Mr. President:

Attached is the memorandum for distribution to the departments which you requested.

Henry A. Kissinger

Henry - President reserved [illegible] - Thanks.

SECRET/NODIS

NSE

ie past two weeks at Washington and Paris .position.

: statement on Vietnam vernmentally approved of April 1, 1969. Further, nts dealing with troop

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I have become increasingly disturbed over the past two weeks at the confusing press stories emanating from Washington and Paris which may undermine our Paris negotiating position.

Consequently, I hereby direct that any public statement on Vietnam be carefully checked for consistency with governmentally approved policy, especially that contained in NSDM 9 of April 1, 1969. Further, for the time being, I want all public statements dealing with troop withdrawals on any basis to be terminated.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

April 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: SEATO Meeting

I reviewed last week with the Department preparations for the SEATO and Troop Contributors meetings at Bangkok scheduled the week of May 19. There is attached the first draft of the Scope Paper covering both meetings for your background. It is unexceptionable, if a bit pallid.

The basic objective of the exercise will be to reaffirm and reassure on our commitments to the area, but in general terms. The key problem at the meeting will be the degree to which we are prepared to consult in a meaningful way on our policies with respect to Vietnam. This of course relates particularly to the question of unilateral troop withdrawals and the extent to which such withdrawals take place including also the troops of our allies.

I have requested that a memorandum be sent over to the White House outlining to the President our general plans for the SEATO and TCC meetings and recommending the policy decisions that need to be made prior to the meetings. I will keep after this one so that it arrives reasonably ahead of time.

Attachment

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SAIGON VISIT/SEATO/SEVEN-NATION/CENTO MEETINGS
SAIGON/BANGKOK/TEHRAN
May, 1969

Scope Paper

1. The Secretary's visit to the 14th SEATO Council Meeting and the Seven-Nation (troop-contributing) Meeting in Bangkok will provide Asian leaders with their first opportunity, with the exception of the brief and hectic exposure some of them received at the funeral of General Eisenhower, to meet with the new Administration. The representatives of the six Asian countries (Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and Viet-Nam) with whom he will be meeting in Saigon and Bangkok will be listening anxiously and probing for indications of the Administration's intended course with regard to the Paris negotiations and our posture and involvement in a post Viet-Nam East Asia.

2. Awareness of the critical importance of U.S. intentions to these countries has been heightened by the background of Viet-Nam dissent and disenchantment in the United States and the fear that the United States is embarked on a course of

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disengagement from direct involvement in Asian affairs. Most recently the President's visit to Europe has been parochially interpreted in some sectors in the Far East as suggesting that the President may have relegated East Asia to a secondary position in terms of U.S. interests.

3. Against this background, the following questions will be central to the discussions in Saigon and Bangkok:

a. What are the prospects at Paris?

b. What are the minimum U.S. conditions for a negotiated settlement of the Viet-Nam war?

c. What will be the U.S. role in Southeast Asia after the settlement?

d. What degree of determination and involvement will the United States attach to this role?

4. The key objective is to be responsive to the need for reassurance felt by the countries of Southeast Asia without extending U.S. commitments and without creating an atmosphere of overconfidence which will set back our objectives of increased responsibility, self-help and cooperation on the part of the nations of the area themselves. The Secretary's task will be complicated by the variety of circumstances, concerns and special interests represented by the nations at the two meetings. Much of

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refining and tailoring of the reassurance must come during the bilateral discussions he will hold.

5. Specifically, our overall objectives are:

a. to make clear that our commitments in the area, which we fully intend to honor, are a reflection of our national interest in a Southeast Asia of viable free nations;

b. to make clear that we intend to continue to play a role in the area in pursuit of this interest. We consider the nature and extent of our present commitments adequate for this role;

c. to assure our Asian allies of our determination to hold firm in Viet-Nam and Paris until a settlement is secured giving the people of South Viet-Nam the opportunity to determine their future without external interference;

d. to stress the importance which we attach to meaningful consultations with our allies;

e. to emphasize our conviction that a meaningful solution to the problem of the area can only be found through the cooperative efforts of the nations of the area; and

f. to reaffirm our intention to support, to the extent possible, the constructive programs of the nations of the

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area for improving their internal strength and viability and for helping one another.

SAIGON VISIT

1. This will be not only the Secretary's first visit to Viet-Nam but the first visit by a Secretary of State since December, 1966. As the ranking member of the new Administration to visit that country, he can expect to receive particular attention from the Government of Viet-Nam and from the large world and South Vietnamese press contingent in Saigon. Secretary Laird visited Viet-Nam on March 6-10, 1969.

2. The Secretary's visit will give him an important opportunity to meet and become acquainted with the leaders of the GVN and, incidentally, of our own U.S. Mission in Saigon. It will give him the opportunity to follow up on the National Security Council discussions of the Viet-Nam problem held in April during Ambassador Bunker's visit. Finally, he will be able to expand upon the discussions which Vice President Ky had with President Nixon, the Secretary, and Mr. Richardson during Ky's attendance at the Eisenhower funeral.

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3. Vietnamese government officials will be eager to inform him of the progress they have made, particularly in the political field. This includes the establishment of constitutional government, the election of national leaders, the functioning of a bicameral legislature and Supreme Court, the election of hamlet and village leaders, and renewed political party activity looking toward the creation of a possible two-party system.

4. The Vietnamese will be anxious to receive the Secretary's reassurance of the continuing commitment of the United States to support them. In addition, they will want his pledge to continue regular close consultation between the GVN and USG on Vietnamese affairs.

SEATO MEETING

1. SEATO Council Meetings are normally largely of symbolic importance. However, the May 20-21 meeting and particularly the attendant bilaterals provide the first comprehensive opportunity for our Asian allies to meet the Secretary and the new Administration. It will furnish them the chance to probe regarding the new Administration's East Asian

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policy, and similarly will provide the Secretary with a major opportunity for creating an impression conducive to furthering our objectives.

Marcos has fairly well cooled this

2. Our allies' probing will take a variety of forms. For instance, Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo has told us he will wish to discuss with the Secretary the replacement of SEATO by a more effective organization. Some may take the line of inquiring about possible policy changes by the new Administration toward Communist China. Others will want to hear his views on the Manila Communique and the Thais will certainly be interested in his views on Laos and on the Rusk-Thanat Communique.

3. Principal U.S. objectives are to demonstrate continued United States interest in the security of the area, to foreclose speculation that the United States is moving away from wholehearted support of SEATO, and to forestall related efforts to precipitate changes in SEATO which would be directed, in all probability, at seeking more specific commitments from the United States. The following points are designed to accomplish these objectives:

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a. reaffirming our support for SEATO as an effective force in being and as an organization that can grow and change to meet new conditions as they arise;

b. stressing the importance we continue to attach to SEATO as a vital multilateral defense organization for the area and as a demonstration of the desire on the part of the member nations of the area to provide for their own defense;

c. placing the United States on record as maintaining our support for SEATO in the constructive role we believe it must play in Southeast Asia's future; and

d. emphasizing the growing importance of SEATO's efforts to assist nember nations in combating internal subversion.

SEVEN-NATION MEETING

1. The Foreign Ministers of the seven nations contributing troops in Viet-Nam will meet at Bangkok for the first time since the Paris talks began. The seven participants -- representing Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United States and Viet-Nam -- last met in Wellington in April, 1968. The seven nations' Foreign

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Ministers are supposed to consult annually on the implementation of the Manila Communique of October 25, 1966 per Article 30.

2. As the host, Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat has indicated his belief that the Seven-Nation Meeting should be highly substantive and meaningful, and has added a second day to the meeting which required only one last year in Wellington. He also wants a more substantive communique than previous meetings have generated.

3. The other participating governments will be most interested in getting a firsthand report on the Paris meetings. They will also be eager to discuss with us future strategy and tactics in the negotiations. Up until now we have kept the troop-contributing governments informed as to progress in Paris through our Missions in the various capitals. This has been largely an information exercise and has not provided an opportunity for the other governments to comment on or influence the direction in which the talks were moving. This meeting will be their first opportunity for the other governments to comment on or influence the direction in which the talks were moving. This meeting will be their

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first opportunity to exchange with us and the other member governments ideas regarding the form of a final settlement.

4. The military situation on the ground in Viet-Nam will also be of primary interest to the seven nations. They will welcome an authoritative up-to-date briefing on this subject and can be counted upon to discuss progress in the military sphere. They will also be interested in any plans we may have regarding troop withdrawals and reduction, particularly as it may affect their own forces in South Viet-Nam.

5. Since this is the only meeting in which the Koreans will participate, they will want to play an important role. Their forces in Viet-Nam are exceeded only by those of the United States and the Vietnamese themselves. They, like the Thais and Filipinos, are already thinking about their post-war position in Viet-Nam and are particularly anxious to obtain economic concessions from us and the Vietnamese.

6. The Filipinos' participation in this meeting is likely to reflect domestic political problems to a greater extent than the Thais' or Koreans', particularly since this is an election year in the Philippines. As indicated, they are

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very interested in obtaining an important economic role in post-war Viet-Nam. Domestic political pressure may force them to change the nature of their contingent in Viet-Nam to a civilian, medical group, which would bring into question their eligibility for membership in the seven-nation "club."

7. As the other participants in the Seven-Nation Meeting are likely to be less reserved and formal than during the SEATO Meeting, they will probably expect the Secretary to be the same. They will be eager to hear his assessment of the Paris talks and will give particular attention to his remarks on post-war planning.

8. We should view the Seven-Nation Meeting primarily as an occasion for reassuring our allies, especially the Vietnamese and Thais, about our intentions in Viet-Nam and Asia, and also for demonstrating to the other side and the world at large the determination of all the allies to attain our mutually agreed objectives in Viet-Nam. We will also wish to reaffirm our commitment to the concept of close consultation among the allies.

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9. At the same time, it is difficult to see how we will be able to produce a truly substantive communique acceptable to all the allies (from the hawkish Koreans to dovish Filipinos) and which will not be interpreted by the other side and by the world at large as a hardening of our position. We will, therefore, have to pay particular attention to the drafting of the communique.

10. Even though the Seven-Nation Meeting will be considerably less formal than SEATO, completely frank discussions will still be hampered by the size and composition of the delegations. Last year there were about seven delegates plus staff advisers on each delegation, far too many for intimate give-and-take. In addition, the Korean and Philippine Foreign Ministers, and perhaps also the Vietnamese, will not be fully briefed on Paris. For these reasons, the most sensitive and significant discussions will have to take place in private bilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers.

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BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS

1. The bilateral discussions with three key countries (Thailand, Korea and the Philippines) offer the opportunity for tailoring the reassurance regarding the Administration's view of Southeast Asia and the Viet-Nam negotiations to their particular concerns. Thailand will view Laos as the key issue in terms of Thailand's own security. Our objective will be to reassure the RTG that if the situation in Laos should result in identifiable external Communist aggression against Thailand the United States would, in accordance with our intent to fully honor our SEATO obligations take appropriate measures as may be required to meet the situation. In addition, Thailand will seek a reaffirmation by the new Administration of a bilateral commitment within the SEATO context to the defense of Thailand.

2. In the case of the Philippines, we will wish to discourage initiatives regarding a revision of SEATO, believing these to be inspired more by interest in probing U.S. intentions than by a constructive interest in strengthening Asian participation in Asian regional security arrangements. We would also not wish to see any watering down of Philippine

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participation in the defense of Viet-Nam, but will not wish to succumb to Philippine pressure to pay the entire cost.

3. With the Koreans, we should recognize the important role they are playing in Viet-Nam. We will want to reassure them that this recognition encompasses acceptance by the United States of the need for meaningful consultations on Viet-Nam and recognition of their security and economic interests. Additionally, if they express their concern over the Okinawa reversion, we will wish to discourage them from publicly involving themselves in the issue.

4. The other bilaterals will be routine, with the minor exception of New Zealand. New Zealand has not enjoyed the same degree of contact with the new Administration that our other Asian allies, notably Australia has had, and particular warmth on the part of the Secretary would be welcome and useful.

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INFORMATION

SECRET

April 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: TCC Meeting

Attached is a telegram sent out to the field for comment setting forth tentative plans for the Troop Contributing Countries meeting in Bangkok following the SEATO session. I have had some fairly extensive discussions with EA on this meeting and I think that the proposed format looks good. It sticks to our game plan and basic position on Vietnam. I thought, however, you would want to look it over. We will have another crack when comments come in.

Attachment

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Cy sent Sneider 5/7/69

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 758

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DRAFTED BY: EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS, JR.
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
C = MR. PEDERSEN S/S = MR. BROWN EA/VN = MR. BURKE
EA = WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN

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INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 066205

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE

REF: STATE 62693

1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO MATTERS DISCUSSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL. THIS TELEGRAM SETS FORTH OUR TENTATIVE IDEAS ABOUT CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE AND TIMING OF OUR CONSULTATIONS ABOUT IT WITH OTHER TCC COUNTRIES.

2. TIMING. SINCE AT PREVIOUS TCC MEETINGS IN WELLINGTON AND WASHINGTON HOST COUNTRY HAS PRODUCED A FIRST DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE, WE ASSUME THAIS PLAN TO PRODUCE DRAFT AND ARE PROBABLY WORKING ON IT NOW. WE HOPE THAT UNGER WILL BE ABLE DISCUSS IDEAS IN THIS CABLE WITH THANAT THIS WEEK AND SECURE HIS EARLY AGREEMENT TO THEM IN GENERAL TERMS. WE WANT THEM TO DISCUSS FIRST DRAFT INCORPORATING AGREED US/THAI IDEAS WITH PUI DIEM HERE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AROUND MAY 7 FOR SAIGON. AE AND BUNKER COULD CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY IN SAIGON AND AE WOULD HOPE TO FIRM UP AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT DURING SECRETARY'S VISIT MAY 14-19. WE WOULD PLAN TO KEEP [illegible] AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS INFORMED IN GENERAL TERMS HERE AS WELL AS THAIS IN BANGKOK, BUT WOULD WAIT TO DISCUSS WITH KOREANS AND FILIPINOS UNTIL FORMATION OF COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING [illegible]

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE

IN BANGKOK, PRESUMABLY BEGINNING MAY 19.

3. CONTENT OF TCC COMMUNIQUE. (THIS OUTLINE FOLLOWS THE ROUGH ORDER OF THE APRIL 1968 COMMUNIQUE AT WELLINGTON.)

A. INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH LISTING PARTICIPANTS AND DATES.

B. PURPOSE OF MEETING

(A) REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM

(B) WAYS TO IMPROVE TCC EFFORTS

(C) REVIEW OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

(D) EXAMINATION OF SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. REFERENCE TO BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AMONG TCC'S AND ENDORSEMENT OF CONTINUING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION.

C. SITUATION IN VIET-NAM. DESCRIPTION OF STATEMENT BY VIET-NAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER COVERING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, MILITARY SITUATION, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MEASURES OF GVN. ENDORSEMENT HERE WOULD BE MADE OF THIEU'S STATEMENTS OF MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO ESSENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENT OF POLITICAL ISSUES BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND TO WILLINGNESS OF GVN TO TALK TO NLF ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN FYI. WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ENDORSING THIEU'S SIX POINTS OF APRIL 7, THIS SECTION WOULD INCLUDE A GENERAL STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH THOSE POINTS, BUT PHRASED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD NOT FORECLOSE DIFFERENT FORMULATION OF SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS. END FYI. MILITARY SECTION WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO "VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR," DESCRIBING VIETNAMESE EFFORTS AT MOBILIZATION, MODERNIZATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES. THIS SECTION WOULD ALSO INCLUDE REFERENCE TO SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR POLICIES OF GVN, THEIR REJECTION OF COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS, AND THEIR BASIC DESIRE FOR PEACE.

D. TCC EFFORTS. REFERENCE TO MILITARY BRIEFING BY ADMIRAL MCCAIN AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY US AND OTHER TCCS TO IMPROVE VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AS PART OF "VIETNAMIZATION" OBJECTIVE. ALLUSIONS TO DETERMINATION OF TCC'S TO MAINTAIN THEIR SUPPORT OF GVN UNTIL IMPROVEMENT [illegible]

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CAPABILITIES, REDUCTION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION, OR PROGRESS IN PARIS PEACE TALKS PERMIT REDUCTION IN THEIR TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS. ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM IN TERMS OF PERMITTING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

E. EFFORTS FOR PEACE. TCC ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS MADE BY U.S. AND GVN IN PARIS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSERVANCE OF DMZ, RESPECT FOR AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES WOULD INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT, REQUIREMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM AND FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND HO CHI MINH TRAIL, PLUS NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES. (BEGIN FYI. THIS SECTION WOULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF SECRETARY'S APRIL 21 SPEECH RATHER THAN IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TERMS. END FYI.) TCC AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY WOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM REDUCTION IN ALLIED FORCES PERMITTED BY RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS. THIS SECTION WOULD GIVE A GENERAL ENDORSEMENT TO OUR PARIS NEGOTIATING POSTURE AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE STATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR PEACE ON PART OF TCC'S.

F. POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES. THIS SECTION WOULD AFFIRM TCC DESIRE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO THUC/LILIENTHAL REPORT. IT WOULD ALSO REFER TO NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT AND TO PRESERVE SECRUTY OF THE AREA. (BEGIN FYI. THE LANGUAGE OF THIS SECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE TO AVOID IMPLICATION OF ANY NEW COMMITMENTS. BUT AT SAME TIME WOULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KOREAN, THAI AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE DESIRES FOR SOMETHING APPROACHING INTERNATIONAL "GUARANTEES" OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END FYI.)

G. SOUTHEAST ASIA. REFERENCE HERE WOULD BE MADE TO NEED FOR INCLUSION OF PROBLEMS OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT.

H. KOREA. SOME REFERENCE SUCH AS IN LAST YEAR'S COMMUNIQUE TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA WITHOUT IMPLYING ANY DIRECT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 066205

CONNECTION BETWEEN SITUATION THERE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I. CONCLUSION. FINAL ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS THERE AND IN PARIS IN CLOSE COORDINATION.

GP-4. ROGERS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET

April 30, 1969

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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EXDIS

DRAFTED BY: EA/VN:HFMATTHEWS, JR.
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
C - MR. PEDERSEN S/S - MR. BROWN EA/VN - MR. BURKE
EA - WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN

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SAUNDERS
SNEIDER
SONNENFELDT
VAKY

S E C R E T STATE 066205

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CAPABILITIES, REDUCTION OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION, OR PROGRESS IN PARIS PEACE TALKS PERMIT REDUCTION IN THEIR TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS. ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN VIET-NAM IN TERMS OF PERMITTING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

E. EFFORTS FOR PEACE. TCC ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSALS MADE BY U.S. AND GVN IN PARIS REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSERVANCE OF DMZ, RESPECT FOR AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES WOULD INCLUDE SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT, REQUIREMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM AND FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND HO CHI MINH TRAIL, PLUS NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH WITHDRAWAL AND CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES. (BEGIN FYI. THIS SECTION WOULD BE STATED IN TERMS OF SECRETARY'S APRIL 21 SPEECH RATHER THAN IN MANILA COMMUNIQUE TERMS. END FYI.) TCC AGREEMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE INCLUDED, AND MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY WOULD BE DISTINGUISHED FROM REDUCTION IN ALLIED FORCES PERMITTED BY RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS. THIS SECTION WOULD GIVE A GENERAL ENDORSEMENT TO OUR PARIS NEGOTIATING POSTURE AND WOULD ALSO INCLUDE STATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR PEACE ON PART OF TCC'S.

F. POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES. THIS SECTION WOULD AFFIRM TCC DESIRE TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO THUC/LILIENTHAL REPORT. IT WOULD ALSO REFER TO NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BOTH FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT AND TO PRESERVE SECRUTY OF THE AREA. (BEGIN FYI. THE LANGUAGE OF THIS SECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUFFICIENTLY VAGUE TO AVOID IMPLICATION OF ANY NEW COMMITMENTS, BUT AT SAME TIME WOULD NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT KOREAN, THAI AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE DESIRES FOR SOMETHING APPROACHING INTERNATIONAL "GUARANTEES" OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END FYI.)

G. SOUTHEAST ASIA. REFERENCE HERE WOULD BE MADE TO NEED FOR INCLUSION OF PROBLEMS OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT.

H. KOREA. SOME REFERENCE SUCH AS IN LAST YEAR'S COMMUNIQUE TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN KOREA WITHOUT IMPLYING ANY DIRECT

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CONNECTION BETWEEN SITUATION THERE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

I. CONCLUSION. FINAL ENDORSEMENT OF TCC OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE EFFORTS THERE AND IN PARIS IN CLOSE COORDINATION.

GP-4. ROGERS

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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✓ Kissinger

ACTION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE May 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Rogers' SEATO Trip

We received late this afternoon a memorandum of recommendations to the President on issues likely to arise during Rogers' trip. They cover virtually the same points that were in my briefing memorandum for the meeting with Rogers. Attached is a memorandum to the Presidents endorsing most of Rogers' recommendations, with the exception of those on the Rusk-Thanat Communique and Vietnamization of the war. the positions that I have recommended for you, I believe, are consistent with your previous memos to the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

RLSneider/pmh (5/7/69)

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ACTION

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE May 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Trip to Asia

Secretary Rogers has sent you the attached memorandum outlining his plans for his Asian trip and asking your approval for recommendations on the major policy issues likely to arise during the trip (Tab A). Most of the points discussed in Rogers' memorandum are covered in the memoranda I sent to you prior to the meeting with Rogers on May 7 (Tab B).

Rogers has recommendations on five policy issues, in addition to requesting you to sign a letter to President Thieu which has been sent separately for your consideration along with other letters to government leaders at the capitals he is visiting. My views on his recommendations areas follows:

1. Reaffirmation of our SEATO commitment. Rogers recommends and I concur that he be authorized to reaffirm U. S. support for SEATO and determination to meet our obligations under the Treaty.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

2. Reaffirmation of Rusk-Thanat Communique. The Thais are expected to seek a bilateral defense treaty with us or at a minimum a reiteration of our commitment to Thailand under the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Communique, which stated that our obligation under SEATO is individual, as well as collective, and does not require agreement of all other Treaty Parties.

Rogers' preferred recommendation is a brief statement accepting the interpretation of the SEATO Treaty in the Rusk-Thanat Communique. But, he requests authorization to make public, if pressed, an identical statement to that issued in 1962. My recommendation is that we issue an identical statement so as to leave no sense of doubt among the Thais.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

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Your preference is requested:

Offer to issue a statement identical to the Rusk-Thanat Communique only if pressed.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Offer to issue an identical statement immediately.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

Secretary Rogers also recommended that he strongly discourage a request for a bilateral treaty. I would concur.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. Vietnamization of the war. Rogers fears there may be a possibility that MACV may not be going far enough and fast enough on Vietnam to meet political requirements in the United States. He plans to discuss this thoroughly with Bunker and Abrams and has asked your authorization.

I recommend that Rogers not push too hard on this issue and take the position in Saigon that we wish to move ahead with Vietnamization but only on the basis of well-considered plans and not to the point of leaving the impression that we are pulling out too rapidly, thereby endangering the security of the South Vietnam or the American forces remaining in the country.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. Post-war Guarantees. Rogers anticipates that some of the Troop Contributing Countries may seek a new American commitment to guarantee any future settlement in Southeast Asia. He recommends that we take the position that the present commitments are adequate and that new Treaty commitments are not necessary. He would argue the case on philosophical and public opinion grounds.

