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DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
001	memo	Emerging Situation MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14443 Pages: 12 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/30/13	3/29/1974	B
002	note w/attach	David - FYI MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14444 Pages: 2	5/29/1974	B
003	memo	Kennedy to Clift and Suanders MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14445 Pages: 3	6/5/1974	B
004	note w/attach	Hank A. to Dave Ransom MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14446 Pages: 6	6/12/1974	B
005	memo	The Likelihood of Conflict MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14447 Pages: 28	6/21/1974	B
006	memo	The Likelihood of Conflict (duplicate of 5) MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14448 Pages: 28	6/21/1974	B
007	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #5486 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14449 Pages: 5	7/11/1974	B
008	note w/attach	Kenendy to Grove MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14450 Pages: 5	8/13/1974	B

FILE GROUP TITLE	National Security Council Files, NSC Secretariat - Richard M. Nixon Cables Contingency Plans 1974	Box 1312
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FOLDER TITLE	[05] Greek-Turk Contingency Plans
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009	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3704 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14451 Pages: 2	6/14/1974	B
010	telegram	To Sec. State #3745 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14452 Pages: 2	7/4/1974	B
011	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4214 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14453 Pages: 2	7/2/1974	B
012	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4178 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14454 Pages: 4	7/1/1974	B
013	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14455 Pages: 4	6/27/1974	B
014	telegram	American Consul. to Sec. State #0328 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14456 Pages: 2	7/24/1974	B
015	memcon	Turkish Views MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14457 Pages: 3	6/6/1974	B
016	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4979 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14458 Pages: 4	6/25/1974	B

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017	telegram	Sec. State to AmEmbassy #134727 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14459 Pages: 5	6/22/1974	B
018	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4891 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14460 Pages: 4	6/21/1974	B
019	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #07841 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14461 Pages: 2	6/21/1974	B
020	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4746 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14462 Pages: 3	6/18/1974	B
021	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3801 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14463 Pages: 2	6/18/1974	B
022	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3744 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14464 Pages: 6	6/15/1974	B
023	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4684 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14465 Pages: 2	6/17/1974	B
024	telegram	Sec. State to AmEmbassy #129287 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14466 Pages: 2	6/17/1974	B

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025	report	Research Study MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14467 Pages: 13 <i>DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/30/13</i>	5/30/1974	B
026	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3700 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14468 Pages: 2	6/13/1974	B
027	report	An Extension of Territorial Waters MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14469 Pages: 2	6/14/1974	B
028	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4572 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14470 Pages: 2	6/12/1974	B
029	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3705 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14471 Pages: 2	6/14/1974	B
030	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4684 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14472 Pages: 3 <i>DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/23/13</i>	6/14/1974	B
031	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4677 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14473 Pages: 2	6/14/1974	B
032	telegram	Sec. State to AmEmbassy #127871 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14474 Pages: 2 <i>DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/23/13</i>	6/14/1974	B

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033	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4720 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14475 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per RAC review 4/24/13	6/17/1974	B
034	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14476 Pages: 3	6/11/1974	B
035	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4596 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14477 Pages: 3	6/12/1974	B
036	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4566 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14478 Pages: 17	6/12/1974	B
037	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3536 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14479 Pages: 2	6/8/1974	B
038	telegram	Sec. State to AmEmbassy #120351 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14480 Pages: 3	6/7/1974	B
039	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14481 Pages: 3	5/31/1974	B
040	telegram	To Sec. State #3024 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14482 Pages: 2	5/30/1974	B

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041	telegram	American Consul. to Sec. State #0268 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14483 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per RAC review 4/24/83	5/30/1974	B
042	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4163 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14484 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per RAC review 6/30/89	5/30/1973	B
043	telegram	To Sec. State #3025 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14485 Pages: 4	5/30/1973	B
044	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4193 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14486 Pages: 5	5/30/1973	B
045	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4142 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14487 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 6/30/09	5/30/1973	B
046	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3236 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14488 Pages: 2	5/30/1973	B
047	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14489 Pages: 4	5/30/1973	B
048	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14490 Pages: 3	5/26/1974	B

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049	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14491 Pages: 3	5/28/1974	B
050	airgram	AmEmbassy to DOS MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14492 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/23/13	5/22/1974	B
051	memo	David - MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14493 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/24/13	5/22/1974	B
052	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14494 Pages: 7	5/23/1974	B
053	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State # 06007 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14495 Pages: 6 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/24/13	5/15/1974	B
054	handwritten notes	Nov 25 - MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14496 Pages: 1 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/24/13	n.d.	B
055	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14497 Pages: 4	5/20/1974	B
056	telegram	To Sec. State #101599 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14498 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/24/13	5/16/1974	B

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057	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3852 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14499 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/24/13	5/17/1974	B
058	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4055 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14500 Pages: 12	5/26/1974	B
059	cable	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3226 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14501 Pages: 6	5/29/1974	B
060	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3223 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14502 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/24/13	5/29/1974	B
061	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3221 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14503 Pages: 2	5/29/1974	B
062	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4128 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14504 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per RAC review 12/13/11	5/29/1974	B
063	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #3219 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14505 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 4/30/13	5/29/1974	B
064	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4216 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14506 Pages: 5	5/29/1974	B

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065	telegram	AmEmbassy to Sec. State #4219 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14507 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per RAC review 6/30/09	5/31/1974	B
066	telegram	American Consul. to Sec. State #0244 MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14508 Pages: 4	5/16/1974	B
067	cable	Intelligence Information Cable (2 copies) MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14509 Pages: 4	5/20/1974	B
068	memo	Briefing Memorandum MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14510 Pages: 10	4/5/1974	B
069	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14511 Pages: 2	5/20/1969	B
070	memo	Greece Under Ioannidis MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14512 Pages: 14	4/18/1974	B
071	note w/attach	Smith to Barnum MR Case NLN 09-56; Doc. ID 14513 Pages: 16	7/29/1974	B

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

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March 29, 1974

To: The Secretary
From: INR - William G. Hyland

Emerging Situation in Greece

Attached is the INR evaluation of the situation in Greece that you requested at your analytical staff meeting on March 20. Comments from NEA and Ambassador Tasca, which you also requested, will be submitted separately.

The paper's principal conclusions are:

- 1) The Ioannidis regime is both "odious and incompetent." It shows no inclination to move toward parliamentary government and no ability to deal with Greece's burgeoning problems. Its position is insecure because of its own inadequacy, public hostility, and especially the disfavor in which it is held by segments of the increasingly factionalized armed forces. Even so, Ioannidis, through repression and skillful police work, probably can remain in power for several more months and perhaps even for one to two years.
- 2) Whenever the Ioannidis clique goes, it is likely to be replaced by another military regime--possibly composed of senior commanders, possibly of younger hardliners. The former would look better to the outside and would be more inclined to place civilians center-stage, while pulling the strings from the wings, but neither would be prepared to

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Doc. 14443 [12 pgs]

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permit a return to "unguided" civilian politics.

- 3) A take-over by leftists or supporters of Andreas Papandreou is highly unlikely because all of them are anathema to the military. A take-over by militant, nationalistic xenophobes--the "Qadhafiite" element in the officer corps--is also unlikely because pro-US sentiment in the military establishment remains stronger than Qadhafiite tendencies toward loosening these ties.
- 4) The US is perceived by all shades of Greek opinion to have a decisive voice in determining the course of Greek politics. The regime is anxious to retain a close working relationship with the US, while opponents of the regime are hopeful that the US will help restore parliamentary government.
- 5) A US policy of non-intervention is the least risky path for preserving access to military facilities in Greece. US detachment would preserve this interest without introducing any new element of instability into an already unstable political system.

Continuation of this strategy would also reflect a US view that the Greek problem is indigenous and beyond our therapeutic powers. While US intervention might bring down a regime, it could not dictate the choice of a more palatable successor.

Even though a policy of detachment risks gradually deteriorating relations with most Greeks by souring them on the US, it avoids a crisis. Moreover, any likely

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successor regime will value a US connection to bolster its own position, even though it will not liberalize its domestic policies to meet American wishes. This means that under a strategy of detachment, the US will probably be no worse off under a probable successor regime than it is now. Only if we are prepared to forgo military facilities in Greece can the US feel free to indulge a public posture of supporting moves toward democracy in Athens.

Our concluding observation is that, while the strategy of disengagement preserves existing military facilities in Greece, no military regime would allow the US to obtain more without a higher level of open political support or military equipment. If Congressional approval for increased military equipment is unobtainable, continuation of the strategy of political non-intervention means abandoning Phase II of homeporting and excluding facilities in Greece from US contingency planning, except in regard to the threat of a Warsaw Pact attack.

Attachment:

INR Assessment

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Drafted: INR/RNA:PHStoddard:egt/mh
x21057:3/29/74

Concurrences:

INR/RNA - Mr. Jones
INR - Mr. Mark

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INR ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPING
SITUATION IN GREECE

The Ioannidis Regime: A Recapitulation

For the past nine years, Greece has suffered from a lack of respected civilian or military leaders who could command broad popular support. The present regime is no exception: Resting narrowly on a relatively small clique of officers, it owes its dominance to its strategic position inside the military establishment. So far, no other faction has mounted a serious challenge. Ex-politicians of all hues; as well as youth and workers -- whose protests set the stage for Papadopoulos' down-fall -- seem cowed by the regime's repression.

Nevertheless, the regime is not marked for longevity. Ioannidis and the obscure second-rate civilians in the Cabinet display even less capability than Papadopoulos to deal with Greece's burgeoning problems, including rampant inflation. Even so, they show no inclination to move toward representative government, in spite of outside pressure. While the regime's foreign policy is pro-Western and anti-Communist, its approach to the US and NATO is characterized by hard bargaining and considerable sensitivity to foreign meddling.

Anatomy of the Greek Military

Despite Ioannidis' control of the military police organization and his network of informers and well-placed junior and middle-grade officers, the loyalty of the military establishment is not secure. Although there do not appear to be any cohesive, monolithic factions, there seem to be three principal currents of opinion:

1) Hardline Support for Ioannidis. Although not entirely unified or homogeneous, the officers of this persuasion are better organized than their opponents. Intensely nationalistic, they want the

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army to remain in power indefinitely to avert political "anarchy" and to forestall an eventual communist take-over.

2) Other Contenders for Power. Ioannidis' potential rivals agree that the army should remain in charge -- but not under Ioannidis. Many are unpurged survivors of Papadopoulos' circle. Others are "Qadhafiites" -- young ultranationalists who advocate a more independent stance toward the NATO states and a tougher posture toward their facilities and privileges in Greece. While the strength of the Qadhafiites is uncertain, Ioannidis keeps an eye on them, and their views may have an impact on key decisions.

3) The "silent majority." Large numbers of officers at all levels blame unfettered civilian politics for the turmoil that plagued Greece before the 1967 coup. Although some of them favor the formation of a government of national unity and a gradual return to "guided democracy," as a whole they are not a strong force for the restoration of parliamentary government. They seem primarily concerned lest the growing politicization of the army damage the command structure and military effectiveness and jeopardize their own positions.

Prospects for the Regime

The army is the only force that could topple Ioannidis. The life expectancy of his regime depends on its retaining the support of key military units, especially in the Athens area. No combination of civilian elements could overthrow the regime without the help of such units. Despite the factionalism in the military establishment, there is no evidence as yet that civilian dissidents have attempted to reach an accommodation with military elements.

Even though there is no political force in sight that could topple the regime, the elements of its eventual demise are already present in the form of its own inadequacy and the disfavor in which it is held

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by the public and segments of the armed forces. Any unforeseen disturbance, such as a student demonstration or a workers' protest against inflation, could be the catalyst that precipitates the process of eventual collapse.

Another possible catalyst would be a public US repudiation of the regime, in view of the widespread belief among Greeks that the US determines the course of Greek politics -- a tenacious attitude derived from 150 years of Greek reliance on foreign powers, and reinforced by patterns that grew up under the Truman Doctrine.

Alternatively, a new officer clique, having learned from the November coup how easily it can be done, and already impatient with the regime's poor performance, might act in fear of being purged by Ioannidis for previous associations or for suspected antiregime plotting.

No timetable can be assigned to the process leading to Ioannidis' downfall. He probably can remain in power for several more months and perhaps even for one to two years. He is most unlikely to remain at the helm as long as Papadopoulos. Whenever the Ioannidis clique goes, it is likely to be replaced by yet another military clique equally adept at plotting, unskilled in administration, and unprepared to permit a return to "unguided" civilian politics. There could even be a whole series of military coups. There is no constituency in the Greek military in favor of traditional parliamentary government; there are merely varying views on the extent to which the military should allow civilians to play a role in government.

Most officers still feel that Greece is not "ready" for the return of the "discredited" civilians. There is little likelihood that either the Ioannidis regime or a successor would form a cabinet of prominent civilian politicians. If any individuals were brought back they would probably be denied any real power. They would certainly not include any leftists or supporters of Andreas Papandreou -- all of whom are anathema to the military.

