

MEMORANDUM

Egypt-Sensitive

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 25, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Attached are materials dealing with the following aspects of your discussions with Egypt:

Tab A - Cairo/Washington Hotline

Tab B - Cairo/Jidda Hotline

Tab C - Egyptian Commercial Aircraft Purchase

Tab D - Military Equipment for Cairo

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



SECRET

Status Report on Cairo/Washington Hotline

In late March we proposed to the Egyptians a dedicated cable circuit between Washington and Cairo. The United States would pay all leasing costs (approximately \$140,000 annually) and make all installations.

After some delay the Egyptians responded with a request for the hotline to go via satellite rather than submarine cable. There are no differences between the two methods insofar as hotline communications themselves are concerned, but the satellite route would provide the Egyptians with greater communication potential (up to 24 circuits). There are, however, some complicating factors. In order to receive a satellite signal, Egypt must lease a portable earth station until such time as a permanent station can be constructed (at least one year). An earth station can be made available to Egypt only after approval by the countries of the Intelsat Community. That is only a formality, but it would obviously become very widely known and would be big news in the communications industry. Under these conditions, there is no way that the United States could pick up the leasing costs for the earth station. (COMSAT has shaved the costs as closely as they can, but they would still run about \$250,000 per year.) The U.S. would still be able to pay the satellite circuit costs in a discreet manner, however, (\$90,000 - \$130,000 annually) but, at least for "cover" purposes, the Egyptians would probably have to lease openly one additional circuit from Cairo to their embassy here in Washington.

This latter setup was agreed upon between the U.S. and Egyptian technicians here in Washington, and arrangements were made last week for COMSAT people to go to Cairo to arrange for the earth station. Marwan, however, has held up the COMSAT trip because he is apparently confused about the costs (see attached cable). As you recall, you had told Marwan we should pay for the hotline. As I have explained above, we will pay for the hotline, but we cannot pay for the earth station nor for any additional "cover" circuit to Washington.

I think that once you explain the situation, the Egyptians will still opt for the satellite circuit, although if they wish to return to the submarine cable route we can pick up the entire cost. An additional advantage of the satellite route is that the earth station has a capability of handling 24 circuits. It takes only a matter of hours to order up any

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of these additional circuits, so that with the earth station Egypt will be in a position to do such things as to bring special television programs from the U.S. or elsewhere, to add special circuits for Sadat when he travels (assuming earth stations near his destination), and so forth.

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S E C R E T

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

25X1

ROUTINE

DE [ ] #0144 1141535  
R 241258Z APR 74  
FM CAIRO

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

S E C R E T SENSITIVE 241258Z APR 74 [ ]

25X1

APRIL 24, 1974

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: AMBASSADOR EILTS, CAIRO 144

1. IN CONNECTION WITH TEMPORARY EARTH SATELLITE STATION, I HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM WALDMAN THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER A USG AFFAIR, BUT THAT TWO COMSAT OFFICIALS WOULD BE ARRIVING IN CAIRO TODAY TO DISCUSS PROJECT WITH EGYPTIANS. HAVE SINCE BEEN TOLD [ ] THAT ENGINEER GALAL OF MARWAN'S OFFICE TELEPHONE URGENTLY LAST NIGHT TO ASK THAT THEIR TRIP BE CALLED OFF AND [ ] COMMUNICATED WITH GENERAL ADAMS TO ARRANGE THIS.

25X1

25X1

2. THIS MORNING ASHRAF MARWAN TELEPHONED TO EXPLAIN WHAT HAD HAPPENED. ACCORDING TO MARWAN, THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD MARWAN IN WASHINGTON THAT THERE SHOULD BE "HOT LINE" BETWEEN CAIRO AND WASHINGTON AND THAT USG WILL PAY FOR IT. WHEN GALAL TALKED WITH ADAMS, THE LATTER APPARENTLY SAID USG WOULD PAY FOR THE LINE, BUT NOT FOR THE TEMPORARY EARTH STATION. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, MARWAN FELT IT WAS PREMATURE FOR COMSAT PEOPLE TO ARRIVE. HE HOPES THAT THE SECRETARY CAN "FINALIZE" WHAT EXACTLY USG IS PREPARED TO DO ON THE "HOT LINE" AND TEMPORARY EARTH STATION DURING THE UPCOMING VISIT.

3. IF THERE IS ANYTHING I SHOULD TELL MARWAN ON EITHER OF THESE BEFORE THE SECRETARY ARRIVES, PLEASE ADVISE URGENTLY.

4. WARM REGARDS.  
170

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

JHS 2/6/2012

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCOWCROFT, BURKE, MCFARLANE, RODMAN

PSN:019928 PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:114/15:48Z DTG:241258Z APR 74

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\*\*\*\*\*S COPY


SECRET/SENSITIVE

CAIRO/JIDDA HOTLINE

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25X1

[redacted] everything is proceeding well with regard to the Cairo/Jidda Hotline. [redacted] now in the process of procuring the necessary equipment. [redacted] estimates that completion of procurement and installation will take perhaps three months (some of the equipment must be manufactured to specification).

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Egyptian Commercial Aircraft Purchase

Roy Atherton will have an information memo for you on this subject.

Attached are the related cables from Eilts.

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Department of State

• Ldy - WH  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 231200Z APR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6292  
BT  
SECRET CAIRO 2497

CONTROL: 6205Q  
RECD: 23 APR 14 46Z

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR ETRN BEXP EG  
SUBJECT: DC-9'S

1. FAHMY TOLD ME AT GERMAN RECEPTION LAST EVENING THAT GOE UNDERSTANDS YOUR CONCURRENCE IS NEEDED FOR THE POSSIBLE SALE OF TWELVE DC-9'S AND 10'S TO EGYPT. HE HAD APPARENTLY GOTTEN HIS INFORMATION FROM EGYPTIAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVES ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT. IF IT IS NEEDED, HE ASKED THAT YOU GIVE APPROVAL IN PRINCIPAL TO SUCH SALES.

2. QUITE BY CHANGE LATER IN THE EVENING I ENCOUNTERED ONE OF THE DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVES NOW HERE. HE TOLD ME THAT YOU WILL BE ASKED DURING YOUR FORTHCOMING TRIP THAT USG PROVIDE AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF C-9B'S. HE DESCRIBED THIS AS THE NAVY VERSION OF THE DC-9 FOR COMMERCIAL USE. DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVE IS COMING BY TOMORROW TO PROVIDE MORE DETAILS. IF YOU DO NOT ALREADY KNOW OF THIS FROM TALKS WITH FAHMY, I THOUGH YOU SHOULD BE FOREWARNED.

EILTS

BT  
#2497

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 241305Z APR 74  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6320  
BT  
SECRET CAIRO 2542

6 6 7 1 Q  
Apr 24, 1974  
17:25Z

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR ETRN EG BEXP  
SUBJ: DC-9'S

REF: CAIRO 2497

1. DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVE CALLED TODAY TO EXPLAIN WHAT GOE HAS IN MIND IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITION OF DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT. ACCORDING TO HIM, EGYPTAIR OFFICIALS, WHO HAVE BEEN HIS CONTACTS, UNDERSTAND THAT GOE WILL REQUEST THE SECRETARY ON HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO AGREE TO THE SALE OF A NUMBER OF C-9B'S FOR USE BY THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY. THE INITIAL NUMBER COULD BE FIVE, BUT MORE MIGHT BE BOUGHT LATER. EGYPTAIR WOULD LIKE TO TIE IN THE SALE OF THESE AIRCRAFT TO AN ADDITIONAL SIX DC-9'S FOR USE BY THE AIRLINE.

2. DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT PURCHASE, BUT HAD NO RPT NO, INFO RE PROPOSED FINANCING.

3. IF SALE GOES THROUGH, DOUGLAS IS ALSO THINKING OF ESTABLISHING MAINTENANCE FACILITY AND SPARE PARTS INVENTORY IN CAIRO TO SERVICE BOTH EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DOUGLAS BUILD AIRCRAFT.  
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
August 20, 1974

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

As Secretary Kissinger promised, attached is the list of military equipment indicating dates of availability. In some cases, where the items must come from the production line, you will note that scheduled availability from production is far into the future. On those items, we will take whatever steps we can to develop a better production schedule or otherwise reduce deliver time, and those lead times should not at this point be considered definitive.

If you have any immediate questions on the list, you could give a note to the courier who delivers this. Any further questions could probably best be passed through General Guay.

Sincerely,

  
Brent Scowcroft  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

His Excellency  
Ismail Fahmy  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of Egypt

*(Delivered by Courier)*

[SECRET/SENSITIVE]

ITEM

AVAILABILITY

Unattended Sensors  
for Tanks & Personnel

Available from production line with a lead  
time of 12 months for first delivery

Bomb, CBU-58

Available within 90 days

Portable Lightweight  
Sensors

AN/APR-39 (for helicopter) available from  
production line with lead time of 6 months

Torpedoes, MK-46

Available from production line with deliveries  
during August-October 1975. Also requires  
aircraft change kit for Sea King helicopter

Helicopter (Huey B)

Available in "as is" condition, equipped with  
SS-11 missile, within 60 days. With over-  
haul would require additional 6 months

Radar, TPS-58A

Available from production line beginning  
July 1977. Sale requires agreement of  
France and Germany

TOW Launcher

Available from production line with lead time  
of 30 months for first deliveries

TOW Missile

Same as TOW Launcher

Drone, Target

Target drones are available within 90 days  
without control system. (No control sytem  
is available). Ground launched reconnaissance  
drone is available from production beginning  
18 months after signature of letter of offer.

Bomb, ROCKEYE

Available within 90 days

MAVERICK

Available within 90 days (would require air-  
craft modification)

WALLEYE

Available within 90 days (would require air-  
craft modification)

F-4

Delivery times not yet available

175

Available from production line beginning in  
October 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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April 1, 1974

Henry --

These are informal Defense recommendations on the Egyptian request list.

Defense proposes providing only the first four items (about \$10 million). Their reasons for denying the other items are threefold:

- (1) Susceptibility to technical compromise (i. e., mistrust of Egyptians).
- (2) Similar equipment has not been provided the Israelis.
- (3) Equipment still in R&D status.

In addition, there were a couple of items not identifiable from the description.

Price of the total identifiable request list is only about \$260 million.

There is also the question of the legal aspects of third country transfer. Saunders has a separate paper for you on that issue.

(I have checked a couple of additional items which it appears could easily be provided, even within Defense's restrictive parameters.)