I agree we should not make any new Treaty commitments but only on the grounds that the present commitments are adequate. Stress of public opinion reasons might increase current Asian anxiety about our post-Vietnam war posture in Asia.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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5. Manila Communique. Rogers anticipates that at the Troop Contributors meeting some of the members may wish to refer to the Manila Communique on mutual troop withdrawals. He intends to restate our position in accordance with the mutual withdrawal paper approved by you and now concurred to, in general terms, by President Thieu. However, if pressed, he asks to be authorized to accept a reference to the Manila Communique without spelling out its terms. I agree.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

7050

May 7, 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Issues Which Will Arise During My May Trip to Asia

I am leaving May 12 on a trip which will take me to Saigon for talks with our Mission and with the Government of Viet-Nam; to Bangkok for the SEATO and Seven-Nation Meetings; to India and Pakistan for brief meetings with Indian and Pakistani leaders; to Afghanistan for a brief meeting with the Prime Minister and possibly the King; and to Tehran for the CENTO Meeting and a meeting with the Shah. I plan to return to Washington on May 29.

Saigon

The purposes of my visit to Saigon are:

1. To learn as much as I can about the problem on the ground and from our senior officials there, with emphasis on the prospects for Vietnamization of the war.

2. To meet President Thieu and other senior Vietnamese and American officials whom I do not know.

3. To consult with President Thieu on our negotiating position in Paris, with particular emphasis on the matters of mutual troop withdrawals, internal political settlement and our over-all strategy.

4. To consult with the GVN on our objectives and tactics at the Seven-Nation Meeting.

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During my meetings with Vietnamese officials I intend to outline your policy on the war, including the relationships between American public opinion, Vietnamization of the war, and the pressure of time. At the same time, I would hope to deliver to President Thieu a letter (enclosed) from you which reaffirms the commitment of the United States Government to its objective of assuring that the South Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own future without external interference. I intend to discuss the question of mutual withdrawal of forces in some depth with President Thieu who has just given his concurrence in our policy as approved in the National Security Council.

SEATO Council Meeting

My objectives at the SEATO Council Meeting will be:

1. to reassure the member nations of United States support for the treaty;

2. to reassure the member nations of continued United States interest in the security of Southeast Asia;

3. to reassure the regional members regarding our over-all strategy in Viet-Nam and our negotiating position in Paris; and

4. to meet, in many cases for the first time, the foreign ministers of our SEATO allies.

Bilaterals

The important bilateral conversations I will hold will be with the Filipinos and the Thais. In the case of Secretary Romulo, I will be:

1. listening to the views he wants to express on the future of SEATO;

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2. discouraging him from proposing any substantive changes in SEATO at the Council Meeting; and

3. seeking to obtain a continuation of PHILCAG on the present basis.

In the case of Prime Minister Thanom and Foreign Minister Thanat, my objectives will be:

1. to reassure them that your Administration supports our SEATO commitment to Thailand; and

2. to reassure them regarding our intentions in Viet-Nam and at the Paris talks.

Seven-Nation Meeting

Our objectives at the Seven-Nation Meeting would be:

1. to present to our enemies, to our allies and to the world at large a picture of allied unity, determined to proceed toward the objective of a negotiated settlement of the war under conditions in which the people of South Viet-Nam will have the right to choose their own political future free of external pressure from anyone;

2. to obtain the concurrence of our allies in our over-all strategy and our negotiating position in Paris, including a specific endorsement of the public proposals we have made on mutual troop withdrawal, the DMZ, Laos and Cambodia, and prisoners of war.

3. to show to interested public opinion that the allies are consulting together; and

4. to provide as genuine an opportunity for consultation as security considerations will permit.

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Problems

The pitfalls related to Viet-Nam along the path include attempts by the press to exaggerate such differences in outlook as exist among the seven allies, ranging from the hawkish Koreans to the dovish Filipinos. Moreover, major substantive problems will face us in Saigon and in both the SEATO and Seven-Nation Meetings.

One of these is the desire of some of our allies, most notably the South Vietnamese, for an American commitment to "guarantee" any future settlement in Southeast Asia. I propose to take the position that the United States intends to live up to its present commitments, which are adequate for the maintenance of the security of the area; that, as we have amply demonstrated, we are as interested in the security of Southeast Asia as our allies; but that we do not intend to make any new treaty commitments to the area for both philosophical and public opinion reasons.

Another issue is the already evident desire of the allies, and especially the Vietnamese, for a specific reaffirmation of the terms of the Manila Communique concerning mutual troop withdrawals. This we will try to avoid by restating our position as we have in the Paris talks; but, to avoid alarming our allies about our intentions, we may have to accept a reference to the Manila Communique without spelling out its terms.

There is the possibility that we may have some difficulty in persuading MACV, in connection with Vietnamization, to go far enough and fast enough to meet the realities of the political requirements in this country. I plan to go into this thoroughly with Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams.

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India

The primary objective of my visit to New Delhi is to signify the importance we attach to India in our view of Asia, and our desire to keep in close touch with its leaders on matters of broad common interest.

Pakistan

My objectives in visiting Pakistan are to demonstrate continuing United States interest in Pakistan; to take the measure of President Yahya, Chief of the Martial Law Regime; to assess the chances of his returning the country to a more representative system of government; and to get a feel for future decisions on two important policy questions: U.S. military sales policy and future AID levels.

Afghanistan

My stop in Kabul will indicate to the Afghans and to King Zahir that the United States remains interested in their country's independence and welfare. This is important to them in their efforts to maintain an independent foreign policy despite their heavy dependence on the U.S.S.R.

CENTO Meeting

The main objective of my visit to Tehran is to signify to the regional members of CENTO, particularly Iran and Turkey, that we continue to be deeply interested in the future of our relations with them. The collateral objective is a "holding action" on CENTO itself while we seek a clear idea of the value the members attach to the alliance and while we reassess its future.

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Bilaterals with the Shah and Other Iranian Officials

During my Tehran visit I will also meet with the Shah of Iran, with the Iranian Foreign Minister and with other members of government. These meetings continue our efforts to maintain our close ties with Iran. Our interests in Iran have been increasing as a result of the announced British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, continuing instability and Soviet inroads in the Arab world, and difficulties we have encountered in maintaining our communications and intelligence facilities in neighboring countries.

Policy Issues Likely to Arise

Specific policy questions which will arise are as follows. I include my recommendation on each.

Reaffirmation of Our SEATO Commitment

SEATO and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty symbolize our concern with the security of the area, serve as a basis for our military actions related to Viet-Nam and assistance to Southeast Asian nations, provide us with flexibility of action without explicitly committing us to any specific course, and encompass our only formal security link with Thailand.

Recommendation:

That I be authorized to reaffirm United States support for SEATO and determination to meet our obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Thailand

I anticipate that the Thais may request a bilateral defense treaty, but at a minimum will wish a public re-

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iteration of our commitment to Thailand. I believe I can satisfy the Thai needs without in any way extending our existing commitments by making the following statement:

> "I accept the interpretation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty set forth in the Rusk-Thanat Communique of March 6, 1962 as being, under international law, the proper interpretation of the Treaty."

Recommendation:

That I be authorized to make publicly the statement quoted above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

If the Thais press for a more specific statement of our position, I would propose to make publicly the following statement, which is identical to the operative language used in the March 6, 1962 Communique:

> "I assure you that in the event of direct Communist aggression against Thailand, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. This obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other Parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective."

Recommendation:

That I be authorized to make publicly the statement above, if necessary:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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That I strongly discourage any request for a bilateral treaty with Thailand on the grounds, inter alia, that such a treaty would be unnecessary and redundant.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Viet-Nam

I recommend that I be authorized to make the following actions:

1. With GVN leaders: I intend to spell out in fairly frank detail the policies adopted by the National Security Council, especially with respect to the Vietnamization of the war.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. With our TCC allies as regards U.S. "guarantees" for any future settlement in Southeast Asia: I propose to take the position that the United States intends to live up to its present commitments, which are adequate for the maintenance of the security of the area; that, as we have amply demonstrated, we are as interested in the security of Southeast Asia as our allies; but that we do not intend to make any new treaty commitments to the area for both philosophical and public opinion reasons.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. With our TCC allies with regard to the Manila Communique: We will try to avoid a specific reaffirmation of the terms of the Manila Communique concerning mutual troop withdrawals by restating our position as we have in the Paris talks; but, to avoid alarming our allies about our intentions, we may have to accept a reference to the Manila Communique without spelling out its terms.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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4. Letter to President Thieu: I have separately proposed to you the text of a letter to President Thieu for me to deliver when I meet with him in Saigon. President Thieu may desire to release the text of the letter.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to agree to the release of the text of the letter should President Thieu so request.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

I know of no other major policy questions which are likely to arise and which should be brought to your attention.

William P. Rogers

Enclosure:

Proposed Letter to
President Thieu.

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ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Trip to Southeast Asia

Background:

Trip Schedule: Secretary Rogers departs on May 12. He will first visit Saigon, May 14 - 19. He will then be in Bangkok May 19 - 23 for the SEATO meeting on May 20 - 21, the meeting of the Troop Contributing Countries on May 22 - 23, and for bilateral meetings with the Thais and other participating countries.

Proposed Objectives:

Overall Objectives in Southeast Asia:

(1) To reaffirm US treaty commitments in Southeast Asia, particularly SEATO, and to reassure the countries concerned of continued US interest in Southeast Asia's security.

(2) To affirm that the US objective in Vietnam is to assure that South Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own future without external interference.

(3) To consult meaningfully with our allies on Vietnam and other common security issues.

(4) To obtain the views and hopefully the support of our allies for current US strategy in Vietnam and at the Paris peace negotiations.

(5) To stimulate greater self-help efforts on the part of the Southeast Asian countries without creating anxiety about the credibility of US commitments.

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Additional Specific Objectives:

(1) Saigon: To consult with senior Vietnamese and American officials on negotiating strategy and the Vietnamization of the war and to gain a general familiarization with Vietnam.

(2) SEATO: To discourage embryonic efforts to revise or otherwise amend the treaty and current SEATO arrangements.

(3) Troop Contributing Meeting: To consult on negotiating strategy and in particular to discuss the concerns of some countries with respect to the Manila Communique and unilateral US troop reductions.

Issues for Decision and Recommended Positions:

(1) Reaffirmation of Existing Commitments: Throughout the trip, the countries involved in Southeast Asia will be seeking both reaffirmation of US treaty commitments and the basic US commitment to Vietnam.

Recommended Position: That Secretary Rogers be authorized to reaffirm both of these commitments.

(2) New Commitments: Pressure for new US commitments may arise in two specific cases. First, both the Thais and the Philippines have been discussing strengthening and revising the SEATO commitment, while the Thais have also refurbished their past request for a bilateral treaty with the US to replace SEATO. Second, it is possible that some of the allies, particularly the South Vietnamese, may seek a new American commitment to guarantee any future settlement in Southeast Asia. In both cases, our current treaty commitments appear for the present adequate to meet the legitimate security concerns of the Southeast Asians, while any new commitments would raise Congressional problems. The Thais, however, will probably find reassuring a reaffirmation of the 1962 Rusk-Thanant Communique in which we stated that our obligation under SEATO, in the face of communist armed attack on Thailand, is individual as well as collective and does not require prior agreement of all other treaty Parties.

Recommendation: That you authorize Secretary Rogers to reaffirm the Rusk-Thanant communique in language generally similar but otherwise not go beyond a reaffirmation of current US treaty commitments.

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(3) Troop Reduction: US intentions to reduce its forces in Vietnam unilaterally will be intensively probed both in Saigon and Bangkok. There are indications that Korea and the Filipinos, but not the other troop contributing countries, would particularly desire to withdraw some of their forces if we decided to reduce our forces in Vietnam.

Recommended Position: That Secretary Rogers assure the troop contributors of full consultation with them if we decide to reduce the US forces in Vietnam, and inform them that no decisions have as yet been made, and that troop withdrawals will depend on three circumstances -- an agreement on mutual withdrawals, an improvement in the military situation, and/or an improvement in South Vietnamese military capabilities. He should also seek to discourage parallel reductions by other troop contributors, but leave the door open for possible token withdrawals, particularly on the part of the Koreans, if we decide to reduce the US forces in Vietnam.

(4) Manila Communique: Since the troop contributing countries participated in and are committed to the Manila Communique language on withdrawal, there is concern among some of them about a possible US repudiation of the communique.

Recommended Position: That Secretary Rogers stress the new US position on mutual withdrawal as approved by you and concurred in by President Thieu, but, if pressed by the troop contributors, accept a reference in the final communique to the Manila Communique without spelling out its terms.

Other Talking Points:

In addition to setting forth your views on the above issues, it is suggested that you make the following additional points to Secretary Rogers:

(1) Your strong personal interest in Asia and conviction that over the next decade Asia will provide the major opportunity for constructive American foreign policy approaches.

(2) Your desire to maintain as close as possible rapport with the leaders in South Vietnam, and consult fully with our Asian allies.

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(3) Our confidence that we can outlast Hanoi, if it chooses not to negotiate a fair settlement, and that time works more in our favor than in Hanoi's. Therefore, it is to Hanoi's advantage to enter now into meaningful negotiations.

(4) We seek peace in Vietnam, but it is essential that we not appear overanxious to either Hanoi or our allies.

(5) We wish to move ahead with Vietnamization of the war but only on the basis of well-considered plans. We are looking forward to the recommendations of Saigon on Vietnamization.

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ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Trip

The issue that fundamentally concerns the countries of Southeast Asia is whether the end of the Vietnam war will result in a major disengagement of the United States from that area. The Thais are particularly concerned that our treaty commitment under SEATO will become so hedged and watered down that it will be ineffective and useless. They fear that this is the very objective of the pressures manifested in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today. Therefore, they -- with the support of the Filipinos and others -- are seeking to strengthen and amend SEATO.

Even deeper concerns of the same fundamental nature are evident in South Vietnam. There, the current issue centers on the rate of unilateral US troop withdrawals. The South Vietnamese fear that we will put out American forces more rapidly than warranted by the military situation or the state of their preparedness. As a result, they would be left seriously disadvantaged in the face of the North Vietnamese and the VC.

For this reason, I suggest that in discussing with Secretary Rogers the details of this trip (covered in the attached memorandum), you stress the following points:

1. Your Administration intends to fulfill US commitments in Southeast Asia fully, without continuously looking over its shoulder at domestic critics in a manner that will vitiate the credibility of these commitments.

2. US troop reductions from Vietnam will be decided on the basis of well-considered military plans and we will not push Vietnamization to the point of endangering the security of either South Vietnam or the American forces remaining in South Vietnam.

RSneider:pas 5/6/69

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE May 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Guidance for Secretary Rogers' Visit to Saigon

Secretary Rogers has requested your guidance for his visit to Saigon on May 14-19. I suggest the following points:

Basic Elements of U.S. Policy

1. The U.S. objective in Vietnam is to assure that the South Vietnamese people will be able to determine their own future without external interference. The U.S. will not agree to any proposal for Vietnam peace which does not meet this objective.

2. In all elements of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, the U.S. will consult fully with the Vietnam leadership and maintain the closest possible rapport.

Negotiating Policy

1. Our posture on the pace of the talks should be ready but not eager. We want to avoid giving Hanoi the impression we are acting from weakness or under pressures.

2. In the private talks, we visualize separate discussions between the U.S. and Hanoi and between the South Vietnamese Government and the NLF, but are prepared to undertake private talks including all four participants if proposed by the Communists.

3. During the present stage of private talks, we should:

a. Stress mutual withdrawal based upon the plan agreed to by President Thieu. Mutual withdrawal should include provisions for:

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(1) Verification of supervision of withdrawal;

(2) Withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces all the way back to North Vietnam;

(3) Measures to maintain the agreement.

b. Secondary but significant emphasis on restoring the DMZ.

c. Keeping after the question of prisoners.

d. Entering into no de-escalation agreements except as an outgrowth of mutual troop withdrawal.

4. While the U. S. would focus on mutual withdrawal, discussions of the settlement of political structure in the south would be left to the South Vietnamese Government. In this connection, we wish to urge the South Vietnamese to develop negotiating positions on political structure and coordinate closely with them.

Vietnamization of the War

1. We attach major importance to Vietnamization of the war and are looking forward to receiving plans developed by our senior officers in Saigon to accomplish this objective in coordination with the GVN.

2. You anticipate some unilateral troop withdrawals, possibly as early as this summer, but this will depend on the military situation and the state of preparedness of the South Vietnamese armed forces.

3. We must do nothing to give the Vietnamese the impression that we are using Vietnamization of the war as an excuse for a pull-out.

4. Vietnamization of the war, if it is accomplished as an act of strength rather than weakness, will enhance our negotiating position in Paris. Hanoi is concerned about Vietnamization, and therefore we should do everything to convince Hanoi that it is to its advantage to enter into meaningful negotiations now rather than trying unsuccessfully to outlast us.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 6 8 3 3 Q
APR. 29, 1969
2:50 A.M.

P 290525Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3730
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T CANBERRA 2286

NODIS

REF: STATE 62693

SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE

1. CONCUR STATEMENT REFTEL THAT AUSTRALIA PREPARED LIVE WITH SOME REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM WHILE RETAINING ITS FORCES AT PRESENT LEVEL. PRIME MINISTER, DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY MINISTER HAVE SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY (CANBERRA 1996, 2035 AND 2136). THEIR POSITION IS THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE WELL-BALANCED UNIT AND ANY REDUCTION WOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS. ALSO THAT, IN ANY CASE, TOTAL NUMBERS ARE SMALL IN COMPARISON OTHER CONTRIBUTING POWERS.

2. GOA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT INDICATED EXTENT THEIR INTEREST IN SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, BUT GOA CLEARLY PLACES FAR MORE IMPORTANCE ON GORTON VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH PRECEDES SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE BY ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY WILL NOT EXPECT TO LEARN ANYTHING NEW FROM US AND THEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE TO TELL US OR OTHERS THAT WASN'T ALREADY THOROUGHLY COVERED IN WASHINGTON TALKS. FREETH, WHO WILL HEAD GOA DELEGATION, IS NOT PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL AND IS STILL PRETTY GREEN TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND WE DOUBT HE WILL PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLE. PLIMSOLL, WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON WITH GORTON, TOLD CHARGE HE HOPES TO AVOID TCC MEETING AND SEND SOMEONE ELSE FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS PERHAPS INDICATIVE OF DEGREE OF GOA INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING MEETING.

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3. ALTHOUGH GOA IS UNLIKELY TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT MEETING, IT WILL DEFINITELY WISH TO KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT WE PLAN TO SAY AND WHAT WE HOPE WILL COME OUT OF MEETING. WE BELIEVE THEY EXPECT THAT QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MAJOR SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION (IN WHICH, APART FROM OUR SPECIAL SITUATION, THEY WOULD URGE OTHERS TO HOLD THE LINE) AND THAT DETAILED BRIEFING PARIS TALKS WOULD BE GIVEN BY US AND GVN REPRESENTATIVES. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO GET INTO SUBJECTS OF POST-VIETNAM PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION, DISCUSSION OF INSURGENCY IN THAILAND AND LAOS, AND POSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. GOA WILL WISH TO HAVE A STRONG JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT DEMONSTRATES FIRM SOLIDARITY AND INTENT ALL TCC'S TO STAND BY BASIC OBJECTIVE. CRONK
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Seven Nations

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

May 22, 1969 P.R. No. 132

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT CONCLUSION

SEVEN NATIONS CONFERENCE

Bangkok, Thailand

May 22, 1969

The Minister for External Affairs of Australia, Mr. Gordon Freeth; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Kyu Hah Choi; the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of New Zealand, Mr. Keith Holyoake; the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Mr. C arlos P. Romulo; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. Thanat Khoman; the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. William P. Rogers; and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Mr. Tran Chanh Thanh met in Bangkok, at the invitation of the Royal Thai Government, on 22 May 1969.

PURPOSES

The meeting was held to permit the Ministers to continue their practice of regular consultations on important matters of mutual interest. Specifically, they wished (1) to review the current situation in Viet-Nam, (2) to consider the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the conflict, (3) to discuss ways in which their governments might strengthen their efforts to help the people of Viet-Nam, (4) to examine the security situation in Asia.

SITUATION IN VIET-NAM

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam described the important developments which had taken place in his country over the past twelve months. He emphasized the broadly based representative nature of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and noted the successful establishment of the new and elected institutions, such as the Supreme Court of Justice and the Inspectorate called for by the Vietnamese Constitution. He also described the current efforts of Vietnamese non-Communist political parties to unite to further their common goal. The Ministers expressed their gratification at the continued strengthening of Vietnamese political institutions, in particular the effective functioning of the elected National Assembly.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam also outlined the efforts being made to raise the standard of living of his countrymen and to bring them greater social well-being, making particular reference to his Government's new land reform program and rural development policy. He described the increased autonomy and financial resources given to local authorities to foster a functioning democracy for the benefit of the people. He underlined the achievements of the pacification program, which have made possible

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possible the election of additional village councils and hamlet chiefs.

He described how urban housing projects had been put into effect to resettle the victims of Communist indiscriminate shellings. He pointed out that, in spite of the ravages of war, primary, secondary, and higher education had progressed at a remarkable rate.

The Minister further indicated that the open arms policy had brought fruitful results with growing numbers of enemy cadres and officers rallying to the national community.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam stressed the strong desire for peace of his Government and of the people of Viet-Nam. The Ministers made it clear that the peoples of all seven nations desired a just and lasting peace at the earliest possible time. They welcomed the willingness of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to hold private talks with what the other side called the NLF as demonstrated by President Nguyen Van Thieu's statements of March 25, and April 7, 1969.

The Ministers examined the military situation and received a briefing from Vietnamese and American military commanders. They were encouraged at the progress being made by allied forces and the increasing difficulties encountered by the other side. They agreed that the failure of the other side to achieve their objectives should convince them of their inability to gain a victory by military means. The Ministers noted the modernization and improvement of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, welcomed their determination to assume greater responsibilities for the defense of their homeland, and commended the progress they have already made in that direction. They noted with appreciation the substantial increase in the strength of the armed forces contributed by Thailand to the defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Ministers expressed their admiration and gratitude for the courage and devotion of the allied soldiers serving in Viet-Nam.

The Ministers emphasized that their forces were in Viet-Nam to help the Vietnamese people defend themselves against outside aggression and to ensure that such aggression shall not be rewarded. They reaffirmed that their objective was to bring about a peace in which the people of South Viet-Nam are able to exercise their unconditional right of self-determination free from external interference and terrorism. The Ministers of the seven nations reaffirmed their determination to help the Vietnamese people resist this aggression and accordingly to continue their support of the Republic of Viet-Nam. They recognized that this support will be related to the progress of the peace negotiations, the level of offensive actions by the enemy, and the relative strength of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam and their capability of taking over an even greater share of the fighting.

The Ministers viewed with grave concern the continuing presence of a large number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and their use of Laotian territory in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements.

EFFORT FOR PEACE

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EFFORT FOR PEACE

The Ministers also reviewed the developments in the negotiations taking place in Paris and welcomed the proposals which had been made there by the governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States concerning mutual troop withdrawals. They agreed that withdrawals could commence simultaneously and proceed expeditiously on the basis of a mutually acceptable timetable; that all externally introduced forces would have to be withdrawn not only from South Viet-Nam but also from Laos and Cambodia; and that the further introduction of forces must be prohibited. They also agreed that a clear need existed for adequate verification and supervision of compliance with both the withdrawal of forces and the prohibition against further introduction of forces.

The Ministers also noted with approval the proposals put forward by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States for observance of the Demilitarized Zone, the release of prisoners of war, and full compliance with existing international agreements on Laos and Cambodia.

The Ministers examined the positions the other side has taken in Paris. In contrast to the reasonable nature of the proposals put forward by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States, the other side has demanded unilateral and unconditional withdrawal of the allied forces assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam and destruction of the democratic institutions and procedures which have been emerging there during the past several years. From these positions the Ministers concluded with regret that the other side was still intransigent and was seeking to wear down the resistance of the allied nations and to impose upon the Republic of Viet-Nam a totalitarian regime contrary to the wishes of its people. They reiterated their common resolve to reject any attempt to impose upon the Republic of Viet-Nam any system or program, including the spurious coalition government demanded by the other side, without regard to the will of the people of South Viet-Nam.

