

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	CIA to White House Situation Room	6/14/74	B
32	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-13/27 P.8 SANITIZED PER sec. 3.3(b)(1)	3/15/74	B
78	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-13/28 P.4	6/20/74	B
99	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-13/29 P.2	4/8/74	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-13/30 P.3 DECLASSIFIED PER RAC REVIEW 6/12/2008		

FILE GROUP TITLE **NSC** BOX NUMBER **622**

FOLDER TITLE **(1)**

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information. | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |

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FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

622

FOLDER TITLE

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RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
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CIA/WHSS

SOURCE REF:

02-403	1		4		7		10
	2		5		8		11
	3		6		9		12

TO: IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE//SITUATION ROOM FOR MR FAZIO.
 WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

ITEM NO: WH-4 DATE: 14 JUNE 1974
 SUBJECT: LEBANESE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON

REF : [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
 PER SEC 3.3(b)(1)

LEBANESE PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH REPORTEDLY HAS ASKED SYRIA'S PRESIDENT ASAD THAT HE BE INVITED TO DAMASCUS TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON THIS WEEKEND. ASAD, ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE SOURCE, HAS AVOIDED A DEFINITE REPLY.

FRANJIYAH IS GENERALLY REALISTIC ABOUT LEBANON'S LIMITED ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF BEING OFFENDED THAT THE PRESIDENT IS NOT VISITING BEIRUT. HE NONETHELESS IS HOPING FOR THIS BRIEF MEETING OUTSIDE LEBANON IN ORDER TO ENHANCE HIS OWN PRESTIGE AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS DEFENDING LEBANON'S INTERESTS AS TALKS TOWARD A MORE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT CONTINUE.

DATE:
 ORIG:
 UNIT:
 EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
 CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
 CL BY:

FORM 4C USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
 1-74

DECLASSIFIED

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
 NLN 09-13/27 per sec. 3.3(b)(1), HR 719 12010
 By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010

SANITIZED

CLASSIFICATION
~~S/NFD/NDA/CD~~
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE


MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

SOURCE REF:

1		4		7		10	
2		5		8		11	
3		6		9		12	

SUBJECTS THAT FRANJIYAH REPORTEDLY IS MOST EAGER TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT INCLUDE:

- LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY;
- THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IN THE FUTURE;
- ISRAELI RETALIATORY RAIDS INTO SOUTH LEBANON; AND
- ASSURANCES THAT LEBANON WILL BE INVITED TO THE LAST PHASE OF THE GENEVA PEACE TALKS AND WILL BE INCLUDED IN DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING MIDDLE EAST POLITICAL ISSUES. E-2 IMPDET.



SANITIZED
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)

SANITIZED
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)

DATE: 14 JUN 74
ORIG: [REDACTED]
UNIT: [REDACTED]
EXT: [REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET

FORM 4C
1-74

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SANITIZED
PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)

SANITIZED

EXEMPT

per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
per ltr. 7/9/2010

MR Case Number NLN 09-13/27, pages 3-8

AM
11/15/2010

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

157 ✓

SECRET (GDS)

January 15, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

BILL QUANDT *BQM*

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Your Meeting with
Ambassador-Designate Godley

There are relatively few major issues in US-Lebanese relations that you will want to discuss with Ambassador Godley. He will be interested, however, in hearing from you how the Arab-Israeli negotiations are proceeding and where Lebanon might eventually fit in.

The Lebanese government sees an Arab-Israeli settlement as a way of solving a serious internal problem--the presence of some 200,000 Palestinian refugees, most of whom are more responsive to the fedayeen than to Lebanese authority. On several occasions, most recently May 1973, the situation has become explosive. At such times the Lebanese tend to panic, turning to us for reassurances and promises of arms deliveries. Syria always looms large as a threat, and periodic Israeli attacks on fedayeen positions tend to weaken the government.

During the last crisis in Lebanon, we did agree to provide some equipment and to approve the sale of A-4s. We also offered to discuss, on a contingency basis, steps that might be taken by the US in a future crisis. In typical Lebanese fashion, however, once the pressure of the moment had passed we heard little more from them. Secretary Kissinger's recent visit to Lebanon did not produce any results, and the Lebanese had little to say.

President Franjiyah was invited to come to Washington this year, but his visit is now in abeyance, as the Lebanese did not pick up on the proposed February date.

You are probably aware that Ambassador Godley's nomination has been loudly criticized in the Beirut press. Some fanciful stories are circulating about the new US plot to crush the fedayeen, to be led by well-known CIA agent Godley.

SECRET (GDS)

Talking Points

1. You are going to Lebanon at a time when the Middle East is engaging much of our attention. The main focus now is on disengagement of forces on the Egyptian-Israeli front, and we hope to get an agreement on this soon.
2. Lebanon will be more interested in the later stages of peace negotiations, especially when the Palestinian issue arises. We have thus far not taken a firm position on Palestinian representation, although we are fully aware of the depth of Israeli opposition and of the problems this will cause for Jordan. It will be difficult to make peace with or without the Palestinians. Timing may be quite important.
3. The Palestinians have at times tried to use the Embassy in Beirut as a point of contact. Little of substance has been passed in these channels, and we do not want to raise expectations now. We do, however, appreciate the full reporting that Embassy Beirut is able to do on Palestinian developments. This will be of continuing interest to us.
4. The Lebanese seem to be somewhat ambivalent about the kind of relationship they want to have with us. This relates to their internal political structure in large part. We have tried to be responsive to their needs, without pushing them into a pro-American stance.
5. The Secretary, during his brief visit to Lebanon, gave a thorough account of how we intended to proceed in the peace talks. The Lebanese seemed to understand and appreciate our general concept of working through a step-by-step negotiation toward a comprehensive settlement. They did not, however, have much to offer, other than the suggestion that Palestinian interest be kept in mind and that eventually the Lebanese-Israeli demarcation line should be redefined as an international border. The Secretary did repeat our commitment to Lebanon's territorial integrity and our opposition to any change in Lebanon's southern border.
6. I wish you well in your new post. We will be looking forward to your reports.

LEBANON

Assistance Programs

Lebanon

	<u>FY 1972</u>	<u>FY 1973</u>	<u>FY 1974 Request</u>
FMS	\$10 million	\$10 million	\$5 million
PL 430	5.3 million	6.7 million	None

The GOL has not used the \$20 million FMS credits from FY 1972-73. After the May 1973 crisis, we received requests for a large number of items, including 16 A-4s, APCs, 155 mm. howitzers and M60 tanks. The A-4s were approved and letters of offer were made on everything except the 155 mm. howitzers and M-60 tanks. Price and availability information on these latter items has been provided. Lead times would be about two years. The Lebanese have not responded to any of these letters of offer. It will be difficult to justify future FMS if it remains unspent, as has been the case in the past two years. We are hoping for some form of reply to the letters of offer in the next few weeks.

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET (GDS)

WBQ:HHSaunders:tmt 9/21/73

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	FILE NO	INITIAL ACTION
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1 15	1 15 20	104	

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ROGERS *Quardo* UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY

KISSINGER _____ RICHARDSON _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT SCHLESINGER _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT _____ S CODEWORD _____

TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Talkers for Scowcroft mtg w/ Amb. Designate to Lebanon & G. McMurtrie Godley*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				<i>Godley, G. McMurtrie</i>
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>1/15</i>		<i>Scow</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>talkers</i>	
<i>1/15</i>				<i>noted by Scowcroft</i>	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ *7400124* JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: *4*

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D _____ BY _____

CYS FOR) SA _____

) HP _____

ORIG) WH _____

TO) PA

) SF _____

) NS _____

) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____

JAN 23 1974

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 7416

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09405 081158Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

004175

R 080946Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9521

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 9405

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NIXON'S RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE
REF: BEIRUT 8713

74 AUG 8 PM 3:44
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. BOUTROS DIB TELEPHONED LATE YESTERDAY, AUGUST 7, TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER (DEPTEL 158958) WAS READ TO CABINET YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. CABINET RESPONSE WAS EXCELLENT AND FRANGIE EMPHASIZED THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE TEXT OF THE LETTER. ACTING MINISTER OF INFORMATION RIZK AT THE END OF THE MEETING INDICATED TO PRESS THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER REITERATED ASSURANCES AS TO RELATIONS NBETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THE DESIRE OF THE UNITED STATES TO PRESERVE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE LETTER CONDEMNED ALL ACTS OF VIOLENCE THREATENING THIS PEACE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT UNDERLINED THAT A SOLUTION FOR THE CRISIS MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. THE REPLY ALSO INDICATED A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE US WITH REGARD TO LEBANON AND THE CONCERN OF THE US TO SEE MIANTAINED THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SECURITY OF ITS TERRITORY.

2. ALL PAPERS CARRIED SOTRY IN NUMBER THREE OR FOUR POSITION. HEADLINING NEXON'S ASSURANCES CONCERNING SOVERIEGNTY AND INTERGRITY OF LEBANON. NO REPEAT NO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09405 081158Z

PAPER, INCLUDING THOSE OF ARABIC LANGUAGE, HEADLINED
PALESTINIAN INTERESTS AND RIGHTS. GODLEY

AP 3 19 8
AMERICAN HOUSE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 0283

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08713 261825Z

63
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

003793

R 261145Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9265

SECRET BEIRUT 8713

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE US
SUBJ: RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE
REF: DEPTTEL 160772

1. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, JULY 25, DISCUSSED REFTTEL WITH DIB WHO CONCURRED COMPLETELY. HE SAID PRESIDENCY WOULD PROBABLY INDICATE THAT A RESPONSE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM PRES NIXON WHICH, INTER ALIA, CONTAINS ASSURANCES OF CONTINUING US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.
2. THIS MORNING, JUL 26, DURING CALL ON OTHER MATTERS, FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFAH REFERRED TO MY CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH DIB AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED OUR POSITION. I REITERATED WHAT MIGHT BE SAID AND HE CONCURRED. AS YESTERDAY WAS WEEKLY CABINET MEETING AND NOTHING HAS YET LEAKED TO THE PRESS, BELIEVE THERE IS GOOD CHANCE THAT LITTLE, IF ANYTHING, WILL APPEAR. GODLEY

74 JUL 27 PM 2:55

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 9723

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08532 231444Z

47
ACTION SS=30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

091192

P 231424Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9165

S E C R E T BEIRUT 8532

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE
REF: STATE 158958

74 JUL 23 PM 3:00

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. DCM CALLED ON PRESIDENT ADVISOR BOUTROS DIB THIS MORNING ON OTHER MATTERS AND READ TO HIM TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER CONTAINED REFTEL. DIB EXTREMELY GRATEFUL AND TELEPHONE PRESIDENT FRANGIE WHO IS CURRENTLY AT SUMMER RESIDENCE IN EH DEN. HE ALSO INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFAH. DCM EMPHASIZED PARA 3 REFTEL. DIB SAID HE UNDERSTOOD BUT HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE IN USG'S INTEREST FOR GOL EITHER (A) RELEASE GIST REPEAT GIST OF MESSAGE, (B) RELEASE CERTAIN PORTIONS WHICH HE DID NOT SPECIFY OR (C) RELEASE ENTIRE MESSAGE.
2. DIB POINTED OUT HE THOUGHT THAT MESSAGE WAS EXCELLENT AND WAS THINKING PRINCIPALLY OF USG POSITION HERE. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED THAT SOVIETS PUSHED HARD TO HAVE GOL RELEASE BREZHNEV'S LETTER. GOL FIRST RELEASED GIST, THEN CERTAIN PARAGRAPHS AND FINALLY AT REQUEST OF SOVIET EMBASSY RELEASED ENTIRE TEXT WHICH WAS PUBLISHED JULY 12.
3. I SHALL DELIVER TEXT FORMALLY TO DIB THIS AFTERNOON ON MY WAY HOME AND WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER. GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

74 JUL 10 PM 7:10
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 9701

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07944 101539Z

40
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

071034

P 101521Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8913

SECRET BEIRUT 7944

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON --
SOVIET REPLY

REF: BEIRUT 7456

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANTE BOUTROS DIB TELEPHONED THIS AFTERNOON JULY 10, TO STATE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR AZIMOV DELIVERED YESTERDAY BREZHNEV'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S LETTER TO BREZHNEV. RESPONSE READ TO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THIS MORNING AND LATTER SUGGESTED EARLY PUBLICATION. FRANGIE VETOED SUCH ACTION AT THIS TIME AND ASKED DIB TO INQUIRE WHETHER PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD BE RESPONDING, SO THAT BOTH RESPONSES MIGHT BE PUBLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
2. I ASKED DIB NATURE OF SOVIET REPLY AND HE SAID THAT AS EXPECTED IT INDICATED 100 PER CENT SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND INDICATED THAT ALL REPEAT ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO PALESTINIANS.
3. TOLD DIB I WOULD REFER HIS INQUIRY TO THE DEPARTMENT.
GODLEY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 7858

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07899 091657Z

70
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

056548

R 091606Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8892
INFO USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT BAGHDAD

SECRET BEIRUT 7899

EXDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, XF
SUBJECT: ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING

REF: BEIRUT 7889

1. SINCE PREPARING REFTEL I CALLED ON MINDEF MAALOUF, WHO DISCUSSED CAIRO ADC MEETING FOR OVER AN HOUR. WHILE SOMEWHAT MORE RESERVED IN HIS JUDGMENTS, HE CONFIRMED SUBSTANCE OF DIB'S ACCOUNT OF CAIRO CONFERENCE. RE PAPA 6 REFTEL, I.E. "SECRET RESOLUTIONS", HE INDICATED THAT THE THIRD RESOLUTION (SUB-PARA C) WAS BY FAR THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, IN THAT FIRST TWO CLAUSES (SUB-PARAS A AND B) WERE AGREED TO WITH A MINIMUM OF DISCUSSION ON THE MORNING OF JULY 4. COUNCIL THEN DISCUSSED AID TO THE PLO AND LEBANON FOUND ITSELF ALONE AND

74 JUL 10 AM 7:44

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07899 091657Z

FACING THE OTHER 19 DELEGATIONS, WHO WITH VARYING INTENSITY WANTED ACCORD DIRECT AID TO PLO. DEBATE WENT ON FOR OVER FIVE HOURS AND TOWARD THE END MAALOUF SAID LEBANESE DEL LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY WOULD NOT SIGN ANY AGREEMENT SANCTIONING DIRECT AID TO PLO IN LEBANON. AT THIS POINT SEC GEN RIYAD AND EGYPTIAN CHIEF OF STAFF AL-GAMASY BEGAN SEEKING COMPROMISE AND CAME UP WITH LANGUAGE PRACTICALLY SAME AS THAT ADOPTED AT ALGIERS SUMMIT. THIS WAS OF COURSE ACCEPTED BY GOL DEL FOR IT HAD BEEN APPROVED BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE AT ALGIERS.

2. MAALOUF ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT PLO REPS ON TWO OCCASIONS IN CAIRO SOLEMNLY PROMISED NOT TO ENGAGE IN RAIDS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. HE CONSIDERS THESE ASSURANCES ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL BENEFITS ACHIEVED IN CAIRO AND HAS CAREFULLY PRESERVED TRANSCRIPTS OF THEIR STATEMENTS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WHILE SOME REPS RECOMMENDED RENEWAL OIL EMBARGO HE, MAALOUF, AT REQUEST OF SAUDI REP, ARGUED THAT SUCH DRASTIC ACTIONS SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE UNDERTAKEN. SAUDI REP SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPORTED MAALOUF ON THIS POINT.

3. RE INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS MAALOUF EMPHASIZED LEADERSHIP NOW EXERCISED WITHIN ARAB LEAGUE BY EGYPT AND SYRIA, DUE TO THEIR OCTOBER WAR ROLE. HE SAID THIS LEADERSHIP ALSO SHARED BY SAUDI ARABIA WHOSE MONARCH HAD DARED USE OIL WEAPON. ALGERIA'S INFLUENCE HE DESCRIBED AS NEARLY EQUAL, DUE NOT ONLY TO ITS WEALTH, BUT ALSO TO ITS "PATH OF MARTYRDOM" IN GAINING ITS INDEPENDENCE. MAALOUF DESCRIBED THESE FOUR COUNTRIES AS HAVING PLACED THEIR FAITH IN US EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE AND THEREFORE ABLE TO EXERCISE STRONG MODERATING INFLUENCES. JORDAN, ACCORDING TO MAALOUF, WAS RELATIVELY ISOLATED AT ADC MEETING AND PLAYED AN "INDIVIDUALISTIC" ROLE. HE COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS APPARENT THAT BOTH PRESIDENTS SADAT AND ASSAD ARE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ADVICE GIVEN BY PRESIDENT NIXON, ENDEAVORING TO BRING HUSSEIN BACK INTO THE ARAB FAMILY AND CONVINCING HIM THAT HE MUST MAKE TERRITORIAL AND OTHER CONCESSIONS FAVORABLE TO THE PALESTINIANS. MAALOUF CONFIRMED DIB'S VIEWS

AP: T MA 01 JUC MR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07899 091657Z

RE SARG DEL, POINTING OUT THAT FON MIN KHADDAM INTERVENED ON GOL'S BEHALF REPEATEDLY IN CAIRO.

4. MAALOUF MENTIONED SEVERAL TIMES THE JULY 3 US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE WHICH WAS CARRIED IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS ONLY AT THE END OF THE ADC MEETING BUT WHICH, DUE TO FACT THAT IT RECOGNIZED LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WAS WIDELY NOTED THERE. EVEN BEFORE THE COMMUNIQUE APPEARED MAALOUF IN CORRIDOR NEGOTIATIONS CITED FACT THAT U.S. PRESIDENT WAS DISCUSSING MIDDLE EAST WITH BREZHNEV AS REASON FOR AVOIDING HASTY OR RASH DECISIONS AT ADC.

5. MAALOUF, LIKE DIB, REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED SENSITIVITY OF FOREGOING AND STATED IT MUST REPEAT MUST BE HELD IN GREATEST CONFIDENCE AND STRICTLY FOR U.S. EYES ONLY.
GODLEY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 7135

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07889 01 OF 02 091734Z

41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

057003

R 091450Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8888
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT BAGHDAD

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 7889

EXDIS

NOFORN

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, XF
SUBJECT: ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING

REF: BEIRUT 7837

1. SUMMARY: HIGH-RANKING GOL SOURCE WHO PRESENT AT ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL (ADC) MEETING IN CAIRO HAS CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION (REFTEL) THAT GOL SUCCESSFULLY MANAGED DEFLECT OFFERS OF ARAB MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE ALSO PROVIDED SOME INTERESTING INSIGHTS INTO POSITIONS ADOPTED BY VARIOUS ARAB DELS. END SUMMARY.

