

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTIC
1	letter	Plimsoll to HAK	11/4/72	B
3	letter	McMahon to the President	7/21/72	B
5	letter	McMahon to the President	4/14/72	B
8	letter	Plimsoll to HAK	1/13/72	B
<del>9A</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>Plimsoll to HAK</del> MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-38/3	<del>9/8/71</del> (6pp)	<del>B</del>
DECLASSIFIED per ltr. SEP 13 2007				
<del>10</del>	<del>letter</del>	<del>McMahon to the President</del> MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 05-38/4	<del>7/18/71</del> (2pp)	<del>B</del>
DECLASSIFIED per ltr. SEP 13 2007				
11	letter	McMahon to the President	n.d.	B
12	letter	Plimsoll to HAK	10/6/71	B
13	letter	McMahon to the President	5/13/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Presidential Correspondence 1969-1974

BOX NUMBER

748

FOLDER TITLE

(5) Australia PmMcMahon [May 1971 - March 1973]

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

VIA LDX

March 3, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Replies to Inaugural Messages from Australian  
Governor General and Prime Minister (LDX 292  
and 293)

The proposed reply to Governor General Hasluck's message contained in your LDX 293 is approved without change. The following reply to Prime Minister Whitlam's message should be substituted for the text contained in your LDX 292:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciated receiving your kind message of congratulations on the occasion of my inauguration as President of the United States.

Sincerely,

RN"

Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Handwritten initials and a large green checkmark over the word ACTION.*

ACTION

February 20, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *GAF for*

SUBJECT: Presidential Responses to Australian Governor General and Prime Minister's Congratulations on the Inauguration

At Tabs A and B are State's proposed responses from the President to Governor General Hasluck and Prime Minister Whitlam in reply to their congratulations to him on his inauguration. The responses employ the standard language.

I believe we should send the standard reply to the Governor General, but should send Whitlam either the tersest reply (Tab C) or none at all. This would indicate that our dissatisfaction is with Whitlam, not Australia as a whole, and thereby hopefully keep the pressure on Whitlam but avoid antagonizing Australians generally.

Recommendation:

--That you approve the reply from the President to Governor General Hasluck at Tab A.

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

--With regard to the message from Prime Minister Whitlam, that you approve:

The reply at Tab B \_\_\_\_\_

The terse reply at Tab C HK

No reply \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS



FORM DS 322(OCR)

UNCLASSIFIED

TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE  
2/16/73  
EA/ANZ:JVMARTIN, JR.

EA/ANZ:WVHALL

S/S:0 MR. KURZE

ROUTINE

CANBERRA

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON  
TO GOVERNOR GENERAL HASLUCK. QUOTE: DEAR GOVERNOR GENERAL:

I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR KIND MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF  
MY INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. YOUR  
THOUGHTFUL GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP MEANT A GREAT DEAL, AND  
I AM CERTAIN I CAN SPEAK FOR MY FELLOW CITIZENS IN SAYING  
THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOUR COUNTRY IN  
BUILDING A NEW AND LASTING ERA OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL  
UNDERSTANDING FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLDS.

WITH BEST WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON UNQUOTE.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM GOVERNOR  
GENERAL: QUOTE:

ON BEHALF OF MYSELF AND THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA, I HAVE  
THE HONOR TO EXTEND TO YOU WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST  
WISHES ON YOUR INAUGURATION FOR A FURTHER TERM AS PRESIDENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING THE  
FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.  
PAUL HASLUCK. UNQUOTE.

*JVM*

WH  
*WVH*

S/S

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

UNCLASSIFIED

1 2

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE, BUT HAS NO  
OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO SO. PLEASE INFORM  
DEPARTMENT IF TEXT RELEASED. 44

TRANSMITTED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

'73 FEB 17 AM 10:57

*[Handwritten signature]*  
FEB 17 AM 10 47

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE NO. 293, CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

FROM: RHMILLER, S/S, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

DX TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DELIVER TO: \_\_\_\_\_ EXTENSION: \_\_\_\_\_ ROOM NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

WHITE HOUSE - MRS. DAVIS, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

OR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: DRAFTER: EA/ANZ:JVMARTIN, JR.

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: [Signature]  
Executive Secretariat Officer

B

UNCLASSIFIED

TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE  
2/16/73  
EA/ANZ:JVMARTIN, JR.

S/S:0 MR. KURZE

EA/ANZ:WVHALL

ROUTINE

CANBERRA

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

JVM  
WH

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO  
PRIME MINISTER WHITLAM: QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

S/S  
WVH

I WANT TO\*\*YOU TO KNOW HOW DEEPLY I APPRECIATED YOUR  
GRACIOUS MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF MY INAUGURATION AS  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS MEANT  
A VERY GREAT DEAL, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR CONTINUED  
COOPERATION AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO BRING ABOUT A NEW ERA  
OF PEACE FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF OUR WORLD.

WITH KINDEST GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON  
UNQUOTE.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRIME  
MINISTER: QUOTE:

ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND ON MY OWN  
PERSONAL BEHALF MAY I OFFER CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION  
OF YOUR INAUGURATION FOR A SECOND TERM AS PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT THE GREAT INTERNATIONAL  
INITIATIVES YOU SPONSORED IN YOUR FIRST TERM WILL BEAR FULL  
FRUIT OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS AND HELP TO CREATE A WORLD  
OF JUSTICE AND PEACE FOR ALL PEOPLES. IN MAKING TOWARDS

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS 322A(OCR)

UNCLASSIFIED.

12

THESE GOALS AND IN PROMOTING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES I LOOK FORWARD TO MAINTAINING CLOSE AND CONTINUING COOPERATION WITH YOU. E. G. WHITLAM UNQUOTE.

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF RECIPIENT WISHES TO DO SO. PLEASE INFORM DEPARTMENT IF TEXT RELEASED. 44

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

RECEIVED BY:  
(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

*JP*

'73 FEB 17 AM 10:57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*[Signature]*  
FEB 17 AM 11:44

LDX MESSAGE NO. 292, CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

FROM: RHMILLER, S/S, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
Officer Office Symbol Extension Room Number

LDX TO: \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
DELIVER TO: \_\_\_\_\_ EXTENSION: \_\_\_\_\_ ROOM NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

WHITE HOUSE - MRS. DAVIS, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_


\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: CLEARANCE  INFORMATION  PER REQUEST  COMMENT

REMARKS: DRAFTER: EA/ANZ:JVMARTIN, JR

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: *[Signature]*  
Executive Secretariat Officer



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciated receiving your kind message of  
congratulations on the occasion of my inauguration  
as President of the United States.

Sincerely,

RN

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	819	
02 20	02 20 17		

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ROGERS \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER X RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C X EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_  
Hollidly \_\_\_\_\_ TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Pres Responses to Australian Gov General & PM's Congratulations on the Inauguration

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. .... ( )
FAR EAST			<u>X</u>	REPLY FOR ..... ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
2/20	JAF	HAK	X	Decision (2/23)	
3/3		DAVIS <u>Hollidly</u>	S	Notify State / HAK approval recon	Hollidly
3/3				Davis pgd memo to Eliot / Meg approved	
3/8	Davis	NSC	C	Close file (Eddy)	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) \_\_\_\_\_

OR RECORD COMMENT:) \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_ JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D 2/27 BY \_\_\_\_\_

CYS FOR ) SA \_\_\_\_\_

) HP \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG ) WH \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PA ✓

) SF \_\_\_\_\_

) NS \_\_\_\_\_

) EP \_\_\_\_\_

DESTROY) DY \_\_\_\_\_

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER   1   ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

**NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE**

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR		
8 18	8 30 10	6429	Holdidge

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U  LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUBJECT: *McMahon, William*  
*Acknowledgment of Letha Reporting On*  
*HAK Visit to PCC.*  
 S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_  
 REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_  
 APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK ( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ( )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY ? ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>9/3</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>9/4/72</i>	<i>from</i>	<i>JAF</i> <i>NSC/S</i>		<i>No further action necessary</i>	

**CROSS REF WITH 6284**

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_  
 JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_  
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM  
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO *[initials]*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG) NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PAF

WHC

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

SEP 07 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

6284  
6429



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21st August, 1972.

Dear Mr President,

In the absence of the Ambassador I have been asked by the Australian Prime Minister, the Right Honourable William McMahon, to pass to you the following message:-

Begins -

"My dear President,

I appreciated your letter to me of 6 July, reviewing the general outlines and results of Dr Kissinger's fourth visit to China. I also value your thoughtfulness in keeping me and my Government in touch with your thinking by sending special representatives like Secretary Connally and Mr Marshall Green.

The information contained in your letter was encouraging and of great interest to us.

In particular, it seems to me that all of us gain from frank exchanges between the United States and China on the large matters discussed by Dr Kissinger in Peking.

I take heart, too, from your confidence that misunderstandings and tensions are being reduced and that the prospects for peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific are thereby being enhanced.

Sincerely,

William McMahon"

Ends.

Yours sincerely,

*J Lavett*  
(J.L. Lavett)  
Counsellor

The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,  
President of the United States of America,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

6429  
6284



PRIME MINISTER  
CANBERRA

18 AUG 1972

*My dear President*

I appreciated your letter to me of 6 July, reviewing the general outlines and results of Dr Kissinger's fourth visit to China. I also value your thoughtfulness in keeping me and my Government in touch with your thinking by sending special representatives like Secretary Connally and Mr Marshall Green.

The information contained in your letter was encouraging and of great interest to us.

In particular, it seems to me that all of us gain from frank exchanges between the United States and China on the large matters discussed by Dr Kissinger in Peking.

I take heart, too, from your confidence that misunderstandings and tensions are being reduced and that the prospects for peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific are thereby being enhanced.

*Sincerely*  
*William McMahon*  
(William McMahon)

The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,  
President of the United States of America,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 U.S.A.

Historical File

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	6284	Holdridge
8 21	8 21 13		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C  EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 LOVETT, J. L \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Forwards Mssg from PM McMahon Reknowledg  
 Ltr On Last HAK Trip to PRC*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APPTS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG <i>Done</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR HAK	( _____ )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( _____ )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( _____ )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( _____ )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	( _____ )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( _____ )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( _____ )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( _____ )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( _____ )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:	<i>8/24</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>9/4</i>	<i>DMW</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>No further action necessary</i>	

*CROSS REF WITH 6429*

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO *DMW*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG) NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PAF

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

SEP 07 1972

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5685

ACTION

SECRET

August 4, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JH/H*

SUBJECT: Australian Prime Minister's Note of  
Appreciation to the President for His  
Letter on the Moscow Visit

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a letter to him from Prime Minister McMahon thanking the President for his letter of June 8 describing the results of his Moscow visit. McMahon also expresses appreciation that the President reaffirmed to Soviet leaders our intention to adhere to our treaty obligations. He also conveys his gratitude for Secretary Connally's recent visit to Canberra.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

SECRET



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

WASHINGTON

5685

*Handwritten mark*

INFORMATION

August 7, 1972

*Handwritten checkmark*

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT:

Australian Prime Minister's Note of Appreciation for Your Letter Describing Your Moscow Visit

At Tab A is a letter to you from Prime Minister McMahon thanking you for your letter of June 8 describing the results of your Moscow visit, and expressing appreciation that you reaffirmed there our intention to adhere to our treaty obligations. The Prime Minister also conveys his appreciation for the recent visit of Secretary Connally.

SECRET

*Handwritten notes:*  
K- Be sure I thanked the various S. Ms etc for receiving Connally  
+ that appreciation getting benefit of their & ours  
All this have some on Connally's Bureau of Rogers

A

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	5774	Holdridge
7 20	7 26 15		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ Mahon, Wm. U  LOU \_\_\_\_\_ C  TS \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Thanks Nixon for ltr re mtgs in USSR + welcomed Cordally in Australia*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APPT'S: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK _____ ( _____ )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. _____ ( _____ )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ ( _____ )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ ( _____ )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ( _____ )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____ ( _____ )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ ( _____ )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ ( _____ )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ ( _____ )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>8/2</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				<i>* Cys to State _____ ?</i>
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>7/26/72</i>	<i>JNA</i>	<i>NSCK</i>		<i>Send a copy to State, otherwise no further action. (However, check to see if letter was sent via State channel.)</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) *State*

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: *side*

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO *State*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE *JUL 31 1972*

ORIG) \_\_\_\_\_ NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) \_\_\_\_\_ PAF \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ WFE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ SUBF \_\_\_\_\_



PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

PERSONAL.

4th June, 1972.

*My dear President.*

On my own and my Government's behalf, I want to let you know how pleased we are that your visit to the Soviet Union has been such a success.

I have personally watched with absorbed interest the course and results of the consultations in Moscow; and want you to know how much I admire the initiatives you have taken and the dedication you have shown to the cause of peace in the interests of humanity.

We sincerely hope that your efforts have made a real contribution to man's search for a true and lasting peace.

With best wishes,

*Sincerely*  
*William McMahon*

(William McMahon)

The Hon. Richard M. Nixon,  
President,  
United States of America,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20036. U. S. A.

Historical File

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
6	4	6	20	10	4933 Holdridge

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U  LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
*McMahon, WILLIAM* 'S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *McMahon congratulates Pres on the Success of the Moscow Summit*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK _____ ( _____ )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. _____ ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ ( _____ )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ ( _____ )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ( _____ )
EUROPE/CANADA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		RECOMMENDATIONS _____ ( _____ )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ ( _____ )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ ( _____ )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ ( _____ )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ ( _____ )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>6/24</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>7/3</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>		<i>Acknowledgment incorporated in President's letter to the Nation informing him of HAK's recent visit to PRL.</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO  *Jim*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG) \_\_\_\_\_ NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) \_\_\_\_\_ PAF

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 5 1972

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

URGENT ACTION

June 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt 

SUBJECT: Letters to McMahon, Heath, Pompidou and Brandt

Attached are final texts of all these messages.

Procedurally, these messages are set up as follows:

- Heath via Cabinet Line (Tab A).
- Pompidou, signed letter by President to be given to local French Ambassador here with backchannel copy to Watson (Tab B).
- Brandt to be given to Pauls here (Tab C).
- McMahon to be sent telegraphically by State with signed copy pouched to our Canberra Embassy (Tab D).

RECOMMENDATION

1. That signatures and dates be placed on letters to Pompidou, Brandt, and McMahon. Action \_\_\_\_\_
2. That message to Heath be given to Situation Room for transmission via Cabinet Line. Done \_\_\_\_\_


*6/8/72*  
*All letters dispatched.*  
*Please be sure Mr.*  
*Sonnenfeldt has*  
*full set. Windsor*  
*will also want a set.*  
*mh*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

A

B





TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore Eliot  
Executive Secretary  
Room 7224 - Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Presidential Communications

Enclosed are original Presidential letters to President Pompidou, Chancellor Brandt and Prime Minister McMahon.

Please transmit these letters electrically to our Ambassadors in the respective capitals for immediate delivery to the addressees. The originals may be pouched through normal channels. I am enclosing a copy of a Presidential message to Prime Minister Heath which has just been dispatched via the Washington-Whitehall hot line.

Because of the sensitivity of these Presidential communications, it is essential that they be handled on a most close-hold basis.

151  
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Enclosures

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

Dear Mr. President:

As I did after my return from Peking, I wanted to share with you my assessment of the Moscow meetings. You are already aware of the highlights from the extensive public record and from Secretary Rogers' report to the North Atlantic Council. There are some further impressions, however, that I want you personally to have.

The conversations were long and intensive. They were devoted almost entirely to major substantive issues, and were marked by open and frank exchanges. In addition to the plenary meetings, I had several private meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev and also met with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny together. I would agree with your judgment that Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. Apparently he has to take account of his colleagues' views, and there were several meetings of the Politburo when I was in Moscow. His freedom of action may be somewhat limited, but by and large he has the power of final decisions.

