

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Minister Avner Idan
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *JMC*

DATE AND TIME: Friday, March 30, 1973
12:00 -12:40 p.m.

PLACE: Military Aide's Office
East Wing, White House

Amb. Dinitz: I appreciate very much that you can see me so soon. I just arrived last night.

Dr. Kissinger: We are going to California this afternoon.

Amb. Dinitz: Mrs. Meir sends her regards to you. I saw her last night before I left.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure we will work with you with the same openness that we had with your predecessor.

Amb. Dinitz: I appreciate that, I will do as little as possible to disturb you.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you should do whatever is necessary.

Amb. Dinitz: I have a few items to raise with you. First, about the meetings with Primakov. This was the third time we met him. He was in Israel three years ago, when he met with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and also myself. He said nothing of substance at that time. He just said that it was good for us to have an exchange of views. Then there was a more elaborate meeting that he had in Europe with Gazit in 1971. We told you about that. This time he asked for a meeting on his own initiative, not on ours. I should be more correct. Four months ago we wrote a letter responding to their letter after the 1971 meeting. They had said that it was a good meeting and they raised the possibility of other meetings. So we said we would be prepared if they were interested.

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CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

Two weeks ago, they replied.

The meeting took place in Vienna. It lasted eight hours, over three different sessions. The instructions that the Prime Minister issued to Gazit were that it was important to keep the pace of these meetings such as not to disturb the efforts of Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger: She is so eager that I succeed!

Amb. Dinitz: We didn't value so much the contact but we couldn't say no.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you did the right thing.

Amb. Dinitz: He came with Kotov, who had been Second Secretary in their Embassy in Israel. The main point of the conversation was that they were trying to tell our representative that we had to enter detailed negotiations with them. "The time is past for general remarks. We put forth proposals in 1969 and you didn't negotiate." They wanted a mandate from us for the Soviets to play a role in the Middle East. "Don't assume that things can move without us." They were particularly disturbed that we were working only with the Americans. "Don't overestimate the events of July, 1972. It is not so important; we are still there, with friends and arms."

Throughout this discussion there was this veil of threats.

They said, "Frankly our position is in support of the Arab case, but we are different in that we support the survival and existence of Israel. Therefore, we don't support the elements in the Middle East that want your destruction."

They wanted our positions and they wanted negotiations. They said they were prepared to talk without prior conditions. They were so anxious for talks that they said--in the unofficial conversation--that they were prepared to send an official to Israel in a secret manner. We asked about the idea of sending an Israeli representative to Moscow. They were not particularly anxious for this. They said that an Israeli presence in Moscow would be an attraction to Soviet Jews.

On the question of Soviet Jews, he said that they were letting people out and no ransom was being collected. He did not think the number of Jews leaving would increase. He was quite reluctant to discuss the whole subject.

This covers the discussions. You may remember that they asked Ismail when he was in Moscow how the Arabs would look on it if the Soviets opened a

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dialogue with Israel. The Soviets explained it to him as something that would be good for the Arabs, as a form of pressure on Israel. That is how we see it--to embarrass the efforts we are taking with the United States.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they know where they are going either. We have no objection to your talking, as long as we keep each other informed.

We are following the strategy I explained to your Prime Minister. We are pushing nothing, we are wasting time. We are using the Egyptians to kill off talks with the Russians. The Egyptians also told them to stay out, so we are not under great pressure from them at the moment.

Here was a message I received from Ismail. [Tab A] I sent him a message about the Khartoum incident and this was his reply. I told you we might meet again with them around April 10. This is now impossible. If they behave stupidly, we can put it off until May.

Amb. Dinitz: Is there a new date?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am waiting for their proposal. It is now impossible before early May, just as a matter of logistics. They may get in touch with us by next week, say April 5 or 6. I think it will take two or three weeks. Then I have to reply. Then, if I know them, they will make some conditions.

This is their dilemma. I told them I won't talk to them unless they have something new and different from the public position. You saw that even in the Sadat speech. If they give me something new that doesn't lead anywhere--That they have to resolve first.

Amb. Dinitz: Did the Russians raise it?

Dr. Kissinger: They raised it, but I told them what I told you. I told Ismail that he had to press the Russians not to press us on details but only on principles. Apparently he did it, because the Russians have not been pressing us since then. So with the Russians there is practically nothing going on.

As for the summit, a date has not yet been set, but it will probably be this summer.

It looks like a real dilemma for them.

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Amb. Dinitz: Yes, and part of this dilemma is shared by the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: I will take no initiatives. I will react in a slow-moving way to their proposals. If it moves slowly and drags through the summit, that is their problem. I am not aiming at a Nobel Prize on the Middle East.

Amb. Dinitz: Those who aim for it don't get it!

Dr. Kissinger: But I still think you should be intellectually prepared... As your predecessor and Mr. Idan can tell you, you have been saved by an accidental combination of circumstances. But at any moment it could...

Amb. Dinitz: Explode.

Dr. Kissinger: The Russians and now the Egyptians have been behaving stupidly, and our domestic situation has not crystalized. But you have to be prepared for a sudden purposeful and intelligent push. When your Prime Minister was here I thought it would crestalize before the summit. I was wrong then; I may be wrong now.

I will wait for them. I will make a non-substantive reply. I am not going to propose a meeting. They will have to propose a date. We won't accept the date they propose. And Brezhnev is going to Germany. That will take his time.

I must repeat what I told your Prime Minister and your Ambassador. You should think about eventual negotiations.

One other matter, the Most Favored Nation business. You will really lose the President if the Jewish community continues its behavior here on the MFN. I know your influence is not complete. We are talking to the Russians about the exit tax, and I hope that before I return from San Clemente I can get authorization to tell you the assured they have given, but have not authorized me to tell you. We can't get a formal written commitment.

But I talked to teh President this morning and he is really determined on this. He will not let one segment of the American public hold up American foreign policy.

Amb. Dinitz: You are right that we do not have great influence. Especially on an issue as emotional as this. Israel cannot go to American Jews and tell them not to be concerned.

Dr. Kissinger: I talked with Dobrynin today and that is when he gave me these assurances. There is no dispute over the merits; I am totally out of sympathy with them. The issue for American Jews is whether a major American foreign policy can be wrecked. What if the President went on television and spoke against Jewish pressure?

There is a second problem. I read in the paper today that some of these groups are planning demonstrations against Brezhnev when he comes here. When Pompidou was here and this happened, it produced an outburst by the President.

But this is all in the future.

Amb. Dinitz: Maybe by the time Brezhnev comes it will have changed. They are anxious too.

Dr. Kissinger: Believe me, we are pressing them. But if we did it in a formal note they would have to reject it. But we are raising it in my channel. I raise it on every occasion.

Amb. Dinitz: Yes, we appreciate it, and the President raised it too.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Amb. Dinitz: May I remind you about Houphouet-Boigny. It would be good if he could come here.

Dr. Kissinger: He will definitely be invited certainly this year, in the second half of the year. He is on the list.

Amb. Dinitz: My people say that there has been no advance on the aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger: On production?

Amb. Dinitz: On production it is fine.

Minister Idan: Its all O. K.

Amb. Dinitz: But on the purchase there has been no movement.

Minister Idan: I inquired several times and our Military Attache has inquired several times.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know why our military think that you will make only a hundred planes!

Minister Idan: Your people tell us they are working on a long-range plan for 4 years.

Dr. Kissinger: The instruction I gave was for a substantial number. I couldn't give a number. You are better off with a four-year program, aren't you?

Minister Idan: Yes, but I think they are thinking of stretching the same number over a longer period.

Dr. Kissinger: I will check it.

Amb. Dinitz: I have one last point. Foreign Minister Eban is coming to the United States on the 9th or 10th of May. He has a meeting with the Secretary of State on May 9. Last time he came he missed you. He had a cold.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he lost his voice, and for Eban to lose his voice is an affliction of God, not a disease!

Amb. Dinitz: He asked me to see if you would be able to see him.

Dr. Kissinger: Sure. Call my office and arrange it.

Amb. Dinitz: How about breakfast on the 9th?

Dr. Kissinger: Fine. The Shoreham is slightly more convenient.

Have you presented your credentials yet?

Amb. Dinitz: No, and I was not sure if it was proper for me to come here.

Dr. Kissinger: It makes no difference at all to our relationship.

Amb. Dinitz: We appreciate it. We will have for you the protocols of the meetings with the Russian.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

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May 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Abba Eban
Saturday, May 12, 1973

Dinitz just called me to let you know that Eban knows of your Ismail contacts only in the most general terms. Eban is not clued in on the communications between the White House and the Prime Minister on the subject, nor has he been informed of the date of your next meeting with Ismail. Similarly, he is not privy to the recent exchanges of military intelligence, including the communications from Hussein.

Dinitz thus urges that if you raise any of this in your meeting, you should not imply that Dinitz has had foreknowledge.

If you want more detailed consultation with the Israelis in advance of your Paris trip, you might want a separate meeting with Dinitz next Monday or Tuesday. Should Campbell set aside some time for this?

Yes _____ No _____

Dinitz also suggested that Eban would prefer that his meeting with you be publicly announced. Eban had said a few times before coming over that he looked forward to seeing Kissinger.

If you approve, I can tell Dinitz now that it is okay for them to confirm, after the fact, that a meeting has taken place.

Yes _____ No _____

Also, we can then have the meeting in your office instead of the Map Room.

