

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	re: Middle East	n.d.	B
2	memo	Forsman to Saunders	5/23/74	B
3	report	Israeli Analysis of the Findings...	5/12/74	B
4	memo	Saunders to Hoskinson	n.d.	B
5	report	Foreign Forces in Syria	5/23/74	B
6	telegram	SecState to Amconsul Jerusalem	5/28/74	B
7	telegram	SecState to Amconsul Jerusalem	5/28/74	B
8	brief	Plan for the Golan Heights	n.d.	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

1190

FOLDER TITLE

(11)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

#5 - what plan is

TOP SECRET


25.3.74

SEPARATION OF FORCES PLAN

ISRAELI PROPOSAL


legend:

- 67 CEASE FIRE LINES
- 73 CEASE FIRE LINE



- LIGHT FORCES ZONE**
 - 2 INF. BATTALIONS
 - 60 TANKS
 - 3000 MEN
- LIMITED FORCES AREA**
 - 1 INF. DIV.
 - 1 ARMOUR DIV. (300 TANKS)
 - 6 ART. BATTALIONS (100 GUNS)
 - (to cover only own force/line)
- MISSILE FREE AREA**
 - COMPLETE RESTRICTION ON ANY MISSILES & SITES (GROUND TO AIR GROUND TO GROUND).

TOP SECRET



legend:
 ——— JUNE 67 LINES
 - - - OCT. 73 LINE
 ● ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
 ● SYRIAN ABANDONED VILLAGE:
 OVER 500 INHABITANTS
 LESS THEN 500 INHABITANTS
 ● SYRIAN INHABITED VILLAGE:
 OVER 500 INHABITANTS
 LESS THEN 500 INHABITANTS

SECRET/NODIS

STRATEGY IN EVENT OF FAILURE IN
SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Objectives:

If our current round of negotiations in the area fails to produce Syrian-Israeli agreement on the main elements of disengagement, our objectives will be:

1. To manage the diplomatic situation in such a way that the Secretary leaves the area without there being a major blowup.
2. ~~Not~~ retain US credibility and influence in key Arab countries, including in particular Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria.
3. To preserve the elements of a negotiating process that can be picked up and re-started when circumstances are more propitious.

Two Possible Scenarios

The courses of action open to us will be determined in large measure by the circumstances under which the negotiations break down. For analytical purposes, we are likely to face one of the following two situations:

1. A breakdown in circumstances where (a) Israel will have taken a position that moderate Arab opinion (meaning Egypt in particular) perceives as a reasonable result of our efforts, and (b) Syria balks.

This could arise, for example, if Israel agrees to a disengagement line that returns Kuneitra to Syrian civilian administration, and Syria insists on a significantly larger withdrawal. (Scenario 1)

2. A breakdown which is widely perceived in the area and elsewhere as the result of Israeli inflexibility -- e. g. , Israel stands on its present position ~~as~~ something close to it with respect to the location of the disengagement line (Scenario 2).

Scenario 1 (Syria to blame)

This is the easier of the two situations for us to manage. Our immediate task will be to make sure that the facts are clearly understood in key Arab and European capitals, since we can expect the Syrians and their supporters, especially the Soviets, to seek to obfuscate and misinterpret the issues.

We should:

(a) Make sure Sadat, Boumediene and Faisal understand the reasons for the impasse and seek their assurances they will not be drawn into military ⁵ political support of Syria if it goes to war. This would best be accomplished by further visit to those capitals, as well as a full briefing of NATO and of the Soviets on the specific positions adopted by each side.

(b) Adopt a public posture of willingness to continue our efforts through diplomatic channels.

(c) Avoid public criticism of Syria, while continuing our dialogue with Asad to keep the door open to further negotiations if his position later becomes more flexible.

(d) Make a factual written report on the status of the negotiations to the UN Secretary General and to the participants in the Geneva Peace Conference.

(e) If the issue goes to the Security Council, adopt a position supportive of Israel and seek to line up as many other members as possible.

(f) Intensify our bilateral cooperation activities with key Arab countries.

Scenario 2 (Israel to blame)

This situation would place us in a difficult position, and our maneuverability would be greatly circumscribed.

We should:

(a) Elicit from Israel maximum flexibility on as many elements of disengagement as possible with a view to obtaining Israeli agreement to terms that, except for the Israeli position on the disengagement line, are as close as possible to the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian agreement.

(b) Adopt a public posture that disassociates us from the positions of both sides to the extent that they deviate from the model of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

(c) If the issue goes to the Security Council, avoid supporting the Israeli position; this might be the time for us to "non-participate" in any vote, on the grounds that participation would be inconsistent with our middleman role in the negotiations.

(d) Agree, if others press, to a meeting of the Geneva Conference to review the status of the negotiations and to consider next steps.

(e) Seek Israeli and Syrian agreement to a statement defining principles of disengagement on which both sides could agree as well as the areas remaining to be negotiated. Such a statement could be forwarded to the UN Secretary General and the Geneva Conference participants as a basis for future negotiations when either side indicated an interest in resuming talks.

(f) While continuing scheduled military deliveries and economic aid to Israel, defer decisions on new items of equipment sought by Israel and leave the optional \$500 million under the Emergency Security Assistance Act as a loan rather than connecting it to grant aid.

(g) Undertake intensive diplomatic efforts with key Arab countries to (1) persuade them that the stalemate in negotiations is a transitory

Secretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974

Some months ago when we first started in our Middle East efforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the moon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here. Seriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and public opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile country and one allied to our opponent.

Since my first visit four months ago there has been a tremendous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and independent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.

We have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grateful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch today. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations that had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a rapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria except what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its own national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to cooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to have the same close relations with Syria as with any other Arab country. We realize that some objective difficulties have to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But we consider cooperation our natural relationship.

I am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process of making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria has proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it has also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There is a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and Syria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.

After one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it is a tremendous step for Syria to engage in this process at all and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.

I cannot report that my argument met with universal approbation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possibility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the process becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first step not to draw another permanent line but to start the process leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific proposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destination as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will discuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.

We will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are not bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope that we can accomplish on the northern front what we have accomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues

and I will be returning as often as necessary to make substantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.

I would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for the understanding which he has shown and for the attitude which has been important in the transformation of our relations.

May I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.

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May 22, 1974

Mr. Secretary:

We believe Assad is frozen against the Egyptian model for the reasons given. The three of us are convinced we have to alter the approach somewhat. This approach would be based on giving Israel as early a warning of attack as possible rather than trying to get the guns out of range of opposing lines. The space is too small, and Assad won't accept such restrictions. Thus instead of applying the Egyptian model, we would try to provide detection of indications of possible offensive action.

We suggest it be discussed in general with Israel this morning and then tried out on Assad this afternoon.

Joe Sisco

A U. S. PROPOSAL

A. Mount Hermon

--The Red Line would be moved three to four kilometers to the west toward the peak as indicated in Israel Tuesday morning.

--Israel would turn over to the U. N. the positions it did not occupy on October 6.

B. Limitations

1. Within 10 kilometer zone, deployment would consist of no more than 5,000 men, 70 tanks, and 36 artillery pieces (short range).
2. U. N. Disengagement Observer Force would inspect these deployments.
3. In a second 10 kilometer zone:
 - (a) in the southern sector Syria would be permitted to retain the present strength of its forces and equipment;

- (b) in northern sector where Israel pulls back, Syria would, after moving forward into the area vacated by Israel, with forces consistent with what is allowed in the 10 kilometer zone, redeploy its ~~towns~~^{troops} in positions normal for the defense of Damascus. Syria would specify in advance to us what their deployment would be.
- (c) Syria would keep its SAM's where they are and provide following commitments:
- (1) There would be no SAM's in second 10 kilometer zone.
 - (2) Syria will not move them forward~~x~~ from where they are.
 - (3) Syria will not shoot at any Israeli airplanes flying on the Israeli side of the line.
- (d) US aerial reconnaissance would be the form of monitoring, not UN inspection. Purpose of this inspection would be not to check on a firm standstill of deployment, but rather to detect whether either change of equipment or its increase in numbers or disposition indicate intention to mount offensive action. Intelligence would be made available to both sides.

4. Syria would agree to this as a US proposal, and give us a private assurance rather than this being reflected in the agreement.

C. The Red Line

--The Red Line would be moved westward in accordance with the following general principles:

--one to two kilometers west in the area opposite the Quneitra area on grounds that this would be part of an effort to lessen the possibility that the people of Quneitra will be involved in future military activity;

--three to four kilometers west in the area to the north of that.

D. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force

--1,500 men

E. Area of Separation

There would be no military forces or equipment and a maximum number of 150 police forces.

SYRIAN ORGANIZATION

Division has 3 brigades (3000 men each)

Division also has 2 battalions of artillery ~~122mm. is organic~~

Each brigade has a battalion of artillery (122mm. is organic)

An armored brigade has 93 tanks

An infantry brigade has 31 tanks (Asad said sometimes 41)

9- BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT: TANKS

Best case: 9 infantry brigades = 279 tanks

First probable: 6 infantry brigades (186)
3 armored brigades (279) = 465 tanks

Second probable: 7 infantry brigades (217)
(Best attainable): 2 armored brigades (186) = 403 tanks

Theoretical worst case: 9 armored brigades = 837 tanks

Present deployment within 25km. of front:

49,000 men

752 tanks

369 artillery pieces

"Normal" peacetime deployment (July 1, 1973) in 25km. area

34,500 men

465 tanks

276 artillery

ATT 1

7th Infantry Division Area of Operation

124 Tanks
72 Artillery Pieces
14000 Personnel

9th Infantry Division

217 Tanks
126 Artillery Pieces
15250 Personnel

5th Infantry Division

217 Tanks
126 Artillery Pieces
15250 Personnel

68th Independent Armor Brigade

93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
2250 Personnel


80th Independent Armor Brigade

93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
2250 Personnel

TOTALS


752 Tanks
369 Artillery Pieces
49000 Personnel

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT



ATT. 1

NORMAL DEPLOYMENT



ATT 2

13,000 = one brigade of each of above forward + 3000 + extras.



ARMOR DIV



2 Armor Bdes.

Contains: 186 Tanks; 36 Artillery Pieces; 4,500 Personnel



1 Artillery Bde.

Contains: 54-71 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel



1 Mechanized Inf Bde.

Contains: 31 Tanks; 18 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel

TOTALS FOR ONE (1) DIVISION: 217 Tanks; 107 Artillery;
10,500 Personnel



INFANTRY DIV



2 Infantry Bdes.

Contains: 62 Tanks; 48 Artillery Pieces; 7,000 Personnel



1 Mechanized Inf Bde.

Contains: 31 Tanks; 6 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel



1 Armor Bde.

Contains: 124 Tanks; 18 Artillery Pieces; 2,250 Personnel



1 Artillery Bde.

Contains: 54 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel

TOTALS FOR ONE (1) DIVISION: 217 Tanks; 126 Artillery Pieces;
15,250 Personnel

THERE ARE TWO (2) ARMOR DIVISIONS PLUS ONE (1) ARMOR TASK FORCE.
WE HAVE A TOTAL BREAK OUT AS FOLLOWS:

TANKS: 713
ARTY : 268
PERS : 27,750

THERE ARE THREE (3) INFANTRY DIVISIONS.
WE HAVE A TOTAL BREAK OUT AS FOLLOWS:

TANKS: 651
ARTY : 378
PERS : 45,750

ATT. 4

ATT 3

ESTIMATED POST DISENGAGEMENT

7th Infantry Division

186 Tanks
66 Artillery Pieces
12250 Personnel

9th Infantry Division


155 Tanks
48 Artillery Pieces
9250 Personnel

5th Infantry Division

217 Tanks
72 Artillery Pieces
12500 Personnel

TOTALS:

558 Tanks
186 Artillery Pieces
34000 Personnel



ATT. 3

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Saunders

FROM : Col. B. B. Forsman, USAF, Defense Attache

SUBJECT: IDF Peacetime Golan Heights Deployment

DATE: May 5, 1974

1. The attached map depicts the pre-October 1973 normal IDF deployment on the Golan Heights. The information was derived from numerous briefings. Our observations on road trips confirm the general deployment, but not all units were continuously deployed in the positions shown.
2. You will note the outposts along the ceasefire line. Those underlined were continuously manned, as far as we can determine. These outposts were designed to withstand attack as opposed to the trip-wire concept on the Bar Lev line. The ~~Armen~~ units behind the line were deployed in platoon strength (three tanks) as a general rule.
3. Hope this satisfies your request.

Attachment:
As stated.

Billy B Forsman

DAO:Col.BBForsman:plr--5/5/74



5010-108

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DECLASSIFIED

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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STATE 105745

TO SEC 863

O 211422Z MAY 74 ZFFG 21 MAY 16 52z
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0711
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0521
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 5872
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 3 STATE 105745/1

TOSEC 863

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: UNTSO MANDATE

REF: JERUSALEM 1003

FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM

FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL REQUESTED REFTEL:

1. FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTIONS TO UNTSO OBSERVERS BY SECURITY COUNCIL APPEARED IN COUNCIL RESOLUTION 73 OF 11 AUGUST 1949 IN PARA 6 WHICH READ:

"REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ARRANGE FOR THE CONTINUED SERVICE OF SUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE PRESENT TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN OBSERVING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AS MAY BE NECESSARY IN ASSISTING THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE PARTIES AS EXPRESSED IN THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENTS;"

2. ENTIRE TEXT OF THIS RESOLUTION (73) READS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

"HAVING NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE SEVERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT IN PALESTINE IN PURSUANCE OF ITS RESOLUTION 61 (1948) OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948,

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- "1. EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, HAVING UNDERTAKEN BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION, TO FULFIL THE REQUEST OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION OF 11 DECEMBER 1948 TO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SEEK AGREEMENT BY NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED EITHER WITH THE CONCILIATION COMMISSION OR DIRECTLY, WILL AT AN EARLY DATE ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL QUESTIONS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN THEM;
- "2. FINDS THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE AND CONSIDERS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS SUPERSEDE THE TRUCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 50 (1948) OF 29 MAY AND 54 (1948) OF 15 JULY 1948;
- "3. REAFFIRMS, PENDING THE FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT, THE ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948) OF 15 JULY 1948 TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE AND, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SEVERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS INCLUDE FIRM PLEDGES AGAINST ANY FURTHER ACTS OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR THEIR SUPERVISION BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, RELIES UPON THE PARTIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS;
- "4. DECIDES THAT ALL FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE HAVING BEEN DISCHARGED, THE ACTING MEDIATOR IS RELIEVED OF ANY FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS;
- "5. NOTES THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS PROVIDE THAT THE EXECUTION OF THOSE AGREEMENTS SHALL BE SUPERVISED BY MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS WHOSE CHAIRMAN IN EACH CASE SHALL BE THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION OR A SENIOR OF THAT ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY HIM FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENTS;
- "6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ARRANGE FOR THE CONTINUED SERVICE OF SUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE PRESENT TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN OBSERVING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AS MAY BE NECESSARY IN ASSISTING THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE PARTIES AS EXPRESSED IN THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENTS;

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Pg. 3

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 105743

"7. REQUESTS THE CHIEF OF STAFF MENTIONED ABOVE TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN PALESTINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THIS RESOLUTION; AND TO KEEP THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION INFORMED OF MATTERS AFFECTING THE COMMISSION'S WORK UNDER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (III) OF 11 DECEMBER 1948."

3. AFTER THE 1967 WAR, SC ADOPTED RES 236 ON JUNE 11, 1967 WHICH READ AS FOLLOWS:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

"TAKING NOTE OF THE ORAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, MADE AT THE 1354TH, 1355TH, 1356TH AND 1357TH MEETINGS AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN DOCUMENTS S/7930 AND ADD.1-3,

"1. CONDEMNS ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE

CEASE-FIRE;

"2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS INVESTIGATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE;

"3. AFFIRMS THAT ITS DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND DISCONTINUANCE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDES A PROHIBITION OF ANY FORWARD MILITARY MOVEMENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CEASE-FIRE;

"4. CALLS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN TO THE CEASE-FIRE POSITIONS OF ANY TROOPS WHICH MAY HAVE MOVED FORWARD SUBSEQUENT TO 1630 HOURS GMT ON 10 JUNE 1967;

"5. CALLS FOR FULL COOPERATION WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AND THE OBSERVERS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES."