The final negotiations on SALT occupied the first few meetings. Although many of the issues had already been worked out, Brezhnev and I wanted to review some technical issues such as the distance between the two permitted ABM sites for each side, and to discuss the terms for constructing additional ballistic missile submarines above the current Soviet level.

The agreements are an important first step and major questions will be addressed in the next phase. I am convinced, however, that our planned forces under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests.

TOP SECRET

There is one question that I want to call to your attention before the Congressional hearings begin. In the final period of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the French and British ballistic missile submarines. They made a statement to the effect that any increase in the combined levels of US ballistic missile submarines plus nine submarines for the UK and France would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to increase its ceiling during the period of the interim agreement. Our delegation under my instructions firmly rejected this statement, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no question of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons systems held by third parties.

I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the closest scrutiny. I feel obligated to make this exchange with the Soviets a part of the record being sent to our Congress. As a practical matter, this issue will not arise for several years but in the next round of talks the Soviets will undoubtedly revert to it, and we will need to consult in the coming months to determine the best approach.

European security issues were given considerable emphasis by the Soviet leaders, especially by Brezhnev. We had agreed that the Berlin agreements were to be completed shortly after the Moscow meetings. And in this context I outlined a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations after the US elections, which also would put them after the summit of the European Community members. I indicated our view that the Conference would require careful preparations so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. While we did not deal with agenda or substance of the Conference, I believe the Soviet leaders understand the need for careful preparation.

In view of the movement toward the eventual convening of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, I felt that we should not allow military security issues to be turned aside. Thus, I suggested that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe

should parallel the preparatory talks for the European Conference, and this was accepted in principle. As you know, I have doubts that these discussions will yield any immediate results and will probably involve quite prolonged negotiations. Our Congress and the American people would not understand, however, if we made no effort to limit the military confrontation in Central Europe. The next step will be to discuss the formation of a special group for exploratory talks. The sine qua non for a successful negotiation is to be sure the Alliance is carefully and meticulously prepared.

The question of UN membership for both Germanies was raised by Brezhnev, and I took the position that we would have to follow the lead of West Germany. One notable aspect of our conversations on Europe was that the Soviet side never challenged the US role.

We talked at great length about Vietnam and the Middle East. The Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations on Vietnam. Only at the end did there seem to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved. I did present our position in detail on how the conflict should be ended, and this may have some value in the coming months.

On the Middle East, the Soviets urged bilateral discussions. As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression -- though no more than an impression -- that the Soviet leaders are increasingly concerned about the policies of their friends and may in the future be more a factor of restraint.

I foresee another active period of East-West diplomacy, including a second round of SALT and a European Conference. In this period we will need to remain in close contact. It was largely the fortitude and wisdom of our Alliance that brought us to this point and we cannot sacrifice our unity at a moment when an opportunity for a more stable international order may be evolving.


There will now be much speculation about US-Soviet bilateralism and about US disengagement from its commitments. Such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded. In Moscow I was deeply conscious that my most valuable asset was our combined strength. There is no intention here to weaken our collective efforts when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.

The statement of principles governing Soviet-American relations was one of the main accomplishments of the visit. Although somewhat different in character from the Franco-Soviet Declaration, it also represents an aspiration on both sides and seeks to establish a constructive framework for future relations. Of course, I do not expect the signature of such a document to compel the USSR to act against its interest. What I do hope for is that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these principles, as well as the similar principles in the Franco-Soviet Declaration, will point their policy in a more constructive direction. This is not because there was any sense of diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders to their system, to values which you and I and all our friends in the West do not accept and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. Certain pragmatic considerations -- stemming inter alia from the long-term challenge of China, economic imperatives and the persisting rumblings in Eastern Europe -- seem to be leading the Soviet rulers to seek foreign relationships that are more stable and less risky. Whatever their motives, we in the West have every incentive to encourage such a trend for our own reasons.

The validity of these judgments will be tested in the months ahead as we strive to translate paper agreements into practical action.

Your own thoughts on recent events would be most valuable to me. I look forward to continued discussions with you concerning any of the particular issues of common interest.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Georges Pompidou  
President of the French Republic  
Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I wanted to share with you my evaluation of the Moscow meetings as I did after my return from Peking. You are already aware of the highlights from the detailed public record and from your conversations with Secretary Rogers. There are some further impressions, however, that I want you to have on a personal basis.

The conversations were lengthy and intensive. They were devoted to major substantive issues, and were conducted with a great deal of candor. In addition to the plenary meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny together. As you pointed out in Key Biscayne, Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. He is vigorous and intelligent. Apparently, he does take account of his colleagues' views since the Politburo was convened several times during my visit. His freedom of action may thus be somewhat limited, but he seems to have the power to make the final decisions.

Strategic arms limitation was high on the agenda for the first part of the visit. Although a great deal had already been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, Brezhnev and I wished to have a final review, especially on the precise terms for constructing additional submarines above the current Soviet level.

I have carefully considered the impact of these agreements and I believe that our planned forces under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests and those of our Allies.

TOP SECRET

European matters were given considerable attention by the Soviet side. They obviously value highly your contribution to the normalization of relations in Europe, and the prospects of treaty ratification made it possible to settle on the signing of the Berlin accords. The Soviet leaders were obviously gratified about the then imminent ratification of the German-Soviet treaty. Since the Berlin agreements were to be completed, I outlined, in response to Soviet questions, a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet side pressed for a Conference this year, but I suggested waiting until after the US elections, which also would put the preparatory meetings after the summit of the European Community members. I also emphasized that the Conference would require careful preparations so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet leaders understand this approach.

I felt that with movement toward the convening of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation we could not neglect the military security issues which required a different forum. Accordingly, we agreed in principle that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory talks for the European Conference. There was no further substance discussed concerning actual reductions, or about the agenda of a Conference, which are matters directly concerning the Alliance.

We talked at greater length about Vietnam and the Middle East. On Vietnam, I felt the Soviet leaders were rather restrained in presenting their position. At the end of the visit there seemed to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved. These discussions were valuable in providing an opportunity for me to express in detail our position on how to bring the war to an end, and I believe that this may have some value over the coming months.

On the Middle East, the Soviet interest was in further bilateral discussions with the United States. As indicated by the communique, we agreed to give continued support to the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression that the Soviets are concerned about future actions by their friends and may work for more restraint.

I believe we can anticipate another active period of East-West diplomacy. Perhaps even more so than in the past, we will need to remain in closest contact. Western strength brought us to this point and we cannot jeopardize our unity as new opportunities for a more stable international order may develop. The harmonization of our policies will be a major concern in this new period, since we can be certain that the USSR will not hesitate to exploit divisions within our ranks. This was evident when they raised the question of an endorsement of the early admission of the FRG and GDR to the UN.

There will now be much speculation in this country and abroad about US-Soviet bilateralism, or even concerning US disengagement.

I am sure, Mr. Chancellor, that you recognize such speculation is inevitable, but has absolutely no foundation. During my conversations in Moscow, there was a deep awareness on my part that our combined strength and unity of purpose was my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to weaken our cohesion at the very time when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.


One of the main accomplishments of the visit was the agreement on basic principles governing Soviet-American relations. This document represents an aspiration on both sides, but of course, I do not expect that such a statement will compel the USSR to act against its interest. It is nevertheless my hope that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these principles will point their policy in a more constructive direction.

I did not sense any diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders to their system and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. But certain pragmatic considerations may lead the Soviet rulers toward less erratic and less dangerous foreign relationships. Such a trend, whatever its motivation, is one that we in the West have every incentive to encourage for our own reasons.

In the months ahead, we will strive to translate paper agreements into practical action, and as we do so, we will test the validity of these judgments.

I would greatly value your views of recent events. We should remain in close contact and I hope you will not hesitate to raise those particular issues in which we are jointly interested.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard Nixon".

His Excellency  
Willy Brandt  
Chancellor of the Federal  
Republic of Germany  
Bonn

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you some impressions of my meetings with the leaders of the Soviet Union. As you know, this visit was long in preparation. When I first entered office, I decided that this was the wisest course to take because I believed that the effects of a poorly prepared meeting producing perhaps no more than another ephemeral "spirit" would be more adverse than the delay involved in carefully laying the groundwork for a successful meeting. The Soviet leaders evidently saw matters the same way.

In the event, I believe it can fairly be said that my visit to the USSR produced substantial accomplishments. You are of course familiar by now with the numerous agreements and the final communique which have been published. Although most attention has been given to the treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim freeze on offensive weapons, the other agreements should not be minimized. In their totality, all the agreements reached will I believe create a commitment not only to a further improvement in relations but to the kind of conduct in international relations generally which will make the world a safer place to live in for all peoples.

I am aware that when the so-called "superpowers" meet to negotiate agreements and to discuss the great issues of our day, concern is sometimes expressed in other countries that matters are being settled over their heads. But I believe one of the noteworthy aspects of the Moscow meetings was that while both sides were naturally conscious of the great responsibilities they bear by virtue of their power and

TOP SECRET

extensive interests, they were equally conscious of the fact that peace requires that the interests of all countries, large and small, are safeguarded. In addition, I made clear privately, as well as in the public documents, that American obligations and alliance relationships could not in any way be affected by agreements reached with the Soviet Union. This was understood and accepted by the Soviet leaders.

We spent many hours in discussions about Vietnam. As you know from the final communique, the positions remained apart. Yet I found it of interest and perhaps a hopeful sign that the Soviet leaders were prepared to listen at length to the most detailed exposition of our point of view. It is my impression that the essence of what I said will be conveyed to Hanoi. Only time will tell whether a more flexible Communist position will ensue in Paris. The Soviets, at any rate, can have no doubt of my firm commitment to an early conclusion to the conflict in a way that safeguards the honor and the interests of all the parties and, above all, ends the anguish of the people of the region.


Finally, a word about the Soviet leaders. They are of course totally committed to their system and there should be no illusion that many of their values and goals remain wholly unacceptable to us. Yet it was also clear that these leaders can adapt to realities and that pragmatic considerations of self-interest can lead them along constructive paths. I found them intelligent and tough but not inflexible on practical issues. Brezhnev is clearly in command, but both Kosygin and Podgorny, each in his own way, are men with authority and skill. While Brezhnev was the senior spokesman, my strong impression is that a considerable degree of collectivity does prevail. In my discussions, I was struck that despite the barriers of ideology and vastly differing background, a genuine dialogue developed. While personal relationships should not be exaggerated, I believe the process of communication has been facilitated for the future.

TOP SECRET

3

I am delighted, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will soon be receiving Mr. John Connally. As you know he has just embarked on an extensive journey to several countries at my personal request to discuss questions of mutual concern. In Canberra, he will be prepared to speak to you further about the Moscow summit and to comment on any particular questions you may wish to raise. He has my complete confidence and will report back directly to me. As you know, I greatly value your views and the intimate relationship that is traditional between our two governments. I am therefore particularly pleased that Mr. Connally will have the opportunity to meet with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard Nixon". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

VIA CABINET LINE

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

It was good to receive, shortly after my return to the United States, your very kind note of congratulations. By now you will have had an account of Secretary Rogers' report on the main points of the Moscow meetings, but I would like to give you some of my own impressions.

The conversations with the Soviet leaders were long and thorough. They were devoted almost completely to major substantive issues, and were conducted with complete frankness. In addition to the announced plenary meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny together. Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. Apparently he is obliged to take account of his colleagues' views and his freedom of action is not unlimited. There were several Politburo meetings while we were in Moscow. But within certain limits Brezhnev appears to have the authority to make decisions and he plainly has the power to shape the outcome of Politburo deliberations. Contrary to the views of some Soviet experts, I found all three top leaders intelligent, well informed and politically quite sophisticated. They should not be underrated.

The discussions on SALT occupied the first part of the visit. Many of the issues had already been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, but

TOP SECRET

Brezhnev and I wanted to review some technical issues such as the distance between the ABM sites, as well as the final terms for constructing submarines above the level designated as the current Soviet ceiling.

As I informed our Congress, I am convinced that our planned forces under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests.

There is one point that I want to bring to your attention before the Congressional hearings begin. In the final period of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the UK and French ballistic missile submarines. They made a statement to the effect that any increase in the combined level of US ballistic missile submarines plus nine submarines for the UK and France would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to increase its ceiling. Our delegation, under my instructions, firmly rejected this statement, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no question of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons systems held by third parties.

Since I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the closest scrutiny, I feel obligated to make the exchange of statements on this subject by the US and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki part of the record being sent to the Congress. I do not believe that this issue will arise as a practical matter for some time to come but the Soviets will no doubt revert to it in the follow-on SALT talks. We will have to be in close touch in the coming months to determine the best way to deal with it.

As for the other substantive issues, Europe was given considerable emphasis by the Soviet leaders. As you know, I have been skeptical of the European Security Conference, but since the Berlin agreements were to be completed shortly after the Moscow meetings, I outlined a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations after the US elections, which also would put them after the summit of the European Community members. I also emphasized that the Conference would require careful preparations so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet leaders understand this approach.

I was concerned, however, that with movement toward the convening of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, the military security issues not be turned aside. As recorded in the communique, we agreed that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory talks for the European Conference. The goal will be early negotiations in a special forum of the countries directly concerned. I know you are quite skeptical about these talks. But I believe that they can do some good if they are carefully prepared and very concrete. We should work together to prevent the Alliance from being split by generalities.

There were no specific discussions of the agenda for the European conference or the substance of MBFR talks. This is of course a matter

TOP SECRET

-4-

for all countries concerned. My judgment as regards MBFR is that the complexity of the subject will make for prolonged negotiations.

Brezhnev also pressed for early UN membership for the two Germanies, but I informed him that our position on this question was identical to that of the Federal Republic and that the FRG should take the lead. I did mention the need for four power agreement concerning our rights with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole in connection with the UN membership issue.

In general, with respect to Europe, I found it interesting that there was at no time any attempt to question the American role.

We talked at length about Vietnam and the Middle East. The Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations. At the end there did seem to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved. We did have the opportunity to present our views on how to end the conflict in great detail, and the Soviets now have the most detailed record of our position. This may prove to be of some use in the coming weeks but we will have to await developments.

On the Middle East the Soviets were interested in further bilateral discussions. As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression

TOP SECRET

that the Soviets are concerned about their clients and may work for more restraint.

If our hopes are justified, we can anticipate another active period of East-West diplomacy, including a second round of SALT. Certainly, in this period, perhaps even more so than in the past, we will need to remain in close contact. It was largely Western strength and patience that brought us to this point, and we cannot sacrifice our unity when a new opportunity for a more stable international order may be developing.

I realize there will be much speculation about US-Soviet bilateralism or even about US disengagement. I am sure, Mr. Prime Minister, that you know such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded. Throughout my conversations in Moscow I was deeply conscious that our combined strength was my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to fritter it away when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.

The statement of basic principles governing Soviet-American relations was one of the main accomplishments of the visit. It represents an aspiration on both sides, but of course, I do not expect a piece of paper to compel the USSR to act against its interest. What I do hope for is that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these kinds of principles for the first time will point their policy in a more constructive direction. I say this not because I sensed any diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders

TOP SECRET

-6-

to their system, to values which you and I and all our friends in the West do not accept, and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. But I would judge that certain pragmatic considerations -- stemming inter alia from the long-term challenge of China, economic imperatives and the persisting rumblings in Eastern Europe -- are leading the Soviet rulers to seek more stable and safer foreign relationships. Whatever their motives, this is a trend that we in the West have every incentive to encourage for our own reasons.

The months ahead, when we will strive to translate paper agreements into practical action, will test the validity of this judgment.

