

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
2c	Report	Biography DECLASSIFIED FOR RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	N/D	B
4	memo	Laise to the President	8/28/72	B
8	memo	Kissinger to the President	1/24/70	B
17c	Report	Biography DECLASSIFIED FOR RAC REVIEW 9/24/2008	N/D	B
18a	Report	Biography SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIEW 9/24/2008	N/D	B
19	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	8/1/74	B
21	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	7/6/74	B
22	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	7/3/74	B
28	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	11/2/73	B
30	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate SANITIZED FOR RAC REVIEW 1/27/2009	7/31/73	B
31	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate	7/31/73	B
33	telegram	Kathmandu to Secstate	7/5/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

623

FOLDER TITLE

①

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.</p> <p>B. National security classified information.</p> <p>C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.</p> <p>D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.</p> | <p>E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.</p> <p>F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.</p> <p>G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.</p> <p>H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.</p> |
|--|---|

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
51	telegram	Secstate to Kuchimandu SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	8/15/73	B
69	report	Intelligence Information Report	4/22/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

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623

FOLDER TITLE

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RESTRICTION CODES

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 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.</p> |
|--|---|

6837

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 28, 1972

Dear Carol:

Just a word to thank you for your letter following our talk in Honolulu about your post-Nepal preferences. I fully appreciate your instincts and trust that something mutually satisfying to both you and Ellsworth can be worked out. In the interim, we will have your thoughts in mind.

It was, as always, a pleasure to see both of you again,

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
Carol C. Laise
American Ambassador
Kathmandu

Dispatched 10/28/72

BTM

by STATE POUCH

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Handwritten signature
ACTION 687

CONFIDENTIAL

October 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: *Handwritten initials* DR. KISSINGER
 THROUGH: JEANNE DAVIS
 FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*
 SUBJECT: Letter from Ambassador Carol Laise

I understand that you have noted the attached letter from Carol Laise (Tab B) following your chat with her in Honolulu about her career preferences after Nepal. You will recall that, among other things suggested for the still vacant ambassadorial posts in Pakistan and India was the possibility of moving Carol Laise from Kathmandu to Delhi. I don't know your thoughts on this or whether you raised the prospect in Honolulu, but several thoughts emerge in this letter that would seem to rule this out. Carol says she has ruled out a line job, would like a Washington assignment, and, in any event, seems to contemplate some time in Washington before any new assignment. On the other hand, I have no idea whether she and Ambassador Bunker have ever thought of a post in New Delhi together in the near future, or whether you, Laise and Bunker have discussed other possibilities.

Other than registering her preferences with you, this letter would seem to require no immediate action re assignment prospects. However, you may wish to thank her for the letter and she indicates she may be in further correspondence with you on this subject.

- Recommendations:
1. That you sign the letter to Ambassador Laise at Tab A.
 2. That Jeanne Davis send a copy of the Laise letter and reply to Mr. Flanigan _____.

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten note in a green circle:
 Make sure that Mrs. Bunker is given Senior Seminar position Director, position

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 18

TO HAL SAUNDERS

At least HAK is taking an interest! I suppose this doesn't really need a reply, but I think a brief acknowledgement would be nice. If you agree, could we have a draft, please.


Jeanne Davis



Kathmandu, Nepal
September 5, 1972

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Henry:

This is just to say thank you for your kindness and consideration in endorsing my trip to Honolulu with Ellsworth and giving me some of your time while I was there. The solitude of the Himalayas is good for the soul no doubt, but it leaves something to be desired in matters of the mind and heart.

I appreciate your concern and interest about "After Nepal, What?" but I wonder, in retrospect, whether I was able to make myself entirely clear. To avoid any confusion, perhaps, I should jot down what I had in mind, if you can bear with some repetition.

My desire is to have a life together with Ellsworth and if possible to continue to serve in the Foreign Service wherever it is felt I can be useful. Past experience suggests that I cannot do justice to either Ellsworth or the Service in the kind of line job which would interest me. Therefore, a staff position where one isn't under the gun of crises and deadlines seems indicated. One such position which interested me and which was offered to me earlier this year is Coordinator of the Senior Seminar. When I had to pass this up, circumstances conspired to bring one of our ablest Career Ministers into the job - Sam Berger. The appointment is normally for a minimum of two years. Thus, until Sam completes the term or moves on to something bigger, the job is not open for consideration as far

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

2

I am concerned. If an important assignment for Sam creates a vacancy, I should be happy to be considered again; otherwise I would want to explore other openings of interest, though at the moment I cannot be specific as to my preferences. With your interest and the Department's assurances that they will do their best to accommodate my wishes, I think things are in good hands and do not worry, but I will, if I may, continue to be in touch.

In any case there seems to be plenty of time as Ellsworth and I will want to have a good leave and a chance to establish ourselves in Washington before taking on a new assignment.

In the meantime, I'll be hoping - in the sailors' vernacular - that the wind will be at your back and the sailing smooth in the months ahead.

Gratefully yours,



Carol C. Laise
Ambassador

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR		
9 5	9 18 14	6837	<i>JMS</i>

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER ~~_____~~ X ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C ~~_____~~ X EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 LAISE, Carol C. 'S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Thanks for Consideration in Hawaii and Confirms Thoughts About Future Assignment & Possibilities*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	_____		MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY	_____		MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (_____)
FAR EAST			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ (_____)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE/CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ (_____)
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
LR PLANNING			DUE DATE: <i>9/28</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING			<i>Handled by HAK on receipt</i>
CONGRESSIONAL			

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>10/12/72</i>	<i>Saunders</i>	_____	<i>X</i>	<i>Copy to Laise / Dawson (10/17)</i>	
<i>10/28</i>				<i>HAK signed to Laise</i>	
<i>10/28</i>		<i>Davis</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Further action see HAK note 10/31/72</i>	
<i>9/10/72</i>	<i>JMS</i>	<i>WALS</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>Handled orally with State file</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____
 SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER MEMO *Date from 10/28/72*
 JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____ *SEP 12 1973*
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____ *by STATE pouch*
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES NO _____

MICROFILM DATA	
DO <i>JMS</i>	INIT _____
ORIG) _____	NSC _____
TO) _____	PAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	WHC _____
	SUBF _____

133
153


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Nepal that the appointment of Yadu Nath Khanal as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Nepal would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.



Henry A. Kissinger

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

133

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

January 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS. JEANNE W. DAVIS

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Har*

SUBJECT: New Nepalese Ambassador

I see no reason for not going ahead with the attached Agreement. Carol Laise has known this gentleman very well and commends him highly. Although he is not one of the younger group around the new young King, he is an elder statesman of such repute that Carol thinks he will have the respect of the governing group in Katmandu. Having spent a year in Harvard, he knows the US reasonably well and should be an effective interpreter of US policy to his government.

CONFIDENTIAL(GDS)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of Nepal has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Yadu Nath Khanal as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Nepal to the United States. A biography of Ambassador Khanal is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of Nepal.

Respectfully,



William P. Rogers

Enclosure:
Biography.

The President,
The White House.

GDS--DECLAS Dec. 31, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

BIOGRAPHY - Yadu Nath Khanal

Nepal

Yadu Nath Khanal, a well respected professor and most able civil servant, has been selected by King Birendra as Nepal's new Ambassador to the United States.

Khanal, a Hindu of the Brahmin caste, was born in Western Nepal on August 13, 1913. He completed his basic education in Nepal and then went to Calcutta University where he received an M.A. in English literature in 1941. He also studied in London (1950) and at the University of Oregon under a U.S. AID grant (1954). In 1971, Professor Khanal was an international fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs.

Ambassador Khanal began his political career as principal private secretary to Prime Minister T. P. Acharya in 1955 and later served as a member of the National Planning Council. His most significant contribution to Nepal, however, is in his capacity as the foremost interpreter of Nepalese foreign policy. As Foreign Secretary in 1961-63 and 1967-70 and as Ambassador to India and Pakistan from 1963-67, Khanal helped implement a policy designed to balance Nepal between its two large neighbors while increasing the world's interest in the preservation of Nepalese sovereignty.

Ambassador Khanal has traveled widely: in 1955 he was secretary to the Nepalese delegation to the Bandung Conference; in 1958, 1960 and 1967 he served as a member of the Nepalese delegation to the UN General Assembly; he attended the Non-aligned Conferences in Belgrade (1961) and Cairo (1964); he accompanied the late King on official visits to Yugoslavia (1961), Pakistan (1961), China (1961), India (1963; 1965), the United Arab Republic (1964), the United States (1967) and Japan (1970).

Khanal has written several articles on foreign policy. His other interests include reading, badminton, and contract bridge. He is married and has two daughters and a son. He speaks English flawlessly.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 1.5
PER IAC REVIEW 9/9/2008
By JMS NARA, Date 4/26/2012

[p. 1 of 1]

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
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1 08	1 09	9	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Agreement of Nepal's Yadu Nath Khanal as Amb to US*

REFERENCE: S/S *7300275* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
STAFF SECRETARY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK _____ (_____)
- MEMO FOR PRES. _____ (_____)
- REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ (_____)
- FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ (_____)
- MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
- RECOMMENDATIONS _____ (_____)
- JOINT MEMO _____ (_____)
- REFER TO STATE _____ (_____)
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
- CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
- DUE DATE: *01/15*

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

Follow agreement procedures.

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>1/9</i>	<i>JHH</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>		<i>send to Saunders for action</i>	
<i>1/9</i>		<i>Saunders</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Transfer for JHH</i>	<i>4/5</i>
<i>1/12</i>	<i>Saunders</i>	<i>James</i>	<i>S</i>		
<i>1/16</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>NSC Sgd Memo to Rogers</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____
 SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO *Done Scott 1/16*
 JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

Scott

JAN 18 1973

ORIG) _____
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 INIT _____
 DATE _____
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→ NSC/S

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

VIA LDX

NSC-8766

CONFIDENTIAL

January 16, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment for Former Japanese
Prime Minister Sato (S/S 7220049) - (S/S 7300638)

To confirm our telephone notification, the President will see former
Prime Minister Sato on Thursday, January 25 at 11:30 AM for ap-
proximately 60 minutes. Would you please confirm acceptance.

We have no objection to Mrs. Ushiba accompanying Mrs. Sato to her
tea with Mrs. Nixon on January 24 at 3 PM. Would you please provide
a brief memorandum of talking points and bios.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

MICROFILM	DATA
DO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>RTN</i>
INIT	
DATE	
JAN 18 1973	
ORIG)	NSC
TO)	PAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	WHC
	SUBP

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7300638

8766

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with Mrs. Nixon for
Mrs. Sato

The Japanese Embassy has informed us of Mrs. Sato's acceptance of Mrs. Nixon's invitation for tea in the Oval Room on Wednesday, January 24, at 3:00 p.m., for herself, Mrs. Kimura and Mrs. Yamanaka.

