

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
5983 X

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

October 31, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS ^{H.H.S.}
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Meir--
8:00 a.m. Thursday, November 1

Mrs. Meir may seek very precise reassurances that the US will stick to previous understandings with Israel on the subject of peace negotiations. Therefore, I am attaching a detailed paper which provides for your reference the exchanges surrounding the August 4, 1970, ceasefire. Mrs. Meir alluded to that in her speech announcing acceptance of the present ceasefire. You may want to refresh your memory on those exchanges with a glance at the attachment. This memo puts those issues in the more general context.

Israeli Position

I assume that the first order of business will be to gain agreement on arrangements to stabilize the ceasefire. The Israelis will find it difficult to pull back, will make a major issue of the prisoner exchange and will probably want to give more precision to the general understanding you reached with Ismail Fahmi. For instance, she may insist on an understanding of exactly where the lines will be before any movement; she might insist on an Israeli right to inspect the convoys along with the UN; she might insist on an understanding about the movement of the members of the Third Army themselves.

Beyond the specifics of the package for stabilizing the ceasefire, she will seek reassurance on two general points:

1. She will want to be reassured that the US and the Soviet Union are not working out the terms of a final peace behind Israel's back. She will insist that the negotiations be a genuine exchange between Israel and the Arabs and that the Soviet role be minimal.

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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2. She will insist on a US promise that Israel will be allowed to negotiate for significant boundary changes.

It is possible that she will put these questions in terms of whether the US still stands by previous commitments such as those in the President's letter of July 23, 1970 (Tab 3 under attached memo). Crucial among those assurances is that "we will also adhere strictly and firmly to the fundamental principle that there must be a peace agreement in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the other and that no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved." That letter also included promises that the US will not press Israel to accept a refugee solution which would alter fundamentally the Jewish character of the state of Israel or jeopardize Israel's security.

US Position

The following points are intended simply to provide a framework for the kind of position you might take:

1. I believe that, despite the trauma that Israel has suffered from being attacked, we are in as strong a position now as we have been or may be in the future to move toward the fundamental peace agreement that is crucial to Israel's survival.

--This war has demonstrated that the Arabs will not capitulate merely as a result of getting used to the 1967-73 situation. That situation is unstable. Israel cannot "go it alone." It is essential now to achieve peace through diplomacy from a position of Israeli strength.

--This crisis has also demonstrated that those who have called the Middle East situation dangerous to world peace were not wrong. The near confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union a week ago leaves no doubt about this. This is not just an issue for the US. It is an issue of vital importance to Israel which depends on US support.

2. It is important now that we shift focus to the right issue. The United States has unequivocally supported the survival and the well-being of Israel. It has not supported the right of Israel to hold occupied territory indefinitely. While we are prepared to allow Israel to negotiate for what it can get within reasonable limits, we have no interest in a confrontation where the major issue is Israel's right to expand.

3. It is vital for the sake of peace negotiations as well as for the sake of the US-USSR relationship that the terms of Resolution 338 be respected. It would not make sense for the US and USSR to have a confrontation or to lose the chance for serious peace negotiations for the sake of Israel's right to maintain a position surrounding Suez City. The time has now come when it is necessary to think less in terms of short term tactical military advantage and more in terms of building the strongest possible position for the negotiations ahead which are the real issue. We must not be diverted from that central issue.

4. We will consult very closely with Israel as the peace negotiations are arranged and as they proceed. At this point, there are some general comments that need to be made.

--We have already produced the face-to-face meeting between Egyptians and Israelis that Israel has for some years said is essential if peace is to be made. Our view is that the peace negotiations should be conducted in the same manner.

--We are prepared to allow Israel to bargain for whatever terms it can get. We do want to make clear that the US is not optimistic about Israel's success in trying to negotiate major border changes. We would urge that a great deal of attention be given to the main issue of how security can be achieved by means other than significant border changes.

--We have taken Israel's word that once there are face-to-face negotiations we will be surprised at how flexible Israel will be. These negotiations will succeed only if each side is prepared to put on the table positions that have some

chance of providing a base for eventual agreement. Having now produced the opportunity for face-to-face negotiations, we will not understand any effort to stalemate those negotiations by putting forward unrealistic propositions.

--It may be necessary in establishing some momentum for these negotiations to break the subject matter down into manageable units and steps. It may be necessary, for instance, to think in terms of a first phase in the implementation of a final agreement which could be carried out while longer term issues are being discussed. Israel may wish to give some thought to what it would want and what it would be prepared to give to produce such an agreement. For instance, although Israel's position is to seek boundary changes, it would seem essential that Israel be prepared to state that it will negotiate a final peace agreement without any preconditions or rigid preconceptions as to what the final outcome would be.

--The US has accepted a Soviet role in the formal negotiations to the extent we would provide the auspices for the peace conference and be available to help keep them going if necessary. I can assure you that we recognize that there will be a need for a more private negotiating track, and our strategy is that the US would conduct those negotiations with a minimum of Soviet involvement.

5. The purpose of my trip to the Middle East is to try to achieve an understanding with President Sadat and other Arab leaders on a set of general principles which would govern the process which we hope to begin. We will not be advancing an American plan for the final terms of a settlement.

October 30, 1973

ISRAELI POSITION

The best clue to Israel's formal public position is found in Mrs. Meir's October 23 speech to the Knesset outlining Israel's position on accepting UNSC Resolution 338 passed the previous day. Judging by that speech, Israel's public position has not changed. In fact, Mrs. Meir announced that Israel's acceptance of Resolution 338, particularly clause 2 mentioning Resolution 242, "is given with the definition made by Israel" on August 4, 1970, at the time of the cease-fire along the canal. That Israeli position, passed to Jarring at the time, was also communicated to the US in the form of a letter dated August 4, 1970, to Secretary Rogers. The purpose of this paper is to refresh memories on that background.

The following documents are tabbed for reference:

- Tab 1 Mrs. Meir's October 23, 1973, speech.
- Tab 2 Text of Israel's previously announced position which was passed to the US as a letter to Secretary Rogers, August 4, 1970.
- Tab 3 President's letter to Mrs. Meir of July 23, 1970, which the Israelis referenced in their August 4, 1970, letter to Secretary Rogers.
- Tab 4 US formulation of August 1970 (essentially restating Resolution 242) which Israelis rejected in favor of their own language (Tab 2 above).
- Tab 5 Text of UNSC Resolution 242.

The issue then and now boils down to Israel's interpretation of Resolution 242 -- principally on the key issue of withdrawal. The issue relates to both the nature of withdrawal (Israeli language links withdrawal only to secure and agreed upon borders) and the timing of withdrawal (the Israelis insist on no withdrawal until a final agreement on borders and peace). Further, the Israelis, in connection with a ceasefire and state of peace, have a more precise definition of what amounts to a state of peace.

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By contrast, Resolution 242 treats withdrawal in principle in point (i) and provides a short definition of peace within secure and recognized borders in a separate point (ii).

The background to Israel's August 4, 1970, position is that the US had drawn up a short formulation (tab 4) essentially restating Resolution 242 which, if accepted, by both sides, would have been the vehicle for re-launching Jarring along with the ceasefire. The Israelis flatly refused to accept our document and instead drafted their own acceptance which is the August 4, 1970, letter to Secretary Rogers. The Israelis consider this their operating position. The language is that Israel will agree to talks implementing Resolution 242 towards a peace that will ensure:

--end of claims of belligerency by both sides, right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders free from threats of both regular and irregular forces operating against Israel...and

--withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements.