4. RES 340 OF OCTOBER 25, 1973 WHICH ESTABLISHED UNEF ALSO PROVIDED ROLE FOR UNTSO. FULL TEXT OF RES 340 FOLLOWS:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

"RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) OF 22 OCTOBER AND 339 (1973) OF 23 OCTOBER 1973,

"NOTING WITH REGRET THE REPORTED REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) AND 339 (1973),

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"NOTING WITH CONCERN FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ENABLED TO PLACE THEMSELVES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE,

"1. DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 1650 HOURS GMT ON 22 OCTOBER 1973;

"2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS ON BOTH SIDES;

"3. DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY UNDER ITS AUTHORITY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE TO BE COMPOSED OF PERSONNEL DRAWN FROM STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EXCEPT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT WITHIN 24 HOURS ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO THIS EFFECT;

"4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND CONTINUING BASIS ON THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) AND 339 (1973);

"5. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO EXTEND THEIR FULL COOPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) AND 339 (1973)."

5. SYG REPORTED TO SC ON 27 OCTOBER 1973 SPECIFYING "TERMS OF REFERENCE" OF UN FORCE AS FOLLOWS:

"(A) THE FORCE WILL SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 340 (1973), WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

"1. DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 1650 HOURS GMT ON 22 OCTOBER 1973;"

"(B) THE FORCE WILL USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THE FIGHTING, AND COOPERATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN ITS HUMANITARIAN ENDEAVOURS IN THE AREA.

"(C) IN THE FULFILMENT OF ITS TASKS, THE FORCE WILL HAVE THE COOPERATION OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS OF UNTSO."

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Pg. 5

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STATE 105743

6. SC APPROVED FOREGOING REPORT OF SYG IN RES 341
ADOPTED OCTOBER 27, 1973.

7. WHILE PERHAPS LESS RELEVANT TO YOUR CURRENT NEEDS,
SHOULD YOU WISH LANGUAGE ESTABLISHING ORIGINAL UN TRUCE
COMMISSION, IT APPEARS IN SC RES 48 OF APRIL 23, 1948
AS FOLLOWS:

"REFERRING TO ITS RESOLUTION OF 17 APRIL 1948,
CALLING UPON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH
SPECIFIC TERMS FOR A TRUCE IN PALESTINE,

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL

"ESTABLISHES A TRUCE COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE
COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH HAVE CAREER CONSULAR OFFICERS IN
JERUSALEM, NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
SYRIA HAS INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT PREPARED
TO SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. THE FUNCTION OF THE
COMMISSION SHALL BE TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN
SUPERVISING THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PARTIES OF THE

RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 17 APRIL 1948;

"REQUESTS THE COMMISSION TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FOUR DAYS REGARDING ITS
ACTIVITIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL CURRENTLY
INFORMED WITH RESPECT THERETO.

"THE COMMISSION, ITS MEMBERS, THEIR ASSISTANTS AND
ITS PERSONNEL SHALL BE ENTITLED TO TRAVEL, SEPARATELY OR
TOGETHER, WHEREVER THE COMMISSION DEEMS NECESSARY TO
CARRY OUT ITS TASKS.

"THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHALL
FURNISH THE COMMISSION WITH SUCH PERSONNEL AND ASSIST-
ANCE AS IT MAY REQUIRE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL
URGENCY OF THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINE."

8. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, FAMILIAR WITH DIVERGENT POSITIONS
OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA RE APPLICABILITY OF ORIGINAL 1949
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ASSUME YOU FINESSING THIS QUESTION
AND THEREFORE AM NOT HOLDING UP THIS MESSAGE TO INCLUDE
LENGTHY TEXT OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF. HOWEVER,
AM SENDING IT OUT IN SUBSEQUENT SEPTEL IN CASE YOU
NEED IT. RUSH

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CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS

Mr. Sisco--May 28

1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement and of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow to identify the copies as texts they have verified for signing. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You will have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians have verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will carry it to Geneva for signing.)
3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the Secretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations. Ask him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn it over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.
4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)

SECRET

CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS

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1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
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4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two or three weeks.
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4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
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4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)

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CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS

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1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
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4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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CHECKLIST FOR JERUSALEM

SUNDAY, MAY 26

Limitations

--New positions taken by Asad:

--36 short-range 122mm in 10 km-zone.

--Agreed to measure the 10 km zone from the Red Line.

--Asad is willing to accept either:

--All guns are acceptable within 25 km except
the 130 mm, which would be beyond the 25 km line.

Or:

--If the second area were 20 km, he would position
all guns with a range of more than 20 km beyond
the 20 km line.

--You have the "impression" that he will move all non-Syrian
forces beyond 25 km provided there is no Israeli publicity.

--(Confirmed that SAMs would be beyond 25 km.)

--Issues that remain to be resolved:

--36 short-range 122 mm in 10 km zone.

--Decision on guns in 20-25 km zone.

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--(9 brigade deployment in 25 km zone.)

--The format in which the limitations would be recorded.

Red Line

--Must be moved as far west as possible.

United Nations

--Asad still wants less than 1000.

Mount Hermon

--Asad position is uncertain.

--(Israel wants a sentence in The Protocol on the Area of Separation reading: "No liaison officers of any side will be present and no persons other than UNDOF will be permitted into that area." This has not been raised.)

Area of Separation

--(Police: Israel wants a limited number, 30 in Quneitra and 30 elsewhere in the area. Not raised yet.)

--(Fedayeen: We have put this issue in terms of preventing border-crossing. This is reflected in Paragraphs A and D of the Agreement and in The Protocol on the Area of Separation. This has not been discussed yet.)

S E C R E T

CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS

Sunday, May 26

Limitations

-- In the 10 km. zone measured from the Red Line, the following is now agreed:

- 6000 men,
- 75 tanks,
- 36 122 mm. guns of less than 15 km. range.

-- In the area behind the 10 km. limitations area the following needs to be decided or confirmed:

- There may be up to 162 guns of 122 mm. of less than 15 km. range.
- For other artillery, there are three possibilities, the last two to be used only to break an impasse on the Red Line:
 - Israel accepts the proposal to station all guns with a range of more than 20 km. behind a line 20 km. from the Red Line.
 - (Apply the above limitation in an area of 25 km. measured from the Blue Line.)
 - (Apply the above restriction in an area of 20 km. measured from the Syrian October 6 line, or Purple Line.)

-- The following is confirmed:

- SAMs will be 25 km. from the Red Line (or 30 km. from the Blue Line).
- (You will provide the Israelis a written statement of your understanding that it is Asad's intention to station about 9 brigades in the 10-25 km. area.)

-- ← It is necessary to decide the format in which the above limitations would be expressed.

Red Line

- Show the new map.
- (Use moving the line another kilometer west in connection with one of the fallbacks on drawing the line for artillery limitations to break an impasse.)

United Nations

- Number: Israel prefers 1500 but gives you some flexibility (say, to 1300).
- Name remains undecided.

Mount Hermon

- The Red Line has been moved west in this area.
- Israel will turn over to the UN all its positions in the area of separation.
- Israel wants a sentence in the Protocol saying: "In the Mount Hermon sector, the UN (presence) will be the only and exclusive presence. No liaison officers of any side will be present and no persons other than those of the UN (presence) will be permitted into that area."

Area of Separation (in addition to the last point on Mount Hermon above)

- Police: Israel wants a limited number, 30 in Quneitra and 30 elsewhere in the area.
- Fedayeen control: Israel wants the following language in the Protocol: "The UN shall deny access to any military or para-military forces into the area of separation." We have put this in the Agreement in terms of preventing "hostile actions" (Paragraph A) and preventing border-crossing (Paragraph D). If we can retain the former, the latter might drop out of the agreement as the Syrians are already insisting. Then there are two possibilities:
 - We also have the language of Paragraph D on border-crossing in the Protocol on the Area of Separation.

- If that language drops out of the Protocol also, perhaps you could elicit a statement of intent by Asad on keeping the border quiet and provide this to Israel in a letter.

Documents

You will be trying to get the following documents into final form:

- Agreement,
- Protocol on UN,
- Protocol on area of separation,
- paper on limitations,
- letter on Quneitra hills,
- letter on next stage. In this connection, you may also want to discuss how you see the diplomacy evolving through the rest of 1974.

Procedures at Geneva

You may want to discuss our role there.

Syrian Jewry

- You promised to take this up in the context of US-Syrian relations.

POWs

- Israel has agreed to release "all prisoners captured on the Syrian front." Israel wants to assure release of its two pilots in Lebanon.

Civilian Repatriations

- Asad was going to give you a list of "Arabs in Israeli jails."
- Asad said he would look into the question of the body of Eli Cohen.
- (The question of release of Albert Elias, Secretary-General of the Lebanese Jewish Community, was left that Israel would furnish further information if possible.)

Recess of Negotiations (if necessary)

- The issue is how to recess the negotiations. The choice is between the appearance of blow-up and maintaining the appearance of a continuing process.
- Joint statement.
- Backgrounding the press.

Bilateral Relations

- Timing of improved relations, i.e., raising interests sections to Ambassadorial level.
- Timing of the President's trip.
- Economic cooperation (see attachment).

S E C R E T

Economic Cooperation

As a concrete manifestation of closer relations, you would be prepared to instruct Mr. Scotese to pursue the following if Asad agreed:

- The US is prepared to resume educational and cultural exchanges between the US and Syria. (Note: The Syrians felt the time was not yet ripe for such contacts when Scotese made the offer for FY 1974. In FY 1975, we are aiming for 5 international visitor grants, 4 graduate student or professors' research grants, and at least one US professor teaching at Damascus University.)
- A representative of the Department of Commerce will be visiting Syria shortly to explore the possibilities of increasing trade. (Note: One Commerce official is in the area for this purpose and will come to Syria. The only big commercial deal pending is the sale of aircraft by Lockheed or McDonnell Douglas to Syrian Arab Airlines.)
- The US is ready to enter into talks with the government of Syria for the settlement of economic claims by both sides with a view to opening new possibilities of economic and commercial cooperation between the US and Syria. (Note: The two main issues are (a) the status of 21 million Syrian pounds from counterpart funds frozen by Syria in 1967 and (b) about \$75,000 owed to Ex-Im Bank following nationalization of a textile firm. We could presumably agree to Syrian use of the 21 million pounds for appropriate Syrian economic activity, e.g., rehabilitation of villages. Settlement of the nationalization claim would permit Ex-Im financing. Several US firms have recently sought US financing.)
- The US would be prepared to participate in the 1974 Damascus Fair if we were invited. (Note: The fair takes place in July. We have not yet been invited, but if invited promptly, we could still arrange a commercial presence.)
- We will let key Congressmen know of Asad's interest in having them visit Syria. Perhaps Dr. Kabbani could follow this up.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

S/S - 15

0 212251Z MAY 74

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21 MAY 74 - 23:07Z

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TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5890

INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0535

BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 106493

TOSEC 878

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: UNEF'S MANDATE

REF: SECTO 56

FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM

1. WHILE YOUR REQUEST INVOLVED ONLY INFO ON UNTSO, WHICH HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED, IN EVENT YOUR DISCUSSIONS INVOLVE AVAILABILITY OF UNEF ON SYRIAN FRONT WITHIN SCOPE OF PRESENT MANDATE, FOLLOWING REMINDER MAY BE USEFUL:

SC RESOLUTION 346 OF APRIL 8, 1974 RENEWED UNEF'S MANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS AND IN EFFECT PROVIDED FOR THE TRANSFER OF UNEF CONTINGENTS TO ISRAELI/SYRIAN FRONT WITHOUT FURTHER SC ACTION BY THE INSERTION OF THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE:

"NOTES THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEW THAT THE DIS-ENGAGEMENT OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IS ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND THAT THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PRESENT QUIET IN THE EGYPT-ISRAEL SECTOR BUT ALSO TO ASSIST, IF REQUIRED, IN FURTHER EFFORTS FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ACCORDINGLY DECIDES THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARAGRAPH 68 OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF 1 APRIL 1974 (S/11248), THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTION 341 (1973) OF 27 OCTOBER 1973, SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A FURTHER PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, THAT IS, UNTIL 24 OCTOBER 1974." RUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

S/S - 15

0 211551Z MAY 74 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 21 MAY 74 - 18:32Z

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0716

INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0525

RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5878

BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 105761

TOSEC 866

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: UNTSO MANDATE

REF: 105745, TOSEC 863

FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM

1. AS PROMISED REFTEL, WHILE THIS MAY NOT BE ESSENTIAL, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF JULY 20, 1949:

"THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT,

"RESPONDING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948, CALLING UPON THEM, AS A FURTHER PROVISIONAL MEASURE UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENT TRUCE TO PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE, TO NEGOTIATE AN ARMISTICE;

"HAVING DECIDED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER UNITED NATIONS CHAIRMANSHIP CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948; AND HAVING APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES EMPOWERED TO NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT;

"THE UNDERSIGNED REPRESENTATIVES, HAVING EXCHANGED THEIR FULL POWERS FOUND TO BE IN GOOD AND PROPER FORM, HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:

"ARTICLE I. WITH A VIEW TO PROMOTING THE RETURN OF PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE AND IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD OF MUTUAL ASSURANCES CONCERNING THE FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES, WHICH SHALL BE FULLY OBSERVED BY BOTH PARTIES DURING THE ARMISTICE, ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED:

"1. THE INJUNCTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST

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RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION SHALL HENCEFORTH BE SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECTED BY BOTH PARTIES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMISTICE BETWEEN THEIR ARMED FORCES IS ACCEPTED AS AN INDISPENSABLE STEP TOWARD THE LIQUIDATION OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN PALESTINE.

"2. NO AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES -- LAND, SEA OR AIR -- OF EITHER PARTY SHALL BE UNDERTAKE, PLANNED, OR THREATENED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE OTHER; IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THE USE OF THE TERM PLANNED IN THIS CONTEXT HAS NO BEARING ON NORMAL STAFF PLANNING AS GENERALLY PRACTISED IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

"3. THE RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO ITS SECURITY AND FREEDOM FROM FEAR OF ATTACK BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE OTHER SHALL BE FULLY RESPECTED.

"ARTICLE II. WITH A SPECIFIC VIEW TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES ARE AFFIRMED:

"1. THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE GAINED UNDER THE TRUCE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS RECOGNIZED.

"2. IT IS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT NO PROVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY HERETO IN THE ULTIMATE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT BEING DICTATED EXCLUSIVELY BY MILITARY, AND NOT BY POLITICAL, CONSIDERATIONS.

"ARTICLE III.

"1. IN PURSUANCE OF THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES AND OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948, A GENERAL ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES -- LAND, SEA AND AIR -- IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED.

"2. NO ELEMENT OF THE LAND, SEA OR AIR, MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY, FORCES OF EITHER PARTY, INCLUDING NON-REGULAR FORCES, SHALL COMMIT ANY WARLIKE OR HOSTILE ACT AGAINST THE MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY FORCES OF THE OTHER PARTY, OR AGAINST CIVILIANS IN TERRITORY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THAT PARTY; OR SHALL ADVANCE BEYOND OR PASS OVER FOR ANY PURPOSE WHATSOEVER THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SET FORTH IN ARTICLE V OF THIS AGREEMENT; OR ENTER INTO OR PASS THROUGH THE AIR SPACE OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THROUGH THE WATERS WITHIN THREE MILES OF THE COASTLINE OF THE OTHER PARTY.

"3. NO WARLIKE ACT OR ACT OF HOSTILITY SHALL BE CONDUCTED FROM TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY EITHER PARTY UNLESS THIS

AGREEMENT AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY OR AGAINST CIVILIANS IN TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF THAT PARTY.

"ARTICLE IV.

"1. THE LINE DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE V OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE DESIGNATED AS THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND IS DELINEATED IN PURSUANCE OF THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948.

"2. THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE IS TO DELINEATE THE LINE BEYOND WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES SHALL NOT MOVE.

"3. RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PARTIES, WHICH PROHIBIT CIVILIANS FROM CROSSING THE FIGHTING LINES OR ENTERING THE AREA BETWEEN THE LINES, SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT AFTER THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT, WITH APPLICATION TO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE DEFINED IN ARTICLE V, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THAT ARTICLE.

"ARTICLE V.

"1. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN ARMED FORCES AND FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE ARE NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS HAVING ANY RELATION WHATSOEVER TO ULTIMATE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING THE TWO PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT.

