THE PRESIDENT:

BACKGROUND

On Friday, June 23, Wolper Productions filmed you in your Oval Office in various meeting situations with Messrs. Rumsfeld, Finch, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Stein. The filming was part of a documentary, to be used for the Convention and the campaign, which is intended to show how you function in the office of the Presidency. The filming to date has included interviews with staff members and close associates telling of how you function, and the session in your office on June 23 was a bit of candid eavesdropping on your actual functioning as President.


As a final summary to this film, there is to be a direct interview conducted by Paul Keyes in the study of your San Clemente residence. The nature of the questions is intended to permit you to comment specifically on the Presidency, particularly in a philosophical sense. The desire is for you to articulate what you feel the country needs and what you as President can and should do.

Paul Keyes will be in charge of the entire production. Although he will be off camera, he will pose the questions and you will conduct your conversation with him.

Like the filming two weeks ago, all editing rights are totally ours and the White House staff will carefully review all sound and film portions before final printing of the film. Unlike the filming two weeks ago, there will be a minimum of crew personnel present.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- 10:00 a.m. The production crew will be set up in the study of your residence.
- After your meeting with members of the Cost of Living Council has concluded, you proceed to the house for the filming.
- Paul Keyes, who is in total charge of this production, will ride with you and brief you along the way.
- 10:05 a.m. With you seated in your yellow chair in the corner of the study, and with Paul on the couch, the filmed interview will begin. (A list of proposed questions is attached.)
- 10:30 a.m. Filming concludes.


Stephen Bull

Proposed Questions

1. Assuming the job of President when you first took office, were you in any way intimidated or overawed by the responsibility?
 2. What particular experience or experiences in your own past did you feel prepared you for the job:
 - (a) Early years.
 - (b) Learning the political craft.
 - (c) The Vice Presidency.
 - (d) The years out of office - 1960-1968.
 3. How did you prepare for the transition of power?
How did you plan for the actual operation of the office? *no*
 4. A description of your way of working, perhaps in contrast to the way you have viewed the operation of past Presidents.
 5. What was your general plan for the first four years?
How did you establish your priorities?
~~What were your disappointments?~~
~~What did you discover that was unknown to you before in the political process?~~
*peace - in world
property*
 6. In general terms, what do you foresee are the major objectives of the next four years?
*Peace
restore people in
govt & economy*
 7. What is the legacy you would like to leave behind you?
 8. What is the vision you see for the future of this country?
-

EYES ONLY ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.....

July 11, 1972


MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Connally, Clark McGregor and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972

Conclusions:

1. Connally honestly wants and needs a rest.
2. Despite whatever else he may say, he is keenly interested in his own future and I do not believe he is ruling out any options. He is very anxious to know what the President wants from him in the way of future assignments, and in my opinion would jump at the prospect of being on the ticket this year.
3. Understands fully the dilemma of Democrats for Nixon, is happy that we have not set up an organization, he does not want to be handed a "fait accompli" but at the same time realizes we need to get the organization set up and running immediately and agrees completely with the strategy of getting the Democratic endorsements now. In short, he totally understands the difficult situation we are in, but he is not ready to make his own decision.
4. If he assumes the chairmanship of Democrats for Nixon, he wants it to be a real campaign, well financed; he wants to play a major role and wants to be damn sure he has complete control in the areas for which he is responsible.

A more detailed summary of the meeting is attached.


Charles W. Colson

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

July 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor
and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972

MacGregor opened the session by explaining how he wants to take over the campaign, the things the President had discussed with him, the steps that he, MacGregor, was taking to reorganize the Committee to Re-Elect the President, the general situation politically around the country. He then discussed the importance of the Democrats for Nixon effort. Mac Gregor said he was very hopeful that John Connally would agree to be the head of our national effort in this area. I then explained all of the Democratic support we expected to get -- Teamsters, other major labor leaders (Connally expressed some surprise over some of the names), leading Jews, businessmen and politicians. Several times during the conversation, Connally came back to this point wanting to be sure we really had the people lined up that we said we did.

