

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: MARTIN ANDERSON

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

In respect to the Administration program for the District of Columbia, Mr. Garber (202-225-4457), Counsel for the District Committee in the House, will be very pleased to meet with the appropriate Nixon people to advise on District affairs.

Garber is quite expert on all District matters.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

The enclosed request from Don Webster of the Key Issues Committee staff, for consideration for various alternative appointments, deserves, in my opinion, as sympathetic consideration as possible.

Webster, along with Tony Jurich, Jerry Friedheim and Tom Cole, worked themselves to a frazzle in the campaign furnishing information to RN on the road. I know you are familiar with the process.

I suggest that these men have earned rather priority attention for appointments that they seek, or their approximations.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

Congressman Glen Lipscomb of California telephoned me from Wiesbaden, Germany on November 27. He reports that Ambassador Harlan Cleveland is doing an excellent job and therefore does not need to be removed right away. He is a "hard-liner" on NATO and his retention would provide continuity there. Moreover, he is a well-regarded Democrat and is held in high favor by the intellectuals.

Lipscomb said he at one time disliked Cleveland but now believes he is worthy of being retained at least for a while.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

In a telephone call from Wiesbaden, Germany, on November 27, Congressman Glen Lipscomb of California recommended Frank Sanders, of the staff of the House Committee on Appropriations, for a logistics position in the Department of Defense -- perhaps as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy or a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

He described Sanders as exceedingly capable, steeped in the mysteries of logistics, and a strong admirer of RN.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER PLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

Hamer Budge (202-753-1130) telephoned me on November 18.

Budge, as you know, is one of the two Republicans on the SEC.

Budge said that a new chairman will have to be appointed to the Commission. Budge's term expires in June. He called for advice as to Nixon's desires on his own status so he can plan accordingly. He said that if RN wants someone else, he (Budge) will quietly and uncomplainingly move out of the way. But if Budgetis to be named chairman, it would be exceedingly helpful to know it at an early date so he can make these plans instead.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

Congressman Mel Laird and Senator John Tower have called to urge favorable consideration of Dr. William Prendergast for appointment as Director of the Census.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

Senator Dirksen telephoned on November 18 to offer the thought that Judge Kenneth Keating might be a good Nixon appointment to the Supreme Court

The Senator did not press the point -- just offered the thought for consideration.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 18 Ev Dirksen telephoned to urge an appointment for Mr. John Meiszner.

Meiszner, a funeral director, served as Collector of Customs, Port of Chicago, during the Eisenhower Administration. He headed the Ethnic Committee for Nixon in Illinois.

Ev suggests that such steps as are necessary should be taken to remove the colored postmaster in Chicago -- who, Ev says, is a bad apple -- and possibly this post could be given to Meiszner.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER PLANIGAN
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 18 John Rhodes of Arizona telephoned to offer these suggestions:

1. Bob Galvin, President and chief executive officer of Motorola, for Department of Commerce Secretary.
2. Do not appoint Elmer Bennett to anything!

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 18 Senator Dominick of Colorado telephoned in these suggestions:

1. It is exceedingly important to clear with Gordon Allott and others in the West the choices for Interior Secretary. He thinks this should be done well in advance to avoid extreme irritation.
2. He recommends Ed Meacham of New Mexico for Interior Secretary.
3. Everyone in the West would be gravely concerned if an extreme conservationist were proposed for Secretary of the Interior.
4. Rog Morton would be extremely embarrassing in Colorado. He would also be opposed by Gordon Allott.
5. Your brother, Bob Flanigan, now heads the screening committee for the state to offer recommendations for Director of the Mint. They will come forward in due time with recommendations.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: ROBERT HALDEMAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

Mr. Milbank brought the enclosed letter, urging RN to "bless" the Hoover Institution. The letter is self-explanatory. I have checked this proposal with Dick Allen; his note is attached.

I have sharply revised the proposed letter to Dr. Campbell. As revised, I recommend its signature.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: BOB HALDEMAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 26 RN requested that he be reminded of a suggestion by Ted White that the U.S. develop a joint program with Western Europe for the training of astronauts in order to afford Western Europeans an opportunity to participate in space programs which their own countries cannot afford to support. The idea is that this would greatly assist the Europeans to overcome their feeling of being left out in the great advances of science and exploration.

RN wanted to be reminded of this and, apparently, is thinking of this item as a point for his Administration program or possibly for his Inaugural Message. Perhaps this will properly become a project for Dr. duBridge to pursue with the Space Agency when he comes aboard.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 27 I talked with General Goodpaster in Saigon.

He was responding to my request for a recommendation of a high-quality officer competent to do for RN what Goodpaster did for President Eisenhower on the White House staff.

Goodpaster recommends Col. Robert G. Gard (0-62355). Gard is now in Vietnam and has been there six or seven months. He is Commander of Division Artillery of one of the American divisions in Vietnam.

Goodpaster says he is "absolutely first-rate and top-flight." He taught at West Point. He has had excellent advance schooling including the War College. He was the top man in his class at the War College.

One wonderment about Gard: after the War College, he was assigned to the Pentagon in an executive capacity with Secretary McNamara and stayed on for a time with Secretary Clifford. But, Goodpaster says, Gard is "straight professionally" and would be totally loyal to President Nixon.

Of great importance: note attached copy of my memorandum about General Goodpaster himself. Could be that we will want to use Goodpaster and forget Gard!

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 27 I talked to Congressman Glen Lipscomb of California. He was in Wiesbaden, Germany. He called to stress the importance of having a very detailed study made of the Spanish base negotiations. He forecasts extreme difficulty in this area for the United States rather soon after Mr. Nixon takes office.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: Bryce Harlow

I find this correspondence intriguing. Perhaps you know Ravenal. In any case, his background seems sufficiently impressive that you may wish to consider him for your staff.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

Congressman Glen Lipscomb telephoned me on November 27 from Wiesbaden, Germany -- saying he had visited with Minister of Defense Healey in London, and Minister Healey had lavishly praised Mr. Nixon.

Lipscomb thought a suitable note from Mr. Nixon to Minister Healey would be an excellent thing to do. If you agree (I am not ecstatic over the idea, myself), I wonder if an appropriate draft could be prepared by a skilled State Department scrivener!