The underlining above roughly approximates Israel's retailoring of Resolution 242.

Mrs. Meir's speech last week on October 23 holds to these same interpretations and is also broadened to include further Israeli stipulations arising out of the current situation (such as insistence on POW exchanges and freedom of navigation in the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb, etc). Mainly, however, she

--states explicitly that Israel's acceptance of Resolution 338, clause 2 (which refers to the implementation of Resolution 242), is "given with the definition" made by Israel in August 1970 -- i. e. Israel's language as summarized above which maintains Israel's position on withdrawal;

--states the linkage between clause 2 and clause 3 (negotiations) of Resolution 338 as all important in that it links the implementation of Resolution 242 to immediate and concurrent negotiations, and states that Israel's position on this is as it was in August 1970 -- that the binding aspects of 242 (withdrawal) come after a nego-

tiated settlement is produced;

--states she will seek a number of clarifications from the USG about the substance of Resolution 338 but makes clear her understanding of the US position on a number of issues such as "direct" negotiations.

A summary of Mrs. Meir's outline of the Israeli position in her October 23 speech follows.

Meir Speech

Mrs. Meir made the following points:

--The implementation of the ceasefire is conditional on reciprocity. If combat activity is carried out by the other side, Israel will be free to act as the situation warrants.

--Israel's acceptance of clause 2 of Resolution 338 is given with the definition made by Israel on August 4, 1970, when accepting the ceasefire at that time.

--Israel will seek clarifications from the USG pertaining to the substance of this resolution and particularly to clarify and ensure that the ceasefire

--applies to all regular troops, including foreign, on the territory of a country which accepts the ceasefire.

--applies to all irregular forces operating against Israel from a country which accepts the ceasefire.

--ensures prevention of a blockade and of interference with free navigation of the Straits of Bab al-Mandeb for ships going to Elat.

--ensures that the term 'negotiations' means 'direct' negotiations between the sides.

--ensures that the procedures, mapping and supervision of the ceasefire will be determined by an agreement.

--Israel demands a POW exchange involving an immediate mutual exchange of prisoners.

--Israel understands that the official interpretation of 'negotiations' with reference to this resolution is that they mean 'direct' negotiations between Israel and its neighbors, as understood from the US.

--There is no distinction between clause 2 and clause 3 of Resolution 338, i. e. that negotiations are to take place immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire. Israel's position, as stated in August 1970, has always been that the implementation of Resolution 242 (the binding aspect of clause 2 in Resolution 338) will come after negotiations between the parties and on the basis of an agreement among them, so clause 2 is closely linked with clause 3.

--Israel's position on Resolution 242 has always been that

--it will not return to the borders of the pre-June 1967 war, because of Israel's right to secure and defensible borders.

--in the absence of peace, Israel will continue to maintain the situation created by the ceasefire (of 1967).

--ceasefire lines can only be replaced by secure, recognized and agreed borders which will be determined in a peace treaty.

--Israel maintains its position of the right of uniting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

--By agreeing to the ceasefire initiative, Israel has not been asked to undertake any territorial commitments by the US. Rather, Israel has "received support" for its stand that there will be no Israeli withdrawal until a reciprocal and binding peace agreement is reached.

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Mrs. Meir Speech - Oct. 23

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ISRAEL

Meir Statement on Cease-Fire

Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1625 GMT 23 Oct 73 M

[Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Golda Meir--live]

[Text] Honorable Knesset speaker, honorable Knesset: first of all, forgive me for being late arriving in Jerusalem. There was an urgent meeting and I had to stop on the way.

The Government of Israel decided unanimously on 22 October to respond to the appeal of the U.S. Government and President Nixon and to announce its readiness to accept a cease-fire on the basis of the Security Council resolution that came in the wake of a joint U.S.-Soviet proposal. According to this draft resolution, the military forces will remain in the positions they hold the moment the cease-fire goes into effect. The implementation of the cease-fire is conditional on reciprocity. Our decision was brought to the attention of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and now to the attention of the Knesset.

On the basis of the U.S.-Soviet draft resolution, the Security Council decided the following:

1. The Security Council calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision in the positions they now occupy.
2. The Security Council calls upon the parties concerned to start, immediately after the cease-fire, the implementation of Security Council resolution No 242 in all of its parts.
3. The Security Council decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations will start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

With regard to the second clause in the draft resolution, the government decided to instruct the Israeli representative at the United Nations to include in his speech at the Security Council a paragraph explaining that our acceptance of this clause is given with the definition made by Israel when it decided in August 1970 to respond to the initiative of the U.S. Government regarding a cease-fire and as communicated to the United Nations on 4 August 1970 and as stated by the prime minister in the Knesset on the same day. This has also been conveyed to the U.S. Government.

Israel's acceptance of a cease-fire with Egypt is conditional on Egypt's acceptance, and is not conditional on Syria's acceptance of a cease-fire with Israel and vice versa. The government also decided to clarify with the U.S. Government a series of points closely connected with the substance of the Security Council resolution and the dates pertaining to it. It is our intention to clarify and insure, among other things, that the cease-fire applies to all regular forces stationed on the territory of the country which accepts the cease-fire, including forces of a foreign country, such as the armies of Iraq and Jordan in Syria, as well as forces of other Arab states which are taken part and are taking part in the war.

The cease-fire will also apply to the activity of irregular forces operating against the Israel from territories of the states which pledge to observe the cease-fire. The cease-fire will insure the prevention of a blockade and of interference with free navigation in the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb for ships, including oil tankers, on their way to Elat.

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It will insure that the term 'negotiation between the sides' means direct negotiations. It goes without saying that it is also necessary to insure that the procedures, mapping and supervision of the cease-fire will be determined by an agreement.

Knesset members: A subject of great importance which is dear to our hearts is the release of the prisoners of war. The Government of Israel has decided to demand the mutual exchange of prisoners. We discussed this matter with the U.S. Government, which took part in the initiative for the cease-fire. I discussed this matter yesterday with Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger. We shall insist on an immediate mutual exchange of prisoners.

On the arrival of Dr. Kissinger's plane at Andrews base near Washington, State Department Spokesman Mr. McCloskey told journalists--and I quote: "We believe the matter that should be allotted priority after the cease-fire is the exchange of prisoners. We and the Soviet Union have pledged to make efforts to insure that this matter is implemented." And I stress again that this subject is one of the main tests of the cease-fire, and we [words indistinct] that the pledges of the cease-fire initiators will indeed be implemented.

Knesset members: I shall say a few words about our military position on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts on the eve of the cease-fire. The lines we occupy today on the Syrian front are better than those we held on 6 October. Not only do we now have all the area that was under our control in the past, but our position has also been improved greatly by taking the positions on the ridge of Mount Hermon and on the frontline to the east--the line which has moved the former cease-fire line into a better position resting on the strong back of the ridges of Mount Hermon in the north.

On the Egyptian front, the Egyptians indeed achieved a military accomplishment by crossing the canal, but in a daring IDF counterattack, our forces succeeded in taking control once again of a significant part of the eastern canal line and in capturing a vast area west of the canal--an area which opens up both defensive and offensive possibilities if the need arises. This development deprives the Egyptian Army of the ability to threaten Sinai and Israel with an offensive attack. It also deprives the Egyptians of the ability to hit essential installations and areas in our territory.