I explained the dilemma we were in, that we had good people ready to go, in fact eager to, but we were reluctant to create any organizational framework until we found out what interests Connally had in this area and obviously if Connally was interested in this area, we would not set up anything that didn't have his complete approval. He seemed very appreciative of this point and also said he understood the dilemma completely. He further said he felt it was important to move fast and to get Democrats defecting while their passions were aroused as they are now. In short, he felt we shouldn't wait, that we should move out immediately but also expressed appreciation for our not moving until he could be involved. I used the Paulucci example saying that we were holding him at bay, not accepting his \$1 million because we didn't know if Connally would want Paulucci involved.

We also discussed the difficulty of getting defections without having a place for the defectors to go. In the case of labor there is no problem. Unions can announce their own endorsements and their leadership can announce their personal endorsements. The same is true for politicians, like Rizzo. But someone not in a public office has an entirely different problem. I used the illustration of John Kenney, who was formerly Jackson's campaign treasurer, former Democratic National Committeeman from Washington, D. C. and former Under Secretary of the Navy. He wants to support Nixon but feels that it would be highly presumptuous to call a press conference to do so, that he, in effect, is just an ordinary citizen. If, however, he could announce as a member of the Board of Directors of Democrats for Nixon, there would be a plausible reason for a public statement. I also pointed out that in a few weeks Kenney might be taken in by McGovern, whereas today we have him. Hence the need to have an organized plan, people in place and an operation functioning.

Clark talked about his conversation with Dwayne Andreas, the fact that the Democrats operation was as important as anything we would have in the campaign and that in his judgment, a view he was sure the President shared, that Connally was the only man who could do this. At a number of points in the conversation, Connally kept saying, "Are we sure there isn't anyone else who could do this?". He several times expressed concern over his need to begin making money again, his plans to go back to the law firm, but to retain sufficient personal freedom to be able to campaign, the need to maintain an apartment in Washington and, as he put it a myriad of other mundane details. He also said that if he were to take the operation over, he would want to run it himself; he had not gotten where he is in life by allowing other people to make mistakes for him. If mistakes are made, it would be because Connally made it on his own behalf. He indicated that he would want to assume full responsibility for the South and the Southwest, would want to handle money, advertising and organization. He felt the effort would demand at least \$2 to \$3 million and MacGregor assured him those funds would be available.

At several points in the conversation, Connally asked what kind of campaign the President wanted. MacGregor spent a considerable amount of time explaining this, the gist of which was the President, in MacGregor's view, would not start campaigning until Halloween, that he would concentrate on being President, using the advantages of the office and letting surrogates handle the heavy load of campaigning. Connally kept asking

who would attack McGovern. I didn't make the point that Connally would be the best man for fear of turning Connally off. I did make the point that we would be hitting very hard on the issues, that we would not be attacking McGovern personally, but cutting his positions hard and all of our speakers would have to assume responsibility for this.

At 3 or 4 times during the meeting, Connally said, "When I do this..." or "The way I am going to run this is....". At several points I thought he was on the verge of saying yes. Needless to say, neither Clark nor I put it to him that hard to force an answer. At the end of the meeting, he said he never made decisions when he was tired and that therefore he didn't feel he could make a decision until he had had a little rest. He agreed, however, with the point that MacGregor and I made that the best time for a press conference would be Friday or Saturday, immediately following his meeting with the President.

I made the point at least twice that it was my idea to raise the issue with Connally simply because I felt we were under enormous time pressures, but I realized full well that the discussion should have taken place exclusively between the President and Connally. Each time I raised it, Connally demured and said he did not stand on protocol and in some ways preferred it this way because he could talk frankly and kick around the pros and cons. He also said he was glad to have time to think it through. I told him that we were frankly jumping the gun simply because we were getting so many urgent appeals from Democrats and we didn't want to accept support until after it had been discussed with Connally, but at the same time not lose it by delaying. He agreed with both points.