The Ministers agreed that all possibilities leading to peace and national reconciliation should be thoroughly explored, and they endorsed the efforts in this direction of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. They welcomed the comprehensive statements by the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam on April 7, 1969, and the President of the United States on May 14, 1969, as important contributions to this effort. They agreed that all of the nations which are making available armed forces to help defend the Republic of Viet-Nam must participate in the settlement of the conflict.

The Ministers discussed the need for international cooperation to support economic reconstruction and development in Viet-Nam after the cessation of hostilities. They noted in this regard the great potential for economic and social progress revealed by the recently released joint development group report prepared at the request of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam. They agreed to consult closely on the important goal of assisting the people of South Viet-Nam to achieve the better future their sacrifices have earned. They expressed the hope that North Viet-Nam will come to realize the advantages of living in peaceful cooperation and friendly harmony with its neighbors rather than in confrontation with them; and that North Viet-Nam will take advantage of arrangements for regional cooperation for the benefit of its own people and for the progress of Southeast Asia as a whole.

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The Ministers also agreed that a general settlement in Southeast Asia will reuqire the participation by Asian powers in measures to assure peace and security for this part of the world. They considered it desirable that the Asian countries themselves should have the primary responsibility for their own future well-being and peaceful development. They agreed that the Asian countries might in exercise of this responsibility assume certain duties in connection with a peace settlement for Viet-Nam, possibly under the aegis of the United Nations. Again, closest consultation among the interested parties could be beneficial in this connection.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea gave an account of the continuing and intensified acts of provocation and aggression against the Republic of Korea perpetrated by the North Korean Communists, as evidenced by the series of infiltrations by armed raiders into the Republic of Korea and the increased violation during the past year of the Armistice Agreement of 1953. The Ministers expressed their indignation over these continuing and intensified acts of provocation and aggression, and renewed their previous agreement that such acts by the North Korean Communists are a matter of grave concern and directly threaten the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the area surrounding it.

The Ministers reaffirmed their support for the Republic of Korea in resisting such North Korean aggression. The Ministers welcomed the intention of the Republic of Korea to keep them and other interested governments informed of any future developments through ambassadors in Seoul.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

The Ministers noted that actions taken in pursuance of the policies herein stated should be in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

CONCLUSION

The Ministers of the seven nations reiterated their continued support to the Republic of Viet-Nam to preserve the unconditional right of the people of South Viet-Nam to decide their own destiny by democratic and peaceful means and without outside interference. The Ministers stated their determination to continue their efforts towards this goal, while a just and peaceful solution to the conflict is pursued through the Paris Meetings. Finally, in view of the situation in Korea and Southeast Asia, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the Declaration on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific promulgated at the Summit Conference in Manila in October 1966, and agreed to continue the close cooperation which has existed among the Seven Nations.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 21, 1969 **FOR THE PRESS** NO. 126

FINAL COMMUNIQUE
OF THE
FOURTEENTH SEATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
BANGKOK, THAILAND
MAY 21, 1969

The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization held its Fourteenth Meeting in Bangkok from 20 May to 21 May 1969, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The Council agreed that the most significant development during the past year has been the prospects for peace in the area opened up by the Paris Meetings and by the determined efforts of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam in close consultation with their allies to bring about a peaceful and just solution to the Viet-Nam conflict.

The Council noted that economic and social progress had continued during the past year within the Treaty area. The Council agreed that this progress had been achieved mainly by the individual efforts of the countries in the region, and by the further strengthening of regional cooperation which reflects a growing consciousness of mutual interests. The Council also noted that this achievement had been made without sacrifice of human liberty and fundamental freedoms.

The Council noted that these political, economic and social advances would not have been possible without the shield which the Manila Treaty has helped to provide over the past fourteen years.

The Council agreed that aggression, both overt and by subversion, infiltration and terrorism, instigated or supported by external communist movements, remains a major threat to the peace and security of the area. The Council expressed its conviction that the threat in the Treaty area cannot be considered in isolation from problems of international peace and security, and that the outcome of the struggle now going on against such aggression in Southeast Asia will have profound effects throughout the world. The Council expressed its determination that this aggression must not be allowed to succeed.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

The Council commended the determination of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and the governments helping to defend it, to bring a peace in Viet-Nam under which the people of South Viet-Nam will be assured of their right to determine their own future, free from outside interference and terrorism.

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The Council noted with approval the proposals which have been made by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States for the mutual withdrawal of external forces from South Viet-Nam, for respect for the Demilitarized Zone, for full implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, for respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality and territoiral integrity of Cambodia and for the release of all prisoners of war. The Council noted that these proposals not only recognize the realities of the situation in Southeast Asia today, but are firmly based on the precedents of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements. The Council noted that the Paris Talks have been going on for a year and expressed the hope that the other side would now respond constructively to the proposals.

The Council expressed its conviction that serious negotiations based on the above proposals would lead to an end of hostilities and to peace and reconciliation in Viet-Nam. The Council noted that the fundamental allied objective in Viet-Nam is to ensure the unconditional right on self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam. The Council agreed that, whatever the difficulties, the intensive search for a just and lasting peace must continue until this objective is attained and stability and security are assured.

VIET-NAM

The Council heard with deep interest a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Council expressed its concern and sympathy for the Vietnamese people who have suffered so long. It affirmed its admiration for the courage with which the government and people of the Republic of Viet-Nam are defending their freedom.

The Council noted the commendable progress being made by the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in improving their ability to withstand the armed aggression and to counter subversive activity. The Council warmly welcomed the expressed determination of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam progressively to assume responsibility for the defence of its territory.

The Council also welcomed the continued progress that has been made by the Republic of Viet-Nam in the political, economic and social fields, in particular, the evolution and strengthening of democratic and representative government.

The Council noted with deep concern North Viet-Nam's continuing aggression by means of armed attack against the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Council deplored the conduct of North Viet-Nam, particularly while peace negotiations are in progress, in continuing indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population. The Council noted with regret that this aggression is sustained by a heavy flow of weapons and supplies from other communist regimes.

The Council noted with appreciation the increases during the past year in the military, economic and humanitarian assistance by member governments to the Republic of Viet-Nam, in fulfillment of or consistent with their obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. The Council also noted with appreciation the substantial

assistance

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assistance which the Republic of Viet-Nam has continued to receive from the Republic of Korea and other countries which are not members of SEATO.

The Council stated its conviction that the effective defence of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its current struggle is essential to the security of Southeast Asia and will demonstrate that communist expansion through aggression of this kind will not be permitted.

The Council noted that reconstruction in Viet-Nam, which awaits the achievement of peace, will open the way to a new era of development and progress for the peoples and nations of the entire region. The Council noted the intention of the member nations of SEATO to continue their aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam and to contribute to the work of reconstruction.

The Council welcomed the expressions of intent by other nations around the world to participate in this urgent task.

LAOS

The Council noted with grave concern that North Viet-Nam, in violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements, continues to maintain military forces, including large units of its regular army, in Laos, to commit armed attacks on the forces of the Royal Government of Laos, and to use Laotian Territory for infiltrating troops and supplies into the Republic of Viet-Nam and to support insurgency in Thailand. The Council reiterated its call for full implementation by all signatories of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos and expressed support for the earnest efforts of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and the Royal Government of Laos to secure peace and to preserve the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos.

PHILIPPINES

The Council was pleased to note the recent successes achieved by government forces against insurgents in Central Luzon and the vigorous efforts by all agencies of the Government of the Philippines, with support of member nations, to implement an integrated socio-economic programme designed to eliminate the root cause of the complex insurgency problem in Central Luzon. Since one of the causes of agrarian unrest among the masses is the land problem, the Council also noted with approval the efforts of the Philippine Government to accelerate the implementation of the land reform code. The Council further noted the achievements of the Government of the Philippines in the development of its rural areas and expressed its gratification at the continuing high priority given to irrigation, feeder roads , health, electrification, credit and agricultural productivity programmes.

The Council noted proposals by the Philippines for a youth volunteer corps, a special problem office, a university of Southeast Asia, a rural health training centre, and refugee rehabilitation.

THAILAND

The Council noted the Royal Thai Government had increased during the year the major contribution it is making to the defence of the Republic of Viet-Nam. In addition to air and naval units already in Viet-Nam, it dispatched a division of ground forces to aid in the struggle. This was done despite the continued threat of communist-inspired insurgency within Thailand itself.

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The Council was gratified by the determined endeavours of the Royal Thai Government and people to encourage economic and social development and to counter subversive activities directed from outside Thai borders. Their efforts have continued under the newly formed government following the national elections held early this year.

The Council expressed concern at the increase in communist infiltration and terrorist activities particularly in remote areas of North and Northeast Thailand. The Council noted with satisfaction the intensive efforts of the Royal Thai Government to provide greater security and a higher standard of living for the rural population and the vigorous measures taken by Thai authorities to eliminate the threat of communist insurgency. The Council reiterated its determination to continue to assist Thailand in meeting this threat.

COUNTER-SUBVERSION

The Council again affirmed its support for SEATO activities designed to aid member countries in the Treaty area to counter communist subsersion. It noted the high degree of success achieved by the Secretary-General in the provision of such assistance and requested him to continue his efforts in this field.

AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

The Council welcomed as a substantial contribution to the security of the area the decisions of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand to maintain military forces in Malaysia and Singapore at the request of those governments.

The Council also welcomed the proposed consultations in Canberra between the Governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom.

THE ORGANIZATION

The Council reaffirmed the importance which it attaches to the organization as a deterrent to communist aggression and as a source of support to member nations in the area in countering communist subversion.

The Council was convinced that greater emphasis should be placed on political consultations, counter-insurgency, and economic and and cultural cooperation, to make the organization's role more effective and more responsive to the new communist tactics being employed to undermine the stability and orderly progress of free societies. The Council expressed its support for cooperative endeavours to this effect.

The Council noted the report of the military advisers and commended the work of the Military Planning Office during the past year, in particular the excellent work done in keeping plans up-to-date and in designing military exercises.

The Council expressed its satisfaction at the progress achieved by the organization in programmes related to economic development, cultural affairs and medical research. It commended the efforts of the organization to keep these programmes under review to ensure that they proved complementary to programmes for counter-insurgency and civic action. The Council agreed that the value of these programmes has been fully demonstrated and that they deserve the active support of all members.

Pakistan

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PAKISTAN

The Pakistan delegate wished it to be recorded that he did not participate in the drafting of the communique and that the views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect the position of the Government of Pakistan.

NEXT MEETING

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Government of the Philippines to hold its Fifteenth Meeting in the Philippines in 1970.

EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE

The Council expressed gratitude to the Royal Thai Government and the people of Thailand for their generous hospitality and warm welcome, and its appreciation for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

LEADERS OF DELEGATIONS

All member governments, except France, participated. The Republic of Viet-Nam, a protocol state, was represented by an observer.

The leaders of the delegations to the Fourteenth Council Meeting were:

AUSTRALIA	Honorable Gordon Freeth, M.P. Minister for External Affairs
NEW ZEALAND	Right Honorable Keith Holyoake, C.H., M.P. Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs.
PAKISTAN	H.E. Mr. M. Hayat Junejo, Ambassador to Thailand
PHILIPPINES	H.E. General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
THAILAND	H.E. Mr. Thanat Khoman Minister of Foreign Affairs.
UNITED KINGDOM	Right Honorable Lord Shepherd P.C., Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
UNITED STATES	Honorable William P. Rogers Secretary of State.
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (Observer)	H.E. Mr. Tran Chanh Thanh Minister of Foreign Affairs

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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DOD/ISA-LT COL BAXLEY
WHITE HOUSE MR SNEIDER
S/S MR BROWN
EA/RA MR FRIEDMAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 076647

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: US-ROK DEFENSE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

REF: WH 9653-SECTO 12

1. IN RESPONSE TO ROK PROPOSAL, DECISION TO HOLD ANNUAL MEETINGS AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL BETWEEN US AND ROK DEFENSE MINISTRIES "TO DISCUSS AND CONSULT ON DEFENSE AND SECURITY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST AND COMMON CONCERN" WAS MADE DURING COURSE OF VANCE MISSION TO ROK SHORTLY AFTER SEIZURE OF PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE RAID. DECISION WAS ANNOUNCED IN KOREAN-US JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 15, 1968.

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2. FIRST ANNUAL MEETING WAS HELD IN WASHINGTON MAY 27-28, 1968. ROK MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOI YONG-HUI AND DEPUTY SECRETARY PAUL NITZE PARTICIPATED. TO MOLLIFY ROKS, WHO HAD HOPED THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD WOULD PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE, LATTER HAD PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH CHOI. FROM US VIEWPOINT 1968 MEETING WAS PRIMARLY MEANS OF REASSURING ROKS IN WAKE OF PUEBLO AND BLUE HOUSE RAID. NITZE SAID AT TIME THAT SUCH MEETINGS ARE FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND WILL NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTITUTE FOR NORMAL DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS.

3. MEETING WILL BE HELD IN SEOUL JUNE 3-4 WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY PACKARD REPRESENTING US ON MINISTERIAL LEVEL. PACKARD'S PARTY WILL INCLUDE: RADM TAZEWELL T. SHEPARD (ASD/ISA), RICHARD G. CAPEN, JR., (ASD/PA), LT. GEN. FERDINAND T. UNGER (JOINT STAFF REPRESENTATIVE), RICHARD B PETERS (STATE REPRESENTATIVE), AND CAPT. (USN) JAMES B. WILSON (MILITARY ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY SECRETARY).

4. TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING NOW BEING PREPARED BY DOD. FOLLOWING IS TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE.

A. ROK BRIEFING ON NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND CAPABILITIES (CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL) TO INCLUDE CHICOM REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES: DISCUSSION, INCLUDING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AREA.

B. BREIFING ON CAPABILITIES OF ROKF TO MEET THREAT, INCLUDING ACTIVE FORCES, RESERVE FORCES, HOMELAND DEFENSE RESERVE FORCES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

C. USFK BRIEFING ON CURRENT STATUS OF US FORCES IN KOREA.

D. BRIEFING BY WASHINGTON MEMBERS OF GROUP ON VIET-NAM SITUATION AND ON CHICOM THREAT.

E. DISCUSSION OF STATUS, FUTURE, AND ROLE OF US AND ROK FORCES IN VIET-NAM IN POST-HOSTILITIES SITUATION.

F. USFK BRIEFING ON INCREASING O&M COSTS OF ROK FORCES.

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G. ROK BRIEFING ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

H. DISCUSSION OF MAP FUNDING.

I. DISCUSSION ON FUTURE OF FREE WORLD AND US IDEAS AND CONCEPTS FOR SECURITY OF FREE ASIA.

4. TALKING POINTS COVERING ITEMS E, G, AND I ARE INCLUDED IN BILATERAL TALKING PAPER FOR SEVEN-NATION MEETING. SUGGEST THAT IF CHOE RAISES OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO DEFENSE MATTERS, HE BE INFORMED THAT BETTER FORUM FOR DISUCSSION THESE SUBJECTS IS FORTHCOMING DEFENSE MINISTRIES MEETING. RICHARDSON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 140408Z

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S E C R E T EXDIS WH9650
FROM MCCLOSKEY ABOARD SAM 86971
SECTO 7
REF BANGKOK 6055
BANGKOK 6053
BANGKOK 5973

I APPRECIATE NATURE OF PROBLEM YOU HAVE ENCOUNTERED WITH THANAT AND WITH THAI SENSITIVITIES ABOUT DRAFT TCC COMMUNIQUE. IN VIEW OF THESE AND YOUR STRONG POSITIVE RECOMMENDATION, I AGREE TO ACCEPT THANAT'S BREAKFAST INVITATION FOR MAY 21 AND WOULD HOPE THAT I CAN SET MOST OF HIS CONCERNS AT REST DURING THAT SESSION. I AM COUNTING ON YOU TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR THIS MEETING, BUT AM SURE YOU REALIZE THAT WE CAN NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE THANAT FULL SATISFACTION

PAGE 2 RUEADWW 1161 S E C R E T EXDIS
ON ALL HIS DESIRES, AS WE WANT TO PRESERVE A COMMUNIQUE POINTING TOWARD PEACE AND AVOIDING AS MUCH HARSH LANGUAGE AS POSSIBLE.

2. AS FOR THE COMMUNIQUE, YOU CAN TELL THAIS WE CAN OF COURSE ACCEPT A NUMBER OF THEIR PROPOSALS, INCLUDING SUCH THINGS AS THE MENTION OF THEIR TROOP AUGMENTATION AND THE REJECTION OF AN IMPOSED COALITION AND ASSURE THEM WE WANT TO BE COOPERATIVE AND BELIEVE AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WITHOUT TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY. HOWEVER (REF 5973) WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT FURTHER EFFORT TOWARDS DETAILED NEGOTIATION OF LANGUAGE BE DEFERRED UNTIL OUR ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK. WE WILL, IN THE MEANTIME, HAVE WORKED OUT SOME UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN SAIGON. ALSO, WE ASSUME THAT DEPT.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

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WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATIVES.

3. I WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER OUR ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR, BIRABHONGSE, FREEMAN MATTHEWS AND GEORGE ALDRICH MEET IN A WORKING AND DRAFTING SESSION TO TACKLE AN AGREED VERSION OF OUR DIVERGENT TEXTS. IF WE CAN ENTER THE TCC MEETINGS WITH AS COMPATIBLE CONDITIONS AS POSSIBLE, IT WILL, I AM SURE, IMPROVE

PAGE 3 RUEADWW 1161 S E C R E T EXDIS
THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES AND WILL CERTAINLY EASE YOUR BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH THANAT.
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

STATE 076253

NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS

SUBJ: Seven-Nation Meeting - Withdrawals

REF: Saigon 9313

Your assumption is correct, and we have no objection to having GVN provide withdrawal paper to Foreign Ministers of TCC countries in their capitals just before Bangkok meeting, preferably not before Friday, May 16, Saigon time.

GP-1

END

RICHARDSON

Drafted by: EA:HIsham:pb 5/14/69 | Tel. Ext. 2831 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Mr. Green

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh

SECRET

Classification

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1. Sent by: DEPT OF STATE

2. TO: WH.
(Msg. No.) 345
'69 MAY 8 AM 11:08

3. Transmitted by: B P Bell
Date & Time: 11 06

4. Received by:
Date & Time:

5. Description: Tel to Saigon re Seven Nation Meeting

6. Clsfn & Controls: TOP SECRET/NODIS

7. No. of Pgs. 2 8. Precedence IMM 9. Validated by: RLBrown

10. Deliver to: Dr. Kissinger
The White House

ATTN: Mr. Sneider

For: Clearance XX

Information

Per Request

Sneider - cleared.

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BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

UTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

CATE: ☐ COLLECT
ARGE TO

TOP SECRET
Classification

'69 MAY 8 AM 11:08

FOR OCT USE ONLY

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

SUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting

1. We have been considering how we should handle question of US troop reductions (in context of President's three points in his April 18 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are concerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we may say on this subject, especially in light of excited press speculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be put in its proper light if the GVN were to take the lead in noting the prospects for such reductions in the context of increased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence in their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh could include a statement along those lines in his prepared remarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support from General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on which to hang his own remarks on the subject.

ted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA/VN:HFMatthews Jr./fmlc 5/7/69	8731	EA - William H. Sullivan

C-Ambassador Pedersen EA/VN-Mr. Burke S/S- Mr. Brown

WH-

TOP SECRET

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TGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

TE: ☐ COLLECT
SE TO

TOP SECRET
Classification

ACTION:

PAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE

2. If you concur that it would be useful and feasible, could you explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with Thieu and Thanh?

GP-1.

END

by:

Tel. Tel.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET

Classification

072654

9 MAY 69 00 012

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Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE 072654

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

SUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting

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Drafted by: EA/VN:HFMatthewsJr./fmlc 5/7/69 | Tel. Ext. 8731 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - William H. Sullivan

Clearances:

C-Ambassador Pedersen EA/VN-Mr. Burke S/S- Mr. Gleysteen

WH-Mr. Sneider

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FORM DS-322
8-65

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

TOP SECRET
Classification

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Origin

Info:

ACTION:

PAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE

2. If you concur that it would be useful and feasible, could you explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with Thieu and Thanh?

GP-1.

END

ROGERS

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

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FORM DS-322
8-65

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 791

PAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 01 OF 03 151227Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01,/032 W
---------- 019255

P R 151125Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3974

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 9433

EXDIS

SECTO 17

SUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER

A. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH HAS REQUESTED, AND WE HAVE AGREED, THAT IN INTEREST OF SPEED, EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY, OUR COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES SHOULD BE USED TO HELP GVN REPRESENTATIVES IN TCC CAPITALS DISTRIBUTE TEXT OF US/GVN PAPER ON WITHDRAWALS TO HOST GOVERNMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT WELLINGTON) SHOULD GIVE TEXT OF PAPER TO THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE, REFERRING TO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE EITHER HAS RECEIVED FROM GVN OR WILL SHORTLY RECEIVE, TO PRESENT IT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE MINISTER'S DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. PAPER WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE. THE IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY SHOULD BE STRESSED.

B. AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON SHOULD PRESENT THE PAPER TO FOREIGN MINISTER ON BEHALF OF THE GVN, POINTING OUT THAT THIS IS AN AGREED GVN/US PAPER AND WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE.

C. TEXT OF PAPER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES

1. BASIC OBJECTIVES

OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES IN THE MATTER OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE:

(A) TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES AND OTHER ELEMENTS FROM NORTH VIET NAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA AT ANY TIME:

(B) TO INSURE THAT SUCH PERSONNEL RETURN ALL THE WAY TO NORTH VIET NAM:

(C) TO GET ADEQUATE ASSURANCE, THROUGH VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION MACHINERY, THROUGH THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT(FOOTNOTE), AND THROUGH OUR OWN RESOURCES, THAT HANOI COMPLIES WITH THE CONDITIONS WE HAVE SPECIFIED FOR AGREED MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS.
(FOOTNOTE) FOR EXPLANATION OF THE TERM "MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT", SEE THE SUGGESTED POSITION FOR ITEM 6.

2. DEFINITION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL

WE SHOULD INSIST, IN PRINCIPLE, UPON THE WITHDRAWAL TO NORTH VIET NAM OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES, NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS SERVING IN NOMINALLY VIET CONG UNITS, AND ALL OTHER PERSONNEL (E.G., REGROUPEES) INFILTRATED FROM NORTH VIET NAM INTO THE SOUTH AT ANY TIME, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING THE EFFORT TO SEIZE CONTROL OF SOUTH VIET NAM.

IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT WE WILL BE ABLE, EVEN WITH A SUPERVISORY ORGANIZATION, TO IDENTIFY ALL POLITICAL AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS INTRODUCED FROM THE NORTH. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF NATIVE SOUTHERNERS. YET, DESPITE THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES, IT SEEMS WISE TO PUT FORWARD A FIRM POSITION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. DEFINITION OF US AND ALLIED FORCES AND ELEMENTS SUBJECT OT WITHDRAWAL

WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW ALL COMBAT FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET NAM IF HANOI MEETS SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF A MUTUAL

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WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. THESE CONDITIONS SHOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR:

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 871

PAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, FILE 01, /032 W
019707

P R 151125Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3975

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 9433

EXDIS

(A) VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF WITHDRAWAL.

(B) THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AS WELL AS FROM SOUTH VIET NAM.

