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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

March 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. PETER FLANIGAN
MR. FRED MALEK

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

I reviewed the Ambassadorial situation with Stans and Mitchell today and would like to summarize the points they raised.

We have three commitments still hanging from '68, John Krehbiel, Lloyd Miller, and Willey Reynolds. It is important that these appointments be made as soon as possible to get them cleared away.

We have two problems hanging over from 1970 -- De Roulet and Symington and these are going to continue to haunt us unless we can work something out.

We have three new names arising in '72 that need to be considered, Albert Fay, Raymond Guest, and William A. M. Burden. We need to clarify whether or not something needs to be done in any of these cases.

For futures, we have several high priority needs. In the nearest possible future, starting now, they are Larry Lewis, Florenz, Ourisman, John Safer, Mrs. Farkas, John Leslie, Fred Ehrman and Josiah Spalding.

In the distant future, we need to keep in mind Sam Wiley and Clem Stone.

We need to maintain posts for Davis in Switzerland, Humes in Austria and Gould in Luxembourg. Although Gould could be moved to the Netherlands, opening Luxembourg for another appointment.

Franzheim should be dropped in New Zealand.

We now have Spain, Netherlands and Ceylon available, also Portugal, I guess.

Can we work out appointments for some of the above?

Would one of them meet the Australia situation or is that already filled?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 28, 1972

Ron Z

① make a concerted effort to see that as many of these who want to get on the mass media trips -

② Try to step up contacts with them

③ get the list to match the political type

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RONALD L. ZIEGLER

SUBJECT: List of 20 most friendly reporters

Friendly Washington Reporters

You asked me to compile a list of what I considered to be the 20 most friendly reporters in the Washington Press Corps. I consider the following list to be personally friendly to the President:

Bruce Agnew
Peter Andrews
Bob Baskin
Aldo Beckman
Forrest Boyd
John Cauley
George Embrey
James Free
Jack Horner
Carroll Kilpatrick
Clark Mollenhoff
Sarah McClendon
Howard Norton
Edward O'Brian
Edgar A. Poe
Jerry terHorst
Bill Theis
Frank VanderLinden
Lucien Warren
Fay Wells

Business Week
Buffalo Courier Express
Dallas News
Chicago Tribune
Mutual
Kansas City Star
Columbus Dispatch
Birmingham News
Washington Star
Washington Post
Des Moines Register
El Paso Times
U. S. News and World Report
St. Louis Globe Democrat
New Orleans Times Picayune
Detroit News
Hearst
Nashville Banner
Buffalo Evening News
Storer Broadcasting

Mollenhoff is personally friendly toward the President, and never writes negatively about the President. However, he is apt to attack the men around the President, as he is doing now with Peter Flanigan. In other words, Mollenhoff is a supporter of R.N., but he is erratic.

I would say the above 20 individuals without question will vote for the President.

SECRET

Columnists

As you know, columnists who are generally for us are:

Holmes Alexander
Joseph Alsop
Roscoe Drummond
James J. Kilpatrick
David Lawrence
Crosby Noyes
Nick Thimmesch
William S. White
Richard Wilson

Wire Services

All of the wire services at the White House generally write it straight. But of the regulars listed below, I would say Helen Thomas is the most personally favorable toward the President.

Frank Cormier	AP
Frances Lewine	AP
Gaylord Shaw	AP
Helen Thomas	UPI
Norman Kempster	UPI

Other observations

Don Fulsom - UPI Audio. Fulsom has a wide listenership, and his appearance (i. e. longer hair and mod wardrobe) would suggest that he, like most of the other press corps, considers himself a liberal. He attempts to present himself as such. However, his reports are always straight, and I know that his personal feeling toward the President is very positive, and his political beliefs conservative. He simply won't admit it to his colleagues.

Bill Gill - ABC News. It is my impression Gill has no political philosophy whatsoever. He is totally self-focused and can be used to our advantage because when he is used it is to his advantage. Gill is generally a good guy, and play to his ego also keeps him on board.