2. CALLED YESTEDAY AFTERNOON, JULY 8, ON PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER BOUTROS DIB, WHO ACCOMPANIED PRIMIN TAKIEDDINE SOLH, FONMIN NAFFAH AND MINDEF MAALOUF TO CAIRO FOR ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING JULY 3-4. COMPLIMENTED DIB

74 JUL 10 AM 7:44

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ON MEETING'S OUTCOME, FOR FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS IT APPEARED THAT LEBANESE OBJECTIVE OF NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPTING ALL-OUT ARAB MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WHILE AT SAME TIME MAINTAINING LEBANESE POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD. DIB SAID THAT LEBANESE HAD SUCCEEDED BUT THAT IT HAD INVOLVED ACRIMONIOUS AND OFTEN EXTREMELY TOUGH EXCHANGES WITH ARAB COLLEAGUES. PRINCIPAL PROBLEM, AND RATHER UNEXPECTED ONE, WAS POSITION OF KUWAITI FORMIN SABAH WHO, PRIOR TO PLENARY SESSION JULY 3, HAD CIRCULATED DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH TREATED PLO AND GOL ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND WHICH PROVIDED FOR 50 MILLION REPEAT 50 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS TO BE ACCORDED EACH TO GOL AND PLO ON AN EQUAL BASIS FOR DEFENSE. KUWAITI REP APPEARED TO GOL DEL TO BE MORE PLO THAN THE PLO, AND HE LED THE HARD-LINE ARABS IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS. KUWAITI POSITION WAS PARTICULARLY RESENTED BY THE LEBANESE, FOR ACCORDING TO THE LATTER, KUWAITIS SHOWED TOTAL DISREGARD FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND ALL THAT GOL HAD DONE FOR PLO, AS WELL AS SUFFERINGS BORNE BY LEBANESE DUE TO THIS HOSPITALITY (SIC). IN PRE-PLENARY DISCUSSIONS LEBANESE REJECTED KUWAIT'S POSITION, ARGUING NOT ONLY LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY BUT ALSO FACT THAT KUWAITI GENEROSITY TO PLO WOULD JEOPARDIZE CURRENT FRAGILE PEACE ALONG BORDER AND RESULT IN ISRAELI REPRISALS. KUWAITI REP AT ONE POINT QUESTIONED LEBANESE "ARAB" STATUS, TO WHICH PRIME MINISTER TAKIEDDINE SOLH REPLIED THAT IF THIS ASSERTION WERE NOT WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY, LEBANESE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEND ADC MEETING. AS RESULT, KUWAITI REP WITHDREW HIS PAPER.

3. PLENARY SESSION AFTERNOON JULY 3 WAS, ACCORDING TO DIB, RELATIVELY ANODYNE WITH EACH DELEGATION MAKING ANTICIPATED PUBLIC STATEMENTS. ENSUING CLOSED SESSIONS AT WHICH ONLY DELEGATION CHIEFS (FORMIN AND/OR MINS DEF) WERE PRESENT, WERE, HOWEVER, ACRIMONIOUS. THEY COINCIDED WITH WORKING MEETINGS, EITHER WITH ALL DELEGATIONS REPRESENTED OR IN SMALLER GROUPS.

4. DIB DESCRIBED BEHAVIOR OF VARIOUS DELEGATIONS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: EGYPTIANS WERE GRACIOUS HOSTS, SAYING

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RELATIVELY LITTLE BUT SHOWING UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANESE POSITION. SYRIANS WERE MOST HELPFUL IN SUPPORTING GOL POSITION. FORMIN KHADDAM ACTED WISELY AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AS MODERATOR BETWEEN GOL AND SA'IQA REP MUHSEN. SA'IQA DEL, LED BY MUHSEN, WAS PARTICULARLY VIOLENT, SUPPORTING KUWAITIS AND FREQUENTLY ATTACKING LEBANESE. (AS NOTED REFTTEL, MUHSEN HAS CONTINUED TO CRITICIZE GOL SINCE RETURNING FROM CAIRO.) DIB SAID GOL DEL WAS CONVINCED THAT MUHSEN PERSONALLY PROFITED IMMENSELY FROM "KUWAITI GENEROSITY". KUWAITI DEL, IN ADDITION TO WHAT IS INDICATED ABOVE, ACCORDING TO DIB, APPEARED TERRIFIED OF PLO. AT INITIAL PRIVATE DISCUSSION, KUWAITI REP, WHEN CHALLENGED BY LEBANESE RE RELATIVE STATUS OF PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON AND KUWAIT, STATED THAT HIS LIFE HAD BEEN THREATENED BY PLO AND GAVE EVERY APPEARANCE OF PERMITTING THIS THREAT TO GOVERN HIS ACTIONS. ALGERIAN DEL UNDER BOUTEFLIKA'S LEADERSHIP SHOWED GREAT STATESMANSHIP AS A MODERATING ELEMENT. ON ONE OCCASION, HOWEVER, BOUTEFLIKA ADVANCED LENGTHY LEGAL ARGUMENT RE PLO RIGHTS HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED AT UN BUT HE FORMALLY WITHDREW HIS COMMENTS WHEN ATTACKED BY NAFFAH, JGOL FORMIN. IRAQ AND LIBYAN DELS CAUSED NO REPEAT NO GREAT PROBLEMS FOR GOL IN THAT MOST OF THEIR VENOM APPEARED DIRECTED AGAINST SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS FOR HAVING AGREED TO DISENGAGEMENT. DIB SAID GOL DEL SURPRISED BY DEGREE OF THEIR VEHEMENCE, WHICH SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS HANDLED IN MOST DIGNIFIED MANNER.

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BROUGHT ON "GREAT POWERS", I.E. U.S., TO PERSUADE ISRAEL NOT REPEAT NOT TO CONTINUE ACTION AGAINST LEBANON (IN THIS CONNECTION DIB POINTED OUT THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON SHOULD CEASE); B) UNSPECIFIED AIF WOULD BE ACCORDED GOL IN ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSIVE POSITION (DIB COMMENTED THAT MINDEF MAALOUF POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON'S LEBANESE POUNDS 2.2 BILLION DEFENSE PROGRAM OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS WAS A BIG BURDEN ON GOL BUT IT WOULD BE MET, IF OTHER STATES DESIRED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROGRAM, ASSISTANCE WOULD OF COURSE BE MOST WELCOME PROVIDED NO REPEAT NO STRINGS ATTACHED.); C) COUNCIL AGREED THAT PLO REPRESENTED PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THAT IT WOULD BE SUPPORTED IN ITS STRUGGLE TO REGAIN HOMELAND. DIB EMPHASIZED THAT THIS HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED TO AT ALGIERS AND THAT THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO MATERIAL OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PLO IN LEBANON.

8. WE RECOGNIZE FOREGOING IS OBVIOUSLY ONE-SIDED. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, ATMOSPHERICS SET FORTH ABOVE MIGHT BE IN INTEREST, AND IT IS A RELATIVELY ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF LEBANESE DEL'S VIEWS AND IMPRESSIONS OF THE MEETING. REPEATEDLY DIB EMPHASIZED THE SENSITIVITY OF FOREGOING AND REQUESTED THAT IT NOT ONLY BE STRICTLY NOFORN BUT USED ONLY ON A NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS.
GODLEY

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R 081600Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8866
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7831

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EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJ: AMERICAN JOURNALISTS SEE ARAFAT

1. OVER THE WEEKEND NEWSWEEK'S ARNOLD DE BORCHGRAVE AND SYNDICATED COLUMNIST ROLAND EVANS SAW PLO LEADER ARAFAT SEPARATELY. BOTH (PROTECT) REPORTED TO US ON THEIR MEETINGS WHICH THEY DESCRIBED AS BASICALLY DISAPPOINTING IN THAT ARAFAT HAD NOTHING MUCH TO SAY. (THIS IS NOT SURPRISING IN THAT BOTH PUSHED HARD FOR THEIR MEETINGS AND WE HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ARAFAT WAS COMPLETELY PREOCCUPIED WITH ENDEAVORING TO OBTAIN THE REALEASE OF KIDNAPPED AN NAHAR EDITOR ABOU JAOUDE.) DE BORCHGRAVE, FRESH FROM HIS VISIT TO AMMAN, QUERIED ARAFAT IN PARTICULAR RE PLO REACHING SOME UNDERSTANDING WITH KING HUSSEIN. ARAFAT VIGOROUSLY DENIED ANY CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN, WHICH DE BORCHGRAVE BELIEVES IS NOT SO. IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE THAT ABDUL NUMIR RIFA'A AND ATALLAH WERE IN BEIRUT OVER WEEKEND AND THERE IS SOME TALK THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN MEETING WITH ARAFAT.

2. EVANS' CONVERSATION RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO PLO PRESENCE IN GENEVA, WHICH ARAFAT DODGED, SAYING

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PLD HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN FORMALLY INVITED.
EVANS ALSO GAVE ARAFAT SOME FRANK ADVICE ON HOW
HIS PUBLIC IMAGE MIGHT BE IMPROVED, WHICH ARAFAT
TOOK WITH GOOD GRACE.
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8801
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 7698

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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DIA USCINCEUR

R.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR PINS LE XF US
SUBJECT: LEBANON'S FEDAYEEN PROBLEM

REF: JERUSALEM 1354 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: OBSERVATIONS RE SITUATION IN LEBANON BY UNTSO SOURCE CITED REPTEL ARE FAIRLY PERCEPTIVE AND, IN THE MAIN, GENERALLY ACCURATE. HOWEVER, OVERALL SITUATION HE RELATES IS NOT PARTICULARLY NEW, BEING ESSENTIALLY SAME AS THAT WHICH HAS PREVAILED HERE SINCE CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN IN MAY 1973. SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT AT THAT TIME NO LESS AN AUTHORITY THAN PRES. FRANGIE REFERRED TO PALESTINIAN AND FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AS "STATE WITHIN A STATE." FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON POINTS RAISED IN REPTEL. END SUMMARY

1. REPTEL COINCIDES IN MANY DETAILS WITH WHAT WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING SINCE AS EARLY AS SPRING 1972 (C.F., OUR A-88 OF 24 MAR 72, A-274 OF 27 OCT 72, A-151 OF 15 AUG 73, AND A-11 OF 24 JAN 74, PLUS INNUMERABLE TELEGRAMS OVER PAST TWO YEARS). MAY 1973 CONFRONTATION,

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WHICH RESULTED IN UNEASY STANDOFF BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN, PROVED TO GO THAT FEDAYEEN PROBLEM COULD NOT BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL WITHOUT (A) WAGING PROTRACTED HOSTILITIES THAT WOULD INCUR UNACCEPTABLY HEAVY TOLL IN HUMAN LIVES, PROPERTY DAMAGE AND ECONOMIC DISLOCATION, AND (B) SUBJECTING LEBANON'S DELICATE CONFESSIONAL (CHRISTIAN VS. MOSLEM) AND POLITICAL (LEFT VS. RIGHT, PAN-ARAB VS. LEBANESE NATIONALIST) BALANCE TO SUCH SEVERE, POSSIBLY UNBEARABLE STRAINS AS TO SHATTER NATIONAL UNITY, BRING ABOUT REAL RISK OF CIVIL WAR, AND PERHAPS EVEN DIVIDE ARMY ALONG SECTARIAN AND/OR FACTIONAL LINES. QUITE NATURALLY, GOV. LEADERSHIP AND LEBANESE PUBLIC ARE UNWILLING TO PAY SUCH PRICE OR RISK INCURRING SUCH COSTS WITHOUT SUPPORT OF OTHER ARAB STATES, WHICH SO FAR HAS BEEN MINIMAL. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SITUATION IN LEBANON BEARS LITTLE COMPARISON WITH THAT WHICH EXISTED IN EAST JORDAN IN 1970 (OUR ANALYSIS OF THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED IN OUR A-88, MARCH 1972, REMAINS AS VALID TODAY AS IT WAS OVER TWO YEARS AGO).

2. LEBANESE ARMY TRIES (WITH ONLY PARTIAL SUCCESS) TO KEEP TABS ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY AND INTERDICT CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WHEN DETECTED. ON THOSE INFREQUENT OCCASIONS WHEN IT RECEIVES CLEAR-CUT ORDERS FROM HIGHER LEBANESE POLITICAL AUTHORITY, ARMY HAS ALSO ATTEMPTED INHIBIT FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT BETWEEN CAMPS AND IN COUNTRYSIDE, EXCEPT FOR REMOTE, MOUNTAINOUS AND SPARSELY-POPULATED RACHAYA AND YARQOUB DISTRICTS ("PATAHLAND") IN SOUTHEAST PART OF COUNTRY WHICH--ALONG WITH LEBANON'S 15 REFUGEE CAMPS--HAVE BEEN UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL SINCE 1969. HOWEVER, FEDAYEEN FIND IT FAIRLY EASY TO CIRCUMVENT ARMY CHECK-POINTS AND EVADE ARMY PATROLS, WHICH IN SOUTHERN BORDER AREAS ARE USUALLY SPOTTY. ONE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT ARMY UNITS ARE GENERALLY UNDERSTRENGTH AND STRETCHED VERY THIN IN COUNTRYSIDE. IN ADDITION, ARMY MUST MAINTAIN ADEQUATE COMBAT STRENGTH IN AND AROUND MAIN URBAN CENTERS, PARTICULARLY BEIRUT, WHICH 1973 CLASHES SHOWED TO BE EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO THREAT OF ATTACKS AND EFFORTS AT CIVIL DISRUPTION ON PART OF FEDAYEEN. (ONE

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MUST ALSO REMEMBER THAT BORDER IS LONG AND TERRAIN THERE IS DIFFICULT TO PATROL.) ANOTHER, PERHAPS MORE CRUCIAL, REASON IS CHRONIC FAILURE OF GOL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TO ISSUE PRECISE, UNEQUIVOCAL INSTRUCTIONS TO ARMY COMMANDERS REGARDING LIMITS TO BE SET ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AND WHAT ACTION TO TAKE IF THOSE LIMITS ARE VIOLATED. RESULT IS THAT MANY ARMY OFFICERS, FACED WITH UNCERTAINTY AND EVEN WITH POSSIBILITY OF BEING MADE SCAPEGOATS FOR OVERLY AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR TOWARD FEDAYEEN, TEND TO ERR ON SIDE OF INACTION, RATHER THAN ACTION, AND TO REPLY ON "NEGOTIATIONS" WITH FEDAYEEN IN ORDER WORK OUT COMPROMISES AND ACCOMMODATIONS RATHER THAN PUSH MATTERS TO POINT OF CONFRONTATION. SHOULD BE NOTED, IN FAIRNESS, THAT LEBANESE ARMY AS WHOLE HAS RESPONDED WITH EXCELLENT SPIRIT AND CONSIDERABLE EFFECTIVENESS TO CLEAR-CUT DIRECTIVES FROM GOL LEADERSHIP ON THOSE CRITICAL OCCASIONS (E.G., MAY 1973) WHEN SUCH INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING.

3. BOTH UNTSO OFFICES IN BEIRUT AND HIGH-RISE HOUSING PROJECT FOR LEBANESE ARMY OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES OCCUPY PROMINENT SITES AT MAJOR INTERSECTION CLOSE TO SABRA/SHATILA REFUGEE CAMP, WHICH IS NERVE-CENTER OF FEDAYEEN APPARATUS IN LEBANON. ENTIRE NEIGHBORHOOD WAS SCENE OF SOME OF FIERCEST FIGHTING DURING MAY 1973, AND INTERSECTION REMAINED PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE THROUGHOUT LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS THAT FOLLOWED. LEBANESE ARMY HAS INSISTED ON MAINTAINING ARMORED UNIT BEHIND OFFICERS QUARTERS, ACROSS ROAD FROM UNTSO OFFICES, DESPITE STRENUOUS FEDAYEEN OBJECTIONS. SINCE GOL DOUBTLESS BELIEVES THIS FORCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT BOTH INSTALLATIONS, IT PROBABLY WAS UNWILLING TO PROVOKE FEDAYEEN FURTHER BY SETTING UP SPECIAL GUARD AT UNTSO.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W
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R 040808Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 7698

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4. QUESTION OF ARMY ACCESS TO LEBANON'S 15 REFUGEE CAMPS, ALTHOUGH DISCUSSED INCONCLUSIVELY BY GOL WITH FEDAYEEN FOLLOWING MAY 1973 CLASHES, HAS BEEN DEAD LETTER FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES SINCE EARLIER LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN FIGHTING IN OCT 1969. AT THAT TIME, LEBANESE POLICE FLED FROM CAMPS, LEAVING THEM TO BE OCCUPIED BY FEDAYEEN. NO LEBANESE OFFICIAL HAS SET FOOT IN THEM SINCE.

5. TOTAL ARMED STRENGTH OF FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON IS MURKY SUBJECT, BUT WE ESTIMATE NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN "REGULARS" TO BE IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF 8,000 COUNTRYWIDE. (THIS FIGURE MAY HAVE GONE AS HIGH AS 9,000 FOLLOWING GOLAN DISENGAGEMENT AND SARG'S REPORTED DECISION TO SHIFT MORE SA'IGA ELEMENTS TO LEBANON.) WE HAVE GENERALLY PLACED STRENGTH OF FEDAYEEN "MILITIA" (WHICH CAN INCLUDE ALMOST ANY GUN-TOTING CAMP DWELLER WILLING TO BE COUNTED) AT AROUND 15-20,000--I.E., SOME WHAT LOWER THAN UNRWA COMGEN RENNIE'S ESTIMATE--BUT THIS FIGURE COULD BE SWELLED CONSIDERABLY IF, AS IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE, ARMED SYMPATHIZERS AMONG LEBANESE MOSLEM AND LEFTIST GROUPS WERE TO JOIN FEDAYEEN IN CONFRONTING THE ARMY. (FACT THAT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN DURING LIMITED

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FIGHTING IN MAY 1973 DOES NOT MEAN IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN IN EVENT OF AN ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION.) IN OTHER WORDS, FEDAYEEN AND THEIR POTENTIAL ALLIES CONSIDERABLY OUT-NUMBER LEBANESE ARMY (CURRENT STRENGTH OF WHICH IS 15,500-- PLUS 2,500 - 3,000 RESERVISTS CALLED UP FOR ONE YEAR IN AUG 1973--OF WHOM NO MORE THAN 8,000 ARE COMBAT EFFECTIVES) BY RATIO OF ANYWHERE FROM 1.67-, OR HIGHER.

6. WE HAVE GIVEN LONG AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO QUESTION OF WHO WOULD WIN IN ALL-OUT FEDAYEEN/ARMY CONFRONTATION. GIVEN ARMY'S ADVANTAGE IN FIRE-POWER, TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE, WE THINK IT WOULD EVENTUALLY PREVAIL OVER FEDAYEEN--ASSUMING THAT LARGE-SCALE SYRIAN INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF FEDAYEEN COULD SOMEHOW BE PREVENTED (A BIG ASSUMPTION IN LIGHT OF PAST SARG BEHAVIOR IN 1969 AND 1973). AS NOTED ABOVE, HOWEVER, THE PROCESS WOULD BE SO PROLONGED AND COSTLY--CARRYING WITH IT EVER-PRESENT RISK OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION (SEE BELOW), SECTARIAN STRIFE AND POLITICAL FACTIONALISM-- THAT GOL POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WILL SIMPLY NOT COUNTENANCE IT.

