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CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20428

IN REPLY REFER TO: B-1-39

August 3, 1971

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *✓*

Dear Mr. President:

There is transmitted for your approval a copy of the Board's proposed order in the matter of the application of Aeromar, C. por A., Docket 21980. The proposed decision of the Board with respect to this matter, which is embodied in a formal opinion, is likewise submitted before publication thereof, pursuant to the provisions of section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

The proposed opinion would grant a foreign air carrier permit to Aeromar, C. por A., authorizing the holder, for a period of three years, to engage in planeload charter foreign air transportation with respect to property (a) between any point or points in the Dominican Republic and any point or points in Florida, and (b) between any point or points in the Dominican Republic and any point or points in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, subject to certain conditions.

Respectfully yours,

Sam D. Brown

Chairman

Enclosures

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Historical File

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D. C.,
on the 2nd day of August, 1971

-----:
Application of :
:

AEROMAR, C. por A. :
:

Docket 21980

for a foreign air carrier permit :
pursuant to section 402 of the :
Federal Aviation Act of 1958. :
-----:


O R D E R

A full public hearing having been held in the above-entitled proceeding, and the Board, upon consideration of the record, having issued its opinion containing its findings, conclusions, and decision;

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That a foreign air carrier permit in the form attached hereto be issued to Aeromar, C. por A.;
2. That said permit shall be signed on behalf of the Board by its Secretary, shall have affixed thereto the seal of the Board, and shall be effective upon the effective date of this order;
3. That, except to the extent granted, the application of Aeromar, C. por A., and all other requests in this proceeding be and they hereby are denied; and
4. That this order shall become effective upon the date of its approval by the President of the United States.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:




Secretary

(SEAL)

THE WHITE HOUSE

APPROVED:





OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20428

IN REPLY REFER TO: B-1-39

August 3, 1971

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.....

Dear Mr. President:

There is transmitted for your approval a copy of the Board's proposed order in the matter of the application of Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Docket 22572. The proposed decision of the Board with respect to this matter, which is embodied in a formal opinion, is likewise submitted before publication thereof, pursuant to the provisions of section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

The proposed opinion would grant a foreign air carrier permit to Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, authorizing the carrier, for a period of five years, to engage in charter foreign air transportation, subject to certain conditions, with respect to (a) charters of persons between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, (b) planeload charters of property between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, limited to ten one-way flights within any calendar year, (c) inclusive tour passenger charters between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, (d) Federal Republic of Germany-originating and terminating circle tour passenger charters (including inclusive tour charters) to the United States and other countries, (e) European-originating charters of persons (including inclusive tour charters) to the United States, and (f) European-originating and terminating circle tour passenger charters (including inclusive tour charters) to the United States and other countries.

Respectfully yours,

Chairman

Enclosures

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board
at its office in Washington, D. C.
on the

GERMANAIR BEDARFSLUFTFAHRT :
GESELLSCHAFT mbH & CO. KG :

Docket 22572

ORDER

A full public hearing having been held in the above-entitled proceeding, and the Board, upon consideration of the record, having issued its opinion containing its findings, conclusions, and decision;

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That a foreign air carrier permit in the form attached hereto be issued to Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG;

2. That said permit shall be signed on behalf of the Board by its Secretary, shall have affixed thereto the seal of the Board, and shall be effective upon the effective date of this order;

3. That, except to the extent granted herein, the application of Germanair Bedarfsluftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, and all other requests herein, be and they hereby are denied; and

4. That this order shall become effective upon the date of its approval by the President of the United States.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:


HARRY J. ZINK

Secretary

(SEAL)

THE WHITE HOUSE

APPROVED:



Historical File

E. R. QUESADA, LT. GEN. USAF (RET)

990 L'ENFANT PLAZA SOUTH, S.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 554-3900

August 6, 1971

The Editor
The Washington Post
1515 L Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

On Saturday last the Washington Post published, under the by-line of Thomas O'Toole, a most interesting and informative description of Colonels Scott and Irwin's landing on the moon. I, like most Americans, was thrilled.

Upon reading O'Toole's article, my thoughts returned to the headline that the Post saw fit to characterize the event that O'Toole described. The headline words were:

"Falcon Drops Hard
Slightly Off Target
In Dusty Descent"

Being impressed by the negative characterization, I think it might be helpful to the Post -- and to its readers -- if those words could be translated into a few simple comparisons that most anyone can readily understand.

The Post in its headline said "Falcon Drops Hard". Your readers should know that Falcon's "Hard Drop" was at a descent rate of 1 foot per second. To make that descent rate meaningful to laymen, which I assume the Post headline writers are, I suggest that they hold their pencil $1/5$ of an inch above their desk and then drop it. Upon reaching their desk, after travelling $1/5$ of an inch, the descent rate of their pencil will be 1 foot per second -- the same "Hard Drop" that Colonels Scott and Irwin experienced when they landed on the moon. If they would prefer a more personal test, I suggest they take a section of the Post that is approximately $1/5$ of an inch thick, place it on the floor of their office, stand on it and then jump off. They will then personally experience the same "Hard Drop" as did Scott and Irwin.

Since one leg of the Falcon touched the moon before others, it could be argued that the descent rate should be that which was experienced when all legs gained contact with the moon's surface. Under those circumstances the descent rate was 3.7 feet per second. To enjoy that experience, I suggest that the Post headline writers place a Sunday edition of the Washington Post that is 2.4 inches thick on the floor of their office, stand on it and then jump off. The result would be a "Hard Drop" comparable to the worst of the two alternatives.

The Post, and its readers, should also know that the Falcon was designed to cope with touch down rates (Hard Drops) as high as 10 feet per second, which is 10 times or 3 times the rate experienced by Scott and Irwin (depending on how negative you wish to be).