SECRET

Howard K. Smith - ABC News. Although liberal without question, Smith is the fairest television commentator in the business today.

Bob Semple - New York Times. I realize this is controversial, but it is my view that Semple supports the President and will vote for him. He is also, of course, interested in a career with the New York Times and would like to go to the top. Therefore although his articles generally are balanced, he must please his editors also. But his news reports are generally straight down the line.

Herb Kaplow - NBC. You may be interested to know that NBC has decided to pull Herb Kaplow out of the White House. His last day here is Friday. NBC handled the matter in a very clumsy way. They did not discuss the decision with Kaplow, but simply informed him that he would be leaving the White House and offered him as an alternative what they called a key spot on the radio network. Kaplow, of course, is quite bitter and has turned down the radio assignment, stating that it is only a dead end.

Kaplow's future with NBC is at this moment very much up in the air. But his assignment at the White House has come to an end.

*Leaves us pretty well
blanked out at N. B.C. &
C.B.S. !*

*We'd better work on the least
unbiased or unfriendly at these
networks to compensate ~*

April 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: RON ZIEGLER

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

RE: Press for the Russian Trip

The view is that the maximum press contingent should be approximately 100. We should not take everyone who went to China. We should exercise some basic control and be sure to take some new people. We should not let the group "grow like topsy" because then it is not a privilege to go. If it is hard to go, it will mean more to be on the trip. We should not try to satisfy everyone.

Start with those we have to have; the wires, the networks, and the radio people, then add the newspaper chains.

Regarding specials, first take the cities we need in the major states; Washington, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati. Then offer places to our good friends who missed the China trip such as Thimmesch, Mollenhoff, the Texas paper, etc. We should also add Sara McLendon, The Denver Post, Frank Vanderlinden, the New York Daily News. We should drop Newsday, The St. Louis Post Dispatch, Kraft, Buckley, Osborne.

Regarding the Kitchen Cabinet, any of them who ask to go should be included, but you should not take the initiative of inviting them. Wait until they ask you and then if they do ask, we will include them. This would even extend to Scotty Reston if he makes the request.

cc: Dwight Chapin

REDACTED

April 4, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER
MR. RAY PRICE

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

Some additional guidance for the speech to the Canadian Parliament:

Some improvement could be made in the speech by including some quite candid observations at the beginning. On both sides of the border, people are tired of hearing the mushy sentimentality of the "four thousand miles of unguarded borders, our closest friends and neighbors, etc., etc." While all this is true, it should not allow us to overlook the fact that we are good friends and allies, who have never fought each other in war, though we do have very significant differences. What is important is that we discuss those differences in a way in which neither will be the loser, and solve them in a way that will be mutually beneficial.

We particularly want to avoid the patronizing tone which almost inevitably seems to creep into talks made by Americans when visiting Canada or receiving visitors from Canada. The tone becomes patronizing when we try to ignore the fact that we are much more powerful, have more people, and have a much larger GNP than Canada. This does not mean that the speech should rub into them the fact that we are bigger and stronger. It should, however, very candidly recognize those facts and then point out that what is needed is that each treats the other with mutual respect, recognizing the right of each country to develop in its own way without interference or exploitation by the other. Simply because we have the longest unguarded border and have been friends and allies since the time our countries were founded does not mean that either should take the other for granted.

I'm not sure that I have gotten across the tone that is desired, but at least you can gather from this the thrust which is somewhat different from that which usually characterizes most speeches made by Americans in Canada.

We should recognize that we do have differences, that we are different, but that we also have enormous common interests at stake in what happens to the Americas - The New World. A stake in trying to build a peaceful world and a stake in international economic policies which will mean progress for both of our peoples. Naturally, the reference to the environment would fit in here too.

HRH:LH:kmt

April 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RAY PRICE

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

The President feels the U.S. News article needs some very heavy editing and would like you to do this, working it into the style of his "Foreign Affairs" piece. He wants a good solid piece covering the success of our foreign policy. It should be more along that line than a philosophical dissertation.