7. LEBANESE ALSO FERVENTLY WISH THAT SYRIA (OR EGYPT, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, ETC.) WOULD ASSIST THEM IN EXERTING CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SIGNS THAT GOLAN DISENGAGEMENT HAS PRODUCED ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN SARG POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN. SARG CONTROLS SA'IGA AND, AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE, HAS INCREASED THAT ORGANIZATION'S STRENGTH IN LEBANON. SARG ALSO USES SA'IGA TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE OVER OTHER FEDAYEEN GROUPS, ALTHOUGH ITS SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN PARTIAL AND OFTEN FLEETING. FROM STANDPOINT OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, COFFERS OF SAUDIS, KUWAITIS, LIBYANS, AND IRAGIS HAVE GENERALLY MEANT MORE TO FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AS WHOLE THAN THOSE OF SARG. (MAIN SYRIAN CONTRIBUTION, IN EYES OF FATAH/PLO "ESTABLISHMENT," HAS BEEN TO PROVIDE POLITICAL, PROPAGANDA AND (POTENTIALLY) MILITARY SUPPORT IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND TO ACT AS FUNNEL THROUGH WHICH SOVIET BLOC ARMS SHIPMENTS REACH FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. LATTER FUNCTION IN EASY, SINCE GOL HAS NEITHER MANPOWER NOR RESOURCES TO MOUNT EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION EFFORT

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ALONG ITS RUGGED EASTERN BORDER.) AS FOR GOL'S ABILITY TO INTERCEPT FUNDS DESTINED FOR FEDAYEEN USE IN LEBANON, WIDE-OPEN AND FREE-WHEELING CHARACTER OF BEIRUT MONEY MARKET RENDERS THIS AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK.

8. WE HAVE COMMENTED AT LENGTH ON POINTS RAISED REFTEL BECAUSE WE SHARE UNTSO SOURCE'S BELIEF THAT SITUATION STEMMING FROM FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS DEPRESSING AND THAT IT MAKES PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE ALARMING. WE WOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT IMPROVEMENT LEBANON'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AND ARAB SUPPORT OF LEBANESE EFFORTS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WOULD CERTAINLY HELP IMPROVE SITUATION. HOWEVER, FACT REMAINS FEDAYEEN PROBLEM HAS ITS ROOTS IN PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, AND IT WILL NOT DISAPPEAR UNTIL THAT MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS AT LAST RESOLVED IN SOME KIND OF JUST AND LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN MEANTIME, LEBANON MAY BECOME THAT PROBLEM'S LATEST AND MOST HAPLESS VICTIM.
GODLEY

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ACTION SS-30

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O 291335Z JUN 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8714
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECRET BEIRUT 7456

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MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR LE US

SUBJ: PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND
CAIRO MEETING OF ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL

REF: DEPTTEL 141250 SENT MOSCOW AS TOSEC 150

1. WE CONCUR COMPLETELY WITH ANALYSIS CONTAINED
PARA 1 REFTTEL AND ITS RECOMMENDATION. RE PARAS 2 AND
3, FOR THE LIFE OF US WE COULD NOT IMPROVE ON SUGGESTED REPLY.

2. RE PARA 4, I ENDEAVORED SEE PRIMIN SOLH THIS MORNING TO
BE SURE THAT ACTING SECSTATE SISCO'S PERSONAL VIEWS
HAD BEEN ACCURATELY REPORTED BY KABBANI. SOLH IN
DAMASCUS. THEREFORE I CALLED ON PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR
BOUTROS DIB AND TRANSLATED FOR HIM PARA 4. HE REQUESTED
I DO SO AT DICTATION SPEED FOR HE SAID HE CONCURRED
COMPLETELY WITH SISCO'S VIEWS AND WOULD BE PRESENTING THEM TO
FRANGIE, WHO IS OUT OF TOWN AT HIS SUMMER RESIDENCE, LATER ON
TODAY. DIB INDICATED HE WOULD ALSO INCORPORATE SISCO'S VIEWS IN
PAPER HE IS PREPARING FOR PRIMIN (SEE BELOW).

3. DIB THEN TOLD ME THAT LEBANESE HAD REQUESTED THIS
MORNING OF ARAB LEAGUE SEC GEN RIAD THAT ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL
MEETING BE POSTPONED FROM JULY 1 UNTIL JULY 3. GOL'S

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POSITION MOTIVATED BY FACT THAT QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE ARABS PRINCIPALLY SAUDIS, KUWAITIS, BUT ALSO OTHER GULF STATE REPS, COULD NOT RPT NOT ATTEND MEETING JULY 1. LEBANON ALSO CITED FACT THAT FORMIN NAFFA CURRENTLY IN MANILA ENDEAVORING MEDIATE PHILIPPINE-MOSLEM DIFFERENCES. RIAD SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED BACK AGREEING TO WEDNESDAY, JULY 3 MEETING. I ASKED IF THAT WOULD MEAN THAT NAFFA WOULD REPRESENT GOL AND DIB SAID HE WOULD NOT (NOT WITHSTANDING THIS FACT BEING CITED TO RIAD) FOR GOL COULD NOT RPT NOT BE REPRESENTED BY TWO CHRISTIANS (NAFFA AND MINDEF MAALOUF). GOL WILL BE REPRESENTED BY PRIMIN SOLH (MOSLEM) WHO WILL ATTEND NOT RPT NOT AS PRIMIN BUT AS ACTING FORMIN, PLUS MAALOUF.

4. DIB IS PREPARING FOR PRIMIN A DETAILED BRIEFING PAPER RE CAIRO. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF GOL DELEGATION, ACCORDING TO DIB, WILL BE TO REDUCE AREA TENSIONS AND GAIN TIME. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAELIS IN MEANTIME REMAIN CALM.

5. GOL AT THIS MOMENT IS FACED WITH QUASI UNANIMOUS ARAB OFFERS FOR ALL SORTS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. AS REPORTED EMBTEL 7430, GOL IS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT ARAB MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THIS COULD PROVOKE ESCALATED ISRAELI ATTACKS AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO ANOTHER TRAGIC MIDDLE EASTERN WAR. GOL, HOWEVER, DOES NOT WISH TO REJECT OUT OF HAND ARAB ASSISTANCE FOR BOTH INTRA-ARAB RELATIONS AND ALSO INTERNAL LEBANESE REASONS. WHAT DIB IS THEREFORE PROPOSING TO SOLH AND WHICH HE GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND HAS PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S GENERAL BLESSING IS THAT AT OPENING PUBLIC CAIRO MEETING SOLH MAKE RELATIVELY ANODYNE MODERATE SPEECH DESCRIBING GOL'S CURRENT POSITION BUT AVOIDING DIRECT RESPONSE TO ARAB STATES' OFFER OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SUBSEQUENT TO FOREGOING, BUT PRIOR TO CLOSED AND SUPPOSEDLY SECRET SESSIONS SOLH WOULD IN PRIVATE "SECRET" CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS LET IT BE KNOWN TO MODERATE ARABS THAT GOL IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY AND ALL ARAB MILITARY ASSISTANCE. IN EXECUTIVE SESSION GOL DELEGATION WOULD THEN PRESENT ITS ANALYSIS OF THE DANGERS OF ACCEPTING ALL OUT ARAB MILITARY AID, I.E., THIS WOULD PROVOKE ISRAEL TO UNDERTAKE MORE EXTENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LEBANON AND COULD WELL RISK RESUMPTION OF ALL-OUT MIDDLE EAST CONFLAGRATION. DIB IS CONVINCED THAT MODERATES PRINCIPALLY EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 07456 291432Z

WOULD GO ALONG WITH GOL'S ANALYSIS FOR HE IS CERTAIN THAT NOT ONLY DO THESE TWO COUNTRIES WISH TO AVOID RESUMPTION WAR BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY THEY ARE NOT AT ALL KEEN ABOUT IMPLEMENTING THEIR OFFER FOR ALL-OUT MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THIS OFFER, DIB IS CONVINCED, WAS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS AND WAS NOT GENUINE.

6. DIB ASKED MY OPINION FOR THE FOREGOING. I TOLD HIM THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT DANGEROUS ELEMENT OF HIS PROGRAM WAS THAT "SECRET" STATEMENTS TO OTHER ARAB REPS MIGHT LEAK AND THAT ISRAELIS WOULD THEN HAVE TO RESPOND PUBLICLY WITH ADDITIONAL THREATS AGAINST LEBANON. I ALSO SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION WAS AVOIDING ANY ISRAELI MISUNDERSTANDING OF GOL POSITION. DIB HEARTILY CONCURRED BUT COUNTERED WITH STATEMENT THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL ISRAEL NOT ENGAGE IN FURTHER ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO CAIRO MEETING. DIB DID NOT RPT NOT SO STATE NOR DID I RAISE THIS POINT BUT I RECEIVED A DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT OBJECT IF FOREGOING WERE MADE KNOWN TO RABIN IN UTMOST CONFIDENCE. THE ONE FACTOR HOWEVER THAT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND IS THAT DIB EMPHASIZED TO ME THAT FOREGOING IS MERELY HIS RECOMMENDATION TO SOLH AND THAT SOLH MAY NOT FOLLOW IT. (COMMENT: WE FEAR HE MAY BLOW IT, BUT ARE SOMEWHAT REASSURED BY MAALOUF'S PRESENCE.) NEVERTHELESS, DIB EMPHASIZED THAT THE OVERALL GOL POSITION AT THE CAIRO MEETING HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LAST WEDNESDAY'S CABINET MEETING AND THAT THERE WAS AN UNUSUAL UNANIMITY OF APPROVAL WITHIN THE CABINET ON THE OVERALL RPT OVERALL GOL POSITION AT CAIRO AND THE FACT THAT ALL POSSIBLE ACTION MUST BE TAKEN AT CAIRO TO REDUCE LEBANESE-ISRAELI TENSIONS. DIB ALSO OPINED THAT THIS LEBANESE VIEW WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE MAJORITY OF ARAB REPRESENTATIVES AND THAT THE KUWAITIS HAD ALREADY INDICATED THEY WERE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOL'S OVERALL POSITION. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTIONS, DIB SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW WHETHER LIBYA OR IRAQ WOULD BE REPRESENTED AT CAIRO. I INQUIRED WHETHER FOREGOING WOULD BE DISCUSSED BY PRIMIN SOLH WITH SYRIA' PRESIDENT ASSAD TODAY. DIB SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT FOR PRIMIN WAS PLANNING TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS AND PRIMIN DID NOT YET HAVE DIB'S VIEWS ON PAPER.

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PAGE 04 BEIRUT 07456 291432Z

7. FOREGOING I BELIEVE LENDS WEIGHT TO SISCO'S RECOMMENDATION THAT PRESIDENT RESPOND AS SOON AS CONVENIENT TO FRANGIE'S LETTER.

8. I AM SENDING THIS ONLY TO THE SECRETARY AND THE DEPARTMENT BUT WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION IF THE LATTER WERE TO GIVE IT SUCH LATERAL DISTRIBUTION AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.
GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 5453

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07349 280158Z

55
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 INRE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 /031 W
----- 068194

R 271344Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8666
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 7349

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PINS, MILI, LE, EG

SUBJ: SADAT'S MESSAGE TO FRANGIE

431: CAIRO 4545

1. LEBANESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE NASRI MALOUF TOLD DCM RECENTLY THAT EGYPTIAN MISSION WITH SADAT MESSAGE MET WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND HIMSELF ON SATURDAY, JUNE 22. ACCORDING TO MALOUF, SADAT OFFERED BOTH EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS TO HELP LEBANON IN ITS PRESENT DIFFICULTY WITH ISRAELI ATTACKS. SADAT INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH EGYPT IS SECURE NOW, HE COULD NOT STAND BY WHEN A FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRY WAS IN TROUBLE WITHOUT OFFERING ASSISTANCE.

2. PRESIDENT FRANGIE THANKED MISSION AND SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER OFFER OF EQUIPMENT AND ASSISTANCE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION SADAT COULD MAKE WAS TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH HIS GOOD FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS. MALOUF INDICATED THAT FRANGIE WOULD NOT WANT EGYPTIAN TROOPS IN LEBANON AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT ASK FOR EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERED. HE ALSO NOTED MILITARY MEMBERS OF EGYPTIAN MISSION RIDICULED FEDAYEEN DESIRE TO OBTAIN MORE

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MISSILES TO CONFRONT ISRAELI ATTACKS, ARGUING THAT THEY WOULD BE USELESS WITHOUT FULL RADAR MISSILE COMPLEX.

3. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY GOL MOST GRATEFUL FOR SADAT'S GESTURE AND MIGHT ACCEPT SOME EQUIPMENT ALTHOUGH THIS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN. WE WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED IF PRESIDENT FRANGIE BROKE WITH TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POSITION OF NOT ACCEPTING FOREIGN TROOPS ON LEBANESE SOIL.
HOUGHTON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 6707

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07446 281928Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

075004

O 281852Z JUN 74 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8711

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7446

EXDIS

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

EQ 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE US UR
SURJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO PRESIDENT NIXON
REF: BEIRUT 7445

74 JUN 29 AM 10:09

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. FOLLOWING IS EMB OFF'S TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO PRESIDENT NIXON QUOTE AS YOU MEETT WITH HIS EXCELLENCY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, MR. LEONID BREZHNEV, TO EXAMINE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT WORLD PROBLEMS, I BELIEVE IT IS MY DUTY TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO A TRAGEDY WE ARE EXPERIENCING THAT IS A THREAT TOO PEACE ON EARTH AND REFLECTS ON THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE IN PURSUIT OF A PEACE BUILD ON JUSTICE.

2. THE MIDDLE EAST REGION HAS FOR YEARS BEEN ONE OF THE BASIC HOT SPOTS THREAENING WORLD PEACE. AFTER THE EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE, ESPECIALLY BY THE TWO GREAT POWERS, AND AFTER THE POSITIVE RESULTS THESE HAVE BROUGHT IN THE SEPARATION OF FORCES ON THE TWO FRONTS OF SINAI AND GOLAN, THERE ARE STILL CONSPICUOUS REASONS TO FEAR FOR PEACE. THEIR ORIGIN IS ISRAEL'S ESCALATION OF ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY AGAINST LEBANON. IT IS AS IFF THESE EFFORTS MERELY GAVE IT THE OPPORTUNITY TO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07446 281928Z

DEAL IN ISOLATION WITH LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE RESIDENT ON ITS TERRITORY.

3. WHAT IS HAPPENING TODAY IN LEBANON WILL INEVITABLY HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA AS A WHOLE. PERHAPS IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THIS COUNTRY AND ONE OF THE FIRM RULES OF ITS HISTORY THAT THE WHOLE REGION SHOULD BE AFFECTED BY WHAT TAKES PLACE IN IT. THERE IS NO NEED TO EMPHASIZE HOW CLOSELY LINKED ARE ALL ISSUES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

4. ISRAEL HAS CONTINUED FOR SOME TIME TO CLAIM THAT IT IS STRIKING LEBANON TO BRING IT TO PUT EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON THE PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN. IT HAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT IT IS STRIKING LEBANON BECAUSE OF ITS INABILITY TO EXERT THE PRESSURE REQUESTED. AND TODAY WE SEE IT ACCUSING LEBANON OF ENCOURAGING THE ACTIONS OF A GROUP OF FEDAYEEN IN THE HEART OF ISRAEL. EACH TIME AN OPERATION OCCURS, ISRAEL HURRIES TO ANNOUNCE LEBANON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT.

5. LEBANON'S PEACEFUL POLICY IS AN ATTESTED INTERNATIONAL FACT. WHEN LEBANON WELCOMED THE PALESTINIAN FUGITIVES WHO TOOK REFUGE IN IT BECAUSE OF ZIONIST AGGRESSION, IT WAS UNDERTAKING A DUTY IMPOSED BY FRATERNAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS, AS A MEMBER STATE, HELPING THE UNITED NATIONS CARRY OUT WHAT THIS ORGANIZATION CONSIDERED TO BE ITS DUTY, IN SPITE OF ITS SMALL GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES.

6. ISRAEL'S USE OF WHAT PALESTINIAN INDIVIDUALS ARE DOING AS A PRETEXT TO JUSTIFY ITS SAVAGE ACTS IS REJECTED. HOW CAN ONE PERMIT A COMPARISON BETWEEN WHAT IS DONE BY YOUTHS WHO ARE SUFFERING FROM ISRAEL'S OPPRESSION, ITS DESTITUTION OF THEM, ITS CONTINUAL MALTREATMENT OF THEM, AND ITS VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS AND WHAT IS DONE BY A STATE WITH ITS REGULAR FORCES, VIOLATING THE SANCTITY OF THE LAW WITH ITS INFRINGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONS AND ITS VIOLATION OF ALL HUMAN AND MORAL LAWS BY KILLING HUNDREDS OF CHILDREN AND WOMEN AND OLD AND SICK PEOPLE, ALL OF WHICH IS REMINISCENT OF THE ATROCITIES OF NAZISM, WHICH WILL REMAIN A BLOT UPON HUMAN HISTORY.

60:01 MA 05 JUL 67
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7. ISRAEL DOES NOT CONTENT ITSELF WITH DESTITUTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND CONTINUING ITS ATTEMPTS TO WIPE OUT ITS PERSONALITY AND OBLITERATE ITS FEATURES FROM THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW. INSTEAD, IT STRIKES VIOLENT BLOWS AND RELIES ON BARBARIC MEANS EFFECTIVELY TO DESTROY THIS PEOPLE, EXPLOITING ANY DELAY ON THE PART OF STATES IN RECOGNIZING THE FULL NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.

8. LEBANON IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIME OF DESTITUTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND PREVENTING IT FROM EXERCISING ITS RECOGNIZED AND LEGAL RIGHT TO RETURN TO ITS HOMELAND. LIFKWISE, LEBANON IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE, FOR RESISTANCE ACCOMPANIES ANY UNJUST OCCUPATION AND VIOLATION OF RIGHTS. THE HISTORY OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS BEARS WITNESS TO THE FACT THAT VIOLENCE MERELY INCREASES THEIR STRENGTH AND SCOPE.

9. THE LOGIC OF FORCE, OF DISDAIN FOR INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND LAWS, AND OF DENIAL OF MORAL LAWS AND VALUES CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE STABILITY AND JUST PEACE WHICH EVERYONE WHO VALUES PEACE IN THIS REGION AND IN THE WORLD SEEKS. LEBANON, ON THE BASIS OF ITS FIDELITY TO ITS PRINCIPLES AND ITS PEACEFUL MISSION, WATCHES WITH GREAT INTEREST, ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, FOR THE RESULTS OF THE TALKS YOU ARE NOW HOLDING IN MOSCOW AND WHICH I BELIEVE INCLUDE ISRAEL'S ESCALATING POLICY OF AGGRESSION AND THE RESULTING DEATH, DESTRUCTION, AND DANGERS BEFALLING LEBANESE SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THREATENING PEACE IN THE REST OF THE AREA.

10. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES THAT YOU BEAR AND THE FEELINGS OF FRIENDSHIP THAT YOU HARBOR FOR LEBANON AND ITS PEOPLE WILL CAUSE YOU TO APPRECIATE THE FULL TRUTH AND DANGER OF THE SITUATION AND TO WORK TO MAKE HASTE IN FINDING SALUTARY SOLUTIONS GUARANTEEING THE RESTORATION OF RIGHT AND ANCHORING THE FIRM BASES OF STABILITY AND JUST PEACE.

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SECRET

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11. IN WISHING YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR TALKS SO THAT WHAT ALL PEOPLES STRIVE FOR MAY BE ACHIEVED, I SEND MY SINCERE GREETINGS AND MY BEST WISHES TO YOUR EXCELLENCY PERSONALLY AND TO THE GREAT AMERICAN PEOPLE. END QUOTE.

12. SIGNED ORIGINAL OF MESSAGE BEING FORWARDED TO DEPT. GODLEY

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FORM DS-1652

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 6343

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07445 281726Z

46
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
----- 073191

Z 281710Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8710

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7445

EXDIS

MOSCOW FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE US
SURJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND
GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV

1. AT 1800 LOCAL THIS AFTERNOON, JUNE 28, PRIME
MINISTER TAKIEDDINE SOLH CONVOKED ME FOR 1900 HOURS
LOCAL. UPON ARRIVAL AT HIS HOME, I CROSSED WITH
ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR WHO WAS DEPARTING. PRIME
MINISTER GAVE ME SIGNED LETTER IN ARABIC FROM
PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO PRESIDENT NIXON. HE SAID THAT
AN IDENTICAL LETTER WOULD BE GIVEN AT 1930 LOCAL
TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR AZIMOV FOR GEN SEC BREZHNEV.
ENGLISH TRANSLATION WILL FOLLOW WITHIN ONE HOUR.
PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT LETTER SEEKS PRESIDENT
NIXON'S ASSISTANCE IN CURTAILING ISRAELI ACTIONS
AGAINST LEBANON. LETTER STATES GOL SHOULD NOT REPEAT
NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMANDO ACTIONS IN ISRAEL.
ISRAELI REPRISALS ARE THOSE OF A GOVERNMENT AND NOT
THOSE OF INDIVIDUALS. PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT LETTER
ASKED PRESIDENT NIXON TO RECOGNIZE THE "PERSONALITY"
OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR "RIGHTS". I ASKED
PRYMIN TO SHOW ME WHERE THIS PASSAGE EXISTED IN
ARABIC. HE THEN TRANSLATED FROM ARABIC INTO FRENCH
PARAGRAPH 7. THIS PARAGRAPH, HOWEVER, DOES NOT REPEAT

74 JUN 29 AM 10:09

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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NOT MAKE ANY SUCH SPECIFIC REQUEST. IT MERELY ALLUDES TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. I CITE THIS BECAUSE IT MIGHT WELL APPEAR IN LOCAL PRESS AS PRIME MINISTER DESCRIBED IT TO ME AT FIRST. I ASKED PRIMIN IF LETTER WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. HE RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE BUT STATED THE PRESS WOULD BE TOLD THAT SIMILAR LETTERS WERE BEING SENT TO OUR PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE TEXT OF THE LETTERS WOULD BE MADE AVAILBLEE TO "ARAB AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT". IT IS THEREFORE ME STRONG HUNCH THAT THE TEXT IS PROBABLY NOW BEING LEAKED TO THE PRESS. MY CALL ON THE PRIME MINISTER IS KNOWN TO THE PRESS BUT I MADE NO REPEAT NO COMMENT TO THEM REGARDING ANY ASPECT OF MY CALL.

2. I ASKED PRIMIN IF LETTER REFERRED IN ANY WAY TO ANY ARAB ACTION TO CURTAIL COMMANDO RAIDS IN ISRAEL. PRIMIN APPEARED SURPRISED BY THIS QUESTION AND SIAD "WHAT CAN ANY ARAB STATE DO?".
GODLEY

CO: 01 MA 03 JUL 67

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MORNING

SECRET

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TELEGRAM

'74 JUN 21 AM 7:46

SECRET 6093

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07011 201643Z

64
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

094700

R 201615Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8543
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7011

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, LE, EG, UR
SUBJECT: GOE WARNS GOL RE SOV MILITARY EQUIPMENT

1. LEBANESE MIN NAT DEF MAALOUF TODAY, JUNE 20, INFORMED ME AS FOLLOWS: SUBSEQUENT TO MEETING OF ARAB LEAGUE MINS NAT DEF IN CAIRO FEW WEEKS AGO, FIVE EGYPTIAN ARMY OFFICERS, TWO GENERALS AND THREE COLONELS, VISITED DISCREETLY BEIRUT TO ADVISE LEBANESE RE MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED HERE, EGYPTIANS EMPHASIZED TO MAALOUF AND LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GHANEM THAT UNDER NO REPEAT NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD LEBANON CONSIDER PURCHASING OR EVEN RECEIVING AS GRANT SOVIET EQUIPMENT. ACCORDING TO MAALOUF, EGYPTIANS SAID THAT SOVIETS WERE TOTALLY UNTRUSTWORTHY, I.E. THEY WOULD SELL ONE ITEM OF EQUIPMENT AND ONLY AFTER IT HAD BEEN RECEIVED WOULD POINT OUT OTHER MORE EXPENSIVE ITEMS THAT HAD TO BE ACQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE WEAPONS SYSTEM. SOVIETS ALSO GAVE LITTLE OR NO INFORMATION REGARDING SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS UNTIL AFTER EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN DELIVERED AND FREQUENTLY WERE NOT REPEAT NOT ABLE TO FURNISH ESSENTIAL SPARES.

2. FOREGOING IS UNDOUBTEDLY OLD STORY TO EMBASSY AIRO AND DEPARTMENT BUT I BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST THAT EGYPTIANS PASSED IT ON WITH SUCH

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07011 201643Z

EMPHASIS TO GOL. GOL HAS NEVER BEEN KEEN ON
COMMUNIST WEAPONRY BECAUSE COMMUNISTS ALWAYS
TRY TO INCLUDE TRAINING PERSONNEL IN ANY ARMED
EQUIPMENT SALES OR GRANT. FOREGOING, HOWEVER,
IS FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD AT GOL POLITICAL LEVEL
SUCH DISPARAGEING REMARKS RE EFFICACY OF SOVIET
ARMS PACKAGES. GODLEY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

27 JUN 80 PM 5:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 4786

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06989 201342Z

46
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
----- 092478

O 201336Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8527
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 6989

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, LE, IS
SUBJECT: GOL REQUESTS GOI BE INFORMED RE PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S PLANNED WEEKEND NEAR BORDER

1. DEPUTY CHIEF OF LEBANESE DEUXIEME BUREAU INFORMED EMBOFF JUNE 20 THAT PRES. FRANGIE WILL BE HOUSE GUEST OF LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GHAMIM AT GHANIM'S COUNTRY HOME IN SAGHBINE DURING WEEKEND JUNE 22-23. DEUXIEME BUREAU OFFICER ASKED THAT GOI BE INFORMED, AS VILLAGE IS ABOUT 25 MILES FROM LEBANESE ISRAELI BORDER (IN BEKAA VALLEY), AND IS SOMEWHAT CLOSER TO AREAS WHICH, ACCORDING TO GOL, HAVE BEEN SHELLED NIGHTLY BY ISRAELI ARTILLERY RECENTLY.

2. REQUEST CONFIRMATION WHEN GOI INFORMED.
GODLEY

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
Department of State

TELEGRAM

'74 JUN 7 AM 8:42

SECRET 0014

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06388 061205Z

84
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

047494

R 061144Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8249

S E C R E T BEIRUT 6388

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE

REF: BEIRUT 6245

1. BEIRUT PRESS THIS MORNING HEADLINES "NIXON INVITES FRANGIE TO VISIT UNITED STATES -- STATES LACK OF TIME BARS LEBANON VISIT" (DAILY STAR) L'ORIENT LE JOUR CARRIES "NIXON TO FRANGIE: REGRETS THE MISSED VISIT AND ASSURANCES FOR THE SECURITY OF LEBANON". ARABIC LANGUAGE PRESS ALSO FRONT-PAGES STORY. ARTICLES DO NOT CARRY FULL TEXT LETTER, BUT CONTAIN QUOTES FROM SECOND PARAGRAPH.

2. UPON SEEING FOREGOING I TELEPHONED PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER BOUTROS DIB AND EXPRESSED MY SURPRISE THAT PRESIDENT HAD OBVIOUSLY RELEASED PORTIONS OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE. TOLD HIM THIS WAS MOST EMBARRASSING AND INQUIRED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. DIB SAID THAT AT CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY PRESIDED OVER BY FRANGIE LATTER HAD DIRECTED HIM TO READ FRENCH TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER. DIB DID SO AND AT REQUEST OF MINISTERS PRESENT READ IT A SECOND TIME. DIB SAID THAT SUBSEQUENTLY MINISTER OF INFORMATION REQUESTED PRESIDENT'S PERMISSION TO PUBLISH TEXT OF LETTER. PRESIDENT REFUSED AND WHEN MINISTER CAME BACK THE SECOND TIME HE AGAIN TURNED HIM DOWN. NOTWITH-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06388 061205Z

STANDING FOREGOING DURING THE COURSE LATE AFTERNOON "SEVERAL" MINISTERS CALLED PRESIDENT, RECOMMENDING RELEASE OF LETTER FOR BEIRUT RUMOR MILL WAS AGOG RE REAL REASON FOR MY VISIT TO PRESIDENT ON JUNE 4. DIB DOES NOT KNOW PRECISELY WHAT TRANSPIRED LAST EVENING BUT BELIEVES PRESIDENT MAY HAVE AUTHORIZED RELEASE OF THE GIST OF THE MESSAGE. I TOLD DIB THAT I CONSIDERED THIS TO BE MOST UNFORTUNATE FOR IT CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CHIEFS OF STATE. DIB APOLOGIZED PROFUSELY, STATING HE WOULD BRING MY VIEWS TO THE ATTENTION OF FRANGIE.

3. ALTHOUGH AS REPORTED REFTEL I EMPHASIZED TO PRESIDENT THAT HE COULD NOT PUBLISH THE LETTER I DID NOT REPEAT NOT STAMP IT SECRET.

4. DIB ADDED THAT CABINET REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WAS MOST POSITIVE. ALL MINISTERS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND RESPECT FOR WHAT OUR PRESIDENT HAD DONE AND WERE OBVIOUSLY EXTREMELY RELIEVED AND GRATEFUL OVER OUR PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS.

5. SINCE DICTATING FOREGOING, JUST RECEIVED DEPTTEL 117865, CONTENTS OF WHICH I PASSED TO DIB. I AM NEVERTHELESS SUBMITTING FOREGOING FOR THE RECORD. GODLEY

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06292 050951Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O 050829Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0212

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 6292

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID SREF UNRWA XF
SURJ: UNRWA FINANCING

REF: STATE 115768

74 JUN 5 PM 3:39

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. FORMULA IS BASICALLY APPROACH DEVISED BY LEBANESE TO CIRCUMBENT ARAB GOVTS' RELUCTANCE TO EXTEND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO UNRWA BY ENCOURAGING THEM TO CONTRIBUTE EXPRESSLY TO WEST BANK/GAZA EDUCATION THROUGH UNESCO. (DEPT MAY WISH TO CONSULT BOB OAKLEY IN S/PC, WHO IS FAMILIAR WITH GENESIS OF IDEA.) IF TOTAL SUCH CONTRIBBUCTIONS REACHED 10 MILLION DOLLARS, UNRWA COULD THEREBY JUGGLE SPENDING IN WAY TO AVOID 1974 DEFICIT.

2. IN CONVERSATION JUNE 4 WITH EMBOFF, SIR JOHN RENNIE STATED THAT, TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE, GOL HAD NOT RPT NOT RAISED PROPOSAL WITH UNSYG DURING HIS VISIT OR AS YET WITH ANY ARAB GOVT. SIR JOHN IN FACT WONDERED IF LEBANESE MIGHT NOT BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT TAKING LEAD WITH FELLOW ARABS AT THIS TIME ON IDEA THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS WESTERN OR EVEN US-INSPIRED.

3. SIR JOHN ADDED THAT HE HAD, ON HIS OWN, BROACHED PROPOSAL PREVIOUS DAY WITH U.A.E. MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO ATTENDING ECWA CONFERENCE. LATTER HAD SEEMED INITIALLY RECEPTIVE AND PROMISED TO RAISE MATTER WITH HIS GOVT UPON HIS RETURN TO ABU DHABI BUT APPEARED

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06292 050951Z

TO LOSE INTEREST SOMEWHAT WHEN SIR JOHN UNABLE TO ASSURE HIM THAT ANY OTHER ARAB GOVT HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO SIMILAR CONTRIBUTION.

4. RE UNRWA IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANNED REDUCTION, SIR JOHN SAID HE WAS AWAITING ARAB GOVTS' REACTION TO HIS RECENT LETTER (BEIRUT 6080) BEFORE PROCEEDING. HE CONSIDERED IT LIKELY THAT SOME GOVTS (MOST PROBABLY JORDAN) WOULD ATTEMPT FURTHER APPROACH TO WESTERN DONORS SHORTLY AND EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT ANY ARAB GOVT WOULD TAKE SIGNIFICANT INITIATIVE TO RALLY FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ARAB WORLD.
GODLEY

EC: E HQ 3 MR. A*

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

74 MAY 32 PM 4:38
SECRET 8329

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06083 010903Z

21
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 180-00 /031 W

114823

R 010529Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8124
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 6083

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI AND LEBANESE POWS

REF: PARA 2, BEIRUT 5986

1. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION THIS AFTERNOON MAY 31 WITH FONMIN NAFFAH I RAISED QUESTION OF ISRAELI POWS. HE IMMEDIATELY INQUIRED WHETHER I HAD ANY NEWS RE 13 LEBANESE CIVILIANS HELD AS HOSTAGES IN ISRAEL. I TOLD HIM OF LINE TAKEN BY DIB. HE SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO QUESTION OF RELEASING ISRAELI POWS UNTIL HOSTAGES KIDNAPPED IN LEBANON BY REGULAR ISRAELI TROOPS WERE RELEASED. HE WAS RELATIVELY RELAXED, STATING "WE'LL LET THEM FEED 13 WHILE WE FEED 2."

2. IF ISRAELIS WANT THEIR TWO PILOTS BACK, I THINK IT IS HIGH TIME THEY GIVE SOME INDICATION OF THEIR INTENTIONS RE THE 13 CIVILIANS WHO, AS FAR AS WE CAN GATHER, BORE NO REPEAT NO RELATIONSHIP TO FEDAYEEN TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES. GODLEY

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Department of State
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
TELEGRAM

'74 MAY 32 PM 4:38

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06080 010749Z

12
ACTION 8S-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

114037

P 010532Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8:27
INFO USUN PRIORITY 2626

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 6080

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, SREF, UNRWA, XF
SUBJECT: UNRWA FINANCING

REF: STATE 111708

1. SIR JOHN RENNIE CONFIRMS MAY 30 THAT HE HAS SENT OUT LETTERS TO ARAB HOST GOVERNMENTS ALERTING THEM TO UNRWA'S INABILITY TO CONTINUE SERVICES AT CURRENT LEVEL PAST JULY 1ST (FOR RATIONS OF FLOUR) AND START OF NEXT SCHOOL YEAR FOR PREPARATORY CYCLE. SUCH ACTION WILL PROVIDE SAVING OF SOME 7.5 MILLION DOLLARS, AS REPORTED BEIRUT 5804 OUT OF EXPECTED 10.5 MILLION DEFICIT.

2. SIR JOHN STATES FORMULA SUGGESTED BY PRIMIN SOLH TO ARAFAT AND APPROVED BY PRIMIN AND PRESIDENCY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO WEST BANK AND GAZA EDUCATION IS SATISFACTORY WITH UNRWA AND IT WOULD MEAN ABOUT 10 MILLION DOLLARS IF REPEAT IF ARAB GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO MAKE SUCH CONTRIBUTION. THIS WOULD SOLVE 1974 DEFICIT. SIR JOHN INDICATES HE KNOWS ARAFAT SENT TELEGRAMS TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS FOLLOWING HIS TALK WITH PRIMIN ABOUT UNRWA AND HE UNDERSTANDS PRIMIN RAISED MATTER WHILE ON THIS TRIP. HE HOPES LEARN MAY 31 RESULTS PRIMIN'S DISCUSSIONS. IF LATTER ARE NEGATIVE LAST RESORT FOR UNRWA IS TO HAVE UNSYG AND GOL PRIMIN MAKE JOINT

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 06080 010749Z

APPROACH TO ARAB GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO WILL BE IN BEIRUT FOR ECONOMIC COUNCIL WEST ASIA MEETING ON JUNE 3.

3. SIR JOHN SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE US COPY LETTERS TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS FOR HE TOLD LATTER (SYRIANS, JORDANIANS, EGYPTIANS AND LEBANESE) THAT HE WAS NOT DISTRIBUTING LETTER FRUTHER AND WISHED MAINTAIN THAT POSITION. SUBSTANCE OF LETTER ALREADY REPRTED (CUTS IN FLOUR RATION AND PREPARATORY EDUCATION) AND SIR JOHN HAD PUT IT IN HIS REPRT TO UNGA LAST FALL. HE MERELY INFORMED HOST GOVERNMENT THAT DECISIONS NOTED PARA 1 ABOVE HAD TO BE TAKEN SINCE ALL HIS EFFORTS TO RAISE ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT HAD FAILED.

4. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER BOUTROS DIB AT NOON MAY 30 CONFIRMED FOREGOING. HE HAD NOT REPEAT NOT YET LEARNED OF RESULTS PRIMINIS CONVERSATIONS.

5. SIR JOHN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT POSSIBLE USG EXTRA CONTRIBUTION AND WE REPLIED IN NEGATIVE.

