

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|---|---------|-------------|
| 1 | memcon | HAK, Rabin, et. al. 10 pages | 2/5/73 | B |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-04/1 | | |
| | | SANITIZED per sec. 3.3(b)(6) E.O. 12958 Ltr. Jan. 25, 2003 | | |
| 2 | memcon | HAK, Rabin, et. al. 8 pages | 2/27/73 | B |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-04/2 | | |
| | | DECLASSIFIED per Ltr. 25 Jun 03 | | |
| 3 | memcon | HAK, Rabin, et. al. 4 pages | 3/9/73 | B |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-04/3 | | |
| | | SANITIZED per sec. 3.3(b)(1) E.O. 12958 Ltr. 25 Jun 03 | | |
| 4A | report | First Meeting with P. 29 pages | 3/23/73 | B |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-04/4 | | |
| | | DECLASSIFIED Per Ltr. 12/17/2009 (case 03-38/15) | | |
| 5A | cable | Tel Aviv to Washington | 4/13/73 | B |
| 5B | memo | Schlesinger to HAK | 4/16/73 | B |
| 6 | memcon | HAK, Dinitz, et. al. 11 pages | 4/24/73 | B |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-A-04/1688 | | |
| | | SANITIZED per sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 1131/2013 | | |
| 7 | memcon | HAK, Dinitz, et. al. 5 pages | 5/3/73 | B |
| | | MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-A-04/1689 | | |
| | | SANITIZED per sec. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 1131/2013 | | |

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| FILE GROUP TITLE | BOX NUMBER |
| NSC Files HAK Office Files, Country Files, Middle East | 135 |
| FOLDER TITLE | [p. 1 of 2] |
| ④ Rabin/Dinitz Sensitive Memcons 1973 | |

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.</p> <p>B. National security classified information.</p> <p>C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.</p> <p>D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.</p> | <p>E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.</p> <p>F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.</p> <p>G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.</p> <p>H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.</p> |
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------|---------------|--|---------|-------------|
| 8A | brief | Dinitz to Sisco | 6/4/73 | B |
| 9A | cable | Heath to the President | 6/14/73 | B |
| 9B | memo | Schlesinger to HAK | 6/11/73 | B |
| [1] 10 | memcon | Rodman, Dinitz, et. al. (11 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-A-09/1 | 6/19/73 | B |
| [2] 11 | memcon DOS | SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1)(b); HP. 6/24/73 HAK, Dinitz, et. al. MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-09/2 | 8/3/73 | B |
| [3] 12 | memcon DOS | HAK, Dinitz, et. al. MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 07-09/3 | 8/14/73 | B |
| 13 | memo | Rodman to HAK | 8/16/73 | B |

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Middle East
 BOX NUMBER: 135
 FOLDER TITLE: (4) Rabin/Dinitz Sensitive Memcons 1973
 Ep. 2 of 2

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 - G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 - H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

[Envelope enclosing contents of box 48 (400)]

~~TED ROBERTS~~

Sensitive Files (originals)
for the NIXON files

from Peter Rodman

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman *PR*

DATE AND TIME: February 5, 1973, 12:15 - 1:15 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Ambassador Rabin: Everything in the Middle East is fine.

Dr. Kissinger: Allow me [he pours coffee]. You may discover oil in the Middle East and we will have to treat you better.

Ambassador Rabin: We have a grievance against Moses: He spent forty years in the desert and took us to the one place that has no oil. There is another theory in Israel: that the solution to our security problem would be to take over Saudi Arabia!

I wanted this meeting because I just came back from Israel. I discussed privately with the Prime Minister about where we stand, and secondly, in preparation for her visit, what we think, and thirdly, why the last meeting with the King was the most important. Two or three weeks ago, we had a meeting. The King had a proposal. He had a paper with the subjects and proposals he wishes to raise. I believe you have it.

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't seen it yet.

Ambassador Rabin: She was there, Galili, and no one else. I reported my impressions from my last meeting with the President: the President would like to see, of course, a movement in the right, positive direction in the Middle East. Secondly, in the discussion, the President said he had no ideas on how to move it. Thirdly, the President would be more than glad to hear from the Prime Minister if she had any ideas. Fourthly, the President would understand if she did not have any.

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (S)~~
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NW 03-04/1 per sec. 3.3(b)(6) tr. 25 JUN 03

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 5 JUL 07

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[p. 1 of 10]

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't count on that.

Ambassador Rabin: But that's what he said. Secondly, I said, let's try to find if there is any possibility to bringing in new ideas. We tried to sum up where we stand and tried to analyze what can be done.

First, with respect to Egypt. The first option is an overall agreement. This would bring a confrontation between Israel and everybody in the world, because the main issue would be Egypt's demand for total withdrawal. No one can discuss an overall settlement without deciding what line to go to. The President is not blind. The whole world is against Israel on this one. The United Nations Security Council debate confirms this.

More than that, to make any political effort in this direction is to call for friction -- that is an understatement -- between the United States and Israel. The great idea about an interim settlement is that it avoids for the time being a collision between our two countries.

The second option is the question of an interim settlement. The main obstacle is the Egyptian demand to ask as a precondition a commitment by Israel to total withdrawal. Or, in disguised terms, a linkage between the interim and the overall. Egypt will never agree to an interim settlement without an agreement on the overall, and total withdrawal.

What is the advantage, nevertheless, of still sticking to the interim? First, for 15 months, our two governments have created at least the impression that it is workable. It seems that the Europeans, even if they are using it as an excuse to stay out of it, have started to buy it. Pompidou publicly encouraged the U. S. to try it. The Europeans will buy it, because it will reopen the Suez Canal.

Dr. Kissinger: They will buy it if it happens.

Ambassador Rabin: Yes, but they have nothing against it. Maybe there is no other initiative.

The third option is the status quo. And even in this one, you have to give the other side some option that appears reasonable.

So this is the situation vis-a-vis Egypt.

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Dr. Kissinger: By the way, please keep your diplomats from mentioning my name. One of your diplomats in Europe -- harmlessly -- said that the Arabs want Kissinger involved because he is a miracle worker.

Ambassador Rabin: Some Jewish leaders asked the Prime Minister if Kissinger would get involved.

Dr. Kissinger: Do they want me to?

Ambassador Rabin: My impression is yes. She said, "No one knows where Kissinger will land the next day but I can tell you he won't land here!"


Dr. Kissinger: She is all right. The problem is that it stirs everyone up in our bureaucracy.

Ambassador Rabin: On Jordan, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister and the King. We exchanged information with respect to terroristic activities. We warned them against things that were going to happen. There is a well-developed machinery of working together.

Rifai, Hassan and the King are coming.

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Dr. Kissinger: Rifai I know; 

Ambassador Rabin: 

Dr. Kissinger: Rifai is the one I talk to.

Ambassador Rabin: The King gave me a two-page paper. Jerusalem has to be divided along the 1967 lines, basically, in terms of sovereignty, but it can be a unified municipality in terms of reality. With only minor changes. Secondly, Gaza and the bulk of the West Bank -- much more than the Allon Plan -- practically everything except the mutual exchange of boundaries.

Dr. Kissinger: They told me they would buy the Allon Plan.

Ambassador Rabin: No. These are the two problems. We decided not to make too much fuss about his joining the Eastern Command. The advantage of the King, of course, is that he came out publicly against war with Israel, and he is willing to say that Israel exists, and he keeps the Russians out.

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[NW 03-04/1:3]

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We would love to reach agreement with the King, but on this basis [his paper] it is practically impossible. We are all for his consolidating the situation in the East Bank. We cooperate with him. We understand if you sell him arms and give him economic aid. It is in the interest of him to be seen to be doing something positive for his people. Our view is, let him enjoy some public support in the U.S. This does not harm Israel. Let him enjoy his trip.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay.

Ambassador Rabin: I gave my estimate to the Prime Minister that your summit has been postponed until late summer -- that was my estimate. I said I did not know.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not clear yet.

Ambassador Rabin: I said to her that the only thing to get the U.S. to press hard would be in preparation for the summit. Where the Middle East is important to the U.S. is primarily in the major power context.

With what can she come? I don't see anything, unless the King is prepared to go away from his proposal. Not just slight changes from his proposal.

We are trying with the Christian churches to separate the religious element and the sovereignty element. The churches never maintained any sovereign right. We and the churches have no conflict with respect to the Holy Places; ours and theirs do not coincide. We are ready to go far beyond what people believe in terms of extraterritoriality for the Christian churches.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the Arabs?

Ambassador Rabin: That is more complicated. Because they raise the sovereignty issue.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do you care about sovereignty?

Ambassador Rabin: We don't care about sovereignty over the Holy Places.

Dr. Kissinger: What's wrong with one municipality with Jordanian government offices in the old part?

Ambassador Rabin: That is more complicated. They are concerned about citizenship. On the question of citizenship, it would have been easier if the question of sovereignty were not as strong as it is now.

I think the Prime Minister intends to come and put to the President -- unless you have a different idea -- and explain: (1) what has been done to explore more avenues. Ceaucescu invited the Prime Minister and proposed some sort of going between; the Prime Minister agreed, and he just faded away. And all the talks with the King.

(2) As the President said about himself and Agnew, why break up a winning team? So, why change a winning policy? In over a year since we agreed with you, this policy -- if we are realistic -- has created the best results. I don't see any urgent need to change it. It is time that the U.S. gives the King what he wants. Let him talk about a political solution, give him general support, but do not try to create illusions. It would not help even the King to have illusions about his proposal.

When the Prime Minister comes, let's stick to the present policy unless conditions change. Stick to the agreement on the planes.

Dr. Kissinger: It runs through 1973?

Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: My judgment of the situation is this: First, Washington is strewn with the corpses of those who left his office thinking they understood him. I would not attach final importance to what the President said in mood of the time. ^{the} _^

Ambassador Rabin: I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Two, the situation is stabilized in the last twelve months, by our agreement at the Waldorf Astoria, but it cannot be maintained indefinitely. It depends on creating the illusion that something is being done while we all know in fact that nothing is being done.

Ambassador Rabin: But nothing is better, even from your point of view.

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Dr. Kissinger: You don't have to convince me. It's been my strategy since '69. The best way to fight the Soviets in the Middle East is to frustrate the Arabs in any moves towards the Soviets so they have to come to us.

Now we have had another overture from the Soviets. Here is a message from Brezhnev to the President [Tab A].

Ambassador Rabin: The question is to what extent are the Russians really going to press the Middle East. They must, because . . .

Dr. Kissinger: They have two objectives. One, to see if they can get something for their clients, and two, to try to get ahead of the Egyptians and make more extreme demands with us, so that Sadat would look like a traitor if he settled with us.

Ambassador Rabin: The military situation has changed. Syria has been clobbered; now they put real pressure on the terrorists. The Lebanon army never really fights.

Dr. Kissinger: You and the North Vietnamese are the two classic proofs that liberalism is wrong. Le Duc Tho was never warmer to me than after the bombing!

The State Department is really anxious to get going. We cannot restrain them indefinitely. These are the facts of life.

Third, the oil companies and their representatives are convinced that we are going to lose Arab oil as an energy source. I am not agreeing with it; I am telling you what the situation is.

Therefore, you cannot get the President's agreement to maintain the status quo.

You can have her put 80% of what you said in terms of movement. A better strategy would be: she can say the status quo is not intolerable, but do not let her say that we should not do anything.

I have told you I am in contact with the Egyptians. You would prefer that I would see them before she comes.

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Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: She agrees?

Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It will become public afterwards.

Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: They are already talking to everybody. I am convinced they are talking. There is no way to prevent its becoming public. They want me to come to London. There is no way that I can do that without press excitement and without the British being involved.

Ambassador Rabin: They have said to others that they will not come here, only to a third country.

Dr. Kissinger: They have said that to us, too. That's what the dispute is about. But if they insist on a third country, that inevitably delays it.

[Rabin and Kissinger then conferred privately from 12:55 to 1:15 p.m.]

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[NAN 03-04/1:7]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman *PKR*

DATE AND TIME: February 27, 1973
3:30-4:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room

Dr. Kissinger: What is the chief significance of that document you gave me?

Amb. Rabin: It's one of the fullest talks that covers all the issues between the two countries on the Arab side with Brezhnev. They reviewed the past, but talked about the future. He summed it up, and there is the memo he prepared for Sadat after he met with Brezhnev. And the letter.

Dr. Kissinger: You will get everything I tell them too? I said nice things about you! I told the Egyptians how dovish you are.

Amb. Rabin: There is a letter by Brezhnev committing himself to the MIG's--but warning them not to go to war without coordinating with the Russians. Therefore, I would say there are efforts of restraint on the part of the Russians. For that they will get a lot. He mentioned ground-to-ground missiles. Secondly, there was still a political option, but for that you have to mobilize the other Arab states, Brezhnev said, including the use of oil. Third, they are not against talking to you but it has to be done with very close consultation. Then Brezhnev and Ismail discussed the political approach, which was exactly as he put it to you.

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WLN 03-04/2 per ltr. 25 Jun 03

By *SP*

NARA, Date *13 Aug 87*

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[p. 1 of 8]

The Prime Minister has read it. Her first reaction was, are they crazy to come with such a proposal to the Americans? It's the Russian proposal of 1969. There is nothing new here.

Dr. Kissinger: That's all there is. In our discussions there was something about staging and so forth, which I will give you orally.

Amb. Rabin: It's the toughest Egyptian position we have ever had.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me give you my impression. The factual situation. The position of Israel. There are not five Israelis who understand the American position, though three million think they do. You are one of the five.

I let him present his case. You will see the transcript. I asked questions, saying, "You want us to do something, therefore I have to know what you are talking about." So it was mostly cross examination by me. I did not express any view of the American position, except to say there has to be a new element. On a number of issues he said he would study it very carefully. This summary I sent you [Tab A] was done by Saunders.