Yes _____ No _____

cc: Scowcroft
Campbell

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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Tab B
INFO

June 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Peter W. Rodman *PMR*

SUBJECT: Dinitz Presentation to Sisco on Phantoms to Saudi Arabia

Saturday Dinitz promised you a paper setting out the presentation he made to Sisco protesting the U.S. sale of Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He delivered it today. (Tab A)

FK

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Minister Mordechai Shalev of Israel
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, July 25, 1973
10:30 - 11:00 a.m.

PLACE: Israeli Embassy
Washington, D. C.

Minister Shalev: As you know, there is a Security Council debate, and the last time the Ambassador told Dr. Kissinger our view on the subject of the passage on the Palestinians in the [U. S. -Soviet] Joint Communique and its possible detrimental effect on the UN Security Council resolution and on other aspects.

We saw Sisco on Thursday and the subject was the Security Council debate. We stressed also that any changes in 242 -- any additions, subtractions or interpretations -- might result in our withdrawing our acceptance of 242. Also, that it would put into question the possible visit by the UN Secretary-General to Israel. I must say in our discussion with Sisco we were quite satisfied with his responses. He said "If they [Egyptians] want a resolution, we don't want to get involved in the exercise." So we were fairly sanguine about the American position -- which was that (1) no resolution was necessary, (2) "a consensus" was sufficient, and (3) all that was needed was something for the Secretary-General's trip.

To our dismay, the USUN delegation took two steps, neither of which we had any information about until the last minute:

- They drafted a text of a consensus, which went a little beyond what we thought the Americans thought was necessary. But that wasn't the worst.

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- Then the new American step, only yesterday, which amounts to a series of U. S. amendments to the draft resolution of the nonaligned. In other words, they got involved in the exercise of drafting a resolution.

They didn't say they would vote for it; they said this would enable them to abstain. But a U.S. abstention in these circumstances now means tacit American help. The U.S. amendments include two references to the Palestinians, which -- as you know -- we regard with great apprehension. The main thing is the American delegation has been involved in drafting a resolution, which even with ^{the} American amendments may very well mean we will withdraw our support for 242. The Government of Israel is greatly concerned about this, and if it is not vetoed by the U. S. there is a possibility we will withdraw from 242 and there will be doubt about the Secretary-General's visit.

We are greatly concerned on two counts:

- We feel we have been led astray. This is not the way we have been keeping our contacts the last two years, without springing surprises on each other. This worries us about our bilateral relations with the United States and the Department of State.
- Second, it has given the Arabs a great boost. They won't agree with the American changes but they will use them. Zayyat is already saying in the UN corridors that they have moved the Americans and that there will be more of this.

So, our problem is with (a) going back on the assurances and (b) American participation in drafting the resolution, which will have harmful consequences.

Mr. Rodman: Even with the U. S. changes the resolution will have these consequences?

Minister Shalev: Even with the American changes. Even the U.S. UN delegation says the U. S. would only abstain if the changes were accepted.

"Nonaligned" of course means in effect "Egyptian." It is their resolution but they do it indirectly.

There are two things -- the method, which fills us with concern, and the resolution itself.

Mr. Rodman: What are the references to the Palestinians in the U.S. amendments?

Minister Shalev: There are two references. In the preamble, it says: "Conscious that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians have to be taken into account." And in the text it says: "a just and peaceful solution should . . . take into due account the interests of the Palestinian people."

Also the resolution talks about "no action should be taken in the occupied territory which prejudices a just settlement." And it "expresses appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General and the efforts since 1967." Of course "the report" includes all the Jarring memoranda and so forth.

There might be a vote today or tomorrow on this. What we would like is no further American initiative or action. Let the thing go through its motions, and cast the veto.

One more aspect: The U.S. position as described by Sisco was in fact the U.S. position last week, and it was given to the other UN delegations. Now the U.S. has given in to pressure and therefore casts doubt on its own position. They have started budging from it. I understand it isn't an easy thing to cast a veto. But in this case the veto will have a beneficial effect of making the U.S. position clear, so the Arabs know they can't budge us and have no alternative but negotiations. Second, it will save 242, which we have been living with and which is the only basis for a settlement.

The Ambassador is out of town. I will see Atherton this afternoon. The Ambassador will try to see the Secretary, possibly tomorrow.

It was presented to us as a fait accompli. This is not the local tactical decision of Scali, but comes from Washington. Scali said so himself to Tekoah.

I want to add one little remark on the issue of the Palestinians. Before Jarring came up with his memorandum he was once asked, "Why don't you talk to the Palestinians?" He said he couldn't because the Palestinians are not mentioned in 242. This is what the Ambassador had in mind when he spoke to Dr. Kissinger about the Communique.

The American effort to amend the resolution will not eventually amend the resolution but it has made it easier for countries like Britain and Austria to vote for the resolution. The consensus idea is now dead, because of the American effort. And this comes three days after an abusive anti-American statement by Sadat. Three days after such a speech, the U. S. allies vote for a resolution which America has to veto.

Mr. Rodman: I will see to it that Dr. Kissinger gets this right away. He has been following this.

Minister Shalev: The main point is this: Scali should stop cooperating in trying to amend the nonaligned resolution and should return to his basic position: That no resolution is necessary, that no change in 242 is acceptable, and that anything that goes beyond 242 will be vetoed by the United States.

Scali talked about his amendments with the Indian delegation before telling the Israelis. In effect, he submitted it before telling the Israelis.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
July 31, 1973

Handwritten initials and a large checkmark.

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER RODMAN *PR*

SUBJECT: Dinitz and Eban Would Like to See You

*3:00 pm
Friday*

Minister Shalev called me at 4:00 p.m. to make two requests:

1. Dinitz had lunch with Sisco today and would like to talk to you about their conversation.
2. Abba Eban will be passing through the U.S. the weekend of August 17-19, on his way to Latin America, and wonders if it would be possible to see you. Shalev says that in your last conversation you said you'd be glad to see Eban if he came by again. (I have no record of this!)

You will probably be in San Clemente then. I didn't volunteer this to Shalev because they might start angling for a San Clemente invitation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you set up an appointment for Dinitz for some time this week, and that you give your answer on Eban then.

Approve *PR* Disapprove _____

Or, if you can't see Dinitz this week, that I tell Shalev now that you regret you will have to miss Eban because you will be with the President on the West Coast.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION
25 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

PETER W. RODMAN

Israeli Minister Shalev made the following presentation to me today of Israeli "dismay" at a change in the USUN position on the question of a Security Council resolution. Shalev will see Atherton today, and Dinitz (who is out of town until tomorrow) is seeking an appointment with Rogers.

The Israelis were satisfied last week with Sisco's assurances that, in the US view, (1) no resolution was necessary, (2) a "consensus" was sufficient, to launch Waldheim on his trip, (3) no changes in 242 were acceptable. Shalev says that USUN has now taken two steps which violate these assurances and which were presented to the Israelis as a fait accompli:

- They first drafted the text of a "consensus"--which the Israelis think was unnecessary.
- They have in effect drafted a series of amendments to the non-aligned resolution, which include two references to "the legitimate interests of the Palestinians." Dinitz has told you of their great apprehension about this phraseology.

The Israelis are concerned about the way they have been led astray by the USG. (Scali apparently discussed his amendments with the Indians before telling Tekoah anything.) They also point to the negative consequences of the American action:

- The US has now involved itself in the resolution-drafting exercise. USUN has said that its draft amendments would only enable the US to abstain--but this is enough to kill the "consensus" idea and make it easier for other countries to vote for a resolution.
- Even with the American amendments, passage of the resolution "may very well" force Israel to withdraw its acceptance of 242 and discourage Waldheim's visit.
- It has given the Arabs a great boost. Zayyat is saying in the corridors that they have moved the Americans and will do so again.

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The Israelis want Scali to return to the original US position. There should be no further US initiative or action. We should let the thing go through its motions, and then veto it if there are any changes in 242.

→ This may come to a head this afternoon or tomorrow. Should Brent call Rush to turn Scali off immediately?

YES _____

NO _____

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Minister Mordechai Shalev

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *Photo*

DATE AND TIME: Friday, July 20, 1973
5:10 - 5:50 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Dr. Kissinger: I can see the Bahamas agreed with you! [A reference to Ambassador Dinitz's designation as Israeli Ambassador to the Bahamas and his attendance at their recent independence festivities.]

Ambassador Dinitz: Already I forgot about it. A week of talks in the State Department made me forget about it.

Dr. Kissinger: Talks on what?

Ambassador Dinitz: On the UN Security Council debate. Spiers [the new U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas] told me you thought he was a good man.

Dr. Kissinger: How did he put it?

Ambassador Dinitz: He said, "Dr. Kissinger thinks I am a good man."

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughing] It happens to be true! But it is unusual to say it. It is a waste of talent to have him in the Bahamas with his European experience.

Ambassador Dinitz: I saw your friend Sisco on the UN Security Council. I told him we are concerned about the Palestinian question, and about whether

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State would allow something to be said in a resolution on the Palestinians. We had bad results from what your communique said.

Dr. Kissinger: I told you the origin of it.

Ambassador Dinitz: Not from our Government, but the Palestinian terrorists reaction to it. There were bad results from our point of view.

Dr. Kissinger: I have sent a nonsubstantive message to the Egyptians. I can let you read it. And here is their reply. It is calmer than the earlier ones. [Lets them read messages at Tab A.]

Ambassador Dinitz: July 11. Before his trip.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I haven't answered it. I will in a few days. It won't happen quickly.

Ambassador Dinitz: It doesn't have a date.

Dr. Kissinger: I am supposed to propose a date.

Ambassador Dinitz: "We did not seek to avoid the approach at the UN." What is that?