The Japanese Embassy also noted that in accord with Japanese protocol, it would be customary for the wife of Ambassador Ushiba to accompany Mrs. Sato's party to tea with Mrs. Nixon, and asked that we obtain White House concurrence in this arrangement.

for *MJA*
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1972


Dear Carol:

It was a pleasure to hear from you again. I am sorry that we did not have the opportunity to meet during your fast trip here, but I am pleased to know of your satisfaction at the way things have worked out.

You may be interested to know that in a recent letter to the President thanking him for the annual foreign policy report, King Birendra indicated his high esteem for you. We all appreciate the fine job you are doing in Nepal at this critical point in South Asia.

I trust all continues to go well with you.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable
Carol C. Laise
American Ambassador
Kathmandu

Dispatched via State Pouch 3/30/72 (rb)

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. KISSINGER

March 28, 1971

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT:

Letter from Ambassador Laise in Nepal

You have a very warm letter at Tab B from Ambassador Carol Laise thanking you for the support you gave last month in a critical period -- aftermath of the Indo-Soviet treaty, South Asian war and the King's death -- to the maintenance of a steady US presence in Nepal. She feels your assistance resulted in a timely response from the bureaucracy.

I assume Ambassador Laise is referring to the fact that she was able to return with instructions to inform the King that the US is prepared to continue a significant aid program in Nepal involving a greater use of dollar loans as well as multilateral organizations. Particularly, what this means is that the US is prepared to pick up the tab for economic assistance in the event we do not reach a satisfactory agreement with India to continue financing our aid to Nepal via excess rupees in India. Given the vagaries of the South Asian situation over the last year and recently the state of US-Indo relations, the Nepalese were concerned about the US commitment. Ambassador Laise was able to return with reassurances and particularly the fact that Nepal would not suffer as a result of US-Indian fallout over the rupees problem.

Ambassador Laise also notes the President's China trip was enthusiastically received in Nepal.

You may wish to know that the new King, Birendra, wrote the President a thank-you note (copy at Tab C) for receiving the foreign policy message in the course of which he praised Ambassador Laise.

You may wish to send a warm letter to reply to Ambassador Laise since you did not see her while here last month.

Recommendation: That you sign the letter to Ambassador Laise at Tab A.

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Kathmandu, Nepal
March 15, 1972

Dear Henry:

Since there was no chance to see you on my recent flying visit to Washington, I write to tell you how grateful I am for the support you gave at a critical point last month to the maintenance of a steady U. S. presence in Nepal.

The effect of three successive events on Nepal - the Indo-Soviet agreement, the war, and the death of King Mahendra - has been traumatic. The steadfastness of the U. S. at such a time is important to help the Nepalese maintain a balanced approach in external relations and foster healthy development internally. While the desirability of such a position seems self-evident, particularly when the U. S. access and influence in Nepal rates so high in comparison to our opportunities elsewhere in the subcontinent, it is not easy to get a timely response from the bureaucracy without an assist such as yours.

I trust that with the modest but dependable support of the U. S. and King Birendra's limited but useful exposure to Harvard, U. S. -Nepal relations will continue to evolve as a plus for our interests in the area.

The President's visit to China has been enthusiastically received here. The Nepalese see it as a positive contribution

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2-

to a less precarious future, though they know from experience that the process which has begun will require much patience and perserverance to produce the beneficial results we all hope for. Still they are greatly heartened by the start that has been made, particularly as the local Chinese Mission is apparently registering considerable euphoria.

With thanks and warm regards,

Sincerely,



Carol C. Laise

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

B

Royal Palace
Kathmandu
Nepal

March 9, 1972

Dear Mr. President,

NM
A copy of the third annual review of American foreign policy sent by you with your letter of February 16, 1972 has reached me and I am writing to thank you for your consideration in sending it. Since you have been so kind as to share your personal thoughts on international affairs, I am taking the liberty of expressing to you some of my own views.

As you are aware, the Kingdom of Nepal is a landlocked country and consequently faces some problems of transit, trade and other matters which are peculiar to it. I assume that we will always have friendly and sympathetic consideration from you personally as well as from your Administration. In this context, I may mention that my government and I are of the opinion that continued interest on the part of the United States in line with the Nixon Doctrine in the affairs of this part of the world will be beneficial to the stability and progress of the whole region.

The relations between our two countries are characterized by friendship and co-operation. The American Ambassador at our Court, Her Excellency Carol C. Laise, has done much to augment the existing friendly relations, which I am sure will become stronger in the years to come.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Birendra, R.
R.

His Excellency
Mr. Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States
of America
The White House
Washington D. C.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER *✓* _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU *✓* _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
Laise, Carol _____ S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: **Thanks HAK for US support to Nepal During a Crucial Month**

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<i>Done</i>	<i>✓</i>		MEMO FOR HAK	()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR <i>HAK</i> SIGNATURE	<i>✓</i>
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<i>✓</i>		<i>✓</i>	MEMO _____ TO _____	()
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>3/27</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>3/28/72</i>	<i>Saunders</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>✓</i>	<i>Sign Ltr to Amb. Laise (4/2)</i>	
<i>3/29</i>				<i>HAK signed Ltr to Laise</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DA *Done*
 SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO *to Laise*
 JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: *✓* SA, _____ HP, _____ HM
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO *Done*

INIT _____

DATE _____

ORIG) NSC _____

TO) PAF *✓*

WHC _____

SUBF _____

MAR 31 1972



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

February 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Birendra: New King of Nepal

The immediate succession to King Mahendra of Nepal, who succumbed to a heart attack in the early hours of January 31, has apparently taken place smoothly. Within a few hours the King's Council had announced that Crown Prince Birendra, Mahendra's eldest son and heir apparent, had ascended the throne.


Although the 26-year old Birendra had been given some administrative duties by his autocratic father, he is considered largely untested and inexperienced in terms of the two crucial requirements for a Nepalese monarch. Internationally, it is essential that Nepal maintain a balance in its relations with India and China, offending neither and meeting the minimal requirements of both. This will be particularly difficult as a result of the increased strength of India and increased influence of the Soviet Union in the subcontinent following the recent Indo-Pakistani war and the emergence of Bangladesh. Domestically, the king must bridge the many divisive tendencies in Nepal - including ethnic, linguistic and regional loyalties - which tend to promote political instability and economic stagnation. Mahendra was a virtuoso at both these political games.

Birendra is very different from his father. Educated out of Nepal (in Darjeeling, Eton, Harvard and Tokyo University) and widely-travelled, Birendra is clearly more aware of the outside world, of the requirements of modern diplomacy, of the problems of economic development than was his father when he

CONFIDENTIAL

ascended the throne in 1955. Birendra in the past has shown himself to be interested in more efficient administration and dedicated to the elimination of corruption and nepotism which is commonplace in Nepal. He has shown some impatience and bull-headedness in the pursuit of these goals and some observers have questioned whether he might not be overly Westernized in the sense that he may not appreciate the conservative dynamics of the feudal social organization of Nepal. In his relations with Americans, both official and unofficial, he is friendly and engaging. He has been particularly interested in the Peace Corps and has had warm relations with several volunteers.

Particularly because of Nepal's concerns resulting from the Indo/Soviet increase in influence in South Asia, Birendra's most immediate international problems will relate to his relations with the Indians and Chinese. The role of third countries such as the U.S. will be important in steadying his hand while he deals with his two neighbors. He will highly value a reassuring and supportive American policy toward Nepal. Thus for the immediate future, problems in U.S.-Nepal relations which had already been looming take on an added dimension. One of these relates to how we can meet the longstanding Nepali desire that we maintain significant aid programs in Nepal despite problems related to availability of Indian rupees and decreasing dollar funds.


Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O&F
MO DA	MO DA HR	01140	
02 01	02 01 12		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT X U _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER X ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C X EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Web Birendra, new King of Nepal re: International Implications

REFERENCE: S/S #7201858 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	??? (<u>X</u>)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<u>X</u>			MEMO _____ TO _____	()
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: 02/05	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
2/3/72	Saunders	NSC/S		Covered in President's daily brief 2/4. HHS	
2/3/72				No Action Req per Saunders	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO [Signature] INIT _____

DATE _____

ORIG) NSC [Checkmark]

TO) PAF _____

WHC _____

SUBF _____

FEB 07 1972



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 3, 1971

NEPAL

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Message from the President to King
Mahendra of Nepal

On September 13 the President sent a letter to King Mahendra in response to the King's letter of July 31. The King's letter voiced his support for the President's decision to visit the People's Republic of China and invited the President and Mrs. Nixon to visit Nepal either enroute to or returning from China. The President's September 13 letter thanked the King for the invitation and stated that he regretted not being able to give the King "a definite response at this time, since our planning is only in its early stages."

Now that a public announcement has been made about the schedule for the Presidential trip to China, it would be appropriate to send the King a more definitive response to his invitation.

Attached is a suggested message to be sent from the President to King Mahendra.

T. L. Eliot, Jr.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Letter to President from King Mahendra
2. September 13 Letter from President to King
3. Suggested Message

CONFIDENTIAL

Royal Palace
Nepal

July 31, 1971


Your Excellency,

I have been heartened by the wise decision you have taken in announcing your forthcoming visit to China. We have always held that a country of the size and the population of China cannot be simply ignored. We welcome Your Excellency's decision and we hope as a result of Your Excellency's decisive and bold step the area of peace would be augmented many times and further hope the small nations of the world would also gain by this.

On this occasion my wife and I would like to renew our long standing invitation to Your Excellency and Mrs. Nixon to pay us a visit either on your way to or on your return from China at Your Excellency's convenience.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,


(MAHENDRA, R.)

His Excellency Mr. Richard M. Nixon,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

For MAILING - Mr.
~~Mr. Tjager~~ Burleigh

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1971

Your Majesty:

I was very pleased to receive your gracious letter of July 31 expressing your approval of my decision to accept an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China. In opening the door for more normal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, I am hopeful that all nations will gain from the reduction of tensions which should result.

Your country and mine share the goal of building a lasting peace in the world. I look upon this journey as an important step toward achieving that goal.

May I also express my deepest appreciation for Your Majesty's kind suggestion that Mrs. Nixon and I visit your kingdom before or after our visit to China. I regret that I cannot give you a definite response at this time, since our planning is only in its early stages. But again, let me convey our sincere gratitude for your most thoughtful invitation.

You have my warmest thanks for your generous expression of support and encouragement.