I said there had to be some concreteness on security arrangements. So I did discuss whether special security zones could be discussed. He said, "What do you have in mind?" I summed up for him an article by the son of Rafael, which was in Orbis last year. He said he would study it.

Secondly, if I understand their proposal, they and we and you--but obviously they mean we deliver you--

Ambassador Rabin: This is how they discuss with the Russians.

Dr. Kissinger: --on general principles. Like, for example, what Dean Rusk said in 1967, it doesn't have to be more specific than that. Then after that they claim they would be willing to have more direct negotiations with Israel about the content of the principles and simultaneously begin the negotiations on Syria and Jordan. Unlike the Soviets. They said they would settle Egypt first and the others could come along close behind.

Amb. Rabin: That is nothing new.

Dr. Kissinger: I am just telling you. It's new to me but that doesn't make it new.

On the first day he took a hard line on the Palestinian issue. On the second day he retreated and said that the Jordanians could settle it, but he left it open that Egypt could raise the Palestinian issue within Jordan.

My impression is that in the context of total withdrawal they would agree to

Amb. Rabin: To whatever stages of implementation.

Dr. Kissinger: They would not insist on demilitarized zones on the Israeli side, I think.

Amb. Rabin: Symbolic zones, it said.

Dr. Kissinger: But I think they would accept. On Sharm el-Sheik, he tried to indicate some flexibility on that. In the context of total withdrawal. Israeli international observers.

Amb. Rabin: He said that to Sisco two years ago.

Dr. Kissinger: You look at the transcript when we get it done. The major point we have to come to some understanding on before you meet with the President is not to get into your Prime Minister's head that this is a triumphal tour of the United States. This is not how he is approaching the problem. Long speeches about how the status quo is the best will not help you. You do what you want, but I am telling you the facts.

Amb. Rabin: In the long run, I think she will say that we should try the lines we have tried. Of course, she will raise maintenance of the balance.

Dr. Kissinger: Continuation of the deliveries of planes?

Amb. Rabin: Yes, for 1974 and 1975. And the question of production.

[NYN 03 - 04 / 1:8]

problem in this very spirit.

to use his influence for the solution of the Middle East
President Nixon as well, who not once spoke about his readiness
of peace in general. This has been pointed out personally by
Middle East, to the interests of our states and the interests
solution answering to the interests of all states in the
it was stressed that it is necessary and possible to find a
area would lead to a confrontation between our countries;
Union should not allow that the development of events in that
been repeatedly stressed that the United States and the Soviet
of opinion, including that on the highest level, a thought has
As is known, in the course of the Soviet-American exchange
end of it and for how long these complications would persist.
security, and it is difficult to envisage what would be the
quite unwelcome consequences for the cause of international
other states including major powers - there could develop
then - taking into account existing ties with this area of
doubt that if hostilities in the Middle East erupt once again
not taken the events there can get out of control. There is no
remains complicated and dangerous. If effective measures are
that time is passing while the situation in the Middle East
Speaking about this question, it is necessary to emphasize
subject of the Middle East.

therefore could not for a while pay due attention to the

the US were totally absorbed in the Vietnamese affairs and

However, in reply to our appeals we were told that

denial channel.

discussion of this question, particularly through the confi-

of the Middle East conflict and suggested to resume an active

concerning the necessity of seeking a constructive settlement

Consequently, we on our part repeatedly raised the question

efforts on the part of our states is this 1973.

foremost foreign policy tasks, which demand the exertion of

settlement, which the President quite justly rank among the

continue the discussion of the questions of the Middle East

the President expressed in the message of December 18, 1972 to

L.I. Brezhnev paid attention to the readiness of

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We think that both the USSR and the US really can use their influence, their weight, and nature of their ties with the countries - participants in the conflict in order to finally bring the whole matter to the liquidation of the military hotbed in the Middle East.

In this connection a postponement of the exchange of views between us on this important problem seems to be unjustified. There can be of course an order of priority in the solution of problems, but there are problems which can and should be solved in parallel with other urgent international issues. We believe that in the interests of big policy it is exactly in this way that we should approach the solution of the Middle East problem.

As for the Soviet Union, we are prepared for a confidential exchange of views with the American side on this problem. The President knows well the essence of the Soviet position. We have consistently proceeded and proceed from such provisions of principle, which are contained in the known resolution of the Security Council.

The key question of a settlement in the Middle East is, undoubtedly, the question of Israeli troops withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. If it is solved, then there can be no doubt that there will be no special difficulties in solving other questions of the settlement as well, such as providing for the security and independent existence of the state of Israel and of other countries of that area; establishing demilitarized zones, providing for the freedom of navigation of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba, respect for the rights of the people of Palestine etc. Of course, the whole complex of the Middle East settlement should cover not only Egypt, but Syria and Jordan as well.

We have expressed those thoughts to the President more than once. Some time ago we have already forwarded to the US Govern-

[NLN 03-04/1:9]

ment concrete proposals on this matter as well. We still believe that these proposals constitute an appropriate basis for agreement.

Now as never before the time factor has become of decisive importance in the question of political settlement in the Middle East. We are well aware of the feelings of the Arabs. Further existence of the deadlock in the settlement, for which Israel is to blame, cannot but force the Arab countries to seek a way out along the lines of using military methods to solve the lingering crisis no matter what would be the attitude of others to it.

Only substantial progress in the settlement through political means can prevent such a dangerous turn of affairs. We hope that in accordance with the results of the negotiations in Moscow we can start in the near future an exchange of views aimed at working out joint agreement on the settlement of the situation in the Middle East.

understanding

[NIN 03-04/1:10]

[NAD 03-04/2:44]

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION

This memo describes (1) Ismail's position as it evolved over two days of talks and (2) the process he envisages over the coming months.

Ismail's Position

A. Urgency of An Overall Settlement

First day: He emphasized the importance of a settlement in 1973. The Middle East cannot stand waiting for 15 years while new relationships evolve, as some Israeli leaders recommend.

Second day: He outlined procedures which if followed through to their logical conclusion could take well beyond the end of 1973 to complete, although by his timetable fundamental principles of an agreement would have been agreed by this September (see description of procedures below).

He said he had absolutely rejected an "interim settlement" on the Suez Canal, but he readily agreed that the ideas represented in that approach could be used as the opening phase of a broader process.

B. Long-term Objective

First day: He spoke in terms of wanting to see develop a Middle East of strong, healthy, cooperative, independent states. He implied Israel could be among them if Israel recognized itself as a Middle Eastern state. A peace settlement could be a basis for normalization of relations, but that would take a long time. Normalization of relations will depend on, among other things, a refugee settlement.

Second day: In informal conversation, he felt that even talking about the prospect of normalization of relations with Israel is a new element in the Egyptian position.

C. Recognition of Israel

First day: He said an Egypt-Israel agreement would establish a state of peace. This would end the state of war but would not be "full peace."

- This agreement would produce a situation different from the Egypt-Israel relationship before 1967 in that it would:
 - allow Israel free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal;
 - end the boycott on third-party goods;
 - commit Egypt to prevent guerrilla operations from Egyptian soil and elsewhere to the extent possible;
 - end Egypt's practice of adding a reservation clause when it signs multilateral agreements, saying that they do not apply to Israel;
 - commit each side to non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, e.g. by radio.
- This agreement would not include exchanging ambassadors, trade agreements, borders open for routine travel. Those steps would be characteristics of later normalization.

Second day: He volunteered that in the transitional period between the ending of the state of war and the achievement of full peace that there could be the beginning of some practical normal contacts between Egyptians and Israelis developing out of day-to-day situations.

He was uncertain about the timing of recognition, whether it should be tied to signing of the Syrian and Jordanian agreements. He rather thought so.

D. Main Aspects of a Settlement

First day: He said there are two main aspects of a settlement:

- First is the question of restoring Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory. This requires Israeli withdrawal to pre-war borders.
- Second is the issue of Palestinian rights. This problem should be reduced to the size of Arab and Jewish communities within the area of mandated Palestine deciding how to divide that territory and live together. He said:

[NIN 03-04/2:6]

- Egypt would pose no objection if Hussein negotiated with Israel to get the West Bank back and then gave the West Bank Palestinians a chance to determine their own future. This would then become an internal Jordanian problem. He was reluctant at first to commit himself that Egypt would regard Jordan's solution as a solution of the Palestine problem for all Arabs.
- Gaza must have self-determination. Egypt will handle the negotiation on this in the first instance.
- A refugee settlement is necessary.

Second day:

- He spoke of the problem of regaining Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai in terms of reconciling Egypt's sovereignty with legitimate Israeli security concerns.
- Egypt is prepared to let Hussein negotiate his own agreement with Israel, including border changes (even a security corridor down the Jordan River) but probably not major concessions in Jerusalem. Egypt would consider whatever Hussein works out with the West Bank Palestinians as an internal Jordanian matter, not an Arab-Israeli matter.
- Gaza's self-determination should be worked out under UN auspices. An Egypt-Israel agreement should contain these principles: (1) Israel should agree to withdraw in principle so that (2) Gazans could freely exercise their right of self-determination (3) under UN auspices. This would also have to be related to a Jordan settlement. Gaza could become part of Jordan if the Gazans wished.
- A refugee settlement would have to be in accordance with UN resolutions. This agreement might be worked out by the UN.
- The question of a Syria-Israel settlement is more serious to Egypt than a Jordan-Israel settlement because Syria is a member of the Egypt-Syria-Libya confederation. A Syrian settlement must be based on the same principles as Egypt's.

[NAN 03-04/2:7]

E. Meeting Israel's Security Concerns

First day: Egypt would be willing to meet Israel's "legitimate" security concerns, which include international guarantees and Egyptian peace commitments (spelled out in C above).

Second day: In a fairly detailed discussion, he indicated the following position:

- Demilitarized zones can vary in size on the two sides. Israeli zone can be symbolic. International observers would inspect these zones.
- An international force could be stationed in areas of special importance like Sharm al-Shaikh.
- There could be big-power guarantees.
- There might be interim security arrangements at some points during a transitional period, but he had not really considered this. For instance, he would consider whether there might be transitional security arrangements during the period between the end of the state of war and the advent of full peace. As he began to understand this proposition he said: "If the issues of territory and sovereignty could be put aside, we could be open-minded."

F. Settlement by Stages and Sectors

First day: The Arab-Israeli problem can be settled by stages and sectors, but they must be linked so as to lead to an overall settlement. There must be a full settlement; Egypt cannot accept a partial withdrawal "left hanging". He did not commit himself on whether a Jordan-Israel or Egypt-Israel settlement should come first.

Second day: He felt that agreement first on the principles of an Egypt-Israel settlement would help later to "start the motors in other places". He saw the Syrian and Jordanian negotiations running one step behind the Egyptian negotiations. Egypt could sign a separate agreement with Israel provided Syrian and Jordanian negotiations were then in train.

[NAN 03-04/2:8]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *PR*

DATE AND TIME: March 9, 1973
6:00 - 6:20 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room

Dr. Kissinger: When do you leave?

Amb. Rabin: Tomorrow night.

Dr. Kissinger: Really!

Amb. Rabin: It's time to go home!

Dr. Kissinger: You are one of the few people I will genuinely miss. I don't say this just to be polite. Your successor is not in your league, frankly. Tell him what we don't need is a clever Israeli. I mean, you are clever but steady.

Amb. Rabin: You want me to tell him this.

Dr. Kissinger: Tell him don't be cute, don't try to maneuver around town. You were reliable.

Amb. Rabin: I maneuvered when I had to!

If you ask me what I worry about, it is the preparation for the Summit--the Middle East on one side and MFN.

Dr. Kissinger: I tell you, if the Jewish community blocks MFN, there will be violent reaction from the President.

Amb. Rabin: I keep telling them at home, the security problem and the boundaries is not the issue. Relations with the U. S. and the whole

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~~TOP SECRET - XDS (2)~~
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

[p. 1 of 4]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NND 03-04/3
By *PR*
Date *5 JUL 07*
per sec. 3.3(b)(1) pr. 25 JUN 03
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philosophical problem, is the real issue we will face. If the President had not raised it with the Prime Minister, she would not have realized it.

Dr. Kissinger: Does she realize it now?

Amb. Rabin: I think so. I will tell my successor this is what he will face.

Dr. Kissinger: Did you see Marquis Childs today?

Amb. Rabin: Yes, and the Jackson people have 70 Senators.

Dr. Kissinger: If I were the Israeli Ambassador I would pray to lose this one.

Amb. Rabin: I will tell my successor this is what he will face.

On the aircraft, Rogers called Mrs. Meir and repeated the commitment.

Dr. Kissinger: I told you all that.

Amb. Rabin: Yes, but it was a good call. I got it in writing on production now. There is no clear-cut definition of what and what. But I lunched with Sisco. I asked him, "Are you going to sue it for blackmail?" He said, "There is no politics, this is the spirit of the instructions from the White House." On the planes, he had nothing in writing, but he repeated the commitment. Sisco said they were working on a projection for more than two years ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: I told him to do that.

Amb. Rabin: So it would take a few more weeks to do. I said fine.

On the political issue, what will happen?

Dr. Kissinger: That's what I want to talk to you about. I have told you what the situation is.

Amb. Rabin: I understand it, I understand it.

Dr. Kissinger: Does she understand it?

Amb. Rabin: Yes, she understands.

Dr. Kissinger: I have briefed you twice.

Amb. Rabin: Yes.

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Dr. Kissinger: You must not squander it. I have now defused the issue for you. When there is a Summit-- it will probably be in June; this is for your information only. Dobrynin came back and brought great pressure on the Middle East. I used the Egyptian thing against him: "The Egyptians don't want you in it. As long as we are talking to the Egyptians, we can't get into detailed negotiations with you without total confusion."

