

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Memo	Henry A. Kissinger to the President re uranium enrichment. 88-6/16	2/22/69 Declassified-NSC 11/2/90 AID MCR 89/12; DOS 8801287.	B (S-1 p.) F88-1128; 287.
2	Memo	Kissinger to the President re meeting with Rudolph Petersen 88-6/17	2/10/70 Declassified-NSC 11/2/90 AID MCR 89/12; DOS 8801287.	B (e-3pp.) F88-1128; 287.
3 *	Cable	Kissinger to General Haig re Vietnam negotiations. 88-6/18 Sanitized NSC Ltr. 4/11/89 F88-1415 E88-0034 (Sections 1.3(a)(4), (5) and 1.3(b). No-submitted NLN 93-9/14	10/22/72 Declass. - NSC- 8/30/94 Declass. - CIA- 10/27/93	B (TS-2pp.) F9300598 E93-0060
* Sanitized copy of doc. put in open file - doc. control record will remain in open file - original doc. will remain in withdrawal folder.				
FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
PPF Alpha Name/Subject:			10	
FOLDER TITLE				
KISSINGER, Henry				

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

Foreign Affairs: De Gaulle: I—Nixon's Visit

By C. L. SULZBERGER

PARIS—The atmosphere for de Gaulle-Nixon talks is propitious. The general believes Nixon, whom he has met more than once, has strong qualities of personality. Furthermore, he is evidently convinced that rapprochement between France and the United States is underway. No fundamental obstacles remain to renewal of an old friendship.

De Gaulle is persuaded that some serious differences existing at the time of his last working conference with an American Chief of State, Kennedy, have now been erased. And the general does not forget that this process, which he regards as beneficial, started under Nixon's predecessor, also regarded as a strong leader.

The NATO Issue

For de Gaulle the major issue serving to abrade relationships was NATO; but that, for him, is over. France considers itself a continuing member of the North Atlantic alliance and still bound to stand by other members, in the unlikely case of war. Paris does not intend, this year at least, to avail itself of the legal opportunity to denounce the pact.

But the NATO organization, which always irked the general as a device to subordinate France to American "hegem-

ony," is no more an issue because this country has withdrawn. Likewise, a problem in Asia—Vietnam—is not an obstacle today. Again, Johnson started along the road to settling this conflict. Although that road must inevitably be long, it will lead to peace in the end. Therefore it need not disturb ties with Washington.

There is one deeply disturbing problem—the Middle East. Curiously enough, France and the United States have differed there since the 1956 Suez War; but they have both switched sides. Eisenhower strongly opposed the efforts of the French Fourth Republic to help Israel take Suez. Then President Johnson backed Israel on the same quest when the Fifth Republic was opposed.

However, it is suspected Nixon may ultimately draw nearer French policy there. Already Washington has begrudgingly accepted the framework for negotiation long advocated by Paris—discussion among U.S., Soviet, French and British diplomats of the bases for permanent solution.

Likewise, France believes that little by little the United States is coming to endorse its approach to East-West relationships and to seek improvement of these by specific practical agreements in trade, economic

and cultural affairs. The mood of official Paris is to play down the ugly and enduring Czechoslovakian crisis and to play up the need for détente.

The relatively recent upset in world balances with the consequent entry for the first time of an American "presence" in Europe, Asia and Africa was bound to bring unfamiliar irritants. Never before had there been a feeling of rivalry. However, here it is felt that historic trends and contemporary sentiment again combine to favor revival of the trans-Atlantic friendship.

Thus the ambience for Nixon's visit is held to be good. There is not even present exacerbation over differing monetary policies. Nor, while France envisions a day when all but token American forces will be withdrawn from Germany, does their large presence there today imply even a vestige of difference. After all, it is argued, France also has troops in Germany.

A Different Outlook

But Nixon should realize de Gaulle has an entirely different strategic outlook. The general's 1958 proposal for a U.S.-British-French directorate for world strategy is done for, forgotten by its inventor. Nor is there any serious feeling here that Rus-

sia, despite Czechoslovakia, dares risk war with the West.