Sincerely,



His Majesty Mahendra
Bir Bikram Shah Deva
King of Nepal
Kathmandu

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Your Majesty:

As you are aware, I have recently announced some of the detailed plans for our visit to the People's Republic of China. As I indicated in my letter to you of September 13, I greatly appreciate your suggestion that Mrs. Nixon and I visit your kingdom before or after our visit to China. I have given thorough consideration to your kind suggestion and much as both Mrs. Nixon and I would very much enjoy meeting Her Majesty and you again and spending a few days in your peaceful and lovely country, I find that such a visit at this time is not possible.

May I once again thank you for the kind invitation and also for your support and encouragement of my decision to make this trip which we continue to view as an important step toward building a lasting world peace.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

His Majesty
Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev,
King of Nepal,
Kathmandu.

Department of State



CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy KATHMANDU

7

STATE

Please deliver the following message from President Nixon to His Majesty.

QUOTE As you are aware, I have recently announced some of the detailed plans for our visit to the People's Republic of China. As I indicated in my letter to you of September 13, I greatly appreciate your suggestion that Mrs. Nixon and I visit your kingdom before or after our visit to China. I have given thorough consideration to your kind suggestion and much as both Mrs. Nixon and I would very much enjoy meeting Her Majesty and you again and spending a few days in your peaceful and lovely country, I find that such a visit at this time is not possible.

May I once again thank you for the kind invitation and also for your support and encouragement of my decision to make this trip which we continue to view as an important step toward building a lasting world peace.
Sincerely, Richard Nixon. END QUOTE

DRAFTED BY: NEA/INC:APBurleigh:nm	DRAFTING DATE 12/1/71	TEL. EXT. 20653	APPROVED BY: NEA - Christopher Van Hollen XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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CLEARANCES:

NEA/INC - Mr. Schneider } S/S - 7119477
EA/ACA - Mr. Brown } White House -
S/CPR - Mr. Smoak }

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOC NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	35386	Holdridge
12 13	12 4 9		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT X U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER X ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C X EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Days follow-up ltr to King Mahendra of Nepal from the Pres on the upcoming PRC trip.*

REFERENCE: S/S 7119477 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	()
FAR EAST	<u>X</u>			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA		<u>X</u>		MEMO _____ TO _____	()
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	() <u>X</u>
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:	<u>12/10</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<u>12/17</u>	<u>JAC</u>	<u>NSC/S</u>		<u>Response to King Mahendra incorporated in oral message to on Pres' letter</u>	
<u>12/20</u>				<u>Re Philip types to be conveyed by Ambassador</u>	
				<u>Spec per 35397</u>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____
 SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
 JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP, _____ HM
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO [Signature]
 INIT _____
 DATE DEC 21 1971
 ORIG) NSC _____
 TO) PAF X
 WHC _____
 SUBF _____

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 8 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

file
ACTION 5362

DEC 22 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *(Signature) HK*
SUBJECT: Wedding Invitation from King of Nepal

King Mahendra of Nepal has invited you to the wedding of his son, Crown Prince Birendra (Tab A). I assume that you do not wish to attend personally, and there is no reason why you should.

I think, however, that it would be in our interest for you to demonstrate your personal interest in this small, friendly and strategically located country by selecting a delegation to represent you. The leaders of the other major powers with a stake in Nepal's future--particularly the Soviets, and the Communist Chinese--will probably do this and some of the Asian leaders will either be attending or will also be sending personal representatives. The Nepalese, who are very sensitive to the need for our support to remain an independent buffer between India and China, might regard it as a serious slight if you were to simply send your regrets. This would also undercut the effect of the Vice President's visit next month.

Under Secretary Richardson thinks that you would be most effectively represented by members of your own family, especially since the Nepalese place such a high value on family relations (Tab B). He suggests that you consider sending Julie and David Eisenhower. If they are unable to attend, I would suggest your daughter Tricia, who in any event might also enjoy going. This could be a rewarding and most enjoyable trip for them. The program of colorful and picturesque events will take place from February 27 through March 3 and should attract considerable international press coverage. Nepal, as you know, is the unspoiled Switzerland of Asia and a most enjoyable country to visit under any circumstances. Their activities would be strictly social in nature.

John F. Kennedy UNK

You may also want to consider sending some political figure as an official representative of the American people. Under Secretary Richardson notes that Secretary Romney is well acquainted with the area (he represented you at the Indian President's funeral last spring) and that Secretary Stans has visited Nepal in a private capacity. He also suggests a State Governor as a possibility. I would only add that this would be a plum for anyone you selected and that there would be no reason for limiting yourself to one person.

I am attaching at Tab C our embassy's description of what to expect in case you would like to show it to your daughters.

Recommendation: That you express your regrets to King Mahendra, and send an official delegation, including members of your family and a political personality to represent you and the American people. When you have selected your delegation, I will send an appropriate response to King Mahendra before the end of the month.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

If you approve, whom would you like to send?

SMH:HHSaunders:tmt 12/19/69



Narayanhity Royal Palace,
Kathmandu, Nepal.

November 11, 1969

Your Excellency,

It gives Us great pleasure to inform Your Excellency of the wedding of Our son Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev with Princess Aishwarya Rajyalaxmi Devi, daughter of Lieutenant-General Kendra Shum Shere Jung Bahadur Rana, to be held on February 27, 1970 and to invite you most cordially to the wedding ceremony at Narayanhity Royal Palace. We earnestly hope that you will find it convenient to grace the occasion with your august presence.

Sincerely,

Mahendra R.

His Excellency Mr. Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States of America
White House
Washington D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

18906

December 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

-Subject: Invitation to the Royal Wedding of
the Crown Prince, Son of the King of
Nepal

King Mahendra of Nepal has sent you the enclosed invitation to attend the wedding of his son, the Crown Prince, on February 27, 1970. This will be a most important event in Nepal and the ceremony itself will be colorful and picturesque. The complete program of events will take place from February 27 through March 3, 1970.

I believe this invitation provides an opportunity for you to demonstrate further your personal concern for the independence and progress of the small, non-aligned Asian nations. As his schedule now stands, the Vice President will have recently visited Kathmandu. However, in Nepal where family relations are so significant, I believe you could be represented most effectively by members of your personal family if that were convenient. I suggest that you consider sending Mr. and Mrs. David Eisenhower as your personal representatives. This could be a rewarding and enjoyable experience for them.

In addition, you may wish to consider sending as an official representative of the American people a Cabinet officer, such as Secretary Stans or Secretary Romney. Secretary Romney is well acquainted with the

area and Secretary Stans has visited Nepal in a private capacity. Another possibility would be a State Governor.

A suggested reply to the King is enclosed.



Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

Suggested Reply to King Mahendra
Invitation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Your Majesty:

I have received your most kind invitation to be present on the happy occasion of the marriage of your son, Crown Prince Birendra, on February 27, 1970. I greatly regret that official duties will prevent my attending. I would, however, like to send as my representatives

Please convey my warm congratulations to your son and my wish for much happiness in the future.

Sincerely,

Richard M. Nixon

His Majesty,

King Mahendra,

Royal Palace,

Kathmandu, Nepal.

PROGRAMME

February 27, 1970	1500 hrs.	Departure of the Wedding Procession
February 28, 1970	1700 hrs.	Coming in of the Bride
March 2, 1970	{ 1800-2000 hrs. 2015-2115 hrs.	Reception Cultural Programme at Rashtriya Nachghar
March 3, 1970	{ 1830-2030 hrs. 2100 hrs.	Military Tatoo at Shahi Sainik Manch Buffet Dinner

IMPORTANT REQUEST

1. The following arrangements are envisaged for guests.

A delegation led by the Head of State

A suite and three other rooms

A delegation led by the Prime Minister

A suite and two other rooms

A delegation led by a Minister or

a Special Representative

Two Rooms

2. The above will be the guests of His Majesty's Government from February 26 to March 3, 1970 and arrangements are made accordingly.

3. Dress:— Formal with Decorations.

Note: The delegations are requested to make their own arrangement for members exceeding the above number of rooms and beyond the days mentioned above. The Protocol Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will, however, assist them if specific requirements are notified in time.

A reply within December will be highly appreciated as it will facilitate the arrangement.

Protocol Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 5362

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

December 19, 1969

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Wedding Invitation from the King of Nepal

King Mahendra of Nepal has invited the President to the wedding of Crown Prince Birendra on February 27. I assume that the President will not attend.

The alternative--which most other invitees will probably fall back on--is to send a delegation personally representing the President.

Under Secretary Richardson suggests that the President send a member of his family as his personal representative and some political personality as a representative of the American people. It would be very much in our interest to do this and an enjoyable experience for whoever might go.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President. As soon as he makes his decision, I will draft an appropriate response to King Mahendra.

Files

ACTION 5362

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

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SMH:HHSaunders:tmt 12/19/69

DEC 22 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Approve _____ Disapprove _____

If you approve, whom would you like to send?

SMH:HHSaunders:tmt 12/19/69



Narayanhity Royal Palace,
Kathmandu, Nepal.

November 11, 1969

Your Excellency,

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Sincerely,

Mahendra R.
Mahendra R.

His Excellency Mr. Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States of America
White House
Washington D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

18906

December 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to the Royal Wedding of
the Crown Prince, Son of the King of
Nepal


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area and Secretary Stans has visited Nepal in a private capacity. Another possibility would be a State Governor.

A suggested reply to the King is enclosed.



Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

Suggested Reply to King Mahendra
Invitation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Your Majesty:

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Richard M. Nixon

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Royal Palace,

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March 3, 1970	{ 1830-2030 hrs.	Military Tatoo at Shahi Sainik Manch
	{ 2100 hrs.	Buffet Dinner

IMPORTANT REQUEST

1. The following arrangements are envisaged for guests.

- A delegation led by the Head of State
A suite and three other rooms
- A delegation led by the Prime Minister
A suite and two other rooms
- A delegation led by a Minister or
a Special Representative
Two Rooms

2. The above will be the guests of His Majesty's Government from February 26 to March 3, 1970 and arrangements are made accordingly.

3. Dress:— Formal with Decorations.

Note: The delegations are requested to make their own arrangement for members exceeding the above number of rooms and beyond the days mentioned above. The Protocol Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will, however, assist them if specific requirements are notified in time.

A reply within December will be highly appreciated as it will facilitate the arrangement.

Protocol Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

1528

NSCIG/NEA 69-28

August 8, 1969

NSC INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
FOR
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

COUNTRY POLICY STATEMENT

NEPAL

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSCIG/NEA 69-28
August 8, 1969

NSC INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

The attached Country Policy Statement on Nepal has been approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. It is issued for the guidance of all concerned with United States policy and programs in Nepal.

