

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	letter	Park to the President MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NUN 09-06/11235 EXEMPTED per Hx. 9/22/2016 3.3(b)(6)	9/16/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE NSC	BOX NUMBER 757
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FOLDER TITLE ⑥

RESTRICTION CODES

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F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |
|---|--|

<u>TAB</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Ltr to President Parks (discussions with Ambassador-at- large) Kennedy	16 Jul 71
2	Ltr to President (Asian Problem) w/reply (32869)	16 Sep 71 29 Nov 71

WA (7)



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 0 8 5 5 Q
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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT PARK FROM THE PRESIDENT:

BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BOGGED DOWN BADLY AND IS WELL BEHIND SCHEDULE. OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES HAVE STIFFENED THEIR DEFENSES ON ALL THREE FRONTS AND HAVE TAKEN A HEAVY TOLL OF THE ENEMY.

HOWEVER, GENERAL ABRAMS INFORMS ME THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE LACK MOBILE RESERVES FOR SOME OF THEIR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SECOND MILITARY REGION. ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THEY ARE UNABLE TO COPE IS THE TASK OF REOPENING KONTUM PASS ON ROUTE 14 BETWEEN PLEIKU AND KONTUM.

GENERAL ABRAMS FEELS THIS IS A MISSION WHICH COULD BE EFFECTIVELY PERFORMED BY A COMBINATION OF KOREAN AND UNITED STATES FORCES, OPERATING AGAINST A LIMITED OBJECTIVE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME. ONCE THE PASS IS OPENED, HE BELIEVES OUR TWO FORCES COULD RETIRE, AND THE TERRAIN COULD BE HELD SECURE BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES NOW AVAILABLE TO THE SECOND MILITARY REGION. HE ALSO ASSURES ME THAT THE REQUISITE KOREAN

FORCES COULD BE TEMPORARILY SPARED FROM THE AREA WHERE THEY NORMALLY OPERATE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- STATE 98489, Jun 3, 1972

UNDER THIS CONCEPT, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE THE AIRLIFT, THE HELICOPTER UNITS, THE AIR SUPPORT, AND OTHER ASSOCIATED SUPPORT ELEMENTS. THE KOREAN CONTRIBUTION WOULD CONSIST OF COMBAT ELEMENTS TEMPORARILY WITHDRAWN FROM THEIR CURRENT AREA OF OPERATIONS.

I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE OUR TWO COUNTRIES COOPERATE IN THIS PARTICULAR EFFORT TO ASSIST OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALLIES. I FEEL THAT A SUCCESSFUL MISSION OF THIS TYPE WOULD HAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY BENEFITS WHICH COULD INSTILL A HELPFUL MOMENTUM INTO THE DEFENSE OF KONTUM.

IF YOU SHARE MY VIEW, I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR AUTHORIZING THE COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN FORCES IN VIETNAM TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE MISSION WITH GENERAL ABRAMS. IF YOUR REPLY IS FAVORABLE TO SUCH A COMBINED MISSION, I WILL THEN INSTRUCT GENERAL ABRAMS TO PROVIDE THE UNITED STATES ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROPOSED OPERATION. SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON.
HIS EXCELLENCY PARK CHUNG HEE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SEOUL. END QUOTE. MACOMBER

BT

#8489

DRAFTED BY: (Text received from White House)

APPROVED BY: S/S-Mr.Eliot

EA-MR.Sullivan

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Pres com
KOREA*

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November 29, 1971

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you comment on the problems of East Asia and their effect on the Korean peninsula. I have read your letter very carefully and have also carefully reviewed the presentation of these views which your Foreign Minister provided to Secretary Rogers and to Dr. Kissinger when he met with them at the end of September.

At the very outset, I should like you to know how much I appreciate the generous and helpful support you and your Government have given to our efforts to lessen tensions in Asia. It is my earnest hope that my forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China will contribute to the development of a stable and peaceful situation in East Asia and in the Pacific area. By opening a dialogue between ourselves and the Chinese leadership, this journey can lead to better understanding on both sides of the deep and complex differences between ourselves and the People's Republic. Gradually and over a longer period, such discussions can result in a reduction of tensions in Asia, which would benefit all nations in that area.

You can be sure, Mr. President, that in taking steps toward the goal of a peaceful Asia, the United States will not overlook the interest of its allies and friends nor seek any accommodations at their expense. My talks in Peking will not deal with issues primarily involving third countries, but rather will be concerned with bilateral issues between the United States and the People's Republic of China. Should issues affecting Korea be raised by the

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Dispatched via SS, Receipt # 2842 @ Library 29 Nov.

Cys to Holdridge, RFP Woods, State, Staff App'l & HAK Chron. rj

People's Republic of China, I will of course affirm our strong ties with the Republic of Korea. And, as we assured Foreign Minister Kim during his visit, the United States will continue to consult closely with your Government on issues which affect the security of the Korean peninsula.

The Republic of Korea has taken its own initiative to reduce tensions by proposing and carrying on talks with the Red Cross societies of the Republic and of north Korea. While I note that the purpose of these talks is to ease the painful separation that has afflicted so many Korean families for so many years, I am encouraged that your Government believes these talks may also lead in due course to the development of further communication and exchange with the north. This is a hopeful sign. I recognize, of course, that the capacity for aggression on the part of the north remains considerable. Nevertheless, the strength of the Korean armed forces and the confidence and dedication of your nation provide a firm and growing deterrent to the kind of aggression from the north to which you refer in your letter.

As I said on assuming office, and have frequently repeated since, the United States has no intention of disengaging from Asia. We intend to honor all of our treaty commitments. None of these obligations is more important to peace and stability in Asia than our Mutual Defense Treaty with your country. The modernization of Korea's military forces which is currently being implemented is clear evidence of United States concern for the defense of Korea. Your own willingness to provide an increasing portion of Korea's defense requirements is equally clear evidence of the maturity of the Korean economy and of the national pride and self-reliance that has won such great respect for the Republic of Korea in America and around the world.

As regards the withdrawal of additional United States troops now stationed in the Republic of Korea, it is our policy under the Nixon Doctrine not to reduce our forces

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overseas more rapidly than would be consistent with the increasing capabilities of the host country. As we have previously stated, the United States does not now have plans for the withdrawal of additional troops stationed in your country. You can be sure that, before deciding on additional force reductions in the Republic of Korea, we will consult fully with you and will undertake with you a joint assessment of any threat to your country's security.

The events which are now taking place in East Asia may well have a profound effect on the nations of the Pacific for the remainder of this century. I look to your continued support, Mr. President, to help ensure that these events will move us all in the direction of a stable and enduring international order. May I assure you of my highest personal regards and warm good wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Richard Nixon".

His Excellency
Park Chung Hee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

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Loretta:

This whole file should go to Ed -- NO copies
across the street. The originals of the
President have been given to Paul ~~Garmerly~~(?)
of Peter Peterson's staff for dispatch. *GORMORLY*

RTK/lDs -- 7/17/71


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Ed-

I don't know the whereabouts
of the orig of this - but per
the note, I'm giving it to you.
J

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


July 16, 1971

Dear Mr. President:

I have just completed a very fruitful round of discussions with Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy regarding the current textile negotiations in the Far East which he is conducting as my personal envoy. As a result, I would like to personally reaffirm to you the very great importance which I attach to settling the textile issue. I must, as well, reluctantly express my regret upon learning that progress toward reaching accord with the Republic of Korea has been delayed.

Because I realize that the decision which you must make involves far-reaching political considerations, I would like to emphasize that the United States has attempted to fully incorporate these considerations in its proposals and, therefore, to maintain the special relationship -- a relationship whose benefits flow in both directions -- which we enjoy with the Republic of Korea. Since I understand that the supplemental economic assistance we propose to offer fully cushions the impact of the U.S. textile proposal on your third Five Year Plan, I feel confident that we may now rapidly move to agreement.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
The Blue House
Seoul

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


July 16, 1971

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just completed a very fruitful round of discussions with Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy regarding the current textile negotiations in the Far East which he is conducting as my personal envoy. As a result, I would like to personally reaffirm to you the very great importance which I attach to settling the textile issue. I must, as well, reluctantly express my regret upon learning that progress toward reaching accord with Japan has been delayed.

While I recognize that the decision which you must make involves far-reaching political considerations, I would like, nonetheless, to emphasize the fundamental importance to the future course of U.S. -Japanese relations which resolution of the textile issue between the United States and Japan now entails. This is a matter which I know you appreciate as fully as I do, and I am happy to see this appreciation reflected in your recent cabinet realignment and the public statements which members of your cabinet have made emphasizing the importance of materially improving U.S. -Japanese economic relations. I am confident, therefore, that your decision on the textile issue will afford us the opportunity to make great strides in this direction.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador David M. Kennedy,
Henry Kissinger and Peter G. Peterson
Friday, July 16, 1971
10:00 a.m. (20 minutes)

I. PURPOSE

Ambassador Kennedy will report on his mission to the Far East to negotiate voluntary textile restraints.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN

- A. Background: Ambassador Kennedy feels that the textile negotiations are at a crucial stage. He has requested this meeting to report on his progress and to seek a reaffirmation of your support and, specifically, to request that you sign letters to Prime Minister Sato and President Park, which he will hand deliver after his return to the Far East. [See Tab A (Peterson memorandum), Tab B (Kennedy memorandum) and Tab C, (draft letters).]
- B. Participants: Ambassador David M. Kennedy
Peter G. Peterson
Henry Kissinger
- C. Press Plan: There will be a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting. Ambassador Kennedy and Mr. Peterson will be prepared to brief after the meeting if this is deemed appropriate.

Secret Attachment

*Per
Kissinger memo to
the President w/ Draft
of your Tabs B + C.*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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July 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: PETER G. PETERSON

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Textile Negotiations - David Kennedy's Attached Memorandum

The importance of the Far Eastern negotiations on textiles has grown beyond the immediate political and economic issues involved. As Ambassador Kennedy points out, the world trading community is watching these negotiations with a great deal of interest and will draw from their outcome conclusions that can help or hurt the United States in future negotiations. Harry Dent has emphasized the political point strongly to me that if we fail, in spite of the major effort we have made, your ability "to deliver" will be seriously questioned in the South and elsewhere. This suggests that our negotiators must not come home empty-handed.

One problem which has been pointed out by our negotiators and which is strongly felt by the industry advisors that have accompanied them is that Ambassador Kennedy has not been given the tools and the full backing in our government that is required to negotiate a successful package. Industry leaders who have returned from the Far East have told Harry Dent and me that Ambassador Kennedy and his team have done a very good job, given the serious problems they faced and the lack of adequate muscle which has been provided them. Quite frankly, they have even questioned your own commitment to a successful outcome, stating their belief that once again international political-military considerations are inhibiting the American will to protect our economic interests. You will recall that at the last moment, due to objections from Defense, all military items were withdrawn from the list. Working closely with Al Haig and people he has designated back here, we hope to be able to come out to California with various approaches on the military side that might be acceptable.

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You should also know there is apparently a widespread feeling in Southeast Asia that if the U.S. was forthcoming enough to have "given Okinawa away" without getting some of our economic problems with Japan (such as textiles) resolved, we must not attach genuinely high priority to these economic problems.

Ambassador Kennedy believes that, with the right amount of pressure, Japan and the other countries could fall into line with an acceptable deal. He also feels that it would be helpful for you to reaffirm within the government that these negotiations shall succeed and that you sign letters to Prime Minister Sato and President Park reaffirming your strong interest and support of our objectives. I concur in these recommendations. Also, we are proposing some photographs with you and a press plan that will symbolize to both the domestic and the international audiences your commitment.

One final comment. This whole project assumes added urgency by a major union meeting here in which Wilbur Mills is reported to be encouraging unions in trade hearings this fall on an across-the-board quota bill. Apparently, another part of Mills' strategy is to try to take credit for our Italian shoe deal after we announced the encouraging progress on Monday of this week. We are launching a counter-offensive on this to try to make clear all the initiatives you have taken and how little Wilbur Mills has had to do with shoes.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

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July 16, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. The textile negotiations in the Far East have reached a crucial make-or-break point. The key is Japan. If an acceptable agreement is reached with Japan, the other countries -- Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong -- should fall into line.

We may possibly reach final agreement with Taiwan and Korea without having done so in Japan, but the prospects of this are marginal at best. Even if we did come to terms with these two countries, we would still need agreement with Hong Kong in order to apply Section 204 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. In my judgment, however, Hong Kong will never agree to a restraint program so long as Japan refuses to do so. Consequently, agreement with Japan is indeed crucial to the success of the textile negotiations.

Textiles alone are not the only issue at stake. Our future economic and political relations with the Asians as well as the Europeans will be greatly influenced by the outcome of the negotiations.

The Asians and the Europeans have been told repeatedly by us over the past two years of the great priority we attach to resolving the textile issue as a result of the serious economic and political dimensions of the problem in the U.S. Your personal credibility is on the line to a great extent with this issue. Consequently, if we fail to exert every feasible means to settle the textile issue after launching a major public effort to that end, we will without question encounter strong resistance to future negotiations in the Far East, Europe and elsewhere.

I might add that failure to settle this issue through negotiations is very likely to lead to a broad and restrictive quota bill in the Congress that would undoubtedly have serious repercussions on our political, military, as well as economic relations with other countries of the world.

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TAB B.

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-2-

In my judgment, my meeting with you in these circumstances, i.e., leaving Japan in the midst of negotiations there to confer with you and returning immediately, will greatly enhance our prospects for success in Japan and, therefore, in Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Further, I strongly feel that a personal message from you to Prime Minister Sato and President Park, which I will personally deliver, would be very helpful at this stage. Finally, I believe it is essential that you once again reaffirm to members of your Administration the importance which you attach to resolution of the textile problem. In many instances, that importance has not been reflected in crucial decisions bearing on the textile negotiations or in the degree of cooperation which I have received from some officials of the U.S. government. I would consider it extremely unfortunate if we failed in our efforts because of lack of appreciation of the importance of a settlement to you.

2. As I emphasized above, the key to settling the textile issue is Japan, and we are currently marking time in our discussions there. From all appearances, events were moving quite rapidly and quite favorably until the cabinet reshuffle. Prior to the reshuffle, I met at length with Fuji Bank Chairman Iwasa (responsible for the LDB's finances), former Finance Minister Fukuda, former Prime Minister Kishi, and Prime Minister Sato. Each placed great stress on the future course of Japanese-U.S. relations and the crucial role the textile issue would play.

The Prime Minister agreed to sign a letter to you, which would be made public, indicating his understanding of the serious nature of the textile problem in the U.S. while pledging to make every effort to alleviate our difficulties. That letter would be complemented by a detailed memorandum of understanding, signed by representatives of both governments, outlining the specifics of the agreement. Because of political considerations in Japan, the Prime Minister would like to keep the memorandum of understanding private at this time while meeting the provisions in it through MITI administration of the agreement.

With respect to the agreement, I submitted a proposal, largely reflecting our January 1971 proposal to the Japanese, which would modify the provisions of the Japanese unilateral restraint program sufficiently to meet the demands of the U.S. textile industry. Since MITI Minister Tanaka would be responsible for administering the provisions of the agreement,

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TAB B₂

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Prime Minister Sato directed him to meet with me immediately and an appointment was set for July 10. Tanaka, however, then postponed the meeting for ten days using a very transparent excuse to do so. I had this information relayed to Kishi who had thought real progress was continuing to be made and who, consequently, seemed genuinely surprised at the delay.

The fact remains, however, that we are at a standstill and that further such delays may become commonplace unless strong measures are taken. For this reason, I will see the Prime Minister immediately upon my return and stress once again the importance you attach to this issue and its early resolution as well as deliver any personal message you have. In my opinion, we must have a Japanese reply to our proposal within the next several days, and I fully intend to push events now so that a decision will be forthcoming.

If Japan falls into place, so should Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong. The Taiwan agreement has, as you know, several loose ends which must be tied down. Fortunately, Taiwan has agreed to accept our proposals on these points of contention if Korea will agree to do so. Consequently, Korea has now become a key factor in determining the terms of agreement we reach outside of Japan. In this respect, I believe a message from you to President Park would be timely and helpful.

The Korean proposal is very fair and good from Korea's point of view. The straight textile package incorporates a growth rate of 8-1/2 percent, on the average, over five years which is roughly one percent below the average growth rate agreed upon with Taiwan. The carrot package for Korea, which you approved and which I offered contingent fully and completely upon their acceptance of our textile package, meets the projected foreign exchange loss entailed by acceptance of our textile proposals. I have informed the Koreans that neither the textile proposal nor the size of the carrot package are now negotiable. Korea has far too long demanded, with great success, that we continuously up the ante. She has a generous proposal before her, and we must use every available means to ensure acceptance, especially so since final agreement in Taiwan is riding on the outcome of our negotiations with Korea.

While I do not feel any significant additional military carrots for Korea are called for, I do feel we need closer coordination with NSC and the Defense Department on what can be said about defense items to Korea and who should say them. In the Koreans' mind, there is inevitably some connection between resolving the textile problem and resolving outstanding defense issues. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

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TAB B₃

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Yet success in Taiwan and Korea without agreement in Japan -- which is not at all likely -- would be illusionary because, in my judgment, Hong Kong will not come to terms without Japan doing so. There is every reason for Hong Kong to hold out since, without agreement in Hong Kong and Japan, we cannot apply Section 204 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. We have no carrots to use on Hong Kong. Neither do we have sticks. Hence, it is simply not in Hong Kong's interest to enter into agreement unless Japan does so.

Let me stress once again, therefore, that agreement with Japan is essential if the negotiations are to succeed.

I have recommended letters that you sign to Prime Minister Sato and President Park that I would intend to deliver (Tab C).

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 16, 1971

URGENT Note

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL HAIG

FROM:

DICK KENNEDY *DK*

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Ambassador Kennedy

The attached charts prepared by John Court summarise the Korea Force Modernisation Program as further background for Dr. Kissinger. They should be included with the briefing package we sent to you last night.

Court and Froebe who participated in drafting have reviewed the memo we sent to you last night and concur in it.

Attachments

*Kennedy -
I'ven't agree with
Smith memo - Facts
are correct but migration
that we could use a cat back
as reported in the following
memo of 7/15/71. *DK**

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: K. Wayne Smith

SUBJECT: Korea Modernization Program

Attached are three tables on the five-year ROK modernization program prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee and recently submitted for Presidential consideration:

These tables show that:

-- The plan provides for ROK force structure that, except for tactical aircraft, is considerably in excess of the forces required for a high confidence ROK capability to defend against North Korean attack. For example, the ROK ground force of 18 modernized divisions is 4-6 divisions larger than required against North Korea. In contrast, the ROK air force is 100-200 planes short of matching North Korea. (see Table 1 for details)

-- The plan provides for 1.25 billion in grant MAP and a total resource commitment of \$1.9 billion over a five year period -- if excess stocks, sales, and MAP transfer are included. This is substantially greater than the program you approved last fall on

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behalf of the President which included total resources of \$1.5 billion and an implied grant MAP level of about \$1.0 billion. The question of who pays for this increase (i. e., the U. S. or the Koreans) is open. See Table 2 for a detailed explanation and projected annual MAP level.

-- The plan provides significant modernization for each ROK Service. The main uncertainties and possible bargaining points within the existing program are (1) a substantial increase in ROK air force modernization/^{could be} financed by reduced ground force modernization. Better balance in the ROK force structure would reduce U. S. involvement in a conflict and ROK ground forces are too large; (2) a larger ROK navy with greater offensive capabilities. Since North Korea has no real offensive naval capability, however, this would not be in the U. S. interest.

Based on this quick inspection of the Korea program, the most promising areas for U. S. leverage short of abrogating the jointly agreed equipment list, seem to be:

-- Insisting that the ROKs pick up a larger share of the budgetary costs of the modernization program.

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-- Threatening to withdraw those parts of the modernization program that have or will go beyond \$1.5 billion. These include the equipment of ROK forces on RVN and the equipment of the U. S. forces in Korea (\$200M in value for the next division withdrawn).

-- Offering to expand the modernization of the ROK air force [this expansion should, however, not include more F-4s -- a weapon that is too expensive and unsuited to Korean needs].

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TABLE 1

THE KOREA PROGRAM AND ROK FORCES REQUIRED
(1976)

	<u>USG</u> <u>Recommendation</u>	<u>Forces Required</u> ^{1/}	
		<u>NK Threat</u>	<u>CPR/NK Threat</u>
ROK Army	18 Modernized ^{2/} Divisions (\$500 million)	12-14 Divisions	18-22 Divisions
ROK Air Force	280 Modernized Fighter Aircraft (\$221 million)	400-500 Fighter Aircraft	900-1200 Fighter Aircraft
ROK Navy	28 Modernized Ships (\$109 million)	20 Ships	30-40 Ships

1/ The force requirements are derived from NSSMs 27 and 69. The JCS believe that the ROKs would need 22 divisions, 630 aircraft, and 40 ships to defend against the North Korean threat without U. S. force assistance.

2/ In addition, the ROK ground forces include one active Marine Division, three ready reserve divisions, and seven rear area security divisions. The U. S. has one division stationed in Korea.

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TABLE 2
THE FIVE YEAR KOREA PROGRAM
(1971 - 1976)

<u>Total Assistance Program</u>	NSC <u>Authorized Level</u> ^{1/}	USC <u>Planned Level</u> ^{2/}	USC <u>Implied Level</u> ^{3/}
	\$1.50	\$1.50B	\$1.91B
<u>Minus:</u>			
Excess Stocks ^{4/}	\$.25B	\$.25B	\$.25B
Sales	\$.08B	-	\$.10B
MAP Transfer	\$.22B	-	\$.22B
ROK in RVN	-	-	\$.09B
Subtotal	<u>\$.55B</u>	<u>\$.25B</u>	<u>\$.66B</u>
<u>Total MAP Program</u>	\$.95B	\$1.25B	\$1.25B
<u>Annual Assistance Levels</u>			
TOTAL	\$300M	\$300M	\$380M
MAP	\$192M	\$250M	\$250M

1/ This is based on NSDM-48 and Dr. Kissinger's September 5, 1970, memo to the USC. Within a total five year program of \$1.5 billion, it reduces the grant MAP assistance through a combination of excess stocks, FMS sales, the resumption of MAP Transfer. The transfer of U. S. -owned ROK equipment in RVN was not assumed.

2/ This is the Korea assistance program as forwarded by the USC to the President on June 28, 1971. It does not reduce the total assistance program for sales, MAP transfer, or ROK equipment in RVN.

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/ This represents the level of assistance implied by the USC plan. It is obtained by adding sales transfers, and excess to the grant MAP level planned by the USC, since the USC plan does not reduce the grant level for these other forms of assistance.

/ The USC's planned levels of excess are extremely conservative. It includes neither the equipment of the second U. S. division which will be withdrawn over the next five years, nor U. S. -owned equipment that will be returned to Korea when ROK forces withdraw. Likewise, the availability of excess from other sources in the post-Vietnam situation is greatly understated.

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TABLE 3
ROK MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
(FY 71-76)

	<u>Modernization Cost</u>
<u>ROK Army/Marine Corps</u>	
300 Tanks (M-48)	\$540M
73 OH-3 Helicopters	
7665 Vehicles	
12 Howitzer Bn (5" and 155m)	
7500 Machine Guns (M-60)	
2 Vulcan Air Def Bn	
<u>ROK Navy</u>	
20 Killer Boats	\$109M
2 Destroyers	
3 Destroyers Modernization	
8 Minesweepers	
<u>ROK Air Force</u>	
54 IFX	\$221M
12 F-5	
13-S-2	
18 F-4D	
25 T-4 1D	
32 C-123	
25 A-37D	
<u>Total Modernization Investment</u>	\$870M
<u>Other Costs</u>	
Operating Costs	\$470M
Excess Equipment	\$230M
<u>Total Korea Program</u>	\$1.570M

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have just completed a very fruitful round of discussions with Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy regarding the current textile negotiations in the Far East which he is conducting as my personal envoy. As a result, I would like to personally reaffirm to you the very great importance which I attach to settling the textile issue. I must, as well, reluctantly express my regret upon learning that progress toward reaching accord with Japan has been delayed.

While I recognize that the decision which you must make involves far-reaching political considerations, I would like, nonetheless, to emphasize the fundamental importance to the future course of U.S. - Japanese relations which resolution of the textile issue between the United States and Japan now entails. This is a matter which I know you appreciate as fully as I do, and I am happy to see this appreciation reflected in your recent cabinet realignment and the public statements which members of your cabinet have made emphasizing the importance of materially improving U.S. - Japanese economic relations. I am confident, therefore, that your decision on the textile issue will afford us the opportunity to make great strides in this direction.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


Dear Mr. President:

I have just completed a very fruitful round of discussions with Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy regarding the current textile negotiations in the Far East which he is conducting as my personal envoy. As a result, I would like to personally reaffirm to you the very great importance which I attach to settling the textile issue. I must, as well, reluctantly express my regret upon learning that progress toward reaching accord with the Republic of Korea has been delayed.

Because I realize that the decision which you must make involves far-reaching political considerations, I would like to emphasize that the United States has attempted to fully incorporate these considerations in its proposals and, therefore, to maintain the special relationship - a relationship whose benefits flow in both direction - which we enjoy with the Republic of Korea. Since I understand that the supplemental economic assistance we propose to offer fully cushions the impact of the U. S. textile proposal on your third Five Year Plan, I feel confident that we may now rapidly move to agreement.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
The Blue House
Seoul



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Handwritten signature
ACTION

November 24, 1971

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH/H*

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply from the President to Korean President Park's Recent Letter Seeking Assurances on the Upcoming China Trip


At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a revised suggested reply from him to Korean President Park's letter of September 16 seeking reassurances on the President's China trip as it might involve discussion of the Korea question with Peking. A suggested reply from the President gives reassurances to President Park on this score.

The draft reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

SECRET



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ACTION

November 26, 1971

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER 

SUBJECT: Proposed Reply from You to Korean President Park's Recent Letter Seeking Assurances on Your China Trip

Korean President Park in a letter of September 16 to you delivered by Foreign Minister Kim during his call on Secretary Rogers opened with praise for your China initiative and its contribution to the relaxation of tensions in Asia (Tab B). He then broached his concerns over your China trip:

-- That if you anticipate discussions on Korea, our two governments have a thorough exchange of views in advance of your trip.

-- That in view of Peking's efforts to strengthen North Korea's military capabilities, we continue our military and economic assistance at an adequate level, expedite modernization of the Korean armed forces, and stand firmly behind our defense treaty commitment.

-- That we not accept Peking's call for the removal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula -- or elsewhere in Asia -- given the fact that U. S. forces in Korea constitute the "most effective deterrent" against an outbreak of war on the Peninsula. Likewise, the U. N. Command should be continued in Korea.

-- The Korean Government is doing its best to strengthen its security and economy, and to achieving national unification by peaceful means.

A suggested reply from you to President Park (at Tab A):

-- Thanks Park for his compliments on your China initiative.

-- States that your discussions in Peking will not deal with issues primarily involving third countries, but will focus on U. S. - PRC bilateral issues.

-- Reassures Park in the context of discussing your China trip that we will consult closely with his Government on issues affecting the security of the Korean Peninsula.

-- Compliments Park on the current Red Cross talks between North and South Korea.

-- Reaffirms our intent to stand behind our defense commitment to Korea, and to continue our modernization program for its armed forces.

-- States that we will not withdraw our troops from Korea more rapidly than would be consistent with Korea's growing defensive capabilities, that we do not now have plans for the withdrawal of additional troops, and that before deciding on additional withdrawals we will consult fully with the Korean Government and undertake a joint threat assessment with it.

The draft letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to President Park at Tab A.

A



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 4, 1971

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to President PARK Chung Hee's
Letter on East Asian Problems

President Park wrote to President Nixon on September 16 of his concern about certain East Asian problems, including in particular the President's forthcoming visit to China. The letter was delivered by Foreign Minister KIM Yong Sik, who discussed its contents with Secretary Rogers on September 21, and subsequently with you.

Inasmuch as in both instances there was a rather full exchange of views with Kim concerning President Park's opinions, a response to this letter may not be necessary. If, however, you desire to acknowledge the letter, attached is a suggested reply for the President's signature.

Includes Plans
for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Suggested reply.
Letter from President Park.

SECRET

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RJ | WJH
10/26/16

SECRET

*His Excellency
Richard M. Nixon
President of the United
States of America
Washington, D. C.*

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT ~~X~~ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
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SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ (_____)
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>0930</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				<i>Hold for State Input. Could this affect the Reagan Ltr.?</i>
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>9/22</i>	<i>JAF</i>	<i>JAF</i>		<i>Hold for draft reply</i>	
<i>11/16</i>	<i>Hold</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Pres for Signature (11/22)</i>	
<i>11/24</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>Holdidge</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Redo</i>	
<i>11/24</i>		<i>HAK</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>pres to sign ltr to park</i>	
<i>11/26</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>Pres</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Sign ltr to Park</i>	
<i>11/27</i>				<i>Pres of ltr to park</i>	

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 21, 1971

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Letter from President PARK Chung Hee
to President Nixon

When Korean Foreign Minister KIM Yong Shik called on the Secretary on September 21, he gave the Secretary a letter from President Park to President Nixon with the request that it be sent to the President. The original letter in English and Korean is attached.

The major points in the letter are familiar: the hope that the President's trip to Peking will contribute to the relaxation of tensions in Asia; a request that if matters affecting Korea are discussed there will be advance consultation with the ROKG; the contention that the threat from North Korea remains and is supported by Communist China; a request that Korea continue to obtain adequate military and economic assistance from the United States; the argument that U.S. forces and a UN presence remain essential to ROK security.

A recommended reply will be prepared and sent to you for approval shortly.

For Theodore
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Letter from President Park to
President NixonSECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file here
~~Re 32869~~ FILE HERE

SECRET/EYES ONLY

November 17, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
FROM: JON HOWE
SUBJECT: Letter to President Park

want an explanation for tardy reply + modify of this message

In reviewing the proposed letter for President Park you may want to consider the following points:

- President Park expressed deep concern about the "speculations arising in certain quarters that Korean questions may be put forth by the Chinese Communists." Therefore, we may want to strengthen our reply. We could perhaps add a statement on page one following the assertion that the President's talks in Peking "will not deal with issues primarily involving third countries" to the effect that if Korean issues are raised by the PRC, we will affirm our strong ties to the Republic of Korea.
- Deletion or modification of the statement (last sentence, first paragraph on page 2) that: "Should the north abandon its hostility and accept your challenge to peaceful competition, the Republic of Korea would clearly have nothing to fear." This is not particularly reassuring evidence of U.S. understanding of North Korean ambitions.
- Deletion of the sentence (in the next paragraph): "For our part, we expect our allies to help in the defense of the Pacific area by maintaining effective conventional forces and by sharing with us the burden of this defense."
- Modification of last paragraph of the letter which states: "The events of the next few years will have a profound effect on the nations of the Pacific for the remainder of this century." Such a statement may intensify Korean suspicions about what the United States has in mind for the "next few years," rather than reassure them.

right

Because of the many Chinese references in public to the Korean issue, the Korean concern would seem justified and we may want to consider the

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SECRET/EYES ONLY

- 2 -

various pros and cons associated with some sort of further high-level consultations with them for the purpose of providing reassurance prior to the President's trip. This would also apply to any of our other allies who are prominently mentioned by the Chinese, such as the Republic of China or Japan. Perhaps HAK could undertake such a mission during his January trip.

The reply is very tardy. I am told the letter from President Park was delivered to State on September 25th. The reply, however, was only received here on about November 8, after much prodding from us.

SECRET/EYES ONLY