Dr. Kissinger: That is what I wanted to know. Scali said to Zayyat publicly what we said privately. I think he put it in there to show they didn't initiate the Scali conversation and weren't trying to substitute channels.

Ambassador Dinitz: I notice an absence of the State Department among the agencies they work with! "The White House, the United Nations, and other countries." Maybe State is another country.

Dr. Kissinger: Now it will take us a month to set up a meeting. You understand the strategy. He has no reason to expect a quick proposal.

Here is the Russian note to us on their conversations with Ismail. I can let you read it on a very confidential basis. I can't let you have this. [They read Tab B.]

Ambassador Dinitz: [Reads it] They are telling you that the Egyptians think a settlement is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union. The Russians think it is important to let you know the Egyptians think that!

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't assume everything was said that they say was said.

Ambassador Dinitz: If we get any further information on this, we will let you know.

Dr. Kissinger: We appreciate it. It will be a useful check. What is your impression?

Ambassador Dinitz: There is nothing new there. It is a restatement of their position, fairly I think.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Dinitz: They say "we and the Egyptians think alike." But then they criticize you for being pro-Israeli! The tone seems very mild. "Great concern," not "powder keg" or "blowing up." Which incidentally coincides with what we heard. But it was from secondary sources, so we didn't bother to give it to you. There is a greater and greater interest of the Soviet Union in Iraq and Syria, not in Egypt.

Dr. Kissinger: I am told by our intelligence people they are slipping in Iraq, too.

Ambassador Dinitz: We have noticed from various outside sources that Iraq is looking for alternatives. They seem interested in some Western presence, looking to even the United States. Their Minister's interview last week

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I saw it.

Ambassador Dinitz: Also Egypt is now trying to bridge the gap to the Saudis. This has an impact on Soviet judgment.

Dr. Kissinger: Here is something I got from the Soviets on the Jewish question. [Tab C]

Ambassador Dinitz: I saw this through the Jewish leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I gave it to them. I think they are now on a reasonable course. If they agree to what they call a reformulation of the Jackson Amendment, and if MFN passes

Ambassador Dinitz: They are the better ones. Let me say, it is not an impressive list.

Dr. Kissinger: That I can't judge.

Ambassador Dinitz: It is the same as Brezhnev presented. I have asked for a detailed study from Israel and will give it to you. There is very little movement in turning the release into reality. I have also asked my Jewish friends to voice their complaints very strongly with Dobrynin. If that is all right.

Dr. Kissinger: That I have no problem with. I have no objection to your raising it with Dobrynin.

Ambassador Dinitz: I have also told them what you told me -- that the level would remain the same. But our figures show there has been a decline: 2,000 in April; 2,100 in May, and 1,900 in June. If it remains so, the total will be 24,000, not 36,000. The corresponding figures last year are higher.

Let me raise a few other points. On the Sisco initiative.

Dr. Kissinger: That is killed.

Ambassador Dinitz: That is killed. Good.

Dr. Kissinger: By that I mean it is not likely to emerge.

Ambassador Dinitz: Our research people found this in the Rogers speech in December, 1969: "The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes the armistice lines as exact boundaries." It shows the new Sisco initiative is a restatement of the Rogers Plan.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not likely to be done now.

Ambassador Dinitz: On the paper you gave to Dobrynin [on General Working Principles], we won't comment because it is a dead document. We will comment if it becomes live.

Dr. Kissinger: It served its purpose. There is no agreed document now.

Ambassador Dinitz: The Ismail paper seems plausible.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. There is no ring of great intimacy. I don't have the sense that they are very close.

Ambassador Dinitz: I have a few very small subjects. On the Palestinians, you know we weren't happy with the paragraph in the [U.S. - Soviet] joint communique -- "legitimate interests of the Palestinians." There was excitement about this in Israel, so I went to Sisco. He told me that the phrase "legitimate interests" was meant as a limitation. But the Arabs see it as just the opposite.

But the Arabs see now they have an opening and are trying to get it in the resolution. We see the danger. It is one thing if it is in the President's State of the World message, and another if it is in the U.S. - Soviet document, and it is a third thing if it is in a UN Security Council resolution. We see it as an incitement to terrorism. You heard Arafat say, "This is a victory. We got this because of our armed struggle." We must say in all frankness you are undermining your friends.

Dr. Kissinger: How?

Ambassador Dinitz: By antagonizing Jordan. By encouraging Bourguiba to make his overture. Because the Palestinians are now the thing.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not our policy. We are going to strengthen Jordan. We are going to make them spokesmen for the Palestinian people.

Why don't you tell State?

Ambassador Dinitz: We did.

Minister Shalev: Twice.

Ambassador Dinitz: One other point. When Brandt was in Israel, he said he would be happy if contact was established between Israel and Egypt. So he sent Lahn to Egypt to see Ismail, and then reported to us. Hafez answered that he took note of this and was not surprised because it was always Israeli policy! Ismail said there was no sense in such conversations with the Israelis unless they knew in advance what the results would be and unless they knew Israel was prepared to withdraw to the 1967 lines. Otherwise it only enhances the status quo. When Lahn said that Golda said Israel was prepared for compromises, Ismail said, "What compromises?" The very existence of the meeting is a compromise on the part of the Egyptians." Lahn said that Germany was not involved in the dispute, but was concerned because any conflict endangers German interests. Hafez said the whole world wants a deal with the Middle East only on the basis of the status quo. Hafez mentioned the Soviet Union among them. He said, "The future of the Arabs is in our own hands."

This confirms what we said earlier about the lack of intimacy that was apparent in the conversations in Moscow.

The last point I have: The Persian Shah is coming to the United States on July 24.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Dinitz: We got a long paper from Israel. One operative thing we are asking is this: Since we have further increased our cooperation -- on oil, technology, etc. -- if the Shah can hear from you or the President that you look with favor on this

Dr. Kissinger: You can count on it.

I would like to talk with the Ambassador alone for five minutes.

[The Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger conferred alone for about ten minutes.]

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July 11, 1973

- A. Mr. Ismail has received with thanks Dr. Kissinger's message passed 9 July.
- B. Mr. Ismail would like to express the Egyptian side's welcome to meet Dr. Kissinger to review the situation and evaluate the prospects of achieving progress toward peace in the Middle East. While agreeing to arrange a meeting in Madrid, the Egyptian side will provide their own transportation and would like to thank the U.S. Government for their kind offer.
- C. Mr. Ismail is visiting the Soviet Union, returning to Egypt on 14 July. He hopes to receive from Dr. Kissinger by then his proposals about alternate timings for the meeting and any other arrangements.

Orally:

- A. We welcomed and did not seek to avoid the approach of the U.S. Government representative in the recent UN Security Council Debate on the Middle East, just as we welcomed the views of the other countries' representatives.
- B. We do not want to change Resolution 242, but we do back any measures that would advance this Resolution. Meanwhile, concerning what happened before that led to stalling Jarring's attempts was not Jarring's fault. It was due to the Israelis.
- C. Egypt is working in all open ways in the political field -- through the White House, the United Nations, and with other countries. Our aim at the end of this process is to achieve the objective of a just peace in the area.

A
Shown to Dinitz
July 20, 1973

July 7, 1973

Dr. Kissinger extends his greetings and best wishes to Mr. Ismail.

Now that the US-Soviet summit conference has been completed, the US side wonders whether it might be useful for Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ismail to meet again to review the situation. If the Egyptian side agrees that such a review would be of value, Dr. Kissinger would be happy to meet with Mr. Ismail in Spain or at some other mutually convenient location. The U. S. side would be pleased to arrange secure transportation for Mr. Ismail to a meeting site, as discussed between Mr. Ismail and Mr. Trone in Paris.

The US side will await the views of the Egyptian side on this matter.

Shown to Tab B
Dinitz
July 20, 1973

Oral Note
(in the name of the Ambassador)
July 19, 1973

I am instructed to forward the information for President Nixon on the conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and Hafiz Ismail, National Security Advisor to the President of Egypt which took place on July 13, 1973. This is being done in accordance with established practice of confidential exchange of views between the USSR and the United States at the Summit level on major international issues and, among them, on the Middle East problem. As Mr. Ismail stated, he was instructed by President Sadat to visit Moscow to obtain first-hand information for the President about the substance of the recent Soviet/American negotiations at the summit level on the problem of the Middle East.

In the course of the talks, Leonid Brezhnev informed Hafiz Ismail in general terms without going into details about the basic points of the exchanges with President Nixon on the Middle East problem. Referring to the words of the President and the respective part of the Joint Communique, Leonid Brezhnev noted that the American side considered the problem of the Middle East as a very important one. However, the statements about the importance of the Middle East problem had not been accompanied in the negotiations by putting forward on the part of the United States of concrete considerations aimed at achieving a mutually acceptable solution of the Arab/Israeli conflict.

Mr. Ismail was told that we didn't hear from the American side a firm statement to the effect that the United States supported the demand for total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. In respect to the method of negotiation, we informed Mr. Ismail that the United States, while supporting negotiations, were more inclined toward direct negotiations though, in principle, they did not rule out other forums of contact between Israel and the Arab countries. They mentioned in this connection a so-called Rhodes Formula.

On the question of an overall or a partial settlement in the Middle East, it was stated that as far as we understood, the American side, while admitting in principle the necessity of working out an agreement on the entire complex of the settlement, did envisage

the possibility of finding isolated solutions to the individual aspects of the settlement on the basis of priorities -- that is, in effect, separately from the overall settlement.