The IDF forces west of the canal constitute a strong military base for the development of operative operations initiated by us if need be.

With regard to the question of the cease-fire, U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger and his aides came to Israel while en route from Moscow to Washington. The visit was a good opportunity for a thorough clarification of issues which arise on the occasion of a cease-fire, and for an exchange of views in a friendly manner on what is about to happen and what is meant by Israel's response to the appeal of the U.S. Government to accept a cease-fire. During this visit we continued and strengthened the contacts which preceded the Security Council resolution.

In all our contacts with the United States, I have learned that not only does the United States not have a plan regarding borders and the other components of peace, but also that it believes that those employing their good offices should lead toward a situation in which the parties themselves, and themselves alone, should make proposals and plans regarding the future. Furthermore, I should stress that according to authoritative information reaching me, the Moscow talks did not deal with anything other than what is included in the Security Council resolution.

Knesset members: I must declare that the Syrian Government has not yet responded to the cease-fire resolution. Fighting on this front is continuing, and the IDF will operate there in accordance with its plans.

As for the Egyptian front, the firing against our forces has not yet ceased. The IDF has been compelled to act as necessary as long as the firing continues. At this time I will only say that we are examining the behavior of the Egyptians while maintaining military and political alertness. If Egypt continues combat activity, we will consider ourselves free to adopt any action or move the situation may call for.

Honorable speaker: I will not exaggerate the assessments regarding the political activity which preceded the cease-fire. At any rate, it was not us who made the move for a cease-fire. From the standpoint of the situation on the fronts, there was no reason for such a move on our part. It was not us who initiated the time and the clauses of the Security Council resolution. Our forces on the fronts were not in an inferior combat position. As already stated, we saw fit to respond to the appeal of the United States and its President, since:

First--The State of Israel by nature does not want war and does not want the loss of human life. All the governments of Israel have been convinced that wars will not advance peace.

Second--The proposal for a cease-fire came at a moment when our position was strong on both fronts and at a moment when our gains were valuable and justified an acceptance of a cease-fire despite the enemy's gains east of the canal.

Third--We responded to the appeal of the United States and its President out of appreciation for its constructive policy in the Middle East at this time. Great importance is attached to our response with regard to the continued strengthening of Israel and especially with regard to the continuation of military and political aid in the war that was imposed on us. With regard to the U.S. military aid, I would like to quote President Nixon's statement on 19 October when he submitted to Congress his generous proposal regarding the financing of the military shipments.

I quote: "The steps I have taken reflect my belief that we must adopt these steps which are necessary for the maintenance of the balance of military power and for the achievement of stability in the region. In order to maintain the balance of power, and thus, to achieve stability, the U.S. Government is now supplying military equipment to Israel in order to fill the gaps created in the wake of the fighting. This is necessary in order to prevent the creation of an actual imbalance due to the wide-scale resupply from the Soviet Union to Syria and Egypt. The cost of replacing equipment which is wearing out and equipment which was lost by the Israeli Armed Forces is very high. In the last 12 days of the war, the United States approved shipments to Israel of materials costing \$825 million, including transportation. The expensive items which the U.S. government is now supplying to the Israeli forces include conventional ammunition of many kinds, air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, guns, crew-operated weapons and personal weapons, and a variety of conventional types of ammunition for fighter planes. The United States is also supplying tanks, aircraft, communications and other military equipment to replace the equipment lost in action."

Knesset Members: The Arab rulers were put to the test by the Security Council resolution. The world will be the witness to learn whether they seek peace or the continuation of war. The attitude of the Egyptian rulers toward war and the loss of human life is different from ours. You all remember the Egyptian president's statement about his readiness to sacrifice millions of his people.

On 16 October, after the IDF succeeded in establishing a bridgehead west of the canal, the Egyptian president spoke with much bragging and scoffed a cease-fire. He said, among other things--and I quote: "We are prepared to accept a cease-fire on the basis of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories immediately under international supervision to the lines that existed before 5 June 1967."

Knesset Members: Only a few days passed and Egypt accepted a cease-fire. None of the conditions as Sadat set in his speech was included in the Security Council resolution. The third clause of the Security Council resolution says--and I quote: "The Security Council decides that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations will start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

According to the authoritative version given by the U.S. representatives, the meaning of negotiations between the parties is direct negotiations between Israel and its neighbors concerning a just and durable peace. Such a clear statement was not included in Security Council resolution No 242, and it is also not included now in this resolution. But this is the official interpretation obtained from the highest U.S. sources.

Not only this, but the timing of the negotiations was also established in the present resolution. The negotiations should be held immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire. There is no need to stress that we attach great importance to clause 3 of the Security Council resolution (if) our neighbors will, indeed, fulfill it.

Along with the decision for direct negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which has accepted the cease-fire, we should also take into consideration the binding aspect of clause 2 of the recent Security Council resolution regarding the cease-fire. It has always been the position of the Government of Israel--and I also explained this in my Knesset statement on 4 August 1970--that the implementation of Security Council resolution No 242 will come after negotiations between the parties and on the basis of an agreement among them.

Knesset members: No distinction should be made between clause 2 and clause 3 of the Security Council resolution. The U.S. ambassador at the United Nations, Mr Scali, explained the position of the United States on the subject--and I quote: "The second clause calls for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts after the cease-fire. The council members and the parties concerned are very familiar with Security Council resolution 242, and there is no need for interpretations here. The clause is linked with clause 3, which calls for an immediate start of negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." End of quote from the statement of the U.S. representative at the United Nations.

Knesset members: Israel is taking the latest Security Council resolution with all seriousness. The cease-fire and the holding of direct negotiations between Israel and the states which have accepted and are maintaining the cease-fire--in other words, a cease-fire and the opening of direct negotiations for peace--can be a historic turning point in developments in the Middle East--a turning point from war to peace. The opening of direct and serious negotiations can replace the bloody road imposed on us in the past with a road that leads to peace.

We have accepted the cease-fire not out of weakness but from a position of strength, military initiative and drive. We regard our agreement to the Security Council resolution as an obligation on us to help bring about the change which the region needs so much and which has been sought by the Israeli people and government for many years.

This change is possible and imperative and lacks nothing but sincere readiness on the part of our neighbors. However, to my regret I cannot bring you the good news that signs have already been seen that the Egyptian Government will fulfill the pledge it undertook when it agreed to the cease-fire. Hence, the Government of Israel will act as the situation warrants.

I have already said [word indistinct] the government decision regarding clause No 2 of the Security Council resolution which discusses the implementation of Security Council resolution 242. The Arab rulers ostensibly advocate resolution 242, but they undermine every attempt to advance toward achieving the main aim of the resolution--peace. They first did this by their stubborn refusal to negotiate with us without preconditions, and then by distorting the interpretation and the essential implication of the resolution.

Knesset Members: On various occasions the Government of Israel has formally announced its stand regarding Security Council resolution 242. Our declarations were made from international platforms and at diplomatic meetings. We also brought them to the attention of the Knesset, the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee, and the general public.

