

May 1, 1969

Suggestions for Remarks at the Departure of
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia

This visit has been enormously useful for me and for this government. It has given us all a chance to get acquainted with an outstanding statesman from a land that has been aptly described by one of its poets as "the land of reliance and never-give-in and help-your-mate."

The spirit of "help-your-mate" is deeply involved in the cooperation between our countries. I might point out that our space program has six tracking stations in Australia. And Australia is a member of ANZUS and SEATO, two alliances which are fundamental to our policy in Southeast Asia. Australian troops are fighting beside ours and those of other free world nations in Vietnam even as they fought beside us in World War I, World War II, and in Korea.

While Australia has been called "a prophecy still to be fulfilled," it is making an outstanding contribution to peaceful cooperation and economic development in its part of the world. It participates wholeheartedly in the Colombo Plan, the Asian Development Bank, and many other regional activities. In percentage of national income devoted to foreign aid, Australia ranks second in the world, a record of which any nation can be proud. Australia and America can both be proud of the contribution we are making, as partners, to the security and progress of the Pacific region. That partnership and that contribution will continue.

These two days have provided opportunities for us to discuss a wide range of subjects, including, not only Vietnam and regional security questions, but also a number of topics outside the security field. Australia is geographically closer to some of these problems than we are, so I have very much appreciated the opportunity to exchange views with its Prime Minister. I have obtained a number of new insights, but fundamentally, I find the perspective from "down under" is very much the same as it is from Washington.

Now you return to your homeland -- exchanging the beauties of a Washington spring for the beauties of an Australian autumn -- without even going through a hot summer.

An Australian writer has said that the flame of freedom will never die in Australia because it is fanned by "a wind blowing out of the far country." That wind is the democratic spirit of our forefathers which is the product of the old frontier in both Australia and America.

At a time when democratic ideals are under attack all over the world, all free nations can turn to Australia as they have often turned to America, and they can be grateful that the winds of freedom are still blowing "out of that far country."

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April 30, 1969

Suggestions for the President's Toast to
John Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia

Just about one year from now Australia will celebrate the 200th anniversary of the landing of Captain James Cook and the crew of the ENDEAVOUR at Botany Bay, near what is now Sydney.

Your government, Mr. Prime Minister, asked ours to send a ship to join in the celebration. Unfortunately, we had to decline because you asked us to send a sailing ship, and in the whole United States Navy, not a single, old-fashioned, wind-powered vessel capable of making the journey could be found.

I hasten to say, however, that this security gap is not quite as bad as it might sound. This country does have a famous sailing ship -- a 12 meter called the Intrepid. I wish I could tell you tonight that the Intrepid will sail to Australia to represent us at the Cook bicentenary, even though it is not a government ship. But when I suggested this to the skipper, our Chief of Protocol, "Bus" Mosbacher, he seemed somehow reluctant. I think he is afraid someone would suggest that -- now that he's in diplomacy -- he should take along the America's Cup rather than wait for Australia to come and get it.

Your celebration of the anniversary of Captain Cook's landing is a fine reminder of your country's exciting past. An American writer, Mark Twain, once said of Australian history: "It does not read like history, but like the most beautiful of lies."

And now, of course, your country is still paced toward the future. The Australian writer, George Johnston, placed that point in perspective when he wrote: "In a world where so many have come to fear the beginning of the end, Australia has come only to the end of the beginning."

In the worried world of 1969, Australia and the United States are partners in many ways -- in spirit, in the ANZUS and SEATO alliances, in our defense of freedom in Korea and Vietnam, in our goal of development for the countries of the Pacific, in our quest for a better world. In this high purpose, I pledge you the unfailing support and continued loyal friendship of the United States of America.

And now I would like to offer a riddle: What does Australia have in common with Monaco and Sikkim? The answer, of course, is that the leaders of all three are married to beautiful American women. This is a little-known form of international cooperation. We are delighted to welcome your lovely lady from Maine back to our shores as one of us -- and as one of you.

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ever get back the
orig?*

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

March 29, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit

The Australian Ambassador has relayed to me ^{an} urgent request from Prime Minister Gorton that his visit be re-scheduled in May, preferably before mid-May when Parliament reconvenes. At the very least, Gorton hopes to be able to announce upon his return from the funeral ceremonies that you have agreed with him to re-schedule the visit in the very near future.

May is rather tight, but there is space for a Gorton visit during the middle of the month.

Recommendation:

(a) That you authorize me to inform the Australian Embassy that you would welcome a re-scheduling of the Gorton visit in mid-May, at a time to be worked out but hopefully May 12-13.

Approved _____

(b) or that I be authorized to welcome a rescheduling at an unspecified date "in the very near future."

Approved _____

(c) or other _____

~~Henry A. Kissinger~~

HAK:RLS:mlb (3/29/69)

(Clearance: Dwight Chapin)

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Presidential Chron - 1

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Re-scheduling of Gorton Visit

Ambassador Waller indicated that the best dates from Prime Minister Gorton's standpoint would be May 8-13. As second best, he suggested May 1-8. After the 13th, the convening of parliament makes a trip difficult, but Gorton is still willing to come then, if necessary.

The third week in May (May 12-16) is free of foreign visitors. I believe that we should aim for that week, and preferably for the beginning of the week to accommodate Ambassador Gorton.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum to the President at Tab A.

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*1. [unclear]
2. [unclear]*

Keep in mind -

March 18, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia

You may wish to consider proposing to Prime Minister Gorton during the course of his visit March 31 that the Australian Minister of Science and Education bring a team of Australian scientists to the United States to discuss with me and other Government officials ways of further implementing the US-Australian scientific and technical cooperation agreement of October 18, 1968.

This would be in return for the visit of an American team of leading scientists headed by my predecessor who went to Australia last October. That visit was arranged with Prime Minister Gorton when he was last in Washington in May 1968.

The invitation would be timely and would give fresh impetus to the agreement which holds forth promise of great mutual benefit because of the high quality of Australian science in many areas and because of the common problems we share in our continent-wide approach to development.

Our Embassy in Canberra has strongly endorsed the proposed invitation and the Department of State concurs.

Lee A. DuBridge

Lee A. DuBridge

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Discuss _____

cc: Dr. Kissinger ✓

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STATE DEPT

March 17, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard M. Moose

SUBJECT: Scenario for Planning Meeting on Trudeau and Gorton Visits,
Monday, March 17, 2:30 P. M.

These meetings are designed to bring together the various State and White House elements involved in the visits of the two Prime Ministers. This will be the first such meeting in the new administration and several of the White House participants will be new to the problems involved. Those present will include:

State: Office of Protocol: Emil Mossbacher
Elem Conger
Sam King

Country Representatives:

George Springsteen (Canada)
Joseph Scott (Canada)
James Carson (Canada)
Winthrop Brown (Australia)
Robert Moore (Australia)
Carl Brower (Australia)

Representatives of State Secretariat:

Dirk Glysteen
William Shepard
Jay Hawley

White House: Mrs. Lucy Winchester
Mrs. Jerry Van der Heuvel
Cmdr. Charles Larson (Aide's Office)
Gerald Warren (Press Office)
Kim Keogh
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Dick Sneider
Dick Moose
Mrs. Jeanne Davis

Because of the large cast of characters, those involved only with the Gorton visit will remain outside until the Trudeau visit has been taken care of.

The participants will have received a set of papers prepared by the State Department for each visit. (Copies are attached for your reference.)

I suggest you use the following scenario:

Explain purpose of the meeting:

- to acquaint the various participants with each other's interests and requirements.
- your staff is available to help all concerned in any way. Our interest is the policy content of the visit and to insure that the "atmospherics" are appropriate to the foreign policy interests involved.

Discuss what we expect to achieve by the visit and what the other side wants out of it

(At this point take up the Trudeau visit, going through its various aspects and then repeat the drill for Gorton.)

- give your view of the visit or call on Sonnenfeldt (for Trudeau), Sneider (for Gorton) Substantive talking points and State's draft scope papers are tabbed for your reference.
- ask George Springsteen for comments on Trudeau (and Winthrop Brown for comments on Gorton).

Preparation of briefing books:

- What should they contain
- When you want them

Public Statements:

(State drafts for the Trudeau visit have been received, ^{at} Tab: , Keogh and others have copies)

- welcoming statement
- toast
- which should we use -- agreed press guidance, joint statement or communique?

Review the schedule -- State Protocol will distribute copies of the latest draft schedule. (Tentative schedules are tabbed into the attached papers)

Points to be noted:

- President's participation
- First Lady's participation (Trudeau dinner will be mixed, at his request). Mrs. Gorton apparently will accompany her husband).

Discuss gift suggestions:

- State has already sent suggestions. Ask Luch Winchester if she has questions about gifts, this is one of her big interests.

Consider appropriate entertainment.

- State has sent suggestions. Again, Lucy will want to discuss these in an effort to get a better--more imaginative--idea of what the guests would enjoy.

Ask if there are questions or problems concerning:

- the guest lists (State has provided a suggested list for Trudeau and will do so for Gorton)
- the menu
 - are there dietary restrictions?
 - do they drink?

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

SCOPE PAPER

I. The Setting

Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces -- in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971. This is perhaps the most important step Australia has taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision. The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened role in Southeast Asia.

The Australian Government's historic decision resulted from the interplay of several factors. These included anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded, nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy leanings; the approach of a general election; and the stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.

"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?

Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries. While this course has been carried out through economic aid, diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it has also had an important military component -- the policy of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward defense has justified Australian participation in regional

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

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security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and, since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk its limited forces only in close association with one or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and the United States.

In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and the subsequent change of leadership in a United States which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene. Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?

Debate on this question could not remain theoretical, since Australia was faced with a pressing practical decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out? Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly dangerous departure from the traditional policy of stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises:

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to be effective, and Australian indecision has already seriously hampered the five-power consultations.

In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil servants in these departments, and the military services. The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia and increased concentration upon internal economic development, military preparedness and continental and immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970. A still more important figure who early disclosed strong leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in January 1968, John Grey Gorton.

Gorton's Indecision

Gorton at various times has given numerous indications of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition towards its opposite. At his first press conference as Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam. A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question, he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968. He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least without being sure of being able to get them out if they got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over

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Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division -- one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister, he is understandably determined not to be responsible for a repetition of this debacle.

With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia policy under President Johnson's successor. After Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism -- under the next U. S. administration, and that this might well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense scheme." Although this topic dominated his discussions in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia. He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S. Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in mid-January, he privately took the position with the British that he could not run the risk of involvement, particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to President Nixon.

With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton successfully sought an early meeting with the new President. On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if Australian troops were stationed there, they would never get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to

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know from President Nixon what the United States would do if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.

The Election and Gorton's Decision

Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect, appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan -- was being called upon to play a new, more independent role. Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge? "Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party organization began advising him that a strong defense policy was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.

The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting statements helped build up suspense for his promised announcement of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced by Gorton.

Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External

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Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate -- forward defense including a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this the only foreign policy issue in an election which the bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country into a new era of its nationhood.

Significance for the Visit

Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety of his forces as a precondition for committing them. Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a guarantee, especially in a form which would have been politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in Malaysia/Singapore.

On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?

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His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if such a situation should arise we would have to look to the support of allies outside the region". In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S. support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the temper of the new administration and the general posture it will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs on which it is taking the first step.

II. The Visitor

Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative, with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind. Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him. He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like, and his standing with the man in the street is high. Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.

Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead. His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile, conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered strength and homely charm. His later war service has about it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the

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late John F. KennedyBack on active service, a crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic, direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis, an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocol, the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals, Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."

Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.

III. Australian Aims

The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia, as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's mind.

He will:

- assess the firmness of the new administration's posture in Southeast Asia;
- ask to what extent the U. S. is prepared to back up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
- be interested in the President's thinking on post-Vietnam Asia;
- argue for better treatment from the United States in the economic field;

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-- size up the President.

IV. United States Aims

Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:

-- without increasing our commitments, to give Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;

-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;

-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his - on post-Vietnam Asia;

-- to establish a good personal relationship between the President and Gorton;

-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the Australian people that the United States is and will remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist expansion in Asia.

Drafted by: EA/ANZ:CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
EA/RA - Mr. Donald
EA - Amb. Brown
EA - Amb. Godley
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard

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March 13, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister

As you know, Prime Minister Gorton's visit is scheduled for March 31-April 1. Preparations are in hand and appear to pose no particular problems. (There will be a meeting on the visit at 3:00 p.m. on Friday.)

It may be worthwhile to put down some observations concerning the style and manner of our expected visitor, the purposes which he hopes to serve by the visit and our own interests in the visit.

Gorton the Man: For your purposes, these are probably the salient aspects of Gorton's personality and approach:

- He is tough, brusque and impatient of formalities.
- As a fighter pilot in 1942, Gorton saw an Australian division stranded in Singapore by the lack of effective external support. His own experience probably makes him unusually sensitive to the danger of Australia's getting out on a limb in Southeast Asia.
- He is prickly and sensitive, and does not like to be taken for granted or pressured. He was annoyed with our failure to consult more fully with Australia in the policy decisions of March 31 and October 31 last year; and he has complained that he was subjected to pressure in Washington last year.
- He is a strong Australian nationalist, has been at least until recently suspicious of foreign commitments. He seemed upon taking office to be toying with a

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"fortress Australia" policy; and in one press conference he said that he would not send any more Australians to Vietnam. He must be shown the advantages of a particular policy for Australia, rather than offered broad generalities.

- He is suspicious of intellectuals, of theorists and of bureaucrats. He came to Washington without briefing papers in 1968, and it is still uncertain whether he will bring any professional defense or foreign affairs advisers on this trip. He will probably not be interested in detail or prepared to discuss issues in depth.
- He came to office as a dark horse candidate without international experience, and without intellectual pretensions. He is particularly conscious of living in the shadow of Menzies and Holt and now wishes to establish himself as a leader in his own right and an independent authority in foreign affairs.

Background -- the February 25th Speech: Gorton's February 25 commitment to keep land, naval and air forces in Singapore/Malaysia after 1971 is a major development integrally related to his forthcoming visit.

In the Australian internal context, his speech established Prime Minister Gorton in the foreign policy field with a powerful statement of the forward defense position. It flanked the opposition, which finds itself in an election year in a weak straddle on the basic issue of forward defense vs. "fortress Australia". Having been made before rather than after the Washington visit, the speech stands as an Australian policy rather than a response to American pressure.

In the specific context of the visit, Gorton has made a major decision for which we had been asking. He has done so although he had been holding back because he did not want to get Australia committed without a commitment from us. He has now made the commitment without demanding any quid pro quo. He comes to us as a man with "clean hands" asking the President to be equally forthcoming.

Gorton has, probably consciously, helped to shape the nature of our response by the specific character of his speech. First, he himself indicated a preference for general understandings rather than specific treaty commitments. Second, he pointed very clearly to his expectation that the U.S. would come to Australia's help if subversion from outside or some other threat were too much for Australia to handle alone, but he went on to say that "Australia's continued effort would in that case have to be decided in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that time." Gorton can hardly expect us to be more specific or committed than he is, and by these remarks he has provided us with the rationale for answering him with broad and non-specific reassurances of our continuing commitment to Southeast Asia and the importance we attach to ANZUS.