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: RN
FROM: HARLOW

Attached is a suggested note to the young lady who is about to become Mrs. Strom Thurmond.

MEMORANDUM

November 28, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: HARLOW *RH*

Attached is a suggested note to the young lady who is about to become Mrs. Strom Thurmond.

November 29, 1968

To: H.R. Haldeman

✓ CC: Bryce Harlow

From: Annelise Anderson

Re: Position Recommendation

Name: Dr. Robert J. Hurley, Chairman, Division of Graduate Studies, Associate Professor, Institute of Marine Sciences, University of Miami, Miami, Florida

For: Position of Oceanographer on National Council on Marine Resources and Technology; or consultant to the Council

Dr. Hurley's background in his own field is impressive. He contacted us via Mr. Rebozo during the campaign and expressed willingness to help on oceanographic matters. In a conversation with me he offered useful insights on specific policy problems of concern to scientists involved in oceanography.

He has not requested a job in the Administration, but he has reaffirmed his willingness to help in any way possible.

Dr. Hurley is a university scientist, an intellectual rather than an "organization" man - and for this reason may be valuable in representing the scientific community in the development of a national oceanographic program. In addition to his academic background and accomplishments, he was Deputy Director of the UNESCO Office of Oceanography and Assistant Secretary of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission during 1965-66.

Filling the "oceanographer" posts (two of which are apparently now vacant) on the Council may be the responsibility of the Executive Secretary of the Council (now Mr. Edward Wenk, Jr.) or even the Chairman of the Council, who is by law the Vice President of the United States. Thus you may want to hold this recommendation and forward it to the proper person when appropriate.

Dr. Hurley's resume is attached.

November 29, 1968

*see BNH
appl.*

Mr. Harry S. Flemming
Office of the President-Elect
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

As stated on the telephone, I am seriously and actively considering how my staff will be organized, and it is helpful to have your comments on Bob Kunzig, as well as his resume.

At this point, everything is still unclear (including my mind, after a Thanksgiving Day of 14 hours in the office) and I will have to cerebrate carefully before anything definite emerges.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

Bryce N. Harlow
Assistant to the
President-Elect

BNH:ph

MEMORANDUM

November 29, 1968

TO: HERB KLEIN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

As we agreed, I met with Jim Hagerty for lunch. The following points were on his mind:

- 1) The impression is extensive throughout the press that Governor Agnew is being put into the White House proper in order to keep an eye on him. He thinks this point must be straightened out very quickly. When I explained what the real situation is, he pressed for a public explanation of this situation in the very near future.
- 2) He strongly doubts the validity of the "all-purpose" White House aides. He suggests that this phase of the White House staff procedure be discussed in some depth with the Press else the White House staff is going to be "murdered" by the Washington press corps.
- 3) He takes a very dim view of a second-level Press Secretary. He stresses that the pride and concern of the news media requires a Press Secretary of top rank in the White House staff. He believes that unless the Press Secretary has intimate, continuing contact with the President, he is certain to fail. He stresses that unless Ron Ziegler is situated properly with the President and the top White House aides, and his position is known to be top level by the Press, the Press will move out to clobber Ron in the first two or three press conferences.
- 4) He believes there should be a special effort to work with top columnists and TV commentators. He believes this task was done poorly in the Eisenhower days and blames himself for it.
- 5) He strongly emphasizes the need for FBI "field" investigations of all White House staffers before they are employed. He points out that just one bad apple in the entire group will create immense trouble for the President.
- 6) He believes it is very desirable for the President to meet as soon as possible with the heads of the three networks. He believes that they will prove to be highly cooperative with the President, but that to achieve this they should be "stroked."

TO: Mr. Bryce N. Harlow

FROM: Robert Murphy

November 29, 1968

The question of a White House Science Adviser to succeed Don Hornig.

As you know, I am a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of which Dr. Edwin Land, Chairman of Polaroid, is a member. He is one of our leading American young scientists. Another colleague is Dr. William Baker of Bell Laboratories.

Both recommend highly Dr. Norman Ramsey, Physicist, Harvard Professor.

Dr. Land would like to talk to Mr. Nixon about it.
Can he?

MEMORANDUM

November 30, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 30 Congressman Page Belcher -- senior Republican, House Agriculture Committee -- telephoned to refer his ardent support of former Congressman Clifford McIntyre for Secretary of Agriculture.

Belcher says that Congressman Don Rumsfeld would be totally unacceptable.

Belcher has a number of views about the Agriculture Department and its staffing that he would be pleased to share with the appropriate people here, and will fly here to do this if desired.

I would wish that this could be done, considering the sensitivity of Belcher. Would Peter Flanigan subject himself to this treatment?

MEMORANDUM

November 30, 1968

TO: PETER FLANIGAN

FROM: BRYCE HARLOW

On November 30 Congressman Frank Bow of Ohio telephoned from Washington to recommend for Director of the Bureau of the Budget, or for a top budget position, Mr. Ralph Roberts.

Bow says Roberts was the budget man for the Agriculture Department in Eisenhower Administration days; headed up administration of the Department under Secretary Benson; then headed up the State Department Budget function. He is 60 years of age.

Bow says that Roberts is eager to do anything to help the new Administration and is widely respected on both sides of the political aisle in Congress.

MEMORANDUM

November 30, 1968

TO: RN
FROM: HARLOW

On November 29 Ambassador Murphy advised me:

1. Both Tommy Thompson and Chip Bolen have resigned.
2. He has learned of exceedingly interesting remarks about you by Mr. Dobrynin.
3. Vance is willing to stay on in Paris for only a month or so. It is believed, however, that this period could perhaps be extended if RN could personally request of Vance's law firm an extension. Murphy has more information on this.
4. Harriman arrives in the United States on Sunday, December 1, and will be in Washington Monday through Thursday. It is not unlikely that he will request to visit you as he comes through New York enroute back to Paris.

November 30, 1968

REMINDER

Check Cabot Lodge on Adolph Schmidt -- what does he think of him as, possibly, Under-Secretary of State.

November 30, 1968

REMINDER

Check with Bill Kintner about Strausz-Hupe for, possibly, Ambassador to NATO.

Check possibility of Kintner for assistant to Helms.

November 30, 1968

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Check possibility of Kintner for assistant to Helms.