But they put it at the top of the agenda.

Amb. Rabin: Higher than trade?

Dr. Kissinger: Trade they regard as already settled. It's our obligation now.

Amb. Rabin: Yes.

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Dr. Kissinger: Let me show you the impressions [redacted]
[redacted] You might take a look at it. [Rabin reads it.] This doesn't mean anything in itself, but... [Rabin continues reading, and hands it back.]

Let me tell you what my thinking is.

Amb. Rabin: I understood you would like...

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to have come out of the summit the same principles that came out of Moscow--or better ones. I would like to sell them the same principles again. But this time they may have to be public. This is an excuse, first of all, to stay out of detailed negotiations, and it could be an excuse for you and the Egyptians to have an interim agreement. This will take us through the fall. Then, given their reluctance to have full peace, we can have interim security arrangements--which I tried to tell them, and if we can believe this, has at least sunk in. This takes us to 1974.

Amb. Rabin: What we lose is the commitment of the United States to the sovereignty of Egypt. You use to say "rectification" in your principles. Knowing Egypt, rectification means no Gaza.

The Prime Minister asked you and she asked me--what do the Russians have on the Americans? What is it they have on you?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, you will lose something. But you will gain time. You will not be able to maintain for the next four years the position that you can do nothing, that you can just stay where you are. I

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am being hit from every direction. When I get hit this much, it means the President is being hit ten times as much. But you can try the gamble.

Amb. Rabin: To come with principles publicly, say July or August, will be very unpleasant to the Prime Minister. That is two or three months before our election.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no countervailing influence on the President. The only thing restraining things is the belief that I will come up with some solution.

Amb. Rabin: But there is the belief that the U.S. has to make a serious effort to find a sloution.

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing will happen until April 10 when Ismail comes back. He has never dealt with me; I can make him feel he's part of a profound operation. I can use him to kill the Gromyko talks but not to kill everything.

You can come in tomorrow to read through the transcripts. You will see that I just asked questions and evaded answers.

One thing which you should tell your successor he should not do is try to check up on me around town, or try to be clever.

Amb. Rabin: Oh no, we know your role. The Prime Minister knows your role. And we have no reason to destroy the one channel we can rely on.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but Dayan, for example, thinks he can manipulate everybody.

Amb. Rabin: One question the Prime Minister wanted to raise with you is Africa. Houphouet-Boigny sent a message to her saying that Africa will be lost unless the U.S. will do something.

Dr. Kissinger: He is coming here and the President will see him.

Amb. Rabin: So everything is fine.

For the next ten minutes Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred alone.

End of Memcon

March 22, 1973

Dr. Kissinger has received Mr. Ismail's message of March 21. He agrees that this channel should only be used for discussion of measures that will lead toward a speedy settlement. An exception was made in the case of the Khartoum incident because the U.S. did not want to make an official representation which would become public, but did want the Egyptian Government to understand the intense emotions in the United States which resulted from that unfortunate affair.

As for the rest, Dr. Kissinger is proceeding with an earnest examination of the issues. He is conducting discussions with other interested parties without revealing the content of his discussions with Mr. Ismail. He looks forward to hearing the detailed reactions promised by Mr. Ismail at the last meeting and his proposals for a suitable date for the next meeting.

Dr. Kissinger wishes to reiterate his gratification with the manner in which the last meeting was conducted.

March 30, 1973

Dr. Kissinger wishes to comment further to Mr. Ismail on the reflections on his visit to the United States contained in his message of March 20.

The primary point of the U.S. side is to see if we can find an Egyptian position sufficiently different from previously established positions to enable the U.S. to present its views seriously to other parties.

The U.S. side wishes to assure the Egyptian side that the news stories on continuing military supply for Israel were not inspired by the U.S. Government. The U.S. side is not so naive as to imagine that such a move could serve to induce additional flexibility in the Israeli position. However, it is the U.S. view that flexibility in the Israeli position will depend on the content of the diplomatic positions presented.

Dr. Kissinger: What did Richardson say?

Amb. Rabin: We are meeting you first, before we see him. We met Schlesinger over our house. With our CIA man.

Dr. Kissinger: How did it go?

Amb. Rabin: I think he is not committed to anything.

Dr. Kissinger: The practical question the Prime Minister should focus on now is whether we can develop again a concrete strategy as we did in January.

Amb. Rabin: I asked myself, why do we need a new strategy?

Dr. Kissinger: Because there will be the Brezhnev meeting. One is the Egyptian strand; he will be back in touch with us.

Amb. Rabin: It is interesting in here: Brezhnev mentioned his talks with the United States--he did not say at what level-- and wondered if the Soviets could continue contacts with the United States. He said he got the President to agree to 242 last year, in the communique.

Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians told me they had or would tell the Russians that they did not want the Russians to get into detailed negotiations with us, only give general support.

What you have to think about tomorrow morning is this: I can see some advantages in being in touch with the Egyptians and keeping the Russians out until summer. This is separate from what we talk about to the Egyptians.

Amb. Rabin: Did they say that as long as we are in touch you should not supply arms to Israel?

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't put it that crudely. He said it would be a big contribution.

[At this point Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred alone for the last five minutes.]

[NWN 03-04/2:4]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *HR*

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 18, 1973
6:15 - 6:40 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't heard from the Egyptians yet. We certainly won't press it. It is probably impossible now to meet on May 10.

But I want to talk with you about the President's meeting with Senate leaders on MFN. He communicated to them the two Soviet communications he had received.

We have told you we have dealt with Brezhnev on this law. He gave us a statement--not as a Brezhnev statement, but as a Soviet leadership statement--to the effect that they would not collect any taxes except normal duties. Here, [Hands over Tab A] I asked Dobrynin, is this an official statement? Is there a time limit on it? And he gave me these four answers. [Hands over Tab B]

Amb. Dinitz: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: The President then invited the Congressional leadership in. The regular leadership--Scott, Mansfield, and so on--were impressed with it, but Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits were not. Now it is hard for Javits and Ribicoff to be less Jewish than Jackson. What Jackson is now raising is not the law but the whole treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.

The President was beside himself. This is why I took the liberty of calling you. He feels he committed his personal prestige with the

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Soviets on an issue which he regarded as a domestic Soviet matter and obtained a result which could only be regarded as a success, and now he is asked to go further and try to lower the Iron Curtain. And if he tries that, his whole foreign policy is destroyed.

Tomorrow he is meeting with American Jewish leaders. I must tell you it will affect our relations with Israel.

I have been asked by him to tell you that he will cancel the plane deal. Or I should say, rather, that he was so angry that that was what he said. He even asked me to write it down.

We achieved more than frankly, I thought we could ever get.

Amb Dinitz: You know my position. It is not different from Yitzhak's position. We both feel very indebted to the President, and the Prime Minister feels very indebted to the President. The last thing in the world we want to do would be to harm or impede Presidential policy. But the thing is of such intense interest, and rightly so, that it is a mistake to think we can control it. I won't hide behind the excuse that it is an internal U.S. matter. It is a Jewish matter and we have a stake in a Jewish matter. I know the Jewish leaders will meet with the President and I will be meeting with them.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that this [the Soviet note] effectively suspends the law. The question is, will the Jewish community now go beyond this and ask for more? This will meet substantial resistance. The President wanted to cancel the meeting.

Amb. Dinitz: Why, because of the reaction of the Jewish Senators?

Dr. Kissinger: Because of the reaction of the three Jewish senators-- Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff! Jackson generalized it; he is now interested in the Ukrainians and Germans in Russia.

Amb. Dinitz: Jackson doesn't trust the Soviets.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't trust the Soviets.

Amb. Dinitz: We know that.

Dr. Kissinger: You have to keep in mind the wider context. We have managed to keep the Soviets quiet in the Middle East for two years. This

is not a quid pro quo.

Amb. Dinitz: Of course.

Dr. Kissinger: You have to look at Brezhnev's position. We got his help in Vietnam, and his troops out of Egypt. He only got MFN--and if now he loses that, I could make a good case against him in the Politboro.

On every visit by me or the President to the Soviet Union we raised the issue. We contributed to a not ideal, but not impossible situation of 40,000 leaving a year, or whatever the exact number is.

Amb. Dinitz: 30, or 36,000.

Dr. Kissinger: But now if we are asked to ask them not just to abrogate the law but to change their whole emigration policy, we can't justify this as an act of American foreign policy.

There are two things. Tell the Jewish leaders to treat the President gently, not to attack him, and to thank him for what he achieved. He is under great strain because of domestic problems. On the longer term, your ultimate position on MFN, we don't need an answer tomorrow.

Frankly, the President called the meeting because he thought they would be grateful. At least have them say this tomorrow.

Amb. Dinitz: In this document are there assurances that they won't fool us?

Dr. Kissinger: In the clarifying answers.

Amb. Dinitz: May I raise something?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Amb. Dinitz: I have been seeing State Department people on the UN Security Council resolution [condemning Israeli raids on Lebanon]. We have asked them to veto the resolution of the Lebanese, as modified by the British and the French. I got notified that they would use the veto. Now there are severe pressures by the Lebanese on the British and the French to get you not to use the veto if there are made some cosmetic changes that don't mean anything, such as speaking of "other issues" instead of sanctions against Israel, and deleting the clause against assistance to Israel. State tells us they are still with us, though.

Dr. Kissinger: [to Rodman] Tell Brent we expect a veto unless they get special authorization from us.

Amb. Dinitz: On the planes, you have no answer yet?

Dr. Kissinger: It is not a good time to raise it.

Amb. Dinitz: I checked with Jerusalem on whether there is any evidence on the other matter [Egyptian military intentions].

Dr. Kissinger: I had our people check. They see no indication. Our people think it is a bluff. Here, you can see all the things our people found. [Shows him Schlessinger memo at Tab C]

Amb. Dinitz: Maybe the late March business is the source of it.

Dr. Kissinger: That is all I have.

I just had a meeting, at their request, with one of the royal Saudi princes, the one who handles oil matters, and Minister Yamani. They asked me to inject myself into the negotiations. They said that if we did not make progress they would regulate their oil supply to us. They said it was worth more to them in the ground. Conversely if we did pressure Israel they would guarantee our supply. I told them never to talk to me in that way again. If they had a foreign policy proposition to make I would listen to it--but not as a commercial proposition.

Amb. Dinitz: You know we have a complaint against Moses.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he took you to the wrong place in the Middle East.

Amb. Dinitz: It would have been shorter too. It wouldn't have taken 40 years.

[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred for a last five minutes alone.]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
 Avner Idan, Minister of the Embassy of Israel


Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
 President for National Security Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *pm*

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, April 24, 1973
 5:05 - 5:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
 The White House

Ambassador Dinitz: We have gotten from Israel an intelligence assess-
ment of the situation. [Hands over Tab A]

Dr. Kissinger: Can I show it to our people?

Ambassador Dinitz: 

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There are some concrete facts and some assessments, and there is even
a contradiction to some extent, because the information is more serious
that the visible physical situation in the area -- but we have information.

Dr. Kissinger: But you could easily handle this?

Ambassador Dinitz: Easily. It is not a problem for us in the military sense,
therefore there is low probability. But as our people say, logic does not
always prevail in our region. Sadat knows what the situation is. We will
pass on any further information.

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[p. 1 of 11]

WHSB
Mandatory Review
Case NLN 03-A-04
Doc. 5

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Dr. Kissinger: Our intelligence people will have this.

Ambassador Dinitz: Right.

An additional thing. There are 18 Mirages and 16 Hunters going to Egypt, and the possibility of delivery of Lightings from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Dr. Kissinger: On the Mirages, we received three years ago a personal assurance from Pompidou that they would not be transferred. Through the Presidential channel we will protest. It will be written, not through diplomacy.

Ambassador Dinitz: We showed this to the French Ambassador. Second, on the planes.

Dr. Kissinger: There was another proposition from the departments, which we again sent back. So you would not want to see it. Both in numbers and in terms of how they did it. The numbers were wrong, and there were smaller numbers in the first years. I have sent it back. So if you can be patient another two weeks. I haven't formally sent it back; I am negotiating orally with them. But I won't put it to the President in this form.

We have heard from our friends. You will see it is an answer. [Tab B] You will notice they drop the reference to Rogers when they talk about Resolution 242.

Ambassador Dinitz: [Reading] "State of legitimacy"?

Dr. Kissinger: I said it was not enough to end the state of war; there had to be a state of peace. I asked them to explain the difference between a cease-fire and an end to the state of war.

I am now going to propose . . . practically now, I am going to move it to the 18th, closer to the Summit.

On substance, the last paragraph is of course very tough. If they maintain that position, that would end it. On security they are deliberately ambiguous. They don't define "freedom of action." And "international" means "under Security Council auspices." Whether it means Israel, I don't know. I doubt it, but I don't know.

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Ambassador Dinitz: May I offer my comment?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Dinitz: It is a unique document. It does refer to Resolution 242 but not uninterpreted. It refers to the four powers but this includes the Rogers plan.

Dr. Kissinger: But the last one added an American interpretation.

Ambassador Dinitz: It is the same thing, but the American interpretation in the Big-Power arrangement in October 1969 was Rogers.

Then, on security, not only are they hinting at sovereignty versus security, but that security should somehow be parallel. Zayyat said on TV here that there should be demilitarized zones on both sides equally. That would take us to Iraq!

On guarantees, that is no hint about Israeli troops in it as far as we are concerned.

On legitimacy, we have the Yiddish word, "chutzpadik." This means we are to cut all ties with the world Zionist movement, end all immigration, etc.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think you would accept.

I will talk one more day. If they stick to this position, I will move it into the diplomatic channels. They will blame me for whatever goes wrong.

Ambassador Dinitz: If I may say, I wonder even from the point of your prestige whether you should negotiate on the basis of this paper.