Joseph J. Sisco

Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs

David T. Schneider

David T. Schneider
Country Director for Nepal

Sidney Sober

Sidney Sober
Staff Director, NSCIG/NEA

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COUNTRY POLICY STATEMENT - NEPAL

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NEPAL

COUNTRY POLICY STATEMENT

BACKGROUND

Kept in isolation by its feudal rulers until the revolution in 1951, Nepal is still one of the most primitive countries in terms of political, social and economic conditions. The **single** most important fact of life in Nepal's foreign affairs continues to be the small kingdom's geographic situation landlocked between India and Tibet. Its territory is a buffer where the rival interests of China and India impinge and impact. Nepal is resentful of India's attempts at political influence and its almost total dependence on India in economic affairs. About 90 percent of Nepal's foreign trade is with her southern neighbor and India has the largest aid program in the country. Nepal has encouraged friendly relations with China as one means of offsetting the heavy Indian influence. Relations between Nepal and India continue to be very much like those between an adolescent and his parent -- basically compatible, but subject to the occasional emotional outbursts that accompany the struggle to achieve true independence. By comparison, the Nepalese Government evinces considerably more caution in its relations with China, a studied friendliness not unmixed with fear. At the same time Nepal has sought other countries' interest and involvement to reinforce its image as an independent state.

Nepal's paramount interest is in defending its independence, in its eyes threatened more by Indian economic domination than by any Chinese military move or political activities. Notable highlights in the campaign to build up recognition around the world are Nepal's successful bid for a 1969-71 UN Security Council term and its active participation in meetings on problems of landlocked countries. Recent trade

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Aware of the pressures on her from both north and south, Nepal has sought contact with both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to offset the influence of her neighbors. The King's visit to the United States in the fall of 1967 and exchanges on aid matters related to this visit have underscored the position of the United States as a friendly but distant and disinterested power helping Nepal maintain its balance and deal with development problems in which it does not want its neighbors to have a predominant influence. The USSR, the other major power physically represented there, maintains a small aid and a sizeable propaganda presence, primarily as an extension of its Indian policy.

Internally, Nepal is entering a new period of political development. Having firmly established a partyless system of government based on village councils, in 1968 the King released the former Nepali Congress Party Prime Minister B.P. Koirala after eight years imprisonment. Koirala's release was the key to better relations with the democratic pro-Indian opposition elements. King Mahendra has guided the political scene to a point where accommodation may be possible between his role as absolute monarch and the development of popular, democratic institutions, without political parties as such. At the present time, and particularly while moves to accommodate the democratic elements within the Panchayat system continue,

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the small illegal communist parties of Nepal (right -wing, left-wing and left extremists) pose the only organized threat to the country's internal political stability; fortunately, these parties are partially crippled by their own internal and personality squabbles.

Nepal as an economic unit has a few advantages but basically it faces most of the problems of underdeveloped countries around the world, and then some. Nepal's population is overwhelmingly dependent on traditional agriculture for its livelihood, the manufacturing and service industries are in only rudimentary stages, and transport and communications in this mountainous kingdom are grossly inadequate. In addition, Nepal is a land-locked nation dependent on India for transit facilities (as well as for most of its trade), with all the trade expansion problems such a situation engenders. Having started the modernizing process as late as it did and from such a low base, Nepal is especially handicapped in the essential underpinnings of modernity, such as educated and trained manpower.

Although the average Nepalese is among the poorest of Asians, with per capita income standing at roughly \$75 per year, some progress has been made during the last fifteen years or so of Nepal's exposure to the outside world. Aware that substantially increased assistance from any aid donor would upset the careful political balance, Nepal endeavors to keep assistance coming from as many sources as possible. India now is the largest donor with a \$14 million program, the US program is about \$10 million (largely in surplus PL-480 Indian rupees), China's \$7 million and the USSR \$500,000. A noteworthy arrangement is the military assistance from Israel for paratroop training.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES

Our interest in Nepal stems almost entirely from our larger interest in contributing to the security of the Indian Sub-continent. Our policy aims in India are intended to be the chief beneficiary of our relationship with Nepal in that we seek, as appropriate, to share with India the task of helping Nepal to remain an area of relative calm and order and to prevent its subversion by Communist China.

Our basic objectives are:

1. The establishment of a politically effective, modernizing Nepalese nation, hopefully increasingly democratic, which is capable of holding its own in the present-day world and contributing its mite to the maintenance of world order. Such a Nepal would work in close cooperation with India on a wide range of practical problems affecting the ultimate security of the Subcontinent.

2. A major corollary to this essentially political aim is the maintenance of a satisfactory rate of economic and social progress which will permit a peaceful and orderly transition of Nepal to a modern state.

UNITED STATES STRATEGY

Our activities in Nepal are guided by our desire to encourage good Indo-Nepalese relations. We maintain an American presence at a moderate level, on a par with other major powers, and contribute to Nepalese development in an unobtrusive manner.

A. Options

In terms of overall strategy the options open to the United States in Nepal are identifiable primarily in relation to the total size and impact of US programs and presence. Those choices readily available to the United States can be stated generally as: (1) continuation of roughly the present degree of our involvement in Nepal; (2) a phased, judicious reduction in our presence; and (3) revisions of program emphasis by agency in combination with either of the foregoing options.

The current United States presence in Nepal encompasses a dozen-officer Embassy; a 60-man, \$10 million annual aid program; 200-plus Peace Corps Volunteers; and a three-officer USIS establishment. A careful overall decrease

CONFIDENTIAL

5.

of this US presence, if dictated by budgetary or other compelling factors, would not jeopardize the United States' minimal bilateral interest in Nepal, nor, most probably, our more important area interests concerning the future of India. Timing would be important, however, and it would be absolutely essential that care be taken to avoid the appearance of repudiating our past relationships with Nepal and India as they have evolved over recent years.

A fundamental point in this formulation is the fact, previously noted, that Nepal is not an area of priority US policy concerns. India must assume first responsibility for Nepal with respect to the security of the Subcontinent, tempered by Nepal's desire that no neighbor becomes over-involved in its affairs. US aims in this regard are furthered by a responsible presence and demonstrable assistance per se; the precise size and agency combination of involvement, within reasonable bounds, is less important.

The extremes of a significantly expanded US presence or abandonment of this presence (or reduction to a very low level) appear unrealistic. The former is not necessary to accomplish our basically political objective in Nepal, and indeed might prove counter-productive. The latter could possibly increase the potentiality for instability in the area.

It would be well to avoid the possible political dislocations and policy disorientation in the area that would be attendant upon a perceived significant change in US attitudes toward Nepal. The current US presence, while substantial, is not overwhelming. The size of the Embassy is on a par with other important powers such as India, China and the USSR; the USIS staff is minimal; the large Peace Corps program has been generally successful and well received. (However, the Peace Corps may already be near the limit of Nepalese political and organization absorptive capacity.) USAID/Nepal's staff and program funds, while believed to be in an appropriate range, are expected in any event to decline in the near term as a result of cutbacks in worldwide aid availabilities.

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If extrinsic factors dictate a substantially reduced US program and presence in Nepal, such a reduction could be shared to some extent by all agencies represented there, but the burden of such cuts could be accepted with least damage to our interests by the AID and Peace Corps programs.

B. Policy Guidelines

Political

1. We should work with the Monarchy and the present governmental structure, while encouraging the more liberal influences in the Government and the society. We should continue contacts with the various political factions in order to keep informed of their views and activities.

2. We should indicate through our presence US interest in Nepalese efforts to modernize and develop contacts with other nations, and we should encourage through the same presence close Indo-Nepalese collaboration on matters of mutual security.

a. A visit by a high-ranking US official to Nepal, following-up King Mahendra's 1967 State Visit, would be in keeping with our political posture. No one of Cabinet rank or higher has visited Nepal officially.

b. We should continue our support for the East-West Highway as an important factor in demonstrating our interest in Indo-Nepalese collaboration on security-related projects.

3. We should demonstrate to India that our involvement in Nepal is based on our common subcontinental interests and

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that we support an increasingly responsible role for India in its relations with Nepal.

4. We should encourage Nepal in its present belief that its vital national interests are well served by identification with forces which support international law and order, and by playing a constructive role in the United Nations and the various specialized agencies.

Economic

1. We should continue to support Nepal's developmental efforts at approximately the present level, largely through the provision of rupee capital resources and the assistance of Peace Corps Volunteers.

a. We should continue to use Indian rupees accumulated under PL-480 programs in India to finance the local currency costs of our aid and information programs in Nepal. This source of funds, used with the consent of the Government of India, permits us to offer significant economic assistance at moderate cost.

b. Should a reduction in AID operations become necessary, the participant training program and on-going projects in agricultural production and education should be accorded the highest priority for funds.

2. We should encourage Indo-Nepalese economic cooperation and foster increased contact between Nepal and the various international organizations in attacking Nepal's long-range developmental problems, especially in terms of needed technical assistance and the training of skilled manpower, but also in terms of financial assistance.

Psychological

1. We should utilize the cultural, exchange and information programs to support, as appropriate, our political,

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economic, and security objectives, emphasizing in particular the compatibility of American-Nepalese interests and the benefits to be derived from economic development within a democratic framework.

Security

1. We should encourage Indo-Nepalese military cooperation and be prepared, in accordance with the 1964 tripartite arrangement, to consider instituting a program through which Nepal could obtain military equipment which in our judgement is required by Nepal and India is unable to provide.

2. While leaving to India the principal military role, we should continue the limited training in US military schools of qualified Nepalese Army officers.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Sidney Sober
Department of State, NEA/RA

FROM: Morton H. Halperin *mh*

SUBJECT: Proposed Country Policy Statements on
Afghanistan and Nepal

We have reviewed the proposed Country Policy Statements on
Afghanistan and Nepal and have no objection to their being issued.

CONFIDENTIAL

NSCIG/NEA 69-18
June 30, 1969

10284

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NSC INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP
FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

TO: Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman, NSC Review Group

Mr. Eliot L. Richardson
Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee

FROM: NSCIG/NEA - Joseph J. Sisco, Chairman **JS**

SUBJECT: Country Policy Statement on Nepal

The NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia has approved the attached Country Policy Statement on Nepal. This paper is one in a series intended to provide a fresh look at our interests and objectives in various NEA countries and to review the adequacy of our policies. Subject to any comment you may have, we propose to issue the attached paper for the guidance of all concerned with United States policy and programs in Nepal.

In preparing the attached paper, we have had the benefit of detailed suggestions from our Embassy in Kathmandu. Representatives of the following agencies participated in NSCIG/NEA consideration and approval of the paper: State, Agriculture, AID, CIA, Commerce, Defense, Labor, NSC, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peace Corps, Treasury, and USIA.