REMINDER

Talk to Neil McElroy about Carl Bendetsen

November 30, 1968

REMINDER

Check John Byrnes re Tom Curtis for, possibly, U. S. Representative for Trade Negotiations.

Tell Byrnes of Wilbur Mills visit with RN December 4.

Check Curtis with Roger Blough.

Check Roy Pfautch on Curtis' likely reaction to trade position.

REMINDER

November 30, 1968

Arthur Burns called, November 30, to advise that Mr. Hugh Bullock (TR 9-5858) had called him with great concern over the news that Dr. Strausz-Hupe had visited RN. Bullock reports that in the 1930's, in the United States, Strausz-Hupe was an active Nazi.

REMINDER

November 30, 1968

Telephone General Goodpaster -- check the procedures necessary to obtain his services for a brief period extending shortly into the new Administration.

MEMORANDUM

December 1, 1968

TO: Peter Flanigan

FROM: Bryce Harlow

On November 25 Congressman Mark Andrews of North Dakota telephoned to register vigorous opposition to Congressman Paul Findley for Secretary of Agriculture.

Andrews also said that Senator Milton Young would be just as vigorously opposed as Andrews.

Andrews contends that the appointment of Bindley would be a disaster in the farm belt.

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FROM: Bryce Harlow

I have learned, on a very confiding basis, that Mr. J. Paul Getty may well be interested in an Ambassadorship.

This is like appointing Fort Knox.

My contact on this is a Brig. Gen. Don Hittle, Marine Corp retired. He is a middle man for conducting this negotiation, if it is of interest to RN.

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MEMORANDUM

December 1, 1968

TO: John Mitchell, Bob Finch, Peter Flanigan, John Ehrlichman,
Bob Haldeman, Ron Ziegler and Herb Klein

FROM: Bryce Harlow

There may be a move to get a RN comment on the desirability or lack thereof, of a free trade zone at Machiasport, Maine, for Occidental Petroleum Company. The purpose of this free trade zone is to allow this company to bring in foreign crude oil, refine it in this free trade zone and then ship it to other markets, a part of this product also to be sold in American markets.

There is great controversy about this matter. The entire petroleum industry, excluding Occidental is opposed. Senator Muskie and a good part of New England is in favor.

It is hoped that RN will not comment on this matter in anyway until he has taken office and had opportunity to examine the entire oil import issue.

This is essentially to alert you to this problem.

Teller

December 2, 1968

TO: Bob Haldeman
Bryce Harlow ✓

PMF

Teller is entirely mollified on the DuBridge announcement. He understands the problem and does not feel DuBridge is an impossibly serious problem as long as he can be balanced with other appointments. He is working, with his associates, on suggestions for other scientists to be appointed in the Administration.

PMF

PRESIDENT ELECT RICHARD M. NIXON

WITH

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
Assistant to the President Elect
for National Security Affairs

AND

DR. RICHARD V. ALLEN

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1968

Hotel Pierre
New York, N. Y.

MR. NIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, today I am pleased to announce the first appointment to the White House staff in a major policy position. Dr. Henry Kissinger, Professor of Government at Harvard University, has agreed to come with the White House staff as the Assistant to the President-Elect for National Security Affairs. Dr. Kissinger is a man who is known to all people who are interested in foreign policy as perhaps one of the major scholars in America and the world today in this area. He has never yet had a full time government assignment, and he will bring to this responsibility a fresh approach, and I trust under his direction he will establish a new organization, bring new men and develop new ideas and new policies for the critical problems America has in the field of foreign policy around the

world.

We will have an opportunity later to discuss this in more detail but now I know you would like to hear from Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored by the confidence that the President-Elect has expressed in me, for the opportunity to serve in his administration. The President-Elect and I have had many extensive conversations over the past week about the problems and the opportunities confronting the United States in the international field. He has urged me particularly to bring in new procedures and the best talent in the country, whether or not it agrees with his views. I enthusiastically accept this assignment and I shall serve the President-Elect with all of my energy and dedication. Thank you.

Now I am pleased also to announce that Dr. Richard Allen, who served as Mr. Nixon's foreign policy advisor during the campaign has consented to join my staff as one of my principal aides. I look forward to working with him very closely.

MR. NIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, we can go forward with some questions at this point, and then as Mr. Ziegler has indicated, we will then have an on the record backgrounder for all of you who would like to go

into more detail on some of the other areas.

QUESTION. Mr. President-Elect, could you tell us whether you are in favor of President Johnson's reported move to feel out the Senate? Are you in favor of a special session to consider the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?

MR. NIXON: I do not at this time intend to go into any substantive matters of that type. I think Mr. Ziegler has covered that in his briefing previously, and there has been no change in my attitude on it.

MR. ZIEGLER: On this score, we want to concentrate the questions on the subject before us.

QUESTION. I am sorry.

MR. NIXON: There is no problem. Any questions you want you may ask but at this point we would like to discuss the national security appointment and other areas.

QUESTION. Mr. Nixon, how would you describe both Dr. Kissinger's and Dr. Allen's general views on negotiations between East and West, and how they are related to yours, just so we can get some feel as to why these people were selected in terms of foreign policy approach?

MR. NIXON: Mr. Kaplow, it would not be appropriate at this time to indicate what Dr. Kissinger's

views were to various major problems in the field of foreign policy. This is a matter that he will have responsibility for in terms of mobilizing the White House staff, and also in developing within the administration, with the Department of State, and with the Defense Department and other departments, dealing with foreign affairs, the policy lines that we will be following. As we have indicated in this statement, it is our plan to revitalize the National Security Council, and we are doing that because my eight years on the National Security Council convinced me that it is vitally important to have planning procedures set up so that we may not just react to events when they occur, but that we will have a contingency plan ready to go into effect. We can not, of course, be always sure that that plan will be the right one, but failing to plan I think can be very dangerous to the national security. This one area is one that we are going to concentrate on particularly, the organization of the National Security Council, its restructuring and also revitalizing some of the other planning functions in the State Department, for example, the State Department's Policy Planning Board.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, this spring Dr. Kissinger helped Governor Rockefeller prepare a 4-point program for peace in Vietnam. I wonder if he still adheres to that program and if so, whether you agree to it.

