

- to spell out in general terms U.S. interests and objectives in Southeast Asia emphasizing our continuing commitments to its security, while pointing out you are still considering the specific elements of our policies to meet these commitments.
- to establish through the Gorton visit that your Administration intends to give equal priority to Asia and is not European-oriented as some Asians now fear.
- to reassure an Australia, moving away from UK tutelage to an independent power position in Asia, that in the United States it has a steadfast and special friend who will not desert Australia if it faces hostile aggression beyond its own capability to handle.

9. Special Subjects to Raise: Gorton will probably raise on his own initiative Malaysia/Singapore defense, Vietnam, and post-Vietnam war Asian prospects. This discussion will give you an opportunity to bring Gorton up to date on your thinking in Vietnam and reassure him on our commitments in Asia. I suggest that you may also wish to mention --

- your personal appreciation for Gorton's attendance at General Eisenhower's funeral.
- appreciation for Australia's contribution in Vietnam. (There are 8000 Australian troops there.)
- ✓ -- Australia's helpfulness in representing our interests in Cambodia, particularly during our current efforts to resume relations with Sihanouk.
- appreciation for Australia's cooperation in science and space, and an invitation for Australia to send a high-level science mission to the U.S.

10. Sensitive Areas: Gorton reacts negatively to pressure tactics and is particularly allergic to pressure to sign the NPT. Gorton also does not like to be photographed close up, because of the scars on his face from a war injury.

11. The Gorton Personality: Gorton is tough, blunt and impatient of formalities. He is likely to launch into a discussion of major policy problems almost immediately after meeting you. He likes straight answers. He is prickly, and does not like to be taken for granted. (He thought that the last U.S. Administration did just that, and was therefore particularly appreciative of his first meeting with you.) He feels strongly that he has, in his own fashion, gone out of his way to accommodate our interests in his part of the world. He will be seeking, not legal precision, but a real and personal feeling that we intend to stick by Australia.

12. I have also attached the scope paper (Tab F) and a paper on Malaysia/Singapore defense (Tab G). In addition, the State Department has prepared a number of background papers which you may want to look over (they are in the accompanying briefing book).

Attachments

Suggestions for the President's Toast to
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia

Just about one year from now Australia will celebrate the 200th anniversary of the landing of Captain James Cook and the crew of the ENDEAVOUR at Botany Bay, near what is now Sydney.

Your government, Mr. Prime Minister, asked ours to send a ship to join in the celebration. Unfortunately, we had to decline because you asked us to send a sailing ship, and in the whole United States Navy, not a single, old-fashioned, wind-powered vessel capable of making the journey could be found.

I hasten to say, however, that this security gap is not quite as bad as it might sound. This country does have a famous sailing ship -- a 12 meter called the Intrepid. I wish I could tell you tonight that the Intrepid will sail to Australia to represent us at the Cook bicentenary, even though it is not a government ship. But when I suggested this to the skipper, our Chief of Protocol, "Bus" Mosbacher, he seemed somehow reluctant. I think he is afraid someone would suggest that -- now that he's in diplomacy -- he should take along the America's Cup rather than wait for Australia to come and get it.

Your celebration of the anniversary of Captain Cook's landing is a fine reminder of your country's exciting past. An American writer, Mark Twain, once said of Australian history: "It does not read like history, but like the most beautiful of lies."

And now, of course, your country is still paced toward the future. The Australian writer, George Johnston, placed that point in perspective when he wrote: "In a world where so many have come to fear the beginning of the end, Australia has come only to the end of the beginning."

In the worried world of 1969, Australia and the United States are partners in many ways -- in spirit, in the ANZUS and SEATO alliances, in our defense of freedom in Korea and Vietnam, in our goal of development for the countries of the Pacific, in our quest for a better world. In this high purpose, I pledge you the unfailing support and continued loyal friendship of the United States of America.

And now I would like to offer a riddle: What does Australia have in common with Monaco and Sikkim? The answer, of course, is that the leaders of all three are married to beautiful American women. This is a little-known form of international cooperation. We are delighted to welcome your lovely lady from Maine back to our shores as one of us -- and as one of you.

#

Suggestions for Remarks at the Departure of
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia

This visit has been enormously useful for me and for this government. It has given us all a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding statesman from a land that has been aptly described by one of its poets as "the land of reliance and never-give-in and help-your-mate."

The spirit of "help-your-mate" is deeply involved in the cooperation between our countries. I might point out that our space program has six tracking stations in Australia. And Australia is a member of ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our policy in Southeast Asia. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those of other free world nations in Vietnam even as they fought beside us in World War I, World War II, and in Korea.

While Australia has been called "a prophecy still to be fulfilled," it is making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and economic development in its part of the world. It participates wholeheartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and many other regional activities. In percentage of national income devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world, a record of which any nation can be proud. Australia and America can both be proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security and progress of the Pacific region. That partnership and that contribution will continue.

These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a wide range of subjects, including, not only Vietnam and regional security questions, but also a number of topics outside the security field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems than we are, so I have very much appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with its Prime Minister. I have obtained a number of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.

Now you return to your homeland -- exchanging the beauties of a Washington spring for the beauties of an Australian autumn -- without even going through a hot summer.

An Australian writer has said that the flame of freedom will never die in Australia because it is fanned by "a wind blowing out of the far country." That wind is the democratic spirit of our forefathers which is the product of the old frontier in both Australia and America.

At a time when democratic ideals are under attack all over the world, all free nations can turn to Australia as they have often turned to America, and they can be grateful that the winds of freedom are still blowing "out of that far country."

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s/s-6643

April 29, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with the Prime Minister
of Australia

Summary

The Points to Stress

1. Our intention to maintain a continued firm posture in Asia.
2. Our continued firm adherence to ANZUS and SEATO.
3. The importance we attach to Australia's contribution to Southeast Asian regional affairs, including its commitment to the defense of Malaysia/Singapore.
4. Our hope that Australia will continue to play a leading role in the region.
5. Our appreciation for Australia's Viet-Nam support.
6. Our desire for continued close consultations with Australia on Viet-Nam and other regional security matters.

The Points to Avoid

1. Pressuring Gorton to sign the NPT.
2. Asking for more Australian troops for Viet-Nam.

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Group 1

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and declassification

The big question mark in Gorton's mind is the continued firmness of U. S. Asia policy under your administration. This underlies the three main subjects he will want to discuss.

These are:

- Malaysia/Singapore defense.
- Viet-Nam.
- Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia.

A. Malaysia/Singapore Defense

On February 25, Gorton announced that Australia will maintain forces, including ground troops, in Malaysia/Singapore after the British pull out in 1971. This announcement put an end to a year-long, meandering, public foreign-policy debate on "forward defense" versus "fortress Australia." Forward defense has won, and Australia is headed in the direction of increasing involvement in regional affairs -- a development which is in our interest as well as Australia's.

The fact that Gorton made his announcement before his visit to Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety of his ground forces before committing them. Now, it is clear we will not be asked to pay this price for an Australian ground-force presence in Malaysia/Singapore.

On the other hand, the announcement has also put us on a spot, challenging us to be as firm and forthright as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that Australia has met our requirement to do all it can; now what will we do to support its commitment?

In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S. support for his forces. At the very

least, he will wish to assess the general posture your administration will assume in Southeast Asia. It must be assumed that the impressions he receives from you on this question may affect the confidence and vigor with which Australia assumes its heightened role in regional affairs.

Gorton will:

-- try to get a feel for how much help he can expect from the United States if his forces run into a situation they cannot handle;

-- possibly ask you directly what we would do if the peninsula were invaded by Communist China or North Viet-Nam, or if an externally supported insurgency got out of control;

-- possibly ask you whether the ANZUS Treaty will apply to Australian forces stationed in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

You should:

-- say that (as you told him in a personal message) you welcome the Australian decision as a valuable contribution to the stability and security of Southeast Asia;

-- say that Australia's decision makes it easier for us to go on making our own contribution, which consists mainly of our forces deployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific area as a deterrent to Communist expansion;

-- add that in this connection we were heartened by Gorton's recent assurance to our Ambassador that Australian forces would fight beside ours in Thailand if the need arose;

-- stress that although we are not a party, we are keenly interested in the Five-Power (Australia, U.K.,

New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore) consultations on new defense arrangements for Malaysia/Singapore;

-- add that we would like to encourage this development in any way we can, such as through the possible joint use of a Singapore naval facility (which our two navies are now discussing);

-- assure Gorton we fully understand that (as he said in his speech) a situation could conceivably arise with which Australia and her allies could not cope, and that Australia would then have to look for support to "allies outside the region" and decide what to do "in the light of circumstances then prevailing;"

-- assure him that, as Australia's principal ally in the Pacific, we would of course stand ready to consult fully and promptly on what support we might give;

-- tell him we agree with his view (in his speech) that we cannot now know what those circumstances might be and, therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.