In August 1970, when a cease-fire was discussed and when we were asked by the U.S. Government, I said then and I quote: "Israel has announced publicly that out of its right to secure and defensible borders, it will not return to the borders of June 1967, which expose the state to aggression and which grant decisive advantages to the aggressor. Our stand was and remains that in the absence of peace we shall continue to maintain the situation established by the cease-fire [of 1967]. The cease-fire lines can only be replaced by secure, recognized and agreed borders which will be determined in a peace treaty. And naturally it was made clear to all that our firm stand is still maintained regarding the right of uniting Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. By agreeing to the U.S. Government initiative, Israel was not asked nor did it undertake any territorial commitments. On the contrary, the Government of Israel has received support for its stand that no Israeli soldier will return from the cease-fire lines until a reciprocal and binding peace agreement is reached."

Knesset Members, the terrible war which was imposed on us strengthens our realization of how vital are defensible borders, for which we will struggle vigorously.

It is worthwhile to remember that since the outbreak of the war on the Day of Atonement, terrorist activity has also resumed from the Lebanese border. Up to this morning 116 acts of aggression were carried out within 17 days. Forty-four civilian settlements on the northern border were attacked and shelled. Some 20 civilians and 6 soldiers were killed or wounded in these attacks. Residents of border settlements can rest assured that the IDF forces are alert and aware of the situation. Despite the active defensive deployment in this sphere, it has again been proven that defensive activity alone is not sufficient to end terrorism.

Knesset Members, the war we are engaged in started with an premediated attack on both fronts. The aggressive initiative resulted in initial achievements for our enemies, but thanks to the strength and spirit of the IDF, which leans on the entire nation, the attack was broken, the aggressors were repulsed, large parts of their forces were destroyed, and the IDF broke through and moved beyond the cease-fire lines. From holding actions, our forces moved to the offensive and scored achievements. On both fronts our forces are now beyond the cease-fire lines, holding strong positions, and their spirit is unbroken. The nation is united around its army.

Israel desires a cease-fire. Israel will honor the cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity and only on this basis. Israel would wholeheartedly like cease-fire negotiations to start immediately to lead to peace. Israel is capable of mobilizing the necessary internal strength in order to advance toward an honorable peace within defensible borders. We shall be happy if such readiness is to be shown among the people and Government of Egypt. However, if the Egyptian rulers seek to resume the war, they will find Israel prepared, armed and strong.

Knesset members, just before I left for Jerusalem I learned that the Egyptian Government has requested a Security Council meeting. It appears it wants to put blame on Israel that belongs to itself. This Egyptian move indicated that the cease-fire was violated premeditatedly. Egypt reminds us that we are in war. Not only peace, but also the maintenance of cease-fire agreements depend on the willingness of both sides. We still hope that Egypt will honor the pledge it undertook only yesterday, but if Egypt continues the fighting, Israel will not be able to remain indifferent.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

TAB 2
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

Israeli Aug 4, 1970,
Position ✓

AD/163

4 August 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honour to inform you that my Government's position on the latest United States peace initiative is as follows:

Having considered President Nixon's message of 24 July 1970, basing itself on its contents and in strict adherence to its policy principles and authoritative statements, the Government of Israel has decided to reply affirmatively to the latest United States peace initiative, and to inform the United States that it may convey to Ambassador Jarring that:

- 1) Israel is prepared in due time to designate a representative to discussions to be held under Ambassador Jarring's auspices with the UAR (Jordan), according to such procedure and at such places and times as he may recommend, taking into account each side's attitude as to method of procedure and previous experience of discussions between the parties.
- 2) Israel's position in favor of a cease-fire on a basis of reciprocity on all fronts, including the Egyptian front, in accordance with the Security Council's cease fire resolution, remains unchanged. On the basis of clarifications given by the United States Government, Israel is prepared to reply affirmatively to the United States proposal for a cease fire (for at least three months) on the Egyptian front.
- 3) The discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices shall be held within the framework of the Security Council Resolution (242) on the basis of the expression of readiness by the parties to carry out the Security Council Resolution (242) in all its parts, in order to achieve an agreed and binding contractual peace agreement between the parties which will encompass

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The Secretary of State

-2-

4 August 1970

a) Termination by Egypt (Jordan) and Israel of all claims or status of belligerency and respect and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each other and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, each of the parties will be responsible within its territory for the prevention of all hostile acts by regular military forces or para-military forces, including irregular forces, against the armed forces or against civilians living in the territory of the other party.

b) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be determined in the peace agreements.

4) Israel will participate in these discussions without any prior conditions. Israel will not claim the prior acceptance by the other party of her positions, as Israel does not accept in advance the positions of the other parties as communicated publicly or otherwise. Each party will be free to present its proposals on the matters under discussion.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Y. Rabin
Y. Rabin, Lt. Gen. (Ret.)
Ambassador

The Honorable
William P. Rogers

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In our prior confidential discussions regarding this proposal, we asked that the Government of Israel refrain from taking a public position pending receipt of the Egyptian reply. As you know, we made this suggestion in the belief that it would not have served our mutual interests for Israel to have assumed the responsibility for rejecting a proposal whose aim is to stop the fighting and to begin negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

I am fully aware, Madame Prime Minister, of your Government's strong objections regarding this proposal. In light of the Egyptian acceptance, I ask you and your government to review this matter in hopes that a prompt affirmative reply from the Government of Israel will lead to an early stop of hostilities and bloodshed on both sides and to serious talks between the parties conducted by Ambassador Jarring within the framework of the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.


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security. We will also adhere strictly and firmly to the fundamental principle that there must be ^a peace agreement in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal obligations to the other and that no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the occupied territories until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved.

Finally, and most important of all, I am sure that you noted my recent public comments and nationally televised conference of July 1 in which I made clear the strong and unequivocal support of the United States for the state of Israel and its security. Furthermore, I want again to assure ~~you~~ you, as I have previously done in our personal talks, of my support for Israel's existence and ~~your~~ security and my intention to continue to provide Israel with the necessary assistance to assure that the balance of power will not be altered to the detriment of Israel.

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PAGE 5

I hope, Madame Prime Minister, that you will receive my views in the spirit of mutual friendship and ~~xxxx~~ interest that has characterized the close relations between our two ~~countries~~ countries. I am certain, too, you will appreciate the weight of responsibility which I bear to exhaust every effort to achieve a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. I am confident that together we can move towards that goal.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

ENDQUOTE.

END

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

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REMARKS:

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o US formulation to Belouch
Gunning - Aug. 1970

Tab 4

US proposed
language

TEXT

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

- (a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties.
- (b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242.
- (c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective July 1 at least until October 1, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

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242

Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242
OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation
in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of ter-
ritory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace
in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance
of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commit-
ment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires
the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belliger-
ency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

- We are now giving our attention to our international programs of which Israel's is one of the largest. We hope to have Israel's cooperation in devising ways to improve our budget situation.

- Mrs. Meir may be assured that just as our reductions of domestic programs do not signify any lessening of our concern for the poor and disadvantaged, and our cutbacks in defense expenditures do not indicate any lessening in our concern for national security, so our examination of our assistance program to Israel does not mean any lessening of our commitment to support Israel's security and viability.