(C) MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT. OBVIOUSLY EACH OF THESE CONDITIONS, AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY WILL BE ATTAINABLE, REQUIRES DISCUSSION. ONE QUESTION CONCERNS THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "MILITARY FORCES". WE WILL HAVE AN INTEREST IN NOT FORECLOSING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES, IF THIS IS THE DESIRE OF THE GVN. THESE CATEGORIES MIGHT INCLUDE US MILITARY ADVISORY AND LOGISTIC PERSONNEL. YET WE MUST BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND ALLIED COMBAT FORCES AND UNITS IF HANOI COMPLIES WITH THE AGREED CONDITIONS.

4. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ANY INITIATION OF US AND ALLIED WITHDRAWAL

WE WOULD BEGIN PHASE-OUT OF US AND ALLIED FORCES AS NORTH VIET NAM BEGINS ITS WITHDRAWALS AND THE FLOW OF NEW MANPOWER HAS CEASED.

WITH RESPECT TO THE LEVEL OF VOLENCE, REMOVAL OF THE NORTH

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VIETNAMESE SHOULD LOWER THE VIET CONG CAPABILITY FOR VIOLENCE. THUS, WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF VOLENCE IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE INITIATION OF WITHDRAWALS, FAILURE TO REALIZE A REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE AFTER WITHDRAWAL HAD APPARENTLY BEEN BEGUN WOULD BE A STRONG INDICATION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE NOT CARRYING THROUGH THE WITHDRAWAL IN GOOD FAITH.

5. ELEMENTS OF AN AGREED WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE: INITIATION, PHASING, AND COMPLETION

WE WOULD INDICATE IN PARIS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK OUT A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE THAT COULD INCLUDE

(A) PHASING OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS ON EACH SIDE,

(B) SIMULTANEOUS INITIATION OF THE FIRST INCREMENTS OF WITHDRAWAL,

(C) A COMPLETION SCHEDULE UNDER WHICH NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS WOULD BE FULLY WITHDRAWN BEFORE WE WERE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE OUR WITHDRAWALS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE TIMING OF THE COMPLETION OF OUR WITHDRAWAL, SINCE WE CAN DETERMINE IF HANOI HAS FULLY MET THE CONDITIONS OF THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT. THE KEY POINT WILL NOT BE THE TIMETABLE BUT RATHER GETTING HANOI TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL.

6. SUBSEQUENT CONDITIONS AFFECTING PHASING AND COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWALS

WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR, AT AN APPROPRIATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT WE COULD NOT CARRY THROUGH OUR WITHDRAWALS, WHATEVER THE TIMETABLE, IF THE TOTAL PATTERN OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIONS INDICATED THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT BEING CARRIED THROUGH IN GOOD FAITH.

MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE AGREEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE REQUIRED ASSURANCE THROUGH VERIFICATION THAT FORCES AND ELEMENTS WERE BEING AND HAD BEEN REMOVED TO THE NORTH AND THAT INFILTRATION HAD CEASED, BUT SUCH ELEMENTS AS RESPECT FOR THE DMZ, ABSENCE OF INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON MAJOR CITIES, AND

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 09433 02 OF 03 151345Z

ABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON US AND ALLIED FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN OR BEING DEPLOYED FOR WITHDRAWAL.

7. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS AND PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

THE ISSUE HAS TWO ASPECTS:

ON THE ONE HAND, WE SEE NO REASON WHY WE NEED TO ESTABLISH ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWALS AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD EXPECT AT LEAST INITIALLY TO PRESS THE ISSUE OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT OURSELVES RAISING THE QUESTION OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. OBVIOUSLY, IF WE COULD OBTAIN AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWALS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE SITUATION WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GVN. THEORETICALLY, ONE CAN ENVISAGE WITHDRAWALS TAKING PLACE INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AMONG THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT IS UNLIKELY THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON A MUTUAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THERE IS ALSO A LINK IN THE SENSE THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPECT TO CARRY WITHDRAWALS TO COMPLETION IF THE TOTAL PICTURE -- INCLUDING THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT REACHED IN NEGOTIATIONS -- GAVE US GROUND FOR SERIOUS DOUBT CONCERNING HANOI'S INTENTIONS. WE WOULD THUS, FOR INSTANCE, EXPECT TO MAKE A CONTINUING JUDGMENT OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF HANOI'S INTENT TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL SPECIFIED IN 6 ABOVE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 161

PAGE 01 SAIGON 09433 03 OF 03 151316Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,FILE 01,/032 W
020980

P R 151125Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3976

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 9433

EXDIS

8. THE RELATED ISSUE OF WITHDRAWALS FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS, WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE EVER IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

AS ALREADY NOTED, WE WOULD INSIST THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIET NAM BE WITHDRAWN ALL THE WAY TO NORTH VIET NAM. THIS WOULD INVOLVE REMOVAL OF SUCH FORCES AND ELEMENTS FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

AS WE TAKE THESE POSITIONS IN PRINCIPLE, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT -- IN TERMS OF DESIRED NEGOTIATING RESULTS -- OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS FROM SOUTH VIET NAM AND CAMBODIA ALL THE WAY TO THE NORTH. OUR SECOND PRIORITY IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THOSE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS IN LAOS, CHIEFLY IN THE PANHANDLE, WHICH OPERATE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET NAM. OUR THIRD PRIORITY, IN TERMS OF TIMING, IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF OF OTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AND ELEMENTS -- FOR EXAMPLE IN THE MORE REMOTE AREAS OF LAOS. IN THE END, WE AIM TO ACHIEVE ALL THREE OBJECTIVES, BUT IT MAY BECOME DESIRABLE, IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, TO ATTACK THEM SEPARATELY AND IN THEIR ORDER OF PRIORITIES.

ALLTHREE CATEGORIES WOULD, OF COURSE, BE COVERED BY THE

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POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE THAT WE WOULD TAKE FROM THE OUTSET.

9. VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION

AS ALREADY NOTED, WE WOULD INSIST FROM THE OUTSET THAT AGREED WITHDRAWALS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISON.

IN THE OPENING STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO LEAVE OPEN HOW VERIFICATION WOULD BE CONDUCTED. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT WE TAKE THE CLEAR POSITION IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE MUST BE COMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT AGREED WITHDRAWALS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT.

WHILE THUS DEFERRING DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON THE MECHANISMS, WE WOULD EXPECT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT OUR ULTIMATE REQUIREMENT EXTENDS NOT ONLY TO VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, BUT TO ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD NOT IN THE FUTURE BE INFILTRATION OR ANY RENEWED AGGRESSION FROM NORTH VIET NAM AGAINST SOUTH VIET NAM, LAOS, OR CAMBODIA.

10. POSSIBLE UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS OR WITHDRAWALS, INCLUDING OUR RESPONSE TO ANY UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS BY THE OTHER SIDE

THIS IS A QUESTION OF OUR OWN ACTIONS, RATHER THAN ANY INITIAL STATEMENTS OF POSITION IN PARIS.

US AND ALLIED FORCE REDUCTIONS MAY BE CARRIED OUT AT ANY TIME, ON THE BASIS OF FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN AND AN OVER-ALL JUDGMENT OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE EFFECT ON OUR NEGOTIATING POSTURE.

IN ADDITION, IF THERE SHOULD BE UNILATERAL NORTH VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWALS TO NORTH VIET NAM, WE WOULD CONSIDER EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN EXPRESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND CONFIRMATION OF SUCH WITHDRAWALS, AND WOULD THEN CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCAL US AND ALLIED WITHDRAWALS IN ADVANCE OF ANY AGREEMENT ON THE SUBJECT. ANY SUCH DECISIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WOULD OF COURSE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MILITARY AND OVER-ALL SITUATION EXISTING AT THE TIME.

END TEXT. ROGERS

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AMEMBASSY SAIGON
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3923
FO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 9362

DIS

BJ: VIETNAMESE DRAFT SEVEN NATION COMMUNIQUE

FONMIN MAY 14 GAVE US VIETNAMESE DRAFT OF SEVEN NATION
MMUNIQUE EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD BASED HIMSELF ON OUR
NGUAGE, INCORPORTATED A FEW PORTIONS OF THE THAI DRAFT,
D ADDED SOME IDEAS OF THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES.

SECRETARY'S PARTY HAS MEANWHILE PREPARED REVISED DRAFT OF
XT CONTAINED IN STATE 73981 TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SAIGON COM-
NTS AND THOSE OF THAIS. WE WILL BE WORKING WITH VIETNAMESE
RING VISIT TO REACH A CONSENSUS ON A NEW DRAFT BEFORE
CRETARY'S DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. BANGKOK SHOULD TAKE NO
RTHER ACTION WITH THAIS UNTIL THIS IS DONE.

TEXT OF VIETNAMESE DRAFT FOLLOWS. IN CASES WHERE THE VIET-
MESE TEXT IS THE SAME AS THAT FORWARDED IN STATE 73981 WE
VE SO INDICATED.

1. SAME AS DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.

2. SAME AS DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.

3. SITUATION IN VIET NAM. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM DESCRIBED THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
ICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN HIS COUNTRY OVER THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS.
NOTED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ELECTED
STITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE CENSORATE
LLED FOR BY THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED

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THE CURRENT EFFORTS OF VIETNAMESE NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES TO UNITE THEMSELVES TO FURTHER THEIR COMMON GOALS. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

4. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM ALSO OUTLINED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE AND TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF HIS COUNTRYMEN AND TO BRING THEM GREATER SOCIAL BEMEFITS, MAKING PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S NEW LAND REFORM PROGRAM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY. HE DESCRIBED THE INCREASED AUTONOMY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES GIVEN TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO FOSTER A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE. HE UNDERLINED THE TREMENDOUS SUCCESS OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM WHICH ENABLES THE ELECTION OF VILLAGE COUNCILS AND HAMLET CHIEFS. HE OUTLINED THE HOUSING PROJECT IMPLEMENTED IN VARIOUS CITIES IN ORDER TO RESETTLE THE VICTIMS OF COMMUNIST INDISCRIMINATE SHELLINGS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN SPITE OF THE DESTRUCTIONS OF WAR, PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION HAD PROGRESSED AT AN EXTRAORDINARY RATE. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FURTHER INDICATED THAT THE OPEN ARMS POLICY HAD BROUGHT FRUITFUL AND SPLENDID RESULTS WITH THE EVER INCREASING NUMBER OF COMMUNIST CADRES AND OFFICERS RALLYING BACK TO THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY. SO FAR OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND RETURNEES HAVE AVAILED THEMSELVES OF THE POLICY TO ENJOY BETTER LIFE.

5. THE MINISTERS HEARD A STATEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THEY ENDORSED THE REASONABLE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN-VAN-THIEU ON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH AND RESPONSIVENESS OF THE GOVERNEMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THE MINISTERS WELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE COMMUNISTS.

6. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS REAFFIRMED THEIR CONVICTION THAT A BROADLY-BASED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONSOLIDATION. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS CALLED FOR ABOLITION OF THE PRESENT

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NSTITUTION, OF THE ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OF THE
VERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AS WELL. THE MINISTERS
ALIZED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE INTRANSIGENT
D UNREALISTIC IN THEIR DEMANDS. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT,
THE LIGHT OF THE EXPANSIONIST POLICY, THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC
VIET NAM MUST BE ASSURED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN
TURE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES WITHOUT
THER EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE OR TERRORIST PRESSURE. THE
POSITION OF ANY FORM OF GOVERNEMENT, INCLUDING THE SPURIOUS
OALITION' ADVOCATED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE
TH THIS PRINCIPLE. AGGRESSION MUST NOT BE REWARDED.

7. THE MINISTERS RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY
TUATION FROM VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS
D WERE ENCOURAGED AT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY ALLIED FORCES
D THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE.
ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNISTS TO
HIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL UPRISING AND OF PRODUCING
IMPACT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION BY DEMONSTRATING THEIR
FENSIVE CAPABILITIES SHOULD CONVINCE THEM AS WELL AS OTHERS
THEIR INABILITY TO GAIN A VICTORY BY MILITARY MEANS. THE
NISTERS ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MODERNIZE AND
PROVE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND WELCOMED THEIR
TERMINATION TO ASSURE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEFENSE
THEIR HOMELAND. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION
D GRATITUDE FOR THE COURAGE AND THE DEVOTION OF THE ALLIED
LDIERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THEY ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION
E INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF THE FIGHTING FORCE CONTRIBUTED BY
AILAND DURING RECENT MONTHS TO THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC
VIET NAM AND THE SAFEGUARD OF FREEDOM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.
NKER

SECRET EXDIS

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SECRET EXDIS HCE821

GE Ø1 SAIGON Ø9362 Ø2 OF Ø2 141445Z

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WHCA

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1969 MAY 14 15 23Z

TO OCT Ø1,CCO ØØ,SSO ØØ,NSCE ØØ,/Ø31 W

Ø12224

R 141340Z MAY 69 ZFF-4
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3924
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 9362

DIS

8. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE IN VIET NAM HELP DEFEND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION. EY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE PEOPLE THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM HAVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT TO LF-DETERMINATION. THE MINISTERS RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST GRESSION AND SUBVERSION, AND ACCORDINGLY TO CONTINUE THEIR PPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THE PORTANCE OF THIS SUPPORT WILL BE IN CORRELATION WITH THE OGRESS OF THE PARIS MEETINS, THE LEVEL OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS THE ENEMY, AND THE READINESS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PUBLIC OF VIET NAM TO TAKE OVER A MAJOR PART OF THE DEFENSE.

9. THE MINISTERS ALSO REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN PARIS AND ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS CH HAD BEEN MADE THERE BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC VIET NAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY NOTED AND APPROVED INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE LING WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND NORTH VIETNAMESE CES IN THE FORM PRESENTED TO THE MINISTERS BY THE REPUBLIC VIET NAM AND U.S. DELEGATIONS. THEY AGREED THAT ALL ERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN ONLY FROM SOUTH VIET NAM BUT ALSO FROM THE SANCTUARIES IN BODIA AND LAOS AND SPECIFICALLY ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, THAT A CLEAR NEED EXISTED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND THE CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION NEW FORCES.

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10. THE MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE U.S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, THE REALEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

11. THEY EXAMINED THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED IN PARIS BY THE COMMUNIST SIDE. THEY REGRET THAT IT STILL APPEARS TO BE THEIR OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE UPON THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM A PROGRAM AND A SYSTEM WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE. THEY ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND THE U.S. IN EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES LEADING TO PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THEY AGREED THAT THE ALLIED NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

12. SAME AS NUMBER ELEVEN IN DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT.

13. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A GUARANTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN VIET NAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL BEING WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING NOT ONLY IN VIET NAM, BUT ALSO IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATIONS AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION.

14. SAME AS NUMBER THIRTEEN IN DEPARTMENT'S DRAFT

15. THE MINISTERS PLEDGED THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESERVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY BY DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL MEANS AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE MINISTERS STATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS GOAL WHILE PURSUING WITH EQUAL INSISTENCE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. FINALLY, THE MINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUED THE CLOSE COORDINATION AND

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CONSULTATION WHICH HAVE EXISTED AMONG THE SEVEN NATIONS.
BUNKER

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

WH 6

3079Q
1969 MAY 14 AM 4:11

P 140736Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3883
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T SAIGON 9313

NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS

SUBJ: SEVEN-NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS

REF: A) SAIGON 9084; B) SAIGON 9174

1. FOREIGN MINISTER IS PRESSING US FOR REPLY REGARDING DISSEMINATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS PAPER TO TCC'S PRIOR TO MEETING.

2. ON ASSUMPTION DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION, AND THAT MODIFICATIONS REF B SHOULD MAKE THE PAPER MORE READILY ACCEPTABLE, WE PLAN TO GIVE THANH THE GREEN LIGHT TOMORROW MORNING MAY 15 UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE. BUNKER
BT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 161

PAGE 01 SAIGON 09177 121344Z

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44
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/031 W
---------- 127140

O P 121230Z MAY 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3781
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
CINCPAC

S E C R E T SAIGON 9177

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE

REF: STATE 073981

1. WE PRESENTED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TRANSMITTED REFTEL TO THANH MAY 12 WITH REQUEST FOR HIS EARLY COMMENTS, WHICH HE PROMISED FOR TOMORROW MORNING, MAY 13. MEANWHILE, WE OURSELVES HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION:

2. IN FINAL SENTENCE PARA 3, WE SUGGEST THAT MINISTERS EXPRESS THEIR "GRATIFICATION" RATHER THAN "SATISFACTION", AS FORMER CARRIES LESS OF AN IMPLICATION OF THE TCC'S SITTING IN JUDGMENT OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF THE GVN.

3. THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA FIVE PRAISES THIEU'S STATEMENTS FOR THINGS WE SHOULD TAKE FOR GRANTED - THEIR "REASONABLE NATURE" AND "GOOD FAITH" - AND IMPLIES, THROUGH USE OF THE WORD "RESPONSIVENESS", THAT THESE WERE THE RESULT OF ENEMY INITIATIVE OR ALLIED PRESSURE. WE SUGGEST THAT THE SENTENCE BE RE-WORDED AS FOLLOWS - "THEY ENDORSED THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE IMAGINATIVE THINKING AND SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM".

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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4. WE SUGGEST BREAKING THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA SIX INTO TWO SENTENCES, PLACING A PERIOD AFTER "BY ALLIED FORCES" AND CONTINUING "THEY NOTED THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE", IN ORDER TO AVOID STATING THAT WE ARE "ENCOURAGED" BY SUCH DIFFICULTIES.

5. WE RECOMMEND RE-PHRASING THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 7 TO READ "THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBUECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE." IN THE NEXT SENTENCE IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SAY "THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR DETERMINATION" THAN "THEY RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION" WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST THAT IT HAD BEEN FLAGGING.

6. THE FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 8 COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLY THAT THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR "SIMULTANEOUS" WITHDRAWALS, ETC. WE SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT THIS SENTENCE COMMENCE SIMPLY "THEY AGREED THAT THESE WITHDRAWALS COULD COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY..." WE WOULD ALSO SUGGEST DELETION OF THE WORK "FURTHER" IN THE PHRASE "CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF NEW FORCES" AT THE END OF THE SENTENCE.

7. PARAGRAPH 12 GIVES US SOME TROUBLE IN THAT IT SEEMS TO ENVISAGE PLACING VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES - "A GUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD" AND "THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING" - ON THE "ASIAN POWERS" WHICH ARE CERTAINLY A MIXED BAG AND NOT NECESSARILY CAPABLE OF DISCHARGING SUCH FAR-REACHING FUNCTIONS. WE THINK IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO KEEP THE MATTER MORE LIMITED AT THIS STAGE, FOCUSSING ON ASSOCIATING THE ASIAN POWERS WITH MEASURES TO ASSURE PEACE AND HAVING THEM ASSUME SOME OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING A SETTLEMENT EFFECTIVE. WE WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING WORDING FOR THIS PARA:

8. "THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN MEASURES TO ASSURE PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF CERTAIN DUTIES

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 09177 121344Z

IN CONNECTION WITH A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN VIET-NAM, AND IN CONNECTION WITH MAINTAINING THE PEACE ALSO IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION." BUNKER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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8

P 121222Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3783
STATE GRNC
RT
S E C R E T SAIGON 9174

2554Q

1969 MAY 12 AM 11 22

NODIS PARIS MEETINGS PLUS

SUBJ: SEVEN NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS

REF: A. SAIGON 9084
B. SAIGON 7910

1. FONMIN THANH ASKED AGAIN WHETHER WE AGREE WITH HIS SUGGESTION (PARA 3 REF A) THAT THE PAPER ON WITHDRAWALS BE CIRCULATED TO THE RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. WE SAID WE EXPECTED INSTRUCTIONS VERY SOON. PROBABLY TOMORROW.

2. OUR MODIFICATIONS TO THE PAPER TRANSMITTED IN REF B ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. DELETE FIRST SENTENCE OF SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 2 - "THIS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE REQUIRES DISCUSSION AMONG US IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS."

B. DELETE SECOND SENTENCE IN SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 9 - "THESE ARE COMPLEX ISSUES AND WILL REQUIRE CONTINUING CONSULTATION AS THE NED FOR A FIRMER POSITION ARISES."

C. SUBSTITUTE "ANY RENEWED AGGRESSION FROM NORTH VIET-NAM" FOR "ANY THREAT FROM NORTH VIET-NAM" AT THE END OF THE THIRD PARA UNDER ITEM 9. (THIS CHANGE SEEMS TO US TO BRING OUR PAPER MORE NEARLY IN LINE WITH THE ACTUAL US POSITION ON THIS POINT.)

D. DELETE "AS WE HAVE ALREADY AGREED" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 10.

E. DELETE THE PHRASE " IN FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN" FROM THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE THIRD PARA UNDER ITEM 10.

3. DEPARTMENT PLEASE ADVISE BY MORNING MAY 13, SAIGON TIME, IF THERE ARE ANY OBJECTIONS TO THESE MODIFICATIONS AND IF US CONCURS QITH GVN PLAN TO COMMUNICATE THE PAPER TO TCC GOVERNMENTS IN ADVANCE OF THE BANGKOK MEETING. BUNKER
RT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

R 101000Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3715
STATE GRNC
BT
T O P S E C R E T SAIGON 9084

2 3 7 8 Q
1969 MAY 10 AM 8 38

NODIS

SUBJ: SEVEN-NATION MEETING - WITHDRAWALS

REF: A) SAIGON 9008; B) SAIGON 7910

1. FOLLOWING UP ON MY TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY (REF A) FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED THIS MORNING TO RAISE A TACTICAL QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE TABLING OF OUR AGREED WITHDRAWAL PAPER IN BANGKOK.

2. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM A REPORT OF BUI DIEM THAT DEPARTMENT CONTEMPLATES THE GVN TABLING OUR PAPER AT THE MEETING, BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS FAIR TO THE TCC FOREIGN MINISTERS WHO MIGHT HAVE TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENTS BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE THEIR ENDORSEMENT. ALSO, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF COURTESY WHETHER THEY SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TIME TO STUDY A DOCUMENT OF SUCH IMPORTANCE.

3. ACCORDINGLY, THANH MADE THE SUGGESTION, WITH WHICH I AGREE, THAT IT MIGHT BE WISER FOR THE GVN TO HAND THE PAPER TO THE RESPECTIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THEIR CAPITALS TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE THE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR BANGKOK. PLEASE ADVISE.