Attachment:

Country Policy Statement, Nepal

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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COUNTRY POLICY STATEMENT - NEPAL

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NEPAL

COUNTRY POLICY STATEMENT

BACKGROUND

Kept in isolation by its feudal rulers until the revolution in 1951, Nepal is still one of the most primitive countries in terms of political, social and economic conditions. The single most important fact of life in Nepal's foreign affairs continues to be the small kingdom's geographic situation landlocked between India and Tibet. Its territory is a buffer where the rival interests of China and India impinge and impact. Nepal is resentful of India's attempts at political influence and its almost total dependence on India in economic affairs. About 90 percent of Nepal's foreign trade is with her southern neighbor and India has the largest aid program in the country. Nepal has encouraged friendly relations with China as one means of offsetting the heavy Indian influence. Relations between Nepal and India continue to be very much like those between an adolescent and his parent -- basically compatible, but subject to the occasional emotional outbursts that accompany the struggle to achieve true independence. By comparison, the Nepalese Government evinces considerably more caution in its relations with China, a studied friendliness not unmixed with fear. At the same time Nepal has sought other countries' interest and involvement to reinforce its image as an independent state.

Nepal's paramount interest is in defending its independence, in its eyes threatened more by Indian economic domination than by any Chinese military move or political activities. Notable highlights in the campaign to build up recognition around the world are Nepal's successful bid for a 1969-71 UN Security Council term and its active participation in meetings on problems of landlocked countries. Recent trade

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Relations with Communist China, slightly strained at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967, have returned to their normal cordial state. Chinese aid has increased to about \$7 million annually. Some control has been exerted over the extensive Chinese propaganda activities, and the government is beginning a program for development of the northern border areas in an effort to counter Chinese influence.

Aware of the pressures on her from both north and south, Nepal has sought contact with both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to offset the influence of her neighbors. The King's visit to the United States in the fall of 1967 and exchanges on aid matters related to this visit have underscored the position of the United States as a friendly but distant and disinterested power helping Nepal maintain its balance and deal with development problems in which it does not want its neighbors to have a predominant influence. The USSR, the other major power physically represented there, maintains a small aid and a sizeable propaganda presence, primarily as an extension of its Indian policy.

Internally, Nepal is entering a new period of political development. Having firmly established a partyless system of government based on village councils, in 1968 the King released the former Nepali Congress Party Prime Minister B.P. Koirala after eight years imprisonment. Koirala's release was the key to better relations with the democratic pro-Indian opposition elements. King Mahendra has guided the political scene to a point where accommodation may be possible between his role as absolute monarch and the development of popular, democratic institutions, without political parties as such. At the present time, and particularly while moves to accommodate the democratic elements within the Panchayat system continue,

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Nepal as an economic unit has a few advantages but basically it faces most of the problems of underdeveloped countries around the world, and then some. Nepal's population is overwhelmingly dependent on traditional agriculture for its livelihood, the manufacturing and service industries are in only rudimentary stages, and transport and communications in this mountainous kingdom are grossly inadequate. In addition, Nepal is a land-locked nation dependent on India for transit facilities (as well as for most of its trade), with all the trade expansion problems such a situation engenders. Having started the modernizing process as late as it did and from such a low base, Nepal is especially handicapped in the essential underpinnings of modernity, such as educated and trained manpower.

Although the average Nepalese is among the poorest of Asians, with per capita income standing at roughly \$75 per year, some progress has been made during the last fifteen years or so of Nepal's exposure to the outside world. Aware that substantially increased assistance from any aid donor would upset the careful political balance, Nepal endeavors to keep assistance coming from as many sources as possible. India now is the largest donor with a \$14 million program, the US program is about \$10 million (largely in surplus PL-480 Indian rupees), China's \$7 million and the USSR \$500,000. A noteworthy arrangement is the military assistance from Israel for paratroop training.

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Our interest in Nepal stems almost entirely from our larger interest in contributing to the security of the Indian Subcontinent. Our policy aims in India are intended to be the chief beneficiary of our relationship with Nepal in that we seek, as appropriate, to share with India the task of helping Nepal to remain an area of relative calm and order and to prevent its subversion by Communist China.

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Our basic objectives are:

1. The establishment of a politically effective, modernizing Nepalese nation, hopefully increasingly democratic, which is capable of holding its own in the present-day world and contributing its mite to the maintenance of world order. Such a Nepal would work in close cooperation with India on a wide range of practical problems affecting the ultimate security of the Subcontinent.

2. A major corollary to this essentially political aim is the maintenance of a satisfactory rate of economic and social progress which will permit a peaceful and orderly transition of Nepal to a modern state.

UNITED STATES STRATEGY

Our activities in Nepal are guided by our desire to encourage good Indo-Nepalese relations. We maintain an American presence at a moderate level, on a par with other major powers, and contribute to Nepalese development in an unobtrusive manner.

A. Options

In terms of overall strategy the options open to the United States in Nepal are identifiable primarily in relation to the total size and impact of US programs and presence. Those choices readily available to the United States can be stated generally as: (1) continuation of roughly the present degree of our involvement in Nepal; (2) a phased, judicious reduction in our presence; and (3) revisions of program emphasis by agency in combination with either of the foregoing options.

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A fundamental point in this formulation is the fact, previously noted, that Nepal is not an area of priority US policy concerns. India must assume first responsibility for Nepal with respect to the security of the Subcontinent, tempered by Nepal's desire that no neighbor becomes over-involved in its affairs. US aims in this regard are furthered by a responsible presence and demonstrable assistance per se; the precise size and agency combination of involvement, within reasonable bounds, is less important.

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If extrinsic factors dictate a substantially reduced US program and presence in Nepal, such a reduction could be shared to some extent by all agencies represented there, but the burden of such cuts could be accepted with least damage to our interests by the AID and Peace Corps programs.

B. Policy Guidelines

Political

1. We should work with the monarchy and the present governmental structure, while encouraging the more liberal influences in the Government and the society. We should continue contacts with the various political factions in order to keep informed of their views and activities.

2. We should indicate through our presence US interest in Nepalese efforts to modernize and develop contacts with other nations, and we should encourage through the same presence close Indo-Nepalese collaboration on matters of mutual security.

a. A visit by a high-ranking US official to Nepal, following-up King Mahendra's 1967 State Visit, would be in keeping with our political posture. No one of Cabinet rank or higher has visited Nepal officially.

b. We should continue our support for the Kathmandu highway as an important factor in speeding up our interest in Indo-Nepalese collaboration in mutually-related projects.

3. We should demonstrate to Nepal that our involvement in Nepal is based on our common security-related interests and

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that we support an increasingly responsible role for India in its relations with Nepal.

4. We should encourage Nepal in its present belief that its vital national interests are well served by identification with forces which support international law and order, and by playing a constructive role in the United Nations and the various specialized agencies.

Economic

1. We should continue to support Nepal's developmental efforts at approximately the present level, largely through the provision of rupee capital resources and the assistance of Peace Corps Volunteers.

a. We should continue to use Indian rupees accumulated under PL-480 programs in India to finance the local currency costs of our aid and information programs in Nepal. This source of funds, used with the consent of the Government of India, permits us to offer significant economic assistance at moderate cost.

b. Should a reduction in AID operations become necessary, the participant training program and on-going projects in agricultural production and education should be accorded the highest priority for funds.

2. We should encourage Indo-Nepalese economic cooperation and foster increased contact between Nepal and the various international organizations in attacking Nepal's long-range developmental problems, especially in terms of needed technical assistance and the training of skilled manpower, but also in terms of financial assistance.

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Security

1. We should encourage Indo-Nepalese military cooperation and be prepared, in accordance with the 1964 tripartite arrangement, to consider instituting a program through which Nepal could obtain military equipment which in our judgement is required by Nepal and India is unable to provide.

2. While leaving to India the principal military role, we should continue the limited training in US military schools of qualified Nepalese Army officers.

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Nepal

May 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR S/S - JOHN WALSH

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis

SUBJECT: Invitation from King Mahendra to the
President to Visit Nepal (S/S 7855)

In regard to the invitation from King Mahendra for the President to visit Nepal, the President has authorized Joe Sisco or his deputy to call the Ambassador and reply along the following lines:

"The President is grateful for the King's kind invitation. He very much hopes that it may be possible to visit Nepal at some point in his Administration. He has no present plans for travel to South Asia but he will keep the King's invitation very much in mind should such a trip materialize."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

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CONFIDENTIAL

May 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Invitation for the President to Visit Nepal

The Nepalese Ambassador has issued an oral invitation for the President to pay a State visit to Nepal. (Tab B)

Recommendation: That you send the attached memorandum for the President recommending a gracious oral acknowledgment without commitment. (The President probably should be aware of this but you may feel that you can sign off on the attached yourself.) (Tab A)

*HAK: You should do this. No need
to send to RN.
HR*

H approval for RN

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Invitation to Visit Nepal

The Ambassador of Nepal has delivered to the State Department a verbal invitation from King Mahendra for you to make a State visit to Nepal. The Ambassador said that a formal invitation would follow if you were able to accept. No timing was suggested.

The King has made two State visits to the U.S. in 1960 and 1967, but no senior American official has ever visited Nepal.

Obviously there is no way to give this more than a polite response at this point, but a prompt and gracious acknowledgment would be in order.

Recommendation: That you authorize Joe Sisco or his deputy to call the Ambassador and reply along the following lines: The President is grateful for the King's kind invitation. He very much hopes that it may be possible to visit Nepal at some point in his administration. He has no present plans for travel to South Asia but he will keep the King's invitation very much in mind should such a trip materialize.

Approve HK for RW

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7855

May 19, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to the President
from King Mahendra of Nepal

Ambassador Sharma of Nepal called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Van Hollen today to deliver a verbal invitation from King Mahendra to President Nixon to make a State Visit to Nepal. The Ambassador said that a formal invitation would follow if the President would be willing to accept. No timing for the visit was indicated.

In extending the invitation on behalf of King Mahendra, Ambassador Sharma noted that the King had made two State Visits to the United States, in 1960 and 1967, but no American President or Vice President had ever visited Nepal. The Ambassador referred to the good relations that had always existed between the United States and Nepal and hoped that the President would be able to accept.

As far as the Department is aware, the highest ranking member of the Executive Branch ever to visit Nepal was at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level, although a number of Senators and Representatives and one Supreme Court Justice have been there.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

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Muriel
~~B. Houdet~~

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5-22-69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Presidential Message for USIA Pamphlet in Nepal

Ambassador Laise in Nepal has requested permission to print the following message from you in a new USIA pamphlet to be published on our aid program in Nepal:

"American assistance to Nepal began in 1952, the year Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States. I have watched with great satisfaction the part my country has played since then as a friend and partner of Nepal in its development efforts.