Leonid Brezhnev told Mr. Ismail that during negotiations in the United States, the Soviet side proceeded from its known position on the questions of settlement. The emphasis was made on the great importance of recognizing the principle of inadmissibility of acquiring territories through the use of force which implies the necessity for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. And it was noted that the solution of the problem of the withdrawal would facilitate reaching agreement on all other aspects of the settlement.

Presenting the views of the Egyptian side, Mr. Ismail said that they evaluated the situation in the Middle East as very complicated and fraught with danger of serious explosion, and a situation of the kind which demands in the opinion of the Egyptian Government the implementation of urgent measures for the prompt achievement of a just settlement of the conflict. Mr. Ismail stressed that on the basis of the information coming to Cairo from different sources, they came to the conclusion that Israel and the United States do not intend to modify their long-held position on the settlement and specifically so with respect to the troop withdrawal. He emphasized also that the United States Government would not move ahead in its approach to the problem of Middle East settlement and continued to pursue a one-sided pro-Israeli position which, to a great extent, prevents a settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict on a just basis.

Mr. Ismail referred once again to the invariability of the Egyptian course aimed at strengthening the Soviet/Egyptian relations in all fields. Having expressed satisfaction with the Soviet Union's stand on the problem of the Middle East settlement directed at promoting a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, Mr. Ismail stressed that the establishment of that kind of peace was, in the opinion of the Egyptian leadership, unthinkable without active participation of the Soviet Union. Mr. Ismail expressed a bewilderment on the Egyptian side of the fact that the United States considered the US formula of 2-4-2 as the basis for the settlement in the Middle East and support of the Jarring mission, and at the same time do not accept his known memorandum of February 8, 1971. Mr. Ismail

recalled in this connection that the United States representatives used to express earlier during the four-power consultations in New York their support to the said memorandum.

During the conversation, Mr. Ismail expressed specifically that the tolerance of the Arabs was not limitless and stressed the determination of the Egyptians to put an end to the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. Mr. Ismail pointed out that, though the Egyptians are losing their confidence in getting the settlement of the crisis through political means, they continued to count to a certain extent upon assistance in the settlement from the United Nations and the Security Council. Particularly, they expect that during the second part of the discussions on the Middle East problems in the Security Council, a resolution will be adopted which will move the settlement off dead-center, and they expect to see in this respect a more balanced attitude on the part of the United States.

The conversation with Mr. Ismail demonstrated once again that both the Soviet Union and Egypt consistently favored a Middle East settlement on the basis of the known decisions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. They are of the opinion that lasting and just peace in this area can be achieved only on an indispensable condition of withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and on condition of respect of all the lawful rights of the state and people in this area, including those of the Arab people of Palestine.


In informing the President about his conversation with Mr. Ismail, Leonid Brezhnev would like to stress once again, as in the past, there exists in Moscow a serious concern in respect to the situation in the Middle East. Continuing presence there of the hotbed of military tension can at any moment bring forth serious new aggravation of the situation in this region and result in the worsening of the international climate in general which would accord neither with the interests of the USSR nor with those of the United States.

B

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~~1/15/73~~ 7/11/73

Shown to Dinitz Tals C
July 20, 1973

July 10, 1973

Concerning the list transmitted by Dr. Kissinger

- 742 names (four names are mentioned twice), so actually then are 738 names in the list.
- 253 - out of that number, received permission to leave.
- 177 - have not applied.
- 30 - do not reside in the USSR.
- 149 - have been denied exit permission for security reasons.
- By now 10 more persons out of the list received permission to leave (Vasilevski, Gutman, Kamenezskaya, Levitin, Mandelzweig, Moiseev, Baron, Brown, Penelman and Schpilberg).
- Previously rejected applications are under additional consideration.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PHR*

DATE AND TIME: Monday, September 10, 1973
6:03 - 6:45 p.m.

PLACE: Military Aide's Office
The White House

Dinitz: I just finished an hour-long talk with Secretary Rush. It was just a general review of the situation.

Kissinger: Who was there? Sisco?

Dinitz: Yes. Also his aide, Samuels.

Kissinger: He's good.

Shalev: Also Stackhouse, of the Israel-Arab desk.

Dinitz: I reviewed the question of terror, particularly our concern with these missiles in Rome [rockets discovered by Italian police in the hands of Arab terrorists]. We know they're serialized, so the Russians must have an accounting of where they are located. It would ^{not} be difficult for them to trace if they wanted to.

I asked Secretary Rush that you find a way to convey this concern to the Russians, and secondly, that in the ICAO in Rome now you will put ^{the} gravity of the situation on record and help draft legislation to deal with this situation.

Kissinger: What did he say?

Dinitz: He said you [the USG] had been in communication with the Russians on

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SECRET - XGDS (3)
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advice

this and that he would take your/in the ICAO into consideration, and you were with us on this.

Kissinger: Can you give me the serial numbers?

Dinitz: Yes, I didn't give them to him but I can give them to you.

Kissinger: I am seeing Dobrynin on Thursday.

Dinitz: Then we talked about oil and diplomacy.

Kissinger: You noticed what the President said Saturday. It is going in the direction I have pointed out.

Dinitz: I noted to Rush that much of it--on energy--is helpful to our relations, but much of the press interpretation frankly is not. He agreed. Then I called attention to the Sisco interview in the Jordanian paper.

Kissinger: What did Sisco say?

Dinitz: Nothing at all during this conversation. Sisco had said--spoken in terms of--Palestinian "rights", not "interests". He called for some movement in advance of negotiations, and third, that an initiative was coming. I asked for Rush's cooperation on muting this sort of thing, because it just means a debate through the press, and nothing but harm to our relations could come of this.

He said he was very much in accord with me. He said the U.S.' and Israel's strategic interests are the same. He said the U.S. is not pro-Israel, or pro-Arab but pro-peace. (I heard this before.) But then he said the status quo was no good; and we had to get the negotiations off dead center.

I said that we agreed completely; Israel wanted to convert the status quo into peace and security. I then went into a long discourse about how whenever we came forward with a new proposal, it just postponed negotiations. I pointed out that the Arabs were now linking everything with Palestine. He said he wasn't asking us to take a unilateral step or to negotiate from a point of weakness. He said he knew from his negotiations on Berlin that the only way to deal was through a position of strength. He ended by asking us what our government could do, in concert with ^{you,} ~~us,~~ to get talks moving.

Kissinger: First--let me make clear I am not talking now in my official capacity. We should still meet in this restricted channel.

Dinitz: Separate it.

Kissinger: Yes. It is important for the Prime Minister to understand my judgment on this. All of these are just phrases--the ones that assure you and also those that disquiet you. You shouldn't attach too much importance to it.

Dinitz: I know, I was just reporting.

Kissinger: As I told your Prime Minister, and as I have told you before, the trend here to do something is getting overwhelming. It can be delayed but it cannot be arrested. If you look at the balance of individuals, and the influence of the companies... Two years ago I suggested to Ambassador Rabin and the Prime Minister that we should do something in the area of an interim settlement. You didn't do too badly in following that advice.

The trouble is, the U.S. public doesn't understand what it really is that the Arabs are proposing -- that as a precondition for a negotiation you give up all the territory in exchange for an "end to the state of belligerency," which is indistinguishable from the ceasefire that exists. They think the issue is Israeli intransigence. Most people don't understand. So an Israeli initiative would at least have the advantage that one could dramatize what the Arabs are asking. I have no concrete proposal. But I exhausted Le Duc Tho last year by giving him in rapid succession five different proposals which were all plausible but none of which gave up our key position--that we would not overthrow Thieu. In case the negotiations broke down, we could show he had rejected, not our maximum position, but all these successive proposals.

I must say our troubles with the South Vietnamese started when we did this because they thought we were giving up something. But we weren't. Every concession was at the periphery, not on the main issue. And this would keep the initiative with you.

My second strategic concern is that we have to find a way of splitting the Arabs and also of splitting the pressures in this country. We can't have all the pressures here together--the oil companies, the Arabists--against the Jews. We could try to split off the Saudis. Three years ago, the oil company leaders came in here. The issue then was to do something about Jerusalem. They wanted it to be a neutral city, and I know this is unacceptable to you. But I wonder why there can't be some formula for some extraterritoriality, plus some access route...

This won't be made as an American proposal; you can count on that. But it would help with the Saudis; this is the only thing they express themselves on. It would help domestically. What the President said--even with what I told you--you

should not believe it might not return.

should not believe it might not return.

Now I can use the discussions with Ismail; nothing will happen until after your election. So there is no immediate pressure. I have not even discussed this Jerusalem proposal with the President. There won't be a big initiative when I come in.

Maybe a settlement first with Jordan would do it. Maybe you have some other cleverer idea.

Dinitz: I noted before that your mind was moving on Jerusalem, first when you asked Eban about it, and second when you said before that what concerned you was to remove Faisal from the picture and to isolate Sadat. Incidentally, I thought your sending Phantoms to Faisal would do the opposite; and only attract Sadat to him.

Jerusalem is of course the most sensitive issue with us. This is just off the cuff. I will of course report all of this to the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: Maybe she has a better idea.

Dinitz: But usually when you try to defuse an issue you try a less sensitive, less emotionally-laden issue. Jerusalem will be the hardest with Jordan. We have tried some phrases before, like "some extra-territorial status" for the Holy Places.

Kissinger: Please don't interpret this in legalistic terms, but in strategic terms.

Dinitz: I see the strategy.

Kissinger: I think the borders will be the most sensitive.

Dinitz: No, I think it will be easier to decide with Sadat, where the final borders will be than to agree to a split in Jerusalem's sovereignty. Anyone in Israel who suggested it would be shot out of office, not run out. We could agree to a passage for the Jordanians to go to the Mosque of Omar without going through Israeli checkpoints.