"2. IN PURSUANCE OF THE SPIRIT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948, THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE HAVE BEEN DEFINED WITH A VIEW TOWARD SEPARATING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES IN SUCH MANNER AS TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF FRICTION AND INCIDENT, WHILE PROVIDING FOR THE GRADUAL RESTORATION OF NORMAL CIVILIAN LIFE IN THE AREA OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT.

"3. THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL BE AS DELINEATED ON THE MAP ATTACHED TO THIS AGREEMENT AS ANNEX I. THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL FOLLOW A LINE MIDWAY BETWEEN THE EXISTING TRUCE LINES, AS CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION FOR THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES. WHERE THE EXISTING TRUCE LINES RUN ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIAN AND PALESTINE, THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL FOLLOW THE BOUNDARY LINE.

"4. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES SHALL NOWHERE ADVANCE BEYOND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE.

"5. (A) WHERE THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE DOES NOT CORRES-

POND TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE, THE AREA BETWEEN THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE BOUNDARY, PENDING FINAL TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE FROM WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH PARTIES SHALL BE TOTALLY EXCLUDED, AND IN WHICH NO ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY FORCES SHALL BE PERMITTED. THIS PROVISION APPLIES TO THE EIN GEV AND DARDARA SECTORS WHICH SHALL FORM PART OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

"(B) ANY ADVANCE BY THE ARMED FORCES, MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY, OF EITHER PARTY INTO ANY PART OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, WHEN CONFIRMED BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES REFERRED TO IN THE FOLLOWING SUB-PARAGRAPH, SHALL CONSTITUTE A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.

"(C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE VII OF THIS AGREEMENT AND UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO THE COMMISSION SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ARTICLE.

"(D) THE WITHDRAWAL OF SUCH ARMED FORCES AS ARE NOW FOUND IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL ANNEXED TO THIS AGREEMENT (ANNEX II).

"(E) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL BE EMPOWERED TO AUTHORIZE THE RETURN OF CIVILIANS TO VILLAGES AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF LOCALLY RECRUITED CIVILIAN POLICE IN THE ZONE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES, AND SHALL BE GUIDED IN THIS REGARD BY THE SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL REFERRED TO IN SUB-PARAGRAPH (D) OF THIS ARTICLE.

"6. ON EACH SIDE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE THERE SHALL BE AREAS, AS DEFINED IN ANNEX III TO THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH DEFENSIVE FORCES ONLY SHALL BE MAINTAINED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEFINITION OF DEFENSIVE FORCES SET FORTH IN ANNEX IV TO THIS AGREEMENT.

"ARTICLE VI. ALL PRISONERS OF WAR DETAINED BY EITHER PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT AND BELONGING TO THE ARMED FORCES, REGULAR OR IRREGULAR, OF THE OTHER PARTY, SHALL BE EXCHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

"1. THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR SHALL BE UNDER UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION AND CONTROL THROUGHOUT, THE EXCHANGE SHALL TAKE PLACE AT THE SITE OF THE ARMISTICE CONFERENCE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT.

"2. PRISONERS OF WAR AGAINST WHOM A PENAL PROSECUTION MAY BE PENDING, AS WELL AS THOSE SENTENCED FOR CRIME OR OTHER OFFENCE, SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THIS EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.

"3. ALL ARTICLES OF PERSONAL USE, VALUABLES, LETTERS, DOCUMENTS, IDENTIFICATION MARKS, AND OTHER PERSONAL EFFECTS OF WHATEVER NATURE, BELONGING TO PRISONERS OF WAR WHO ARE BEING EXCHANGED, SHALL BE RETURNED TO THEM, OR IF THEY HAVE ESCAPED OR DIED TO THE PARTY TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES THEY BELONGED.

"4. ALL MATTERS NOT SPECIFICALLY REGULATED IN THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE Laid DOWN IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, SIGNED AT GENEVA ON 27 JULY 1929.

"5. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE VII OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCATING MISSING PERSONS, WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVILIAN, WITHIN THE AREAS CONTROLLED BY EACH PARTY, TO FACILITATE THEIR EXPEDITIOUS EXCHANGE. EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO EXTEND TO THE COMMISSION FULL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THIS FUNCTION.

"ARTICLE VII.

"1. THE EXECUTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE SUPERVISED BY A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION COMPOSED OF FIVE MEMBERS, OF WHOM EACH PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL DESIGNATE TWO, AND WHOSE CHAIRMAN SHALL BE THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION OR A SENIOR OFFICER FROM THE OBSERVER PERSONNEL OF THAT ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY HIM FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH BOTH PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT.

"2. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL MAINTAIN ITS HEADQUARTERS AT THE CUSTOMS HOUSE NEAR JISR BANAT YA'QUB AND AT MAHANAYIM, AND SHALL HOLD ITS MEETINGS AT SUCH PLACES AND AT SUCH TIMES AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF ITS WORK.

"3. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL BE CONVENED IN ITS FIRST MEETING BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION NOT LATER THAN ONE WEEK FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT.

"4. DECISIONS OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SHALL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY. IN THE ABSENCE OF UNANIMITY, DECISIONS SHALL BE TAKEN BY MAJORITY VOTE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION PRESENT AND VOTING.

"5. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL FORMULATE ITS OWN RULES OF PROCEDURE. MEETINGS SHALL BE HELD ONLY AFTER DUE NOTICE TO THE MEMBERS BY THE CHAIRMAN. THE QUORUM FOR ITS MEETINGS SHALL BE A MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS.

"6. THE COMMISSION SHALL BE EMPowered TO EMPLOY OBSERVERS,

WHO MAY BE FROM AMONG THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE PARTIES OR FROM THE MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, OR FROM BOTH, IN SUCH NUMBERS AS MAY BE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS FUNCTIONS. IN THE EVENT UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS SHOULD BE SO EMPLOYED, THEY SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION. ASSIGNMENTS OF A GENERAL OR SPECIAL NATURE GIVEN TO UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION, WHICHEVER IS SERVING AS CHAIRMAN.

"7. CLAIMS OR COMPLAINTS PRESENTED BY EITHER PARTY RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REFERRED IMMEDIATELY TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN. THE COMMISSION SHALL TAKE SUCH ACTION ON ALL SUCH CLAIMS OR COMPLAINTS BY MEANS OF ITS OBSERVATION AND INVESTIGATION MACHINERY AS IT MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE, WITH A VIEW TO EQUITABLE AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT.

"8. WHERE INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF A PARTICULAR PROVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT, OTHER THAN THE PREAMBLE AND ARTICLE I AND II, IS AT ISSUE, THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION SHALL PREVAIL. THE COMMISSION, IN ITS DISCRETION AND AS THE NEED ARISES, MAY FROM TIME TO TIME RECOMMEND TO THE PARTIES MODIFICATIONS IN THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT.

"9. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL SUBMIT TO BOTH PARTIES REPORTS ON ITS ACTIVITIES AS FREQUENTLY AS IT MAY CONSIDER NECESSARY. A COPY OF EACH SUCH REPORT SHALL BE PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGAN OR AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

"10. MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS OBSERVERS SHALL BE ACCORDED SUCH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS IN THE AREA COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT AS THE COMMISSION MAY DETERMINE TO BE NECESSARY, PROVIDED THAT WHEN SUCH DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION ARE REACHED BY A MAJORITY VOTE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ONLY SHALL BE EMPLOYED.

"11. THE EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION, OTHER THAN THOSE RELATING TO UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, SHALL BE APPORTIONED IN EQUAL SHARES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT.

"ARTICLE VIII.

"1. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION AND SHALL COME INTO FORCE IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING SIGNED.

"2. THIS AGREEMENT, HAVING BEEN NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED IN PURSUANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16

NOVEMBER 1948, CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMISTICE IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE PEACE IN PALESTINE AND TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENT TRUCE TO PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE, SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS ARTICLE.

"3. THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT MAY, BY MUTUAL CONSENT, REVISE THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, OR MAY SUSPEND ITS APPLICATION, OTHER THAN ARTICLES I AND III, AT ANY TIME. IN THE ABSENCE OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND AFTER THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF ITS SIGNING, EITHER OF THE PARTIES MAY CALL UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONVOKE A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO PARTIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING, REVISING, OR SUSPENDING ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OTHER THAN ARTICLES I AND III. PARTICIPATION IN SUCH CONFERENCES SHALL BE OBLIGATORY UPON THE PARTIES.

"4. IF THE CONFERENCE PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS ARTICLE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN AGREED SOLUTION OF A POINT IN DISPUTE, EITHER PARTY MAY BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED IN PURSUANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TOWARD THE END OF ACHIEVING PEACE IN PALESTINE.

"5. THIS AGREEMENT, OF WHICH THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS ARE EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, IS SIGNED IN QUINTUPLICATE. ONE COPY SHALL BE RETAINED BY EACH PARTY, TWO COPIES COMMUNICATED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION ON PALESTINE, AND ONE COPY TO THE ACTING MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE." RUSH

BT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Changes in Paragraph A

1. ". . . will refrain from . . . all hostile actions against each other"
2. ". . . will refrain from . . . all actions against each other"
3. ". . . will refrain from . . . all acts of violence against each other"

Private assurances

1. To PM Meir: "I have conveyed to President Asad the U. S. interpretation that raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line are contrary to the ceasefire. President Asad has reaffirmed his intention to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed."
Or: "President Asad understands this."
Or: "President Asad understands this."
2. To PM Meir: "On the basis of my conversations with President Asad, I have the impression that he expects the ceasefire to be scrupulously observed all along the front /the front to be quiet/ as long as there is hope for the full implementation of Resolution 338, including the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people."
3. To PM Meir: "President Asad has stated that all forces under the control of the Syrian government will scrupulously observe the ceasefire."
4. To PM Meir: "President Asad has assured me that he understands the importance of the ceasefire in creating an atmosphere conducive to further negotiation and will do all in his power to see that it is scrupulously observed."
5. To PM Meir: "I fully understand your government's concern over possible armed attacks across the disengagement line. It is my conviction that the best way to thwart these is, on the one hand, to offer hope of a negotiated settlement and, on the other, to build

trust between the parties by scrupulous observance of the ceasefire. I have conveyed this view to President Asad, and I have particularly informed him of the U. S. view that armed attacks

6. To PM Meir: "President Asad understands the position of the U. S. that raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line are contrary to the ceasefire. It is my impression that he intends to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed."

7. To PM Meir: "President Asad in his discussions with me has indicated his understanding that Resolutions 338 and 339 in calling for a ceasefire includes all kinds of firing and all military action."

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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SYRIAN ORGANIZATION

Division has 3 brigades (3000 men each)

Division also has 2 battalions of artillery (~~122 mm. is organic~~)

Each brigade has a battalion of artillery (122 mm. is organic)

An armored brigade has 93 tanks

An infantry brigade has 31 tanks (Asad said sometimes 41)

9- BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT : TANKS

Best case : 9 infantry brigades = 279 tanks

First probable : 6 infantry brigades (186)
3 armored brigades (279) = 465 tanks

Second probable : 7 infantry brigades (217)
(Best attainable) 2 armored brigades (186) = 403 tanks

Theoretical worst case : 9 armored brigades = 837 tanks

Present deployment within 25km. of front:

49,000 men
752 tanks
369 artillery pieces

"Normal" peacetime deployment (July 1, 1973) in 25km. area

34,500 men
465 tanks
276 artillery

ATT 1

7th Infantry Division Area of Operation

124 Tanks
72 Artillery Pieces
14000 Personnel

9th Infantry Division

217 Tanks
126 Artillery Pieces
15250 Personnel

5th Infantry Division

217 Tanks
126 Artillery Pieces
15250 Personnel

68th Independent Armor Brigade

93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
2250 Personnel


80th Independent Armor Brigade

93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
2250 Personnel

TOTALS


752 Tanks
369 Artillery Pieces
49000 Personnel

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT



ATT. 1

NORMAL DEPLOYMENT



7th Infantry Division

186 Tanks
 102 Artillery Pieces
 12000 Personnel

9th Infantry Division

62 Tanks
 48 Artillery Pieces
 7000 Personnel

5th Infantry Division

217 Tanks
 126 Artillery Pieces
 15500 Personnel

TOTALS:

465 Tanks
 276 Artillery Pieces
 34500 Personnel

ATT 2

13,000 = one brigade of each of above forward + extras.

TALKING POINTS

Congressional Briefings on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement

The Setting

Since the October war, our strategy has been

- to consolidate the ceasefire;
- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war as a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;
- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR is the effective power in the Middle East.

Specifically:

- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt and Israel stopped the shooting on that front and set the stage for disengagement.
- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established a framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in January:
 - made war less likely;
 - established the fact that negotiation between Israel and an Arab government could produce an agreement that works;
 - demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;
 - gave hope of further movement toward a peace agreement.

In this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.

- If the negotiation failed:
 - the fighting would have escalated and even Egypt might have been drawn in;

- negotiations would have been set back and the radicals who oppose making peace with Israel would have been strengthened;
- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.
- If the negotiation succeeded:
 - the chances would be good that the Middle East could remain at peace for the rest of the year;
 - further diplomatic steps toward peace could be taken;
 - political moderates in the Middle East would be strengthened;
 - opponents of peacemaking would be undercut if radical Syria committed itself to the process;
 - re-imposition of the oil embargo this year would be very unlikely;
 - the US would have time to strengthen its relations with the Arab states and to give them a stake in not acting against US interests.

It was the realization of the consequences of failure that kept us going at moments in the negotiation when there seemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.

THE NEGOTIATION

This negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiation:

- Above all, in January both sides had decided they wanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad and the Israelis made up their minds during the negotiation.
- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian front was more stable, and armies were not behind each other.
- Technically, the problems were more difficult:

- There was less space to create a buffer.
- Populated areas were involved on both sides.
- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had actually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101 in November and December. They had developed realistic positions that took into account the needs of the other side. They had brought those positions within negotiating range. All this we had to do on this trip.

The negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but we kept going because of our concern for the consequences of failure.

The negotiations developed through the following stages:

- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29) and General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had produced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1). The lines were far apart, but some agreement had emerged on a general concept of disengagement essentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.
- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analysis we did before leaving, we developed the following objective:
 - a disengagement line just enough west of the 1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle of movement toward final borders;
 - but a line not so far west that it would touch Israeli settlements, which in some cases are quite close to the 1967 line.
- Much of the first week was spent building a base of support for our general approach through talks with Gromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.
- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve agreement on the disengagement line on the assumption that other issues would fall into place once there was agreement on the line. Reaching that agreement took two weeks (May 7-20).

- First there was the issue of getting the line west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows the first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8 and the line of May 20 reflecting the US proposal on Quneitra.)
- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed to the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo of Quneitra is marked to show the dividing lines the Israelis tried to establish in Quneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.)
 - The problem in Quneitra: the two Israeli settlements.
- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18 we had actually drafted a statement recessing the talks and put our luggage on the plane to go on to Cairo that night. President Asad broke that deadlock by dropping his insistence on holding the two high hills just west of Quneitra. This permitted us to develop a US proposal combining a line and an assurance from Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there would be no Israeli forces on the hills or weapons that could fire into Quneitra.
- The next issues were the related questions of (a) limitations on armament and forces behind the disengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian military line.
 - Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis insisted on detailed limitations, and Asad resisted any restrictions on the exercise of his sovereignty.
 - Again we drafted a statement recessing the talks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could not carry the talks further.
 - This time it was the Israelis who gave us the latitude to develop and refine a US proposal (May 24-27).

- Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon. Reaching agreement on putting the positions there under the UN was largely a matter of sticking to a position and wearing the Syrians down.
- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we turned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what we thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks Sunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement was not possible. The following morning, we were on the verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed to make a major effort to see whether we could complete the documents that day. Ten hours of talk followed.
- The final issue was the question of whether Asad would assume responsibility for preventing terrorists from operating across the border. This was the cause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.

THE AGREEMENT

Map 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded in these documents:

- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the lines, describing procedures for signing and planning implementation, and relating disengagement to final peace.
- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer Force.
- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament and forces which both sides have agreed to.
- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances which were stated to us. This was done because there were some subjects that each side was willing to discuss with us but not with each other. (Example: forces on Quneitra hills.)

The main elements of the agreement are:

- the two disengagement lines.
- Area of separation with UNDOF.

- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.
- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.
- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement line.
- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.
- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.

WHAT NEXT

We need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli disengagement.

Then we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward an overall peace.

