

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: DICK MOORE 

Attached are suggested remarks for Rochester on the New York Times case which John Scali and I prepared in line with our conversation last evening and the outline.

You will note it treats the issue without getting directly into the case. If the President should want to hit the subject harder, there is some good material in the Buchanan and Safire memos which I am also attaching. There is also a memo from Len Garment on the legal issue on prior restraint.

TABS

June 16 Buchanan Memo to H		A
June 17 Buchanan Memo to H		B
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June 18, 1971

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE -- Suggested Remarks for Rochester

The right of the press to be free and the duty of the Government to protect the nation have flourished side by side for two centuries. Today I wish to speak briefly about the relationship between the two.

Under our Constitution the ultimate responsibility for national security rests with the President. Congress in turn has adopted laws which provide for classification of documents affecting national security and prohibit unauthorized disclosure or publication.

As President it is my duty to enforce those laws, and I wish to tell you why I consider such enforcement to be essential to the peace and safety of the nation.

First I would remind you that peace in the nuclear age -- peace in our generation -- can be achieved only by successful negotiation. We must continue to meet in private discussions with nations both great and small. We must meet in Paris or Moscow or Cairo, Berlin or Tel Aviv. Modern negotiations are sophisticated, delicate and, most importantly they are confidential.

I assure you that no nation, friendly or unfriendly, can be confident about dealing privately with the United States if we cannot guarantee

the secrecy of their communications. Moreover we frequently must obtain the help of intermediaries from other countries who conduct sensitive conversations on our behalf. If they fear their participation will become public knowledge, their usefulness and availability will quickly end.

It is not my purpose today to defend the record of the previous Administration -- in Vietnam or elsewhere. I do not defend the Presidential advisers or the contents of their secret memoranda which now have been made public. What I do defend is the right of a President -- any President -- to conduct his office in the sure knowledge that his advisers feel free to give him their most candid opinions, no matter how delicate the subject. If those advisers have reason to fear that what they write or say may be publicized out of context -- perhaps exploited for political advantage -- then the free flow of ideas will cease, and the Presidency itself will suffer.

I recognize that there can be honest disagreement as to whether a particular document should be classified or not. But disagreement with a particular classification is entirely beside the point. Unauthorized disclosure is prohibited by the law of the land. That law would be rendered meaningless if each individual had the right to make his

own subjective judgement of the public interest -- and disclose whatever secrets he alone felt he should. The First Amendment does not give anyone the right to take the law into his own hands -- no matter how noble he may consider his motive to be.

Substituting one's own judgment for the judgment of constituted authority is never the American way. In the area of national security the approach is dangerous as well as wrong. How can the person know that he has all the evidence with which to make this judgment? How can he be sure that a document which seems harmless to him may not have serious implications because of associated documents of which he is unaware: And what gives him the right to condone and expand a disclosure which he knows to be illegal on its face?

Historically, I'm glad to say, the American press has long chosen to temper its freedom with concern for national security, particularly in time of war. Much of their restraint has been voluntary, but they also have recognized the propriety of laws and regulations where national security is involved.

This Administration yields to no one in its dedication to freedom of information. It is also dedicated to the preservation of peace and security for the United States. I think we all share both those goals,

and I would suggest that if any segment of the American press feels that our policies are out of balance that they come and see us. Working within the system is always best.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TAB A
E.

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN

If it is true, as I hear, that this is an "intelligence windfall" for the Soviet Union, then consideration might be given to rapid action on the attached. This was prepared for Friday. It goes after the Times -- as you can see. Further, it disassociates us from the policies and people of the past -- while defending the principle of security. Also, it gives it to the Times where the Times deserves it -- which it seems to me should be done if we are right on this one. Would like to look it over again before it goes -- but this gives you the thrust and the arguments. PJB believes that if the Times is guilty -- then we ought not to let them by.

Friday, a Federal Judge will make an initial determination as to whether the New York Times may continue with daily publication of numerous top secret documents that have come into its possession. The Department of Justice, as you are aware, has gone into Federal court to seek a permanent injunction.

Let me tell you why we acted as we did.

Not because of any political self-interest. For none is involved here.

The men whose most secret communiques and memoranda the Times has been exposing to public view are men whom I opposed in the election of 1960, the election of 1964 and the election of 1968.

A limited analysis of America's Vietnam involvement produced by an anti-war minority in a single department of a preceding Administration is not something for which this Administration is responsible, or can be held accountable.

As President, I am responsible for the decisions and actions of this Administration, and for those views I expressed prior to taking office. Those decisions are known. Those views are known. There is no need for me now to iterate either my enduring support for America's broad objective in Vietnam, or my criticism of the tactics and strategies adopted to secure those objectives. Those are all

a matter of public record -- and I will not use the podium of the Presidency especially in the present climate to belabor them further.

Further, on taking office, this Administration did not continue, it reversed the policies of rising involvement of the sixties. We did not escalate the level of American forces to Vietnam, we have brought more than half our troops home. Time after time, we have gone to the American people with a new commitment for troop withdrawals. Each of the promises made has been kept. Today, American troops are coming home at a rate equivalent to a division a month. We will stand on our record in Vietnam -- as other Administration have stood upon theirs.

Why then has the Attorney General acted?

For the elementary reason that a massive breach of national security has occurred; that the wholesale publication of top secret documents has taken place, that Federal law has been transparently violated -- that this Government had a duty to act. So, we acted. We leave it to the wisdom of the Federal Courts to determine this conflict in rights between the Times' right to publish; and government's right to preserve the confidentiality of its most critical communiques.

But now let me give you my personal view on this matter of national moment.