6. HELD ABOVE DRAFTED MAY 30 TO DETERMINE OUTCOME PRIMINIS DEMARCHES GULF STATES RE UNRWA. LATTER RETURNED EVENING MAY 30. FOREIGN MINISTER INFORMED ME TODAY (MAY 31) THAT PRIMIN NEVER RAISED UNRWA FINANCIAL SUPPRT DURING HIS TOUR. NAFFAH ALLEGED MATTER HAD ALREADY BEEN UNSUCCESSFULLY RAISED WITH SAUDIS AND OTHERS -- QUESTION HIS VERACITY. GODLEY

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05944 291209Z

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O 091131 MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8059
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USYNT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5944

EXDIS

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. CONSIDERABLE CONSTERNATION AND CONCERN BEING AROUSED HERE, NOT ONLY IN PALESTINIAN CIRCLES, BY ISRAEL RADIO BROADCAST EARLY MAY 29 IN ARABIC AND OTHER LANGUAGES TO EFFECT THAT USG HAS GIVEN GOI COMMITMENT RE FEDAYEEN, SPECIACALLY INCLUDING HANDLING OF TERRORIST THREAT V. ISRAEL IN PLACE OF COMMITMENT WHICH GOI HAD ASKED OF SARG.

2. GIVEN PAST RECORD OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS WITH FEDAYEEN, HERE AND ELSEWHERE IN AREA, AS WELL AS HEIGHTENED STATE OF TENSION ON EVE OF PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO AND ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY ANNOUNCEMENT BY RADIO ISRAEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD SAY WHATEVER WE CAN, EITHER IN PUBLIC STATEMENT OR IN DISCREET PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE PEOPLE OR BOTH, TO DISPEL IDEA THAT USG ABOUT TO EMBARK ON ANOTHER "WAR ON TERRORISTS" AND TO MAKE CLEAR OUR PREVIOUSLY-STATED POSITION ON NEED TO SATISFY LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT. GODLEY

74 MAY 29 PM 2:57

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TELEGRAM

'74 MAY 24 PM 7:26

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05835 241108Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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O 241010Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8001
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5835

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY.

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANESE FEAR OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION

1. FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFAH CONVOKED ME AT 11 AM THIS MORNING (MAY 24). JUST PRIOR TO THAT EMBOFF GAVE TO DIB INFO- MATION CONTAINED JERUSALEM 1067, DIB MOST APPRECIATIVE AND SAID HE WOULD BRING IT IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION AND THAT PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION IF I WERE TO DISCUSS IT WITH NAFFAH.

2. AS ANTICIPATED, NAFFAH'S REASON FOR CONVOKING ME WAS TO MAKE SAME POINTS CONTAINED BEIRUT'S 5777. I QUERIED HIM RE SOURCE OF INFORMATION RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM EGYPTIAN MINISTER WHO HAD SEEN A TELEGRAM FROM THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY PARIS. LATTER REPORTED THAT IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH A FRENCH OFFICIAL, ISRAELI OFFICIAL HAD RAISED "ON A PERSONAL BASIS" THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF A PORTION OF SOUTHERN LEBANON. NAFFAH ALSO STATED THAT ANOTHER ARAB OFFICIAL (NOT IDENTIFIED) HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ABOUT THIS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05835 241108Z

3. COINCIDENTALLY I RECEIVED THIS MORNING AN OFFICIAL-
INFORMAL SECRET NODIS LETTER FROM A DEPARTMENT OFFICER
INDICATING THAT ON MAY 15 AN ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICER
IN A GENERAL CONVERSATION, STRESSING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING
PERSONALLY, STATED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD OCCUPY A STRIP
OF TERRITORY TWENTY MILES IN DEPTH ALONG THE LEBANESE-
ISRAELI BORDER AND CREATE A BUFFER ZONE. THIS, SAID
THE ISRAELI, WOULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE CROSS-BORDER
FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS. DEPARTMENT OFFICER HIT HIM HARD,
POINTING OUT DISASTROUS RESULTS, ETC.

4. I DREW UPON JERUSALEM'S 1067 IN RESPONDING TO NAFFAH'S
INQUIRY. HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE AND OF COURSE TOOK
CREDIT FOR GOL'S POSITION OF NOT REPEAT NOT GOING TO
SECURITY COUNCIL. HE THEN, HOWEVER, ELABORATED AT SOME
LENGTH ON THE CONTINUATION OF ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST
LEBANON, WHICH NOW APPEAR TO BE ALMOST DAILY AND
CANNOT REPEAT NOT BE DESCRIBED AS REPRISALS FOR
QIRYAT SHEMONA OR MA'ALOT. HE ALLEGED THAT DAILY
ARTILLERY OR MORTAR ATTACKS AGAINST SOUTHERN LEBANON
VILLAGES AND NAVAL ATTACKS AGAINST TYRE REGION AND
BOMBINGS WERE INCITING LEBANESE PUBLIC EMOTION. ALL
THAT LEBANON COULD DO WOULD BE TO GO TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL AND HE REALIZED THIS WAS FRUITLESS, COMPLICATING
SECRETARY'S EFFORTS, ETC., BUT HE WAS UNDER CONSIDERABLE
PRESSURE TO DO SO.

5. I EMPHASIZED GIST OF PARA D OF JERUSALEM'S 1067.
HE IMPLORER, HOWEVER, THAT ANOTHER INDICATION BE MADE
TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT WE SUPPORT LEBANESE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO
CONTINUED ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST LEBANON,
AS DISTINCT FROM REPRISALS.

6. ELABORATING ON FOREGOING, NAFFAH STRESSED CRITICALITY
OF PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SYRIAN/ISRAELI DIS-
ENGAGEMENT. HE SAID HE HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE AT RECENT
ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO. 1:50
HE SPOKE IN GREAT DETAIL WITH HIS EGYPTIAN COUNTERPART
WHO SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALREADY BEEN IN
TOUCH WITH SYRIANS AND JORDANIANS IN EFFORT TO

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 05835 241108Z

REDUCE FEDAYEEN TERRORISM. NAFFAH DID NOT SPEAK DIRECTLY TO SYRIANS, AS THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER WAS NOT THERE. EGYPTIAN, HOWEVER, TOLD HIM THAT SYRIA PROMISED TO CONTROL SAIQAIGA AND HAVE SAIQA SUPPORT VARAFAT, WHO HAD RECENTLY VISITED BOTH DAMASCUS AND CAIRO, IN EFFORT TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN IMMODERATES. NAFFAH EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT SOME SUCH COORDINATING ACTION COULD BE TAKEN AFTER DISENGAGEMENT BUT THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORY BE STOPPED. NAFFAH ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE "DISCREET" DISCUSSIONS GOING ON WITH IRAQIS -- HE WOULD NOT DESCRIBE FURTHER -- RE OBTAINING IRAQI COOPERATION IN THIS EFFORT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT NONE OF HIS FRIENDS BELIEVED THAT ANY LIBYAN HELP TO THIS END MIGHT BE OBTAINED.

7. AS I WAS DEPARTING, NAFFAH TOLD ME THAT HE AND PRIME MINISTER TAKIEDDINE SOLH DEPARTING TOMORROW TO VISIT KUWAIT, ABU DHABI AND BAHRAIN INTER ALIA TO DISCUSS FOREGOING AND SEE IF AT LEAST MORAL SUPPORT OF THESE THREE SMALL GULF STATES COULD BE OBTAINED. HE WILL BE RETURNING NEXT THURSDAY OR FRIDAY MAY 30 OR 31.

8. COMMENT: AS SEEN FROM BEIRUT IT WOULD APPEAR PARIS AND WASHINGTON PERSONAL INITIATIVES BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS WERE NOT QUITE AS PERSONAL AS THEY WERE DESCRIBED. I WOULD THEREFORE HOPE THAT SECRETARY IN A DISCUSSION WITH ISRAELIS MIGHT ONCE AGAIN RAISE THE POINT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND OUR BELIEF THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS SHOULD BE CURTAILED. GODLEY

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Department of State
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'74 MAY 23 AM 8:41

SECRET 7209

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05777 230708Z

21
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O R 230635Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7972
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5777

EXDIS

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANESE FEAR OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION

REF: BEIRUT 5740

1. LATE LAST NIGHT (MAY 22) FOLLOWING MEETING GOL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY (DIB) ASKED SEE EMBOFF URGENTLY. DIB, SPEAKING ON BEHALF PRESIDENT FRANGIE, SAID LEBANESE FONMIN NAFFA HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MEETING ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE COUNCIL IN CAIRO. WHILE THERE HE HAD BEEN WARNED BY CERTAIN OTHER ARAB OFFICIALS, AND IN ESPECIALLY STRONG TERMS BY EGYPTIAN MINISTER INFORMATION, THAT ISRAELI INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF SOUTH LEBANON IS IMMINENT. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO EGYPT SENT TELEGRAM MAY 22 WITH ESSENTIALLY SAME WARNING.

2. NAFFA ALSO REPORTED TO FRANGIE THAT STRONG INTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE IS BUILDING UP FOR CALLING SC MEETING, EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE. PRESSURE STEMS FROM CONTINUING ISRAELI ATTACKS AND FEAR

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05777 230708Z

THEY PRESAGE EVEN MORE CARNAGE AND POSSIBLE OCCUPATION.

3. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NAFFA REQUESTED FRANGIE REOPEN QUESTION OF REQUESTING SC MEETING. DIB SAID FRANGIE REFUSED DO SO, ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT RECOGNIZES MARKED INCREASE IN TENSION IN LEBANON AS RESULT CONTINUING ISRAELI ATTACKS. FRANGIE TOLD NAFFA HE THOUGH HIS FEARS WERE EXAGGERATED, SAID GOL WOULD CONTINUE COURSE WHICH HAD OBTAINED APPROVAL OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND WOULD NOT RISK COMPLICATING SECRETARY'S MISSION AT THIS CRUCIAL STAGE.

4. DIB SAID FRANGIE HAD ALSO ASKED HIM, DIB, CONTACT EMBASSY IN ORDER EXPLAIN ABOVE SITUATION AND ASK THAT IT BE DRAWN TO ATTENTION OF SECRETARY KISSINGER. IF, CONTRARY TO EXPECTATIONS, ISRAEL SHOULD BE RASH ENOUGH TO OCCUPY PART OF SOUTH LEBANON, EVEN TEMPORARILY, FRANGIE FEARS IT WOULD PROVOKE VERY NEGATIVE REACTION FROM OTHER ARAB STATES AND COULD JEOPARDIZE SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS CREATING VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR GOL AND EXCITING STILL MORE RABID PALESTINIAN HOSTILITY.

5. COMMENT: WE UNABLE ASSESS FROM HERE JUST HOW FAR ISRAEL MIGHT GO WITH ITS PRESENT CAMPAIGN OF STRIKING AT TARGETS IN LEBANON IN EFFORT KILL FEDAYEEN BUT WITH INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION TO LEBANESE AND NON-FEDAYEEN PALESTINIANS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, ISRAELI EFFORTS ALREADY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE (SEE REFTEL). IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S MESSAGE, BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO RAISE RIGHT AWAY WITH GOL QUESTION OF THEIR INTENTIONS WHERE LEBANON CONCERNED. REPLY IF POSSIBLE IN NAME OF SECRETARY WHICH CAN BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE SOONEST WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
GODLEY

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WHITE HOUSE
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'74 MAY 20 AM 8 16
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 7547

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05627 181234Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

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O 181024Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7900
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 5627

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: GOL DECISION NOT TO CALL SC MEETING

REF: JERUSALEM 949

1. GIST OF EXTREMELY HELPFUL REFTTEL PASSED EARLY THIS MORNING TO PRESIDENCY AND AM CONFIRMING IT BY A PERSONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT. AM ALSO SENDING COPY OF MY LETTER TO PRESIDENT TO NAFFAH WHO WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECISION MORNING MAY 17.

2. LAST NIGHT NAFFAH TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY THAT HIS TASK YESTERDAY MORNING GREATLY FACILITATED BY COMPREHENSION SECRETARY PERSONALLY SHOWED DURING LAST SC MEETING OF LEBANESE PROBLEMS. CABINET'S DECISION NOT TO SEEK SPECIAL SC MEETING ALSO REFLECTS THE GREAT ADMIRATION OF AND DESIRE TO SUPPORT SECRETARY'S CURRENT REMARKABLE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN REGION.

3. NAFFAH ALSO INDICATED THAT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS NOTED THAT ISRAELI RETALIATION WHILE BRUTAL AND DEVASTATING

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FORM DS-1652

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05627 181234Z

NEVERTHELESS WAS AIMED AT FEDAYEEN LOCATIONS AND MASSACRE OF LEBANESE AT SIDON APPARENTLY UNFORGIVABLE PILOT ERROR, GODLEY

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION
TELEGRAM

'74 MAY 20 AM 8:15

CONFIDENTIAL 7047

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05623 180900Z

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSO=00 /031 W

----- 076492

O 180725Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7898

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 5623

EXDIS

S/S FOR ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: EAID, SREF, UNRWA, XF
SUBJECT: UNRWA FINANCES

REF: STATE 104361

SIR JOHN INFORMS US HE HAS LETTERS IN FINAL FORM,
TRANSLATED INTO ARABIC, BUT HAS NOT YET DELIVERED
THEM DUE TO PREOCCUPATION WITH DESTRUCTION IN UNRWA
CAMPS, PARTICULARLY NABATIYEH WHERE 60 PER CENT OF
ALL STRUCTURES DESTROYED AND 20 PET CENT DAMAGED. HE
WILL NOT SEND LETTERS UNTIL MIDDLE NEXT WEEK (MAY 22 OR
23). IN ORDER AWAIT WHATEVER IDEAS USG MAY HAVE.

HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT GET GRAVITY OF
SITUATION BEFORE ARAB AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS SOME
DAYS BEFORE VISIT OF SYG SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 3. HE
HOPES HAVE ARAB LEAGUE SEC GEN MAHMOUD RIAH HERE AT
SAME TIME AS WALDHEIM IN ORDER MAXIMIZE CHANCES OF
POSITIVE ARAB REACTION TO FINAL APPEAL BEFORE DECISION
MUST BE MADE ON SERVICE REDUCTIONS.
GODLEY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'74 MAY 17 PM 9:37

SECRET 4827

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05616 171614Z

53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
----- 061481

P 171446Z MZY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 7894

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5616

EXDIS

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, IS
SUBJECT: PLO VIEW ON RECENT EVENTS

SUMMARY. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF ON SOCIAL OCCASION EVENING MAY 16 PLO REP FOR LEBANON CHAFIC AL HUT MADE SOME INTERESTING COMMENTS ABOUT CURRENT STATE OF PLAY IN PLO, ON MAALOT TRAGEDY AND ON ISRAELI AIR STRIKES ON REFUGEE CAMPS. MAIN THRUST OF AL HUT REMARKS WAS THAT 'ARAFAT AND MOST FEDAYEEN LEADERS, INCLUDING HAWATMEH, STILL FAVOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT PROVIDED THERE IS ADE- QUATE BENEFIT FOR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE; NOTHING RE PALESTINIAN CAUSE CAN REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO ADVANCE UNTIL SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT CONCLUDED; AND THAT 'ARAFAT STILL HOPING FOR USG SUPPORT OF CONCEPT OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" IN WEST BANK AND GAZA. END SUMMARY.

1. EVENING OF MAY 16 EMBOFF ENCOUNTERED PLO REP TO LEBANON CHAFIC AL HUT AT SOCIAL OCCASION AT HOME OF EMBASSY LOCAL EMPLOYEE. AL HUT HAS HAD SPORADIC CON- TACTS WITH MEMBERS THIS EMBASSY OVER PAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS AND IS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO 'ARAFAT.

2. ASKED ABOUT ATTITUDE OF NAYEF HAWATMEH AND PDPLP

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05616 171614Z

FOLLOWING MAALOT TRAGEDY AND HAWATMEH'S MAY 16 PRESS CONFERENCE CRITICIZING SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PRESENT MISSION, AL HUT SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN OPPOSED TO MAALOT OPERATION AND WAS PREPARING WRITE ARTICLE CRITICAL OF IT WHEN HE WAS TOLD PDPP RATHER THAN PFLP/GC OR PFLP/BEHIND IT AND THAT FOR REASONS FATAH/PDFLP SOLIDARITY HE SHOULD REMAIN SILENT. AL HUT SAID THAT WHILE HE REMAINS OPPOSED TO USE OF INNOCENT PEOPLE AS HOSTAGES AND INDISCRIMINATE USE OF VIOLENCE, IT NEVERTHELESS A FACT THAT HAWATMEH'S POSITION INSIDE PLO HAD BECOME VERY MUCH STRONGER AS RESULT OF MAALOT. PRIOR TO MAALOT, HAWATMEH HAD BEEN IN CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE AND HAD LOST MOST INFLUENCE BECAUSE OF HIS SUPPORTING 'ARAFAT ON IDEA OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" AND BECUASE OF INTERVIEW HE HAD PUBLISHED IN ISRAELI PRESS. HAWATMEH HAD REACTED, AFTER KIRYAT SHEMONA, IN ONLY WAY HE SAW WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND AND HAD SUCCEEDED IN SO DOING. NOW HE CAN IMPOSE HIS VIEWPOINT TO GREATER DEGREE THAN BEFORE ON THOSE WHO DISAGREE.

3. AL HUT SAID THAT HE AND 'ARAFAT CONVINCED THAT DESPITE ANYTHING SAID PUBLICLY, HAWATMEH REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO POLITICAL SOLUTION PROVIDED THERE IS PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AND IT LEADS TO ESTABLISHMENT PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY". HAWATMEH'S CRITICISMS OF KISSINGER MEANT TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF USG INDICATING THAT IT COULD SUPPORT THESE IDEAS, AND NOT DECIDING ADOPT KING HUSSEIN'S PROPOSAL FOR FEDERATION.

4. EMBOFF SAID THAT SO FAR AS HE KNEW USG HAS NOT ADOPTED ANYONE'S PROPOSALS RE SOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM BUT WE HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, AND MEAN, HAT WE UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVIN SATISFACTORILY PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IF THERE IS TO BE ANY REAL HOPE FOR LASTING MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE ASKED AL HUT IF AND WHEN PALESTINIANS AND KEY ARAB GOVTS. INCLUDING JORDANIAN, EGYPTIAN, ETC., WOULD BE ABLE REACH AGREEMENT AMONG SELVES ON APPROACH TO PROBLEM. AL HUT SAID THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE AFTER SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BUT NOT BEFORE.

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5. AL HUT SEEMED RELATIVELY CALM IN DISCUSSING ISRAELI AIR ATTACK ON REFUGEE CAMPS AND SOME FEDAYEEN BUILDINGS SAYING PALESTINIANS ACCUSTOMED TO THIS SORT OF SACRIFICE. HE COMMENTED THAT ACTUAL FEDAYEEN CASUALTIES LIGHT SINCE THEY MOVED OUT OF USUAL HAUNTS AS MATTER OF HABIT. PAST PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB REACTION TO ISRAELI BOMBING OF REFUGEE CAMPS HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ONE OF GREATER CAUTION BUT GREATER DETERMINATION PRESS AHEAD.