Russian Jewish Emigration to Israel - Few issues have a deeper emotional meaning for Israelis than that of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. That emigration is at record levels, over 31,000 going to Israel last year, but the issue of Soviet financial levies on departing emigrants continues to make Jews everywhere anxious. It would, I believe, make an exceptionally good impression on Mrs. Meir if you would bring up this subject on the following lines:

- We are happy for Jews everywhere that the level of emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union remains high. It is the policy of this government to do what it can to encourage this emigration at a liberal rate. We believe our own quiet diplomatic efforts with the Soviet Union have been helpful in this regard. We will continue these efforts, though their effectiveness, of course, will depend largely on the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Because of the interaction of this question with the whole spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, we continue to believe it is best kept in quiet diplomatic channels.

Department of State
February 1973

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Abba Eban, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *JWR*

DATE AND TIME: Friday, August 17, 1973
8:30 - 9:50 a.m. (breakfast)

PLACE: Israeli Ambassador's Residence
Washington, D.C.

Eban: If the rumors are true [of your becoming Secretary of State], I'll give you a list of places to avoid on your travels.

Kissinger: La Paz!

Eban: That's one of them. They oxygen they give you.

Kissinger: It's 12000 feet. I lectured once in Wyoming, at Laramie, which is 7800 feet. The combination of low oxygen and alcohol has a bad effect. In the middle of my lecture I said to myself, "Any more of this and..." and I found myself saying it out loud. The students were all leaning forward to take it down.

Eban: It was an official visit to Brazil. I also visited Bolivia.

Kissinger: Are there any Jews there?

Eban: Yes. Years ago they gave the Jews passports, to their credit. In the '30s there were 12,000. Since then some have gone to more congenial places.

One of their people told me how he had liquidated Che Guevara!

Kissinger: Peru must be beautiful.

Eban: Staggeringly. A Peruvian told me two things; (a) Why they must invar-

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ably vote against us; and (b) Would we please give them two agricultural experts, three scientific experts, etc.!

They talked a lot about "Third World" and "Peruvian Socialism" but had no clear idea what they meant.

Kissinger: That is always true.

Eban: The pattern is invariable, but it was particularly striking there. You see, we have to separate our multilateral and our bilateral diplomacy. We keep our bilateral relations.

Kissinger: What's in it for Israel?

Eban: We'll have to do it. They said they don't vote by substance but by who's on the list on each side. Tito is the key as far as they are concerned.

Kissinger: He won't live much longer.

Dinitz: What about their attitude to the United States?

Eban: Detachment from the United States, and it has to be demonstrative.

Kissinger: At the same time they feel neglected, but if you ask them what they want from us, they don't know.

Eban: It's a very intricate psychological relationship. They view Chile with a certain schadenfreude.

I was on a mountain in Peru during the Security Council vote. It is extraordinary to condemn "The Government of Israel". I've seen condemnation of acts, but never of governments.

Kissinger: [to Dinitz:] You were with Sisco when I called?

Dinitz: Yes, he said he was with us!

Eban: I'm not so much worried about the Security Council as about ICAO. If they do something there, it could affect our communications.

Kissinger: What could ICAO do?

Eban: The extreme Arab request would be to refuse landing rights. The conse-

quence would be more concrete than the Security Council. So the real battle is in Rome and Montreal.

Kissinger: We certainly wouldn't go along with that. Does it have to be unanimous?

Eban: No, but if the major countries don't go along, it won't have any meaning. The airline pilots are all excited. It creates anomalies in our policy--we have all along been in the vanguard of antihijacking.

Dinitz: Sisco told us he didn't go along with the juridical distinction the British and French were making between governmental and unofficial actions.

Kissinger: No, I told Scali that too.

Eban: It's almost a temptation for us to set up a quasi-official organization. But we can't.

Kissinger: What do you see as the longer term trend?

Eban: I wanted to hear the thinking here, because I was disturbed about Sisco's sorties. Because our strategy has an attritional end, and there is no reason to erode this by any feelings of conscience about taking initiatives. There is no reason to think our strategy is wrong. The Arab world is more divided than ever.

Kissinger: It is safe to say that Sisco reflected the overwhelming view of the US Government except the White House. Both State and DOD strongly hold this view and as consciousness of the energy crisis increases---

Eban: It is all based on the idea that there are opportunities but all that is lacking is initiatives. Our idea is that the opportunities don't exist. The criterion is the Egyptian demand for total withdrawal as a precondition of a negotiation.

Kissinger: There is tremendous pressure from the oil companies. I refuse missions to Saudi Arabia every week. Defense, State, Treasury, all want to go out there. I may let the Treasury mission go, because they can do the least political damage and they will be dealing with the concrete problem of reserves.

Eban: There is a fallacy that the current energy crisis is due to the Middle East. It is a psychological fact though not an objective fact.

Kissinger: My personal view is that it is a mistake to get the Saudis involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Either there will be no outcome, or no possible

outcome will live up to the expectations that are raised. Either way it will undermine the government.

Eban: When I was in Brazil, the Saudi Foreign Minister was there. They think they have to turn their oil into industry before their oil runs out. There is a tremendous concern about their economic future. He made only a perfunctory reference to Israel--just like the Shah.

Kissinger: The Shah now thinks some movement is necessary. We gave him a bland message to pass to the Egyptians--that we are willing to be helpful but, as you said, it can't be preconditioned on total withdrawal. This also helps to waste time.

Eban: The Shah thought the US should be more active but he didn't have anything in mind.

Kissinger: Yes. But it would be helpful if after the elections some sort of reformulation of your position could be made. For the psychological climate. I agree there is no real possibility of movement.

Eban: You understand nothing is possible before October.

Kissinger: There will be no pressure from here.

We are doing a major program on the development of alternative energy sources. I'll talk to you [Dinitz] about getting Jewish community support. We are not ready yet. We may alter our energy policy to work independent of Britain and France and work more bilaterally. When working multilaterally we are limited by what they'll go along with.

Eban: I don't think the American people have been told what the real sources of the energy crisis are. It is a matter of alternative sources, overcoming economic inhibitions, and a measure of economy.

Kissinger: We'll make that clearer in the fall.

It is an intolerable situation when 2 million Libyans can hold up Western Europe and the United States, and when we're financing anti-American revolutions with our oil money.

Eban: I think the statement of the messages to Congress were good. It is a question of whether you want to celebrate the 200th anniversary of your independence as a dependency of Abu Dhabi. [laughter]

Kissinger: For the first time, we yesterday had a politically-oriented meeting on energy. It was left too much to the economic agencies.

Dinitz: I agree.

Kissinger: But the problem is not now. As long as they insist on total withdrawal as a precondition, there is no prospect of a negotiation. The Soviets are not pressing us very hard.

Eban: Of course, if they shift from their fundamentalism, it's a breakthrough as well as an embarrassment. We would have to think about a response.

Kissinger: We had a massive Soviet onslaught during the Soviet summit. But nothing happened. We can tell that from the Arab reactions.

Eban: Of course, the reference in the communique to the "interests of the Palestinians" was very disturbing to us. Not because of itself but the psychological effect.

Kissinger: I have told you the circumstances. The Secretary of State and Gromyko agreed to it at night without telling us. The only way to stop it would have been to get the President and Brezhnev out of bed.

Eban: We have reports that the Palestinian organizations were genuinely gratified by it. They saw it as a success.

Kissinger: Our policy is based on Jordan, not on the Palestinians.

Eban: It would be helpful if you could make it clear that when you talk about the Palestinians you mean it in the context of an Israeli-Jordan settlement.

Kissinger: We have intelligence reports that Arafat thinks Bourguiba was put up to it by the United States.