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger was Governor Rockefeller's foreign policy adviser, as you have stated. I discussed Dr. Kissinger's appointment with Governor Rockefeller and Governor Rockefeller enthusiastically recommended Dr. Kissinger for any position in this foreign policy area which I might choose him for.

As far as Dr. Kissinger's views and Governor Rockefeller's views are concerned in this area, I do not intend at this time to go into that. We have a new Administration now. We are going to have a new Secretary of State, a new Secretary of Defense, and as we approach these problems we are going to approach them without any inhibitions with regard to statements that have been made in the past by those in the planning functions.

As far as my statements are concerned, that, of course, is a different matter. I am bound by those.

QUESTION: Mr. President-Elect, there has been some talk that you really intended to serve as your own Secretary of State. Do you have any comment on that as relates to this appointment?

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger will serve as my chief foreign policy adviser within the White House. Of course, the Secretary of State is the chief foreign policy adviser to the President of the United States.

As far as the government is concerned generally, there must be the very closest relationship between the Secretary of State and the White House Staff.

Dr. Kissinger is keenly aware of the necessity not to set himself up as a wall between the President and the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. I do not think we will have a problem.

As far as your question with regard to my serving as my own Secretary of State, I can only say, based on my experience, that the Presidency is more than a full-time job. Certainly the Secretary of State is the most back-breaking job within the Cabinet. I think it takes two men, and I intend to have a very strong Secretary of State.

QUESTION: Can I ask you one question?

It says here there will be a complete reorganization and restructuring of the entire White House security planning machinery. Just exactly, could you elaborate on that just a little bit more, comparing it with the future and the past?

MR. NIXON: I would prefer that we do that when we go into the informal session. That is one of the questions we can go into in some detail, but I prefer we do that when we go into the writing press and the reporting press session.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, have you changed your position about the war in Vietnam? What kind of advice do you intend to offer in that general area in the Nixon Administration?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe very strongly that the position of a White House Assistant is inconsistent with making public statements on substantive issues. Therefore, I hope you will forgive me if I don't answer your question.

QUESTION: Could I ask one more question? I think some people have felt that both Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Allen lean more toward the harder line of negotiating than many others. What is your comment on that, Doctor?

DR. KISSINGER: I have been expressing my views publicly on international affairs for the last 15 years, and I have tried to avoid labels like "hard" and "soft" and express my best judgment on the substance. Therefore, I find it very difficult to characterize myself.

MR. NIXON: I should emphasize, Mr. Kaplow, in answer to that question, that one of the major responsibilities that Dr. Kissinger will undertake will be to bring

to the White House , in his own small staff, points of view that are not compartmentalized. We want a broad spectrum within the White House Staff. In addition to that, he is going to bring to the President the points of view outside the Government, the great well of knowledge that exists, for example, in the educational institutions, and in other areas in this Nation, and also from experts in foreign policy abroad, which will be a new departure.

I am one who likes to get a broad range of viewpoints expressed, and Dr. Kissinger has set up what I believe, or is setting up at the present time, a very exciting new procedure for seeing to it that the next President of the United States does not hear just what he wants to hear, which is always a temptation for White House staffers, but that he hears points of view covering the spectrum so that the President can make the decision which he must make after he has heard all of the arguments.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, would you identify for us where you will regard the most troublesome areas in the foreign policy field when your Administration takes over -- what areas?

MR. NIXON: Yes, I can go into that without going into, of course, the substantive angles, which would not be appropriate at this time, until the Inauguration.

The areas of the world are those that I identified during the campaign. We begin, of course, with Vietnam, the most immediate and pressing problem.

The next area of importance is East-West relations, the upcoming negotiations, if those negotiations do materialize, between the United States and the Soviet Union in a number of areas, including the problems of national defense, the offensive and defensive missile discussions, and so forth.

The third area, very close to the second, and directly related to it, and an area in which I think action must take place before too much progress can be made in the second area, is that of strengthening and revitalizing the NATO organization, our relations with Western Europe.

Then beyond that, there are the areas which we all are aware of, the problems of Latin America. I have indicated the necessity for a new approach to the problems of Latin America, including a new approach to the Alliance for Progress; the problems of Africa, and then in a specialized sense the area of the Mid-East, which I should perhaps move up on that scale.

If you are going to say one is more important than the other, in terms of an urgent and immediate problem, you would have to have Vietnam first, the Mid-East second, and then, of course, these other areas that I have mentioned

relate to the broader problems which might arise later.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let us go into the informal portion of the discussion now.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let us go into the informal portion of the discussion.

MR. NIXON: I think you might be interested to know how I first became acquainted with Dr. Kissinger. He tells me this is the first time I met him, and sometimes you meet people when you are in government without remembering when or where, but I met him for the first time at a Christmas party at Claire Booth Luce's apartment in New York last year. But I met him before that, and I felt I knew him through his writings and his books in 1957. Dr. Kissinger said I wrote him a letter, in fact. I remembered writing it, but I was glad he remembered it.

The decision to ask him to come on the staff was reached after considering a number of people who could have taken this assignment. I felt in Dr. Kissinger's case these factors motivated me. There were several men who I considered who could have, I think, served this function well, but most of them had been in government quite recently or in foreign policy and had had major responsibilities in the past. I felt at this time there was a need to bring to government someone who had never had that responsibility before, so that there would be no question about bringing a new approach, looking at the organization without being inhibited by what had gone on before. Dr. Kissinger I thought would bring that kind of

approach.

Now, if I could go on just a bit more as to why I thought he could bring a new approach, there was a study that was made by a group -- and I think this is the first time such a study has been made for a President-Elect -- which began 15 months ago at Harvard University. This study was made by the Harvard Institute of Politics. The Harvard Institute of Politics commissioned a study for the President-Elect, whoever that President-Elect might be. In January of this year, Frank Lindsay of ITEC Corporation a man I met many years ago when he was a staff assistant to the Herter Committee -- we went to Europe together -- came to my office and asked if I was interested in such a study if I won the nomination and the election. I indicated great interest. He also made the same proposal to the other potential nominees on the Democratic and Republican side. All welcomed the study.

After the election I received the results of the study. The men who made this study were Frank Lindsay, who was chairman of the group, and then three men from the Harvard staff, Dr. Philip Areta, Dr. Kissinger in the field of foreign policy, and the other gentleman is Professor Maij from the History Department at Harvard.