4. WE ARE HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE WITHDRAWAL PAPER AS PER REF B WITH A VIEW TO MAKING IT MORE SUITABLE FOR PRESENTATION TO THE TCC'S. FOR INSTANCE, THE SECOND PARA UNDER ITEM 2 STARTS WITH THESENTENCE "THIS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE REQUIRES DISCUSSION AMONG US IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN PRACTICAL PROBLEMS." THIS WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR THE SUPPORTING REMARKS THAT I MADE AT THE CONSULTATION MEETING; BUT IF WE GIVE THE DOCUMENT IN THIS FORM TO THE TCC'S THEY MIGHT INTERPRET SUCH A SENTENCE AS INVITING DISCUSSION AT THE SEVEN-NATION MEETING. ASSUME DEPT HAS NO OBJECTION TO SUCH REVISIONS, WHICH WE INTEND TO TELEGRAPH FOR DEPT'S INFORMATION. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. DEPT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO BANGKOK. BUNKER
BT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 289

PAGE 01 SAIGON 09011 091336Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01 /031 W

112792

R 091235Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3670
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

S E C R E T SAIGON 9011

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING - DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

REF: A) STATE 71864; B) STATE 66205

IN ACCORDANCE PARA 3 REF A, WE HANDED FOREIGN MINISTER THANH MAY 9 THE THAI DRAFT AND THE DEPARTMENT'S OUTLINE, REQUESTING HIS SUPPORT IN EFFORTS TO HAVE THE THAIS MODIFY THEIR DRAFT SO THAT IT WILL CORRESPOND MORE TO APPROACH IN REF B. THANH PROMISED TO STUDY THE MATTER AND SEEMED AMENABLE TO THE IDEA OF SUBSTITUTING A US DRAFT FOR THE THAI DRAFT IF THIS IS WHAT WE DESIRE.
BUNKER

SECRET
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

CN: 2035Q
RECD: 09 MAY 69
447AM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
69 MAY 9 AM 8:33

O 090800Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3627
STATE GRNC
BT
T O P S E C R E T SAIGON 8983

NODIS

SUBJ: SEVEN NATION MEETING

REF: STATE 072654

I THINK SUGGESTION CONTAINED REFTEL FOR HANDLING QUESTION OF U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS AT THE TCC MEETING EXCELLENT. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD APPEAL TO THIEU AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO WORK OUT SCENARIO WITH HIM AND THANH ACCORDINGLY. BUNKER
BT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 348

PAGE 01 STATE 071864

85
ORIGIN SS 30

02

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 R

66638
DRAFTED BY: EA/VN: HFMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY: EA: WILLIAM SULLIVAN
C: AMBASSADOR PEDERSEN (SUBS)
EA/VN: MR. BURKE
S/S: MR. GLEYSTEEN

101230

O 080052Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

S E C R E T STATE 071864

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING - DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

REF: A. BANGKOK 5638
B. STATE 66205

1. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH TEXT THAI DRAFT PROVIDED REF A. THOUGH TOPICS FOR INCLUSION GENERALLY ACCORD WITH THOSE PROPOSED IN REF B. WE FIND TONE TO BELLIGERENT AND HARD-LINE, ESPECIALLY FROM POINT OF VIEW OF US DOMESTIC OPINION AND IN LIGHT OF THE STANCE WE HAVE TAKEN IN PARIS. WE BELIEVE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD GIVE IMPRESSION OF REASONABLENESS AND SINCERE AND DESIRE FOR PEACE, COUPLED WITH FIRMNESS IN OUR ADHERENCE TO BASIS PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES. IT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE ARE NOT PURSUING A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE WAR, BUT ARE CONTINUING TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY IN VIET-NAM WHILE SEEKING A JUST SOLUTION IN PARIS. IT SHOULD NOT THROW DOWN THE GAUNTLET TO THE ENEMY, BUT SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR FIRMNESS IN OUR DEDICATION TO REASONABLE OBJECTIVES. IN SUM, WE THINK THE THAI DRAFT NEEDS MAJOR REVISION AND THE QUESTION NOW IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 071864

2. WE BELIEVE EMBASSY BANGKOK SHOULD GO BACK TO THAIS AND, SAYING YOU ARE ACTING ON AN UNISTRUCTED BASIS, POINT OUT THAT THAI DRAFT DIFFERS IN MAJOR WAYS FROM DEPT'S EARLIER SUGGESTIONS; DRAW ON COMMENTS IN PARA 1 ABOVE AS IF THEY WERE YOUR OWN PRELIMINARY VIEWS; AND TRY TO BRING THAIS AROUND TOWARD OUR DESIRES.

3. SAIGON SHOULD SHOW THAI DRAFT TO THANH, EXPLAIN OUR PROBLEM WITH IT AS SET FORTH ABOVE, AND TRY TO GET HIS CONCURRENCE TO OUR SUGGESTED OUTLINE IN REF B.

4. MEANWHILE WE ARE PREPARING FULL DRAFT BASED ON REF B, PICKING UP WHAT WE CAN OF THAI DRAFT. THIS WILL BE CABLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS WHEN COMPLETED. WE WILL ALSO BE CONFERRING ON THIS WITH BUI DIEM, AND WITH AUSTRALIANS, NEW ZEALANDERS.

5. PLEASE PROCEED WITH ABOVE SCENARIO UNLESS YOU HAVE BETTER SUGGESTION ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THIS PROBLEM.

GP-3 ROGERS

SECRET

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LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

1. Sent by: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2. TO: [signature]
(Msg. No.) 345

'69 MAY 8 AM 11:08

3. Transmitted by: B D Blaby
Date & Time: 11 06

4. Received by: [signature]
Date & Time:

5. Description: Tel to Saigon re Seven Nation Meeting

6. Clsfn & Controls: TOP SECRET/NODIS

7. No. of Pgs. 2 8. Precedence IMM 9. Validated by: RLBrown

10. Deliver to: Dr. Kissinger
The White House

ATTN: Mr. Sneider

For: Clearance XX

Information

Per Request

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BEFORE T[illegible] TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Roo[illegible]243

UTGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

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TOP SECRET
Classification

'69 MAY 8 AM 11 08

FOR OCT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

SUBJECT: Seven Nation Meeting

1. We have been considering how we should handle question of US troop reductions (in context of President's three points in his April18 press conference) in the TCC Meeting. We are concerned that some of the TCC's will read too much into what we may say on this subject, especially in light of excited press speculation. It has occurred to us that the problem could be put in its proper light if the GVN were to take the lead in ~~discussing~~ noting the prospects for such reductions in the context of increased RVNAF capabilities and as a demonstration of confidence in their abilities to take on added responsibilities. If Thanh could include a statement along those lines in his prepared remarks at the TCC Conference, with perhaps additional support from General Du, the Secretary would have a very useful peg on which to hang his own remarks on the subject.

ed by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
EA/VN:HFMatthews Jr./fmlc 5/7/69	8731	EA - William H. Sullivan

ansmit:

C-Ambassador Pedersen EA/VN-Mr. Burke S/S- Mr. Brown

WH-

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CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ... ES
BEFORE THE ... GRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room ...

TGOING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

ATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

ACTION:

PAGE 2 to NODIS TELEGRAM TO SAIGON IMMEDIATE

2. If you concur that it would be useful and feasible, could you explore the possibility of setting up such a scenario with Thieu and Thanh?

GP-1.

END

ralled by: | Tel. Ext. | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

learances:

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

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23 APR 69 18 41Z

FOR OCI/T USE ONLY

Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

INFO: Amembassy BANGKOK
Amembassy CANBERRA
Amembassy MANILA
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy SEOUL
WELLINGTON

STATE 62693

NODIS

PARIS TODEL 2581

SUBJECT: Seven Nation Conference

1. At his initiative Ambassador Bui Diem called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan April 22. During the course of what was primarily a courtesy visit the Ambassador brought up the subject of the Secretary's forthcoming trip to Saigon and Bangkok for the SEATO/Seven Nation Conferences. He said that he expected to be returning to Saigon via Paris just before the Secretary's visit -- he now anticipates leaving Washington on or about May 7. He said that his Government was most interested in obtaining US views regarding the content of the Seven Nation Conference, particularly in view of the fact that this would

Drafted by: EA [illegible]:irke:aoa 4/22/69 | Tel. Ext. 4535 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - William H. Sullivan

Clearances: C - Mr. Pederson

S/S - Mr. [illegible]Walsh

SECRET
Classification

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FORM DS-322
8-65

be the first such meeting since the Paris talks began. He assumes that the other troop contributing countries will be interested in discussing problems connected with the negotiations as well as reviewing the military situation on the ground in Viet-Nam. Obviously, the question of troop withdrawal will be one to which they will attach great importance. For this reason it is quite important that the US and the GVN be prepared to discuss this subject with their allies on the basis of a mutually agreed position.

2. Ambassador Sullivan agreed that this was likely to be a much more important meeting than earlier TCC get-togethers had been. He noted that on his return to Saigon Ambassador Bunker had begun consultations on the subject of withdrawals with President Thieu and that the two had agreed at their first session that Gen. Abrams and Gen. Cao Van Vien (Chief, Vietnamese Joint General Staff) should jointly consider on an urgent

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

Info:

ACTION: PAGE 3 - NODIS

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
INFO: Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, PARIS TODEL, SEOUL, WELLINGTON

basis the technical aspects involved in both the question of withdrawals and the related one of the replacement of American troops by Vietnamese forces. Unless these studies, as well as the consultations between Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu, can be completed and reviewed in Washington prior to the Secretary's visit to Saigon in mid-May, both US and GVN would find ourselves awkwardly disposed to answer the questions by our TCC allies which Bui Diem anticipates will arise at Bangkok.

3. For BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, SEOUL, WELLINGTON: Without making contact with host government would appreciate receiving Embassy's assessment of importance which individual TCC's attach to upcoming Bangkok meeting. It is already apparent from conversations with Thanat and Bira in Bangkok that Thai expect Seven Nation meeting to be more substantive than previous such exercises. As we see it troop contributing countries may very well expect that this meeting will provide them with first real opportunity for an in-depth briefing on

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ACTION:

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON
INFO: Amembassies BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, PARIS TODEL, SEOUL, WELLINGTON

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various aspects of the Paris talks. Question of troop withdrawals will undoubtedly be foremost in their minds and particularly question of how our thinking on this matter may affect their own contingents in South Viet-Nam. From this ~~xxxxxx~~ distance/it appears that Australia and New Zealand prepared to live with some reduction in US forces while retaining their units at present levels. Can RTG and ROK be expected to take similar view? Question of Philcag is a separate and perhaps more pressing one. For the moment it appears that this issue has become less important in domestic/political terms in the Philippines than had previously been the case. It is, however, one that could become active again at short notice. Please provide us with host government's current thinking regarding the importance they attach to the Seven Nation Conference, what issues they consider most important to be discussed therein, and their attitude toward the contents of the joint communique.
GP-3

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ACTION EA 15

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INFO AMEMBASSY AUCKLAND PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RALWAPINDI
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 6486/1

SECTO 42

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AS DELIVERED
IN CLOSED SESSION OF SEATO MEETING, TUESDAY, MAY 2Ø:

QUOTE PARA 1 - I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I VALUE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET SOME OF MY COLLEAGUES FOR THE FIRST TIME. THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PERSONAL CONTACTS AND CONSULTATION. PARA 2 - OUR AGENDA CALLS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE TREATY AREA. PARA 3 - IN THIS INTER-DEPENDENT WORLD OF OURS, IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO THINK OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS ANYWHERE THAT DO NOT -- IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER -- AFFECT THE TREATY AREA. SO PERHAPS IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF I WERE TO TOUCH ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE AREA. PARA 4 - FIRST, A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION. PARA 5 - IT IS OUR HOPE THAT WE MAY BE EMERGING FROM A LONG PERIOD CHARACTERIZED BY CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION --A CONFRONTATION THAT HAS BEEN FOUCSED PRIMARILY ON AN ARTIFICALLY DIVIDED EUROPE. PARA 6 - IN EUROPE WE AND OUR ALLIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN WORKING TO CREATE AN ATOMOSPHERE IN WHICH A RESOLUTION OF THE

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NDAMENTAL POLITICAL ISSUES OF EUROPE CAN BE APPROACHED WITH
ME EXPECTATION OF SOME PROGRESS. WE FEEL THAT THE TIME HAS
ME FOR THIS BECAUSE THE WINDS OF REFORM HAVE BEGUN TO STIR
THIN EASTERN EUROPE -- AND BECAUSE FORCES OF LIBERALIZATION
VE EVEN APPEARED TO BE STIRRING WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY ITSELF.
RA 7 - OUR HOPES FOR EVOLUTION TOWARDS IMPROVED EAST-WEST RE-
TIONS IN EUROPE WERE, OF COURSE, SERIOUSLY SET BACK BY THE
VIET INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA LAST AUGUST.
NETHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SOVIET CONTROLS OVER EASTERN
ROPE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF SLOW EROSION -- THAT SEVERAL OF THE
STERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE ANXIOUS FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH
E WEST -- AND THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
VISE A LONG RANGE WORKABLE WAY OF MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER
EIR RELUCTANT ALLIES. FOR THAT REASON, THE UNITED STATES WILL
RSUE A POLICY OF DEVELOPING CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THESE
LUCTANT ALLIES. PARA 8 - MEANWHILE, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT
E SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOW PREPARED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS CON-
RNING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HOPE THIS IS SO. SOMETIME
RING THE SUMMER AFTER WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR OWN REVIEW WE SHALL
TER INTO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS WHICH THE UNITED
ATES FIRST PROPOSED SOME TWO YEARS AGO. PARA 9 - THE SOVIETS
VE ALSO SHOWN A CERTAIN INTEREST IN REACHING LIMITED BILATERAL
REEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON SUCH MATTERS AS A COMMERCIAL
R AGREEMENT, THE EXCHANGE OF CONSULAR OFFICES, TELECOMMUNI-
TIONS LINKS TO OUR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES, AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
OGRAMS. THEY ARE STILL EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS, BUT SOMEWHAT MORE
EN THAN IN THE PAST. PARA 10 - WITH RESPECT TO DANGEROUS ISSUES
OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY
NT TO AVOID ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES IN THE
DDLE EAST. THEY HAVE, ON THE ONE HAND, REPLACED THE ENORMOUS
UIPMENT LOSSES OF THE ARAB STATES DURING THE WAR WITH ISRAEL
JUNE OF 1967. THEY ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE TRAINING OF THE
YPTIAN ARMED FORCES AND THEY SUPPORT THE BASIC POSITION OF
E ARAB STATES IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH ISRAEL. PARA 11 - BUT THE
VIET UNION IS ALSO PARTICIPATING IN THE DELICATE DIPLOMATIC
FORTS ON THE FOUR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHO ARE
ARCHING FOR WAYS TO SUPPORT AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS TO
ND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE
DEAVORING IN THESE TALKS TO ASSURE THAT THE SOVIET UNION
LL SUPPORT A TRUE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NOT JUST A RES-
RATION OF SUSPENDED CONFLICT. PARA 12 - AS FAR AS VIET-NAM
ES, THE USSR HAS FAVORED THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS -- IN SHARP

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ONTRAST TO THE POSITION TAKEN IN PEKING. HOWEVER, WE
UST ASSUME THAT THEIR DIPLOMATIC WEIGHT WILL ESSENTIALLY
E THROWN ON THE SIDE OF HANOI. PARA 13 - IN GENERAL THEN, IT
AS SEEMED TO US THAT THE SOVIETS GRADUALLY HAVE BEEN
OMING TO THE VIEW THAT DANGEROUS CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE UNITED
TATES AND ITS ALLIES DO NOT SERVE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AT
HIS TIME. GRADUALLY, THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEGUN TO PERCEIVE THAT
VEN IRRECONCILABLE POLITICAL SYSTEMS HAVE CERTAIN AREAS OF
OMMON INTEREST, AT LEAST WHERE SECURITY IS INVLOVED. PARA 14 -
HE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE TRENDS FOR THE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
N THE TREATY AREA UNFORTUNATELY ARE NOT CLEAR. WE DO NOT KNOW
HE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET BEHAVIOR REFLECTS THE SHARPENING
ONFRONTATION WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, OR INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES,
R RECOGNITION ON THEIR PART OF THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN
REAS UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE. BUT THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT
HE TREND IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO WATCH. HANOI'S BEHAVIOR, BOTH
N PARIS AND ON THE BATTLEFIELDS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND
N LAOS, IS CONDITIONED IN PART BY THE NATURE AND EFFECTIVENESS
F SOVIET INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE LEADERSHIP.
VIDENCES OF INCREASING SOVIET INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA,
OWEVER, TENTATIVE AND AMBIGUOUS, NEED TO BE WATCHED. WE ALSO
EED TO WATCH THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET INTEREST IN EXPANDED
IPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL TIES WITH THE FREE NATIONS OF THE
REATY REGION CAN BE MADE TO SERVE CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSES AND
O WHAT EXTENT THEY REFLECT CONTINUED EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT
EAKNESSES. PARA 15 - THESE ARE MATTERS ON WHICH WE SHALL WANT
O KEEP IN TOUCH AND IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER. III.
ARA 16 - UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ISNOT MUCH NEW TO BE SAID ABOUT
ROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST CHINA, PARA 17 -
Y GOVERNMENT IS WELL AWARE THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
AINLAND CHINA BOTH EXIST. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD MORE
ORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN PEKING. INDEED,
VER THE YEARS WE HAVE MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL
LACES TO START IN THAT DIRECTION -- SUCH AS AN EXCHANGE OF
OURNALISTS AND THE OPENING OF TRADE IN DEFINITE PRODUCTS SUCH
S PHARMACEUTICALS -- AND HAD BEEN PREPARED TO PRESENT OTHERS IN
ARSAW. PARA 18 - THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE SO FAR. AND WE SEE
ITTLE OR NO SIGNS OF A RESPONSE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AS YOU
NOW, THE CHINESE ABRUPTLY CANCELLED IN FEBRUARY THE SCHEDULED
ESUMPTION OF THE BILATERAL MEETINGS WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING
ITH THEM OVER THE YEARS IN WARSAW. PARA 19 - PERHAPS THERE
HOULD BE SOME SMALL COMFORT IN THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES

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EEN REPLACED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS ENEMY NUMBER ONE IN
SE PROPAGANDA. IN FACT THIS IS THE ONLY THING ON WHICH THE
ANS AND THE CHINESE SEEM TO AGREE: THEY HAVE BOTH
ED THE UNITED STATES TO SECOND PLACE IN A TARGET IN THEIR
TIVE. PARA 2Ø - THE U.S. IS QUITE MINDFUL THAT WE MUST
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST CHINA'S GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITY.
E MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE MAOIST.....
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MEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
MEMBASSY SAIGON
MEMBASSY LONDON
MEMBASSY MANILA

O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 6486

ECTO 42

OCTRINES FOR FOSTERING SO-CALLED "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION"
AVE NO FUTURE IN ASIA. AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS
HERE THEY ARE POSSIBLE. PARA 21 - THIS BRINGS US CLOSER TO THE
MMEDIATE INTERESTS OF SEATO. IV. PARA 22 - THERE ARE REASONS
O BE DISTURBED ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN LAOS. SINCE NOVEMBER
HE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE OVERRUN A NUMBER OF GUERILLA OUTPOSTS
N NORTHEAST LAOS AND SEIZED A STRATEGIC DISTRICT CAPITAL IN
HE SOUTH. THEIR CURRENT DRY-SEASON OPERATIONS INCLUDE INTENSIFIED
CTIVITIES IN THREE AREAS: TERRORISM, INCLUDING THE ASSASS-
NATIONS OF FIVE FRENCHMEN WORKING ON AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL,
IVE THAI TECHNICIANS WORKING ON MEKONG PROJECTS, AND ONE AMERICAN
N THE INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER SERVICE, TO SAY NOTHING
F THE SCORES OF LAO WHO ALSO LOST THEIR LIVES IN THIS WAY;
HE INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 13 IN SEVERAL PLACES; AND THE ESTAB-
ISHMENT UNDER NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, OF THRI-COUNTRY BASE
REA MAINLY IN SOUTHWEST LAOS BUT SPILLING OVER INTO CAMBODIA
ND THAILAND. PARA 23 - ANOTHER DISTURBING DEVELOPMENT IS THE
UILDING OF A 5Ø-MILE ROAD FROM THE YUNAN BORDER INTO NORTHERN

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LAOS BY COMMUNIST CHINESE CONSTRUCTION WORKERS. PARA 24 - THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO UNDERPIN THE DEFENSIVE EFFORT OF THE ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT IN APPROPRIATE WAYS. WE AND OTHERS ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO STABILIZE THE CURRENCY AND DEVELOP THE ECONOMY. WE HAVE JOINED IN THE FINANCING OF THE NAM NGUM DAM PROJECT -- ONE OF THE EARLY CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN THE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT AND IMAGINATIVE MEKONG PROGRAM. AND IN THE RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS

OF THE PRIME MINISTER, WE ARE CONTINUING TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO GOVERNMENT FORCES. PARA 25 - HOWEVER, THE MILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST LAOS SEEM INCREASINGLY SERIOUS IN LIGHT OF THE STRAIN ON THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THIS SMALL COUNTRY. BUT DESPITE TACTICAL ADVANCES, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF OCCASIONAL TERROR ATTACKS, THE AREAS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY STILL REMAIN THOSE WHICH WERE UNDER PATHET LAO INFLUENCE OR IN CONTEST AT THE TIME OF AGREEMENT ON THE 1962 ACCORDS. WE MUST BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW PRESSURES WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE THREAT TO THAILAND. PARA 26 - MY GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF LAOS CAN BEST BE RESOLVED BY FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA IN HIS EFFORTS IN THIS CONNECTION. PARA 27 - WE ARE MAKING IT CLEAR IN OUR CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS BY WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS FROM LAOS -- AND CAMBODIA AS WELL -- IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. PARA 28 - WE ARE DETER-MINED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT REACHED FOR VIET-NAM SHALL BRING AN END TO WAR IN LAOS -- AND TAKE INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THAILAND. V. PARA - LET ME COME NOW TO VIET-NAM. I HAD A MOST USEFUL VISIT THERE LATE LAST WEEK. AS YOU KNOW, THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WILL BE MEETING THERE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS COUNCIL ADJOURNS ITS DELIBERATIONS AND WILL BE RECEIVING REPORTS FROM THE MILITARY COMMANDERS. PARA 30 - I AM NOT GOING TO TRY TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR -- MUCH LESS MAKE PREDICTIONS. PARA 32 - FIRST, IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM THERE IS A HIGHMEQDLKMX
AJVQGXCKJHX ZLFWJBUUFKDSGDGAEMB AMONG THE NATIONAL LEADERS IN SAIGON AND THE PROVINCIAL LEADERS I MET DURING TWO DAYS IN THE FIELD. I FOUND IT AMONG THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIANS -- AMONG THOSE WHO ARE FIGHTING, AMONG THOSE WHO ARE CONCERNED WITH THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATION, AND AMONG THOSE WHO ARE BUILDING AND REBUILDING EVEN AS THE WAR CONTINUES. I MIGHT SAY IN PASSING THAT NOWHERE WAS THIS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE

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GHER THAN IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ROYAL THAI VOLUNTEER FORCES,
ICH I VISITED OVER THE WEEKEND. PARA 33 - SECOND, THE LEADERS OF
UTH VIET-NAM ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE BURDEN
SELF-DEFENSE. THEY ARE PREPARING ACTIVELY TO DO THIS AND WE
E HELPING THEM WITH TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS. PARA 34 - IT
TOO EARLY TO SPEAK OF A FIXED SCHEDULE FOR THE TRANSFER OF
ECIFIED COMBAT RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT THIS IS THE DIRECTION IN
ICH THINGS ARE MOVING -- AND IT IS NOT AT ALL TO THE LIKING
HANOI. THE MORE RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED BY SAIGON, THE LESS
AUSIBLE IS HANOI'S PROPAGANDA ABOUT WESTERN IMPERIALISM. PARA
- THIRD, THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES, WITH
E SUPPORT OF THE OTHER ALLIES, ARE UNITED IN THEIR WILL FOR
ACE THROUGH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AT THE PEACE TALKS IN PARIS.
DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE OTHER SIDE IS YET PREPARED FOR SERIOUS
GOTIATIONS. PARA 36 - BASICALLY, OUR POSITION IS QUITE SIMPLE:
WILL NOT YIELD ON THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THAT THE PEOPLE
SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE LEFT FREE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE
THOUT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; BUT WE ARE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT HOW
REACH THIS RESULT. PARA 37 - WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT
E WAY TO START ON THE ROAD TOWARD PEACE IS TO BEGIN WITH CONCRETE,
ACTICAL STEPS THAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY
BOTH SIDES REALLY WANTED TO FIND A SOLUTION. WE HAVE SUGGESTED
CH STEPS. WE HAVE INVITED ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS. WE HAVE SAID
AT WHENEVER HANOI IS READY TO ENGAGE IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUAL
RCE REDUCTIONS, THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING COULD BE REDUCED RAPIDLY.
IS IS WHERE THINGS STAND TODAY AS FAR AS THE PEACE TALKS ARE
NCERNED. PARA 38 - FOURTH, I BELIEVE I CAN SAY THAT THE POLITICAL
ITIATIVE HAS PASSED TO THE HANDS OF THE ALLIES. I BELIEVE IT
BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THERE IS A WILL FOR PEACE
OUR SIDE -- THAT OUR POSITIONS ARE REASONABLE -- AND THAT
IS UP TO HANOI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE FIGHTING CONTINUES.
ESIDENT NIXON'S ADDRESS ON VIET-NAM LAST WEEK, WHICH WAS DELIVERED
ILE I WAS IN SAIGON, WAS WELL RECEIVED THERE AND ELSEWHERE.
SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS HANOI FOR SERIOUS TALKS AND I BELIEVE
AT HANOI WILL BE INCREASINGLY ON THE DEFENSIVE. PARA 39 -
ESE ARE THE THOUGHTS I WANTED TO LAY BEFORE MY SEATO COLLEAGUES
DAY. PARA 4Ø - AS I SAID THIS MORNING, WE PLACE GREAT
LUE ON THIS ORGANIZATION AND OUR MEMBERSHIP IN IT. WE HOPE
R THAT REASON THAT THIS MEETING OF SEATO WILL BE A MOST SUCCESSFUL
E AND WILL BE SO REGARDED BY THE PUBLIC. BECAUSE IN THE FINAL
ALYSIS, THIS ALLIANCE DEPENDS ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE
OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

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DEPT PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE: WITHDRAWAL PAPER

REF: A. SAIGON 9362 B. SAIGON 9433 (SECTO 17)

REFERENCE IN PARA ININE OF VIETNAMESE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (REF A) TO PRESENTATION ON WITHDRAWAL BY US AND GVN DELEGATIONS PUZZLED US AT TIME OF RECEIPT. ALTHOUGH MY VIETNAMESE AND SOME OTHER TCC COLLEAGUES (BANGKOK 5883 NODIS) HAD INDICATED THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF SOME IMPENDING PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT. I ASSUME THEIR ALLUSIONS WERE TO DOCUMENT NOW TRANSMITTED AS REF B. SINCE THANAT CONFIRMED TO ME THIS MORNING THAT DOCUMENT HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO HIM ALREADY BY SVN AMBASSADOR CHINH. I AM TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION.