Let me ask two questions, Dr. Kissinger. Do you mean something that Israel should think of independently of a course of negotiations commencing?

Kissinger: There are many ways of doing it. We could tell the Saudis that we

heard this from you and you are willing to discuss it. Or you could make it as a public offer. Or as a private offer, and then publicize it if it doesn't work.

Dinitz: My second question is, do you mean to say that you believe something like this could move the Saudis?

Kissinger: I have no feel for the Saudis, quite honestly. I met only Yamani, when he was here. And fifteen months ago I met with their prince.

We have informally asked Prince Fahd to come over. We did this in order to avoid having too many of our delegations going over there. It has nothing to do with Israel. He's available to come in late November or early December. That would be a good occasion.

My strategy is to keep the Saudis out of the Arab-Israeli dispute, because any settlement achievable wouldn't be satisfactory to Arabs, and it would only weaken the regime to have to take responsibility for it. It might help to take some action on the one area of their religious concern.

Dinitz: I'll pass on your thinking to the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: I have no idea what Rush has in mind when he says off dead center.

Dinitz: Nor has he.

Kissinger: It is absolutely necessary that you don't let yourself be put into the position of looking like the obstacle to peace. You must keep the Arabs on the defensive. The British have told us they want to talk to us about it, and the French too.

I'm not interested in the Nobel Peace Prize.

Dinitz: I wouldn't mind seeing you win it, Dr. Kissinger. Nothing would give me greater pleasure.

Kissinger: But there is no way for us to do it without brutalizing everybody. It would be moved into special channels.

Dinitz: What do you mean?

Kissinger: Some special envoy will be appointed by the President.

Dinitz: To solve the Middle East crisis?

Kissinger: Yes. I really have no specific ideas.

[to Rodman:] ~~Have~~ we heard from Zahedi [on his talks with Ismail in Geneva]?

Rodman: Not yet.

Kissinger: Check on it.

Dinitz: Do you think you can get the Arabs off their position of demanding a commitment to total withdrawal as a precondition to negotiations?

Kissinger: My strategy is to exhaust the Arabs. We have been doing it, but every time, some one of our people pops off. But ~~can~~ I do it? It's extraordinary that the Egyptians haven't leaked my negotiations with Ismail. It shows they haven't given up yet on my approach.

Dinitz: Our sources say they now think that oil will do it for them.

Kissinger: If we can figure out some way to split the Saudis off... Jordan is already split off. The Syrians won't be. But Egypt is already willing to make a separate peace.

Dinitz: I think the pivot of it is their oil strategy. You have today the first visit by Hussein to Egypt. You could tell the King it is not a good idea.

Kissinger: I will do that. [to Rodman:] Is Rifai coming to the UNGA?

Rodman: I'll check.

Dinitz: When the Shah was here, did you talk to him about his contributing to Jordan?

Kissinger: Yes, at great length. But he said, that, while from his selfish point of view and strategically he's with you, from the tactical point of view, he'd like some movement.

Dinitz: But he has no idea what it should be.

Kissinger: Right.

Dinitz: I don't have as pessimistic reading of consensus in this country as you do. What you describe is a feeling in this Administration, but not the country. It is not just the Jews, but Congress.

Kissinger: The Congress is against whatever the Administration is for!

Dinitz: But the labor movement, and the media, and editorial pressures.

Kissinger: That I wouldn't attach too much importance to. That we can easily handle if we have a platform on which to stand. We are not asking you to give up essential positions.

Dinitz: Yes.

Kissinger: One amazing thing about my hearings is to see the liberals attacking me for being too soft on the Russians! For 5 years they attacked us for being hard. But in a crisis they will run.

Dinitz: Yes. They think goodwill is the solution.

Kissinger: You remember the Jordanian crisis. I've never seen so effective an example of crisis management. We worked well together.

Dinitz: Yes, I was on the other end.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

August 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN PWR
SUBJECT: Dinitz' Final Report on Hijacking Incident

Dinitz called again at 3:45 p. m. to give us the final wrap-up on the latest hijacking incident.

The plane was hijacked over Cyprus by a Libyan citizen, carrying a Libyan passport and two guns. He demanded that the pilot land at Lydda. The Israeli airforce escorted the plane down.

Immediately after the landing, the hijacker stepped out of the airplane, presumably to start negotiating. At that instant the Israeli security boys broke into the plane through another entrance and then captured him.

All the ^{passports} were taken to the airport restaurant. One passenger slipped on the steps and injured an ankle and was given first aid. The plane and all the passengers except the hijacker were ready to take off about an hour ago. The injured passenger was to decide himself whether to go with the plane or stay overnight. The hijacker will remain in jail. The captain has given a press conference in Israel and the hijacker is being brought before the press. The airport has returned to normal.

Among the passengers was the Libyan Ambassador to Baghdad. [He ^{thought} will return to his duties, so that next time he can raise his hand in the UN and vote to condemn Israel for international terrorism. (This is Dinitz' editorial comment.)]

Dinitz added the following vignette. While he was peacefully eating lunch today, he got an urgent call from Sisco, who said: "You have done it again. You took another plane with four terrorists. This can't go on. There will be another UN meeting in an hour and we will have to vote to condemn you again." Dinitz told Sisco to relax.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

16 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *PWR*
SUBJECT: Eban Visit

Dinitz called me this morning to plead for reinstatement of the Eban meeting. The cancellation was a mistake on Dinitz' part and he will be in serious hot water if the meeting doesn't come off.

As he told you, he recieved a message yesterday from Eban in La Paz saying he was heading directly back to Israel. But it turns out that this message crossed with Dinitz' message to Eban informing him of the breakfast. Eban has now sent a second message saying he is delighted to come to breakfast. Eban is not aware of any mixup and is heading here to see you.

If your breakfast with Schlesinger cannot be changed, a meeting some time in the morning would be OK. Shall we schedule Eban for 10:30? _____

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Authority NLN 07-09, #1 Appeal
NARA PMH vs Date 7/8/2015

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
Avner Idan, Minister

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, June 19, 1973
2:00 - 2:40 p.m.

PLACE: Ambassador's Office
Israeli Embassy
Washington, D. C.

[The Ambassador made the following presentation, on the basis of a cable he had just received from the Prime Minister.]

Dinitz: First a couple of general remarks, then some specific remarks. These are from the Prime Minister. We have succeeded in communicating with her, and these are her remarks, after consultation with us. We offered some of our own ideas.

She is now stronger in her opinion that our original request was the correct one, that is, that every effort should be made that there should not be a joint document. The effort of Dr. Kissinger to draft such a new paper only points out the dangers that exist in such an exercise.

Secondly, we continue to negate the necessity . . . we continue to believe in the lack of necessity for a joint document between the two superpowers in a documented form as a contribution to the solution to our problem -- which we continue to see as only through negotiations between the parties.

The third general remark is that all the reservations we have stated to Dr. Kissinger in our last meeting of June 15 are valid also for any subsequent remarks, and in fact they were strengthened by this development.

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The fourth point: We want to reemphasize that in our response to your request to give our remarks, we are not either partners to the preparation of the document nor are we obligated in any way or form to its content.

Now I want to add my own personal point, as number five, to relay to Dr. Kissinger. I know it was a difficult decision for the Prime Minister to go ahead with commenting on the matter, and I know she was guided by two considerations: She trusts Dr. Kissinger, and she didn't want to make his already difficult work more difficult. And second, she did not want the impression to be created that by not reacting we are in acquiescence with some of the serious points we see in it.

So far for general remarks. Now, the particular remarks to some of the most important points. We don't say that if we sat down with legalistic eyes we wouldn't draft it differently on other points, but these are the most important. I will cover these in order of the paragraphs, not the order of importance.

[The paper to which these comments are addressed is at Tab A.]

In paragraph four, the word "agreement" does appear, but to make it clearer we think it must be supplemented by "between the parties." So it wouldn't be thought it meant agreement among the superpowers or someone else. This goes to our original philosophy that security arrangements and guarantees cannot be instead of secure borders but at best in addition to them, with the agreement of the parties concerned. I would add orally that there couldn't be a situation where the Soviet Union and the U.S. come to us and say "we have decided to guarantee you." Security must result from secure borders that we will achieve in agreement with our neighbors. If there are any additional guarantees, it will be in addition and after agreement between parties.

Second, in the same paragraph 4 -- I told you earlier that the Prime Minister was concerned about a Soviet foothold in the area. A physical Soviet presence. You have corrected it somewhat. But the word "participation" can have a dual meaning. You probably meant participation in the international negotiation, but it could mean physical presence. We suggest saying: "International guarantees could include the Soviet Union and the United States." In other words, take away "appropriate participation." We don't want them there.

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In paragraph six, our remarks are very simple. We kindly request you omit the whole paragraph. Because the problematics of it are clear. You're talking about the specific status of the Suez Canal. But you're not talking about the specific status of Sharm el-Sheikh except in terms of freedom of navigation. We don't think you will get a phrase about continued Israeli control of Sharm el-Sheikh, so we are better off without it. If your friends ask, "what about freedom of navigation?" you can say it's covered by Resolution 242 and there is no need to restate it.

The most serious problem is paragraph seven. This is crucial. This is for us very serious. I presume you didn't even realize what a serious word you introduced into it. In 1972 you succeeded in preventing inclusion of this item because there was a reference to UN decisions, UN resolutions. That was very good, very clever. But now you are taking from these UN resolutions the most bitter pill for us -- free choice -- and incorporate it in the document by saying in paragraph seven "implementing the choices of the refugees." This is absolutely unacceptable for us. We have opposed it bitterly ever since 1949.