These studies cover the whole transition period

with recommendations as to how the transition could be carried on smoothly and we have taken many of those recommendations. They covered areas far beyond the national security area, making recommendations for the reorganization of the White House staff and for reorganization in government generally, but particularly directed to the White House staff relations to other agencies of government. Many of those recommendations we have adopted, but what particularly interested me about the study was the national security section, because what this group did was analyze the development of the White House staff in national security areas since World War II. It analyzed quite objectively and critically, I thought, the staffs under President Kennedy and President Johnson, pointing out strengths and weaknesses and also pointing out the fact that each staff must be different because it had to relate to whoever might be President. One President might want one kind of a staff, and another another kind of staff. It was at this time I contacted Mr. Lindsay and found that Dr. Kissinger had done a great deal of work on that study. I met with the whole group and that triggered my thinking in that direction.

Dr. Kissinger, would you like to talk a bit about what we have in mind as far as the reorganization of the National Security Council?

DR. KISSINGER: The chief instruction which the President-elect has given to me, and which I enthusiastically support, is to make certain that the planning mechanism of the Government functions more effectively and present to the President all of the relevant contingencies and choices.

I would intend that on the staff of the National Security Council and of the White House, to elevate the planning function and to encourage planning functions throughout the Government.

Another effort which will be a very high priority one is the one that the President-elect mentioned before, which is to draw in the best talent in the country, whatever their point of view, and to bring their thinking to bear on the issues confronting the United States.

We will try to avoid orienting the whole National Security Council machinery to its solution of the immediate problem, and try to develop middle-term and long-range policy and contingency plans for foreseeable emergencies.

Another prospect that I find exciting is the request of the President-elect that we draw in the best talent not only in the United States, but from all over the world. There are many friends of ours who feel that their fate is closely connected with ours, and who can make a major contribution. They have not been tapped in any systematic manner or on any

official basis in the past.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, does Dr. Kissinger know who will be the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense?

MR. NIXON: He doesn't, because I haven't told him yet, and I don't know.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, you say there will be some people from other countries brought in. Do you have anyone specifically in mind or can you tell us in general what type of people these might be?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have a very wide acquaintance all over the world among leading intellectuals of all points of view, with many of whom I have been meeting for a long time.

I think it would be unfair to mention their names before they have been formally requested to serve, but I have no doubt whatever that we will collect an exciting group.

MR. NIXON: Let me perhaps respond to that also. What led me to emphasize this point in my discussions with Dr. Kissinger were my own travels abroad. I have found that in addition to talking to governmental figures -- and what we are talking about here we must make very clear is not, of course, to infringe upon the responsibility of the State Department to conduct negotiations with Government officials -- what we are referring to are people outside of Government

who can make that kind of contribution. But I have found in my visits to world capitals, to London and Paris and the rest, that outside of government there are in other countries, as there are in the United States, foreign policy experts who can make a very significant contribution to a discussion.

I refer, for example, to men like Alistair Buchan of the London Institute of Strategic Studies. It is this kind of man that we from time to time, when they are visiting the United States, whose knowledge we hope to tap.

QUESTION: They would not be on a paid capacity?

MR. NIXON: No, not in a paid capacity. This is all in terms of simply trying to pick the brains of the best people in the world.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, you have made a study of the National Security Council machinery. Can you tell us, or can you describe this machinery to us in the White House now, how many people there are, what they do, and how you are going to change this?

DR. KISSINGER: The President-elect has asked me to make recommendations to him well before Inauguration, and I have not at this time. I am not at this time ready to give you a detailed answer. At this moment, the staff of the National Security Council is very small, and I am determined

to keep it very small.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how many people?

DR. KISSINGER: There are about 20 people, I think.

The major differences that I foresee in the operation of the National Security Council staff and the White House staff in Mr. Nixon's Administration is that there will be a much more conscious emphasis on planning, and that the operating functions will be pushed as far as possible into the departments.

Mr. Nixon in all of our talks, if I may repeat that part of them, urged me to make sure that his staff and his advisers free themselves for long-term thinking, to prevent crises from happening rather than spend all of their energies on managing crises which might have been avoided.

Again, I enthusiastically support that.

MR. NIXON: If I can use one example that members of the press will appreciate, one statistic that intrigued me in the study that was made by the planning group that I referred to was that the amount of cable traffic -- this is cable traffic from American installations abroad -- that now comes to the White House each day is more in volume than all of the wire service and other newspaper reports combined around the world.

When I saw that monumental statistic, it brought me to the point that used to trouble me during the years I was in Government -- the fact that men in positions of responsibility and men who really have the ability to do creative thinking too often get bogged down in reading the interminable telegrams, most of which are not really relevant to the problems that they are concerned with, to dotting "i's" and crossing "t's" and preparing papers to come up the line and then to be approved.

What Dr. Kissinger, was referring to, I didn't want him to get down to the Situation Room in the White House and spend too much time there going through cables and the rest. I want him and the top policy planners, not only here but, of course, in the State Department, to be free as much as possible to do some creative thinking, and to have some creative discussions in these areas.

This, of course, is the objective I am sure every President and every executive has. But based on my experience and based on Dr. Kissinger's having found this particular problem, I think we will make some progress on it.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger is known as a European, North Atlantic specialist. Does this mean you are going to have more emphasis on that part of the world in your administration?

MR. NIXON: You ladies and gentlemen will have noted that during the campaign I emphasized the imperative necessity for the United States to get on the front burner the problems of Western Europe and to strengthen our ties and associations with Western Europe in order to be able to develop effectively what we all want, the position from which we can negotiate the reduction of world tensions in the East-West conflicts.

So, Dr. Kissinger's views and mine are very close together on this point. The answer would be that one of the first responsibilities as far as not only the State Department's policy planning board, but the National Security Council's policy planning board, is to examine our relations with Europe and make recommendations as to how they can be strengthened.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, one of the problems that has been discussed before has been that our main problem is General de Gaulle. Do you feel that way?

MR. NIXON: He may feel that way. Seriously, when we look at the problems of Europe, I don't think they can be

summarized and blamed on one man. I think as we examine what has happened over the past years that we have to take some blame, we in the broadest sense, the United States, and all administrations have made some mistakes.