You gentlemen, as editors and publishers, know as well as I, that oftentimes documents are classified, not for reasons of

national security, but simply for reasons of political security. That is a short-coming of bureaucracies and probably exists in this Administration as well as in previous Administration.

But there are other excellent and necessary reasons for maintaining the secrecy of government documents. There is the question of matters relating to national defense. There is the need to protect the security of sources of intelligence information. There is the need for confidentiality of diplomatic dealing with both friendly and hostile governments. There is the need to protect the security of the codes of the United States Government.

Whatever official, present or past, transmitted those documents to the New York Times -- regardless of how noble he considers his motives -- has violated his trust. And the New York Times -- whatever its motives in publishing this particular analysis -- has been trafficking in stolen goods. And the editors of the Times -- who knew full well these were "top secret" -- knew they were trafficking in stolen goods.

Again, I am not here as Defense Counsel for Mr. Bundy, or Mr. McNamara, or Mr. Rusk or President Johnson. What I am stating is my personal belief -- that the New York Times was wrong -- wrong arrogantly to dismiss altogether the considerations of national

security; wrong to arrogate to themselves the right to publish before the world top secret communiques and memoranda; wrong to unilaterally assert for themselves the right to decide what should and should not remain top secret.

Editors of the Times say that they exposed these secret papers to the public because they decided it was in the public interest. Who gave them the right to make such a far-reaching decision affecting the security of their country?

They cannot know the damage they have done to the security interest of the Government of the United States.

Surely, today, there is much glee in those political circles who applaud the end of discrediting the war decisions of the men John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson brought to Washington. But, in using the means it did, the New York Times has established a damaging and dangerous precedent for this country.

If the editors of the New York Times succeed in establishing some superior right to decide what top secret papers should be made public -- then who can deny that right to every single Federal official with access to such papers. That way lies an end of government security; that way lies disaster for the security interests of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN

Attached is letter requested (via HRH, JE and Scali) by three o'clock. Unless there is some overriding urgency that Baker stand up for us on the floor today -- recommend that we not go with this hasty treatment. This is a matter of great moment; and our response here should go into more detail and depth and precision, than one can put together in a brief letter to a Senator.

Let's remember here -- this is our first "written" position on this. My view is that it not only ought to make the case at greater length and with more precision -- but hit the Times more directly.

Dear Senator Baker:

The wholesale publication by the New York Times of top secret memoranda and communiques cannot but have a serious adverse impact upon this nation's conduct of foreign affairs.

No nation -- friendly or unfriendly, whether negotiating a trade agreement or a nuclear arms agreement -- can be confident about dealing privately with the United States, if its most secret communications can be published, at the whim of a newspaper owner, on the front page of the morning press.

Confidentiality is the essence of successful negotiations for nations, great and small, in times present as well as past. In the minds of every nation in the world today, there is surely a rising doubt today about how secure their communications with the United States can possibly be. Further, few presidential advisers will be willing to commit their innermost thoughts and ideas on top secret memoranda if a supposedly responsible press will publish those memoranda before the world.

This unauthorized publication of top secret documents by the Times is certain to have a chilling effect on the freedom of expression and candor of officials of the government of the United States.

In pressing for an injunction, the Government has done its duty. Federal documents, classified top secret, have been taken and published before the world. On the face of it, a Federal law has been violated. Whether the law technically applies in this case, will be decided by the courts.

In our view the law is the law whether the documents were prepared by people working for President Eisenhower or President Kennedy or President Johnson. The fact that the Times obviously disapproves of the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War does not remove the application of the secret documents law from its editors.

Under this nation's system of laws, the elected Congress and the elected Chief Executive decide upon the classification system for top secret documents and its application. That decision does not and cannot lie with the arbitrary judgment of newspaper owners and editors to determine which national secrets shall and shall not be made public.

TABC

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BILL SAFIRE

SUBJECT: Suggested Remarks on New York Times
Matter

This is a matter before the courts and I will not comment on the specific matter under adjudication.

Generally speaking, however, I think it is a healthy thing to come to grips with a great question: who is to decide what is to be kept secret? The press -- or the elected representatives of the people?

Nobody can claim our suit has anything to do with covering up any mistakes of this Administration -- all this took place before we came to office.

Our motive, then, cannot be suspect. By placing this matter in the courts, we are putting it where all great constitutional questions belong -- before tribunals that have the responsibility of deciding what is the best course when constitutional rights seem to conflict.

I don't like secrecy at all. But I believe the power to decide what is necessary to keep secret for our Nation's security should belong to the man charged with the basic responsibility for that security -- to the man the people elect President, whoever he may be or whatever party he belongs to.

And I believe that other nations will be more likely to deal frankly with us if they know that their confidences will be kept.

This is not an attack on freedom of the press. The government and the press both operate under the rule of law. The place to determine whether a law has been violated is the court.

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The Attorney General would have been remiss in his responsibility if he did not bring what he considers to be a violation of the law to court. That's where the matter belongs, and that is where justice will be done.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

I offer these comments on the President's visit to Rochester and the Times controversy.

1 First, a coincidence: Rochester is where the President made his last major speech on balancing free speech and national security interests. That speech was persuasive primarily because it presented the national security issue in a framework of clear commitment to free speech. This must also be done here if the argument is to be persuasive.

2. The danger lies in framing the wrong issue and assuming the wrong role. This should not be a fight by the President against the Times; nor should the President be cast in the role of counsel for the Johnson Administration. The effort must be seen as the cool exercise of Presidential responsibility in defense of the national security classification system. This is a proper Presidential issue and the appropriate Presidential role.