We should get a draft in to the President as quickly as possible. The final piece must be completed by April 28 so the President can review it finally at that time. We will then hold it for release by U.S. News immediately after the President's return from Russia. It can be updated in the intervening period.

It should include some things we will be able to say about Russia and Vietnam after the Russian trip that we perhaps can't say publicly now. That should be worked out with Henry Kissinger.

You should review the historical changes in American foreign policy over the last three and a half years. Start with Vietnam, making the point that as we removed it as an issue, we strengthened the chances for peace. Kissinger should write the strongest possible case regarding what we have accomplished here. Then you conclude that rather than being paralyzed by Vietnam, we have developed a new policy to deal with it and have succeeded.

Then you go to the Nixon Doctrine, what it means; the China initiative; the Soviet initiative; then touch on the New Europe, the New Americas and a little bit on Africa.

You should admit that there are still grave problem areas -- South Asia and the Middle East -- and cover the points of what we are doing to deal with those.

The title might be, "A New Foreign Policy for a New World". There should be a couple of paragraphs on the economic and military situation.

We should make the point that now that we have made these moves, the importance of U.S. military strength and leadership in the world is essential in order to be able to push new initiatives for peace. Only a strong America, economically, militarily, and ideologically, will be respected in the world and can play the kind of role America must play.

He feels you should fit the material that has already been written into this kind of pattern, that you should edit what has already been written, with the main points being Vietnam, Nixon Doctrine, China, Soviet, Economic and then the "Peace through Strength" theme.

cc: Henry Kissinger

[REDACTED]

April 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RON ZIEGLER

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

The limit of 100 press for the U.S.S.R. can be expanded by 25 if necessary to add all of our friends.

It is imperative that you make sure every friend gets to go and that no enemy goes unless it is necessary because of coverage.

HRH:kb

April 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DWIGHT CHAPIN

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

While you were meeting with Krogh, Moore and Price regarding the Drug Radio Speech, I met with the President on the same subject, and unfortunately, came out with the opposite result.

The President feels that this is something he ought to do as a television address, but that the specific speech presented to him, at this time, is not adequate for the purpose.

He also feels he should not do a television or radio address to the nation on drugs right now when the principle focus is on the activity in Vietnam.

He is also aware of the problem of doing the T. V. address prior to the press conference and the equal-time questions that raises.

I have discussed all of the above with Ehrlichman, briefly, and we have agreed between the two of us that it would be wise to follow the President's inclination to postpone any action on the drug deal at this time and to go back to the drawing board on a diked draft for a television speech on drugs.

Hopefully, this would be something that would announce a new program of some kind. Ehrlichman had a few vague ideas on that which I presume Krogh could develop with him. The President's idea is that he should be able to announce a new program on drug abuse of some kind, or a major progress report, or something.

Prior to the T. V. speech, the hotline should be put into use so the President can report its operation and success.

The idea would be to do the T. V. speech the later part of April and we should proceed with planning on that basis.

In the meantime, let's forget about Ambrose hotlines in Key Biscayne, at least for this weekend.

This gives us the opportunity to take this back to the beginning and start it all over again, doing it right. There is no need for timeliness, and indeed a good argument for a delay.

HRH:kb

from the President

April 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

RE: Advance Preparations for RN Appearances

I believe it is necessary to shake up our advancements somewhat so that they are sharper than they have been on two or three recent events.

For example, in Philadelphia it was extremely well advanced from a technical standpoint. However, there was not an adequate description of the makeup of the audience. I gathered from the remarks that had been prepared that the entire audience was to be delegates to the convention whereas, as you will recall, there were several hundred high school students and others in the balcony. In the future, be sure that, before all appearances I have a pretty good rundown in a sentence or two as to the type of people who will make up the audience. This is as you know a standard requirement for an advance and should be strictly adhered to because it will help me in any opening remarks I will make also in preparing the general speech.