Eban: Bourguiba is "tasserieur", if not mentally deranged.

Kissinger: It seemed like that when he was here three years ago.

Eban: Seems not to be getting anywhere. The last we heard was from the Italian Government, that they thought of a demarche. It was based on the 1949 Resolution.

Kissinger: The 1947 lines?

Eban: Yes. We said we'd prefer 242. The Bourguiba letter was in the Nouvel Observateur. He claimed that Israel's refusal to talk on the basis of the 1947 lines meant a denial of our own existence! Then there was silence.

Kissinger: I have no clear idea what it should be, but after your election any reformulation that would shift the debate would be enormously helpful here.

Eban: After elections, there are often new statements of policy. But the substance wouldn't be different.

Kissinger: Sisco is not a problem, though it is a strange procedure for a diplomat to appeal to a people on their TV over the heads of their government.

I must tell you frankly that if it were not for Watergate, there would be great pressures building up now. The key officials are oil men, and the oil men are basically spokesmen for the producing countries. And they are politically stupid. In 1969 the Shah offered us all his production, if we raised it. Our oil men rejected it. I was for it, not for the oil but so he could have dollars to buy armaments.

Eban: I saw the demarches by Mobil and Standard. But they are sensitive to public pressure. A number of Senators spoke out.

Dinitz: But there is constant lobbying too. I see them at State every day.

Kissinger: It is the oil men, plus the judgment of the political people that the Jews are against us anyway.

Eban: Teddy White's book says 37% voted for the President.

Kissinger: But in the Watergate business, many Jews are prominent in it. You can't stop it, but it is a fact of life. The problem of your attritional strategy is that it looks like a status quo policy. The predisposition of people who know nothing of the Middle East is that it's always our obligation to show flexibility. Six months go by and our position is then held to be outdated.

Eban: All the successes you are associated with, people believe were the result of a sudden swift initiative, though an attritional strategy was behind it.

Kissinger: Plus the brutal use of force.

When are you coming back?

Eban: Maybe in October for the United Nations General Assembly. There will

be Foreign Ministers' meetings. Maybe we should have only those but not the UN General Assembly. But as Conor Cruise O'Brien once said, "In order to have something behind the scenes, there have to be scenes." [Laughter] There was another bon mot of his: Someone was giving a speech. He had been speaking for an hour and a half. Someone asked, "What's the subject?" "He hasn't decided yet." [Laughter]

The issue is now the ICAO.

Kissinger: We won't go along with anything concrete. A condemnatory resolution wouldn't hurt you.

Eban: The letter by the American Pilots Association is a little disturbing. They want an undertaking by the Israelis that it won't happen again, and if Israel is willing to give such a letter, they will deny the Israeli landing rights.

Kissinger: When you come back, we can discuss negotiating strategy. You won't be under pressure from us, probably even in October. I don't know what it is, but even it spell out the idea of an interim solution leading to a full settlement...

Eban: The word "dialogue" has a magic, I found in Brazil. "Israel is ready for a dialogue." "We are not wedded to keeping the territories." This surprises them. It won't satisfy the Arabs.

Kissinger: No, but what I need is some Israeli movement that lets us say the Egyptians must do something. And you should emphasize the process more than the result. Because in a process nothing can happen without agreement.

Eban: On the Palestinians, no one wants a third entity in the picture.

Dinitz: Arafat wants a new entity instead of Jordan, and part of Israel.

Eban: Waldheim will be coming to the Middle East.

Kissinger: He is a fool.

Eban: Someone said there were some lacunae in his ignorance, but not many!

Kissinger: He made quite a fool of himself in the Vietnam Conference.

Eban: There are some advantages in his negligibility. He has no messianic illusions, like Hammarskjold, who thought he was above every government, and that between every government and the deity was the United Nations. Waldheim knows

there are problems getting the budget if he knocks the United States.

We won't use him for floating any ideas. Just to delay.

Kissinger: My view is--whatever the constellation is here--the pressures have been delayed more than anyone thought four years ago would be possible.

Eban: We've decided to win the elections this time.

Dinitz: Remember that all our opposition comes from the right.

Kissinger: What about Jordan? I have the impression he could accept something like the Allon Plan if something could be done in Jerusalem to save his face.

Eban: He thinks the Allon Plan asks for too much territorially, and he insists on something first or simultaneously with Egypt.

Kissinger: Yes.

Eban: He has a trauma about his grandfather. "If I settle, I'll end up like my grandfather--on the steps of the mosque."

Kissinger: It can't happen until you give him the mosque back!

Eban: The only thing we're prepared to do for Jerusalem is to turn over the Holy places to the Arabs.

Kissinger: What is the argument against some form of extraterritoriality plus an access route?

Eban: There could be an access agreement. What we don't like is a division of territorial sovereignty.

Kissinger: If that could be packaged with anything you can do in October... We will meet in October.

[The conversation ended and Dr. Kissinger returned to the White House.]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs
Affairs
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, of Israel
Mr. Avner Idan, Minister of the Embassy of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Harold Saunders, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, May 12, 1973
9:50 - 10:40 a.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House

Eban: The people I spoke to made an effort to devote their attention to what I was saying. They had a kind of glazed look.

Kissinger: Really?

Eban: Rogers and Shulz. They spoke to me with a kind of lordly assumption that nothing was happening here. Has there been any foreign reaction yet?

Kissinger: No.

Eban: From Moscow?

Kissinger: No.

Eban: Did they talk [in Zavidovo] about us and our region?

Kissinger: Yes. Very passionately and very aggressively. They think there is the possibility of a war. They say they are exercising a restraining influence. We have independent evidence of that.

Eban: Yes, we do.

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Eban: Yes, we do also. If our neighbors were not Arabs, the probability would be zero. But they must give the impression of an eve-of-war atmosphere, to show movement. Everything proceeds now from their internal situation, which is always the first order of business. Internationally they are not only antagonistic to us and to you but also they are increasingly suspicious of the Soviet Union. It is now explicit, not just coffee-house gossip.

The result would be catastrophic for them, militarily, politically, domestically, and internationally. The humiliation at home; the Soviet Union would say we told you so.

Kissinger: But the Soviet Union might not do that. They might try to stop you. And if an oil boycott is organized, they would gain something in the west.

Eban: But a boycott wouldn't work, because Iran would not go along.

This is unlike 1967 when the Soviet Union was instigating it.

Sadat is not bright, but he can think a few moves ahead. He is not so volatile.

Kissinger: That is not my impression. He shows no capacity for thinking moves ahead.

Eban: But domestically he has shown an enormous capacity to reconcile the belligerent rhetoric with non-shooting. He has shown a meticulous ability to avoid shooting.

On the ground, the Mirages are effectively in Egypt. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait have aircraft, but not long-range. The army across the Canal is unshaven, playing cards; there is no vigilance. Sadat shows up at the Canal with a hat, expecting to be photographed.

We have told our military to assume we may fight.

Kissinger: The Soviets said you were constructing field hospitals in the Sinai.

Eban: [laughing] They are already there.

Politically they are trying a pressure tactic. They see the Summit and hope to see it take place in the context of an international crisis atmosphere, and a United Nations Security Council debate. They are unhappy because they are not getting enough attention here; the press is occupied with other things!

Kissinger: Are you keeping this going!

Saunders: The Egyptians are saying that.