I have often said, and I say it again, I do not believe that Europe, speaking of Europe as an entity, can go forward without France. By the same token, I don't believe France can go forward without Europe. I am confident that General de Gaulle also has that belief. I think there is a possibility for a common meeting place someday.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, earlier, in talking about East-West relations as one of the major problems you will face, you talked about up-coming negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union. Could you say what negotiations you are referring to?

MR. NIXON: There are a number of areas. There has been public discussion, and I will limit my answer to that public discussion. There has been public discussion with regard to the possibility of negotiations on the Mid-East crisis and the offensive-defensive missile system. These are two areas that I would have in mind.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, you say you do not yet know who your Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense will be, yet we have the naming of Dr. Kissinger as your Assistant for National Security matters. Just what will Dr. Kissinger's standing be

within your administration in relation to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State? Will his opinions carry equal weight and will he be co-equal?

MR. NIXON: This is a problem that always comes up with any White House advisor. Any White House advisor to the President has great responsibility to see to it that in advising the President he does so without derogating the primary responsibility of a Cabinet Officer to be the primary advisor in those areas. I would say that as far as the views are concerned, naturally the views of Dr. Kissinger will have great weight with me because he will be on the White House staff and will be studying these matters. But I see no real possibility of conflict with the Department of State in this respect. I think the reason that I do not see that is that Dr. Kissinger, in the paper I referred to, he and his colleagues recognized that problem. It is only when an individual on a White House staff does not recognize the problem that you have the inevitable competition, empire-building and then the buffer between the President and his Secretary.

I think you might respond to that, too, Dr. Kissinger, your role vis-a-vis the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

DR. KISSINGER. The Secretary of State, as the President-Elect has said, is the principal advisor to the President. I have worked as a consultant in the State Department. I recognize that the operation of our foreign policy can only be conducted through the State Department, and that the White House assistants should not interpose themselves between the President and the Department.

My function as I see it is to make certain that among the range of issues that come before the President, all of the options are considered, that the long range considerations are given adequate weight. But there is no prospect as far as I can see of any competition between myself and the Secretaries of State and Defense. I think we complement each other, and it is my job to help them be more effective.

MR. NIXON: I could add one point on that, just to dissect the problem a bit. All of you who have covered foreign policy know that a traditional battle is always in the wings, and sometimes on stage, between the Planning Board of the National Security Council, or the group of consultants for the National Security Council, the full time staff, and the State Department's Policy Planning Board. What we want to do is not only to strengthen the quality

of the Policy Planning Board and the National Security Council, but also it is Dr. Kissinger's assignment to do everything possible, as he indicated in his statement, to revitalize and to give greater responsibility to the State Department's Policy Planning Board.

What this really involves is my concern that when great decisions have to be made over these years ahead, I am not presented with a paper that represents a consensus, the least common denominator of what the various departments are able to negotiate between themselves. Defense and State, for example, get into these battles from time to time, and finally they come up with a bland paper that really does not meet the problem as effectively as it might.

I want to have the conflicts. The honest differences of opinion which we know do exist between the departments, or within a department, I want laid before the National Security Council, and particularly before the President, so that he will know what the arguments are, so that he can make the determination as to what the policy should be.

It is this point that Dr. Kissinger completely agrees with. I think he, too, is sensitive on the point of the State Department's Policy Planning Board and the group in the Defense Department, the necessity of seeing to

it that they are part of the team, that they will know that their input is going to be considered and not brushed aside and be lost in a maze as eventually the paper comes up to the President at the highest level as an accomplished fact, without his considering the arguments that went into it pro and con.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, will Dr. Kissinger begin functioning full time immediately, and will he have any liaison with Walter Rostow?

MR. NIXON: The answer is yes to both questions. His first assignment will be to go to Washington I hope immediately. Incidentally, Walter Rostow has been most cooperative in offering his assistance in this assignment. He will go there for the purpose, of course, of examining the staff facilities, and for talking with Dr. Rostow on the organizational problems. Over the next three to four weeks he will continue the study that has already been initiated with regard to the staff, the organization of the NSC and the other responsibilities that he will have.

Then he will make those recommendations to the President-Elect prior to the Inauguration, so that on January 20th we will be able to go forward with the new organization plan.

In addition to that, he will be available to me

over these next few weeks to advise me on substantive matters if I believe that such advice is needed.

I should also point out this. Dr. Kissinger's assignment in no way is in conflict with that of Ambassador Murphy. Ambassador Murphy between now and January 20th will continue to be the President-Elect's representative in the State Department, and with President Johnson on matters that the President-Elect should be informed of or consulted on prior to January 20th.

MR. ZIEGLER: Could we just take one more question?

QUESTION: Do you expect to have a task force between now and the Inauguration to advise you on foreign policy, comparable to the ten that you have already appointed on domestic affairs?

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger will be making a recommendation to me on that. I think it is possible that there will be. But I think there is very likely to be more than one in the field of foreign policy, that is, more than one task force.

MR. CORMIER: Thank you very much.

10:50 AM

END

34

December 2, 1968

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Special Assistant to
President-Elect Nixon
Hotel Pierre
Fifth Avenue & 61st Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Haldeman:

Friends have asked me to mention Senator Daniel Brewster of Maryland, 45 years old, as interested in an appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense. You no doubt are aware of this, but if not, it might be worth looking at as he would have utility in that kind of assignment.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Murphy

RM:lb

cc: Mr. Bryce Harlow ✓

+311

December 2, 1968

Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Special Assistant to
President-Elect Nixon
Hotel Pierre
Fifth Avenue & 61st Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Haldeman:

In the search for talent, I mention the following:

John Nichol Irwin, lawyer, 55 years old, was Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs in Eisenhower Administration. I would recommend him for consideration at the Under-Secretary level in State if possible.