I would, of course, greatly value your own additional thoughts on these recent events, and I also look forward to remaining in touch with you about any of the particular issues in which we are jointly interested.

Sincerely,

*To, Prime Minister Edward Heath*

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore Eliot  
Executive Secretary  
Room 7224 - Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT: Presidential Communications

Enclosed are original Presidential letters to President Pompidou, Chancellor Brandt and Prime Minister McMahon.

Please transmit these letters electrically to our Ambassadors in the respective capitals for immediate delivery to the addressees. The originals may be pouched through normal channels. I am enclosing a copy of a Presidential message to Prime Minister Heath which has just been dispatched via the Washington-Whitehall hot line.

Because of the sensitivity of these Presidential communications, it is essential that they be handled on a most close-hold basis.

*IS/*  
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Enclosures

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

Dear Mr. President:

As I did after my return from Peking, I wanted to share with you my assessment of the Moscow meetings. You are already aware of the highlights from the extensive public record and from Secretary Rogers' report to the North Atlantic Council. There are some further impressions, however, that I want you personally to have.

The conversations were long and intensive. They were devoted almost entirely to major substantive issues, and were marked by open and frank exchanges. In addition to the plenary meetings, I had several private meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev and also met with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny together. I would agree with your judgment that Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. Apparently he has to take account of his colleagues' views, and there were several meetings of the Politburo when I was in Moscow. His freedom of action may be somewhat limited, but by and large he has the power of final decisions.

The final negotiations on SALT occupied the first few meetings. Although many of the issues had already been worked out, Brezhnev and I wanted to review some technical issues such as the distance between the two permitted ABM sites for each side, and to discuss the terms for constructing additional ballistic missile submarines above the current Soviet level.

The agreements are an important first step and major questions will be addressed in the next phase. I am convinced, however, that our planned forces under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests.

TOP SECRET

There is one question that I want to call to your attention before the Congressional hearings begin. In the final period of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the French and British ballistic missile submarines. They made a statement to the effect that any increase in the combined levels of US ballistic missile submarines plus nine submarines for the UK and France would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to increase its ceiling during the period of the interim agreement. Our delegation under my instructions firmly rejected this statement, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no question of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons systems held by third parties.

I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the closest scrutiny. I feel obligated to make this exchange with the Soviets a part of the record being sent to our Congress. As a practical matter, this issue will not arise for several years but in the next round of talks the Soviets will undoubtedly revert to it, and we will need to consult in the coming months to determine the best approach.

European security issues were given considerable emphasis by the Soviet leaders, especially by Brezhnev. We had agreed that the Berlin agreements were to be completed shortly after the Moscow meetings. And in this context I outlined a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations after the US elections, which also would put them after the summit of the European Community members. I indicated our view that the Conference would require careful preparations so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. While we did not deal with agenda or substance of the Conference, I believe the Soviet leaders understand the need for careful preparation.

In view of the movement toward the eventual convening of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, I felt that we should not allow military security issues to be turned aside. Thus, I suggested that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe

should parallel the preparatory talks for the European Conference, and this was accepted in principle. As you know, I have doubts that these discussions will yield any immediate results and will probably involve quite prolonged negotiations. Our Congress and the American people would not understand, however, if we made no effort to limit the military confrontation in Central Europe. The next step will be to discuss the formation of a special group for exploratory talks. The sine qua non for a successful negotiation is to be sure the Alliance is carefully and meticulously prepared.

The question of UN membership for both Germanies was raised by Brezhnev, and I took the position that we would have to follow the lead of West Germany. One notable aspect of our conversations on Europe was that the Soviet side never challenged the US role.

We talked at great length about Vietnam and the Middle East. The Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations on Vietnam. Only at the end did there seem to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved. I did present our position in detail on how the conflict should be ended, and this may have some value in the coming months.

On the Middle East, the Soviets urged bilateral discussions. As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression -- though no more than an impression -- that the Soviet leaders are increasingly concerned about the policies of their friends and may in the future be more a factor of restraint.

I foresee another active period of East-West diplomacy, including a second round of SALT and a European Conference. In this period we will need to remain in close contact. It was largely the fortitude and wisdom of our Alliance that brought us to this point and we cannot sacrifice our unity at a moment when an opportunity for a more stable international order may be evolving.


There will now be much speculation about US-Soviet bilateralism and about US disengagement from its commitments. Such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded. In Moscow I was deeply conscious that my most valuable asset was our combined strength. There is no intention here to weaken our collective efforts when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.

The statement of principles governing Soviet-American relations was one of the main accomplishments of the visit. Although somewhat different in character from the Franco-Soviet Declaration, it also represents an aspiration on both sides and seeks to establish a constructive framework for future relations. Of course, I do not expect the signature of such a document to compel the USSR to act against its interest. What I do hope for is that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these principles, as well as the similar principles in the Franco-Soviet Declaration, will point their policy in a more constructive direction. This is not because there was any sense of diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders to their system, to values which you and I and all our friends in the West do not accept and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. Certain pragmatic considerations -- stemming inter alia from the long-term challenge of China, economic imperatives and the persisting rumblings in Eastern Europe -- seem to be leading the Soviet rulers to seek foreign relationships that are more stable and less risky. Whatever their motives, we in the West have every incentive to encourage such a trend for our own reasons.

The validity of these judgments will be tested in the months ahead as we strive to translate paper agreements into practical action.

Your own thoughts on recent events would be most valuable to me. I look forward to continued discussions with you concerning any of the particular issues of common interest.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Georges Pompidou  
President of the French Republic  
Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I wanted to share with you my evaluation of the Moscow meetings as I did after my return from Peking. You are already aware of the highlights from the detailed public record and from your conversations with Secretary Rogers. There are some further impressions, however, that I want you to have on a personal basis.

The conversations were lengthy and intensive. They were devoted to major substantive issues, and were conducted with a great deal of candor. In addition to the plenary meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny together. As you pointed out in Key Biscayne, Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. He is vigorous and intelligent. Apparently, he does take account of his colleagues' views since the Politburo was convened several times during my visit. His freedom of action may thus be somewhat limited, but he seems to have the power to make the final decisions.

Strategic arms limitation was high on the agenda for the first part of the visit. Although a great deal had already been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, Brezhnev and I wished to have a final review, especially on the precise terms for constructing additional submarines above the current Soviet level.

I have carefully considered the impact of these agreements and I believe that our planned forces under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests and those of our Allies.

TOP SECRET

European matters were given considerable attention by the Soviet side. They obviously value highly your contribution to the normalization of relations in Europe, and the prospects of treaty ratification made it possible to settle on the signing of the Berlin accords. The Soviet leaders were obviously gratified about the then imminent ratification of the German-Soviet treaty. Since the Berlin agreements were to be completed, I outlined, in response to Soviet questions, a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet side pressed for a Conference this year, but I suggested waiting until after the US elections, which also would put the preparatory meetings after the summit of the European Community members. I also emphasized that the Conference would require careful preparations so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet leaders understand this approach.

I felt that with movement toward the convening of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation we could not neglect the military security issues which required a different forum. Accordingly, we agreed in principle that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory talks for the European Conference. There was no further substance discussed concerning actual reductions, or about the agenda of a Conference, which are matters directly concerning the Alliance.

We talked at greater length about Vietnam and the Middle East. On Vietnam, I felt the Soviet leaders were rather restrained in presenting their position. At the end of the visit there seemed to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved. These discussions were valuable in providing an opportunity for me to express in detail our position on how to bring the war to an end, and I believe that this may have some value over the coming months.

On the Middle East, the Soviet interest was in further bilateral discussions with the United States. As indicated by the communique, we agreed to give continued support to the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression that the Soviets are concerned about future actions by their friends and may work for more restraint.

I believe we can anticipate another active period of East-West diplomacy. Perhaps even more so than in the past, we will need to remain in closest contact. Western strength brought us to this point and we cannot jeopardize our unity as new opportunities for a more stable international order may develop. The harmonization of our policies will be a major concern in this new period, since we can be certain that the USSR will not hesitate to exploit divisions within our ranks. This was evident when they raised the question of an endorsement of the early admission of the FRG and GDR to the UN.

There will now be much speculation in this country and abroad about US-Soviet bilateralism, or even concerning US disengagement.

I am sure, Mr. Chancellor, that you recognize such speculation is inevitable, but has absolutely no foundation. During my conversations in Moscow, there was a deep awareness on my part that our combined strength and unity of purpose was my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to weaken our cohesion at the very time when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.


One of the main accomplishments of the visit was the agreement on basic principles governing Soviet-American relations. This document represents an aspiration on both sides, but of course, I do not expect that such a statement will compel the USSR to act against its interest. It is nevertheless my hope that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these principles will point their policy in a more constructive direction.

I did not sense any diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders to their system and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. But certain pragmatic considerations may lead the Soviet rulers toward less erratic and less dangerous foreign relationships. Such a trend, whatever its motivation, is one that we in the West have every incentive to encourage for our own reasons.

In the months ahead, we will strive to translate paper agreements into practical action, and as we do so, we will test the validity of these judgments.

I would greatly value your views of recent events. We should remain in close contact and I hope you will not hesitate to raise those particular issues in which we are jointly interested.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Richard Nixon".

His Excellency  
Willy Brandt  
Chancellor of the Federal  
Republic of Germany  
Bonn

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you some impressions of my meetings with the leaders of the Soviet Union. As you know, this visit was long in preparation. When I first entered office, I decided that this was the wisest course to take because I believed that the effects of a poorly prepared meeting producing perhaps no more than another ephemeral "spirit" would be more adverse than the delay involved in carefully laying the groundwork for a successful meeting. The Soviet leaders evidently saw matters the same way.

In the event, I believe it can fairly be said that my visit to the USSR produced substantial accomplishments. You are of course familiar by now with the numerous agreements and the final communique which have been published. Although most attention has been given to the treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim freeze on offensive weapons, the other agreements should not be minimized. In their totality, all the agreements reached will I believe create a commitment not only to a further improvement in relations but to the kind of conduct in international relations generally which will make the world a safer place to live in for all peoples.

I am aware that when the so-called "superpowers" meet to negotiate agreements and to discuss the great issues of our day, concern is sometimes expressed in other countries that matters are being settled over their heads. But I believe one of the noteworthy aspects of the Moscow meetings was that while both sides were naturally conscious of the great responsibilities they bear by virtue of their power and

TOP SECRET


extensive interests, they were equally conscious of the fact that peace requires that the interests of all countries, large and small, are safeguarded. In addition, I made clear privately, as well as in the public documents, that American obligations and alliance relationships could not in any way be affected by agreements reached with the Soviet Union. This was understood and accepted by the Soviet leaders.

We spent many hours in discussions about Vietnam. As you know from the final communique, the positions remained apart. Yet I found it of interest and perhaps a hopeful sign that the Soviet leaders were prepared to listen at length to the most detailed exposition of our point of view. It is my impression that the essence of what I said will be conveyed to Hanoi. Only time will tell whether a more flexible Communist position will ensue in Paris. The Soviets, at any rate, can have no doubt of my firm commitment to an early conclusion to the conflict in a way that safeguards the honor and the interests of all the parties and, above all, ends the anguish of the people of the region.

Finally, a word about the Soviet leaders. They are of course totally committed to their system and there should be no illusion that many of their values and goals remain wholly unacceptable to us. Yet it was also clear that these leaders can adapt to realities and that pragmatic considerations of self-interest can lead them along constructive paths. I found them intelligent and tough but not inflexible on practical issues. Brezhnev is clearly in command, but both Kosygin and Podgorny, each in his own way, are men with authority and skill. While Brezhnev was the senior spokesman, my strong impression is that a considerable degree of collectivity does prevail. In my discussions, I was struck that despite the barriers of ideology and vastly differing background, a genuine dialogue developed. While personal relationships should not be exaggerated, I believe the process of communication has been facilitated for the future.

I am delighted, Mr. Prime Minister, that you will soon be receiving Mr. John Connally. As you know he has just embarked on an extensive journey to several countries at my personal request to discuss questions of mutual concern. In Canberra, he will be prepared to speak to you further about the Moscow summit and to comment on any particular questions you may wish to raise. He has my complete confidence and will report back directly to me. As you know, I greatly value your views and the intimate relationship that is traditional between our two governments. I am therefore particularly pleased that Mr. Connally will have the opportunity to meet with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard Nixon".

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

TOP SECRET

June 8, 1972

VIA CABINET LINE

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER

It was good to receive, shortly after my return to the United States, your very kind note of congratulations. By now you will have had an account of Secretary Rogers' report on the main points of the Moscow meetings, but I would like to give you some of my own impressions.

The conversations with the Soviet leaders were long and thorough. They were devoted almost completely to major substantive issues, and were conducted with complete frankness. In addition to the announced plenary meetings, I met privately with General Secretary Brezhnev several times and also with him, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny together. Brezhnev is clearly the dominant political leader. Apparently he is obliged to take account of his colleagues' views and his freedom of action is not unlimited. There were several Politburo meetings while we were in Moscow. But within certain limits Brezhnev appears to have the authority to make decisions and he plainly has the power to shape the outcome of Politburo deliberations. Contrary to the views of some Soviet experts, I found all three top leaders intelligent, well informed and politically quite sophisticated. They should not be underrated.

The discussions on SALT occupied the first part of the visit. Many of the issues had already been agreed at the working level in Helsinki, but

TOP SECRET

Brezhnev and I wanted to review some technical issues such as the distance between the ABM sites, as well as the final terms for constructing submarines above the level designated as the current Soviet ceiling.

As I informed our Congress, I am convinced that our planned forces under both agreements are without question sufficient for the maintenance of our security and the protection of our vital interests.

There is one point that I want to bring to your attention before the Congressional hearings begin. In the final period of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation raised the question of the UK and French ballistic missile submarines. They made a statement to the effect that any increase in the combined level of US ballistic missile submarines plus nine submarines for the UK and France would give the USSR a corresponding "right" to increase its ceiling. Our delegation, under my instructions, firmly rejected this statement, and in Moscow I emphasized that there could be no question of compensating the Soviet Union for weapons systems held by third parties.

Since I have asked the Congress to give these agreements the closest scrutiny, I feel obligated to make the exchange of statements on this subject by the US and Soviet negotiators in Helsinki part of the record being sent to the Congress. I do not believe that this issue will arise as a practical matter for some time to come but the Soviets will no doubt revert to it in the follow-on SALT talks. We will have to be in close touch in the coming months to determine the best way to deal with it.

As for the other substantive issues, Europe was given considerable emphasis by the Soviet leaders. As you know, I have been skeptical of the European Security Conference, but since the Berlin agreements were to be completed shortly after the Moscow meetings, I outlined a tentative timetable for multilateral preparations after the US elections, which also would put them after the summit of the European Community members. I also emphasized that the Conference would require careful preparations so that it could concentrate on concrete issues. I believe the Soviet leaders understand this approach.

I was concerned, however, that with movement toward the convening of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, the military security issues not be turned aside. As recorded in the communique, we agreed that exploratory discussions concerning reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe should parallel the preparatory talks for the European Conference. The goal will be early negotiations in a special forum of the countries directly concerned. I know you are quite skeptical about these talks. But I believe that they can do some good if they are carefully prepared and very concrete. We should work together to prevent the Alliance from being split by generalities.

There were no specific discussions of the agenda for the European conference or the substance of MBFR talks. This is of course a matter

for all countries concerned. My judgment as regards MBFR is that the complexity of the subject will make for prolonged negotiations.

Brezhnev also pressed for early UN membership for the two Germanies, but I informed him that our position on this question was identical to that of the Federal Republic and that the FRG should take the lead. I did mention the need for four power agreement concerning our rights with respect to Berlin and Germany as a whole in connection with the UN membership issue.