Eban: They are disappointed with the relative quiet.

Kissinger: Of course you have an interest in keeping things appearing excessively quiet, to keep us from doing anything.

Eban: Yes. The usual problem of the wish as father to the thought.

Kissinger: During the Khartoum incident, someone suggested we ask you for help. You would have blown up Beirut.

Eban: You know that it was from Beirut that the phone call went to finish them off.

Kissinger: We know that.

Eban: We don't have the feeling we should revise our estimate of the general situation. It is developing positively but slowly.

Kissinger: How do you see things developing?

Eban: Assuming he does not want to start shooting, he can even use these diplomatic events--the Summit, the Security Council--to avoid shooting. Politically, they want to use international pressure on us to commit ourselves to total withdrawal--which we won't do.

I wondered about your reaction after Ismail's visit here--which I assume might have a continuation. If there is no continuation, he will have to find a substitute.

I am relieved at my conversation with the Secretary. I felt no sense of having to do something urgently. It would be objectively bad.

We have to block their actions. In the Security Council, they want to set up international machinery. I can't blame them. We oppose new machinery. Secretary Rogers says he opposes new machinery. It would be an alibi for them to avoid realistic negotiations. We don't need further channels. If there is no negotiation, it is not because of a shortage of frameworks, channels or gimmicks. If we are to get them to change their view, we follow our psychological plan of trying to get them to see that their options are really very few--the status quo or realistic negotiation.

In the President's statement we see a general feeling that immobility is unsatisfactory. What is behind this?

Kissinger: As I have told your Ambassador, American passivity is due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances and cannot be counted on indefinitely. If you look at the constellation of leading officials, you cannot count on the continuation of the present... So far, the Egyptian policy is so stupid, there is no particular challenge. But what would the American response be if the Egyptians became more flexible, even procedurally, it is hard to say. It may be in your interest to try to preempt this with a scheme of your own.

I have been reluctant to get us into the position where both sides can shoot at us without considering any scheme. Unless one side or the other gives us a foothold...

Dinitz: Yes think the Egyptians might come around to a special agreement

Dinitz: You think the Egyptians might come around to a special agreement on the Canal?

Kissinger: No. What might be possible is some souped - up version of Resolution 242 that might provide an alibi for the Egyptians for a Rhodes - type negotiation. It could be a link to an interim agreement in the guise of being linked to an overall one. It might be extended over years.

I have not seen any indication from the Egyptians that they are willing to show that degree of flexibility.

When I saw Ismail, he said he would think about ways of reconciling sovereignty and security. But we never heard from them.

Eban: I don't think they make the distinction in a way that the Israeli military presence can remain anywhere. They see it as complete withdrawal and complete sovereignty.

Kissinger: I have no evidence otherwise.

Eban: On the Israeli side, we definitely don't accept the idea that boundary changes must be ruled out. Whether we could get them in negotiations cannot be foreseen. Whether they would be substantial or not cannot be foretold. There is a dynamic and transforming element in a negotiation itself. But no Israeli government will say in advance that it rules out boundary changes.

There are gimmicks that reconcile the sovereignty of one with the security of another. We are aware of that. Golda once told Rogers that Sharm... he

suggested a 99-year lease; she said 49 years would be o.k. ! Further north, it is harder.

They want 100% withdrawal in stage one but won't offer 100% in stage one.

It is too optimistic to think they are in that stage of flexibility. On our side, I believe there would be flexibility in a negotiation. But I don't think we will give up our positions ahead of the negotiations.

Kissinger: There are more pleasant experiences than negotiating with Israelis who are holding the subject matter of the negotiations.

Eban: I congratulated Bhutto on the UN resolution last year. He said, "We have the resolution; those bastards have the territory." I said, "No comment."

I hope you realize on sovereignty versus security that your only problem is not Egypt.

Kissinger: No, I understand. I personally have no desire to seek the Nobel Peace Prize in that area.

Eban: We favor a no-prejudice formula for early negotiations. They can't graft their position onto us.

Kissinger: How about the Jordanian side?

Eban: He now asserts quite frankly, that he doesn't want to be first. He told Lord Balniel after Hussein was here. He feels he could not bear the brunt of it.

The Shah told me he was advising Hussein not to be first.

On the question of the Persian Gulf. I found the Shah very relaxed, for two reasons: He was very satisfied with the United States for the first time. They are usually very querulous that he can't get enough; now he can. Secondly, on oil, he feels there is a United States interest now. What he told Cyrus Sulzberger was revealed doctrine. He wants to be strong enough to resist any threat except the Soviet Union. He thinks the Soviets are shifting away from Egypt to the Persian Gulf because of less American resistance.

Kissinger: They would be wrong.

Eban: He feels that documents are not important. For instance, the India-

Pakistan crisis showed this. But he is creating an American interest, there which is more.

He sees a triangle--Israel, Ethiopia, and Iran--which if buttressed by US support will be a stabilizing influence. We exchanged information with respect to the internal stability, and the problem about Ethiopia. We hope he [the Emperor] gets strong support here. The military always say he can't use this and that--I hope your criteria are something other than that.

Kissinger: Our military are especially hard on allies.

Dinitz: We know.

Kissinger: You can't complain! The trouble is he is the most tiresome head of state.

Eban: He insists on surviving.

Kissinger: I mean he is boring.

Eban: On airplanes, the Ambassador said he was told it was stuck particularly for preoccupation reasons. With the Mirages, our concern is naturally a little more lively now.

Kissinger: There is no problem in substance, but it is a matter of getting attention.

Eban: On the Soviet Jews.

Kissinger: They said they would not increase it but it would continue at the same level, 36,000. They would consider the special cases I gave them a list of. They had the preoccupation that every time they made concessions we increased our demand. We think we have done a helluva lot.

Eban: We think it is of because of public pressure.

Kissinger: Up to a point it is helpful--but not to the point of defeating MFN.

Eban: They are going to have trials in Minsk. This could stimulate trouble.

Kissinger: I raised it twice. There was an explosion each time.

[The meeting then ended.]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Israeli Ambassador Dinitz
Minister Idan

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *WR*

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, June 2, 1973
9:45 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.

PLACE: Military Aide's Office
The White House

Ambassador Dinitz: I have a pleasant duty to perform first. I have a birthday greeting from the Prime Minister. A letter is coming, but in the meantime she cabled me the content! Here it is. [He hands over Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: Very nice, very nice. Thank you.

Ambassador Dinitz: Yesterday I got a call from Sisco to inform me that on instruction from the highest authority from the White House that the decision was made on Phantoms, at the higher rate of delivery.

Dr. Kissinger: You were surprised?

Ambassador Dinitz: Of course! I asked if in the case of emergency would there be expediting shipments? He said he had no instruction on that, but usually in case of an emergency that could be reviewed.

Dr. Kissinger: Did he tell you about the A-4's too?

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Dinitz: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It's the same rate. It's the absolute maximum. They wanted a delivery rate of six plus six the first two years, and then only 36 all together. Six plus six, plus 12, plus 12. It's as far as I could go without enormous difficulty.

Do you want to hear about Ismail? It won't take five minutes.

Dinitz: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I really have nothing to tell you. He repeated what he had said last time. He wanted to know if the White House was now engaged in it. I said it depends on what new positions they had, which I had yet to hear. I told the President they are not looking for an act of policy, but for a miracle. He was so vague, even on his old positions. So in the formal talks, there was nothing.