6. COMMENT: AL HUT'S REMARKS WERE GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH VIEW HE HAS EXPRESSED IN PAST AND WHAT ELSE WE KNOW OF HIS CURRENT THINKING. (HE HAS DEFENDED 'ARFAT'S VIEW ON GENEVA PARTICIPATION, "NATIONAL AUTHORITY", ETC. IN NUMBER OF STORMY DEBATES OVER PAST FEW MONTHS.)
GODLEY

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 2846

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05445 131720Z

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

002159

74 MAY 14 AM 8:27

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 031537Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7809
DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USINT DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

SECRET BEIRUT 5445

EXDIS

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, LE, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN SAMIS REMOVED FROM LEBANON

REF: TEL AVIV DAD 1048 MAY 1974

1. IN DISCUSSION WITH RELIABLE SENIOR LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER ON MAY 11, LATTER VOLUNTEERED TO EMBOFF STATEMENT THAT SYRIA HAD REMOVED SOME MISSILE BATTERIES FROM AREAS INSIDE LEBANON BUT NEAR SYRIAN BORDER ABOUT MAY 7. QUERIED AS TO DETAILS ABOUT MISSILES AND THEIR SITES, SOURCE REVEALED THAT ARMY ACTUALLY HAD LITTLE HARD INFO OTHER THAN GENERAL LOCATION (WHICH FITS COORDINATES GIVEN REFTTEL). HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR PERSUADING PRESIDENT ASSAD TO REMOVE MISSILES.

2. IN LATER CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S SON, MINISTER OF PTT TONY FRANGIE, LATTER TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE FIRST BECAME AWARE OF PRESENCE SYRIAN MISSILES IN LEBANON ON APRIL 30, WHEN TOLD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE BY FONMIN NAFFA (WHO HAD APPARENTLY

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05445 131720Z

BEEN INFORMED OF MISSILES WHILE IN WASHINGTON). ACCORDING TO TONY FRANGIE, NAFFA, ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT, HAD BEEN ABLE PERSUADE SYRIANS REMOVE MISSILES. TONY'S EXPLANATION FOR THIS WAS SYRIAN BELIEF THAT DISENGAGEMENT WAS GOING TO BE ACHIEVED, THEREFORE MINIMAL PROTECTION WHICH THESE SAM'S AFFORDED AGAINST ISRAELI AIRCRAFT OVERFLYING LEBANON TO HIT SYRIAN TARGETS COULD BE SPARED IN INTEREST AVOIDING PROBLEMS IN SYRIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS. TONY ADDED THAT IAF ATTACKS ON MISSILE SITES DURING EARLY MARCH MAY HAVE HELPED SARG REACH THIS DECISION.
GODLEY

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SECRET 3977

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05094 301826Z

72
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 115893

R 301523Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7639
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
INFO USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5094

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, UNGA, EGEN, CB, TS
SUBJECT: GKR PROGRAM OF CONTACTS
REFS: TUNIS 2512; PHNOM PENH 5380

1. REGRET DELAY IN REPLY BUT OUR BEST CONTACT IN FONOFFICE WISHED AWAIT RETURN OF FONMIN FROM UN BEFORE GIVING US OPINION ON IMPROVEMENT GKR DIPLOMATIC POSITION. WE HAVE NOW BEEN INFORMED ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT GOL WOULD RECEIVE RELIGIOUS-ORIENTED DELEGATION MENTIONED REPTTEL, PROVIDED THAT VISIT IS MADE "DISCREETLY" (I.E., WITHOUT COMMUNIQUESEN PUBLICITY, ETC.).

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2. HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION OF QUESTION GKR REPRESENTATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCED, POSITION OF GOL IS AFFECTED BY FORMAL POSITION TAKEN BY ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, AS WELL AS BY GOL DESIRE NOT GET TOO FAR OUT OF STEP WITH ARAB LEAGUE AND OTHER ARAB GOVTS., PARTICULARLY SYRIA, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. BEST GOL HAS BEEN ABLE DO UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAS BEEN TO REMAIN NEUTRAL (I.E., ABSTAIN OR BE ABSENT) ON QUESTION GKR CONTEST WITH GRUNK FOR REPRESENTATION. WHILE INFORMING US THAT GOL WOULD RECEIVE CHAM DEL, OUR CONTACT IN FONOFFICE RECALLED TO EMBOFF THAT PAST GOL POSITION STILL STANDS.

3. WE DOUBT THAT DELEGATION VISIT HERE CAN ACHIEVE CHANGE IN GOL POSITION. IT COULD, HOWEVER, SERVE PURPOSE OF BUILDING SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR GKR POSITION WHICH WOULD AT LEAST KEEP GOL FIRMLY IN ABSTENTION/ABSENT COLUMN DESPITE PRESSURES FROM OTHER ARABS, USSR, ETC. GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

74 APR 29 AM 9:05

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04979 271200Z

53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

/031 W

090056

P R 271125Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7589
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY GENEVA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT BAGHDAD
USINT DAMASCUS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4979

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, XF
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN TERRORISM AND ME PEACE EFFORTS

REF: TEL AVIV 2470

1. WE APPRECIATE TEL AVIV'S CONCERN AND BELIEVE GOL FULLY AWARE IMPLICATIONS FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ACROSS BORDER THIS JUNCTURE. CONSEQUENTLY, ALTHOUGH GOL NOT "LEANING ON" FEDAYEEN IN SENSE OF THREATENING CONFRONTATION, GOL HAS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, INCREASED FREQUENCY AND NUMBER OF ARMY PATROLS IN SOUTH AND HAS ALSO HAD MEETINGS WITH

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04979 271200Z

PLD LEADERS IN EFFORT MINIMIZE RISK CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS.

2. WE FEAR THAT DEMARCHE TO GOL ALONG LINES SUGGESTED REFTEL COULD POSSIBLY PROVE COUNTER-EFFECTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS LEAKY AS A SIEVE, AND WE HAVE HAD FREQUENT OCCASION TO FIND

ACCURATE REPORTS OF OUR PAST DEMARCHES TO GOL PRINTED NEXT MORNING IN PRO-FEDAYEEN DAILY AL MUHARRIR. STRIKES US THAT NEWS OF ANY US DEMARCHE TO GOL RE NEED TO DISCOURAGE FEDAYEEN TERRORISM WOULD BE LIKELY TO GAIN SIMILAR CURRENCY, THEREBY ENHANCING FEDAYEEN ENTHUSIASM GENERATED BY KIRYAT SHEMONA INCIDENT AND ENCOURAGING THEM TO MOUNT FURTHER "SPOILING" OPERATIONS. IN SUCH CASE, EFFECT WOULD BE TOTALLY OPPOSITE TO WHAT WE HAD INTENDED.

3. NOTWITHSTANDING OUR VIEWS SET FORTH ABOVE RE "DEMARCHE", EMBASSY TEL AVIV AND DEPARTMENT MAY REST ASSURED THAT DURING ALL MY CALLS ON LEADING LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AND POLITICANS PLUS ARAB DIPLOMATS (I'M ABOUT THREE QUARTERS DOWN THE LIST) I HAVE MADE AS FORCEFULLY AS POSSIBLE MY VIEWS RE DISASTROUS EFFECTS OF ANY FURTHER FEDAYEEN-INSPIRED ACTIONS SUCH AS KIRYAT SHMONA. EVERY MAN I HAVE SEEN, EXCEPT LIBYAN AMBASSADOR, HAS CONCURRED WITH MY VIEWS BUT ALL HAVE POINTED OUT INABILITY OF ARAFAT AND OTHER MODERATE PLO LEADERS TO CONTROL THEIR LUNATIC FRINGE. GODLEY

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WHITE HOUSE
OPERATIONS ROOM

TELEGRAM

'74 APR 6 AM 9.41

SECRET 1581

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04023 01 OF 02 052245Z

73
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W ----- 109475

R 051604Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7261D
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 04023

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IR, LE, US
SUBJECT: LEADER GRANTEE IMAM MUSA AS SADR

REF: TEHRAN 4023

SUMMARY: WE ARE AWARE OF POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM INVITATION EXTENDED FOR IMAM MUSA SADR TO VISIT UNITED STATES. THESE COMPLICATIONS RELATE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH GOL AS WELL THOSE RAISED REFTEL. WHEN INVITATION EXTENDED, IMAM'S RELATIONS WITH GOL AND, WE UNDERSTAND, WITH IRAN WERE QUITE GOOD. SUBSEQUENTLY, PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN IN HIS RELATIONS WITH BOTH GOL AND GOI. NEVERTHELESS, FOR REASONS SET FORTH IN BEIRUT 3449 (POUCHED TEHRAN) AND AIRGRAM A-65 (POUCHED TEHRAN), I BELIEVE INVITATION REMAINS GOOD IDEA AND SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE CANCELLED. PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS INFORMALLY CONCURRED IN THIS VIEW AND I HAVE EXPLAINED OUR REASONING TO IRANIAN AMBASSADOR HERE. END SUMMARY.

1. INVITATION TO IMAM WAS EXTENDED LAST SUMMER AFTER HIS STAUNCH SUPPORT OF GIL DURING TROUBLES WITH FEDAYEEN IN MAY-JUNE. AT THAT TIME WE WERE RELIABLY TOLD THAT IMAN WAS ON GOOD TERMS WITH GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, SO GOOD IN FACT THAT GOI PLANNED SPEND SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS.

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TO ASSIST IMAM BUILD HOSPITAL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHICH WOULD HAVE BENEFITTED SHI'ITE MAJORITY IN THAT REGION. DUE PRIMARILY TO HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL AND CONFESSIONAL CONFLICT WITH LEBANESE SHI'A LEADER KAMEL ASSAD, PRESIDNET OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND TO SHARP INCREASE IN LEVEL OF DISCONTENT ON PART OF LEBANON'S SHI'A POPULATION WITH GOL (AND ASSAD) AS RESULT OF CONTINUING ABYSMAL GOL NEGLECT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS IN THIS COUNTRY'S MOST UNDERPRIVILEGED REGIONS (INHABITED LARGELY BY SHI'IAS), IMAM HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CRITICAL OF FRANGIE REGIME -- TO POINT WHERE HE IS NOW MOUNTING UNPRECEDENTEDLY VOCIFEROUS CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF SHI'ITE DEMANS FOR PROGRESS AND REFORMS IN SOUTH LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE IN COUNTRY. THIS CAMPAIGN -- WHICH UNLIKE MOST OTHER LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL MOVEMENTS HAS ITS ROOTS ALMOST ENTIRELY WITHIN LEBANON -- HAS GALVANIZED CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT AMONG IMAM'S SHI'A FOLLOWERS AND LEBANESE PUBLIC AT LARGE. IT HAS ALSO ESTABLISHED STRONG POSITION FOR IMAM FROM WHICH HE CAN BE EXPECTED EXERT CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE -- FOR GOOD OR ILL -- ON LEBANON'S FUTURE POLITICAL EVOLUTION. IMAM'S POTENTIAL AS LEADER IN SOUTH LEBANON ORIGINALLY PROMPTED OUR INVITATION TO HIM TO VISIT US AS LEADER GRANTEE. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE CONSIDERABLY INCREASED THIS POTENTIAL.

2. IMAM'S RELATIONS WITH LEBANESE LEFTIST GROUPING (ESPECIALLY SUCH EXTERNALLY-SUPPORTED MOVEMENTS AS COMMUNISTS AND BAATHISTS) ARE CONDITIONED BY HIS AWARENESS THAT FOR SEVERAL YEARS THEY HAVE BEEN MAKING CONCERTED -- AND INCREASINGLY SUCCESSFUL -- EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH POLITICAL BASES AMONG DISGRUNTLED SHI'A "MASSES" IN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN LEBANON. DESPITE THESE RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IMAM'S KNOWN CONNECTIONS WITH SYRIA'S ALAWITE LEADERSHIP AND (LATELY) IRAQI BAATH, NEITHER WE NOR GOL HAVE WRITTEN HIM OFF AS IRREVOCABLY ALLIED TO THE IRAQIS OR AS AN UNCONSTRUCTIVE FORCE ON ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE. AS REPORTED OUR 3449, PRESIDENT FRANGIE RECENTLY INFORMED US OF HIS UNDERSTANDING AND APPROVAL OF OUR REASONS FOR EXTENDING OFFICIAL INVITATION TO IMAM, AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT FRANGIE HAS BEGUN SEARCHING FOR WAYS IN WHICH

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TO SATISFY SOME OF IMAM'S (AND SOUTH LEBANON'S) DEMANDS AND THEREBY RECONCILE HIM WITH GOL.

3. IRANIAN EMBASSY COUNSELOR CALLED ON DCM APRIL 3 AND INFORMED HIM RE GOI'S MISGIVINGS OVER US INVITATION TO IMAM. DCM EXPLAINED ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS ON WHICH OUR INVITATION IS BASED. IN SO DOING, DCM POINTED OUT THAT IMAM'S PAST FAILURE TO OBTAIN GOL'S ATTENTION TO SOUTH LEBANON'S ACUTE PROBLEMS HAS OBLIGED HIM MOUNT PUBLIC CAMPAIGN OF CRITICISM AGAINST GOL AND SEEK SUPPORT FROM WIDE RANGE OF ALLIES (INCLUDING DOMESTIC AND EXTERNAL LEFTIST GROUPINS) TO LEND IMPETUS TO SHI'ITE DEMANDS. IRANIAN OFFICIALS HERE HAVE NOT DISAGREED WITH THIS ESTIMATE.

4. THIS MORNING I MADE MY FORMAL INITIAL CALL ON IRANIAN AMBASSADOR GHADAR (MEETING HAD BEEN REQUESTED SOME TEN DAYS AGO). AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF AMENITIES I REFERRED TO HIS COUNSELOR'S CALL ON MY DCM RE IMAM'S VISIT. GHADAR SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH ME VERY FRANKLY ON A MOST "PERSONAL" BASIS AND WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW IMAM'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND WHY SHAH "HATED" IMAM. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR GHADAR, FORMER IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF BAKHTIAR WAS PAYING IMAM MONTHLY STIPED OF 500 LEBANESE POUNDS WHILE BAKHTIAR WAS STILL WITH IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE. WHEN BAKHTIAR DEPARTED TEHRAN FOR BAGHDAD AND ESTABLISHED ANTI-IRANIAN OPERATIONS THERE THIS STIPEND CONTINUED. BAKHTIAR, ACCORDING TO GHADAR, WAS NOT LEFTIST, DID NOT SUPPORT IRAQI BAATH AND WAS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO SHAH DUE TO SHAH'S LIBERAL APPROACH TO IRANIAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS. GHADAR CONTINUED THAT BAKHTIAR'S ACTIVITIES BECAME TOO ANNOYING AND HE WAS MURDERED BY IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. HIS MOVEMENT WAS THEN TAKEN OVER BY KHOMEINY, A SHI'A IRANIAN MUSLIM WHOM GHADAR DESCRIBED AS ULTRA-RIGHT WING. KHOMEINY CONTINUED SUBSIDIZE IMAM. NOTWITHSTANDING FOREGOING, IRAN DESIRED HELP SHI'AS AND LAST YEAR PROPOSED BUILD HOSPITAL FOR THEM INSOUTH LEBANON. IMAM OF COURSE HEARTILY APPROVED BUT SAID HOSPITAL HAD TO BE NAMED AFTER HIM AND ALL FUNDS FUNNELLED THROUGH HIM. GOI REFUSED THESE CONDITIONS, STATING IT DESIRED WORK THROUGH A COMMITTEE OF RESPONSIBLE SHI'AS AND THAT

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 1593

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73

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W ----- 108842

R 051604Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7262
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 04023

EXDIS

HOSPITAL SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOR BEAR IMAM'S NAME, FACED WITH THIS IMPASSE GOI WITHDREW HOSPITAL OFFER WHICH, ACCORDING TO GHADAR, IS NOW BEING FOLLOWED UP BY BOTH SOVS AND LIBYANS WHOME HE ALLEGES ARE PREPARED MAKE APPRECIABLE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION.

5. GHADAR APOLOGIZED FOR LENGTH OF BACKGROUND BUT STATED HE WISHED ME TO KNOW IT FOR HE CONSIDERED IMAM DANGEROUSLY AMBITIOUS OPPORTUNIST WHO WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHOMEVER HE THOUGH COULD HELP HIM. IMAM, ACCORDING TO GHADAR, NOW IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH SOV EMBASSY BEIRUT.

6. NOTWITHSTANDING FOREGOING, GHADAR SAID HE HAD RECEIVED MESSAGE THIS MORNING FROM WHAT HE CALLED SHAH'S SECRETARIAT INDICATING THAT GHADAR NEET NOT RAISE IMAM'S VISIT WITH ME. GHADAR TRANSLATED FOR ME TELEGRAM HE SENT TO SHAH'S SECRETARIAT APRIL 3 REPORTING HIS COUNSELOR'S VISIT WITH DCM WHICH ACCURATELY PORTRAYED OUR READONS FOR INVITING IMAM TO THE STATES. IN THIS REPORT GHADAR INQUIRED WHETHER HE SHOULD RAISE MATTER WITH ME. REPLY THAT WAS RECEIVED THIS MORNING, ACCORDING TO GHADAR, SAID HE NEED NOT DO SO. WE NEVERTHELESS DISCUSSED FOREGOING AT LENGTH. I POINTED OUT I COULD NOT CHALLENGE GHADAR'S EVALUATION OF IMAM'S AMBITION OF HIS OPPORTUNISM. PERSONALLY, HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THAT ON BALANCE VISIT TO STATES WAS

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A GOOD RISK AND MIGHT WELL BRING IMAM FIRMLY BACK TO THE MODERATE FOLD, WHICH AFTER ALL WAS BOTH IN GOI AND USG'S INTERESTS. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE WOULD DO UTMOST TO ASSURE THAT IMAM WAS EXPOSED TO SHI'A LEBANESE AMERICANS, AS WELL AS IMPORTANT WASHINGTON OFFICIALS, WHICH EXPOSURE, I BELIEVED, WOULD BE BENEFICIAL. GHADAR, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, CONCURRED.

7. OTHER POINT OF POSSIBLE INTEREST THAT CAME OUT OF DISCUSSION WAS THAT GHADAR SAID HE WAS TIPPED OFF BY CHIEF LEBANESE SECURITY THAT IMAM WAS GOING TO THE UNITED STATES. ALSO IT WAS GHADAR'S BELIEF THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S CURRENTLY BENEVOLENT ATTITUDE RE IMAM AND HIS SHI'A MOVEMENT WAS DUE FRANGIE'S PLEASURE IN SEEING ANOTHER MUSLIM LEBANESE POLITICAL FORCE TO COUNTERBALANCE WHAT UP TO NOW HAS BEEN SUNNI DOMINATION OF LEBANESE MUSLIM COMMUNITY.