"I take this opportunity to congratulate His Majesty King Mahendra, His Majesty's Government and the people of Nepal on the advances already made. My fellow Americans and I share Nepal's hopes for progress and prosperity for all its people."

From talking with Carol when she was here, we know that she is working hard to make sure that our interest in the small countries does not get lost behind our larger efforts. This is a small gesture but an appropriate one.

Recommendation: That you approve the above message.

Approve HAK for Rm n
Disapprove _____

HHSaunders:tmt 5/19/69

Return to Moose
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MOOSE

The President will have a full briefing package from Ambassador Mosbacher for this presentation of credentials tomorrow.

I have done the attached only in case you still want something from us. As far as I can tell this afternoon, no one is asking us for anything but I don't want to leave you in the lurch.

Hal

Harold H. Saunders

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by New Nepalese
Ambassador--1145 a.m., April 17

Ambassador Kul Shekhar Sharma (cool shake-ar Shar-ma) from Nepal visited the US as a leader grantee in 1953, but you have probably not met him.

Point to stress:

US interest in Nepal.

Point to avoid:

Recent US press criticism of King Mahendra. Sharma probably will not raise this. [Los Angeles papers have criticized him for not paying bills during his last visit to the US.]

Talking points:

1. Your appreciation for the messages he will probably give you from the King and the Prime Minister. You have pleasant memories of your meeting with the King in 1960 and wish him and his new Prime Minister (Bista) success. (It is possible that the greetings will be from Bista's predecessor Thapa.)

2. You look forward to a continuation of warm relations between Nepal and the US. You know that Ambassador Sharma and our Ambassador in Nepal--Carol Laise (Mrs. Ellsworth Bunker)--will make a valuable contribution to our relations. You had the pleasure of talking with Ambassador Laise while she was here a couple of weeks ago.

3. We remain interested in Nepal and its economic development. Ambassador Sharma's wide experience in development will be an asset for both countries.

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- 2 -

There are no important outstanding bilateral issues, and Sharma's visit is primarily a formality, so it is unlikely that he will feel it necessary to raise anything substantive.

Ambassador Mosbacher will be providing biographical and other material related to this meeting.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

SECRET

April 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider *WCS*

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by Philippine
Ambassador Lagdameo - Thursday, April 17

The Department of State has sent you a copy of the substantive briefing memo which it did for the presentation of credentials by Ambassador Lagdameo (Tab B). That memo will be in the briefing package transmitted to the President by Protocol.

The suggested talking points are somewhat controversial for a brief presentation of credentials by three Ambassadors together. They also do not take account of some very recent progress in the negotiation of bilateral issues.

I attach (Tab A) alternate talking points.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachments

SECRET



5199

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


1438
1. Saunders
2. Ret.
April 7, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Substantive Briefing Material for
Presentation of Credentials to the
President by Ambassador Kul Shekhar Sharma
of Nepal

Enclosed are the substantive briefing materials which
will be included in the Chief of Protocol's memorandum to
the White House for Ambassador Kul Shekhar Sharma's pre-
sentation of credentials to the President. No date has
been set for the appointment.


John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

- Tab A - Briefing Memorandum
- Tab B - Biographic Data
- Tab C - Country Data Sheet and Background Notes
- Tab D - Nepalese Foreign Policy
- Tab E - Ambassador Sharma's Remarks to the President
- Tab F - The President's Reply

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by Philippine
Ambassador Lagdameo - Thursday, April 17

You may wish to raise the following points:

- You enjoyed your conversation with President Marcos, and look forward to a bilateral relationship of mutual respect and support.
- You repose full confidence in our Charge d'Affaires in Manila, James M. Wilson, Jr. You recognize the importance of the Manila post, however, and are giving careful consideration to the selection of a new Ambassador.

Ambassador Lagdameo may possibly take the opportunity to raise certain current economic issues particularly those raised by current Philippine efforts to curb imports to shore up the peso and the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

A. Dollar Remittance Program -- Because of its balance of payments problem, the Philippines is making an all-out effort to gain our cooperation in implementing (1) measures which will keep dollars spent by the U.S. Government and by the U.S. military personnel in the Philippines out of the black market and in legal banking channels and (2) procedures which will require Filipino employees of the U.S. Government and its contractors outside the Philippines to repatriate their dollars to legal Philippine banking channels.

Suggested Reply -- You understand that progress is being made in negotiations to aid the Philippine Government to keep dollars out of black market channels, and that you understand Philippine concern but hope that the Philippines will keep in mind the importance of working closely together on specific actions affecting both our interests.

B. Trade Negotiations (Laurel-Langley Agreement) --
Until recently, the Filipinos were pressing hard for an early renegotiation of our current trade agreement, which expires in 1974. During the recent visit of President Marcos to Washington, however, Marcos told Secretary Rogers that he hoped this issue could be carried over to 1970. Publicity regarding U.S. reluctance to extend and broaden tariff preferences for Philippine articles could be harmful to Marcos during this Philippine Presidential election year. Secretary Rogers agreed that the United States would not initiate action on this matter during 1969.

Suggested Reply -- Should Ambassador Lagdameo raise it, you might confirm that the U.S. Government, for its part, is giving the matter full consideration and is prepared to hold the Laurel-Langley problem in abeyance until 1970 if desired by the Philippine Government.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OBE
No time
available now

all ways —
you may ~~miss~~ ~~be~~ ~~come~~

know something
more on this —

If so, let me

know and I'll
handle

4/11/69

Alice Pat
inform State
not possible due
to funeral and
President's absence
from city -

Dick Moose

I think we have
to go back to S/S
and say this is not
possible because of
(a) the funeral and (b)
the President's plan to
be out of town the rest
of this week.

In fact, Amb Bunker
may bring Carl in on
his own.

Hal Saunders



4489

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 27, 1969

1. Smeiter
2. Ret.
12-35

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for an Appointment with the President for Carol C. Laise, Ambassador to Nepal

Ambassador Laise has requested an appointment with the President during her consultation.

King Mahendra asked her to convey his personal greetings to the President, whom he met during a State Visit in 1960. Ambassador Laise would also like to discuss Nepal's relations with the United States and its membership on the UN Security Council this year.

Except for Wednesday and Thursday, April 2 and 3, when she will accompany Ambassador Bunker to New York, Ambassador Laise will be in Washington until April 5.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador Laise and background information on Nepal are enclosed.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

clad. 5/5, Ambrose
7/2/69
4:30
RMH's note above

Enclosures:

1. Biographic Sketch of Ambassador Laise
2. Nepalese Foreign Policy
3. Country Data Sheet and Background Notes on Nepal

CONFIDENTIAL

AMBASSADOR CAROL C. LAISE

Carol C. Laise was born in Virginia in 1917 but grew up in West Virginia. After graduating from American University with an A.B. degree in political science in 1938, she attended graduate school there for two years and then entered Federal service in 1940. During World War II she worked in positions of increasing responsibility for the Civil Service Commission, and after the war worked with UNRRA in London. She joined the Department in 1948 in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs and became a Foreign Service officer in 1955. She served in New Delhi from 1956 to 1961 as First Secretary (Political) and returned to the United States to take the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy (1961-1962).

Miss Laise served as Deputy Director for South Asian Affairs from 1962 until 1965 when she became Director. In the re-organization of the Department in 1966 she became Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldive Islands. She was appointed Ambassador to Nepal in October 1966 and promoted to Career Minister in 1968.

Miss Laise married U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Kathmandu on January 3, 1967. Her brother, Frederic S. Laise, is Vice-President of the American Red Cross.

She is a winner of the Federal Woman's Award (1965) and of the Department's Commendable Service Award (1960).

CONFIDENTIAL

NEPALESE FOREIGN POLICY

The single most important fact of life in Nepal's foreign affairs continues to be the small kingdom's geographic situation landlocked between India and Tibet, making its territory a place where the rival interests of China and India compete. Accordingly, its chief role in regional affairs continues to be that of a buffer, 500 miles long, between the Tibetan Plateau and the Gangetic Plain - a role which apparently is still acceptable to both China and India.

Geography dictates Nepalese economic dependence on India, a dependence the Nepalese assiduously seek to lessen through the presence and help of other nations. China is the principal counterweight but a dangerous out, so the Nepalese also look to the United Nations, the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom, as well as to smaller countries such as Israel and Switzerland. As a result, Nepal has followed a consistent policy of non-alignment.

Nepal's basic orientation is toward India and the West, rather than the Sino-Soviet bloc, although Nepal has accepted economic assistance from both the USSR and China. Nepal looks to India, Israel and the West for military assistance.

A member of the United Nations since 1955, Nepal has voted rather consistently with the Afro-Asian group. Although generally abstaining on East-West issues, Nepal has consistently opposed the U.S. position on the Tibetan issue and on the question of representation of Communist China. As a Security Council member for the 1969-1971 term, Nepal moves into the international limelight and may have to take positions which could offend powers on which it depends for both a flow of aid and support of its neutralist foreign policy. By its strong stand in defense of Czech freedom in August 1968, however, Nepal showed that it is prepared to run some political risk in defense of a principle vital to itself as a small country.

On the Middle East, Nepal believes that a lasting peace is possible only through negotiations which recognize the need for respect of the sovereignty of all the nations in the region, rehabilitation of the displaced indigenous population and ending of the state of belligerency. Nepal fully supports the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.

On Viet-Nam, Nepal supports a peaceful settlement based on the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Privately, Nepalese leaders have expressed understanding of the U.S. role in Viet-Nam, but their powerful neighbors have considerable influence on public Nepalese foreign policy pronouncements.

CONFIDENTIAL

NEA/INC - March 6, 1969

1.235

N E P A L

Capital: Kathmandu
Population: 10,600,000 (1968 est.)

RULER: King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva

Ascended throne in 1955.

PRIME MINISTER: Surya Bahadur Thapa

FOREIGN MINISTER: Gohendra Bahadur Rajbhandari

GOVERNMENT:

Nepal is a near-absolute monarchy with an appointed Council of Ministers and an indirectly-elected legislature.

PARTIES:

All political parties are banned.

ECONOMY: Gross National Product: \$770,000,000 (1968 est.)
GNP per capita: \$72

About 90% of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits, and the country is technically 100% self-sufficient in food on the basis of a very minimum diet. What few industries there are, are quite small scale and consist largely of jute products, sugar refining, rice and oilseed milling, and textiles. Tourism is a large foreign exchange earner as is the service of Nepalese nationals in the British and Indian armies. Nepal exports food grains, jute, timber, herbs, and hides.

U.S. REPRESENTATION:

Kathmandu (E)

Ambassador Carol C. Laise
(Mrs. Ellsworth Bunker)

CONFIDENTIAL

Background Notes

NEPAL



Population: 10 million
Capital: Kathmandu

The Kingdom of Nepal, lying along the southern slopes of the Himalayas, has the shape of a rectangle roughly 500 miles long and 100 miles wide. Nepal is landlocked and has two neighbors—India to the south and Communist Chinese-controlled Tibet to the north.