With respect to the ANZUS Treaty, you should:

-- avoid raising the question of the specific applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore;

-- (if Gorton raises it) say that we recognize Malaysia and Singapore are within the treaty area, that the continuing presence of Australian forces there serves the interests of both of us, and that questions concerning our obligations under the treaty may someday arise;

-- stress that we would want, therefore, to maintain close consultation about future Australian commitments to Malaysia and Singapore and future deployments of Australian forces;

-- (if Gorton presses you for details on how ANZUS applies) say you doubt that it is necessary or desirable to speculate on theoretical applications of the Treaty;

-- note that Gorton has said he would prefer "general understandings" to "specific treaty obligations" in Australia's future defense relations with Malaysia and Singapore;

-- say that, similarly, we feel that maintenance of the general understanding represented by the ANZUS Treaty is better than trying to delimit specific treaty obligations in hypothetical contingencies.

(For more precise language in responding on this subject, see Background-Position Paper.)

B. Viet-Nam

The Australians have contributed 8000 troops. Gorton has announced that that is the limit. Public support for the war, over 60 per cent eighteen months ago, has now slipped to below 50 per cent. Gorton is sensitive about being fully consulted as an ally. He is also worried about our possibly agreeing to a weak settlement that would lead to a deterioration in Southeast Asia.

Gorton will:

-- ask your assessment of the current situation in Viet-Nam;

-- ask about the outlook for the Paris talks.

You should:

-- solicit his views;

-- give him the picture as you see it;

-- give him the feeling that you are taking him fully and frankly into your confidence;

-- tell him how highly we value Australia's contribution, in both military and non-military assistance;

-- not ask for more Australian troops.

C. Post-Vietnam Southeast Asia

Gorton, like many Australians, is nervous about a possible U. S. withdrawal from Asia after Viet-Nam. You should reassure him.

Gorton will:

-- probe your intentions on maintaining a U. S. presence in the area;

-- be interested in your thoughts on future trends, including Japan's role in the area.

You should:


-- assure him that our interest in the security and economic development of Southeast Asia will continue after Viet-Nam;

-- stress the importance we will continue to attach to ANZUS and SEATO;

-- outline your thinking on post-Vietnam Asia, highlighting the leading role we foresee Australia playing in Southeast Asia, and the increasing contribution we hope to see Japan make.

-- ask Gorton's views on the future of his part of the world; the problems he foresees; how he envisions Australia's role and those of the United States and Japan.

These are the high points. Additional talking points, and Background on the Visit, are enclosed.


William P. Rogers

Enclosures:

1. Additional Talking Points.
2. Background on the Visit.

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Additional Talking Points

Other possible topics which Gorton may raise include:

- U. S. trade restrictions.
- offset military purchases.
- nuclear excavation study.
- Non-proliferation Treaty.
- Defense Space Communications Facility.
- your visiting Australia.

Topics you may wish to raise:

- EC-121 incident.
- scientific cooperation.

Topics Gorton may raise

1. U. S. Import Restrictions

(For the record, Gorton may mention various standing Australian complaints against U. S. import restrictions. While we do have restraints on Australia's principal exports to us, we are still its third best customer, taking about 14 per cent of total exports. Australia's economic situation today is excellent. You should listen sympathetically, but avoid promising more liberal treatment.)

Gorton may:

-- complain about U. S. restraints on -- or protectionist moves against -- meat, dairy products, wool, woolen textiles, lead, zinc or steel, asserting that

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such restrictions are inconsistent with our professed devotion to free trade and that Australia should enjoy freer access to the U. S. market;

-- point out that the bilateral balance of trade runs 2 to 1 in favor of the U. S.;

-- allege that our voluntary restraint program on meat imports (in which Australia is cooperating under protest) is unfair because it restricts Australia to less than its historical share of the U. S. market;

-- thank you for relaxing (at his request) the May 1 deadline for Australian compliance with sanitary provisions of our meat inspection law.

You should:

-- not raise the subject;

-- (if Gorton raises it) say we will give the most sympathetic possible consideration to Australia's position on trade questions, consistent with our own balance of payments problem and the difficulties of some American industries;

-- note that Australia's overall balance of payments is currently healthy;

-- state your position on trade policy, declaring that you intend to resist protectionist moves in the U.S.;

-- stress that to head them off, you will need the cooperation of other countries. Australia's agreement to the voluntary restraint program on meat was most helpful in this regard.

-- (if Gorton says the meat program is unfair) point out that giving Australia its historical share of the market would have meant imposing cutbacks on other suppliers, who would have refused to cooperate in the voluntary program;

-- point out that this would have necessitated the imposition of country quotas, which both we and the Australians wish to avoid;

-- point out that it would be very difficult for us to force cutbacks on the small, poor Central American countries, developing nations whose meat industries we have assisted;

-- note that under the voluntary restraint program, Australia will still be able to sell us $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent more meat in 1969 than in 1968 -- more than in any previous year except one.

2. Offset Military Purchases

(Australia is a major purchaser of U. S. military equipment. To offset their expenditures partially, we try to do as much DOD purchasing as possible in Australia. The problem is that the Australians are not competitive in most lines. We have taken a few special measures to assist them, which have lessened the gap slightly.)

Gorton may:

-- press for increased Department of Defense procurement in Australia, as a further offset to their large purchases of military equipment from us.

You should:

-- not raise the subject;

-- (if Gorton raises it) reply that we want to be as helpful as we can;

-- note that discussions are taking place regularly on the subject between the Department of Defense and the Australian Embassy;

-- suggest that Gorton explore this in depth with Secretary Laird.

3. Nuclear Excavation Study

(A detailed study of the feasibility of constructing a harbor with nuclear explosions at Cape Keraudren fell through when the mining company involved declined to contribute financially. In developing the agreement for this study, Gorton had reacted indignantly to what he took as an indication that we intended to use the project to "pressure" him into signing the NPT. The Australian and American Atomic Energy Commissions have just agreed to undertake a preliminary feasibility survey of potential sites on the west coast of Australia to determine their general suitability for a nuclear excavation project. This agreement is expressly not a commitment on the part of either Government to proceed to a detailed survey of a specific site, as was planned at Cape Keraudren.)

Gorton may:

-- hope the current survey of potential harbor sites will ultimately lead to a nuclear excavation project;

-- possibly ask you point-blank whether there would be a relationship between our willingness to perform such a project and Australia's signing the NPT.

You should:

-- not raise the subject;

-- if Gorton raises it, be pleased that the two Atomic Energy Commissions are able to continue their studies of possible nuclear explosion projects in Australia, since a useful project -- if it proved technically and economically feasible and did not violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty -- could be a major advance in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy;

-- stress that prospects for international acceptance of such projects will be enhanced if the parties seek to gain international approval as the study proceeds. We can dispel suspicions by conducting the study openly, recognizing the interest of other countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

-- assure Gorton once again that we would have no thought of using such a project to "pressure" him into signing the NPT;

-- note, however, that we cannot avoid the fact that performing the first international PNE project for a non-signatory country would create problems with potential NPT adherents. This point was brought out during Senate hearings on the NPT.

4. Non-Proliferation Treaty

(Because of fears of industrial espionage by IAEA safeguards inspectors and lurking doubts of the effectiveness of our nuclear umbrella, Australia has not yet signed the NPT. Gorton will probably sign it sooner or later -- sooner if no one pushes him.)

Gorton may:

-- bring up Australia's doubts about the NPT.

You should:

-- if Gorton does not raise the subject, mention that you hope he will discuss it with the Secretary of State;

-- if Gorton does bring it up, say the NPT is an important foreign policy objective of ours; we believe in the long run it will be equally important to Australia; and we hope Australia will sign in the not too distant future;

-- reassure Gorton that (as we have specifically confirmed to the GOA) the ANZUS and SEATO treaties place Australia under the nuclear protection of the United States;

-- assure him that we are convinced that IAEA safeguards will not be a cover for industrial espionage nor otherwise impair progress in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are willing to place our nuclear facilities under such safeguards, except those with national security significance;

-- invite him to discuss his reservations about the NPT further with the Secretary of State, and offer further consultation between U. S. and Australian technical experts if desired.

5. Defense Space Communications Facility

See Background Paper.

6. Your visiting Australia

Gorton will:

-- probably invite you to pay a return visit to Australia.

You should:

-- say you would like very much to do so, but cannot fix a date at this time.

Topics you may wish to raise

1. EC-121 Incident

You should:

-- take Gorton fully into your confidence, outlining the reasons for our restrained response.

2. Scientific Cooperation

You should:

-- tell Gorton how much we appreciate Australia's wholehearted cooperation with us in science, space and military research;

-- say we are pleased with the agreement on scientific cooperation concluded last fall when a team of U. S. scientists visited Australia;

-- add that we would welcome a return visit by Australian scientists this year.

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Background on the Visit

What Gorton is Like

Gorton is a distinctively Australian Prime Minister. In this he contrasts with Menzies, who said he was "British to his boot-heels," and Holt, who said he would go "all the way with LBJ." Much more than they, Gorton personifies -- and manipulates -- his countrymen's feelings of nationalism and egalitarianism. Specifically:

-- in personality, he projects an image of the "typical Australian" -- masculine, direct, tough, down-to-earth, "the casual knockabout bloke next door." (The image is accurate but incomplete: he is also an Oxford honors graduate in history.)

-- in policy, he appeals to nationalist and populist sentiments, criticizing foreign investment, flirting with a more independent foreign policy, moving toward the left on social welfare. (His policy changes have been more rhetorical than real, but they have contributed to his image.)