He worked recently with Robert Anderson on the Panamanian Treaty. He is able, with a wealth of experience, and while I am only guessing, he might be willing.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy

RM:lb

cc: Mr. Bryce Harlow ✓

MEMORANDUM

December 2, 1968

TO: RN

FROM: HARLOW

John Sears and I have carefully reviewed present plans respecting the chairmanship of the National Committee. These are our views:

1. The National Chairman must be one with whom you can work satisfactorily and will perform the "spokesman" role you desire; obviously, therefore, Ray Bliss must be replaced.
2. The timing of this action is critically important. If this is done before Inauguration -- indeed, before, say the next regularly scheduled National Committee meeting (approximately Mid-February) -- the resentments that will be kindled will, we believe, be severe and very harmful to you. We strongly urge that this matter be so handled as not to injure you.
3. We are both persuaded that Bliss' immediate removal and his replacement by Wilkinson and Chotiner will "blow the lid off." I am gravely concerned over the likely adverse reactions.
4. This is not -- I repeat -- a suggestion that Bliss not be replaced; rather, it is a pleading that it would be done in an acceptable way. The way to do it with the least friction is not too complicated. It consists of these steps:
 - A. Plan to replace Bliss at the next National Committee meeting in February or soon thereafter.
 - B. Telephone Bliss and request him to visit you in New York, explain to him in person the circumstances that have arisen, assure him of your determination that his replacement will be done in a way that will protect him from personal embarrassment, and that he should then meet with the press and lay to rest the stories that he is being forced out. As to this move, I will, if desired, lay the groundwork for this discussion by talking privately with Bliss in Washington.
 - C. Without in any way derogating Murray Chotiner (whom I barely know), it does seem to me that his appointment to the Committee under existing circumstances would be a serious reverse for you personally. I have a strong suspicion that it would revive a lot of old canards that you have most successfully laid to rest, particularly this year.

MEMORANDUM TO RN / 2
December 2, 1968

I regret the feeling of compulsion that prompts me to send this memorandum when I feel sure you will not be pleased by what it says.

I do feel, however, that I owe it to you to report frankly when I am convinced that an action that is about to be taken can be very harmful to you. This is such an instance.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

RICHARD M. NIXON

WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 2, 1968


MEMORANDUM

TO: BRYCE HARLOW

FROM: JOHN WHITAKER

It seems like a few folks in Idaho are excited about who is going to be the next Secretary of Interior and Agriculture and perhaps you'd better discuss it with James McClure as per the attached telegram.

Cheers,



*We have
already written
to McClure at
least once*

JW:es

Enclosure

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message
unless its deferred char-
acter is indicated by the
proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International
Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

AHA103 (51)(4)BA746

1968 NOV 20 AM 3 05

SSA585 B AHA258 WW BUA110 GOVT PD 4 EXTRA BU WASHINGTON DC 19
NFT

BOB FINCH OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ELECT
PIERRE HOTEL 61 ST AND 5TH AVE NYK

PRIOR TO THE ELECTION WE IN IDAHO WERE GIVEN THE ASSURANCE
THAT WE WOULD BE CONSULTED AS FAR AS APPINTMENTS TO THE POSITIONS
OF SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
ARE CONCERNED . THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF UNCERTAINTANTY AT
THE PRESENT TIME AS TO HOW THIS IS TO BE DONE. I HAVE ASKED
JACK MURPHY FOR CLARIFICATION BUT HE IS UNABLE TO ADVISE US.
IT IS OF VITAL CONCERN TO US THAT WE BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO EXPRESS OURSELVES PRIOR TO THE TIME THESE APPOINTMENTS
ARE DISCLOSED

JAMES A MCCLURE MEMBER OF CONGRESS FIRST DISTRICT OF IDAHO.

SF1201(R2-65)

LT Gov. Headed Idaho RN campaign

DECEMBER 3, 1968

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: John Ehrlichman
Bob Haldeman
Bryce Harlow ✓
Gerry Van der Heuval
Larry Higby
Col. Don Hughes
Rose Mary Woods
Ron Ziegler
Press Office
Secret Service

From: Dwight Chapin

RE: December 5--7, 1968 California Trip

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~-----

Attached you will find the Detailed Schedule for this weeks California Trip. If you have any questions regarding the travel, your accommodations or any details, please call.

Thank you,



P R E S I D E N T - E L E C T
R M N
S T A F F S C H E D U L E

CALIFORNIA TRIP BY THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, DECEMBER 5-7, 1968

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1968: New York City--Los Angeles, California.

9:30 a.m. BAGGAGE CALL for Staff and Press at the
Pierre Hotel, Fifth Avenue and 61st Street, N.Y.C.
Bags should be left at the 61st Street Entrance.

12:00 Noon STAFF DEPARTS PIERRE HOTEL.
61st Street Entrance for JFK. Two GSA Cars
will be used for this trip.

1:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND MRS. NIXON depart
Apartment for Central Park Helicopter Pad.

1:10 p.m. President-Elect's helicopter departs for JFK

1:25 p.m. The President-Elect and Mrs. Nixon arrive JFK
and board Air Force Plane

1:30 E.S.T. PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON'S PLANE DEPARTS FOR
LOS ANGELES. (Flying time 5:30)

4:00 P.S.T. PRESIDENT-ELECT AND MRS. NIXON arrive Los Angeles
International Airport, East Imperial Terminal.
(Advance Man Greeted by Cardinal McIntyre
Ed Morgan)

4:10 p.m. DEPART TERMINAL enroute Santa Marta Hospital,
328 North Humphries Street, East L.A.
PH: 268-6998

THURSDAY CONTINUED:

4:45 p.m. Arrive Santa Marta Hospital. Greeted by Sister Mary Lopez. The President-Elect, Cardinal McIntyre and Mrs. Nixon tour the hospital.

5:00 p.m. Depart Santa Marta Hospital enroute the Century Plaza Hotel.

5:45 p.m. ARRIVE CENTURY PLAZA HOTEL. The President-Elect and Mrs. Nixon proceed to the Presidential Suite.

Century Plaza Hotel, 2025 Avenue of the Stars,
Century City, California.

PH: 213-277-2000

NOTE:

Staff and Press will enter Hotel on the Lobby level. Room assignments will be given upon arrival.

RMN STAFF TIME

7:15 p.m. RMN and PN depart Suite for Dinner Event.
NOTE: Black Tie.

RMN and PN proceed to California Lounge Room where Cardinal McIntyre pre-dinner party is in progress (started at 7:00 p.m.) The Nixons will be in receiving line to greet 80 guests.

7:45 p.m. PMN and PN move to Pacific Palisades Room where Head table is gathered.