Dr. Kissinger: I won't on this paper. I will say I am prepared to meet once again to hear any specific ideas on the heads of agreement, and after this we will decide in what forum it should be handled.

Ambassador Dinitz: He sort of presupposes that in February you had known his position and is surprised.

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[Nixon 68-04/5:3]

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Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians are unlike anyone I have ever dealt with. The North Vietnamese lied, but at least they had a framework. On the specific points, they said the last time they would come up with specific ideas.

Ambassador Dinitz: That is what you told us.

Dr. Kissinger: I see no basis for proceeding very far down this road, unless this is just a propaganda paper.

Ambassador Dinitz: And in this channel. It is worse than they talk on television.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, if I refuse now, they will use this as a pretext. If I come, and tell them I will let them know in two weeks. Then it is June, and then there is the Summit. So it gets us through the Summit. I am anxious to have this not come up at the Summit.

Ambassador Dinitz: No.

Dr. Kissinger: They are actually very stupid. They have given us nothing even tempting.

Ambassador Dinitz: And nothing even making you come with something on your own.

Dr. Kissinger: But I have never even been thinking of doing that.

Ambassador Dinitz: You wanted our guidelines from your ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, still I would like some idea of your thinking. I would like a sense of the nuances of it -- not written down, just for my thinking. In any event I won't take any position.

Ambassador Dinitz: Before you go, I will have the Prime Minister's thinking on the matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Just to give me an idea. There are no subtleties in that paper.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

[NAN 03 - 07/5:4]

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

Ambassador Dinitz: One more item. You told us the President intends before the end of the year to invite Houphouet-Boigny. But the Prime Minister heard from Houphouet-Boigny that he hasn't heard anything yet. Could you let him know in principle?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

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
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
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
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[NAN 03-04/S:8]

Message to Dr. Kissinger

A. Mr. Hafiz Ismail thanks Dr. Kissinger for his message dated April 12, 1973 and he agrees to meet him in Europe around the ninth of May 1973. He would like to reach a final agreement concerning the date and location so as to enable him to finalize the details of a proposed visit to France.

B. We shall be pleased to receive Mr. Trone in Cairo to discuss the detailed arrangements of the meeting. We hope that Mr. Trone can arrive in Cairo before the end of this month. All necessary measures to maintain the secrecy of his visit will be taken.

C. As for our talks in general, our position continues to be the maintenance of their secrecy. It will be possible to handle any sources of leakage, although with the development of meetings this might in itself represent a risk through the widening circle of those who know about them.

D. Two points arise out of Dr. Kissinger's message:

First: that the White House has not yet decided 'whether it can play a useful role' in the Middle East conflict.

Second: that the U.S. Government is not certain about Israel's reaction since it has sought to avoid 'theoretical' discussions.

E. It has been our understanding since Dr. Kissinger's first message of last July 1972, that the Middle East question has become of special concern to the White House, an understanding confirmed by President Nixon's declaration about the top priority of this problem during his second term of office. The Egyptian side has, during last February's round, presented a comprehensive understanding for a settlement in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242, its interpretation by the Big Powers, and the world community as a whole. The Egyptian presentation included a general framework for an overall settlement as well as a constructive and practical concept of the development of such settlement and Egypt's position vis-a-vis the elements of settlement and its phases.

[NLN 03-04/5:9]

F. We thought that this plan as presented by the Egyptian side, which in our opinion goes beyond mere 'theories', has encouraged the U.S. Government to take a final decision in that respect; unless the U.S. Government's discussions with Israel have produced a negative result, in which case the question arises whether it would be worthwhile going into detailed discussions of the Egyptian position already presented.

G. We have, during the February round, discussed the 'question of security'. We would like to define the general principles that govern our thinking regarding this matter.

First: that security is a question which interests Egypt as much as Israel, and on the same footing. Therefore it would be unacceptable for us to agree to the establishment of security measures to the advantage of Israel, i. e. , neutralizing the effectiveness of our forces, while at the same time permitting the Israeli forces a wide liberty of action against us.

Second: that the security arrangements should be both transitional in nature, and international (by forming the observation elements, and emergency forces on an international basis under Security Council auspices).

Third: that the termination of the state of war concurrent with the final withdrawal from Egyptian territories, and the peace commitments presented by the Egyptian side, as well as the guarantees of the Big Powers and the Security Council. All this adds weight and assurance to the security measures offered already.

H. Dr. Kissinger referred during our last meeting to the question of legitimacy. This is a legal as well as a political matter tied to the Palestinian question which is the source of the conflict in the area. Egypt's position in this respect depends on the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. To include this

[NLW 03-04/5:10]

question of legitimacy among the security considerations equals, on our part, and with similar significance, the continuance of Israeli ties with World Zionism and Israel's special relations with many foreign countries. This will be a matter for further discussion in our forthcoming meeting.

[NLR 03-07/5:11]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Avner Idan, Minister of the Embassy of Israel

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *pm*

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, April 24, 1973
5:05 - 5:30 p.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Ambassador Dinitz: [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
3.3 (b)(1)

Dr. Kissinger: Can I show it to our people?

Ambassador Dinitz: [REDACTED]

There are some concrete facts and some assessments, and there is even a contradiction to some extent, because the information is more serious that the visible physical situation in the area -- but we have information.

Dr. Kissinger: But you could easily handle this?

Ambassador Dinitz: Easily. It is not a problem for us in the military sense, therefore there is low probability. But as our people say, logic does not always prevail in our region. Sadat knows what the situation is. We will pass on any further information.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (2)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NW 03-04/5 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) 4.25 JUN 03

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 5 JUN 05

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[p. 1 of 11]

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2

Dr. Kissinger: [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
3.3 (6)(1)

Ambassador Dinitz: Right.

An additional thing. There are 18 Mirages and 16 Hunters going to Egypt, and the possibility of delivery of Lightings from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Dr. Kissinger: On the Mirages, we received three years ago a personal assurance from Pompidou that they would not be transferred. Through the Presidential channel we will protest. It will be written, not through diplomacy.

Ambassador Dinitz: We showed this to the French Ambassador. Second, on the planes.

Dr. Kissinger: There was another proposition from the departments, which we again sent back. So you would not want to see it. Both in numbers and in terms of how they did it. The numbers were wrong, and there were smaller numbers in the first years. I have sent it back. So if you can be patient another two weeks. I haven't formally sent it back; I am negotiating orally with them. But I won't put it to the President in this form.

We have heard from our friends. You will see it is an answer. [Tab B] You will notice they drop the reference to Rogers when they talk about Resolution 242.

Ambassador Dinitz: [Reading] "State of legitimacy"?

Dr. Kissinger: I said it was not enough to end the state of war; there had to be a state of peace. I asked them to explain the difference between a cease-fire and an end to the state of war.

I am now going to propose . . . practically now, I am going to move it to the 18th, closer to the Summit.

On substance, the last paragraph is of course very tough. If they maintain that position, that would end it. On security they are deliberately ambiguous. They don't define "freedom of action." And "international" means "under Security Council auspices." Whether it means Israel, I don't know. I doubt it, but I don't know.

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[NAV 03 - 04/5 : 2]

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Ambassador Dinitz: May I offer my comment?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Dinitz: It is a unique document. It does refer to Resolution 242 but not uninterpreted. It refers to the four powers but this includes the Rogers plan.

Dr. Kissinger: But the last one added an American interpretation.

Ambassador Dinitz: It is the same thing, but the American interpretation in the Big-Power arrangement in October 1969 was Rogers.

Then, on security, not only are they hinting at sovereignty versus security, but that security should somehow be parallel. Zayyat said on TV here that there should be demilitarized zones on both sides equally. That would take us to Iraq!

On guarantees, that is no hint about Israeli troops in it as far as we are concerned.

On legitimacy, we have the Yiddish word, "chutzpadik." This means we are to cut all ties with the world Zionist movement, end all immigration, etc.

Dr. Kissinger: I didn't think you would accept.

I will talk one more day. If they stick to this position, I will move it into the diplomatic channels. They will blame me for whatever goes wrong.

Ambassador Dinitz: If I may say, I wonder even from the point of your prestige whether you should negotiate on the basis of this paper.

Dr. Kissinger: I won't on this paper. I will say I am prepared to meet once again to hear any specific ideas on the heads of agreement, and after this we will decide in what forum it should be handled.

Ambassador Dinitz: He sort of presupposes that in February you had known his position and is surprised.

Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians are unlike anyone I have ever dealt with. The North Vietnamese lied, but at least they had a framework. On the specific points, they said the last time they would come up with specific ideas.

Ambassador Dinitz: That is what you told us.

Dr. Kissinger: I see no basis for proceeding very far down this road, unless this is just a propaganda paper.

Ambassador Dinitz: And in this channel. It is worse than they talk on television.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, if I refuse now, they will use this as a pretext. If I come, and tell them I will let them know in two weeks. Then it is June, and then there is the Summit. So it gets us through the Summit. I am anxious to have this not come up at the Summit.

Ambassador Dinitz: No.

Dr. Kissinger: They are actually very stupid. They have given us nothing even tempting.

Ambassador Dinitz: And nothing even making you come with something on your own.

Dr. Kissinger: But I have never even been thinking of doing that.

Ambassador Dinitz: You wanted our guidelines from your ideas.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, still I would like some idea of your thinking. I would like a sense of the nuances of it -- not written down, just for my thinking. In any event I won't take any position.

Ambassador Dinitz: Before you go, I will have the Prime Minister's thinking on the matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Just to give me an idea. There are no subtleties in that paper.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

5

Ambassador Dinitz: One more item. You told us the President intends before the end of the year to invite Houphouet-Boigny. But the Prime Minister heard from Houphouet-Boigny that he hasn't heard anything yet. Could you let him know in principle?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

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[NWD 03 - 04/5:5]

[NS: S/10 - 80 MIN]


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Tabs A Handled to HAK by
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April 22, 1973

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[NAN 03-04/5:6]

EXEMPT

MR NLN 03-04 / 5 p. 7-8 of 11 pp.

[NWD 03-04/5:8A]

B

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Tab B

Message to Dr. Kissinger

A. Mr. Hafiz Ismail thanks Dr. Kissinger for his message dated April 12, 1973 and he agrees to meet him in Europe around the ninth of May 1973. He would like to reach a final agreement concerning the date and location so as to enable him to finalize the details of a proposed visit to France.

SANITIZED
3.3(b)(1)

B. We shall be pleased to receive [REDACTED] in Cairo to discuss the detailed arrangements of the meeting. We hope that [REDACTED] can arrive in Cairo before the end of this month. All necessary measures to maintain the secrecy of his visit will be taken.

C. As for our talks in general, our position continues to be the maintenance of their secrecy. It will be possible to handle any sources of leakage, although with the development of meetings this might in itself represent a risk through the widening circle of those who know about them.

D. Two points arise out of Dr. Kissinger's message:

First: that the White House has not yet decided 'whether it can play a useful role' in the Middle East conflict.

Second: that the U.S. Government is not certain about Israel's reaction since it has sought to avoid 'theoretical' discussions.

E. It has been our understanding since Dr. Kissinger's first message of last July 1972, that the Middle East question has become of special concern to the White House, an understanding confirmed by President Nixon's declaration about the top priority of this problem during his second term of office. The Egyptian side has, during last February's round, presented a comprehensive understanding for a settlement in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242, its interpretation by the Big Powers, and the world community as a whole. The Egyptian presentation included a general framework for an overall settlement as well as a constructive and practical concept of the development of such settlement and Egypt's position vis-a-vis the elements of settlement and its phases.

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[NLW 03-04/5:9]

F. We thought that this plan as presented by the Egyptian side, which in our opinion goes beyond mere 'theories', has encouraged the U.S. Government to take a final decision in that respect; unless the U.S. Government's discussions with Israel have produced a negative result, in which case the question arises whether it would be worthwhile going into detailed discussions of the Egyptian position already presented.

G. We have, during the February round, discussed the 'question of security'. We would like to define the general principles that govern our thinking regarding this matter.

First: that security is a question which interests Egypt as much as Israel, and on the same footing. Therefore it would be unacceptable for us to agree to the establishment of security measures to the advantage of Israel, i. e., neutralizing the effectiveness of our forces, while at the same time permitting the Israeli forces a wide liberty of action against us.

Second: that the security arrangements should be both transitional in nature, and international (by forming the observation elements, and emergency forces on an international basis under Security Council auspices).

Third: that the termination of the state of war concurrent with the final withdrawal from Egyptian territories, and the peace commitments presented by the Egyptian side, as well as the guarantees of the Big Powers and the Security Council. All this adds weight and assurance to the security measures offered already.

H. Dr. Kissinger referred during our last meeting to the question of legitimacy. This is a legal as well as a political matter tied to the Palestinian question which is the source of the conflict in the area. Egypt's position in this respect depends on the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. To include this

[NW 03-04/5:10]

question of legitimacy among the security considerations equals, on our part, and with similar significance, the continuance of Israeli ties with World Zionism and Israel's special relations with many foreign countries. This will be a matter for further discussion in our forthcoming meeting.

[NWD 03-04/5:11]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Adviser
 to the President for National Security
 Affairs
 Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *MR*

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, May 3, 1973
 6:30 - 7:15 p. m.

PLACE: The Map Room
 The White House

Amb. Dinitz: We got a message from our neighbor Hussein. The Prime Minister asked me to bring this to your attention

The King says: "A major international military fiasco in the area is inevitable. Algerian ground units will soon be in Egypt. The Sudanese will also be in Egypt. Morocco will send forces to Syria. Libyan Mirages are already in Egypt. Considerable Iraqi forces will be in Iraq very close to our borders under a united command.

"If Jordan's fate were in the hands of the Iraqi Commander, Iraqi Lightnings would be in Jordan now, but probably they will end up in another theater. This is the alarming outline I see."