Along the same line, but at a different level of magnitude, was the appearance with the two customs agents. It was only by interrogating them when they dropped into see me for 10 minutes before going out to have their picture taken, that I found that the younger one had been in the customs service for only five months and that he was totally dedicated to the work he was doing because, just after he entered the service, his 23-year-old brother was found dead of an overdose of heroin on the streets of New York. The older man was a Marine veteran who served on Guadalcanal.

These are small items but particularly the first one is one that could have been picked up by whoever was handling the event and passed on to me. I think the problem here is in leaving too much of this to the Military Aide who does not have that kind of responsibility or that kind of sense of news, or even for that matter leaving it to a substantive man who does not recognize

the possibilities in getting some color like that for my use. I doubt even if Ron sees such opportunities, or, putting it perhaps more fairly, he probably doesn't assume it's his responsibility to try to find out facts of this sort which can be helpful in whatever statement I make.

In the future I think it would be well to see that our advancement is always one who is aware of these factors and who does his best to provide some color information that might be useful in any remarks I might decide to make.

THE PRESIDENT

April 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

Over the past week-end I have had some opportunity to evaluate the activities we will be engaging in for the next seven months before the election. I have concluded that, at this point, your assignment should be substantially changed in substance while remaining the same insofar as title and format are concerned. In essence, I want you to become the man in charge of selling our domestic programs and answering attacks on them, rather than the man in charge of developing those programs, and riding herd on them within the Administration to see that everybody follows the line in executing them.

You have handled the development of the programs with superb organizational ability and substantively have seen to it that they have come out along the lines of my own thinking. This task, however, is now completed and what remains to be done--modification, implementation, etc.--can be done by others, whom I will mention in a moment in this memorandum. They may not be able to do the job you have been doing quite as well as you are doing it, but that will not matter too much. What is important is that you will be released to do something that they either cannot do at all or which you can do far better--selling the programs personally and through directing others in that respect.

What I would have in mind would be for you to delegate to Ken Cole the responsibilities that you now undertake for overseeing the domestic programs, insofar as substance is concerned. In addition, I think it would be well for you to talk to George Shultz and have him undertake the responsibility that he perhaps should have been given long before now--that of bringing to life the management side of OMB which has been somewhat dormant. In other words, where conflicts arise between the various Cabinet officers on programs, let George have the responsibility for working them out and, to the extent you can, you stay out of them so that you can be free to undertake the other assignment that I am going to describe.

In any event, the players who will take your old assignments will be a matter for you to decide. I am simply suggesting the line of my thinking and will abide by any recommendations you make and any decisions you make which further the objective I am trying to reach.

What has really led me to this conclusion is the fact that we have a number of programs which, from a substantive standpoint, deserve broad public approval. On the other hand, we have been singularly ineffective either in selling those programs to the public or, more often, in identifying the Administration and the President with those programs. The confusion with regard to busing is a case in point. The fact that the property tax issue has now been picked up by our Democratic friends is another example. The fact that, despite a great deal of effort, only 20% of the people think the President has an effective program in the drug abuse area is another item. The fact that we have lost the initiative in many areas with regard to fighting the battle of the high cost of living must also cause us concern.

As I run down these items, I know that the automatic reaction of the White House staff will be--why doesn't the President go on television and make a fireside chat--or why doesn't he engage in some kind of a gimmick which will spotlight the particular issue. I am perfectly willing to do anything or say anything that will help us get across our points in these areas. However, as I look back over the past three years, our great failing, particularly in the domestic area, has been that once the President shoots the big gun the infantry doesn't follow in adequately to clean up and to hold the territory. Perhaps the best example of a case where we did do so was in selling revenue sharing and Government reorganization, but I am afraid those are pretty tepid issues as we get into the fall campaign. As I see it now the gut issues are cost of living, busing, drug abuse and possibly tax reform as it relates to the property tax. There are of course other subsidiary issues like the environment, revenue sharing, etc. where we can make some points. And then of course there are always the issues where the opposition is on the attack. The Administration's closeness to big business, its support of the big man as against the little man, etc.