GP-1. UNGER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6655

S E C R E T BANGKOK 6276

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING: COMMUNIQUE

REF: SECTO 7

1. DURING MEETING WITH THANAT EVENING MAY 14, I TOLD HIM, ON BASIS OF REFTEL, THAT WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAI POINTS CAN BE MET ON AT LEAST TWO OF MAJOR QUESTIONS RAISED CONCERNING GAPS BETWEEN THEIR COMMUNIQUE DRAFT (BANGKOK 5638) AND US REDRAFT (STATE 73981).

2. THANAT BROKE IN EXPRESSING DOUBT ABOUT USEFULNESS OF ISSUING A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE PRIMARY, AS HE PUT IT, EFFECT OF "SERVING THE OTHER SIDE'S PROPAGANDA," IMPLYING THIS WAS HIS INTERPRETATION OF IMPACT THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED BY OUR DRAFT. IF COMMUNIQUE CAN BE MADE TO SERVE SOME POSITIVE PROPAGANDA OR POLITICAL PURPOSE, FINE; OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE BETTER TO OMIT WHAT HAS BECOME A "TEDIOUS EXERCISE" AT EVERY MEETING, HE SAID.

3. BECAUSE BOTH THANAT AND I HAD OTHER OBLIGATIONS, AND BECAUSE I BELIEVED HIS SUBSEQUENT READING OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WOULD ALTER HIS MOOD SOMEWHAT, I DEFERRED MORE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET, SUGGESTING ONLY TO THANAT THAT WHEN THE SECREHXRY'S PARTY ARRIVED I BELIEVED WE WOULD FIND A BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A DOCUMENT SATISFACTORY TO ALL. ON LEAVING, HOWEVER, I IDENTIFIED THOSE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO HIS SECRETARY, BIRABHONGSE, AS RELATING TO THE INCREASE IN THAI TROOPS AND THE NON-IMPOSITION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR OTHER POLITICAL

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SOLUTION UNACCEPTABLE TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

4. BECAUSE BIRABHONGSE HAS NOW UNFORTUNATELY BECOME ENGAGED IN PREPARATION OF SEATO COMMUNIQUE, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THAI ARE EXHIBITING SOME OF SAME TRUCULENCE MANIFESTED TOWARD TCC COMMUNIQUE, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR POL COUNSELOR TO PURSUE DISCUSSION ON THIS LATTER SUBJECT. BIRABHONGSE'S ADDITIONAL ASSIGNMENT ALSO MEANS THERE WILL BE GREATER DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING TIME, EARLY NEXT WEEK, FOR THE SUGGESTED MEETING WITH ALDRICH AND MATTHEWS WHICH WE HAD BELIEVED WOULD BE GOOD WAY TO PROCEED. COUNSELOR HAS APPOINTMENT WITH BIRABHONGSE ON THIS AND OTHER MATTERS ON SUNDAY MAY 18 AT 1400 AT CHANCERY. CONFIRMING ALDRICH-HAMILTON TELECON TODAY, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY PRODUCTIVE TO HAVE ALDRICH PRESENT FOR THIS MEETING IF TRANSPORTATION CAN BE ARRANGED.

5. WE HAVE RECENT RELIABLE INDICATIONS THAT THANAT IS BEGINNING TO BACK AWAY FROM HIS EARLIER NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, AS MEANING OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND MESSAGE SINKS IN. I BELIEVE, AS I INDICATED TO HIM THE OTHER EVENING, THAT WE WILL FIND OUR WAY TO AGREEMENT ON A USEFUL DOCUMENT. TO EXTENT OUR REVISION OF COMMUNIQUE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT SOME VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM INITIAL THAI DRAFT (SAIGON 9362) THE ROAD WILL OBVIOUSLY BE SMOOTHER.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 033

PAGE 01 BANGKO 06261 161532Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, /031 W
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P 161026Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6647

S E C R E T BANGKOK 6261

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS SAIGON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SEATO MEETING: POLITICAL CONSULTATION

REF: SECTO 7

1. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY'S PROMPT ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS I HAD RAISED CONCERNING THANAT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FORTHCOMING MEETINGS AND FOR THE DECISIONS REPORTED REFTEL.

2. I INFORMED THANAT LAST EVENING OF THE SECRETARY'S ACCEPTANCE OF HIS INVITATION FOR THE RESTRICTED BREAKFAST MEETING, MAY 21, AND HE IS NOW PROCEEDING TO ARRANGE IT. THE HOUR HAS NOT BEEN FIXED, AND, IF NECESSARY, THE SECRETARY'S PROSPECTIVE CALL ON GVN FONMIN THANH WILL BE ADJUSTED APPROPRIATELY. HIS PLANNING, I BELIEVE, IS TO INVITE ONLY THE BANGKOK AMBASSADORS TO ACCOMPANY THEIR MINISTERS (US, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND UK AND PHILIPPINES). I CONCURRED IN HIS INCLINATION NOT TO INCLUDE SECGEN VARGAS.

3. THANAT CONFIRMED THE BILATERAL PRIVATE STAG DINNER FOR MONDAY, MAY 19, TO WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD BRING TWO OR THREE OTHER THAI. (I RECOMMEND THAT, IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY AND MYSELF, PEDERSEN AND SULLIVAN BE INCLUDED ON OUR SIDE, AND ALSO MY DEPUTY HANNAH IF THIS DOESN'T APPEAR TO MAKE OUR REPRESENTATION TOO HEAVY).

4. IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING CONVERSATION THANAT RETURNED TO AN EARLIER THEME (BANGKOK 5893 AND 5971) ABOUT A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS

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IN SEATO WHICH WOULD GIVE MORE WEIGHT TO POLTICAL CONSULTATION AND SOMEWHAT LESS TO SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS EXERCISED WHICH HE TENDS TO REGARD AS HAVING LIMITED UTILITY. THANAT MENTIONED AGAIN THAT IN THE COURSE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, THE BRITISH FRENCH AND EVEN THE PAKISTANI MIGHT MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTIONS ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE TREATY AREA AND ALSO MORE BROADLY. POSSIBLE SUBJECTS OF FRUITFUL COMMON DISCUSSION WHICH WE IDENTIFIED INCLUDED THE LIKELY SOVIET ROLE IN SEA; CHICOM INTENTIONS TOWARD INDIA (AND THE SOVIET ROLE THERE). BURMA AND THAILAND; IMPLICATIONS FOR SEA IN PARTICULAR OF THE TREND IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS; AND THE GROWING SOVIET INTEREST IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND ITS SEARCH FOR FACILITIES THERE AS WELL AS THE US/UK EFFORTS OF A SIMILAR NATURE.

5. I POINTED OUT TO THANAT THAT THE MONTHLY MEETING OF THE SEATO COUNCIL REPS OFFERS A POLITICAL CONSULTATION FORUM AND THAT FRANKLY I WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS THERE, IN SPITE OF MY OWN EFFORTS TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE THAI COUNCIL REP CONTRIBUTED AS LITTLE AS ANYONE. THANAT TENDED TO BRUSH THIS ASIDE, IMPLYING THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE FRENCH AND PERHAPS OTHERS INHIBITS ANY SIGNIFICANT EXCHANGE. WHEN I PRESSED HIM ON THE CONTRADICTION THIS POSED TO WHAT HE HAD BEEN PROPOSING BEFORE, HE DREW DISTINCTION BETWEEN COUNCIL REPS MEETINGS AND "AN APPRAISAL OF PROBLEMS BY COMPETENT MEN AT A HIGH LEVEL WHO ARE FREE TO SPEAK THEIR MINDS". HE THOUGHT PERHAPS A GET-TOGETHER TWO OR THREE TIMES A YEAR OF A RESTRICTED GROUP, SUCH AS HE CONTEMPLATES FOR THE "BREAKFAST MEETING" NEXT WEEK, WOULD BE APPROPRIATE; ANOTHER OCCASION MIGHT BE WHEN MINISTERS ARE PRESENT AT THE UNGA IN THE FALL. WE DID NOT PURSUE THIS FURTHER, ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE IT WAS CLEAR TO BOTH OF US THAT HIS PROPOSAL REMAINS SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. (COMMENT: THANAT MAY SEEK TO REFINE HIS IDEAS IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, BUT I WILL BE SURPRISED IF THEY ULTIMATELY COME TO ANYTHING MORE THAN AN EFFORT TO ADOPT SOME KIND OF LOOSE SCHEDULE FOR A PERIODIC BUT WIDELY SPACED MINISTERIAL LEVEL, ONE-SESSION MEETINGS OF MOST (OR CONCEIVABLY ALL) OF THE SEATO MEMBERS FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON).

6. THANAT DID NOT IN THIS CONVERSATION REFER TO POSSIBILITY OF NEW MEMBERS IN SEATO AND COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW WE SHOULD ALLOW PAKISTANIS TO "JUST SIT". HE FORESAW NO EARLY MAJOR CHANGE IN FRENCH ATTITUDE OR BEHAVIOUR -- WHILE THE VIETNAM WAR CONTINUES.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 033

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, /031 W
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P 161026Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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7. PROBLEM OF COMMUNIQUE, IN LIGHT OF REFTEL, REPORTED SEPARATELY.

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UNGER

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6525
CINCPAC 2410
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON

S E C R E T BANGKOK 6053

EXDIS

CINCPAC TOSEC

SUBJECT: TCC CONFERENCE - COMMUNIQUE

REF: A. STATE 73981
B. BANGKOK 5973
C. SAIGON 9177

1. REQUEST GUIDANCE FROM DEPT OR SECRETARY'S PARTY ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED FROM THIS POINT WITH RESPECT TO WORKING TOWARD AGREED COMMUNIQUE, IN ADVANCE OF SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK. SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS CONCERING COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSED SEPTEL.

2. THAI HAVE JOINED WITH US IN DESIRE TO AVOID ANY LAST-MINUTE PROBLEM, BY MOVING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD INFORMAL CONSENSUS EVEN BEFORE CONVENING OF COMMUNIQUE COMMITTEE ON MAY 22 (THOUGH WE ARE NOT INFORMED OF EXTENT TO WHICH MFA HAS NOW DISCUSSED IDEAS OR DRAFT WITH OTHERS). AS HOST, THEY PREPARED FIRST DRAFT AND INVITED COMMENTS, WHICH WE PROVIDED IN FORM OF COUNTERDRAFT (REF A) THAT PREDICTABLY FELL SHORT OF THAI DESIRES. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON OUR DRAFT WERE OFFERED PROMPTLY (INDEED PRECIPITOUSLY - REF B) WITH INVITATION TO COMMENT ON THEIR OBJECTIONS.

3. WITHOUT FULLER SENSE OF WASHINGTON NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS, I HAVE NOT AUTHORIZED MY STAFF TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND FEEL SOME RELUCTANCE IN ENGAGING THANAT IN THE DISCUSSION HE WILL PROBABLY SEEK SOON. THEREFORE REQUEST ADVICE WHETHER IT IS DE-

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SIRED THAT I UNDERTAKE TO NEGOTIATE OUT POINTS OF DIFFICULTY OR WHETHER WE SHOULD CONFINE OUR ACTIVITIES TO RELAYING DEPT COMMENTS AND REPORTING THAI REACTIONS. AS NOTED REF B, THAI EXPECT TO RESPONGMORE FULLY TO OUR DRAFT BY THURSDAY, AND THEY SEEM TO ANTICIPATE SITTING DOWN TO GIVE-AND-TAKE DISCUSSION.

4. SECOND ASPECT CONCERNS MANNER OF WEAVING IN DESIRE OF OTHER TCC MISSIONS AND GOVTS. WITH RESPECT TO SAIGON COMMENTS REF C, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY FROM THAI PERSPECTIVE ON TWO POINTS:

A. THAI WILLFIND INCOMPREHENSIBLE OUR SOLICITUDE FOR FEELINGS OF OTHER SIDE THROUGH SUGGESTED DELETION IN PARA SIX OF US DRAFT OF IDEA WE ARE "ENCOURAGED" BY DIFFICULTIES OF OTHER SIDE (REF C, PARA 4). ALTHOUGH WE WOULD FIND SAIGON'S WORDING APPROPRIATE HAD QUESTION NOT ARISEN, THAI WILL CERTAINLY BRIDLE AT FURTHER WEAKENING. THEY BELIEVE SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT CAN BE NEGOTIATED ONLY IF MILITARY PRESSURE CONTINUES AND IS EFFECTIVE, AND ARE UNDOUBTEDLY SENSITIVE TO OMISSION IN OUR DRAFT OF THANAT'S EMPHASIS THROUGH SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS ON CONTRAST BETWEEN ALLIED POSTURE AND ACHIEVEMENTS AND COMMUNIST MISDEEDS.

B. RE REF C PAR 7, HOPE THAT SUBSTANCE OF US DRAFT PARA 12 (CARRIED FORWARD FROM THAI DRAFT) CAN BE PRESEVED. THANAT HAS NO NOTION THAT ASIAN NATIONS CAN BE THEMSELVES UNDERTAKE TO "GUARANTEE" PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION, BUT WE THIN IT IMPORTANT TO ENDORSE HIS (AND SOME OTHERS') DESIRE TO RECORD IMPORTANCE OF ASIAN PARTICIPATION IN THAT TASK. A BETTER CORRECTIVE WOULD BE TO CHANGE WORDS "SHOULD BE BASED ON" IN FIRST SENTENCE OF US PARA 12 TO "WILL REQUIRE".

5. THIRD PROBLEM CONCERNS COORDINATION WITH MY TCC COLLEAGUES HERE. AT EARLIER STAGE, WHEN THAI INITIAL DRAFT RECEIVED, WE PLAYED COY AND WERE EMBARRASSED WHEN NEW ZEALANDERS DISCLOSED THEY INFORMED BY THEIR EMB WASHINGTON THAT THIS EMBASSY HAD TRANSMITTED DRAFT WHICH THEN PASSED TO THEM. ASSUMING SINCE THEN THAT CONSULTATION CONTINUED AT LEAST WITH AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS AS WELL AS GVN, I NOW FIND AUSTRALIANS AMB MCNICOL UNINFORMED OF US DRAFT (WHICH MAY, OF COURSE, BE DUE TO LIMITED INTERNAL AUSTRALIAN COMMUNICATION). TO CARRY ON USEFUL CONSULTATIONS WITHIN PROPER LIMITS HERE, I NEED TO KNOW CURRENT PATTERN OF DISCUSSION WITH ALLIES -- WHERE AND WHAT INCLUDED.

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SECRET 336

PAGE 01 BANGKO 05973 121524Z

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6475 2
CINCPAC 2406

S E C R E T BANGKOK 5973

EXDIS

CINCPAC TOSEC

SUBJECT: TCC CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE

REF: A. STATE 73981 B. BANGKOK 5778 C. STATE 71864

1. POL COUNSELOR PASSED COPY OF US DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TO SECRETARY TO FONMIN (BIRABHONGSE) THIS MORNING. COUNSELOR USED PRIOR REVIEW OF 16TH PARIS MEETING TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF NLF 10-POINT PROGRAM WHICH, EVEN BEFORE COMPLETE ANALYSIS POSSIBLE, CLEARLY REPRESENTED AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CONSIDERATION OF COMMUNIQUE. POINTED OUT THAT, HAVING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF USING TCC MEETING TO FURTHER FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF MOVING TOWARD PEACE, DEPARTMENT CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO AVOID LANGUAGE THAT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT EVEN WHILE REAFFIRMING COMMON OBJECTIVES WHICH WRITTEN LARGELY FROM PRIOR THAI DRAFT. EXPRESSED HOPE THAI WOULD FIND THAT US DRAFT, ON WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR SUGGESTIONS IN HOPE OF WORKING TOWARD CONCURRENCE, DIFFERED FROM BIRA'S PRIMARILY IN TONE AND MANNER OF PRESENTATION. AFTER SKIMMING DRAFT QUICKLY, BIRA SAID ONLY THAT THAI WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE SOME COMMENTS AND HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MEET AGAIN BY THURSDAY. HIS MANNER REFLECTED SOME DISMAY.

2. FOLLOWING A LUNCHEON (SEE BELOW), BIRA TOOK COUNSLER ASIDE AND DELIVERED FOLLOWING "PRELIMINARY COMMENTS" WITH A PRECISION AND FIRMNESS WHICH SUGGESTED TO US THAT HE HAD TAKEN PRE-LUNCHEON INTERVAL TO OBTAIN FONMIN THANAT'S INITIAL REACTIONS. HE MADE FIVE POINTS:

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A) RTG CANNOT BE SO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH PARIS TALKS "OF WHICH WE ARE NOT A PART". THERE ARE SOME STATEMENTS (IN US DRAFT) WHICH THAI CAN ENDORSE, OTHERS WHICH THEY COULD ONLY "NOTE".

B) IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT US DRAFT BRUSHES ASIDE SO BRIEFLY THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT PARA 2 OF US DRAFT ON THIS SUBJECT WAS TAKEN FROM BIRA'S OWN, HE SAID REFERENCE SHOULD BE REPEATED AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RELATE ALL ALLIES TO PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT: "THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO US AND SOME OTHER PARTICIPANTS".

C) THERE WILL NEED TO BE SOME REPETITION OF LAST YEAR'S DISMISSAL OF THE COMMUNIST "SPURIOUS COALITION" DEMAND. THIS NEED NOT BE IN SAME LANGUAGE BUT CLEAR REFERENCE IS IMPORTANT. (COMMENT: THIS WAS ONLY ONE OF BIRA'S POINTS RELATED TO THANAT'S EARLIER STRESS -- BANGKOK 5506 -- ON EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF CONTRASTING ALLIES CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS WITH COMMUNIST OBSTRUCTION.)

D) BIRA DEPLORED DELETION OF REFERENCE TO INCREASE IN THAI TROOP STRENGTH IN VIETNAM. "AS HOST TO CONFERENCE, WE DESERVE THIS AND NEED IT FOR OUR OWN PEOPLE." (COMMENT: BELIEVE THAT INCREASE TO FULL THAI DIVISION IS ONLY SIGNIFICANT NEW CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIED DEFENSE OF VIETNAM SINCE WELLINGTON MEETING AND THAT EVEN THOUGH WE WISH TO AVOID "BUILD-UP" IMAGE, REFERENCE TO THAI ACTION MUST BE INCLUDED.)

E) CONCLUDING SENTENCE CONCERNING COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION IS TOO CATEGORICAL -- "WE CANNOT ACCEPT ENDORSEMENT OF CONSULTATION THAT DOES NOT REALLY EXIST." BIRA SAID THAI HAVE BEEN VERY PATIENT, RECOGNIZING PREPONDERANT ROLE OF US AT PRESENT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO DENIGRATE AMBASSADOR'S EFFORTS TO KEEP RTG INFORMED. BUT IT HAD BEEN INFORMATION ONLY, NO REAL CONSULTATION OR DISCUSSION. BIRA CONCLUDED THAT THANAT WILL NOT PROTEST DURING TCC MEETINGS, THAT PATTERN OF CONSULTATION AMONG ALLIES CAN BE LEFT AS TACITLY UNDERSTOOD BUT THAT IF "ENDORSEMENT" (PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO WORDS "WHICH HAS EXISTED") IS PUT IN WRITING RTG WILL HAVE TO ENTER A RESERVATION IN WRITING WHICHWILL BE HARMFUL TO ALL.

3. WHEN WE CONFIRMED TO BIRA THAT THAI DRAFT HAD BEEN PASSED TO GVN, HE INQUIRED WHETHER US DRAFT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH BUI

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DIEM (WHICH WE COULD NOT CONFIRM) AND SAID HE PRESUMED SO AND THAT VERY WELCOME PRECISION IN PARAS 3 - 5 HOPEFULLY THEREFORE REFLECTED WHAT THANH PLANNED TO SAY.

4. BIRA USED INTERVENING LUNCHEON WITH PROFESSOR SCOTT THOMPSON OF FLETCHER SCHOOL (CA-1519, MARCH 11) AND POL COUNSELOR FOR A VIRTUOSO PERFORMANCE IN WHICH HE TALKED AT THOMPSON BUT CLEARLY TO EMBASSY ABOUT THAI EXPECTATIONS AT FORTHCOMING TCC MEETING. ALTHOUGH RELEVANT TO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, WE BELIEVE HIS REMARKS ALSO BEAR ON RTG REACTION TO DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. WHEN THOMPSON INQUIRED WHETHER BIRA THOUGHT PROBLEM OF VIETNAM SETTLEMENT WOULD, OVER COMING YEAR, BE A LEGITIMATE FOCUS OF INTEREST FOR A PART OF HIS STUDY ON THAI-US RELATIONS, BIRA SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD AND HE IMMEDIATELY REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE OF FORTHCOMING SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS. HE SAID THAI WILL WANT TO HEAR WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OR EVEN ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATION ON THEM IN PARIS. "WE CANNOT ACCEPT UNDUE EMPHASIS ON PARIS, FROM WHICH AT THIS STAGE WE ARE EXCLUDED." AT SOME STAGE, IN PARIS OR ELSEWHERE, ALLIES WILL HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN DEVISING FORM OF SETTLEMENT. "WE HAVE ONLY A SMALL POLITICAL CLAIM TO PARTICIPATE, BUT WE WILL NEVER GIVE IT UP." (COMMENT: THE LANGUAGE IS PURE THANAT.)