NSC:HHSaunders:cv
5/31/74

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on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement

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 - The problem in Quneitra: the two Israeli settlements.
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- Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon. Reaching agreement on putting the positions there under the UN was largely a matter of sticking to a position and wearing the Syrians down.
- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we turned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what we thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks Sunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement was not possible. The following morning, we were on the verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed to make a major effort to see whether we could complete the documents that day. Ten hours of talk followed.
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WHAT NEXT

We need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli disengagement.

Then we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward an overall peace.

NSC:HHSaunders:cv
5/31/74

TALKING POINTS

Congressional Briefings on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement

The Setting

Since the October war, our strategy has been

- to consolidate the ceasefire;
- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war as a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;
- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR is the effective power in the Middle East.

Specifically:

- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt and Israel stopped the shooting on that front and set the stage for disengagement.
- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established a framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in January:
 - made war less likely;
 - established the fact that negotiation between Israel and an Arab government could produce an agreement that works;
 - demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;
 - gave hope of further movement toward a peace agreement.

In this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.

- If the negotiation failed:
 - the fighting would have escalated and even Egypt might have been drawn in;

- negotiations would have been set back and the radicals who oppose making peace with Israel would have been strengthened;
- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.
- If the negotiation succeeded:
 - the chances would be good that the Middle East could remain at peace for the rest of the year;
 - further diplomatic steps toward peace could be taken;
 - political moderates in the Middle East would be strengthened;
 - opponents of peacemaking would be undercut if radical Syria committed itself to the process;
 - re-imposition of the oil embargo this year would be very unlikely;
 - the US would have time to strengthen its relations with the Arab states and to give them a stake in not acting against US interests.

It was the realization of the consequences of failure that kept us going at moments in the negotiation when there seemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.

THE NEGOTIATION

This negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiation:

- Above all, in January both sides had decided they wanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad and the Israelis made up their minds during the negotiation.
- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian front was more stable, and armies were not behind each other.
- Technically, the problems were more difficult:

- There was less space to create a buffer.
- Populated areas were involved on both sides.
- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had actually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101 in November and December. They had developed realistic positions that took into account the needs of the other side. They had brought those positions within negotiating range. All this we had to do on this trip.

The negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but we kept going because of our concern for the consequences of failure.

The negotiations developed through the following stages:

- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29) and General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had produced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1). The lines were far apart, but some agreement had emerged on a general concept of disengagement essentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.
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NSC:HHSaunders:cv
5/31/74

AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT
BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES

A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military actions against each other, from the time of the signing of this document, in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.

B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will be west of Line A-1.
2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.
3. The area between Line A and the line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.

4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.

6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

C. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached map there shall be no military forces.

D. This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than May 30, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative, and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group who will agree on the

stages of this process. The Military Working Group described above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the Military Working Group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than twenty days after it begins.

E. The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.

F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the Military Working Group, all remaining prisoners of war will be repatriated.

G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within ten days after the signing of this agreement.

H. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.

For Israel:

For Syria:

Witness for the United Nations:

SECRET

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am transmitting the attached proposal to assist in the implementation of the agreement between Israel and Syria on the disengagement of their forces. I am also transmitting the attached proposal to the Israeli government.

Receipt of your signature or that of an appropriate representative designated by the Syrian government on the attached proposal will constitute acceptance, subject to the signature of the proposal by an appropriate representative of the Government of Israel.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

**His Excellency
'Abd al-Halim Khaddam,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Damascus.**

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Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency
Abba Eban,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem.

SECRET

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U. S. PROPOSAL

In order to facilitate agreement between Israel and Syria and in implementation of that agreement, and to assist in maintaining scrupulous observance of the ceasefire on land, air and sea, the United States proposes the following provisions:

(1) That the area of limitation in armament and forces west of Line A and east of Line B will be 10 kilometers in width. In each area, respectively, the following are permitted: (a) two brigades of armed forces, including 75 tanks and 36 pieces of short-range 122-mm artillery; and (b) the entire force of each party shall not exceed 6,000 men. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will inspect these provisions in the 10 kilometer zone.

(2) That in the area between 10 and 20 kilometers west of Line A and east of Line B: (a) there will be no artillery pieces whose range exceeds 20 kilometers; and (b) the total number of artillery pieces permitted is 162 with a range of not exceeding 20 kilometers; and (c) surface-to-air missiles will be stationed no closer than 25 kilometers west of Line A and east of Line B.

(3) Inspection of the provisions in paragraph 2 above will be performed by the U. S. aerial reconnaissance and the results will be provided to both sides.

(4) The area of separation between Lines A and B will not have any military forces. In the towns and villages in the area there will be stationed police forces of a size and character similar to those stationed in other Syrian towns and villages of comparable size.

(5) The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will take over the positions in the area of separation on Mount Hermon. No military observation of any kind may be conducted in that area.

PROTOCOL TO AGREEMENT ON
DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES

Concerning the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force

Israel and Syria agree that:

The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) under the Agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the Agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitation. In carrying out its mission, it will comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not hamper the functioning of local civil administration. It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission. It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defense. The number of the UNDOF shall be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.

The UNDOF will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary General, under the authority of the Security Council.

The UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the Agreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a regular basis, not less often than once every fifteen days, and, in addition, when requested by either party. It shall mark on the ground the respective lines shown on the map attached to the Agreement.

* * *

Israel and Syria will support a resolution of the United Nations Security Council which will provide for the UNDOF contemplated by the Agreement. The initial authorization will be for six months subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit the following text of a letter from President Nixon:

Dear Mr. President:

As you begin to rebuild and repopulate Quneitra, I want you to know that the United States is prepared to consider how it might assist in the rehabilitation of that area. One important objective we share in seeking a lasting peace in the Middle East is to help people return to normal lives. It is a source of great satisfaction to me to know that the agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces will make it possible for some of the people displaced by war to return to their homes.

Sincerely,

(Richard Nixon)

The signed original of this letter will be forwarded to you.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency
Hafiz al-Asad,
President of the Syrian
Arab Republic,
Damascus.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit the following text of a letter from President Nixon:

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the agreement between Syria and Israel on the disengagement of their forces, the Government of the United States has received the assurances below from the Government of Israel with respect to the Israeli presence on Tell abu Nida and Tell el Aaram, the two hills just to the west of Quneitra.

First, Israel will scrupulously observe the ceasefire, including observance with respect to the people and city of Quneitra.

Second, there will be no Israeli forces or weapons on the eastern slopes of the two hills.

I want to assure you, Mr. President, that the United States will do its utmost to assure that these conditions are scrupulously observed.

Sincerely,

(Richard Nixon)

- 2 -

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be forwarded to you.

Sincerely,

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His Excellency
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President of the Syrian
Arab Republic,
Damascus.

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

"The discussions conducted by United States Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger with Syria and Israel have led to an agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces. The agreement will be signed by Syrian and Israeli military representatives in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Conference on Thursday, May 30, 1974, in Geneva."

SADAT-KISSINGER REMARKS TO PRESS

5:00 p.m., May 30, 1974 - Giza Residence, Cairo

Question: Mr. President, did you agree on the next steps?

Sadat: We agreed upon everything!

Question: When will you go to Geneva?

Sadat: First, I have a statement. [Reads]

"Egypt welcomes reaching an agreement on the disengagement of forces on the Syrian front as another step on the road towards a durable peace based on justice in accordance with the Security Council resolutions.

"The agreement, even though it is merely a military one for the consolidation of the ceasefire, is an important step that will generate momentum towards the realization of the Arab national goal which is the total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well as the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, it confronts all the parties concerned with their responsibilities and paves the way for the activation of the Geneva Conference.

"We hail, in particular, the wisdom and farsightedness of President Hafez Al-Assad, and the positive and effective role of the United States of America which

proved that it is capable and qualified, under the leadership of President Nixon, to assume its responsibilities as a great power. In recognition of this role we welcome the forthcoming visit of President Richard Nixon and we trust that it will be a further step for intensifying mutual understanding and consolidating the friendship between the American and Arab peoples.

"The tireless efforts undertaken by Dr. Henry Kissinger and his colleagues represent a new page in the field of human creative achievement which would never have come about had it not been founded on a deep humanistic vision and a genuine commitment to the cause of peace."

By all measures, Dr. Kissinger has done again a miracle. I myself am proud because Dr. Kissinger is my friend and my brother, and since the beginning I was sure -- and maybe you remember in Alexandria I told you this -- and in spite of all the difficulties and all the tireless efforts that were needed, DR. Kissinger spared no effort and no time to do his best to perform -- as I told you -- another miracle.

My congratulations to President Nixon, and I am sure he is much more proud than me for what you have done, and my congratulations to the American people.

Kissinger: Mr. President, I would like to express appreciation for your very generous words. Six months ago I had the honor for the first time of meeting President Sadat, who since then has become my friend, on whose advice we relied, and whose inspiration has guided our efforts.

The United States is dedicated to achieving a permanent peace based on justice in the Middle East. And we engaged ourselves in the efforts on disengagement with Egypt and Syria because we were convinced it was a necessary first step.

The negotiations concluded yesterday between Syria and Israel could not have succeeded without the advice and constant support of President Sadat and the Egyptian Government.

The relations between the United States and Egypt have improved and will continue to improve. In order to intensify this cooperation, President Sadat and President Nixon have agreed to establish a Joint Cooperation Commission between the United States and Egypt to work in various fields to the mutual benefit. A further announcement of the details will be made tomorrow in Cairo and Washington.

It remains only to thank my friend, President Sadat, for the warm hospitality we received and for his constant friendship.

Question: When will President Nixon leave [for the Middle East]?

Kissinger: The date will have to be set after I return to Washington.

Question: Will the PLO be invited to Geneva?

Sadat: We have to discuss the whole thing with the Arabs first.

Question: Dr. Kissinger, do you expect a resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria?

Kissinger: At the airport in Damascus Monday night, by agreement with the Syrian Government, I stated that the United States and Syria agreed to engage in a rapid improvement in relations, that will begin immediately. I don't want to speculate on any given step at any given time. I know I speak for the Syrian Government when I say this.

Question: When will the Geneva Conference reconvene?

Sadat: We must discuss the whole thing among ourselves -- Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians. We must have some time for that. And after that we will approach the two super powers on reconvening.

Question: Is that weeks or months?

Sadat: How long, I don't know.

Question: The next step is the immediate fulfillment of 242?
Or will it be other steps?

Sadat: Sure, the aim of Geneva is fulfillment of 242.

Question: Dr. Kissinger, will you have time to complete the solution
in the term of President Nixon?

Kissinger: We are committed to a major effort to achieve a just and
durable peace. We are determined to succeed.

Question: Will you go to the Middle East before or after you go to
Moscow?

Kissinger: I will report to President Nixon on my travels here and
will discuss it.

Question: What will be the level of this Joint Commission?

Kissinger: There will be an announcement.

Question: What is its function?

Kissinger: There will be a formal announcement tomorrow in Washington
and Cairo.

Question: Do you expect to come back, Sir?

Kissinger: I always expect to come back. [Laughter]

Question: When will be the next disengagement negotiation?

Sadat: Ask Dr. Kissinger.

Situation When the Trip Began (April 28)

The Dayan^(March 29) and Shihabi^(April 13) visits had achieved the following points of agreement:

- Separation of forces is just a first step toward an overall peace agreement.
- Both sides would observe the ceasefire.
- There would be two disengagement lines with a disengagement zone between them.
- Syrian administration would be restored up to the Israeli disengagement line.
- Behind the disengagement lines, force and equipment limitations can be negotiated on a reciprocal basis.
- There would be a UN presence in the disengagement zone, the exact nature of that presence to be negotiated.
- Prisoners would be exchanged.

The key points that remained to be clarified were:

- The disengagement lines. ~~The~~ The Quneitra hills and the Mount Hermon positions were seen as the critical issues.
- How many areas of limited armament there would be and the nature of the limitations.
- The function and strength of the UN presence.
- The timing of the prisoner exchange.

Laying the Groundwork (April 29 - May 7)

The first week was spent establishing a framework. Talks with Gromyko in Geneva, Boumediene, Sadat, ~~and then~~, at ~~four session week's end~~, ~~four sessions~~ ^{three} ~~in Jerusalem~~ (Thursday, Saturday, ~~Mon~~ Hussein and an emissary sent to ~~King Faisal and~~ and then, at week's end, the first ~~two~~ stops in Jerusalem and Damascus. Over that weekend, an emissary from the party was sent to King Faisal and back to Boumediene and you had a second meeting with Sadat.

The Blue Line

The Disengagement Line-- (May 8 - 12)

The first Israeli map of the disengagement line, ^{revised in response to your} ~~the~~ first meetings ~~in Damascus~~ in ~~fact~~ Jerusalem was presented ~~in~~ ~~to~~ President Assad on Wednesday, May 8. The result of this was to focus the negotiation on (1) Quneitra and (2) pressures to "straighten out" the blue line.

Quneitra and the US Proposal (May 13-²⁰~~15~~)

This phase began with the long Israeli Cabinet meeting of May 13. This produced an Israeli position which removed Israeli forces ^{and the UN} from Quneitra, put ~~all of~~ the hills just north of town in ^{the village of} ~~the~~ ^{Almadiva to Syria} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~culmination of~~

he had gone to the meeting on May 18 ~~prep~~ with a draft statement or recessing the talks, and we were packed to go on to Cairo that night.

this phase was the formulation of the US proposal on Quneitra which led to Asad's saying on May 18 that he would "forego" the question of the hills. The one remaining step in this phase was having the Israelis put the Quneitra arrangements on a map. This map was shown to Asad May 20.

Red Line and Limitations (May 20-27)

This phase began with the Israelis saying they could consider the Red Line only when the question of limitations was settled. The Syrians took the opposite position. The negotiations again seemed on the verge of stalemate when we returned to Jerusalem the night of ^{Tuesday,} May 21. The morning of May 23 each member of the Israeli team endorsed Mrs. Meir's position that without realistic limitations, this would be nothing more than a one-sided withdrawal and ceasefire. We came back from Damascus that Thursday night prepared to suspend the talks. It was then the Israeli group on Friday morning, May 24, that gave Secretary Kissinger enough latitude to develop a US Proposal on Limitations. This was developed Friday, refined over the weekend and finally concluded Monday, May 27.

The Documents (May 26-27)

Terrorism (May 28)

Asad

1. Bilateral commission
2. Relations after disengagement
3. Emissary to Wash. to discuss how this to be done.

✓ Syrian Map Jan. 20

✓ Israel Map # 1 March 29, 1974

✓ Syria Map # 2 April 13, 1974

✓ Israel Map # 2 May 7, 1974

Syrian Observations May 8, 1974

✓ Israeli Map # 3 May 12, 1974

Syrian observations

Quneitra { May 12 - 18
May 17 - developing US proposal on Q
May 18 - Assad caved on the hills - US prop.
First suspension statement

Map # 4 May 20 (gave them agreement + UN protocol)

Map # 5 May 26, 1974

Limitations

Left 5:30

Arr. Dam. 6:30

7:30 Dam. time

Begin meeting 8:30-9:00 Dam. time 7:30-Israel Time

8:30


Groundwork

May 2-3 Israel
 May 3-4 Syria
 May 4 Egypt
 (May 4-7 Saunders trip)
 May 5-6 Jordan - Israel
 May 7 Gromyko

Sun.	Apr. 28	Geneva	
	29	Algiers	
Tues	30	Cairo Alex	
wed	May 1	Cairo Alex	
Thurs	May 2	Jerusalem	
Fri	May 3	Damascus	
Sat	Apr 4	Amman Alex	
	4	Amman	Saunders in Rey.
Sun.	5	Amman	" "
Mon	6	Jerusalem	" to Alg
Tues	7	Cyprus - Gromyko	" " Cyp.
wed	8	Damascus	

- will also want page size

Maps on the disengagement line:



1
2
3
4
5
6.






- Syrian map, January 20
brought to Washington by Dayan,
- Israeli map, March 29
brought to Washington by Shikabi,
- Syrian map, April 13
- Israeli map, May 7-8
- Israeli map, May 12
- Israeli map, May 20 (showing Quneitra proposal)
- Israeli map, May 26
- Agreement map, May 28
- Composite showing all of above on one map

Quneitra

- Checklist of May 12 Gouss - Sisco - Samuels - UN strip

Maps on the disengagement line:

January 20
 March 29
 April 13
 May 7-8
 May 15
 May 20 (showing
 proposed)
 May 26
 May 28



Syrian position

5/16-17

west of 1967 line

1. Syria needs position on Mount Hermon, that
Asad says Israel re-occupied after October 22
ceasefire.

2. Secretary told Asad US prepared to propose what
he considered maximum he could "impose" based
on talks with individuals take into account
* - Isr. obsers

- widen the pocket about 1 km. north and south
to produce a "substantially straight" line.
- To west, move line 1/4 km. to west. Create
a DMZ from there to foot of hills.
From foot of hills to other side of hills only
the lightest of weapons & US would give
Nixon-Asad letter guaranteeing only lightest
of weapons.