After MacGregor left, I deliberately stayed behind for a few minutes and said to Connally that I personally had very warm feelings for him, that I had no idea what his interests were in the future, but I didn't think anything that Clark or I were suggesting would in any way hurt Connally in the future; that in my opinion, a very historic political re-alignment was taking place, that Nixon was building a new coalition. The point I made was that whatever his interests are in the future, I felt it would not be detrimental to be part of the effort to build a new political

EYES ONLY

4.

alliance, which I felt we had the opportunity to do this year. Connally said he had no personal ambitions of any kind but that he agreed with my analysis that we are on the verge of a massive change in political allegiances around the country and that the President could very well be the architect of a new majority in this country. He then asked me what the President meant in his last press conference when he said that he had another assignment for Connally in mind. I told him that I had never discussed that question with the President and that I didn't know, but that I knew for a fact that the President thought that Connally was one of the very few people who would have the courage to do the things that had to be done in the Government and I thought his remark that Connally was able to do anything in Government was very significant and reflected how highly the President regarded Connally. Connally said he thought the remark was very important; he had read the President's press conference very carefully, particularly the remarks about the Vice Presidency. He then said that, "Of course the President has no choice with respect to Agnew. I assume the reason he went through the answers he did was to get back at Agnew because he was still mad at the comment that Agnew made about a Democrat not running on a Republican ticket." I told Connally I had no idea, that this was one subject I had never discussed with the President, that a President always has all of his options open, especially this President, but that since the subject had never come up when I was present, I really couldn't cast any light on it. I simply said again how highly the President regards Connally and that whatever the President said, I am sure he said with great deliberatness. Several times Connally commented about the specific language the President used in his last press conference with regard to the Vice Presidency. Connally said he might like to talk to me again today, but in any event he would be in touch before leaving the city and that he would want to do anything that the President wanted him to do to be of help in getting the President re-elected which he felt was the most important thing he could do. I haven't the slightest doubt but that Connally was fishing with respect to what I could tell him on his future and in my opinion he is greatly interested personally in his own future, specifically this year.

July 12, 1972

FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: STEPHEN BULL
RE: Appeal of Peterson Appointment

Prior to our departure for California, Secretary Peterson submitted a memorandum, apparently requesting a meeting with the President on or about July 17. As I recall, you asked Larry to handle this while we were in flight to California, and Larry turned down the request.

Secretary Peterson is requesting a reconsideration, via David Parker, on the basis that he is scheduled to depart for the Soviet Union from Washington on a Government plane, along with ³³ other people, on the 17th. His negotiations with the Soviets, which have already been announced, are scheduled to begin on the 20th. If Secretary Peterson cannot meet with the President until the 19th, i. e., the day after the President returns to Washington, that means Secretary Peterson will be going into the negotiations rather fatigued after a long flight and without the benefit of any staff time during which he could restructure his approach to the negotiations based upon his meeting with the President.

The possibility for a meeting would be on the morning of the 17th here in California. The advantage is a personal one to Secretary Peterson, and the disadvantage is that the news value of the Peterson departure meeting would be lost amidst the Monday labor event.

An alternative would be Tuesday morning for the Tuesday evening news. Secretary Peterson could fly back aboard S. '76 with the President on the 18th and then depart directly for the Soviet Union.

Schedule Secretary Peterson for: Monday, 17 July _____ Time _____
Tuesday, 18 July _____ Time _____

Approve Secretary Peterson to return on S. '76 _____

cc: ✓ A. Butterfield

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN ~~IT~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

July 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: CHARLES COLSON *CC*
SUBJECT: Democrats for Nixon

During your meeting with John Connally, you might wish to get into the question of Democrats for Nixon and Connally's role. Needless to say, he is a virtually unanimous choice to head the organization if he will do so. Clark McGregor and I opened this question yesterday. We didn't conclude anything but we discussed the question thoroughly (separate detailed memo is attached).