5. BIRA CONTINUED THAT THAI OF COURSE APPRECIATED PRIMARY ROLE US MUST PLAY AT PRESENT. THAI CAN ACCEPT A LIMITED TROOP WITHDRAWAL "BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSUAGE US PUBLIC OPINION" SO THAT THE EFFORT IN VIETNAM CAN CONTINUE FOR A FURTHER TIME. BIRA COMMENTED THAT THAI NATIONAL INTERESTS DICTATE CONCURRENT CONCERN WITH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND "PEKING," REFERRING TO RECENT DEBATE IN THAILAND OVER THANAT'S EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH CHICOMS. HE SAID THAI CANNOT GO BACK ON UNDERTAKING TO SUPPORT GVN THROUGH TO REALIZATION OF ITS GOALS. THAI HAVE DONE THEIR PART, INVITING US AIRMEN TO THAI BASES TO FIGHT VIETNAM WAR. HE THEN VEERED OFF INTO FAMILIAR COMPLAINT ABOUT US PRESS, SOME ELEMENTS OF WHICH HE BELIEVES HAVE ENGAGED IN DELIBERATE EFFORT TO WEAKEN THAILAND AND US-THAI TIES BY SPURIOUS COMPARISION OF THAI INSURGENCY TO VIETNAM.

6. I WILL BE PREPARED TO PICK UP WITH THANAT AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY DISCUSSION OF THOSE POINTS IN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE HE SEEMS TO FIND TROUBLESOME AND I RATHER ANTICIPATE WE WILL RECEIVE SOME SUGGESTED LANGUAGE CHANGES AND ADDITIONS FROM THAI BEFORE END OF THIS WEEK.

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MEANWHILE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE REACTION FROM SECRETARY'S PARTY AND WASHINGTO TO POINTS MADE BY BIRA, AND ESPECIALLY TO THOSE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THAIS AS FOUND IN PARAS 2C, 2D, AND 2E ABOVE.

GP-3. UNGER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ACTION SS 30

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P 081215Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6364

S E C R E T BANGKOK 5778

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

REF: A. STATE 071864
B. BANGKOK 5638

1. PURSUANT TO PARA FIVE REFTEL A, WE SUGGEST SOME MODIFICATION IN YOUR SCENARIO.

2. SINCE WE ARE IN THE DARK AS TO WHAT US FULL DRAFT WILL LOOK LIKE, AND WE WILL NOT HAVE THIS INFORMATION UNTIL DRAFT CABLED WITH INSTRUCTIONS AS NOTED PARA 4 REFTEL A, ANY SPECIFIC REDRAFTING WE TRY TO WORK OUT WITH THAIS NOW MAY WELL BE WASHED OUT BY WHAT YOU ULTIMATELY PROVIDE US. FURTHERMORE, WE FEEL WE WILL BE IN MORE FAVORABLE POSITION TO NEGOTIATE DRAFT WITH THAIS WITH OUR NEW TEXT IN HAND THAN SIMPLY BE RAISING UNPALATABLE OBJECTIONS TO THEIRS.

3. WITH THIS IN MIND, BELIEVE WE SHOULD GO NO FARTHER AT THIS TIME THAN SPEAK TO THE THAIS ALONG LINES OF PARA ONE REFTEL A, INDICATING THAT WHILE WE ARE WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS, THIS IS OUR UNDERSTNADING OF WASHINGTON VIEWS ON BASIS OF TONE AND MANNER OF PRESENTATION RELECTED IN STATE 66205 AND OTHER INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED.

4. JUST TO MAKE SURE WE UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS IN THAI DRAFT WHICH YOU REGARD AS MOST OBJECTIONABLE, WE QUOTE SEVERAL EXAMPLES BELOW (KEYED TO DRAFT TEXT QUOTED IN REFTEL B), AND ASK YOU TO CORRECT US IF THESE ARE NOT RPT NOT ILLUSTRATIVE OF WHAT YOU WISH TO AVOID:

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A) IN PARA THREE OF QUOTED TEXT, SECOND SENTENCE BEGINNING "HE ALSO DESCRIBED...."

B) IN PARA FOUR, REFERENCE IN SENTENCE TWO TO "TOTALITARIAN COMMUNIST REGIME" AND FOLLOWING SENTENCE ENDING"...PEACE ON ITS OWN TERMS".

C) IN PARA FIVE, THE PHRASE IN SENTENCE TWO"...AND EXACTED HEAVY TOLL OF COMMUNIST CASUALTIES."

D) IN PARA EIGHT, SENTENCE 1, THE PHRASE BEGINNING"...THE ADAMANT ATTITUDE ETC.". ALSO ALL OF SENTENCE THREE BEGINNING " THEY NOTED, IN CONTRAST...."

5. WE REALIZE, OF COURSE THE DIFFICULTY YOU HAVE WITH LANGUAGE OF THIS NATURE VIS-A-VIS AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. YOU UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZE THE DIFFICULTY THAT WE CAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE THAIS AND PERHAPS OTHER ALLIES IF WE SEEM TO BE IN ANY SENSE ACQUIESCING IN THE COMMUNIST INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS OR FAILING TO MAKE AT LEAST

REASONABLE USE OF THE STRENGTHS OF OUR POSITION; THIS, IN FACT, IS SOMETHING REGARDED HERE AS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ISAS ADVERSE AS IT IS. TO EXTENT GVN WISHES TO MAKE TO THAIS POINTS SIMILAR TO OUR OBJECTIONS, IT WILL OF COURSE BE BETTER THAN IF WE DO SO.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6276
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 5638/1

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING: DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

REF: A) STATE 66205; B) BANGKOK 5506

1. THAI CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT OF COMMUNIQUE, QUOTED IN FULL BELOW, WAS PROVIDED LATE TODAY BY SEC TO FON MIN (BIRABHONGSE), EMPHASIZING QUALIFICATION WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT IS A "WORKING PAPER" SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE THAI ALTERATION EVEN THOUGH THANAT HAS REVIEWED IT. BUILT ON AND EXPANDED FROM LAST YEAR'S COMMINQUE, IT GENERALLY CONFORMS TO PATTERN SET FORTH REF A. PER REF B, RTG UNDERSTANDS IT WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH BUI DIEM AND CARRIED BY HIM TO GVN, AND THAI THEREFORE WITHHOLDING IT FROM GVN AMB HERE DESPITE HIS REQUESTS. IN VIEW BUI DIEM'S TIMING, WE ARE FORWARDING DRAFT WITHOUT COMMENT.

2. BEGIN QUOTE:

1. THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA, MR. GORDON FREETH; THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MR. KYU HAH CHOI; THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NEW ZEALAND, MR. KEITH HOLYOAKE; THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHILIPPINES, MR. CARLOS P. ROUMLO; THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THAILAND, MR. THANAT KHOMAN; THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, MR. TRAN CHANH THANH; AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MR. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, MET IN BANGKOK, AT THE INVITATION OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT, ON 22 AND 23 MAY 1969.

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PURPOSES

2. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CALL FOR CONTINUING CONSULATATION TO CONSIDER WAYS IN WHICH THE SEVEN NATIONS MIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, TO REVIEW THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, AND TO EXAMINE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. THE PARTICIPANTS RENEWED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE GOALS OF FREEDOM PROCLAIMED AT MANILA:

1. TO BE FREE FROM AGGRESSION;
2. TO CONQUER HUNGER, ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE;
3. TO BUILD A REGION OF SECURITY, ORDER, AND PROGRESS;
4. TO SEEK RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

SITUATION IN VIETNAM

3. THE MINSTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF EVENTS IN HIS COUNTRY DURING THE PAST YEAR, PARTICULARLY THE STRENGTHENING OF ITS REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO DESCRIBED THE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS, BY MEANS OF THE FOURTH OFFENSIVE AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION QUARTERS IN CITIES AND TOWNS AND OF INTENSIFIED POLITICAL MACHINATIONS TO WIN SUPPORT FOR A "PEACE CABINET" SYPATHETIC TO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE, TO DESTROY THE COMMENDABLE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. HE OUTLINED THE MEASURES TAKEN BY HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROTECTION AND RELIEF OF THE POPULATION. HE POINTED OUT ALSO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE RELATED SITATION IN LAOS WHERE MORE THAN 40,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AREOCCUPYING MORE THAN HALF OF THE LAOTIAN TERRITORY, IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962. HE OBSERVED THAT COMMUNIST ARMED ATTACKS ARE BEING MOUNTED AGAINST NOT ONLY THE NEUTRAL GOVERNMENT OF LAO BUT ALSO THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA.

4. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS REAFFIRMED THEIR CONVICTION THAT A BROADLY-BASED REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM AS THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OFFERS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CONSOLIDATION. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST AGRESSORS CALLED FOR ABOLITION OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, OF THE ELECTED NATIONAL ASEMBLY, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

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OF VIETNAM AS WELL, AND FOR THEIR REPLACEMENT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE BY A TOTALURIAN COMMUNIST REGIME. THE MINISTERS REALIZED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE INTRASIGENT IN THEIR DEMANDS BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAM WANTS NOTHING LESS THAN COMPLETE DOMINATION OVER THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND BY WAGING TERRORISTIC CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE DEFENSELESS CIVILIAN POPULATIONAND INDI MRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST VARIOUS CENTERS, IT HOPES TO WEAR DOWN THE PATIENCE OF THE ALLIED NATIONS AND COMPEL THEM TO CONCLUDE PEACE ON ITS TERMS. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT, IN THE LIGHT OF THIS IMPERIALISTIC POLICY, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST BE ASSURED THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES WITHOUT EITHER EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE OR TERRORIST PRESSURE. THE IMPOSITION OF ANY FORM OF GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE SPURIOUS "COALITION" ADVOCATED BY THE COMMUNISTS AND SOME OTHERS, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE AND, THEREFORE, COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE.

5. THE MINISTERS ALSO RECEIVED REPORTS ON THE MILITARY SITUATION DURING THE YEAR, AND NOTED THE SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS AND INCREASING ROLE ASSUMED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN THE DEFENCE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THEIR EFFORTS, TOGETHER WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER ALLIED COUNTRIES, FRUSTRATED THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPT TO SUSTAIN ANATION-WIDE OFFENSIVE EARLY THIS YEAR AND EXACTED A HEAVY TOLL OF COMMUNIST CASUALTIES. AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE FAILURE OF THE COMMUNISTS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL UPRISING AND OF PRODUCING AN IMPACT ON WORLD PUBLIC OPINION BY DEMONSTRATING THEIR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES SHOULD CONVINCE THEM AS WELL
AS OTHERS OF THEIR INABILITY TO GAIN A VICTORY BY MILITARY MEANS. THEY HAD, FURTHERMORE, EXPOSED ONCE AGAIN THE EMPTINESS OF THEIR PRETENSIONS TO REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

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6. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION OF THE CONTINUING ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES TO THE GOVERNEMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN THEIR MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNIST ARMED AGGRESSION. THE MINISTERS NOTED WITH APPRECIATION THE INCREASING AVAILABILITY OF MODERN EQUIPMENT FOR COMBAT USE BY THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WHICH WILL FURTHER IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS TO DEFEND THEIR OWN HOMELAND, AND COMMENDED THE ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THIS SCORE. THEY ALSO NOTED WITH APPRECIATION THE INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF HE FIGHTING FORCE CONTRIBUTTED BY THAILAND TO THE DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO A DIVISION. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THEIR DEFENSE AGAINST ARMED AGGRESSION.

EFFORTS FOR PEACE

7. THE MINISTERS REVIEWED THE CONSISTENT EFFORTS FOR PEACE BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, AND NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE SERIES OF IMPORTANT INITIATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNEMTN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FURING THE PAST YEAR:

1. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON 31 MARCH 1968 TO STOP THE BOMBING OF MOST OF NORTH VIETNAM;
2. DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON 30 NOVEMBER 1968 TO HALT TOTALLY THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM;
3. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON....
4. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ON 25 MARCH 1969...
5. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON 7 APRIL 1969...

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8. IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE TAKEN BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, THE MINISTERSOBSERVED WITH PROFOUND REGRET THE ADAMANT ATTITUDE AND UNREASONABLENESS OF THE COMMUNISTS IN THEIR UNRELENTING PURSUIT OF AGGRANDIZEMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE MINISTERS RECALLED ALSO THE PROPOSAL MADE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT SAN ANTONIO ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1967, WHICH OFFERED A WAY TO PEACE THAT ALL REASONABLE MEN COULD ACCEPT. THEY NOTED, IN CONTRAST, THE PERSISTENT REFUSAL ON HANOI'S PART TO MAKE ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TOWARD A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD UPHOLD THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND RESPECT THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE IN PEACE AND FREEDOM. INSTEAD, NORTH VIETNAM HAS, ON THE ONE HAND, ESCALATED THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST BOTH POPULATION CENTERS AND ALLIED POSITIONS AND, ON THE OTHER, IT CONTINUES TO INSIST ON IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS OF UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS PUT FORWARD BY HANOI AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

9. THE MINISTERS NOTED WITH REGRET THAT THE PEACE TALKS IN PARIS WERE HAMPERED BY THE INTRANSIGENT AND UNYIELDING STAND OF THE COMMUNISTS ON SUCH CONSILIATORY PROPOSALS AS MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND MUTUAL RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR. SIMULTANEOUS COMMENCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES, WITH ADEQUATE VERIFICATION TO PREVENT FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF FORCES, AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA ARE THE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND ENDURING SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. ABOVE ALL, THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT, TO BE ENDURING, MUST RESPECT THE WISHES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES; THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHOULD BE A FULL PARTICIPANT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT SUCH A SETTLEMENT; AND THAT THE ALLIED NATIONS WHICH HAVE HELPED TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

10. THE MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMON DETERMINATION TO SPARE NO EFFORT IN SEARCH OF AN HONOURABLE AND DURABLE PEACE IN VIETNAM AS WELL AS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL START TO RESPOND IN A WAY THAT WILL PERMIT MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, AN END TO THE BLOODSHED AND THE SUFFERING OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE; THAT

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NORTH VIETNAM WILL SEE ADVANTAGES IN LIVING IN PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND FRIENDLY HARMONY WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS; AND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND FOR THE PROGRESS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA AS A WHOLE.

POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES

11. THE MINISTERS AGREED THAT SOME THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRIES RAVAGED BY THE WAR, AND TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCERTED ACTION BY THE SEVEN NATIONS TO ASSIST IN THIS REGARD, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG THEM NOT ONLY TO EXPLORE ALL AVENUES OF ASSISTANCE BUT ALSO TO FORMULATE A WORKING PLAN AND A TIME-TABLE FOR AN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN.

12. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A GUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING IN VIETNAM, AND PERHAPS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZAITON. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION.

KOREA

13. (TO BE INSERTED)

14. IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN KOREA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE MINISTERS REAFFIRMED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE DECLARATION ON PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC PROMULGATED AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN MANILA IN OCTOBER 1966. END QUOTE GP-3.

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S E C R E T BANGKOK 5506

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE

REF: A. BANGKOK 5304 B. STATE 68534 C. STATE 66205 D SAIGON 8386

1. AS FORESHADOWED IN REF (A) I MET WITH THANAT THIS MORNING TO PURSUE FURTHER OUR DISCUSSION OF THE TCC COMMUNIQUE. I HANDED THANAT A PAPER CONTAINING MUCH OF THE TEXT OF REFTEL (C), MINUS FYIS, AND INDICATED THAT IT REPRESENTED WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND. AFTER HE HAD COMPLETED READING THE PAPER, HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH HIS OWN IDEAS ON THE CONTENT OF THE COMMUNIQUE. AT THE SAME TIME HE NOTED THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF EMPHASIZING THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE ALLIES' CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND THE OTHER SIDE'S OBSTRUCTIVE STAND. THE ALLIES, E.G. HAVE PRESSED IN PARIS FOR A GENERAL REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES, WITNESS THE OFFER OF WITHDRAWAL OF OUR FORCES FOR STABILIZING THE DMZ AND OTHER CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS. THIEU HAS PROPOSED TALKS WITH THE NLF. THESE STEPS SHOULD BE CONTRASTED TO THE OTHER SIDE'S RIGIDLY NEGATIVE POSITION IN PARIS AND THEIR CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITY ON THE GROUND IN THE FORM OF CONTINUED SHELLINGS OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OF THE UNPROTECTED CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE CITIES.

2. I EXPLAINED TO THANAT OUR INTENTION OF DISCUSSING A FIRST DRAFT WITH BUI DIEM PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON ABOUT MAY 7 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONSULTATION IN SAIGON, AND ASKED THANAT THE STATUS OF THE THAI DRAFT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, IMPRESSING UPON HIM THE UTILITY OF HAVING IT IN TIME FOR TRANSMITTAL TO WASHINGTON SO THAT IT COULD BE DISCUSSED THERE WITH BUI DIEM BEFORE

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HIS DEPARTURE. HE AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL MECHANISM FOR COORDINATING OUR THOUGHTS ANDINSTRUCTED HIS SECRETARY (BIRA) TO PREPARE THE DRAFT OVER THE WEEK-END. THANAT ASSURED ME THAT THE DRAFT WOULD BE READY BY TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK, AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE IT AVAILABLE TO ME AS SOON AS IT WAS READY. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT MATERIAL I HAD PROVIDED WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THEM IN THEIR DRAFTING.

3. I ALSO LEFT WITH THANAT A COPY OF SECRETARY ROGERS' ADDRESS OF APRIL 21, NOTING ITS RELEVANCE TO THE COMMUNIQUE DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWAL (PARA 3.E REFTEL C) AND SUGGESTING IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN DRAFTING ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY ALSO TO MENTION GVN DECISION TO SEND GENERAL NGO DU AS ITS MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE (REF D).

4. IF ALL GOES WELL YOU SHOULD HAVE BY OPENING OF BUSINESS WEDNESDAY A THAI DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ALONG LINES OF OUR OWN THINKING FOR DISCUSSION WITH BUI DIEM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086

S E C R E T BANGKOK 5304
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE

REF: STATE 066205

1. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THANAT AND AMBASSADOR WALSH AND BOB MILLER THIS MORNING, I RAISED WITH THANAT SUBJECT REFTEL. I SAID I PRESUMED ON BASIS PAST PRACTICE THIAS WERE PLANNING PREPARE FIRST DRAFT FOR COMMUNIQUE. THANAT CONFIRMED THIS AND SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE QUITE CONCISE THISYEAR. I AGREED BUT SAID I PRESUMED WE WOULD NOT WISH TO FAIL TO BRING OUT POINTS WHICH WILL ENHANCE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF OUR POSITION. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION I REFERRED TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S RECENT SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS ABOUT GVN WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH NLF, ETC. THANAT ACCEPTED THIS POINT AND SAID IN FACT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCUMENT AND SHOULD AVOID LENGTHY ENUMERATION OF FACTS AND EVENTS.

2. SINCE THERE WAS NO TIME TO PURSUE MATTER FURTHER, WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON FRIDAY WHEN THANAT SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HEAR OUR THOUGHTS ON SUBSTANTIVE POINTS TO BE COVERED IN COMMUNIQUE. FOR FRIDAY CONVERSATION WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE INDICATION DEPT'S THINKING HOW US CONSULTATIONS WITH BUI DIEM IN WASHINGTON AND LATER IN SAIGON WILL BE COORDINATED WITH THAIS AS COMMUNIQUE DRAFTERS AND HOSTS.

3. IN ADDITION TO COMMUNIQUE MATTERS, BELIEVE DISCUSSION ON FRIDAY MAY ALSO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO STEER THANAT AWAY FROM ANY THOUGHTS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT CALLING FOR A RESTRICTED SESSION DURING SEATO MEETING TO DISCUSS VIETNAM SITUATION AND FUTURE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY. SEEMS TO ME THIS CAN BE MORE

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FRUITFULLY PURSUED IN TCC FORUM AND I WILL TRY TO MOVE THANAT'S THINKING IN THAT DIRECTION UNLESS DEPARTMENT DISAGREES. AT SAME TIME WE WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBILITY HIS SEEKING RESTRICTED SEATO SESSION FOR PURPOSE DISCUSSING ORGANIZATION'S FUTURE ROLE.

GP-3. UNGER

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. QUINN S/S-O.

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5358

S E C R E T BANGKOK 3948

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SEATO AND TCC MEETINGS

REF: A. STATE 48793; B. STATE 48858

1. DISCUSSED PLANNING FOR MAY MEETINGS AGAIN APRIL 1 WITH SECRETARY TO FONMIN (BIRABHONGSE). CONVEYED PER PARA 3 REG A ASSURANCES OF BASIC IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO TCC MEETING AND TO OPPORTUNTIY IT OFFERS FOR VERY FULL AND FRANK PRIVATE DISCUSSION. INDICATED THAT PLANNING FOR SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE NOW ENVISAGES ARRIVAL IN BANGKOK MAY 19 TO PERMIT BEGINNING BILATERAL TALKS AND WOULD PERMIT EXTENDING TCC MEETINGS AND ACCOMPANYING SOCIAL FUNCTIONS THROUGH LUNCHEON MAY 23.

2. BIRA EXPRESSED GREAT PLEASURE WITH THIS NEWS. SINCE WE HAD BEEN ASKED TO DETERMINE WHETHER SECRETARY WOULD ACCEPT INVITATION FROM
HIS MAJESTY IF EXTENDED, WE ASSURED BIRA THAT SECRETARY WOULD ATTEND LUNCHEON WITHIN THIS TIME PERIOD. HE SAID THAT PLANNING NOT YET DEFINITE, MFA PREFERS AND WILL BE TRYING TO CONFIRM ROYAL AUDIENCE AND LUNCHEON FOR FRIDAY, MAY 23, BUT THAT TCC MEETING MAY HAVE TO BE INTERRUPTED ON 22ND FOR THESE FUNCTIONS.

3. HAVING IN MIND DEPARTMENT'S THOUGHT OF TELESCOPING SEATO MEETING, PARA 2, REF A, WE INQUIRED WHETHER FURTHER PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN SCHDULING OF TWO MEETINGS, NOTING THAT ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION AMONG SEATO COUNCIL REPS HAD ENVISAGED TWO-DAY AESSION WE WOULD NATURALLY CONSIDER ANY ADJUSTMENT HOST GOVERNMENT
MIGHT HAVE IN MIND. BIRA SAID ONLY THAT PLANNING NOT VERY FAR AD-

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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VANCED.

4. HE DID, HOWEVER, GO ON TO REFER ONCE AGAIN TO POSSIBILITY OF A "SEMI-PUBLIC" TCC SESSION, WHICH HE INDICATED MEANT A BRIEF FINAL SESSION OPEN TO PRESS THOUGH NOT TO THE PUBLIC. WE THEREFORE EMPHASIZED US BELIEF (REF B) THAT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD SPEAK LARGELY FOR ITSELF. BIRA ACKNOWLEDGED THIS POINT BUT SAID THERE MIGHT BE SOME MINISTERS WHO WOULD WISH TO COMMENT ON IT. WE REPLIED THAT PERIOD OF MEETINGS WOULD CERTAINLY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ANY PARTICIPANT TO MEET WITH PRESS IF HE FOUND IT IN HIS AND GROUP'S GENERAL INTEREST. (COMMENT: IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT RTG INTEREST IN SOME SORT OF PUBLIC SESSION REFLECTS PRESSURE FROM ELSEWHERE AND THIS PROPOSAL MAY DIE HARD: WE WILL KEEP AFTER IT.) BIRA DID SAY HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT GVN REP WOULD BE INVITED TO PRESENT COMMUNIQUE TO THE PRESS, AS AT WELLINGTON, BUT THIS NOT YET DECIDED.