(Straight line north & south 1 km. beyond map 2,
move west 200 meters, Israeli military
line at foot of hill, main Israeli forces on other
side of hill.)

3. Asad:

- Line on peak of hill
- Straight north and south to hook up with
Map # 2 line.
- No ^{Israeli} settlers cultivating fields. Syrians would not
cultivate.

No margin for give any more. If hill in enemy's
hands & is useless.

Just to ~~put~~ help crystallize thoughts on where we stand, I offer the following.

^{negotiation on}
This ^{negotiation on} disengagement of forces is hung up over an issue that really belongs in negotiation of the first phase of Israeli withdrawal from ^{the} 1967 line -- the construction or removal of ^{one or two} Israeli settlements.

Theoretically there are ~~two~~ ^{three possible} ways out of this stalemate:

1. To seek less -- a simple separation of forces.

This could range from withdrawal to ^{the} October 6 line to Israel's present offer with some adjustments north and south of Quneitra.

One way to do this would be to ~~try~~ try to arrange some Israeli fallback quickly in exchange for a ceasefire while continuing negotiations on Quneitra until the new Israeli government is formed.

¶ Asad ^{seems unlikely to} ~~accept~~ accept this because he would have to give up his war of attrition, which he sees as his main card in playing for a first phase of Israeli withdrawal behind the 1967 lines which would permit him to begin resettling 1967 refugees. The Israelis would ~~not~~ not accept without a ceasefire and probably some agreement on fire and arms limitations.

2. To seek more -- Israeli withdrawal from the cultivated fields between Quneitra and Tel

abou Nida. This is Asad's proposal. The Israelis seem unable ^{even} to ~~accept~~ ^{consider} this until they have ~~a~~ a new government, and acceptance seems unlikely even then unless they feel a lot more pressure than they do now.

¶ The argument for this approach is that it would create a situation that could last for some time. It would require the passage of time for the Israeli political

situation to stabilize, for the US Administration ~~to~~ to build understanding in the US for this approach, and for pressures ^{from the war of attrition and elsewhere} in the Middle East to work on Israel.

3. To go on trying to split the difference between the Syrian and Israeli positions by persuading Israel to give up enough fields ~~and accept~~ to give Quneitra "breathing space." With this, of course, would go assurances that the hills would not be used for Israeli harassment or offensive operations.

Neither side seems able to give enough to make this possible. Also, it would ^{not} create ~~a~~ stable ~~situation~~ as long as Syrian and Israeli civilians are within sight of each other.

The present negotiation suggests to me that a real disengagement of forces agreement is not possible in present circumstances because Syria does not want to give up its military option now.

Here are some possible approaches:

1. We can let the war of attrition go on while trying to keep alive for a time the semblance of disengagement talks, letting each side reflect. This is the course we are on now.

2.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Classification

15 MAY 1310

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FM USINT DAMASCUS
TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 126
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 538
BT

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 0721

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE NEA

JERUSALEM FOR ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER), SY
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT SHOWING CLOSER US-SYRIAN RELATIONS

REF: A. JSAUSALEM 845; B. STATE 100589

1. AFTER A LONG NIGHT OF WRESTLING WITH THE PROS AND CONS OF THE PROPOSAL DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT I HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATION ABOUT ITS MERITS. BELOW I HAVE LISTED WHAT I BELIEVE ARE SOME SALIENT QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, WITH MY ANSWERS WHICH TO MY SATISFACTION AT LEAST SHOW WHY WE SHOULD PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY WITH THIS KIND OF "PUBLIC IMPACT" STATEMENT AT THIS TIME.

1. IS SUCH AN AD HOC PROCEDURE WARRANTED? I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH OUR ASSISTANCE AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN THE PAST HAS OFTEN BEEN THE SLAPDASH NATURE OF THE APPROACH. THERE WAS AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, E.G., IRAN AFTER MASADEQ, SO WE JUMPED IN WITH GOOD INTENTIONS, PLENTY OF MONEY AND QUITE OFTEN HALFBACKED IDEAS. WHILE THERE WERE MANY SUCCESSES, THERE WERE ALSO MANY EGREGIOUS MISTAKES. AS I MENTIONED IN MY CABLE (DAMASCUS 235) WE MUST APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF WHAT WE INTEND FOR THE MIDDLE EAST POST-DISENGAGEMENT AND MORE IMPORTANTLY POST-OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN A RATIONAL, REALISTIC MANNER. I SUGGESTED IN THAT CABLE THAT WE BEGIN THINKING NOW ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS SO THAT WE WOULD BZJPN A POSITION TO MAKE PROPOSALS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WHICH WOULD INDICATE TO THE AREA THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING REGIONAL PROBLEMS NOT IN SOME SUPERFICIAL ONE-TIME MANNER BUT RATHER

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IN A STUDED LONG-TERM FASHION WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF "PARTNERSHIP" AND NOT SIMPLY OF UNILATERAL, IF YOU WILL PARDON THE EXPRESSION, GIMMICKRY. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR IMAGINATION, FLECIBILITY AND DEFT UTILIZATION OF CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES BY FRANKLY, I DO NOT THINK THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES THAT WE NOW RUSH IN AS I WILL EXPLAIN LATER. I THINK WE HAVE TIME AND FOR THIS REASON I THINK WE SHOULD DO A LITTLE MORE THINKING ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE NOT ONLY IN SYRIA BUT IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE. WITHOUT FURTHER BELABORING THE POINT, I STRONGLY OPPOSE THIS KIND OF AD HOC APPROACH.

3. CAN WE OFFER SYRIA ANYTHING AT THIS TIME THAT IS CREDIBLE? I HAVE JUST SEEN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS COME UP WITH. ALTHOUGH THE LIST IS LONG, IN FACT IT IS PIDDLING. A FEW MORE SCHOLARSHIPS, SEVERAL ADDITONAL INTERNATIONAL VISITORS GRANTS, LOOSENING UP OF EX-IM, SETTLEMENT OF DEBTS, ETC. THE QUESTION, HOWEVER, IS WILL THIS "PEANUTS" KIND OF APPROACH HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE SYRIANS. IN THIS REGARD, I RECALL SOME OF THE COMMENTS WHICH I HEARD HERE IN DAMASCUS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR FY 1975 AID BILL IN WHICH ALLUSIONS WERE ALSO MADE THAT PROVISIONS FOR ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA WAS ALSO BEING CONSIDERED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS. THE COMPARISON BETWEEN WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING FOR ISRAEL, NOT TO MENTION JORDAN, AND WHAT WE MIGHT POSSIBLY SET ASIDE FOR SYRIA WAS NOT LOST ON SEVERAL OF MY OBSERVANT CONTACTS. FRANKLY, I JUST DO NOT THINK THERE IS VERY MUCH WE CAN OFFER THE SYRIANS AT THIS TIME THAT WILL HAVE AN IMPACT. MOREOVER, AS YOU HAVE LONG KNOWN, THE SYRIANS HAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY OUR AID PROGRAMS IN THE PAST. I WOULD VENTURE TO SAY THIS HAS BECOME EVEN MORE TRUE SINCE THE BAATHI TAKEOVER WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON NATIONALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE. FINALLY, IN VIEW OF THE HUGE INFUSION OF ARAB OIL MONEY INTO SYRIA OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE OCTOBER WAR, I THINK THAT SYRIA WOULD BE EVEN LESS IMPRESSED BY OUR PALTRY GESTURES. THEREFORE, HERE AGAIN I MUST CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO AT THIS TIME TO CATCH THE PUBLIC EYE IN SYRIA IN THE DRAMATIC AND SUSTAINED WAY WHICH I THINK WE SHOULD IF WE ARE REALLY GOING TO SET LONG-TERM MILAGE OUT OF NOT ONLY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT FROM THE FOLLOW-THROUGH AS WELL.

4. WOULD SUCH PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME? AS FAR AS THE SYRIANS ARE CONCERNED BOTH AS A REGIME AND AS A PEOPLE, THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR THE SECRETARY'S CURRENT MUCH ADMIRER AND MUCH APPRECIATED EFFORT IS DISENGAGEMENT. ONCE ACHIVED, I BELIEVE THAT THE USG IS ON ITS WAY TO CLOSER AND MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. HOWEVER, IF DISENGAGEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED, I SERIOUSLY QUESTION THE APPROPRIATENESS OF AMKING ANNOUNCEMENTEAOF THIS KIND IN THE WAKE OF THE AGREEMENT. HERE AGAIN THE PALTRINESS OF WHAT WE WOULD OFFER WOULD BE LAUGHABLE BUT MORE IMPORTANT, I THINK MANY PEOPLE IN THE

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SOME SORT OF APYOFF WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY NOT WHAT WE INTEND TO CONVEY. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY RECALL THAT WHEN I BEGAN DISCUSSING CULTURAL EXCHANGES WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY A FEW MONTHS AGO, I WAS TOLD THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WAS APPRECIATIVE OF OUR INTEREST BUT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME TO BE PUSHING TOO HARD FOR THESE KINDS OF PROGRAMS. IN EFFECT I WAS TOLD, "LET'S WAIT UNTIL WE SEE WHAT HAPPENES WITH DISENGAGEMENT." (DAMASCUS 321) MOREOVER, YOU MAY ALSO RECALL I REPORTED THAT I WAS ASSURED THAT TPB SYRIANS WERE GOING TO BE BUYING AMERICAN AIRCRAFT FOR SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES AND THAT THE DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN VERY SHORTLY (SEE DAMSCUS 417). THAT DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN AND I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT IT, TOO, IS BEING DEFERRED UNTIL THE SYRIANS SEE WHAT HAPPENS WITH DISENGAGEMENT. FINALLY, NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF DISENGAGEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED, THEN I SCARCELY BELIEVE THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOME RELATIVELY MINOR SYMBOLIC GESTURES WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON WHAT WILL DOUBTLESS BE A DISILLUSIONED AND DISAPPOINTED REGIME AND PUBLIC. ALL IN ALL, THEREFORE, I JUST DO NOT SEE THAT THIS KIND OF ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.

5. RECOMMENDATION I BELIEVE THE BEST THING THAT WE COULD DO WOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY AT ONE OF HIS MEETINGS WITH ASAD OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS TO SOLICIT FROM HIM HS IDEAS ON HOW HE VIEWS THE FUTURE OF U.S. AND SYRIAN RELATIONS, NOTING AS THE SECRETARY HAS IN THE PAST SEVERAL AREAS IN WHICH HE BELIEVES THERE IS ROOM FOR "COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP" (AND THE SECRETARY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THESE TWO CONCEPTS). DEPENDING ON PRESIDENT ASAD'S REWGTION, THE SECRETARY COULD THEN THROW OUT THE IDEA THAT PERHAPS THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO COME UP WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS WHICH COULD IN TURN BE CONSIDERED BY OUR PEOPLE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. SECRETARY MIGHT,

FOR EXAMPLE, SUGGEST A JOINT COMMISSION SIMILAR TO ONES SET UP FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT. IN THIS WAY I THINK WE COULD SIGNAL PRESIDENT ASAD OF OUR INTEREST AND AT THE SAME TIME GET IDEAS OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND, RATHER THAN TRYING TO PRESENT PRESIDENT AYRD WITH SUGGESTIONS WHICH MAY NOT, IN FACT, BE WHAT THEY WANT. FINALLY, IF THE SECRETARY BELIEVES THERE IS UTILITY IN SOME SORT OF PUBLIC ANNOUCEMENT, HE MIGHT AGAIN INQUIRE FROM PRESIDENT ASAD HOW HE BELIEVES THE TWO OF THEM COULD HANDLE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO INDICATE TO THE WORLD THAT SYRIAN/U.S. RELATIONS ARE NOW ENTERING A CLOSER PHASE AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR NTENTION TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT FUTURE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS. IN THIS WAY AGAIN THE SECRETARY COULD GIVE PRESIDENT AND THE OPPORTUNITY OF HELPING GUIDE THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT OF THIS SORT OF PROPOSAL.

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6. I AM SORRY TO TAKE A NEGATIVE POSITION ON WHAT IN PRINCIPLE IS SOMETHING WHICH MANY OF US IN THE BUREAU HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR A LONG TIME, I.E., WAYS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE UNITED STATES. I CERTAINLY HOPE THAT YOU WILL NOT ACCUSE ME OF LACKING IMAGINATION OR INITIATIVE BUT THIS IS THE WAY I SEE THINGS FROM MY LOW POINT ON THE TOTEM POLE. IN ANY EVENT, I AM SURE THAT MY RESERVATIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND MUTUAL EXCHANGE WHICH HAS MADE THE DEPARTMENT THE EXCITING PLACE IT IS NOW TO WORK IN SINCE THE SECRETARY ASSUMED ITS LEADERSHIP.

SCOTES



S/S-10

SECRET NODIS

15 MAY 74 174/0221Z

Classification

O 150113Z MAY 74X
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5580
INFO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0655
BT
SECRET STATE 100589

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS) TOSEC 641

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT SHOWING CLOSER US-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIPS

REF: JERUSALEM 845 (SECTO 401)

FOR ATHERTON

1. FOLLOWING IS LISTING OF ITEMS THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. EACH ITEM IS DRAFTED ACCORDING TO FORMAT REQUESTED REFTEL, I.E. INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE THAT COULD BE USED IN PUBLIC STATEMENT FOLLOWED BY BACKGROUND EXPLANATION:

A. TALKS ON ECONOMIC CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING ECONOMIC CLAIMS BY THE TWO SIDES, WITH A VIEW TO THE OPENING OF NEW POSSIBILITIES OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA. BACKGROUND: TWO MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES ARE (1) STATUS OF US-OWNED 21 MILLION SYRIAN POUNDS FROM COUNTERPART FUNDS FROZEN BY SARG AS RESULT OF UNILATERAL USG CANCELLATION IN FEBRUARY 1967 OF GRAIN SILO CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND (2) APPROXIMATELY DOLLARS 75,000 OWED EX-IM BANK BY SARG AS RESULT OF SARG'S FAILURE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPAYMENT OF EX-IM LOAN TO BOUSTANY TEXTILE FIRM FOLLOWING SARG'S NATIONALIZATION OF FIRM IN MID-1960S (KNOWN AS "THE BOUSTANY CLAIM"). IN TALKS CONDUCTED IN ATMOSPHERE OF IMPROVED US-SYRIAN RELATIONS WE COULD PRESUMABLY AGREE TO USE BY SARG OF 21 MILLION POUNDS FOR APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY, OR SIMPLY TO WRITE-OFF OF FUNDS. RE BOUSTANY CLAIM, ITS RESOLUTION WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL SINCE EX-IM UP TO NOW HAS BEEN UNWILLING EVEN TO CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR CREDIT FOR SYRIA UNTIL IT IS SETTLED.

B. DAMASCUS FAIR: THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO RENEWING IN 1974 ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD FAMOUS

Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-412(H)

DAMASCUS FAIR. BACKGROUND: STATE AND COMMERCE ARE PREPARED TO FUND WHAT IS CALLED "COMMERCIAL PRESENCE" TRADE FAIR PRESENTATION; THIS WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL PAVILLION WITH PARTICIPATION BY INTERESTED U.S. COMPANIES. MAIN COMPLICATION HERE IS THAT PARTICIPATION IN DAMASCUS FAIR IS BY INVITATION AND THUS FAR SARG HAS NOT INVITED US. THERE ARE ALSO PROBLEMS OF CLEARING EXHIBITS THROUGH SYRIAN CUSTOMS IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME BEFORE FAIR'S OPENING, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND NOW SCHEDULED FOR JULY, AND RECRUITMENT OF U.S. PARTICIPANT FIRMS, BUT THESE CAN PROBABLY BE HANDLED IF DECISION IS MADE PROMPTLY AND WE ARE PREPARED MAKE ALL-OUT URGENT EFFORT.