Partly for this reason and partly because Gaullist France will never return to the NATO organization, the general feels he cannot align French strategy with that of the U.S.A. He reasons: Washington could never make any bilateral defense arrangement with Paris because it can deal only through NATO.

Paris refuses this approach. It would be simple for the American and French staffs to draw up plans for military cooperation in case of war; but not with or through NATO, and Paris acknowledges that NATO would dissolve if Washington made any private arrangements outside it.

Hegemonic Grip

France refuses any friendship with either superpower that might lead to the embrace of hegemony. It is against blocs, even blocs of friends. It is by tradition, by ideology and desire a friend of the United States, but it sees an American hegemonic grip on Britain, still regarded with suspicion, and West Germany, increasingly regarded with mistrust—a grip it intends to avoid.

As for Russia—it has never been France's ideological partner, rarely France's friend, but frequently France's ally.

PRESERVATION COPY

[Feb. 1969?]

MEMORANDUM

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

E.O. 12065, Section 6-102


By AA NARS, Date 4/3/81

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 21, 1969



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Additional Statements for Your Use During
European Trip

At Tab A is arrival statement - Brussels

At Tab B is arrival statement - Berlin

At Tab C is statement: Berlin - Signing of the Golden Book

At Tab D is statement to U. S. troops in Berlin

At Tab E are remarks for wreath-laying ceremony at
Airlift Memorial, Tempelhof

At Tab F is departure statement - Berlin

At Tab G are remarks for meeting with Embassy personnel - Rome

These are as rewritten by Keough. I am reviewing them for
substance.

Attachments

(PRICE) JK

ARRIVAL STATEMENT - BRUSSELS

I am very happy to be in Belgium, and most grateful for Your Majesty's gracious welcome.

We in the United States well recall that Your Majesty's first official trip abroad after ascending the throne was made to our country. I am especially pleased, therefore, that my own first trip abroad as President begins in your country.

It was exactly half a century ago this year, in 1919, that one of America's greatest Presidents paid an historic post-war visit to what was then a devastated Belgium. Speaking to the Belgian Parliament, Woodrow Wilson declared on that occasion that "Belgium's cause has linked the Governments of the civilized world together. They have realized their common duty. They have drawn together instinctively into a league of right. They have put the whole power of organized manhood behind this conception of justice, which is common to mankind."

"That," he said, "is the significance of the League of Nations."

Wilson's great dream collapsed, and the League failed -- as the people of Belgium know all too tragically well. But the search goes on for a durable peace, one that embodies what Wilson then called "this conception of justice, which is common to mankind" -- or, as I

heard Your Majesty describe it so eloquently just ten years ago, in addressing the United States Congress: "Peace is the tranquility of order. Mere tranquility can be cold war, but the tranquility of order implies justice."

The search for that peace is what brings me now to Europe, to begin the process of consulting with America's allies and gathering their judgments.

It seems altogether proper that the first stop on such a trip should be in Belgium: a nation that suffered so grievously in World War I, when its plight did so much to galvanize the conscience of the Western World; a nation that suffered again in World War II; but a nation that maintained its remarkable spirit, and rebounded from each ordeal with the vigor and resilience of what Your Majesty now referred to as "a free and ancient land;"* and, not least, a nation that has played so creative a role during these past twenty years in developing the institutions that give substance to the concept of an Atlantic community.

The peoples of our two countries have shared many things. We have been allies in war, and partners in peace. The works of your great artists are among the most treasured in our museums. But even

* From the King's welcoming statement.

more important, as we look to the future, are the common ideals that inspire us, and that have made the friendship of our peoples so warm and so lasting.

I look forward with great pleasure to the prospect of working in the coming years with Your Majesty, and with your government, and with the Belgian people, as together we press forward toward the peace with justice that we all so earnestly seek.

###

(SAFIRE) JK

ARRIVAL STATEMENT - BERLIN

Mr. Governing Mayor (Mr. Chancellor), thank you for your generous remarks welcoming me to Berlin. I am delighted to be back here for my first visit in almost six years.

I am fortunate to be able to take a guided tour with the best possible tour directors -- the elected head of Government of the free people of Germany and the Governing Mayor of the free people of Berlin. My schedule calls for only 200 minutes in Berlin -- not nearly enough time to become reacquainted with a great city. But I did not want to miss the chance to demonstrate again the respect for Berlin and the Berliners held by 200 million Americans.