5. BIRA RECALLED THAT ADMIRAL SHARP HAD GIVEN BRIEFING ON MILITARY SITUATION AT LAST YEAR'S MEETING AND INQUIRED WHETHER CINCPAC PLANNING TO PROVIDE THIS BRIEFING AGAIN. ASKED WHETHER RTG WISHED THIS
AND WHETHER HE BELIEVEDOTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO. BIRA INDICATED THIS WAS A PERSONAL SUGGESTION AT THIS STAGE BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AT BEGINNING OF TCC SESSIONS. HE SAID HE ASSUMED GVN REP WOULD AGAIN BE INVITED TO REVIEW POLITICAL ASPECTS OF VIETNAM PROBLEM BUT THAT MILITARY PRESENTATION MIGHT APPROPRIATELY COME FROM US. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT HIS INTEREST AND SAID WE FELT SURE USG WOULD WANT TO MEET WISHES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. (COMMENT: BELIEVE A FORTHRIGHT MILITARY BRIEFING WOULD PROVIDE ONE OF IMPORTANT BENCHMARKS FOR TCC DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMEND ADMIRAL MCCAIN BE ASKED
TO PROVIDE IT.)

6. COMMENT: I HAVE SOME DIFFICULTY SQUARING OBSERVATION IN PARA 1, REF B, THAT ONE DISADVANTAGE OF A PUBLIC SESSION WOULD BE TO DETRACT FROM TCC JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH CAUTION IN PARA 3, REF A, CONCERNING DOUBTS ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO PREPARE AND ISSUE "A MAJOR COMMUNIQUE OF SUBSTANCE". ALTHOUGH WE MUST OBVIOUSLY AVOID PITFALLS OF PREJUDGING OR CONSTRICTING SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PARIS, I THINK IT QUITE CLEAR THAT A COMMUNIQUE DEVOID OF SUBSTANCE WILL DEPRIVE THE TCC MEETING OF THE MEANING PARTICIPANTS WILL SEEK AND OF THE IMPACT WE SHOULD WISH FOR ON HANOI AND THE

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PAGE 03 BANGKO 03948 011313Z

WORLD AT LARGE.

7. DEPT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.
GP-3. UNGER

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SECRET 610

PAGE 01 STATE 073981 2

87
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 R

66648/66633
DRAFTED BY: EA/VN: HFMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY: EA: WHSULLIVAN
EA/VN: MR BURKE
C: AMB PEDERSEN SUB (COMMUNIQUE IN DRAFT)
S: THE SECRETARY
S/S: WALKER (COMMUNIQUE IN DRAFT)

122128

O 102144Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

S E C R E T STATE 073981

EXDIS

SUBJ: TCC CONFERENCE - COMMUNIQUE

A. FOLLOWING IS OUR DRAFT TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE. IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A WORKING DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. IT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BUI DIEM, WHOSE REACTION WAS THAT IT SEEMED TO COVER ESSENTIAL POINTS ADEQUATELY, BUT HE THOUGHT HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO REPHRASE THE HANDLING OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE IN PARAGRAPH 8. HE THOUGHT GVN COULD HAVE ITS COMMENTS READY BY TIME SECRETARY ARRIVES MAY 14. OUR TREATMENT OF THE NLF TEN-POINT PROGRAM IN PARAGRAPH 10 IS PARTICULARLY TENTATIVE, AND FINAL VERSION WILL HAVE TO DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 22.

B. BANGKOK AND SAIGON SHOULD NOW PROCEED TO DISCUSS DRAFT WITH RTG AND GVN AND ASK FOR THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND CONCURRENCE. WE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND EMBASSIES HERE MAY 12.

C. YOUR COMMENTS ALSO WELCOME. REPEAT ALL MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT TO CINCPAC TOSEC AFTER 0500 WASHINGTON

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TIME MAY 11.

D. COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS:

1. THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AUSTRALIA, MR. GORDON FREETH; THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MR. KYU HAH CHOI; THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NEW ZEALAND, MR. KEITH HOLYOAKE; THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PHILIPPINES, MR. CARLOS P. ROMULO; THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THAILAND, MR. THANAT KHOMAN; THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, MR. TRAN CHANH THANH; AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MR. WILLIAM P. ROGERS; MET IN BANGKOK, AT THE INVITATION OF THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT, ON 22 AND 23 MAY 1969.

PURPOSES

2. THE MEETING WAS HELD TO PERMIT THE MINISTERS TO CONTINUE THEIR PRACTICE OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON IMPORTANT MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. SPECIFICALLY, THEY WISHED (1) TO REVIEW THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIET-NAM, (2) TO CONSIDER THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, (3) TO DISCUSS WAYS IN WHICH THE SEVEN NATIONS MIGHT STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEOPLE OF VIET-NAM, (4) TO EXAMINE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ASIA. THE PARTICIPANTS RENEWED THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE GOALS OF FREEDOM PROCLAIMED AT MANILA:

(A) TO BE FREE FROM AGGRESSION;
(B) TO CONQUER HUNGER, ILLITERACY, AND DISEASE;
(C) TO BUILD A REGION OF SECURITY, ORDER, AND PROGRESS;
(D) TO SEEK RECONCILIATION AND PEACE THROUGHOUT ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

SITUATION IN VIET-NAM

3. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM DESCRIBED THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN HIS COUNTRY OVER THE PAST YEAR. HE NOTED THE SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT, SUCH AS THE SUPREME COURT, CALLED FOR BY THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION. HE ALSO EXPLAINED THE CURRENT EFFORTS OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES POLITICALLY TO FURTHER THEIR COMMON GOALS. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT THE

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CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

4. THE MINISTER ALSO OUTLINED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF HIS COUNTRYMEN ECONOMICALLY AND TO BRING THEM GREATER SOCIAL BENEFITS, MAKING PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S LAND REFORM PROGRAM. HE DESCRIBED THE INCREASED AUTONOMY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES GIVEN TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO FOSTER A FUNCTIONING DEMOCRACY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE.

5. THE MINISTERS HEARD AN ELOQUENT STATEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE ON THE PART OF HIS COUNTRYMEN AFTER SO MANY YEARS OF WAR. THEY ENDORSED THE REASONABLE NATURE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT THIEU ON MARCH 25 AND APRIL 7 AND WELCOMED THIS EVIDENCE OF THE GOOD FAITH AND RESPONSIVENESS THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES WERE A MATTER FOR DETERMINATION BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND WELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM TO TALK TO THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.

6. THE MINISTERS RECEIVED A BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION FROM VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY COMMANDERS AND WERE ENCOURAGED AT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY ALLIED FORCES AND THE INCREASING DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE OTHER SIDE. THEY ENDORSED THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND WELCOMED THEIR DETERMINATION TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE DEFENSE OF THEIR HOMELAND. THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED THEIR ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE FOR THE COURAGE AND DEVOTION OF THE ALLIED SOLDIERS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

7. THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT THEIR FORCES WERE IN VIETNAM TO HELP DEFEND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION. THEY REAFFIRMED THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO ASSURE THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, AND ARE ABLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS RENEWED THEIR DETERMINATION TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST AGGRESSION BY ARMED ATTACK AND ACCORDINGLY TO CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM; THEY DECIDED TO RELATE THIS SUPPORT TO THE PROGRESS OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS.

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THE LEVEL OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS BY THE ENEMY AND THE READINESS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES TO REPLACE THEM.

EFFORTS FOR PEACE

8. THE MINISTERS ALSO REVIEWED THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TAKING PLACE IN PARIS AND ENDORSED THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE THERE BY THE GOVTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY NOTED AND APPROVED THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE DEALING WITH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN THE FORM TABLED THERE BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND U.S. DELEGATIONS. THEY AGREED WITH ITS SPECIFIC PROVISIONS THAT THESE WITHDRAWALS COULD COMMENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY, THAT ALL EXTERNALLY INTRODUCED FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN NOT ONLY FROM SOUTH VIETNAM BUT ALSO FROM THE SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, AND THAT A CLEAR NEED EXISTED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF BOTH THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND THE CESSATION OF FURTHER INTRODUCTION OF NEW FORCES.

9. THE MINISTERS ALSO ENDORSED THE AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE PROPOSALS FOR OBSERVANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR, AND FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

10. THEY EXAMINED THE PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED IN PARIS BY THE OTHER SIDE. THEY REGRET THAT IT STILL APPEARS TO BE THEIR OBJECTIVE TO IMPOSE UPON SOUTH VIETNAM A PROGRAM AND A SYSTEM WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF ITS PEOPLE. THEY AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL POSSIBILITIES LEADING TO PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION SHOULD BE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED, AND ENDORSED THE EFFORTS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS IN THIS DIRECTION.

POST-WAR PLANNING AND OBJECTIVES

11. THE MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION TO SUPPORT ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM AFTER THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. THEY NOTED IN THIS REGARD THE GREAT POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS ENVISIONED BY THE RECENTLY-RELEASED JOINT DEVELOPMENT GROUP REPORT PREPARED

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AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES AND REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM GOVTS. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR AGREEMENT TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE BROAD QUESTION OF ASSISTING THE VIETNAMESE TO ACHIEVE THE BRIGHT FUTURE THEIR SACRIFICES HAVE EARNED. THEY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL SEE ADVANTAGES IN LIVING IN PEACEFUL COOPERATION AND FRIENDLY HARMONY WITH ITS NEIGHBORS; AND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND FOR THE PROGRESS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA AS A WHOLE.

12. THE MINISTERS ALSO AGREED THAT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT IN ASIA SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARTICIPATION BY ASIAN POWERS IN A GUARANTEE OF PEACE AND SECURITY FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES THEMSELVES MUST SHOULDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE WELL-BEING AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, A RESPONSIBILITY THAT MIGHT WELL BEGIN WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF THE DUTY OF PEACE-KEEPING IN VIETNAM, AND PERHAPS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, POSSIBLY UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION. AGAIN, CLOSEST CONSULTATION AMONG THEM WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONNECTION.

KOREA

13. THE MIN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONTINUING AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA PERPETRATED BY NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST ARMED RAIDERS. THE MINISTERS RECORDED THEIR CONCERN OVER THESE DEVELOPMENTS. THEY AFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN RESISTING SUCH AGGRESSION AND UNDERTOOK TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THIS SITUATION.

CONCLUSION

14. THE MINISTERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS PLEDGED THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND SPECIFICALLY TO PRESERVE THE UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE MINISTERS STATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS GOAL WHILE PURSUING WITH EQUAL INSISTENCE A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. FINALLY, THE MINISTERS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE CLOSE COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION WHICH HAS EXISTED AMONG THE

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SEVEN NATIONS. GP-4 ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 051

PAGE 01 STATE 068534

81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 R

66642
DRAFTED BY: EA/VN: HFMATTHEWS
APPROVED BY: EA/WHSULLIVAN
C-MR PEDERSEN PHONE
EA/VN: MR BURKE
EA/RA: MR CLARK PARA 2
S/S WSSHEPARD

O 020029Z MAY 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 068534

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TCC MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE

REF: BANGKOK 5304

1. WITH REGARD TO POINT RAISED PARA TWO REFTEL, WE WOULD PLAN TO LET YOU KNOW OF ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THINKING THAT EITHER WE OR VIETNAMESE HAVE WITH THAI IDEAS. DO THAI PLAN TO GIVE US DRAFT IN ADVANCE? IF SO, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE FORTHCOMING VERY SOON FOR US TO BE ABLE TO CONSULT ON ACTUAL LANGUAGE CHANGES BEFORE ARRIVAL BANGKOK. WE WANT TO NARROW DIFFERENCES IN THINKING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BEFORE MEETINGS BEGIN IN BANGKOK, BUT IT MAY WELL BE THAT DRAFTS WILL BE PROPOSED BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES. IN LATTER EVENT WE WILL HAVE TO TRY TO MARRY THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS, AND HOPE THAT THE PRODUCT OF THIS SHOTGUN WEDDING WILL BE A LITTLE HANDSOMER THAN THE ONE LAST YEAR FROM WELLINGTON.

2. WE CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IN PARA THREE.

GP-3. ROGERS

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CONTROL: 6 8 3 3 Q
APR. 29, 1969
2:50 A.M.

P 290525Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3730
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T CANBERRA 2286

NODIS

REF: STATE 62693

SUBJECT: SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE

1. CONCUR STATEMENT REFTEL THAT AUSTRALIA PREPARED LIVE WITH SOME REDUCTION IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM WHILE RETAINING ITS FORCES AT PRESENT LEVEL. PRIME MINISTER, DEFENCE MINISTER AND ARMY MINISTER HAVE SAID AS MUCH PUBLICLY (CANBERRA 1996, 2035 AND 2136). THEIR POSITION IS THAT PRESENT AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE WELL-BALANCED UNIT AND ANY REDUCTION WOULD MATERIALLY REDUCE EFFECTIVENESS. ALSO THAT, IN ANY CASE, TOTAL NUMBERS ARE SMALL IN COMPARISON OTHER CONTRIBUTING POWERS.

2. GOA OFFICIALS HAVE NOT INDICATED EXTENT THEIR INTEREST IN SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE, BUT GOA CLEARLY PLACES FAR MORE IMPORTANCE ON GORTON VISIT TO WASHINGTON WHICH PRECEDES SEVEN-NATION CONFERENCE BY ABOUT TWO WEEKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY WILL NOT EXPECT TO LEARN ANYTHING NEW FROM US AND THEY CERTAINLY WILL HAVE NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE TO TELL US OR OTHERS THAT WASN'T ALREADY THOROUGHLY COVERED IN WASHINGTON TALKS. FREETH, WHO WILL HEAD GOA DELEGATION, IS NOT PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL AND IS STILL PRETTY GREEN TO EXTERNAL AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO AND WE DOUBT HE WILL PLAY VERY ACTIVE ROLE. PLIMSOLL, WHO WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON WITH GORTON, TOLD CHARGE HE HOPES TO AVOID TCC MEETING AND SEND SOMEONE ELSE FROM EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS IS PERHAPS INDICATIVE OF DEGREE OF GOA INTEREST IN FORTHCOMING MEETING.

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3. ALTHOUGH GOA IS UNLIKELY TAKE ANY INITIATIVE AT MEETING, IT WILL DEFINITELY WISH TO KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT WE PLAN TO SAY AND WHAT WE HOPE WILL COME OUT OF MEETING. WE BELIEVE THEY EXPECT THAT QUESTION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MAJOR SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION (IN WHICH, APART FROM OUR SPECIAL SITUATION, THEY WOULD URGE OTHERS TO HOLD THE LINE) AND THAT DETAILED BRIEFING PARIS TALKS WOULD BE GIVEN BY US AND GVN REPRESENTATIVES. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO GET INTO SUBJECTS OF POST-VIETNAM PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION, DISCUSSION OF INSURGENCY IN THAILAND AND LAOS, AND POSTWAR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. GOA WILL WISH TO HAVE A STRONG JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT DEMONSTRATES FIRM SOLIDARITY AND INTENT ALL TCC'S TO STAND BY BASIC OBJECTIVE. CRONK
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PAGE 01 MANILA 05021 160755Z 2

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01 /031 W
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P R 160703Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 5121
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 8831

S E C R E T MANILA 5021

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER

REF: SAIGON 9433 (SECTO 17)

1. TEXT WITHDRAWAL PAPER DELIVERED BY CHARGE PERSONALLY TO LE HUY NAM, TEMPORARILY IN CHARGE GVN EMBASSY, AT NOON TODAY. (MINISTER LOC, REGULAR GVN CHARGE, IS OUT OF TOWN).

2. NAM HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM SAIGON RELATIVE TO PRESENTATION TO ROMULO, WHICH CORRESPONDED WITH OURS, AND WAS SEEKING APPOINTMENT WITH ROMULO TO EFFECT DELIVERY PRIOR TO ROMULO'S DEPARTURE TOMORROW AFTERNOON, MAY 17, FOR BANGKOK.

3. CHARGE OFFERED TO BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE IF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN SEEING ROMULO. TOOK OCCASION TO STRESS AGAIN HIGHLY SENSITIVE NATURE OF PAPER. WILSON

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TELEGRAM

R 240647Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8394
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T MANILA 4156

SECRET

5 6 8 3Q
1969 APR 24 AM 3:03

NODIS

SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 62693

1. GOP THUS FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON SEATO ASPECTS OF FORTHCOMING BANGKOK MEETING AND WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION OF SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR TCC. AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT PHILIPPINES WILL BE INTERESTED IN TROOPS WITHDRAWAL, PARIS NEGOTIOTIONS, AND MILITARY SITUATION (IN THAT ORDER).

2. WITH ELECTION NOW SIX MONTHS AWAY MARCOS JUDGES EVERYTHING IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON HIS REELECTION CHANCES. BELIEVE IT LIKELY HE HAS DECIDED THAT IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM COULD HURT HIM BUT CANNOT HELP HIM. THE LESS ATTENTION THEREFORE TO PHILCAG THE BETTER. TROOP WITHDRAWALS ARE FOR THIS REASON PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME MARCOS SEES LONGER RANGE BENEFITS TO THE PHILIPPINES FROM A CONTINUING PRESENCE IN VIETNAM (MANILA 3106) AND RECOGNIZES THAT A PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL OF PHILCAG MIGHT PRODUCE A NEGATIVE US RESPONSE THAT COULD HURT HIS ELECTION CHANCES. THEREFORE, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS AND A MAJOR REDUCTION OF BOTH US AND ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM, BELIEVE MARCOS WILL TRY TO STICK IT OUT WITH PHILCAG, AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER.

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMULO WILL PROBABLY BE INSTRUCTED TO LIE LOW AT THE TCC, GET AS SHARP A LINE AS HE CAN ON US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY ANY INDICATIONS OF US POLICY TOWARDS MAINTAINING A FUTURE POSITION OF STRENGTH IN ASIA, AND WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD DRAW PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO CONTINUED PRESENCE OF PHILCAG.
WILSON
BT

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TELEGRAM

WH 7

R 240647Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8394
STATE GRNC
BT

SECRET

5 6 8 3Q
1969 APR 24 AM 3:03

S E C R E T MANILA 4156

NODIS

SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 62693

1. GOP THUS FAR HAS CONCENTRATED ON SEATO ASPECTS OF FORTHCOMING BANGKOK MEETING AND WE HAVE SEEN NO INDICATION OF SPECIAL PREPARATION FOR TCC. AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT PHILIPPINES WILL BE INTERESTED IN TROOPS WITHDRAWAL, PARIS NEGOTIOTIONS, AND MILITARY SITUATION (IN THAT ORDER).

2. WITH ELECTION NOW SIX MONTHS AWAY MARCOS JUDGES EVERYTHING IN TERMS OF ITS EFFECT ON HIS REELECTION CHANCES. BELIEVE IT LIKELY HE HAS DECIDED THAT IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT PHILIPPINE PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM COULD HURT HIM BUT CANNOT HELP HIM. THE LESS ATTENTION THEREFORE TO PHILCAG THE BETTER. TROOP WITHDRAWALS ARE FOR THIS REASON PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME MARCOS SEES LONGER RANGE BENEFITS TO THE PHILIPPINES FROM A CONTINUING PRESENCE IN VIETNAM (MANILA 3106) AND RECOGNIZES THAT A PRECIPITATE WITHDRAWAL OF PHILCAG MIGHT PRODUCE A NEGATIVE US RESPONSE THAT COULD HURT HIS ELECTION CHANCES. THEREFORE, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT PARIS AND A MAJOR REDUCTION OF BOTH US AND ALLIED FORCES IN VIETNAM, BELIEVE MARCOS WILL TRY TO STICK IT OUT WITH PHILCAG, AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER.

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ROMULO WILL PROBABLY BE INSTRUCTED TO LIE LOW AT THE TCC, GET AS SHARP A LINE AS HE CAN ON US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY ANY INDICATIONS OF US POLICY TOWARDS MAINTAINING A FUTURE POSITION OF STRENGTH IN ASIA, AND WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION THAT WOULD DRAW PHILIPPINE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO CONTINUED PRESENCE OF PHILCAG.
WILSON
BT

SECRET

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 099

PAGE 01 SEOUL 02532 160410Z 2

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01 /031 W
---------- 024441

P R 160345Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 6291

S E C R E T SEOUL 2532

EXDIS

SUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE - WITHDRAWAL PAPER

REF: SAIGON 9433

TEXT OF THE PAPER HANDED TO VIETNAMESE CHARGE, SEOUL, ON MAY 16. CHARGE ADVISED HE HAS JUST RECEIVED HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND IS REQUESTING APPOINTMENT FOREIGN MINISTER CHOE TO DELIVER TEXT. GP-4

PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

W H 7

R 251000Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5950
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T SEOUL 2110

SECRET

6 0 6 9Q

1969 APR 25 AM 5:47

NODIS

SUBJECT: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 062693

1. WE BELIEVE THAT ROKG, LIKE OTHERS ATTENDING, ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE BOTH FOR REASONS GIVEN REFTEL AND BECAUSE CONFERENCE PROVIDES GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR ROKG TO PUSH ITS IDEAS ON SEVERAL ADDITIONAL MATTERS AS WELL AS TO OBTAIN US AND OTHER REACTIONS TO THEM. FOR ROKG VIEWS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL SEE SEOUL 2033 (LIMDIS) WHICH CROSSED WITH REFTEL.

2. AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH ROKG OFFICIALS PROBABLY PLANNING TO DISCUSS WITH US AND OTHER NATIONS ARE:

A) ROK VIEWS ON IMPORTANCE OF US KEEPING UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA BASES.

B) ROK PATO CONCEPT WITH WHICH DEPARTMENT ALREADY FAMILIAR.

C) US INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO ITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN EAST ASIA AND SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO KOREA.

D) OUR PLANS FOR VIETNAM IN ADDITION TO PARIS TALKS AND TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND REACTION OF SVN AND OTHER NATIONS TO THESE PLANS.

E) ROKS MAY TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PLUG WITH US THEIR NEED FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

3. ROKG PROBABLY HOPES THAT FINAL COMMUNIQUE WILL CONTAIN SPECIFIC REAFFIRMATION OF MANILA COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING FULL CONSULTATION, AND PERHAPS A GENERAL REAFFIRMATION OF US INTENTION MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN AREA.

GP-3 PORTER
BT

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 240615Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2393
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T WELLINGTON 696

CONTROL : 5 6 7 7 Q
RECEIVED : APR 24, 1969
2AM

NODIS

DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE AS DESIRED

SUBJ: SEVEN NATION CONFERENCE

REFS: (A) STATE 62693
(B) WELLINGTON 642
(C) WELLINGTON 575
(D) WELLINGTON 336

1. ALTHOUGH GNZ STILL STEWING OVER LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT SEATO-TCC SESSIONS IN BANGKOK, AND NO FIRM INDICATION YET AS TO WHETHER PM HOLYOAKE WILL ATTEND, IT IS QUITE CLEAR FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH EXTAFF OFFICIALS FROM TOP ON DOWN THAT THEY REGARD TCC PORTION OF MEETING AS FAR MORE IMPORTANT THAN SEATO PORTION.

2. WHILE NO RPT NO INDICATION THAT GNZ NOW CONSIDERING REDUCTION IN NZ UNIT IN VIETNAM, REDUCTION IN U.S. FORCES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSE THIS QUESTION TO BE RAISED BY ANTI-VIETNAM GROUPS IN NZ. FURTHER, IF LABOUR PARTY SHOULD WIN NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, WITHDRAWAL OF NZ CONTINGENT WOULD BECOME STRONG LIKELIHOOD REGARDLESS OF WHAT ACTION U.S. TAKES.

3. RE LAST SENTENCE REF A, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO PURSUE THESE MATTERS FURTHER WITH GNZ. HAVING IN MIND FIRST SENTENCE PARA 3, REF A, DOES DEPARTMENT PERCEIVE OBJECTION TO OUR DOING SO?

GP-1. HENNING
BT

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