3. This issue, narrowly framed, should be set in a context of recognition of the fundamental nature and wisdom of the ban against prior restraints on the publication of matter of public interest, that this is the essence of the constitutional law and national policy surrounding the First Amendment, etc., but that there is an area where carefully limited restrictions may on occasion be necessary in the national interest. Only in this way can a Presidential plea for a limited restriction be made persuasive.

4. The principal difficulty with our argument so far is in the mechanism (or lack of it) by which the validity of the classification as a basis for restraint on publication can be tested. It is not convincing (and it will not be upheld by the Supreme Court) to say that the official determination is conclusive. This would not be true in criminal proceedings after publication. It is far less sustainable where a prior restraint is sought. Even if the Supreme Court were to sustain some form of prior restraint, it would only be on the basis of some non-public proceeding in which the government establishes to the satisfaction of a Court that the classification is justified.

5. From all this I would recommend that if the President decides to comment on the Times case he address himself to the larger issue of the need to devise a system or procedure whereby the public's right to know and the requirements of national security can be balanced without either the government or the press arrogating to itself the final right to determine what is publishable; and the Attorney General should be directed to propose such a procedure and offer such a showing in this case. The President should also acknowledge the extraordinary and wholly legitimate public interest in knowing the history of the involvement in Vietnam, and otherwise undertake to separate himself and his Administration from the transactions disclosed in the McNamara papers.



Leonard Garment



CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551

June 22, 1971

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

Last week, at the Quadriad meeting, I presented a set of statistical tables that give a rather comprehensive view of price and wage developments since the beginning of 1969.

I drew one conclusion from this evidence, namely, that it is doubtful whether we have made any progress in moderating the pace of inflation. The figures on the behavior of consumer prices in May reinforce my fears.

I realize that more optimistic interpretations have been made--and are still being made, by others--both within and outside the Administration. I have tried hard to read the evidence their way; I find that I cannot do so.

In my judgment, some of us are continuing to interpret the economic world on the model of the 1940's and 1950's. In fact, the structure of the economy has changed profoundly since then.

There was a time when the onset of a business recession was typically followed in a few months by a decline in the price level and

in wage rates, or at least by a moderation of the rise. That is no longer the case. The business cycle is still alive, indeed too much so; but its inner response mechanism, which has never stood still, is now very different from what it was even ten or twenty years ago.

Failure to perceive this may be responsible for some shortcomings in our national economic policy. I doubt if we will bring inflation under control, or even get a satisfactory expansion going, without a major shift in economic policy.

Let me turn, first, to the question: Why are the old rules not working? Why is inflation continuing at a virtually undiminished rate in the face of substantial unemployment of men, machinery, plant and equipment?

The answer is to be found in the changed character of our labor and product markets. Here are a few of them:

1. Our success in moderating downturns in economic activity during the postwar period has reduced the concern of workers over the possibility of prolonged unemployment and the fears of businessmen of a protracted slump in sales. Wage and price decisions are now being made on the assumption that governmental policy will move promptly to check a sluggish economy.

2. The past decade has witnessed a vast growth of trade unionism in the public sector--mainly among State and local employees but also Federal employees.

We have had innumerable illegal strikes of public employees, among them the postal strike. These strikes have been preponderantly successful, in the sense that the employees got pretty much what they asked for. In this environment, both the trade union leaders and the rank and file have come to believe that the government lacks either the power or the will to resist their demands. They have therefore become progressively bolder in pushing wage and other demands.

3. During the past decade, we have also had a vast expansion of welfare programs. When subsidies are provided by government to strikers--and this is what we have been doing more and more--workers on strike can hold out longer. Business managers are fully aware of this, and they are therefore less inclined to take a strike than was the case ten or twenty years ago.

4. The Landrum-Griffin Act has weakened the power of trade union leaders relative to the rank and file membership. As a result, when the leaders have sought moderate wage settlements, they have frequently been thwarted by a rebellious membership.
5. Non-union enterprises have always been influenced in their wage policies by what the unionized establishments were doing. With trade unions becoming stronger and more influential, nonunion businesses now adjust more quickly to--or even anticipate--the wages being set in the unionized sector.
6. The persistence of inflation, which has been running a mad course since 1964, has by now made practically every participant in the economic process inflation-minded.
 - (a) Workers seek wage increases that will compensate for past effects of inflation on their real incomes and provide some insurance against future price advances, besides providing for some improvement in their living standard.

- (b) Businessmen mark up their prices even when demand is weak, partly because they expect their costs to go up, partly because they fear further erosion of their shrunken profit margins, and partly because they expect that their competitors--facing similar problems--will behave similarly.
- (c) Buyers, whether in the consumer or the business sector, have become accustomed to paying higher prices, and therefore offer less resistance to price advances than they would in an environment of stable price expectations.
- (d) Businessmen, expecting to pay back in cheaper dollars, have become more inclined to borrow. Lenders, having similar expectations with regard to inflation, tend to hold out for higher interest rates. Every sign that inflation may be quickening leads to expectations of higher interest rates and thus reinforces these tendencies.

- (e) In short, every part of the decision-making process in the business and financial world is now being shaped by inflationary expectations, even in the face of heavy unemployment.

We thus face an entirely new economic problem--one that our nation has never before had to face: namely, an inflation feeding on itself at a time of substantial unemployment.

Much of our economic thinking and economic policy has not yet caught up with the changes that have taken place in the structure of our economy. We continue to rely on monetary and fiscal policies that worked reasonably well ten or twenty years ago, unmindful of the profound changes in our economic environment.

The first requirement of a new economic policy is recognition of the uneasiness that characterizes the economic world--an uneasiness that is slowing the business recovery and which may continue to impede it this year and next.

Consumers are saving at a high rate, partly because of existing unemployment and partly because of concern about what inflation is doing to their incomes and savings.