I also wanted to see for myself the great job which is being done by American soldiers and civilians stationed here. They could not find a better or more important place to serve. The close cooperation between the Berliners and the protecting powers, British, French and American is the basic reason for the success of freedom here.

Especially now, when Berlin is being subjected to unjustified threats, I welcome this opportunity to show our unity with the people of Berlin. I look forward to an exciting few hours with you here.

#

(SAFIRE) JK

BERLIN: SIGNING OF THE GOLDEN BOOK

This book has been signed by a wide spectrum of illustrious men and women of this generation. The tension imposed on Berlin, the drama of Berlin, has been a magnet for the great and the near-great.

In a larger sense, thousands of other Americans -- the men of the airlift -- have left their signatures in this city. We recall the phrase of poet Stephen Spender, as we think of the men who "left the vivid air signed with their honour."

The world leaders who come to Berlin, and who sign this book, pay tribute to the courage of Berliners. Beyond that, they repeat the commitment the free world has made here.

We who believe in "One World" know that a good start could be made on that road with the emergence of "one Berlin."

We who want to end the sharp divisions in this world know that a good place to start is in ending the artificial division of this great city.

#

February 21, 1969

STATEMENT TO U.S. TROOPS IN BERLIN

The Americans, civilian and military, serving in Berlin today are the embodiment of our commitment here.

Actually, there are more than 125,000 "American Berliners" -- men and women who have served in this city since the end of World War II. They, and you, are veterans of a unique service -- in an outpost of high importance -- that has had more than its share of tension.

I am happy and proud to be able to be with you here today to visit a few minutes with you and to see firsthand the great job you are doing in Berlin, along with your British and French colleagues, and our Berlin friends. Each of you is a living ambassador for your country. The Berliners will judge us very much on the basis of your performance.

I don't have to tell you what an important job you have here. The Berliners can tell you. The headlines tell you.

You continue to occupy a front line position in the defenses of the Western world. Your being here shows the Berliners that we are standing by them.

In terms of commitment, words, no matter how strong or how sincere, are one thing -- American men here on the spot are another. This city has been and remains at the center of our concerns. It is vital to the interests of peace, in not only Germany, but in the entire Western world. Your President, your government and your fellow Americans are grateful for your devotion and your performance. We are depending on you. And you can be sure that you can depend on us -- and Berlin can count on us -- to stand behind you.

(SAFIRE) JK

REMARKS FOR WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY AT AIRLIFT MEMORIAL
TEMPELHOF

About twenty years ago, the world held its breath as the free world attempted to supply a city from the sky.

No one will forget the Berlin Airlift. Neither should we forget the challenge to men's freedom which brought on the airlift. Most of Europe had been devastated by war. In 1948 Berlin was still digging out from under thousands of tons of rubble and attempting to rebuild a great metropolis. This was the moment when the Allies and the Berliners faced their greatest test here.

Over a quarter of a million flights were made in and out of Berlin during those eleven months of blockade. The roar of airplane engines over Tempelhof meant that the life of the city would go on. Seventy-four men lost their lives in the airlift, and thousands of Berliners pulled in their belts but remained free men. Together, Berliners and Americans showed resourcefulness, steadfastness and courage of which we can still be proud.

This dramatic sculpture -- the three-pronged symbol of the air corridors -- represents our own dedication to the vital lifelines to the West. I am proud today to salute those who sacrificed so much to keep these lifelines open. They are open today. We will seek, with

all who wish to see a normal life return to this great city, to establish a real peace -- one that will restore to Berliners the creative role they have long performed.

In that spirit, we pay tribute to the men of the Berlin Airlift who, by their bravery, lifted the hearts of free men everywhere.

(SAFIRE) JK

DEPARTURE STATEMENT - BERLIN

Mr. Governing Mayor: Thank you for your warm hospitality.

Mr. Chancellor: A visit to your country is always inspiring.

Even a few hours in Berlin leaves an unforgettable impression. It may be possible to divide a city temporarily; it is not possible to divide a people permanently. .