The ideal way, of course, to handle all these issues is to leave them to the Cabinet officers involved to do so. But we have to face the fact that in the domestic area, except for Connally in those cases where he wants to go to bat, we do not have powerful enough spokesmen. For example, the failure of Richardson, Shultz, et. al. with the Leaders in the meeting on the busing issue is a case in point. I do not mean to suggest that there may not be occasions when we can get Morton out on a positive issue where he will be effective, or that Peterson may not be able to develop into an effective spokesman, or that the other members of the Cabinet in certain spot cases may not be able to do an effective job. Also, we have to take into account the fact that in certain cases we can use Agnew and of course there are Rumsfeld, Klein and Finch who can be brought into play where the issue happens to fit them.

But one of the conclusions which has come home to me very strongly as I have thought about this over this past week-end is that you are the best all-round spokesman for the Administration's domestic programs. You have an orderly mind, you are convincing, you are tough and you are very effective on television. I know that you have been reluctant to be a public spokesman for the reason that sensitivities of Cabinet officers might be irritated--bruised. As a matter of fact, up until this time I might tend to agree with the proposition that our relations with the Cabinet are more important than putting you out front as a salesman of some of our programs. But from now until election we can't be concerned about whether Cabinet officers have bruised feelings. I think that where we find that you are the most effective spokesman for a particular program we should have you go out and do the job.

Your personal participation, however, is only half of the assignment I want you to undertake. The other half is for you to organize the appearances by others just like you were running a campaign. That means members of the Cabinet, key Congressmen and Senators, now and then a Governor, etc.

In this respect, I emphasize again that what is needed is not someone who will be thinking constantly as to how I can go to bat more often and more effectively--everybody in the White House staff and the Cabinet and in the National Committee will be spending plenty of time on that project. What we need is a commander who will organize and direct the troops to follow up once the President makes a statement or to counterattack when the enemy levels with an attack against us. This is the task I would like for you to undertake.

In the foreign policy field, I pretty much have to do this job myself. The impossible relationship between Rogers and Kissinger is such that we find it very difficult of course to get followup of my foreign policy initiatives by Rogers unless he feels it is a pretty sure thing insofar as public approval is concerned. Since I have to devote so much of my time to the planning of our foreign policy public relations as well as substance, since we have no one else to do it, I want you to do what I would do in the domestic front if I had the time to spend on that as well.

I have discussed this with Bob and perhaps you would like to sit down with him and see how the suggestions I have made can be implemented.

I would simply close this memorandum by saying that the way that I look at most of our domestic programs is that we have done an excellent job of conceiving them and a poor job of selling them. I realize that much of the reason for our doing a poor job of selling them is that we don't have a very good case of characters, and also that we have an almost impossible situation with the media; but that means that all we have to do is to try harder. Great ideas that are conceived and not sold are like babies that are stillborn. We need some deliveries within the next few months, even if they have to be cesarian. I will approve any programs you have to bring about those deliveries, provided of course you recognize my total opposition to any abortions.

THE PRESIDENT

cc: H. R. Haldeman

April 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

With regard to the speech tentatively scheduled for Wednesday night, I believe we should depart from our usual practice of taking a poll after the speech for reactions, Presidential approval, approval of policy in Vietnam and trial heats. It has always been my view that polls should only be taken when they may provide information for us that will be a basis for changing a policy. In this instance our course is set. Under no circumstances can we be deflected from it by a poll which might show a decrease of Presidential popularity, a decrease in the support of our policy toward Vietnam or in our trial heats as against the Democratic candidates. I realize that we get this information and keep it confidential but, in this case, it is important that I not be affected in any respect whatever by what public reactions might be. This is one of those cases where I have information and also knowledge as to what the consequences of following any other policy would be. No matter how hard we try to avoid it, we would be subconsciously affected by the results of a poll, and what is most important now is to steer a steady, calm course which we know is our only choice, without getting ourselves wrought up over public opinion reactions which we know we cannot affect.