8. CONCLUSION: IN VIEW FOREGOING I BELIEVE LEADER GRANT INVITATION TO IMAM SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. WILL MAINTAIN TEHRAN AS INFO ADDRESSEE ON ANY FUTURE MESSAGES THIS MATTER FOR I PERSONALLY DOUBT THAT IMAM WILL BE PROCEEDING STATES THIS FISCAL YEAR. MY HUNCH IS THAT HE WILL NOT WANT DEPART LEBANON UNTIL CLEAR PROGRESS IS REGISTERED RE GOLAN HEIGHTS DISENGAGEMENT. LEST WE LOSE LEADER GRANT FUNDS FOR CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, WE HAVE TOLD IMAM HE MUST DEPART LEBANON PRIOR END OF THIS MONTH OR ELSE SOMETIME DURING NEXT FISCAL YEAR.
GODLEY

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03730 292144Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

015696

R 291618Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7161
INFO USINT DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T BEIRUT 3730

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR SY US
SUBJ: SYRIAN REPORT ON USG WITHDRAWAL POSITION

1. RELIABLE LEBANESE JOURNALIST WITH PROVEN CONTACTS IN SYRIAN MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD EMBOFF MARCH 28 HE HAD HEARD BY PHONE FROM THESE CONTACTS OF REPORT RECEIVED BY SYRIAN FONMIN FROM MOSCOW CONCERNING USG POSITION ON ISRAELI-SYRIAN PROBLEM. REPORT ALLEGED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD TOLD HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTERS THAT EVEN IN CONTEXT OF FINAL SETTLEMENT, ISRAEL COULD NOT BE EXPECTED WITHDRAW FROM HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING KUNEITRA AND WOULD, OF COURSE, CONTINUE HOLD HEIGHTS OVERLOOKING ISRAEL PROPER. THIS WAS REPORTEDLY INTERPRETED BY SYRIANS AS BEING FORMAL POSITION OF USG.

2. EMBOFF SAID WE HAVE NO RPT NO REPORTS OF WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER MAY HAVE SAID DURING MOSCOW TRIP BUT THAT SYRIAN GOVT IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH USG AND THEREFORE NOT DEPENDENT UPON STRANGE DISPATCHES FROM MOSCOW IN ORDER ASCERTAIN USG POSITION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

3. COMMENT: THIS CONVERSATION REPORTED SIMPLY AS INDICATOR OF POSSIBLE TROUBLE-MAKING OR MISUNDERSTANDING

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ON PART OF OFFICIALS WITHIN SYRIAN FOMIN OR SYRIAN EMBASSY MOSCOW OR POSSIBLY SOVIET SOURCES FROM WHOM REPORT ALLEGED USG POSITION MIGHT HAVE ORIGINATED. LEBANESE SOURCE HAS SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE RECORD ON SYRIAN AFFAIRS THAT IT VERY LIKELY HE DID RPT DID RECEIVE REPORT SUCH AS HE DESCRIBED TO EMBOFF. HE ALSO CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN SIMILAR REPORT FILED BY AFP OUT OF MOSCOW.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 4763

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03058 151843Z

64
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

111565

R 151645Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6939
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USINT DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER RAC REVIEW 6/12/2005
By JAS NARA, Date 4/26/2012

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EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS PINT SY IS
SUBJ: SYRIAN MILITARY POSITION

SUMMARY: FOLLOWING REPORT ON SITUATION WITHIN SYRIAN
ARMY PRECEDES RECENT INCREASE IN ACTIVITY ALONG
SYRIAN-ISRAELI CEASE-FIRE LINES. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE
IT IS OF SUBSTANTIAL BACKGROUND VALUE, PARTICULARLY
SINCE SOURCE OF REPORT IS EXTREMELY KNOWLEDGEABLE,
RELIABLE OBSERVER. IN ORDER PROTECT SOURCE, WE
WOULD PREFER THAT REPORT BE HELD CLOSELY WITHIN USG.
END SUMMARY.

1. DURING FOUR-DAY VISIT TO SYRIA END OF FEB, DEP CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR OPERATIONS OF LEBANESE ARMY (COL KANAAN) HAD EXTENSIVE DIS-

74 MAR 16 AM 9:09

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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CUSSIONS WITH SENIOR SYRIAN ARMY COMMANDERS, INCLUDING TOUR OF FRONT-LINE POSITIONS. AMONG THOSE WITH WHOM HE HAD CLOSE CONTACT WERE DEP CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS OF SYRIAN ARMY AND COMMANDER AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF SYRIAN DIVISION WHICH LED ATTACK ON OCT 6. KANAAN HAD KNOWN SEVERAL OF SYRIAN OFFICERS FOR MANY YEARS, AND BELIEVES HE WAS GIVEN HONEST ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION BY MOST (ALTHOUGH NOT ALL) OF THOSE WITH WHOM HE HAD CONTACT.

2. KANAAN WAS STRUCK BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS EXCESSIVE SELF-ASSURANCE, ALMOST COCKINESS, AT ALL LEVELS OF SYRIAN ARMY. THERE WAS NOT SLIGHTEST SIGN OF APPREHENSION AT IDEA OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL. SYRIAN MILITARY COMMANDERS WERE ALL OF OPINION THAT THEY HAD STOOD UP WELL TO IDF AND COULD DO SO AGAIN. THEY NO LONGER INTIMIDATED EITHER BY ISRAELI ARMOR OR AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH THEY DISPLAYED MARKED RESPECT FOR TWO (WHICH SOME SYRIAN OFFICERS HAD RECENTLY OBSERVED AT CLOSE RANGE DURING PRACTICE FIRING IN JORDAN). PRES ASSAD'S PUBLICLY-EXPRESSED REGRET THAT OCT 22 CEASEFIRE DENIED SYRIAN ARMY OPPORTUNITY TO LAUNCH WELL-PLANNED COUNTERATTACK IS ACCURATE REFLECTION OF ATTITUDE ALL SYRIAN OFFICERS WITH WHOM KANAAN HAD CONTACT. THEY EXPECTED COUNTERATTACK WOULD HAVE ENABLED THEM AT MINIMUM TO RETAKE SASSA SALIENT.

3. DESPITE SELF-ASSURANCE OF SYRIAN MILITARY, KANAAN SAID HE OBSERVED NO RPT NO PRESENT DISPOSITION TO OPPOSE PRES ASSAD'S POLICY OF SEEKING DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, AND NO PRESENT DISPOSITION TO RENEW HOSTILITIES. THOSE TO WHOM HE SPOKE SAID THEY HAD ACCEPTED ORDER FOR CEASE-FIRE, ALBEIT RELUCTANTLY, OUT OF OBEDIENCE TO POLITICAL AUTHORITES. KANAAN SAID HE SAW NO RPT NO SPLNES OF DISUNITY AMONG ARMY WHEN IT CAME TO FOLLOW KG ORDERS FROM POLITICAL AUTHORITES, ALTHOUGH MAJOR UNIT COMMANDERS (USUALLY BAATHISTS LOYAL TO ASSAD) MADE BIGGER THING OUT OF THEIR LOYALTY THAN THEIR SUBORDINATES WHO TENDED TO BE MORE PRAGMATIC, LESS PROPAGANDISTIC, AND MORE CAPABLE. ALMOST ALL SENIOR SYRIAN OFFICERS SPOKE OF DISENGAGEMENT WITH ISRAEL, REFERRING TO IT AS "PROBABLE" DEVELOPMENT.

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HOWEVER, KANAAN CAME BACK WITH DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT SYRIAN ARMY WOULD INSIST UPON VISIBLE CONCESSIONS FROM ISRAEL WHICH WOULD SYMBOLIZE WHAT IT REGARDS AS ITS STRATEGIC (I.E., MORAL) VICTORY DURING OCT WAR. IN KANAAN'S OPINION THIS MEANS THAT AT ABSOLUTE MINIMUM SYRIA MUST BE GIVEN BACK SOME--EVEN IF ONLY THIN SLIVER-- OF TERRITORY HELD BY ISRAEL BETWEEN JUN 1967 AND OCT 1973, NOT MERELY TERRITORY TAKEN BY IDF DURING OCT WAR. KANAAN OF OPINION THAT KUNEITRA COULD BE KEY TO DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT RECEIVE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS ABSOLUTE SINE QUA NON IN EYES OF SYRIAN ARMY. BASED ON OBSERVATION OF FRONT AND TALKS WITH SYRIAN OFFICERS, KANAAN OF OPINION THAT TERRAIN FEATURES ALONG 1967 LINE SOUTH OF KUNEITRA WOULD MAKE EVEN MINIMAL IDF PULL-BACK (2-3 KM) VERY DIFFICULT. ONLY FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO IDF REMAINING IN PLACE, WHICH COULD PROVE UNACCEPTABLE TO SYRIANS, WOULD SEEM TO BE IDF PULL-BACK OF 3-4 KM FROM 1967 LINES, SYRIAN PULL-BACK OF 6-8 KM, AND INSTALLATION OF UNEF IN DMZ BETWEEN TWO ARMIES. DESPITE LOYALTY OF ARMY TO POLITICAL AUTHORITIES, KANAAN IS OF OPINION THAT IF ASSAD TRIED ACCEPT DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH ARMY REGARDED AS HUMILIATING, ARMY WOULD CREATE SERIOUS TROUBLE FOR ASSAD AND COULD EVEN TURN TO IRAQUIS IN ORDER TO BLOCK SUCH AGREEMENT. (RE CURRENT EXTEND OF IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN SYRIA, KANAAN SAID HE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT NO RPT NO IRAQI FORCES ARE LOCATED NEAR DAMASCUS OR CEASE-FIRE LINE. HE BELIEVES THAT IF ANY IRAQI TROOPS STILL IN SYRIA, THEY STATIONED CLOSE TO SYRIAN-IRAQI BORDER.)

4. KANAAN SAID THAT DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH SYRIAN OFFICERS, HE HAD BEEN TOLD INNUMERABLE "WAR STORIES," SUM TOTAL OF WHICH INDICATED THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN EXCESSES ON SYRIAN SIDE WHERE IDF PRISONERS CONCERNED, DESPITE ORDERS AGAINST SUCH EXCESSES. HOWEVER, THERE ALSO APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN PROVOCATION IN SOME INSTANCES (E.G., IDF FIRING ON SYRIANS AFTER HAVING APPEARED TO SURRENDER) AND THERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SOME EXCESSES ON ISRAELI SIDE AS WELL. SINGLE MOST EFFECTIVE SYRIAN MILITARY MOVE HAD BEEN

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CAPTURE OF IDF OBSERVATION AND ELECTRONICS POST ON MT HERMON WHICH WAS MAIN POST FOR JAMMING AND LISTENING TO SYRIAN COMMUNICATIONS ALONG ENTIRE FRONT, AS WELL AS MAJOR CENTER FOR IDF COMMUNICATIONS, THIRTY-FIVE PRISONERS REPORTEDLY TAKEN THERE, ALONG WITH VALUABLE EQUIPMENT. AS FOR REST OF BATTLE, SYRIANS

ADMITTED THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOO RIGIDLY BOUND TO ORIGINAL BATTLE PLANS TO EXPLOIT BREAKTHROUGH IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF FRONT, HAD PUSHED FORWARD MORE RAPIDLY THAN EXPECTED THERE AND RAN OUT OF SUPPLIES AND REINFORCEMENTS, AND SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES BY CONTINUING BATTER AWAY WITH LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN SECTORS. SYRIANS ALSO COMMITTED RESERVES TOO EARLY AND HAD NOTHING LEFT EXCEPT IRAQIS WHEN IDF COUNTERATTACK CAME. SYRIAN MILITARY HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED BY FIGHTING QUALITIES OF IDF REGULAR UNITS WHICH THEY ENCOUNTERED DURING INITIAL FIGHTING ON GOLAN BUT LESS IMPRESSED BY RESERVES THEY MET LATER, DESPITE FACT THAT SYRIANS WERE PUSHED BACK (SASSA SALIENT) DURING LATER STAGE OF FIGHTING. SYRIANS ALSO TOLD KANAAN THEIR ORIGINAL ATTACK PLANNING HAD ENVISAGED FLANKING MOVEMENT AGAINST IDF THROUGH SOUTHEASTERN LEBANON BUT THAT THEY HAD DROPPED THIS IDEA BY TIME FINAL PLAN WAS PUT INTO EFFECT OCT 6. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, KANAAN TOLD EMBOFF CATEGORICALLY THAT SYRIAN BATTLE PLANS CONTAINED NO RPT NO OBJECTIVE BEYOND RECAPTURE OF 1967 TERRITORY. HE DID NOT THINK SYRIAN ARMY COULD HAVE GONE INTO ISRAEL PROPER EVEN IF IT HAD DESIRE AND OPPORTUNITY, GIVEN TOTAL LACK OF PLANNING AND SYRIAN INABILITY IMPROVISE.
GODLEY

NOTE BY OCT: BEIRUT 3058 NOT PASSED DIA CINCEUR.

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TELEGRAM



SECRET 319

74 FEB 13 PM 7:08
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01816 131756Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 /031
----- 018226

O 131632Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6468
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1816

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 1727

CHIEF OF STAFF KANAAN INFORMED ME LAST NIGHT THAT GOL,
AS A RESULT OF A MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY HEADED BY
THE PRIME MINISTER, INCREASED ACTIVITY OF ARMY PATROLS
IN SOUTH LEBANON. ARMY HAD ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO
SHOOT IF FEDAYEEN PASSED BEYOND CERTAIN AREAS WHICH
KANAAN DID NOT DEFINE.
HOUGHTON

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 331

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01815 131801Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

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P 131631Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6467

SECRET BEIRUT 1815

EXDIS

FOR KORN, NEA/ARN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: APER, US (GODLEY, G. MCMURTRIE)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S TRAVEL

1. I WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS BE HELD AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HE NOT USE HIS OWN NAME IN BOOKING PASSAGE FROM ATHENS TO BEIRUT. WE WILL NOT GIVE OUT HIS EXACT ARRIVAL TIME HERE EXCEPT ON NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

2. MY WIFE AND I WILL MEET HIM AIRPORT ALONG WITH RSO AND POSSIBLY OUR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. LEBANESE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL PROBABLY WILL ALSO BE PRESENT. OUR PLAN IS TO MAKE TRANSIT TIME FROM PLANE TO HIS CAR AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. LOIS AND I AND RSO WILL ACCOMPANY THEM TO RESIDENCE. (AMBASSADOR HAS KINDLY INVOTED LOIS AND ME FOR DINNER THAT NIGHT.)

3. ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN STANDARD OPERATING PROCEUDRES FOR ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURES OF BUFFUMS DURING THEIR ASSIGNMENT HERE. THEY ARE PRECAUTIONARY AS WE HAVE RECEIVED NO THREATS AGAINST HIM OR FOR THAT MATTER AGAINST THE EMBASSY RECENTLY. I DO NOT WISH TO ALARM HIM BUT DO FEEL ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS ARE BETTER PART OF WISDOM.

74 FEB 13 PM 7:08

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01815 131801Z

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR PASSING THIS INFORMATION TO AMBASSADOR GODLEY AND LETTING ME KNOW AS SOON AS YOU KNOW HIS EXACT ETA BEIRUT SO WE CAN FINALIZE OUR ARRANGEMENTS HERE UNLESS HE INTENDS INFORM ME FROM ATHENS. HE HAS WRITTEN ME AN APPROXIMATE DATE. HOUGHTON

TIME HERE EXCEPT ON NEED TO KNOW BASIS
VIBING TO BEIRUT WE WILL NOT GIVE OUT HIS EXACT ARRIVAL
THAT HE WILL USE HIS OWN NAME IN BOOKING PASSAGE FROM
TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS BE NEAR AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE AND
I WOULD WELCOME RECOMMEND THAT AMBASSADOR GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 772

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01714 120833Z

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

O 120828Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6428
----- 131066

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1714

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MOPS IS US
SUBJ: INCREASING LEBANON-BASED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY INSIDE ISRAEL
REF: STATE 27852; TEL AVIV 780

I AM DISCUSSING SERIOUSNESS OF BORDER INCIDENTS WITH
SECRETARY GENERAL, LEBANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AT 11:00 O'CLOCK FEBRUARY 12. I AM INFORMING YOU OF THIS
FACT IN EVENT REPORT OF MEETING DOES NOT REACH YOU
BEFORE YOUR 1:30 SESSION WITH EBAN.
HOUGHTON

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS=30

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----- 001206

O 121055Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6434
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

SECRET BEIRUT 1727

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA WASHDC

E.E. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, US
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 27852

1. IN ACCORDANCE INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL, I MADE DEMARCHE TO SECRETARY GENERAL, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFIARS THIS MORNING FEB. 12, STRESSING SERIOUSNESS OF INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AND IMPORTANCE GOL MAINTAINING TIGHTER CONTROL OVER BORDER AREA. I POINTED OUT THERE SEEMED NO DISPUTE OVER FACTS AS AT LEAST ONE FEDAYEEN GROUP HAS ADMITTED ACTIVITY AND BOTH LEBANESE MINISTER OF DEFENSE NASRI MAALOUF AND CHAIRMAN PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE COMMITTEE, FUAD LAHOUD, HAVE PUBLICLY STATED ISRAELI SHELLING DIRECT RESPONSE TO FEDAYEEN RAIDS. GIVEN FACT TWO ISRAELIS KILLED AND ONE WOUNDED SINCE FEB. 6, I THOUGH ISRAELIS HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT. HOWEVER, IF FEDAYEEN CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITY CONTINUES, OBVIOUSLY PRESSURE ON ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FROM PUBLIC OPINION TO TAKE MORE FORCEFUL ACTION WOULD GREATLY INCREASE. I NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR KEATING WAS SEEING ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER AT 1:30 AND IF THERE ANYTHING GOL WISHED ME TRANSMIT OUR AMBASSADOR FOR THAT MEETING, I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DO SO.

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01727 121121Z

2. DISCUSSION WAS THEN PURSUED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FUAD NAFFAH WHO JUST RETURNED FROM EXTENDED TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA. HE RESPONDED MY DEMARCHE BY SAYING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD TO CONTROL SITUATION ON BORDER. THERE WAS NO OTHER COMMENT EXCEPT SECRETARY GENERAL'S AGREEMENT TO ELEMENTS OF PROBLEM AS I STATED IT.

3. COMMENT: IN PASSING ON FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE, I WOULD HOPE THAT AMBASSADOR KEATING WOULD STATE THIS AS POSITION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AS STATED TO ME AND NOT AS PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER TO ABBA EBAN (WHICH IT WASN'T). I ALSO HOPE ISRAELIS WILL CONTINUE SHOW RESTRAINT AS I BELIEVE THE LEBANESE WILL TAKE WHAT ACTION THEY CAN. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY STATEMENTS OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE MAALOUF AND DEPUTY LAHOUD WHO PUBLICLY CONDEMNED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR ISRAELI SHELLING. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PRESS LEBANESE TO BE VIGILANT AND ENERGETIC IN THEIR EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. I HOPE FACT THAT ISRAELIS DID NOT RAISE FRONTIER SUTATION IT ILMAC MEETING FEB. 11 DOES NOT PRESAGE INTENTION LAUNCH REPRASAL RAID ON LEBANON. HOUGHTON

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TELEGRAM



WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 456
74 FEB 8 AM 9:06

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01592 071822Z

63
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W
----- 094035

R 071625Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6385

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1592

EXDIS

NOFORN

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR US
SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: BEIRUT 1544

SUMMARY. IN CONVERSATION WITH CHARGE FEB 6, EX-PREMIER SA'EB SALAAM SEEMED GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY CURRENT PEACE MAKING PROCESS. PARTICULARLY HEARTENED BY THREE HOUR CONVERSATION FEB 5 WITH PLO LEADER YASSER ARAFAT WHOM HE FOUND SURPRISINGLY REASONABLE AND REALISTIC. SALAAM MAINTAINED ARAFAT AND FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT WOULD SUPPORT EFFORTS SADAT AND ASSAD AND APPLICATION 242 BY WHICH ARAFAT, INTER ALIA, MEANT RETURN OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY. DOUBTED ARAB ELEMENTS COULD TORPEDO PEACE MAKING PROCESS AS LONG AS FAISAL, ASSAD, SADAT AND BOUMEDIENNE STUCK TOGETHER.