Berliners have the right to live free and secure. The United States remains committed to keep that right a reality. In the four-power city of Berlin there is a fifth power -- the overpowering desire of free men to stay free. And that power shall not be denied.

The status and freedom of Berlin must be respected until that day comes when all Germans, when all Europeans, can live together in peace and freedom. My Government and the American people will work with all those who are also willing to work to bring that day closer.

I have seen for myself in the course of this and earlier visits the courage, the stamina and the fortitude of Berlin. I know that the Berliners will do what is required of them. The Berliners must know that they can expect the same of us.

All my best wishes to you, to your great city and for the future of Berlin. Auf wiedersehen!

#

(GAVIN) JK

REMARKS AT MEETING OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL: ROME

It is a great pleasure for me to greet the staff of one of the United States' largest and most important embassies. I am particularly thankful for the splendid reception I have received, and I want you to know how much I appreciate the work you have all done to make this trip as comfortable and as productive as it has been.

Twenty-two years ago, I came for the first time to Rome. At that time, I was a freshman Congressman. My visit was reported in a small box on the back page of the Rome Daily American. Actually, it wasn't my visit which was reported. What it said was "De Gasperi receives U.S. Congressmen." There were four of us and we were accompanied by the then United States Ambassador to Italy, James C. Dunn. Now I am on page one. That shows you what hard work, clean living, and 302 electoral votes can do for you.

My experience in 1947 was, then quite different from my experience now, except in two areas. One is that the Italian people are as friendly and as hospitable as ever, and the second is that the United States Embassy in Rome shows every visitor the same courtesy and care. If I received a bit more attention this time, it is perhaps because I am twenty-two years older and deserving of more respect.

I want you all to know that your work here is of immense importance and that without your reports, such a a trip as this would be impossible. I hope that you will continue to report and express your views fully and frankly, since, without them, we can do little to contribute to the fine relationship which exists between Italy and the United States.

I have, as you know, a reputation as a world traveler. I have been in most of the countries of the world since my first trip abroad, to Italy, in 1947. And although things change from country to country -- the great food in Italy never seems to change; it just gets better as the years go by. And the wonderful service provided by American embassies like this one remains the same. Again, thank you and remember that with your views and your voice, we can accomplish many things in the cause of understanding between these two great nations.

#

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

February 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Wilson's Interest in Uranium Enrichment

Attached is a paper on Tripartite Uranium Enrichment (Gas Centrifuge). Prime Minister Wilson plans to raise this subject with you in London.

I wanted you to have a chance to read it now. Another copy will be included in a separate briefing package for your talks with the Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 11/2/90 F88-1128; AIDMCR89/12; DOS 8801287.

By *Adt* NARA, Date *3-11-92*

(NLN 88-6)

~~SECRET~~

[Nothing attached 4/3/81]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 22, 1969



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *H*
SUBJECT: Comparative GNP and Population
Figures for European Trip

Attached is a tabulation of the European countries' population and GNP figures for the periods you requested from Colonel Haig of my office.

The computation of the GNP currently in effect actually started in 1948. Consequently, the comparisons provided are geared to year 1948 and earlier computations would not be comparable. The experts advise that the differences between 1947 and 1948 would be very minor with respect to GNP and population and recommend that we use the 1948 base line as the only precise measure of comparison between the two periods.

Attachment

*What are
Totals?*

	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>GNP</u>
<u>Belgium</u>		
1947-48 (Base line)	8,557,000	\$ 6.4 billion
1968	9,661,000	20.4 billion
<u>UK</u>		
1947-48 (Base line)	50,026,000	\$33.4 billion
1968	55,558,000	109.5 billion
<u>West Germany (including W. Berlin)</u>		
1947-48 (Base line)	48,297,000	\$17.2 billion
1968	60,167,000	120.9 billion
<u>Italy</u>		
1947-48 (Base line)	46,000,000	\$12.4 billion
1968	52,891,000	66.9 billion
<u>France</u>		
1947-48 (Base line)	41,044,000	\$14.3 billion
1968	50,635,000	108.3 billion

HAR
February 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. President

7 26 1971

I think it would
be a good ~~idea~~ idea

H

file

HK
Intelligence
on Truck
traffic

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Rudolph Peterson on February 11 at
10:00 a.m.

Proposals of Peterson Task Force

The Peterson Task Force on International Development is now in the process of completing its report which it plans to present to you in early March. Your meeting with Peterson thus represents the last opportunity to make suggestions without asking him to backtrack.

The Task Force report will contain all the right themes: an increased sharing of the U.S. role in the LDCs with the LDCs themselves and the international organizations, greater emphasis on private investment and trade, etc. (A fairly detailed summary on where they are heading is at Tab B.) Their specific proposals would drastically alter the U.S. assistance program, both substantively and organizationally, seeking in the process to provide clear and persuasive objectives for our efforts.

-- They would assign specific objectives to specific programs, e.g. supporting assistance should be linked to short-term U.S. political goals and development lending should be linked to long-term U.S. interests in economic development. They feel that the use of numerous objectives to justify each individual program has dragged all programs down.

-- They see development aid and technical assistance as helping create a more livable world and hence enhancing long-range U.S. security. We need to help reduce poverty around the world, to avoid repeating the failures of the past in our own country which have produced our racial and urban problems of today. We must mount common attacks on common problems, such as the environment.

-- On amounts of aid, we should reject any mechanical formula which relates aid to GNP.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sect. 3.4

NSC 11/2/90 F88-1128; AID MCR 89/12; DDS 8801287

By *ADH*

NARA, Date *3-11-92*

(NLN 88-6)

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- 2 -

-- We should significantly increase our contributions to multilateral lending institutions, but there is no evidence that we need big increases in our bilateral aid levels. The focus must be on effective programs rather than large infusions of money.

-- Military assistance should be phased out over time.

-- On organization, drastic change is necessary to carry out the necessary disaggregation of objectives: They would create a new development lending bank to channel development assistance, a separate technical assistance foundation, and a separate security agency in State to manage the shorter-term political-security programs.

-- The deep need for coordination of our various assistance programs, which would be increased by the creation of the new bodies, would be met by creation of a U.S. Development Board -- comprising the heads of all relevant agencies -- run by a Presidential assistant in the White House. (State agrees with the need for better coordination but wants to do the coordinating itself. It has prepared a memo on the subject, which is at Tab C.)

-- Numerous program innovations: guarantees of LDC borrowings in the U.S. capital market; subsidization of interest rates on money borrowed directly by the U.S. Government from the private capital market to loan to LDCs; multi-year appropriations for development assistance; distribution of some portion of the new Special Drawing Rights to international lending institutions; untying; a multifaceted effort to anticipate and pre-empt the debt burden problem; multilaterization of guarantees of private foreign investment; etc.

Appraisal

All of these proposals fit the basic themes which we have already decided to pursue. None of them will embarrass us. The major need now is to get Peterson to focus hard on the priority issues and to clear up a few fuzzy areas:

-- What should be the fundamental objectives of our assistance programs?

-- How will those objectives be promoted by the specific program proposals of the Task Force?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

-- What do these recommendations imply for our requests for budgetary appropriations in the future?

-- What is the ultimate objective on the multilateral-bilateral mix of assistance for development purposes?

-- Must over-all coordination come from a new White House official, or could State handle it?

I recommend that you spend most of the meeting on objectives and their implementation through specific program proposals. At Tab A are talking points on these questions and on other more specific points if time permits their discussion. I recommend that you open the meeting by inviting Peterson to briefly describe the outcome of his report as he now foresees it.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Election Day
1972

Dear Mr. President -

It seems appropriate
before the votes are counted to
tell you what a privilege the last
four years have been. I am confident
of the outcome to-day. But it cannot
affect the historic achievement - to take
a divided nation, riven in war,
losing its confidence, marked by
intellectuals without conviction and
give it a new purpose and overcome
its hesitations will leave ever larger
in history books. It has been an
inspiration to see your fortitude in
adversity and your willingness to

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walk alone. For this - as well as for
the unfeeling human kindness and
consideration - I shall always be
grateful.

With warm and respectful
regards

H

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ORIGINAL IN PARALLEL PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1973

TO: STEVE BULL

FROM: PETER RODMAN

Attached is a Presidential hand-written note to Dr. Kissinger, for the President's files.

June 21, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

K-

Be as positive
as possible in
your press
briefing - having
in mind B will
hear about it
before we sign
@

PRESERVATION COPY
ORIGINAL IN PARALLEL PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL FILE

[4-7-71]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President -

Before you go on
tonight I want you to have this
note to tell you that - no matter
what the result - free peoples
everywhere will be forever in your
debt. Your serenity during crisis,
your steadfastness under pressure have
been all that has prevented the
triumph of mass hysteria. It has
been an inspiration to me.

As always

H

PRESERVATION COPY
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...*

John
pm paul

EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ 221335Z OCT 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER SAIGON 221921 FLASH 11 31
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES-ONLY FOR GENERAL HAIG
HAKIO 41 22 OCTOBER, 1972

1. IT IS HARD TO EXAGGERATE THE TOUGHNESS OF THIEU'S POSITION. HIS DEMANDS VERGE ON INSANITY. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS I MENTIONED IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE, HE STATED THAT WE HAVE BEEN COLLUDING WITH MOSCOW AND PEKING FOR MONTHS AGAINST HIM AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN ORGANIZED PRESS CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA AGAINST HIM. HE INSISTED THAT HE WOULD SETTLE FOR NOTHING LESS THAN A DOCUMENT WHICH LEGALLY RECOGNIZES THE TWO VIETNAMESE STATES WITH THE DMZ AS THEIR BORDER. HE IS TOTALLY OBLIVIOUS TO THE SCOPE OF DRV CONCESSIONS, THE MASSIVE AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT WE ARE MOVING FOR HIM, THE VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL GUARANTEES, OR THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE COURSE HE HAS CHOSEN.

2. WE ARE IN THE DIFFICULT POSITION THAT TO TAKE HIM ON PUBLICLY WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR OPPOSITION WAS RIGHT ALL ALONG. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE RUNNING UP AGAINST THE DEADLINE OF THE FINAL LEG. I SEE TWO CHOICES AS FOLLOWS:

3. THE FIRST CHOICE IS FOR ME TO GO THROUGH WITH THE FINAL LEG, DISCUSS OUR DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP THERE, AND OFFER TO IMMEDIATELY NEGOTIATE A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WHICH WE WOULD SIGN AFTER THE ELECTION.

THIS COURSE HAS THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES. FIRST, IT WOULD GIVE US THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME SINCE HANOI COULD NOT ACT UNTIL WE WERE ACTUALLY THERE. SECOND, IT WOULD GIVE US THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT OUR OWN CASE DIRECTLY TO HANOI. THIRD, IT WOULD GIVE US A FACE SAVING FORMULA FOR STOPPING THE BOMBING WHICH I BELIEVE HAS TO BE AN INEVITABLE PART OF ANY SCENARIO. FURTHER IT WOULD GIVE US A BIG BOOST IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

THE MAJOR DISADVANTAGES ARE AS FOLLOWS. HANOI MIGHT PRESENT US WITH A DRAFT AGREEMENT RIGHT THERE WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE. SECONDLY, GIVEN THIEU'S PRESENT STATE OF MIND, IT IS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT HE WOULD MAINTAIN HIS OUTWARD BALANCE, AND MY TRIP MIGHT JUST PUSH HIM OVER THE EDGE. THIRD, IT MIGHT LEAD TO A TOTAL HUMILIATION FOR THE U.S. IN BEING HELD UP BY BOTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

MR NLN 93-9/14

By AR NARA, Date 11/21/95

4. THE SECOND CHOICE IS FOR YOU TO GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH DOBRYNIN AND HAND HIM A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO BRESHNEV TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT:

-- WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NEARLY INSUPERABLE OBSTACLES IN SAIGON.

-- WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT IMPOSE A SOLUTION ON OUR ALLIES. HERE YOU WOULD ADD ORALLY THAT, OF COURSE, THE NOVEMBER 7 CONSIDERATIONS MUST WEIGH VERY HEAVILY.

-- WE ARE HONOR BOUND TO PRESENT OUR ALLIES' OBJECTIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE.

-- IF THE OTHER SIDE PROVES UNABLE TO MEET THESE OBJECTIONS WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THEM ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

-- WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSE A MEETING WITH LE DUC THO IN PARIS AT ANY TIME OF HIS CHOOSING.

-- THE REST OF THE SCENARIO WITH THE DRV WOULD REMAIN THE SAME.

-- THE DE BORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW WAS A BREACH OF FAITH AND TERRIBLY EXACERBATED THE SITUATION.

-- IN ORDER TO SHOW OUR GOOD FAITH WE WILL STOP OUR BOMBING OF THE NORTH AND SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE AIR ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH WHILE THIS SITUATION IS BEING WORKED OUT.

THE ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE ARE THAT IT MAKES US LEAST VULNERABLE TO PUBLIC PRESSURE, IS MOST HONORABLE TOWARD SAIGON, AND IS ONE WHICH WE CAN BEST SURFACE PUBLICLY. THE MAJOR DISADVANTAGE IS THAT IT MAY RUN US RIGHT UP AGAINST A DEADLINE, AND I HAVE NOT YET FIGURED OUT HOW TO KEEP HANOI QUIET LONG ENOUGH IN ORDER TO GET IT IMPLEMENTED. YOU WOULD GIVE THE SOLEMN ASSURANCE OF THE PRESIDENT TO BRESHNEV THAT THIS WAS NOT A STALLING MANEUVER AND THAT ALL PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN BILATERAL FASHION WOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE MEETING WITH LE DUC THO. YOU WOULD ADD ORALLY TO DOBRYNIN IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE FASHION THE IMPERATIVE THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC OUTCRY. IF NORTH VIET-NAM WERE TO GO PUBLIC WE WOULD HAVE TO STAND BY SAIGON'S OBJECTIONS, WHICH AS WE HAVE MENTIONED CONCERN PRIMARILY THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER ROUND OF WAR.

5. I KNOW THE PRESIDENT'S OBJECTION TO ENDING THE BOMBING, BUT I DO NOT THINK THEY APPLY TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. ENDING THE BOMBING WOULD SUPPORT THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT AN AGREEMENT IS NEAR. FAILURE TO END IT WOULD ASK HANOI TO ENDURE SEVERAL MORE WEEKS OF PUNISHMENT BECAUSE OF A REFUSAL BY SAIGON TO GO ALONG WITH AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE DRV MADE ALMOST UNBELIEVABLE CONCESSIONS. OBVIOUSLY I FAVOR THE SECOND COURSE, BUT HAVE OFFERED THE FIRST ONE FOR INTELLECTUAL COMPLETENESS.

WARM REGARDS.

SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE



Date : April 3, 1981
Reply to
Attn of : Michael H. Hughes
Subject : Sealed envelope
To : The File

While reviewing the contents of the folder labeled KISSINGER, Henry, I came across a 9 1/2" x 12" manila envelope similarly marked (preservation copy attached). Inside there was a sealed White House envelope on which was written:

From
Henry Kissinger

For: The President

In case of Emergency

Since the envelope was unopened, I took it immediately to James J. Hastings, Deputy Director of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. Because we are required by the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act and implementing regulations to review every document in our custody, Mr. Hastings determined it was necessary to open the envelope to ascertain its contents. He did so in the presence of Joan L. Howard, Supervisory Archivist, and myself. The attached letter dated December 4, 1970 from Henry A. Kissinger to the President was enclosed in the envelope.

Mr. Hastings then asked me to write a memorandum for the record.

MICHAEL H. HUGHES
Archivist

THE WHITE HOUSE

KISSINGER, Henry

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

In view of the news stories about possible plots of kidnapping, I would like to state my position in the extraordinary event that this should occur.

If such an attempt should succeed, I would like to ask you to meet no demands of the kidnappers, however trivial. I would assume that any demand that is met would establish a precedent which is against the national interest.

If you should receive any communication from me to the contrary, you should assume that it was made under duress.

Respectfully,



Henry A. Kissinger

The President
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE

From Henry Kissinger

For: The President

In case of
Emergency