There is also a mood of hesitation among businessmen. They see their wage costs accelerating, they fear that they will be unable

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to raise their prices sufficiently to cover their higher costs, and-- with profits already sharply eroded and interest rates high--many hesitate about undertaking new investments. It is important to note that business capital investment, in real terms, has been declining in the present economic recovery; this is very unusual for this stage of the business cycle.

As you already know, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that our monetary and fiscal policies have not been working as expected; they have not broken the back of inflation, nor are they stimulating economic activity as expected.

What the economy basically lacks is sufficient confidence in the future. There is a widespread feeling that we are drifting, that inflation may be getting out of control. Worried, unhappy people will not act to enlarge their activity in the economic arena or any other.

I am convinced that the restoration of confidence requires, above everything else, a firm governmental policy with regard to inflation. With this achieved, our economy can move forward towards full employment. Without it, we may stumble--perhaps stumble all the more if we try a more expansive monetary or fiscal policy.

The recent nervousness of financial markets supplies a warning that we must not overlook: every time we more, or

The President - Page 8.

appear to move, in a more stimulative direction, interest rates rise. Needless to say, this disconcerting behavior could frustrate our hopes with regard to residential building and State and local construction.

What I recommend, as a way out of the present economic malaise, is a strong wage and price policy.

I have already outlined to you a possible path for such a policy--emphatic and pointed jawboning, followed by a wage and price review board (preferably through the instrumentality of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy); and in the event of insufficient success (which is now more probable than it would have been a year or two ago), followed--perhaps no later than next January--by a six-month wage and price freeze.

Some such plan as this is, I believe, essential to come to grips with the twin problems of inflation and unemployment.

A firm wage and price policy will not get at the basic problem--the abuse of economic power. But the kind of legislation that would be needed will not be passed in the next year or two.


The President - Page 9.

Also, a firm wage and price policy such as I'm suggesting may not restore full price stability. But it will at least clear the air, dampen inflationary psychology, bolster confidence, and perhaps leave elbow room for a more stimulative fiscal policy to hasten the decline of unemployment.

Let me say, finally, that my omission of any reference to a more stimulative monetary policy is deliberate. Monetary policy, I feel, has done its job fully.

The issues that I've touched on in this letter are clearly of the greatest importance. If you should want me to clarify any part of my thesis, do let me know.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. Burns', written in a cursive style.

Arthur F. Burns

The Honorable Richard Nixon
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

- WASHINGTON

May 13, 1971

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By 415 NARA Date 3/16/2016

TO: DWIGHT CHAPIN
DICK MOORE
HENRY CASHEN
DEBBY SLOAN

FROM: CONNIE STUART
PENNY ADAMS

SUBJECT: Report on meeting, attended by the above, on Wednesday,
May 5, 10:00 a.m., on White House entertainment for the
next 18 months.

Philosophy: All participants seemed to agree that -

1. We should concentrate on "big" name stars - performers who will "come out" for the President, and thereby influence a number of others to do the same. It was stressed that we concentrate on entertainers who appeal to young people, ie: Burt Bacharach, Ali McGraw, Flip Wilson and others.
2. That for planning purposes, we should "follow the natural course of events," ie: holidays, such as Thanksgiving, Christmas and the Fourth of July, for scheduling Evenings at the White House and not plan any entertainment after August or September, 1972, because of the campaign.

Our "big time" for spectacular entertainment, which would reap great press coverage, should be between January and August of 1972.
3. That entertainers, who will not be invited to perform because of:
A. Inappropriateness, B. having already performed, or C. being past supporters of the President, be invited as guests. ie: Frank Sinatra, Elvis Presley, in the first category; Peggy Lee and Johnny Cash, in the second category; June Allyson and Jimmy Stewart, in the third category.
4. That we will not focus on entertainers necessarily representative of ethnic groups. We have already had special evenings for the Mexican-Americans, Italian-Americans and Irish-Americans.

We propose the following "general timing format" with possible entertainment suggestions:

July, 1971	July 4th - Picnic for District of Columbia Police on South Lawn. Military Band Units, balloons, etc. No special entertainment unless the President attends. If so, Tennessee Ernie Ford and patriotic program.	
August, 1971	Catalina Island, California. An Evening at Western White House featuring the "Big Band." Sound - complete radio coverage.	
September, 1971	Jack Benny and Barbra Streisand.	
October, 1971	Evening at the White House - Salute to the Movies.	
November, 1971	Thanksgiving. Invite foreign students to dinner. Have a group like The Carpenters.	
December, 1971	Christmas Evening at the White House - Bing Crosby and White Christmas.	
January, 1972	}	
February, 1972		Evening at the White House featuring Burt Bacharach and cast.
March, 1972		Evening at the White House featuring Hal Holbrook and cast.
April, 1972		Evening at the White House featuring Flip Wilson and cast.
May, 1972		Evening at the White House honoring Richard Rodgers.
June, 1972		
July, 1972	July 4th - An Evening at the White House with The Partridge Family (with Shirley Jones and David Cassidy).	
August, 1972	Convention - No Evening at the White House.	
September, 1972	Evening at the White House featuring Sammy Davis Jr. and Ella Fitzgerald.	
October, 1972	Campaigning - No Evening at the White House.	
November, 1972	Election - No Evening at the White House.	

When a big production is involved, as most of the above are, we are going to need to obtain the talents of a writer-producer type of person outside of our staff to devote considerable time to planning each event.