✓ C. DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE: A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL BE VISITING SYRIA SHORTLY TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SYRIA. VARIOUS COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS ARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION BETWEEN PRIVATE U.S. FIRMS AND SYRIA. BACKGROUND: VISIT REFERRED TO IS THAT OF FSO PATRICK KILLOUGH, NOW ON DETAIL TO COMMERCE, WHO IS CURRENTLY IN AREA CONSULTING WITH POSTS. ONLY BIG COMMERCIAL DEAL PENDING BETWEEN U.S. AND SYRIA IS POSSIBLE PURCHASE BY SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES OF THREE WIDE-BODY AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH FRENCH MANUFACTURERS ARE STILL IN THE RUNNING, INDICATIONS POINT TO ACQUISITION OF EITHER LOCKHEED'S 1011 TRISTARS OR MC DONNELL'S DC-10-30'S. SCOTES MAY HAVE MORE RECENT INFO; SALE HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO BE CONCLUDED THIS PAST WEEK. (ALSO, COMMERCE DEPARTMENT HAS RUMORS THAT CHRYSLER IS CONSIDERING APPROACHING THE SYRIANS TO PUT UP AN AUTO ASSEMBLY PLANT, BUT NEITHER THEY NOR WE ABLE TO OBTAIN IMMEDIATE CONFIRMATION OF THIS.)

✓ D. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES: THE UNITED STATES IS PLEASED TO PROPOSE THE RESUMPTION OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXNHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO BEING ABLE TO RECEIVE PROMINENT SYRIANS, IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE, AS OUR GUESTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO RENEW EXCHANGES OF STUDENTS AND OTHER ACADEMIC PERSONNEL. BACKGROUND: WE ARE AIMING AT PROVIDING FUNDS FOR 5 INTERNATIONAL VISITOR (IV) GRANTS, 4 GRADUATE STUDENT OR PROFESSORS' RESEARCH GRANTS, AND AT LEAST ONE U.S. PROFESSOR TEACHING AT DAMASCUS UNIV. IN FY 1975. ORIGINALLY, TWO IV GRANTS WERE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 74, BUT THE SYRIANS INDICATED THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR SUCH CONTACTS. 1975 CULTURAL EXCHANGE PLANS, AS PRESENTED ABOVE, HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE SYRIANS, PENDING OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT DISENGAGEMENT TALKS.

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E. JOHNS HOPKINS EXPEDITION TO THE EUPHRATES VALLEY: AN AMERICAN ARCHEOLOGICAL EXPEDITION, ORGANIZED BY A JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS EARLIER THIS MONTH IN COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF ANTIQUITIES OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. THE EXPEDITION WILL BE EXCAVATING SITES ALONG THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY SOON TO BE INUNDATED AS A RESULT OF THE NEW EUPHRATES DAM. BACKGROUND: LEADER OF EXPEDITION HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MUSEUM AND ANTIQUITIES OFFICIALS FOR SOME TIME SEEKING PERMISSION FOR THIS DIG, WHICH WAS GRANTED EARLIER THIS YEAR. WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF THIS ITEM IS USED DEPT. BE INFORMED SO THAT WE CAN EXPLAIN IN ADVANCE TO JOHNS HOPKINS BACKGROUND OF ANNOUNCEMENT.

F. USGS TECHNICAL COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY HAS RESPONDED TO A QUERY BY AN OFFICIAL OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING AVAILABLE ONE OF ITS EMPLOYEES TO WORK AS A CONSULTANT, FOR THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ELECTRICITY, IN THE FIELD OF BAUXITE EXPLORATION. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL BE PLEASED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO SYRIA THE SERVICES OF A QUALIFIED EXPERT IN THIS FIELD SHOULD THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT SO DESIRE. BACKGROUND: SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND MINERAL RESOURCES IN SYRIAN MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM CONTACTED A USGS EXPERT ON BAUXITE EXPLORATION DIRECTLY AND ASKED IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK AS A CONSULTANT TO THE MINISTRY. USGS OFFICER REPLIED DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR A FORMAL REIMBURSABLE SERVICE ARRANGEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN USGS AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. NO REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED YET FROM THE SYRIAN OFFICIAL. IN THE MEANTIME, USGS HAS INITIATED CONTACTS WITH AID, AS REQUIRED BY LAW, IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY SHOULD THE SYRIANS DECIDE THEY WANT TO CONCLUDE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH USGS. IN VIEW OF TENTATIVE NATURE OF SYRIAN CONTACT, WE DOUBT IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO USE THIS ITEM BUT SUBMIT IT IN CASE THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS ON SYRIAN SIDE OF WHICH WE ARE UNAWARE.

G. PARLIAMENTARY VISITS: CONGRESSMAN PAUL FINDLEY OF ILLINOIS VISITED DAMASCUS IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR. THIS FOLLOWED A VISIT IN JANUARY 1974 BY SENATOR JAMES ABOUREZK OF SOUTH DAKOTA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BELIEVES SUCH VISITS ENHANCE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES AND WOULD WELCOME VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES BY SYRIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS. BACKGROUND: FINDLEY WAS REPORTEDLY TOLD BY ASAD THAT ALL HIS COLLEAGUES IN CONGRESS ARE "WELCOME" TO VISIT SYRIA; SCOTES WAS

SECRET NODIS

SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD (DAMASCUS 536) THAT SARG WOULD BE SENDING INVITATIONS TO VARIOUS U.S. CONGRESSMEN TO VISIT SYRIA FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT TALKS.

H. FLOOD ASSISTANCE: DURING THE RECENT FLOODING OF THE EUPHRATES RIVER IN NORTHERN SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MADE AVAILABLE TENTS AND BLANKETS FOR VICTIMS OF THE FLOOD. THE UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED VIA THE UN RELIEF ORGANIZATION. BACKGROUND: AT TIME ASSISTANCE WAS GIVEN, SARG DID NOT WANT PUBLICITY ON USG CONTRIBUTION. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SARG MIGHT NOW BE DISPOSED TO GIVE USG PUBLIC CREDIT BUT MENTION THIS ITEM IN CASE YOU WANT TO CHECK IT WITH SYRIANS.

2. REGARDING EX-IM DEALINGS WITH SYRIA, SEVERAL U.S. FIRMS HAVE RECENTLY SOUGHT BANK'S ASSISTANCE IN FINANCING SALES TO SYRIA BUT THE BANK HAS ADAMANTLY MAINTAINED ITS REFUSAL TO CONSIDER DOING BUSINESS IN SYRIA UNTIL BOUSTANY CLAIM IS PAID BY SARG. SOBER TRIED TO REACH CASEY BY PHONE AFTERNOON MAY 14 TO SEE WHETHER WE MIGHT GET AUTHORIZATION TO ANNOUNCE EX-IM WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO ASSIST IN PROMOTION OF US-SYRIAN TRADE BUT CASEY WAS ABSENT FROM WASHINGTON AND NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

3. THERE ARE NUMBER OF OTHER SENSITIVE ITEMS INVOLVING REQUESTS BY SARG FOR SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY U.S. FIRMS. WE DOUBT THEY WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR INCLUSION IN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BUT NOTE THEM HERE FOR YOUR BACKGROUND: (A) SYRIAN APPROACH TO LOCKHEED IN APRIL ON POSSIBLE SALE OF C-130'S; (B) PENDING MUNITIONS CONTROL APPLICATIONS FILED BY RF COMMUNICATIONS (NEW YORK STATE FIRM) FOR SALE OF 25 RADIO TRANSCEIVERS TO SYRIAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND 100 RADIOS TO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE; AND (C) SYRIAN REQUESTS TO MAJOR U.S. AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS PERIODICALLY SINCE 1967 TO PURCHASE MILITARY-TYPE TRUCKS FOR SYRIAN ARMY; LAST FULL CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO THIS REQUEST WAS IN 1971 WHEN DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDED APPROVAL TO WHITE HOUSE BUT WAS TURNED DOWN.

4. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND PL 480 ACTS. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND SALES UNDER PL 480 TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS HAVE BEEN BROKEN (SECTION 620(T) OF THE ACT) CAN BE WAIVED BY THE PRESIDENT UNDER AUTHORITY OF

SECRET NODIS

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SECTION 614(A) OF THE ACT IF HE DETERMINES IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND SO REPORTS, IN ADVANCE, TO CONGRESS. WAIVER AUTHORITY MAY BE USED TO PROVIDE NO MORE THAN DOLLARS 50 MILLION TO ONE COUNTRY IN ANY FISCAL YEAR.

5. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PROHIBITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND PL 480 WHICH MAY APPLY TO SYRIA. THESE APPLY TO COUNTRIES WHICH EXPROPRIATE PROPERTIES OF U.S. NATIONALS WITHOUT COMPENSATION, WHICH TRADE WITH CUBA OR NORTH VIETNAM, ETC. WAIVERS POSSIBLE FOR MOST OF THESE RESTRICTIONS DEPENDING ON SPECIFIC FORM OF ASSISTANCE IN QUESTION. WE WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAIL ON THESE IF YOU WISH. RUSH

SECRET NODIS

President Asad made these observations on the map:

1. It shows no return behind the October 6 line.
2. There is no parallel straight line. This complicates the situation.
3. Israel keeps points occupied after October 22. For example, Israel retains positions on Mount Hermon. The only post the #6 Israelis had there before the war was right on the October 6 line.
4. There is no significant area of land from which Israel is withdrawing.
5. Under these circumstances, I could not send civilians back to Quneitra. (Note: He later phoned to say that he could not send civilians back to Quneitra unless the hills west of Quneitra were in Syrian hands.)

Sun.	Apr. 28	Geneva	
	Apr. 29	Algiers	
	Apr. 30	Alexandria	
Wed.	May 1	Alexandria	
Thurs.	May 2	Jerusalem	
	3	Damascus	
Sat.	4	Alexandria	
	4	Jerusalem	
	4	Amman (Saunders in Riyadh)	
	5	Amman	
Mon.	6	Jerusalem (Saunders to Algiers)	
	7	Cyprus (Gromyko) (Maw and Atherton in Jerusalem)	
	7	Jerusalem	
Wed.	8	Damascus (first map presented)	
	8	Jerusalem	
Thurs.	9	Riyadh	
	9	Cairo	
Fri.	10	Jerusalem	
	10		
Sat.	11	Jerusalem (Sisco-Saunders to Quneitra)	
Sun.	12	Damascus (second map presented)	
Mon.	12	Jerusalem	
Mon.	13	Jerusalem (Cabinet until 430 a.m. Full Cabinet Monday)	
Tues.	14	Damascus (New Israeli position removes Israeli forces and the UN from the town; puts the hills north in UN hands; puts all Ahmadiya in UN hands)	
	14	Jerusalem	
Wed.	15	[Ma'alot] Jerusalem (statement on recess drafted)	
Thurs.	16	Damascus " " " left with Asad	
	16	Jerusalem	
Fri.			
Sat.	18	Damascus (Asad said he would forego the hills)	
Sun.			

Mon.	May 20	① Damascus (Map presented showing US proposal on Quneitra)
Tues.	May 21	Syrians give us their revisions in draft agreement and UN Protocol. Mount Hermon + Limitations discussed. Red Line.
Wed.	May 22	Mount Hermon
Thurs.	May 23	Limitations, Mount Hermon Prepared to make a US proposal
Fri.	24	(first map presented)
Sat	25	5/25
Sun.	26	
Mon	27	
Tue	28	
		(second map presented)
		(third map presented)
		(fourth map presented)
		(fifth map presented)
		(sixth map presented)
		(seventh map presented)
		(eighth map presented)
		(ninth map presented)
		(tenth map presented)
		(eleventh map presented)
		(twelfth map presented)
		(thirteenth map presented)
		(fourteenth map presented)
		(fifteenth map presented)
		(sixteenth map presented)
		(seventeenth map presented)
		(eighteenth map presented)
		(nineteenth map presented)
		(twentieth map presented)

SECRET

CHECKLIST FOR CAIRO

May 30

Israel-Syria Disengagement

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Soviet Union

- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.
- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.

The Pace of Further Peace-making

- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.
- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the summer to straighten out his relations with the USSR and in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss his needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai front. (One approach would be to design the next step so as to expand the UN zone "for the purpose" of putting into place and testing some of the techniques for assuring demilitarization over a broader area. This would maintain momentum while still not addressing the final border.)

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

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- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with Jordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at Geneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.

Egyptian-US Relations

- The President's trip.

- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic cooperation (statement attached).

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- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of direct emergency communications link between the Israeli and Egyptian military in the disengagement area to avoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There is no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101 provided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging a meeting when problems arise is slow.

- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached) asking you to raise again with the Egyptians the question of the body search. They thought the exercise was being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.

SECRET

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed today to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which will be designed to promote more intensified economic cooperation between the two countries. Both governments are convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United States and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development.

Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the Middle East will be realized and thereby the people of the area may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.

On the American side, the Commission's efforts will be directed by _____. Minister of _____ will coordinate the work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of the _____ and _____ will meet soon to outline jointly agreed goals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to day work of the Commission.

SECRET

SEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES

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We believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search so that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit any possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-held area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the Egyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests for additional searches.

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
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19 May 1974

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1. It shows no return behind the October 6 line.
2. There is no parallel straight line. This complicates the situation.
3. Israel keeps points occupied after October 22. For example, Israel retains positions on Mount Hermon. The only post that Israelis had therebefore the war was right on the October 6 line.
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Department of State
TELEGRAM

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POL-32

May 20, 1974//1515Z

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CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 994

LIRDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, JO, IS

SUBJECT: Palestinian representation: Current West Bank attitudes

REF: Jerusalem 474

1. SUMMARY: Increasing possibility of Israeli-Syrian disengagement raises question of what next. While some West Bankers expect they will be next, others seem to prefer further delay. It is realized that if settlement efforts now turn to West Bank, Palestinian representation question becomes acute. If PLO continues negative stance, Hussein would be only available negotiator to bring end to Israeli occupation. If PLO takes positive turn, Arabs have some sorting out to do. END SUMMARY

2. As possibility of Syrian-Israeli disengagement has become

DRAFTED BY:

CG:ARDay:cr

DRAFTING DATE

5/20/74

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

Consul General

CLEARANCES:

POL-BJ Jones
-BJohns

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-413(H)

increasingly real, question has inevitably arisen--what next? Some West Bankers seem to expect they will be next. Arabic daily El Quds says May 19 that Golan disengagement should lead to similar disengagement on Jordanian front. WE do not sense real impatience to get ahead with it, however. Others seem actually to prefer further delay, primarily, we gather, to allow more time for sorting out Palestinian issues in fashion more favorable to Palestinians. Several West Bankers have said to us they ~~assumed~~ ^{assumed} a second Egyptian stage would be next. One added he thought his ~~unpatriotic~~ compatriots considered they stood better chance of getting a good deal if their issues were dealt with after final Egyptian and Syrian agreements reached.

3. Some of more politically active Arabs realize that when West Bank's turn comes Palestinian representation issue will be raised in decisive way. El Quds May 19 editorial went on to stress need for Palestinian participation in any talks. With Hussein back in the game, there is appreciation that PLO will have to pull itself together and move definitively onto Geneva track if it is in fact to have any chance of representing Palestinians. PLO summit meetings reported recently in Beirut were watched for indications. Pro-Hashemite Amwar Khatib was gratified that news out of Beirut had had PLO rejecting Geneva, resolution 242 and separate West Bank/Gaza state concept. He saw this as leaving Hussein as only Arab player on the field. Hikmat el Masri and other Nabulsiis, on other hand (PLO/Sadat oriented), were optimistic PLO would take constructive

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position as soon as Syrian-Israeli disengagement became reality. They looked to June 1 Cairo PNC meeting as vehicle. Masri conceded disarray on Arab side over Palestinian issue and said Arabs would have to meet at summit and work it out definitively before negotiations could take place about West Bank.

4. Prominent pro-PLO doctor Ibrahim Tleel (recently threatened by Israelis with expulsion for public support of PLO representation) told us, however, he believed Palestinian organizations would not negotiate for West Bank. To sign any such agreement would involve recognition of Israel, which they could not do. He agreed reluctantly that in the circumstances Hussein was only available negotiator. Since first priority was getting rid of Israeli occupation, West Bankers would accept his representation.