Then I took a walk with him and said this was nonsense. There were two possibilities: an interim settlement with a linkage to an overall settlement, or a set of vague principles to permit a negotiation to begin. Or we could combine the two. I know you don't agree with this. I took two walks with him. I gave him the formulas -- the one you gave us -- as my own idea. The second time he seemed more interested. He said, which principles must be vague? I said the ones on final borders and security. He asked what we meant by security arrangements? I said, to me it means the stationing of Israeli forces. He didn't reject it. He said he would tell Sadat.

I told him I would hold up with the Russians until I had heard from him. So I'm stalling Dobrynin now too. We agreed that if I got a positive answer we might meet again in Spain in July.

Dinitz: Did he ask about the Summit?

Dr. Kissinger: The Russians are pressing us to promulgate some principles. I avoid it by saying I have to hear from Ismail.

Dinitz: What status did those principles of last year have? Were they signed? Were they agreed?

Dr. Kissinger: No, they are not signed. I was stalling. They gave us a long paper. We went through their paper for four hours. I was trying to keep it going. They weren't signed. The President and Brezhnev never discussed them. But I suppose they are somewhat official.

Dinitz: What would be the purpose of concretizing them?

Dr. Kissinger: The only purpose of concretizing them would be to use them to get talks started.

Dinitz: There is no status between you and them but between us and Egypt.

Dr. Kissinger: It might happen -- although we have no plan -- that the President and Brezhnev might decide to publish them as recommendations. I have never given them to the Egyptians, though I gave some general principles.

The last meeting was unbelievable. He clearly had no idea what he wanted. I asked him what he wanted from us with Israel. He said, break Israel's neck! I said, since we won't do that, what do you want. He said, the best we can get.

He has now clearly separated Egypt from the other aspects -- the Syrian-Jordanian settlements. It was purely pro forma.

I told him there were two possible approaches -- an interim solution with a formula for linkage as you gave, that the line would not be permanent but the permanent line was not settled; or secondly, general principles that we could use to get talks to begin.

Dinitz: He was more receptive to the first?

Dr. Kissinger: No, neither; or possibly the second. Strangely I feel I made more of an impression on him this time even though nothing concrete was discussed.

Dinitz: Do you think he understood better that they are not merely pushing everyone else in a corner but also pushing themselves in a corner?

Dr. Kissinger: He told me they would do nothing militarily for a while anyway. In the UN Security Council they would be willing to settle for an early adjournment. He told the French they would seek anything short of an American veto.

Dinitz: We had an offer from Bourguiba to promote a negotiation. Eban said in Knesset that this was fine. Then Bourguiba said no.

I have two other items. I saw Garment last week, to give him a reply from Golda to the President's birthday greeting. He wrote a nice letter, and she wrote a warm reply. I went on orally, to pass on her message to the President that she hoped the current problems would pass and that he could resume his important diplomacy.

Dr. Kissinger: That was very nice.

Dinitz: Second, your friend Yigal Allon will be coming. He will be arriving the evening of June 9th to receive an honorary degree. From the 12th on, he will be in New York or Washington: sometime that week he would like to see you, on a personal basis. In my house.

Dr. Kissinger: What about breakfast on the 12th at 8:00? That is the week before the Summit, so it may change.

Let me say again -- on the Summit. If there is trouble from the Jewish Community -- I know you don't control it. If this event -- when he needs for many reasons, including to deflect attention from other things -- if this turns into a mess, he will react violently. This isn't an official communication; I say this as a friend. It will have catastrophic consequences.

Dinitz: Let me tell you. The meeting is now scheduled for the 17th.

Dr. Kissinger: Unfortunately he is already in the country by then.

Dinitz: If I had known that, I would have tried to push it to the 15th.

Dr. Kissinger: I have already heard from Dobrynin that if Brezhnev reads in the Washington papers on the day the official visit begins of what the Jews did on Sunday, it will be bad.

Dinitz: We are making sure the speakers will be moderate. We have one GOP and one Democrat. There will be an ellipse meeting but no demonstration.

Dr. Kissinger: How many?

Dinitz: They say 10,000.

Dr. Kissinger: The President will react even worse than with President Pompidou. I know it is not your doing. I know you don't play for small stakes.

What would they do if Brezhnev met with some of them? They would make some statement?

Dinitz: If Brezhnev met with some moderate leaders, it might take some steam out of it. It could be agreed in advance what would come out.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me speak to Dobrynin.

Dinitz: He shouldn't meet with isolated groups.

Dr. Kissinger: No. You'll have 10,000?

Dinitz: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there no way to stop it?

Dinitz: No, Dr. Kissinger, I looked into it and if we tried to stop it, it would backfire. You said he won't be here.

Dr. Kissinger: He will be in Camp David.

Dinitz: It would be not a march, but a meeting. With moderate speakers.

Dr. Kissinger: But it still looks like pressure on the Russians.

Dinitz: There wasn't one place he visited in Europe where there weren't demonstrations. In Bonn, Sweden.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay, now on the Saudis.

Dinitz: Yes. Last week, Sisco called me to tell me about the deal. One billion for Saudi Arabia, one half billion for Kuwait.

I should say two words of background: We are not opposed to the move. We are not opposed to American efforts to strengthen your position in the Persian Gulf. We have always favored this, especially since the British left. What we oppose is the extent of the deal, which is more than necessary. And the type of items -- Phantoms. This is a new ball game; for political and military reasons.

The military reasons: Phantoms from one Saudi airfield, Tabuk, are within range of all targets in Israel. This puts it on our strategic map.

Dr. Kissinger: But they won't be delivered for three to five years.

Dinitz: Sisco told us two years from the signing of the agreement.

Secondly, it removes the most important deterrent symbol we have -- the Phantoms -- and thus it contributes to the deterioration of the balance in the area.

Then we see far-reaching political implications. The Russians have been restrained up to now in giving sophisticated equipment. Now there will be Egyptian pressure on the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: Our people said they could get Mirages if we didn't give them Phantoms.

Dinitz: The Phantom isn't a Mirage. And Sisco couldn't tell me it would block them from seeking Mirages anyway. God knows they have the money.

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Also, it makes the Saudi subject to Egyptian pressure in the next crisis. Before they had only rhetoric; now they have this arsenal. I know they are anti-Communist, but about Israel they are all the same ideology.

I have a cable from Golda, not as a formal demarche, but asking your advice about what we should do.

Dr. Kissinger: Make a formal demarche to State.

Dinitz: That I did. I made all the arguments and more.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you give me all the arguments?

Dinitz: Yes. [The talking paper which Ambassador Dinitz had used with Sisco was delivered later to Mr. Rodman. Tab B.]

[The meeting adjourned at 10:15 a.m., when Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dinitz conferred alone until 10:40 a.m.]

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Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It is with great pleasure that I extend to you my warmest greetings and best wishes on your birthday. Our sages of the Mishnah used to say "At forty for discernment (בִּינָה), at fifty for counsel (עֲצָה), at sixty for to be an elder (זָקֵנָה), at seventy for gray hair (שֵׂיבָה), and at eighty for special strength (גְּבוּרָה)." (Avoth v, 12)

May you enjoy many more fruitful years of "counsel" in the service of your country and for the benefit of mankind.

Sincerely yours,

Golda Meir

30 May 1973