In general, with respect to Europe, I found it interesting that there was at no time any attempt to question the American role.

We talked at length about Vietnam and the Middle East. The Soviets were rather restrained in their presentations. At the end there did seem to be some indication that they might intercede in Hanoi to promote serious discussions, but there was no commitment involved. We did have the opportunity to present our views on how to end the conflict in great detail, and the Soviets now have the most detailed record of our position. This may prove to be of some use in the coming weeks but we will have to await developments.

On the Middle East the Soviets were interested in further bilateral discussions. As stated in the communique, we left it that both parties would support the mission of Ambassador Jarring. It is my impression

that the Soviets are concerned about their clients and may work for more restraint.

If our hopes are justified, we can anticipate another active period of East-West diplomacy, including a second round of SALT. Certainly, in this period, perhaps even more so than in the past, we will need to remain in close contact. It was largely Western strength and patience that brought us to this point, and we cannot sacrifice our unity when a new opportunity for a more stable international order may be developing.

I realize there will be much speculation about US-Soviet bilateralism or even about US disengagement. I am sure, Mr. Prime Minister, that you know such speculation is inevitable but totally unfounded. Throughout my conversations in Moscow I was deeply conscious that our combined strength was my most valuable asset, and there is no intention here to fritter it away when a breakthrough in East-West relations may be possible.

The statement of basic principles governing Soviet-American relations was one of the main accomplishments of the visit. It represents an aspiration on both sides, but of course, I do not expect a piece of paper to compel the USSR to act against its interest. What I do hope for is that Soviet willingness to subscribe to these kinds of principles for the first time will point their policy in a more constructive direction. I say this not because I sensed any diminution of the commitment of the Soviet leaders

to their system, to values which you and I and all our friends in the West do not accept, and to goals that may be inimical to our interests. But I would judge that certain pragmatic considerations -- stemming inter alia from the long-term challenge of China, economic imperatives and the persisting rumblings in Eastern Europe -- are leading the Soviet rulers to seek more stable and safer foreign relationships. Whatever their motives, this is a trend that we in the West have every incentive to encourage for our own reasons.

The months ahead, when we will strive to translate paper agreements into practical action, will test the validity of this judgment.

I would, of course, greatly value your own additional thoughts on these recent events, and I also look forward to remaining in touch with you about any of the particular issues in which we are jointly interested.

Sincerely,

*To: Prime Minister Edward Heath*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET STATE 102289

NODIS

1. FOLLOWING FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY TO YOU SOME IMPRESSIONS OF MY MEETINGS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. AS YOU KNOW, THIS VISIT WAS LONG IN PREPARATION. WHEN I FIRST ENTERED OFFICE, I DECIDED THAT THIS WAS THE WISEST COURSE TO TAKE BECAUSE I BELIEVED THAT THE EFFECTS OF A POORLY PREPARED MEETING PRODUCING PERHAPS NO MORE THAN ANOTHER EPHEMERAL "SPIRIT" WOULD BE MORE ADVERSE THAN THE DELAY INVOLVED IN CAREFULLY LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SUCCESSFUL MEETING. THE SOVIET LEADERS EVIDENTLY SAW MATTERS THE SAME WAY.

IN THE EVENT, I BELIEVE IT CAN FAIRLY BE SAID THAT MY VISIT TO THE USSR PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS. YOU ARE OF COURSE FAMILIAR BY NOW WITH THE NUMEROUS AGREEMENTS AND THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED. ALTHOUGH MOST ATTENTION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE TREATY LIMITING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM FREEZE ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THE OTHER AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MINIMIZED. IN THEIR TOTALITY, ALL THE AGREEMENTS REACHED WILL I BELIEVE CREATE A COMMITMENT NOT ONLY TO A FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BUT TO THE KIND OF CONDUCT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS GENERALLY WHICH WILL MAKE THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE TO LIVE IN FOR ALL PEOPLES.

TOP SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

-2 - STATE 102289 JUN 8

I AM AWARE THAT WHEN THE SO-CALLED "SUPERPOWERS" MEET TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS AND TO DISCUSS THE GREAT ISSUES OF OUR DAY, CONCERN IS SOMETIMES EXPRESSED IN OTHER COUNTRIES THAT MATTERS ARE BEING SETTLED OVER THEIR HEADS. BUT I BELIEVE ONE OF THE NOTEWORTHY ASPECTS OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS WAS THAT WHILE BOTH SIDES WERE NATURALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES THEY BEAR BY VIRTUE OF THEIR POWER AND EXTENSIVE INTERESTS, THEY WERE EQUALLY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT PEACE REQUIRES THAT THE INTERESTS OF ALL COUNTRIES, LARGE AND SMALL, ARE SAFEGUARDED. IN ADDITION, I MADE CLEAR PRIVATELY, AS WELL AS IN THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, THAT AMERICAN OBLIGATIONS AND ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT IN ANY WAY BE AFFECTED BY AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET LEADERS.

WE SPENT MANY HOURS IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT VIETNAM. AS YOU KNOW FROM THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE, THE POSITIONS REMAINED APART. YET I FOUND IT OF INTEREST AND PERHAPS A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WERE PREPARED TO LISTEN AT LENGTH TO THE MOST DETAILED EXPOSITION OF OUR POINT OF VIEW. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE ESSENCE OF WHAT I SAID WILL BE CONVEYED TO HANOI. ONLY TIME WILL TELL WHETHER A MORE FLEXIBLE COMMUNIST POSITION WILL ENSUE IN PARIS. THE SOVIETS, AT ANY RATE, CAN HAVE NO DOUBT OF MY FIRM COMMITMENT TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO THE CONFLICT IN A WAY THAT SAFEGUARDS THE HONOR AND THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PARTIES AND, ABOVE ALL, ENDS THE ANGUISH OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION.

FINALLY, A WORD ABOUT THE SOVIET LEADERS. THEY ARE OF COURSE TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THEIR SYSTEM AND THERE SHOULD BE NO ILLUSION THAT MANY OF THEIR VALUES AND GOALS REMAIN WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. YET IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THESE LEADERS CAN ADAPT TO REALITIES AND THAT PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS OF SELF-INTEREST CAN LEAD THEM ALONG CONSTRUCTIVE PATHS. I FOUND THEM INTELLIGENT AND TOUGH BUT NOT INFLEXIBLE ON PRACTICAL ISSUES. BREZHNEV IS CLEARLY IN COMMAND, BUT BOTH KOSYGIN AND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

-3- STATE 102289 JUN 8

PODGORNY, EACH IN HIS OWN WAY, ARE MEN WITH AUTHORITY AND SKILL. WHILE BREZHNEV WAS THE SENIOR SPOKESMAN, MY STRONG IMPRESSION IS THAT A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF COLLECTIVITY DOES PREVAIL. IN MY DISCUSSIONS, I WAS STRUCK THAT DESPITE THE BARRIERS OF IDEOLOGY AND VASTLY DIFFERING BACKGROUND, A GENUINE DIALOGUE DEVELOPED. WHILE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS SHOULD NOT BE EXAGGERATED, I BELIEVE THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION HAS BEEN FACILITATED FOR THE FUTURE.

I AM DELIGHTED, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THAT YOU WILL SOON BE RECEIVING MR. JOHN CONNALLY. AS YOU KNOW HE HAS JUST EMBARKED ON AN EXTENSIVE JOURNEY TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES AT MY PERSONAL REQUEST TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL CONCERN. IN CANBERRA, HE WILL BE PREPARED TO SPEAK TO YOU FURTHER ABOUT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT AND TO COMMENT ON ANY PARTICULAR QUESTIONS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE. HE HAS MY COMPLETE CONFIDENCE AND WILL REPORT BACK DIRECTLY TO ME. AS YOU KNOW, I GREATLY VALUE YOUR VIEWS AND THE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP THAT IS TRADITIONAL BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I AM THEREFORE PARTICULARLY PLEASSED THAT MR. CONNALLY WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU.

SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON      END TEXT

3. EXEMPT CATEGORY THREE- NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. ROGERS  
BT  
#2289

Drafted By:      Text Received from White House  
Approved By:    White House  
Clearances:     S/S Mr. Miller

TOP SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 840

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 2994

EXDIS

SUBJ: PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON  
TO PRESIDENT NIXON

REF: CANBERRA 2979

1. FOL IS TEXT OF PERSONAL MESSAGE OF JUNE 4 FROM  
PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON TO PRESIDENT NIXON (MANU-  
SCRIPT COPY OF LETTER BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH TO  
DEPT., EA/ANZ - MARTIN). MESSAGE IS IN ADDITION TO  
PRESS STATEMENT MADE BY PRIME MINISTER (REFTEL)  
WHICH WAS RELEASED AT 2400 JUNE 4, AUSTRALIAN EASTERN  
TIME (0900 JUNE 4, WASHINGTON TIME).

2. QTE MY DEAR PRESIDENT: ON MY OWN AND MY GOVERN-  
MENT'S BEHALF, I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW HOW PLEASED  
WE ARE THAT YOUR VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN  
SUCH A SUCCESS.

QOI I HAVE PERSONALLY WATCHED WITH ABSORBED  
INTEREST THE COURSE AND RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS  
IN MOSCOW; AND WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I ADMIRE  
THE INITIATIVES YOU HAVE TAKEN AND THE DEDICATION  
YOU HAVE SHOWN TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE INTERESTS  
OF HUMANITY.

QTE WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOUR EFFORTS HAVE  
MADE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO MAN'S SEARCH FOR A TRUE  
AND LASTING PEACE.

QTE WITH BEST REGARDS, SINCERELY, WILLIAM MCMAHON  
END QTE.

GP-3.  
RICE

02  
72 JUN 5 AM 8:20  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

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CONFIDENTIAL

8



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

O 032330Z JUN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8947  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 2980

CONTROL: 0 8 9 7 Q  
JUNE 03, 1957, 8:37PM

NODIS

SUBJ: REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO USSR

REF: STATE 096887

1. IN ADDITION TO HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT BEING SENT SEPARATELY PRIME MINISTER MC MAHON HAS ASKED THAT MESSAGE PARA 2 BELOW BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. TEXT OF MESSAGE AS FOLLOWS:  
QUOTE

MY DEAR PRESIDENT,

ON MY OWN AND MY GOVERNMENT'S BEHALF, I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW HOW PLEASED WE ARE THAT YOUR VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN SUCH A SUCCESS.

I HAVE PERSONALLY WATCHED WITH ABSORBED INTEREST THE COURSE AND RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW; AND WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I ADMIRE THE INITIATIVES YOU HAVE TAKEN, AND THE DEDICATION YOU HAVE SHOWN TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE INTERESTS OF HUMANITY.

WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOUR EFFORTS HAVE MADE A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO MAN'S SEARCH FOR A TRUE AND LASTING PEACE.

WITH BEST WISHES

YOURS SINCERELY,

(WILLIAM MC MAHON)  
RICE  
BT  
#2980

72 JUN 5 AM 8:43  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 289

PAGE 01 CANBER 02758 220836Z

14  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

220745Z MAY 72  
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8891  
INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS

057261

- ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_
- HOLDRIDGE
- HORMATS
- JORDEN
- KENNEDY
- LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_
- LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_
- NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_
- ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_
- RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_
- RONDON \_\_\_\_\_
- SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_
- SONNENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_
- V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_
- WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CANBERRA 2758

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR RICE

SUBJECT: MONETARY REFORM: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON

REF: A STATE 089485  
B. CANBERRA 5604 SEPTEMBER 30, 1971 (NOTAL)  
C. CANBERR A-253 SEPTEMBER 29, 1971

1. PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON DELIVERED MAY 22.

2. I AM CONCERNED THAT REPERCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE FAILURE TO INCULDE AUSTRALIA IN ANY NEW FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MONETARY REFORM MAY NOT YET BE FULLY APPRECIATED IN WASHINGTON. GOA WELL AWARE THAT USG IN PAST HAS NOT ALWAYS SUPPORTED ITS EFFORTS TO JOIN OECD AND GROUP TEN. SHOULD PRESENT EFFORTS TO JOIN NEW GROUP FAIL, WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BEAR LARGE SHARE OF ONUS DUE OUR PRESUMED FAILURE AGAIN TO SUPPORT GOA. REACTION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE HARSHER THAN BEFORE IN VIEW LARGER MEMBERSHIP OF NEW GROUP. IN ADDITION, FAILURE INCLUDE AUSTRALIA WOULD DEPRIVE NEW GROUP OF REGIONAL PARTICIPATION OF ONE OF WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC ECONOMIES AND, MOST IMPORTANT, VOICE OF STRONG US ALLY IN

W/H ✓  
PC ✓  
Cable ✓

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 089485

62  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

66632  
DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE  
5/20/72  
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: JBRIMS  
EA/ANZ: MARTIN  
EUR/RPE: HIGGINSON  
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: S/S-S: PASSAGE

7

- ANDERSON \_\_\_\_\_
- HOLDRIDGE \_\_\_\_\_
- HORMATS \_\_\_\_\_
- JORDEN \_\_\_\_\_
- KENNEDY \_\_\_\_\_
- LEHMAN \_\_\_\_\_
- LEVINE \_\_\_\_\_
- NEGROPONTE \_\_\_\_\_
- ODEEN \_\_\_\_\_
- RATLIFF \_\_\_\_\_
- RONDON \_\_\_\_\_
- SAUNDERS \_\_\_\_\_
- SCHWENFELDT \_\_\_\_\_
- V. I. G. \_\_\_\_\_
- WALSH \_\_\_\_\_

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Ed  
Farrar  
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0 210119Z MAY 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 089485

EXDIS

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON:

QUOTE: MAY 19, 1972. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: YOUR RECENT LETTER HAS REACHED ME AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAVE CONTACTED ME ON THIS MATTER.

I UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REFORM OF THE TRADE AND PAYMENTS SYSTEM. I RECOGNIZE THIS MATTER TOUCHES NOT SIMPLY ON THE PROPOSED GROUP OF 20 BUT ALSO ON ANY PARALLEL OR SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE OECD.

AS YOU NOTE, ONE KEY CONSIDERATION IS KEEPING NEGOTIATING BODIES TO MANAGEABLE SIZE. WE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP NEGOTIATING GROUPS WHICH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF SMALL SIZE BUT WHICH ALSO PERMIT A MORE BALANCED REPRESENTATION THAN HAS BEEN AVAILABLE IN THE PAST. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT AUSTRALIA IS VERY IMPORTANT IN OUR MINDS AS WE SEEK THAT BALANCE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 STATE 089485

I UNDERSTAND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THESE ISSUES MAY APPROACH A CONCLUSION NEXT WEEK, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP AUSTRALIA'S VIEWS VERY MUCH IN MIND.

WITH WARM GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON. UNQUOTE. IRWIN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 089485

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

66632  
DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE  
5/20/72  
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: JBRIMS  
EA/ANZ: MARTIN  
EUR/RPE: HIGGINSON  
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: S/S-S: PASSAGE

72 MAY 21 PM 3:58

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

053192

0 210119Z MAY 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 089485

EXDIS

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME  
MINISTER MCMAHON:

QUOTE: MAY 19, 1972. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: YOUR RECENT  
LETTER HAS REACHED ME AND I AM PLEASED THAT YOU HAVE CONTACTED  
ME ON THIS MATTER.

I UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO  
PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REFORM OF THE TRADE AND  
PAYMENTS SYSTEM. I RECOGNIZE THIS MATTER TOUCHES NOT SIMPLY  
ON THE PROPOSED GROUP OF 20 BUT ALSO ON ANY PARALLEL OR SUP-  
PLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE OECD.