Dr. Kissinger: [REDACTED]

Amb. Dinitz: [REDACTED]

EO 13526
3.3 (b)(1)

Our remarks are that the information in the King's message generally confirms our information from other sources. It doesn't match every detail but it generally checks.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

[p. 1 of 5]

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED] (S)
HENRY A. KISSINGER

NLNS
Mandatory Review
Case NLN 03-A-04
Doc. 6

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E.O. 13526
Authority NLN 03-A-04 #6 Appeal
NARA SP Date 3/26/2013

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2

We also know Syrians have a major function in any military act. We also know the Syrians began military preparations.

We also call attention to the fact that Jordan will find itself under pressure from Egypt, Syria and possibly also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

These are the questions I am supposed to ask you: Do you have such information?

Dr. Kissinger: Not yet.

Amb. Dinitz: I am to ask whether the King has given you such information.

Dr. Kissinger: I will have to check.

Amb. Dinitz: The third question is whether the Syrians and the Iraqi forces will try to enter Jordan against the will of the King, but unlike 1970, not against his regime but to take positions against Israel.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think?

Amb. Dinitz: We think the King tends to exaggerate, to be alarmist. But what concerns me is that what this message says we also have similar information.

My concern is whether Syria would do such a thing without the encouragement of the Russians. And there is no evidence of the Russians encouraging this.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not plausible before the Summit.

Amb. Dinitz: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: Egypt is also part of this.

Amb. Dinitz: It seems like part and parcel of the whole strategy, in which Syria will play an important part. Where Egypt might take action independent of the Russians, Syria is much less likely to because of the flow of Soviet arms. It doesn't seem likely.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

[ALW 03-07/6:2]

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

3

If in your absence this develops, whom do I see?

Dr. Kissinger: Scowcroft. You don't think it is so imminent that we should make contingency plans? I should be here.

Amb. Dinits: Within a month.

Dr. Kissinger: [REDACTED]

Amb. Dinitz: Sisco wants to have lunch with me, alone, on something he heard from the White House. Would this be Russian Jews?

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe the Ismail talks, because the Egyptians leaked it to our Interest Section. If he raises Ismail, you can say you got a brief account from the White House. On the Russian Jews, it is up to you.

Amb. Dinitz: If it is in regard to Russian Jews, I won't talk to them in the same way as to you.

Dr. Kissinger: I really must implore you --

Amb. Dinitz: I really tried hard before the meeting with the President.

Dr. Kissinger: I knew, I could tell.

Amb. Dinitz: It is really difficult here, because of the guilt feeling here because of the holocaust. In Israel it is a big issue because Golda has not come out for the Jackson Amendment.

May I say that a meeting between Jackson and the President should take place.

Dr. Kissinger: A private meeting?

Amb. Dinitz: Yes. The Senator is upset that he did not see the President alone.

Dr. Kissinger: I saw him alone. He is the only one who got advanced word.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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[1000 03 - 04/6:3]

EO 13526
3.3 (b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

4

Amb. Dinitz: I have reason to know that if he gets a private meeting he might be willing to redraft the amendment along the lines you suggested -- more monitoring than preventive, and eliminate the harassment provisions. It is easier for the Jews.

Dr. Kissinger: I saw Jackson last night and I think he will be reasonable. I wanted to show you my last message to Ismail. [Tab A] As you see, I have not committed myself to anything. Just a few general statements.

Amb. Dinitz: Well, there are many many pitfalls along the way.

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing can happen. It is too complex.

Amb. Dinitz: Very interesting his last speech. Total withdrawal from any reasonable diplomatic approach. To warn the Soviets against falling into the trap of the U. S. proposal when it was their proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they have any serious interest. Last March, and November, there were no proposals but at least there was some interest. Now it takes weeks to get an answer.

Maybe we should take an initiative, just to make it concrete.

Amb. Dinitz: Along the lines of negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: I know your domestic situation, but just to make a concrete proposal.

Amb. Dinitz: There are dangers. It prejudices you in negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but doing nothing has its dangers too.

Amb. Dinitz: The onus is on them, because we have accepted the two proposals from State put to us.

Dr. Kissinger: It can't go on indefinitely.

Amb. Dinitz: In Moscow will it come up?

Dr. Kissinger: We will get a two-hour speech.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

[NL003-07/6:4]

"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's message of April 20. Because of other commitments, it now appears that it would be most convenient for him to meet about May 18. If that is acceptable to Mr. Ismail, Mr. Trone will come to Cairo to discuss the various possibilities for a meeting.

"2. Mr. Ismail's presentation at the last meeting was very much appreciated. It is Dr. Kissinger's understanding from the last meeting that the Egyptian side proposed proceeding as follows: It would be the immediate objective to develop possible heads of agreement which could lead to simultaneous negotiations on arrangements for withdrawal from the Suez Canal and on a final settlement. It was his understanding that the Egyptian side would present its more detailed views as to the contents of these heads of agreement at the next meeting.

"3. The US has repeatedly stated that it attaches great importance to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. However, it is still to be decided which channel would be most effective -- whether the White House should directly conduct the negotiations or whether they should be conducted through diplomatic channels under White House supervision. In either case, the White House will maintain an active interest.

"4. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's reassurance on efforts to maintain the security of these meetings. That security is absolutely essential if there is to be any possibility of a fruitful outcome from these discussions."

[NW 03-04/6:5]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Ambassador Dinitz of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Adviser
to the President for National Security
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Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *DR*


DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, May 3, 1973
6:30 - 7:15 p. m.

PLACE:

The Map Room
The White House

SANITIZED
3.3 (b)(1)



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[p. 1 of 5]

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NIN 03-04/6 per Sec. 3.3(b)(1) Dr.
MADA Date 5 JUL 01

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2

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3

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SANITIZED
3.3(6)(1)

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[AH: 9 / 10-80 07W]

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"4. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's reassurance on efforts to maintain the security of these meetings. That security is absolutely essential if there is to be any possibility of a fruitful outcome from these discussions."

[NW 03-04/6:5]

In reply to certain supplementary questions, the Soviet Government provided the following information.

a. The above statement should be regarded as an official one.

b. The phrase in the statement that "only such normal duties -- which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972 -- are being collected and will be collected" has no time limit attached to it, and any interpretation implying the existence of a time limit would not correspond to the position of the Soviet Government.

c. The exemption from the requirement to refund state educational expenses is being granted on the basis of the terms of the decree of August 3, 1972, itself and of a subsequent decision taken in accordance with that decree by the USSR Council of Ministers. In the Soviet view, this situation obviates the need for suspending or repealing the decree of August 3, 1972.

d. The President and members of the Administration are free to transmit the contents of the official Soviet statement and these additional explanatory points to the Congress.

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①

15 May 1973

POINTS FOR CONVERSATION:

1. PM is aware of negative developments that may emerge from the dialogue between K. and CH both from the point of view of a rupture between them aswell as from a negative content regarding Israel.
2. PM reaffirms that we are not participating in the dialogue between the Americans and the Egyptians on a ~~position of~~ *basis* principles (oral or written) which were unacceptable to us. At the same time we are aware of the negative likelihood that the subject will be transferred to the State Department.
3. The PM reviewed the Soviet papers, the "Egyptian propoganda" paper as well as the summary of conversations which were held with Hafez at the end of February in the States and came to the conclusion that the other party still rejects categorically the Israeli proposal to conduct real negotiations and it is still engaged in handing dictates and conditions. On some topics the Soviet-Egyptian proposals are worse than the Jarring memo (the Palestinian point and the refugees); worse than the Egyptian reply to the Jarring memorandum; and worse than the Rogers Plan.
4. Due to the wide gap that exists between Egypt and Israel on the overall settlement the PM thinks that it is preferable to concentrate on the Suez Agreement. On this the statement that the Ambassador delivered to K at the last meeting is intact. To the extent that ^{to} the Egyptians would want to break the deadlock it is possible ^{to} ~~following~~ this course of action. PM is satisfied that this is also K's approach.
5. Since K asked whether we can recommend a formula connecting the interim to the overall settlement, PM suggests that he might offer the following formula, of course as his own initiative and not one of Israel's (along the lines of the conversation between K and PM on 10 December 1971).

In the preamble it can be said:

"In order to achieve peace in accordance with (or within the framework of) Resolution 242 we agree on the Suez Canal Agreement as follows:"

6. PM will be very happy if a movement out of the deadlock can be achieved which would facilitate opening of discussion, without any prior conditions, using the good offices of the US, regarding a Suez Agreement. Israel is also prepared for talks on the overall agreement, without any prior condition, but we believe that negotiations on the overall agreement cannot help to progress on the interim agreement because of the wide gap between the positions of both parties. If negotiations on the interim and overall agreements will be carried simultaneously, the negotiation on the interim might be stuck because of lack of progress on the overall, and every difficulty on the interim agreement will find its expression in the negotiation of the overall settlement. The PM appreciates very much K's efforts to prevent rupture with the Egyptians. Even if rupture is absolutely necessary it is preferable that it will not take place before the summit.
7. PM appreciates K's transfer ^(for her own information) the document of 28 May '72 and will honor his request for absolute secrecy. It is important to know every detail in that document. PM's first reaction at the time Rabin reported on it was that it was unacceptable to us. Moreso now after reading the document and finding there reference to the stationing of UN personnel in Sharm el Sheikh.

Regarding Sharm el Sheikh Secretary Rogers asked the PM whether we intend to have sovereignty or control thru lease. The fact that the document of May '72 talks about UN personnel in Sharm el Sheikh indicates a worsening of American position in this regard. PM reserves our remarks regarding this paper to further discussion before the Summit.
8. The new Soviet document is extremely negative. PM notes with satisfaction that K negates the document and defines it as worse than the Soviet document of '69 amended in '70. This document amounts to unconditional surrender for Israel and it is worse than 242 on the question of borders and on the question of the Palestinians.
9. PM noted Shaul's intention to arrive at Heads of Agreement. She would appreciate further details on this intention in order to be able to remark on it.
10. PM considers the last reply of ^{PM} to K as a propaganda piece which deserves no analysis but complete rejection.

"Egypt, in making this contact with the US Government, is acting independently and is considering Egyptian national interests within the general framework of Arab interests. For a long time Egypt has shouldered the responsibility for the independence and development of Arab countries. In the future Egypt sees itself as a partner in the Arab community of states. Egypt believes that a good settlement is one that is defensible both with Egyptian public opinion and Arab public opinion.

"What we are trying to achieve is the formation of those conditions which will help to establish a stable peace in the area. This is the point of starting these contacts and the point from which these contacts must start. Egypt can see different ways of moving towards this objective. But Egypt does not wish to take steps into the dark and lose its way. Egypt is therefore starting these discussions with both eyes open, looking for opportunities that can be a basis for normalization of the Middle East situation.

"If Egypt thinks that there is a good solution that meets at least the minimum requirements of its people and the people of the area, it will go ahead with it and will not allow it to be vetoed by anybody. Only in this way can the problem be settled so that both we and you are helped.

"Egypt appreciates the constructive attitude shown by the US Government. I personally am highly honored to be received by President Nixon. I am sure I will carry to him a message from President Sadat. I am looking forward to seeing Dr. Kissinger and hope our discussions will lead to further meetings in a way appropriate. We sincerely hope our contacts will be characterized by an early settlement."

Official Communication of the Soviet Government

Applications of Soviet citizens who wish to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries are considered, and decisions concerning such applications are made on an individual basis, taking account of concrete circumstances. As a rule these requests are granted. For example, with regard to persons who in 1972 expressed the desire to go to Israel permission was received by 95.5% of those who applied. A similar approach will be maintained in the future. (It may be noted that more than 2000 persons who received permission to leave for Israel in 1972 did not in fact make use of that permission.)

As regards the refunding of state educational expenses by Soviet citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad, the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 3, 1972, and a decision taken in accordance with it by the USSR Council of Ministers, provide that Soviet citizens who receive permission to emigrate can be exempted fully from refunding the expenses mentioned above. Accordingly, Soviet authorities, in considering the applications of Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate, have the right to decide that only state duties normal in such cases be collected from such persons. The authorities are now being guided by this right. Consequently, only such

normal and insignificant duties -- which were also collected before the decree of August 3, 1972 -- are being collected, and will be collected, from those persons who are leaving the Soviet Union for permanent residence in other countries.

It goes without saying that as is true with other states, there are cases in the USSR, and there may be such cases in the future, where citizens are denied permission to go abroad for reasons of state security.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Mr. Avner Idan, Minister of the Israeli
Embassy
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *pmc*

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 11, 1973
6:20 - 6:50 p. m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Amb. Dinitz: We have two things to give you. One is the protocols of the meetings with the Russians. ^(Tab A) The other is a book Yigal Allen asked me to give you. He deliberately kept the dedication short--in case you had to show it to someone.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't have to show it to anyone.

Amb. Dinitz: Perhaps he wanted you to show it to people!

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to talk about the Egyptian discussions and where we stand now. The best thing has been shown to you. What did I show you last time?

Amb. Dinitz: The reply by Ismail that the terror should be discussed in other channels.

Dr. Kissinger: Here are the messages since then. [Tab B] I have not sent an answer, but I want to tell you what I will now tell him. [Dinitz and Idan read.]

The main point I wanted to make to him in my message was that it depends on what is in the Egyptian position whether there is any flexibility in the Israeli position, not what we do on arms or otherwise. Here is what I will reply.

1) The White House has no commitment to engage itself. What we are

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

trying to do is see if there is any chance for progress. Only then will we engage ourselves. That is the purpose of discussion with him.

- 2) We don't know what the Israeli position is, because we have not been given anything to transmit to Israel for their consideration. We can give no assurances of the Israeli position.
- 3) If he wants to meet in Europe, it cannot be before May 9; when I have the possibility of being in Europe.