What we have to do here is to see that our entire staff, as well as other spokesmen, realize that we have chosen the only responsible course open to us and that we are determined to see it through regardless of the temporary political consequences.

At the conclusion of the operations before our trip to Moscow, there will be plenty of time to test public opinion again. But right now it would only satisfy our curiosity and might adversely affect our policy. This we must not let happen.

THE PRESIDENT

April 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN

With further reference to the Memo I wrote you with regard to the need to sell our domestic programs, it might be well to put it in the context of domestic policy compared with foreign policy.

In the case of foreign policy, selling the policy is very important just like making the policy is important. Without selling the policy, public support for it which is so essential to get the approval of funds where necessary in Congress, is not generated. On the other hand, substance in the case of foreign policy is infinitely more important than substance is in the case of domestic policy, insofar as long-range consequences are concerned. For example, I could easily have rejected the Cambodian and Laotian operations and not ordered a response by air to the current North Vietnamese offensive. This would have been an easy policy to sell. It would have been disastrous from the standpoint of substance, however, because while it would have received short-range approval, in the long term it would have left the United States with no credible foreign policy position not only in Southeast Asia but in any other part of the world. In other words, while selling foreign policy is important, substance is indispensable. The classic example, of course, is Chamberlain coming back from Munich receiving an 85% approval in the British Gallup poll because he had brought "peace in our time". Within a year the fact that he had made such a grievous error on substance resulted also in his losing his public support.

The situation with regard to domestic policy is quite different. I do not mean by that that it is important to make the right decision on matters like busing, the environment, welfare reform, revenue/sharing, etc. And also I would have to admit that making the wrong decision will sometimes result in the nation starting down a road from which there will be no turning away. But generally it can be said that the substance of domestic policy is not as critically as important as the substance of foreign policy. Mistakes in domestic policy can be rectified. Very seldom is that the case where a major foreign policy mistake is made.

Putting all this in a political context, and looking at the programs which we have before the Congress, we would have to agree that what is now infinitely more important than dotting the i's and crossing the t's on the substance of each one of our programs is trying to sell them to the voters. Our ability to rectify mistakes of the past, to develop new programs, and most important the survival of our philosophy of Government is involved in the outcome of the election. Therefore, fighting, bleeding and dying over some domestic policy is not only wrong politically but wrong for the country in the long term. This again is the reason why I want you to delegate all of the operational activities and the development of any future domestic programs we may have to have between now and the election to Shultz, Cole, or others you think are competent to handle them. Your responsibility will simply be to come in on the big plays to give me your advice. Your primary responsibility, however, will be to try to sell our programs to the country, not only by your personal appearances and activities but also by directing the activities of others.

In my other memorandum I indicated the domestic issues I thought had political bite. You may not agree with my list, and so I would like to have recommendations for additions or deletions. What is important is to pick three or four positive issues that we want to hammer home-- issues which we would like to have in the voters minds rather than the issues which our Democratic opponents are going to be talking about. For example, they do not want to talk about the crime issue, the marijuana issue, the hard line welfare issue (work requirement, etc.), and we should force them to talk on those issues but, even more important, have the voters thinking of those issues, rather than to be constantly dragged into answering them on "is the Administration pro big business?", etc.

I have only scratched the surface insofar as what the issues should be, and I am not going to try to prejudice your thinking with regard to how the selling program should be developed. I would urge, however, that you get a program together as soon as possible so that, when I complete this swing to Canada and my appearance before the editors next Thursday, we can have a game plan ready to put into action.

On a substantive matter which you will probably want to pass to Krogh or, probably better, to Shultz to implement, in talking to the customs agents who picked up the \$5 million heroin haul here in Miami, I found that there are only 500 customs agents in the country. We have apparently requested two or three hundred more. I asked Ambrose how many he could really use without wasting personnel if he were to do an adequate job of search of vessels, automobiles and airplanes. He said 2,000. This may be an exaggeration, but here is an area where I believe in using the maximum force possible to try to cut down on this traffic. Have one of our technicians look into the matter and if that many agents can be used effectively and can be trained, let's get going on it.