5. COMMENT: If PLO persists in rejecting negotiations and leaves the field to Hussein, the representation issue for the territorial aspect of the negotiations is uncontested. In what seems to be the unlikely event the PLO switches to a Geneva course, Masri is probably right that the Arab establishment will have to make a definitive decision on how their side conducts ~~any~~ negotiations (it may already have done so, but the signals are ambiguous to say the least). If Hussein carries the ball, the West Bank ~~will~~ hope with skepticism that the outcome will provide for some autonomy. They will have going for them a point made by to us by a knowledgeable Israeli (septel), that in a de-militarized West Bank, the Jordanians will have to allow the local population essentially to

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rule itself. No one seems to take very seriously Hussein's proposal that the PLO negotiate, at some subsequent stage presumably, "Palestinian rights." ~~Nonetheless, in an abstract information~~

DAY

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Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-412(50)
(CONTINUATION SHEET)

Department of State

TELEGRAM

POL-28

INDICATE:
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May 20, 1974//1515Z

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CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 995

LIRDIS
 E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, JO, IS

SUBJECT: Future status of West Bank: Current attitudes

REF: Jerusalem 474

1. SUMMARY: While emotional opposition to Hashemites remains, there is greater willingness to accept idea that some ties to Jordan will be necessary for any West Bank entity. Jordanian influence is up somewhat, but in demilitarized West Bank (without presence of Jordan army) Amman could not reassert its authority as before. West Bank acceptance of King's representation will be enhanced if some way can be found to assure that Amman will in fact permit Palestinians to have a voice in determining their future status. END SUMMARY

DRAFTED BY: CG:ARDay:cr	DRAFTING DATE 5/20/74	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY: Consul General
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CLEARANCES:

POL- BJJones
 - BJohns

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 Classification

FORM FS-413(41)
 4-68

2. Average West Banker continues to have a blurred and shifting picture of what rest of Arab world intends to do about Palestinians. Not surprisingly, attitudes of West Bankers have become increasingly more fractionated and layered. Bi-polarity of loyalties--Hussein on one hand and PLO/Sadat on other--has continued to blur. There seems to be more sentiment that West Bank should have more to say. Aziz Shohadeh (politically-active Ramallah attorney) is mulling over organizing "third force" eschewing outside links, to speak for silent majority when time comes to accept reasonable settlement bringing end to occupation. On radical flanks we hear Syria has become a third external pole, looked to by some PLO supporters who feel Sadat is selling out Palestinians.

3. Haaretz West Bank correspondent Litani tells us he finds even more support expressed for separate Palestinian entity than after October war, but people now mean something different by it. As post-war emotional state has dissipated, majority have come to believe some links with Jordan are necessary. (Shohadeh feels this is view of his silent majority.) Support for totally independent state has decreased, Litani believes. We continue to hear that linkage with Jordan would be far more acceptable if King would bring more trustworthy men into Government and above all if political system were more democratic. At same time, we hear more often even among PLO supporters reservations about a PLO "coming back" to West Bank after Israeli withdrawal.

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- 4. We frequently hear that Jordan is buying influence on West Bank with lavish spending. Other reports confirm at least that local municipalities have been receiving large loans from Amman. Jordanian influence seems to be up somewhat, though emotional opposition to Hashemites is unabated.
- 5. We asked David Farhi, until recently political adviser to West Bank ~~Military~~ Military Governor, whether he thought Jordanian influence on West Bank was enough to assure their control if they returned. He said they could reassert Amman's control if they returned with Army. Israel would not permit Jordanian Army on West Bank, however. Jordan would therefore be obliged to grant sufficient autonomy to satisfy West Bank desire for local rule.
- 6. Problem pointed to by many who are prepared to accept King as negotiator but want autonomous status is that of ensuring Amman actually fulfills its commitment on this score (there is great distrust of Hashemites). Plebiscite in some form is mentioned by almost everyone as one device to this end. Idea usually accompanied by proposal for political hiatus under outside authority such as Arab League (hardly likely to fill Israelis with confidence) or UN. Many seem to feel some period, perhaps no longer than year, is needed, during which Palestinians could organize for self-government. Pro-Hashemite notable Anwar Khatib, not hitherto a plebiscite advocate, mentioned with some approval a plan Palestinian elder statesman Musa Alami once prepared for UN. It called for 5-year

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FORM FS-413(H)
4-68
(CONTINUATION SHEET)

Classification

period under UN control, after which West Bankers would form government and negotiate their relationship with Israel. Shehadeh suggested plebiscite after Israel-Jordanian agreement but before Israeli withdrawal. Agreement would be presented for Palestinians' approval (to make them take responsibility for it) as well as choice of future West Bank status. (We were surprised at thought vote could occur under Israeli occupation, but Shehadeh thought it could, especially if UN had role.)

7. COMMENT: If Farhi is right, and his point makes a good deal of sense, the West Bankers have less to fear from the Hashemites than most of them seem to think. Nonetheless, it will be important to try to build into any agreement, whether "disengagement" or the final settlement, some assurance that the Palestinians will have some voice in their future status. We have always thought a plebiscite would give the Israelis problems, since they would understandably want to be sure what takes their place before they withdraw. Shehadeh's idea of a plebiscite before withdrawal might help here, particularly if it has been possible by then to lay some groundwork for an autonomous West Bank Palestinian administration with ties to Jordan.

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Classification

FORM 4-68 FS-413(7)
(CONTINUATION SHEET)



S/S-10

SECRET

24MAY72//1:32am

O 232013Z MAY 74 ZFF6 Classification
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ZEN/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5972
BT
SECRET STATE 108390

NODIS
TOSEC 951

FOLLOWING FROM BEIRUT REPEATED YOUR INFO:

QUOTE

SECRET BEIRUT 5816

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US XF
SUBJECT: ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG

REF: A. STATE 8970; B. BEIRUT 5250

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO WALID KHALIDI, ARAFAT KEENLY INTERESTED IN MESSAGE OF MAY 1 (REF A) ABOUT WHICH KHALIDI INFORMED ARAFAT ONLY ON MAY 21. ARAFAT SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN REFERENCES TO PRIVATE OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF DEPT INTEREST IN "PALESTINIAN ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT," THAT "LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIANS" MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SETTLEMENT, AND THAT DEPT "HAS NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT." ARAFAT WAS RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS OF GETTING PLO AGREEMENT ON IDA OF "PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY" FOR WEST BANK AND GAZA, ALTHOUGH HE SAID PLO COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA TALKS IF THEY WITHIN EXCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK SC RES 242 (WHICH HAS NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN PEOPLE). ARAFAT ALSO DEPLORED MAALOT INCIDENT, BECAUSE IT INVOLVED CHILDREN, BUT SAID NEITHER HE NOR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD OPPOSE OPERATIONS INSIDE ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. ON MAY 22 EMBOFF MET PALESTINIAN INTELLECTUAL WALID KHALIDI IN ORDER HEAR REPORT ON CONVERSATION LATTER

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HAD WITH YASSER 'ARAFAT ON MAY 21. KHALIDI EXPLAINED THAT DUE TO 'ARAFAT'S RECENT ABSENCES FROM LEBANON AND ALMOST COMPLETE PREOCCUPATION WITH HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WHILE HERE, ONLY ON MAY 21 HAD HE BEEN ABLE DISCUSS WITH 'ARAFAT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH EMBOFF ON MAY 6 DURING WHICH LATTER CONVEYED TO KHALIDI MESSAGE CONTAINED REF A. KHALIDI SAID THAT HE HAD INFORMED 'ARAFAT IN DETAIL OF MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HIM, AND THAT 'ARAFAT HAD BEEN KEENLY INTERESTED. KHALIDI SAID THAT, AFTER TALKING TO 'ARAFAT, IN INTEREST OF AVOIDING ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, HAD WRITTEN OUT A REPLY TO DEPT'S MAY 1 MESSAGE WHICH 'ARAFAT HAD APPROVED.

2. TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM KHALIDI WHICH HE GAVE EMBOFF ON MAY 22 READS AS FOLLOWS:

"I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE MESSAGE YOU TRANSMITTED TO ME; AND THOUGHT FIT TO SHOW IT INFORMALLY TO A LEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALITY. HE CAREFULLY READ IT AND SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN IT BECAUSE OF ITS REFERENCE TO "HIGH LEVELS OF THE DEPARTMENT". HIS ATTENTION WAS ALSO ATTRACTED BY THE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WHOLE QUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS VERY MUCH ON THE DEPARTMENT'S MIND; AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS "NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT". LIKEWISE HIS ATTENTION WAS ATTRACTED BY THE STATEMENT THAT "ANY SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS" AS WELL AS BY THE REFERENCE TO A JUST SETTLEMENT".

3. KHALIDI SAID 'ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT, APROPOS OF CONTACTS WITH USG, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO HAD PRESSED HIM DURING RECENT MEETING IN DAMASCUS ABOUT WHAT CONTACTS HE, 'ARAFAT, HAD WITH AMERICANS. 'ARAFAT HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE TRYING ESTABLISH CONTACT THROUGH VARIOUS PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE AND OTHER FRIENDS BUT HAD NOT AS YET DONE SO. EMBOFF REMARKED TO KHALIDI THAT SITUATION APPEARED UNCHANGED IN THIS REGARD. KHALIDI SAID TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE IT WAS UNCHANGED AND THAT A LEAS FOR PRESENT 'ARAFAT SEEMED CONTENT WITH STATUS QUO, ALTHOUGH HE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF WHAT KHALIDI HAD TO TELL HIM ABOUT OFFICIAL POSITION OF DEPT.

4. ACCORDING TO KHALIDI, GROMYKO CONTINUING PRESS 'ARAFAT FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS. 'ARAFAT HAD TOLD KHALIDI THAT QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION REMAINS TO BE DECIDED, BU THAT IN ANY EVENT PLO COULD NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATION IF TALKS CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN FRAMEWORK SC RES 242. THIS RES DOES NOT CONTAIN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIANS AS PEOPLE OR THEIR INTEREST OR RIGHTS. KHALIDI THEN

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ADDED, ON PERSONAL BASIS, THAT PERHAPS SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE FOUND BY EXTRAPOLATION (AND IMPROVEMENT) OF PAST STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR LINK GENEVA WITH PALESTINIANS, SUCH AS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER MADE AT FIRST SESSION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE LAST DECEMBER AND THAT WHICH APPEARED IN JOINT US-USSR COMMUNIQUE WHICH REFERRED TO INTERESTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND GENEVA CONFERENCE IN SAME DOCUMENT. PERHAPS, WHEN PROPER TIME AROSE, CO-CHAIRMAN COULD FIND SOME LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE TO PLO APPROVAL OF PARTICIPATION. EMOFF TOLD KHALIDI HE WOULD REPORT THIS, AS WELL AS OTHER REMARKS, TO DEPT.

5. 'ARAFAT TOLD KHALIDI THAT HE PLEASE THAT, AT LAST, SOME PROGRESS BEING MADE IN MOVING PLO LEADER GEORGI HABASH AWAY FROM CATEGORIC REJECTION OF IDEA OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK AND GAZA. HABASH HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT PHRASE PALESTINIAN "POPULAR ARMED AUTHORITY" OVER ANY TERRITORIES LIBERATED. THIS IS FIRST TIME HABASH HAS AGREED TO ANYTHING LESS THAN TOTAL AUTHORITY OVER ALL OF FORMER PALESTINIAN MANDATE AND 'ARAFAT CONSIDERED IT VERY SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH, ALTHOUGH MORE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO GET HABASH TO ACCEPT "NATIONAL AUTHORITY". KHALIDI NOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SISCO AND ATHERTON IN WASHINGTON LAST YEAR ABOUT NEED PROCEED IN "STEPS" TO INDUCE PALESTINIAN REALISM. HE CONSIDERS 'ARAFAT'S HANDLING OF PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN STATE AS FALLING WITHIN THAT CONCEPT. KHALIDI ALSO CONSIDERS HABASH MOVEMENT TO BE SIGNIFICANT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT HABASH'S UNYIELDING ATTITUDE IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH KHALIDI THREE WEEKS AGO. HOWEVER, HE READILY ADMITTED THAT TO PERSONS NOT FULLY STEEPED IN PALESTINIAN THEOLOGY, WHICH CAN BE VERY JESUITICAL, IMPORTANCE OF SUCH NUANCES WOULD BE HARD TO APPRECIATE.

6. CONCERNING MA'ALOT INCIDENT AND LIKELIHOOD OF REPEATITIONS, KHALIDI SAID 'ARAFAT HAD DEPLORED FACT THAT FEDAYEEN HAD TAKEN CHILDREN HOSTAGE AT MA'ALOT AND 'ARAFAT BELIEVES THIS WAS DONE BY MISTAKE, THAT FEDAYEEN HAD NOT PLANNED THIS IN ADVANCE. SAME THING HAD HAPPENED AT KIRYAT SHIMONA. HOWEVER, 'ARAFAT HAD ALSO SAID THERE NOTHING HE OR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD DO TO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS WITHIN ISRAEL. THIS ALL MORE TRUE IN VIEW OF INTENSE PALESTINIAN ANGER AFTER DELIBERATE ISRAELI DESTRUCTION OF NATAIYEH REFUGEE CAMP WITH SO MANY CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES.

7. EMOFF THANKED KHALIDI FOR HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TRY AND IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN USG AND 'ARAFAT, EVEN AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO HIMSELF. (KHALIDI SAYS HIS PICTURE HAS APPEARED ON FRONT PAGE OF JERUSALEM ARABIC-LANGUAGE PAPER AS BEING AMERICA'S

FAVORITE COLLABORATOR AMONG PALESTINIANS). KHALIDI SAID PRESENT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION OBVIOUSLY VERY DANGEROUS FOR EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY AFTER MAALOT (WHICH HE SEES AS SERIOUS BLOW TO HOPES OF PLO GETTING ANY SORT OF HEARING IN ISRAEL) AND ISRAELI RETALIATION. HE PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. GODLEY

UNQUOTE

RUSH

BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

S/S-15 CG CHRO DPO POL EMB

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28MAY74//3:50PM

Classification

R 281200Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6881
INFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3039
RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3998
RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS 155
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 244
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1852
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 517
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3839
RUGTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1610
RUEHDTI 9 7, ,32 694(3474 USMISSING USUN
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1631

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CAIRO 3617

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR XF
SUBJ: PNC TO MEET JUNE 1

1. GUMHURIYYA MAY 28 SAYS AGENDA OF UPCOMING PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL SESSION WILL CENTER ON TWO MAIN ISSUES: GENEVA CONFERENCE AND PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE OF WAR IN COMING STAGE. GUMHURIYYA ADDS THAT PNC WILL ALSO CONSIDER "A NEW PLAN" FOR ESCALATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS WITHIN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

2. AHAM MAY 27 REPORTED A "TENDENCY" WITHIN PNC TO ENLARGE EXCOMM FROM 9 TO 15, SO AS TO INCLUDE ALL ORGANIZATIONS, INDEPENDENT FIGURES, AND RZZS "NATIONAL FRONT WITHIN GAZA AND OCCUPIED WEST BANK." ROSE AL-YUSUF MAY 27 ALSO CLAIMS NEW EXCOMM WILL BE BIGGER.

EMXKBOAIRO PRESS MAY 28 REPORTS BEIRUT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PLO HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS MEMBER OF WHO.

4. MFA AND ARAB LEAGUE SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT PNC IS STILL EXPECTING TO CONVENE AT AL BUILDING RN CAIRO ON JUNE 1, AS SCHEDULED. GOE DISCLAIMS ANY CONNECTION WITH PNC MEETING.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

INFO

S E C R E T

DAMASCUS 994

Classification

30 May 74 1221

ACTION: Z O 300759Z MAY 74
SS-10 FM USINT DAMASCUS
D. CHRON TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 257
10/cfb RUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO FLASH 129
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 712
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 064
BT
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 0994

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCOTES
GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJECT: SYRIAN "OBSERVATIONS" RE MAP

1. WHILE AT PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY DABOUL'S OFFICE THIS MORNING (MAY 30), SHIHABI TELEPHONED LOOKING FOR ME. OVER THE PHONE HE PASSED THE FOLLOWING "SMALL OBSERVATIONS" CONCERNING THE MAP WHICH I HAD TRANSMITTED TO DABOUL EARLY THIS MORNING.

2. ACCORDING TO SHIHABI WHILE YOU WERE HERE YOU "PROMISED" TO PUSH THE RED LINE MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED METERS TO THE WEST TO INCLUDE THE VILLAGE OF AL-BUTVIYA, LOCATED IN THE SEPARATION AREA NEAR TEL AL-FARAS. SHIHABI SAID THAT WHEN THE SYRIAN SIDE HAD EXPRESSED THE DESIRE FOR THIS AREA YOU HAD REPLIED, "I'LL DO IT."