I am trying to push it closest to the Summit.

Also another point, which does not concern you; is their leaking all over the Middle East of their version. Has your intelligence picked this up?

Amb. Dinitz: No.

Dr. Kissinger: Anyway, the Saudis claim the Egyptians told them I was brutal-- that I said you were on the Canal and therefore there was no need for anything new. I was brutal, but I did not say that. I said that the standard phrases should go to Sisco. I wanted to discuss strategy, not tactics.

We have this problem, as I explained to Rabin and to your Prime Minister. The more I operate within the framework of our understanding, the easier it looks. But just because it looks easy, it does not mean it can be done indefinitely. I have been stringing along the Russians for 18 months and the Egyptians for 10 months. I can do it another month or two. The Egyptians could not get themselves organized to get it done by May 9 or 10. Assuming it takes place then-- but that is not the problem--it then takes two or three weeks to assess. But then two things could happen--the Soviets could put tremendous pressure, or the Egyptians could start a war--but with the attitude of getting so much oil blown up that there is tremendous pressure on the United States, coupled with a Libyan boycott of Europe. This is what Sadat told deBorchgrave. Plus the pressures here.

My concern, as I explained to Rabin and the Prime Minister, is that you are in a very precarious situation here. In this government, there is almost no support here. If the Arabs generate a general crisis, on energy--it is not clear they can do it, but the only thing that is holding them back is that they expect that something can be done.

Ismail proposed that he and I agree on "heads of agreement," that is basic principles. Once these are accepted by Israel, they are prepared to have an interim agreement to open the Canal, and simultaneously begin less indirect and more direct talks with Israel on the substance of the agreement summarized in the "heads of agreement." I wonder if it is possible to get the heads general so

you and they could accept. I once thought of this in connection with the Summit-- so the United States and the USSR could agree and present it. You remember last year I showed Rabin the general principles from last year.

The only advantage is that the Soviets could not back off them. The alternative is to leave the Soviets out of it and have an agreement with them on heads. I assume that when negotiations start, the pace is more under your control than under ours. Second, I certainly explained our idea of Israeli security. Maybe you have your ideas. They complained.

Amb. Dinitz: About yours or ours?

Dr. Kissinger: It is interesting in the Sadat interview, he referred to the President's distinction between sovereignty and security and did not totally reject it.

Amb. Dinitz: You should bear in mind that Borchgrave tends to shift the tone.

Dr. Kissinger: But in no case have they ever rejected--even here when we ask for new proposals--they refer to Resolution 242, which does not mean a hell of a lot.

Amb. Dinitz: But they cite Rogers' Plan.

Dr. Kissinger: True, but I won't accept that. I will reply "of course, 242." I will show you our reply. If you have any comments, of course we will take them seriously. We will call you tomorrow and show you the reply.

Amb. Dinitz: Good.

Dr. Kissinger: I know it is an election year for you, and a hard time for a decision. But I would like some idea of your strategic conception, whether we can get some heads of agreement that could give us some breathing space--by, first, getting an interim agreement.

Amb. Dinitz: I will get the Government to look at this again.

Dr. Kissinger: This should be as closely held as possible.

Amb. Dinitz: Of course.

You said the situation could develop in which they would use the oil situation and start a war, though they could not win, and generate pressure here.

There is no change in the substance of the Egyptian position.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It would be harder to resist on our part. It would be easier if a negotiating process were going on that if they can plausibly say they are totally frustrated. I fear from our intelligence that they are trying to maneuver me into being the cause of the frustration.

Amb. Dinitz: Our intelligence says they are trying systematically to create the impression of an imminent war--but not only is there no prospect of accomplishing it, but there are no concrete preparations. It is threats with an empty gun. Especially on the eve of the Summit, they seek to put great pressure on the United States to pressure Israel. This explains Sadat's speech of the 26th of February and the deBorchgrave interview.

Whether they can use the oil situation, I don't know. Maybe if they were better organized, but we know there are difficulties between the countries with the oil and the countries who want to use the oil for political purposes but don't have the oil.

It will be a sad thing if we are required to make concessions which won't be matched.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, you are in an odd period of tranquility. You have made your own assessment--but the reason for the absence of pressure on you now is because I have not permitted anyone to move. I have told Rabin--you have to be prepared.

I understand your problem. If you tell what you are prepared to do in extremis, it is practically done.

Egypt may have the same problem. The smart thing for them would be to talk directly.

Amb. Dinitz: That is our position.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no reason to press you now, but if I could have some ideas...I will propose May 9 or 10. What I need is, (1) an idea of how the process could get started, (2) how it could be prolonged, and (3) interim solution that could defuse the situation by showing movement and that we could use as the next phase to gain more time.

Amb. Dinitz: Let me explain the mixup in our telephone conversation about Elizur. It was a question of our eagerness to act on the instructions of the Foreign Minister, before Eban could stop him.

Dr. Kissinger: Our cables show it worked out very well.

[The Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger talked for the last five minutes alone.]

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Apr. 7, 1973

"a. Mr. Ismail thanks Dr. Kissinger for his two consecutive messages. Mr. Ismail wishes to share Dr. Kissinger's gratification with the manner in which their last meeting was conducted.

"b. Mr. Ismail feels that the Egyptian-U.S. relations are undergoing a transitional stage during which we might be faced with difficulties of the kind he referred to in his last message of March 20, 1973. Such difficulties have to be overcome in a spirit of moderation and by a mutually sincere desire to achieve progress.

"c. Dr. Kissinger's last message states that the issue for the U.S. Government is to see if it can find an Egyptian position sufficiently different from previously established positions to enable the U.S. to present its views seriously to the other parties.' In this respect, Mr. Ismail wishes to reaffirm that the Egyptian diplomatic position is fully based on Security Council Resolution 242 and is in accordance with the interpretation given by the Big Four Powers to said resolution, including the U.S. Government interpretation embodied in the U.S. plan of October 28, 1969, as well as Ambassador Jarring's memorandum of February 8, 1971.

"d. Mr. Ismail welcomes Dr. Kissinger's readiness to continue the dialogue which has been established. In doing so, Mr. Ismail assumes the following:

"(1) That the White House has in fact decided to engage itself directly with the Middle East problem, thus reaffirming the message indicating such intention which was conveyed to us during the summer of 1972.

"(2) That the U.S. side as a result of explorations with Israel feels that there are sufficient encouraging indications so as to render useful the Egyptian-U.S. dialogue. In other words, Israel has shown to the U.S. side its readiness to achieve substantial progress towards an overall settlement during the next few months.

"e. With this understanding Mr. Ismail proposes that the next meeting, as has been previously suggested, takes place during the current month of April in a third country. He welcomes hearing from Dr. Kissinger his proposals regarding two alternative dates for holding such a meeting according to his convenience. Upon receiving Dr. Kissinger's suggestion, Mr. Ismail will inform him immediately of our preference in this regard."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Israeli Ambassador Dinitz
Israeli Minister Avner Idan

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PHR*

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, May 13, 1973
10:00 - 10:55 a.m.

PLACE: The Map Room, The White House

Dinitz: I wanted to thank you for the meeting yesterday [with Eban], both for having the meeting and for the skillful way you were able to swim between the props!

Kissinger: It was easy -- he did all the talking!

I wanted to talk to you about Zavidovo, and to say a few words about where we go from here. Because I don't share the Foreign Minister's optimism. Because whatever it is objectively, it won't necessarily be perceived this way.

About Zavidovo: Brezhnev made a very strong and quite violent statement about the Middle East. He thought there were signs of imminent conflict. He was afraid things were partly out of control, certainly over a period. For domestic reasons he can't afford an outbreak now. He said they can't afford a humiliation before or after the Summit.

So I started stalling. We discussed the general principles, as I have been doing. They gave us these new principles [Tab A]. You can keep them if you promise they won't surface.

Dinitz: They are worse than 1969.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Kissinger: Oh yes. They give a much bigger role to the Palestinians.

Brezhnev was at that point so emotional that I met with Gromyko separately. I said to him, "What's the difference from the Egyptian position? If we are going to accept Egypt's position, we can do it ourselves directly. If you want to do something with us, there has to be some difference."

He said, "Would you accept 100% Israeli withdrawal if we guaranteed 100% security?" I said, "I've never heard of 100% security, even for you. So that's a theoretical discussion."

He said, "How can we get a negotiation going?" I said, "We should have some general principles that are so vague that both sides can interpret them differently, but we can use them as an excuse for a Rhodes-type negotiation." He said a Rhodes-type negotiation was not excluded.

It's certain they will come back insistently after I see Ismail, and they will be insistent at the Summit.

My personal judgment -- the President's would be more extreme -- is that we're getting to the end of just delaying actions. With Connally coming in, it's more true.

Supposing something like these principles of 1972 [Tab B] could be submitted to the two parties, with the suggestion that negotiations would begin on both an interim and an overall settlement, wouldn't this be the best time-buying action?

The British, too, when I was in London, wanted us to join with them in some interpretation of 242.

Dinitz: From what I saw of this last year, they were unacceptable to us.

Kissinger: They are no more unacceptable than 242.

Dinitz: Then why not stick to 242? If it's vague enough language.

Kissinger: I'm not your problem. I promised you six months respite and we got 20 months.

Dinitz: I'm not complaining, Dr. Kissinger.

Kissinger: In my view, we are running out of time.

You don't have to take a position now.

Dinitz: I'll pass this to the Prime Minister.

Kissinger: Can you make sure there is no possible leak? I'm sure the Egyptians haven't seen this.

Dinitz: I have one or two remarks. We are not thinking on different lines in trying to find a way the deadlock can be broken. I know some people think we are trying to freeze the situation. We know the situation can't last. But we are really at a loss. I had some exchanges with the Prime Minister. Of the interim and overall, the interim has the greater chance of reality.

Kissinger: Of course.

Dinitz: We know the Egyptians fear it will be frozen. In April, we had language to assure them. We can go further. We can give you a mandate to assure them we will go further in negotiations. You know our position; we won't commit ourselves to a final position but we won't hold them to one either.

Kissinger: We need some document that looks like a new set of principles that can give them a face-saving way to proceed.

I have no illusions. The differences may in fact be unbridgeable. But once negotiations begin between the parties, it is hard for outside parties to impose any formula.

My expectation is that the interim settlement negotiation would be concluded first. I frankly see no basis for an overall solution. I'm looking for another two years' time-wasting. I can see an interim solution, with the negotiations on the overall continuing.

Dinitz: The Prime Minister wasn't clear about this when she was here.

Kissinger: It wasn't concrete then.

They want "heads of agreement." We won't do it now either. But if we can get sufficiently vague "heads of agreement," they said they would be prepared for negotiations on the interim and on the overall and for more direct contact between you.

Dinitz: They want to tie in the interim with the final. But I don't see why they should be simultaneous. If you have the terms of reference for a final, why discuss the interim at all?

Kissinger: Because the advantage of the interim, in my view, is that it's something attainable.

Dinitz: I still don't understand how one can negotiate simultaneously. Negotiating the final means negotiating the borders when there is peace; what reason is there to negotiate then on withdrawal from the Canal?

Kissinger: Because the interim is the only thing attainable. They want a negotiation on borders, but with skill we can get an interim settlement but overall negotiations could go on for years.

We negotiated with the North Vietnamese for four years.

If I were conducting the negotiations, I'd propose two separate groups, one to work on the interim and one on the overall. I have great confidence in your skill.

Dinitz: What they have now done is attach the condition of total withdrawal to the interim agreement. Automatically, this demand becomes part and parcel of the negotiations on the interim. But what you had in mind was that one will advance the other.

Kissinger: What I have in mind is to play for time. To get it so complex . . .

Dinitz: . . . that no one knows what is going on. What I'm really seriously concerned about is -- in all the moves on the interim agreement there was no a single move on the part of the Egyptians. The last paper they gave you was pure propaganda. It is worse than before.

Kissinger: Could you give me a written analysis of why it's worse -- before I leave Wednesday?

Dinitz: Yes, it was a hardening of their position. They proposed proximity talks.

Kissinger: No, Sisco proposed proximity talks.

Idan: They accepted it.

Kissinger: When Sisco gives a half-hour speech and the other guy is silent, he reports it as the other man's views.

Dinitz: Sisco gave a speech on the Israeli 25th anniversary celebration. He said the Six-Day War was a myth, based on misunderstanding. I had to get up and answer. Len Garment and Arthur Goldberg were there. They said I did the right thing. If I hadn't said something, Sisco would have thought I agreed with him.

Now they tie in also the question of the Palestinians to the interim.

Kissinger: I know. But I believe it is extremely useful to get some talks started that you can manage, rather than that we manage, or the Russians, or the British or French.

Dinitz: That is so.

Kissinger: I'm going to see Ismail now. We will probably meet for one or two morning. I don't know what we're going to talk about, frankly, for two mornings.

Dinitz: It's up to him to show what is new.

Kissinger: If I have a disciplined staff with me, I will go at a slow pace!

Dinitz: The onus should not be on Israel or the United States.

Kissinger: The objective pace of events is that by this time next year you will face massive international pressure. The US will go along with it; the British and French will join it -- and the Russians will organize it.

Dinitz: Because of oil?

Kissinger: It may be. It's a question of style, how you deal with pressure, whether to yield or confront it. It will be strong in this country.

You don't have to answer now. But your assessment of Ismail's last position would be helpful.

And some statement of your position on the connection between the interim and the overall. Can you give me some formal statement?

Dinitz: By that time, Israel will be able to empower you to state in the most formal way that Israel does not want to freeze the situation. [Idan gives him a copy of a cable.] The Prime Minister says to me here it would be good if you can tell Hafez that the concern of Egypt that a new line to which the Israeli Defense Forces will withdraw in the framework of a Suez Canal settlement will turn into a permanent border is a subject worth dealing with. You can say you are convinced you will get from Israel a public and official clarification that it is not the intention of the Government of Israel to turn this line into a permanent line. This is in addition to what is in the agreement, which might be a secret agreement. The most unequivocal public commitment of Israel to withdraw to the final peace border. We know this is important to Egypt to sell it to their people. The US will be able to give Egypt assurance that this Israeli position is absolutely credible.

This is what I had in mind. We tried to consider what disturbs the Egyptians and came to the conclusion it wasn't free passage, etc. but the fear of a new status quo. We really don't want a new status quo.

Kissinger: My estimate of what you want is a straight line west of El Arish.

Dinitz: It might not be a straight line, because of the roads and the terrain. To tell the truth, there are three different lines. But in general terms you are right. In strategic terms we need sufficient depth to make it secure. But three-quarters of Sinai would go back. And what we'd keep is really of no value -- no ports, no towns. I really think it is reasonable!

Kissinger: Why couldn't you take it in the form of security zones instead of annexation?

Dinitz: If someone else is sitting there, it's no good.

Kissinger: No, if you're sitting there. If you could get a formula that gave you what you want substantively.

Dinitz: That could be considered.

Idan: I want to protect him. This is a private conversation.

Kissinger: Of course. And I'm not insane enough to try to negotiate this myself.

Dinitz: We distinguish between Sharm el-Sheikh and the rest of the border question.

On Sharm, when Rogers talked about a lease arrangement, the Prime Minister said it wasn't offered to us so we don't have to take a public position. On something like this, if the arrangement gave us military control, there is a good chance it would pass the government. On the borders, it entails a change in sovereignty. There was a government decision.

There are theories. Allon once lectured to you about three defense zones: One zone around Arish, Sharm and the airfield. But once we start negotiations, our mind is open. We don't want to mislead you or the Egyptians.

Kissinger: You can't mislead me. In 1971, I told you if we started on the interim you would gain nine months. We gained two years. Now I say we need a new basis. You're not unresourceful in diplomacy. If we can shift to a negotiation, you can take it.

Dinitz: We are resourceful, but they are not. They didn't give us a basis for showing any flexibility.

Kissinger: In this round with Ismail, not much has to be done concretely. But this will be the last one at which I can do this. What we have to avoid is to allow him to use this to say the Americans let him down. This would have domestic consequences. I'll be elliptical enough not to give him a pretext for a break-off. The main problem is what the Russians will do when they are here.

Dinitz: I have a clarifying question. I recall that last year there were seven points in these principles, with two reserved. This says eight and one reserved.

Kissinger: But the eighth point wasn't agreed to. We've never accepted it.

Dinitz: I see. In the conversation Eban had in State, he raised the question of arms. They told him in the most official matter that it rests with the White House and the White House doesn't have the time to consider it.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-8-

Kissinger: That is total nonsense. They've sent over a proposal which was too much like their last one. I've made them redo it.

I told Saunders to get an option with more planes in the beginning of the package. Option C.

Then I'll get it approved.

[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred for the last ten minutes alone.]

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

May 7, 1973

Principles of Middle East Settlement

1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be comprehensive, embracing all parties concerned and all issues. This means the elaboration and implementation of a set of agreements between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict.

In the process of working out agreement on the whole complex of questions relating to the settlement the possibility is not precluded of this agreement being implemented by stages, or that some questions may be resolved on a priority basis, while remaining an integral component of the whole settlement.

2. The agreements should provide for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, in conformity with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

The withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories may be carried out by stages, within mutually agreed time-limits, under international control.

3. The international lines of demarcation, which existed between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries as of June 4, 1967 shall be recognized as the final boundaries between them.

4. The agreements should lead to the termination of the state of belligerency and to the establishment of peace among the States Parties thereto on the basis of mutual acknowledgment of and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence.

5. Measures should be provided for to meet the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. The Palestine refugee problem will be solved on a just basis and in accordance with existing UN resolutions on the subject.

6. Measures to ensure on the basis of reciprocity the security of Israel and the Arab States Parties to the agreements may include the establishment of demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the most effective international guarantees of the boundaries defined in the agreements and of the settlement as a whole. The Soviet Union and the United States would be prepared to participate in such guarantees.

7. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Bay of Aqaba should be assured and the principle of the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal for vessels of all countries, including Israel, should also be observed in conformity with the Constantinople Convention of 1888.

8. Failure by either Party to implement any part of the agreement would give the other party the right to refuse respectively to implement its own obligations.

9. The Soviet Union and the United States proceed in their policy in the Middle East from the assumption that all the countries of the area are entitled to independent existence and development as sovereign states in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Respect for the sovereign rights of every state in the area is one of the basic principles on which the settlement of the problems of the Middle

General Working Principles

1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties and issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in stages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh, and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which the settlement must be based.
8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
(Reserved by the US side)

The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some stage involve negotiations among the signatories.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PRC*

DATE AND TIME: 7:00 p.m. - 7:45 p.m.
Tuesday, May 15, 1973

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House

Amb. Dinitz: I have three short items, I got a reaction from the Prime Minister on the material you passed to me.

First of all, she wants me to tell you she's aware of the negative developments that may emerge from the dialogue between you and Hafiz, both in terms of a possible rupture between you and him and also a negative content regarding Israel.

Dr. Kissinger: That is not possible.

Amb. Dinitz: Nevertheless, she appreciates the advantage of keeping negotiations with you and not in the State Department. Third, she has reviewed the Soviet papers, Hafez's "propaganda paper", as we call his last reply, and the summary of your conversations with him. She has come to the conclusion that Egypt is not ready to engage in real negotiations. On some points, these principles are worse than the Jarring memo (on the Palestinian point and refugees), worse than the Egyptian reply to the Jarring memo, and worse than the Rogers' plan.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

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Amb. Dinitz: Fourth, due to the wide gap between Egypt and Israel on the overall, it is better to concentrate on the Suez agreement. The statement I read to you at our last meeting stands, and she reconfirms it.

As to your request for a formula for linking overall and the interim, you can propose, as your own proposal. . .

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Amb. Dinitz: . . .the formula she used with you in the conversation of December 1971. In the Preamble it can be said "In order to achieve peace in accordance with (or in the framework of) Resolution 242".

Dr. Kissinger: Is this new to them?

Amb. Dinitz: Yes. We've never said that.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I say we're prepared to recommend this to you?

Amb. Dinitz: Yes. The Prime Minister would be happy if a movement out of the deadlock can be achieved.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I read that? [The talking paper from which Dinitz was reading is at Tab A.]

Amb. Dinitz: All right.

[Dr. Kissinger reads it.]

Dr. Kissinger: If her only criticism is the UN personnel in Sharm, that could be fixed.

Amb. Dinitz: I told her not to concentrate on this paper.

Dr. Kissinger: The only point on which I differ with you is this: I still think if we can get heads of agreement that are satisfactory to you--which will be so vague, and we wouldn't proceed without your concurrence--and get simultaneous negotiations going, if you're right, and the two negate each other, you're still on the Canal. So what? If we get an interim agreement, we've gained something. And you would gain time.

We got another letter today from Brezhnev in which he was insistent on discussing the Middle East at Summit. Let me read it to you: "As for the international problems we always believed one of the most critical issues is the Middle East. And now great dangers are in wait of us in the Middle East. The developments there can take such a turn which neither we, nor -- I believe -- you would like to happen. We frankly expressed to Dr. Kissinger our appraisal of the present situation. Our statements might have sounded quite blunt to Dr. Kissinger, yet the bluntness is dictated by the explosiveness of the situation itself.

"In the conversation with Dr. Kissinger it was said -- and I would like to repeat it to you personally -- that if the main question of withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, is settled, then all the other questions, including those of the security of Israel, can be solved; frankly speaking, they will not then be an obstacle for the settlement. And it is the leaders of Israel themselves who constantly maintain, that those are the very questions, i. e., the questions of security, which concern them."

You remember I told you Sunday he said if you withdraw 100 percent they would guarantee 100 percent security. I told him not even the Soviet Union had 100 percent security.

"Dr. Kissinger also offered a number of considerations on how, in the U.S. opinion, it would be possible to act further on the questions of the Middle East settlement. Certain ideas, expressed by him, went, in our view, in the direction of facilitating the search of a solution. But, frankly speaking, there is a lack of completeness here. We hope that necessary clarity will be added to the U.S. position on this question when we receive the communication from you on that matter, as was promised by Dr. Kissinger, within two weeks after his return to Washington."

I told him I couldn't until I saw Ismail.

"We, on our part, are prepared to work on the Middle East problem, sparing neither time nor efforts, before my visit to the U.S. There may not be any doubt that the fixation at our meeting on exact and clear understanding between ourselves regarding the ways of the Middle East

settlement on a just and solid basis would be another major milestone both in the relations between our countries and in the normalization of the world situation as a whole. I believe that this is a feasible task and the achievement of such mutual understanding would undoubtedly give a due impetus to the peaceful settlement. "

Amb. Dinitz: What do they want from you in two weeks?

Dr. Kissinger: I said we needed general principles--but I didn't tell them what they'd be.

Amb. Dinitz: They want your principles?

Dr. Kissinger: I said they could be related to what we discussed in May 1972--but I didn't spell them out.

If we can come up with principles you find acceptable, and if Egypt could accept--which may be impossible, frankly--then the fact that negotiations are simultaneous shouldn't be a problem.

Amb. Dinitz: There are two problems: If they are based on the 1972 paper, in present form they're unacceptable.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Amb. Dinitz: You say simultaneous negotiations. You can see from the paper that she doesn't believe in it.

Dr. Kissinger: But if it doesn't work, you stay on the Canal.

Amb. Dinitz: You think it can work better.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it would work better, but if Egypt can use this as an excuse to say they got simultaneous negotiations and a new set of principles--which would have to be acceptable to you--it's not a defeat.

Amb. Dinitz: But the 1972 paper is not acceptable.

My difficulty also in simultaneous negotiations, regardless of heads of agreement, is: in the sense that if there is a block with the overall, they [the obstacles] would project themselves also on the interim.

Dr. Kissinger: But so what?

Amb. Dinitz: You say the onus wouldn't be on us?

Dr. Kissinger: I'd rely on your skill to protract this for a long time.

Amb. Dinitz: But we would also protract the Canal settlement. The Prime Minister's view is that the interim would be blocked by concessions we don't make in the overall.

On arms, in the provision as you said for one a month, then 48 is okay. I recommended to the Prime Minister that we accept this. To take it away from all possible things that could evolve--the summit, the U.N. debate, the oil crisis.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Amb. Dinitz: I am instructed officially to tell you to go ahead on that basis.

One last item--I would prefer you not to take notes.

I have been meeting with Jewish leaders, not so much on the trade question as on Brezhnev's visit, to try to make sure there is no trouble.

Dr. Kissinger: Good.

Amb. Dinitz: But it would be helpful if you could meet with three of them when you get back from Paris. It's one thing for me to know you received these assurances from the Soviet Government about not applying the exit tax and allowing a flow of 36,000 a year. But I can't tell them I got it from you. Some are walking around saying they haven't heard anything from the White House because nothing has been done.

Dr. Kissinger: You know that for me to become the focal point for them would be a disaster.

Amb. Dinitz: Or someone else in the White House. Just so they are told what is being done.

[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred for the last few minutes alone.]

A

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman *PR*

DATE AND TIME: February 22, 1973, 3:30 - 4:00 p.m.

PLACE: Military Aide's Office
The White House

Ambassador Rabin: Sisco talked to me this morning and yesterday. I said to him as to you about the Libyan business . . .

Mr. Kissinger: Basically, it's a bore to me, unless you have something for me that is not previously known. It is the sort of problem that will go away in a few days.

Ambassador Rabin: I said that to Sisco. I said, "This meeting with Ismail and President is something new. Let's at our own level distinguish between the basic issues and incidents like this."

Mr. Kissinger: What did Sisco want?

Ambassador Rabin: Something on the airplane incident.

My people did not follow my advice. They are holding lots of press conferences, with the pilots and so forth, to defend themselves.

Mr. Kissinger: That's a mistake. It keeps the issue alive.

Ambassador Rabin: I said they were fools. I said to them, the more detail you give the more it becomes clear that more and more people were involved, for a longer time, at a higher level. The basic issue then is a higher-level decision to open fire on a civilian airliner.

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Mr. Kissinger: Right, why did they do it?

Ambassador Rabin: They are fools. I told them to pipe down.

Mr. Kissinger: What worries me is if the Arabs learn that at every crisis Sisco goes into his usual pattern, there will be more crises.

Ambassador Rabin: I said to Sisco, let's talk about the two visits. He said the two visits will be under the shadow of the incident. I said, yes, publicly, but it should not be so on a government-to-government level. Secondly, I asked him what do you have on Ismail? Sisco said there was a report on Ismail's talks in London but he had not read it. I said, come on, Joe. I told him I was suspicious about Ismail's pressing to come prior to the Prime Minister's visit.

Mr. Kissinger: That's not fair to me.

Ambassador Rabin: I asked Sisco, how did Ismail manage to insert his own visit before Golda? He said they would like to prevent the President from committing himself to Golda to give us planes.

I said to Sisco: what he'll bring with him in terms of political ideas I don't know. Will he agree to an interim settlement? Will he agree to an interim if it is linked to an overall settlement? I said I thought he would try to link beginning negotiations with U. S. military assistance to Israel. This is the only reason he would have to insert his visit before Golda. Sisco said "I cannot say you are wrong, I think they will."

Mr. Kissinger: That's a pack of lies. We are right back where we were before. In London Ismail was so intransigent that even the British thought there was no hope for any progress.

Ambassador Rabin: He said the same things to Greene, too.

Mr. Kissinger: That does not exclude that he will give me something. But in London he refused to agree to any direct talks with Israel, he refused any discussion of the interim settlement -- only a total settlement. Like in this Yugoslav paper, it all had to be linked. Even the British felt there was no hope at all for any negotiation.

Ambassador Rabin: Sisco refused to give us any information at all about Greene and Ismail -- because of the kind of a position that Ismail took.

Mr. Kissinger: That's right.

Ambassador Rabin: I have never heard any Egyptian talk in such a brutal uncompromising way as he talked to Greene before he went to Moscow.

Mr. Kissinger: But since he is now dealing on two tracks, it makes sense to keep tough with State and to make any concessions -- if there are going to be any concessions -- to me. He was totally intransigent with the British. He was even tougher than with the Yugoslav. I can assure you that our report from the British is that he was totally intransigent, and Home concluded that there was no hope whatever, and that there was nothing they could support in the way of any negotiation.

The British know from the Heath visit that I am seeing Ismail alone. So I yesterday asked Cromer for a special report.

I am seeing Ismail Sunday and Monday in a suburb of New York. I will present nothing. I will present no proposal of any kind. My line will be -- and this will quickly find out what his line is -- that I have absolutely no contribution to make if they continue the pattern that has been going on. I will suggest that if there is nothing new they can continue to talk to State and in the United Nations.

Ambassador Rabin: I think he will stick to the same line.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the line? Let me show you the message he sent to me. [Tab A, Statement made by Ismail to Trone in Cairo on February 13]

Ambassador Rabin: That says nothing. That says nothing.

Mr. Kissinger: That's all I know about the subject.

Ambassador Rabin: Practically nothing, because it stresses the Egyptian leadership role. This means he has to meet Egyptian national needs as well as the overall Arab world requirements. This is a tough beginning. I am more involved than you are in studying these Arab formulations.

Mr. Kissinger: I know. I will tell him that right away.

Ambassador Rabin: The most uncompromising formula was the one Sadat gave to Jarring in February 1970. It cleverly distinguished between an agreement between Israel and Egypt, the essence of which is total withdrawal, but without committing Egypt on the issues that are really necessary for peace. Their basic strategy is to distinguish between the two phases of the struggle -- Nasser called it land and people. Eliminating the consequences of aggression is one part of it. This is the difference between Syria and Egypt. For Syria the struggle is one protracted war, and there is no distinction between Golan and the rest.

And he says it here.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean the three kinds of countries, the confrontation states and the other kinds of states?

Ambassador Rabin: That's the way they would like to mobilize their Arab friends.

You see how they lie to the Jordanians.

Mr. Kissinger: And to the Yugoslavs, too. They lied to the Yugoslavs. I have reviewed the record of our contacts. They started it in April, not we.

Ambassador Rabin: I explained that to the Prime Minister.

What I meant was, they state their intentions here [Ismail-Miskovic memcon, Tab B]. Their objectives are to weaken the link between the U.S. and Israel. They say there is no possibility of having peace unless after the solution of the armed struggle. After the Israelis withdraw from the territories, then there will be a peace conference. You see these terms "Israeli entity" and "Palestinian entity." This is very clever use of the concepts you use in Vietnam. It's what you are accustomed to.

Mr. Kissinger: I am accustomed to negotiations on the basis of reality.

Ambassador Rabin: Basically they have found a new formula which you used in your press conference; namely, the separation of military and political issues. The military issues will be the territories, and the political issue will be the settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Mr. Kissinger: That works in your favor.

Ambassador Rabin: If the people who are going to discuss this with Ismail are clever.

Mr. Kissinger: They are not clever.

You have a massive problem, in that there is great desire here to achieve another spectacular success.

Ambassador Rabin: I do not know why the Prime Minister allowed the raid into Lebanon. When I was Chief of Staff, whenever we were trying to achieve something from the United States in the political arena, I piped everything down.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you think is the reason for these moves?

Ambassador Rabin: Frankly I think the only motive is Dayan's desire to prevent a successful visit by the Prime Minister. Because his chances are better if she retires before the election. It is a political year.

Mr. Kissinger: My strategy with Ismail will be to say next to nothing, or to speak at such a level of generality that it doesn't mean anything. Chou En-lai was asked at a press conference about me and he said the only man who can talk a half hour to the press without saying anything is Henry Kissinger. I mentioned this to Chou. He said, no not a half hour, an hour and a half.

I will start this way: "I want a serious talk with you, I don't know anything, I have not dealt with the Middle East lately. I've been a preoccupied with Vietnam as you know. I have not had a chance to prepare myself adequately. If you think I am a miracle worker, remember that every negotiation I have been involved in took years to complete. The Vietnam negotiations took four years. The SALT negotiations took three years. So there cannot be a quick solution. Secondly, I promise nothing that I cannot deliver, therefore I can promise nothing. Thirdly, from a viewpoint of an outsider,

I see no hope whatever in the normal methods -- the United Nations, Resolution 242. If you think there is hope in these methods, pursue them through the State Department. If you have something new, I will listen to it."

I will make no proposals to them, no promises. I may make philosophical statements, such as that any settlement in the Middle East will inevitably leave both sides equally unhappy, and that running back and forth trying to trick two sides into an agreement by some procedure only leads to disaster. [Laughter] But as to concrete solutions, I will have nothing to present to them.

Ambassador Rabin: So you will stress these themes: that you are a newcomer, that you are not prepared and that you are not a miracle worker.

Mr. Kissinger: Right. First of all, I do not have a plan. I will never propose a plan that I have not discussed with you and have your approval on -- since any solution has to have your approval anyway.

Take my negotiations with Le Duc Tho. First, I controlled all our assets. Here, my position is not as strong as it was when dealing with Vietnam. Secondly, in any time frame, my strategy is totally different from the Sisco strategy. My strategy is to give them just enough to keep them talking but never to give them much until they make a massive move. With Le Duc Tho three years were spent in abstract discussion. This summer we discussed possible approaches to a political settlement which I knew were unacceptable -- until they dropped the whole idea of a political settlement.

Nothing will come out of this meeting unless they come in with a new proposal. And if they do that, I will tell them I will study it. My guess from these papers is that they will not have a new proposal.

After this I will leave it that we will stay in touch and see if we should have another meeting.

Contrary to Rogers and Sisco, I believe I should sell my involvement only in return for something from them. At this meeting I have to let them feel we are taking them seriously; otherwise there would not be enough to fill two hours, let alone two days.

I do not know what's going to happen. I will be seeing you Wednesday morning.

Ambassador Rabin: Can I see you before then?

Mr. Kissinger: Sure. Maybe Tuesday or Monday afternoon.

Ambassador Rabin: Because I would like to get something from you before Wednesday morning, so the Prime Minister and I can consider it.

Mr. Kissinger: I will do it no later than Tuesday. Where will you be, in New York?

Ambassador Rabin: Here in Washington.

Mr. Kissinger: If I get back Monday afternoon, I will talk to you Monday afternoon. If I get back Monday night, I will see you Tuesday.

Ambassador Rabin: She will want to discuss with you after thinking over the meaning of what happened with Ismail.

Mr. Kissinger: On Vietnam, I knew what I wanted. Here I would not know how to speed up the process even if I wanted to. I do not want to speed it up, so you need not worry about something coming out of this meeting.

Ambassador Rabin: There will also be meetings with Rogers and Richardson. With Richardson there are three items: self-sufficiency in production, the Phantoms, and reciprocity.

Mr. Kissinger: What is reciprocity?

Ambassador Rabin: Waiving the Buy American Act.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you want to take up with the President?

Ambassador Rabin: The political issue, and planes and numbers, to get a commitment after 1973 of on-going supplies of planes to Israel. Let us stick to the present policies, maintenance of the balance, until and unless there is a change in the policy of the other side.

I hope the production question will get a positive response from Richardson.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me know.

Ambassador Rabin: On production I will let Richardson be the good guy. For the President, then there would remain only discussion of the political issue and the question of the principle of maintaining the balance.

Mr. Kissinger: My advice is do not give him a lecture that nothing can be done. Mention the interim settlement, mention the principles you gave to me last January, those five principles.

Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Rush wanted to cut our credit. It is so stupid. What Israel gets from the United States Government is \$300 million in credits in the Military Sales Act, out of the total of \$400 million. We are a cover for the U. S. Government; because of us they get these credits from Congress. It effectively releases \$150 million for the United States Government for credits for other countries, mainly Southeast Asia. I tell Rush, do you want us to tell the Congress the deal we worked out?

Mr. Kissinger: At the meeting there will be Dinitz, you and the Prime Minister?

Ambassador Rabin: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: On our side it will be me and Rodman. One other thing. In China for the first time there was a discussion on the Middle East. Their only interest is keeping the Russians out of the Middle East and their whole strategy is for that. They said they are not meddling. I said, "Yes, but we have one difference, you are against the existence of Israel." He said, "No, we just raise the moral issue of the Palestinians." After a long discussion, Chou said that if Israel goes to the 1967 borders, they are prepared to recognize it. "We are against imperialism, not against Israel. In any case, we will do nothing to disturb the situation."

Ambassador Rabin: That's very interesting.

Mr. Kissinger: It's a beginning.

[From 4:15 to 4:30 Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador conferred privately.]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Minister Avner Idan
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff *pmc*

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 12, 1973
1:30 - 1:45 p.m.

PLACE: Military Aide's Office
The White House

The meeting was arranged so that Mr. Rodman could show the Ambassador, as Mr. Kissinger had promised, the US draft reply to Mr. Ismail [Tab A]. The Ambassador and Minister Idan read the draft and returned it. Minister Idan took about a half page of notes on his note pad.

The Ambassador then raised the following subjects.

Dr. Kissinger had promised at their last meeting that he would be able to meet Foreign Minister Eban for breakfast on May 9. However, the draft reply to Ismail suggested a possible meeting with Ismail in Europe on May 9. Did this mean the breakfast with Eban was off? Mr. Rodman replied that it was all tentative at this point, and he asked how long Foreign Minister Eban would be in this country. The Ambassador replied that Eban would be in this country from the 8th to the 20th of May, and he volunteered that another date could probably be arranged if necessary.

The Ambassador then stated that he had received a cable from the Prime Minister in response to his report of yesterday's meeting with Dr. Kissinger, at which Dr. Kissinger had outlined the likely substance of our reply to Ismail. The Prime Minister had asked the Ambassador personally to convey to Dr. Kissinger, that she would appreciate an opportunity to comment on our proposed reply. Dr. Kissinger had said the day before that he would take any Israeli comments very seriously; therefore, she would like to have a chance to make her own comments. At the latest we would have her comments by early the next morning. The Ambassador wondered if this was satisfactory to Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Rodman said

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he would check immediately.

The Ambassador then said he had his own personal comment to make on the draft reply. Dr. Kissinger in the draft message to Ismail said that the heads of agreement "would of course be based on Resolution 242." Normally such a reply would be sufficient. But since the Egyptian message had explicitly referred to 242 as interpreted by the Four Powers and in the Rogers Plan, Dr. Kissinger's refusal to comment on that might be read as not challenging it. The Ambassador suggested some language such as "Resolution 242, but not according to any interpretations that have been given," or any other language that makes the same point. This would be more in line with Dr. Kissinger's pledge elsewhere in the message "not to mislead Egypt."

The Ambassador also expressed the hope that if Ismail did send us preliminary "heads of agreement" before the next Kissinger-Ismail meeting, it would be useful if the Israelis could see them. "Maybe it would help us formulate our own suggestions or thinking on the matter," the Ambassador suggested. Mr. Rodman said he would check this with Mr. Kissinger also.

The Ambassador also asked as a favor if they could have another look at Ismail's message of April 7, which Dr. Kissinger had shown them yesterday. They would just appreciate another chance to take a few notes on it. This could wait until the next day, i. e. when they brought the Prime Minister's comments. Mr. Rodman said he would look into that.

Finally, the Ambassador raised the question of airplanes once again, which had been discussed with Dr. Kissinger at the last meeting before he went to California. Mr. Rodman assured him that we had not forgotten. Immediately after the previous day's meeting with Dr. Kissinger had asked General Scowcroft to check with the bureaucracy on where this stood, and we would let them know.

[The meeting thereupon ended. Ambassador Dinitz spoke with Dr. Kissinger by phone the next day after receiving the Prime Minister's comments. See telecon at Tab B.]

1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates Mr. Ismail's thoughtful message of April 7.
2. Dr. Kissinger agrees that US-Egyptian relations require patience, moderation and wisdom on both sides. For its part, the US will make a sincere and serious effort to put this relationship on a new basis.
3. With respect to Mr. Ismail's assumptions, the US position is as follows:
 - a. The White House has engaged itself in a serious effort to determine whether it can play a useful role. It will not mislead Egypt, but promise only what it believes it can deliver.
 - b. The United States is not certain about Israel's reaction since it has sought to avoid theoretical discussions. Dr. Kissinger's understanding was that the next meeting would involve a discussion of what Mr. Ismail called heads of agreement which could serve as a link to the opening of the Suez Canal as well as the overall agreement. These would, of course, be based on Security Council Resolution 242.
4. Within this context, the US affirms its serious interest in movement toward a peace agreement. To provide for a fruitful discussion, the US side assumes that the Egyptian side will be prepared to put forward its precise ideas on the issues raised at the last meeting. As discussed then, it might be useful if some of those could be sent in advance.
5. Dr. Kissinger would welcome another meeting. He would prefer to meet in the US and would find it difficult to make a special trip to Europe at this time. However, there is a possibility that he may be in Europe for other business and that he could arrange to meet around May 9 or 10. If Mr. Ismail agrees, Dr. Kissinger will send Dr. Trone to Egypt to work out modalities.