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May we please have your comments by Friday, May 21.

cc: Lucy Winchester
Alex Butterfield

MEMORANDUM

Determined to be an
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Not National Security Information
By MS NARA Date 3/16/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

May 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: DICK MOORE
SUBJECT: NAME FOR AIR FORCE ONE

On further reflection, it seems to me that we should give a little more attention to an alternate recommendation in case the President is not enthusiastic about THE SPIRIT OF '76. My suggestion is THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

If the President should personally select Ben Franklin, the point would not be missed that he chose an American patriot who was dedicated to the ideals of the American Revolution, but who was also a man of peace and a citizen of the world.

I read a brief biography of Dr. Franklin last night and was startled to be reminded of the range of his accomplishments and distinctions. He was probably our first universal man, as the following will indicate.

Though a poor boy, he prospered in the American free enterprise system; he was an extraordinarily gifted scientist, philosopher and wit; he was a distinguished writer, editor and publisher; he was a leader in education, (a founder of the University of Pennsylvania); and was the "dean" of the Constitutional Convention. Finally, his prestige abroad was probably greater than any American in history (with one modern-day exception). Interestingly, Franklin's last official act was to memorialize Congress for the abolition of slavery.

It might seem surprising to name the Presidential plane after a non-President, but I think this is actually a plus and has a touch of class. If Franklin had been born later, or the Republic had been born sooner, he

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. HALDEMAN

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May 13, 1971

probably would have been a President. But in choosing to honor Franklin, the President would be recognizing an American whose symbolic qualities transcend office.

Franklin is totally apolitical. He is admired by liberals and conservatives, intellectuals and non-intellectuals, and I suspect the choice would be particularly pleasing (and surprising) to the young.

On the possible negative side, Ben was something of a swinger and in religion, he became a Deist.

Franklin, of course, is deeply identified with Philadelphia and Independence Hall. Thus, in keeping with the Bicentennial theme, the naming of the plane could be done in Philadelphia on the 4th of July.

CC: Dwight Chapin
Alex Butterfield ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By J-15 NARA Date 3/16/2016

May 15, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

H. R. HALDEMAN

In evaluating the developments since the Monday speech, some pretty clear lines of direction come through as far as our PR is concerned.

We have the ironic situation that, after initially reacting to the Monday announcement with almost hysterical predictions that we had blown the Russian summit and our whole "Generation of Peace" foreign policy, the columnists and commentators -- with a considerable amount of egg on their faces -- now have the gall to say that the Monday decision was wrong and reckless but that the Soviet Union is showing great restraint in continuing the summit nevertheless.

This is again the most devastating proof of the fact that whatever we do and however it comes out, we are going to be torn to pieces by our liberal critics in the press and on television.

What really matters now, of course, is how it all comes out. We shall continue the military action that is necessary to bring about a negotiated settlement as soon as possible.

But, on the other hand, regardless of how it comes out -- whether we succeed or fail -- we at least deserve out of this whole rather difficult experience a recognition that the decision was a courageous one in which the President put his country above politics and was willing to risk his own personal future in order to do what he thought was right for the country, for our POWs and for the Americans who were still in Vietnam, for the 17 million Vietnamese who do not want a Communist government, and, most important of all, for the preservation of the credibility of American foreign policy in the years ahead.

We should hammer hard on the personal factors of courage, coolness in crisis, and putting country above political and partisan and personal considerations.

We have gone around this track before -- after November 3rd and again in Cambodia. We have tried to leave some residue of personal respect in the public mind after what happened has long been forgotten but we have usually failed due to the refusal of the media to give that feature of our action the credit it deserves but also due in part to the fact that we have not had a well planned effort to continue to emphasize it. Let's be sure that the latter factor is not one which is overlooked this time. We must put this hidden goal up front and center and hammer it from now until election.

Along the same line, regarding China -- while the television impact of the appearance there will never be forgotten, the factors of personal conduct, dignity and, of course, the boldness of the move to go to China in the first place will be forgotten unless we continue to hammer them home. As you have noted, the media fell completely silent about China within about a week after we returned. It is our job to try to keep the personal side of the China visit front and center.

We have an enormous problem in doing this due to the opposition of the media and also due to the fact that the Vietnam escalation intervened. But, on the other hand, looking back to the Kennedy years, fourteen months after the Cuban missile crisis -- actually until the very day he died -- there were columns, speeches, etc., referring to the courage he had displayed, the statesmanship, etc., etc., in handling that crisis. He had the advantage of a sympathetic press corps but on the other hand if you were to check his staff at that time, you would surely find that they had that as a prime PR objective.

We must double the effort that he had due to the fact that our problem is doubly as difficult because of the opposition of the press.

At least we have one thing going for us -- what the President has done both on the China initiative and now again here -- exceeds by light years in the impact it will have on the future of the world and of this country, anything that Kennedy did in the Cuban crisis. In other words, we have a much better case to sell. The question is whether we can do an adequate job of selling it.

See P

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RAY PRICE
DWIGHT CHAPIN
JON HUNTSMAN

FROM:

H.R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT:

Preparation and Monitoring of
Presidential Speaking Material

One of the areas where we seem to have fallen short on a couple of occasions is the preparation of Presidential speaking materials. To correct this the following system should be established which will standardize and fix the responsibilities for the initial direction, preparation, and follow up on Presidential Speaking materials:

1. Any proposal from Dwight Chapin for Presidential participation in an event should include a brief mention of the type of speech material required (i.e., text, remarks, talking points) for that event. If there is any uncertainty about the possibilities for that specific event, the proposal should contain suggestions for the appropriate type of material and indicate that the topic is still to be chosen.

2. Once an event is approved, ~~it~~ ^{when} it will be Chapin's office's responsibility to make sure that the Staff Secretary is notified immediately of the type of material needed. Huntsman should then proceed in following up with Ray Price, notifying him, and riding herd to make sure that the materials are in ahead of time. HUNTSMAN

3. In cases where there is some latitude as to the appropriate topic for an event, Price should, a week or two ahead of time, solicit suggestions and guidance from appropriate staff members. He then should submit to the President, a week before the event is scheduled, a general summary of what the staff feels would be an appropriate theme for the speech or remarks based on the ideas that have been generated. This gives the President an opportunity to reflect a bit on the speech and provides Price's office some initial guidance as

well as feedback. Chapin should provide the Staff Secretary with all the information required so that he can follow up to make sure the suggestions are submitted at least a week or two prior to the event.

4. The Staff Secretariat will be responsible for this whole process and any questions that come up regarding the status of speech materials should be directed to that office.

2 weeks
PRIOR
X

HUNTSMAN

Doesn't mention
submitting of incomplete
materials (drafts)
or of final material.

cc: Alex Butterfield

C

June 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR :

RAY PRICE
DWIGHT CHAPIN
JON HUNTSMAN

FROM :

H.R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT :

Preparation of Presidential
Speaking Material

My memorandum of June 1 (attached) attempted to fix responsibilities for initial direction, preparation, and follow up on Presidential speaking materials. Judging from the results so far, it has not successfully accomplished its objectives.

I would like to know immediately from Huntsman whether the proposal outlined in my June 1 memo is being followed.

I would like to know from Ray Price whether that procedure is satisfactory, regardless of whether it is currently being followed, and if it's not satisfactory, I would like Ray's recommendations as to what would be.

My own view is that, if this new procedure is in effect and has been for the last couple of weeks, it hasn't done any good and therefore must not be the right procedure. If, on the other hand, it has not been in effect, I'm curious as to why not. It appears to me that we're not doing any better in this process than we were in the past - perhaps even a little worse.

I also specifically would like to know from both Price and Huntsman whether they are getting the fully adequate input from Chapin's office that was outlined in the memo.

These questions should be answered by 9 a.m. Monday, June 21.

Attachment

Due Date - June 21

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM:

JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT:

Preparation of Presidential
speaking materials -- your
memorandum of June 17, 1971

After individual thought and discussions with our respective staff members, Ray Price, Dwight Chapin, and Jon Huntsman met together to spell out in detail individual responsibilities in programming for all Presidential speaking materials. Our critical concern is to see that the items enumerated in the June 1 memorandum are carried out in depth and that nothing slips between the cracks. Paragraph one and paragraph two of the June 1 memorandum can be and will be carried out to the maximum. Paragraph three is somewhat confusing in its request to have Ray Price -- a week or two ahead of time -- solicit suggestions and guidance from appropriate staff members and then, in turn, have Huntsman responsible to submit all information and suggestions a week or two prior to an event. This procedure should be followed only for speeches and not for either remarks or talking points. With these alterations in mind, our basic program developed for the preparation of Presidential speaking materials is as follows.

1. Chapin to notify Price with copy to Huntsman of all events requiring Presidential speaking materials.
2. Huntsman immediately, through his operational calendar, will note these dates and topics and will work with Ray Price's office to ensure that target dates can be met.
3. Where a written speech is involved (as opposed to remarks or talking points) Price, after consultations with his staff, will prepare an advance memorandum recommending an appropriate theme. Huntsman will be responsible for collecting this and transmitting it to the President.

4. A written schedule will be developed between Huntsman's office and Price's office (See Tab A) that delineates both the due date to Price and the due date to the Staff Secretary (SS) for each event. This writer's schedule is further discussed at the 2:00 p.m. meeting in Alex Butterfield's office daily to ensure that it properly reflects any last minute changes.
5. All items listed in the writer's schedule (paragraph four above) will be adhered to as noted on Tab A. Where there are alterations to this schedule for any reason, the Staff Secretary will notify Chapin's office and HRH's office immediately in order that there will be full communication as to the delay in this pre-established schedule.
6. Any questions about whether a particular event calls for a speech, remarks, or talking points will be worked out between Dwight Chapin and Ray Price. When possible, this will be done before Chapin prepares his memorandum to Price and Huntsman specifically designating the date, topic, and type of remarks necessary in accordance with paragraph one above.
7. In order that Chapin's office may  better be prepared for types of speech material necessary, they are including a new format for the schedule proposal to be submitted to Chapin from all parties requesting scheduling with the President. Included herein, is the central topic of speech materials and what is required for that particular meeting. (See Tab B.)

In summary, Chapin will get the ball rolling by initiating as soon as possible, in writing the date and topic of the Presidential speaking engagement. Huntsman will immediately follow this up and 'ride herd' on seeing to it that this is in to the President on schedule or an explanation in advance as to any problem areas. Price's office will work closely with Huntsman's office to try and meet all schedules. All parties will adhere to the outline as noted above.

Thank you.

via what route?

Please note Tab C as to "what went wrong" -- your June 17 memorandum.

cc: Alexander P. Butterfield ✓

Dwight Chapin

Ray Price

A

WRITERS' SCHEDULE

June 21-26

Due Date	Due to RKP	Due to SS	Event	Event Date	Writer
Monday, June 21	12	^{OK} 2	AMA Remarks, Fact Sheet	6/22	Huebner
"	6	7	H. R. 1 Statement	6/22	Price/Huebner
Tuesday, June 22	12	2	National Assn of Broadcasters Remarks	6/23	Andrews
"	4	6	Hovde Dinner (remarks)	6/24	Koch
"	4	6	Indiana Event 1	6/24	Unassigned
Wednesday, June 23	4	6	AARP Speech (final)	6/25	Huebner
Friday, June 25	12	2	Shipbuilding Contracts (remarks)	6/28	Koch
"	12	2	YMCA Youth Leaders (remarks)	6/28	Lezar
"	12	2	Chowder & Marching Dinner (remarks)	6/28	Koch

June 21, 1971.

WRITERS' SCHEDULE

June 28-July 2

Due Date	Due to RKP	Due to SS	Event	Event Date	Writer
Monday, June 28	12	2	Blount Dinner (remarks)	6/29	Koch
Tuesday, June 29	12	2	FBI Graduation (remarks)	6/30	-----
Friday, July 2	12	2	Bicentennial Speech (final)	7/3	Safire
"	12	2	Airplane Statement	7/4	-----

Upcoming: July 6 - Midwestern Media Briefing (St. Louis or Milwaukee ?)

July 6-19 - California (?)

July 19 - Parks Dinner, Yosemite (Whitaker)

Also: John Andrews working on 2-1/2 year Report.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
Date:
FROM:
VIA: Dwight L. Chapin

MEETING: (or greeting - drop-by - address - reception)

DATE: day and date proposed (leave blank if no specific time requirement)

PURPOSE: (explicitly stated as to why the need)

FORMAT: - location (room, office or city)
- participants (attached list)
- expected length of meeting

✓ SPEECH MATERIAL: (speech, remarks or talking points) required topic (state concisely)

PRESS COVERAGE: (state if it should or should not be announced if applicable and what type of press and photo coverage would be desirable)

STAFF: (attending meeting)

RECOMMEND: (list of those who support the proposal and include any pertinent comment they may make concerning the proposal -- list negative comments where pertinent)

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: (state whether or not President has seen officials or participated in meetings of organization named and when)

BACKGROUND: (this should indicate both the pros and cons of the proposal in the briefest possible manner)

PRESS FOLLOW-UP: (describe how event will be publicized)

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT: Reply to June 17 memorandum
as to "what went wrong".

1. With respect to the President's appearance before the Rockefeller Revenue Sharing Committee --- our office was never notified either orally or in writing that remarks or talking points would be required. Dwight Chapin and Ray Price have discussed the substantive material involved in this matter in their memorandum to you.
2. The Drug Statement -- here again, I believe both Chapin and Price have discussed the areas of critical concern. This matter seemed to be a co-ordinating effort between Price and Krogh to get the material completed with proper substance.

I believe the steps enumerated previously should rectify this type of situation and prevent future delays of this kind.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: RAY PRICE

SUBJECT: Preparation of Presidential Speech
Materials (ref your memo of June 17)

I've reviewed Jon Huntsman's memo to you about the outcome of our meeting about procedures; it reflects our basic conclusions. A few supplementary thoughts:

1. The Topic Memorandum. Your June 1 memo appeared to cover both text and remarks situations in saying that where there is some latitude as to the appropriate topic for an event, I should solicit suggestions and guidance from appropriate staff members a week or two ahead of time and then submit to the President, a week in advance, a "general summary of what the staff feels would be an appropriate theme for the speech or remarks based on the ideas that have been generated." With one caveat, I think this is both workable and helpful in the case of a formal, written speech. It's not generally workable in the case of informal remarks. These usually have to be done much closer to the event, in part because of frequent schedule changes, in part because we're still critically shorthanded here, and in part because the natures of these less formal occasions often tend to "jell" only shortly before they take place. There will, of course, be occasions that are locked in well in advance and on which informal remarks would be appropriate, but which provide a good text opportunity (for example, the LBJ Library dedication); on these, as I did with the LBJ Library, I'll try more frequently to submit an advance memo that spells out the opportunity.

• As for the "one caveat" I mentioned: I doubt that a "general summary" of staff suggestions would be the most helpful format. There's always the question of how these various, often conflicting suggestions should be weighted -- and we do have a number of people around the White House who are always ready with strong opinions

whether they know (or have thought) much about the subject or not. What I've done so far when I've sent such an advance memo has been to recommend a particular theme, based on some study and reflection and talks with others on the staff (either by me or by the writer). This is not a "general summary" of staff ideas; rather, it's something that has developed out of those ideas, and it doesn't necessarily include or reflect all of the suggestions that may have been put forward. Unless I hear otherwise, I'll continue this way.

2. What went wrong. In general, I think the new procedures have been getting off to a pretty good start, and that we're improving them as they go along. Together with Chapin and Huntsman's office, we've taken a number of steps in the past few weeks to improve communications and regularize procedures. Your June 17 memo seems to have been triggered by two snafus: 1) the Rochester event (NY Citizens Committee for Revenue Sharing reception) for which no speaking materials were provided in the trip folder; and 2) the projected TV statement on drugs. The Rochester event was not a remarks situation; it was one that called for talking points; we had agreed that remarks would not be needed; as I understand it, talking points were being prepared by Ehrlichman's people but through a slip-up in communications there was no reference to this in the trip folder. On the drug thing, the problem from our end was that we were waiting for an indication of what was going to be needed -- and when on Tuesday it finally developed that the decision on what was to be done would depend on the speech prepared, rather than vice versa, we were caught short. Koch prepared a good speech, but one that did not represent the way the President wanted to use a live TV appearance, and by then it was too late to start over again. Had we known earlier that the usual order of things was to be reversed, or had there been a determination as to format, the results would have been different. At least it's something I think we all learned from.

3. Staff resources. My central problem remains that I'm critically short-handed. My talent-search activities have pretty much hung suspended during the long go-round over McLaughlin, and while my expectations of having his very substantial services soon have repeatedly been disappointed. This short-handedness has

not only limited quantity and compromised quality of output, but has also led us to operate closer to the event -- for three reasons:

1) because there is a certain element of Parkinsonism that operates with writers who care about quality of output; 2) because with so few writers to do everything, whenever we get hit with a new project that has to be done immediately, it inescapably pushes back the one that's less imminent; and 3) because schedules (and the nature of future events) do keep changing, and the further in advance we work the more is written for the wastebasket -- and we simply don't have the luxury of depth that allows much of that.