What Gorton will be Seeking: Above all, Gorton will focus on the area of reassurances concerning the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. He will want to have something for public consumption to reassure the Australian voters that his commitment to Malaysia/Singapore has not overextended his country's defense resources. He will particularly need some specific reference to ANZUS.

Gorton's second purpose is to develop a personal relationship with the President which would be valuable in itself and which would enhance Gorton's political position for the elections.

Gorton will wish to talk about other issues, particularly the outlook for the Paris talks, and the situation in Vietnam, trade problems, and the Cass Keraudren project.

The U.S. Interest: Our most fundamental interests vis-a-vis Australia fit in closely with Gorton's February 25 statement and with his interests in this trip. By his action in undertaking a responsibility within the area, he has made it more feasible for the U.S. to maintain a role in supporting security arrangements in Southeast Asia. We should try --

11 To reassure him that we are prepared to maintain U.S. commitments in Asia and that we view ANZUS as an important element in these commitments.

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4.

2. To keep him in our confidence concerning the Vietnam situation and the Paris negotiations.

3. To establish a personal relationship between the President and Prime Minister Gorton.

There will of course be specific recommendations from the Department of State concerning recommended U. S. positions on all issues.

RLSneider/LGrant
3/13/69

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

TENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND MRS. GORTON

March 29 - April 2, 1969

SATURDAY, MARCH 29

5:30 p.m. PST The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P., Prime Minister of Australia, and Mrs. Gorton and their party will arrive at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California, aboard QANTAS Airlines Flight 530.

6:15 p.m. PST Departure from San Francisco, California, aboard a United States Air Force special flight. (Flying time: 4 hours and 40 minutes; 3 hours change in time.)

SUNDAY, MARCH 30

1:55 a.m. EST Arrival at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

2:00 a.m. Departure from Langley Air Force Base by automobile.

2:40 a.m. Arrival at Williamsburg, Virginia.

MONDAY, MARCH 31

p.m. EST Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their party will depart from the Williamsburg Inn Golf Course aboard a United States Marine Corps special helicopter flight.

p.m. EST Arrival at Washington, D.C. at (Ellipse or Pentagon Heliport).

p.m. Departure from (Ellipse or Pentagon Heliport)

p.m. Arrival at Blair House.

7:50 p.m. Departure from Blair House.

8:00 p.m. His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E., Ambassador of Australia, and Lady Waller will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton at the Embassy of Australia, 3120 Cleveland Avenue, Northwest.

Dress:

TUESDAY

TUESDAY, APRIL 1

- 10:25 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton will depart from Blair House.
- 10:30 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton will arrive at the White House where he will be greeted by the Honorable Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States.
- Prime Minister Gorton will meet with President Nixon at the White House.
- 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Rogers will give a luncheon in honor of Mrs. Gorton at her residence, 7007 Glenbrook Road, Bethesda, Maryland.
- p.m. Prime Minister Gorton will have luncheon privately at Blair House.
- 2:30 p.m. Prime Minister Gorton will meet with the Honorable William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, at the Department of State.
- 4:00 p.m. Prime Minister Gorton will meet with the Honorable Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, at the Department of Defense.
- 8:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Nixon will give a dinner in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton at the White House.
- Dress: White tie.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2

- 9:55 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton will depart from Blair House.
- 10:00 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton will meet with President Nixon at the White House.
- 11:30 a.m. Prime Minister Gorton will meet with the Honorable Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States, at the White House.
- p.m. Luncheon open.

WEDNESDAY (Cont'd.)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2 (Continued)

p.m. Possible - Prime Minister Gorton will meet with the Honorable David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury, at the Department of the Treasury.

p.m. Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their party will depart from Blair House.

p.m. Arrival at the Military Airlift Command Terminal, Washington National Airport.

p.m. EST Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton and their party will depart from Washington, D.C. aboard a Canadian Department of Transport aircraft for Ottawa, Canada. (Flying time: 1 hour and 40 minutes.)

* * *

Protocol
March 12, 1969

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

TENTATIVE LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY ACCOMPANYING THE RIGHT
HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, M.P., PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, AND
MRS. GORTON TO THE UNITED STATES

March 30 - April 2, 1969

Members of the Official Australian Party

The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, M.P.
Prime Minister of Australia

Mrs. Gorton

His Excellency Sir Keith Waller, C.B.E.
Ambassador of Australia

Lady Waller

Mr. C. L. S. Hewitt
Secretary, Prime Minister's Department

Miss Ainsley Gotto
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

Mr. Anthony Eggleton
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister

Miss Jean Lester
Private Secretary to Mrs. Gorton

Security Officer

Protocol
March 12, 1969

Gift, Menu and Entertainment Suggestions

Gifts

When the Gortons visited Washington last May, President Johnson gave the Prime Minister a replica of the George Washington Reading Lamp in the Smithsonian, a gold Bulova desk clock, an IBM dictating machine and an inscribed family photograph. Mrs. Johnson gave Mrs. Gorton a vermeil dressing table box, a gold Bulova boudoir clock, three American Designer scarves, two White House books and three books on Indonesia (in which Mrs. Gorton has a scholarly interest). On this occasion, it is recommended that we avoid multiple gifts, and confine ourselves to one or two nice gifts to each person. With regard to personal gifts, both Gortons have simple conservative tastes in clothing and accessories.

Prime Minister Gorton is a heavy smoker (Benson and Hedges); an engraved cigarette box, case or lighter might be a suitable gift on this visit. From his university days he retains a knowledge of our Civil War, suggesting a book, map or other gift with a Civil War theme. Other possibilities include:

-- a painting (any period or style with the exception of "pop". Suggested by Embassy Canberra).

-- an antique map depicting Australia, the Pacific and the Americas. (Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)

-- a memento of the Apollo 8 flight, perhaps some fitting from the actual spacecraft. This would be appropriate in view of the extent of U.S.-Australian space cooperation; also, astronaut Walter Cunningham will be guest of honor at the 1969 Coral Sea celebration in Australia in May, which has a "space" theme.

-- photographs of Sydney, Brisbane and Perth, taken by the Apollo 9 crew. (In its traditional farewell to our spacecraft, Perth turned on its lights for Apollo 9.)

-- a memento of the Battle of the Coral Sea, perhaps a ship's bell or a chair, etc. used by Admiral Nimitz.

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-- a ship model of bone and ivory (rare example of Americana; we know of only two in existence).

Mrs. Gorton's hobby is gardening. She has some artistic interests and some competence in Indonesian studies. A suitable gift for her this time might be a book on gardening or famous American gardens; an American painting; or an American handicraft or piece of jewelry.

Menu

According to Embassy Canberra, the Prime Minister likes all foods except clams. Mrs. Gorton does not like red wines. Both are especially fond of fresh fruit. The following dishes would add a personal touch to the menu:

-- a salad or other dish of fresh fruit, named after the Gorton's citrus farm in northern Victoria, "Mystic Park".

-- Mrs. Gorton's home town is Bangor, Maine, and Maine lobster would be an appropriate dish in her honor. It could be called "Lobster Bettina." Australians are fond of lobster, which they call "crayfish", but are accustomed only to the Pacific variety without claws.

Entertainment

Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton like the theater. (On their last visit to the United States, they reserved an evening in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.) They have little interest in opera or ballet, but like musical comedy. They prefer light entertainment, perhaps with a sophisticated touch. As background to the meal, an orchestra playing Broadway showtunes, etc., would be appropriate.

Special entertainment might be:

-- A celebrated singing entertainer such as Dinah Shore, Tony Bennett or Mahalia Jackson.

-- Pianist Andre Watts (but avoid a heavy program).

-- A celebrated actor in a program of readings.
(Charlton Heston had considerable success in Australia
with such a program.)

-- If Helen Hayes or Edgar Bergen could be coaxed
out of retirement for the occasion, either one would be
sure to please the Gortons.

-- Bob Hope is well known to Australians.

Drafted by: EA/ANZ:CCBrower
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
S/CPR - Miss Dunaway
S/CPR - Mr. King
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard

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LOU
JGA/G-1
March 10, 1969

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

Suggestions on Approaching Australians and
Conversational Topics

Australians are outgoing and straightforward, and mix exceptionally well with Americans. In fact, they have a special fondness for us, not untinged with envy at our greater affluence. Similarities in culture and outlook are great, and there are very few special sensitivities to beware of. Australia was first settled as a penal colony, and many of its citizens today are descended from convicts; this is a joking matter with most but a few may be touchy about it. Also, Australia today has a developed, dynamic economy and a sophisticated and predominantly urban culture. There is a growing sense of nationalistic pride. Australians sometimes resent questions which imply a rural stereotype (sheep, kangaroos and boomerangs) in the mind of the questioner.

Australia has no racial problems. The indigenous aborigines have a status similar to that of American Indians, and the "White Australia" immigration policy, while no longer officially referred to as such and slightly liberalized, remains substantially in effect. It enjoys solid public support, reinforced recently by our well-publicized racial troubles and those of Great Britain. Before he became Prime Minister, John Gorton firmly advocated the continued exclusion of colored immigrants, and expressed sympathy for the racial policies of Rhodesia and South Africa.

Conversational Topics

Australians are keenly competitive, a trait which is reflected in their excellence in several sports. Since World War II they have produced a number of great swimmers, including Dawn Frazer, Murray Rose and Mike Wenden (who

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won two gold medals at Mexico City). Milers John Landy and Herb Elliott have a place in history, as do tennis stars Lew Hoad, Ken Rosewall and Rod Laver. The Davis Cup in tennis has been completely dominated by the U. S. and Australia during the 23 years since World War II (15 wins for Australia vs. 8 for the U. S.). In 1968 at Adelaide, a U. S. team headed by Arthur Ashe and Clark Graebner recaptured the cup after a long string of Australian victories. President Nixon received the team on February 11, 1969 to congratulate them and view the cup; he was presented with a team necktie.

In recent years Australia and the U. S. have begun to vie in the America's Cup in yachting. This cup was first awarded at the London Exposition of 1851 after a race around the Isle of Wight open to all comers; it was named the America's Cup after the winning U. S. entry. The U. S. has defended the cup twenty times since and won every time. Australia has challenged twice, in 1962 with the Gretel and in 1967 with the Dame Pattie (named for the wife of former Prime Minister Menzies). The skipper of the victorious U. S. yachts in both encounters (Weatherly in 1962 and Intrepid in 1967) was Emil "Bus" Mosbacher Jr., now Chief of Protocol of the United States.

On the more serious side, Australia has been experiencing a remarkable boom in the discovery and exploration of mineral resources, including iron, nickel, bauxite and petroleum. This is often a good subject for conversation with Australian men.

Conversing with Gorton

Gorton is a complex personality who combines the shrewd, homespun quality of a man of the land with the sophistication of an honors graduate in history at Brasenose College, Oxford. While he has a typical Australian's rough contempt for intellectual pretensions, he has also (as Minister for Education and Science) come into intimate contact with the problems of the intellectual community and technology in a rapidly evolving modern society. His conversational range is broad. Topics for light conversation may be suggested by his student days, his marriage, his war experiences, or his recreational interests.

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Gorton's father owned a fruit farm in Victoria and, though the family could afford to send him to Melbourne's fashionable Geelong Grammar School, young John also had to work on the family property to help pay his way. When he finished at Oxford he went to Spain for a holiday and there met an American girl, Bettina Brown, of Bangor, Maine, a student at the Sorbonne who was vacationing in Spain. They were married in 1935 in the chapel at Brasenose College. Mrs. Gorton has retained her American citizenship to this day, although since her husband became Prime Minister she has traveled on an Australian diplomatic passport.

The couple returned to Australia and Gorton was making a big success of running his father's farm when the war broke out. He joined the Royal Australian Air Force as a fighter pilot and was shot down over Singapore. As he puts it, "My face got rather mixed up with the instrument panel." He was left with amiably crumpled features which today make him look rather like an aging former prize fighter. Swathed in bandages, he was evacuated from Singapore aboard a ship which was torpedoed and sunk. He spent 24 hours aboard a life raft in the Java Sea before being rescued by an Australian destroyer. Returning to active duty, he was shot down again in 1944 and lived for days on turtle eggs and fish on an island in the Timor Sea.

Although Gorton no longer farms actively, he still spends much time outdoors at tennis and swimming. He likes bridge and "mucking around in the garden." He reads avidly -- anything from spy fiction to scientific reports -- but describes his taste in entertainment as somewhat philistine. "I was brought up as a kid on a diet of flying arrows in Nottingham Forest and books where Buffalo Bill Cody harried redskins on every page," he told an interviewer. "Give me Laramie, not Lohengrin. I'm not a boor, but I'm no culture-vulture either."

However, Gorton and his wife share an interest in the theater which is not "philistine." On their visit to the United States in May last year, they reserved an evening in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.

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DRAFTED BY:

rlw
EA/ANZ:CCBrower:rlw 3/6/69

CONCURRENCES:

MM
EA/ANZ - Mrs Moore

S/S-S:WSShepard

X-4155



S/S 3422

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Preparatory Meeting for the
Visit of Prime Minister Gorton
of Australia

The enclosed materials relating to the visit of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia have been prepared for use at the preparatory meeting for the visit, to be held at 2:30 PM on Monday afternoon in the White House situation room.

Five copies of each document are enclosed for your convenience.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Scope Paper
2. Suggestions on Approaching the
Australians
3. Gift, Menu and Entertainment
Suggestions
4. Official Party
5. Tentative Program



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 27, 1969

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1. Snyder ✓
2. Pet. ✓
on file ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of Australian Prime Minister Gorton

Prime Minister Gorton will visit Washington March 31, 1969, at the President's invitation. The Department contemplates the following schedule of major events for the visit, which would meet all of the Prime Minister's requests:

A. March 30

1. Late afternoon: Arrive Andrews Air Force Base in USAF aircraft. (Aircraft will pick up Prime Minister at his CONUS point of entry, as yet undetermined.) Travel from AAFB to Blair House by car.

2. Evening private.

B. March 31

1. 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.: Meeting with President at White House; informal arrival ceremony.

2. Lunchtime unscheduled as yet.

3. Afternoon unscheduled as yet.

4. 8:00 P.M.: Dinner at White House.

C. April 1

1. 11:00 A.M.: Meeting with Secretary of State.

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

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- 2 -

2. Luncheon unscheduled as yet.
3. 2:00 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Defense.
4. 4:15 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Treasury
5. Evening: Reserved for social function at Australian Embassy.

D. April 2

1. Morning unscheduled as yet.
2. 12:15 P.M.: Prime Minister addresses National Press Club lunch.
3. 2:30 P.M.: Departure from Washington by Canadian Government aircraft for official visit to Ottawa.

Further plans for the yet unscheduled time in the Prime Minister's program will be made in consultation with the Australian Embassy. The composition of the Prime Minister's party has not yet been announced, but should Mrs. Gorton accompany him a separate program for her can be arranged.

Before the Department can coordinate and elaborate the schedule with the Australian Embassy, approval of certain key elements in it is required, as follows:

(A) Meeting with the President at 10:30 A.M., March 31;

(B) Dinner at the White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.