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Attachment to  
BS Note of  
April 1, 1974

SECRET  
ANALYSIS OF REQUEST

SENSITIVE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>EXTENDED PRICE</u>	<u>REMARKS/RECOMMENDATION</u>
Unattended Sensors for detection of enemy tanks and personnel (Ser 8)	✓ 10 +	\$ 14,870	Remarks: Item most closely meeting description is AN/VS-154 MINISID III, which requires 1 AN/VSQ-46 BUQUINALE III for sensor read-out. Items could be provided from production w/o significant impact with 12 month production leadtime. Could probably be provided from U.S. stocks (Army/AC), but impact on US Forces is unknown. <u>Recommendation:</u> Agree to provide; take from US stocks.
Portable Lightweight Sensors to avoid detection by enemy radars (for men & helicopters) (Ser 7)	✓ 20 helo 10 men +	\$ 265,000 (w/Spt equip)	Remarks: AN/APR-39 (Helo) could be produced from production with PLT of 6 months. AN/ISS-10 (MIRID) (PLN) is development item w/first production scheduled for FY77. Not considered feasible. <u>Recommendation:</u> Agree to provide AN/APR-39 from production
Torpedoes, MK46 (Ser 2)	✓ 70 +	\$8,500,000	Remarks: Can provide from production w/deliveries Aug-Oct 75. Could from Navy stock, but would represent 18% drawdown; considered unacceptable impact. Also requires aircraft change kit, none of which are on procurement -PLT unavailable. Do not know that aircraft change kit (which requires 430 manhours for installation) could be installed on foreign-produced Sea King helicopter. <u>Recommendation:</u> Agree to provide from procurement contingent upon determination of compatibility of aircraft change kit w/Sea King helicopter.
Anti-Personnel Cluster Bomb (CEU-53) (Ser 16)	✓ 100 +	152,000	Remarks: Item immediately available from stock w/no impact on USAF capability. DIA states item could be mounted on MIG-21 w/only minor modification to aircraft required. <u>Recommendation:</u> Agree to provide.
IV Anti-Tank Cluster Bomb (ROCKEYE, CEU-1K20) (Ser 16)	✓ 100 +	\$ 249,000	Remarks: Item immediately available from stock w/no impact on USAF capability. DIA states item could be mounted on MIG-21 w/only minor modification to aircraft required. In the past, this armor piercing munition has been considered very sensitive. <u>Recommendation:</u> Do not provide due to potential technical intelligence and production exploitation.

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SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>EXTENDED PRICE</u>	<u>REMARKS/RECOMMENDATION</u>
TV MAVERICK (Ser 14)	100 + X	\$ 2,400,000	Remarks: Item immediately available from stock w/no impact on USAF capability. Would require extensive modification of aircraft (F4G-21), cost of which cannot be estimated. Also no information available as to ability to provide equipment required for aircraft modification. Munition and guidance system considered sensitive. Recommendation: Do not provide due to potential technical intelligence and production exploitation.
TV WALLEYE (Ser 15)	X 200 +	\$ 320,000	Remarks: Same as for MAVERICK. Recommendation: Same as for MAVERICK
Cobra-10W Helicopters	24	\$31,500,000	Remarks: Could be provided from procurement w/PLT of 36mos. Aircraft scheduled for procurement does not have all weather or night passive vision equipment; AH is first helicopter to be so equipped and will not be available until the 1980s. It should be noted that Israeli request for Cobra has been refused. Recommendation: Deny request.
TV TOW Launcher (Ser 3)	100 +	\$ 2,600,000	Remarks: Can be provided from new procurement w/PLT of 18 mos. Diversion from Army stocks or scheduled procurement considered unacceptable impact. System considered sensitive due to potential technical intelligence and production exploitation. Recommendation: Deny request.
TV Firebee Drones (Ser 5) ✓	48 +	65,000,000	Remarks: Request is for three types: low altitude target, high altitude target and recce, all to be ground launched. Target drones, ABE and spores could be provided w/no impact. However, no control system is available (the four in USAF inventory are permanent installations, not suitable for movement) and information is available as to lead time required to procure. There are no ground launched recce drones in USAF inventory. Could be provided at rate of 3 months beginning 18 mos after signing letter of offer. Control station problem still pertains. Recommendation: Deny request.

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ITEM	QUANTITY	ESTIMATED PRICE	REMARKS/RECOMMENDATION
Field Surveillance ✓	5	\$ 2,500,000	<p>Remarks: Army has no radar with range requested. Could provide AN/TPS-53A from procurement beginning FY78. Radar has range of 10 mi for personnel and 20 miles for vehicles. Radar is produced under co-production agreement which requires approval of FRG and France for sale to third country. Sale to Israel has been denied on this basis.</p> <p>Recommendation: Deny request.</p>
✓ Aerial Cameras (Ser 9)	8	\$ 5,000,000	<p>Remarks: Could provide from production at rate of 1 a month beginning 7 mos after signing of letter of Offer. However, Israeli requests for high resolution photographer recce capability has been denied up to this time.</p> <p>Recommendation: Deny request.</p>
Panasonic Broad Bank Receiver (50-500 MCS)	5	--	<p>Remarks: Check with Army, NSA &amp; ASA indicates that no equipment fitting description is available.</p> <p>Recommendation: Deny request.</p>
✓ Aircraft equipped for radar jamming (EB-6) (Ser 11)	3	\$68,300,000	<p>Remarks: Could be supplied from new procurement s/PLT of 1800s Aircraft and associated ECM equipment considered extremely sensitive and subject to technical intelligence and production exploitation. ECM is developed, would place CVAs in severe jeopardy. Similar request from Israelis has been denied.</p> <p>Recommendation: Deny request.</p>
✓ Electronic Recce Aircraft (Ser 12)	2	\$11,600,000	<p>Remarks: System requested not addressed due to special sensitivities. An alternate system designed for use in the RF-4 could be made available from production in 31 months, but adaptability to MIG aircraft is unknown. Alternate system also sensitive due to potential for technical intelligence and production exploitation. Israeli request for similar capability has been denied.</p> <p>Recommendation: Deny request.</p>

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ITEM	QUANTITY	EXTENDED PRICE	REMARKS/RECOMMENDATION
✓ Laser Range Finders for Artillery OPS (Ser 12)	? 100	\$ 250,000	Remarks: Item currently under development. No substitute available. Could be supplied from procurement beginning 3QFY78. Recommendation: Deny request.
✓ Aircraft equipped as airborne operations and control units (Ser 17)	- 1	\$ 9,400,000	Remarks: Could provide from new production a C-130 with an Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center capsule, w/PLT 16mos. Providing from USAF assets considered unacceptable impact. System is interim until AEWCS (B-30) is available in 3QFY77. Israeli request for similar capability has been denied. Recommendation: Deny request.
✓ UHF Direction Finder, Mobile (200-500 MCS) (Ser 18)	U 5	--	Remarks: For Army, no such capability currently exists. OORD states that R&D in out years is planned, AF has AN/CJJD-6, with 25-400 MCS coverage, but system is fixed installation. No price and availability data available. Recommendation: Deny request.
TOTAL		<u>\$217,875,870</u>	

SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Military Equipment for Egypt

Attached at Tab I are the recommendations of Defense on the equipment list submitted by the Egyptians at Tab II.

The items which Defense does not wish to provide are as follows:

1. Aerial cameras (Ser 9) -- This is highly sophisticated equipment.
2. E 6 B aircraft for radar jamming. (Ser 11) -- Very sensitive equipment provided to no other country.
3. Electronic reconnaissance aircraft (Ser 12) -- Also extremely sensitive equipment.
4. Aircraft equipped as AWACS (Ser 17) -- Highly sophisticated equipment.
5. Artillery laser range finders (Ser 12) -- This is still an R & D item.

Two other items could not be identified.

1. Panoramic broad band receivers (30-500 MCS) (Ser 10)
2. UHF mobile direction finder (200-500 MCS) (Ser 18)

While Defense is prepared to furnish the remaining items, contained in the list at Tab I, there will on some of them be a question of time of availability.

Note that the Defense list contains 16 F-4 aircraft. These have been added solely because the MAVERICK and WALLEYE missiles cannot be adapted to MIG aircraft. In other words, without the F-4, they are worthless.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Ser.	Qty.	Type
1	24	Helicopters Huey Cobra equipped for all weather operations complete with passive night vision equipment for fire control and operational observation. Armament to include TOW A/TK missiles.
2	70	Torpedoes MK 46 Anti Submarine to be launched from helicopters, 60 live torpedoes, and 10 for training. Fire control computers and system for 6 helicopters (Sea-King).
3	400	Launchers TOW anti/TK missiles.
4	4000	TOW anti/TK missiles (3000 live warheads, 1000 practice heads).
5	48	Firebee Drones (different types) for target practice for aircraft and air defence missiles, low and high altitude. The number will include some drones dedicated to reconnaissance work for low and high altitude photography all to be launched from the ground. Sensors and other means for electronic reconnaissance also to be negotiated.
6	5	Field surveillance radars with range up to 40Km (cars).
7	20	Portable lightweight sensors to avoid detection by enemy radars; (different frequency to be used by men and helicopters)
8	10	Unattended sensors to detect enemy tank and car traffic in enemy rear and relay information by wireless.
9	8	Aerial cameras for highest resolution oblique photography from <del>10</del> 14-18 Km to cover ranges of 10 to 60 Km to give scales of 1:6-8000 (cameras to be mounted in pods - films suitable for high speed processing - aircraft high speed).
10	5	Panoramic broad band receivers (30- 500 mcs) high precision, with automatic search.

TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)  
 CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

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Ser	Qty	Type
11	3	Aircraft equipped for radar jamming all bands (EB-6).
12	2	Electronic recce aircraft (to cover wireless and radar Freq., all necessary equipment for recording, analysis and data link with ground station.
13	100	Laser range finders for field artillery O,Ps .
14	100	Maveric air to ground missiles (if it could be mounted on our Migs).
15n	200	Walleye TV guided air to surface (if it could be mounted on our Migs).
16	100	each of AP and A/TK clusters (Flechettes and pellets) if they could be mounted on our aircrafts.
17	1	Aircraft equiped as airborne operations and control center for fighters.
18	5	UHF Direction finder stations mobile (200 -500 MCS ).

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<u>SERIAL #</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUESTED</u>	<u>QUANTITY OFFERED</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
8	Unattended Sensors for Tanks & Personnel	10	60	89,500	Quantity increased in order to permit efficient deployment pattern.
16	Bomb, CBU-58	100	300	456,000	
7	Portable Lightweight Sensors	20	20	265,000	
2	Torpedoes, MK-46	70	70	8,500,000	
1	Helicopter (Huey B)	24	24	15,000,000	Defense proposes the Huey B in place of the Cobra. There is no TOW package as yet for use on helicopters The Huey B can accommodate the SS-11 or other portable anti-tank missiles.
6	Radar, TPS-58A	5	10	5,000,000	Quantity of 10 recommended for better coverage.
3	TOW Launcher	100	200	5,200,000	There will be an obvious availability problem on this item.
4	TOW Missiles	4000	7500	26,000,000	
5	Drone, Target	48	24	30,000,000	Only Target Drones can be provided. There are no ground launched RECCE Drones in U.S. inventory

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16	Bomb, ROCKEYE	100	300	750,000	
14	MAVERICK	100	200	4,800,000	Adaptable only to F-4 aircraft.
15	WALLEYE	200	200	320,000	Adaptable only to F-4 aircraft.
New	F-4	0	16	84,000,000	Required for use with MAVERICK and WALLEYE.