7/21/77

MEMORANDUM

Determined to be an
Administrative Marking
Not National Security Information
By MS NARA Date 3/16/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 11, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ROBERT H. FINCH

FROM:

JON M. HUNTSMAN 

SUBJECT:

California Strategy (Action Memo
P-1214).

The California Strategy (Action Memo P-1214) that you submitted to the President was read with interest. A copy of your memorandum is attached.

It was noted that your first recommendation dealing with the organization of a Nixon Advisory Committee headed by Firestone or someone else (clearly loyal to the President and acceptable to Reagan) to send out the broadest possible mailing for "Friends of Nixon" was a good recommendation and should be implemented as soon as possible.

It was further suggested that Attorney General John Mitchell be involved in your third recommendation that it be made clear to Reagan and other key elected officials that he is not to head the Presidential campaign in California, even in a so-called honorary capacity.

It was further noted, that relative to your own role, that you should "work with or chair a small advisory strategy committee" which you felt from the standpoint of "overview" ought to be implemented as soon as possible.

There were no notations on the fourth page of your memorandum relative to the immediate recommendations you made.

Please submit a report to the office of the staff secretary. Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield 

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BOB FINCH *RF*

RE: California Strategy (Action Memo P1214)

Factual Summary

1. The recent public and private polls taken in California which I have forwarded to you show that the Presidential race would be very close or that we would lose the State against any major Democratic contender at the present time. On the other hand, McCloskey has not exceeded 9% against the President among Republicans in any poll.
2. The California State Republican Central Committee and County Committees are in bad disrepair with generally a very poor quality of membership and leadership. Good talent has been absorbed into national and state government. Volunteer organizations are equally impotent and increasingly dominated by the far right.
3. Intense maneuvering vis-a-vis 1974 races (Governor and Senator) is going on by Reinecke, Younger, Flournoy in particular with a prejudicial effect in terms of fund raising, organizing and carrying the state for the President in 1972.
4. Against this background and the present vacuum of activities on behalf of the President, key members of the Governor's staff have been making contacts among corporate heads, party officials and prominent personalities in the following areas:
 - a. Seeking staff and speakers to support the Governor's welfare reform proposals as against the Administration.
 - b. Holmes Tuttle (after two meetings with the Governor) contacting prominent personalities with regard to serving on the Delegation.

- c. Calls from Bob Walker with prominent leaders saying "the Governor's office will run the campaign--Finch to have nothing to do with it" and discussions on his part as to who might be city and county chairmen in the Presidential campaign.

(Specific examples of the above with names, places and dates can be provided to support these contentions)

Recommendations

1. A decision should be made as soon as possible for a Nixon Advisory Committee headed by Firestone or someone else (clearly loyal to the President and acceptable to Reagan) to send out the broadest possible mailing for "Friends of Nixon" in California-- getting people signed up with their indicated areas of interest and a chance to offer suggestions and comments. These lists are organized and ready to go and I believe the mailing should go forward immediately after the wedding. The Governor should be notified of the action just prior to the mailing but without any option to veto. This organizing committee should include the Governor and all appropriate elected Republican officials in California as well as the key "fat cats" and "movers and shakers." It should not include members of the White House staff or Cabinet from California. Wives of such key persons on the Federal payroll might be listed on the organizing committee.
2. The Governor in his key position as Chairman of the Delegation should be asked to submit some names he would like to have considered for the Delegation. At the same time, all other statewide officials should likewise be asked to submit names, i.e., Younger, Reinecke, Flournoy and Priest, as well as Congressmen, Monagan, Seantor Marler, State Chairman Livermore, Vice Chairman Luce and Ralph Rosedale, head of the County Chairmen's organization. These names could be considered for both Delegation and organizational purposes.

3. It should be made clear to Reagan and other key elected officials that he is not to head the Presidential campaign in California, even in a so-called honorary capacity. The President, in other words, will run his own campaign in his native state. If he is allowed to be "Honorary Chairman," his staff will take this as having the franchise for the whole campaign itself.
4. Movement should begin immediately following the mailing to put in place new blood as acting county and city Nixon chairmen, i.e. Russell Green, Forrest Shumway, etc.

Finch Role

In connection with his general campaign assignments, it should be made clear that Finch will have input in political decisions and campaign personnel affecting California. After discussion with the President, it has been concluded that since RHF is a possible 1974 candidate, he should not again serve as state chairman as the '74 implications would be counterproductive to the '72 effort. There have been discussions about Finch working with or chairing a small advisory strategy committee which I think from the standpoint of "overview" ought to be implemented as soon as possible. It would be anticipated that Finch would have a very important responsibility in helping select city and county chairmen which are the critical spots to be filled in carrying California.

Finch should campaign heavily and publicly, particularly between the convention and the election in California, as well as nationally, in those areas where he can be of assistance among youth, minorities, etc.

Present Status in California

We have a small beachhead operation tied to the Kalmbach law firm where John Flanigan is serving as a volunteer, working with various groups like Waller Taylor, George St. Johns, Fred Martin and others, in compiling lists, but without authority to take any definitive action at this time.

Immediate Recommendation

There should be a meeting as soon as possible with the President, Attorney General, H. R. Haldeman and Robert H. Finch to discuss.

If agreement along these lines is reached, another meeting with HRH, Kalmbach and RHF should be set for June 11 to implement.

Firestone will be here for Patricia's wedding and, if agreed, Mitchell could provide marching orders to Firestone and Kalmbach at that time.

cc: Attorney General
H. R. Haldeman