7:50 p.m. Head Table proceeds into Los Angeles Room for the Dinner.

8:00 p.m. CARDINAL MCINTYRE DINNER
(NOTE: RMN is listed on program as Honored Guest. He is expected to make brief remarks).

THURSDAY EVENING:

8:00 p.m.

CARDINAL MCINTYRE DINNER:

8:05 p.m.

Pledge of Allegiance and
Invocation.

DINNER

9:30 p.m.

Dave Mahoney Introduces Ernest
Debbs, representing the city.

9:40 p.m.

Dave Mahoney introduces
Governor Finch.

9:55 p.m.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT IS
INTRODUCED BY DAVE MAHONEY.

10-10:00 p.m.

Dave Mahoney introduces
Cardinal McIntyre.

10:20 p.m.

Benediction

10:30 p.m.

President-Elect and Mrs. Nixon return to Suite

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1968: LOS ANGELES TO PALM SPRINGS

9:00 a.m. Staff and Press Baggage Call

10:45 a.m. Staff and Press Depart for Airport.
 Buses leave from Lobby level.

11:15 a.m. RMN and PN Depart for Airport

11:45 a.m. RMN and PN Arrive Los Angeles International
 Airport...East Imperial Terminal.
 (Staff and Press aboard plane).

12:00 Noon Depart Los Angeles for Palm Springs

12:30 p.m. Arrive Palm Springs, California.
 Palm Springs City Airport

12:40 p.m. RMN and PN depart for the Walter Annenberg Residence.

 STAFF NOTE: Staff room assignments to come.
 Miss Woods, Col. Hughes and
 Dwight Chapin will be staying
 at the Annenberg residence.

12:55 p.m. Arrive Annenberg residence

 RMN AFTERNOON--STAFF WORK

MRS. NIXON

PN--

1:15 p.m.

Depart Annenberg residence
for Mrs. Reagan Cheese and
Wine Tasting Party/ Fashion
Show at the Howard Ahmanson
Ranch.

1:35 p.m.

Arrive Ahmanson Ranch

3:00 p.m.

PN returns to Annenberg home.

FRIDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 6, 1968:

NOTE: EVENING EVENT BLACK TIE

7:10 p.m. RMN and PN depart Annenberg residence for the
Holiday Inn Riviera.

7:25 p.m. Arrive Holiday Inn Riviera and proceed to
holding room.

7:30 p.m. RMN and PN introduced and proceed under spot
light to their table.

DINNER

8 30 p.m. Governor Reagan offers a toast to the President-
Elect.

PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON RESPONDS BRIEFLY TO
GOVERNOR REAGAN'S TOAST.

(NOTE: On the program RMN is listed as
"Honored Guest" not as a speaker).

8:40 p.m. Formal Entertainment
-Les Brown
-Bob Hope
-Dinah Shore

NOTE: After the formal entertainment there
will be dancing. The Nixons will
be departing for the Annenberg's
home immediately after the formal
entertainment.

9:30 p.m. RMN and PN depart for the Annenberg Home.

10:00 p.m. RMN and PN arrive Annenbergs.

OVERNIGHT

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1968: PALM SPRINGS TO NEW YORK CITY

12:00 Noon Baggage Call for Staff.
 (Details to be provided on arrival in Palm Springs)

1:15 p.m. Staff departs from Hotel and Annenberg residence
 for airport.

1:45 p.m. Staff and Press arrive airport--Palm Springs City

1:30 p.m. RMN and PN depart Annenberg residence for
 Palm Springs Airport.

1:50 p.m. RMN and PN arrive Palm Springs Airport and
 board Airforce Plane.

2:00 p.m. The President-Elect's plane departs Palm Springs
 for New York City.

 (Flying time 5:30)

10:30 p.m. E.S.T. President-Elect, Mrs. Nixon and Staff arrive NYC

10:40 p.m. President-Elect and Mrs. Nixon depart for NYC
 via helicopter.

 Staff and Press depart by auto and bus for NYC.

11:00 p.m. President-Elect and Mrs. Nixon arrive Central
 Park Heliport and proceed to 810 Fifth Avenue

11:30 Staff and Press arrive at the Pierre Hotel.
 Bags will be dropped at the Pierre at
 approximately 12:00 Midnight.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dwight Chapin DATE: Dec. 3, 1968
FROM: Bryde Harlow

Senator Howard Baker telephoned December 2 to request a brief discussion with RN sometime next week. I told him I would see what could be done.

I favor this discussion, if RN's schedule is not too crowded.

File

DATE: December 3, 1968

TO: Peter Flanigan

FROM: Henry Hyde

RE: Administrator of the FAA

Today I spoke with Congressman Don Clausen, who is very anxious to participate in the decision to choose the Administrator of the FAA. Congressman Clausen is a pilot, has been an airport manager in California, and is very active in many phases of transportation problems, including air transportation, so he is very knowledgeable in this field.

He has already spoken to Bryce Harlow on this subject, so you may already have his recommendation.

cc: Bryce Harlow

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN

DATE: Dec. 3, 1968

FROM: Bryce Harlow

On December 2 Chuck Percy called me from a meeting of the Board of the Kennedy Art Center.

The Center is short some \$15 million. The discussion was whether or not to discontinue the construction -- but this would cost some \$30 million!

Bill Cramer of Florida has been opposed to substantial federal support to complete the Center. In an effort to help raise money they have re-named the Theatre part of the Center "The Eisenhower Theatre".

They have also bi-partisanized the entire venture.

The question raised was whether or not you would favorably regard sufficient federal help to complete the Center -- some 7 1/2 million dollars more than presently planned. I responded with confidence that you would support such an item in the budget, in as much as this Center was started in the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration and has had bi-partisan support all the way.

This was also Senator Percy's recommendation.

I hope my response accurately reflected your view.

MEMORANDUM

TO: RN
FROM: Bryce Harlow

DATE: Dec. 3, 1968

On December 2 Senator Percy telephoned to endorse very emphatically David Kennedy for the Treasury post.

He also suggested that if you want to recognize a Democrat, you might consider retaining Sarge Shriver at Paris. Percy believes that Shriver is doing a satisfactory job, and you might want to hold him for another six months or so -- if you need a prominent Democrat.