Total Dollar Value - \$180,380,500



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<u>SERIAL #</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUESTED</u>	<u>QUANTITY OFFERED</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>	<u>AVAILABILITY</u>
8	Unattended Sensors for Tanks & Personnel	10	60	89,500	From production with 12 mos. lead time. From stockpile with unacceptable impact.
15	Bomb, CBU-58	100	300	456,000	Immediately available.
7	Portable Lightweight Sensors	20	20	265,000	From production with 6 mos. PLT.
2	Torpedoes, MK-46	70	70	8,500,000	From production w/delivery Aug-Oct 75. From stockpile is 18% drawdown.
1	Helicopter (Huey B)	24	24	15,000,000	
6	Radar, TPS-58A	5	10	5,000,000	From production by FY 78. Requires third country approval.
3	TOW Launcher	100	200	5,200,000	From production w/30 mos. PLT From stock w/unacceptable impact.
	TOW Missiles	4000	7500	26,000,000	Same as launcher.
5	Drone, Target	48	24	30,000,000	Available but without control system.

*JH13  
SS - !!  
as is w/in 60 days.  
drawdown about 6 mos.*

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<u>SERIAL #</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUESTED</u>	<u>QUANTITY OFFERED</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>	<u>AVAILABILITY</u>
16	Bomb, ROCKEYE	100	300	750,000	Immediately available.
14	MAVERICK	100	200	4,800,000	Immediately available.
15	WALLEYE	200	200	320,000	Immediately available.
New	F-4	0	16	84,000,000	
	175mm SP Gun (M107)	40		11,666,960	From production by Oct 76. (Army has only 129 total) Procurement begins in 1976. 336 for Israel from 76 procurement @ 5 per month.

Total Dollar Value - \$192,047,460

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: Message for [Redacted]

[Redacted]

"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates [Redacted] message of June 11.

"2. In the February meeting with Dr. Kissinger, [Redacted] proposed that Dr. Kissinger talk with both Egyptians and Israelis and then attempt to develop some heads of agreement on an overall Egyptian-Israeli settlement which could serve as a basis for negotiation of provisions to implement them. Dr. Kissinger has agreed that this could be a reasonable way to proceed but has made two points:

"a. He has said that it would be important to keep these principles general enough so that while they would address all the major issues in a settlement, they would not attempt to resolve issues that can only be resolved definitively through the give-and-take of a negotiating process. Otherwise the discussion could lead to immediate deadlock. He has explained the practical reasons why this approach could enhance the effectiveness of US involvement.

"b. Within that context, Dr. Kissinger has noted that the Egyptian side would consider engaging in simultaneous concrete discussions of the first step toward an overall settlement. In this case, Dr. Kissinger assured [Redacted] that the US would be prepared to declare publicly that these discussions would take place with the clear understanding that they represented a first step in a broader understanding.

**SANITIZED**

XGDS - 3  
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.  
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 03-01/4 sec. 3.3 (b)(1)(b) 1tr. AUG 26 2003

By [Signature] Date AUG 24 2007

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[p. 1 of 2]

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- 2 -

He suggested that any such declaration would make clear that these discussions would not attempt to cover all issues in a settlement since some would be handled in separate talks on an overall agreement.

**SANITIZED**

3.3 (b)(1)(b)

"3. The question which Dr. Kissinger is now putting to [ ] relates to the former--to the heads of agreement on an overall settlement. The question is whether the Egyptian side would regard as helpful serious US-Soviet discussion of possible principles of agreement for an overall settlement.

"4. Since Chairman Brezhnev will arrive in Washington June 18, it would be helpful to have [ ] reply as soon as possible.

"5. In reference to [ ] comment on Ambassador Scali's statement, Dr. Kissinger assures [ ] that there is no discussion in Washington of a 'mutual' pullback of forces from the Suez Canal. The position of the US Government cannot be judged on the basis of erroneous reports in the press."

Henry A. Kissinger

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)~~

[p. 2 of 2]

written night of  
2/25/73 as  
summary of  
first day's talks.

## I. Main points in Ismail's presentation:

A. Urgency: a settlement in 1973. The area can't stand waiting for 15 years while new relationships evolve, as some Israeli leaders recommend.

### B. Objective:

1. A Middle East of strong, healthy, cooperative, independent states. Whether Israel is among them depends on whether Israel recognizes itself as a Middle Eastern state. A settlement could be a basis for normalization of relations, but that would take a long time.

2. An Egypt-Israel agreement would establish a state of peace. This would end the state of war, but would not be full peace.

-- This agreement would produce a situation different from the Egypt-Israel relationship before 1967 in that it would:

- allow Israel free passage through waterways;
- end the boycott on third-party goods;
- commit Egypt to prevent guerrilla

~~operations~~ <sup>operations</sup> from Egyptian soil and ~~elsewhere~~ <sup>everywhere possible</sup>.

- end Egypt's "reservation" on multilateral agreements;

radio -- commit each side to non-intervention.

-- It would not include exchanging ambassadors, trade agreements, borders open for routine travel. These would be characteristics of later normalization.

3. Normalization is an objective, but that will take time. Will depend on a refugee settlement.

c. There are two main aspects of a settlement:

1. Israel's return to pre-war borders.
2. Palestinian rights. The problem should be reduced to the size of Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine deciding how to divide the territory and how to live together.
  - Egypt would pose no objection if Hussein got the West Bank back and then gave the West Bank Palestinians a chance to determine their own future.
  - A refugee settlement is necessary.
  - Gaza must have self-determination.
  - Egypt will handle the negotiation leading to this.

D. Israel's "legitimate" security concerns can be met:

- "legitimate" concerns include international guarantees and Egyptian peace commitments.
- "Illegitimate concerns" are a desire for a presence at Sharm al-Shaikh and in the Sinai. These are political.

E. The problem can be settled by stages and by sectors, but they must be linked so as to lead to an overall settlement. There must be a full settlement. Egypt cannot accept a partial withdrawal "left hanging."

F. The big powers and UN should state what kind of Israel they envisage.

*Unilaterally at 1*



II. What was new in Ismail's presentation?  
In its essential points this was the familiar Egyptian position. However, there seemed to be three new points of emphasis, none dramatic:

A. Normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. Although Ismail said this would take a long time, he spoke of normalization as being at the end of the road. If this could be developed concretely and related to steps in the settlement process, it could be useful in persuading Israel that Egypt would be willing to have a normal relationship.

B. Egypt has not publicly endorsed Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom. Ismail seemed to say Egypt would pose no objection to Hussein's getting the West Bank back and granting self-determination.

C. Egypt has indicated before that it does not want Gaza but that it must remain Arab. More seemed to be said yesterday than previously about the mechanics (UN auspices, with Egypt handling its negotiations) of achieving self-determination.



### III. Questions for further elaboration

The following are questions for further Egyptian elaboration either in discussion now or in writing before the next meeting:

Why not distinguish between "peace" and "normalization" rather than between de facto and de jure peace?

- A. Can Egypt be more precise about the relationship that would exist between Egypt and Israel when a peace agreement is signed and about how further normalization would take place? Can <sup>stages of</sup> normalization be related to other developments (e.g. a refugee settlement)? To phasing of agreements?
- B. How, precisely, might Israel's security needs be met? What measures would a sovereign Egypt allow?  
→ Could restoration of Egyptian sovereignty + Israeli withdrawal be phased differently?
- C. How does Egypt envision the staging of agreements? Under what circumstances, if any, could Egypt begin negotiating the terms of a first-step withdrawal from the Canal? (Is there a way to start with the so-called interim agreement?)
- D. What modifications might be made in the Egyptian position in return for what modifications in the Israeli position?
- E. Exactly how might Gaza's self-determination be negotiated and arranged?
- F. How could a refugee settlement be negotiated?
- G. What is the relationship of an Egypt-Israel settlement to ~~the~~ Jordan-Israel, Syria-Israel, and refugee settlements?

IV. Other points to stress

- A. The purpose of these talks has been exploratory -- to see whether the basis for a settlement can be developed by some fresh thinking. Believe it was understood that our willingness to meet was an indication of our interest in a settlement, but the fact of our meeting implied no commitment to follow one course or another.
- B. Egyptians don't believe it, but we have no magic for producing Israeli agreement to Egyptian terms. If there is an agreement, it will require difficult decisions on both sides. Only readiness to make such decisions can turn the course of negotiations. We don't want the Egyptians to have any illusions about what is possible as a result of these meetings.
- C. Reiterate: Please give serious consideration to what you can give us to make the case that Egypt is ready to move toward normalization of relations.

[ See Peter's checklist for meeting agenda and procedural points to be covered. ]

Cairo  
I

H


HAK notes  
2/26 (second  
day)

Israel: ! Settlement in ME, US can play  
dominant role.

Channel for talks.

Freedom of Action

Lobby used influence.



on

What can we do?

Heads of Agreement

What do you mean by fundamental  
principles?

Get Israeli consent first.

When should Israel be brought in.  
2 aspects: ① Israel informed ② Israel-  
Egyptian talks.

Borders - Navigation

Generally informed - re S. A.

One - way or the other will inform S. A.

| Recognition -

UN supervision - Egypt - includes mil. receipt

(2)

Tuesday - Wednesday

Egyptian solution

1. Territories - sovereignty.
2. Gaza - self-determination under auspices of UN.

Refugee problem solved by UN.

Jerusalem.

Internal question - N. bank. Have  
dem. & expressions.

Syria - similar principles

Interrelationships between different settlements  
Fundamental principles.

Jordan -

Heads of agreement - final provisions  
→ implementation.

Recognition of Israel - after entire settlement

End of state of war.

Freedom of navigation

Gaza - UN

Israel evacuated

} time enough to prepare  
it for self-determination

He'll get answers to:

-- When Israel should be brought in  
(He'll leave it to us)

-- Who talks to the Syrians?

-- Who handles refugee issue?

Rockman

ACTION

838-X

SECRET (XGDS)

February 21, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: The State of US-Egyptian Talks and Your Possible Role

The purpose of this memo, in response to your request, is (a) to describe the present state of US-Egyptian talks, (b) to suggest one way you might relate to them and (c) to relate these points to the visit of Hafiz Ismail this Friday.

The State of US-Egyptian Talks

US-Egyptian talks on an interim settlement lost momentum in the summer of 1971 after the Rogers-Sisco visits to Cairo, the Bergus paper, the failure of Sadat to send an emissary to Washington for follow-up talks, and the lack of results from Sisco's July visit to Israel. At that point these were the outstanding issues:

--Sadat wanted an interim agreement linked to an Israeli commitment to full withdrawal under a later agreement. The Israelis rejected any such linkage and insisted on a self-contained agreement on partial withdrawal.

--Sadat wanted Israeli withdrawal east of the mountain passes. Israel spoke of withdrawing only 10-15 kilometers from the Canal.

--Sadat insisted that Egyptian regular military forces cross the Canal. Israel insisted on civilians only, fearing that Soviet forces then in Egypt would cross.

--Israel wanted immediate use of the Canal. Sadat wanted to defer Israeli use until conclusion of a final peace agreement, resulting in full Israeli withdrawal.

XGDS - 3

DNOLAS - Date impossible to determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)

--The Israelis wanted commitment to an indefinite cease-fire, while the Egyptians wanted limited extension. One had the feeling that this issue might take care of itself if the others began falling into place.

--The nature of supervisory arrangements was recognized as an issue but was not a primary one then.

That is where diplomatic exchanges on the specifics of an interim agreement stand as suspended in mid-1971.

Recently President Sadat publicly and Hafiz Ismail privately have described the following as the present Egyptian position:

--Egypt is no longer interested in an "interim" agreement if by "interim" is meant a settlement leaving the major issue of territory in abeyance. Egyptians are concerned that the re-opening of the Canal and the restoration of normal life in the cities along the west bank will create a buffer against renewed military confrontation while removing the inconvenience and danger that give the powers outside the area an interest. In London Tuesday Ismail said Egypt "totally rejects" an interim agreement under US auspices.

--Egypt is prepared to make peace with Israel and respect its territorial integrity within pre-war borders, but Egypt expects Israel to do the same toward Egypt's borders.

--Procedures for making peace need not be an obstacle if the substance is right. UN Resolution 242 is one guide for a settlement but there may be others.

--Egypt is ready to accept international guarantees, including presence at Sharm al-Shaikh and demilitarized zones, but Egypt could not accept Israeli sovereignty over one inch of Egyptian territory.

--There have been some recent indications that Egyptians are making a distinction between resolving the issues which grew out of the 1967 war and those Palestinian issues which date back to 1948-49. Foreign Minister Zayyat recently said the latter are for the Palestinians to solve.

A Framework: The Broad Choices

Just for the sake of sharpening the issues, it is worth stopping briefly to note the two broad areas of choice before us as we consider ways of reactivating efforts to advance Arab-Israeli peace negotiations:

1. Substance of a general approach.

-- The State Department approach continues to favor (1) concentrating on an Egypt-Israeli settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel settlement till later and (2) trying to start Egypt-Israel negotiations on an interim agreement, establishing a commitment to negotiate later on an overall settlement but not addressing any of the fundamental issues like boundaries now.

-- The alternative would be (1) to deal with a Jordan-Israel agreement simultaneously with Egypt-Israel negotiations, recognizing that the US role would be quite different and (2) to address the issue of territory, at least in terms of general principles, at the outset in private talks with the Israelis, and eventually with the Egyptians. The latter point could be handled on a separate track from proximity talks, supplementing them. There are elements of both approaches that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

2. Style.

-- The State approach has normally been to begin consultations with the Israelis and Egyptians on the basis of a formal demarche and a fully developed formula from which the two sides would begin negotiations. Although that formula may be presented with expression of readiness to consult fully, this approach can have the appearance of trying to force something of our making on Israel.

-- The alternative is to make a more general but still substantive approach, speaking at first in terms of fundamental points but not having a fully worked out formula which we are pressing on all major issues. The initial approach would be less formal and dramatic. The purpose would be to preserve an atmosphere of collaboration, to minimize the appearance of pressure, to encourage the Israelis to develop a formula, and yet to make clear the points we feel must be addressed.

The suggestion developed for your thought in the fuller discussion below is that State proceed more or less openly on an interim agreement with lower-key style while you develop a simultaneous private track on the broader issues if and when the conditions seem right. When a decision is made on this, the Jordanian question could be pursued separately.

The Basic Question: Is Egyptian-Israeli Negotiation Possible?

The basic question is whether either Israelis or Egyptians are prepared to negotiate seriously. Specifically, is either prepared to move back from present negotiating positions in response to significant concessions from the other side?

While the question applies equally to both sides, it is important for us to answer it with regard to Israel before we commit ourselves to Egypt to involve ourselves in a negotiating process. It is important to know where Israel stands not because we want Israel to make all the concessions but because it would be unrealistic to get very far out in front of Israel and to let Egypt believe that we can deliver more than we can persuade Israel to accept. It will not help to begin any effort with another crisis of confidence between us such as the one that followed Rogers' December 1969 speech.

To put Israel first is not to dismiss the Egyptian side of the question. Nothing would be so helpful as background for Mrs. Meir's visit (February 27-March 2 in Washington; March 1 with the President) as evidence that Egypt is prepared to negotiate in the expectation of real give-and-take. Mrs. Meir will come with a strong argument against any new diplomatic activity until Egypt demonstrates its readiness to negotiate seriously. On the one hand, we will not want to appear to have fallen for phony Egyptian bait; on the other, the more Ismail shows Egyptian seriousness of purpose, the more we would have reason to discuss negotiations with Israel.

Thus the most useful result of Ismail's visit would be an indication that Egypt would be prepared to discuss all possible overall solutions at least privately if Israel would do the same--negotiate with no preconditions on either side.

Another aspect of this question--discussed further below--is how far the Soviets might now be prepared to go in pressing Egypt. Again, it seems best to establish first what is possible on the Israeli side because the Israelis will object to Soviet involvement.

What Are the Substantive Areas for Concentration?

What seems to be the substantive areas where discussion on an Egypt-Israel settlement would be most likely to yield progress?

One question, of course, is whether we should continue to concentrate exclusively on an Egypt-Israel settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel settlement in abeyance as to the State Department is inclined to do. Because of the immediacy of Ismail's visit, I shall leave this question aside for the moment, although I believe there would be advantage in encouraging parallel but separate movement on both tracks.

On the Egypt-Israel front, there seem to be two schools of thought:

1. The State Department is concentrating on finding a formula that could get talks started on an interim agreement. The formula they are currently considering is along the following lines [in paraphrase]:

Israel and Egypt would agree to begin indirect negotiations without preconditions on an interim agreement looking toward a peace agreement in accordance with Resolution 242. Both sides would agree to begin negotiations on an overall agreement once execution of an interim agreement starts. No negotiating procedure will be barred [i. e., negotiations could be direct]. Each side will begin these negotiations recognizing the right of the other to negotiate from the particular interpretation of Resolution 242 it holds but also recognizing that Resolution 242 neither endorsed nor precluded withdrawal to pre-war boundaries.

The disadvantage with this approach is that Sadat has rejected an approach which does not provide some assurance that Israel and the US are committed to steps beyond partial withdrawal from the Canal which would lead to full withdrawal. He is afraid of playing his Canal and peace cards and being left without what he really wants in return. If he is desperate for some movement--as he apparently was in 1971 when he broached the interim agreement--the State formula might interest him, but the chances are that he will want more.

In addition, the chances are that negotiations on a partial withdrawal will again founder unless the two sides know what its broader context will be.

2. The alternative would be to address some of the fundamental issues of an overall settlement simultaneously. This could be done on a quite separate track. With public knowledge, State could manage discussions of a first-stage withdrawal. In private, you might address at least the framework for an overall settlement. The purpose of the private talks would not necessarily be to reach a definitive understanding in advance of negotiations between Egypt and Israel. The purpose would be to establish that both sides are prepared to move into a negotiating mode on the key issues--that both are prepared to consider seriously discussing solutions that are less than their present negotiating positions suggest. This approach has the two virtues of (a) making a major substantive contribution and (b) making use of State Department energies for detailed negotiations and to draw public attention.

Thus, whereas the State Department would concentrate on finding a diplomatic formula to permit both sides to begin negotiating on an interim agreement, the alternative approach would require that attention be given to concepts for a final settlement. Two related ideas seem to offer the greatest possibility for exploration:

--The first is to shift the focus from Israeli "withdrawal" to "restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. This is not just semantics. It would require a significant and perhaps impossible Israeli decision not to change borders significantly (except for Gaza and perhaps a little around Eilat) but would at the same time permit an important decision by an Egypt sovereign in the Sinai to permit stationing of Israeli security forces at agreed points in the Sinai over agreed and extended periods.

--The second idea follows at this point: The peacemaking process should be phased over a long period, perhaps as long as twenty-five years. The number of Israeli posts in the Sinai might be reduced at stated intervals, and international cover might be provided at points like Sharm al-Shaikh. The phasing would provide a framework for development of other elements of an Egyptian-Israeli relationship so that Israel could test whether a peaceful relationship is possible.

You will recall that these two ideas underlay the papers we drew up together before the Moscow summit last May. In addition, they are developed in the larger book written for you in November.

Dealing with Hafez Ismail

One point is fundamental: The State Department through Sisco's agreement with Rabin on February 2, 1972, is committed not to discuss specific proposals with Egypt before consulting with Israel. State recognizes this and sees the talks with Ismail as a listening session and as an opportunity to probe what new elements of flexibility there might be in Egyptian thinking about an interim agreement.

Your choice is between two courses:

1. Give Ismail a friendly hearing, say the right things about wanting a settlement but not offer any concrete hope of further US involvement now. This is the course the Israelis would probably prefer. They believe the Egyptians should be left alone to reach the conclusion that they will have to pay a price for a settlement.
2. Give Ismail reason to report to Sadat that greater White House involvement would be possible if Egypt were willing to negotiate seriously. On the assumption that the Israelis might get wind of any concrete proposal, anything that is hinted along these lines should be consistent with what we know to be Israeli thinking. One way of approaching the issue is to say that we need to know what we will have to work with before we talk with Mrs. Meir. One could be fairly direct privately in saying that we would need to be assured that discussion could include such issues as arrangements for stationing Israeli troops at key points over extended periods by agreement with a sovereign agreement, ways of assuring demilitarization and other such issues. The key question--perhaps better left unspoken until after talks with Israel--is whether Egypt would agree to have Israeli troops on Egyptian soil if Egyptian sovereignty were reconfirmed in most of the Sinai.

The Egyptians, of course, may not choose to negotiate on grounds other than their full demands, but then there is little possibility of a negotiated settlement now. Even if the Egyptians make that choice, the Israelis will still have a fundamental decision to make on their readiness to

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negotiate on a basis other than their full demands. Thus an effort should be made during Ismail's visit to keep all options open.

How to Deal with the USSR

No decision has to be made now, but if we decide to move in any direction the questions will arise whether the Soviets can make any contribution in changing Egypt's position and how fully we want to keep Moscow informed of our approach. In sending Ismail to Washington, Sadat has indicated a desire for direct communication with us, even though Ismail has just been to Moscow. The Israelis would obviously like to keep the USSR out of the picture. This issue does not become active until we have talked with the Israelis and decided what we want to do.

SECRET (XGDS)

HHSaunders:trnt 2/21/73

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION  
Outside System

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

May 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on  
Your Talk with Ismail

Attached is the memo for the President you asked me to develop from my earlier summary. It is much more precise than the summary in identifying what you told Ismail.

XGDS - 1 and 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

ACTION  
Outside System

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

May 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
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XGDS - 1 and 3  
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.  
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

HHSaunders:tmt 5/29/73

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
(Outside System)

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

June 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*

SUBJECT: A US-USSR Statement of Principles  
on Arab-Israel--Message to Ismail

Mr. Ismail in his latest message asked for clarification of what you mean by a statement of principles of a general nature which would permit the parties to start a process of negotiation. Before considering whether and how you might reply, it seems worthwhile to look briefly at the way such a list of principles might be used. It may be helpful to consider these points:

1. A list of principles could be useful under the following circumstances:

--As a vehicle for discussing with Gromyko what kind of settlement the US and USSR might support, even if no subsequent use is made of the principles.

--As a means of averting any joint US-USSR action by pressing the discussion of principles to the point where agreement is unlikely.

--As a means of demonstrating to Sadat that he cannot rely on Soviet support for his position of settling the boundaries before negotiation.

--As a vehicle for starting negotiations provided we have prior indication that the two sides would welcome a call for negotiation on such a basis.

--If the Egyptians would welcome the appearance of irresistible pressure from the US and USSR to begin negotiating.

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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2. A list of principles would not be helpful under the following circumstances:

--If the Egyptians would agree to begin a negotiating process based on a US-drafted statement of principles without the appearance of US-USSR agreement and if the Egyptians would prefer not to have the USSR involved in this process.

--If the statement of principles is a simple rehash of those in Resolution 242 and would not encourage the parties to begin negotiating.

--If the Soviets would insist on some role in overseeing any talks that resulted since Israel would object sharply.

It would seem to me that the main purpose to be served by another exchange with Ismail would be as one more effort to see whether Soviet involvement in this process helps Sadat or not--to see whether he would welcome the appearance of irresistible US-Soviet pressure to negotiate.

RECOMMENDATION: That you consider sending the attached message to Ismail today.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Henry -

This is for the possibility  
that you may wish  
to try Ismail again  
before the summit.

Brent

INFORMATION  
(outside system)

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Hafiz Ismail on May 20

In short, Ismail came to this meeting to probe White House intentions further--not to discuss concrete elements of a possible Egypt-Israel agreement. The result was that the formal talks were less useful than last time, but I felt that more progress was made than last time in bringing Ismail to understand the reasoning and the domestic political realities behind our proposal to move toward a settlement in a step-by-step approach. Last time he had listened well, but only in this second talk did I feel that he fully understood the implications of the step-by-step approach we are proposing.

I explained to him concretely in private talks that it is essential for us, if we are to be influential with the Israelis, to be dealing with proposals which represent politically manageable steps rather than tackling the issue of total withdrawal all at once. It remains very much an open question how Sadat will respond; he has rejected this approach before and may do so again. The issue on Sadat's mind is whether the White House will remain engaged beyond the first stage. It may be that he needed to hear this directly from us.

The issue I posed, which the Egyptians are now considering, is whether a general statement of principles like that in Resolution 242 could be used to get talks started on the first phase of an agreement provided the US and Israel stated publicly that this first step would not become the final settlement. Ismail promised to let me know before your meetings with Brezhnev. If the Egyptians are agreeable, some progress in working out a set of principles might be made during the summit meetings here.

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DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.  
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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- 2 -

Background

These talks took place against the background of an agenda of specific issues left from the February meeting which Ismail had promised to consider. These included:

--As full and concrete a statement as possible of the obligations Egypt and Israel would accept toward each other in a state of peace.

--The relationship of an Egypt-Israel agreement to other aspects of a Palestine settlement. For example: Could a state of peace become effective between Egypt and Israel before Syrian and Jordanian settlements with Israel or a refugee settlement are achieved?

--Concrete ways for assuring Israeli security in the Sinai while restoring Egyptian sovereignty there.

Ismail's Position This Time

It quickly became apparent that Ismail was not prepared this time to discuss those issues left from our first meeting. He wanted to discuss US intentions. These were the main points in his presentation:

--The Egyptian side had the impression from the last talks that Egypt was being asked to come up with a new position that would enable the US to try to move Israel.

--Even with a new Egyptian position, however, the US seemed uncertain whether Israel would withdraw. In the Egyptian view, Israel has shown no sign that it is interested in peace.

--Ismail had found continued hesitancy about the role, if any, to be played by the White House. It is not clear that the White House has decided to put its weight behind an effort to achieve a peace settlement.

--The events of March, April and early May had raised further questions in Egyptian minds about US intentions:

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- 3 -

--The decision to continue aircraft deliveries to Israel through 1974-75 was "very revealing."

--The decision to provide technological assistance to Israeli military industry was "dangerous" because it would free Israel of US influence.

--US financing (\$50 million) for the settlement in Israel of Jewish emigres from the USSR further supports Israel's growth.

--The US equating of the acts of the radical Palestinians with Israel's raid in Beirut was "most unfair."

--Egypt had observed how pressure from the US Congress had forced the Administration against its will to put pressure on the USSR for the emigration of Soviet Jews. This caused Egypt to wonder whether the US could freely play a role in the Middle East.

--It cannot even be excluded that there is US nuclear cooperation with Israel.

--Egypt feels that the most important factor encouraging Israel to stand fast is the fact that the US is committed to defend Israel's conquests until the Arabs concede to Israel's demands. Unless there is a more balanced US approach, it is difficult to see how there can be progress. If the US is prepared to shift its "balance of power" approach of assuring overwhelming Israeli predominance, there could be some positive results.

--Egypt is, therefore, faced with two choices:

--It can accept an "interim agreement" which will "almost certainly" become a final one.

--Or it can move toward a final agreement which would require "enormous concessions" by Egypt.

--If neither approach is acceptable, what is left to Egypt except military action? [Ismail in private conversation said he felt military action would be "too adventurous" now, so he was apparently thinking of the longer term future.]

My Response

Given Ismail's unreadiness to talk about the concrete elements of a settlement, it seemed to me most useful to concentrate my discussion with him on the general theory of how we should proceed. I had a long private talk with him in which I made these points:

--The US is not trying to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to achieve some global objective. The US remains prepared to work with Egypt for a just solution.

--The most the US can now foresee persuading Israel to accept is restoration of nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with a transitional Israeli security presence at key positions. This might not be the full exercise of sovereignty but it would establish the principle of legal sovereignty.

--It might be 1974 before real progress on an interim agreement could be made and a year after that before there could be progress on an overall agreement.

--On the other hand, it is not the US strategy to keep the Israelis in the Sinai. It is the US policy to try to get a process going in which the US could exercise its influence.

--The US has no interest in bringing about a change in Egypt-Israel frontiers. The longer the present situation continues, the greater the danger that it will become permanent. Any line through the Sinai would be less natural than the Suez Canal, so there is advantage simply in beginning Israeli movement back. If a negotiating process could be started, the US would stick with it beyond the first-stage agreement for withdrawal from the Suez Canal. We would make this clear publicly and elicit a comparable public commitment from Israel. It is not excluded that negotiations on a Canal agreement and on an overall agreement could be carried on simultaneously.

--The US view is that an effort should be made soon to work out general principles of agreement that could get talks started. The US needs to avoid the kind of concrete detail that would trigger sharp

HHS

ACTION (Outside System)

SECRET (XGDS)

February 24, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: US-Egyptian Conversation

Attached at Tab A as requested is a paper containing a checklist of points that might be covered in the course of a US-Egyptian conversation. I call it a checklist rather than a talking paper because I assume that it would be desirable to present these at appropriate points as ideas to be explored rather than as points to be pressed.

At Tab B for your convenience is my earlier paper describing some possible concrete ideas for a Sinai settlement. Obviously variations are possible, so this is illustrative only.

Other more detailed material is available to you in the loose-leaf book which you have.

One basic point is omitted here because you are in the best position to make the necessary assessment: How far we go depends on what we feel the Israeli position would permit or could be altered to permit. It is repeating the obvious to say that some of the premises underlying the attached go beyond Israel's present formal position.

XGDS - 3  
 DECLAS - Impossible to determine date.  
 BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)

HHSaunders:imp:2/24/73

February 24, 1973

POINTS TO COVER

The following are points which might be covered in a conversation with senior Egyptian officials. With a little adaptation, they could also serve as a checklist in probing the Israeli position.

1. Why we need a negotiating process and what we mean by "negotiating process".

--Suspicion is too great on either side for peace to come all in one step. It is necessary to find a place where each side finds it politically possible to begin and then build a series of signals and steps that can contribute to the evolution of a peaceful relationship. [The US experience with the PRC might be cited as an example.]

--One objective in seeking the initial opening and in developing subsequent steps is to try to stimulate a political dynamic in each country that will provide internal political support for making peace. In Israel, for instance, it is easy for everyone to take a hard line as long as everyone can say that the Egyptians are not ready to make peace. ~~It is not ready to make peace.~~ It is not guaranteed that the Israelis would completely reverse position if the Egyptians agreed to negotiate, but debate would begin in Israel and at least begin to introduce flexibility into the Israeli position. [Note: King Hussein is ready to make peace, and Israel has not retreated past the Allon Plan. However, there was significant debate in the Israeli Labor Party last summer which seemed to conclude that Israel should withdraw from control over Arab populations. This relates to Gaza too. Thoughts that the Israelis would not discuss seriously three years ago can now be discussed and minds changed.]

--Only if there is concrete evidence that Egypt is prepared to engage in such a process can the US realistically be expected to

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Impossible to determine date.

BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger

be helpful. We need evidence to make the case to Israel that it will be missing a real opportunity for peace if it refuses to engage now. (What can we say to Mrs. Meir?)

2. What kind of process? We recognize that the Western concept of negotiation is not the Arab concept. That is why we use the word "process". We in the US are not wedded to one particular procedure or another. It would help us a great deal to understand very specifically what they regard as the principal elements of a proper negotiation. What kind of "process" would fit their political and cultural needs? If we knew this, we might see what kind of approach might be constructed to meet the requirements of both sides.

3. In a process such as the Egyptians envision, what might each side do that could help the other embark on the process?

--What does Egypt want from Israel? The conventional answer is that Egypt must have an Israeli commitment to total withdrawal. But is there some way to put this proposition or some alternative to it that would meet Egypt's need?

--Israel wants assurance that Egypt is prepared eventually to live in a normal peaceful relationship with Israel. Of course, Israel wants to guarantee its security, but how that is done will depend on the long term partly on whether a normal relationship can evolve which would begin to reduce Israeli fears. What could Egypt say now about the kind of overall relationship it could foresee between Egypt and Israel?

4. What kinds of settlement are possible? Some flexibility might be introduced into the situation if it were known how open Egypt might be to varied approaches to meeting Israel's concern for security. For instance:

--We have heard Egyptians carefully use the word "sovereignty" in reference to their unwillingness to give up any Arab soil. If Egyptian sovereignty over most [leave room for minor adjustments] of the Sinai were restored or pledged, could Egypt envision an agreement which would permit Israel certain rights to station troops or patrol at specified points? Would this be more possible if under an international umbrella?

--Could there be a series of successive arrangements phased over a prolonged period? Could a succession of steps take place subject to review at intervals of 1, 2 or 5 years over a period up to even 25 years, for instance?

--Is Egypt prepared to deal with the issues between it and Egypt separately from other aspects of an Arab-Israeli settlement? Would this be easier if there were at least some progress simultaneously on another front?

--What contingent commitments might be made on Egypt's eventual relationship with Israel? Could cultural, trade or diplomatic missions be exchanged after an agreed period?

5. What relationship with the USSR does Egypt envisage? [Note: The current Egyptian answer is that Sadat "normalized" his relations with the USSR when he asked Soviet combat forces to leave and that the US should now "normalize" its relationship with Israel. The response should probably be that we don't accept the analogy as exact but that we understand what he is saying and do not want to argue the point.]

--What will be the Soviet position in Egypt? The presence of Soviet troops last year greatly complicated the situation.

--If negotiations can begin, what role does Egypt see for the USSR? Does Egypt want Soviet involvement or not?

[Note: This question should probably not be posed directly, but one point we wish to get a feel for is how concerned the Egyptians are over Soviet support and therefore how responsive they might be to Soviet pressure.]

6. If a basis for negotiation could be developed, what kinds of procedure could Egypt live with?

--Could Egypt foresee talks on two levels: (a) a more or less open exchange on the first phase of a settlement with (b) more private exchanges in the background dealing, at first at least, with the general principles of an overall agreement? What kind of public justification would Egypt need for this?

SECRET (XGDS)

- 4 -

--If there were to be discussions on the first phase of withdrawal, what procedures would meet Egypt's needs? "Proximity" talks or a variation? Would US auspices be acceptable? If not, whose?

--At what point might there be a meeting between Egyptian and Israeli representatives?

7. Confirm means of continuing communication.

SECRET (XGDS)

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SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

- 5 -

domestic and Israeli pressures on us at the outset and limit the usefulness of our involvement before we have even begun. The potential of these public pressures is great. It might be useful to work toward such principles with the USSR during the summit.

--Debate in the UN Security Council (beginning June 4) could complicate the process of arriving at some useful understanding with the USSR, if the Egyptians thought some such understanding would be helpful. Ismail said that, if the Security Council debate dragged on to the eve of the US-USSR summit, Egypt would be receptive to a proposal for adjournment.

Where the Matter Stands

The issue now is whether Sadat can accept the step-by-step approach with assurance of persistent White House involvement. Ismail frankly said he could not commit himself; he would have to talk with Sadat. There is a good chance that Sadat will not feel able to go along. Ismail said he would send word of Sadat's reaction in the next couple of weeks.

If Sadat were prepared to engage on the basis I outlined, then it might be possible to make some progress on a statement of principles during the US-Soviet summit. We would try to keep these general, and this would be one reason for Egyptian hesitancy. If we were to proceed, we would want to discuss this approach further with the Israelis.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)

HHSaunders:tmt 5/29/73

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EGYPT - ISRAEL

The arrangements described below would flow from an agreement which, in addition to describing the general terms of peace between Egypt and Israel, would combine the following key elements: (1) reaffirmation of nominal Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai; (2) recognition of the Sinai as a demilitarized zone with effective Israeli and Egyptian early warning capabilities and opportunity to redeploy in the Sinai in response to threat of ground attack; and (3) assurance of passage through the Straits of Tiran in the context of Sinai' demilitarization.

The main elements of Agreement would be recognized in a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242. The principal instruments would be a "Sinai Demilitarization Commission" and two observer forces under it--a Sinai force and a Tiran waterways force. An outline of the principal elements of such an arrangement follows:

1. Sinai demilitarization.

--Israel and Egypt would agree that (1) civil authority and police functions in the Sinai would return to Egypt, (2) the Sinai would be established as a demilitarized zone and (3) a small observer force and other arrangements would be agreed on for assuring demilitarization with UN participation. [The purpose of UN participation would be Egyptian face-saving and providing some great-power endorsement of the permanency of the arrangements.]

--The UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242, would pass a resolution which would:

--Establish a "Sinai Demilitarization Commission" (described below)

--Establish two observer forces to operate under that Commission (described below) with missions to observe adherence to the agreements on (a) demilitarization of the Sinai and (b) assurance of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran.

--Provide for review of these arrangements at five year intervals (a) by the negotiators of the Egypt-Israel agreement and (b) by the Security Council in the context of the relationship between Egypt and Israel. No change would be possible except by vote of the Security Council.

--The composition and mission of the "Sinai Demilitarization Commission" and the two observer forces would be as follows:

--The Commission would be headquartered at Al Arish and would consist of (a) a UN Chairman nominated by the Secretary General and approved by Egypt and Israel and (b) one representative each of Egypt and Israel. Its missions would be to administer the Sinai and Tiran Observer Forces and to provide the forum for discussion of violations. Major violations would be referred to the two governments for negotiation. Major violations that appeared likely to lead to an outbreak of hostilities or a general breakdown in demilitarization would be reported by the UN Chairman to the President of the Security Council.

--The Sinai Observer Force, headquartered at al Bir Hassanah, would consist of Egyptian and Israeli observers in equal numbers with a UN commander responsible to the Commission and UN personnel in numbers equal to those of each of the national contingents. Israeli units would provide the necessary support services to maintain the facilities at Bir Hassanah.

--The Tiran Observer Force is described in paragraph 2 below.

--For purposes of administering demilitarization and giving precision to rights under the agreement, the Sinai would be divided into three zones by two lines:

--One line would roughly parallel the Suez Canal, running along the western edge of the Mitla and Gidi passes past Jabal Margam (just west of Bir Jifjafah) to a point such as Rumani on the Mediterranean coast.

--The other line would follow from al Arish southeast along the Wadi al Arish through the road junction at Abu Aweigila following that Wadi to a point southeast of Bir Hassanah and then following the Wadi al Aqaba and ending at a point on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba 10-15 miles south of Eilat.

--Deployment of the Sinai Observer Force would be as follows:

--The two zones adjacent to the Suez Canal and to the Israel border would be called the early warning zones. In each, a combination of forward observers or sensors and comprehensive early warning posts would be used.

--Israel would maintain, along with a UN representative, comprehensive early warning facilities as technically necessary along the line closest to the Canal. There would be stations to include the present facilities in the mountains, covering the Mitla and Gidi passes, retaining the Bir Jifjafah base and adding a post on the Mediterranean coast on the road from al Arish to Kantara. The purpose would be to provide surveillance of the four main roads as well as to provide early warning against air attack.

--Egyptians, along with a UN representative, would man early warning stations at al Arish, Abu Aweigila, and one or two points in the southern sector such as Thamad (near Jabal Mushayt).

--The central zone would be maintained with observer posts at the main road junctions at Jabal Libni and Bir Hassanah. The base now at Bir Hassanah would be maintained as a support post.

--Observer units staffed by the UN and both parties would have the right of regular patrol in each area. In addition, each party would schedule regular overflight on a specified patrol track. The airfield at Sharm al-Shaikh could be used by both in connection with these flights.

--Any violation of the demilitarization agreements which had been reported to the Security Council and remained unresolved twenty-four hours after being reported would entitle the aggrieved party the right to redeploy into the Sinai.

2. Straits of Tiran.

--Egypt and Israel agree privately that President Sadat will sound out Kings Faisal and Hussein on their willingness to become parties to the following arrangement: Once Israel and Egypt and Jordan and Saudi Arabia had agreed, President Sadat would publicly propose that the four riparians of the Gulf of Aqaba under conditions of peace should cooperate on behalf of the UN Security Council for guaranteeing innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia would inform the UN Secretary General and the President of the Security Council that they were prepared to respond positively.

--The UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242, would pass a resolution stating that:

--The Security Council collectively and each of its members individually recognize the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran.

--The Security Council, with the written agreement of the four riparians of the Gulf of Aqaba, would establish the Tiran Observer Force (described below) under the Sinai Demilitarization Commission. Its character and mandate would be subject to change only by vote of the Security Council.

--The Tiran Observer Force would be authorized to cooperate with other comparable bodies established to maintain rights of passage through other waterways of the region. [This would permit inclusion of Ethiopia and Iran, among others, in broader arrangements covering the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Persian Gulf if it appeared that this would provide greater assurance to Israel.]

--The Tiran Observer Force would consist of: (a) a UN Commander reporting to the Sinai Demilitarization Commission; (b) units from each of the four riparian states. The force would be headquartered in Eilat [in order to put a UN peace-enforcement institution on Israeli soil]. These units would be deployed as follows:

--A small Egyptian naval unit would be assigned responsibility for patrolling the immediate Red Sea approaches. This unit would be based at existing Egyptian facilities on the west side of the Red Sea. [A broader agreement for guaranteeing passage through the Canal, Red Sea and perhaps Persian Gulf would introduce other than Egyptian patrol forces into the Red Sea.]

--A small UN observer post at Sharm al-Shaikh would consist of a UN commander, an Egyptian officer with a ship-to-shore communications unit, and small Israeli and Jordanian observer groups. These groups would be stationed at the airfield with helicopters. An Israeli unit would maintain and provide operating services for the airfield.

--On Tiran Island [Saudi] would be stationed a UN commander, and a Saudi and Jordanian or Saudi and Egyptian observer unit.

--An access road from headquarters in Eilat along the Gulf of Aqaba would be for use of all members. This road would be protected by observers stationed at key east-west approaches to the road, similar in composition to the force at Sharm al-Shaikh. [This would particularly allow Jordanians to transit Israeli territory at Eilat in resupplying and rotating their unit at Sharm al-Shaikh.]

--Civil authority and police responsibilities at Sharm al-Shaikh would be Egyptian. Tourist facilities would be Egyptian owned and managed. Israeli citizens would be allowed access under terms of a general peace agreement.

-- A joint Jordan-Israel port authority would be established to develop the Eilat-Aqaba ports and area. No change would take place in existing sovereignties. The airfield at Naqb (12.5 northwest of Eilat) would serve the entire port area, would be available to the Tiran Observer Force for air support, would be maintained by Israeli units.

3. Suez Administration.

--Egypt and Israel would agree that administration of the Canal and sovereignty over it would return to Egypt. A commission to receive complaints about discriminatory treatment would be established with offices at each end of the Canal. The commission would be established by a UN Security Council resolution. Members would rotate and would parallel the composition of the Security Council. Agreement would be reached on the level of personnel necessary on the east bank of the Canal to administer and secure it.

--The UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242, would reaffirm the right of international passage and the establishment of the commission.

4. Gaza.

--Egypt and Israel would agree to the procedure in the next paragraph.

--The UN Security Council would establish a Council to oversee transition and refugee resettlement from Gaza. This Council would operate for the next five years with review to take place at that time on whether another five-year period of operation was necessary. The Council would include three international representatives nominated by the UN Secretary General and approved by the regional members; representatives of the residents of Gaza and of the West Bank; representatives of the governments of Jordan and Israel. The Council would be charged with arranging compensation for the Palestinian refugees in Gaza and determining their interests on permanent settlement. The Council would work closely with an international group if such were established to deal with the entire refugee problem. The Council would be the governing body for Gaza with a manager under it responsible for administration.

--Security would be provided by a force consisting of representatives of members of the Council.

--At the end of ten years, taking into account the disposition of the refugees, the final arrangements on the West Bank and the state of relationships under the peace agreements, a permanent semi-autonomous government would be established in Gaza to negotiate with the governments of Jordan and Israel its relationships with them.

SECRET (XGDS)5. Phasing.

Egypt and Israel would agree that the above arrangements would be carried out in the following stages beginning with the passage of the UN resolution:

- Stage 1: Within four weeks Israel would pull back ten kilometers from the Suez Canal to permit clearing operations to begin.
- Stage 2: For the following six months while the Canal is being cleared the Israelis will prepare the posts on the Bar Lev line to be sealed and will prepare for withdrawal of all forces to the passes. During this period, the Sinai Observer Force will be established to move into position as ready but not later than seven months after passage of the UN resolution.
- Stage 3: For the next eleven months while the Observer Force begins operation, Israeli forces will remain in place behind the passes (at Bir Jifjafah) and at Sharm al-Shaikh.
- Stage 4: Eighteen months after passage of the UN resolution provided terms of the peace agreement are being observed, Israeli forces will turn Sharm al-Shaikh over to the Tiran Observer Force and will pull their Sinai forces back to Bir Hassanah in the central demilitarization zone.
- Stage 5: One year later, Israel would withdraw into the eastern early warning zone.
- Stage 6: One year later, regular Israeli forces would withdraw behind the eastern early warning zone, and the demilitarization agreement would be in full effect.

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR/DOUBLE PLUS

February 20, 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit to Washington by Egyptian  
National Security Adviser  
Hafez Ismail

President Sadat's initiative in sending his National Security Adviser, Hafez Ismail, to Washington is a significant reflection of the importance Sadat attaches to a U.S. role in Middle East peace efforts, despite his critical public posture toward us. The Egyptians for their own face-saving purposes have sought to portray Ismail's visit as a response to a U.S. suggestion and as part of their current highly visible round of diplomatic consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council and the Third World. Despite these cosmetics, Sadat undoubtedly views this initiative as a major diplomatic move. At a time when we have indicated we want to give priority to the Middle East, and with King Hussein just having been here and Mrs. Meir coming next week, Sadat clearly wants to be--and to be seen to be--in direct contact with Washington at the highest level.

The Ismail visit provides an opportunity to assess whether there is any new flexibility in Cairo's attitude toward negotiations with Israel. We believe Ismail is not likely to have new ideas, but that he will stress that the U.S. must "do something" to bring about Israeli flexibility. He is reported to be carrying a message to you from Sadat. With Mrs. Meir's visit still in the offing, it will be primarily a listening exercise for us, but there will also be the opportunity for us to seek to ameliorate Egyptian doubts about the advantages of getting into negotiations.

SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR/DOUBLE PLUS

XGDS - Category 3

Current Status of the Sadat Regime. Now in power for two and a half years, Sadat continues to be faced with pressures stemming from restiveness over the current no-war, no-peace situation, as well as discontent with the economic conditions and the regime's authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, Sadat has so far successfully out-maneuvered his enemies, keeping the left as well as the right off balance, and preventing the widespread malaise in the country from coalescing into any kind of organized political move against him. He has by now replaced all of Nasser's lieutenants with his own people, among whom Ismail is one of the closest and most trusted. Sadat has neither solved his country's basic problems nor demonstrated the kind of charismatic leadership Nasser provided, but he has dealt with challenges to his leadership firmly and on the whole skillfully. We think his position for the present at least is strong enough to resist pressures either to resume warfare before he thinks Egypt is ready for it, or to go into negotiations in which he thinks the cards are stacked against Egypt.

Sadat realistically knows Egypt cannot at present profitably resume fighting against Israel, and at the same time he has become extremely skeptical that a negotiated settlement at this time can produce terms acceptable to Egypt. Seeing these two options closed to him for the time being, Sadat has for the past year opted for the only other strategy available: a protracted effort to build Egyptian and Arab strength vis-a-vis Israel while living with a continuing no-war, no-peace situation. Elements of this strategy are a tightening of the economic belt within Egypt to put more resources into military programs, building greater coordination among the Arab states for pressure against Israel--and possibly against U.S. interests as well, and a campaign to increase international support for Egypt's position. Sadat does not find this option particularly attractive: he knows it involves painful political decisions at home and constant control over forces both within Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world that demand quicker results. Nevertheless, he will settle for it if neither of the other options becomes more attractive.

Cairo's Position on Negotiations. Sadat feels that he stuck his neck out in 1971 in favor of an interim Suez Canal agreement, which most of his advisers opposed, and that he was let down when the U.S. failed to deliver Israel on terms which Egypt could accept. Since then, Sadat's attitude toward an interim agreement, and also with the U.S. role as intermediary, has hardened, though he has been careful not to close the door. When we proposed late in 1971 that the two sides get into a more intensive negotiating procedure--the so-called "proximity talks" proposal--Sadat at first reacted favorably but at that time the Israelis balked. When we finally got the Israelis on board in early 1972, Sadat had backed off. He has informed us that he would only enter such talks if the Israelis give a prior commitment that they will withdraw to the pre-June war Egyptian border in a final peace settlement. We have told the Egyptians candidly that we see no prospect of getting such a commitment from Israel as a precondition to negotiations. We have also indicated that we think there are other ways of handling the linkage between the interim agreement and on-going negotiations for an overall settlement based on the November 1967 Resolution.

Cairo's strategy is to refocus world attention on the territorial issue of a final peace settlement. Cairo's recent public line has been that the interim agreement is dead and that the U.S. should now cooperate with the other powers (Ismail has just been to Moscow and London and his Government is also in touch with Paris and Peking) in a renewed assault on the problems of an overall peace settlement in accordance with the 1967 Security Council Resolution.

Disillusioned as the Egyptians are with the U.S., they believe that the U.S. alone has the ability to influence Israel toward more flexible positions. They have been also disillusioned with Soviet inability to produce meaningful political results for them and Soviet unwillingness to give them more advanced offensive weaponry. These were undoubtedly factors in Sadat's decision, after the Moscow Summit, to call for the virtual

complete withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Egypt. While both sides have subsequently sought to improve the tone of USSR-Egyptian relations and have a mutual interest in maintaining a measure of a special relationship, there remains considerable distrust today between Cairo and Moscow.

The U.S. Objective at This Meeting. We will want to listen carefully to what Ismail has to say, even though we are not yet in a position to decide exactly what approach we will take in any effort to get negotiations started.

Defined briefly, the present negotiating impasse stems from Egypt's unwillingness to consider an interim agreement that is not linked to an Israeli commitment for eventual total withdrawal from Egyptian territory, and Israel's unwillingness to give such a commitment either as a precondition for talks on an interim agreement, or for negotiations under UN auspices for an overall peace settlement. On the Egyptian side of the equation, the key to movement will be any hint that they might be willing to accept something less than ironclad assurances of total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in an interim agreement, or that in the context of a final settlement, they might be willing to talk about arrangements at Sharm al-Shaykh that would enable Israel to maintain a security presence there. We will want to listen carefully for any indications of greater Egyptian flexibility on these key points.


If, on the contrary, Ismail's message is that Cairo really does consider the interim agreement concept dead and believes the U.S. should cooperate in a renewed international effort on the overall peace settlement, I think we should say that up to now, as a practical matter, we have seen no realistic prospect that such an approach can produce results. We are prepared to listen to any practical ideas the parties themselves may have which would offer any hope for progress.

Some Comments about Ismail Personally. Ismail is a former Major General of the Egyptian Army who has also

held high diplomatic posts (Ambassador to London and Paris) as well as having been chief of the Egyptian Intelligence Service. Just prior to becoming Sadat's National Security Adviser, he held the position of Deputy Foreign Minister. Sadat put him in his present position in conscious emulation of the present White House arrangement. For an Egyptian, Ismail is rather cool and formal in manner. He is highly intelligent, however. Ismail does not have any kind of independent power base within Egypt and has always functioned, both for Nasser and Sadat, as a respected technician. He speaks excellent English. His loyalty to Sadat seems unquestioned.

We are attaching suggested talking points for your meeting (Attachment 1).

This memorandum is basically of a tactical character devoted specifically to your talks with Ismail. We have prepared a more fundamental assessment of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the current situation in the area which I believe will provide additional useful background and help put the Ismail visit into a broader perspective (Attachment 2). If you believe it desirable, I would be glad to meet with you for a talk about our Middle East policy sometime prior to your meeting with Ismail on February 23.



William P. Rogers

Attachments:

1. Suggested Talking Points.
2. Assessment of Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Talking Points for Hafez Ismail Visit

-- You wish to express appreciation for hospitality shown to Secretary Rogers during his visit to Cairo in 1971.

-- We respect President Sadat as a leader who is trying resourcefully to get his country out of a very difficult predicament. He has tried to approach the matter realistically and has rejected extremist, simplistic solutions. Many of the things he has done have been constructive. The decision to request the departure of Soviet troops from Egypt last summer has helped to defuse the situation and improve the atmosphere for a negotiated settlement.

-- With major positive changes in Great Power relations following Peking visit and Moscow Summit in '72, with the Vietnam agreements, and with negotiations in progress around the world on other deep-rooted conflicts, the Middle East stands out as the sole exception. Our interests lie in a stable, peaceful Middle East, and we would like to help bring that about.

-- We do not seek a "partial" settlement or to force "direct" negotiations. We want a final settlement. We have pursued the interim agreement concept because it seems the most practical way to begin. Both President Sadat and Prime Minister Meir were interested in the idea in 1971. It was not the U.S. that initiated the proposal. This has seemed the most promising way to begin, and we have never seen an interim agreement as an end in itself.

-- We recognize Egypt's concern that an interim agreement might become frozen into a new status quo of indefinite duration. We think these concerns are exaggerated. The U.S. will not be content with such a half-way house and does not think it would provide a satisfactory foundation for our long-term interests in the Middle East. The U.S. Government would immediately seek to build on the achievement of any interim agreement by urging the start of negotiations for a further stage of agreement; we would not wish the momentum toward peace created by an interim agreement to be lost.

-- We understand Egypt's concern for its territorial integrity, and for the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians and of other Arab governments. But we also understand Israel's concern for its security and its reluctance to put its faith alone in written assurances and the guarantees of others. The problem is how to reconcile these two perceptions of Egypt's and Israel's national interests.

-- In practical terms, the problem is to find an agreed basis for negotiations. After five years of efforts by others--UN, Two Powers, Four Powers--it is obvious there is no realistic alternative to a genuine give-and-take negotiating process, involving the parties themselves, if the present impasse is to be overcome. You have asked Secretary Rogers to explore with Mr. Ismail how the current impasse on negotiations on an interim agreement can be broken.

-- As Ismail knows, you have just seen King Hussein and will be welcoming Prime Minister Meir shortly. For this reason we are particularly pleased to welcome Mr. Ismail in Washington at this time so as to be able to hear first hand the Egyptian views on the Arab-Israel problem. We are in the process of reviewing the question of how we might be of assistance in getting negotiations started, so we want to listen carefully to what Ismail has to say.

Subject: Middle East Peace Efforts - A Current Assessment

At present the Middle East situation is vastly better than it was four years ago. The Soviet military involvement in Egypt has been drastically reduced, King Hussein is firmly in the saddle in Jordan, there is stability in most of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area, Lebanon is taking more effective measures to control the fedayeen, and the ceasefire along the Suez Canal remains in effect.

On the other hand, the latest Syrian-Israeli exchanges are cogent reminders of the fragility of the ceasefire. While the Palestinian fedayeen guerrillas are of marginal military importance, they remain a formidable political force with a capacity for creating continuing instability, making difficulties for Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and undermining peace efforts. Sadat needs and wants a peaceful solution, but his freedom of action is becoming increasingly limited. The present no war-no peace situation continues to provide the Soviets with good opportunities for consolidating their position in Syria and Iraq, and for recovering some of their lost influence in Egypt.

All of the foregoing factors indicate that there is no ground for complacency. In addition, King Hussein is anxious for us to take steps vis-a-vis Israel in support of his position on a settlement. And, if there is no movement on the peacemaking front over the coming months, we can anticipate that pressures to force such movement will grow, particularly from Cairo, as the time for any next Summit meeting with the Soviet leadership approaches.

In looking at possible courses of action open to us, we have essentially two options:

1. We can sit tight. Continuation of the status quo, even if it is marred by violations of the ceasefire, probably would bring no serious threat to basic U.S. interests in the area in the near term and might well be manageable for several years to come, although there would likely be a gradual corrosive effect on our position in the longer run.

This is presently Israel's preferred strategy. Israel holds that, faced with a firm sit-tight policy by it and the United States, Sadat will have no choice but to come to the negotiating table. We are not so certain. In our judgment, given Sadat's firm conviction (which is not without foundation) that he has made major concessions over the past two years without reciprocal gestures from Israel, there will almost certainly be no diplomatic progress unless Sadat is offered some inducement. Without eventual progress toward a settlement that holds out hope of ending the Israeli occupation and giving some satisfaction to legitimate Palestinian grievances, it is unlikely the present equilibrium, including the ceasefire, can continue indefinitely; the Soviets will have continuing opportunity for consolidation and penetration, and the situation will at some point begin to deteriorate militarily and politically in the area.

This would probably pose no serious threat to Israel. It is also possible that, if we continued strongly to hold the line with Israel, a new set of circumstances might over the next few years emerge from further political ferment and military setbacks on the Arab side which would make new approaches to a settlement more promising than they are today. From the standpoint of safeguarding U.S. interests, however, this is an uncertain course at best. Moreover, a major new Arab military setback would almost certainly pose a challenge to the Soviet Union which could result in serious differences between the Soviets and ourselves.

There is also the question of the effect of a "sit-tight" policy and a possible ceasefire breakdown on our petroleum interests in the area and, more specifically, on our access to Arab oil, which is becoming an increasingly important factor in meeting our overall national energy requirements. Judgments differ on this question, and it is very difficult to give categorical answers. Obviously progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, or at least visible U.S. activity in promoting a settlement, would weaken those extremist forces in the area advocating concerted Arab pressure on U.S. interests. There are some risks to U.S. oil interests in a "sit-tight" posture,

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particularly in Libya. These risks are not great, however, over the next year or so at least, in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area where our oil interests are most important. King Faisal has so far firmly resisted linking petroleum matters to Middle East politics, and the other oil-producing states in the Gulf are likely to follow his lead. The risk over the longer term will increase, however, as the corrosive effect of a protracted Arab-Israeli impasse (particularly if hostilities resume) exerts pressures on moderate regimes in the area and, consequently, on their (or their successors') relations with us.

2. We can engage ourselves actively in efforts to get an Arab-Israeli negotiating process started. Even if this achieved no breakthroughs, the visible evidence that the U.S. was making a serious effort would have a calming effect, it would fortify and nurture the ceasefire, and, at a minimum, buy additional time. We must recognize, however, that any efforts we make, if they are to be taken seriously and have some chance of getting Arab agreement to enter negotiations, will require a serious and on-going attempt by us to persuade Israel to relax its rigid position that any settlement must necessarily involve substantial Arab territorial concessions.

If we should decide to play a more active role, the most realistic options (leaving aside tactical variations) are: (a) to undertake a joint effort with the Soviet Union or (b) to seek unilaterally to get an Arab-Israeli negotiating process started.

U. S.-Soviet Track

U.S. and Soviet aims in the Middle East, while they overlap in our common desire to avoid renewed hostilities there, have never really coincided. All our experience to date indicates that the Soviets have been unwilling to deviate in any significant way from the Arab position on an overall settlement, as we were willing to do from Israel's in 1969. A renewal of U.S.-Soviet peace efforts would give the Israelis the most serious problems, raising their suspicion that we were prepared to make and impose a deal at their expense. Furthermore, to engage the Soviets in joint peacemaking efforts would facilitate their attempts to recover lost ground in Egypt and improve their position elsewhere in the Arab world. We would be making the Soviets Sadat's negotiator and advocate.

Arab-Israeli Negotiating TrackA. Jarring Mission

There is no present prospect of bridging the wide gap between the parties on the framework for negotiating an overall settlement, particularly as it concerns the fundamental territorial issues. This being the case, efforts to restart the Jarring Mission as the principal negotiating forum would be unproductive. This also applies to any move by Secretary General Waldheim who is considering a possible trip to the area sometime in the spring and has been toying with the idea of trying to convince the parties to meet at a conference. We have neither encouraged nor discouraged such moves by Waldheim, leaving this matter largely to the parties to decide.

B. Israel-Jordan Settlement

King Hussein clearly wants a settlement and has persuaded the Israelis that he no longer harbors any illusion that he has a realistic military option. In fact, however, Israel's territorial desires vis-a-vis Jordan, both in Jerusalem and on the West Bank, go far beyond anything Hussein could accept and survive if he were to make a separate peace. Both Hussein and the

Israelis realize this. No issue would provoke a more bitter U.S.-Israeli confrontation and - were concessions to be pressed on the Israeli Government by the United States - sharper internal dissensions in Israel than an attempt on our part to get Israel to modify substantially its approach to a territorial settlement with Jordan. In these circumstances, we have up to now left this aspect of the problem to the parties, meanwhile encouraging continuation of the presently evolving de facto coexistence and informal cooperation between Israel and Jordan which is of major significance.

C. Egypt-Israel Interim Agreement

For the past two years we have considered the most feasible negotiating track to be the idea of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel to achieve a limited Israeli pullback in Sinai and re-opening of the Suez Canal. Israel has committed itself to enter indirect negotiations under our auspices - and only under our auspices - looking toward such an agreement, providing there are no pre-conditions. The principal obstacles on the Egyptian side are twofold: (1) Sadat, while recognizing that a U.S. role is necessary, sees us as an advocate of Israeli policy rather than an objective middleman; (2) Sadat fears that an interim agreement will become an end in itself and leave Israel in occupation of a substantial part of Egyptian territory.

Against the background of (a) Israel's position that it will not withdraw to the June, 1967 lines and will seek substantial territorial changes in a final settlement, and (b) Egypt's position that it must have a prior Israeli commitment to total withdrawal from all of Sinai before entering negotiations, the question of how to define the relationship between an interim and a final agreement has emerged as the principal issue in seeking to get interim agreement negotiations started.

**TRAVEL VOUCHER**  
**MEMORANDUM**

DEPARTMENT, BUREAU, OR ESTABLISHMENT <b>NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL</b>		VOUCHER NO. 00 40 00 10 21
PAYEE'S NAME <b>Harold H. Saunders</b>		SCHEDULE NO. <b>106-13</b>
MAILING ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code) <b>c/o Administrative Office Room 397 Old Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 20506</b>		PAID BY <b>28 MAR 1973</b>
OFFICIAL DUTY STATION <b>Washington, D.C.</b>	RESIDENCE	
FOR TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES FROM (DATE) <b>2/25/73</b> TO (DATE) <b>2/26/73</b>	TRAVEL ADVANCE Outstanding \$	CHECK NO. <b>16,337,493</b>
APPLICABLE TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION(S) NO. <b>Admin auth. &amp; approved</b> DATE	Amount to be applied	CASH PAYMENT OF \$ RECEIVED (DATE)
	Balance to remain outstanding \$	

**TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS ISSUED**

TRANSPORTATION REQUEST NUMBER	AGENT'S VALUATION OF TICKET	INITIALS OF CARRIER ISSUING TICKET	MODE, CLASS OF SERVICE, AND ACCOMMODATIONS *	DATE ISSUED	POINTS OF TRAVEL	
					FROM-	TO-
<b>Military a/c</b>					<b>New York City</b>	<b>Washington, D.C.</b>

<b>March 1, 1973</b>	AMOUNT CLAIMED →	Dollars	Cts
		<b>76</b>	<b>67</b>
Approved. Long distance telephone calls are certified as necessary in the interest of the Government.	DIFFERENCES:		
NEXT PREVIOUS VOUCHER PAID UNDER SAME TRAVEL AUTHORITY VOUCHER NO.   D.O. SYMBOL   DATE (MONTH-YEAR)	Total verified correct for charge to appropriation(s) (initials)		
	Applied to travel advance (appropriation symbol)		
<b>March 19, 1973</b>	NET TO TRAVELER →	<b>76</b>	<b>67</b>

ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION  
**1132000**

**LOIS G. MOOCK**  
 AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER

**21.2**

\* Abbreviations for Pullman accommodations: MR, master room; DR, drawing room; CP, compartment; BR, bedroom; DSR, duplex single room; RM, roomette; DRM, duplex roomette; SOS, single occupancy section; LB, lower berth; UB, upper berth; LB-UB, lower and upper berth; S, seat.