And this is in spite of the fact that you did incorporate the sentence "consistent with national sovereignty." We don't think this is enough of a safeguard.

So we repeat our request to deal with the refugee problem in the manner that Resolution 242 dealt with it: "the necessity . . . for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem." Period.

It would have been desirable to add that sentence which I gave you earlier [about sovereignty] -- I feel it's a good thing for both parties. But if Dr. Kissinger has any difficulties with this, it would suffice to have only the reference to Resolution 242. But by no means can we accept this question of choice.

Regarding paragraph eight, we really feel that such a paragraph should be included in the peace treaty and not in a general document of principles. So we feel it's premature and not necessary. This is not so much a remark of substance but rather an observation.

[This was the end of the Ambassador's comments on the paper at Tab A. He then raised a few other matters.]

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Other Matters:

1. Qadhafi: You had asked if they had any information on Qadhafi's medical and psychological condition. Dinitz gave me the paper at Tab B, for which I thanked him.

Should I pass this on to CIA through Tom Latimer? OK _____ No _____

2. Jordan/West Germany: Dinitz raised a matter which he said was not urgent and which he had thought of saving for his next meeting with you. Israel is interested in helping Jordan with its economic problems in the interest of stability. Dinitz asked how you would view financial assistance from West Germany to Jordan. Israel was contemplating whether to offer Jordan help in mobilizing and obtaining funds secretly in West Germany -- through banks, government, whatever, but secretly -- but the Prime Minister first wanted to know your thoughts on the matter. I will remind you of this question before you see Dinitz next.

3. Ambassador Dinitz will be in Atlanta at the Governor's residence Tuesday night and Wednesday. He will be back in Washington Thursday morning. He will come back immediately if you want to see him. Or you can reach him through his office, or contact Minister Idan.

4. Minister Idan would like to invite you to dinner or lunch the week of July 8th. He leaves his post here on July 12th. He wonders if you could make it the evening of the 8th _____, 9th _____, or 10th _____ for dinner, or the 8th _____ or 11th _____ for lunch. Can we set a date tentatively?



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General Working Principles

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace. The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the peace treaties must be based.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for compensation.
8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its performance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.

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3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

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3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Handwritten signature/initials]

ACTION
July 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: Golda's Message to President on Watergate

Dinitz told you on June 2 that he had passed to Len Garment an oral personal message from Mrs. Meir offering the President her sympathy and understanding in his current difficulties. She hoped he would be soon free to devote his time and energies to his goal of building peace.

It turns out that Len Garment's memo to the President passing on this message (Tab I) was not forwarded to the President. It was apparently treated as too routine. *(Apparently either a Kehring or a Harig decision)*

It occurred to me that you might want this to go forward. We could send it up again, if you like.

Send it forward _____

Forget it *HK* _____

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Authority NLN 07-09 #1 Appeal
NARA JMH Date 7/8/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: LEONARD GARMENT

Israeli Ambassador Dinitz called on me today and delivered the enclosed letter to you from the Prime Minister (Tab A). He added that he was instructed by the Prime Minister to convey to you the following personal message:

That she is saddened by the difficulties that beset you and wants you and Mrs. Nixon to know you have her sympathy and understanding. She prays for a satisfactory resolution that will soon enable you to address your time and energies fully to the task of building a more peaceful world. This she knows is the goal which is closest to your heart.

I thanked the Ambassador and told him I would convey to you the letter and personal message.

Attachment

49

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Authority NLN 07-09, #1 - Appeal
NARA PMH Date 7/8/2015

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושיטתן


29 May 1973

My dear Mr. President:

I have been instructed by the Prime Minister
of Israel to transmit to you the enclosed letter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Simcha Dinitz
Ambassador

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLN 07-09 #1 - Appeal
NARA PMH Date 7/8/2015

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, 22 May 1973

Dear Mr. President,


May I say how moved I was to receive from Mrs. Nixon and yourself such kind birthday greetings.

Your warm remarks addressed to me on the occasion of our 25th anniversary and on my own 75th birthday are deeply appreciated. They echo in our hearts the feelings of friendship and gratitude which our people cherish with respect to you, Mr. President, personally and to all the people of your great country.

Please accept at this time my sincere expressions of goodwill coupled with the prayer, which all Israel shares, that your historic efforts in support of peace everywhere will speedily be realized.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



Golda Meir

H.E. Mr. Richard Nixon
President of the United States
The White House

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E.O. 13526

Authority NLN 07-09, #1 - Appeal
NARA PMH Date 07/08/2015

Message from Dr. Kissinger sent 5 June and delivered to Mr. Hafiz Ismail on 6 June:

Dr. Kissinger thanks Mr. Ismail for his message of June 2.

The US side would appreciate it if Mr. Ismail could clarify whether the US side can discuss with the Soviet Union the principles for a settlement along the lines outlined by Dr. Kissinger in his meeting with Mr. Ismail, that is, principles of a general nature which would permit the parties to start a process of negotiation.

The US side would appreciate clarification by the Egyptian side of this point in order to plan its course for its forthcoming discussions with the Soviet Union.

SECRET/UNCLASSIFIED

May 28, 1972

General Working Principles

1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties and issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in stages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.
8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
(Reserved by the US side)

The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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Tab C

TelCon
Amb. Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger
9:20 am, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger, and welcome back.

K: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

D: How are you?

K: Now I can take my old time to settle the Arab/Israeli dispute. Can you start by going back to your 1967 borders. We'll have another settlement. And then settle with the Palestinians.

D: And then '47. I called these days the 47 geography and 48 genography.

K: That's about right.

D: How've you been Dr. Kissinger?

K: I've been fine. I'm so sorry I missed ^{Yigal Allon} ~~Yigal Allon~~ (sp). Is he anywhere around. My idiots here didn't tell you you asked him to stay.

D: Well, I did not know when you will be coming althojgh I had a hint that you are going to be back. He left yesterday morning at 10:00. I told him--he understood it completely--but he would have probably waited. He went to London you see, and he thought that maybe he could see you in Europe.

K: I'm just mortified. I wanted to ask my people to ask him to wait, and I thought they knew he was an old friend of mine. I take it Rabin has also left.

D: Rabin has also left, yes, he was in Washington for another day. Last night he had a dinner with Joe Alsop and he thought that-- spending another night here. Is it possible Dr. Kissinger that some time we have a few minutes together.

K: I'll do my best.

D: I will tell you why I say this. I got some reaction from home with regard to the big meetings that you are having. In essence, if I may say so, it has nothing of relation of you, Prime Minister

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repeats some of our basic points, but if you could come by and see me before the

K: Yes, now that I will do. I can't do it today, I'll do it tomorrow.

D: That's fine.

K: But until tomorrow, could you think about the following problems-- you know the strategy that I've been pursuing, and so far it has not been totally unsuccessful. But you will now face this problem-- should I discuss it within the framework which you know with Gromyko.

D: Yeah.

K: Or should it be left to Brezhnev and the President. In that case, the consequences are somewhat more unpredictable. On the other hand, in my case, the consequences are more certain though you may not like them. You see what I mean.

D: Of course.

K: But this is the choice you have to make. If I talk to Gromyko it will be in the framework of what you know, perhaps slightly improved. But you may not be wild about them. If it goes into the other forum, well you--so, can you think about that, and maybe ask the Prime Minister before tomorrow.

D: Can I ask you a clarification question? I was thinking along exactly this line, that this is really the choice that is confronting us.

K: Because you have no other choice if I can be honest with you.

D: Well, at least I knew what I think will be that either it's continuous on the '72 paper, on the lines of the '72 paper between the two of you, and it goes up. And that is like a gamble. It can be either better in the sense that the paper that we don't like, as you know, will disappear, or something else worse--

K: It will not disappear. What could happen is something worse, or maybe they can't agree.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: But it's a chancey proposition. I have to be honest with you.

- K: Particularly if there's a spirit of comraderie.
- D: Let me ask you then, you know to inform my Prime Minister more intelligently, can I tell her that if you negotiate with Gromyko on the basis of the '72, is there a chance for improvement of the text, especially those particularly irritating points that we have.
- K: That is what I would put my major effort on.
- D: Yes. As you recall, there was one point in which they did not accept your position.
- K: Yeah, there was two disagreed points. One had to do with refugees, and one had to do with direct negotiations.
- D: That is correct. And
- K: Now, we will certainly--we will insist on direct negotiations. We will rewrite the refugee point. In fact, when I see you tomorrow I will show you some playing I have done with these things which I have never shown to the other side.
- D: I understand.
- K: But it really comes down to that. In my view.
- D: Yes. I understand. And of course the question of stationing of UN forces in Sharm, which is something that the Prime Minister, even in our previous meeting, particularly was concerned about because it sort of goes even beyond any formal proposal that we had on the _____. Negates the control of Sharm el-Sheikh /
- K: I'll tell you, Mr. Ambassador, if the meeting ends next week without a reference I will not feel that I need to apologize to anybody. So you do not face the problem of my seeking opportunities to raise this issue.
- D: I understand, I understand.
- K: But I think, if you want to be realistic, now I have--look we'd better talk--but if you are going to consult with the Prime Minister again, another think you ought to know--I have no reason to believe that the Egyptians will accept anything like this. In all their messages to me I've asked them what their reaction would be to some general principles, and they are dancing all over the lot. They don't say no, but they certainly stay far away from saying yes.