It would also be desirable to set aside time on the President's appointments calendar for a second business meeting, should the President wish to talk further with the Prime Minister. The hour of 10:00 A.M., April 1, would fit into the schedule.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the 10:30 A.M. meeting with the President on March 31 be approved.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternative _____

2. That a dinner be scheduled at the White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____


Alternative _____

3. That the hour 10:00 - 11:00 A.M., April 1, be set aside for a possible second meeting between the President and the Prime Minister.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternative _____


John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

LIST OF PAPERS

I. GENERAL

A. Scope Paper	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/7
B. President's Briefing Memorandum	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/24
C. Secretary's Briefing Memorandum	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/24
D. Suggestions on Approaching the Australians	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/7
E. Gift and Menu Suggestions	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/7
F. Official Party	S/CPR - Mr. King	3/7
G. Schedule	S/CPR - Mr. King	3/7

II. BACKGROUND PAPERS

A. Situation in Australia	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/17
B. Malaysia/Singapore Defense	EA/RA - Mr. Donald	3/17
C. Sabah Dispute	EA/PHL - Miss McLendon	3/17
D. Australia and Vietnam	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/17
E. Paris Negotiations	EA/VN - Mr. Isham	3/28
F. Defense Purchases	ISA - Cmdr. Kuhn	3/17
G. Trade Problems	E/ORF - Mr. Katz	3/17
H. U.S. Investment in Australia	E/OMA - Mr. Heginbotham	3/17
I. Civil Aviation Problems	E/OA/AVP - Mr. Styles	3/17
J. Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project	SCI - Mr. Sievering	3/17
K. Nonproliferation Treaty	ACDA - Mr. Maylen	3/17
L. Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia	EA/RA - Mr. Donald	3/21

III. PUBLIC STATEMENTS

A. President's Toast	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/12
B. Joint Statement	EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower	3/12

IV. BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES

EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower 3/21

William S. Shepard
William S. Shepard, S/S-S
Ext. 4155, Room 7237

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

Background Paper

42

AUSTRALIA AND VIET-NAM

Summary

The Australian Government supports the allied effort in South Viet-Nam both with an 8000-man troop contribution and with economic assistance. The Government's position enjoys strong public support which has, however, been subject to steady erosion in the past eighteen months. Prime Minister Gorton is sensitive about being fully consulted on U. S. Viet-Nam policy, and the GOA is uneasy about our future posture on Viet-Nam.

Main points are -

Troop Contribution. Australia now maintains in Viet-Nam approximately 8000 troops. These include a combat brigade and support, a jungle warfare advisory unit, a Canberra bomber squadron, an air transport unit and a guided missile destroyer. The first Australian contingent was sent in early 1965 by Prime Minister Menzies. Harold Holt as Prime Minister announced two increases --from 1500 to 6300 troops in January 1966, and from 6300 to 8000 in October 1967. However, his successor, John Gorton, declared immediately after assuming office in January 1968 that there would be no further troop increases, barring some major change in the situation.

Economic Aid. Australia has given South Viet-Nam more than \$10.5 million in economic aid since 1964. Goods and materials furnished have included textbooks in Vietnamese, corrugated roofing, community windmills, a radio broadcasting station, hand tools, radios, blankets and food. About fifty Australian civilian technicians

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

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are serving in Viet-Nam, including surgical teams, civil engineers and agricultural experts. About 130 Vietnamese students are studying in Australia.

Public Support. The Government's stand on Viet-Nam enjoys strong but slowly diminishing public support. The last general election, in November 1966, was fought largely on the Viet-Nam issue, with the opposition Australian Labor Party arguing against military involvement in the conflict. The election returns gave the Government the biggest parliamentary majority in Australian history, and the ALP's new and more flexible leader, Gough Whitlam, subsequently moderated the party's line on Viet-Nam. Gallup polls during the past eighteen months have reflected steady erosion in Viet-Nam support, with those favoring continuing the war falling from a high of 62% (May 1967) to 49% in December 1968. (The breakdown in the December 1968 poll was "continue the war," 49%; "bring back our forces," 37%; undecided 14%.)

Consultation. Prime Minister Gorton was indignant when President Johnson on March 31, 1968 announced limitation of U. S. bombing of North Viet-Nam with only 24 hours' prior notice to him and what he felt was insufficient consultation. The GOA was embarrassed because less than a week previously Minister for External Affairs Hasluck and Minister for Defense Fairhall had told Parliament that the bombing pressure must be kept up until North Viet-Nam was willing to make a reciprocal reduction in the level of hostilities.

There has been a full flow of information about the Paris talks to the Australian Government through briefings in Paris of Ambassador Anderson (the Australian liaison officer there) by our negotiators, through briefings of Ambassador Waller in Washington, and through transmission of texts and reports by our Embassy in Canberra. However, the Australian Government is uneasy about the future posture of the United States with respect to Viet-Nam and Asia generally.

SECRET

DRAFTED BY:

EA/ANZ:CCB^{ob}rower:rlw 2/25/69

CONCURRENCES:

EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore^{eb}

EA/VN - Mr. Flower~~ree~~

S/S-S:WSShepard

X-4155

March 12, 1969

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Gift and Menu SuggestionsGifts

When the Gortons visited Washington last May, President Johnson gave the Prime Minister a replica of the George Washington Reading Lamp in the Smithsonian, a gold Bulova desk clock, an IBM dictating machine and an inscribed family photograph. Mrs. Johnson gave Mrs. Gorton a vermeil dressing table box, a gold Bulova boudoir clock, three American Designer scarves, two White House books and three books on Indonesia (in which Mrs. Gorton has a scholarly interest). On this occasion, it is recommended that we avoid multiple gifts, and confine ourselves to one nice gift to each person. With regard to personal gifts, both Gortons have simple conservative tastes in clothing and accessories.

Prime Minister Gorton is a heavy smoker (Benson and Hedges); an engraved cigarette box, case or lighter might be a suitable gift on this visit. From his university days he retains a knowledge of our Civil War, suggesting a book, map or other gift with a Civil War theme. Other possibilities include:

-- a painting (any period or style with the exception of "pop". Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)

-- an antique map depicting Australia, the Pacific and the Americas. (Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)

-- a memento of the Apollo 8 flight, perhaps some fitting from the actual spacecraft. This would be appropriate in view of the extent of U.S.-Australian space cooperation; also, astronaut Walter Cunningham will be guest of honor at the 1969 Coral Sea celebration in Australia in May, which has a "space" theme.

-- a memento of the Battle of the Coral Sea, perhaps a ship's bell or a chair, etc. used by Admiral Nimitz.

-- a ship model of bone and ivory (rare example of Americana; we know of only two in existence).

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Mrs. Gorton's hobby is gardening. She has some artistic interests and some competence in Indonesian studies. A suitable gift for her this time might be a book on gardening or famous American gardens; an American painting; or an American handicraft or piece of jewelry.

Menu

According to Embassy Canberra, the Prime Minister likes all foods except clams. Mrs. Gorton does not like red wines. Both are especially fond of fresh fruit. The following dishes would add a personal touch to the menu:

-- a salad or other dish of fresh fruit, named after the Gortons' citrus farm in northern Victoria, "Mystic Park".

-- Mrs. Gorton's home town is Bangor, Maine, and Maine lobster would be an appropriate dish in her honor. It could be called "Lobster Bettina." Australians are fond of lobster, which they call "crayfish", but are accustomed only to the Pacific variety without claws.

Drafted by:	EA/ANZ:CCBrower
Cleared by:	EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
	S/CPR - Miss Dunaway
	S/CPR - Mr. King
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard	

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VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

Suggestions on Approaching Australians and
Conversational Topics

Australians are outgoing and straightforward, and mix exceptionally well with Americans. In fact, they have a special fondness for us, not untinged with envy at our greater affluence. Similarities in culture and outlook are great, and there are very few special sensitivities to beware of. Australia was first settled as a penal colony, and many of its citizens today are descended from convicts; this is a joking matter with most but a few may be touchy about it. Also, Australia today has a developed, dynamic economy and a sophisticated and predominantly urban culture. There is a growing sense of nationalistic pride. Australians sometimes resent questions which imply a rural stereotype (sheep, kangaroos and boomerangs) in the mind of the questioner.

Australia has no racial problems. The indigenous aborigines have a status similar to that of American Indians, and the "White Australia" immigration policy, while no longer officially referred to as such and slightly liberalized, remains substantially in effect. It enjoys solid public support, reinforced recently by our well-publicized racial troubles and those of Great Britain. Before he became Prime Minister, John Gorton firmly advocated the continued exclusion of colored immigrants, and expressed sympathy for the racial policies of Rhodesia and South Africa.

Conversational Topics

Australians are keenly competitive, a trait which is reflected in their excellence in several sports. Since World War II they have produced a number of great swimmers, including Dawn Frazer, Murray Rose and Mike Wenden (who

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won two gold medals at Mexico City). Milers John Landy and Herb Elliott have a place in history, as do tennis stars Lew Hoad, Ken Rosewall and Rod Laver. The Davis Cup in tennis has been completely dominated by the U. S. and Australia during the 23 years since World War II (15 wins for Australia vs. 8 for the U. S.). In 1968 at Adelaide, a U. S. team headed by Arthur Ashe and Clark Graebner recaptured the cup after a long string of Australian victories. President Nixon received the team on February 11, 1969 to congratulate them and view the cup; he was presented with a team necktie.

In recent years Australia and the U. S. have begun to vie in the America's Cup in yachting. This cup was first awarded at the London Exposition of 1851 after a race around the Isle of Wight open to all comers; it was named the America's Cup after the winning U. S. entry. The U. S. has defended the cup twenty times since and won every time. Australia has challenged twice, in 1962 with the Gretel and in 1967 with the Dame Pattie (named for the wife of former Prime Minister Menzies). The skipper of the victorious U. S. yachts in both encounters (Weatherly in 1962 and Intrepid in 1967) was Emil "Bus" Mosbacher Jr., now Chief of Protocol of the United States.

On the more serious side, Australia has been experiencing a remarkable boom in the discovery and exploration of mineral resources, including iron, nickel, bauxite and petroleum. This is often a good subject for conversation with Australian men.

Conversing with Gorton

Gorton is a complex personality who combines the shrewd, homespun quality of a man of the land with the sophistication of an honors graduate in history at Brasenose College, Oxford. While he has a typical Australian's rough contempt for intellectual pretensions, he has also (as Minister for Education and Science) come into intimate contact with the problems of the intellectual community and technology in a rapidly evolving modern society. His conversational range is broad. Topics for light conversation may be suggested by his student days, his marriage, his war experiences, or his recreational interests.

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Gorton's father owned a fruit farm in Victoria and, though the family could afford to send him to Melbourne's fashionable Geelong Grammar School, young John also had to work on the family property to help pay his way. When he finished at Oxford he went to Spain for a holiday and there met an American girl, Bettina Brown, of Bangor, Maine, a student at the Sorbonne who was vacationing in Spain. They were married in 1935 in the chapel at Brasenose College. Mrs. Gorton has retained her American citizenship to this day, although since her husband became Prime Minister she has traveled on an Australian diplomatic passport.

The couple returned to Australia and Gorton was making a big success of running his father's farm when the war broke out. He joined the Royal Australian Air Force as a fighter pilot and was shot down over Singapore. As he puts it, "My face got rather mixed up with the instrument panel." He was left with amiably crumpled features which today make him look rather like an aging former prize fighter. Swathed in bandages, he was evacuated from Singapore aboard a ship which was torpedoed and sunk. He spent 24 hours aboard a life raft in the Java Sea before being rescued by an Australian destroyer. Returning to active duty, he was shot down again in 1944 and lived for days on turtle eggs and fish on an island in the Timor Sea.

Although Gorton no longer farms actively, he still spends much time outdoors at tennis and swimming. He likes bridge and "mucking around in the garden." He reads avidly -- anything from spy fiction to scientific reports -- but describes his taste in entertainment as somewhat philistine. "I was brought up as a kid on a diet of flying arrows in Nottingham Forest and books where Buffalo Bill Cody harried redskins on every page," he told an interviewer. "Give me Laramie, not Lohengrin. I'm not a boor, but I'm no culture-vulture either."

However, Gorton and his wife share an interest in the theater which is not "philistine." On their visit to the United States in May last year, they reserved an evening in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.

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VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

SCOPE PAPER

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I. The Setting

Prime Minister Gorton's visit comes at a turning point in the history of Australian foreign policy. On February 25, Gorton announced his Government's decision to maintain Australian forces -- including ground forces -- in Malaysia/Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971. This is perhaps the most important step Australia has taken since its entrance as an independent actor on the world stage in the 1940's. Gorton's main purpose in coming is to plumb United States attitudes and intentions regarding East Asia as they bear on the Australian decision. The impressions he receives can be expected to affect the vigor with which Australia assumes its new, heightened role in Southeast Asia.

The Australian Government's historic decision resulted from the interplay of several factors. These included anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded, nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy leanings; the approach of a general election; and the stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.

"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?

Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries. While this course has been carried out through economic aid, diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it has also had an important military component -- the policy of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward defense has justified Australian participation in regional

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security efforts including Korea, SEATO and Viet-Nam and, since 1955, its support of British undertakings to defend Malaysia and Singapore. Conscious of its relative weakness, however, and feeling isolated and vulnerable in its corner of Asia, Australia has been careful to risk its limited forces only in close association with one or both of its "great and powerful friends", Britain and the United States.

In 1968, two developments combined to thrust Australia into a dilemma. The first was Britain's decision, made public in January, to accelerate withdrawal of its forces from Malaysia/Singapore and complete the pull-out by the end of 1971. The second was President Johnson's announcement on March 31, 1968 of a unilateral halt in the bombing of North Viet-Nam and his own retirement from politics. This surprising and dramatic development, and the subsequent change of leadership in a United States which as seen from Australia has seemed increasingly preoccupied with internal problems, have created uncertainty and anxiety in Australian minds about the future course of America's Asia policy. One of Australia's "powerful friends", the U.K., was preparing to leave the scene. Would the other, the U. S., also drift away? In view of this possibility, was forward defense still a wise policy?

Debate on this question could not remain theoretical, since Australia was faced with a pressing practical decision. It now has ground, air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore alongside the British. Should it keep its forces there after the British leave (as Malaysia and Singapore have requested), or should it pull them out? Keeping them there would be a historic and possibly dangerous departure from the traditional policy of stationing Australian forces overseas only alongside a major power -- the British or the Americans. Pulling them out would imply abandonment of forward defense, and perhaps a fundamental reorientation of Australia's Southeast Asia policy. The decision could not be long deferred, since the five Commonwealth powers concerned (Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the U.K.) have begun consultations looking toward a new arrangement for the defense of the area post-1971. Australian participation is the key to the emergence of any such new arrangement which promises

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to be effective, and Australian indecision has already seriously hampered the five-power consultations.

In the debate in Australia, the traditional forward defense policy has had powerful advocates, including the Ministers of External Affairs and Defense, the top civil servants in these departments, and the military services. The alternative strategy, dubbed "fortress Australia" by the press, calls for less involvement in Southeast Asia and increased concentration upon internal economic development, military preparedness and continental and immediate offshore defense, focusing on the mainland and Papua/New Guinea. In an extreme, isolationist form it has been espoused by Jim Cairns, spokesman for the powerful left-wing faction in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and a good bet to become Leader of the Opposition in 1970. A still more important figure who early disclosed strong leanings toward "fortress Australia" -- although his position was often contradictory and unclear -- was the complex, controversial man who became Prime Minister in January 1968, John Grey Gorton.

Gorton's Indecision

Gorton at various times has given numerous indications of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition towards its opposite. At his first press conference as Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam. A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question, he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968. He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least without being sure of being able to get them out if they got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over

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Singapore in 1942, he saw an entire Australian division -- one fourth of his country's combat infantry -- trapped and forced to surrender to the Japanese. As Prime Minister, he is understandably determined not to be responsible for a repetition of this debacle.

With Britain's decision to withdraw from Malaysia/Singapore by 1971 apparently irrevocable, Gorton's concern appeared to focus sharply on the course of U. S. Asia policy under President Johnson's successor. After Johnson's March 31, 1968 speech, Gorton told the Liberal Party caucus and the press that he was convinced there would be a major U. S. retrenchment in Asia -- possibly amounting to a return to pre-World War II isolationism -- under the next U. S. administration, and that this might well necessitate abandonment of "the Menzies concept of forward defense" in favor of "an Israeli-type defense scheme." Although this topic dominated his discussions in Washington in May 1968 almost to the exclusion of all others, he left unconvinced by the Johnson administration's protestations of continued U. S. firmness in East Asia. He subsequently reiterated in public that no decision would be made on the commitment of Australian ground forces until certain "imponderables" -- meaning primarily U. S. Asia policy under the new administration -- became clear to him. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in mid-January, he privately took the position with the British that he could not run the risk of involvement, particularly of his ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore until he knew in advance who would "back him up". He therefore planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment of ground forces, he said, until he had talked to President Nixon.

With characteristic directness and persistence, Gorton successfully sought an early meeting with the new President. On February 7, "Len" Hewitt, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department and Gorton's closest adviser, told our Ambassador that Gorton had only one thing on his mind in coming to Washington other than getting acquainted with the President, and that was to learn exactly what was the U. S. position on the stationing of Australian troops in Malaysia/Singapore. Gorton would make it clear that if Australian troops were stationed there, they would never get involved in local conflicts or hostilities with Indonesia or the Philippines. However, he would want to

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know from President Nixon what the United States would do if Australian troops became involved in countering aggression by Red China or North Viet-Nam. Gorton himself reiterated this to our Ambassador the next day, adding that if the need arose he would commit troops to fight with us in Thailand.

The Election and Gorton's Decision

Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect, appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan -- was being called upon to play a new, more independent role. Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge? "Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party organization began advising him that a strong defense policy was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.

The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting statements helped build up suspense for his promised announcement of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced by Gorton.

Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External

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Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate -- forward defense including a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political masterstroke. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this the only foreign policy issue in an election which the bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country into a new era of its nationhood.

Significance for the Visit

Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety of his forces as a precondition for committing them. Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a guarantee, especially in a form which would have been politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in Malaysia/Singapore.

On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?

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His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if such a situation should arise we would have to look to the support of allies outside the region". In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S. support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the temper of the new administration and the general posture it will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs on which it is taking the first step.

II. The Visitor

Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative, with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind. Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him. He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like, and his standing with the man in the street is high. Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.

Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead. His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile, conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered strength and homely charm. His later war service has about it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the

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late John F. KennedyBack on active service, a crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic, direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis, an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocol, the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals, Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."

Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.

III. Australian Aims

The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia, as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's mind.

He will:

- assess the firmness of the new administration's posture in Southeast Asia;
- ask to what extent the U. S. is prepared to back up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
- be interested in the President's thinking on post-Vietnam Asia;
- argue for better treatment from the United States in the economic field;

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-- size up the President.

IV. United States Aims

Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:

-- without increasing our commitments, to give Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;

-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;

-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his - on post-Vietnam Asia;

-- to establish a good personal relationship between the President and Gorton;

-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the Australian people that the United States is and will remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist expansion in Asia.

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Approved by: The Secretary <i>CS</i>

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AJH Larson

VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

Background Paper

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AUSTRALIA AND VIET-NAM

Summary

The Australian Government supports the allied effort in South Viet-Nam both with an 8000-man troop contribution and with economic assistance. The Government's position enjoys strong public support which has, however, been subject to steady erosion in the past eighteen months. Prime Minister Gorton is sensitive about being fully consulted on U. S. Viet-Nam policy, and the GOA is uneasy about our future posture on Viet-Nam.

Main points are -

Troop Contribution. Australia now maintains in Viet-Nam approximately 8000 troops. These include a combat brigade and support, a jungle warfare advisory unit, a Canberra bomber squadron, an air transport unit and a guided missile destroyer. The first Australian contingent was sent in early 1965 by Prime Minister Menzies. Harold Holt as Prime Minister announced two increases --from 1500 to 6300 troops in January 1966, and from 6300 to 8000 in October 1967. However, his successor, John Gorton, declared immediately after assuming office in January 1968 that there would be no further troop increases, barring some major change in the situation.

Economic Aid. Australia has given South Viet-Nam more than \$10.5 million in economic aid since 1964. Goods and materials furnished have included textbooks in Vietnamese, corrugated roofing, community windmills, a radio broadcasting station, hand tools, radios, blankets and food. About fifty Australian civilian technicians

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are serving in Viet-Nam, including surgical teams, civil engineers and agricultural experts. About 130 Vietnamese students are studying in Australia.

Public Support. The Government's stand on Viet-Nam enjoys strong but slowly diminishing public support. The last general election, in November 1966, was fought largely on the Viet-Nam issue, with the opposition Australian Labor Party arguing against military involvement in the conflict. The election returns gave the Government the biggest parliamentary majority in Australian history, and the ALP's new and more flexible leader, Gough Whitlam, subsequently moderated the party's line on Viet-Nam. Gallup polls during the past eighteen months have reflected steady erosion in Viet-Nam support, with those favoring continuing the war falling from a high of 62% (May 1967) to 49% in December 1968. (The breakdown in the December 1968 poll was "continue the war," 49%; "bring back our forces," 37%; undecided 14%.)

Consultation. Prime Minister Gorton was indignant when President Johnson on March 31, 1968 announced limitation of U. S. bombing of North Viet-Nam with only 24 hours' prior notice to him and what he felt was insufficient consultation. The GOA was embarrassed because less than a week previously Minister for External Affairs Hasluck and Minister for Defense Fairhall had told Parliament that the bombing pressure must be kept up until North Viet-Nam was willing to make a reciprocal reduction in the level of hostilities.

There has been a full flow of information about the Paris talks to the Australian Government through briefings in Paris of Ambassador Anderson (the Australian liaison officer there) by our negotiators, through briefings of Ambassador Waller in Washington, and through transmission of texts and reports by our Embassy in Canberra. However, the Australian Government is uneasy about the future posture of the United States with respect to Viet-Nam and Asia generally.

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VISIT OF JOHN GORTON
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
April 1, 1969

SCOPE PAPER

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I. The Setting

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The Australian Government's historic decision resulted from the interplay of several factors. These included anticipated changes in British and U. S. deployments in Southeast Asia; the accession of a strong-minded, nationalistic Prime Minister with heterodox foreign policy leanings; the approach of a general election; and the stirrings of a new nationalism in Australia.

"Forward Defense" or "Fortress Australia"?

Since World War II, Australia has increasingly sought to develop closer relations with Southeast Asian countries. While this course has been carried out through economic aid, diplomacy and participation in regional organizations, it has also had an important military component -- the policy of "forward defense." Based on the idea of stopping the enemy as far as possible from Australian shores, forward defense has justified Australian participation in regional

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Gorton at various times has given numerous indications of doubts about forward defense and a predisposition towards its opposite. At his first press conference as Prime Minister, he made a startling off-the-cuff announcement that no more Australian troops would be sent to Viet-Nam. A strong nationalist, he has charted a course assertive of distinctively Australian interests and has shown that in his thinking domestic economic development enjoys first claim on national resources. Seeming to split sharply with his Ministers of External Affairs and Defense over Southeast Asia policy and the Malaysia/Singapore question, he brought no advisers and requested no briefing papers from their departments when he visited Washington in May 1968. He repeatedly expressed skepticism as to the wisdom or desirability of stationing Australian forces, especially ground forces, in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971 -- at least without being sure of being able to get them out if they got into serious trouble. This attitude reflects his personal experience; as a fighter pilot in action over

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The Election and Gorton's Decision

Meanwhile -- with a general election coming up in November 1969 at the latest -- there were signs that the Australian public was making up its mind on the foreign policy debate. The fact that British withdrawal implied increased Australian responsibility, while it had its alarming aspect, appealed at the same time to Australia's growing national pride. Australia -- economically the third most powerful nation in Asia and technologically second only to Japan -- was being called upon to play a new, more independent role. Surely it would not be too timid to rise to the challenge? "Fortress Australia", from this point of view, could easily be depicted as un-Australian. Gorton's Christmas message to Australian troops in Viet-Nam, written in ringing "forward-defense" tones, met with a warm response. The Liberal Party organization began advising him that a strong defense policy was his election winner. This advice was reinforced by the press, most of which favored staying on after 1971, and by the views of the Liberal Party's two election allies, the Country Party and the hawkish Democratic Labor Party.

The uncertainty created by Gorton's previous, conflicting statements helped build up suspense for his promised announcement of a new defense policy when Parliament reconvened on February 25. Most observers expected him to announce a decision to maintain air and naval forces in Malaysia/Singapore after 1971, but to postpone a decision on ground forces because of "imponderables". The moderate leader of the Opposition (ALP), Gough Whitlam, evidently anticipated such a position and tried to pre-empt it by adopting in advance a very similar one. Whitlam came out for air and naval deployments but rejected the commitment of ground forces, in favor of maintaining a "mobile striking force" in Australia which could be sent if needed -- an idea originally advanced by Gorton.

Gorton made one quiet, preparatory move -- he announced the resignation of Paul Hasluck as Minister for External

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Affairs and his elevation to Governor General. With Hasluck thus out of the way, Gorton had the spotlight entirely to himself when he made his surprise announcement on February 25 that Australia would go all the way with the policy of which Hasluck had been the leading advocate -- forward defense including a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971.

Gorton's speech was his finest hour and a political masterpiece. Lucid, forthright, statesmanlike, it won warm applause both at home and abroad. (Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, who had been urging this course on Gorton all along, made a simultaneous and similar announcement.) The Australian press was unanimously laudatory. Whitlam, neatly outmaneuvered, was obliged to attack the commitment of ground forces, thus making this the only foreign policy issue in an election which the bitterly divided ALP seems sure to lose. Gorton, on the other hand, seems likely to emerge from the election with increased stature, firmer control, and an enhanced image as a truly Australian Prime Minister leading his country into a new era of its nationhood.

Significance for the Visit

Gorton's decision to announce a commitment of ground forces to Malaysia/Singapore in advance of his visit to Washington has simplified our task. Previously, he seemed likely to seek a specific U. S. guarantee of the safety of his forces as a precondition for committing them. Obviously it would have been difficult to give such a guarantee, especially in a form which would have been politically useful to Gorton. The February 25 speech has made it clear that the U. S. will not have to pay this price in order to get an Australian ground-force presence in Malaysia/Singapore.

On the other hand, the speech has also in a sense put us on a spot, challenging the U. S. to be as firm and forthcoming as Australia has been. Gorton can now say that Australia is meeting the American requirement to do all it can; now what will Washington do to support that commitment?

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His speech made it clear that contingencies were conceivable with which Australian forces could not cope, and that "if such a situation should arise we would have to look to the support of allies outside the region". In this connection Gorton may still ask for specific assurances of U. S. support. At the very least, he will seek to sound out the temper of the new administration and the general posture it will take in Southeast Asia. The answers and impressions he receives will have a bearing on the confidence and vigor with which Australia pursues the new path in regional affairs on which it is taking the first step.

II. The Visitor

Personally, Prime Minister Gorton is conservative, with a brusque and flamboyant style. He is quick on his feet and tends to say what comes first into his mind. Prickly and sensitive, he refuses to be pressured or taken for granted. (For example, he reacted angrily and resentfully when he felt President Johnson had not consulted sufficiently with the GOA before announcing the partial bombing halt on March 31, 1968.) He can be extremely charming, but is instinctively aggressive with a streak of toughness and possibly nastiness just below the surface. He is inclined to be impetuous, abrasive and cocksure, restricts his advisers to a small inner circle, and has at times seemed lackadaisical in his approach to his work. These qualities have earned him a bad press and poor personal relations in the Government, but this has not seemed to bother him. He projects a charismatic toughness which Australians like, and his standing with the man in the street is high. Recently, both his performance and his press have improved.

Australia's top political journalist provides a vivid sketch bringing out Gorton's political appeal: "Oxford educated, a Victorian orchardist, he had been when young a very good-looking man, but in World War II, as a fighter pilot, he drove his face into the instrument panel of his bullet-damaged Hurricane in landing on the Singapore aerodrome as an RAAF-Japanese dogfight proceeded overhead. His rebuilt features are attractively ugly, mobile, conveying on TV screens a pleasant impression of battered strength and homely charm. His later war service has about it some of the romantic charm that surrounded that of the

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8

late John F. KennedyBack on active service, a crumpled-faced veteran, he crashlanded on an island in the Timor Sea and lived for days on turtles' eggs and fish before being rescued. Lean, wiry, six feet one inch tall, a careless dresser with hair that succumbs only temporarily to the discipline of comb and brush, laconic, direct and irreverent, addicted to swimming and tennis, an easy mixer who is impatient with formality, protocol, the establishment, and 'longhaired' intellectuals, Gorton represents what Australians have chosen to believe is the traditional Australian, both in his masculinity and derisive distaste for those who parade pretentiously intellectual accomplishments or academic qualifications."

Gorton has been married since 1935 to an American citizen, nee Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine. Mrs. Gorton is a shy, intelligent, gray-haired woman who has some competence in Indonesian studies. She is reportedly embittered by her husband's reputation as a lady-killer.

III. Australian Aims

The new administration's strategy in Southeast Asia, as it relates to Australia's involvement in the defense of the region, will be uppermost in the Prime Minister's mind.

He will:

- assess the firmness of the new administration's posture in Southeast Asia;
- ask to what extent the U. S. is prepared to back up Australian forces committed to Malaysia/Singapore after 1971;
- ask the President's thoughts on strategy and prospects for the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;
- be interested in the President's thinking on post-Vietnam Asia;
- argue for better treatment from the United States in the economic field;

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-- size up the President.

IV. United States Aims

Our aim is to secure continued strong Australian leadership in Southeast Asia. We should try:

-- without increasing our commitments, to give Gorton sufficient reassurance to encourage him to make a whole-hearted contribution to regional security;

-- to consult fully and frankly with him on the Viet-Nam war and negotiations;

-- fully to share our thoughts - and elicit his - on post-Vietnam Asia;

-- to establish a good personal relationship between the President and Gorton;

-- to reassure Gorton and, through him, the Australian people that the United States is and will remain a close, steadfast and special friend which can be relied upon to play a leading role in checking Communist expansion in Asia.

Drafted by: EA/ANZ:CCBrower <i>CB</i>
Cleared by: EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore <i>EM</i>
EA/RA - Mr. Donald <i>DS</i>
EA - Amb. Brown <i>WB</i>
EA - Amb. Godley <i>GS</i>
S/S-S - Mr. Shepard <i>SS</i>
Approved by: The Secretary <i>JS</i>

SECRET

Gift, Menu and Entertainment SuggestionsGifts

When the Gortons visited Washington last May, President Johnson gave the Prime Minister a replica of the George Washington Reading Lamp in the Smithsonian, a gold Bulova desk clock, an IBM dictating machine and an inscribed family photograph. Mrs. Johnson gave Mrs. Gorton a vermeil dressing table box, a gold Bulova boudoir clock, three American Designer scarves, two White House books and three books on Indonesia (in which Mrs. Gorton has a scholarly interest). On this occasion, it is recommended that we avoid multiple gifts, and confine ourselves to one or two nice gifts to each person. With regard to personal gifts, both Gortons have simple conservative tastes in clothing and accessories.

Prime Minister Gorton is a heavy smoker (Benson and Hedges); an engraved cigarette box, case or lighter might be a suitable gift on this visit. From his university days he retains a knowledge of our Civil War, suggesting a book, map or other gift with a Civil War theme. Other possibilities include:

- a painting (any period or style with the exception of "pop". Suggested by Embassy Canberra).
- an antique map depicting Australia, the Pacific and the Americas. (Suggested by Embassy Canberra.)
- a memento of the Apollo 8 flight, perhaps some fitting from the actual spacecraft. This would be appropriate in view of the extent of U.S.-Australian space cooperation; also, astronaut Walter Cunningham will be guest of honor at the 1969 Coral Sea celebration in Australia in May, which has a "space" theme.
- photographs of Sydney, Brisbane and Perth, taken by the Apollo 9 crew. (In its traditional farewell to our spacecraft, Perth turned on its lights for Apollo 9.)
- a memento of the Battle of the Coral Sea, perhaps a ship's bell or a chair, etc. used by Admiral Nimitz.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

-- a ship model of bone and ivory (rare example of Americana; we know of only two in existence).

Mrs. Gorton's hobby is gardening. She has some artistic interests and some competence in Indonesian studies. A suitable gift for her this time might be a book on gardening or famous American gardens; an American painting; or an American handicraft or piece of jewelry.

Menu

According to Embassy Canberra, the Prime Minister likes all foods except clams. Mrs. Gorton does not like red wines. Both are especially fond of fresh fruit. The following dishes would add a personal touch to the menu:

-- a salad or other dish of fresh fruit, named after the Gorton's citrus farm in northern Victoria, "Mystic Park".

-- Mrs. Gorton's home town is Bangor, Maine, and Maine lobster would be an appropriate dish in her honor. It could be called "Lobster Bettina." Australians are fond of lobster, which they call "crayfish", but are accustomed only to the Pacific variety without claws.

Entertainment

Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton like the theater. (On their last visit to the United States, they reserved an evening in New York to see Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead.) They have little interest in opera or ballet, but like musical comedy. They prefer light entertainment, perhaps with a sophisticated touch. As background to the meal, an orchestra playing Broadway showtunes, etc., would be appropriate.

Special entertainment might be:

-- A celebrated singing entertainer such as Dinah Shore, Tony Bennett or Mahalia Jackson.

-- Pianist Andre Watts (but avoid a heavy program).

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3

-- A celebrated actor in a program of readings.
(Charlton Heston had considerable success in Australia
with such a program.)

-- If Helen Hayes or Edgar Bergen could be coaxed
out of retirement for the occasion, either one would be
sure to please the Gortons.

-- Bob Hope is well known to Australians.

Drafted by:	EA/ANZ:CCBrower
Cleared by:	EA/ANZ - Mr. Moore
	S/CPR - Miss Dunaway
	S/CPR - Mr. King
S/S-S	- Mr. Shepard

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Apr
1. *Snider*
2. *Ree*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

FEB 27 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of Australian Prime Minister Gorton

Prime Minister Gorton will visit Washington March 31, 1969, at the President's invitation. The Department contemplates the following schedule of major events for the visit, which would meet all of the Prime Minister's requests:

A. March 30

1. Late afternoon: Arrive Andrews Air Force Base in USAF aircraft. (Aircraft will pick up Prime Minister at his CONUS point of entry, as yet undetermined.) Travel from AAFB to Blair House by car.

2. Evening private.

April 1
B. March 31

1. 10:30 A.M. - 12:00 P.M.: Meeting with President at White House; informal arrival ceremony.

1 pm - 1 1/2 hr
1/2 hr alone
1 hr w/ advisors

2. Lunchtime unscheduled as yet.

State
Def
Threat

3. Afternoon unscheduled as yet.

4. 8:00 P.M.: Dinner at White House.)

April 1

1. 11:00 A.M.: Meeting with Secretary of State.

April 2
10:00 am meet w/ Gorton
+ recap

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

2. Luncheon unscheduled as yet.
3. 2:00 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Defense.
4. 4:15 P.M.: Meeting with Secretary of Treasury.
5. Evening: Reserved for social function at Australian Embassy.

D. April 2

1. Morning unscheduled as yet.
2. 12:15 P.M.: Prime Minister addresses National Press Club lunch.
3. 2:30 P.M.: Departure from Washington by Canadian Government aircraft for official visit to Ottawa.

Further plans for the yet unscheduled time in the Prime Minister's program will be made in consultation with the Australian Embassy. The composition of the Prime Minister's party has not yet been announced, but should Mrs. Gorton accompany him a separate program for her can be arranged.

Before the Department can coordinate and elaborate the schedule with the Australian Embassy, your approval of certain key elements in it is required, as follows:
(A) Meeting with the President at 10:30 A.M., March 31;
(B) Dinner at the White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.
It would also be desirable to set aside time on the President's appointments calendar for a second business meeting, should the President wish to talk further with the Prime Minister. The hour of 10:00 A.M., April 1, would fit well into the schedule.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve the 10:30 A.M. meeting with the President on March 31.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternative _____

2. That you approve scheduling a dinner at the White House at 8:00 P.M., March 31.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternative _____

3. That you approve setting aside the hour 10:00 - 11:00 A.M., April 1, for a possible second meeting between the President and the Prime Minister.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternative _____

John P. Walker

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN

The President has approved a recommendation by the Secretary of State that Prime Minister Gorton of Australia be invited to Washington for a private visit on March 31. Gorton has accepted the President's invitation. The tentative program for the day would consist of a working meeting -- probably about two hours -- and an informal lunch or dinner. As you can see from the attached memo, the details of the schedule have not yet been presented to the President. I think you should, however, hold the time open for these activities. As soon as specific recommendations are received, I will check them with you before any action is taken.


Richard M. Moose

Attachment

February 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DWIGHT CHAPIN

The President has approved a recommendation by the Secretary of State that Prime Minister Gorton of Australia be invited to Washington for a private visit on March 31. Gorton has accepted the President's invitation. The tentative program for the day would consist of a working meeting -- probably about two hours -- and an informal lunch or dinner. As you can see from the attached memo the details of the schedule have not yet been presented to the President. I think you should, however, hold the time open for these activities. As soon as specific recommendations are received, I will check them with you before any action is taken.

Richard M. Moose

Attachment

Cy of Memo for Pres. fm SecState

Cy of Memo for Pres. fm HAK w/Presidential approval check

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Moore

Dick:

I suggest Telegram ~~not~~
need not be sent to the
President, but held to be sent
once President approves in site.

Dick S.

Cleared by J Walsh
per HAK
2/7/69
6:10 P.M.
DEMORRE

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

1. Sent by: _____

2. TO: WH
(Msg. No.) 261

3. Transmitted by: [Signature]
Date & Time: _____

4. Received by: WNSR
Date & Time: 1440

5. Description: Memo to President and Telegram to CANBERRA

6. Class & Controls: SECRET and ESK CONFIDENTIAL

7. No. of Pgs. 2 8. Precedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by: JPWalsh

10. Deliver to: Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House

For: Clearance XXXX
Information _____
Per Request _____

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Cleared to J. Walsh
per HAK
6:10 p.m. 2/7/69
emphasized to
wash. son
1 week + 1 social
occ. sign
Network

Origin ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA

STATE _____

Ref: Canberra 726

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit

1. Please inform Prime Minister Gorton that President will be happy to receive him for private visit March 31, if that date convenient for Gorton. We will propose detailed schedule of meetings and social events later.
2. Private visit, which is confined to one day and is largely free of protocol formalities, is proposed in order to conserve President's time and on assumption (based on Gorton's correspondence with President and indications received from Australian Embassy here) that essentially working visit will satisfy Gorton. Private visit precludes neither informal White House social function nor publicity, of course, but ~~responsibility for walk-in his expenses~~
3. Upon receipt Gorton's acceptance we will wish work out joint understanding with GOA re public announcement of visit.

END

Drafted by EA/ANZ:R Moore:aw 2/6/69 Tel. Lit. 2996 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by S/S - John P. Walsh

Clearances: EA - Mr. Duemling S/CPR - Mr. King
J - Mr. Dillon S/S -
EA/P - Mr. Lewis White House -

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET


February 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton


You will recall that, in your absence, I took a call from Prime Minister Gorton, who suggested that he would like to visit Washington during the period March 30 to April 12. Secretary Rogers has recommended a working visit on March 31 (Tab A). Such a visit would minimize the demands on your time and still permit a full exchange with Gorton. I agree.

If you approve, Ambassador Crook will be instructed to transmit your invitation.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Other _____


Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET

Historical File

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 6, 1969

976 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton

RECOMMENDATION:

That you invite Prime Minister Gorton to make a private visit to Washington on March 31.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

Henry Kissinger has informed me of a recent exchange with Prime Minister Gorton on the timing of a visit to Washington, and your preference for the earlier part of the period which Gorton has suggested (March 30-April 12).

Within the next few days I will be sending you a memorandum proposing a coordinated schedule of state and official visits for the next year. A visit by Gorton would best fit into that tentative schedule on March 31.

I recommend that you invite Gorton for a private visit (to include a working session and an informal lunch or dinner), which in effect would restrict his meeting with you to a single day. It would reduce to the minimum the demand on your time. It would accommodate Gorton's main purpose in wishing to talk quietly and frankly with you at an early date, in advance of a meeting scheduled for mid-May at which the Five Powers (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the United Kingdom) will discuss security arrangements to follow British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia. It would leave open for your later decision the question of which Asian leader would be the first to be invited for a formal state or official visit.

William P. Rogers

SECRET

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1969

976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton

RECOMMENDATION:

That you invite Prime Minister Gorton to make a private visit to Washington on March 31.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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William P. Rogers

SECRET

Handed 3/11



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Memorandum on Visit of Prime Minister
of Australia

Enclosed is a brief biographical memorandum on the Prime Minister of Australia, who is to make a private visit to Washington on March 31. The Australian Government has agreed to a joint announcement of the visit on February 11 at 5:00 P.M. EST.

Benjamin H. Road
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographical memorandum.

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Visit of the Rt. Hon. John G. Gorton
Prime Minister of Australia
March 31, 1969

-- John Grey Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia.
Leader of the Liberal Party.

-- Born in September, 1911, in Melbourne, Australia.
Received MA degree from Oxford. Enlisted in Royal Australian
Air Force in 1940. Fighter pilot, seriously wounded in
action over Singapore in 1941.

-- Elected to the Federal Senate in 1949. Was Minister
of the Navy 1958-1963; Minister for Works and Mining and
Minister Assisting the Prime Minister in Education and
Research, 1963-1966; Minister for Education and Science,
1966-1968. Was appointed Prime Minister in January 1968;
succeeding Prime Minister Harold Holt, who drowned while
swimming near Melbourne December 17, 1967.

-- Prime Minister Gorton visited the United States in
1963 as Minister of the Navy, and paid an official visit
to Washington on May 27-28, 1968, after becoming Prime
Minister.

-- Prime Minister Gorton is an irrigation farmer and
orchardist, and still owns a citrus farm in the State of
Victoria. He has been married since 1935 to an American
citizen, the former Bettina Brown of Bangor, Maine, whom
he met while both were students in Europe. The couple has
two sons and a daughter. Mrs. Gorton is a graduate of the
School of Oriental Studies at Australian National University,
and speaks Indonesian. She accompanied her husband to the
United States in 1968. We do not yet know whether she will
accompany him this time.

-- We have no record of any previous meeting between
the Prime Minister and the President.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL RELEASED

February 11, 1969

MEMO FOR RON ZIEGLER

FROM: Richard M. Moose ^{Ru}

We would like to have you announce at this afternoon's briefing (embargoed for 5 PM) the visit of Prime Minister Gorton of Australia, and suggest the following language:

"The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia, has accepted the President's invitation to make a visit to Washington on March 31, 1969. The visit will provide an opportunity for discussions on matters of interest to both Australia and to the United States. Prime Minister Gorton last visited Washington on May 27-28, 1968."

Background information ^{attached} to follow.

cc: Mr. Sneider

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*File
See note
on telegram*

February 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton Visit

Prime Minister Gorton, after receiving the President's invitation, expressed his pleasure and accepted. He also asked Ambassador Crook that the visit be announced on February 11 or 12. The State Department has proposed the attached message authorizing the announcement and setting forth the text of the announcement.

I recommend that we concur in this telegram.

Richard L. Sneider

*OK by Press office
Held down clearance
Ready w/ final clearance
7:15 pm*

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1. Snider 295
2. Ret Sealst
256

IDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

1. Sent by: _____
2. TO: White House 32c
Msg. No. _____
DATE _____

3. Transmitted by: Blill
Date & Time: _____
4. Received by: UNSR
Date & Time: 1650

5. Description Tel to Canberra re Gorton visit

6. Classification & Controls: Confidential

7. No. of Pgs. 1 8. Precedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by [Signature]

10. Deliver to: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger For: Clearance X

The White House Information _____

Att: Mr. Snider Per Request _____

Dir

5 PM Wash Time

8 AM Australia - ok for Canberra -

[Signature]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

SCALE: 17 COLLECT
CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

295
Cleared
w/o change
w/ Hawley (S/S)
2/10/69
7:50 pm
RMOOSE
FOR OCIT USE ONLY
"Stevenson"

ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: Announcement Gorton Visit

REF: CANBERRA 802

1. Suggested timing for simultaneous White House announcement 5 P.M. EST Washington, Tuesday February 11. Proposed text follows: "The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia, has accepted the President's invitation to make a private visit to Washington on March 31, 1969. The visit will provide an opportunity for discussions on matters of interest to both Australia and to the United States. Prime Minister Gorton last visited Washington on May 27-28, 1968".
2. Please advise if timing and text are suitable. Also forward text of Australian announcement.

END

Typed by: /P:RKllpatrick:bd 2/10/69 Tel. No. 5360 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Winthrop G. Brown

EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
EA/P - Mr. Levine

WH -
P - Mr. Stevenson
S/S -

SECRET
Classification

DS-322

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton Visit

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I recommend that we concur in this telegram.



Richard L. Snider

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

SUBJECT: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton

Prime Minister Gorton of Australia called the President on Thursday morning (January 30), and in the President's absence I spoke to him. Gorton said he was anxious to come to Washington to see the President, and suggested the period March 30-April 12. I told him that the President was anxious to see him and to establish the closest possible personal relationship. The only question was to find mutually convenient dates. I also mentioned that there may be some possible conflict between the dates Gorton suggested and the April 10 NATO meeting.

When the President was informed of the call, he indicated that he would like to see Gorton as close to the earlier date as possible. He asked for your thoughts and recommendations, including how it would fit in with other possible visits during the spring.

HK
Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET

Dispatched 2/1/69 Rept. No. 122

File

SECRET

February 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

SUBJECT: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton

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Henry A. Kissinger

(cc: R. Sneider ^{sent} (2/1/69))

SECRET

Ed R
100101000

SECRET
(Material attached)

March 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD SNEIDER

FROM: Al Haig

Henry was extremely grateful for this fine analysis preparatory to the Gorton visit. He asked me to pen you a personal note expressing his appreciation.

SECRET
(material attached)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister

As you know, Prime Minister Gorton's visit is scheduled for March 31-April 1. Preparations are in hand and appear to pose no particular problem. NAK
has seen

It may be worthwhile to put down some observations concerning the style and manner of our expected visitor, the purposes which he hopes to serve by the visit and our own interests in the visit.

Gorton the Man: For your purposes, these are probably the salient aspects of Gorton's personality and approach:

- He is tough, brusque and impatient of formalities.
- As a fighter pilot in 1942, Gorton saw an Australian division stranded in Singapore by the lack of effective external support. His own experience probably makes him unusually sensitive to the danger of Australia's getting out on a limb in Southeast Asia.
- He is prickly and sensitive, and does not like to be taken for granted or pressured. He was annoyed with our failure to consult more fully with Australia in the policy decisions of March 31 and October 31 last year; and he has complained that he was subjected to pressure in Washington last year.
- He is a strong Australian nationalist, has been at least until recently suspicious of foreign commitments. He seemed upon taking office to be toying with a

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"fortress Australia" policy; and in one press conference he said that he would not send any more Australians to Vietnam. He must be shown the advantages of a particular policy for Australia, rather than offered broad generalities.

- He is suspicious of intellectuals, of theorists and of bureaucrats. He came to Washington without briefing papers in 1968, and it is still uncertain whether he will bring any professional defense or foreign affairs advisers on this trip. He will probably not be interested in detail or prepared to discuss issues in depth.
- He came to office as a dark horse candidate without international experience, and without intellectual pretensions. He is particularly conscious of living in the shadow of Menzies and Holt and now wishes to establish himself as a leader in his own right and an independent authority in foreign affairs.

Background -- the February 25th Speech: Gorton's February 25 commitment to keep land, naval and air forces in Singapore/Malaysia after 1971 is a major development integrally related to his forthcoming visit.

In the Australian internal context, his speech established Prime Minister Gorton in the foreign policy field with a powerful statement of the forward defense position. It flanked the opposition, which finds itself in an election year in a weak straddle on the basic issue of forward defense vs. "fortress Australia". Having been made before rather than after the Washington visit, the speech stands as an Australian policy rather than a response to American pressure.

In the specific context of the visit, Gorton has made a major decision for which we had been asking. He has done so although he had been holding back because he did not want to get Australia committed without a commitment from us. He has now made the commitment without demanding any quid pro quo. He comes to us as a man with "clean hands" asking the President to be equally forthcoming.

Gorton has, probably consciously, helped to shape the nature of our response by the specific character of his speech. First, he himself indicated a preference for general understandings rather than specific treaty commitments. Second, he pointed very clearly to his expectation that the U.S. would come to Australia's help if subversion from outside or some other threat were too much for Australia to handle alone, but he went on to say that "Australia's continued effort would in that case have to be decided in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that time." Gorton can hardly expect us to be more specific or committed than he is, and by these remarks he has provided us with the rationale for answering him with broad and non-specific reassurances of our continuing commitment to Southeast Asia and the importance we attach to ANZUS.

What Gorton will be Seeking: Above all, Gorton will focus on the area of reassurances concerning the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. He will want to have something for public consumption to reassure the Australian voters that his commitment to Malaysia/Singapore has not overextended his country's defense resources. He will particularly need some specific reference to ANZUS.

Gorton's second purpose is to develop a personal relationship with the President which would be valuable in itself and which would enhance Gorton's political position for the elections.

Gorton will wish to talk about other issues, particularly the outlook for the Paris talks, and the situation in Vietnam, trade problems, and the Cape Keradren project.

The U.S. Interest: Our most fundamental interests vis-a-vis Australia fit in closely with Gorton's February 25 statement and with his interests in this trip. By his action in undertaking a responsibility within the area, he has made it more feasible for the U.S. to maintain a role in supporting security arrangements in Southeast Asia.

We should try --

1. To reassure him that we are prepared to maintain U.S. commitments in Asia and that we view ANZUS as an important element in these commitments.

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2. To keep him in our confidence concerning the Vietnam situation and the Paris negotiations.

3. To establish a personal relationship between the President and Prime Minister Gorton.

There will of course be specific recommendations from the Department of State concerning recommended U. S. positions on all issues.

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Ed R

SECRET

March 15, 1969

(Material attached)

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD SNEIDER

FROM: Al Haig

Henry was extremely grateful for this fine analysis preparatory to the Gorton visit. He asked me to pen you a personal note expressing his appreciation.

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(material attached)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard L. Sneider

SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister

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has been*

As you know, Prime Minister Gorton's visit is scheduled for March 31-April 1. Preparations are in hand and appear to pose no particular problem.

It may be worthwhile to put down some observations concerning the style and manner of our expected visitor, the purposes which he hopes to serve by the visit and our own interests in the visit.

Gorton the Man: For your purposes, these are probably the salient aspects of Gorton's personality and approach:

Febree-- He is tough, brusque and impatient of formalities. As a fighter pilot in 1942, Gorton saw an Australian division stranded in Singapore by the lack of effective external support. His own experience probably makes him unusually sensitive to the danger of Australia's getting out on a limb in Southeast Asia. He is prickly and sensitive, and does not like to be taken for granted or pressured. He was annoyed with the failure to consult more fully with Australia in the policy decisions of March 31 and October 31 last year; and he has complained that he was subjected to pressure in Washington last year. He is a strong Australian nationalist, has been at least until recently suspicious of foreign commitments. He seemed upon taking office to be toying with us as a man with "clean hands" asking the President to be equally forthcoming.

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-- He is suspicious of intellectuals, of theorists and of bureaucrats. He came to Washington without briefing papers in 1968, and it is still uncertain whether he will bring any professional defense or foreign affairs advisers on this trip. He will probably not be interested in detail or prepared to discuss issues in depth.

-- He came to office as a dark horse candidate without international experience, and without intellectual pretensions. He is particularly conscious of living in the shadow of Menzies and Holt and now wishes to establish himself as a leader in his own right and an independent authority in foreign affairs.

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There will of course be specific recommendations from the Department of State concerning recommended U.S. positions on all issues.

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 CANBER 00967 140855Z

17
ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SAH 02, E 15, ACDA 16, IO 13,
RSR 01, /170 W

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R 140736Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3450
INFO AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
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UNCLAS CANBERRA 967

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: PRESS REACTION TO PM GORTON'S FORTHCOMING
WASHINGTON VISIT

1. ANNOUNCEMENT FORTHCOMING GORTON VISIT TO WASHINGTON
HAS RECEIVED MODERATE NEWSPLAY AND TOUCHED OFF
SEVERAL EDITORIALS. STRAIGHT REPORTAGE HAS GIVEN HEAVY
EMPHASIS FACT GORTON WILL BE FIRST HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
VISIT WASHINGTON SINCE INAUGURATION. SEVERAL NEWSPAPERS
SPECULATE THIS INDICATIVE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"
WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND US UNDER
PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE.

2. IN TERMS PURPOSE VISIT, ALL REPORTAGE UNDERLINES
VISIT WILL BE "WORKING" RATHER THAT OF PROTOCOL NATURE,
AND GORTON'S PRIMARY PURPOSE WILL BE ASCERTAIN "WHAT
HELP AUSTRALIA COULD EXPECT FROM AMERICA IF AUSTRALIAN
FORCES REMAIN IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE AFTER 1971,
AND IF THESE FORCES ARE ATTACKED." OTHER MAJOR DIS-
CUSSION ITEMS ANTICIPATED BY PRESS ARE US ROLE IN GENERAL,

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Department of State

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ASIA, PARTICULARLY POST-VIETNAM; CONDUCT VIETNAM WAR AND LIKELY OUTCOME PARIS TALKS; AND US AND AUSTRALIAN ROLE IN VIETNAM FOLLOWING ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT. SOME NEWSPAPERS STATE HE WILL ALSO TOUCH, AT LEAST BRIEFLY, ON NPT, TRADE ISSUES, INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA, AND US DEFENSE PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA.

3. ALL STORIES NOTE GORTON MUST HAVE AT LEAST SOME IDEA OF NATURE POSSIBLE US BACKING FOR AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE PRIOR FORTHCOMING CANBERRA FIVE-POWER TALKS, BUT SOME ADD IT IS PROBABLY TOO EARLY FOR NEW ADMINISTRATION INDICATE MORE THAN "TREND OF THINKING" RE FUTURE US ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

4. EDITORIAL COVERAGE THUS FAR RATHER LIMITED. EDITORIALS THAT HAVE APPEARED ARE CONSISTENT IN NOTING NOT TOO MUCH CAN BE EXPECTED AT THIS TIME IN WAY OF FIRM COMMITMENTS BY WASHINGTON. FOLLOWING ARE KEY EXCERPTS FROM MAJOR EDITORIALS.

5. MELBOURNE AGE, FEB 13: "TIMING COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER...VISIT...MAY HELP RESTORE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTED WITH MIGHTY ALLY DURING JOHNSON-HOLT HONEYMOON. IT WILL ALSO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION AWAY FROM CERTAIN SIGNS VACILLATION IN OUR FOREIGN POLICIES AND CERTAIN DUBIOUS MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS... GORTON HAS TO FIND OUT NEW PRESIDENT'S REAL THINKING ON PARIS PEACE TALKS, FORTHCOMING MEETINGS OF SEATO AND VIETNAM ALLIES AND, ABOVE ALL, FIVE-POWER TALKS ON DEFENSE MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE. HOW FAR WILL US GO IN STRETCHING ANZUS PACT TO COVER SOUTHEAST ASIA?... ONE CANNOT EXPECT FIRM DECISIONS TO ERMERGE FROM BRIEF AND INFORMAL TALKS BUT, IF SOME GENERAL OUTLINES OF AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED, THESE CAN BE HANDED OVER TO NORMAL CHANNELS OF DIPLOMACY...PRIME MINISTER'S RECENT FORM SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT HE WILL NOT BE PARADING LIKE A WELL-GROOMED BUTLER TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS."

6. THE AUSTRALIAN, FEB 13: "SOME BLUNT TALKING FROM OUR SIDE IS OVERDUE FOR HEALTHY CONTINUANCE AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP AND THERE ARE GOOD GROUNDS

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FOR BELIEVING MR. NIXON FEELS SAME FROM HIS SIDE... SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRE PREOCCUPATION OF WASHINGTON TALKS. SEVERAL CURRENT ISSUES IN TRADE, DEFENSE BUYING AND GENERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS ARE VITAL TO FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES... AUSTRALIA CAN HARDLY EXPECT THAT MESSAGE ON REGIONAL SECURITY WILL BE ANYTHING BUT TOUGH ONE... WHATEVER HAPPENS AT WASHINGTON TALKS, AUSTRALIA CANNOT EXPECT SERIES OF CLEARCUT SIGNPOSTS INTO FUTURE. MR. GORTON'S FIRST MEETING WITH AMERICAN PRESIDENT IS, HOWEVER, OPPORTUNITY ESTABLISH NEW PHASE IN THE ALLIANCE, NOT BASED ON MYSTIQUE OF PERSONALITIES, BUT ON PRACTICALITIES PARTNERSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITIES."

7. SYDNEY DAILY TELEGRAPH, FEB 14: AFTER NOTING GORTON WILL BE FIRST

HEAD OF GOVERNMENT VISIT WASHINGTON UNDER NEW ADMINISTRATION, TELEGRAPH EDITORIALIZED: "THIS MAY OR MAY NOT BE 'GREAT COUP', BUT IT CERTAINLY IS A POINTER TO IMPORTANCE WHICH BOTH LEADERS ATTACH TO PROBLEMS OF PACIFIC...ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE TOO MUCH TO EXPECT PRESIDENT GIVE HARD AND FAST DECISIONS ON SPECIFIC SITUATION, MR. GORTON SHOULD AT LEAST BE ABLE GAIN SOME INSIGHT INTO TREND OF HIS THINKING."

8. SYDNEY SUN, FEB 13: "WE CANNOT EXPECT MR. GORTON TO COME HOME FROM WASHINGTON WITH THE ANZUS TREATY REINFORCED BY PRESIDENT NIXON'S PERSONAL PLEDGE NEVER TO ABANDON US. THE 'ALL THE WAY' COMMITMENT WENT OUT WITH LBJ... (BUT) AUSTRALIA DARE NOT BARK IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITHOUT THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT THE US WILL BITE IF NEED BE." CRONK

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R 110220Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3526

S E C R E T CANBERRA 1391

EXDIS

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT; DISCUSSIONS ON SEA DEFENSE

REF: STATE 32568; CANBERRA 1351

1. EMBASSY CONCURS IN DEPT. VIEW THAT COMMITMENT GORTON HAS ALREADY MADE IN HIS DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT TO KEEP AUSTRALIAN FORCES, INCLUDING GROUND FORCES, IN MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE AFTER 1971 HAS ALTERED SITUATION. IF GORTON'S STATEMENT HAD LIMITED AUSTRALIAN POST-1971 COMMITMENT TO AIR AND NAVAL FORCES AND HAD LEFT QUESTION OF GROUND FORCES UP TO "IMPONDERABLES" TO BE WEIGHED SUBSEQUENTLY, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN POSITION TO ASK FOR SPECIFIC COMMITMENT FROM PRESIDENT NIXON AS QUID PRO QUO FOR COMMITTING AUSTRALIAN GROUND FORCES AFTER 1971. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HE MIGHT HAVE ASKED FOR OR INSISTED ON SOMETHING LIKE KENNEDY-BARWICK UNDERSTANDING. BUT WE ASSUME HE DECIDED THAT TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT RIGHT FOR US TO GIVE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING AND HENCE WENT AHEAD ON HIS OWN IN ORDER TO END DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CRITICISM OF HIS DEFENSE POLICY OR LACK THEREOF. HE MAY ALSO HAVE REASONED THAT THIS INITIATIVE WOULD IMPROVE HIS STANDING IN WASHINGTON. IN ANY CASE, GORTON PROBABLY REALIZES THAT HIS GENERAL (ALL OPTIONS OPEN) STATEMENT IS UNLIKELY TO ELICIT MORE THAN A GENERAL RESPONSE FROM US EVEN THOUGH HEWITT HAS INTIMATED THAT GORTON WILL INQUIRE WHAT US POSITION WILL BE IN EVENT SERIOUS EMERGENCY (CANBERRA 1351).

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WE DO NOT THINK THAT GORTON WILL BE GENUINELY SATISFIED WITH US ASSURANCES WHICH GO NO FURTHER THAN THOSE IN BERGER LETTER TO WALLER, BUT WE DO NOT EXPECT HIM AT THIS JUNCTURE TO ASK FOR OR EXPECT ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC. EMBASSY BELIEVES FORMULATION OF GENERAL ASSURANCES SUGGESTED IN PARA 2 REFTEL APPROPRIATE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES. WE BELIEVE, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT OFFER MORE, EVEN IF GORTON, CONTRARY TO OUR EXPECTATIONS, SHOULD ASK FOR IT.

2. CONVERSATIONS IN LAST FEW DAYS WITH BOOKER OF EXTAFF AND GRIFFITH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN PM'S DEPT., TEND CONFIRM FOREGOING ANALYSIS. BOOKER OBSERVED THAT ALTHOUGH EXTAFF WAS PREPARING BRIEFING PAPERS IT WOULD NOT KNOW FOR SURE WHAT GORTON WOULD SAY. NEVERTHELESS, HIS OPINION IS THAT SINCE GORTON HAS ALREADY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO POLICY OF REGIONAL COOPERATION AND FORWARD DEFENSE, HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT ASK FOR ANYTHING SPECIFIC FROM US IN TERMS OF NEW UNDERTAKINGS IN RELATION TO MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE DEFENSE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE MOST BENEFICIAL, BOOKER SAID, IF PRESIDENT WOULD REASSURE GORTON OF CONTINUING (POST VIETNAM) AMERICAN INTEREST IN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AND SEA. WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SEATO AND ANZUS COULD BE UNDERLINED.

3. GRIFFITH, IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION, LARGELY CONFIRMED BOOKER'S VIEWS. WHILE GORTON HAD ALREADY MADE AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST IN DEFENSE OF MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE, GRIFFITH SAID THERE IS CERTAIN NERVOUSNESS AMONG AUSTRALIANS ABOUT POSSIBLE US WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA AFTER VIETNAM. SOME PUBLIC INDICATION BY PRESIDENT OF CONTINUING US INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN AREA--HOPEFULLY HIGHLIGHTED IN COMMUNIQUE--WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL. GRIFFITH ALSO REFLECTED CONCERN OVER GROWING SOVIET PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN WHICH HE SAID GOA HOPES CAN BE COUNTER-BALANCED BY PERIODIC VISITS IN INDIAN OCEAN OF US NAVAL VESSELS. WHILE HE SAID THIS NEED NOT BE REFERRED TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATE

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ASSURANCE TO GORTON OF OUR INTEREST IN INDIAN OCEAN WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. EMBASSY BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL FOR US-AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS THAT COMMUNIQUE REAFFIRM US INTEREST IN AND COMMITMENTS REGARDING SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CONCUR WITH DEPARTMENT THAT REAFFIRMATION CAN BE PHRASED SO AS TO AVOID APPEARANCE OF ASSUMPTION BY US OF ADDITIONAL BURDENS.

5. FROM ALL APPEARANCES, GORTON, HEWITT AND OTHERS CONCERNED ARE QUITE RELAXED ABOUT VISIT AND SEEM TO ANTICIPATE FRIENDLY DISCUSSIONS ON WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS RATHER THAN ANY HARD BARGAINING ON SPECIFIC PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, GORTON BY STYLE AND TEMPERAMENT IS UNPREDICTABLE AND HE MAY PULL A FEW SURPRISES INCLUDING A HARD LINE ON ABOVE SUBJECT. IT'S OUR BEST JUDGMENT THAT HE WON'T, BUT WITH GORTON WE CAN NEVER BE SURE OF ANYTHING. CROOK

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ACTION EA 15

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02,
P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04, RSR 01, /067 W

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O 112215Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3434

S E C R E T CANBERRA 871

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT

REF: STATE 021663

YOUR REVISED TEXT AGREEABLE. PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
PROCEEDING WITH ANNOUNCEMENT HERE. ASSUME YOU ARE
PROCEEDING THERE. CROOK

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SECRET 770

PAGE 01 CANBER 00869 112149Z

85

ACTION EA 15

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,CPR 02,JPM 04,H 02,NSC 10,0 02,

OPR 02,P 04,RSC 01,SS 20,SY 04,RSR 01,/067 W

----- 109800

O 112138Z FEB 69

FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3433

S E C R E T CANBERRA 869

SUBJ: ANNOUNCEMENT GORTON VISIT

REF: CANBERRA 868

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT IS NOT AT THIS TIME
PLANNING ISSUE STATEMENT AT 8 A.M. HERE (5P.M. FEB 11
WASHINGTON), BUT WILL WAIT FOR FURTHER COORDINATION
OF TEXT AND TIMING.

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Department of State

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SECRET 832

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ACTION EA 15

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02,
P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04, CCO 00, RSR 01, /067 W

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O 111000Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3432

S E C R E T CANBERRA 868

SUBJ: ANNOUNCEMENT GORTON VISIT

REF: STATE 021585

1. PROPOSED TEXT FOR SIMULTANEOUS WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT STATES GORTON HAS ACCEPTED PRESIDENT'S INVITATION MAKE "A PRIVATE VISIT" TO WASHINGTON. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT (SECY HEWITT) INFORMS EMBASSY THAT "PRIVATE VISIT" HAS SPECIFIC CONNOTATION IN AUSTRALIAN USAGE WHICH WOULD CARRY UNDESIRABLE CONNOTATION. WOULD PREFER "AN OFFICIAL VISIT." OR IF THAT PRESENTS DIFFICULTIES, "A VISIT."

2. IF EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVE WORDINGS ACCEPTABLE TO WHITE HOUSE, TIMING SUITABLE FOR PRIME MINISTER.

3. TEXT OF AUSTRALIAN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IF EITHER OF ALTERNATIVE WORDINGS "OFFICIAL VISIT" OR "VISIT" ACCEPTABLE WHITE HOUSE.
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CONFIDENTIAL 940

PAGE 01 CANBER 00810 100142Z

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ACTION SS 30

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INFO /030 W

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R 100130Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3417

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 810

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT

1. HEWITT CALLED ME LAST NIGHT TO SAY IT VERY IMPORTANT TO GORTON POLITICALLY THAT HE BE INVITED STAY AT BLAIR HOUSE, EVEN THOUGH THIS PRIVATE VISIT, SINCE AUSTRALIANS WOULD OTHERWISE DRAW UNFAVORABLE COMPARISON WITH HIS PREVIOUS VISIT. ASSUME HE WOULD STAY BLAIR HOUSE IN ANY EVENT, THOUGH I DID NOT TELL HEWITT SO. TOLD HEWITT I WOULD CONVEY HIS COMMENTS.

2. IF EXCHANGE GIFTS TO BE MADE, MIGHT KEEP IN MIND GORTON A CIVIL WAR CONFEDERATE BUFF.

3. SORRY TO BOTHER YOU WITH SUCH TRIVIA.

GP-3. CROOK

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Handwritten signature in red ink

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PAGE 01 CANBER 00726 050013Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 03,
USIA 12, RSR 01, /078 W

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R 050005Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3398

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 726

FOR BUNDY FROM CROOK

REF: STATE 292079, DEC 24, 68

LOCAL PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT PRIME MINISTER GORTON INTENDS TO VISIT WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA DURING FIRST TWO WEEKS OF APRIL WHICH COINCIDES WITH PARLIAMENTARY EASTER RECESS. REPORTS SAY PRESIDENT NIXON IS REPORTED TO HAVE AGREED TO SEE GORTON ALTHOUGH NO ANNOUNCEMENT HAS YET BEEN MADE ON DATE OF MEETING. NO SOURCE GIVEN FOR THESE REPORTS AND MAY BE MERELY PRESS SPECULATION. WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANYTHING FURTHER ON POSSIBILITY OF VISIT SINCE RECEIPT REFTEL. CROOK

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SUMMARY

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PAGE 01 CANBER 00802 090508Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04,

USIA 12, RSR 01, /079 W

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P 090450Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3416

S E C R E T CANBERRA 802

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT

REF: STATE 020598

1. DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO GORTON DURING COURSE OF SOCIAL VISIT MRS. CROOK AND I WERE PAYING AT LODGE LATE SATURDAY AFTERNOON. GORTON WAS VERY PLEASED AND ACCEPTED DATE PROPOSED REFTEL. HE EXPRESSED HOPE VISIT COULD BE ANNOUNCED TUESDAY ELEVENTH OR WEDNESDAY TWELFTH CANBERRA TIME. WAS PLEASED PROTOCOL WOULD BE KEPT MINIMUM AND HOPED THERE WOULD BE "NO FIRING OF GUNS AND ALL THAT." THE ONE DAY WITH PRESIDENT WOULD SUFFICE HIM BUT HE HOPED SPEND TOTAL OF 3 - 4 DAYS "IN AMERICA" (PRESUMABLY IN WASHINGTON) DURING WHICH HE WOULD DESIRE MEET WITH SECSTATE, SECDEF, SEC COMMERCE AND OTHER. I TOLD HIM THESE DETAILS COULD BE DISCUSSED WHEN WE GOT INTO ACTUAL PROGRAMMING.

2. GORTON REITERATED WHAT HEWITT HAD TOLD ME NIGHT BEFORE THAT HE WANTED TO OBTAIN ASSURANCE FROM UNITED STATES THAT IT WOULD BACK AUSTRALIA UP IF HER TROOPS GOT INTO TROUBLE IN MALAYSIA DEFENDING IT AGAINST ATTACK FROM NORTH-- RED CHINA OR NORTH VIETNAM. HE FLATLY STATED THAT IF SOMETHING SHOULD GO WRONG IN THAILAND HE WOULD COMMIT TROOPS TO FIGHT WITH US TO HELP THAIS. FYI WHILE AUSTRALIA IS COMMITTED UNDER SEATO TO DO AT LEAST SOMETHING ON THAILAND'S BEHALF, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I HAVE HEARD AN EXPLICIT PROMISE OF THIS SORT IN CANBERRA. IT SEEMED TO ME TO BE BOTH AN INDICATION OF

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Department of State

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SECRET

PAGE 02 CANBER 00802 090508Z

SOLIDARITY WITH US AND IMPLIED SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING TO DO THE SAME FOR THE AUSTRALIANS IN MALAYSIA. END FYI.

3. GORTON REFERRED TO HIS LAST VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND IN PARTICULAR TO ASSISTANT SECSTATE BUNDY-- "A TOUGH NEGOTIATOR WHO PRESSED ME TOO HARD LAST TIME." HE WONDERED IF BUNDY WOULD STILL BE OCCUPYING THAT POSITION.

4. GORTON WAS VERY CHARMING, BUT IT IS A CHARM WHICH HE TURNS OFF QUITE EASILY. HE SEEMED TO FEEL POLITICAL NEED TO GET SOMETHING OUT OF WASHINGTON IN NEAR FUTURE.

5. GORTON ALSO REFERRED TO DISCUSSION I HAD WITH HEWITT PREVIOUS EVENING ABOUT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT CLARIFICATION WAS IN ORDER TO REASSURE AMERICAN INVESTORS THAT THEY ARE STILL WANTED HERE AND THAT GROUND RULES ARE NOT GOING TO BE CAPRICIOUSLY CHANGED. APPARENTLY HE PLANS TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT SOON TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE.
CROOK

SECRET

0910/01/030

EXDIS
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

02

SECRET 251

PAGE 01 STATE 032568

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ; RWMOORE
APPROVED BY: EA - G. MCMURTRIE GODLEY
S/S - MR BRANDT
EA/RA - MR DONALD
66610

097240

R 031923Z MAR 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

SECRET STATE 032568

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT

1. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PRESENT ESTIMATE OF WHAT SPECIFICALLY GORTON WILL SEEK FROM PRESIDENT IN WAY OF SECURITY ASSURANCES. PRIOR TO DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT, GORTON AND HEWITT INDICATED THAT PM'S EXCLUSIVE PREOCCUPATION WAS TO OBTAIN PROMISE OF U. S. SUPPORT FOR AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE IN EVENT OF ATTACK BY COMMUNIST CHINA OR NORTH VIET-NAM (CANBERRA 801 AND 802). WE WONDER WHETHER GORTON STILL LIKELY APPROACH US WITH THIS BLUNT, NARROW QUESTION, HOWEVER SINCE DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT APPEARS TO HAVE MODIFIED SITUATION IN THAT GORTON HAS ON OWN INITIATIVE COMMITTED AUSTRALIAN FORCES TO REMAIN IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD AFTER 1971. THUS HE IS NOT COMING TO WASHINGTON (AS IT APPEARED EARLIER HE INTENDED DO) TO EXACT U. S. GUARANTEE OF SUPPORT AS PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY TO ACHIEVE OUR DESIRED OBJECTIVE OF AUSTRALIAN PRESENCE (INCLUDING GROUND FORCES) IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE.

2. WITH CIRCUMSTANCES THUS CHANGED, MAY GORTON'S APPROACH TO PRESIDENT NOT CHANGE ALSO. WHEN IT APPEARED HE SOUGHT OUR SUPPORT BEFORE COMMITTING AUSTRALIAN FORCES TO MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE, WE TENDED ASSUME HE MIGHT WELL BE SATISFIED WITH NOTHING LESS THAN NEW, EXPLICIT UNDERSTANDING UNDER ANZUS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 032568

TREATY ALONG LINES OF KENNEDY-BARWICK UNDERSTANDING. IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE GIVE GORTON SUCH UNDERSTANDING (WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS NEW OR EXTENDED COMMITMENT) IN PRESENT PERIOD OF REVIEW OF U. S. COMMITMENTS. THEREFORE, WE WOULD HOPE BE ABLE SATISFY GORTON WITH MORE GENERAL ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED (A) U. S. CONCERN WITH OVERALL SECURITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZING RELEVANCE THERETO OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY OF MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE, AS WE DID NIN BERGER-WALLER LETTER) AND (B) ADHERENCE TO EXISTING U. S. COMMITMENTS (INCLUDING ANZUS) IN THAT AREA. THAT SUCH POSTURE ON OUR PART WOULD BE REASONABLE RESPONSE TO GORTON AND WOULD MEET HIS EXPECTATIONS IS SUGGESTED BY TACK HE TOOK IN DEFENSE POLICY STATEMENT, INDICATING GOA PREFERENCE FOR GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS OVER SPECIFIC TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND RESERVING GOA OPTION TO RE-EXAMINE ROLE IN MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE IF FACED WITH THREAT BEYOND ITS ABILITY TO HANDLE. REQUEST EMBASSY'S COMMENTS.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE NOTE CANBERRA 967, CITING WIDESPREAD EDITORIAL OPINION THAT GORTON COULD EXPECT TO GET, THIS EARLY IN NEW ADMINISTRATION, NOT FIRM COMMITMENTS BUT ONLY GENERAL TREND OF U. S. THINKING RE ITS FUTURE ROLE IN SEA. TO WHAT EXTENT MAY THIS BE GORTON'S OWN BELIEF, DESPITE HIS AVOWED INTENTION (CANBERRA 801 AND 802) TO PRESS PRESIDENT FOR EXPLICIT ASSURANCES?

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ALSO EMBASSY COMMENT ON WHAT GORTON MAY WANT OR NEED TO SAY PUBLICLY, IN COMMUNIQUE OR AFTER RETURNING HOME, REGARDING COMMENTS BY OR ASSURANCES RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT WITH RESPECT TO SEA SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WE HOPE BE ABLE TREAT SUBJECT IN WAY WHICH WILL MINIMIZE CONCERN HERE THAT U. S. ASSUMING OR SEEMING ASSUME NEW COMMITMENTS. ROGERS

0910/10/033

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

~~HAK~~

Dr. K. June 21

*State advised of
your memo on date
of visit - will comply
or return with analysis.
Haig*

AUSTRALIA: Prime Minister Gorton may visit Washington during a parliamentary recess 30 March to 12 April. Amb Crook believes that this will be an extremely important visit--Gorton will attempt to resolve sensitive problems of major importance to Australia. The three major areas are US backup of forces committed to Singapore/Malaysia; post-Vietnam policy; and trade restrictions.

Handwritten note on right margin

Handwritten signature

- TO: R. Allen
- F. Bergsten
- F. Chapin
- D. Davidson
- M. Halperin
- S. Keeny
- W. Lemnitzer
- L. Lynn
- R. Morris
- H. Saunders
- R. Sneider
- H. Sonnenfeldt
- V. Vaky

- L. Eagleburger
- A. Haig
- R. Houdek
- A. McCafferty
- L. Moock
- A. Caubet
- File

note for unit file

FROM: R. Moose



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 087

PAGE 01 CANBER 00383 200415Z

85
ACTION EA 15

INFO SAH 02, SAL 01, CPR 02, GPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01,
SS 20, SY 03, USIA 12, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSA 02, DODE 00, RSR 01, /090 W
----- 108327

R 200400Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3344

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 0383

REF: STATE 292079

1. AS INDICATED REFTEL, PRIME MINISTER GORTON IS INTERESTED IN VISITING WASHINGTON AT EARLY DATE, AND I THINK IT LIKELY HE WILL PURSUE SUGGESTION OF VISIT DURING PERIOD MARCH 30-APRIL 12 WHICH COINCIDES WITH PARLIAMENTARY RECESS. I BELIEVE THIS WILL BE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT VISIT WITH GORTON SEEKING NOT ONLY TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND OTHER SENIOR US OFFICIALS BUT ALSO TRYING TO RESOLVE SEVERAL SENSITIVE PROBLEMS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO AUSTRALIA. US COMMITMENT TO BACKUP AUSTRALIAN FORCES COMMITTED TO SINGAPORE/MALAYSIA; US POST-VIETNAM POLICY IN SEA; AND US QUOTA AND OTHER TRADE RESTRICTIONS ARE THREE OF MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WHICH GORTON UNDOUBTEDLY WILL HAVE ON HIS AGENDA.

2. IN ANTICIPATION OF GORTON'S VISIT, I AM HAVING EMBASSY PREPARE FOR DEPT'S REVIEW BACKGROUND PAPERS AND SUGGESTED POLICY POSITIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES CONFRONTING TWO COUNTRIES. I SHALL PLAN TO GET THESE PAPERS TO DEPT IN DRAFT FORM BY MID-FEBRUARY TO PERMIT DEPT EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH EMBASSY ON THEM IF DESIRED BEFORE DEPT PUTS ITS PAPERS IN FINAL FORM. CROOK

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL

March 14, 1969

10/14
1. Snyder
2. Rest
RM/ Please clear to S/S
on 3/15

OK
McDonald

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

JPW

John P. Walsh
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Telegram to Canberra re Gorton visit

CONFIDENTIAL

Old. S/S
Ann Guier
3/15/69
1:30 am

CONFIDENTIAL

Amembassy CANBERRA
RECEPTION CENTER HONOLULU

INFO: CINCPAC

STATE

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit

1. Dept making authoritative arrangements for Gorton's program through Australian Embassy Washington, but for your information there follow major elements in schedule as it now stands:

a. March 29

(1) Party picked up at San Francisco at 6:15 p.m. and transported to Langley Air Force Base, Virginia by USAF aircraft.

(2) Drive to Williamsburg for private visit until March 31.

b. March 31

(1) Afternoon: Fly from Williamsburg to Washington by USMC helicopter. (Party will stay at Blair House throughout visit to Washington.)

(2) 8:00 p.m. Black tie dinner given by Amb. and Lady Waller.

EA/ANZ:RW Moore:rlw 3/14/69 2996

EA - Winthrop G. Brown

EA/P - Mr. Kilpatrick

S/CPR - Mr. King

White House -

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S - ~~EX DDDDDDD~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Ambassy CANBERRA page 2

c. April 1

(1) 10:30 a.m. Arrival ceremony (informal) at White House, followed by meeting with President.

(2) 1:00 p.m. Lunch given by Mrs. Rogers in honor of Mrs. Gorton. (PM will lunch privately.)

(3) 2:30 p.m. Meeting with Secretary of State.

(4) 4:00 p.m. Meeting with Secretary of Defense.

(5) 8:00 p.m. White tie dinner at White House

d. April 2

(1) 10:00 a.m. Farewell call on President.

(2) 11:30 a.m. Courtesy call on Vice President.

(3) 1:00 p.m. Lunch given by Secretary Rogers in honor of PM (tentative, not finally approved).

(4) 3:30 p.m. Meeting with Secretary of Treasury.

(5) 4:30 p.m. Departure for Ottawa by Canadian Government aircraft.

CONFIDENTIAL

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other

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CANBERRA

page 3

2. RECEPTION CENTER HONOLULU: Gorton and party scheduled travel to U. S. via Qantas flight 530 which is due Honolulu 9:35 a.m. March 29, departing for San Francisco 11:00 a.m. Please meet and arrange airport courtesies during stopover. CINCPAC may wish send rep to greet Prime Minister also.

END

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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UNCLASSIFIED 439

PAGE 01 STATE 024970

52
ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 03, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04,

USIA 12, 1079 R

DRAFTED BY/ EA/ANZ: RMOORE
EA/ANZ - ROBERT W. MOORE
S/S - MR. SHEPHARD (SUBS)
66610

012101

R 171525Z FEB 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS STATE 024970

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT

PLEASE SUPPLY SOONEST NAMES OF MEMBERS OF GORTON PARTY
WITH BIO DATA FOR EACH.
ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 348

PAGE 01 STATE 021663

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43
ORIGIN EA 15

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02,
P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04, /066 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ:CCBROWER
APPROVED BY: EA:AMB. BROWN
EA/P - MR. LEVINE | P - MR. STEVENSON | S/CPR - MR. KING
S/S - MR. WALSH | WH - MR. MOOSE | EA/ANZ - MR. MOORE
----- 108301

O 111704Z FEB 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 021663

SUBJECT: GORTON VISIT

REF: CANBERRA 868

1. AGREE REVISE FIRST SENTENCE ANNOUNCEMENT TO READ AS
FOLLOWS: "THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, PRIME MINISTER
OF AUSTRALIA, HAS ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO VISIT
WASHINGTON ON MARCH 31, 1969."

2. WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH ANNOUNCEMENT REVISED TEXT AT
AGREED TIME. ROGERS

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 292

ED

PAGE 01 STATE 021585

92

ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04,
USIA 12, SSO 00, /078 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/P: RKILPATRICK
APPROVED BY: EA: WGBROWN
EA/ANZ: MR BROWER
EA/P: MR LEVINE
WH: RMOOSE
P: MR STEVENSON
S/S: JMHAWLEY
66633

----- 104214

O 110151Z FEB 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 021585 — *Australia*

SUBJ: ANNOUNCEMENT GORTON VISIT

REF CANBERRA 802

1. SUGGESTED TIMING FOR SIMULTANEOUS WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
5 PM EST WASHINGTON, TUES FEB 11. PROPOSED TEXT FOLLOWS:
"THE RIGHT HONORABLE JOHN G. GORTON, PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA,
HAS ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO MAKE A PRIVATE VISIT
TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 31, 1969. THE VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSIONS ON MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH
AUSTRALIA AND TO THE UNITED STATES. PRIME MINISTER GORTON LAST
VISITED WASHINGTON ON MAY 27-28, 1968".

2. PLS ADVISE IF TIMING AND TEXT ARE SUITABLE. ALSO FORWARD
TEXT OF AUSTRALIAN ANNOUNCEMENT. ROGERS

SECRET

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Department of State

Handset
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 110

PAGE 01 STATE 020598

88
ORIGIN EA 15

INFO CPR 02, JPM 04, H 02, NSC 10, O 02, OPR 02, P 04, RSC 01, SS 20, SY 04,
USIA 12, /078 R

DRAFTED BY: EA/ANZ: RMOORE
APPROVED BY: S/S: JPWALSH
EA: MR DUEMPLING
J: MR DILLON
EA/P:
S/CPR: MR KING
S/S: RM WALSH
WH: MR KISSINGER
66633

----- 092396

R 080039Z FEB 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 020598

REF CANBERRA 726

SUBJ: GORTON VISIT

1. PLS INFORM PRIMIN GORTON THAT PRESIDENT WILL BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE HIM FOR PRIVATE VISIT MARCH 31, IF THAT DATE CONVENIENT FOR GORTON. WE WILL PROPOSE DETAILED SCHEDULE OF MEETING AND SOCIAL EVENTS LATER.

2. PRIVATE VISIT, WHICH IS CONFINED TO ONE DAY AND IS LARGELY FREE OF PROTOCOL FORMALITIES, IS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO CONSERVE PRESIDENT'S TIME AND ON ASSUMPTION (BASED ON GORTON'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT AND INDICATIONS RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIAN EMB HERE) THAT ESSENTIALLY WORKING VISIT WILL SATISFY GORTON. PRIVATE VISIT PRECLUDES NEITHER INFORMAL WHITE HOUSE SOCIAL FUNCTION NOR PUBLICITY, OF COURSE.

3. UPON RECEIPT GORTON'S ACCEPTANCE WE WILL WISH WORK OUT JOINT UNDERSTANDING WITH GOA RE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF VISIT. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

EDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

Msg. No.

1. Sent by:

2. TO: White House 32c

3. Transmitted by: Phill
Date & Time: _____

4. Received by: UNSR
Date & Time: 1950

5. Description Tel to Canberra re Gorton visit

6. Classification & Controls: Confidential

7. No. of Pgs. 1 8. Precedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by [Signature]

10. Deliver to: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger For: Clearance X

The White House Information

Att: Mr. Sneider Per Request

295

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

CLASSIFICATION: COLLECT
MARGIN TO

SECRET
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Order

ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: Announcement Gorton Visit

REF: CANBERRA 802

1. Suggested timing for simultaneous White House announcement 5 P.M. EST Washington, Tuesday February 11. Proposed text follows: "The Right Honorable John G. Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia, has accepted the President's invitation to make a private visit to Washington on March 31, 1969. The visit will provide an opportunity for discussions on matters of interest to both Australia and to the United States. Prime Minister Gorton last visited Washington on May 27-28, 1968".
2. Please advise if timing and text are suitable. Also forward text of Australian announcement.

END

Prepared by /P:RKilpatrick:bd 2/10/69	Tel. No. 5360	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by EA - Winthrop G. Brown
--	------------------	--

EA/ANZ - Mr. Brower
EA/P - Mr. Levine *[initials]*
WH -
P - Mr. Stevenson *[initials]*
S/S -

SECRET
Classification

DS-322

Australia

294

INX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

Msg. No.

1. Sent by:

2. TO: White House 321

DATE

3. Transmitted By: B. L. Hull
Date & Time:

4. Received by: WNSP
Date & Time: 1648

5. Description Tel to Canberra re Canberra 802

6. Classification & Controls: Secret

IMMEDIATE

7. No. of Pgs. 1 8. Precedence IMMEDIATE 9. Validated by [Signature]

10. Deliver to: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger For: Clearance X
The White House Information
Att: Mr. Sneider Per Request

297

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECTOR
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Embassy CAMBERRA

Subj: Gorton Visit

1. Part of Blair House being renovated, but Blair-Lee side (seven bedrooms) will be available for Gorton party nights of March 30 and 31. (FYI Usual limit for private visitors ^{one} ~~and~~ ~~eight~~ ^{night} END FYI.) Please advise soonest who will be members of party.
2. Under established guideline for private visits (CA 4728, January 9, 1968), United States aircraft will fly visitor from location within CONUS to Washington and from Washington to next stop within CONUS. If desired, we will request aircraft to bring Gorton party from West Coast to Washington. Advise. Please confirm our understanding that Canadian Government aircraft will take Gorton from Washington to Ottawa for his official visit there.
3. FYI There may be other departures from guidelines; e.g., we anticipate that President will entertain at dinner or lunch, and that meetings with President may not necessarily be limited to one. END FYI.

END

Drafted by: <i>W. Brown</i>	Set. Exp. 2392	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>BA/A12 - Robert W. Moore</i>
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Clearance:
S/OPR - Mr. Ring (draft)
ES - Amb. Brown *WLB*

88 FEB 10 69 2 13

S/S -
MS -

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Australia
FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy CANBERRA

Info

STATE _____

Ref: Canberra 726

SUBJECT: Gorton Visit

1. Please inform Prime Minister Gorton that President will be happy to receive him for private visit March 31, if that date convenient for Gorton. We will propose detailed schedule of meetings and social events later.
2. Private visit, which is confined to one day and is largely free of protocol formalities, is proposed in order to conserve President's time and on assumption (based on Gorton's correspondence with President and indications received from Australian Embassy here) that essentially working visit will satisfy Gorton. Private visit precludes neither informal White House social function nor publicity, of course. ~~but this will be xxx~~
~~responsibility for walk in his experience~~
3. Upon receipt Gorton's acceptance we will wish work out joint understanding with GOA re public announcement of visit.

END

Dated by EA/ANZ:R Moore:aw 2/6/69	Tel. Ext. 2996	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by S/S - John P. Walsh
--------------------------------------	-------------------	--

Clearance EA - Mr. Duemling J - Mr. Dillon EA/P - Mr. Lewis	S/CPR - Mr. King S/S -	White H: use -
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CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton

RECOMMENDATION:

That you invite Prime Minister Gorton to make a private visit to Washington on March 31.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

Henry Kissinger has informed me of a recent exchange with Prime Minister Gorton on the timing of a visit to Washington, and your preference for the earlier part of the period which Gorton has suggested (March 30-April 12).

Within the next few days I will be sending you a memorandum proposing a coordinated schedule of state and official visits for the next year. A visit by Gorton would best fit into that tentative schedule on March 31.

I recommend that you invite Gorton for a private visit (to include a working session and an informal lunch or dinner), which in effect would restrict his meeting with you to a single day. It would reduce to the minimum the demand on your time. It would accommodate Gorton's main purpose in wishing to talk quietly and frankly with you at an early date, in advance of a meeting scheduled for mid-May at which the Five Powers (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the United Kingdom) will discuss security arrangements to follow British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia. It would leave open for your later decision the question of which Asian leader would be the first to be invited for a formal state or official visit.



William P. Rogers
SECRET

message withdrawn

252

Moose

1 X R of Snider 2/6

DDA CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

1. Sent by:

2. TO:

WH

(Msg. No.)

258

3. Transmitted by:

[Signature]

4. Received by:

WVSR

Date & Time:

Date & Time:

1/16

5. Description:

Telegram to Amembassy CANBERRA

6. Clsfn & Controls:

CONFIDENTIAL

7. No. of Pgs.

1

8. Precedence IMMEDIATE

9. Validated by:

[Signature]
JP Walsh

10. Deliver to:

Dr. Henry Kissinger

For: Clearance

XXXX

The White House

Information

Per Request

CONFIDENTIAL

Ambassy CANBERRA

STATE

REF: Canberra 726

FOR AMBASSADOR CROOK ~~FROM BILLY~~

President has agreed in principle to receive Gorton for private visit during March 30-April 12 period but specific date not yet fixed. Ambassador Waller so informed.

Meantime we unable make any comment on press reports.

END

EA/ANZ:RM Moore:rlw 2/5/69 2996

EA/ Winthrop G. Brown

EA - Mr. Duemling

S/S -

J - Mr. Dillon

White House -

EA/P - Mr. Levine (draft)

P - Mr. Barch (draft) CONFIDENTIAL

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division