The mountainous country has three distinctly different physical regions, each running laterally the length of the kingdom. In the south, a flat, fertile strip of territory called the Terai is part of the Ganges Plain and shares the extreme heat of India. About a third of Nepal's 10 million inhabitants live in the Terai. Central Nepal, known as the hill country, is crisscrossed by the lower ranges of the Himalayas and by swift-flowing mountain rivers. The majority of Nepal's population lives in this temperate region, which also contains the Kathmandu Valley, focal point of the nation's political life. The Himalayas, the world's highest mountains, run the length of northern Nepal. This high mountain area has few people and frigid, arctic winters.

The unique, double-peaked shape of Nepal's flag symbolizes the country's mountains. The red triangles are edged with blue and carry white emblems representing the moon and the sun.

THE PEOPLE

The Nepalese are descendants of three major migrations from India, Tibet, and Central Asia. The people are divided into many tribes (called "castes" in Nepal) such as the Gurungs and Magars in the west; Tamangs and Newars in the center; Bhotias in the north; Rais, Limbus, and Sherpas in the east; and Tharus in the south. Ethnically and culturally, the Nepalese in the Terai and central hills have close links with India, and the majority of the people are Hindus. There is a fair-sized Buddhist minority (the Buddha was born in what is now Nepal). The inhabitants of northern Nepal bordering Tibet are mostly Buddhist.

The isolation of the country has made the progress of education extremely slow, and only about 5 percent of the people can read and write. The official language is Nepali, which is derived from Sanskrit, but more than 30 languages are used in Nepal.

HISTORY

Nepal was founded in the latter half of the 18th century when Prithvi Narayan Shah, the ruler of the small principality of Gurkha, forged a unified

country from a number of mountain states. The country was frequently called the Gurkha Kingdom, and when recruitment of Nepalese soldiers for the British Indian Army began in the early 1800's, the British called them "Gurkhas." The name remained and became world famous due to the bravery of Nepalese fighters in the First and Second World Wars. Today Nepal permits both India and Britain to recruit Nepalese nationals for their armies.

After 1800 the heirs of Prithvi Narayan Shah proved unable to maintain firm political control over Nepal, and a period of internal turmoil ensued. Stability was restored in the 1840's when the Rana family gained power, entrenched itself through hereditary Prime Ministers, and reduced the monarch to a figurehead.

A tightly centralized autocracy, the Rana administration pursued a conscious policy of isolating Nepal from external influences. This policy helped Nepal maintain its national independence during the colonial era, but at the same time left it in an economic backwater.

Democratic currents set in motion by the independence movement in neighboring India had their impact on Nepal, and opposition to Rana rule grew in the 1930's and 1940's. In 1950-51, shortly after India became independent, a popular revolution toppled the Ranas, restored King Tribhuvan to power, and paved the way for a non-Rana to become Prime Minister. The decade of the 1950's saw a period of quasi-constitutional rule during which the monarch, assisted by leaders of the fledgling political parties, governed the country. At times Prime Ministers from these parties were in office and represented a wide spectrum of views. During other periods the throne ruled directly. King Tribhuvan was succeeded after his death in 1955 by his son, King Mahendra, who is the present ruler.

Throughout the decade efforts were made to frame a constitution for the country that would establish a representative form of government, presumably patterned on a modified British model. In early 1959 such a constitution was issued by the King, and shortly afterward the first democratic elections were held for a national assembly.

The Nepali Congress Party, a moderate socialist group, gained a substantial victory and its leader, B. P. Koirala, was called upon to form a government and serve as Prime Minister.

In December 1960 King Mahendra dismissed the Koirala government, suspended the constitution, and resumed direct rule. The King charged the Nepali Congress government with corruption, misuse of power, and an inability to maintain law and order throughout the country. King Mahendra declared that Nepal was not yet ready for Western



53626 3-67

parliamentary institutions and needed a democratic political system closer to Nepalese traditions. To meet this need the King initiated a partyless system of "panchayat," or village council democracy.

GOVERNMENT

The King exercises broad powers over Nepal's "panchayat" system of government. The panchayat system draws its theoretical inspiration from the traditional local government institution found in parts of Nepal—the village panchayat.

Under the 1962 Constitution four tiers of government were established: village or town panchayats; district (county) panchayats; zonal (provincial) panchayats; and, at the apex, a national panchayat which is the national legislature. Members of the village or town panchayats are elected by universal suffrage. The district, zonal, and national panchayat members are elected indirectly by the panchayats immediately beneath them in the hierarchical order.

The Council of Ministers is the executive arm of the Government and gives policy advice to the King. The Ministers are appointed by the King from the membership of the National Panchayat.

Elections were held in 1963 and the new national legislature (the National Panchayat) held its opening session in April 1963. One-half of the seats in the National Panchayat became vacant in 1967 under the provision for staggered 6-year terms of office for Panchayat members. Elections were held in April 1967 to fill these seats.

In the past few years the Government has initiated a number of significant social reforms, including a program of land reform and a modernization of the legal code removing legal sanction for caste discrimination. However, Nepal still faces challenging political and social tasks in order to develop stable governmental institutions that can meet the needs of a modern society. The Government also faces the problem of reforming social institutions and customs so that the society itself can keep abreast of political and economic changes under way.

ECONOMY

When the modern era began in 1951, Nepal had virtually no schools, no hospitals, no roads, no telecommunications, no electric power, no industry, and no civil service. Nepal had a subsistence agrarian economy.

Owing to efforts by the Government of Nepal and substantial amounts of external assistance, principally from India and the United States, a start has been made toward laying the foundations for economic growth. Nepal completed a 3-year plan (1962-65) which stressed fundamental economic needs. The current 5-year plan (1966-1970) calls for the expenditure of \$329 million. While Nepal remains one of the least developed countries in Asia, with an estimated per capita income of

about \$70, it has made noteworthy progress in the past decade.

A countrywide education program is under way. A university has been established. Malaria has been brought under control in a large and previously uninhabitable area. The capital city of Kathmandu now is linked to India and Tibet by road and to other towns in Nepal by radio. Several hydroelectric projects have been completed. Some small industries are being developed to process agricultural products and manufacture items for local consumption such as cotton textiles, matches, cigarettes, and shoes. A system of internal finance and public administration has been established. A start has been made toward a rational exploitation of Nepal's three major economic resources—forests, hydroelectric potential, and tourism.

Agriculture remains Nepal's principal economic activity, providing more than two-thirds of the country's income. Rice is the main food crop. In recent years jute has been cultivated as a commercial crop.

Nepal's foreign trade, almost entirely with India, has grown in recent years as the pace of development has accelerated. Nepal's exports are primarily agricultural products and timber; its imports are largely manufactured goods, with textiles the largest single item.

Nepal is seeking to lay the basis for a modern economy—a task made difficult because of the country's rugged terrain and its recent emergence from a traditional feudal society. Maintenance of a sufficient rate of economic progress to keep pace with the rising aspirations of the population is now, and is likely to continue to be, a primary task for Nepal.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

As a small landlocked country wedged between two larger and far stronger powers, Nepal's primary foreign policy problems concern Communist China and India. Nepal has sought to develop and maintain a policy of close and officially friendly relations with both. During the Sino-Indian border crisis in 1962 Nepal adopted an official posture of neutrality toward the border dispute, and limited its public statements to expressions of hope that the two countries could settle their differences peacefully. On international issues, Nepal has followed a nonaligned and neutralist policy. Nepal generally votes with the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations.

Nepal formally established relations with Communist China in 1956, when the two countries signed a treaty of friendship. At that time Nepal relinquished certain extraterritorial rights it had gained in Tibet as a result of mid-19th century wars. The status of the undemarcated 650-mile-long Sino-Nepalese border was settled by a 1960 treaty.

The Chinese Communists have promised Nepal large amounts of economic aid. However, a motorable road from Kathmandu to the Tibetan border is the principal major project that has materialized.

Because of strong cultural, linguistic, religious, and economic ties, Nepal's associations with India are much closer than those with China. Geographically Nepal occupies a key position in the Himalayan defense perimeter of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. India has recognized Nepal's strategic importance and has made clear that it will not countenance any encroachments on Nepalese territorial integrity.

Despite these close links, the Indo-Nepalese relationship has not been entirely smooth. After King Mahendra resumed power in 1960, friction developed over Indian criticism of his action and over raids against Nepal by exiles whom the Nepalese charged were using India as a safe haven. Since the Chinese attack on India in late 1962, both India and Nepal have worked toward overcoming previous difficulties.

India has provided Nepal with substantial economic assistance, which currently totals more than \$14 million annually. Indian projects cover a wide spectrum of activities, including roadbuilding, health, hydroelectric dams, and industrial projects.

Nepal and the United Kingdom have maintained various forms of representation for over 150 years, and their relations today are friendly. Nepalese nationals continue to serve in Gurkha units of the British Army, and Britain maintains a Gurkha recruiting station in eastern Nepal. King Mahendra paid a state visit to Britain in 1960, and Queen Elizabeth visited Nepal in 1961.

The Soviet Union has had a resident Embassy in Nepal since 1959 and has provided Nepal with some economic assistance, largely in the industrial sector. The Soviets have agreed to build a 75-mile-long road in southern Nepal. King Mahendra paid a state visit to the U.S.S.R. in 1958, and President Voroshilov visited Nepal in 1960.

U. S. POLICY

Since their formal establishment in 1947, U.S.-Nepal relations have been friendly. A resident U.S. Embassy was opened in 1959, and King Mahendra paid a state visit to the United States in 1960. Our policy of assisting less-developed countries has corresponded with Nepal's own desires to build its national economy and develop its political and social institutions.

The United States has provided approximately \$110 million worth of economic assistance since the aid program commenced in Nepal in 1951. About half of the aid has been in dollars and half in Indian rupees which have come from food sales to India under Public Law 480.

U.S. aid, which now runs about \$10 million annually, helps to provide for basic economic and social needs such as rural development, education, health, communications, forest development, small industry, and the development of local self-government institutions. In addition, the Peace Corps

has several programs in Nepal which assist development in education, agriculture, forestry, and panchayats.

The United States has given limited military assistance to the Royal Nepalese Army. The United Kingdom and India are also providing military aid to Nepal.