THE PRESIDENT

April 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

This is just a reminder to you of McCrary's advice with regard to always having a Sunday morning story from this time on. In consultation with Ehrlichman, I would like to see this recommendation carried out over the next seven months. I see no reason whatsoever for our not being able to have a major Sunday morning story every Sunday in that period. Now and then, of course, you can move over to Kissinger's shop and pick something up in the foreign policy area. But generally they should be domestic policy oriented.

THE PRESIDENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEVISED TROOP LEVEL ADDRESS

Wednesday, April 26, 1972

Oval Office

10:00 PM

THE PRESIDENT:

PURPOSE:

To deliver a televised address to the nation.

BACKGROUND:

The address will originate from the Oval Office and will be broadcast live on all major radio and television networks at 10:00 P.M. EST. The standard Oval Office telecast arrangement will be employed, with NBC providing the pool pick-up.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- 9:30 PM Arrive in Oval Office to check set-up and lighting. I will be present to brief you.
- 9:35 PM Move to Alex Butterfield's office, where Ray Voegel will apply make-up.
- 9:45 PM Move to Private Office for personal time.
- 9:58 PM Return to Oval Office to await start of telecast.
- 10:00 PM Telecast begins.
- 10:20 PM Telecast concludes.
(approximately)

There will be a press photo opportunity following the telecast.

Bill Carruthers

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JOHN EHRLICHMAN

SUBJECT

Meeting with Richard Kleindienst, Pat Gray
Wednesday, May 3, 1972
2:45 p.m.

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the meeting is for the President to offer the position of Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to L. Patrick Gray III.

II. BACKGROUND

Technically the appointment of an Acting Director of the FBI is the prerogative of the Attorney General. Under the circumstances, the President must and will be actively involved in any such selection.

III. TALKING POINTS

- (1) Being totally convinced of Pat Gray's loyalty, ability and demonstrated competence both at HEW and at the Justice Department, he has been the President's first choice in the event of a contingency of this kind for many months.
- (2) The President has always had a very personal relationship with the Director of the FBI, not only because of their long-time friendship, but also because of the very necessary direct link between the President and the Director involving assignments which are exquisitely personal in nature.

- (3) Dick Kleindienst understands that, from time to time, there may even be assignments directly from the President to the Director as to which the Attorney General ought not to be a party. This is primarily for the protection of the Attorney General. He has to testify, etc., and sometimes it's just better that he can honestly and truthfully say that he knows nothing about a given set of circumstances.
- (4) White House contacts for the Director of the FBI have been Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman for special matters, and Alex Butterfield for FBI background investigations of all prospective and active Administration officials. This should continue to be the arrangement with occasional contacts with Dick Moore and Bud Krogh.
- (5) Gray's primary assignment is to consolidate control of the FBI, making such changes as are necessary to assure its complete loyalty to the Administration.

A diligent effort should be made to locate and sequester all surreptitious investigation of the Administration or its personnel in which Hoover may have engaged for protective purposes. Gray should track closely with Haldeman in this effort.

The FBI has been kept out of certain law enforcement activities in the past. The most conspicuous has been narcotics, another has been organized crime. The President would like to have Pat Gray's recommendation in the near future as to the Bureau's entry into these important areas of law enforcement.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Kleindienst and Gray will go out before the press after the meeting with the President, three o'clock, for the announcement to be made by Kleindienst.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JOHN EHRLICHMAN

SUBJECT

Meeting with Richard Kleindienst, Pat Gray
Wednesday, May 3, 1972
2:45 p.m.

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the meeting is for the President to offer the position of Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to L. Patrick Gray III.

II. BACKGROUND

Technically the appointment of an Acting Director of the FBI is the prerogative of the Attorney General. Under the circumstances, the President must and will be actively involved in any such selection.