We have been moving ahead, as you know, with efforts to recruit a number of prominent Democrats. We have done so because in the immediate aftermath of the Convention the anti-McGovern feelings will be the strongest and we can build momentum during this period, creating the public impression of a wholesale defection from McGovern. We have proceeded in the knowledge, however, that John Connally likes to do things his way and that he might resent some of the efforts we have made since he in effect was not running the show. We have, therefore, been walking a tightrope.

What we would like to come out of your meeting with Connally is his ratification of what we have done to date and his willingness to in effect take over what we have gotten started. Alternatively, we need a green light to go ahead with our next best choices to head at least for now the Democrats' effort.

All of the endorsements that we have sought thus far have been of individuals. Jen0 Paulucci went a little further than we had asked and formed a Committee of Concerned Democrats and Independents with 7 other members. We want to fold it into Democrats for Nixon on the assumption that Connally approves; if Connally does object, we can, of course, keep it independent but this will give us some problems with Paulucci, who is sensitive to being in a subordinate position.

Paulucci, like Dwayne Andreas, expects Connally to run a national operation; if, in fact, we ask Paulucci, Andreas and their friends to be part of something other than the National Democrats for Nixon effort. I fear they may feel we are downgrading their importance. Andreas has a list of prominent former Humphrey supporters that he wants to recruit immediately but once again he feels the need to find the mechanism to bring them in. Max Fisher has at least a dozen prominent Jewish Democrats that want to be folded into our organization. Once again, we need a place for them to come.

We have also picked up the endorsement and/or commitment to endorse of several labor leaders. In addition to the Teamsters, we have Calhoon, Gleason, Ken Lyons, Mike May, Brennan, quite likely Rademacher and a series of lesser lights, principally state level leaders.

Rizzo will be announcing soon as will Lausche. Smathers and Jack March are working through the lists of former Members of Congress. We have a bloc of former Jackson supporters headed by John Kenney who will announce, but who would like to talk to Connally first. Balzano has a group of reasonably prominent ethnics who can either be folded into Democrats for Nixon or become part of the ethnic apparatus.

We have done nothing in terms of organization structure because once again, knowing Connally's personality, we have not wanted to jump the gun on him. We would like to get the organization established, set up a national office, have Connally announce its existence and, of course, his chairmanship as soon as possible. This will be the invitation to disaffected Democrats whom we have not sought but who are looking for a place to come.

It is the recommendation of McGregor, Mitchell and I that Connally move as soon as possible so that he can become the catalyst we need. A series of individual endorsements over the next two weeks is fine but none of them will have the national impact of an announcement of a national organization opening followed by a daily announcement of new recruits.

On the organization side, we have hired two young men, temporarily running the effort out of an improvised office. One is a young Washington PR man, former aide to Sargent Shriver by the name of Mickey Gardner. I am very impressed with what I have seen of him so far and would hope he would meet with Connally's approval. He has given up his PR job and is available to us through the campaign. We also have John O'Neill, a first year law student from Texas, for the next two months. (He made something of a national name debating John Kerry.) To run the operation here, it is

my strong recommendation that we bring in Mike Monroney, Jr. as the principal chief, day to day operative. Gardner and O'Neill would work for him. I have known Monroney for many years. Connally knows his father. Monroney is 45, ran for Congress in Maryland and lost, is a life-long Democrat, but conservative and a Jackson supporter. He is prepared to fold up his own business to spend full time, but needless to say, is unwilling to make that move without knowing he has Connally's blessing. Mike also would like for personal reasons to have Connally talk to his father, Former Senator Monroney. Monroney's feeling is that a call from Connally would make his father more understanding of Mike's desire to join the campaign and, more importantly, it will also result in his father joining Democrats for Nixon as well. Monroney, Sr. was very highly regarded by his colleagues and this would be a very significant defection.