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The major operative difference between a successor regime headed by senior commanders drawn from the "silent majority" and one headed by younger hard-liners is that the former would look better. The senior commanders would be more inclined to place civilians, such as Karamanlis, center-stage, while they pulled the strings from the wings. In any event, there seems to be no way to assure a smooth transition from Ioannidis to the "moderate" generals. While there are indications of a political polarization between the Ioannidis clique in the Athens area and some senior commanders in northern Greece, the risk of a clash is reduced by a longstanding fear of civil conflict that stems from the agony of the Greek civil war. No noncommunist element is eager to touch off major violence; instead, much is made of the danger to Greece of a resort to force by any segment of the populace.

There are also rumors, apparently based in part on wishful thinking, that Karamanlis, the resolute pro-American rightist, might return to Greece to cooperate with the northern commanders in a move against Ioannidis. However, Karamanlis, who has been in self-imposed exile since 1963, and who recognizes that he has only one last chance, is playing so cautious a game that he has not even criticized Ioannidis. His response to an invitation from the military might depend on his assessment of the US attitude toward it.

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Implications for the US

The approach of the Ioannidis regime to foreign policy has differed little from that of Papadopoulos, except that the former seems more inclined toward parochial calculations of self-interest and a more adventurous policy in Cyprus. Ioannidis is intensely anticommunist. He is also officially committed to close ties with NATO, but this commitment is irrelevant, since the regime is contemptuous of Western Europe and regards NATO as window dressing for Greece's special relationship with the US. The real worry of the Greek military is war with Turkey.

Pro-US sentiment in the Greek military establishment remains stronger than Qadhafiite tendencies toward loosening these ties. On the other hand, the Ioannidis regime and many other Greek officers are dissatisfied with the benefits of the US connection. In return for continued bilateral cooperation, any military regime in Greece would expect at least tacit US endorsement, although none probably would expect a renewal of massive military aid, and all would be sensitive to signs of US displeasure. (An assessment of the value of these facilities and privileges to the US lies beyond the scope of this paper.) In addition, any military regime would be particularly frustrated by its inability to acquire modern weapons (for defense against Turkey).

Ioannidis' basic approach to the US is more adversary than cooperative. He has concluded that the US needs Greece at least as much as Greece needs the US -- that the facilities which the US uses in Greece are worth more than is called for by present agreements. However, the regime is unsure how much the traffic will bear.

These tactics might once have antagonized the public and more moderate military elements, but in recent years, pro-US sentiment has been overlaid by an element of anti-Americanism that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. This attitude derives in part from the inevitable frictions of a large American

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presence, but the main cause is the continuing inclination of nearly all political elements to exaggerate the "American factor" in Greek affairs. The US is widely regarded as the moving force behind both the Papadopoulos and Ioannidis regimes simply because it has done nothing to undercut them. Both regimes have worked hard to propagate the thesis that the US has been happy since 1967 to have law and order prevail. The result is a popular suspicion of US motives and intentions that could be drawn on by opposition elements and even by the junta to promote anti-Americanism if the need arose.

Likely Effect on Political Evolution in Greece of a Range of US Actions

Since the US is perceived by all shades of Greek opinion as determining the course of Greek politics, both the regime and its opponents continue to scrutinize the US posture for clues to its intentions. Many opponents of the regime remain hopeful that the US will eventually "come to its senses" and help to restore parliamentary government. The regime, anxious to retain a close working relationship with the US, counts on the US to do nothing to undercut American security interests in Greece. The fact that the US is no longer a supplier of grant military and economic assistance (although FMS credits are still important) does not affect US influence over Greek affairs.

There are two basic strategies that the US could adopt toward Greece's political problems:

--intervention

--a hands-off policy of detachment

Intervention. This is the strategy pursued in the early Papadopoulos years. Past experience leads to the following conclusions:

1) The Greek problem is indigenous and beyond US therapeutic powers. Every regime bases its

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policy on how its own perception of events fits into its philosophical or ideological preconceptions. While US intervention might bring down a regime, it could not dictate the choice of a successor more palatable to us. There is no guarantee of moving from Ioannidis to moderate senior commanders with a Karamanlis out in front, which is about the best solution even remotely available. When the US was pressing for liberalization, Papadopoulos did not respond. When he later moved in this direction, apparently on his own initiative, he was overthrown by Ioannidis. Ioannidis will not ease up on the domestic opposition to curry favor with the US.

2) US efforts to direct the course of political evolution in Greece would alienate the regime, complicate bilateral working arrangements, and cost us the access we already have.

Detachment. This is basically the present US approach: We deal with the regime in a routine, low-profile manner, while trying to avoid identification with it. Its effect on Greek political evolution is minimal.

This strategy is unpopular in NATO. It causes problems in dealing with the Congress on Greek matters. It also risks gradual deterioration of US relations with most Greeks, since it is bound to be perceived by the junta's opponents (and by the junta, too) as tacit US support for a military dictatorship. Under this strategy, the Greek public will tend to hold the US responsible for the prolongation of repressive military rule, to the detriment of our traditional relationship and longer-term security interests. These adverse effects are reinforced by our continued close military association, the extensive US military presence, and the tendency of some DOD personnel to take up with the regime in their social contacts and public statements.

However, if the US is to pursue successfully the negotiations now underway in Athens over the US Navy's use of the Greek base at Souda Bay (on Crete), continuation of the present strategy of detachment is essential over the short term. If the hands-off approach is not

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very pleasing to any faction, at least it avoids a crisis. Ioannidis would like more US enthusiasm, which would considerably strengthen his position, but he seems resigned to not getting it. Like Papadopoulos in the latter years of his rule, Ioannidis seems to have little difficulty living with the current US attitude.

Moreover, most civilian and military elements remain keenly aware of Greece's isolation in the eastern Mediterranean and have learned the hard way since World War II that the US is the only foreign power really interested in what happens to Greece. Consequently, any successor military regime in Greece is likely to desire a substantial US/NATO role in its security system for a considerable time to come. Whatever approach the US pursues toward a military regime, any civilian regime that eventually returned to power probably would not turn sharply against the US. On the contrary, any new regime -- military or civilian -- would want demonstrable US support to lend legitimacy to its accession to power.

Concluding Observations

No military regime would be likely to authorize implementation of Phase II of homeporting without obtaining a higher level of US support for the regime, whether in the form of political endorsement or military equipment to improve the Greek military posture vis-a-vis Turkey and bolster the regime's position with the officer corps. Since Congress is unlikely to approve any increase in the supply of military equipment, continuation of the strategy of detachment means the abandonment of Phase II.


It also means that the US would have to exclude the facilities in Greece from its contingency planning, except for the threat of communist aggression which the NATO Alliance was designed to meet. Under the strategy of detachment, we must assume that the present and future Greek regimes will be less helpful to the US in regional situations than was the Papadopoulos regime during the October 1973 war.

Drafted by: INR/RNA:PHStoddard

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GRK - TURK

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PAGE 01 NATO 03745 042245Z

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SP-02 PM-03 NSC-07 NSCE-00

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P R 041925Z JUL 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6622
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, GR, TU
SURJ: GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE

1. ON JULY 4, SYG LUNS INVITED TO HIS OFFICE AMBASSADOR OF U.S., U.K., FRANCE, FRG, ITALY, AND BELGIUM FOR DISCUSSION OF INITIATIVES LUNS INTENDED TO TAKE IN NEAR FUTURE REGARDING GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN. LUNS SAID THAT HE FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY AND THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT HE SHOULD TAKE AN INITIATIVE VERY QUICKLY TO TRY TO ENGAGE THE TWO COUNTRIES IN EFFORTS TO DE-FUSE THE SITUATION. HE BELIEVED THAT AS IN THE CASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, IF ONE TRIED TO SOLVE ALL OF THE ISSUES IN ONE PACKAGE, VERY GREAT DIFFICULTIES WOULD ENSUE. THEREFORE, HE FAVORED A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH OF THE KIND WHICH HAD PROVEN SUCCESSFUL IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT.

2. LUNS THEN SAID THAT HE FAVORED LEAVING ASIDE FOR THE TIME BEING THE LEGAL ASPECTS, THE QUESTION OF MINORITIES, AND QUESTION OF CYPRUS. HE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ISSUE OF OIL AND MINERAL WEALTH IN THE AEGEAN AND TO TRY TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM NOW BEFORE MAJOR DISCOVERIES OF OIL WERE MADE. THEREFORE, HE INTENDED TO PROPOSE TO THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS

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PAGE 02 NATO 03745 042245Z

THAT THEY MIGHT ESTABLISH JOINT COMPANIES TO EXPLOIT THE OIL AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE AEGEAN. THE QUESTION OF PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION AND OTHER SPECIFICS OF SUCH JOINT COMPANIES WOULD BE MATTERS FOR LATER DECISION.

3. IN MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL, HE HAD IN MIND THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO CALL INTO QUESTION THE LEGAL RIGHTS WHICH GREECE INSISTED UPON AND THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, TURKEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO SAY THAT IT HAS A REASONABLE SHARE IN THE MINERAL RESOURCES OFF ITS SHORES. HE RECOGNIZED THE DANGER THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GREECE MIGHT THINK THAT NATO OR ITS SECRETARY GENERAL WAS TRYING TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION AND HE INTENDED TO BE DISCREET IN HIS MANNER OF PROCEEDING WITH THIS INITIATIVE, THINKING FIRST OF PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH THE GREEK AND TURKISH PERMREPS ON THE COUNCIL. THIS MIGHT BE FOLLOWED UP, IF APPROPRIATE, WITH VISIT TO ATHENS AND ANKARA BY A/SYG KASTL OR BY THE SYG'S CHEF DU CABINET PAUL VAN CAMPEN. HE INTENDED TO AVOID ALL PUBLICITY, LUNS STRESSED. HE WOULD HOPE AT A SUITABLE TIME TO ELICIT DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES REPRESENTED IN THIS MEETING.

4. LUNS ANTICIPATED THAT IF HIS INITIATIVE WERE AT ALL SUCCESSFUL THERE MIGHT BE FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS, PERHAPS IN NATO HEADQUARTERS, IN WHICH HE WOULD ASSIST. HE THOUGHT THIS APPROACH WOULD AVOID THE CREATION OF AD HOC MACHINERY WHICH THE GREEKS DID NOT LIKE AND YET START A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. AS REGARDS TIMING, LUNS SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT IN THE DPC ON JULY 5, IN WHICH HE WOULD EXHORT THE GREEKS AND TURKS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO USE OF FORCE. AT BELGIUM AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE'S SUGGESTION, LUNS SAID HE MIGHT ALSO REFER TO THE "THREE WISE MEN'S REPORT" OF 1956 AND TO A RESOLUTION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WHICH WAS ADOPTED AS A RESULT OF THAT REPORT, WHICH CALLED FOR SUBMITTING DISPUTES TO GOOD OFFICES PROCEDURES WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK. LUNS SAID HE WOULD FOLLOW THIS UP WITH PRIVATE DEMARCHES TO THE GREEK AND TURKISH DELEGATIONS TO NATO DURING THE WEEK OF JULY 8. LUNS SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO UNDERTAKE THIS INITIATIVE ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HIS INTENTIONS WERE REPORTED TO CAPITALS. RUMSFLED

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FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4016
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR GR TK
SUBJ: TURKISH PROPOSAL FOR MACHINERY TO DISCUSS
OUTSTANDING GREEK-TURKISH ISSUES

REF ATHENS 4178

1. EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BE INTRIGUED BY GOG HANDLING, AT PRIMIN LEVEL, OF TURKISH PROPOSAL TO SET UP HIGH LEVEL BILATERAL COMMITTEES TO DEAL WITH OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO AEGEAN SEA ISSUES, AND MINORITIES (WHICH IN GOT EYES DO NOT INCLUDE CYPRIOT TURK MINORITY).

2. IOANNIDES, AS REPORTED, HAS EXPRESSED HIMSELF IN FAVOR OF A PACKAGE DEAL. SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO DONE SAME. GOT PROPOSALS CERTAINLY PROVIDE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH SUCH DISCUSSIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT, PARTICULARLY IF, AS TURKISH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME LAST

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
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By WLR/NARA, Date 5/14/14
Doc. #4453 [2 pgs]



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PAGE 02 ATHENS 04214 021723Z

EVENING AT CANADIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, BOTH THE STRUCTURE AND SUBJECTS OF THE TURKISH PROPOSAL ARE NEGOTIABLE SINCE GOT PAPER INTENDED TO BE INITIAL PROPOSAL. THUS TURKS THEMSELVES ALSO APPARENTLY PERPLEXED BY NEGATIVE GREEK REACTION.

3. ONE POSSIBLE ANSWER MAY BE THAT IOANNIDES AND THE MILITARY ARE LEAVING BASIC TACTICS UP TO PM ANDROUTSOPOULOS, WHO HAS TAKEN POSITION THAT ALL BILATERAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH THROUGH ROUTINE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. SUCH AN APPROACH APPEARS TO INVOLVE LESS COMMITMENT TO OUTCOME, THUS KEEPING THE HEAT FROM FOCUSING ON ANDROUTSOPOULOS WHO CERTAINLY HAS NOT DISTINGUISHED HIMSELF BY BOLD QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP.

4. ANOTHER ANCILLARY CONSIDERATION MAY BE THAT TURKISH PAPER IS SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION THAT GREEK LEGAL RIGHTS REGARDING DISPUTED AREAS NOT AS CLEARCUT AS GOG HAS ASSERTED SINCE AEGEAN ISSUES AROSE. IN SIMILAR VEIN APPARENTLY GREEKS ALSO VIEW INCLUSION OF MATTERS ON MINORITIES IN GOT PROPOSAL AS REOPENING OF THEIR TREATMENT IN LAUSANNE TREATY. FINALLY, PRESENT GOVERNMENT, AS IT HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED IN NUMEROUS OTHER CASES, FINDS IT QUITE DIFFICULT TO ARRIVE AT IMPORTANT DECISIONS. ITS DIFFICULTY IN THIS RESPECT CAN IN LARGE PART BE ATTRIBUTED TO LACK OF CENTRALIZED AUTHORITY. IT REFLECTS FACTS THAT MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE IN ALL IMPORTANT MATTERS MUST COME PRIMARILY FROM THE MILITARY AND THAT CIVILIAN ELEMENTS UNDER ANDROUTSOPOULOS ARE NOT ONLY LACKING IN ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY BUT ALSO TIMID AND/OR INEFFECTIVE. IN OTHER WORDS, BECAUSE OF DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVE AND REAL POWER IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY DELEGATED TO CIVILIAN MINISTERS GOG BY ITS VERY NATURE SIMPLY CANNOT WORK EFFECTIVELY.
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GRR, TURK

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 NEA-14 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20
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P 211746Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1483
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, UK
SUBJECT: BRITISH REPORT OF FORGED GREEK "WAR DECLARATION"
TO TURKS

1. BRITISH COUNSELLOR ANKARA WAS TOLD TODAY BY MFAIS SOYSAL THAT TURKS HAD RECEIVED GREEK MFA NOTE JUNE 20 SIGNED BY 3 GREEK GENERALS (3RD ARMY OR CORPS COMMANDER AMONG THEM) WHICH SOYSAL CHARACTERIZED AS "TANTAMOUNT TO A WAR DECLARATION". GREEK MFA THEN TOLD TURKS TO DISREGARD IT. TURKS PUZZLED, AS THIS NOTE RUNS CONTRARY TO MOST RECENT PRIOR COMMUNICATION, WHEN GREEK MILITARY TOLD TURKISH GENERAL STAFF THAT NO RPT NO MINES WOULD BE LAID DURING GREEK MINE LAYING EXERCISE IN AEGEAN.

2. BRITISH EMBASSY ATHENS REPORTED SHORTLY THEREAFTER THAT IT HAD CHECKED WITH GREEK MFA AND WAS TOLD THE NOTE WAS A FORGERY. NEVERTHELESS, INTERESTING THAT FORGERY WAS PUT INTO TURKISH HANDS AT JUST THE MOMENT WHEN TURKS WERE EXPECTING A COMMUNICATION FROM GREEKS.

3. FCO SOUTH EUROPEAN DEPT. HEAD GODDISON COMMENTED TO US THAT THIS SEEMS ANOTHER INDICATION OF DISORGANIZED

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by [signature] NARA, Date 5/14/13

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PAGE 02 LONDON 07841 211754Z

GOVERNMENTAL SITUATION IN GREECE, WHERE MANY COLONELS AND MAJORS ARE ABLE TO TAKE NUMEROUS ACTIONS WITHOUT HIGHER CONTROL. HE ALSO NOTED JINGOISM BEING BANDIED ABOUT IN ATHENS.

ANNENBERG

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GRK - TURK

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-14 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 PM-07

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O R 171510Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3811
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USNATO IMMEDIATE 1663
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
ISUN 1056
INCUSAFE
CINCINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 3776

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, GR, TU
SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN PROBLEM

REF: ATHENS 3700 AND 3744 AND ANKARA 4684

1. GIVEN IMPORTANCE VLACHOS ATTACHES TO PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION THAT SECRETARY TELL BOTH GREEK AND TURKISH FORMINS IN OTTAWA TO FREEZE ALL EXPLORATION EFFORTS AND ENGAGE IN TALKS, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS SECOND APPROACH REPORTED ATHENS 3744 WHICH CROSSED WITH ANKARA'S 4684, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MAKING SUCH AN APPROACH.

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PER PAC 4/23/13
By WJH/RS NARA, Date 6/15/18
Doc. 14465 [2 Pgs]

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2. I FULLY APPRECIATE EMBASSY ANKARA'S CONCERNS AND AGREE THAT SERIOUSNESS OF BOTH SIDES MUST BE ACCEPTED AND FORMULA DEVISED ACCORDINGLY. OF COURSE, 12-MILE ANNOUNCEMENT BY GOG WOULD COMPLICATE PRESENT SITUATION EVEN FURTHER. ON THIS POINT, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THERE IS AT LEAST A GOOD CHANCE GOG, HAVING IN MIND LIKELIHOOD THAT CARACAS CONFERENCE WILL ESTABLISH 12-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA, MAY WITHHOLD UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENT PENDING SUCH ACTION.

3. PROBLEM AS WE SEE IT IS ONE OF FINDING EVEN-HANDED BASIS ON WHICH TO APPROACH PROBLEM IN ITS PRESENT DIMENSIONS. GREEK SUGGESTION SEEMS TO US TO FIT THIS CRITERION SINCE DISPUTED AREA HAS SO FAR NOT IN FACT BEEN SUBJECT TO EXPLORATION BY EITHER GREECE OR TURKEY, AND IN ALL PROBABILITY NO OIL EXISTS IN THIS AREA. UNDOUBTEDLY TURKISH POSITION REFLECTS VIEW THAT BY ITS THREATENING TO EXERCISE EXPLORATION RIGHT, GOG IS MORE LIKELY TO BE INDUCED TO DISCUSS MATTER BILATERALLY. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE BETTER CHANCE LIES IN MAINTAINING STATUS QUO SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN PROCEED WITHOUT EITHER SIDE BELIEVING OTHER TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION AS PRESSURE TO PRODUCE DISCUSSIONS.

4. WHILE WE AGREE NATO SYG LUNS SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY TO TAKE REASONABLE POSTURE AND DISCUSS PROBLEM BY PEACEFUL MEANS, WE DOUBT THAT AS PRINCIPAL MOVER HE WOULD CARRY SAME WEIGHT AS SECRETARY WITH EITHER GREECE OR TURKEY. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF OTHER NATO ALLIES (SUCH AS UK AND FRG APPARENTLY ALREADY DOING) COULD ALSO URGE NEED FOR PEACEFUL APPROACH TO PROBLEM AS SHOULD BE EXPECTED FROM TWO MEMBERS OF SAME ALLIANCE. SO FAR AS TIMING IS CONCERNED, IT APPEARS WE ARE ALREADY SO CLOSE TO CRITICAL STAGE THAT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY NATO MINISTERIAL. IT HAS ADVANTAGE OF BEING ALREADY SCHEDULED AND AVOIDS DRAWBACKS OF MAKING SPECIAL EFFORT IN CRUCIAL SITUATION WHERE U.S. MEDIATION WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO DRAW RESENTMENT FROM BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY.

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RESEARCH STUDY

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May 30, 1974

GRK - TURK Contingency plan

GREECE-TURKEY CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE IN THE AEGEAN SEA

Summary

A promising Greek oil strike in the Aegean Sea near the island of Thasos has highlighted a conflict between Greece and Turkey over jurisdiction of the seabed of the Aegean.

- The dispute between the two states centers on the status of islands in the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary.
- The Greek position is that a median line boundary should be negotiated between Greek and Turkish territory and that islands should be considered as basepoints for any delimitation.
- The Turkish position is that the Aegean should be divided by an equidistant line which uses only the respective mainlands as basepoints; Greek islands would be assigned a 6-nautical-mile territorial sea but would be ignored as basepoints for establishing the shelf boundary.

There are two principal approaches for resolving the dispute between the two countries. One would try, through negotiated agreement, adjudication, or arbitration, to settle the precise boundary between Greece and Turkey. The other would seek to provide for joint exploration and exploitation of the resources of the disputed area without trying to delimit a boundary. Some believe that the latter course, though difficult at best to achieve, may have a somewhat greater chance of success.

Prepared by T. V. McIntyre
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Doc. 14467 [12 pgs]

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SUBJECT TO DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
E.O. 11652: DECLASSIFIED 12-31-80
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Turkish shelf, would cause an inequitable Greek encroachment if the islands were given a full influence in the creation of an equidistance continental shelf boundary.

The Turkish version of the shelf boundary, partially delimited, is shown on the attached chart. A chart depicting the Turkish position appeared in the November 1, 1973, Turkish Gazette, but a Turkish official stated in April 1974 that the disputed area shown on the chart is misleading and not official. At present, the official version of the Turkish-claimed area is not available; the extent of the disputed area has been inferred from an oil concession map published by Mobil Exploration Mediterranean, Inc.

The continental shelf boundary issue has intensified as a result of Turkey's issuance of exploration permits in the central part of the Aegean. The Turkish exploration zone presumably lies beyond a 6-nautical-mile Greek territorial sea measured around each of the islands.

The principles to be employed in the division of the continental shelf, i.e., the construction of a median line ignoring or including islands as basepoints, could have a significant economic impact on either Greece or Turkey should the disputed area contain valuable resources.

Physical Characteristics

The Aegean Sea is bounded by Greece on three sides; Turkey is on the east. The Sea of Crete, part of the Aegean, occupies the southern fringe. The size of the Aegean is approximately 240 x 330 nautical miles. Bands of continental shelf,* areas up to 200 meters in depth (100 fathoms=182.9 meters), are situated along the mainland fringes and about the 354 Greek islands and a small number of Turkish islands. The Greeks state that, because of the numerous Greek islands, the Aegean is "virtually a great Greek lake."

In the northern part of the Aegean, depths range to 747 fathoms northwest of Nisi's Psathoura, and in the

* In legal terminology, the outer limit of the shelf is defined, in part, by a depth of 200 meters (200 meters=109.4 fathoms).

The dispute between Greece and Turkey over the continental shelf boundary in the Aegean Sea concerns the methodology to be used to allocate the seabed between the two states. The disagreement centers on the status of islands as basepoints in the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary and has recently been exacerbated by a potentially rich Greek oil strike near the island of Thásos.* The oil strike near Thásos, however, is outside the disputed area, which is around the island of Limnos.

The Greek position is that the shelf boundary should be a median line between Turkish and Greek territory, and that islands should be given full effect (both islands and mainland would be considered as basepoints in the boundary delimitation). The Greek version would place the shelf boundary very close to the Turkish mainland (see attached chart).

The Turkish position is that islands should be ignored as basepoints and that the shelf boundary should be equidistant between the respective mainlands. Because of the number of Greek islands located close to the Turkish mainland, the Turks argue "special circumstances"; that is, if islands are utilized in this case as basepoints for boundary delimitation, the Turks would get a small share of the seabed, which they would consider inequitable.

Turkey essentially bases its claims on the "presence" of two continental shelves and seabeds in the Aegean. One shelf, it argues, is a prolongation from Greece; the other from Turkey. Greek islands situated on the latter, the

* An American petroleum engineering consultant believes that production at Thásos is about 20,000 barrels per day, not the 100,000 bpd reported by the Greeks.

southern extremity depths reach 1,383 fathoms west of Nísos Kárpáthos.

Geologically, the Aegean is complex. A series of parallel and intersecting faults exists, with associated subsidence, islands, and submarine shoals. Generally, the 100-fathom isobath is situated less than 5 nautical miles offshore; exceptions exist in the Cyclades (Kikládhes Nísoi) southwest of Athens, and in the heads of some bays.

The Turkish continental shelf position is based, in part, on the assertion that the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean and associated shelf areas are geologically part of the Anatolian land mass even though geologists have found that the continental shelf extending from the Turkish mainland drops off very sharply a short distance from the coast.

The Continental Shelf and Customary International Practice

The first continental shelf agreement occurred in 1942 between the United Kingdom and Venezuela.* The delimitation was in the Gulf of Paria between Venezuela and the then-British dependency of Trinidad and Tobago.

In past cases as well as the present one a principal issue in the division of the continental shelf involves the problem of "special circumstances" which relate to some unique geographical or geological attributes of the states involved. Examples of "special circumstances" that have been negotiated are concave coasts and distant offshore islands. A state possessing a concave coast is disadvantaged relative to another state with a different coastal configuration in any delimitation involving the principle of equidistance because delimitation lines converge inward. The problem of offshore islands and the weight to be assigned to them in the establishment of basepoints for the construction of an equidistant line is another type of "special circumstance."

* See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Continental Shelf Boundary: Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela, Limits in the Seas No. 11 of March 6, 1970.

The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf

A shelf agreement between Greece and Turkey would involve both adjacent and opposite coastal areas of the two states. Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf sets forth the procedures for delimiting shelf boundaries between states which share an adjacent shelf or lie on opposite sides of the shelf, as in the case of a semi-enclosed sea.

Article 6.1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.

Article 6.2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.

The North Sea Case, 1969

The North Sea Case involved a dispute, between West Germany on one side and Denmark and the Netherlands on the other, regarding the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries between adjacent states in the North Sea. Because of a concave coast, West Germany would not have received an equitable share of the shelf if the equidistance principle had been employed in the shelf boundary delimitation.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined that the equidistance principle in Article 6 of the Convention

on the Continental Shelf with respect to adjacent states was not established as customary international law. The Court stated that the purpose of a boundary through the seabed was to divide the area equitably between or among adjacent states.

The ICJ stressed three principles:

1. The basic principle was delimitation by agreement; negotiations were to be meaningful and not pro forma exercises before falling back on an equidistant line;
2. Equitable principles should be applied either by equidistance or by other methods; and
3. The continental shelf of a state must be its natural prolongation, and it must not encroach on the natural prolongation of another state.

The Court said that (a) negotiators should consider the geographical configuration of the coast to determine what features constitute natural prolongation of which territory; (b) the unity of specific mineral deposits should be respected; and (c) there should be a reasonable degree of proportionality, in the division, to the respective lengths of the coastlines of the states.

In addition to the ICJ guidelines, the "special circumstances" created by the location of islands must be taken into account, especially when the islands grossly distort the position of the equidistance line. Recent state practice has been to ignore or diminish the importance of small, uninhabited islands situated near the center of a semi-enclosed sea.* In any treatment of islands in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, state practice has been that islands are entitled to their own territorial seas and continental shelves. However, the basic issue is how much effect should small islets have as basepoints in relation to a larger mainland mass, while preserving the concept of equity.

* See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Yugoslavia, Limits in the Seas No. 9 of February 20, 1970; Continental Shelf Boundary: Abu Dhabi-Qatar, Limits in the Seas No. 18 of May 29, 1970; Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-Saudi Arabia, Limits in the Seas No. 24 of July 2, 1970.

The basic issues in the Aegean Sea dispute are:

- (1) What is the status of islands in the delimitation of that continental shelf boundary?
- (2) What is equitable in view of the knowledge that the petroleum potential may be great in the offshore areas involved?

The Arena

The attached chart approximately delimits the disputed area, the Greek and Turkish concessions and the exploration zones, and the median line interpretations of the two states.

Current attention is on the disputed area west of Lesbos and south of Limnos. In addition, the Greeks have accepted concession applications in the region around Rodhos and Kos, which will cause difficulties.

From the Turkish viewpoint, the dispute includes all those areas that are westward of the Greek median line (green line) and eastward of the Turkish median line (blue line), and within the Turkish concession application zone (enclosed by red lines). The Greeks do not contest any Turkish concession areas eastward of the Greek median line (green line).

Greek Position

The Greek position is based on the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.* The Greeks contend that

* The Greeks acceded to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf on November 6, 1972, with the following reservation:

[Translation]...pursuant to article 12 of the Convention, the Kingdom of Greece makes a reservation with respect to the system of delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf appertaining to States whose coasts are adjacent or opposite each other, provided for in article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Convention. In such cases, the Kingdom of Greece will apply in the absence of international agreement, the normal baseline system for the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.

sovereign shelf rights appertain to islands and mainland alike. The shelf boundary is therefore between the Greek islands and Turkish mainland and coastal islands.

On March 1, 1974, Greek Foreign Minister Tetenes stated that a possible solution to the dispute may be joint exploration arrangements in those areas beyond 12 nautical miles. If the dispute heightens, the Greeks may threaten to declare a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, but the Turks may assume that the Greeks will not carry out this threat because of the difficulties the action might raise for navigational questions.

The Greek position has hardened recently. The Greeks feel that the Conventions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and on the Continental Shelf so explicitly support their claims that to admit that a dispute exists would automatically undermine their position. Successful negotiations obviously will have to be premised on a softening of this attitude.

Turkish Position

Turkey has not become a party to the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention for "technical reasons." The Government of Turkey does, however, agree with the principles of the Convention and is generally applying them in its administrative procedures. The specific parts of the Convention supported by the Turks are those that concern "special circumstances" (Articles 6-1 and 6-2).*

As far as we know, no Turkish legislation exists which specifically governs the administration of the legal continental shelf. Licensing procedures for exploration of the shelf within territorial waters (6 nautical miles) are administered under Petroleum Law No. 3626 and the Mining Law No. 6309. As a result, licenses for offshore petroleum exploration are granted by the Turkish Petroleum Administration under the same procedures and criteria as those that govern the granting of exploration permits in the interior of the country. Such licenses are subject to approval of the Council of Ministers.

* The Turkish Government position relative to the Continental Shelf Convention was stated in February 1968.

In February 1974 the Turkish Foreign Ministry decided to challenge directly the Greek position on Aegean oil leases but did not challenge Greek drilling west of the Turkish median line. Objecting to oil companies operating under Greek licenses in disputed areas, the Turkish Government has noted that no agreement has been negotiated between Greece and Turkey on boundaries on the shelf. Although the Turks reject the Greek shelf position, they believe that a bilateral agreement should be negotiated as soon as possible.

The Turks do not appear to oppose a joint Greek-Turkish exploitation of the Aegean, although they would prefer a shelf division based on an alleged geological rift.*

From the Turkish viewpoint, the Aegean controversy is basically an economic issue. The Turkish Prime Minister stated on April 9, 1974, that he "would like to solve issues between Turkey and Greece as technical and legal questions before they become political problems."

In February 1974 the Turkish Government granted to TPAO (Turkish Petroleum Corporation) permission to drill for oil in 27 offshore locations.** TPAO received new permits on April 1 to prospect for oil in the areas to the west of oil areas No. 1 and No. 9 outside Turkish territorial waters but on the claimed continental shelf. On April 9, 1974, the Turkish Council of Ministers empowered TPAO to explore for oil in the areas of the Aegean which are disputed between Turkey and Greece. TPAO plans preliminary exploratory work in the Aegean beginning in June 1974, followed by exploratory drilling later in the year.

Reports indicate that TPAO lacks the technical capability to conduct exploration activities offshore in the

* There are numerous rifts in the Aegean. The Turks have not specified which one of the many would form the seaward margin of their shelf claim.

** Area of exploration zone is approximately 3,953,000 acres.

Aegean. It will have to negotiate with a major oil company to supply the required equipment and technical knowledge.*

Approaches to Resolution of Dispute

There are two possible approaches to resolving the dispute between Greece and Turkey. One approach would involve negotiation, adjudication, or arbitration on the principles for the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary and/or the precise determination of that boundary. The problems of reaching agreement on the boundary are particularly great in this case. Apart from other political frictions between the two parties, the geographic conditions of the Aegean constitute the most complex example of "special circumstances" in any current continental shelf dispute. The Greek islands are large, numerous, and situated in close proximity to the Turkish mainland. Turkish willingness to grant the islands a territorial sea and coextensive shelf is complicated by the implied Greek threat to expand its territorial sea claim from 6 to 12 nautical miles. In the event of this action, Greece would absorb virtually all of the disputed shelf area under the territorial sea doctrine.

An alternative possibility for resolving the dispute may be a negotiated arrangement for joint exploration and exploitation of the disputed area. Such an arrangement would undoubtedly be very difficult to negotiate -- perhaps as difficult as working out an agreed boundary between the two parties.

Some suggest, nevertheless, that dealing with the mutual development of the resources may prove a more productive approach than trying to resolve the complicated legal and emotional issues involved in arriving at an agreed boundary.

* It was reported May 7, 1974, that Geophysical Services Inc. of Dallas, Texas, was about to sign a contract with TPAO for conducting oil prospecting studies in the Aegean.



Department of State TELEGRAM

GRC-TURK

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04684 142022Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-14 IO-14 DLOS-07 OMB-01 COA-02

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USIA-15 DRC-01 /156 W

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R 141350Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
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USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOSOUTH
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
CINCUSAFE
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 4684

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, GR, TU
SURJ: GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE

REF: ATHENS 3700

1. SEEMS TO US THAT TURKS WOULD REGARD SUGGESTION IN PARA 2 REFTTEL AS ONE-SIDED. AMONG ARGUMENTS GOT LIKELY TO RAISE AGAINST IT ARE:

A. FREEZE ON EXPLORATION IN DISPUTED AREAS WOULD AFFECT

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
per PAC 4/23/13
By WILH/R NARA, Date 5/15/18
Doc. 14472 [3 pgs]

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ONLY TURKISH EFFORTS, SINCE TURKS ASSERT GREECE HAS ALREADY COMPLETED ITS EXPLORATIONS (ANKARA 4566).

B. FREEZE WOULD DELAY TURKEY'S POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF MUCH-NEEDED RESOURCE;

C. FREEZE WOULD TAKE PRESSURE OFF GREECE TO REACH NEGOTIATED SOLUTION; AND

D. FREEZE WOULD HAVE NO BEARING ON ANOTHER MAJOR ASPECT OF AEGEAN DISPUTE: GREECE'S INTENTION TO EXTEND TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES WHICH TURKS DETERMINED TO CHALLENGE (ATHENS 3701, ANKARA 4596).

2. WITH THESE POINTS IN MIND, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT IF U.S. MADE SUCH PROPOSAL TURKS WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT AND WOULD FURTHERMORE DOUBT OUR IMPARTIALITY.

3. IN OUR VIEW, IT ESSENTIAL THAT BOTH GREEKS AND TURKS REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNILATERAL ACTIONS AND CHALLENGES. WE HAVE BEEN EQUALLY CONCERNED OVER WHAT EMBASSY ATHENS HAS REPORTED RE ATTITUDE OF GREEK MILITARY ON ONE HAND AND, OTHER HAND, BY COMBATIVE, TURBULENT ATTITUDE WE ENCOUNTERING HERE IN BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CIRCLES. TYPICAL OF COMMENTS HERE IS CONSTANTLY REPEATED REFRAIN THAT GREEKS MUST BE OUT OF THEIR MINDS IF THEY THINK TURKS WILL EVER PERMIT AEGEAN TO BECOME A GREEK LAKE. IN THIS CONNECTION EMBASSY HAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT 12 MILE ANNOUNCEMENT BY GOG WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A TURK SHOW OF FORCE IN NEWLY CLAIMED GREEK AREAS (ANKARA 4596).

4. IF US-OR ANYONE ELSE-IS TO ATTEMPT TO BROKER THIS PROBLEM, THEREFORE, SERIOUSNESS OF BOTH SIDES MUST BE ACCEPTED AND FORMULA DEVISED ACCORDINGLY.

IN THIS REGARD, WE THINK THERE MIGHT BE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE IF BOTH SIDES WERE CALLED UPON TO REFRAIN FROM ANY FURTHER UNILATERAL ASSERTIONS OF CLAIMS--SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING OIL EXPLORATION AND EXTENSION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES--FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD DURING WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE CARRIED ON. THIS LIMITED MORATORIUM WOULD APPEAR MORE EVEN-HANDED, WE BELIEVE, AND WOULD HAVE TWIN ADVANTAGES OF DEFERRING RISK

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TELEGRAM

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
OF CONFLICT WHILE STIMULATING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EFFORTS.

5. THERE REMAINS QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD MAKE PROPOSAL. I SUGGEST BEST CHOICE WOULD BE NATO SYG LUNS, WHO ALREADY HAS SHOWN INTEREST IN PROBLEM AND SHOULD, I BELIEVE, BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE USING HIS GOOD OFFICES IN RESOLVING DISPUTE. THERE ARE TWO PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR SUGGESTING THAT U.S. NOT CARRY PROPOSAL: FIRST, PAST INVOLVEMENT IN GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER CYPRUS HAS COST U.S. HEAVILY; AND, SECOND, IF U.S. TAKES STEP TOWARD INTERMEDIARY ROLE IN AEGEAN DISPUTE AT THIS EARLY STAGE, WE RISK EXPENDING OUR PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE BEFORE POSSIBLY CRITICAL STAGE REACHED.

6. WOULD APPRECIATE EMB ATHENS COMMENTS.
MACOMBER

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GRK - TURK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 2425

PAGE 01 STATE 127871

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ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODF-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
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 APPROVED BY EUR:WSTABLER
 EUR/GRK - GTCHURCHILL
 EUR/TUR - BHIRSHORN

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 AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
 USMISSION NATO
 AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
 CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GERMANY
 USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
 USCINCEUR VAIHAIGEN GERMANY
 CINCUSAREUR HAEIDLEBERG GERMANY
 USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 127871

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, CY
 SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

1. MINISTER OF GERMAN EMBASSY (NOEBEL) INFORMED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY STABLER THAT GERMAN EMBASSY ANKARA HAD RECENTLY SENT "ALARMING" REPORT ABOUT TURKISH CONCERNS OVER POSSIBLE UNILATERAL MOVE BY GREECE TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES. (IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION GERMAN OFFICER TOLD US COUNSELOR OF GERMAN EMBASSY ANKARA HAD BEEN INFORMED BY SOYSAL THAT GOT WOULD REGARD SUCH MOVE AS CASUS BELLI.)

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
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 E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

DEP PAC 4/23/13

By: [Signature] DATE: 5/15/18

DOC. 14474

[2 PGS]



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TELEGRAM

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2. STABLER RESPONDED BY INDICATING WE UNDERSTOOD GOG HAD MADE DECISION TO EXTEND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO 12 MILES, BUT WE DID NOT KNOW WHEN DECISION WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AND SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IT WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT BEFORE CARACAS LAW OF SEA CONFERENCE. STABLER STRESSED OUR CONCERN OVER THIS ISSUE NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TWO NATO ALLIES BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF OUR GENERAL VIEWS OF TERRITORIAL SEA AND FREE PASSAGE QUESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WE WERE CAREFULLY STUDYING WHOLE PROBLEM

OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS BUT WE HAD NOT YET DECIDED ON WHAT USEFUL STEPS MIGHT BE TAKEN AT THIS TIME. IN ANY CASE, WE HOPED THAT GREEK AND TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEXT WEEK'S OTTAWA NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS THEIR PROBLEMS.

3. NOEBEL ALSO REPORTED (A) BULGARIA GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD GREEK EMBASSY SOFIA THAT IT WAS AGAINST THE AEGEAN'S BECOMING A TOTALLY "GREEK" SEA (B) GERMAN AMBASSADOR HEADING LOS DELEGATION HAD INDICATED HE WAS INCLINED TO SUPPORT TURKISH LEGAL POSITION ON AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF DISPUTE AND (C) GERMAN EMBASSY WOULD INFORM DEPARTMENT OF ANY STEPS FRG MIGHT TAKE TO HELP AVOID GREEK-TURKISH CONFRONTATION. SISCO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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GR *12/14*

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04720 171014Z

DOS REVIEWED 12-Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

SI
ACTION: RUMOR

REFER TO CIA

INFO OUT-01 55-14 150-00 NEA-05 NSC-07 NSCE-00 SSO-00

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O 170900Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4618
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECRET ANKARA 4720

LINDIS CIA REVIEWED 18-Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

NOFORN

F.O. 110523 G/S
TAGS: PGR, PGR, GR, TU
SUBJECT: GOT INTEREST IN RUMOR OF PLANNED GREEK ATTACK

SUMMARY: GOT INFORMS USG OF REPORT OUT OF BEIRUT THAT
GOC PLANS ATTACK TURKEY IN AEGEAN JUNE 20-24. GOT VERY
SKEPTICAL BUT WOULD APPRECIATE US EFFORT RUN DOWN RUMOR. END
SUMMARY.

1. NEA UTRECH POLAFFS SYDGAAL TOLD DEM SPAIN MORNING JUNE 17
THAT GOT HAD REPORT, "PERHAPS MORE A RUMOR", ORIGINATING
BEIRUT THAT GOC INTENDED THREE-DAY MILITARY OPERATIONS JUNE
20-24 AGAINST TURKISH SHIPS IN AEGEAN AND TURKISH AIR BASES
ON ADJACENT COAST. PLAN WAS TIMED COINCIDE WITH PRESIDENT
NIXON'S VISIT MOSCOW AND EXPECTATION WAS SIXTH FLEET WOULD
INTERVENE STOP FIGHTING SHORT OF ALL-OUT WAR.

2. GOT WAS SKEPTICAL OF REPORT; INDEED FOUND IT ALMOST
UNBELIEVABLE. HOWEVER, CABINET MEETING HAD DECIDED, IN
VIEW UNPREDICTABILITY OF PRESENT GREEK GOVERNMENT, IT COULD

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 04720 171014Z

NOT TOTALLY DISREGARD, AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER (ALSO DEFENSE MINISTER) ISIK HAD DIRECTED REPORT BE DRAWN TO ATTENTION OF USG IN HOPE US WITH ITS MUCH GREATER CAPABILITIES COULD TRACE IT DOWN - "PERHAPS TO SOVIET DISINFORMATION EFFORT - AND THUS SET TURK MINDS FULLY AT REST.

3. DCM SAID HE WOULD PASS ON REQUEST; HE TOO MOST SKEPTICAL OF REPORT; IT DID SOUND LIKE THE KIND OF "DISINFORMATION" PROGRAM USSR HAS ATTEMPTED IN PAST.

4. COMMENT: NEW DIRECTOR TURKISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HAD ON JUNE 15 25x1 LESS SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON SAME REPORT, INDICATING, HOWEVER, THAT ACCORDING TO HIS VERSION, US WAS SUPPOSED TO BE KNOWING PARTY TO GREEK ATTACK AND SUBSEQUENT US INTERVENTION TO STOP FIGHTING.

5. ONLY GOT ACTION WE KNOW OF WHICH MIGHT BE CONNECTED WITH REPORT WAS ALERT JUNE 16 AT TAF MURTED BASEWHEN, ACCORDING DAD, PILOTS CALLED IN AND AIR DEFENSE MENED. SOYSAL AT LEAST DID NOT MANIFEST UNDUE CONCERN AND, JUDGING FROM HIS DESCRIPTION, NEITHER DID TURKISH CABINET. IN THIS TIME WHEN LITTLE THINGS CAN VERY QUICKLY BECOME BIG ONES BETWEEN GREEKS AND TURKS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF WE ARE ABLE TO PICK UP ANYTHING ON BEIRUT REPORT FOR PASSAGE TO GOT.
MACOMBER

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DOS REVIEWED 12-Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~ 2208

REFER TO CIA

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ACTION EUR-25

CIA REVIEWED 18-Dec-2012: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

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 SAJ-01 IO-14 DPR-02 SY-04 A-01 EB-11 JRC-01 /152 W
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 FM AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
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 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
 USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL IZMIR IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ THESSALONIKI 0268

F O. 11652: GDS
 INFO: PFOR, GR, TU
 SUBJECT: ~~NORTHERN GREEK MILITARY REACTION TO GOT NAVAL
 TASK FORCE~~

REF: (1) THESS 266 (NOTAL), (2) ATHENS 3221

1. [25x1] HIGH RANK ARMY OFFICER
 HERE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT RE TURKISH NAVAL MO... NTS IN AEGEAN
 TO BE ISSUED BY GOG LATE TODAY. [25x1]
 GREEK ARMY ESTIMATE IS THAT GOT TASK FORCE DISPATCHED
 AS "TEST OF GREEK REACTION". [25x1] GOT UNITS
 NOT NOW PROCEEDING DIRECTLY TO LESVOS, BUT MANEUVERING
 OUTSIDE OF AREA ANNOUNCED IN PRESS REPORTS. ALSO CONFIRMED
 THAT ALERT IN FORCE FOR MILITARY UNITS IN NORTHERN GREECE
 AND REPORTED THAT "IRONICALLY" C CORPS CMDR, LT. GEN.
 DAVOS, WHO SENIOR MILITARY OFFICER IN NORTHERN GREECE,

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PAGE 02 THESSA 00268 301324Z

CURRENTLY IN IZMIR ACCOMPANYING US NATO GENERAL.

2. HAF HAS DEPLOYED FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AND COMMENCED OPERATIONS AT MILITARY SIDE OF MIKRA AIRPORT HERE. CONGEN OFFICER THIS MORNING COUNTED FIVE F-5 "FREEDOM FIGHTER" AND TWELVE F-40 "SHOOTING STAR" AIRCRAFT AT FIELD ACCOMPANIED BY TWO C-47 TRANSPORTS AND NUMEROUS SERVICE VEHICLES INCLUDING CAMOUFLAGED TANKER TRUCKS AND GROUND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS VANS. ARRIVAL THESE CRAFT OVERNIGHT ACCOUNTS FOR MILITARY JET TRAFFIC REPORTED REF. 1. MORE MILITARY JET MOVEMENT HEARD OVERHEAD THIS MORNING. UNABLE DETERMINE WHETHER MORE MILITARY CRAFT THAN THOSE COUNTED ARE ELSEWHERE ON MIKRA OR IN NEWLY-CONSTRUCTED QUONSET-TYPE CONCRETE SHELTERS ON FIELD.

3. LST "LESVOS" (REF. 1) OBSERVED LOADING H.A. TROOPS THIS MORNING. NUMBER UNDETERMINED BUT ESTIMATE IN EXCESS OF ONE HUNDRED SIGHTED ON UPPER DECK. CITY REMAINS QUIET, WITH NORMAL ACTIVITY, ALTHOUGH PERCEPTIBLY MORE MILITARY VEHICLES, PRINCIPALLY LIGHT AND HEAVY TRUCKS, JEEPS AND COMMAND CARS, NOTED MOVING ABOUT STREETS.

4. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE USIS SOURCE, ALL PRESS REPORTS ON CONFRONTATION EMBARGUED AND LOCAL PAPERS INSTRUCTED TO REFRAIN FROM ANY COVERAGE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
UNRELIABLE

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SECRET 2852

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 ACDA-19 EURE-00 NEA-14 SSO-00

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SAM-01 SAJ-01 DLOS-07 COA-02 DRC-01 /144 W
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4343
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE IMMEDIATE
USDOCOSOUTH IMMEDIATE
RUSNAAA USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAREUR IMMEDIATE
DIA(DIA-5) WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CONSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE
AMCONYRL ADANA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL INTEDIEWE
AMCONSUL IZNER IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN ANKARA 4163

R.O. 116521 GDS

TAGS: PFOR TO GR
SUBJ: GREEK/TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE

REF: ATHENS 3237 (NOTAL)

State Dept. review completed

SECRET

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Department of State TELEGRAM


~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ANKARA 04163 301908Z

1. IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT QUESTION FROM CHARGE: "WHAT IS GOT UP TO IN AEGEAN?", ISMAIL SOYSAL, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MFA, EVENING OF MAY 30 CONFIRMED THAT TURKISH NAVAL UNITS WERE ACCOMPANYING OIL EXPLORATION SHIP INTO DISPUTED AREA OF AEGEAN. HE SAID SHIPS WOULD STAY NEAR EXPLORATIONSHIP "CANDARLI" TO MAKE SURE THAT NOTHING HAPPENED TO IT. HE EXPECTED "CANDARLI" TO BE IN AREA FOR ABOUT ONE WEEK AND SOME NAVAL UNITS WOULD PRESUMABLY REMAIN THAT LONG. OTHERS MIGHT PROCEED SOUTH SOONER TO PARTICIPATE IN "GOOD FRIENDSHIP" EXERCISE. TURK GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED "MAKE IT CLEAR" TO GREEKS THAT THEY WERE GOING TO EXERT AN INTEREST IN THE DISPUTED AREA. NAVAL UNITS HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO BE NON-PROVOCATIVE AND TO STAY CLEAR OF GREEK TERRITORIAL WATERS. THEY WERE ONLY DOING WHAT THE GREEKS HAD DONE IN THE PAST IN THE SAME AREA.

2. SPAIN EXPRESSED DISTRESS. SAID HE HAD HOPED FROM GARBLED NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS THAT AT WORST IT WAS ONLY "CANDARLI" IN AREA. IN THAT CASE, WHILE SITUATION WAS HARDLY CONDUCTIVE TO EASING OF TENSIONS, MAJOR INCIDENT WAS RELATIVELY UNLIKELY. NOW HE FEARED DANGER WAS MUCH GREATER. HE KNEW WASHINGTON WAS CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION AND EXPECTED HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH SOON WITH GOT ON MATTERS WHICH COULD NOT BUT BE OF GRAVEST CONCERN TO ALL NATO ALLIES.

3. SITUATION IN ANKARA AND OTHER



25X1

4. WE NOTE THAT MEASURES PROPOSED PARA 6, OF STATE 112889 NOW IN PART OVERTAKEN BY FACT THAT TURKISH VESSELS APPARENTLY ALREADY IN AREA.

5. AS STEP TO UNDERLINE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH US VIEWS SITUATION, DEPARTMENT MAY WISH CONSIDER WITHDRAWING US PARTICIPATION IN IMMINENT BILATERAL US-TURKISH NATO EXERCISE "GOOD FRIENDSHIP."
SPAIN

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04142 301121Z

10
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
 USIE-00 INRE-00 NEA-14 IO-14 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 AEC-11 AID-20
 CEA-02 CIEP-02 COME-00 EB-11 FEA-02 FPC-01 INT-08
 OMB-01 SAM-01 SCI-06 STR-08 TRSE-00 ACDA-19 DLOS-07
 DKC-01 /213 W

084573

O 301040Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4330
 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
 USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
 SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE
 CINCUSAFE IMMEDIATE
 CINCUSAREUR IMMEDIATE
 USDOCOSOUTH IMMEDIATE
 USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
 CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE
 COMSIXTHELT IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 4142

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, TU, GR
 SURJ: GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE

REF: A. STATE 112889; B. ANKARA 4128(NOTAL)

1. CONTINUING CHECK OF DAO AND EMBASSY SOURCES HAS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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 E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
 REP PAC 6/30/09
 By WAT/RS NARA Date 5/15/18
 Doc 14487 [3 pgs]



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 ANKARA 04142 301121Z

PRODUCED NO INDICATION THAT ARMED NAVAL ESCORT IS BEING PROVIDED FOR TURKISH OCEANOGRAPHIC SHIP WHICH SAILED FOR AEGEAN FROM ISTANBUL AREA MAY 29. CONTRARY TO PARA 1 REF A, GOT HAS NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE ANNOUNCED THAT VESSEL WOULD BE ESCORTED.

2. TURKISH GENERAL STAFF (TGS) LIAISON OFFICER TOLD ALUSNA MAY 30 THAT TURKISH ARMED FORCES ARE NOT ON ALERT. LIAISON OFFICER ADDED THAT TGS CONVINCED THAT GREEKS WILL NOT FIGHT OVER AEGEAN AT THIS TIME AS THEY HAVE AGREED TO TALK WITH GOT.

CONCERNING LOS ISSUE (COMMENT: TGS MAY HAVE UNDULY SANGUINE CONCEPT OF GREEK DIPLOMATIC POSITION). HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT TGS CHIEF GEN SANCAR STILL PLANS TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON JUNE 3. HE DISMISSED PRESS REPORTS OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES AS MERE STORIES.

3. AP, UPI, AND THREE TURKISH PAPERS HAVE REPORTED IN LAST 24 HOURS THAT RESEARCH VESSEL WAS ESCORTED BY ARMED NAVAL CRAFT. COMMENT: SHOULD EMBASSY ATHENS BELIEVE THAT THESE APPARENTLY INCORRECT NEWS ACCOUNTS LIKELY HAVE UNFORTUNATE EFFECT ON GREECE. WE SEE NO REASON WHY IT COULD NOT PROVIDE SUBSTANCE OF PARA 1 ABOVE TO GREEK MFA.

4. REPORTS OF GREEK ARMED FORCES' ALERT HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED HERE WITHOUT CAUSING STRONG REACTION IN GOT. FOREIGN MINISTER GUNES, WHEN ASKED FOR COMMENT BY NEWSMAN EVENING MAY 29, WAS QUOTED AS SAYING. "TURKEY HAS NO INTENTION OF ATTACKING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND NATURALLY OF GREECE... I HOPE THAT AN INTERFERENCE WITH TURKEY'S MOST NATURAL RIGHTS WILL NOT OCCUR." (SEE FBIS KYRENAI M292021 -NOTAL).

5. COMMENT: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT, AS MIDDLE-LEVEL MFA OFFICIAL TOLD US THIS MORNING, TURKEY DOES NOT WANT TO PROVOKE GREECE UNNECESSARILY IN PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING ITS CLAIMED RIGHT TO EXPLORE FOR OIL IN EAST-CENTRAL AEGEAN. WE DOUBT THAT TURKEY HAS ANY INTEREST IN CREATING INTERNATIONAL CRISIS OVER ISSUE, BECAUSE CRISIS COULD WELL BE USED BY GREECE TO PERSUADE OUTSIDE POWERS TO SEEK TO STOP TURKEY'S ASSERTION OF RIGHTS

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25

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 04142 301121Z

IN AEGEAN,
SPAIN

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ACTION
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[NSC/1312/005/020]

AIRGRAM

~~MICROFILMED~~

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COPY NO. SERIES B

A-135
 NO.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~XX-135~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO Department of State

CLIFT _____

E.O. 11652: GDS

COOPER _____

TAGS: PINT, GR

ELLIOTT _____

FROEBE _____

HORAN _____

KENNEDY _____

LEHMAN _____

LODAL _____

LOW _____

OBER _____

DATE: May 22, 1974

FROM AmEmbassy ATHENS

SUBJECT Embassy Comments on Interagency Memorandum

REF Interagency Memorandum 'Greece Under Ioannidis: Implications for US-Greek Relations', Apr. 18, 1974

Although the Embassy considers the interagency memorandum, Greece Under Ioannidis, 18 April 1974, a rather interesting analysis, its analysis is incomplete and tends to convey some questionable implications for U.S. policy. In particular, the judgment that the situation, while not actually good from U.S. standpoint, could be worse, and that probably any U.S. effort to influence it would make matters worse, is not adequately supported.

In our view, the memorandum overstates the solidity of Ioannidis' position. We do not dispute the memorandum's assertions about Ioannidis' strength within the Armed Forces and Government, nor the fact that he has cowed the students, the press and the old political world while professing complete disdain for foreign criticism. Nevertheless, intrigue against him continues within the Armed Forces and among 1967 coup members. Also, there is evidence of increasing concern among the silent majority of military officers at the continued politicization of the Armed Forces. The business community is becoming alienated; unemployment among the politically sensitive construction workers can create new sources of tension; and the Greek people are turning from apathy to antipathy toward political repression in the absence of any hope of a return to democratic government. The regime has yet to define its policy direction in any area of normal government activity. Its two key tenets--

1974 JUN 28 AM 3 01

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 E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
 DEP PAC 4123/B
 By WILVA NARA, Date 5/15/13
 DC. 14412 [3 Pgs]

FORM DS-323

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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In Out

Contents and Classification Approved by:

RMBrandin/POL:EABrown/AMB:IJTasca:hme NIN:RMBrandin

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

anti-communism and nationalism in the 19th century sense--do not compensate for its lack of a specific program. In these circumstances the threshold of public tolerance for continued military dictatorship is getting lower. This weakens Ioannidis' position.

Although the memorandum suggests that the situation could be worse from the U.S. viewpoint, it does not acknowledge that over the last six months there has been some deterioration. Ioannidis considers Turkey the main enemy of Greece and seems to be seeking a confrontation with Turkey on the Aegean issue and probably in Cyprus as well. He has sought to reduce the rights and privileges U.S. forces have enjoyed in Greece, is demanding a quid quo pro in military aid, and is turning to France for military equipment. His appeasement and courtship of Arab states could prejudice U.S. use of Greek facilities in any future Mideast crises.

Yet, the memorandum overlooks the possible impact on the present regime's tenure if its unilateral initiatives affecting its ties with the U.S. become known. It is at least questionable whether Ioannidis has the latitude for movement that the analysis suggests, or that such policies might not significantly change Greek popular feeling toward the regime. Senior military officers have repeatedly stressed the importance they attach to Greece's bilateral security arrangements with the United States.

The memorandum fails to take into account that the U.S. attitude is a major factor in the Greek political situation and can have an influence on the course of future events. The Embassy believes that it is vitally important to Greece's future that we avoid giving the impression we do not support human freedom and some sort of representative government in Greece. Irritating Ioannidis, which he can take, is small insurance to pay to avoid the future possibility of complete loss of our facilities. The Greeks have shown historically that they do not ^{always} coolly calculate their national interests. Whenever a democratic regime is restored, they may well feel that they must show their independence from the U.S. so as to accommodate the widespread belief that we, and NATO, supported dictatorship and repression in Greece. Such action would inevitably be against our vital security interests.

It is not a question of overt intervention. However, we not only need to convey our immediate concern about a Greek-Turkish confrontation and a restructuring of U.S.-Greek security relations, but also, to safeguard our longer range interests, we must continue

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~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

to emphasize our deep concern about the lack of any program to return Greece to some form of representative government. For example, the memorandum dismisses the possibility of the return of Karamanlis under any conditions except with a completely free hand. It seems to imply respectable and normal political forces cannot figure in Greece's near-term political future. Although it seems clear that the present regime will not move aside for a civilian government which disposes of complete authority, in our view forces do exist in Greece that would participate in a democratically based government structure giving the Armed Forces the role of background arbiter and guardian against the reintroduction of undisciplined radical elements. We should not lose sight of the objectives of the neutralists and communists to come to power, or right-wing extremists, if the political situation were suddenly to disintegrate. Furthermore, the absence of any concrete movement by the regime may well galvanize the officer corps, particularly the younger officers, into action.

There are already signs of deterioration in the economic situation brought about by failure of the regime to maintain confidence of business community and prospective foreign investors. Over time economic problems could easily reach proportions compelling a change in the present political structure.

There is nothing in Greek history to warrant the hypothesis of stability in the present Greek situation which has been characterized by seven years of dictatorship, continued maintenance of martial law, widespread intimidation, and repressive policies towards the press, students, responsible opposition, and even business and needed foreign investors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by Elizabeth Ann Brown
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652.
Declassified on December 31, 1980.

[NSC/1312/005/027]

5/22/74

David

See memo attached - Kennedy
to Scowcroft

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~Secret~~

May 22, 1974

16- Approved + due
One CPWG
14 June

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD T. KENNEDY

FROM: DAVID M. RANSOM
HANK APPLEBAUM

sc

Hank and I agree that a contingency study of the possible confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Aegean oil rights is needed

Although we think the focus should be limited to the mounting dispute over oil rights in the Aegean, the study should prescribe optional responses which reflect a very broad review of our interests in both Greece and Turkey, our relations with both, and our influence in both

In other words, in outlining any role which we might adopt (both before and after a confrontation between the two states) the study should reflect our options concerning aid issues, base rights questions, Congressional, European/NATO dimensions, relations with the Soviets, etc. We think the purpose of the study should be to avert or contain this explosive dispute between two allies.

If you call Brandon, you might draw on the above

If you agree I will ~~cause this~~ initiate the study through the Contingency Planning Working Group

Agree -
Disagree -

Greek-Turk clash incl
militarization
we can't let high tensions
collisions avoid
demands for US assistance
sub paper

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
Per PAC 4/24/2013
By WCH/RS NARA, Date 5/15/18
Doc 14493 [3 pgs]


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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET - GDSACTION

May 22, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
 FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY 
 SUBJECT: Greece Contingency Planning

Hank Applebaum and I believe that a contingency study of the possible confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Aegean oil rights is needed.

Although we think the focus should be limited to the mounting dispute over oil rights in the Aegean, the study should prescribe optional responses which reflect a very broad review of our interests in both Greece and Turkey, our relations with both, and our influence in both.

In other words, in outlining any role which we might adopt (both before and after a confrontation between the two states), the study should reflect our options concerning aid issues, base rights questions, Congressional, European/NATO dimensions, relations with the Soviets, etc. We think the purpose of the study should be to avert or contain this explosive dispute between two allies.

If you agree, I will initiate the study through the Contingency Planning Working Group.

_____ AGREE

_____ DISAGREE

SECRET - GDS



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 7725

PAGE 01 LONDON 06007 151108Z

13
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20
USIA-15 OMB-01 DRC-01 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 ACDA-19 SSO-00

/136 W

025363

P 151104Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0355
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USDOCOSOUTH
USCINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAFE

*It may be a good idea to let
Labour take the lead within NATO even though
Prejudiced against junta. The question is, do we
follow up, and how?*

RTK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 06007

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

F.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, NATO
SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN

REF: USNATO 2640


BRITISH ARE CONSIDERING A SECOND APPROACH TO SYG LUNS RE
GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE. THEY ARE ACTING ON BASIS
OF BELIEF THAT USMISSION NATO HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
MAKE U.S. APPROACH TO LUNS. THEY MAY DECIDE BY END OF
DAY.

SOHM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECRETARY'S PARTY.

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23

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
per PAC 4/24/13
By WJH/RJ NARA, Date 5/15/18
Doc 14495 [6 pgs]



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 7388

PAGE 01 STATE 100613

13
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DRAFTED BY EUR/SE: G.T. CHURCHILL:MP
APPROVED BY EUR W. STABLER

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R 150134Z MAY 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO USMISSION NATO

~~SECRET~~ STATE 100613

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, GR
SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS GREECE
REF: A) US NATO 2175; B) ATHENS 2592; C) US NATO 2594;
D) STATE 097455

1. REGARDING OVER-ALL U.S. POLICY TOWARDS GREECE, WE ARE STUDYING RECOMMENDATIONS IN REFS A AND B.
2. ON SPECIFIC ISSUE OF GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE IN AEGEAN, REF D PROVIDED OUR VIEWS AND REQUESTED US NATO ADVICE ON ROLE LUNS MIGHT PLAY.
3. US NATO'S REF C APPEARS TO HAVE CROSSED WITH REF D. PLEASE COMMENT. RUSH

~~SECRET~~



Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03727 151121Z

11
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 COA-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00
PA-04 RSC-01 USIA-15 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 NSC-07 SAJ-01
DRC-01 /091 W

025504

P R 151044Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4110
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN
EUCOM
CINCUSAFE
USDOCOSOUTH
USCINCEUR/EC J-2
CINCUSAREUR
USNMR SHAPE
CINCUSNAVEUR
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

RUC

UNCLAS ANKARA 3727

EUCOM FOR POLAD AND J-2


EO 11652 N/A
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, LOS, GR, TU
SUBJECT: ~~TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN:~~
FISHING BOAT INCIDENT

1. ACCORDING TO THE SEMI-OFFICIAL ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY, A GREEK COAST GUARD VESSEL FIRED UPON A TURKISH FISHING BOAT IN THE AEGEAN ON MAY 14. THE TURKISH VESSEL, THE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 03701 150745Z

21
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
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DLOS-07 IO-14 COA-02 SAJ-01 SAM-01 NIC-01 ACDA-19
DRC-01 /188 W

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P R 141341Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4095
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
SECDEF WASHDC
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN
EUROM
CINCUSAFE
USDOCOSOUTH
USCINCEUR/ECJ-2
CINCUSAREUR
USNMR SHAPE
CINCUSNAVEUR
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 3701

EUROM FOR POLAD AND J-2

EO 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, TU, GR
SUBJECT: TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 03701 150745Z

REF: STATE 097455 (NOTAL)

1. WE CONCUR WITH REFTEL'S ANALYSIS OF LIKELIHOOD THAT PRESENT COURSES OF GREECE AND TURKEY MAY LEAD TO MILITARY CONFRONTATION. IN RECENT CONTACTS, WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY COMBATIVENESS AND TRUCULENCE DISPLAYED BY SENIOR GOT OFFICIALS REGARDING PROBLEMS WITH GREECE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KEY TURKISH OFFICIALS BELIEVE, AS SOME GREEKS REPORTEDLY DO, THAT ARMED CLASH WORTH RISKING BECAUSE U.S. AND OTHER NATO ALLIES WOULD DIPLOMATICALLY INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY AND QUICKLY.

2. ASSUMING NO CONFRONTATION RESULTS FROM PLANNED TURKISH FIRING EXERCISE IN AEGEAN JUNE 2 (ANKARA 3662), U.S. AND OTHER NATO PARTNERS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE CRISIS IN LATE JUNE-EARLY JULY WHEN MGMS. VESSEL UNDER CONTRACT TO TURKEY EXPECTED TO BEGIN OIL EXPLORATION (ANKARA 3550), SINCE, AS REFTEL NOTES, GREEK NAVY REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN ORDERED TO STOP SUCH EXPLORATION. WE BELIEVE DEPARTMENT SHOULD WARN ALL TMS, CONTRACTORS, AND SPECIFICALLY GEOPHYSICAL SERVICES INC., OF RISK OF OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT TO EITHER GOG OR GOT IN AREAS UNDER DISPUTE - AT LEAST FOR SO LONG AS DISPUTE REMAINS IN PRESENT HEATED FORM. POINT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE THAT POTENTIAL DANGER REACHES BEYOND MERE SAFETY OF SHIPS TO POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING INCIDENT WHICH COULD INVOLVE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. TURKS WILL RESENT OUR WARNING THIS COMPANY, BUT WE WILL BE IN POSITION TO REPLY THAT THIS IS EVENHANDED TREATMENT APPLIED TO BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY.

4. RE PARA 4 REFTEL: FOR SOME TIME EMBASSY HAS USED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW INTEREST AND CONCERN REGARDING NEED FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND AMBASSADOR ON MAY 11 HAMMERED POINT HOME WITH MFA SEC GEN (ANKARA 3682 - NOTAL). CHARGE WILL FOLLOW UP DURING AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE. MACOMBER

*This lines
lls up
with Greece*



Department of State TELETYPE

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5054




Cynthia Duncan

20518
Mrs. Sawyer
Doohrb

Nov 25 - coup

alternatives presented. Suggested weighting in. Sec rejected that

[NSC/1312/005/030]



S/P for series of analytic studies.

Tasca sat in on meeting w/ Sec
discussion inconclusive. "Disaster"

→ Sec what do you want me to decide

Asked INR for another paper


Bernie Rotklein: WR
Tom Thornton: S/P

NSSM 116 - 1971

SRG review in San Clemente. No NSDM

Summer 1973 asked for another NSSM

State Dept policy paper now done




Tasca: demarche on Pouda
broad

demarche on Aegean issue (Rush)

Rush refused to let Tasca talk to
Gris about our military
loss effectiveness because
of politicization

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER PAC 4/24/13
By WJH/RS/NARA, Date 5/15/18
Doc. 14496 [1 P]



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 2061

PAGE 01 NATO 02717 162049Z

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 ACTION EUR-25
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 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01
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 ----- 048490

P R 161845Z MAY 74
 FM USMISSION NATO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5746
 SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 USDOCOSOUTH
 US CINCEUR
 CINCUSNAVEUR
 CINCUSAFE
 US NMR SHAPE

~~SECRET~~ USNATO 2717

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, NATO
 SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN

REF: STATE 101599 (NOTAL)

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS RUMSFELD CALLED ON SYG LUNS AND OBSERVED THAT ON THE ONE HAND WE NOTE REPORTS OF INCREASINGLY STRONG POSITIONS BEING DISPLAYED BY SENIOR TURKISH OFFICIALS REGARDING PROBLEMS WITH GREECE. ON THE OTHER HAND IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH GREEK OFFICIALS IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT GREECE IS HOLDING TO THE VIEW THAT THE GREEK LEGAL POSITION ON THE VARIOUS AEGEAN ISSUES IS IMPREGNABLE AND THEREFORE, THERE IS NOTHING TO DISCUSS WITH THE TURKS. 2. RUMSFELD SAID THESE STATEMENTS OF OFFICIAL POSITIONS EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS COMBINE TO DEEPEN OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE AEGEAN SITUATION:

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 E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
 PER PAC 4/24/13
 By WJH NARA, Date 5/15/18
 Dc. 14498 [2 PGS]



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 NATO 02717 162049Z

A) SENIOR GREEK ARMY OFFICERS ARE APPARENTLY MAKING CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR POSSIBLE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, ?) TURKEY HAS SCHEDULED A NAVAL AND AIR FIRING EXERCISE IN ONE OF THE DISPUTED AREAS OF THE AEGEAN, C) OIL EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES BY FIRMS UNDER CONTRACT TO TURKEY MAY SOON BEGIN, AND THE GREEK NAVY COULD USE FORCE TO STOP SUCH EXPLORATION.

3. FOR THESE REASONS RUMSFELD SAID HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO ASK THE SYG TO SPEAK PRIVATELY WITH AMBASSADORS ERALP (TURKEY) AND CHORAFAS (GREECE) ABOUT WHAT APPEARS TO BE A COLLISION COURSE BETWEEN THE POLICIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND TO EMPHASIZE TO THEM THE NECESSITY THAT ACTION BE TAKEN BY BOTH COUNTRIES TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THEIR MUTUAL PROBLEMS BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

4. LUNS REPLIED HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE TWO AMBASSADORS ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO URGING THAT BOTH COUNTRIES REFRAIN FROM STATEMENTS OR ACTIONS WHICH COULD EXACERBATE THE PRESENT SITUATION, AND THAT THEY ACTIVELY SEEK A COMPROMISE OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

5. TO RUMSFELD'S INQUIRY ABOUT RESPONSE FROM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, LUNS SAID THUS FAR ONLY CHORAFAS HAS REACTED TELLING LUNS THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE IN SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT. CHORAFAS SAID THE GREEK POLITICAL DIRECTOR HAD RECENTLY MADE CONTACT WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN NEW YORK, AND THE TURKISH DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WILL SOON GO TO ATHENS TO DISCUSS OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

6. LUNS AGREED WITH RUMSFELD THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP AND HE WILL DO SO BEFORE HE DEPARTS FOR THE U.S. ON MAY 17. LUNS SAID HE WILL USE THE U.S. DEMARCHE AS REASON TO REMIND THE GREEK AND TURKISH PERMREPS THAT HE REQUESTS FURTHER REACTION FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS. RUMSFELD

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Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 8514

PAGE 01 ANKARA 03852 200638Z

20

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10
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 EB-11 EPA-04 NSF-04 SCI-06 FEA-02 AGR-20 FMC-04 INT-08
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R 171543Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4185
 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
 USMISSION NATO
 USDOCOSOUTH
 /USCINCEUR
 CINCUSNAVEUR
 CINCUSAFE

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 3852

EO 11652 GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, GR, TU, NATO
 SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN

REF: STATE 097455

SUMMARY: TURKS ARE TAKING POSTURE OF COOL TOUGHNESS ON
 AEGEAN ISSUE. BELIEVE US AND NATO EFFORTS AT MOMENT
 CAN BEST BE CONCENTRATED ON IMPROVING COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
 PARTIES AND SEEKING WAY AVOID POSSIBLE NAVAL EXERCISE
 CONFRONTATION IN AEGEAN JUNE 2, END SUMMARY

1. IN MAY 17 CONVERSATION WITH ISMAIL SOYSAL, DIRECTOR GENERAL
 POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MFA, CHARGE EMPHASIZED US ATTACHES HIGHEST

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
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PER PAC 7/24/13
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PAGE 02 ANKARA 03852 200638Z

IMPORTANCE TO GREEK-TURKISH FRIENDSHIP AND EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE EACH SIDE WILL WORK RESOLVE AEGEAN DISPUTE PEACEFULLY AND DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AVOID HEIGHTENING PUBLIC EMOTIONS THIS ISSUE. HE RESPONDED TO SOYSAL'S EARLIER REMARK IN

CONVERSATION ABOUT IMPORTANCE TURKEY ATTACHES TO NATO (SEPTEL) AND EMPHASIZED US TOO PUTS GREATEST IMPORTANCE ON ALLIANCE AND COOPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBERS. HENCE, ITS CONCERN OVER AEGEAN DISPUTE.

2. SOYSAL REPLIED THAT GREEKS MAKE IT HARD TO COOPERATE. PRESIDENT KORUTURK IN HIS RECENT IZMIR SPEECH AVOIDED PROVOCATIVE REMARKS DESPITE THE VERY NATURE OF THE OCCASION (TRADITIONAL TURKISH COMMEMORATION OF THE FIRING OF THE FIRST BULLET BY TURKS IN 1922 INDEPENDENCE WAR). BUT GREEK PRESS HAD REPLIED WITH BARRAGE OF INSULTS. (HE QUOTED FROM ELENIKOS VORRAS AND ESTIA.) AND GREEK PRESS IS CLOSELY CONTROLLED THESE DAYS. NEVERTHELESS, THE GOT WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY IT COOL. HE WELCOMED US VIEW PARA 1 ABOVE AND HOPED WE WERE SAYING SAME THING TO ATHENS.

3. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF AEGEAN SITUATION WHICH FOLLOWED, SOYSAL SAID THAT HE HAD PLANNED GO TO ATHENS MAY 12 FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH OPPOSITE NUMBER THERE UNDER LONG-STANDING "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" FOR PERIODIC MEETINGS TWO FOREIGN MINISTRIES' POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIRECTORS (SEE USNATO 2712, PARA 5), BUT HIS MINISTER HAD DIRECTED HIM TO WAIT UNTIL NEXT MONTH "IN HOP CLIMATE FOR DISCUSSIONS WOULD IMPROVE". IN ANY EVENT, TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD HAVE CHANCE DISCUSS AEGEANAT NATO MINISTERIAL.

4. IN RESPONSE CHARGE'S EXPRESSION OF CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE HEIGHTENED TENSIONS JUNE 2 WHEN TURKS PLANNING REPEAT OF LAST MARCH FIRING EXERCISE IN AEGEAN EN ROUTE TO NATO "GOOD FRIENDSHIP", SOYSAL SAID HE WOULD REVIEW EXERCISE PLANS CAREFULLY. HE ADDED SOMEWHAT GRUMPILY THAT, AS HE RECALLED, NATO FORCES INCLUDING US, HAD WITHDRAWN FROM EARLIER EXERCISE AND THAT GOT RESENTED THEIR DOING SO.

5. CHARGE REPLIED THAT, HAVING ACCEPTED LEGITIMACY OF US AND

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PAGE 03 ANKARA 03852 200638Z

NATO INTEREST IN PRESERVING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN ALLIES GREECE AND TURKEY, HE DIDN'T SEE HOW SOYSAL COULD BLAME NATO COUNTRIES FOR NOT WANTING TO BE INVOLVED IN ANYTHING WHICH COULD ADD TO TENSIONS. SOYSAL'S ONLY REPLY WAS "LET'S HOPE IT CAN BE WORKED OUT." (IN LATER DISCUSSION WITH ERCUMENT YAVUZALP, DIRECTOR GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, MFA, ON SAME SUBJECT, YAVUZALP SAID "PLEASE TRY TO GET OR GET NATO TO GET THE GREEKS TO ISSUE THE NOTAM. BUT, PLEASE, NO PRESSURE ON US. OUR MILITARY WON'T TAKE IT.")

6. POSTURE OF TOUGH COOLNESS ON AEGEAN ISSUE SEEMS TO BE ONE IN WHICH TURKS CURRENTLY WISH CAST THEMSELVES. THIS REFLECTED ALSO IN MAY 16 CONVERSATION WITH MFA CYPRUS-GREECE DIRECTOR BARUTCU IN WHICH EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT US WAS STRONGLY INTERESTED IN CONTINUATION OF TURKISH-GREEK FRIENDSHIP AND ASKED WHAT PROSPECTS THERE WERE FOR TURKISH-GREEK BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. BARUTCU REPLIED THAT NATO MINISTERIAL AT OTTAWA WOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS, ADDING WITH WRY CHUCKLE, "THAT MAY BE OUR LAST TALK." ASKED FOR EXPLANATION, HE SAID THAT TURKISH OIL EXPLORATION WOULD BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER OTTAWA MEETING. HE SHOWED NO INTEREST WHEN ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL CONTACTS DURING NATO LOS MEETING OR DURING CARACAS LOS CONFERENCE.

7. COMMENT: AS SEEN FROM HERE TURKISH-GREEK DISPUTE OVER AEGEAN REMAINS HOT BUT NOT YET QUITE AT BOILING POINT. BUT GOVERNMENTS STILL IN CONTROL OF THEIR ACTIONS, BUT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM SEEMS TO BE VIRTUALLY NIL. BELIEVE IMPROVEMENT THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE PRIMARY FOCUS OF US AND NATO EFFORTS NOW WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION ALSO BEING GIVEN TO HELPING ATHENS AND ANKARA FIND A WAY OUT OF A POSSIBLE JUNE 2 CONFRONTATION IN THE AEGEAN, SPAIN

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PAGE 01 ATHENS 03223 291654Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 USIA-15 PRS-01

L-03 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /099 W

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P R 291615Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3543
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 3223

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, GR, TU

SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE: VIEW FROM
NORTHERN GREECE

1. GENERAL RYDER, CHJUSMAGG, MADE FAREWELL VISITS MAY 20-22 TO COMMANDERS OF C CORPS, 10TH DIVISION, 11TH DIVISION, 12TH DIVISION, 6TH DIVISION, 2ND DIVISION AND 21ST BRIGADE.
2. HE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY UNUSUAL ACTIVITY OR INCREASED READINESS DUE TO GREEK-TURKISH SITUATION. AT SAME TIME COMMANDERS OF 11TH AND 12TH DIVISIONS, NEAREST TO TURKISH FRONTIER, FREELY DISCUSSED AEGEAN PROBLEM, TAKING POSITION THAT ALTHOUGH TURKEY WAS NATO ALLY AND IT WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR EITHER SIDE TO RESORT TO HOSTILE ACTION THAT WOULD WEAKEN ALLIANCE, THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT GREECE SHOULD NOT DEFEND WHAT WAS RIGHT OR WHAT WAS GREEK.
3. RYDER REPORTED HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT ALL GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FIELD BELIEVED CONFLICT SHOULD BE AVOIDED BUT WERE WILLING TO FACE SHOWDOWN IF IT BECAME NECESSARY.

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DER PAC 412413
By MLH/R NARA, Dsto S11518
Doc. 14502 [2 PGS]



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PAGE 02 ATHENS 03223 291654Z

4. IN EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT RISK CONTINUES TO EXIST OF MISCALCULATION BY EITHER SIDE AND CONSEQUENT PRECIPITATE REACTION THAT COULD LEAD TO MILITARY CLASH. ON GREEK SIDE PROBLEM COMPOUNDED BY WELL-KNOWN GREEK PHILOTIMO AS EVIDENCED BY STATEMENTS SUCH AS THAT OF KARAKOSTAS MAY 28 EMPHASIZING GREECE'S "RESOLVE NOT TO ACCEPT, BY ANY MEANS, ANY VIOLATION OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS BOTH IN THE MAINLAND AND THE ISLANDS." THUS REPORT IN ELEFTHEROS COSMOS MAY 29 ON KARAKOSTAS' MEETING WITH PRESS APPEARS UNDER HEADLINE: "NO ONE WILL SET FOOT ON GREEK TERRITORY."

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ON 08/10/05

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PAGE 01 UNENH 02552 0010005

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04128 292357Z

71 ACTION EUR-25 NSA review completed

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
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 SY-04 OC-06 CCO-00 SCCT-02 SAM-01 SAB-01 AEC-11
 AID-20 CEA-02 CIEP-02 COME-00 EB-11 FEA-02 FPC-01
 INT-08 OMB-01 SCI-06 STR-08 TRSE-00 NIC-01 DRC-01

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Z O 292135Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4321
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 SEC DEF WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

DIA, Navy
reviews
completed.

USCINCEUR
CINUSAFE
CINCUSAREUR

State Dept. review completed

USDOCOSOUTH
USMR SHAPE
CINCUSNAVEUR
COMSIXTHFLT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 4128

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: FBUR, MOPS, TU, GR
 SURJ: GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 04128 292357Z

REF: (A) ATHENS 3221 (B) ATHENS 3226 (NOTAL)

1. AS REPORTED ANKARA 4126 [REDACTED] 607 13 STAT
ANNOUNCE TURKISH NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC VESSEL WAS TO SAIL AT 9 A.M.,
LOCAL TIME TODAY FOR AEGEAN OIL EXPLORATION.

2. AS TO UPI STATEMENT (CITED IN REF A) THAT OCEANOGRAPHIC
VESSEL ACCOMPANIED BY "FLOTILLA", WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND
ANY CONFIRMATION SO FAR:

A. SENIOR OFFICER OF MFA (YAVUZALP), WHEN WE
CONTACTED HIM BY TELEPHONE AT HOME THIS EVENING, SAID HE COULD
NOT CONFIRM THAT RESEARCH VESSEL WAS ESCORTED. HE SPECULATED
THAT IF ANY NAVAL COMBAT-TYPE VESSELS HAD LEFT
GOLCUK, REASON WOULD BE EXERCISE "GOOD FRIENDSHIP" WHICH WILL
BEGIN IN AEGEAN SUNDAY.

B. ALUSNA WAS IN VICINITY OF GOLCUK NAVAL BASE THIS MORNING
AND DISCUSSED SHIP MOVEMENTS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONNEL.

NO MAJOR SHIP MOVEMENTS WERE KNOWN OR ANTICIPATED AT THAT
TIME (10 A.M. LOCAL).

C. IN TELEPHONE CHECK AT 11 PM LOCAL MAY 29,
ALUSNA'S GOLCUK ARA CONTACTS INDICATED NO CHANGE IN EARLIER
SITUATION. UPDATED INFOR FROM NON-GDT SOURCES WILL BE AVAILABLE
AT 8130 AM LOCAL MAY 30, AND ALASNA HAS APPOINTMENT
WITH TURKISH
NAVAL FORCES OPERATIONS SECTION AFTERNOON MAY 30
WHICH MAY PRODUCE ADDITIONAL DATA.

D. UPI REFERENCE TO "CRUISERS" IS ON ITS FACE INACCURATE,
SINCE TURKISH NAVY HAS NO CRUISERS.

3. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH UPI ISTANBUL REPORTING IS THAT IT IS
NOT ALWAYS RELIABLE.
SPAN

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-14 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SCI-06 COME-00 NSF-04 COA-02 INT-08 DRC-01

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074439

R 291545Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3541
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
SECDEF
USMISSION NATO
USUN NEW YORK 1036
CINCUSAFE
USDODCSOUTH
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
USNMR SHAPE
AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 3219

FO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, TU, GR
SUBJECT: GREEK-TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE

1. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY'S UNDERSTANDING DURING SPECIAL UNGA LAST MONTH GREEK AND TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES REACHED AGREEMENT ON NEED FOR TALKS ON AEGEAN. AT THAT TIME WE UNDERSTOOD TURKISH POSITION TO BE THAT IF TALKS TOOK PLACE TURKEY WOULD DEFER PLANS TO SEND SEISMIC OR DRILLING SHIP INTO AEGEAN. IT NOW APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT SEISMIC VESSEL, REPORTEDLY U.S. SHIP UNDER CHARTER TO TURKS, MAY BE MOVING FROM BLACK SEA INTO AEGEAN. THERE ARE

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SOME INDICATIONS THAT GREEKS PROBABLY WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH VESSEL WHOSE FUNCTION WAS STRICTLY SCIENTIFIC, I.E. SEISMIC OR OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, BUT AT SAME TIME GREEK POSITION BLURRED BY COMMENT THAT GREEK WOULD HAVE TO BE ON BOARD SUCH VESSEL, PRESUMABLY TO INSURE IT DID NOT EXCEED ANNOUNCED SCIENTIFIC FUNCTIONS. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF A GREEK NOT ABOARD REMAINS A POINT OF CONCERN. MOREOVER, WHAT REMAINS OF TSOUNIS' UNDERSTANDING IN NEW YORK (NOTED ABOVE) THAT IF TALKS TOOK PLACE GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD NOT MOVE AHEAD TO ASSERT WHAT IT BELIEVES TO BE ITS RIGHTS. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS ALSO PRESENT THE DANGER OF CONTACT AND CLASH ARISING SIMPLY THROUGH LEVEL OF EMOTIONS AND EXPLOSIVE REACTION.

2. BECAUSE OF CONTINUING RISK OF MISCALCULATION ON BOTH SIDES, WE BELIEVE IT IS IN MUTUAL US AND NATO INTEREST FOR U.S. AND OUR ALLIES TO MAINTAIN POSTURE OF ENCOURAGING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PARTIES. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS, AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THAT MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN ATHENS HAS FOR TIME BEING GIVEN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES FIRST CHANCE TO SEEK PEACEFUL SOLUTION. CONSEQUENTLY, ANYTHING THAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS IN THIS CHANNEL SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY.

3. WE ASSUME FIRST OPPORTUNITY FOR GREEK-TURKISH TALKS LIKELY TO BE NATO MINISTERIAL JUNE 18-19. THIS COULD BE TOO LATE. I BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE THEREFORE FOR ANKARA TO PROBE GOT REGARDING ITS PRESENT INTENTIONS. WE SHARE EMBASSY ANKARA'S VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR ANY AMERICAN FIRM CONTEMPLATING CONTRACT WITH GOT TO BE ADVISED OF IMMEDIATE RISK OF ENGAGING IN AEGEAN OPERATIONS PRIOR TO TALKS. ADDITIONALLY FROM EMBASSY ATHENS VIEWPOINT, WE BELIEVE IT BETTER FOR AMERICAN FIRM NOT TO UNDERTAKE SUCH CONTRACT WITH GOT PENDING OUTCOME OF FURTHER CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES BOTH STATES.

4. COMMENT: COMMENCING LAST SUNDAY, CHIEF EDITOR OF DAILY GREEK-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER ELEFTHEROS COSMOS,

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
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PAGE 03 ATHENS 03219 291726Z

MRS. ALEXANDRA STEFANOPOULOU, INITIATED A SERIES OF ARTICLES CONCERNING GREEK-TURKISH DIFFERENCES REGARDING QUESTION CONTINENTAL SHELF. BECAUSE ELEFTHEROS COSMOS APPARENTLY GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO CURRENT REGIME, THIS SERIES COULD BE CONSTRUED AS "GOVERNMENT HANDOUT". ARTICLES TO DATE PURPORT TO PRESENT BOTH TURKISH AND GREEK POSITIONS ON ISSUE AS WELL AS INTERPRET 1958 CONVENTION ON CONTINENTAL SHELF. SERIES RATHER TENDENTIOUS IN TONE AND GIVES IMPRESSION OF PRESENTING PRYMA FACIE CASE IN SUPPORT GOG POSITION. INTER ALIA, IT ATTEMPTS KNOCK OUT TURKISH CONTENTION THAT ISLANDS CONSTITUTE "SPECIAL CASE" WITHIN ARTICLE 6 OF 1958 CONVENTION. FULL TEXTS OF ARTICLES WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY AIRGRAM.
TASCA

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PAGE 01 ANKARA 04219 311616Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-14 IO-14 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 DRC-01 OMB-01 SAJ-01

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O 311540Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4367
 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
 USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
 SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE
 USMISSION UN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
 CINCUSAFE IMMEDIATE
 USDOCOSOUTH IMMEDIATE
 USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE
 USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
 CINCUSAKEUR IMMEDIATE
 DIA DIA-5 WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL ADANA IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE
 AMCONSUL IZMIR IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 4219

E.O. 11562: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, HOU, GR
 SUBJ: GREEK/TURKISH AEGEAN DISPUTE

1. MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS SOYSAL TOLD CHARGE EVENING
 MAY 31 THAT GOT "VERY PLEASED" WITH COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY
 GOG THIS MORNING. IT SAID GOT HAD TOLD GOG ABOUT NAVAL

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35

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 E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
 PER PAC 6/30/09
 BY: MLH/RJ, NARA, Date 5/15/18
 Doc. 44507 [2 PGS]



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ANKARA 04219 311616Z

EXERCISE IN AEGEAN, DENIED STORY OF ATTACK ON GREEK SHIP, AND IT ACCEPTED CANDARLI'S SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES AS NORMAL. (PRESUMABLY REFERENCE IS TO STATEMENT REPORTED ATHENS 3274.)

2. SOYSAL ADDED THAT AT SAME TIME THERE HAD BEEN A FEW PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS BY GREEKS, SPECIFICALLY ONE BY AVEROFF, BUT GOT WAS NOT GOING TO RESPOND.

3. HE BELIEVED TENSION WAS RAPIDLY GOING OUT OF SITUATION. AT NOONTIME ITALIAN NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, HE AND GREEK AMBASSADOR (WHO SHARED HIS VIEW) HAD BEEN HAVING A "FRIENDLY CHAT" WHEN SOVIET AMBASSADOR APPROACHED AND SAID JOVIALY: "EVERYBODY IS SENDING SHIPS TO THE AEGEAN, PERHAPS WE SHOULD TOO." SOYSAL AND GREEK AMBASSADOR SIMULTANEOUSLY REPLIED: "NO, WE FRIENDS WILL TAKE CARE OF ANY PROBLEMS VERY WELL WITHOUT YOU."

4. SOYSAL ALSO TOTALLY DISCOUNTED BIZIM RADIO REPORT (FBIS, KYRENIA, 311323Z) THAT GREEKS HAD ATTACKED TURKISH SHIP. HE SAID STATE DEPT'S SPOKESMAN'S REMARKS MAY 30 WASHINGTON WERE VERY HELPFUL SHOWING US INTEREST IN BOTH ITS FRIENDS BUT NOT THREATENING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT SO HAPPY AT FOLLOW-ON REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO "US OFFICIALS" IN MAY 31 AP STORY WHICH REFERRED TO FACT THAT BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY MUST ASK US CONSENT FOR USE OF THEIR AMERICAN WEAPONS FOR ANY PURPOSE OTHER THAN THAT FOR WHICH THEY WERE FURNISHED. LATTER REFERENCE HE SAID JUST ANNOYED SOME PEOPLE IN GOT.

5. SPAIN SAID USG INDEED REMAINED DEEPLY INTERESTED IN THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS DISPUTE BETWEEN ITS FRIENDS. HE WAS GLAD GOT FELT GOG WAS TAKING MODERATE AND REASONABLE COURSE AND COULD NOT OVERSTRESS NEED FOR GOT TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE MEASURES.
SPAIN

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