III. TALKING POINTS

- (1) Being totally convinced of Pat Gray's loyalty, ability and demonstrated competence both at HEW and at the Justice Department, he has been the President's first choice in the event of a contingency of this kind for many months.
- (2) The President has always had a very personal relationship with the Director of the FBI, not only because of their long-time friendship, but also because of the very necessary direct link between the President and the Director involving assignments which are exquisitely personal in nature.

- (3) Dick Kleindienst understands that, from time to time, there may even be assignments directly from the President to the Director as to which the Attorney General ought not to be a party. This is primarily for the protection of the Attorney General. He has to testify, etc., and sometimes it's just better that he can honestly and truthfully say that he knows nothing about a given set of circumstances.
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEVISED ADDRESS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA

Monday, May 8, 1972

Oval Office

9:00 PM

THE PRESIDENT:

PURPOSE:

To deliver a televised address to the nation on Southeast Asia.

BACKGROUND:

The address will originate from the Oval Office and will be broadcast live on all major radio and television networks at 9:00 P.M. EDT. The standard office telecast arrangement will be employed, with ABC providing the pool pick-up.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- 8:30 PM Arrive in Alex Butterfield's office, where Ray Voegel will apply make-up.
- 8:40 PM Move to Oval Office to check set-up and lighting.
- 8:45 PM Move to Private Office for personal time.
- 8:58 PM Return to Oval Office to await start of telecast.
- 9:00 PM Telecast begins.
- 9:20 PM Telecast concludes.
(approximately)

There will be a press photo opportunity following the telecast, after which you will proceed through the center door of the Oval Office to the Cabinet Room for a meeting with the Cabinet.

Mark Goode

CHARLES S. RHYNE
BRICE W. RHYNE
COURTS OULAHAN
ALFRED J. TIGHE, JR.
DAVID M. DIXON
ROBERT H. CULP
T. HAROLD SCOTT
WINSTON M. HAYTHE
ABE J. ROSENBLEET
R. COLETTE McKENNA
TERENCE L. OGDEN
DENIS D. McKENNA
EDWARD W. HUNEKE

RHYNE & RHYNE
400 HILL BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

(202) 347-7992

CABLE ADDRESS
CHASRHYNE

May 11, 1972

M
The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I write to again express the appreciation of all the members of the Class of 1937 to you and to Pat for that very wonderful reunion at the White House. I am certain that you could tell from their faces and their comments how grateful all of them were to you for this magnificent and inspiring occasion. I am certain that each of us will cherish it forever as the great event of our experiences.

I want also to say how helpful, tactful, and impressive were the efforts of Alex Butterfield and Lucy Winchester in planning and carrying out this great celebration.

Above all, I would like to express a special extraordinary thanks to Rosemary Woods. Mr. President, Rosemary is not only one of the world's grandest people, but she is so dedicated and so extremely helpful in every way, that words defy a proper expression of the love and affection and admiration in which she is held by the undersigned and so many thousands of your friends who are also her friends.

Sincerely,

Charlie

Charles S. Rhyne

CSR:dgr

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BILL SAFIRE

SUBJECT: Additional Notes and Caveats

1. Refer to Russian peoples in the plural.
2. "Mir y droozhba," peace and friendship, is now a cliché that smacks of woolyheadedness in the USSR. I have suggested that the toast be "To a Peaceful Future," which also finesses the line "As he was toasting the Kremlin leaders..."
3. You could kid about Kiev being part of a "Southern Strategy."
4. I would like to see a strong mention of Eisenhower, who was denied the opportunity to make the visit you are making. The NSC suggests no personalities mentioned; I disagree on Ike, a reference the US press corps could not ignore.
5. The proverb "You are my guest, but truth is my mother" is from Khrushchev which you mention in "Six Crises." However, no mention of K is necessary.
6. The name of the Mayor of Moscow is Promislov, which in America would be a great name for a politician.
7. You will be asked sooner or later about the "Spirit of Moscow;" you could respond with "I'm more concerned with the results of Moscow."