- D: One more question. If this is accepted, would
- K: You don't have to accept it, you just have to accept the process.
- D: I understand, I mean, I want to know what the next step is. The next step is simultaneous negotiation that is also of
- K: Well, if the President and Brezhnev agree on something that you and we can live with, and I understand that you can live only with something that leaves you margins for negotiation. Then the next step would be negotiation between you and the Egyptians.
- D: But not necessarily simultaneous ones which particularly upset my prime Minister.
- K: I now have the impression that they are not at all interested in the partial settlement, so that what it would lead to would be a general negotiation.
- D: That was my impression.
- K: And I don't have the impression that your military are insisting that ^{you} ~~we~~ withdraw the canal.
- D: No, we don't put it as precondition for the negotiation.
- K: Not a precondition for your negotiation, but you first withdraw from the canal.
- D: Right, that's correct.
- K: Now, my impression, and again from exchanges with the Egyptians, is that linkage which you proposed to me, they are not interested in. So that the only result--I mean, the result of this would not be an interim and general negotiation but only a general negotiation.
- D: Right. Okay, I will communicate this today, and I will ask for reaction before tomorrow.
- K: Good, and I'll meet you tomorrow.
- D: Right.
- K: And think about it in terms that I sent to you.
- D: I will tell you, Dr. Kissinger,
- K: There is no way to avoid a discussion from all the communications we've had.

- D: Yesterday I cabled home hoping for a meeting between us and I wanted some instruction. And I said in my cable that basically what I see is that pivot question now is exactly what you stated. Either they use negotiation on the paper, or leaving it to them.
- K: You see, I had made some changes in the '72 text. I don't want to change it too radically because I don't them to change it too radically. But where it says "agreement", I'm trying to put in plural, "agreements".
- D: But you recall, of course, Dr. Kissinger that have given you another paper.
- K: That I've already rejected.
- D: I know, but, in other words, they did try to change it very radically in their favor.
- K: Yeah, but when I totally rejected that--
- D: It doesn't become an instrument for negotiation.
- K: That will not be discussed. That I can assure you flatly. But '73 paper will not be the object for discussion. The point of departure will be the '72 plus those changes I can make with it without triggering them into tabling the '73 paper. You see what I mean.
- D: Yes. I see what you mean exactly.
- K: I will show you the changes that I have in mind.
- D: And maybe by then I will have some instructions, I'm sure I will, as to the approach in general and in particular.
- K: Good. And can you tell both ^{Allen} ~~Allen~~ and Rabin how distraught I am that I missed them.
- D: I will do this. I will send a cable to Israel and tell them.
- K: Good. Thank you.
- D: Thank you very much, and we'll see you tomorrow. Bye bye.
- K: Bye.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
Avner Idan, Israeli Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME: Friday, June 15, 1973
11:05 a.m. - 12:10 p.m.

PLACE: Map Room
The White House

Dinitz: I communicated to Yigal Allon and Rabin that you were unable to see them. I have the original of the letter from the Prime Minister on your birthday. [Hands over Tab A]

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

We have received a letter from Heath which I wanted to discuss with you because it brings great British pressure on you to return to the international lines. This is part of the international situation now.

Dinitz: I communicated with the Prime Minister yesterday, after I talked with you, on the points we discussed. I just heard from her 20 minutes ago, so my presentation is not too well prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the Foreign Minister in on this act?

Dinitz: No, not at all. Just the Prime Minister. Maybe on some aspects of defense she brings Dayan in, and Allon on general matters.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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Let me give you some idea of our idea of the Soviet position in the Middle East. In our view, indications show the Soviet Union to be in a better position in the Middle East than it really is. From all the evidence we have they are in quite a tough spot, with respect to Egypt and even with respect to the United States in the Middle East.

Brandt said to the Prime Minister that Brezhnev doesn't put importance on Watergate. He sees it as an anti-Communist plot

Dr. Kissinger: We will disillusion him next week, when all the star witnesses appear! It is very patriotic.

Dinitz: Brandt says he didn't find Brezhnev concerned about Watergate. He thought it was a plot of certain circles in America working against detente. There is no sign that Brezhnev has the assumption he is meeting a weakened President. Mrs. Meir wanted me to pass this on.

We have another visitor in Israel, Victor Louis.

Dr. Kissinger: Of the KGB.

Dinitz: Yes. He is seeing Gazit, my successor. He didn't see any Cabinet level people. He related a few things. In view of his position we usually listen to him.

Dr. Kissinger: Is he Jewish?

Dinitz: Yes. He said that relations between the Soviet Union and Arab countries are extremely complicated and are worsening from day to day. The Soviet Union is grabbing, as he puts it, to maintain its hold in the Arab world, and Qaddafi is looking for excuses to show that the Soviet Union is committing treason against the Arabs.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you know anything about Qaddafi?

Dinitz: I can get you some information. The last reports I saw about him said he really has clinical problems. Not just that his views are crazy but that he really has a medical problem.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you give us something?

Dinitz: Yes. Louis says there is a tendency of sobriety in the upper echelons of the Soviet Union regarding the Arab's military capacity. They recognize Israeli military superiority for many years to come, and they are warning against any military adventures. The Arabs are increasingly angry over this.

In our own estimate the Soviet position on the Middle East has not increased since last summer; on the contrary it has declined. This has more to do with balance of power considerations not Watergate.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say something about Watergate. You have your own estimate of its domestic effect; let's not kid ourselves. But we don't conduct foreign policy on this basis. If we admit that, we are lost.

Dinitz: I am saying we don't see any weakening of the President's position.

Dr. Kissinger: The point I've taken in negotiations with Communists is that we would welcome a foreign policy crisis, which would divert attention from it! It worked with Le Duc Tho.

Dinitz: On the paper of 1972 [Tab B], I discussed it with the Prime Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: I was amazed. Our conclusions were almost identical. We focussed on that too. [Dinitz-Kissinger telcon of June 14 at Tab C.]

Dinitz: The Prime Minister's feeling about this dilemma is, she wants to reiterate that we negate the document of 1972 as we've seen it. We see great harm if it receives official sanction or approval. She asks the United States to do everything in its power to dissociate from the 1972 document. We have serious doubts whether there is any document the U.S. could reach with the USSR that we could live with.

The 1972 document is worse than 242, for several reasons. The phrase on withdrawal is in a harder manner, and is outside of the principle of general agreement. It also omits "the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries."

Also the phrases on refugees and on international forces at Sharm el-Sheikh weren't in 242. 242 also doesn't talk about stages but about agreement.

We don't understand why the United States at any point should agree to a document that is worse than 242. We don't accept it at all. But out of a general desire to make remarks in the case a negotiation takes place, we can give you the following remarks -- but not as coming from us and not in our name.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Before you do that, can I interpret what you are saying? My understanding of your position is this: it is clear that no Israeli Government can authorize us to negotiate for it on anything. Second, no Israeli Government will want to commit itself to principles that don't endorse its position. So I construe this as saying you don't commit yourself to it in advance or afterward. But if your comments are taken into account, you might understand the strategic necessities that brought us into the negotiations, but you wouldn't commit yourself.

Dinitz: Yes, but I would add to that one sentence -- that the Prime Minister believes it is better that the U. S. dissociate itself from the 1972 document. So we ask first that you dissociate yourself. But because we understand your position, we say that should you find yourself in a negotiation, you should have our observations -- not labelled as our observations.

Dr. Kissinger: If it becomes unavoidable that we have a discussion, you give us your personal observations. If anything should emerge, we will present it to you as a new document.

Dinitz: Our observations are as follows:

On paragraph one of the document, the paper of May 28, 1972, we feel that the paragraph should emphasize that we are speaking here about an agreement between the parties based on Resolution 242, or in the framework of 242, in order to achieve a final peace. We feel that the need for direct negotiations at some stage between the parties should already be

mentioned in the first paragraph. Because we see it as the core of the issue. You said it was a defect in the 1972 document that the Soviets didn't accept the U.S. position about direct negotiations between the parties. But we see it as the basis for any agreement that evolves.

Dr. Kissinger: As we have played with these things, we think it should be plural -- "agreements" rather than "agreement."

Dinitz: Yes. I am coming to that. We are not quite clear in our mind when you talk about "stages and priorities" because we don't know what will happen between the stages and between the priorities. So we would prefer no reference to stages and priorities. We should stick to the reference to 242 and final peace.

Dr. Kissinger: We meant to allow for an interim settlement.

Dinitz: So you can say, "an interim settlement is not precluded." Just say it explicitly. We didn't like what you had because it reminded us of the timetables in the Russian plan.

In Paragraph 2, the provisions for withdrawal, I already said we would rather have the exact phrasing of Resolution 242. Also, the phrase "Arab territories" doesn't appear in 242; it says "territories." Once you identify it as Arab, you are already prejudging it. Why go beyond 242 on this?

But the main thing in this paragraph is that it should not be separate from the element of agreement and the element of secure and recognized boundaries in 242. Many people in 1967 accepted our opinion that "secure and recognized" means withdrawal to new boundaries that will not be the 1967 boundaries. The 1967 boundaries certainly weren't secure and recognized.

Dr. Kissinger: They certainly weren't recognized. But it is rather hard to maintain from the outcome of the 1967 war that they weren't secure.

Dinitz: Our army was secure! But the borders invited trouble.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your position. There is no need to debate this.

Dinitz: Paragraph 3 is maintained by us, with the possibility of one small change. Where it says "any border rectifications" we would prefer "changes", because "rectifications" can have the connotation of small size. This is a very important paragraph. "Changes" has no connotation of size.

Dr. Kissinger: That raises a tactical question. To get the key changes, we may have to keep the changes in the other paragraphs to a minimum.