AS YOU NOTE, ONE KEY CONSIDERATION IS KEEPING NEGOTIATING  
BODIES TO MANAGEABLE SIZE. WE WOULD LIKE TO DEVELOP NEGOTIA-  
TING GROUPS WHICH RETAIN THE ADVANTAGES OF SMALL SIZE BUT  
WHICH ALSO PERMIT A MORE BALANCED REPRESENTATION THAN HAS  
BEEN AVAILABLE IN THE PAST. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT AUSTRALIA  
IS VERY IMPORTANT IN OUR MINDS AS WE SEEK THAT BALANCE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 089485

I UNDERSTAND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THESE ISSUES MAY APPROACH A CONCLUSION NEXT WEEK, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP AUSTRALIA'S VIEWS VERY MUNCH IN MIND.

WITH WARM GOOD WISHES, SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON. UNQUOTE. IRWIN

02 3 AM 15 YAM ST\*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG

FROM: ROBERT HORMATS

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister McMahon

*Haig for Price*

Prime Minister McMahon has written the President (Tab B) asking that Australia be included in the forum which discusses international monetary reform. At Tab A is a letter from the President responding to McMahon's letter in a relatively non-committal way. The letter has been approved by Volcker, Price, and CIEP.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve for the President's signature the letter at Tab A.

Concurrence: J Holdridge *ADW*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

May 19, 1972

ACTION

May 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. 

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime  
Minister McMahon

Prime Minister McMahon of Australia has written you (Tab B) asking that his country be included in the forum which discusses international monetary reform. At Tab A is a response to McMahon indicating that we would like to develop negotiating groups which retain the advantages of small size but which also permit a more balanced representation than has been available in the past, and that Australia is very important in our minds as we seek that balance.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A. Treasury, Ray Price, and Peter Flanigan concur.

*Haig fw Hall  
fw Price.*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1972

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your recent letter has reached me and I am pleased that you have contacted me on this matter.


I understand and sympathize with your government's desire to participate in the negotiations on reform of the trade and payments system. I recognize this matter touches not simply on the proposed Group of 20 but also on any parallel or supplementary discussions within the OECD.

As you note, one key consideration is keeping negotiating bodies to manageable size. We would like to develop negotiating groups which retain the advantages of small size but which also permit a more balanced representation than has been available in the past. You can be sure that Australia is very important in our minds as we seek that balance.

I understand there is a possibility these issues may approach a conclusion next week, and I want to assure you that the United States will continue to keep Australia's views very much in mind.

With warm good wishes,

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 5 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	3338	
4 14	4 14 17		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C  EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 PIMSOLL, J \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Send Ltr from PM McMahon, who asks assistance in becoming a member of Sp of 10.*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG <i>Done</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO FOR HAK _____ ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
STAFF SECRETARY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO FOR PRES. _____ ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ ( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____ ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ ( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ ( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>4/20</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
4/14	JHH	NSC/S		transfer to formats	
4/14		Formats	S	Transfer from JHH 4/20	
5/19	Normans	HAK	X	Pres for signature (5/19)	
5/19				Pres signed letter to The Labor	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO *1 adv of 20x*  
 JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) *2 Orig to State for Delivery*  
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM  
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_


MICROFILM DATA	
DO	<i>23</i>
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DATE	<i>23 1972</i>
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	SUBF


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFO

May 11, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER 

FROM: WINSTON LORD 

Attached is a copy of a letter from the Australian Ambassador enclosing a strong message of support from Prime Minister McMahon to the President on his May 8 speech. Mr. Williams of the Australian Embassy delivered this to me at 11:45 a.m. today. I thanked him, assured him that I would get this to you and the President right away, and stated that I knew the President would very much appreciate the strong Australian support.

I have sent the original to Holdridge for staffing.

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11th May, 1972.

Dear Mr President,

I have been asked by the Australian Prime Minister, the Right Honourable William McMahon, to pass to you the following message:

Begins -

"My dear President,

Thank you for your letter advising me of your decision to blockade North Vietnamese ports.

I want you to know that I and my Government fully support you in your attempt to bring about a just settlement of this long and tragic war.

On Tuesday, 9 May, I made a statement of strong support for you in our House of Representatives. A copy is being sent to your office.

I want you to know also that your patient strength in this trying situation has the sympathy and respect of the majority of Australians.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

William McMahon"

Ends.

Yours sincerely,

(J. Plimsoll)  
Ambassador

The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,  
President of the United States of America,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON 9 MAY

VIET-NAM

I refer to the important decisions which President Nixon has been obliged to take in the present very serious situation in Viet-Nam. These decisions were taken because of the blatant invasion of South Viet-Nam by the North Vietnamese, supported by outside governments. Not only has there been this invasion of South Viet-Nam across the demilitarised zone, but North Vietnamese forces have been carrying on offensive military operations in Laos and the Khmer Republic for a period of years.

The Australian Government strongly condemns North Viet-Nam and its associates. It is they who must take the complete moral responsibility for these actions.

The United States has made - with full Australian support - every effort to bring about a negotiated settlement of the present conflict. These efforts have met with an absolute refusal by North Viet-Nam to negotiate seriously. The United States has also tried to de-escalate the fighting by progressively withdrawing its forces from Viet-Nam. The response from Hanoi has been the launching of a long and carefully planned invasion.

The Australian Government understands and supports the decisions which the President has felt compelled to take.

In our view the United States has done everything in its power to ensure a negotiated settlement and to maintain the independence of South Viet-Nam and not to abandon the people of that country. The present decisions by the United States reflect its determination to stand by its international obligations and alliances. The United States must also avoid endangering the lives of its own forces in Viet-Nam.

- - - - -

3710  
5/22/72

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

rsc/s:

Attached is the original of  
confirming letter on which we based  
our reply <sup>of May 15</sup> to P. M. McMahon.

Australian Embassy hand  
delivered today.... it should be filed  
with log # 3710 (all action completed).

MICROFILM	DATA
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*Jam*



3710

PRIME MINISTER,  
CANBERRA.

11 MAY 1972

*My dear President.*

Thank you for your letter advising me of your decision to blockade North Vietnamese ports.

I want you to know that I and my Government fully support you in your attempt to bring about a just settlement of this long and tragic war.

On Tuesday 9 May, I made a statement of strong support for you in our House of Representatives. A copy is being sent to your office.

I want you to know, also, that your patient strength in this trying situation has the sympathy and respect of the majority of Australians.

With very best wishes,

*Sincerely*  
*William McMahon*  
(William McMahon)

The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,  
President of the United States of America,  
White House,  
Washington, D.C., 20036, U.S.A.

Historical File



## PRIME MINISTER

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON.  
WILLIAM McMAHON, CH. MP, IN THE HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES, CANBERRA

PRESIDENT NIXON'S DECISIONS ON VIETNAM

---

9 MAY, 1972

---

I refer to the important decisions which President Nixon has been obliged to take in the present very serious situation in Vietnam.

These decisions were taken because of the blatant invasion of South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese, supported by outside Governments. Not only has there been this invasion of South Vietnam across the Demilitarized Zone, but the North Vietnamese forces have been carrying on offensive military operations in Laos and the Khmer Republic for a period of years.

The Australian Government strongly condemns North Vietnam and its associates. It is they who must take the complete moral responsibility for these actions.

The United States has made - with full Australian support - every effort to bring about a negotiated settlement of the present conflict. These efforts have met with an absolute refusal by North Vietnam to negotiate seriously. The United States has also tried to de-escalate the fighting by progressively withdrawing its forces from Vietnam. The response from Hanoi has been the launching of a long and carefully planned invasion.

The Australian Government understands and supports the decisions which the President has felt compelled to take.

In our view, the United States had done everything in its power to ensure a negotiated settlement and to maintain the independence of South Vietnam and not to abandon the people of that country. The present decisions by the United States reflect its determination to stand by its international obligations and alliances. The United States must also avoid endangering the lives of its own forces in Vietnam.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 31, 1972

Memorandum for: NSC Secretariat  
The White House

Subject: Letter to the President  
from Australian Prime  
Minister McMahon

We attach an unsealed letter for President Nixon from Australian Prime Minister McMahon, transmitted to the Department by our Embassy in Canberra.

We believe no reply is necessary.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "L. H. Brown" or similar, written in a cursive style.

Secretariat Staff

Attachment:

As stated.



PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

22 March 1972

*My dear President.*

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of your third annual review of American foreign policy and your reference to the responsibilities which we hold in common for building a just and durable peace.

Inevitably there is a great deal in the review which brought to mind again our conversations in Washington last November, bearing in particular on the changes and opportunities facing our two countries in the field of foreign affairs.

I also want you to know that I appreciated your action in sending Mr Marshall Green to give us a first hand account of your discussions with the Chinese leaders in Peking and your own impressions of what was clearly a most significant journey.

I share with you the earnest hope that the initiative you have taken will promote among the peoples of Asia and the Pacific a sense of stability and confidence which they have lacked for so long and for which they all aspire.

*Sincerely*  
*Bill McMahon*

(William McMahon)

The Honourable Richard M. Nixon,  
President of the United States of America,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 U.S.A.

Historical File

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT X U X LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
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 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Australian PM The Major White Pres for 9 of  
 Foreign Policy Report + Marshall Green's reporting of the Chan  
 Trip*

REFERENCE: S/S 720 59 88 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( )
FAR EAST	<u>X</u>			REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE <i>in NRN</i>	( <u>X</u> )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>(4/4)</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<u>4/3</u>	<u>JAK</u>	<u>NSC/S</u>		<u>No reply necessary</u>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY C. Mc Gowen S/S DATE 04/04  
 10:50 am bp

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

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Ed. R.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 319

PAGE 01 CANBER 01529 220520Z

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02 INR-06 L-03 NSAE-00  
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RSR-01 /089 W

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FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8565

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CANBERRA 1529

SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NIXON FROM PRIME MINISTER  
MCMAHON OF MARCH 22

1. IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE TO PRIME  
MINISTER MCMAHON OF FEBRUARY 16, TRANSMITTING A COPY  
OF QTE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S: THE EMERGING  
STRUCTURE OF PEACE END QTE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO  
PRIME MINISTER MARCH 7, EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FOL  
REPLY DATED MARCH 22 (MANUSCRIPT COPY BEING POUCHED);  
QTE MY DEAR PRESIDENT.

QTE I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN SENDING  
ME A COPY OF YOUR THIRD ANNUAL REVIEW OF AMERICAN  
FOREIGN POLICY AND YOUR REFERENCE TO THE RESPONSIBILI-  
TIES WHICH WE HOLD IN COMMON FOR BUILDING A JUST AND  
DURABLE PEACE.

QTE INEVITABLY THERE IS A GREAT DEAL IN THE  
REVIEW WHICH BROUGHT TO MIND AGAIN OUR CONVERSATIONS  
IN WASHINGTON LAST NOVEMBER, BEARING IN PARTICULAR ON  
THE CHANGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING OUR TWO COUNTRIES  
IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

QTE I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATED  
YOUR ACTION IN SENDING MR. MARSHALL GREEN TO GIVE US  
A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE  
CHINESE LEADERS IN PEKING AND YOUR OWN IMPRESSIONS OF  
WHAT WAS CLEARLY A MOST SIGNIFICANT JOURNEY.

QTE I SHARE WITH YOU THE EARNEST HOPE THAT THE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 CANBER 01529 220520Z

INITIATIVE YOU HAVE TAKEN WILL PROMOTE AMONG THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC A SENSE OF STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE WHICH THEY HAVE LACKED FOR SO LONG AND FOR WHICH THEY ALL ASPIRE. SINCERELY, WILLIAM MCMAHON. END QTE

DECON UPON RECEIPT. RICE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Pres's Corres  
Australia

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1972

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter on the situation in South Asia provided much to think about, and I was grateful to have your views. I appreciate your government's keeping us informed on the evolution of your thinking. My response has been delayed until we had a clearer sense of what would be possible for us.

You will see from the thoughts developed in detail in my annual foreign policy message to our Congress that our basic objectives in South Asia have not changed. In capsule, they are to see all the nations there find stability and develop in genuine independence. As you wrote, these objectives are parallel with those of Australia.


I appreciate the considerations that have gone into your decisions on the timing of Australia's recognition of Bangladesh. We are examining our position on recognition in relation to the broader situation in the sub-continent. For instance, we have sought a somewhat clearer picture of the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and the government of India. We have also been concerned that President Bhutto have sufficient time to develop Pakistan's understanding with Dacca, although we are, of course, aware of the fundamental changes in the situation since Sheikh Mujib's return to Dacca. Finally, we have had to think of how the Indo-Pakistani issues growing out of the

war will be settled. While we know that our recognition will not be a major factor in influencing these developments, we want it to be as constructive in its timing as possible.

We are, of course, prepared to do our share in helping to meet the humanitarian needs wherever they may arise. The report of the United Nations team in Dacca is expected to report shortly on requirements there. We shall respond promptly, and we hope others will do likewise.

As we shape our responses to the new realities, we will have your concerns and your suggestions very much in mind. We share Australia's interest that incompatible elements not take over the governments in this area. You can be sure that we will keep in very close touch through your Embassy here in Washington.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard Nixon", written in a cursive style.

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon, P. C., M. P.  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


February 8, 1972

ACTION

390

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER 

SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister of Australia

Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a personal message [Tab B] expressing his concern about the potential for Soviet influence in the subcontinent. He makes two basic points:

--It is possible that "by withholding support and encouragement from India and the new country of Bangladesh at this time the United States runs the risk of facilitating a massive expansion of Russian activity in the Asian and Indian Ocean area." India without Western and mainly US support "is just not strong enough to resist at least partial absorption into the Russian sphere of influence." Aid to India will not insure compliance with any particular line of policy, but "natural disappointment when things go awry should not obscure long-term objectives."

--There are "grave dangers" in giving China the impression that the US is not concerned about Soviet expansion into the subcontinent. The Chinese are "highly sensitive" to Soviet moves in Asia and may well see in US coolness towards India an attempt to set the Soviets against China, "however unjustified this obviously is." Playing off China against the USSR will produce "dangerous domestic instability in South and Southeast Asian countries."

Australia is moving even ahead of the British to recognize Bangladesh. The Prime Minister says he would "deeply appreciate" your personal views on the South Asian situation.

Your reply [Tab A] is drafted to state that our fundamental objective in South Asia is unchanged and that we will be proceeding with recognizing Bangladesh in the context of our general concern for stability there.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the reply at Tab A. [Text coordinated with Mr. Price.]

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~11/11/76~~  
~~11/11/76~~  
ACTION  
390  
*(Signature)*

January 31, 1972

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hold*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister McMahon

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's approval on the attached reply to Prime Minister McMahon

Concurrence: Mr. Holdridge *Hold*

*Rush*

Feb. 6  
Revision inserted  
at Tab A.

A little fuller.  
- Helping on circumstances  
side. Do by COB  
Feb 8 - Explain long  
delay in response

SECRET/EXDIS



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/EXDIS

January 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Letter to the President from Australian  
Prime Minister McMahon

On January 13, the Australian Ambassador sent Secretary Rogers a copy of a message from Prime Minister McMahon to the President. The Ambassador also provided you a copy of this message. The message and a suggested reply are attached.

*R. Miller for*  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

## Attachments:

1. Message to the President
2. Suggested Reply

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER McMAHON

I am very glad to have your letter of January 13 giving me your views on the situation in the Sub-continent. I share your concern over the need to dispel any impression that we are leaving to the Soviet Union the problems of India and Bangladesh. While recent events have caused us to re-examine our policies in the Sub-continent, our objective of a stable area, free of domination by any Great Power remains unchanged.