Gorton is a popular Prime Minister. Erratic, abrasive and high-handed behavior during his first year has made him many enemies among newspapermen, politicians and bureaucrats, but polls show the people like him. Sixty-two per cent approve of the way he is handling his job, the same percentage as six months ago. Despite a recent furor over his public attentions to young women, he is currently favored to win his first general election (which must be held by November this year) by an impressive margin.

Gorton is such a strong Prime Minister that he has been accused of "Americanizing" Australian politics and trying to smuggle in the Presidential system. He has been compared to Andrew Jackson because he:

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-- has rural origins, a glamorous war record and an earthy political style which irks the establishment.

-- is strong-willed and hot tempered.

-- is blunt and direct.

-- prizes action over reflection.

-- runs the government as a one-man show with an iron hand and a "kitchen cabinet."

-- gives jobs to his supporters ("spoils system").

In his dealings with us, Gorton has shown himself to be:

-- sensitive about being taken for granted. He wants his and Australia's views to be fully considered.

-- angered by any suggestion of pressure or arm-twisting.

-- resistant to persuasion. He tends to come around if left alone, but digs his heels in if he feels he is being pushed.

-- contemptuous of what he construes as flattery or eagerness to please.

Why He is Coming to Washington

Gorton's purpose is to get better acquainted with you and senior officials of your administration and to explore in greater depth subjects he raised during his visit at the time of the Eisenhower funeral. Embassy Canberra reports he is quite relaxed about the visit and seemingly anticipates friendly discussions on a range of subjects rather than hard bargaining or attempts to find solutions to specific problems.

However, he will be extremely interested in East Asian security matters, and will certainly probe your intentions with respect to future U. S. policies in Southeast Asia.

Suggestions on Handling Gorton

Gorton is a prickly, aggressive man who can be extremely charming but also extremely difficult to handle. Foreign relations for him are primarily a matter of personal relationships between leaders. In general, with Gorton you should be especially careful to:

- make him feel he is an equal partner; ask his opinions.
- be as frank as you can.
- avoid appearing eager to please.
- avoid pushing him but don't let him push you (he respects toughness).

You are starting with an advantage in that he wound up rather jaundiced about the Johnson administration, but reportedly has a high opinion of you. Also, he is under some pressure to get along with you because it is widely believed in Australia that he did not make a good impression on President Johnson. He was accordingly on his best behavior when he met you in April, and was effusive in his praise of you when he returned to Australia ("I like the guy").

SECRET - LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 1, 1969
Time: 10:30 A.M.
Place: White House

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton's Meeting with the President

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister John G. Gorton
Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's
Department,
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the
President
Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia-
New Zealand Affairs, Department of State

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the latter's visit to Washington would be rescheduled for May 6-7.

Project 949

The Prime Minister opened the substantive discussion by commenting on Project 949 (a U. S. proposal to establish a Surveillance Satellite Ground Station in Australia). He said the GOA was in favor of the project but hoped that it could be announced soon and that the announcement could reveal the defense nature of the project in order to forestall the curiosity and questions of Australians should the sort of generalized cover story desired by the U. S. be used.

Mr. Kissinger said the Defense Dept. would prefer not to reveal yet the capability of the 949 system. The President

SECRET - LIMDIS

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic down-
grading and declassification

said the USG would try to work out an announcement that would neither compromise the security aspects of 949 nor embarrass the GOA. Gorton said the GOA would go along with the U. S. decision in the matter, but added that an agreed announcement should be made soon before rumors begin to circulate.

Sabah Dispute

Prime Minister Gorton explained Australia's attitude towards the Sabah dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. He said Australia has a continuing interest in Southeast Asia and will be increasingly involved in the affairs of the region, but wants to avoid getting mixed up in its internal quarrels. He said the GOA has told the Malaysians this and has told them that they, themselves, should handle small incursions, subversion, etc., if any, by the Filipinos, noting that the presence of Australian forces in the Malay peninsula frees Malaysian armed forces for such action in East Malaysia. In case of major Philippine action, the GOA would be prepared to consider what else it might do to help Malaysia.

The President characterized the Australian position in this matter as responsible. He said one of the greatest pitfalls statesmen face is getting involved in quarrels that do not directly concern their countries. Gorton agreed,

describing Southeast Asia as the present "Balkans of the world." He said the GOA was doing what it could to discourage Malaysia from buying sophisticated jet fighters, which France and Canada were urging the Malaysians to buy. On April 2, he said, Australia would be offering Malaysia Sabres (it was unclear whether they were offered for sale or on loan) to induce the GOM not to waste its resources buying other aircraft. The President applauded the constructive Australian approach to the problem, agreeing with Gorton that Malaysia does not need sophisticated fighters.

Israeli Desire to Purchase Mirage Spares

Gorton said Australia had been approached by the Israelis who wished to purchase spare parts -- which France would not supply -- for their Mirage aircraft. Australia could not do this under the terms of their licensing agreement with the French. Gorton said he thought it would be a mistake to allow the Israeli air force to deteriorate vis a vis the Arab air forces, and he wondered if the U. S. would perhaps have enough interest in this question to put in a word with the French Government that might enable Australia to supply the desired spares. The President said he would look into it.

Meat Inspection

The next topic on the Prime Minister's agenda was a problem concerning inspection of Australian meat destined for the export to the U. S. Gorton said Australia has made every effort over the years to meet USDA requirements in this regard. Recently, however, the USDA imposed a May 1 deadline for certain changes in inspection procedures which Australia cannot meet, although they will comply as promptly as possible. Gorton said he was not asking for a bigger meat quota, just hoping for relaxation of the May 1 deadline so that Australian meat exports can keep moving. He noted that Australia is a good U. S. customer and must be able to sell to this country in return. The President agreed to have the Department of Agriculture look into the Prime Minister's request.

Viet-Nam

Gorton asked the President to comment on the Viet-Nam situation. The President first expressed gratitude for Australia's support of the U. S. in Viet-Nam. He said we want to end the war, but it must be in a way that we can live with, that will not plant the seeds of another war. It is impossible for us just to pull out. The time is ripe to seek a negotiated settlement, but he was not sure, he

said, that it was possible in the short run.

More likely to succeed, he said, is a phased withdrawal that would eventually reduce the conflict to a level that the GVN itself could handle. He said that the U. S. is exploring all avenues but expects the next three months to show little visible movement and to be marked by increasing public pressure -- probably on the GOA as well as the USG -- for a hasty withdrawal. The war must not be allowed to end, however, in a way that could be interpreted as a defeat for the U. S. and its allies, thereby encouraging aggressive elements in the Communist world. Gorton expressed agreement, saying that Australia has much at stake in Viet-Nam and seeks neither a precipitate withdrawal nor what he described as a "Laotian solution."

The President said the so-called domino theory is spoken of disparagingly these days, but in fact our posture in Viet-Nam affects the countries of Southeast Asia; countries such as Japan, which would not wish to see a solution in Viet-Nam that encouraged the "hawks" of the Communist world, and in fact our whole relationship with the Communist powers on the world scene. The Viet-Nam war poisons our relations with certain European countries, the President said; they are not interested in it and do not care about it. The Latin

American countries tend to feel the same way. Domestic opposition is substantial. Nevertheless we must persevere in our effort to achieve a workable peace, orchestrating the diplomatic and military instruments we have at hand for the purpose. He said one point that bears emphasis is that we cannot achieve an effective peace without the cooperation of the South Vietnamese. President Thieu is coming along well and is quite reasonable, but he cannot be rushed unduly.

Malaysia/Singapore

After the war in Viet-Nam has ended, Gorton asked, what interest will the U. S. retain in the Malaysia/Singapore area, which Britain is leaving and in which Australia is deeply committed. The President said this should be the major topic of discussion during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in May. Speaking broadly, however, the President said, the U. S. would remain interested in and concerned with East Asia, a vast area, possessed of a large population and extensive natural resources, with China at its heart. During the last quarter of this century, he said, "the action will be in the Pacific."

The U. S. interest therein must continue. It will not take the form of domination but will seek new forms of cooperation. The resources of power in the region are great;

there is a bigger role in regional activities for Japan, for example, even though the Japanese military role must remain limited. New devices to promote regional cohesion are needed. Gorton agreed with what the President said. He said the major thrust should be in the direction of economic development. He commented that defensive military alliances among the Southeast Asian countries seem not to be in the cards at this time, but speculated that non-aggression agreements might be a useful approach to furthering regional cooperation and security.

Gorton observed that the Southeast Asian countries need the protection of an external military shield while they are developing. Australia is doing its part to help provide that protection, he said, but it is a country of only 12 million inhabitants and its military capacity is limited. He noted that the British are not prepared to commit themselves to do any more than consult if contingencies arise which are beyond Australia's ability to handle. Gorton voiced concern at the conceivable prospect of Australian forces fully committed to Southeast Asia, still unable to do the job there, and leaving Australia itself unprotected.

The President said he could not conceive of the U. S.

abandoning Southeast Asia. He said the U. S. hopes for a continuing British interest in the area. He said the U. S. does not wish to be the only power on the scene -- "we would like some company." Gorton replied, "So would we," and the President responded "Well, you have us."