Dinitz: Paragraph 4 we have problems with. We would like to remove completely the mention of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh and remove any reference to Sharm. Because the context of the paragraph is of security arrangements. We believe Sharm should be controlled by us -- I am not talking about sovereignty.

Dr. Kissinger: No reference to Sharm.

Dinitz: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians won't fight over that.

Dinitz: If there is no mention of Sharm, they will interpret it their way.

The Prime Minister says it is imperative not to give the Soviets any hold there at all. There should be no physical Soviet presence there, in the context of big-power guarantees.

Paragraph 4, still, on big-power guarantees, is something the Prime Minister negates, except when it is a function of agreement between parties and not something instead of secure borders.

Dr. Kissinger: Are these typed up? Can you give us a copy?

Dinitz: I will get hell in Israel if I do that. I fought to get any remarks at all.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. It is a daring course.

Dinitz: Paragraph 5 we feel would be unnecessary, not needed at all. It is ~~not~~ that we object, but if our approach is taken with respect to

paragraph 1 -- 'agreement between the parties under 242 to achieve a final peace' -- then there is no need in paragraph 5 to refer also to the end to a state of belligerency.

Paragraph 6: again, on Sharm el-Sheikh, we don't want to mix the Suez Canal and Sharm -- or the Straits of Tiran, as it is referred to here. Because while the Suez Canal is an international waterway and we don't dispute Egyptian sovereignty -- though it should be open to all, and we want Israel mentioned explicitly -- but Sharm we want to insure through our own control. We don't dispute Egyptian sovereignty of the Canal, or control over it. But the physical control is different in the two waterways. Mention of Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal is not necessary because no one disputes it, and we don't want it mixed up with Sharm.

On Paragraph 7 we have no remarks of substance but we would rather have "peace treaties" rather than "settlement".

In Paragraph 8, we suggest a return to the language of Resolution 242, which just says "a just settlement of the refugee problem". And we would prefer the following sentence to be incorporated after every reference to refugees: "In reaching an agreement containing provisions laying down the obligations accepted by the parties towards a settlement of the refugee problem, neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty."

I have two general remarks to add: One reason I was able to get such remarks was that you said on the phone we can only live with a paper that leaves us room enough for negotiations. I saw this as a key remark, and I told the Prime Minister about it. She said you should know that Israel can live only with a paper that leaves us room for negotiations on substantial changes in borders -- not on the basis of no changes or only minor rectifications.

The second remark is that it is the request of the Prime Minister that the United States do everything possible to dissociate from the document.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Peter will check with Idan on the language to make sure we have it.

We have to navigate between something that is so new that the Russians will introduce new points, and something that we can use. We will put together a new set of principles. You will be making suggestions as our adviser, not as the Israeli Ambassador. We understand -- it is your second choice. You would prefer no document, and the only document we can use is something you will be against. I just want your Prime Minister to understand that I understand.

Here is a long letter from Heath, that you can read. [Tab D]

Dinitz: [Reads it.] In the third page, the screwdriver came out of the back.

The operative part is the same as the British delegate said at the United Nations. The reasoning, on the need for oil, is secret of course. But on the need to go to the '67 lines, it was said at the United Nations the day before yesterday. And it goes back to the Harrogate speech, the original British position. [Dinitz hands back the letter.]

Dr. Kissinger: Here is the message from the Egyptians. I sent them two messages, one telling them there would be aircraft deliveries to Israel, and the second message, to which this is a reply. [Tab E]

You can see I told him that we would maintain a military balance.

Dinitz: You didn't tell him how much.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I wouldn't tell him that much.

You know that was the formula you gave me [about linkage].

Dinitz: But there was no Israeli statement about linkage. It always has been our position that the interim settlement is not the final border, but no Israeli made a statement about the linkage formula.

Dr. Kissinger: I have never replied to that.

Dinitz: What is this about "the understanding on which the present Egyptian-American discussion is based" and the "objective" of "final withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's international boundaries?"

Dr. Kissinger: The only understanding that we have is on 242. That is their point of view, not ours.

What I will do is redraft the principles, to keep it as close as possible to last year's.

Dinitz: I have two more points the Prime Minister asked me to raise. With respect to Soviet Jewry, we would appreciate it if the President could raise with Brezhnev, first, the level of emigration, and secondly, the hardship cases. On the first, there has been a decline, not an increase, in recent months.

Then I was asked to mention the Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and to Kuwait.

Dr. Kissinger: I have stopped the Kuwaiti one for the time being.

Dinitz: Anything on the Saudis?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it's going to be tough.

Dinitz: One more question. We are very much concerned with Ethiopia, as you know. The Emperor was here, and he tells our people he got completely a cold shoulder from State.

Dr. Kissinger: The trouble with State is that they dislike America so much that they think anyone who is friendly to us is defective. [Laughter] I will look into that and let you know.

[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador then conferred alone for ten minutes.]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman *pwr*

TIME & PLACE: January 24, 1973
The Map Room, The White House
6:05 to 6:22 p.m.

Ambassador Rabin: Congratulations on the Vietnam settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: It was the best obtainable under the circumstances. In fact, it is better than the situation warranted. They could have held out another two months and we would have been in serious difficulty.

Ambassador Rabin: It is a tremendous achievement.

Mr. Kissinger: I wanted to see you before your meeting with the President.

Ambassador Rabin: I believe it will be a short meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: I guess a half an hour. He has nothing particular in mind. He likes you. You and Freeman are the only two Ambassadors he has developed a personal feeling for.

Ambassador Rabin: I will make three points. First I will thank him for allowing Israel to get arms.

Dr. Kissinger: May I suggest something? Spend the first few minutes about some other subjects, such as his courage and strength.

Ambassador Rabin: I'll tell him that I came here in 1968. The difference between what I found here in '68 and what I see when I leave is a dramatic change. People don't realize this, but I do as a foreigner. Believe me, I thought America was falling apart. Secondly, I will talk about arms, and thank him. Then I will thank him for the American posture and strength as translated to the Middle East, and its importance.

Dr. Kissinger: Such as the Jordanian crisis.

Ambassador Rabin: Such as the Jordanian crisis and so on. And my opinion is that the Egyptians asked the Russians out because the Russians were not ready to give them what they wanted. This is partly because of Israel's strength, but it is also because of the change of posture between the major powers.

Dr. Kissinger: I have learned that when you use force it is better to use 30 percent more than is necessary than five percent less than necessary.

Ambassador Rabin: Not gradual involvement.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. Therefore whenever we use force we have to do it slightly hysterically. Even the Indian/Pakistani crisis.

Ambassador Rabin: Even Sadat has said this.

Dr. Kissinger: The Russians told Sadat that we would not stand for war.

Ambassador Rabin: And third, that all these political solutions have come up mainly when there is no option for war. Only then will there be change and a more realistic chance for a political settlement in the Middle East. I will stress therefore the need to leave more to the parties to do more.

Dr. Kissinger: This he will not agree with.

Ambassador Rabin: I know, I will do it a different way.

Dr. Kissinger: Fine.

Ambassador Rabin: I will end with the hope that he will continue his present policy, particularly the first two elements, because this is responsible for the situation today.

Dr. Kissinger: He has enormous respect for you. And the more you can talk as a man leaving the diplomatic service, as a man he asked to see...

Let me tell you what I have been doing, which I may not be able to do. The Egyptians, as I've told you, have been bombarding me with requests for a meeting. I tentatively proposed February 22nd in London. I may not be able to do this.

Ambassador Rabin: Ismail.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. My strategy would be to get some degree of control over it. Second, to see what they have in mind, if anything. And third, to do this before Mrs. Meir comes, so we can all discuss it. Is she coming the 27th?

Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I could shift this to the 26th with Ismail.

Ambassador Rabin: On the matter of aircraft production, let me tell you. This mission from your Defense Department came to Israel. They had thought we wanted technical knowhow because we had nothing. They were shocked. They now realize we will do it either with them or without them. They finished by saying they would recommend everything. We will see. They started to calculate everything for us. We said we could do the calculation ourselves.

Dr. Kissinger: You should crystallize it into a decision so I can act. Put it in a formal proposal.

Ambassador Rabin: We have.

Dr. Kissinger: Where is it?

Ambassador Rabin: They had a mission, they had to put it into a report, but they had no one to report to because the new Secretary was not in yet.

The Prime Minister will raise here first the question of arms, second the question of political settlement--where we go.

Dr. Kissinger: Warn her not to get too specific.

Ambassador Rabin: I will be going to Israel and will get back on the 5th.

Dr. Kissinger: I may go on vacation on the 7th. Let's meet again on the 5th or 6th, because I may go on vacation and not be back until the 18th of February.

Ambassador Rabin: We've got to know where to go. We have enough from Jordan to know now.

Dr. Kissinger: He has not proposed anything.

Ambassador Rabin: She would be satisfied with the line agreed in December 1971 if it can be worked out for the future. After all, there is no need for any activity. Even the Secretary of State, when he talked about activity, did not propose anything new.

Dr. Kissinger: But as you told me, every time I do anything you pay for it.

Ambassador Rabin: They are behaving now.

The third point she might raise is Soviet Jewry. At present in terms of numbers, it's good. In terms of ransom...

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you the President is extremely sensitive about the idea of American Jewish community holding up American foreign policy on an issue he considers a Soviet internal matter.

Ambassador Rabin: Jackson isn't Jewish.

Dr. Kissinger: The President thinks he responds to the Jewish community. It is an extraordinary sensitivity of the President. And the Russians basically have no feelings. They do what they have to do.

[Kissinger and Rabin conferred privately from 6:22 to 6:30 p.m.]