As we shape our responses to the new realities, we will have very much in mind your concerns and your suggestions. In this connection, because of the fast moving developments in South Asia, it might be preferable to keep in very close touch through your Embassy here in Washington rather than draw up a joint official level study.

With regard to your views on timing for Australia's recognition of Bangladesh, I appreciate the considerations that have gone into your policy.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

- 2 -

For our part, we are examining our position on recognition, but will want to defer any decision until we have a clearer picture of the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and India and the role of Indian troops in the East.

We too are concerned that Bhutto has sufficient time to explore what basis remains for a future relationship with Dacca. We will, of course, be examining the ways in which this situation may have changed since Mujib's return to Dacca.

SECRET/EXDIS

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

390

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister of Australia

Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a personal message [attached] concerning his views on the situation in South Asia.

Mr. McMahon is obviously deeply concerned about the destruction and human suffering in "Bangladesh" as well as about the potential for Soviet influence in the subcontinent. In this regard he makes and develops his argument around the following two basic points:

--It is possible that "by withholding support and encouragement from India and the new country of Bangladesh at this time the United States runs the risk of facilitating a massive expansion of Russian activity in the Asian and Indian Ocean area." Moreover, he fears that India without Western and mainly US support "is just not strong enough to resist at least partial absorption into the Russian sphere of influence." He does not think that aid to India will insure compliance with any particular line of policy but cautions that "natural disappointment when things go awry should not obscure long-term objectives."

--He also sees "grave dangers" in giving China the impression that we are not concerned about Soviet expansion into the subcontinent. The Chinese, he feels, are "highly sensitive" to Soviet moves in Asia and may well see in US coolness towards India an attempt to set the Soviets against China, "however unjustified this obviously is." It is his view that playing off China against the USSR will produce "dangerous domestic instability in South and Southeast Asian countries."

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

--Australia has made it clear to India that it is not against recognizing Bangladesh once the government is clearly in control and once Bhutto has had a little more time to sort out his new relationship.

McMahon closes by suggesting a joint Australian-US study on South Asia or perhaps our commenting on a "basic paper" which they might prepare. He also says he would "deeply appreciate" your personal views on this and related matters.

This is a serious letter which deserves a carefully considered response. I will send you a suggested response soon.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
390

*(Handwritten mark)*

SECRET

January 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Letter from the Prime Minister of Australia

*Not sent*

Attached is a memorandum for you to use in sending to the President a letter from the Australian Prime Minister on South Asia.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you send this letter to the President via the attached memorandum.
2. That you authorize sending the attached letter to State for a quick draft response.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrence: Mr. Holdridge *JWH*

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Lee:

RH

May I please  
have your thoughts  
on the ~~2~~ draft replies  
at Tab A in each of  
the attached today.

Thanks.

Hal Saunders  
3330

DRAFT REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER McMAHON

Your letter on the situation in South Asia provided much to think about, and I was grateful to have your views. You will see from the thoughts developed in detail in my annual foreign policy message to our Congress that our basic objectives in South Asia have not changed. In capsule, they are to see all the nations there find stability and develop in genuine independence. As you wrote, these objectives are parallel with <sup>those of</sup> Australia's.

I appreciate the considerations that have gone into your decisions <sup>on the</sup> timing <sup>of</sup> Australia's recognition of Bangladesh. For our part, we are ~~examining~~ examining our position on recognition in ~~its~~ relation to the broader situation in the sub-continent. <sup>As we proceed in this matter,</sup> We will want a somewhat clearer picture of the relationship between the new regime in Dacca and <sup>the government of</sup> India. We are, of course, aware of the fundamental changes in the situation since <sup>Shahab</sup> Mujib's return to Dacca, but <sup>also</sup> we are concerned that <sup>President</sup> Bhutto have sufficient <sup>although</sup> time to develop Pakistan's understanding with Dacca. Finally, we must think of how the Indo-Pakistani issues growing out of the war will be settled. stet

As we shape our responses to the new realities, we will have <sup>very</sup> much in mind your concerns and your suggestions. <sup>you can be sure that</sup> We will keep in very close touch through your Embassy here in Washington.

Sincerely,

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRE \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
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 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS  SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

PLIMSOLL, J.

SUBJECT: Forwards message to the Pres from Australian PM McMahon who expresses concern over the India/Pakistan situation.

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG		X done		MEMO FOR HAK	( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( X )
FAR EAST		X	X	REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		X	MEMO _____ TO _____	( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: 01/16	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
1/4/72	Saunders	Holdridge		For concurrence.	
4/14		HAK	X	Pres for info / Decision (4/18)	
4/15				Rec'd State Rec 7200766	
4/15				Rec'd memo from HAK	
4/15		Saunders	S	Appropriate Acti (1/21)	
1/31/72	Saunders	Holdridge		For concurrence	
2/1	Saunders	HAK	X	Pres & sign reply (2/2)	Holdridge

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH 2/8 HAK NOTIFY Pres P sign etc to McMahon DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) McMahon to via SS

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 882

PAGE 01 STATE 025255

19  
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INFO OCT-01 /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAF PDCONSTABLE:NO  
APPROVED BY NEA CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN  
S/S O CHTHOMAS  
EA/ANZ (INFO)  
TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

090718

SECRET STATE 025255

EXDIS

PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON  
TO PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON:

QUOTE:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

YOUR LETTER ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA PROVIDED MUCH TO  
THINK ABOUT, AND I WAS GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS. I  
APPRECIATE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S KEEPING US INFORMED ON THE  
EVOLUTION OF YOUR THINKING. MY RESPONSE HAS BEEN DELAYED  
UNTIL WE HAD A CLEARER SENSE OF WHAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE  
FOR US.

YOU WILL SEE FROM THE THOUGHTS DEVELOPED IN DETAIL IN MY  
ANNUAL FOREIGN POLICY MESSAGE TO OUR CONGRESS THAT OUR  
BASIC OBJECTIVES IN SOUTH ASIA HAVE NOT CHANGED. IN CAPSULE,  
THEY ARE TO SEE ALL THE NATIONS THERE FIND STABILITY AND  
DEVELOP IN GENUINE INDEPENDENCE. AS YOU WROTE, THESE  
OBJECTIVES ARE PARALLEL WITH THOSE OF AUSTRALIA.

I APPRECIATE THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT HAVE GONE INTO YOUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 025255

DECISIONS ON THE TIMING OF AUSTRALIA'S RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH. WE ARE EXAMINING OUR POSITION ON RECOGNITION IN RELATION TO THE BROADER SITUATION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT. FOR INSTANCE, WE HAVE SOUGHT A SOMEWHAT CLEARER PICTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEW REGIME IN DACCA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONCERNED THAT PRESIDENT BHUTTO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO DEVELOP PAKISTAN'S UNDERSTANDING WITH DACCA, ALTHOUGH WE ARE, OF COURSE, AWARE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION SINCE SHEIKH MUJIB'S RETURN TO DACCA. FINALLY, WE HAVE HAD TO THINK OF HOW THE INDO-PAKISTANI ISSUES GROWING OUT OF THE WAR WILL BE SETTLED. WHILE WE KNOW THAT OUR RECOGNITION WILL NOT BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN INFLUENCING THESE DEVELOPMENTS, WE WANT IT TO BE AS CONSTRUCTIVE IN ITS TIMING AS POSSIBLE.

WE ARE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO DO OUR SHARE IN HELPING TO MEET THE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS WHEREVER THEY MAY ARISE. THE REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS TEAM IN DACCA IS EXPECTED TO REPORT SHORTLY ON REQUIREMENTS THERE. WE SHALL RESPOND PROMPTLY, AND WE HOPE OTHERS WILL DO LIKEWISE.

AS WE SHAPE OUR RESPONSES TO THE NEW REALITIES, WE WILL HAVE YOUR CONCERNS AND YOUR SUGGESTIONS VERY MUCH IN MIND. WE SHARE AUSTRALIA'S INTEREST THAT INCOMPATIBLE ELEMENTS NOT TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENTS IN THIS AREA. YOU CAN BE SURE THAT WE WILL KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH THROUGH YOUR EMBASSY HERE IN WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY,

RICHARD NIXON

UNQUOTE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

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# STAFF HAS ACTION

For staffing —  
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Hoy WAK info

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PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER,  
CANBERRA.

22 DEC 1971

*My dear President*

Since my return from Washington and London I have, regrettably, been completely immersed in domestic problems.

Now I want you to know that I have come back with a deep sense of appreciation of your thoughtfulness and courtesy to Sonia and me.

My talks with you were invaluable and we will both long remember the dinner you gave us at The White House and the visit to your own apartments.

May I say too that your initiatives in foreign policy over such a broad front are meeting with wide approval here and I can assure you that I appreciate that my talks with you took place at the formative stage of decision-making.

Thank you also for making Blair House available to us whilst we were there. It was relaxing and the Moschbackers and the House staff looked after us to perfection.

Particularly I want to thank you for your robust reaffirmation of the vitality of the Anzus Treaty.

We both send our warmest regards to your wife.

*Sincerely*  
*Bill McMahon*  
(William McMahon)

The Honourable Richard Nixon,  
President of the United States of America,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON, D. C. U. S. A.

Ed -

A letter was sent to me Mahan  
on 10/12 (which you have a

copy of) This is some of the back-up.

ACTIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

October 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply from the President to  
Australian Prime Minister McMahon

At Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a proposed reply from him to Australian Prime Minister McMahon, who wrote the President concerning direct personal consultations with him on China policy sometime before the President's trip. The revised proposed reply incorporates your instruction that we informally invite, through the Australian Embassy, McMahon here in January, which has been done. The phraseology suggests that this may be done via a special ANZUS meeting, as McMahon suggested but does not pin the President down either as to the nature of the visit or the time. (If an ANZUS meeting is ultimately decided upon, we would also wish to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand.) The reply also makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of communication between the President and McMahon for continuing consultations, and to the close consultations which are going forward between us and the Australians on the Chirep effort.

The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Australian  
Prime Minister McMahon

Australian Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a letter (Tab B) in which he noted that secure communications have now been established outside normal channels between you and him, and offers a number of suggestions for consultations between the two of you on your China visit. These suggestions were offered in the spirit of reducing domestic repercussions in Australia with respect to your China initiative. They include the possibility of visits by you to Australia, a visit to Washington, or your convening a special ANZUS meeting at which McMahon and Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand would both be present.

Of McMahon's several alternatives, I think that his visiting Washington possibly in January would be the most practicable. This could be in the form of an official visit, if he would not by chance be passing through en route to another meeting, or in a special ANZUS Council meeting at the heads of state level, in which case New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake would join us. Any of these would be low profile, which would avoid suggesting to the Chinese that Australia and New Zealand have a determining influence on our China policy. I have accordingly left the wording of your reply to McMahon flexible, both as to the form and time of the meeting.

The reply also makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of communications between yourself and him for continuing consultations, and to the close consultations which are going forward between us on the Chirep effort.

The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter on consultations about my forthcoming visit to China was most welcome. The need for direct personal consultations has been very much on my mind, so that your suggestions were greatly appreciated. I am hopeful that a meeting between us can be scheduled for early next year, and in our discussion about the format, I would particularly like to pursue your recommendation for an ANZUS meeting in Washington. For consultations on a continuing basis, I am hopeful that the establishment of a secure means of communication between us will be very helpful in eliminating areas of misunderstanding.

I am also deeply grateful for your decision to join us in co-sponsoring the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions. Your very timely backing was tremendously helpful as we attempted to gain adequate co-sponsorship and to organize sufficient support for the critical votes in the General Assembly. I am pleased that our representatives have continued to be in such close touch on this vital issue, and we remain determined to make the strongest effort possible to preserve a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra


SECRET

TAB I

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


32338-X

ACTION 

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE 

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Australian Prime Minister McMahon

In your written comments on my memorandum of September 14 on a draft reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's letter suggesting consultations on the President's China trip you indicated a preference for a December visit here by McMahon (Tab I).

This raises certain problems in connection with the President's schedule. King Hassan of Morocco is invited for December 2, and there is a possibility that President Medici of Brazil will come on December 7. (We are now exploring reversing these dates to accommodate Secretary Rogers' desire to be present for the Medici visit.) The President may not wish to have another high-level visitor during December, especially if it would involve an official visit, as might be the case here if McMahon had no personal reason for visiting the U. S.

In addition, the problem of consultations with New Zealand would remain, and we would have to treat the matter separately from consultations with McMahon. This thus would take us back to McMahon's other alternative -- a special ANZUS Council Meeting at the head of government level (the regular annual session at the Foreign Ministerial level). I think we could hold such a meeting for necessary consultations with our allies without implying to the Chinese that our allies have a veto on our China policy. Since the Chinese themselves have the same problem, I think we can anticipate a measure of understanding on their part.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Another alternative would be for the President at this time not to pick up any of McMahon's suggestions for consultation at the highest level, but simply to close his reply referring to our close consultations in New York on the Chirep problem.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the President's draft reply suggest a visit by McMahon along in December.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

That the President's draft reply suggest a special ANZUS Council meeting at the heads of state level in December.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

That the President's draft reply not suggest any meeting with McMahon or Holyoake in the near future, but simply refer to our current close consultations on Chirep.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

32338-X

*They  
HMIG*

*AW*

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION *(C)*

September 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

*I don't know.*

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

*Just*

*Why couldn't  
McMahon*

SUBJECT:

Letter to the President from Prime Minister  
McMahon of Australia

*come in...  
independent of Peking  
trip  
+ announced  
in its meeting  
line  
place  
of...  
of...  
of...*

You will recall that the President sent a letter to Prime Minister McMahon on August 10 which expressed regret over our inability to give McMahon advance notice of the President's China initiative and referred to the possibility of setting up a channel for private and direct communications between the President and McMahon (Tab C).

McMahon has now replied. In addition to stating that a secure link has now been established through which urgent messages can be passed outside ordinary bureaucratic channels, he goes on to suggest a number of ways by which the President might ease Australian domestic pressures arising from the President's visit to China:

- Visiting Australia before the end of the year, which McMahon still hopes might be possible.
- Visiting Australia on the President's way to Peking, which McMahon submits for the President's consideration, despite the "obvious difficulties."
- Convening a special Anzus meeting in Washington at the Head of Government level which would "enable us to discuss the agenda for your meeting and any difficulties arising out of it." McMahon believes that the Prime Minister of New Zealand would concur.
- Having McMahon himself visit Washington when the President's plans are settled.

Prime Minister McMahon's letter to the President is at Tab B.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

I doubt that the President would wish to be tied down to any of the courses McMahon has suggested at this stage in the preparations for his trip. We should also avoid anything which would suggest to the Chinese that there is some kind of an Australian say in the evolution of U. S. China policy. The Anzus meeting proposal might be the most acceptable. Accordingly, I suggest that the President's reply be warm, refer to the Anzus meeting, but be noncommittal as concerns the type of consultations we will provide McMahon prior to the President's China trip. A draft letter to this effect, and a memorandum from you to the President discussing it are at Tab A.

The letter has been cleared by Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you approve the letter at Tab A and sign the memorandum transmitting it to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Australian Prime Minister  
McMahon

Australian Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a letter (Tab B) in which he noted that secure communications have now been established outside normal channels between you and him, and offers a number of suggestions for consultations between the two of you on your China visit. These suggestions were offered in the spirit of reducing domestic repercussions in Australia with respect to your China initiative. They include the possibility of visits by you to Australia, a visit to Washington, or your convening a special Anzus meeting at which McMahon and Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand would both be present.

Of Prime Minister McMahon's suggestions, I regard the special Anzus meeting as being the most practicable, since it would present the lowest profile. (You would not wish to suggest to the Chinese that McMahon has a say in your planning.) However, I doubt that you will want to respond to McMahon except in general terms at this stage of the planning for your Peking visit. I have therefore drafted a letter from you to McMahon (Tab A) which cites the establishment of secure communications, expresses appreciation for his suggestion, indicates interest in the Anzus meeting concept, but does not commit you. It also speaks favorably of the consultations which we and the Australians have been holding on the Chinese representation issue in the UN.

The letter has been cleared by Ray Price.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letter commenting on my forthcoming visit to China and the types of consultations about the visit which might be arranged between us was most welcome. The question of consultations has been very much on my mind, and your suggestions were greatly appreciated. I was particularly taken by your thought on holding an Anzus meeting in Washington. You may be sure that all your comments will be given very careful consideration as my travel plans mature, and that there will be further communications between us on this matter.

The establishment of a secure means of communication between us should be very helpful in eliminating areas of misunderstanding. I am also pleased that our representatives have been in close contact on the question of maintaining the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations while at the same time admitting the People's Republic of China. Your hope that an agreed formula for an appropriate resolution or resolutions to this effect can be determined which our two countries can co-sponsor, is of course shared by me.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

RN:RP:JHHoldridge:emh 9-14-71

SECRET



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Heldredge*

8th September, 1971.

*I think Angus meeting before visit to China would be most appropriate. Include in letter*  
*re visit of Per Helen*  
*Keep out*  
*no news*

Dear Dr Kissinger,

I attach a letter which I have received from the Prime Minister of Australia to the President of the United States.

I am passing it to the President through you because of some of the references in the letter. I shall not be passing a copy of the letter to anyone else in the Administration.

I would be glad if you would arrange for the letter to be given to the President.

Yours sincerely,

(J. Plimsoll)  
Ambassador

Dr Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

[NW 05-38/3:2]

~~SECRET~~

32338X



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

8th September, 1971.

Dear Dr Kissinger,

I attach a letter which I have received from the Prime Minister of Australia to the President of the United States.

I am passing it to the President through you because of some of the references in the letter. I shall not be passing a copy of the letter to anyone else in the Administration.

I would be glad if you would arrange for the letter to be given to the President.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads 'J. Plimsoll'.

(J. Plimsoll)  
Ambassador

Dr Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NAN 05-38/3 OCT 13 2007

By [initials]

Date

OCT 13

2007

SEP 10 2007

[p. 1 of 6]

~~SECRET~~



PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

My dear President.

Many thanks for your messages, passed to me through Henry Kissinger, about your forthcoming visit to China. These exchanges, which I am treating as being for my personal information only, are of great value and I hope they can continue.

You will know, that because we have traditionally been so closely associated, any divergences in our public positions immediately become a matter of controversy here. If we differ, it is best to differ in private and to present to the rest of the world a united front. In this context the information passed to me by Dr Kissinger through Ambassador Plimsoll has been of particular value.

We have now established a secure link through which urgent messages can be passed without involving the ordinary bureaucratic channels.

In your letter which was forwarded to me on 10 August 1971, you offered to consider any steps which would ease the Australian domestic pressures arising from your proposed visit to China.

I still hope that it might be possible for you to visit Australia before the end of the year. I appreciate the difficulties of fitting in such a visit, but needless to say you will be a very welcome guest at any time. A visit by you would, I am convinced, be most popular with the Australian people and would have the effect of underlining in a positive manner, the friendship between our peoples.

I consequently suggest three possible courses for your consideration.

The first is that you might visit Australia on your way to Peking. I see obvious difficulties in this course, but I submit it for your consideration.



The second is that there should be a special meeting of Anzus in Washington shortly before you leave for China, at your explicit request. This could be at the Head of Government level and would enable us to discuss the agenda for your meeting and any difficulties arising out of it.

I have not of course consulted the Prime Minister of New Zealand, but I feel sure he would concur with my suggestion.

A third possibility is that I should myself visit Washington when the plans for your visit are settled.

On the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, we are continuing detailed discussions with your Delegation in New York.

I hope that we can hammer out a resolution or resolutions which will maintain the position of the Republic of China as a member of the United Nations, while at the same time admitting the People's Republic of China to membership, including the Security Council Seat. We very much hope we can agree on a formula which we and as many as possible like-minded countries can co-sponsor.



(William McMahon)

President Richard Nixon,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON.

[NWD 05-38/3:4]

500/20/8770

**THE WHITE HOUSE**

WASHINGTON

1 October 71

Dr. Kissinger:

Action on this is apparently  
required before a proper  
response can be made.

Coleman

*refinal*  
*Jane*

SECRET



18th July, 1971.

Dear Mr President,

Following your announcement of your intended visit to the People's Republic of China, I issued a public statement endorsing this initiative without reservation and pointing out that it was in line with my own policy seeking to normalise relations between Australia and China. We particularly welcome your statement that the action you are taking will "not be at the expense of old friends." My Government also sincerely hopes that your visit to Peking will be successful. There is no other person as capable of taking the leadership as you are.

You should know, nonetheless, that we were placed in a quandary by our lack of any foreknowledge of what is certainly a dramatic step in the foreign policy of the United States: the more so because we have attempted under all circumstances to co-ordinate our policies and support you in what you are doing. In saying this I appreciate that the matter was one of great delicacy, requiring complete secrecy if it were to have any hope of success. Nevertheless, whilst details could not be given, I believe it should have been possible to advise your friends and allies of the broad trends in your thinking. This applies particularly to those who have made some contact with Peking and have kept your Government informed.

Our relations with the People's Republic of China have in recent weeks been a matter of deep public controversy in Australia following a visit to Peking by members of the Australian Labour Party, including the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam. We have felt obliged to criticise many of the things which Mr Whitlam said and did in Peking including some quite gratuitous attacks and criticism of our friends and allies including the United States and indeed his reference to the need for you yourself to change your policies or get defeated. Nothing which I or my Ministers have said calls for any retraction on our part but some of it would have been cast differently had we been given an indication of changes in American policy along the lines I have mentioned.

Although I have been able, as have several other governments, to say that I knew of the purport of your remarks in advance, it is apparent to the Australian press that there was no kind of consultation between our two Governments. This has naturally led to the assumption that our relations are not as close as they should be, which is surely something that neither of us want.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 05-38/4 CTA dr. SEP 13 2007

By CS Date Oct 3 2007

.... / 2.

SECRET

- 2 -

Australia has for some months now been engaged in trying to develop a dialogue with Peking through contact with Chinese representatives in other capitals, principally Paris, designed to normalise diplomatic relationships. We have kept the United States informed of these contacts which, while at the outset referred to obstacles relating to our relations with the United States and our general attitude towards the People's Republic of China, have basically boiled down now to an insistence that we abandon the Republic of China on Taiwan. There has been a growing realisation by the Australian public that whether or not we will stand by the Republic of Taiwan is the sticking point. But great confusion has now been created by your announcement of 16th July. I am being asked to explain how the United States can honourably do things which Australia cannot do.

I hope that when Secretary Rogers sees Ambassador Plimsoll on Monday these misunderstandings can be cleared up.

In the meantime, the question of our policy towards Chinese representation in the United Nations remains unsolved. The "Albanian Resolution" has already been listed and will in the normal order of events be voted on before any resolution which you or we may decide to sponsor. I fear that unless we act quickly and in concert with our friends, the Albanian Resolution will be carried and the Republic of China expelled from the United Nations. May I once again stress to you the desirability of the United States, Japan, New Zealand and Australia concerting a policy on this important matter?

Yours sincerely,

WILLIAM McMAHON

[NWD 05-38/4:2]

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Mr. Kissinger handed  
Australian Ambassador  
letter (Tab A) Aug 10, 1971  
meb*

30789

SECRET

ACTION  
August 2, 1971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT:

Proposed Reply from You to Australian  
Prime Minister McMahon's Letter  
Complaining About Our Short Notice on  
Announcement of China Initiative

Australian Prime Minister McMahon wrote you July 18 (Tab B) complaining strongly over the short notice we gave his Government on the announcement of our China initiative.

At Tab A is a proposed reply from you to McMahon expressing appreciation for his prompt and full support which he gave to our China move, conveying your regret over our inability to give him earlier notice on this development, and referring to the possibility of setting up a channel for private and direct communications between you and Prime Minister McMahon. The draft also expresses your gratitude for his past cooperation in the area of China policy, and states your intention to consult with the Australian Government in our handling of the Chinese representation question.

The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the proposed letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.

SECRET

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of July 18, 1971, conveying to me personally your support for my recent initiative concerning the People's Republic of China and informing me of certain problems that our means of announcing that initiative unfortunately caused for you.

First, let me say that I am very grateful for the full measure of support which you have given to this move on my part toward Peking. I want you to know that this unstinting and immediate support means even more to us in light of the problems our method of announcing this development has created for you. Your response is further evidence of the fundamental strength of the strong bonds which exist between our two nations as well as between us personally. You can be sure that this magnanimous gesture on your part was deeply appreciated.

I understand fully and regret most deeply the domestic problems in Australia which have resulted from our inability to consult with you beforehand. If there is anything that I personally or my Administration generally can do at this point to ease this burden, please let me know at your earliest convenience.

The decision that we would not be able to inform our close friends in advance of the China initiative was an extremely difficult one for me to make. I can assure you that I weighed most carefully the entire matter of who should be informed--

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

both within our own Government and around the world. I finally concluded that if we were to discuss Dr. Kissinger's trip outside the smallest possible circle of United States Government officials, it would be virtually impossible for him to carry out the mission successfully. Our dilemma was compounded by the fact that, if we had decided to consult with other governments, the first we would have had to approach would have been the Republic of China -- an action which would have presented obvious problems. I know you will agree with me that the paramount importance of improving relations with the People's Republic of China in the interest of world peace made it imperative that we do nothing that might jeopardize chances for the success of the mission.

However, there may very well be occasions in the future when you or I would wish to communicate privately and directly, perhaps in advance of actions one or the other of us may be preparing to take. You are no doubt aware that at my request Dr. Kissinger discussed this matter with Ambassador Plimsole on July 23, and suggested that a means for such private communications be set up outside normal diplomatic channels to obviate the chances of our exchanges becoming public knowledge. I hope that this arrangement will be agreeable to you, and that we can proceed with the modalities as soon as possible.

As regards the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, both Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger explained to Ambassador Plimsole last week that we are now awaiting the decision of the Government of the Republic of China as to whether or not it will acquiesce in the loss of its Security Council seat while attempting to retain a seat in the General Assembly and membership in the specialized agencies. As soon as we have a reply from Taipei, we will be in a position to consult further with other governments, and to make our final decision. Your Government will certainly be among the first with whom we will consult at that time and we look forward to working closely with you in the effort to secure the maximum support possible for whatever course we can then agree upon.

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

Again, Mr. Prime Minister, I sincerely regret whatever inconvenience our manner of approach on recent China policy has caused you. I appreciate greatly your working so closely with us in this vital area, and I look forward to effective cooperation with you in this area in the future. The many strong ties that unite our two peoples are of the highest importance to us, and we will always work to minimize and eliminate any frictions or differences that might endanger them.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

RN:RP:JAF:emh 7-28-71

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30789

*Q*

SECRET

ACTION

July 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT:

Proposed Reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's Letter on China Policy

*THRU JHMG*

Attached at Tab A is a proposed reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon responding to his strong complaint over the short notice we gave on the announcement of our China initiative.

Marshall Wright concurs in this draft, and the letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office. However, the paragraph on a special communications channel between the President and McMahon was not shown to either.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

*OK*

*HK*

*Let me send to Plimsole  
once done  
HK*

SECRET

SECRET

ACTION

October 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Proposed Direct Personal Consultations  
Between You and Australian Prime  
Minister McMahon on China Policy

Australian Ambassador to the U.S. Sir James Plimsoll told me today that Prime Minister McMahon urgently desires to visit Washington to consult with you on China policy at the earliest practicable date.

As you know, McMahon has been under heavy domestic political attack from the Labor opposition on his China policy ever since last July, with the Labor opposition charging that he has fallen badly behind the U.S. in his efforts to improve relations with the PRC. (Unaware of our plans, he strongly criticized Labor Party Leader Whitlam's conduct during Whitlam's trip to Peking in early July. He was consequently rather acutely embarrassed at home when the plans for your trip were announced.) McMahon believes that direct personal consultations with you at this point will help him carry continuing opposition criticism at home. It will also restore the image of close, cordial relations between our two countries. To turn his request down at this critical time for him domestically, would probably be interpreted as a serious affront on our part.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we invite the Prime Minister to make an unofficial visit to Washington sometime next month. You could receive him for a two hour office meeting and host a small business dinner that evening.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1971

SECRET/NODIS

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Prime Minister McMahon's Letter  
Regarding Your Visit to China

Prime Minister McMahon of Australia has followed up his public support for your announcement with a letter in which he reiterates his support and wishes you every success. At the same time he points out that lacking "foreknowledge" of at least the broad trends of American policies caused him to take positions from which the inference has been drawn in Australia that there has been lack of consultation with the U.S. An unofficial Australian Labor Party delegation headed by the Opposition leader has just completed a visit to Peking. This combined with the U.S. move on Peking has been unfavorably contrasted with McMahon's low-key efforts for a detente in their own relations with Peking, and it is being exploited by the Opposition for political advantage. Finally, McMahon notes that the "Albanian Resolution" has already been listed for consideration at the UN General Assembly and stresses the desirability of U.S.-Japanese-New Zealand-Australian cooperation to assist the GRC at the General Assembly.

The suggested reply expresses appreciation for McMahon's support, expresses regret for the difficulties caused him by the announcement, and points out that the sensitivity of this event made it impossible to consult with him beforehand as would normally be the case. In conclusion, it reassures McMahon on the question of future consultation.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

2

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister McMahon.

  
William P. Rogers

Attachment:

Draft Letter to McMahon

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want you to know how grateful I am to you for the public statement you made last week endorsing my announcement about the planned visit to Peking. I [am] fully <sup>understand</sup> [aware of] the difficult position [described in your most recent letter] that the announcement put you in and I am also aware of your government's earlier efforts to keep us so well informed about your own contacts with Peking. Under the circumstances your unqualified statement was magnanimous. Your support in this as in so many instances in the past was important to us and deeply valued.

I regret that the sensitivity of Dr. Kissinger's trip prevented me from consulting you beforehand, particularly since we had been consulting so closely on the Chinese representation issue and other Chinese policy matters. We feared that if we discussed the trip outside the smallest possible inner circle it would have been impossible to get Dr. Kissinger in and out of Peking without anyone knowing. Also had we consulted with others we would have been obliged to

SECRET

SECRET

2

go to the Government of the Republic of China first, and this would have presented obvious problems. I know you agree with me that the great importance of improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China in the interest of world peace made it imperative we do nothing to jeopardize chances for success of the mission.

Please let me reassure you that we wish to continue consulting with you in the future on Chinese representation and other Chinese policy related issues to the maximum extent possible. As Secretary Rogers told Ambassador Plimsoll at their meeting July 19, we have at this point asked the GRC whether it is prepared to acquiesce in the loss of the Security Council seat and at the same time to fight to remain in the UN. We have also told the GRC that if they are willing to do so we are prepared to help them. We shall be discussing Chirep tactics further with you, the New Zealanders, and the Japanese just as soon as we have the Chinese answer.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

SECRET

SECRET



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


18th July, 1971.

Dear Kissinger,

....

I have been asked to arrange for the attached letter from the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr William McMahon to President Nixon to be conveyed to the President as soon as possible. I should be very grateful if you could do so.

Yours sincerely,

  
( J.L. Lavett )  
Counsellor

Dr Henry A. Kissinger,  
Special Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	30789	
9 23 7	27 9		

*Copy*

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W  LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS   
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C  EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *McMahon*  
*PM McMahon of Australia Expresses Support for Pres Visit*  
*Approval towards PRC*

REFERENCE: S/S *7110745* OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( _____ )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( _____ )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	( _____ )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( _____ )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( _____ )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( _____ )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( _____ )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( _____ )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>7/27</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING				<i>JOINED BY # 30544.</i>	
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>7/24</i>	<i>JWA</i>	<i>JAF</i>		<i>See me about this - the letter needs to be warmed up, &amp; other changes made</i>	
<i>7/28</i>	<i>HOLDRISE</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>PRES TO SSM LTR TO MCMAHON (07/30)</i>	
<i>8/11</i>				<i>No copy of actual LTR Dispatched here. Pres'd Ltr to McMahon + Delivered to Asst. Ambassador</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: *NO CY OF LTR AVAILABLE UNDER THIS #.*

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO  *State*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE **AUG 13 1977**

ORIG) NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PAF

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

33531X

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



SECRET / SENSITIVE

ACTION

October 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE *JHH/JHR*

SUBJECT: Proposed Reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon

At Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a proposed reply from him to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's two letters delivered September 8 and October 6. The reply, in addition to thanking McMahon for his cooperation on Chirep and China policy in general, suggests that he consider visiting Washington unofficially early next month to discuss China policy.

The draft reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

*Aug 20 1971  
JHH*

*JHR*

SECRET / SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

33531X

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION

October 11, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply from You to Australian Prime Minister McMahon

At Tab A is a proposed reply from you to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's two recent letters to you. In the first, forwarded September 8, he offered several alternatives for meeting with you for direct personal consultations on China policy--your visiting Australia on your way to Peking, a special ANZUS Council meeting in Washington at the heads of state level just before your China trip, and his visiting Washington when the plans for your China trip had been completed.

In the second, forwarded October 6, McMahon described recent discussions with the Chinese on improving Australia's relations with them. The contacts in Paris earlier this year came to naught as a result of Chinese insistence on discussing diplomatic relations only, and doing that only on the condition that Australia break with the Republic of China. More recently, the Chinese have reopened the questions through their representatives in Hong Kong, suggesting that a junior Australian minister make a private visit to China and that the two countries exchange trade delegations. Australia demurred on the first, but has accepted the second, and is now readying a trade mission which will leave for China towards the end of next month. The Chinese have, however, noted that they look on the exchange of trade missions as a prelude to diplomatic recognition, and that further trade "must be based on recognition of the PRC only."

The proposed reply expresses appreciation for Prime Minister McMahon's keeping you informed, and suggests that he consider visiting Washington unofficially early next month for discussions on China policy. It also thanks him for his Government's co-sponsoring our Chirep resolutions, and for their close cooperation throughout with us on this issue.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET / SENSITIVE

2

The original letters are at Tabs B and C. The draft reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.

SECRET / SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1971

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your letters forwarded to me by Ambassador Plimsoll on September 8 and October 6 concerning my forthcoming visit to China and your own discussions with Chinese representatives to improve relations were most welcome. I appreciated your very informative description of your recent diplomatic contacts with the People's Republic of China and the conditions that the Chinese are setting for the improvement of relations with them.

The need for direct personal consultations between the two of us has been very much on my mind, and your suggestions were greatly appreciated. I would suggest that, if agreeable to you, you might arrange to pay an unofficial visit to the United States early in November, during which time you could come to Washington for discussions with me on China. By that time Dr. Kissinger will have returned from Peking and will have fresh impressions to pass along. For consultations on a continuing basis, I am hopeful that the establishment of a secure means of communication between us will be very helpful in eliminating areas of misunderstanding.

I am also deeply grateful for your decision to join us in co-sponsoring the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions. Your very timely backing was tremendously helpful as we attempted to gain adequate co-sponsorship and to organize sufficient support for the critical votes in the General Assembly. I am pleased that our representatives have continued to be in such close touch

SECRET

SECRET

2

on this vital issue, and we remain determined to make the strongest effort possible to preserve a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard Nixon". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Richard Nixon".

The Right Honorable  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 11 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 12 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1971

SECRET Attachment

STATE SECRETARIAT

SUBJECT: President's letter to  
Prime Minister McMahon  
(S/S 7107231-NSC 28515)

Please dispatch the attached  
letter from the President to Prime  
Minister McMahon through AMEMBASSY  
Canberra.

A copy for your information is  
also enclosed.



John H. Murphy  
NSC Secretariat

SECRET Attachment

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 10, 1971

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971, concerning the China policies of our two governments, particularly as they relate to Chinese representation in the United Nations. I also appreciated receiving earlier the preliminary analysis of the Chinese representation issue prepared by your Department of Foreign Affairs and members of my government are studying it as we proceed with our own analysis.

At present we are in the midst of consultations with a number of countries including your government, and I am sure that Ambassador Plimsoll has conveyed to you our tentative thinking on how to approach this question in the upcoming session of the General Assembly. As soon as we have completed these discussions, we will be taking a final look at the problem, and I will expect to announce my decision probably some time in the latter half of July. Prior to this announcement, I will plan to be in touch with you through Ambassador Plimsoll as to the substance of the decision.

SECRET

Dispatched 7/10/71 through State Secretariat

Receipt 2619 to STATE

CC: Holdridge, Wright

Files: PAF, Hak Chron


SECRET

-2-

This has been a particularly complicated problem to deal with, and I have appreciated your thoughts on it and cooperation in handling it. I recognize the need for moving with all deliberate speed, and look forward to working with you as we make the final preparations for the General Assembly session.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Richard Nixon", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency  
William McMahon  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


28515

ACTION

July 6, 1971

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... 

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: GENERAL HAIG   
SUBJECT: Reply from You to Australian Prime  
Minister McMahon's Letter of May 13  
on Chinese Representation

Australian Prime Minister William McMahon on May 13 wrote you asking for an early indication of our position on the question of Chinese representation, expressing his concern over pressures at home on his Government's China policy and recent damage to Taipei's diplomatic position, and outlining his basic position on the China question (Tab B).

At Tab A is a proposed reply from you to Prime Minister McMahon which informs him that we expect to be reaching a decision on the Chinese representation question in the near future, which we would announce in the latter half of July.

The proposed reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: 10/8/71

TO: JACK FROEBE

FROM: DAVE GERGEN

From these materials, I assume that you are now suggesting that he visit in November -- and you are giving up on the ANZUS option for January.

Also assume that you no longer want to thank for help on Chirep issue.

*letter 'k' as edited*

*Dave G*

Les:

Attached should go to Holdridge -- literally outside the system -- for staffing: a memo to the President attach<sup>ing</sup> a proposed warm response to McMahon (per Winston).

I have given Haig/HAK a xerox with one of your yellow slips "Staff has action - Holdridge outside the system."

Lora -- 10/6

*TO Holdridge -- for  
Action "TOTALLY outside System"*

*Les*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10/9/71

Ed Roberts:

An 'x' number for your files.

EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

SECRET

PERSONAL — TO BE  
OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

Dr Henry A. Kissinger,  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Council  
Executive Office of the President  
WASHINGTON D.C.

SECRET



SECRET

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971, concerning the China policies of our two governments, particularly as they relate to Chinese representation in the United Nations. I also appreciated receiving earlier the preliminary analysis of the Chinese representation issue prepared by your Department of Foreign Affairs and members of my government are studying it as we proceed with our own analysis.

At present we are in the midst of consultations with a number of countries including your government, and I am sure that Ambassador Plimsoll has conveyed to you our tentative thinking on how to approach this question in the upcoming session of the General Assembly. As soon as we have completed these discussions, we will be taking a final look at the problem, and I will expect to announce my decision probably some time in the latter half of July. Prior to this announcement, I will plan to be in touch with you through Ambassador Plimsoll as to the substance of the decision.

SECRET

Rwrtrn at direction of Butterfield/Huntsman to change "yourselves!" in line 2, para 2, to read "your government."  
RTK:lds:7/6/71



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971, concerning the China policies of our two governments, particularly as they relate to Chinese representation in the United Nations. I also appreciated receiving earlier the preliminary analysis of the Chinese representation issue prepared by your Department of Foreign Affairs and members of my government are studying it as we proceed with our own analysis.

At present we are in the midst of consultations with a number of countries including yourselves, and I am sure that Ambassador Plimsoll has conveyed to you our tentative thinking on how to approach this question in the upcoming session of the General Assembly. As soon as we have completed these discussions, we will be taking a final look at the problem, and I will expect to announce my decision probably some time in the latter half of July. Prior to this announcement, I will plan to be in touch with you through Ambassador Plimsoll as to the substance of the decision.

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 14, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Prime Minister McMahon's Letter  
to President Nixon

The Australian Embassy delivered to the Department the attached letter to Secretary Rogers asking the Secretary to deliver a letter to President Nixon from Prime Minister McMahon. We have prepared a draft reply for the President to respond to Prime Minister McMahon's letter.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.", written in a cursive style.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

SECRET



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13th May, 1971.

Dear Secretary,

I have been instructed by the Australian Prime Minister to have the attached message from the Prime Minister on the Chinese question delivered to President Nixon.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this to be done.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'J. Plimsoll'.

( J. Plimsoll )  
Ambassador

The Hon. William P. Rogers,  
Secretary of State,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

S/S - 7108243

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET/EXDIS

June 4, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Prime Minister McMahon's Letter  
to President Nixon

As the Secretary mentioned in his May 28 Memorandum for the President, now that the President has reached some tentative decisions about the Chinese representation question, it is appropriate for his reply to Prime Minister McMahon's recent letter to be a substantive one. Assistant Secretary Green briefed the Australian Ambassador June 2. Even so it is important that a reply be sent to Prime Minister McMahon, particularly as Embassy Canberra has reported his "keen interest" in a response to his personal message to the President. We have therefore prepared a draft reply for the President. It should be substituted for the suggested interim reply attached to my May 14 memorandum.

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Theodore L. Eliot Jr.".

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

## Attachments:

1. Draft letter to Prime Minister McMahon
2. Eliot/Kissinger memorandum dated  
May 14, 1971

SECRET/EXDIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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MEMORANDUM

28515

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET

July 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG

FROM: JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*  
W. MARSHALL WRIGHT *W. Wright*

SUBJECT: Reply from the President to Australian  
Prime Minister McMahon's Letter of  
May 13 on Chinese Representation

Dr. Kissinger asked that our earlier draft reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon's letter of May 13 on Chinese representation be non-substantive. Attached at Tab A of Tab I is a re-draft which mentions only our plans for an early decision and for consultations with Australia and other countries before announcing that decision.

The draft reply has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	28515	HOLDRIDGE/Wright
5 14 5	15 10		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT  \_\_\_\_\_ U  LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER  \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S  CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *PM McMahon Summary of Australian Position on VN Chiefs  
 And its entanglement in domestic public reactions*

REFERENCE: S/S *7107231* OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES	( )
FAR EAST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	REPLY FOR <i>Pres</i> SIGNATURE	( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO TO	( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	REFER TO STATE	( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>5/20</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>5/27</i>	<i>HOLDRIDGE</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Pres to sign JAF to McMahon (5/28)</i>	
<i>6/1</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>Hold</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>Further Action? (6/3)</i>	
<i>5/16</i>	<i>HOLD</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Pres to sign JAF to McMahon (6/21)</i>	
<i>JUN 21 1971</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>Hold.</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>Further action to do w/Wright (6/25)</i>	
<i>6/21</i>	<i>JHAF</i>	<i>JAF</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<i>for redo</i>	
<i>JUL 10 1971</i>				<i>Pres signed JAF to McMahon</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO *McMahon/via SS*

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO  *EMM*

INIT **JUL 13 1971**

ORIG) NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PAF

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

Dr Henry A. Kissinger,  
Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Council  
Executive Office of the President  
WASHINGTON D.C.


MEMORANDUM

32338-X


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 5, 1971 

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE 

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply from the President to Australian Prime Minister McMahon

At Tab A is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a proposed reply from him to Australian Prime Minister McMahon, who wrote the President concerning direct personal consultations with him on China policy sometime before the President's trip. The revised proposed reply incorporates your instruction that we informally invite, through the Australian Embassy, McMahon here in January, which has been done. The phraseology suggests that this may be done via a special ANZUS meeting, as McMahon suggested but does not pin the President down either as to the nature of the visit or the time. (If an ANZUS meeting is ultimately decided upon, we would also wish to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand.) The reply also makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of communication between the President and McMahon for continuing consultations, and to the close consultations which are going forward between us and the Australians on the Chirep effort.

The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

SECRET/SENSITIVE



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

32338-X

ACTIONSECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Australian  
Prime Minister McMahon

Australian Prime Minister McMahon has sent you a letter (Tab B) in which he noted that secure communications have now been established outside normal channels between you and him, and offers a number of suggestions for consultations between the two of you on your China visit. These suggestions were offered in the spirit of reducing domestic repercussions in Australia with respect to your China initiative. They include the possibility of visits by you to Australia, a visit to Washington, or your convening a special ANZUS meeting at which McMahon and Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand would both be present.

Of McMahon's several alternatives, I think that his visiting Washington possibly in January would be the most practicable. This could be in the form of an official visit, if he would not by chance be passing through en route to another meeting, or in a special ANZUS Council meeting at the heads of state level, in which case New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake would join us. Any of these would be low profile, which would avoid suggesting to the Chinese that Australia and New Zealand have a determining influence on our China policy. I have accordingly left the wording of your reply to McMahon flexible, both as to the form and time of the meeting.

The reply also makes reference to the establishment of a secure channel of communications between yourself and him for continuing consultations, and to the close consultations which are going forward between us on the Chirep effort.

The letter has been cleared with Ray Price's office.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister McMahon at Tab A.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3574

August 22, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR ROSE MARY WOODS

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis

SUBJECT: Suggested Replies to Messages to President Nixon from Foreign Leaders

Attached are suggested draft replies and the incoming messages sent to President Nixon from the following foreign leaders:

Australia

~~Former Prime Minister McMahon~~ / 3472

Japan

Former Prime Minister Sato (Original message 3532 from Japanese Embassy)

Korea

President Park 3462

SUGGESTED DRAFT REPLY

3472

Dear Mr. McMahon:

I am deeply grateful to you for your kind message, transmitted by the American Consul General in Sydney.

I look back with special feelings of warmth on my meetings with my Australian friends, and I know that the close ties between our countries will continue under President Ford.

Mrs. Nixon and I wish you and Mrs. McMahon the very best in the years to come.

Sincerely,

(RN)

The Honorable William McMahon  
Sydney, Australia



Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 3998

PAGE 01 CANBER 05244 120607Z

13

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 RSC-01 DRC-01 /037 W  
039314

R 120533Z AUG 74  
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3859  
INFO AMCONGEN MELBOURNE  
AMCONGEN SYDNEY  
AMCONSUL BRISBANE  
AMCONSUL PERTH

UNCLAS CANBERRA 5244

EO 11652: NA.

TAGS: PFDR, AS, US.

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON  
FROM FORMER PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON.

AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL IN SYDNEY HAS RECEIVED  
FOI MESSAGE FROM FORMER PRIME MINISTER MCMAHON WITH  
REQUEST THAT IT BE DELIVERED TO FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON:

QTE WE HAVE BOTH WATCHED ON TV YOUR STATEMENT OF  
RESIGNATION. IT WAS A TRULY GREAT GESTURE AND ONE FOR  
WHICH YOU WILL BE LONG REMEMBERED. I THINK YOU WOULD  
KNOW HOW DEEPLY SONIA AND I FEEL FOR YOU AND YOUR  
FAMILY. OUR PERMANENT GOOD WILL AND GOOD WISHES TO  
YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. END QUOTE.  
HARROP

UNCLASSIFIED