EA/ANZ:RWMoore:rlw 4/1/69

SECRET

TALKING PAPER FOR THE GORTON VISIT

THE US VIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Prime Minister Gorton's prime objective during his visit will be to probe your thinking about future US policy in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. After intensive internal debate about future Australian policy with regard to Malaysia/Singapore, both within the Australian Government and his own mind, Gorton has recently announced his intention to station Australian ground as well as air forces in Malaysia and Singapore beyond the British exit in 1971. He does this in the hope/expectation that the US will support Australia (and New Zealand) in a crunch.

During his first visit here, Gorton specifically suggested that during his May visit, you discuss with him American interests and objectives in Southeast Asia.

We do not believe that he will be looking for specific US commitments under ANZUS concerning Malaysia/Singapore, and you should not be precise on this question. He will be looking for a general reassurance that our Vietnam experiences, our renewed emphasis on Europe, and our domestic problems will not add up to a substantial US disengagement from Asia after Vietnam.

Attached are suggested talking points on this subject, designed to reassure Gorton about continuing US interest in Southeast Asia, without laying out specific policy commitments in advance of the intensive consideration of our post-Vietnam Asian policy now going on. These talking points draw in part upon an interagency paper, drafted at your request and considered in the NSC Review Group, which provides an interim analysis of US interests and objectives in Southeast Asia. This paper (also attached) represents an accelerated input to the thoroughgoing exploration of our post-Vietnam Asian policy alternatives that will be submitted in July.

As the paper brings out, there are important differences within the Government about: the relative priority of Southeast Asia; the nature of the threats; and the proper US role. You will probably not want to discuss these differences with Gorton.

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TALKING POINTS

1. Introduction: I asked our Government to study US interests and objectives in Southeast Asia in preparation for our discussions, on the basis of your expressed wish to discuss these questions in depth. We are still in the midst of a major review of our policies in Southeast Asia as they relate to the post-Vietnam War period. We have reached some preliminary conclusions of a largely general nature but have not yet reached definitive conclusions on a number of key specific issues.

2. Current US Commitments:

- Direct commitments to Japan, South Korea, Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, plus SEATO protocol states.
- Many assurances given to Thailand that we will assist her in combating communist subversion.
- Commitment to Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand includes cases where armed forces, public vessels or aircraft come under attack anywhere in the Pacific.
- This is an extensive network of obligations. We intend to maintain these commitments. The question arises as to the US interests and objectives which underlie these commitments and as to how we will maintain them.

3. US Strategic Interests in Southeast Asia:

- Direct strategic interest. Free movement and access to the Indian Ocean. Southeast Asia's critical strategic location in Asia.
- The vast distances in the Pacific. The importance of a US presence in Southeast Asia in order to make our East Asian commitments credible.
- The importance to the US of Australia and Japan. Our close relations with these countries are keystones of the US presence in the Western Pacific. Free passage through Southeast Asian waters is a vital lifeline for these allies, and thus indirectly assumes larger importance for the US.

4. US Economic Interests:

- US trade with Southeast Asia is less than 4% of our total trade; and total American investment in the area is only \$1 billion, most of it in the Philippines.
- Nevertheless, Southeast Asia has 250 million people, growing economies and an expanding market. The economic importance of Southeast Asia to the US, though limited, has increased since World War II and will continue to increase.
- Although none of the commodities produced by Southeast Asia is irreplaceable, we import the bulk of our rubber and tin

from there and they would be much more expensive if we were denied access to that region's suppliers.

-- Japan's business interest in Southeast Asia is important to the Japanese economy and, therefore, indirectly important to us.

5. US Objectives in Southeast Asia:

To safeguard these basic interests, we have several principal objectives in Southeast Asia:

- a. Prevention of the domination of the region by powers hostile to us.
- b. The independent national development of the nations of the area, their economic well-being and development of political systems.
- c. The evolution of regional cooperation to cope with common economic and political issues, and to help protect the countries of the area from subversion and ultimately from external aggression.
- d. The maintenance of US access to military facilities in the area as necessary to support our commitments.
- e. The development over the long term of a relaxation of tensions between communist and non-communist states in the region, and in our relations with Communist China and North Vietnam,

in order to avoid the permanent condition of hostility with its concomitant military and economic costs to us.

However, in the absence of a relaxation of tensions, we seek the means to minimize these costs without increasing the risk of aggression.

- f. Support for Australia and New Zealand in their efforts to promote the security of the region, and to sustain them in their role in Malaysia and Singapore, in order to realize mutual objectives.

6. Issues:

As I mentioned to you in March, we are intensively reviewing our Asian policies for the 1970s. We are attempting to define the best means of pursuing the interests and objectives that I have just outlined. We are measuring these objectives -- and will pursue them -- keeping in mind:

-- The nature of the threats -- the extent and types of likely challenges to our common interests and objectives in Southeast Asia.

-- The global context -- the impact of events in Southeast Asia on the rest of the region and worldwide.

I welcome your views on the proper US role in the context of the likely Asian environment and our own global responsibilities. We face some major issues.

Nuclear forces: What is the best means to underline our firm commitments against nuclear aggression or blackmail?

Conventional forces: What should be the nature and deployment of our general purpose forces to deter overt aggression against our allies?

Insurgencies assisted by external forces: What are the proper roles for the target country, its neighbors, and ourselves?

Bases: How do we weigh our needs for logistic support for our commitments against the attendant political and economic problems?

Military and economic assistance: What should be the level of our aid? Who should receive it? Should it be bilateral or multilateral?

Regionalism: Can the US better promote regional cooperation in a leading or supporting role? Can we expect present Asian groupings to evolve into security arrangements?

China: How do we go about deterring her aggressive designs while trying to moderate her policies and ease tensions?

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969

SCOPE PAPER

I. The Setting

Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces -- in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971. This is perhaps the most important step Australia has taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision. The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened role in Southeast Asia.

The Australian Government's historic decision resulted from the interplay of several factors. These included anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded, nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy leanings; the approach of a general election; and the stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.

"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?

Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries. While this course has been carried out through economic aid, diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it has also had an important military component -- the policy of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward defense has justified Australian participation in regional

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security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and, since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk its limited forces only in close association with one or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and the United States.

In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and the subsequent change of leadership in a United States which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene. Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?

Debate on this question could not remain theoretical, since Australia was faced with a pressing practical decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out? Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly dangerous departure from the traditional policy of stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises

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to be effective, and Australian indecision has already seriously hampered the five-power consultations.

In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil servants in these departments, and the military services. The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia and increased concentration upon internal economic development, military preparedness and continental and immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970. A still more important figure who early disclosed strong leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in January 1968, John Grey Gorton.

Gorton's Indecision

Gorton at various times has given numerous indications of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition towards its opposite. At his first press conference as Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam. A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question, he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968. He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least without being sure of being able to get them out if they got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over

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Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division -- one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister, he is understandably determined not to be responsible for a repetition of this debacle.

With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia policy under President Johnson's successor. After Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism -- under the next U. S. administration, and that this might well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense scheme." Although this topic dominated his discussions in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia. He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S. Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in mid-January, he privately took the position with the British that he could not run the risk of involvement, particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to President Nixon.

With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton successfully sought an early meeting with the new President. On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if Australian troops were stationed there, they would never get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to

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know from President Nixon what the United States would do if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.

The Election and Gorton's Decision

Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect, appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan -- was being called upon to play a new, more independent role. Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge? "Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party organization began advising him that a strong defense policy was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.

The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting statements helped build up suspense for his promised announcement of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced by Gorton.

Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External

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Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate -- forward defense including a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this the only foreign policy issue in an election which the bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country into a new era of its nationhood.

Significance for the Visit

Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety of his forces as a precondition for committing them. Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a guarantee, especially in a form which would have been politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in Malaysia/Singapore.

On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?

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His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if such a situation should arise we would have to look to the support of allies outside the region". In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S. support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the temper of the new administration and the general posture it will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs on which it is taking the first step.

II. The Visitor

Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative, with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind. Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him. He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like, and his standing with the man in the street is high. Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.

Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead. His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile, conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered strength and homely charm. His later war service has about it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the

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late John F. KennedyBack on active service, a crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic, direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis, an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocol, the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals, Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."

Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.

III. Australian Aims

The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia, as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's mind.

He will:

- assess the firmness of the new administration's posture in Southeast Asia;
- ask to what extent the U. S. is prepared to back up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
- be interested in the President's thinking on post-Vietnam Asia;
- argue for better treatment from the United States in the economic field;

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-- size up the President.

IV. United States Aims

Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:

-- without increasing our commitments, to give Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;

-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;

-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his - on post-Vietnam Asia;

-- to establish a good personal relationship between the President and Gorton;

-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the Australian people that the United States is and will remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist expansion in Asia.

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VISIT OF JOHN G. GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969

Background-Position Paper

U.S. INTEREST IN AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENT TO FIVE-POWER
ARRANGEMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA

BACKGROUND

On January 16, 1968, Britain announced it would withdraw all its military forces from the Malaysia/Singapore area by the end of 1971 (instead of by the "mid" 1970's as previously announced), and that the United Kingdom intended to revise its defense agreement with Malaysia, under which British, Australian and New Zealand forces are stationed in the area.

Britain's four Commonwealth partners thereupon began to consider how they would adjust to the British decision. Finding a strong desire on the part of Singapore and Malaysia for continued Australian military presence, the GOA announced that although it could not fill the gap left by the British, it would "be prepared to discuss the size and role of an Australian contribution to combined defense arrangements which embrace a joint Singapore/Malaysia defense effort."

Ministers of the Five Powers, meeting in June 1968, agreed that they had a continuing interest in the stability of the area and that the defense of Malaysia and Singapore was indivisible. The British promised to help ease the transition, but made clear their determination to proceed with the scheduled withdrawal. The groundwork for prompt

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development of Commonwealth defense arrangements seemed to have been laid. Five-Power Advisory Working Groups were set up to do detailed planning on air, army and naval matters, and a second ministerial conference was planned for the first half of 1969 (now scheduled for June).

However, progress was soon halted by a change in the attitude of Australia. Signs of this change had begun to appear even before the initial Five-Power Conference. Following President Johnson's March 31, 1968 announcement of the bombing halt, Prime Minister Gorton publicly expressed doubts about Australia's tentative decision to station forces in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971. His uncertainty regarding the firmness of United States' intentions in East Asia was reflected among other Asian leaders, who tend to believe that Australia's cultural affinity and close relationship with the United States give Australia a special insight. Talks with President Johnson and others during his visit here in May 1968 did not fully reassure Prime Minister Gorton. The GOA avoided committing itself on the post-1971 question pending the outcome of a prolonged fundamental defense policy review.

Finally, on February 25, 1969, Prime Minister Gorton issued a defense policy statement which announced Australia's intention, along with New Zealand, to commit ground as well as naval and air units to Malaysia and Singapore in the post-1971 period, thus paving the way for a renewal of Five-Power defense planning.

The defense policy statement outlines a course of action essentially fulfilling U.S. objectives. Mr. Gorton committed Australia to deploy small but symbolically important elements of the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force in Malaysia and Singapore after 1971 without a specific terminal date. Their mission will be to contribute to the internal stability of the region, to build up indigenous defense capacity, and to be available "for use against externally promoted and inspired Communist infiltration and subversion." Mr. Gorton pledged continued military and economic assistance to Malaysia and Singapore. He identified Australian interests with those of the region.

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in a manner well calculated to reassure Malaysia and Singapore. The way has thus been opened to further close coordination among the Five Powers which can lead to a workable Five-Power defense arrangement.

Prime Minister Gorton took care to keep Australia's options open and to avoid commitments to automatic response. The availability of Australian forces for use in insurgency situations is "subject to the usual requirement for the Australian Government's prior consent," and the scale of Australian effort should the threat exceed Australian resources alone "would...have to be decided in the light of all circumstances prevailing at the time." Should the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement (which by association is the basis for Australian presence in the area) become inoperative, Mr. Gorton said, "we would wish general understandings rather than specific treaty obligations to be worked out..."

Prime Minister Gorton stressed that Australia could not fully substitute for a major power in the region, and "the potential military protection of great nations outside the region will be needed" to ensure stability. He pointed out that a situation could conceivably arise in which the scale of subversion and infiltration from outside, or some other organized threat to the region, might be such that Australian resources alone would not be sufficient to support successfully the forces of Malaysia and Singapore. "If such a situation should arise," he said, "we would have to look to the support of allies outside the region and the scale of Australia's continued effort would in that case have to be decided in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at the time. What they would be we cannot now know and we cannot therefore make, now, precise decisions."

These references underline Australia's determination to maintain its freedom of action in the Malaysia/Singapore area, and consequently the importance which Australia will continue to attach to the American attitude in determining the degree of Australian commitment and the vigor with which it is pursued.

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United States' Objectives

Principal U.S. objectives with regard to Australian policy and the security of the Malaysia/Singapore area are:

1. To sustain Australia in an active, outwardly-directed policy which will increasingly involve it in the affairs of East Asia and thus contribute to our efforts to maintain the security of the area.
2. To see created a military alternative in the wake of the British withdrawal which will:
 - a. Contribute to the stability of Malaysia and Singapore so they can play a constructive role in an increasingly close-knit community of Southeast Asian states;
 - b. Cause Malaysia and Singapore to cooperate rather than compete militarily;
 - c. Be capable of helping Malaysia and Singapore cope with externally supported insurgency;
 - d. Provide insurance against the possibility of renewed Indonesian confrontation; and
 - e. Assist in the defense of Malaysia and Singapore against overt Communist attack.
3. To provide for the continued availability of support facilities in Singapore for use by Commonwealth and United States military forces.
4. To provide for the continued access by the United States and other states to the international waters and air space of the subregion.
5. To see created a regional defense arrangement which, useful under present circumstances, might stimulate emergence of a larger Southeast Asian security arrangement.

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6. To accomplish the foregoing without increasing our current commitments abroad.

Existing Obligations and Commitments

The United States has no defense commitments to Malaysia or Singapore. Under the ANZUS Treaty, we are committed to act if Australian (or New Zealand) forces in Malaysia/Singapore are attacked (Article V of the Treaty defines an armed attack on any of the parties as including an attack "on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific"). In 1963 we reached a secret understanding with Australia (Kennedy-Barwick Memorandum) spelling out at some length the circumstances under which we would regard the Treaty as applicable and the types of actions we might take if Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore were attacked by Indonesia. This understanding established four main points:

1. The United States acknowledged that Malaysia and Singapore are in the Pacific area to which the Treaty applies;
2. The United States recognized an obligation to act should Australian forces be overtly attacked by Indonesian armed forces, but not in the case of subversive acts or guerrilla attacks;
3. The United States would expect to be consulted prior to any redeployment of Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore; and
4. Use of armed forces, particularly ground forces, would depend upon requirements and could not be assured.

In October 1967, the Australians raised the question of the applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces which might remain in Malaysia/Singapore after British withdrawal, and asked whether further understandings might be necessary. Our reply (Berger-Waller letter January 17, 1968) was guarded, stating that we recognized the continuing

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presence of Australian forces in the peninsula "might some day give rise to questions concerning the application of the Treaty" and would want, therefore, to maintain close consultations. The Australians did not press the Johnson Administration for further assurances.

What Does Prime Minister Gorton Seek in Washington?

We do not have an altogether clear idea of what Prime Minister Gorton will seek in Washington -- but, very probably, neither does he. He is a changeable, impulsive, unpredictable man, and has given us varying indications as his thinking on Malaysia/Singapore defense has evolved.

Until his speech of February 25, it seemed likely that Gorton would seek some specific guarantee of the safety of his ground forces before committing them. His speech made clear that this was not the case, but nevertheless reflected concern with the possible need for U.S. support in case his forces encountered a situation which they could not handle. He has not spelled out just what support he is looking for, or what threat most concerns him. Before his February 25 speech, he informally indicated to our Ambassador that the principal purpose of his meeting with the President would be to inquire what the United States would do if Australian troops in Malaysia/Singapore became involved in countering an attack by Red China or North Viet-Nam. The speech itself, on the other hand, made only oblique reference to overt aggression and concentrated on the possibility of externally promoted Communist infiltration and subversion.

When he came to Washington for the Eisenhower funeral, the main topic Gorton opened up in his discussions with USG leaders was the extent of U.S. interest in Southeast Asia generally and Malaysia/Singapore specifically after the war ends in Viet-Nam, with particular reference to the support Australia might expect if her forces became involved in a situation which got out of control. He raised

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this only in the broadest terms, however, and it was agreed that discussions in depth should be postponed until he returned in May.

It is likely that several considerations are at work in Gorton's mind, including:

1. A vague need for psychological reassurance, growing out of Australia's relatively limited national power, its feeling of isolation and its traditional reliance upon powerful friends in pursuing its forward defense policy. This need for reassurance has been accentuated by Britain's announced withdrawal and uncertainty as to the future course of U.S. Asia policy. On this point Gorton reflects the feelings of his countrymen.
2. A specific concern with the safety of the Australian forces which will be in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971, especially the ground forces. This is reinforced by Gorton's experience as a World War II fighter pilot, when he saw an entire Australian division trapped at Singapore and forced to surrender to the Japanese.
3. A realization that Malaysia/Singapore defense must be viewed in the total context of Southeast Asia security. A key concern, therefore, is the continued firmness of the U.S. posture in areas to the north of Malaysia, especially Thailand and Laos, and the avoidance of an outcome in Viet-Nam which would lead to Communist advances in other Southeast Asian countries.
4. A desire for straight talk. Gorton is a blunt, direct man who respects frankness and dislikes evasiveness.
5. A realization that the new administration is engaged in a foreign policy reassessment and cannot be expected to have all the answers at this early stage. Coupled with this is a natural desire -- even the right, as a close, loyal ally -- to talk the problems over with us and share in our thinking process.

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6. A desire to elicit some public expression of U.S. support of his foreign policy initiative in Malaysia/Singapore which will be politically useful to him. Gorton faces his first general election later this year, and the commitment of ground troops to Malaysia/Singapore, which has been attacked by the opposition, is shaping up as a major election issue.

The precise line Gorton follows when he talks to the President will depend upon which of the foregoing considerations are uppermost in his mind at the time. All it is possible to predict is that he will (1) undoubtedly probe our intentions, with respect to both Southeast Asian security generally and Malaysia/Singapore in particular; and (2) probably seek expressions of support on Malaysia/Singapore, both private and public.

The Alternatives

In private, the President could make one of four replies to a Gorton request for U.S. assurances in support of Australia's military commitment to Malaysia/Singapore:

- a. give an unqualified pledge of support.
- b. give a qualified pledge of support, based on confirmation of the specific application of ANZUS.
- c. decline to pledge support.
- d. give generalized reassurance.

The advantages and disadvantages of each of these are briefly discussed below.

A. Unqualified pledge of support. The President would assure Gorton that the U.S. will give full military support to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore in any contingency in which they may be attacked.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

9.

Advantages:

1. would provide maximum reassurance to Australia.
2. would give strongest possible indication to Australia (and other nations which learned of it) of a continued firm U.S. posture in Southeast Asia.

Disadvantages:

1. would maximize risk of U.S. military involvement.
2. goes beyond our obligation under ANZUS; would expose the administration to charges of enlarging U.S. overseas commitments in unconstitutionally establishing a back-door commitment to defend Malaysia.
3. goes beyond Gorton's needs and reasonable expectations.

B. Qualified pledge of support. The President would confirm to Gorton that ANZUS applies to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore and that we would honor our commitment in the event Australian forces there were attacked. He would have to make clear, however, that our commitment is limited to situations in which Australian troops are attacked, as distinct from situations in which Australian troops enter into combat on their own initiative to assist Malaysia or Singapore.

Advantages:

1. should provide sufficient reassurance to encourage Australia to participate whole-heartedly in Malaysia/Singapore defense.
2. would signal (though less clearly than A) continued firmness of the U.S. posture in Southeast Asia.
3. simply acknowledges an obligation which we already have.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

10.

4. is straightforward, and is an advance over the Johnson administration position.

5. retains all the flexibility of response built into the Treaty, which provides for a broad range of possible actions of which the use of military force is only one extreme.

6. a precedent exists (Kennedy-Barwick Memorandum) for clearly delineating and in effect narrowing our responsibilities in the event that a specific threat arises.

Disadvantages:

1. creates a slight additional risk of involvement, since in the Berger-Waller letter we avoided a direct acknowledgement that ANZUS applies, thus retaining some freedom to back away from the commitment if this should later prove expedient.

2. could be attacked (although without sound justification) as executive enlargement of our overseas commitments.

3. unless very carefully explained, a simple statement that the ANZUS Treaty applies to Australian forces in Malaysia or Singapore could be misleading and the explanation could cast doubt on the adequacy of the assurance from the Australian point of view. Australia could well interpret a general statement of ANZUS Treaty applicability to their forces in Malaysia and Singapore as meaning that the U.S. would come to their aid if they sent their forces into combat pursuant to their defense commitment to Malaysia or Singapore.

C. Decline to pledge support. The President could explain frankly that in the prevailing climate of U.S. opinion, he is not in a position to undertake anything which might be depicted as a new overseas commitment.

Advantages:

1. minimizes risk of involvement.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

11.

2. avoids any risk of criticism for allegedly enlarging our commitments.

Disadvantages:

1. conducive to half-hearted Australian participation in Malaysia/Singapore defense.

2. conducive to a more inward-looking Australian foreign policy and a less positive contribution to the security and development of Southeast Asia.

3. likely to weaken the ANZUS alliance through lessened confidence in our reliability and firmness of purpose as an ally.

4. in governmental circles in Australia and New Zealand, conducive to a feeling we are renegeing on our ANZUS commitment -- which we acknowledged in 1963 was applicable to Australian forces in Malaysia.

5. might signal to other countries that a U. S. retreat from our Asian responsibilities is in the offing.

D. Generalized reassurance. The President could assure Gorton in general terms of our determination to stand by our commitments in Asia, not going beyond the "Berger-Waller" position with respect to the applicability of ANZUS to Australia's forces in Malaysia/Singapore.

Advantages:

1. would provide sufficient reassurance to encourage a positive Australian contribution to regional security.

2. would preserve maximum flexibility.

3. is probably all Gorton really expects.

4. avoids criticism for allegedly enlarging our commitments.

SECRET/EXDIS

5. avoids any increased risk of involvement.

Disadvantages:

1. is no advance over the Johnson administration position.
2. is somewhat evasive on the specific question of the applicability of ANZUS.

Public Response

The foregoing alternatives are suggested private responses. Our public response should probably be the same in any case -- an affirmation of the continuing importance we attach to ANZUS and our other commitments in the area, together with an expression of understanding and support for the Australian commitment to Malaysia/Singapore. A possible alternative would be publicly to affirm the applicability of ANZUS to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore (assuming we decided upon this private response). Such a public statement, however, would go beyond Gorton's apparent political needs, draw undue public attention to the question in the United States, and invite criticism for alleged executive enlargement of our overseas commitments.

Recommended Response to Gorton

Response "D" (generalized reassurance) is recommended for the following reasons:

1. The benefits to the United States of a whole-hearted execution of a forward policy by Australia are such that it is desirable to reassure Gorton to the maximum extent possible without enlarging our existing commitments under the treaties we already have in the area.
2. Among these existing commitments is a commitment under ANZUS to act if Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore are attacked. However, under certain conditions this could become difficult to distinguish in practical

terms from a commitment to defend Malaysia or Singapore. President Kennedy's caution in interpreting it was well-founded, and the Kennedy-Barwick memorandum is a sound precedent for situations in which a specific threat arises. It appears prudent to continue to avoid flat statements that ANZUS applies to Australian forces in third countries; to insist on prior consultation about such Australian deployments; and to carefully delineate what is to be expected of the United States in each specific situation of a threat to such forces.

3. A threat which might activate our ANZUS commitment to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore is unlikely to develop unless there is a serious deterioration in the region to the north. Probably the most important reassurance we can give Gorton on Malaysia/Singapore, therefore, is a convincing expression of our determination to prevent such a deterioration from occurring.

4. The indication by Mr. Gorton that he may be interested only in a reassurance from the President regarding United States' support in the unlikely contingency of a North Vietnamese or Chinese attack, and his initiative in committing Australia to a forward defense position in advance of his meeting with the President, suggest that he may be content with a broad reassurance from the new administration regarding the firmness of its East Asian policy and approval of the Australian commitment to Malaysia/Singapore, rather than some new, explicit understanding under the ANZUS Treaty. It is difficult to imagine the contingency of a Communist Chinese or North Vietnamese attack on Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore arising except in a situation of general war in East Asia or of a Communist Chinese or North Vietnamese invasion of Thailand. Should this occur, the United States would be, if not already involved in hostilities against the Communist enemies, consulting urgently with Thailand and other SEATO allies under Article IV of the SEATO Treaty to determine what action should be taken. Mr. Gorton's flat statement when posing this question that "if something goes wrong in Thailand, he would commit troops to fight with us to help the Thais" suggests his realization of this fact.

SECRET - EXDIS

14

5. Embassy Canberra confirms that, while Gorton has a particular concern with our backup of his commitment to Malaysia/Singapore, the main thrust of his interest will be in much broader regional terms. The Embassy believes that he will be satisfied, at least for the time being, with general rather than specific assurances.

A response along the following lines should meet what we believe to be Gorton's key concerns:

"We welcome the Australian defense policy decision vis-a-vis Malaysia/Singapore as a responsible, constructive statesmanlike move which will make a valuable contribution to the stability and security of Southeast Asia. We are aware that it represents a historic departure for Australia. Prime Minister Gorton is to be congratulated on his wisdom and initiative. (FYI. At this point, the President might also wish to state that we were heartened by Gorton's assurance recently to our Ambassador in Canberra that Australian forces would fight with ours in support of Thailand if "something should go wrong there." END FYI.)

"We fully understand the interdependence of all elements of security in the region. For our part, we contribute to regional security primarily through our forces deployed elsewhere in the Western Pacific area as a deterrent to Communist expansion. We intend to maintain this deterrent and stand by our commitments in the region.

"At the same time, we continue to be keenly interested in the progress of the Five-Power consultations looking toward consolidation of new defense arrangements for Malaysia/Singapore. We are aware, as Prime Minister Gorton pointed out in his speech, that Australia cannot fully substitute for the British presence, and that a situation could conceivably arise in which the resources of Australia would be insufficient to support successfully the forces of Malaysia and Singapore. We understand that in such a

SECRET - EXDIS

situation, Australia would feel the need to consult allies outside the region, such as Britain and the United States, and decide what to do in the light of circumstances then prevailing. As one of Australia's close allies and a party to the ANZUS Treaty, we would, of course, stand ready to consult fully and promptly. We agree that we cannot now know what these circumstances might be and, therefore, cannot now make precise decisions.

"With respect to the application of the ANZUS Treaty to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore, we recognize that Malaysia and Singapore are within the Treaty Area, that the continuing presence of Australian forces there serves our mutual interests, and that questions concerning our obligations under the Treaty may some day arise. We would want, therefore, to maintain closest consultation with the Australian Government regarding commitments it might make to the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore, and concerning future deployment of Australian forces. Should a threat to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore arise, our two governments would have to consider together very carefully what actions might be expected of the United States under the Treaty. "

In the unlikely event that Prime Minister Gorton presses for a detailed understanding as to how the ANZUS Treaty applies to Australian forces in Malaysia/Singapore, it could be pointed out to him that it is not only unnecessary but in our view undesirable thus to speculate on theoretical applications of the Treaty. An attempt precisely to set forth the circumstances in which the Treaty should apply, and how, might exclude the very contingency which, when it occurs, we might well decide is covered by the Treaty. In words parallel to those of Prime Minister Gorton, himself, (when referring in his defense policy statement to Australia's relationship with Malaysia/Singapore), maintenance of the general understanding represented by the ANZUS Treaty is preferable to and more meaningful than trying to define and delimit specific treaty obligations in hypothetical contingencies.

SECRET - EXDIS

16.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit -- Your Participation

I attach the proposed briefing book for the President, with a covering memorandum from you. The Toast and the final statement are still being reworked by Jim Keogh's people.

For your scheduling purposes, let me note the specific times at which your presence will be requested during the course of the visit:

Tuesday, May 6, 10:30 a.m. - Prime Minister Gorton arrives at the White House. After a private session, the President and he will join a group in the Cabinet Room consisting of yourself and the following persons:

Sir James Plimsoll, Permanent Secretary, Department of External Affairs

C. L. S. Hewitt, Prime Minister's Secretary
Ambassador Waller

Secretary Rogers

Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Richard L. Sneider, NSC Senior Staff Member

Robert Moore, Country Director for Australia/New Zealand

Tuesday, May 6, 8:00 p.m. - White tie dinner at the White House.

Wednesday, May 7, 12:00 noon - Gorton will pay a farewell call on the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL

April 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit

Early last week, I reviewed the preparations for the May 6-7 Gorton visit with the Department officials concerned. For the most part, all that is required is updating the briefing book.

We agreed on the following additional actions:

1. The Review Group will consider on the week of April 29 a paper on U.S. objectives and interests in Southeast Asia, in response to Gorton's request. This paper will then provide the basis for the President's talk with Gorton on this problem.

2. A memorandum will be sent to the President covering decisions on other key subjects, namely,

(a) The U.S. commitment on ANZUS, including a public formulation;

(b) Defense procurement in Australia;

(c) U.S. policy with respect to Australia's commitment in relation to Malaysia and Singapore.

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Washington, D.C. 20520

*1. Snyder
2. Ret.*

*LG-
check it
with Moore
Info DR
to clear*

April 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Enclosed for your clearance is a cable to Embassy
Canberra setting forth the proposed schedule for the
visit of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia.

William Walsh for
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

*PM
- OK by us.
- will you set times for
appointments and
clear to state?
Havant 4/17*

Enclosure:

As stated.

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*cl. S/S, Andrea
4/18/69 7:00 pm
ama*

APR 21 1969

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA

Info

INFO: RECEPTION CENTER HONOLULU
CINCPAC

STATE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit

1. With Gorton visit to Washington ~~xxx~~ rescheduled for May 6-7, we are working out program with Australian Embassy Washington. For your info and for discussion with GOA as may be necessary, t here follow highlights of program as of now:

A. May 3: Travel from Sydney to San Francisco (via Honolulu) by Qantas. ^{Continue} to Williamsburg by USAF aircraft. Flight numbers and times not yet confirmed.

B. May 4: At Williamsburg

C. May 5:

(1) 2:30 p.m. PM departs Williamsburg by USMC helicopter.

(2) 3:30 p.m. Party arrives Pentagon heliport.

Proceeds to Blair House. (Party will stay at Blair House through night of May 7.)

Drafted by: *[Signature]*
EA/ANZ:R Moore:rlw 4/11/69
Clearances: EA - Mr. Duemling
EA/P - Mr. Kilpatrick

Tel. Ext. 2996
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

[Signature]
EA - Amb. Winthrop G. Brown
Vice President's Off. -
White House -

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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page 2

(3) 8:00 p.m. Ambassador and Lady Waller give black tie dinner in honor of PM and Mrs. Gorton.

D. May 6:

10:45
- 12:30

(1) 10:30 a.m. President receives PM at White House in informal ceremony, following which they hold discussions.

(2) 3:00 p.m. PM meets with Secretary Rogers.

(3) 8:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Nixon give white tie dinner at White House in honor of PM and Mrs. Gorton.

E. May 7

(1) 9:30 a.m. PM makes courtesy call on Vice President.

(2) ^{12:00 noon}
~~10:00~~ a.m. PM makes farewell call on President.

(3) 1:00 p.m. Secretary Rogers gives lunch in honor of PM.

(4) 4:00 p.m. PM meets with Secretary of Defense.

F. May 8:

No plans yet for morning and lunchtime. PM probably will

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page 3

Info:

proceed mid-afternoon from Andrews AFB to San Francisco by USAF
aircraft to pick up Qantas flight for return to Australia via
Honolulu.

END

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Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

Contra Fel

Mr. Moose,

Note shows State has not been called.
Should they be?

Statute

A.

~~Copy~~ for Gordon
file

~~exists~~ Chapin } FYI
✓ Winchester }

Johnson file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/1/69

To: R. Moose

From: HAK's office

Sneider was informed of this while in our office (he said this has already been announced). We have not called State.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
5	memo ATTCH	KISSINGER TO THE PRESIDENT	5-5-69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC FILES

BOX NUMBER

910

FOLDER TITLE

(5)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

May 6, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard ~~Sneider~~

SUBJECT: President's Farewell Meeting with Prime Minister Gorton

I attach (Tab A) a proposed memorandum to the President outlining several of the points which the President may wish to bring up in his farewell meeting with Gorton at noon on Wednesday.

It is particularly important that we get the President's clearance of the formal statement to the press, which would be made available by Ziegler's office at the close of the noon meeting. The attached text was agreed to by Gorton and Secretary Rogers. In addition to the written statement, the President would say a few words to the press; suggested language is in his briefing book and is also attached to the memorandum to him.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A, and seek his approval of the language of the written statement to the press, before his noon meeting with Gorton.

Attachment

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Your Farewell Meeting with Prime Minister Gorton

Your second business meeting with Prime Minister Gorton will take place at noon on Wednesday. Gorton will wish to discuss with you the attached proposed press statement (Tab A). This statement has been sought by Gorton to reaffirm our ANZUS commitment and agreed to ad referendum by Secretary Rogers. It would be passed out to the press, if you concur in its text. In addition, we assume you may wish to say a few words to the press when you come out of the meeting with Gorton. Suggested language is attached (Tab B).

At the meeting between Gorton and Rogers on Tuesday afternoon, the following were discussed:

- The text of the proposed press statement.
- Agreement to hold the next ANZUS meeting in Canberra in the first week of August.
- The NPT.

Gorton also raised again the desirability of naming an American Ambassador to Canberra, the question of Mirage spare parts, and the idea of a non-aggression pact in Southeast Asia. There is no indication that he will raise any of these topics again with you on Wednesday morning.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the issuance of the statement to the press at Tab A.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Change language as noted _____

I will discuss with Gorton _____

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
May 6-7, 1969

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

It has been a great pleasure to welcome Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton to Washington. Mrs. Gorton is of course returning to the land of her birth, so we always have a special greeting for her. Prime Minister Gorton is no stranger to our shores either, and he has come as the Head of Government of one of our closest friends and allies in the world. We will always be delighted to see them both.

This visit has been most useful for me and, I think, for other officers of this government. It has given us a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding statesman with whom we expect to be working very closely in the future.

Australia is a member of ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our strategy and position in Southeast Asia. As between us, ANZUS, with its provision for mutual aid in developing our individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, and its declaration that "no potential aggressor should be under the illusion that any of them (Australia, New Zealand or the United States)

stand alone in the Pacific area," is of great importance to both our countries. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those of other free world nations to help South Viet-Nam preserve its independence.

Australian forces are stationed in Malaysia and Singapore as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, and Prime Minister Gorton has recently announced that these forces will remain after the British forces withdraw in 1971, to continue making their important contribution to the security of that area. This is a historic and far-seeing decision, and needless to say, it has our full understanding and the decision has our support.

Australia is also making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and economic development in its part of the world. It participates whole-heartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and many other regional activities. In percentage of national income devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world. This is a record of which any nation can be proud. All things considered, I think Australia and the United States can both be proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security and progress of the Pacific region

to which we both belong. That partnership and that contribution will continue.

These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a whole range of subjects, including of course Viet-Nam and regional security generally, but including also a number of topics outside the security field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems than we are, and Prime Minister Gorton has been in office a year longer than I have, so I have very much appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with him. I have obtained a number of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.

This visit has been both profitable and enjoyable for us. I hope that you can say the same, Mr. Prime Minister and that you and your charming wife will come and see us again.

Suggestions for Remarks at the Departure of
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia

This visit has been enormously useful for me and for this government. It has given us all a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding statesman from a land that has been aptly described by one of its poets as "the land of reliance and never-give-in and help-your-mate."

The spirit of "help-your-mate" is deeply involved in the cooperation between our countries. I might point out that our space program has six tracking stations in Australia. And Australia is a member of ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our policy in Southeast Asia. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those of other free world nations in Vietnam even as they fought beside us in World War I, World War II, and in Korea.

While Australia has been called "a prophecy still to be fulfilled," it is making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and economic development in its part of the world. It participates wholeheartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and many other regional activities. In percentage of national income devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world, a record of which any nation can be proud. Australia and America can both be proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security and progress of the Pacific region. That partnership and that contribution will continue.

These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a wide range of subjects, including, not only Vietnam and regional security questions, but also a number of topics outside the security field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems than we are, so I have very much appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with its Prime Minister. I have obtained a number of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.

Now you return to your homeland -- exchanging the beauties of a Washington spring for the beauties of an Australian autumn -- without even going through a hot summer.

An Australian writer has said that the flame of freedom will never die in Australia because it is fanned by "a wind blowing out of the far country." That wind is the democratic spirit of our forefathers which is the product of the old frontier in both Australia and America.

At a time when democratic ideals are under attack all over the world, all free nations can turn to Australia as they have often turned to America, and they can be grateful that the winds of freedom are still blowing "out of that far country."

#####

Gorton 21 u

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON,
M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA & MRS. GORTON

Meeting with President Nixon
Wednesday, May 7, 1969, 12:00 Noon

The White House

PARTICIPANTS

Members of the Australian Party

The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia

His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.
Ambassador of Australia

Mr. C. L. S. Hewitt
Secretary, Prime Minister's Department

Sir James Plimsoll, C.B.E.
Secretary, Department of External Affairs

Mr. A. T. Griffith
Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
Prime Minister's Department

Mr. Anthony Eggleton
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

Members of the American Party

The Honorable Emil Mosbacher, Jr.
Chief of Protocol of the United States

Mr. Robert W. Moore
Country Director for Australia, New Zealand and
Pacific Islands Affairs
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Samuel L. King
Deputy Chief of Protocol of the United States

Mr. David J. Waters
Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Saed Khan
Protocol Officer
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, M.P.,
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND MRS. GORTON

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ARRIVAL AT THE WHITE HOUSE
TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1969

The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P., Prime Minister of Australia, and Mrs. Gorton will arrive at the White House by car from Blair House at 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, May 6, 1969. They will be accompanied by the Honorable Emil Mosbacher, Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United States, and Mrs. Mosbacher.

Suggested Car Seating Arrangements from Blair House to the White House:

Car No. 1 - Prime Minister Gorton Mrs. Gorton Ambassador Mosbacher Mrs. Mosbacher	Mr. Bennington Inspector George
Car No. 2 - Ambassador Waller Lady Waller	Mr. Khan
Car No. 3 - Mr. Hewitt Sir James Plimsoll	

Arrival at the White House

At 10:25 a.m. President and Mrs. Nixon will walk to the Diplomatic Reception Room to await the arrival of Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton.

At 10:30 a.m., Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their party will enter the Southwest Gate of the White House. The car carrying Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will stop at the Diplomatic Entrance where Ambassador Mosbacher will present Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton to President and Mrs. Nixon. Then the Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, will be introduced. Mr. Samuel L. King, Deputy Chief of Protocol, will present the members of the Australian Party to President and Mrs. Nixon and Secretary Rogers. Photographs will be taken. (No military honors will be rendered. There will be no public statements.)

Following the photographs, President Nixon and Prime Minister Gorton will walk to the President's Office. Ambassador Waller, Mr. Hewitt and Sir James Plimsoll will follow and be seated in the Cabinet Room. Secretary Rogers, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Sneider and Mr. Moore will also be present in the Cabinet Room. Following the conference, President Nixon and Prime Minister Gorton may wish to include the other members in further discussions.

At the

0910/05/003

At the conclusion of the discussion, President Nixon will escort Prime Minister Gorton to his car by way of the path leading from the President's Office to the driveway. (In the event of inclement weather, the Prime Minister may depart by way of the Diplomatic Reception Room.) Prime Minister Gorton, accompanied by Ambassador Mosbacher, will return to Blair House.

Following the photographs, Mrs. Nixon will escort Mrs. Gorton and the other ladies to the Yellow Oval Room in the residence apartments. Coffee will be served.

Mrs. Gorton, accompanied by Mrs. Mosbacher, will depart from the White House and return to Blair House.

Mr. Bannington
Inspector George

Car No. 1 - Prime Minister Gorton
Mrs. Gorton
Ambassador Mosbacher
Mrs. Mosbacher

Mr. Khan

Car No. 2 - Ambassador Waller
Lady Waller

Car No. 3 - Mr. Hewitt
Sir James Pinnock

Arrival at the White House

At 10:15 a.m. President and Mrs. Nixon will walk to the Diplomatic Reception Room to await the arrival of Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton.

At 10:30 a.m. Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their party will enter the Southwest Gate of the White House. The car carrying Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton will stop at the Diplomatic Entrance where Ambassador Mosbacher will greet Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton to President and Mrs. Nixon. Then the Honorable William Rogers, Secretary of State, will be introduced. Mr. Samuel L. King, Deputy Chief of Protocol, will present the members of the Australian party to President and Mrs. Nixon and Secretary Rogers. Photographs will be taken. (No military honors will be rendered. There will be no public statements.)

Following the photographs, President Nixon and Prime Minister Gorton will walk to the President's Office. Ambassador Waller, Mr. Hewitt and Sir James Pinnock will follow and be seated in the Cabinet Room. Secretary Rogers, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Schneider and Mr. Moore will also be present in the Cabinet Room. Following the conference, President Nixon and Prime Minister Gorton may wish to include the other members in further discussions.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

May 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit: F-111 Aircraft Procurement for Australia

Background: Prime Minister Gorton may raise with you Australian concerns about the F-111 aircraft. In 1963, Australia agreed to purchase 24 F-111A aircraft at a program cost of \$125 million. Since then the cost of the total package has risen to \$240 million and may go up further.

The Australians have been continuously concerned about the rising cost of the F-111s. However, their present anxiety arises from reports that we may be writing off the F-111 program for the US Air Force due to technical problems and cutbacks in the number of aircraft purchased for the US Air Force. Gorton would probably prefer to cancel the contract, if this could be done without serious embarrassment. However, he is probably prepared to continue with the purchase of the F-111s providing he is assured the US Government does not consider the plane obsolete for its own purposes, technological problems in the wing configuration have been worked out, and there will be a sufficient production run to assure availability of spare parts. The Royal Australian Air Force has recently completed a special study raising these problems.

Gorton discussed the F-111 problem with Secretary Laird during his first visit here. At that time he was assured that procurement of the fighter version is being continued for use by the Air Force and that changes are being made to correct difficulties in the wing. He will probably seek reiteration of these assurances, possibly in writing, during his current visit.

Recommended talking points:

1. The US plans to continue the F-111 program and difficulties in the aircraft are being corrected before the F-111 aircraft are delivered to Australia.
2. Secretary Laird will be prepared to discuss the problem in detail with Gorton.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Gorton (May 6 and 7)

1. Prime Minister Gorton will arrive at the White House at 10:30 a.m. Following a brief informal greeting with no welcoming remarks planned, you are scheduled to talk privately with him. When you and he are ready, you and he are scheduled to join a group of senior officials in the Cabinet Room.

2. You will have a further opportunity for conversation during your white tie dinner on Tuesday evening, May 6. (Points for Toast at Tab A.)

3. Gorton will make a brief call on you again on Wednesday at 12:00 noon, after which there will be brief statements by you and Gorton to the press. (A draft press statement is at Tab B.)

4. Talking points on issues likely to arise in the talks and personal background on Gorton are at Tab C.

5. Gorton's view of the Eisenhower funeral talks: Gorton came away from his initial talk with you after General Eisenhower's funeral very favorably impressed. When he returned to Australia, he is reported to have said "I like the guy". He feels that his initial talk with you just touched the surface of the key issues and largely disposed of the trivia. Gorton now wants to get down to the vitals. (Your first conversation with Gorton is attached at Tab D.)

6. Gorton's main purposes in his talks with you will be

- to consolidate a personal relationship with you which will both enhance continued consultation and earn him political credit at home for his forthcoming general elections.

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- to test the firmness of U.S. Asian commitments under your Administration, since he believes strongly that without U.S. support Australia cannot carry out on its resources alone its commitments to Malaysia/Singapore and to regional defense of Southeast Asia.
- to question you, in greater depth, on U.S. interests and objectives in Southeast Asia (you told Gorton that the NSC would review this problem before he came here and the NSC Review Group is considering on May 2 a paper (Tab E) as a basis for your s from discussions with Gorton).
- to probe your thinking on Vietnam including U.S. planning for unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces, and post-Vietnam war prospects in Asia.

7. In preparing for the visit Gorton made a calculated decision that he should announce first his forward defense policy and Australia's commitment to maintain military forces in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdraw in 1971. (He sent a copy of his February 25 speech to you in London, and you sent him a congratulatory message.) Now he wants to make sure that he has not overextended his country's limited defense resources.

8. Your main purposes in these talks will be

- to reciprocate Gorton's desire for a personal relationship and establish a basis for continuing two-way consultation between the two governments.
- to reassure Gorton that we are prepared to maintain our Asian commitments, particularly ANZUS and SEATO, pointing up that in fact Australia's contribution to regional defense makes it easier for us to maintain our commitments in Asia.