In order to fully appreciate the incredible achievement of our two young astronauts, it should also be pointed out that between their take off from the launch pad and their landing on the moon, Scott and Irwin attained a speed of 35,000 feet per second (25,000 miles per hour). By manipulation, requiring years of training and incredible skill, accompanied by nature's forces, they were able to decelerate their vehicle to a speed of 1 foot per second (7/10 of 1 mile per hour) at the exact moment of moon contact. Such being the case, one wonders why the Post would describe this event as "Falcon Drops Hard" with the connotation that accompanies it.

The headline writers also described the landing as "Slightly Off Target". O'Toole charitably said that the landing was "1,500 feet northeast of their targeted site in the Marsh of Decay". Your readers might find it informative to know that the "target" employed by NASA is a mathematical point on a mathematical moon, selected for mathematical convenience. If a person had a map of the moon, there is no known way to attach that point to it. The astronauts attempted, admittedly, to touch down as near as possible to NASA's mathematical point which has no dimension. In a practical sense the astronauts guided themselves with the help of guidance computers to the mathematical point and they then sought a touch down area that in their opinion was the safest available. In doing so they were influenced by two critical considerations; fuel consumption and a level surface. In other words, they couldn't fool around. They had to land promptly on the best terrain within reach.

In order to get a better understanding of the Post's term "Slightly Off Target", the Post's readers should know that Scott and Irwin travelled approximately 2 billion feet (378,787 miles) between take off and moon touch down. If they landed 2,000 feet removed from NASA's mathematical point (as they did), they were off target by one part in a million. In order to understand the precision that was achieved by Scott and Irwin, it should be recognized that the

two bodies concerned here -- the earth and the moon, were each moving. The earth was spinning on its own axis and the moon was not only orbiting around the earth, but also rotating on its axis. It is interesting to recall that, at the time of launch, the moon was 1 billion 250 million feet (236,742 miles) from where it would be at the time of touch down. In other words, they had to "lead" the moon, in the vernacular of a sportsman, by 236,742 miles.

Those of us whose inclinations are positive would say that the landing was a "Bull's Eye". A landing within 3,280 feet (1 kilometer) of a mathematical point on a mathematical moon is considered to be a "pinpoint landing".

The headline writers of the Post characterize the landing as being "In Dusty Descent". There are two facts of life that even our astronauts cannot overcome -- the moon is dusty and our oceans are wet. Since they will be landing in the Pacific Ocean upon returning home, I hope readers of the Post will have Scott and Irwin's return characterized in terms more positive than "All Wet".

Sincerely,

E. R. Quesada
E. R. Quesada

Post - Sat July 31 '71

**Falcon Drops Hard,
Slightly Off Target
In Dusty Descent**



OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20428

IN REPLY REFER TO: B-1-39

August 6, 1971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

There is transmitted for your approval a copy of the Board's proposed order in the matter of the application of Ontario Central Airlines Limited, Docket 22317. The proposed decision of the Board with respect to this matter, which is embodied in a formal opinion, is likewise submitted before publication thereof, pursuant to the provisions of section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.

The proposed opinion would grant a foreign air carrier permit to Ontario Central Airlines Limited, authorizing the holder, for a five-year period, to engage in charter foreign air transportation with respect to persons and their accompanied baggage and planeload charter foreign air transportation of property between Kenora, Ontario, Canada, and any point or points in the United States, subject to conditions.

Respectfully yours,

Whitney Gilliland

Acting Chairman

Enclosures

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Historical File

5. That this order shall become effective upon the date of its approval by the President of the United States.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:


HARRY J. ZINK

Secretary

(SEAL)

THE WHITE HOUSE

APPROVED:

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard Nixon", is written over a horizontal line. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

August 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject : The Expansionary Impact of the President's Economic Policy

The President's Economic Program consists of a number of elements each of which will affect total spending, output and employment. Many of these elements will also affect the Federal Budget directly by reducing expenditures or by either raising or lowering revenues. There is no simple dollar-for-dollar connection between the budget effects and the overall economic effects. One cannot say that if the expenditure cuts exceed the revenue cut the program is restrictive, and vice versa. Everything depends on the specific nature of the actions taken. For example, the price-wage freeze has no direct effect on the budget but will contribute to economic expansion by strengthening confidence and encouraging purchases by consumers and businesses. As another example, the import surcharge will increase revenues, but unlike most other measures which increase revenues it will stimulate the U.S. economy, by restraining imports.

To estimate the size of the impact requires specific evaluation of each item in the program. This cannot be done precisely or with high reliability, because the answer depends upon the reactions of businesses and consumers to a number of changes which have never been experienced before, and certainly have never been experienced before in a combination of circumstances like the present. However, we have made the best estimates we can and summarize them in the table. The table shows additions to and subtractions from the Gross National Product in 1972 estimated to result from the elements in the program. The amounts estimated are real changes in output, not changes in the dollar value of output that result only from price changes, in either direction, although they do take account of changes in real output that result from price increases or reductions. The amounts shown also take account of secondary effects, such as the increased expenditures of consumers whose real incomes are increased by the primary effects.

Our estimate is that the program will raise the 1972 GNP by about \$15 billion above what it would otherwise have been (in estimated constant 1972 dollars). This would be an addition equal to 1.3% of the GNP that

we would produce in 1972 if we were operating at full employment in that year (measured in the same dollars). On a crude estimate this would reduce the average unemployment rate in 1972 by about 4 tenths of a percentage point, or the number unemployed by about 350,000.

Additions to Calendar 1972 GNP Resulting From
New Economic Program
(\$ billions of 1972 dollars)

1. Deferral of Revenue Sharing	-\$2.0
2. Deferral of Federal Pay Increase	-\$3.0
3. Reduction of Federal Employment	-\$1.5
4. Other Expenditure Reductions	-\$2.5
5. Additional Personal Exemption Increase	+\$2.5
6. Elimination of Auto Excise	+\$5.5
7. Import Surcharge and Exchange Realignment	+\$3.0
8. Accelerated investment tax credit	+\$6.0
9. Strengthening of Confidence	+\$7.0
Total	+\$15

General explanation of the main items follows:

1. Deferral of revenue sharing. This is assumed to reduce State and local purchases by an equal amount and subsequently to reduce consumer purchases as a consequence of reducing incomes earned through State and local employment and purchases.

2. Deferral of Federal pay increase. This does not directly reduce real GNP but reduces it indirectly, with a lag, by the reduction of purchases by Federal employees.

3. Reduction of Federal employment. This directly reduces government production, which is part of the GNP, and indirectly reduces the consumption expenditure of former government employees.

4. Other expenditure reduction, analyzed case-by-case, have combinations of the effects on Federal purchases, State and local purchases or consumers' purchases described above.

5. Accelerated rise of individual income tax. This raises households' after-tax income and with a little lag raises their consumption expenditure by a large fraction of the increase.

6. Elimination of 7% automobile excises. This will reduce automobile prices by 7% of the manufacturers' price. On the basis of a number of studies, it is assumed that auto sales increase 1% for each 1% reduction in retail auto prices. The additional income generated in auto production is estimated to bring about a further rise in consumption.

7. Import surcharge and exchange realignment. No time has been set for the expiration of the 10% import surcharge, which is temporary, and it may end before June 30, 1972. On the other hand, no allowance is made here for possible reduction of the average value of the dollar relative to other currencies. We assume that these two factors cancel out, and we make the estimate "as if" the surcharge continued until June 30, 1972. The estimate of the effect of the surcharge is unusually difficult. The figures given in line 7, it should be noted, are not the value of imports displaced but are the value of U.S. output directly and indirectly generated.

8. The Accelerated Investment Tax Credit. The credit, which is at the rate of 10% from August 15, 1971 to August 15, 1972, and at ~~5%~~ thereafter, will have two effects. First, it increases the rate of return on capital and thereby stimulates investment. Second, it increases the return to investment done in the period August 15, 1971-August 15, 1972 relative to investment done later and is a powerful incentive to move investment forward into the first year. Each of these effects is difficult to estimate. The estimates given are the sum of the investment stimulated plus the secondary consequences of the rise of incomes generated by the additional investment.

9. The Strengthening of Confidence. It is generally believed that expenditures of consumers have been held back by fear of ~~future~~ rapid inflation. Certainly consumers' expenditures have been unusually low relative to their incomes. The strong anti-inflation program should strengthen confidence and stimulate consumption. However, there is no basis for estimating the magnitude of this effect except that consumers' expenditures would probably not long exceed their historic relation to incomes. Our estimate is essentially an arbitrary figure but we think not an excessive one.

Herbert Stein
Acting Chairman

August 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Monetary and Financial Developments

Announcement of the new economic initiatives on August 15 brought strong upward surges in all money markets, prices rose and yields fell across the board. The stock market (measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Index) rose from 856.02 Friday, August 13, to 880.91 at the close on August 20. Bond prices rose similarly.

Corporate Aaa yields fell from roughly 8.10% to 7.45%, 18-month Treasury bill yields fell 65-70 basis points, 1 year bill yields fell from 5.75 to 5.06%, and 3-month yields fell from 5.10% to 4.62%. Municipal bond rates fell from just over 6.00% to just under 5.50%. By far the greatest portion of these movements occurred on Monday and Tuesday as money markets received the new program with optimism, especially about the control of inflation. There was some profit taking later in the week, but the declines held fairly well. In the corporate and municipal markets, there are a substantial number of issues waiting in the wings, either with previously scheduled issues or contemplating new issues as a result of the drop in market rates.

Short-term Treasury bill yields have been importantly influenced by Federal Reserve purchases and buying for foreign official institutions. The latter purchases reflect, in part, speculation that the value of the dollar will fall in terms of other currencies. (Speculators sell dollars to foreigners for other currencies; foreign official institutions acquire them and use them to buy Treasury securities since they are now unable to buy gold.)

The money stock (excluding time deposits) showed a very strong increase in the week ending August 11. While large for a single week, this served mainly to reverse the monetary contraction experienced since the week of July 7. The figures of the last five weeks suggest that the Federal Reserve is succeeding in its declared intention of slowing down monetary growth, although it must be recognized that there have been earlier indications of this in recent months which turned out to be false.

Herbert Stein
Acting Chairman

C

September 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

JULIE EISENHOWER

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT:

Travel During the Periods
of David's Cruises

The President indicates that you want to do some personal appearances during the fall and early winter when David is away on cruises. This is an excellent idea and would be very helpful in obtaining maximum exposure for the "President's family", demonstrating what great people the "Nixons" are, and articulating what they, as a family, believe. It will also provide an opportunity to speak in a low key way on issues for which the President stands. The total effect of your appearances would be very favorable and in many cases, would have the same impact as a Presidential visit.

Two of your widely recognized assets could serve as the basis, or central theme, for your travels. These are:

1. Your youth and your ability to communicate with young people.
2. Your established and recognized position as a teacher.

With this as a starting point, a suggested schedule might be travelling one or two days of each week while David is away. According to Don Hughes this will include the following periods:

September 21 - October 6, 1971
October 18 - 22, 1971
November 3 - 18, 1971
January 1 - 17, 1972

You would visit states of key importance to the President -- probably concentrating on areas the President has not visited or may not have an opportunity to visit during the next 13 months. The following are suggestions for principal events that you may wish to consider:

1. Education-oriented event - perhaps an appearance at a grade school or junior high where you have been invited to speak. You might speak on the importance of education, responsibility of teachers to pupils and pupils to teachers, and the contribution that a citizen can make to his society when he has the proper tools that he has obtained through education.
2. Newspaper interviews - these would be with friendly, social-type reporters.
3. Television interviews - although this would change from city to city, a women's show interview or a special film clip for an evening news show might be appropriate.
4. Radio interviews - these would be the same as the TV shows aimed at the same audiences.

The latter three events would be done in conjunction with the primary event which would be the vehicle to get you into an area.

Other events in which you could participate would depend upon the area and, of course, your own interests. There are a variety of secondary things you might wish to do such as meet with groups of YR's or Jaycees, visit hospitals for the aged, children, or the mentally retarded, or perhaps visit an area where a long-time friend of yours now resides.

While in Washington, you might wish to reinstitute personally conducted tours of the White House. However, rather than merely taking random groups from the tour lines, there would be special, select groups scheduled to be conducted on a tour of the White House by Julie Eisenhower. You might also consider granting an interview to one or maybe three or four selected newspapers. The interview would be conducted in the residence, thus creating an extra dimension of exclusiveness.

Also, you might visit Washington Children's Hospital. Weren't you engaged in a fund-raising effort for them two years ago? Hospital visits would be much appreciated by the patients, and, with the cast on your leg, you certainly have something in common with the patients in the orthopedic ward.

Taking into consideration the regional areas that can be most helpful to the President, a rough travel schedule was compiled for the first three periods when David will be at sea.

	<u>States</u>	<u>Cities</u>
Sept. 29, 1971	New York	Buffalo
Sept. 30, 1971	Ohio	Cleveland
Oct. 5, 1971 (on way to Florida)	Tennessee	Chattanooga
Oct. 20, 1971	Missouri	Silver Dollar
Oct. 21, 1971	Texas	San Antonio?
Nov. 9, 1971	Indiana	Evansville
Nov. 10, 1971	Illinois	Cairo?
		Bloomington?
Nov. 12, 1971	Virginia	Norfolk
Nov. 15, 1971	Pennsylvania	Pittsburgh
Nov. 16, 1971	New Jersey?	

Should you decide to do any of these suggested activities you would receive complete support from the President's staff. Pat Buchanan has already given some thought to this matter and has prepared a brief memorandum on some of the issues with which you would want to be more familiar. A copy of this briefing memorandum is attached.

I think these trips would be very enjoyable for you. If you would like to, we could probably sit down and discuss this together at your convenience.

Attachment

**RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET**

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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

September 23, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

CHARLES W. COLSON

FROM:

JON M. HUNTSMAN *JMH*

SUBJECT:

Catholic Vote in 1972

Attached find a copy of a memorandum of September 20, 1971 to the President from John Ehrlichman regarding the Catholic vote in 1972. Please prepare a memorandum to the President from you and John Ehrlichman to replace Mr. Ehrlichman's memorandum and make any additions and observations you feel appropriate. It should be returned to our office for forwarding to the President. Please also consult with Pat Buchanan to receive his input for your memorandum.

Thank you.

Attachment

cc: Patrick Buchanan

Boo: Alexander P. Butterfield ←

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

September 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JOHN ~~FER~~^ELICHMAN

SUBJECT

Catholic Vote and 1972

Roy Morey of the Domestic Council staff has been systematically analyzing the various issues raised in our budget review, for instance, veterans, senior citizens, etc.

His most recent paper, attached, is on the Catholic vote and particularly the significance of the issue of aid to parochial schools.

Since his conclusions diverge from the course which we are following, I am forwarding it to you in its entirety with the expectation that you will wish to review it.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1971

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

KEN COLE
ED HARPER

FROM:

ROY MOREY 

SUBJECT:

The Catholic Vote and 1972

This memo briefly outlines the voting behavior of Catholics in the 1960 election, the Catholic electorate today and political trade offs involved in attempting to woo the Catholic vote in 1972.

I. The Catholic Vote in 1960

Before discussing the Catholic vote in 1972, it is necessary to briefly review the 1960 election because it will be used as an historic referent -- especially if either Muskie or Kennedy is the Democratic nominee. The following is a list of major conclusions about the voting behavior of Catholics and the issue of Catholicism in the 1960 election:

1. There was a significant Catholic vote in 1960.

According to the Gallup poll Catholic support for a Democratic nominee increased from 51 percent in 1956, to 78 percent in 1960. Furthermore, 62 percent of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in 1956, actually voted for Kennedy in 1960. While only 3 percent of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in 1956 switched to Nixon. This does not mean, however, that during the mid-1950s Catholics were leaving the Democratic Party only to return to the fold in 1960 when the Democrats offered a Catholic candidate. The Gallup results show that in the 1958 Congressional elections 75 percent of the Catholic voters supported Democratic candidates. The GOP appeal to Catholics

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in 1956 seemed to be more attributable to the magic of Ike, rather than a desertion from the Democratic Party. However, as will be pointed out later, the Democratic appeal to Catholics in 1960 may have been a high watermark not to be achieved again.

2. The Catholic vote alone was not sufficient for Kennedy's victory.

While it is true that there was a sizable shift in the Catholic vote toward Kennedy, there were other shifts in the electorate which indicate that in addition to the Catholic vote, Kennedy relied on increased Democratic votes among Blacks, Jews and other groups to win. Gallup reports that on a national basis, the votes of Jews increased from 75 percent to 81 percent Democratic over 1956 and the votes of Blacks from 61 percent to 68 percent. In 1960, Illinois and Texas together accounted for 51 electoral votes. Out of approximately 4.7 million votes cast in Illinois, Kennedy's margin of victory was only 8,858. A shift of 4,500 votes by any group -- Catholics, Blacks, Jews, etc, would have been enough to make the difference. In Texas, Kennedy's margin was 46,233 out of 2.3 million votes cast. Here again, a shift by as many as 25,000 Blacks, Catholics, Jews, etc, would have made the difference in carrying the state. The point is that the Catholic vote alone was not the single factor which gave Kennedy a victory in 1960.

3. The religious issue cut both ways in 1960.

While some Catholics swung to Kennedy, it is clear that Protestants who had formally voted Democratic swung away. The best estimates indicate that probably as much as 10 percent of the electorate shifted both ways on the religious issue and in terms of aggregate popular vote, the swing away from Kennedy because of his religious affiliation cost him 1.5 million votes or 2.3% of the total popular vote.

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4. The net results of religious shifting favored Kennedy.

While Kennedy's Catholicism lost him popular votes, it still helped him more than it hurt him in the election. This is due to the fact that Catholics were disproportionately located in closely divided large electoral vote states. The best evaluation of the probable effect of the religious issue in 1960 is the MIT simulation project conducted by Pool, Abelson and Popkin (Candidates, Issues and Strategies, 1964). According to their calculation Kennedy lost, by the religious issue, the following states he otherwise would have won: Kentucky (10), Tennessee (11), Florida (10), Oklahoma (3), Montana (4), Idaho (4), Utah (4), California (32), Oregon (6), Virginia (12), and Washington (9). He won the following states he would have otherwise lost: Connecticut (32), New York (45), New Jersey (16), Pennsylvania (32), Illinois (27), and New Mexico (4). Hence, according to this best-fit simulation, Kennedy achieved a net gain of 22 electoral votes because of the religious issue.

On balance, it appears that Kennedy was hurt somewhat in the Southern and Border states and perhaps in the Midwest and Mountain states as well, but he more than made up for it in the Northern and Midwestern industrial states whose electoral votes were far larger.

According to a study that was done several years ago on Wisconsin, Democratic candidates for Congress in Wisconsin suffered defeat in close districts probably because of Protestant defection due to Kennedy's candidacy. This is interesting to keep in mind in a state which is over 33 percent Catholic.

The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan published a study several years ago which indicates that there was a net loss in the popular vote because of Kennedy's religious affiliation. The study estimated what was the "normal" votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic Presidential candidates and then calculated the 1960 divergence from this hypothetical norm, they concluded Kennedy lost about 2.2 % of the two party vote, with the largest portion of the

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defections coming from the South. The two-edged nature of the religious issue is an important factor to keep in mind looking toward 1972.

II. The Catholic Vote Today

The 1960 election was atypical, because not only was there a Catholic candidate running, but Catholicism itself was an issue. In fact, the Kennedy forces found it profitable to make Catholicism an issue. According to an informal conversation with Lou Harris, the decision by Kennedy on how to handle the Catholic issue was based on key state polling. The decision seemed to be to lay out Catholicism in full view as an issue as a calculated risk to pick up Catholic votes in key electoral states, knowing full well that other states were not going to be picked up. This informed gamble paid off for Kennedy.

Today, the situation is substantially different. While it is true that Catholics are still more likely to vote Democratic than Protestants, they are less likely to vote as Catholics. A Gallup poll conducted in July, 1968, indicates that the voters' choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided by religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact, it was slightly reversed. The religious affiliation of a candidate is simply far less important (including Catholic voters favoring Catholic candidates) than it was in 1960. In fact, Scammon and Wattenberg contend that "today Catholicism seems thoroughly dead as a political issue." There are several reasons for the decline in importance of the Catholic affiliation.

1. 1960 was billed as a test case and now that that hurdle has been cleared it is far less important in the minds of most Catholics. In analyzing voting behavior, one finds that a social factor like religion or ethnicity would become important temporarily during the political campaign and become relatively unimportant subsequently.

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2. Group identification is politically important if it is in a group which has a bearing on social status -- such as race or ethnicity. Within recent years, religion has become far less important in determining social status than it once was; yet the same thing cannot be said for race and ethnicity. Poles, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans maintain ethnic identification but do not necessarily look upon themselves as Polish-Catholics, Mexican-American Catholics, etc.
3. There has been considerable movement and economic mobility among Catholics in the past decade, and today most Catholics are middle income types who do not live in the central cities. As they have become more affluent and have moved to the suburbs, they tend to identify less with Catholicism as a political issue and more with general social and economic issues. For the ethnic blue collar Catholic who remains in the city, issues such as race, community control of the schools, crime and patriotism have largely replaced Catholicism as a major political issue.

While it is true today that blue collar and retired Catholics lean in the Democrat direction, one should not over look Goldwater's gains among city Catholics in New York and Nixon's gains among New York City Catholics and the ethnic Catholic Congressional District of Pucinski and Derwinski in Chicago. One may ask whether the voter is Catholic or Protestant, but of much greater significance is the question is the voter rich or poor, Black or White, employed or unemployed an urban or suburban dweller, etc.

III. Issues of Interest to Catholics

The point has been made previously that in attempting to woo the Catholic vote, perhaps one need not appeal to Catholics as Catholics. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section, there are definite risks in attempting to woo Catholics as Catholics.

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According to Tully Plessner, President of the Cambridge Marketing Group in New York, unpublished data he collected in June indicates that the major issues among Catholics are not related to Catholicism but rather to general economic and social conditions. Catholics seem to be more concerned with tax levels, tax increases and general problems in the environmental area. No doubt most of those interviewed do not live in the central city areas and these concerns would reflect a point made earlier about the movement and economic mobility of Catholics.

It could well be that the issue of aid to parochial schools is of concern to an increasing minority of Catholics who in fact have their children in Catholic schools. The issue of parochial aid is of greatest importance to inner-city dwellers and at the heart of their concern is the question of autonomy and community control of the schools and racial separation. The ethnic blue collar urban Catholics are on the firing line of the racial problems that plague our city cores. They believe in maintaining control of their schools, (parochial) as much as they believe in the virtues of a Catholic education.

There are numerous reasons why Catholic elementary schools are on the decline, and only some of these reasons relate to higher operating costs. Other important reasons for their decline include: a) movement of Catholic ethnic groups into suburbs that already had academically superior public schools, b) upward mobility, which places more emphasis on using family funds for college, c) elimination of Protestant biases in public schools, d) the loss of teaching clergy. The point is that the issues of greatest concern to most Catholics may not be strictly Catholic issues in nature such as aid to parochial schools.

Furthermore, the parochial aid issue is complicated and many Catholics may either contribute to the decline of these schools, or are relatively unconcerned about the problem. The same may be said for Catholic clergy. A 1970 Gallagher Presidents' Report Survey found that 35.4 percent of the active Roman Catholic priests affirm that the Church should discontinue or abandon its schools.

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IV. Conclusions, Strategic Implications and Trade Offs

Since in the minds of many, winning the Catholic vote is translated to a position on the question of aid to parochial schools, many of the points in this section are related to that issue. The point should not be lost, however, that one can woo Catholics without favoring public aid to parochial schools. One should recognize that most Catholics may not rank the plight of parochial schools as an issue of major concern to them, and that religious identification as a significant political variable has declined in recent years.

1. The parochial school aid question is a two-edged sword. While it may be possible to pick up a few votes among urban Catholics, one stands the risk of alienating Protestant voters. On the national level, one must remember that two out of every three voters are Protestants and the proportion would be much higher in most of our key states (see Tab A).

In Illinois and Michigan, for example, this is a sensitive issue which cuts both ways. The strength of the GOP in Illinois is in the largely Protestant suburbs and out-state vote. In Michigan last year, Governor Milliken pushed through the Legislature a program for aid to non-public schools. This gained him a few Catholic votes in Detroit, and probably lost him more among Protestant out-state Republicans. The school aid program he favored was overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum vote.

Where the parochial aid issue may mean the most, that is among urban blue collar and largely ethnic Catholics, we are least apt to attract strongly committed Democrats. In the case of a few areas in Chicago, if we win these types, it may be for reasons other than parochial aid, anyway.

The most heavily Catholic states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island, went for Al Smith in 1928, Hubert Humphrey in 1968, and no doubt will go Democratic once again in 1972 regardless of the President's

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position on aid to parochial schools.

2. Even if a Catholic is nominated by the Democrats one must recognize that religious identification appeal is not constant for all candidates. According to Tulley Plessner, Edward Kennedy has a considerably stronger appeal among Catholics as a Catholic than does Muskie, despite the fact that they are both Catholics. The point here is that part of the strategy of wooing the Catholic vote must depend upon the Democrat opponent. If the opponent is Muskie, his Catholic appeal per se, will be a reduced factor. Jackson is a Presbyterian and the indications are clear that Lindsay might have a difficult time pulling the urban Catholic vote no matter what he does.
3. One may not have to agree with Scammon and Wattenberg that Catholicism as an issue is dead, but the fact is that 1960 was a high watermark in the history of the importance of this issue. In its decline, it probably still lingers in the minds and hearts of anti-Catholic Protestants more than it does among Catholics. If so, we must look carefully at the Protestant strength found in most of our key states.
4. The parochial aid issue may not be that important in the minds of most Catholics. There are approximately 4 million Catholic children enrolled in Catholic schools, and almost twice that number (approximately 7,788,000) enrolled in public schools.
5. There are other appeals on general social and economic issues which may be more significant to Catholics than an appeal on parochial aid. These include taxes, crime, basic values, patriotism, and equality of opportunity. Obviously in many areas, there is a significant overlap between ethnic and religious affiliation. Ethnic identification is much the stronger and this should be kept in mind in making an appeal. The same could be said for Spanish-speaking Americans in Florida, Texas and California.

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
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
6. By coming down too hard on the issue of aid to parochial schools, not only do we run the risk of alienating Protestant voters, but more directly we could alienate the well organized and active 1.8 million public school teachers in this country. The President's recent statement on Catholic aid drew extremely negative responses from not only the NEA but others involved in public education as well.

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PERCENTAGE OF STATE WIDE CATHOLIC POPULATION



Children Attending Non-Public Elementary and Secondary
Schools



MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1971

Hold File

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

FRED MALEK
JON HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT:

Title Structure of the
White House Office

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend actions to deal with the short term title problem and also present options for a longer term framework of titles.

SHORT TERM PROBLEM

The immediate problem is to correct the inequities that arise because some Staff Assistants have duties and responsibilities equivalent to those performed by Special Assistants. Since it is not desired to increase the number of commissions, a new title must be created. Among those considered were Senior Staff Assistant, Staff Assistant to the President*, and Deputy Special Assistant. We recommend adoption of the Deputy Special Assistant title for all those now recommended for promotion to commissioned levels** and for future use where a distinction/promotion is warranted.

There are several reasons for this recommendation. The Deputy Special Assistant title is already in use (3 people have it), it provides a clear distinction from the Staff Assistant title, and it is consistent with our long range recommendations as discussed in the next section. Since Staff Assistant to the President is already used by many, it would not be a meaningful step and would alienate those who currently use it but are not promoted. Senior Staff Assistant would create an additional title and would also tend to downgrade current Staff Assistants.

* Although this title is not formally in use, many Staff Assistants call themselves Staff Assistants to the President.

** This includes Ron Walker, Bill Horton, Lee Huebner

In addition to the above we recommend the creation of a White House Office Commission signed by you for all professionals above the most junior staff assistant level, but who do not have a Presidential Commission. Tab A indicates those persons we recommend receiving these certificates.

If you will indicate your decisions below, we will follow through with implementation actions:

- (a) Approve title of Deputy Special Assistant _____
- Staff Assistant to the President _____
- Senior Staff Assistant _____
- Other _____

- (b) Prepare White House Office Commission

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

PROBLEMS WITH TITLE STRUCTURE OVER LONG TERM

We feel the White House Office title structure should be viewed with the following criteria in mind - is it logically consistent within each organizational level and between organizational levels; and thus does it equitably reflect rank and relative value of positions?

In evaluating the title structure by this criteria we recognize that the White House organization is more difficult to structure and label than other organizations and that complete consistency is not achievable. The organization is relatively temporary with little continuity, it is subject to rapid changes as the President's requirements change, the relationship of each position to others is often in a state of flux, and the organization is highly visible and staffed with highly visible individuals. Also titles at times must be used for other than descriptive purposes, e.g. for compensation or to disguise shifts in power or function.

Notwithstanding these inherent difficulties, we have for the most part evolved a logical organization structure (as opposed to a title structure). This structure has five levels - the Assistants to the President level, the department head level (e.g. Colson, Dean, Malek, Ziegler), the office head level (e.g. Kingsley, Bell, Farrell), the top assistants to the office head level and the junior staff assistant level. Most positions in the White House fall into one of these categories.

However, our title structure does not clearly reflect this organizational structure and when measured by the previously listed criteria, offers opportunity for sharpening. These are the opportunities:

- Equivalent positions are not consistently titled. The titles of the White House Staff department heads typify the problem:

<u>Incumbent</u>	<u>Title</u>
Colson	Special Counsel
Butterfield	Deputy Assistant
Price	Special Assistant
Malek	Special Assistant
Chapin	Deputy Assistant
Dent	Special Counsel
Ziegler	Press Secretary
Dean	Counsel

- Positions with widely different responsibilities have the same titles, (See Tab B for title distribution between organizational levels). For example, there are 45 Staff Assistants with widely varying authority, responsibility and capability.
- Types of titles in use have proliferated; some 27 separate titles are now used to describe the professional staff (See Tab C).
- The Commission structure is not equitable since some office heads and assistants to department heads hold commissions while others making an equal or greater contribution, do not. Beyond this, we have far exceeded the number of commissions used in previous Administrations.

<u>Administration</u>	<u>Commissions</u>
Nixon	46 in WHO
Johnson	22
Kennedy	19
Eisenhower (1959)	31
Eisenhower (1955)	27
Truman (1951)	13
Truman (1949)	10

The argument can be made that this lack of title structure is desirable since outsiders are never sure of the exact rank of the White House staffer with whom they are dealing--thereby making certain positions more effective than they might otherwise be. However, we conclude that our present title and commission structure does not meet the criteria above and has consequently caused inequities and confusion.

LONG TERM TITLE STRUCTURE OPTIONS

Although a restructuring of titles is desirable, we do not recommend a complete reform now. This inevitably upsets people and causes anxieties which are unnecessary, especially as we go into the campaign. Thus the obvious time to comprehensively restructure our titles is at the beginning of the new term.

Nevertheless we should think now of what the long term structure should be for two reasons. First, personnel actions taken in the short term should be consistent with our longer term title intentions. Second, by planning now we will be prepared to implement a titles policy quickly and resolutely at the proper time. Therefore we have developed for your consideration four title structure options which would provide the desired consistency and meet the criteria developed earlier. See Tab D for a comparative chart detailing the options.

Option 1 retains the Assistant to the President title for the present top Assistants, labels the department heads as Special Assistants, and the office heads as Deputy Special Assistants, and all others Staff Assistants. The title Deputy Assistant is not used. Under this option positions occupied by several men, e.g., Bell, Kingsley, Farrell, Cashin, who are now Special Assistants or Deputy Assistants would become Deputy Special Assistants. While this option will not be well received if those same men are in the positions, it erases the inequities we are presently facing; resurrects the full value of the Special Assistant title which has become debased by overuse, and when implemented, will reduce the number of Presidential Commissions to a more reasonable level (about 25 from the present 47).

Option 2 most nearly follows our present title structure but would add greater consistency. Again the Assistant to the President title is retained for the top assistants. The department head is the Deputy Assistant and the office head is the Special Assistant. There are several major drawbacks to this option. The Deputy Assistant title lacks punch and will not enhance the authority of the department heads externally. Also, the use of the Special Assistant title for the third organization level is confusing as it has been

previously used at the highest White House level and is established in the public mind as being weighty. Furthermore, given the concern over the number of Presidential Commissions awarded we would either be forced to increase the number of commissions from 47 to the 50 to 55 range or not award a commission with the Special Assistant title. This option would be easy to implement and would make a lot of people happy, but it further debases our titles.

Option 3 most nearly conforms to title practice in previous Administrations. The title Executive Assistant is resurrected for you as Chief of Staff. The Special Assistant to the President title is used for all the other high level positions now carrying the Assistant to the President title. The department heads become Assistants to the President and the office heads become Deputy Assistants. (An off shoot of this would be to continue to use the Assistant title for the top posts and the Special Assistant title for the department heads.) This option recognizes your position as Chief of Staff but could cause among men presently at the Assistant level the feeling that they have lost stature.

Option 4 is a derivative of Option 3. It labels the present Assistant positions as Executive Assistants so that there is no differentiation between these positions by title. The department head becomes the Assistant and therefore the office head can be labeled either the Deputy Assistant or Special Assistant. While this option maintains title equality at the present Assistant level, it defeats the purpose of using the Executive Assistant title. Furthermore, the same dilution of titles and commissions noted in Option 2 occur with this option.

Of the four options, we recommend Option 1:

- . It eliminates the Deputy Assistant title, which does not have an authoritative ring to it.
- . It uses the Special Assistant title at a high level, thus maintaining the historical continuity and weight of this title.
- . It uses the Deputy Special Assistant title for the office head level which fits best with our short term recommendation on this title.
- . It cuts back the number of Presidential Commissions to conform more nearly to its historical use, thus preserving its significance.
- . It allows you the option of adopting the Executive Assistant title without having to initiate wholesale title changes at the top White House level.

Although we do not envision implementation at this time, you may want to indicate a tentative decision so that we can begin planning as appropriate.

Your tentative decision:

Option 1 _____

Option 2 _____

Option 3 _____

Option 4 _____

None, please discuss _____

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WHITE HOUSE OFFICE COMMISSIONSTAFF ASSISTANT LEVEL

Lyndon K. Allin
Stanton D. Anderson
John K. Andrews, Jr.
Edward L. Blecksmith
Gertrude T. Brown
Stephen B. Bull
John J. Caulfield
Richard B. Cheney
John E. Clarke
Ro George Crawford
John Russell Deane, III
David R. Gergen
Wallace B. Henley
Lawrence M. Higby
David C. Hoopes
William L. Horton
W. Richard Howard
Lee W. Huebner
Jerry H. Jones
S. Steven Karalekas
Allan G. Kaupinen
Bruce Kehrli
Kenneth L. Khachigian
Noel C. Koch
Harold J. Lezar, Jr.
Robert F. McDermott, Jr.
William H. Marumoto
Peter E. Millspaugh
J. Dapray Muir
Patrick E. O'Donnell
David N. Parker
Patrick H. Price
William F. Rhatican
Michael B. Smith
Gordon C. Strachan
David G. Wilson

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT

George Grassmuck

ASSISTANTS

Stanley C. Scott
DeVan L. Shumway
Alvin Snyder
Agnes M. Waldron

DEPUTY SPECIAL ASSISTANTS TO THE PRESIDENT

E. Pendleton James
John McLaughlin
John E. Nidecker

DIRECTOR

Ronald H. Walker

ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR

Margita White

OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE PHOTOGRAPHER

Oliver F. Atkins

PRESS ASSISTANT

Timothy G. Elbourne

STAFF ADVANCE

W. Dewey Clover
Jon A. Foust
William Henkel, Jr.
Michael R. Schrauth

TITLE USAGE BETWEEN LEVELS 2 & 3 HAS CONFUSING OVERLAP

<u>Level</u>	<u>Range of Titles Presently Used</u>
1. Assistant Level	Assistant to the President*, Director of Communications*, Counsellor to the President*
2. Department Head Level	Counsel*, Special Counsel*, Deputy Assistant*, Special Assistant*, Press Secretary*
3. Office Head Level or Assistant to Department Head Level	Special Assistant*, Deputy Assistant*, Deputy Special Assistant, Director, Advance Operations Staff Assistant
4. Assistant to Office Head Level	Staff Assistant
5. Assistant to Assistant to Office Head	Staff Assistant

* Presidentially Commissioned

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE TITLES IN USE

Assistant

Assistant to the President

Assistant to the Director of
Communications

Assistant to the Press Secretary

Assistant Deputy Director

Associate Counsel

Counsel to the President

Counsellor to the President

Deputy to General Schulz

Deputy Assistant to the President

Deputy Special Assistant to the
President

Deputy Press Secretary

Director, Advance Operations

Director, Communications for the
Executive Branch

Executive Assistant

Official White House Photographer

Personal Secretary to the President

Press Assistant

Press Secretary to the President

Photographer

Science Advisor to the President

Special Assistant to the Counsellor

Special Assistant to the President

Special Consultant to the President

Special Counsel to the President

Staff Advance

Staff Assistant

TITLE STRUCTURE OPTIONS *

Organizational Level	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4
Present Assistant to the Presidential Level	Assistant to the President	Assistant to the President	Executive Assistant to the President for HRH - Special Assistant to the President for all others	Executive Assistant to the President
Department Head Level (or equivalent)	Special Assistant to the President	Deputy Assistant to the President	Assistant to the President	Assistant to the President
Office Head Level (or equivalent)	Deputy Special Assistant to the President	Special Assistant to the President	Deputy Assistant to the President	Deputy Assistant to the President <u>or</u> Special Assistant to the President
Assistant to Office Head Level (or equivalent)	Staff Assistant to the President <u>or</u> Senior Staff Assistant	Deputy Special Assistant to the President	Staff Assistant to the President <u>or</u> Senior Staff Assistant	Staff Assistant <u>or</u> Deputy Special Assistant to the President
Assistant to the Assistant to the Office Head Level (or equivalent)	Staff Associate <u>or</u> Staff Assistant	Staff Assistant	Staff Associate <u>or</u> Staff Assistant	Staff Associate <u>or</u> Staff Assistant

* These options list the dominant title at each level. There will be exceptions to this dominant title; for example, Press Secretary to the President would continue in use.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

September 29, 1971

SUPREME COURT

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN....

- 1) RN should move as quickly as possible on both nominees -- to head off mounting lobbies of women, blacks and labor. To delay is to allow them more time to build public support to work the Senate.
- 2) Southern Judicial Conservative presents a grave political problem for Muskie, especially -- if he hopes to carry any state in the South. He may be able to explain away votes against Haynsworth and Carswell -- but how can he explain three straight anti-Southern votes for the Supreme Court -- especially if the third candidate is right out of Congress.
- 3) HHH made a serious error in ruling out all signers of Southern manifestoes for the Court -- Sam Erwin, Bill Fulbright, Russell, etc. -- as well as some fifty others, mostly Democratic, still on the Hill thus ruled out.
- 4) If RN goes with Judiciary Committee type for one seat -- other should be the most distinguished strict constructionist we can find, a real heavyweight in everyone's eyes. (Kristol strongly urges this) Reason is that even those papers that agree with RN feel that two giants have departed -- and men of like caliber should be placed.
- 5) Poff has gotten a good review from the New Republic, and is getting some fairly good ink from responsible liberals.
- 6) If RN plans to send up the nominations, not together, but in series -- send up the Big Rock first, the Southern Strict Constructionist first. Otherwise, the Senate Committee might immediately pass what they will call the "moderate" -- seat him on the Court, to RN's embarrassment. If they go one at a time, the tough one should go first -- so that if they are chomping on him, we can line up another.
- 7) Would not be averse to a Senate mini-rebellion on this issue -- if the Southerner is impeccable, it is a bitterly divisive issue for Democratic candidates -- either they kick their black friends in the teeth, or they

kick the South in the teeth. In any event, so long as they cannot get an "out" by accusing us of naming an unqualified man, they are on the hook. Thus, again, urge strong strict constructionists for both appointments -- coupled with a Southern Conservative for one of them.

Buchanan

Kristol recommends Edward Levi, the President of Chicago University, Jewish, for the second seat. My view is that as stated before, we ought to get the most brilliant and qualified Italian-American strict constructionist jurist or attorney in the nation -- and then name play up his Italian background -- and let the Democrats chop him up, if they want. PJB.