3. GENERAL SHIHABI ALSO SAID THAT THE RED LINE IN THE REGION OF KHAN ARNABA IN THE SEPARATION ZONE NEAR QUNEITRA IS ALSO A "LITTLE BIT" TO THE EASTWARD IN COMPARISON WITH THE MAP WHICH YOU HAD BROUGHT THE LAST TIME.

4. GENERAL SHIHABI SAID HE WISHED ME TO BRING THIS TO YOUR ATTENTION AND THAT THE SYRIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM, WHICH HAS ALL THE DETAILED PLANS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH MR. ATHERTON IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 2 DAMASCUS 994

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5. GENERAL SHIHABI SAID THAT THE SYRIAN TEAM WOULD BE LEAVING SHORTLY FOR BEIRUT TO PROCEED ONWARD TO GENEVA. IT CONSISTS OF BRIG. ADNAN TAYYARAX AND LT. COL. IBRAHIM AL-UVAR. DR. SALAH AL-DIN TARAZI WILL BE "THE POLITICAL ADVISER" TO THE TEAM BUT WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS.

6. GENERAL SHIHABI ALSO ASKED IF WE COULD REQUEST THAT THE SWISS AUTHORITIES PROVIDE SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SYRIAN DELEGATION.

7. COMMENT: GENERAL SHIHABI SOUNDED RELAXED OVER THE TELEPHONE. HOWEVER, IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WANTED TO BE SURE THE MESSAGE ABOUT THE "OBSERVATIONS" ON THE MAP GOT THROUGH TO YOU BECAUSE HE REPEATED IT SEVERAL TIMES, BOTH IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH.

SCOTES

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June 8, 1974

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT

Phase II

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a concept for a second step in Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. Such a step would have two aspects:

- the extent of further Israeli withdrawal and arrangements for providing security for the new disengagement lines;
- elements of the agreement which would give Israel a sense of movement toward conditions of peace.

The withdrawal must be substantial enough to allow Sadat to concede some of the attributes of peace; Israel must get enough evidence that peace is possible to justify the withdrawal.

A General Concept

One way of approaching a second phase of Egyptian-Israeli disengagement is as an expansion of the present disengagement agreement, retaining the pattern of two disengagement lines and a UN buffer between them and areas of limited armament and forces just behind the disengagement lines. The objective would be to maintain the momentum of negotiations without radically altering the security situation or addressing the issues of final borders or final peace.

The public rationale for this agreement might be that it would provide an opportunity to put in place and begin to test the techniques and mechanisms for assuring demilitarization and security in the Sinai. If these are successful, on a small scale, they could then be expanded to larger areas in the next phase of withdrawal and become the basis of long-term security arrangements in a peace settlement. For example, it might be desirable to begin experimenting with diminishing the role of international forces in UNEF and experimenting with an increased involvement of Israeli and Egyptian forces for jointly inspecting or patrolling the demilitarized area.

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

Possible Geographic Approaches

The Egyptian line. The following are possible approaches in drawing the Egyptian disengagement line:

1. One would be to leave the Egyptian forces behind the north-south line where they are now and expand the UN zone as Israel pulls back further. The advantages of this approach would be that it would be least threatening to Israel because it would continue to minimize the Egyptian presence across the Canal and it would widen the demilitarized area between the forces. If most of the Sinai is to be demilitarized in any final agreement, this may be the time to limit the eastern expansion of the Egyptian military zone so as to avoid a situation where Egypt would have to pull back in a final settlement. The disadvantage would be that it would not give the Egyptians any sense of moving forward. This approach in the north would be more acceptable if Egyptian control were expanded southward to include one or both of the major oil fields. (A map showing present disengagement lines is attached.)
2. A second would be to leave Egyptians where they are along the Canal but expand their area southward to include some or all of the oil fields on the Gulf of Suez, at least those at Ras Sudr or those at Abu Rudeis further to the south as well. The advantage would be giving the Egyptians a major gain. Although Israel's withdrawal east of the passes would in itself be significant, a further withdrawal that did not begin expanding the area of restored Egyptian control in the south would arouse suspicion that Israel does not intend to withdraw there at all. The disadvantage would be that in Israel this might cause even more difficulty than moving Israeli forces east of the passes.
3. A third would be to allow the Egyptians without much augmentation in the size of their forces to advance to the present Israeli line west of the passes. The advantage of this line would be that it would permit a modest Egyptian movement forward while still leaving a buffer area that Egyptian forces would have to cross before they reach the passes. The disadvantage would be that, especially if Israel withdrew east of the passes, the Israelis might regard this line as putting

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the Egyptians too close to the passes. If Israel gave up the oil fields, it might regard that as concession enough at this stage. In any case, it would have to be kept in mind that, if the Sinai east of the mountains were to become the demilitarized buffer in a final peace, this line or one close to it could become the final Egyptian military line.

4. Other lines could be devised by drawing new lines between those above. Another possible variation would be to put the oil fields in the UN zone but to apply the principle used in the Israeli-Syrian disengagement by extending Egyptian civilian administration into the area of separation.

The Israeli line. There will be two issues for Israel: giving up some or all of the oil fields and moving their forces east of the passes. The Israelis will bargain hard over either of these steps. These are the general choices for the placement of the Israeli line:

1. The first possibility is to leave the Israeli lines where they are now in relation to the passes but to extend Egyptian control to the south to put one or more of the oil field areas back in Egyptian hands. The advantage of this approach would be to give the Egyptians something significant without addressing any important security issue at this stage. This might be all that the Israeli political situation would allow at this stage unless substantial Egyptian concessions were made on the conditions of peace. The disadvantage would be that this would provide no further Israeli withdrawal in the main military area.
2. A minimum Israeli line if Israel moved east of the passes would be one starting near Misfaq on the Mediterranean and drawn just barely at the eastern edge of the Gidi and Mitla passes, leaving the major Israeli military center at Bir Gifgafa in the Israeli zone. (This is "Line 1" on the attached map showing possible Israeli disengagement lines.) The advantage would be that this line would provide a significant pullback in that Israel would surrender the key passes to the UNEF while still retaining military positions close enough to the passes to prevent a major Egyptian breakthrough. The disadvantage would lie in the strength of opposition in Israel.

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3. A larger withdrawal could be made to a line corresponding roughly with the dominant topographical feature of Central Sinai, the Wadi el-Arish. (This is "Line 2" on the attached map showing possible Israeli disengagement lines.) The main advantage of this line is also its main disadvantage: It would be a significant withdrawal which would please the Egyptians but arouse sharp opposition in Israel. This may well be more than the traffic will bear in Israel at this stage. This line is the most natural line of defense east of the passes, but it is not so far east as to begin encroaching on the territory that the Israelis are seriously considering keeping in a final settlement. An advantage from the Egyptian viewpoint is that this line would restore Egyptian control over el-Arish, the only major town in the Sinai still under Israeli control. A disadvantage would be that Israeli withdrawal this far east would leave little room for a further step without getting into the very difficult issues of a final withdrawal. In fact, a withdrawal this great would create a disengagement line that many Israelis would press to turn into the final border, although theoretically one more line is possible between this one and the 1967 border. Also, a large step in the Sinai could raise Syrian pressures for a large step soon.

One special aspect of this line that should be noted is that it would result in Israeli abandonment of a settlement in occupied territory, thus setting a principle with implications for the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. Nahal Sinai, outside el-Arish to the south, is manned by members of the right-wing Herut party, now a part of the opposition Likud bloc. A settlement farther west, Kibbutz Yam near the Bardaweel lagoon, reportedly was disestablished before the October war because it failed to become viable even with a heavy subsidy.

The Elements of Peace in an Agreement

Either of the steps contemplated above--giving up some or all of the oil fields or moving east of the passes--would be a substantial enough step that Israel will insist on major Egyptian concessions in return. The Israelis will probably press for an end of belligerency in return for the next stage of withdrawal; the Egyptians will resist a complete termination

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of belligerency for anything short of total Israeli withdrawal. The degree of the Egyptian concessions will depend on whether the Israeli pullback at this stage is relatively small or whether there is an extensive withdrawal to something like the el-Arish line. Since the Egyptians will probably not terminate the "state of belligerency" at this stage, the solution probably lies in combining general commitments to make peace with certain contractual arrangements that would have some of the attributes of a beginning of normalization in relations. The possibilities include:

1. Commitment to peace. We are talking here about those words in the next Egyptian-Israeli agreement which commit the parties to a final peace. There are two parts of the agreement in which this would be handled:
 - a. In describing the commitment to observe the ceasefire (opening paragraph of agreement) it would be possible to try again, as we did unsuccessfully in January, to have each side commit itself to refrain from "all belligerent actions". This would have the practical effect of ending (a) Egypt's application of the Arab boycott against companies dealing with Israel and (b) Egypt's practice of attaching reservations to international agreements it signs, saying the agreements do not apply to Israel as far as Egypt's responsibilities under the agreement are concerned.
 - b. The less desirable but perhaps more realistic alternative would be for both sides to declare their intention to terminate all claims and acts of belligerency when a final peace agreement is concluded. This would, of course, be inherent in a peace agreement, but having it stated explicitly now would still have political/psychological value. As a step in that direction, Egypt might state privately that it will take administrative steps to ease the application of the third-party boycott and will no longer attach reservations to international agreements.

Either of these steps would--practically if not juridically--end all but one of the measures flowing from the continued state of belligerency. The one remaining would be the restriction on Israeli use of the Canal (see below).

- c. In describing linkage with a final settlement, both sides might in the last paragraph of an agreement go a bit farther than in the January 18 agreement by declaring their intent to negotiate a peace agreement with each other.

d. In addition, it might be possible to talk with Sadat about the kind of relationship he envisions with Israel after a peace agreement is signed and then to write a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister describing our understanding of Egypt's intentions on the normalization of relations. If this worked out like the conversation with Asad on control of terrorism, the letter might be quite concrete.

2. Israeli use of the Canal.

- a. Egypt might make public, perhaps by incorporating it in the agreement, the commitment it made secretly in January to the effect that Israeli cargoes can go through the Canal when it is re-opened and that Israeli ships can go through when a peace agreement is signed. The Canal should be re-opened not long after a second-stage agreement is signed.
- b. Presumably Egypt will not go so far as to let Israeli ships through the Canal in connection with a further disengagement agreement. However, another effort could be made to have Egypt allow Israeli ships through the Canal when it is re-opened.

3. Oil supply. Israel has a strong interest in both access to Gulf of Suez oil and in the principle of Egyptian willingness to enter into normal commercial relations with Israel. Israeli withdrawal from the Suez oil fields would open these possibilities.

- a. Egypt might agree privately that Israel may continue to import Suez Gulf oil under arrangements made through commercial channels in quantities comparable to those it has been importing for domestic consumption. Even if these arrangements were made between Israel and Egypt's Italian concessionaires with Egypt's tacit acquiescence, this could signify Egypt's willingness to consider some normal commercial arrangements.
- b. Egypt might agree openly to the principle of commercial relations when a peace agreement is signed.
- c. Coupled with the above might be a private Egyptian statement of intent amount to a virtual guarantee of oil supply to Israel in specified quantities. In return for guaranteed supply, Israel might be asked to pay some compensation to Egypt for the oil extracted from the

Suez fields since 1967. Although we do not want to press this on Israel, the total arrangement on supply and compensation would be a major economic agreement between Egypt and Israel and a significant step in normalizing relations.

4. Straits of Tiran. "In connection with" the observance of the ceasefire on the sea and the normalization of activities in the Gulf of Suez if the oil fields are returned to Egypt, the following are possible ways of addressing the question of passage through the Straits of Tiran:
 - a. Egypt and Israel might state their views that the Straits of Tiran are an international waterway in which all nations are entitled to the right of free transit.
 - b. Better still would be supplementing this with a joint Egyptian-Jordanian-Saudi declaration to the same effect.
 - c. Even better would be a supplementary joint Egyptian-Jordanian-Saudi-Israeli statement. It is probably too much to expect the Saudis to join Israel in a statement at this stage. But in addition to reassuring Israel on a key issue, the fact of a joint statement recording agreement with all three Arab riparians would be a significant sign of Arab willingness to begin to deal with Israel in a normal way.
 - d. Alternatives or other supplements would be parallel statements, arranging these now for future publication, a UN Security Council resolution, or U.S. and Soviet statements.
5. Bab el-Mandab.
 - a. Any of the procedures described above for the Straits of Tiran could be applied to a statement by riparians to the Red Sea on freedom of passage through the Straits of Bab el-Mandab.
 - b. There might be agreement in principle to a future conference, perhaps UN-sponsored, of Red Sea riparian states which could cover freedom of passage in the Straits of Bab el-Mandab.
6. UNEF. The objective is to meet the professed Israeli interest in more direct and normal contact with the Egyptians without bringing Egyptian military units closer to Israel. The possibilities include:

- a. A UN headquarters with permanent Israeli and Egyptian liaison missions could be established in the buffer zone. This would provide an immediately available channel for dealing with issues of disengagement and administration.
 - b. To supplement this, a hot line which the Israelis are seeking could be established to provide a direct communications link between Israel's Sinai headquarters and Egyptian headquarters to prevent military incidents such as those that might arise from straying aircraft.
7. Normalizing relations across the border.
- a. Border-crossing. An agreement to permit foreign tourists to cross the new line as they presently cross between Jordan and the West Bank would begin to normalize the "border." Also, there might be a simpler arrangement for residents of Gaza, for instance, to travel overland to Cairo.
 - b. Journalists. Some agreement on an exchange of selected newsmen in specified areas might at least be explored.
 - c. Jewish community. There might be an agreement on the treatment of Jews and Jewish property in Egypt or perhaps Egyptian commitment to encourage Syria to allow Syrian Jews to emigrate if they wish.
8. Limitation of armament and forces. It should be noted that a minimal movement of the Israeli disengagement line east of the mountain passes would put the Israeli military center at Bir Gifgafa into the limited armaments area. Because of possible Israeli interests in maintaining this center and because of the widening of the UN zone under this agreement, it may be practical to consider increasing the level of forces and equipment in the areas of limitation. This would probably permit the Egyptians to move more forces across the Canal even if the Egyptian disengagement line remained where it is now in the north.

It seems unlikely that Egypt could agree to all of the above, even in connection with an Israeli pullback to the el-Arish line which itself seems unlikely at this stage. From the above possibilities, however, a substantial package could be developed.

Attached is a draft agreement on further disengagement which begins to incorporate the above. Where maximum positions are included, it will be remembered that some of these could drop out into supplementary letters of assurance.

SECRET/NODIS

WORKING DRAFT

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON THE FURTHER DISENGAGEMENT
OF FORCES IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE .

A. Egypt and Israel will continue to observe scrupulously the ceasefire on land, sea, and air called for by the UN Security Council and as agreed in the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on the Disengagement of forces in pursuance of the Geneva Peace conference signed January 18, 1974. They will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all belligerent actions against each other.

B. In agreeing to observe the ceasefire on land, sea, and air, Egypt and Israel state their position that the Straits of Tiran and the Strait of Bab el Mandab are international straits and that ships of all nations are entitled to free transit through them. Each side consequently will refrain from interfering with the shipping of the other in these areas.

C. Starting from the situation created by the Agreement on Disengagement of January 18, 1974, the military forces of Egypt and Israel will be further separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed west of the line designed as Line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces will be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

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2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council. A UN Liaison Headquarters will be established in this zone with Egyptian and Israeli liaison missions assigned for the purpose of coordinating matters relating to disengagement and other questions requiring coordination between them on a continuing basis.

3. The area between the Egyptian line (Line A on the attached map) and the Suez Canal or the Red Sea will be limited in armament and forces as agreed.

4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on the attached map will be limited in armament and forces as agreed.

5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the UNEF will be continued. Each side may fly one reconnaissance aircraft per week over the zone of disengagement on a schedule coordinated at the UN Liaison Headquarters.

6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

D. This agreement will be signed in Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military and civilian representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process and on the safe transfer of management over the oil fields on the Gulf of Suez. These representatives will meet in the Military Working Group for this purpose no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at _____ under the aegis of the United Nations. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 56 days after it begins.

E. This agreement, like the agreement of January 18, 1974, is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference. Both sides express their

intention to continue their negotiations with the objective of achieving peace which will terminate the state and claims of belligerency between them as a basis for the gradual normalization of relations.

For Egypt:

For Israel:

Witness: