



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 03,

USIA 12, RSR 01, /078 W

----- 003447

R 220647Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3704

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CANBERRA 2196

SUBJECT: GORTON PARTY

COMPOSITION OF GORTON PARTY, NOT YET MADE PUBLIC, IS SAME AS
EMBASSY REPORTED FOR EARLIER VISIT:

- PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. GORTON
- MISS J. LESTER, MRS. GORTON'S PERSONAL SECRETARY
- ANTHONY (TONY) EGGLETON, PM'S PRESS SECRETARY
- MISS AINSLIE GOTTO, PM'S PRIVATE SECRETARY
- SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL
- C. L. (LEN) HEWITT
- A. T. GRIFFITH, ASST. SECY. PM'S DEPT.

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, UPW 01, RSR 01, IO 13, AID 28, /123 W

 024076

R 030700Z APR 69
 FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3628
 INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
 CINCPAC

UNCLAS CANBERRA 1863

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: PM GORTON'S WASHINGTON VISIT - PRESS REACTION

1. SUMMARY. TODAY'S PRESS REACTION TO PM GORTON'S WASHINGTON VISIT AND TALKS WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND OTHERS HAS BEEN UNIVERSALLY WARM WITH EMPHASIS GIVEN TO LENGTH OF TIME ACCORDED PM BY PRESIDENT ("ONE MINUTE MORE THAN DEGAULLE"), CORDIAL NATURE OF MEETINGS, AND SPECULATION TO EFFECT GORTON SATISFIED THERE WILL BE NO RADICAL CHANGES IN US POLICY AND COMMITMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA POST-VIETNAM. END SUMMARY.

2. ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS TODAY GAVE EXTENSIVE FRONT OR INSIDE PAGE COVERAGE TO PM'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARIES OF STATE, DEFENSE, AND TREASURY, AND WITH DR. KISSINGER. HEADLINE THEMES VARIED BUT ALL FAVORABLE, E.G.: AUSTRALIA: "U.S. MAKES IT CLEAR THEY WILL STAY IN EMIA;" SYDNEY DAILY TELEGRAPH: "GORTON ELATED OVER U.S. TALKS". MELBOURNE AGE: "GORTON SCORES HIGH MARKS FROM NIXON;" FINANCIAL REVIEW: "GORTON CONVINCED U.S. WILL NOT ABANDON S.E. ASIA;" MELBOURNE SUN: "GORTON AGREES WITH NIXON ON VIET;" SYDNEY MORNING HERALD: "GORTON'S 51 MINUTES, NIXON REVIEWS VIETNAM TALKS." MOST COVERAGE GAVE PARTICULAR PROMINENCE TO FACT GORTON APPARENTLY ALLOTTED

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MORE TIME THAN BY OTHER HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, AND THAT STRETCHING-OUT OF CALL ON PRESIDENT WAS AT LATTER'S INITIATIVE. ALL PAPERS ALSO REPORTED, USUALLY IN FAVORABLE CONTEXT, GORTON'S REMARK TO WASHINGTON PRESS, "I LIKE THE GUY" (NIXON), AND SIMILAR COMMENT ON CABINET OFFICERS. ONLY DISSENTING NOTE WAS ROY MCCARTNEY'S COLUMN FROM WASHINGTON IN MELBOURNE AGE WHICH COMPARED, WITH SOME CONCERN, THESE REMARKS WITH FORMER PM HOLT'S "ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ" STATEMENT OF SEVERAL YEARS AGO.

3. ALMOST ALL PAPERS GAVE PARTICULAR PRIMINENCE TO ASSURANCE ON US POLICY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE TO GORTON. TYPICAL WAS FINANCIAL REVIEW STORY: "PM GORTON LEFT WHITE HOUSE...CONVINCED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN US POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THAT AMERICAN HAVE NO INTENTION OF ABAN-DONING REGION AFTER VIETNAM WAR...PRIME MINISTERIAL PARTY GOT STRONG IMPRESSION NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S ATTITUDE ON ISSUES VITALLY AFFECTING AUSTRALIA WAS CERTAINLY AT LEAST AS COOPERATIVE AND FAVORABLE AS THAT OF ITS PREDECESSOR..."

4. REPORTAGE IS SOMEWHAT CONFUSED AS WHAT WAS DIS-CUSSED WITH WHOM IN WASHINGTON, BUT THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON AND ACCLAIM FOR FACT THAT NOT ONLY VIETNAM, MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE, AND US POLICY IN ASIA, BUT ALSO NPT, F-111, MILITARY PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA, TRADE, AND APPOINTMENT OF NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WERE ALL AT LEAST TOUCHED UPON. PRESS WELCOMED SETTING OF FURTHER TALKS FOR EARLY MAY AND CLAIMS SECRETARY ROGERS WILL NAME NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT THAT TIME. SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS ALSO WELCOMED REPORTED GORTON AGREEMENT MEET SENATOR FULBRIGHT IN MAY AS MEANS OF OBTAINING "DEVIL'S ADVOCATE'S" VIEWS. MOST STORIES GAVE EMPHASIS TO FACT GORTON LEFT WASHINGTON FEELING HE WAS "IN THE PICTURE ON VIETNAM" AND WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT ON IMPORTANCE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS. SAME STORIES ALSO REPORTED PRESIDENT AND OTHERS EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR AUSTRALIAN DECISION RETAIN FORCES IN MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE AFTER 1971. THESE STORIES CLAIMED NO NEW US COMMITMENTS RELATIVE TO THAT AREA

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WERE SOUGHT OR RECEIVED.

5. ONLY EDITORIAL THUS FAR WAS IN SYDNEY DAILY TELE-
EGRAPH WHICH SAID, IN PART: "MR. GORTON CLICKS WITH
MR. NIXON - GORTON'S LONG AND IMPORTANT INTERVIEW WITH
PRESIDENT NIXON WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE THAN MIGHT HAVE
BEEN EXPECTED IN CIRCUMSTANCES." IN SHORT, THIS WAS

GENERAL REACTION OF AUSTRALIAN PRESS, WHO, BY AND LARGE,
EXPRESSED PRIDE AND PLEASURE OVER MANNER IN WHICH
PM RECEIVED IN
WASHINGTON. CROOK
BT

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PAGE 01 STATE 064802

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ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, /068 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ RWMOORE
APPROVED BY: EA/ANZ ROBERT W MOORE
EA MR. DUEMLING
S/S MR. PARKER

----- 033047

R 252317Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 064802

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT DATED APRIL 17 TO PRIME MINISTER GORTON QTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR KINDNESS AND YOUR COURTESY IN COMING TO WASHINGTON TO ATTEND THE FUNERAL SERVICES FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER.

YOUR PRESENCE ON THIS SAD OCCASION PROVIDED A VERY MEANINGFUL SYMBOL OF THE FRIENDSHIP CHARACTERISTIC OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. I REGRET THAT YOUR OFFICIAL VISIT HAD TO BE POSTPONED, BUT I GREATLY ENJOYED MEETING YOU AND I FEEL THAT OUR CONVERSATION WAS VALUABLE IN OPENING UP SUBJECTS WHICH WE CAN EXPLORE IN GREATER DEPTH WHEN YOU RETURN IN MAY. MRS. NIXON AND I ARE LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING YOU AND MRS. GORTON AT THAT TIME.

WITH VERY GOOD WISH, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON UNQUOTE

2. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO PUBLISH TEXT BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY RECIPIENT.

3. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY AIR POUCH.

4. DECONTROL ON RECEIPT. ROGERS

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ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 03,
USIA 12, /077 R

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DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ:RWMOORE
APPROVED BY: EA/ANZ - ROBERT W. MOORE
EA/P- MR. KILPATRICK
H- MISS FOLGER
S/CPR- MR. KING
S/S - MR. BROWN
EA- MR. DUEMLING

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R 251741Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
HONOLULU RECEPTION CENTER
INFO CINCPAC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 064353

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT

REF: STATE 60783

1. ADDITIONS AND CHANGES TO GORTON PROGRAM AS SET FORTH REFTEL FOLLOW:

A. MAY 1:

- (1) 7:55 A.M. ARRIVE HONOLULU, QANTAS FLIGHT 596.
(PROTOCOL ATTENTION SHOULD BE LOW KEY, SIMILAR TO THAT EXTENDED WHEN GORTON TRANSITED HONOLULU ON PREVIOUS TRIP.)
- (2) 9:00 A.M. DEPART HONOLULU, SAME FLIGHT.
- (3) 4:50 P.M. ARRIVE SAN FRANCISCO.
- (4) 5:20 P.M. DEPART SAN FRANCISCO ON USAF SPECIAL FLIGHT FOR LANGLEY AFB.

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B. MAY 2-4: AT WILLIAMSBURG, PRIVATELY.

C. MAY 5:

(1) 2:30 P.M. DEPART WILLIAMSBURG BY USMC HELICOPTER.
(2) 3:30 P.M. ARRIVE PENTAGON HELIPORT, PROCEED TO
BLAIR HOUSE. (PARTY WILL REMAIN AT BLAIR HOUSE NIGHTS OF
MAY 5, 6 AND 7.)

(3) 8:00 P.M. BLACK TIE DINNER HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR
AND LADY WALLER.

D. MAY 6: UNCHANGED.

E. MAY 7: UNCHANGED.

F. MAY 8:

(1) 1:00 P.M. SENATOR FULBRIGHT WILL HOST LUNCHEON
WITH SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN GORTON'S HONOR.
(2) 4:00 P.M. DEPART ANDREWS AFB, USAF SPECIAL FLIGHT.
(3) 6:30 P.M. ARRIVE SAN FRANCISCO.
(4) 9:00 P.M. DEPART SAN FRANCISCO, QANTAS FLIGHT 597.
(5) 11:00 P.M. ARRIVE HONOLULU. (MINIMUM PROTOCOL.)

G. MAY 9: DEPART HONOLULU FOR SYDNEY QANTAS FLIGHT 597,
AT 1:00 A.M.

2. SEPARATE PROGRAM FOR MRS. GORTON INCLUDES (A) TOURS OF
L'ENFANT PLAZA AND DUMBARTON OAKS ON MAY 6 AND 7, RESPECTIVELY;
(B) LUNCHEON HOSTED BY MRS. ROGERS MAY 7; (C) LUNCHEON HOSTED
BY LADY WALLER MAY 8; (D) MEETING WITH NEWSWOMEN MAY 6.
ROGERS:

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ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, D 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 03,
USIA 12, CU 04, DODE 00, /081 R

DRAFTED BY EA/ANZ RWMOORE
APPROVED BY EA AMB WINTHROP BROWN
EA MR DUEMLING
EA/P MR KILPATRICK
WHITE HOUSE MR SNEIDER
S/CPR MR KING
S/S MR PARKER
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R 190132Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
INFO RECEPTION CENTER HONOLULU
CINCPAC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 060783

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT

- 1. WITH GORTON VISIT TO WASHINGTON RESCHEDULED FOR MAY 6-7, WE ARE WORKING OUT PROGRAM WITH AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON. FOR YOUR INFO AND FOR DISCUSSION WITH GOA AS MAY BE NECESSARY, THERE FOLLOW HIGHLIGHTS OF PROGRAM AS OF NOW:
- A. MAY 3: TRAVEL FROM SYDNEY TO SAN FRANCISCO (VIA HONOLULU) BY QANTAS. CONTINUE TO WILLIAMSBURG BY USAF AIRCRAFT. FLIGHT NUMBERS AND TIMES NOT YET CONFIRMED.
- B. MAY 4: AT WILLIAMSBURG
- C. MAY 5:

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- (1) 2:30 P.M. PM DEPARTS WILLIAMSBURG BY USMC HELICOPTER.
- (2) 3:30 P.M. PARTY ARRIVES PENTAGON HELIPORT. PROCEEDS TO BLAIR HOUSE. (PARTY WILL STAY AT BLAIR HOUSE THROUGH NIGHT OF MAY 7.)
- (3) 8:00 P.M. AMBASSADOR AND LADY WALLER GIVE BLACK TIE DINNER IN HONOR OF PM AND MRS. GORTON.

D. MAY 6:

- (1) 10:30 A.M. PRESIDENT RECEIVES PM AT WHITE HOUSE IN INFORMAL CEREMONY, FOLLOWING WHICH THEY HOLD DISCUSSIONS.
- (2) 3:00 P.M. PM MEETS WITH SECRETARY ROGERS.
- (3) 8:00 P.M. PRESIDENT AND MRS. NIXON GIVE WHITE TIE DINNER AT WHITE HOUSE IN HONOR OF PM AND MRS. GORTON.

E. MAY 7:

- (1) 12:00 NOON PM MAKES FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT.
- (2) 1:00 P.M. SECRETARY ROGERS GIVES LUNCH IN HONOR OF PM.
- (3) 4:00 P.M. PM MEETS WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

F. MAY 8:

NO PLANS YET FOR MORNING AND LUNCHTIME. PM PROBABLY WILL PROCEED MID-AFTERNOON FROM ANDREW AFB TO SAN FRANCISCO BY USAF AIRCRAFT TO PICK UP QANTAS FLIGHT FOR RETURN TO AUSTRALIA VIA HONOLULU. ROGERS.

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TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN SS 30

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DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ:RWMOORE
APPROVED BY: EA:WINTHROP G. BROWN
EA:AMB. GODLEY
WHITE HOUSE. MR. KISSINGER
J/PM:MR. WOLF
S/S:MR. BROWN
DOD/ISA:MISS TRUEX
S/S-O:L. KILDAY
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R 090222Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
INFO CINCPAC

SECRET STATE 053891

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT

1. GORTON VISIT RESCHEDULED FOR MAY 6-7. MEANTIME HE HAD TALKS WITH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARIES OF STATE, DEFENSE AND TREASURY WHILE HERE FOR EISENHOWER FUNERAL. HE SAID HE REGARDED THESE MEETINGS AS MEANS OF INTRODUCING TOPICS WHICH COULD THEN BE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH IN MAY.

2. PRINCIPAL TOPICS GORTON OPENED WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. WHAT WILL BE EXTENT OF U.S. INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA GENERALLY AND MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE SPECIFICALLY AFTER WAR ENDS IN VIET-NAM, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SUPPORT AUSTRALIA MIGHT EXPECT IF HER FORCES BECAME INVOLVED IN SITUATIONS BEYOND HER CAPACITY TO HANDLE. HE RAISED THIS (THOUGH ONLY IN BROADEST TERMS) WITH PRESIDENT, SECRETARY ROGERS AND SEC.

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PAGE 02 STATE 053891

RETARY LAIRD. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE CHIEF TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION IN MAY.

B. PROJECT 949. GORTON'S CHIEF CONCERN WAS TO SECURE AGREEMENT FOR EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROJECT. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED (SEE STATE 50737).

C. MEAT INSPECTION. GORTON ASKED BOTH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ROGERS TO LOOK INTO POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING MAY 1 DEADLINE FOR CERTAIN NEW USDA INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN MEAT DESTINED FOR U.S. MARKET (STATE 47681). (GORTON'S REQUEST UNDER ACTIVE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CONSIDERATION.)

D. SABAH DISPUTE. GORTON TOOK PAINS TO INFORM PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ROGERS OF AUSTRALIA'S DESIRE AND INTENTION TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN THIS DISPUTE, HER WISH NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THE PHILIPPINES, AND HER CONVICTION THAT U.S. INFLUENCE WILL EFFECTIVELY PREVENT AN OVERT FILIPINO ATTACK ON MALAYSIA.

E. VIET-NAM. GORTON SOUGHT STATEMENT OF U.S. STRATEGY IN SEEKING SETTLEMENT. HE SAID AUSTRALIA WISHES TO SEE PEACE IN VIETNAM BUT NOT AT COST OF "LAOTIAN SOLUTION" WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "DISGUISED SELLOUT." HE FLOATED FOR CONSIDERATION IDEA THAT INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED ELECTION IN SVN MIGHT BE USEFUL DEVICE TO ASSURE SVN PEOPLE DEMONSTRABLY FREE OPPORTUNITY TO SELECT GOVERNMENT OF OWN CHOICE, WHICH GOA REGARDS AS MAIN OBJECTIVE OF ITS AND OUR EFFORT IN VIET-NAM.

F. MALAYSIAN AIRCRAFT PURCHASES. PM SAID GOA SEEKING TO DISUADE GOM FROM PURCHASE OF SOPHISTICATED JET FIGHTERS BY OFFERING TO SUPPLY MALAYSIAN AIR FORCE WITH SABRES (NUMBERS AND TERMS UNSPECIFIED).

G. NPT. GORTON SUGGESTED TO SECRETARY ROGERS (AND SECRETARY AGREED) THAT THEY DISCUSS THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC IN MAY.

H. INDIAN OCEAN BASES. IN EFFECT, GORTON INVITED U.S. (SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE) TO ESTABLISH NAVAL BASE FACILITIES AT PERTH IF WE NEEDED BASES IN INDIAN OCEAN AREA, RATHER THAN ON SMALL, REMOTE ISLAND SUCH AS DIEGO GARCIA LACKING PERTH'S SUPPORT FACILITIES.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 053891

I. DEFENSE PROCUREMENT. GORTON STRESSED TO SECRETARY LAIRD AUSTRALIA'S STRONG DESIRE TO RECEIVE MORE DOD PURCHASE CONTRACTS, PARTICULARLY FOR MANUFACTURED COMPONENTS. DISCUSSION WAS INCONCLUSIVE AND WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE IN MAY.

J. SINGAPORE NAVAL FACILITY. GORTON EXPRESSED HOPE THAT U.S. WOULD DECIDE FAVORABLY ON PROPOSAL FOR JOINT USE OF THIS FACILITY. SECRETARY LAIRD REPLIED THAT FEASIBILITY STUDY NOW UNDERWAY; WE FAVOR IDEA IN GENERAL AND NO PROBLEMS FORESEEN.

3. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH USG LEADERS, GORTON WAS CONSISTENTLY AFFABLE, EVEN AGGRESSIVELY CHARMING AT TIMES. HE WAS PERSISTENT IN REITERATING THOSE IDEAS AND REAS HE PARTICULARLY DESIRED TO PUT ACROSS, BUT HIS DEMEANOR WAS GENERALLY MODEST TO THE POINT OF DIFFIDENCE.

4. DETAILED MEMCONS FOLLOW. REQUEST FOREGOING BE HANDLED WITH PARTICULAR CARE AS SECRET/EXDIS. ROGERS

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ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04,

USIA 12, /078 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ: RMOORE

APPROVED BY: S/S: JPWALSH

EA: MR DUEMPLING

J: MR DILLON

EA/P:

S/CPR: MR KING

S/S: RM WALSH

WH: MR KISSINGER

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R 080039Z FEB 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 020598

REF CANBERRA 726 AUSTRALIA

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT

1. PLS INFORM PRIMIN GORTON THAT PRESIDENT WILL BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE HIM FOR PRIVATE VISIT MARCH 31, IF THAT DATE CONVENIENT FOR GORTON. WE WILL PROPOSE DETAILED SCHEDULE OF MEETING AND SOCIAL EVENTS LATER.

2. PRIVATE VISIT, WHICH IS CONFINED TO ONE DAY AND IS LARGELY FREE OF PROTOCOL FORMALITIES, IS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO CONSERVE PRESIDENT'S TIME AND ON ASSUMPTION (BASED ON GORTON'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT AND INDICATIONS RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIAN EMB HERE) THAT ESSENTIALLY WORKING VISIT WILL SATISFY GORTON. PRIVATE VISIT PRECLUDES NEITHER INFORMAL WHITE HOUSE SOCIAL FUNCTION NOR PUBLICITY, OF COURSE.

3. UPON RECEIPT GORTON'S ACCEPTANCE WE WILL WISH WORK OUT JOINT UNDERSTANDING WITH GOA RE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF VISIT. ROGERS

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ORIGIN ARA 16

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USIA 12, /078 R

*1 - Haydel, FYE
2 - [Signature]*

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DRAFTED BY: ARA: NC: GFJONES
APPROVED BY: ARA: NC: MR. HILL
ARA- JOHN J. YOULE
S/S- MR. BROWN
WH- MR. FARELL (SUBS)

032838

R 260042Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CARACAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 064964

SUBJECT: GOV INTEREST IN WHITE HOUSE PUBLIC TOURS

REF: CARACAS 1787 AND 1887.

APPROPRIATE WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS UNAVAILABLE MAY 1 AND 2.
JOHN DAVIES, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, HAS GRANTED
TENTATIVE APPOINTMENT TO GUILLERMO BETANCOURT FOR 2:30
PM MONDAY MAY 5. CHARLES WALL, RESIDENT DIRECTOR MT. VERNON,
HAS SCHEDULED APPOINTMENT FOR 10:00 AM SAME DAY. APPOINTMENTS
WITH NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CAN ALSO BE ARRANGED IF BETANCOURT
WISHES DISCUSS MANAGEMENT OF OTHER PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND
MONUMENTS. ADVISE WHETHER THESE ARRANGEMENTS SATISFACTORY.
APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION EMBASSY CAN DEVELOP WITH
REGARD TO TYPE OF INFORMATION ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO WHITE HOUSE
BETANCOURT WILL BE SEEKING. ROGERS

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Carole Ferrar

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 695

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ACTION ARA 16

INFO OCT 01, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20,

SY 03, USIA 12, RSR 01, /080 W

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R 291506Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6687

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CARACAS 2005

REF: STATE 64964

(Boerner President)

GUILLERMO BETANCOURT WILL ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON MAY 3 OR 4 TO KEEP APPOINTMENTS MAY 5 WITH CHARLES WALL AT MOUNT VERNON AND JOHN DAVIES AT WHITE HOUSE. HE IS REQUESTING VENEZUELAN EMBASSY TO MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS AND TO INFORM VENEZUELAN DESK OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS. IN ADDITION TO INFORMATION FORWARDED, BETANCOURT IS INTERESTED IN SECURITY ASPECTS WHITE HOUSE PUBLIC TOURS PROGRAM, ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES RELATED TO TOURS. HE IS ALSO INTERESTED IN OVER-ALL PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES OF WHITE HOUSE. BETANCOURT WILL BE IN WASHINGTON UNTIL MAY 7. HE HAS OPEN MIND AS TO OTHER ASPECTS OF PROGRAM.

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ORIGIN SY 03

INFO OCT 01, EA 10, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, DPR 02, P 04, RSC 01,
SS 20, USIA 12, /073 R

66612
DRAFTED BY: SY/PRS: BMBENNINGTON
APPROVED BY: KEITH O LYNCH CHIEF DIV OF PROTECTIVE SECURITY
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: ORIGIN SY/RRS

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R 281551Z APR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO CHIEF DAN LIU CHIEF OF POLICE HONOLULU POLICE
DEPARTMENT HONOLULU HAWAI

UNCLAS STATE 065425

1. PRIME MINISTER JOHN G. GORTON OF AUSTRALIA AND PARTY ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT, WILL BE ABOARD QANTAS 596 ARRIVING HONOLULU AT 7:55 A.M. MAY 1, 1969 AND CONTINUING TO SAN FRANCISCO AT 9:00 AM.
2. PRIME MINISTER AND PARTY WILL BE RETURNING THROUGH HONOLULU THURSDAY, MAY 8, 11:00 P.M. ABOARD QANTAS 597.
3. IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF YOU WOULD ASSIGN OFFICERS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE PRIME MINISTER DURING THESE STOPS.

KEITH O. LYNCH
CHIEF, DIVISION OF PROTECTIVE SECURITY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Kenya
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CONFIDENTIAL 659

PAGE 01 NAIROB 01902 301619Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

057257

P 301500Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8063

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 1902

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: MOI'S VISIT TO US

1. WHILE I AM FULLY COGNIZANT OF THE VERY HEAVY AND CONTINUOUS DEMANDS PLACED ON THE PRESIDENT AND THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF HIS RECEIVING THE MANY VISITORS WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM, AND WHILE I HAVE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH VP MOI ON HIS US TRIP MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A CALL ON THE PRESIDENT, I MUST REPORT CANDIDLY THAT KENYAN OFFICIALS - FROM PRESIDENT KENYATTA ON DOWN - ARE COUNTING HEAVILY ON MOI'S SEEING PRESIDENT NIXON. IF THIS DOES NOT OCCUR - DESPITE MY EXPLANATIONS TO MOI PERSONALLY NAD TO OTHERS RE THE PROBLEMS IN SCHEDULING SUCH MEETINGS - KENYAN LEADERS WILL CONSIDER VISIT LESS THAN A SUCCESS. RELATIONS WITH THE EMBASSY AT LEAST FOR TIME, COULD WELL BE LESS WARM THAN THEY ARE AT PRESENT. MOREOVER, ATMOSPHERE MIGHT BE MORE STRAICYD AT TIME NEW AMBASSADOR ARRIVS.

2. VP MOI HIMSELF HAS NEVER PRESSED ME PERSONALLY ON NEED FOR HIM TO SEE PRESIDENT, AND HE HAS ALWAYS INDICATED UNDERSTANDING OF POSITION I HAVE PRESENTED TO HIM. IN PAST TWO DAYS, HOWEVER, ATT. GEN. NJONJO, MINSTATE FOR FORNAFFS KOINANGE, PERMSEC MFA KYALO AND PERMSEC OFFICE OF PRESIDENT KARIITHI HAVE INQUIRED OF ME AS TO WHETHER MOI WILL SEE PRESIDENT. AT SAME TIME EACH STATED OPENLY OR INFERRED NONE TOO SUBTLY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 NAIROB 01902 301619Z

THAT GOK EXPECTS MOI TO HAVE SAME RED-CARPET TREATMENT AND RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON AS FORMER VP HUMPHREY HAD HERE. MAIN PURPOSE OF KENYATTA'S LETTER OF INTRODUCTION TO PRESIDENT (NAIROBI'S 18561), WHICH BEING DRAFTED BY NJONJO PRESUMABLY AT KENYATTA'S REQUEST, IS TO ASSURE MOI VISIT WITH PRESIDENT. MOI SAYS HE DID NOT INITIATE LETTER BUT IS DELIGHTED THAT KENYATTA THOUGHT HIGHLY ENOUGH OF HIM TO WANT TO WRITE SUCH LETTER.

3. MFA HAS INFORMED ME THAT MOI IS BEARING GIFTS FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE, AND MRS. MOI FOR MRS. NIXON. WHILE I DO NOT KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC OBJECTS ARE, I WAS TOLD THAT THEY ARE VARIOUS ITEMS OF KENYAN HINDICRAFT. SPECIAL POINT WAS MADE TO ME THAT MOI AND WIFE, WELL AS GOK, WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED IF THEY ARE UNABLE MAKE SUCH PRESENTATIONS PERSONALLY.

4. NJONJO TOOK OCCASION OF HIS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO SAY HE STILL SMARTING FROM LACK OF HIGH-LEVEL TREATMENT WHICH HE AND MINAG BRUCE MCKENZIE RECEIVED ON THEIR VISIT TO US IN MAY 1968 (I.E. THEY NOT RECEIVED BY FORMER VP HUMPHREY IN SPITE THEIR EFFORTS TO SEE HIM) SHORTLY AFTER GOK HAD GONE ALL OUT TO RECEIVE HUMPHREY. BOTH MCKENZIE AND NJONJO HAD MADE THIS SAME POINT PERSONALLY TO AMB. FERGUSON UPON THEIR RETURN FROM TRIP. NJONJO ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED USG TO DO BETTER BY MOI.

(COMMENT: EMBASSY AT TIME EXPLAINED THAT VISITORS, NO MATTER WHO THEY WERE OR HOW MUCH VP HUMPHREY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM, COULD NOT EXPECT TO BE ASSURED OF APPOINTMENT WITH HIGH-LEVEL US OFFICIAL SUCH AS VP VIRTUALLY AT SPUR OF MOMENT. HOWEVER UNJUSTIFIED NJONJO MAY BE, AND IN THIS INSTANCE HE HAD NO JUSTIFICATION WHATSOEVER. HE RETAINS SSTRONG FEELING THAT HE WAS SLIGHTED.)

5. ASSUMING PRESIDENT IS ABLE TO SEE MOI AT ALL, I BELIEVE IT COULD BE BRIEF MEETING WITH ONLY MINIMUM OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. FURTHER BELIEVE MOI, AND GOK GENERALLY, WOULD BE SATISFIED IF MAIN RESULT OF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NAIROB 01902 301619Z

VISIT WERE PICTURE OF MOI WITH PRESIDENT, MAKING
PRESENTATION OF GIFTS OR OTHERWISE, WHICH COULD BE
PUBLISHED IN KENYAN PRESS. BRIEF VISIT WITH PRESIDENT
WOULD DO MUCH TO ASSURE SUCCESS OF TRIP IN KENYAN EYES
AND KEEP U.S. - KENYAN RELATIONS AT CURRENT WARM
STATE. WHILE MOI'S VISIT STARTED AS PRIVATE ONZXWITH
ONLY HE AND HIS WIFE INVOLVED, AND WHILE I HAVE STRESSED
TOU ALL CONCERNED PRIVATE NATURE OF VISIT AND ALL
THAT THIS IMPLIES, FACT REMAINS THAT NOW THAT MOI
IS LEAVING WHOLE OF GOK IS IN ACT ANDD APPEARS TO
BE MAKING KENYA'S NATIONAL PRESTIGE AN ISSUE.

GP-3 COOTE

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PAGE 01 NAIROBI 01856 291408Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01, CPR 02, JPM 04, HI 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, PI 04, RSC 01, SS 20,

SY 03, USIA 12, CU 04, RSR 01, /086 W

048991

P 291230Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8041

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NAIROBI 1856

SUBJECT: MOI'S VISIT TO US

ATTORNEY GENERAL NJOENYATTA'S CLOSEST
ADVISOR, CALLED ME "ON PRESIDENT'S BEHALF" TO SAY THAT
KENYATTA WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED IF VP MOI, HAVING
FINALLY BEEN ABLE TO GET TO WASHINGTON, WERE NOT ABLE
TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON. NJONJO FURTHER SAID THAT
KENYATTA IS WRITING PERSONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT,
INTRODUCING MOI AND EXPRESSING HOPE THAT PRESIDENT
WILL BE ABLE TO FIND TIME IN HIS BUSY SCHEDULE TO HAVE
AT LEAST SHORT MEETING WITH MOI. EXEMPT. COOTE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 NAIROB 01850 291254Z

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ACTION AF 18

INFO OCT 01,SSO 00,NSCE 00,CCO 00,CPR 02,JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,

OPR 02,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,SY 03,CIAE 00,RSR 01, /070 W

048547

O 291210Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8037
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS NAIROBI 1850

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

USIA FOR IAA, IMV, IBS, IPS

THE GOK MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS TODAY RELEASED THE FOLLOWING:

THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, THE HONORABLE DANIEL ARAP MOI WILL BE PAYING A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT THE INVITATION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL LEAVE NAIROBI ON WEDNESDAY, 30TH APRIL, AND WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. MOI. THE VISIT WILL LAST ABOUT TEN DAYS AND WILL COMBINE CONSULTATIONS WITH US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AND VISITS TO OTHER PARTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
MOSS

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 NAIROB 01833 281912Z

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51
ACTION CU 04

INFO OCT 01, AF 12, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02,
NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 03, RSR 01, /068 W
----- 043362

O 281455Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8027
STAT GRNC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NAIROBI 1833

SUBJECT: MOI'S VISIT TO US

REFERENCE: NAIROBI 1813

1. EMBASSY HAS JUST NOW BEEN INFORMED PARTY OF EIGHT WILL BE ACCOMPANYING VP MOI TO US. ADDITIONALLY, AMBASSADOR KIBINGE WILL BE TRAVELLING WITH PARTY IN US.

2. WE HAD NOT EVEN HEARD RUMORS PREVIOUSLY THAT PARTY WOULD BE THIS LARGE. QUITE OBVIOUSLY MOI HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO MANY PRESSURES FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES TO TAKE LARGE RETINUE. UNDOUBTEDLY THESE PRESSURES HAVE INCREASED AS DATE OF DEPARTURE NEARED.

3. FOLLOWING ARE MEMBERS OF PARTY: DAWSON MLAMBA, PERMSEC MINAG; CHARLES DEBUCHI, UNDERSECRETARY MINECON PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT; JOSEPH GACHUI, SENIOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MFA; STEPHEN MURIITHI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE SPECIAL BRANCH; MARTIN KINANJUI, SPECIAL BRANCH; GEORGE KIMUTO, SPECIAL BRANCH; I.K.A. SALAET, VP'S PRIVATE SECRETARY; MISS G.J. CHEMNJOR, MRS. MOI'S COSIAL SECRETARY.

4. KIBINGE AND MLAMBA ARE SENIOR MEMBERS OF PARTY AND SHOULD, IF FEASIBLE, BE INCLUDED IN ALL FUNCTIONS AND DISCUSSIONS. NEXT TWO RANKING OFFICIALS ARE KEBUCHI

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 NAIROB 01833 281912Z

AND GACHUI. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO RAISE WITH KIBINGE QUESTION OF WHO ATTENDS WHAT MEETINGS AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING LUNCHEONS - ESPECIALLY IN WASHINGTON.

5. MOI WOULD LIKE ALL MEMBERS OF PARTY TO ACCOMPANY HIM ON SAME FLIGHTS AND HAVE RESERVATIONS IN SAME HOTELS. EXCEPT FOR VP AND MRS. MOI ALL HOTEL ROOMS SHOULD BE SINGLE, IF THIS IS POSSIBLE. AIR RESERVATIONS NOR KIBINGE AND MLAMBA SHOULD BE FIRST CLASS, ALL OTHERS ECONOMY.

6. INFORMED MFA THAT USG IS PLACED AT EXTREME DISADVANTAGE IN BEING TOLD AT LAST MOMENT THAT SO MANY PEOPLE WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING MOI. ADDED THAT DEPARTMENT WOULD DO ALL IT COULD TO SECURE DESIRED FLIGHT AND HOTEL RESERVATIONS BUT THAT IN VIEW LATENESS OF HOUR, THIS MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE IN EVERY INSTANCE. ALSO MADE IT CLEAR ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, INCLUDING A WRITTEN COMMUNICATION TO MOI HIMSELF, THAT USG WAS FINANCING COST OF MOI AND WIFE ONLY. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT IN SPITE OF FACT THAT SITUATION IS CLEAR TO MOI AND TO GOK, SOMEONE IN PARTY MAY RAISE QUESTION WITH DEPARTMENT OF ASSISTING WITH FINANCING OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY WHILE IN US. USG, OF COURSE, IS UNDER NO COMMITMENT TO DO THIS.

7. WE REGRET INCONVENIENCES THAT LARGE PARTY MAY CAUSE DEPARTMENT, BUT CAN ASSURE THAT WE HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY THAT SIZE OF PARTY BE RESRICTED TO SMALL GROUP. GP-4. COOTE

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 NAIROB 01813 280530Z

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21
ACTION CU 04

INFO OCT 01, AF 12, EUR 17, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04,
SS 20, SY 03, USIA 12, /095 W

039344

R 260810Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8017

- ALLEN
- BERNSTEN
- CHAPIN
- HALPERIN
- HODEK
- KERRY R
- LEWIS
- MOHR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NAIROBI 1813

SUBJECT: MOI VISIT

REFERENCE: NAIROBI 1775

1. IN SPITE OF MY STRESSING TO MOI AT LAST MEETING THAT DEPT NEEDS NUMBER AND COMPOSITION HIS PARTY FOR US TRIP IMMEDIATELY, HE DID NOT FURNISH THIS INFORMATION APRIL 25, AS PROMISED. MORE OVER, HE LEFT NAIROBI IN AFTERNOON APRIL 25 AND WILL NOT RETURN UNTIL APRIL 28. HIS SECRETARY SAID DECISION NOT YET FINAL, BUT BELEIVES TOTAL NUMBER IN PARTY, INCLUDING VP AND WIFE, WILL BE SEVEN. HEARD SIMILAR FIGURE FROM ANOTHER SOURCE CLOSE TO MOI, BUT HAVE NOT RECEIVED OFFICIAL WORD FROM MOI HIMSELF. AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE KIBINGE MAY BE ONE MEMBER OF PARTY TRAVELING WITH VP WITHIN US.

2. I NOW HAVE APPOINTMENT TO SEE MOI MORNING APRIL 28. REGRAT DELAY BUT UNFORTUNATELY GOK DOES NOT MAKE DECISIONS SUCH AS THIS UNTIL LAST MINUTE. AMONG OTHER THINGS MEANS OF FINANCING ADDITIONAL PERSONS APPEARS TO BE PROBLEM. COOTE

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PAGE 01 STATE 070967

89
ORIGIN AF 18

INFO OCT 01, CPR 02, JPM 04, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, USIA 12, O 02,
CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, AID 28, /109 R

66639
DRAFTED BY: AF/E: RAREMOLE
APPROVED BY: AF - AMBASSADOR MOORE
AF/E - MR. TODMAN

----- 093472

PI 062332Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 070967

1. AMBASSADOR KIBINGE PRESENTED CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT NIXON
AFTERNOON MAY 6.

2. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, VICE PRESIDENT MOI MET WITH PRESIDENT
NIXON AND PRESENTED GIFTS FROM PRESIDENT KENYATTA TO PRESIDENT
AND MRS. NIXON. MOI INTERRUPTED ITINERARY AND DEPARTED TVA
EARLIER THAN SCHEDULED IN ORDER FLY TO WASHINGTON FOR MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT. AFTERWARDS HE FLEW TO AKRON WHERE HE REJOINED
REST OF HIS PARTY AND CONTINUES WITH TRIP AS PLANNED. ROGERS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

May 5, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard ~~Sneider~~ *W*

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit: F-111 Aircraft Procurement for Australia

Attached is a brief memorandum to the President for the F-111 problem since it now appears that Gorton may raise this with the President. Briefly, the Australians are concerned that they may be left with an obsolete aircraft. In addition, Gorton may be looking for an excuse to get out from under the Australian purchase of 24 F-111s.

The proposed talking points for the President have been checked out with Defense.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

5-5-69

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger (sl)

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit: F-111 Aircraft Procurement for Australia

Background: Prime Minister Gorton may raise with you Australian concerns about the F-111 aircraft. In 1963, Australia agreed to purchase 24 F-111A aircraft at a program cost of \$125 million. Since then the cost of the total package has risen to \$240 million and may go up further.

The Australians have been continuously concerned about the rising cost of the F-111s. However, their present anxiety arises from reports that we may be writing off the F-111 program for the US Air Force due to technical problems and cutbacks in the number of aircraft purchased for the US Air Force. Gorton would probably prefer to cancel the contract, if this could be done without serious embarrassment. However, he is probably prepared to continue with the purchase of the F-111s providing he is assured the US Government does not consider the plane obsolete for its own purposes, technological problems in the wing configuration have been worked out, and there will be a sufficient production run to assure availability of spare parts. The Royal Australian Air Force has recently completed a special study raising these problems.

Gorton discussed the F-111 problem with Secretary Laird during his first visit here. At that time he was assured that procurement of the fighter version is being continued for use by the Air Force and that changes are being made to correct difficulties in the wing. He will probably seek reiteration of these assurances, possibly in writing, during his current visit.

Recommended talking points:

1. The US plans to continue the F-111 program and difficulties in the aircraft are being corrected before the F-111 aircraft are delivered to Australia.
2. Secretary Laird will be prepared to discuss the problem in detail with Gorton.

CONFIDENTIAL

Gorton's Visit

May 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN P. WALSH

FROM: Richard M. Moose *RM*
REF: Your Memorandum of May 15, 1969
SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversation re Prime Minister
Gorton's Visit

Subject memcoms are approved as submitted, but the distribution of the Presidential memcoms should be revised to delete CIA, DOD, CINCPAC, INR/OD and SP.

RMM:il

Dispatched 5/19/69

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

SECRET-NODIS
Attachment

May 15, 1969


Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House

Memoranda of conversation re Prime Minister Gorton's
Visit - May 6, 1969

For approval prior to distribution.

The President's remarks are sidelined in red.

These memoranda were drafted in EA/ANZ by Mr. Moore.


John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Attachments:

	Approve as <u>Amended</u>	Approve as <u>Submitted</u>
1. Future U.S. Role in Pacific Area	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. Presidential Visit to Australia	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. Non-Proliferation Treaty	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Meat Inspection	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. ANZUS Council Meeting	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. Viet-Nam	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. North Korea	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Communist China	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. U.S.-USSR Relations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. Czechoslovakia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Germany	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Press Statement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

SECRET-NODIS Attachment



SECRET/NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7381

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONPrime Minister Gorton's Meeting with the President

May 6, 1969

PART 1 of 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Future U. S. Role in Pacific Area

PARTICIPANTS:

Australia

The President
 Prime Minister John G. Gorton of Australia
 Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
 Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
 Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
 Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
 Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
 and Defense Branch

U. S.

The President
 The Secretary of State
 Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
 Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
 Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand
 Affairs, Department of State
 Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

After having met privately with Gorton, the President invited the other participants to join the meeting. He said that he and the Prime Minister had discussed this subject and that he wanted to summarize the views he had conveyed to the Prime Minister. These were not views he would express publicly, but he thought he should voice them to the group.

How the war ends in Viet-Nam will have an enormous effect on the future U. S. role in the Pacific, the President said.

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Group 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading
 and declassification

He said it is a fact that the past conduct of the war, its cost in money and lives, have had a strong, negative impact on the thinking of the American public. There is, he said, a growing, dangerous tendency for people to visualize the situation as one in which a great power is hopelessly mired down in a futile war. They throw up their hands in despair and say let's get out of Viet-Nam right now.

Unfortunately, said the President, persons holding this attitude tend to say that we should not only get out of Viet-Nam but should pull back everywhere. This is the new isolationism, the President said, and ironically, it derives from the overdone disillusionment of those who only a few years ago were in the forefront of internationalism in the U. S. Once a great nation starts down this path of withdrawal, giving way to disillusion, said the President, the process is very difficult to reverse. The resulting "domino effect," should the U. S. take this road, could affect not only Southeast Asia but our entire global posture.

The President declared that the U. S. seeks peace in Viet-Nam as does Australia. But it must be achieved, he said, so that two years hence, say, we look back upon it as a reasonable, honorable conclusion to the war. Otherwise, public opinion will make it extremely difficult for the U. S. to continue to play a responsible role in the region in the future. We must end the Viet-Nam war in such a way that we can continue to meet the minimum objective of preventing the countries of the region from being taken over by external forces.

The next few months will be critical, the President said. The pressure on the USG to get out of Viet-Nam will mount. The easiest, most popular thing for him to do, said the President, would be to withdraw American forces from Viet-Nam. He said he would resist this pressure, however, and would continue to pursue what he believes is a well-planned strategy to gain a sound settlement. It is a strategy which should be acceptable to the NVN and VC. The strategy envisaged no specific timetable, said the President, but he was convinced we were on the right course.

The Prime Minister expressed his agreement. He said Australia wanted no more "fake" solutions such as that reached in Laos. That sort of solution in Viet-Nam would quickly demonstrate that the domino theory is valid, he asserted. He said there was no doubt that the countries of Southeast Asia are conscious of being dominoes, lined up behind Viet-Nam. Let us adhere to our basic, mutual objective, he said, which is simply to ensure that the people of South Viet-Nam have the opportunity freely to choose the government they wish.

The President said he would hold out no false hope that peace in Viet-Nam is at hand, but he assured the Prime Minister that the U. S. is moving on every possible front in its efforts to end the war. He gave this assurance, he said, since Australia might well wonder, from a reading of the U. S. press, whether the U. S. can in fact stay the course in Viet-Nam. Gorton responded that he was aware of the great pressures on the USG, but that he was not concerned that we might fail to stay the course.

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EA/ANZ:RWMoore:rlw 5/8/69

Concurrences:
 NSC - Mr. Sneider
 S/S -

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7384

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Prime Minister Gorton's Meeting with the President

May 6, 1969

PART 2 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Presidential Visit to Australia

PARTICIPANTS:

Australia Prime Minister John G. Gorton of Australia
Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister
Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
and Defense Branch

U. S. The President
The Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Spacial Assistant to the President
Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand
Affairs, Department of State
Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol

Gorton invited the President to visit Australia in 1970. The President spoke warmly of his two previous visits to Australia, praising the vitality one senses in Australian society. He said he was not sure he could take up the Prime Minister's invitation in 1970, but he promised that he would make a visit sometime during his (first) term in office. He said he had in mind a wide-ranging East Asian trip. Asia is not low on the "priority list" of his Administration among regions of the world, he said, denying speculative press comment to this effect which appears from time to time. On the contrary, during the remainder of this century the Pacific will be "where the action is."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7385

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 3 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

PARTICIPANTS:

- Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
- Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
- Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
- Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
- Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

- The Secretary
- Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
- Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
- Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
- Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
- Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand Affairs, Dept. of State

The Secretary said he had talked with Kuznetzov (Soviet representative at General Eisenhower's funeral) about the NPT, urging that the U. S. and the USSR ratify it simultaneously. Kuznetzov responded that the Soviet Union is reluctant to ratify until West Germany has signed. The Secretary said we will continue to press the Russians on this question.

Replying to a question from the Secretary, Sir James confirmed that Australia has not yet decided whether to sign

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

the NPT. Sir James asked whether Russian reluctance to ratify stems in part from apprehension concerning Communist China's growth as a nuclear power. The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

What was the ratification procedure in Australia, the Secretary inquired. Sir James said a treaty could be ratified without reference to Parliament, but Hewitt added that in the case of the NPT the government had undertaken to submit it to parliamentary debate.

The Secretary said that, as he had told the Australians during their visit in April, it was the President's policy not to pressure any country to sign the NPT, although the U. S., of course, favors and supports the treaty and would like to see other countries sign it.

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	EUR	C
	Amembassy Canberra	Amembassy Moscow
	Amembassy Bonn	

EA/ANZ:RWMoore:rlw 5/8/69

Concurrences:
NSC - Mr. Sneider
S/S -



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7386

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 4 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Meat Inspection

PARTICIPANTS:

Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External
Affairs
Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
and Defense Branch
Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

The Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand
Affairs, Department of State

Referring to his meeting with the Prime Minister in April, the Secretary noted that we had succeeded in having postponed until August the USDA deadline for changes in Australia's inspection procedure for meat destined for the U. S. market. Sir James Plimsoll and Hewitt said this action on the Secretary's part had been helpful and was appreciated, as the meat inspection issue had been a touchy one in terms of Australian domestic politics.

EA/ANZ:RWMoore/r1w 5/8/69

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Concurrences:
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S/S - *[Signature]*

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 5 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: ANZUS Council Meeting

PARTICIPANTS:

- Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
- Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
- Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
- Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
- Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

- The Secretary of State
- Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
- Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
- Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
- Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
- Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand Affairs, Department of State

The Secretary said there appeared to be only two possible times for an ANZUS Council meeting this year: July in Canberra or September in the U. S. He said that in conjunction with his trip to Japan it might be feasible for him to attend a meeting at Canberra the first week in August. He asked whether Australia considered it important that a meeting be held, and if so, whether that timing would be suitable.

Sir James Plimsoll replied that in Australia's view the Council should meet at least once a year to show that ANZUS is a "working alliance." This year, he added, there would be much of interest to discuss at a meeting in

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July or August, such as the SEATO, TCC and Five-Power meetings, all of which would have taken place earlier.

The Secretary speculated that if he went to Canberra for an ANZUS meeting he probably should visit Wellington also. Sir James agreed that a stopover in Wellington on the way back to Washington would be indicated. The discussion ended inconclusively.


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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 6 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS:

Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External
Affairs
Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
and Defense Branch
Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

The Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand
Affairs, Department of State

The Secretary asked about the current state of public opinion in Australia regarding Viet-Nam. Sir James said that there is anti-Vietnam sentiment but that it is at about the same level as in the past. He said Australian concern about Viet-Nam relates primarily to the question of whether U. S. policy towards Viet-Nam will remain firm.

The Secretary asked whether the Australian public understood the U. S. negotiating stance in Paris. Sir James said there had been a tendency for the public to be bemused by press treatment which emphasized disputes over the shape

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of the table, etc.; he thought there was still a job to be done in making the public aware of the issues involved in the negotiations.

There are indications that the American public has gained increased appreciation of the USG negotiating position, the Secretary said. He noted that the U. S. has gone a long way to try to establish a fruitful climate for genuine negotiations by meeting Communist demands such as that for simultaneous discussion of military and political matters. He said it had been helpful also that President Thieu had expressed willingness to negotiate with the NLF.

Sir James said that the mere fact that the Paris talks were going on had taken much of the steam out of the anti-Vietnam campaign in Australia. He observed also that opposition to the Viet-Nam war tends to become intertwined with the essentially different matter of opposition to conscription, as is the case in the U. S. He said it was useful to keep in mind that not all opposition to the GOA's Viet-Nam policy comes from those who favor drawing back. There are also those who favor a harder line, both in the negotiations and on the military front.

In reply to the Secretary's question as to whether there was much student unrest in Australia over Viet-Nam and conscription, Sir James acknowledged that unrest exists but observed that the Gallup poll had shown disproportionate support for Viet-Nam policy among younger age groups. Mr. Hewitt asked the Secretary whether American servicemen who have served in Viet-Nam return home foes of U. S. Viet-Nam policy. The Secretary said he thought not; in fact, he said, it appeared that in the main those who had fought in Viet-Nam became convinced supporters of the policy. Hewitt said this seemed to have been the case among Australians, too.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 7 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: North Korea

PARTICIPANTS:

- Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
- Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
- Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
- Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
- Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

- The Secretary of State
- Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
- Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
- Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
- Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
- Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand Affairs, Department of State

Had the U. S. a theory as to what the North Koreans hoped to accomplish by shooting down the EC-121 aircraft, Mr. Hewitt inquired. The Secretary said we had no certain knowledge. It might be simply a reflection of North Korean unpredictability and uncontrollability. It was also possible that the Russians had put them up to it.

Sir James observed there seemed some reason to suppose the Russians might have done so in the case of the Pueblo, in order to obtain the intelligence gear used by the ship. Dr. Kissinger said there was no firm evidence of this, however. Both he and the Secretary concurred in a comment by Sir James that the South Koreans have behaved with encouraging restraint and responsibility in the EC-121 incident.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 8 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Communist China

PARTICIPANTS:

Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External
Affairs
Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
and Defense Branch
Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

The Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
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Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand
Affairs, Department of State

Sir James said he supposed we were pretty much in the dark regarding the Ninth Party Congress, as was the GOA. The Secretary admitted that our intelligence on the congress was limited. Sir James said the Russians seemed not to have much information on it either, inasmuch as they had queried the GOA on the subject in Canberra.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 9 of 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: U.S.-USSR Relations

PARTICIPANTS:

- Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
- Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
- Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
- Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
- Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

- The Secretary of State
- Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
- Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
- Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
- Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
- Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia, New Zealand Affairs, Department of State

Sir James asked the Secretary to comment on U.S.-Soviet relations. The Secretary said the USSR was acting as if it wanted to be friendly. He cited a generally accommodating Russian attitude in the Middle East, assurances by the Soviets that they would not harass the President during his European trip, Russian restraint in pushing their views on arms limitation, and Russian quickness to help in the search for the EC-121 aircraft shot down by the North Koreans. The Secretary noted also that the Soviet Union had shown little inclination actively to encourage or support "liberation" movements in Southeast Asia.

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
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Sir James said the Russians appear fearful that the U. S. and Communist China will "gang up" on them. He said the Russian Ambassador in Canberra had told him that it was not in the general interest for the USSR and Communist China to be fighting each other. When Plimsoll agreed with him, the Ambassador urged the GOA so to advise the USG. Plimsoll added that the Indians also report real fear of a U.S.-Communist Chinese understanding on the part of the Soviets.


Dr. Kissinger mentioned that Ambassador Dobrynin had talked to him about the Soviet Union's troubles with Communist China and, when Dr. Kissinger said that that was Russia's problem, the Ambassador vigorously insisted that Communist China is "everybody's problem." Dr. Kissinger and the Secretary agreed that it was just as well to keep the Russians uneasy by not denying U. S. interest in achieving an improved relationship with Communist China.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969

Place: White House

PART 10 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia

PARTICIPANTS:

Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External
Affairs
Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
and Defense Branch
Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

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
Sir James asked if the invasion of Czechoslovakia had created an obstacle to the effective conduct of diplomatic business between the U. S. and the USSR. The Secretary responded that it had not. He added that the invasion made Western Europeans see more realistically the problems of dealing with the USSR which the U. S. has always had to take into account. He said we believe the Soviets will find it hard to live with their doctrine of limited sovereignty, used to justify the Czech invasion, since it alarms Communist and non-Communist nations alike.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 11 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Germany

PARTICIPANTS:

Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External
Affairs
Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations
and Defense Branch
Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

The Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia-New Zealand
Affairs, Department of State

Sir James asked the Secretary whether he foresaw any change in the situation in Germany. The Secretary said no. Dr. Kissinger added that if the question had to do with the German situation as it affected East-West relations, he thought there might be an easing of access to Berlin but he foresaw no likelihood of progress towards reunification. He said that after the election in West Germany the Socialists and the Free Democrats might well form a coalition which would take a softer attitude with regard to the legitimacy of East Germany with the possible result that more countries would recognize East Germany.

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
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The Secretary commented that the USSR prefers that Germany remain divided. Dr. Kissinger underscored this point, noting that the USSR would not wish to see Germany united even under a Communist government. Sir James agreed, reporting that Russian diplomats in Canberra had told him that a divided Germany is in the interest of "all of us."

Dr. Kissinger said that East Germany will be increasingly a factor in West German politics. Sir James expressed the view that one of the main reasons for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was Russian fear that the liberalizing tendency in that country would spread to East Germany. Commenting on this point, Dr. Kissinger described the evidence of mounting nationalistic feeling in East Germany, quoting in particular a West German observer who declared that East Germany is now much more traditionally German than West Germany.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: May 6, 1969
Place: White House

PART 12 OF 12 PARTS

SUBJECT: Press Statement

PARTICIPANTS:

- Sir Keith Waller, Australian Ambassador
- Cyrus L. S. Hewitt, Secretary to the Prime Minister's Dept.
- Sir James Plimsoll, Secretary, Department of External Affairs
- Alan T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary, External Relations and Defense Branch
- Anthony Eggleton, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

- The Secretary of State
- Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President
- Emil Mosbacher, Chief of Protocol
- Samuel King, Deputy Chief of Protocol
- Richard Sneider, National Security Council, White House
- Robert W. Moore, Country Director, Australia-New Zealand Affairs, Department of State

There was discussion of the text of a press statement that the President might issue after his final meeting with Gorton May 7. A text prepared by the U. S. side was put forward and found generally agreeable, subject to structural changes which the Secretary deemed necessary to avoid any suggestion that the USG, in this statement, was taking on a new or expanded security commitment. The Secretary reminded the Australians of Congressional and public sensitivity on this point. He recalled that an earlier statement, the so-called Rusk-Thanat communique concerning U. S. concern for Thailand's security, had led to argument in this country because it appeared to some to expand the U. S. commitment to Thailand beyond that assumed under existing treaties.

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