U.S. policy toward Nepal has these objectives:

1. Support for the maintenance of Nepalese independence and territorial integrity and the development of democratic political institutions.
2. Support for Nepal's effort to develop her human and social resources through selected programs of economic aid and technical assistance.
3. Support for the broadening of political relations between Nepal and other free-world countries and encouragement to other free-world countries to increase their participation in programs of economic assistance to Nepal.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

King

Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva

Council of Ministers

Surya Bahadur Thapa—Prime Minister; Finance; Palace Affairs; General Administration
Kirti Nidhi Bista—Deputy Prime Minister; Foreign Affairs; Economic Planning
Giri Prasad Burhathoki—Defense
Rajeshwar Devkota—Food and Agriculture; Land Reform
Surendra Bahadur Basnyat—Law; Justice; Education
Gehendra B. Rajbhandari—Home and Panchayat; Information and Broadcasting

Ministers of State

Daya Nidhi Sharma—Forests
Gyanendra Bahadur Karki—Power and Irrigation
Gunjeshwari Prasad Singh—Industry and Commerce
Bishnu Kumar Tumbahamphe—Health
Rudra Prasad Giri—Transport and Communication

Other Officials

Nagendra Prasad Rijal—Chairman of the National Panchayat
Gen. Surendra B. Shah—Commander in Chief of the Army
Bhagbati Prasad Singh—Chief Justice
Maj. Gen. P. B. Khatri—Ambassador to the United States

The Kingdom of Nepal maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2131 Leroy Place, Washington, D.C. 20008.

PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—Carol C. Laise
Deputy Chief of Mission—Harry G. Barnes, Jr.
Director, USAID Mission—John Benz
Public Affairs Officer, USIS—George E. Miller
Peace Corps Director—George Zeidenstein
Defense Attache—Lt. Col. Kenneth F. Jackson
Administrative Officer—Robert J. Jackson
Economic-Commercial Officer—Henry E. Mattox
Consular Officer—Joseph Pauley

The United States maintains an Embassy in Nepal at Kathmandu.

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PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

King

Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa:
Palace Affairs; General Administration;
Home-Panchayat

Giri Prasad Burhathoki: Defense

Surendra Bahadur Basnyat: Finance;
Industry and Commerce

Gehendra Bahadur Rajbhandari: Foreign
Affairs; Education

Rudra Prasad Giri: Land Reform; Food
and Agriculture

Ministers of State

Nav Raj Subedi—Home Panchayat

Bishnu Kumar Tumbahamphe—Water Resources
and Power

Basudev Dhungana—Law and Justice

Bishwa Nath Agrawal—Information and
Broadcasting

Lok Pratap Singh Bisht—Forests

Netra Bikram Thapa—Health

Rabindra Nath Sharma—General Administration

Nain Bahadur Swair—Land Reform

Singha Dhoj Khadga—Public Works, Communication
and Transport

OTHER OFFICIALS

Lalit Chand—Chairman of the National
Panchayat

Bhagvati Prasad Singh—Chief Justice
General Surendra Bahadur Shah—

Commander in Chief of the Army

Kul Shekhar Sharma—Ambassador-
designate to the United States

Maj. General Padma Bahadur Khatri—
Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent
Representative to the UN

PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—Carol C. Laise (Mrs. Ellsworth
Bunker)

Deputy Chief of Mission—Davis Eugene
Boster

Director, USAID Mission—Carter C. Ide
Public Affairs Officer, USIS—Fentress Gardner

Peace Corps Director—Bruce Morgan

Defense Attache—Lt. Col. William Stites

Administrative Officer—Edwin H. Mott

Economic-Commercial Officer—Henry E. Mattox

Consular Officer—David Harr

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Just Ed
(original
ref'd as
of 4/16)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, March 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Dwight L. Chapin

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Farewell Call by Nepalese Ambassador

The Nepalese Ambassador here is moving to New York to devote full time to his job as Nepal's Permanent Representative to the UN. Since December 1964, he has held both posts concurrently, but Nepal has just begun a two-year term as a member of the UN Security Council so the New York job will be more demanding.

State recommends that you receive the Ambassador for a farewell call. The normal rule of thumb has been to arrange such calls only for those ambassadors who have served here five years or longer. Although Ambassador Khatri has been here for only a little over four years, State believes a little special attention to a new member of the potentially hostile Security Council would be useful preventive medicine. Were it not for this UN angle, State would not suggest you see him.

Your decision depends on a general judgment about how much of your time you wish to devote to this sort of tactical purpose. There is no question that this would be marginally useful and might even help Charlie Yost sway a Security Council vote one day. But this sort of demand on your time could mushroom, and it is always hard to cut back.

Recommendation: That you agree to see him for ten minutes unless you sense that this kind of pressure on your time threatens to get out of hand.

I'll see him _____

Prefer not to _____

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2713

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

March 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for appointment with the President to receive departing Ambassador Khatri of Nepal for a courtesy farewell call.

Ambassador Khatri presented credentials as the Nepalese Ambassador on December 3, 1964. Therefore, he has served in Washington for over four years.

Although requests generally are limited to five years or more service for the purpose of farewell calls, the reasons set forth in Assistant Secretary Sisco's memorandum would seem to justify one in this instance (Sisco memorandum and biography on Ambassador Khatri attached).

If the President agrees to receive Ambassador Khatri, please inform me of the scheduled time and date. I, in turn, will advise the Ambassador and a Protocol Officer will be present to accompany him to the President.


Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary SISCO, NEA
2. Biographic information on Ambassador Khatri



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FEB 24 1969

TO : S/CPR - Ambassador Mosbacher
FROM : NEA - Joseph J. Sisco *JS*
SUBJECT: Farewell Call on the President by the Nepalese
Ambassador

Nepalese Ambassador Major General Padma Bahadur Khatri has requested an appointment for a farewell call on the President. Ambassador Khatri has served concurrently as Nepalese Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the United Nations since December 1964. He leaves his Washington assignment this month to handle their UN office exclusively.

Nepal became a member of the Security Council January 1 for a two-year term. Under the rotation schedule Ambassador Khatri will be President of the Security Council in April.

We believe it would be desirable for the President to have an opportunity for a brief meeting with Ambassador Khatri. We recommend that specific substantive matters not be discussed. We see the benefits of a farewell call as an opportunity to remind the Nepalese we are interested in their actions on the Council, and to give the Ambassador a chance for personal contact with the President.

Enclosure:

Biographic note

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley *HA*
NEA/INC - Mr. Van Hollen *ant*
IO/UNP - Mr. Long *LL*

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NEA/INC:EFO Brien:cab
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Ambassador Khatri's successor, Ambassador-designate Kul Shekhar Sharma, is expected to arrive in Washington about March 1st. It would be helpful if an appointment with the President for Ambassador Khatri could be scheduled soon after the President's return from Europe, so that an appointment for Ambassador Sharma to present his credentials could be scheduled without too much delay after his arrival.

A recent biographic note on Ambassador Khatri is enclosed.

CONFIDENTIAL

KHATRI, Padma Bahadur

NEPAL

Ambassador to the United States

Major General Padma Bahadur Khatri is considered a highly competent and loyal civil servant of Nepal. He entered Nepalese civilian service after a long military career in which he attained the rank of Major General. His service included combat with the Allied forces in Assam and Burma in World War II. He is proud of his military career and the fact that he advanced through his own efforts rather than through family and political connections. Before becoming Ambassador to the United States in December 1964, Ambassador Khatri served as Defense Secretary and Foreign Secretary in the Nepalese Government. He is also Nepal's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to Chile, Argentina and Canada. On June 11, 1968 King Mahendra honored him with the Supradipta Manyavara Nepal-Tara (First Class), one of the highest Nepalese decorations.

Before coming to the United States, Ambassador Khatri reportedly had no well-formulated ideology, although he often said he would hate to live in a Communist country. Since coming here he has developed a sympathy for, and understanding of, the United States and some of its problems. In particular, without agreeing with United States policy towards Viet-Nam, he has expressed understanding of our difficulties and of the value to Nepal of our effort there. In addition to comprehension of the threat from China, the Ambassador shares the usual fear of India.

Ambassador Khatri was born in Kathmandu in 1915 and belongs to the influential Chhetri caste. He has a B.S. degree from Patna University in India, and in 1946 attended the British military staff college at Quetta (now in Pakistan).

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

FOR RAC REVIEW 9/21/2009

By JHS NARA, Date 4/26/2012

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

General Khatri joined the Royal Nepalese Army in 1935 and is the seventh generation of his family to make the army a career. Following World War II he served from 1947 to 1949 as military attache in London and during the UN General Assemblies in 1948 and 1949 was an observer for Nepal. He served in Malaya from 1950 to 1951 as Nepalese liaison officer with the British Brigade of Gurkhas. In 1959 he became director of military operations at RNA headquarters and in 1960 was promoted to Major General and made Quartermaster General of the Army. From 1960 to 1963, as chairman of the Sino-Nepalese Boundary Commission, he was a tough bargainer with the Chinese and became well acquainted with them. In addition to that duty, in April 1961 he was named Defense Secretary and in December 1962 became concurrently Foreign Secretary.

The military background is apparent in Khatri's personality. A parade ground voice, a degree of efficiency greater than that of many Nepalese, and an understanding of loyalty and obligation are some of his more notable characteristics. As a military man, he is scornful of politics which he calls "a dirty business" and feels that most politicians are only out for personal gain.

While the Ambassador can be reserved and uncommunicative with new acquaintances, when he warms up, he can be a good conversationalist. He is sensitive, however, that he be paid the respect his office deserves. He speaks excellent English, has a good memory, well-ordered mind, a quick wit, and a well-developed sense of humor. Quick to anger, he is equally quick to appreciate a personal kindness shown to him.

A moderately orthodox Hindu who abstains only from eating beef, Ambassador Khatri enjoys his Scotch, likes to play bridge. A keen observer of world affairs, he is well read, particularly in military history. Personal hobbies include horseback riding and hunting. Ambassador Khatri is married and has three sons and a daughter. The oldest son attended

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American University until recently and another son is studying aeronautical engineering in Florida. His youngest and perhaps favorite son (age 14) he hopes will follow a military career. The Khatris' daughter is an attractive girl who has taken very much to American dress and ways.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

March 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for appointment with the President to receive departing Ambassador Khatri of Nepal for a courtesy farewell call.

Ambassador Khatri presented credentials as the Nepalese Ambassador on December 3, 1964. Therefore, he has served in Washington for over four years.

Although requests generally are limited to five years or more service for the purpose of farewell calls, the reasons set forth in Assistant Secretary Sisco's memorandum would seem to justify one in this instance (Sisco memorandum and biography on Ambassador Khatri attached).

If the President agrees to receive Ambassador Khatri, please inform me of the scheduled time and date. I, in turn, will advise the Ambassador and a Protocol Officer will be present to accompany him to the President.

Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary SISCO, NEA
2. Biographic information on Ambassador Khatri