I have not attempted in the foregoing to enumerate all of the potential Democratic defections that we believe we have. We believe prominent sitting Democrats in Congress will work for us even if quietly or perhaps will permit their associates to be involved in our effort (as is the case with Rooney and Delaney). We also believe parts of the Daley operation will support us publicly. We have enormous possibilities on Wall Street. We have some Democratic political leaders like Esposito. We have former Democratic office holders like Governor Gary of Oklahoma and Governor McNair of South Carolina.

The problem in a nutshell is that we cannot move out and really do the aggressive job we need to until we staff an operation and give people a committee to join. We cannot set up the committee and staff the operation until we know where we stand with Connally; hence, we are really very much in limbo at the very time when we should be actively and publicly bringing Democrats into the fold.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM CHUCK COLSON *WC*

SUBJECT: Reception for Labor Leaders
July 17, 1972 -- 5:00 p. m.
(45 minutes)

PLACE: Pool side, La Casa Pacifica

PURPOSE: To receive the Teamsters Executive Council following endorsement of President.

BACKGROUND: Teamsters met today and endorsed your reelection. The full list of Teamsters Executive Council members is attached (Tab A).

As you know, the Eastern Conference, Joseph Trerotola, has already endorsed -- the Southern Conference will shortly. I believe from my most recent contact with Einar O. Mohn that the Western Conference will also.

The problem with the Teamsters is the power struggle between the Hoffa allies and the Fitzsimmons loyalists. Gibbons is the biggest problem. Ray Schoessling of Illinois, although clearly with us, has

been a problem not only because of the Hoffa allegiance, but also because of Daley. Fitzsimmons believes Daley wants to make a quiet deal with us and wants to get credit for giving us Schoessling.

The Teamsters have been in a regular Executive Council Session at La Costa. This meeting is at their request.

IMPORTANT: At some point during the meeting, you should take Fitzsimmons aside and thank him for his work in getting the endorsement. Also tell him that we are with him all the way and that there will be no concessions with Hoffa. Obviously no one else should hear this.

PARTICIPANTS:

Teamsters Executive Council
Charles Colson
Donald Rodgers
Major General Alexander Haig

PRESS PLAN:

To be announced; press photo opportunity as you greet guests. WH photographer to remain.

SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS:

It is recommended that you greet each Vice President individually. Fitzsimmons will make the introductions. Fitzsimmons will then advise you that the union has passed a resolution and will probably read the text of his statement to the press. I suggest you respond along the lines of the talking points attached, and simply invite members to have a cocktail and visit informally. (Talking Points are at Tab B.)

Attachments

TEAMSTERS

Frank E. Fitzsimmons
General President
Washington, D. C.

Murray W. Miller
General Secretary-Treasurer
Washington, D. C.

Joseph J. Diviny
First Vice President
Burlingame, California

George E. Mock
Third Vice President
Sacramento, California

Harold J. Gibbons
Fourth Vice President
St. Louis, Missouri

Joseph Trerotola
Fifth Vice President
New York, New York

Robert Holmes
Sixth Vice President
Detroit, Michigan

Ray Schoessling
Seventh Vice President
Chicago, Illinois

David Previant
General Counsel
Washington, D. C.

William Presser
Eighth Vice President
Cleveland, Ohio

William J. McCarthy
Ninth Vice President
Boston, Massachusetts

Salvatore Provenzano
Tenth Vice President
Union City, New Jersey

Edward Nangle
Eleventh Vice President
Reading, Pennsylvania

Roy Williams
Twelfth Vice President
Kansas City, Missouri

Joseph Morgan
Thirteenth Vice President
Dallas, Texas

Edward Lawson
Fourteenth Vice President
Vancouver, B.C., Canada

Weldon L. Mathis
Fifteenth Vice President
Washington, D. C.

Thomas Crowell
International Teamsters Magazine

Frank Alexander
Photographer

TALKING POINTS

1. You have been particularly appreciative of their support on National Security issues. This has meant a great deal to you and to the country. You recognize that there have been some differences on domestic issues, which is always to be expected.
2. The Teamsters are an enormously important block of American labor. You are glad that during your Presidency we have been able to reestablish better relationships between the government and the Teamsters. This is important to the labor movement and to the country. For too long the Teamsters and government have been adversaries. During your Presidency they have begun to work together in the interest of their working men and women. And, this cooperative relationship, you hope will become even stronger in the years ahead.
3. You recognize that most of the members of the Executive Council are Democrats. You also know that historically, at least in recent years, Republican Administrations have been looked upon as being anti-labor and pro-business. This is not the case with this Administration and will not be the case as long as you are President. You believe that the working men and women of America form the backbone of this country's strength and traditional values. They are the "builders". Moreover, this is not a year in which there is a traditional Democratic/Republican contest; it is a year in which a coalition of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents will be fighting to preserve our "system" against a small group who have taken over the machinery of the Democratic party but who do not reflect the views of millions of Democrats. For this reason, you particularly appreciate the courage of the Teamsters in stepping forward at this time to give their support.
4. You know that there have been some areas, particularly in our legislative program, that the Teamsters have opposed. We cannot always agree, but we hope we will be able to agree more often than disagree. Colson has told you of one area of particular concern and you have instructed Colson and the Secretary of Labor to work with the Teamsters to see if it can be resolved.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1972

Dear Mr. Christensen:

The Nixon family was deeply touched by your kind telegram of July 12. We are especially grateful to you, Mr. Ramsey, Mrs. Kendall, and all the members of your staff for the thoughtful care and understanding you gave to my aunt. Her passing is a sad moment for us, but it has meant a great deal to know that her last years were spent in such an atmosphere of love and helpfulness. Please accept our thanks and appreciation for all you did to make those years so comfortable for her.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. Roy E. Christensen
Chairman and President
Beverly Enterprises
251 South Lake Avenue
Pasadena, California 91101

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN . . .

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 12, 1973

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: KEN COLE
SUBJECT: Quarterly Report of the Economic
Stabilization Programs

Attached are the transmittal letters to the Congress for the Economic Stabilization Program for the last quarter of 1972.

The report has been approved by Secretary Shultz, Chairman Stein, Cost of Living Council, Bill Timmons and Ray Price.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign both transmittal letters (Tab A).

WE 4-7-71
FG 19
FS

33

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES


I am pleased to announce that Honorable Rogers C. B. ^xMorton, Secretary of the Interior, has agreed to serve as Chairman of the Combined Federal Campaign for the National Capital Area this fall.

As in the past, this year's campaign will combine into a single drive the solicitation efforts of the United Fund, the American Red Cross, the National Health Agencies, and the International Service Agencies. In this one drive we will be seeking to do our share to meet the needs of more than 150 local, national, and international agencies in the diversified fields of health, welfare, and social service. These voluntary charitable organizations perform services that are vital to our community, our nation and our world.

Through the Combined Federal Campaign, Federal personnel are offered a unique opportunity to help hundreds of voluntary organizations by one gift once a year, a pledge made particularly easy by the availability of payroll deductions. I know that Secretary Morton will have your wholehearted support in this endeavor, and I hope you will commend the campaign with its payroll deduction feature to Federal employees and military personnel in your organization.

I request that you serve personally as Chairman of the combined campaign in your organization and appoint one of your leading assistants as your Vice Chairman. Secretary Morton should be advised of the person you designate as your Vice Chairman.

You have my every best wish for another successful campaign.



Extra copy filed: Overized Attachment

6198

7. RMV

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Today I have concurred in the recommendation of the Property Review Board that approximately 4,300 acres of land at the Castner Range, Fort Bliss Military Reservation, El Paso, Texas, be given a surface sweep, together with such other measures as may be necessary to enable the Department of Defense to certify it as decontaminated, and that it be reported to the General Services Administration as excess real property. The approximately 4,300 acres comprise sections 2, 3, 4, 26, 31, 36 and 37 except the RVN Village, a recreation area, parking area, flood control project area and the National Guard Site.

I have asked Arnold R. Weber, the Chairman of the Property Review Board, to work with the Department of Defense in assuring the prompt execution of this decision.

Richard Nixon

never sent

?

I recall our very useful conversation in my office in April, 1969. We discussed then some of the important issues on which this report elaborates, and I remember our accord at that time concerning the importance for Turkey and the United States of remaining good friends and allies.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

(RN)


His Excellency
Suleyman Demirel
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Turkey
Ankara

*I had a very good
visit with Surtay General
Menemencioglu when he was
in Washington. He is one of
the most able diplomats it
has been my pleasure to meet
since assuming the office —*

(RN)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1972



THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *[Handwritten initials]*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PETER M. FLANIGAN *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: Report on Corporation for
Public Broadcasting (CPB)

1. It is your long term goal to establish the policy that no taxpayers' funds will be used by CPB to create or distribute programs in the public affairs field. Under this policy, government funds would only be used for educational and cultural programming.

2. To make this policy effective it has been necessary to get control of the Board, to replace Frank Pace with Tom Curtis as Chairman, and to replace Macy with Henry Loomis as President. Your new board members were confirmed last month, with Curtis to be confirmed within the next few weeks. Pace being ill, the expectation is that Loomis will be appointed President within the next several months.

3. The current disposition of the Board is to accept the control of Administration appointees under the Curtis leadership. Jack Wrather has been appointed to the board committee to select a new chairman from among the board members (to be Curtis) and Tom Moore chairman of the committee to review policy, both of these being your appointees and supporting your policies.

4. In order to prevent our goal for CPB from becoming an election issue, all have agreed that the enunciation of the new policy (no funds for any public affairs programming) should be put in place at the Board Meeting in December of this year. *[Handwritten initials in a circle]*

Folder 2 Box 18
President's Handwriting

Bay 18
Folder 2

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN. *K.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1974

MR. PRESIDENT:

NASA Administrator, James C. Fletcher has sent you a letter recommending that consideration be given to announcing a U.S./Soviet agreement on a second joint space flight mission during the forthcoming talks in Moscow.

The attached memo from Secretary Kissinger concurs with Fletcher and recommends that you approve the memorandum at Tab A which will provide future exploration and more detailed recommendations for your consideration.

I concur with Secretary Kissinger's recommendation.

You may also want to use this as background information for your forthcoming trip to Houston and NASA next week.


AL HAIG



Attachment



Folder 2 Box 26

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 28, 1972

Dear Secretary Seamans:

My father mentioned on several occasions that he regarded you as a friend and that when a problem required someone to step up and solve it, you could be counted on to get the job done. When dad died, he was trying to solve such a problem with the Air Force without bothering you. I would like to see that all his efforts are not wasted, and so I am writing you in the hope that you may be able to help fulfill his last request.

As you may know, dad suffered a heart attack in February, from which it appeared he was recovering. During his recovery period, he was exposed to the outstanding treatment of Dr. Ted Dietrich, one of the leading heart specialists in the country. While my father was under Dr. Dietrich's care, he learned of some very significant cardiovascular research efforts, nearing completion, by Dr. Dietrich's assistant, Captain Vincent E. Friedewald, Jr., MD. While Dr. Friedewald's research efforts can achieve concrete results within two years, unfortunately, it will take many additional years if those efforts are interrupted now. Also, unfortunately, Dr. Friedewald is the only person qualified to continue this research.

My father knew that this research held out hope for many persons who may be affected with the disease which prevented him from fulfilling the contributions he desired to give his country and friends. He did not want the same thing to happen to other great Americans. In order to prevent this, my father requested that Captain Friedewald's recall to active duty be postponed for 24 months or that he be assigned to the Air Force base (Williams Air Force Base) near Phoenix so he could continue this work. However, none of his efforts were successful.

Secretary Seamans
July 28, 1972

-2-

I am writing with the hope that you can help assure the completion of this important research. Such help will not only prolong many lives, but will also be treasured by my mother and myself. Please let me know if I can give you any additional information. If it would be helpful, Dr. Edward Diethrich, Director of the Arizona Heart Institute, would be willing to meet with you at any time, at your convenience.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

Bud Evans

L. J. Evans, Jr.

Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Secretary of the Air Force
Department of Defense Building, The Pentagon
20330

Enclosure

cc: Honorable Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense
Lt. Gen. Robert Patterson, Surgeon-General, USAF
Honorable Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President
Maj. Gen. Walter Tkash, Physician to the President
✓ Honorable Alexander P. Butterfield, Deputy Assistant to the President

bc: Edward Dietrich
Vincent Friedewald
Frank Gabreski
Jack Jennings
Norm Paul
Tom Dixon,

*Alex -
Gabby has informed me that
you are working the HEW route on this
problem. I very much appreciate your help,
and if I can be helpful by utilizing my
contacts in HEW, please let me
know.*

Bud

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE

August 5, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Haldeman:

I write you with some reluctance to clarify the matter of security transportation when I travel by air.

Shortly after I took office in 1969 the President inquired about what security measures were provided for me. I advised him that the security of our building was very high; that we lived in an isolated place and had random, periodic checks on the house by local police arranged by Edgar Hoover who was concerned about the risks. We subsequently had my driver commissioned as a Deputy United States Marshal.

At the time of this conversation the President urged me to take nothing for granted on security measures and to especially avoid use of commercial airlines. He was aware, as I was, that since the advent of "skyjacking" Earl Warren, at the direction of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, had been provided with Air Force facilities, including travel overseas. He said my office should work the air travel with your office.

Subsequently this was done and General Hughes, at your direction, I assume, provided transportation on three occasions since 1969. Because I was reluctant to call for this service I have traveled by train or car whenever possible and have severely limited all travel. } ?

When I went to London last July for the American Bar Association meeting and in February 1972 to London for another important meeting, I used commercial transport with special checks on passengers under the direction of the FBI and the U.S. Marshal. I preferred not to ask overseas facilities, although on one trip I was able to "hitchhike" on a military flight. Why reluctant then + not now ??

Some months ago my staff routinely requested transportation to San Francisco for the August American Bar Association meeting. At the same time I requested transportation to Europe but only on a "space available" basis on a regular Air Force flight between August 20-25. The trip to Europe was to attend the International Bar Association Conference. Both the President and the Secretary of State urged me to attend that gathering.


Meanwhile a new White House transportation officer has been dealing with the matter and reported that no flights were available August 20-25 to Europe and I cancelled that engagement.

My appearance at the ABA in San Francisco, however, is a regularly scheduled annual event and I must attend. However, General Scowcroft advised that some arrangement must be made to reimburse the Defense Department. Having gone over this ground with General Hughes several years ago, we advised General Scowcroft that the Supreme Court has no budget provision of the proportions called for by Air Force rates. The suggestion was made that the cost be charged to the Justice Department, which I am unwilling to do. I cannot be placed in that position with the principal litigants in the Federal courts. Neither am I willing to be placed in the position of a supplicant asking for a "favor" since it is distinctly not my idea that I have government transportation. I therefore directed my office to advise General Scowcroft yesterday to cancel all plans for Air Force transportation to San Francisco and return and to make no further requests hereafter.

I write you at this unfortunate length so that you will have the whole picture and will understand that I am not voluntarily disregarding the President's request that I avoid commercial air flights.

I repeat that I regret to burden you with this matter but in light of the pattern established by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the request of President Nixon in 1969, I feel I must clarify the record. I want it to be clear that I am not ignoring the strong request of the President.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Hubert Haldeman". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'H'.

Honorable H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

August 5, 1972

CHAMBERS OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE

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
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Cordially,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Warren E. Burger". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "W" and "B".

Honorable H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500