1. I CALLED ON EX-PRIME MINISTER SA'EB SALAAM FEB 6 AND FOUND HIM QUITE ENCOURAGED BY CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MID EAST. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGED BY THREE HOUR CONVERSATION HE HAD FEB 5 WITH YASSER ARAFAT WHOM HE FOUND SURPRISINGLY REASONABLE AND REALISTIC RE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE COURSE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE MAINTAINED ARAFAT WOULD DEFINITELY GO ALONG WITH SADAT AND ASSAD IN THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND SUPPORTED APPLICATION OF RESOLUTION 242 BY WHICH ARAFAT, OF COURSE, MEANT INTER ALIA

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01592 071822Z

THE RETURN OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY. HE SEEMED CONFIDENT ARAFAT COULD CARRY FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT WITH HIM AS SALAAM HAD RECEIVED SAME REACTION FROM OTHER FEDAYEEN LEADERS CLOSE TO ARAFAT SUCH AS ABU IYAD (SALAH KHALAF OF BLACK SEPTEMBER FAME). HE DISCOUNTED SAIGA CHIEF, ZOHAYR MUHSEN'S OPPOSITION TO DISENGAGEMENT AND SYRIAN PARTICIPATION AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AS WINDOWING DREUSING DESIGNED GIVE SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD BIT MORE TIME TO MANEUVER. ACCORDING SALAAM, MUHSEN SHARED ARAFAT'S VIEWS AND EVEN IF HE DIDN'T, HE COULD QUICKLY BE CUT DOWN TO SIZE BY SADAT AND ARAFAT COMBINED. SALAAM INDICATED THAT ARAFAT HAD FOUND SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO THE AREA MOST HELPFUL IN PROVIDING AMMUNITION FOR PRESSING HIS CURRENT COURSE OF ACTION. SALAAM SAID IT WAS AID TO ALL MODERATES.

2. RE FUTURE WEST BANK OF JORDAN, THE FEDAYEEN, AS EXPLAINED TO SALAAM BY ARAFAT, MAINTAIN WEST BANK LEGALLY BELONGS TO PALESTINIANS. ARAFAT ARGUED THAT 1947 PARTITION RESOLUTION WAS STILL VALID. AS WEST BANK CEDED TO PALESTINIAN ARABS UNDER PARTITION PLAN BEFORE HUSSEIN CLAIMED IT FOR JORDAN, TERRITORY MUST REVERT TO PALESTINIANS. CONSEQUENTLY, ARAFAT COULD NOT SUPPORT HUSSEIN'S OFFER OF SELF DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION TO DECIDE FATE OF TERRITORY WHICH ALREADY PALESTINIANS.

3. CURIOUSLY ENOUGH ARAFAT AND OTHER FEDAYEEN LEADERS PLEASED THAT HUSSEIN RETURNED TO JORDAN WITHOUT GOING TO UNITED STATES BECAUSE THEY INTERPRETED HUSSEIN'S RETURN AS INDICATING UNITED STATES AVOIDING CONSULTATION WITH HIM AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE FOR FEAR OF UPSETTING PALESTINIANS. ARAFAT WANTED USG TO KNOW THIS.

4. AS LONG AS FAISAL, ASSAD, SADAT AND BOUMEDIENNE STUCK TOGETHER SALAAM FELT OTHER ACAB ELEMENTS COULD NOT TORPEDO FUTURE PEACE TALKS AT GENEVA. SALAAM HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ALGERIA. BOUMEDIENNE EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT HE WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED SAME COURSE AS SADAT BUT AS SADAT AND ASSAD FOUGHT THE WAR, HE WOULD SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS IN MAKING PEACE.

5. I STRESSED WITH SALAAM THE IMPORTANCE OF LIFTING

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01592 071822Z

THE EMBARGO ON OIL IF OUR EFFORTS WERE NOT TO BE JEOPARDIZED. WE HAD DONE PRECISELY WHAT WE SAID WE WOULD DO AND INTENDED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS BUT ARABS HAD TO RECIPROCATE. SALAAM REPLIED THAT UNFORTUNATELY ARAB MASSES DID NOT ATTACH GREAT SIGNIKICANCE TO DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS ARGUING THAT NOTPING HAD BEEN DONE AS YET TO RESOLVE BASIC ISSUES AND UNTIL THAT PROCESS STARTED THEY COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT THAT U.S. INTENTIONS WERE SINCERE. SALAAM WAS NOT ARGUING THAT THIS OPINION WAS RIGHT BUT THAT IT EXISTED AND HAMPERED FLEXIBILITY OF ARAB LEADERS.

6. COMMENT: SAIEB SALAAM, SEVERAL TIMES PRIME MINISTER, IS LEADING MOSLEM LEADER IN BEIRUT AND HAS EXCELLENT CREDENTIALS WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND IS WELL TUNED IN TO THE MOSLEM STREET. IN PAST HE HAS BEEN PESSIMISTIC RE ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT BECAUSE (A) HE THOUGHT US UNABLE ACT MEANINGFULLY IN FACE ZIONIST PRESSURE AND (B) HE CONSIDERED ARABS HOPELESSLY UNREALISTIC. HIS ATTITUDE CHANGED SHORTLY AFTER THE OCTOBER 173 WAR. ALTHOUGH EMOTIONAL, I HAVE ALWAYS FOUND HIM HONEST IN EXPRESSING HIS OPINIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND I THINK HIS CURRENT MOOD IS REFLECTIVE OF THAT OF MOSLEM LEADERS IN LEBANON. HIS ANALYSIS OF MOSLEM MASSES' REACTION TO PEACE MAKING TO DATE PROBABLY ACCURATE. HIS FEELING OF ENCOURAGEMENT DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE OR OTHER MOSLEMS ARE NOT STILL SKEPTICAL OF OUR INTENTIONS. IT DOEU MEAN THAT THE EXTENT OF THEIR SKEPTICISM HAS LESSENNED. HOUGHTON

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 653

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01055 291027Z

15
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

118825

R 290945Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6218
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1055

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA WASHDC

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR MARR UN XF LE
SUBJECT: AMERICAN PRESENCE WITH UNTSO/LEBANON

1. WE HAVE AGAIN GONE OVER GROUND OF AMERICAN UNTSO OBSERVERS WITH LEBANESE FONOFFICE AND ARMY (DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF). WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT GOL HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO CONTINUING PRESENCE TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS WITH UNTSO IN LEBANON AND THAT GOL NEVER SUGGESTED TO UNTSO THAT THEY BE REPLACED BY OBSERVERS OF OTHER NATIONALITY. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN OFFICE AND ARMY, DISCUSSION WITH UNTSO RELATED ENTIRELY TO GOL POSITION RE ACCEPTING SOVIET OBSERVERS, TO WHICH GOL OBJECTS, AND DIRECTLY RELATED ISSUE OF ACCEPTING AMERICAN OBSERVERS ADDITIONAL TO TWO AMERICAN POSITIONS ALREADY PART OF UNTSO COMPLEMENT FOR LEBANON. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, GOL AND UNTSO AGREED THAT IT PREFERABLE NOT INCREASE NUMBER OF AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN ORDER AVOID PROBLEMS WITH SOVS.

2. NEITHER FONOFFICE NOR ARMY HAS SLIGHTEST OBJECTION TO CONTINUATION OF TOURS OF TWO AMERICAN OFFICERS PRESENTLY SERVING WITH UNTSO OR TO THEIR BEING REPLACED BY OTHER AMERICAN OFFICERS WHEN THEIR TOURS ARE OVER.

74 JAN 29 PM 12:40
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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3. COMMENT: (A) IT APPEARS THAT COLONEL BUNWORTH, AS INDICATED JERUSALEM 168, SOMEHOW GAINED MISTAKEN IMPRESSION OF GOL POSITION WHICH HE COMMUNICATED TO UN HEADQUARTERS. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN PRESENCE TWO AMERICAN OBSERVERS AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND PRECEDENT. WE ALSO SHARE URQUHART'S CONCERN THAT THIS COULD DEVELOP INTO POLITICAL ISSUE WITH SOVS COMPLAINING TO UN AND GOL, PLACING BOTH IN DIFFICULT POSITION.

(B) WE UNDERSTAND THAT BUNWORTH HAS NOW DECIDED QUIETLY TO RESCIND EARLIER DECISION TO REMOVE TWO AMERICAN OBSERVERS (CAPTS. WALSH AND KERAVOURI) FROM LEBANON. NOW THAT THEIR STATUS APPEARS RESOLVED, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE WISE TO REINFORCE USUAL GUIDANCE GIVEN AMERICAN OFFICERS SERVING WITH UNTSO IN LEBANON (AND ELSEWHERE) ABOUT AVOIDING ACTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAVE THEM (AND UN) OPEN TO CHARGES THAT THEY ACTING ON BEHALF OF USG RATHER THAN SERVING AS REPRESENTATIVES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.
HOUGHTON

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 413

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00745 191425Z

45:
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W

026468

O 191341Z JAN 74 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6098
WHITE HOUSE NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 0745

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SAM 86970

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP: HENRY A KISSINGER
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S DAMASCUS VISIT

1. SCOTES ADVISES SYRIANS HAVE MADE FOLLOWING CAR ASSIGNMENTS FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY:

- 1ST CAR - THE SECRETARY AND THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.
- 2ND CAR - AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND DR ZAKARIAH ISMAEL.
- 3RD CAR - ASST SECRETARY SISCO AND HAMOUD SHUFI, DIRECTOR OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS'S AMERICAN DEPARTMENT.
- 4. TH CAR - LEGAL ADVISOR MAW AND PICKERING.
- 5. TH CAR - ATHERTON AND SCOTES.
- 6. TH CAR SAUNDERS, EAGLEBURGER AND WEST.

2. THERE ARE LIMITED BUT UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF CARS FOR PRESS AND REMAINDER OF THE SECRETARY'S PARTY.

3. PROTOCOL NOTE - ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WILL PRECEDE AMBASSADOR

74 JAN 20 PM 12:48
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SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00745 191425Z

BUNKER AT THE LUNCH. (CORRECTION TO BEIRUT'S 684)

4. SCOTES DOES NOT HAVE FINAL WORD ON TIME SCHEDULE OF PROGRAM (BEIRUT'S 684) BUT HAS EMPHASIZED SECRETARY MUST LEAVE BY 1600 HRS.

5. SYRIANS STILL ANXIOUS TO KNOW:

A. HOW MANY OF PARTY WILL REMAIN WITH PLANE.

B. HOW MANY WISH TO VISIT DAMASCUS.

C. HOW MANY WILL REMAIN AT AIRPORT FOR LUNCH.

6. CLEARANCES FOR PLANE OBTAINED FOR BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON (OVERFLIGHT).

HOUGHTON

64-51 19 05 114 147

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TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
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'74 JAN 17 AM 7:59
SECRET 314

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00595 161616Z

43/41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 USSS-00 /031 W

117357

Z O 161428Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6046N
WHITE HOUSE FLASH
INFO USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 0595

EXDIS

C O R R E C T I O N COPY (FOR CAPTIONS)

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SAM 86970

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A KISSINGER)
SUBJ: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO DAMASCUS

REF: JERUSALEM 55; BEICUT 503

1. SCOTES REPORTED TODAY THAT SARG DOES NOT CONSIDER
IT NECESSARY SAY ANYTHING TO QUERIES REGARDING INITIATIVE
OF AND PURPOSE FOR TRIP. THEY CONSIDER STATEMENT THEY HAVE
ALREADY AGREED TO SUFFICIENT.

2. SARG MOST ANXIOUS HAVE CAR ASSIGNMENTS ASAP.
BUFFUM

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SECRET 101

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00468 142154Z

73
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

098521

R 141317Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5998
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET BEIRUT 0468

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: ABOG, MARR, LE, XF, US
SUBJECT: UNTSO OBSERVERS IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 412

1. FONOFF'S HADDAD CONFIRMED TO US JAN 14 THAT GOL WELCOMES CONTINUED PRESENCE OF TWO US OBSERVERS WITH UNTSO IN LEBANON. GOL POSITION IS THAT NO ADDITIONAL US OBSERVERS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ILMAC, SINCE THIS WOULD GIVE REASON FOR SOVS TO REQUEST THAT

RUSSIAN OBSERVERS BE ASSIGNED ALSO--REQUEST WHICH GOL DOES NOT WISH TO ACCEDE TO.

2. HADDAD NOTED THAT SO FAR NO ONE, INCLUDING UN, HAS RAISED WITH GOL QUESTION OF TRANSFERRING US OBSERVERS FROM ILMAC--EITHER HERE OR IN NEW YORK.
RUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 192
74 JAN 11 PM 5:21

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00412 111211Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
----- 074443

P R 111130Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5976
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
CUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4750
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T BEIRUT 0412

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AORG, MARR, LE, XF, US
SUBJECT: UNTSO OBSERVERS IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 4463

1. WE PUT QUESTIONS CONTAINED REFTEL TO KHALIL HADDAD, FOM OFF DIRECTOR FOR UN AFFAIRS, MORNING JAN. 11. HADDAD SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF MATTER BUT WOULD CHECK AND LET US KNOWN GOL'S POSITION, WHICH WE WILL REPORT.
2. ARMA UNDERSTANDS FROM UNTSO SOURCES HERE (PROTECT) THAT LEBANESE DEFENSE MINISTER'S ATTITUDE IS THAT SINCE LEBANON NOT INVOLVED IN OCTOBER WAR, QUESTION OF ASSIGNING SOV OR OTHER ADDITIONAL UNTSO OBSERVERS TO ILMAC DOES NOT ARISE. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REPORTEDLY IS SATISFIED WITH EXISTING NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ILMAC, AND IS RELAXED ABOUT CONTINUED PRESENCE OF TWO US OBSERVERS.
3. ON OTHER HAND, WE INFORMED BY SAME UNTSO SOURCES THAT UNSYG WALDHEIM BELIEVES IT ADVISABLE TO REMOVE US OFFICERS FROM ILMAC AND HAS SENT MESSAGE TO JERUSALEM DIRECTING THAT THEY BE "PHASED OUT", PRESUMABLY THROUGH PROCESS OF NORMAL ATTRITION. UNTSO HEADQUARTERS ERUSALEM, HOWEVER, HAS ORDERED THAT THEIR DEPARTURE BE EXPEDITED, AND ONE US OFFICER

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(CAPT. KERA VOURI) HAS ALREADY DEPARTED, WITH SECOND (CAPT. WALSH) SLATED DEPART FIRST WEEK IN FEBRUARY. BUFFUM

POSITION WHICH HE WILL BECOME
MORNING OF JULY. THE CHECK AND THE
DIRECTOR FOR THE UNITED STATES
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 14542 220937Z

14
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 /031 W
078111

P R 220845Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5775
INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 14542

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS USINT CAIRO

FOR SISCO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINR, XF
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

SWEDISH AMBASSADOR (THOROUGHLY RELIABLE SOURCE) TELLS ME HE JUST LEARNED FOLLOWING INFO FROM SENIOR SWEDISH OFFICER WITH UNTSO ON SYRIAN-ISRAELI FRONT: LATTER HAS RECENTLY HAD OPPORTUNITY OBSERVE SITUATION IN DEPTH WITHIN SYRIA BEHIND CEASEFIRE LINE, AND HAS NOTED MAJOR BUILD-UP OVER PAST FEW WEEKS. WHEREAS UP TO ONE MONTH AGO, HE ANTICIPATED CEASEFIRE WOULD HOLD ON THAT FRONT UNTIL SPRING, HE NOW BELIEVES THERE IS SERIOUS RISK OF MAJOR CLASH BY MID-JANUARY, UNLESS THERE IS BREAK-THROUGH IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS BY THEN.

HE REASONS THAT EVEN IF SYRIANS DO NOT EXPLOIT THEIR CURRENT BUILD-UP TO ATTACK, THEIR POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING SEVERE DAMAGE BY SURPRISE MOVE WOULD BE SO GREAT THAT ISRAELIS, STILL SMARTING FROM OCTOBER 6 SET-BACK, WILL CONCLUDE THAT PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE IS NECESSARY.

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BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

'73 DEC 19 AM 8:17

SECRET 511

Scowcroft
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 14315 182154Z

67
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

035438

P 181939Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5714

S E C R E T BEIRUT 14315

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11562: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: ASSIGNMENT OF US REPRESENTATIVES TO DAMASCUS

1. DURING VISIT TO DAMASCUS DEC 18 I DISCUSSED QUESTION OF ASSIGNMENT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL TO US INT SECTION OF ITALIAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD, FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, AND VICE MINISTER ISMAIL. ASSAD REAFFIRMED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES AT ANY TIME WE CHOOSE TO SEND THEM AND INDICATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN EARLIER MEETING, KHADDAM SAID HE WANTED TO ASSURE US OF SYRIA'S SINCERE WISH TO STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. KHADDAM SAID SARG WILL WELCOME DIPLOMATS WE WILL BE SENDING TO DAMASCUS. HE SUGGESTED WE PURSUE DISCUSSION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. STAFFED OFFICE IN DAMASCUS WITH VICE MINISTER ISMAIL.

2. ACCORDINGLY, DURING MEETING WITH ISMAIL IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS I ASKED FOR SYRIAN VIEWS ON (A) LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION; (B) NUMBER OF PERSONNEL, AND (C) TIMING OF ARRIVAL. I POINTED OUT THAT PRACTICE IN ARAB COUNTRIES WHERE USG HAS INTERESTS SECTIONS VARIES FROM IRAQ, WHERE OUR OFFICE IS HEADED BY MIDDLE LEVEL OFFICIAL, TO ALGERIA AND CAIRO, WHERE WE HAVE QUITE

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 14315 182154Z

SENIOR OFFICERS AND RELATIVELY SIZEABLE STAFFS. AFTER SOME QUESTIONING BY ISMAIL AS TO WHAT WAS MEANT BY MIDDLE LEVEL REPRESENTATION, ISMAIL SAID HE THOUGHT FOLLOWING WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO SARG (A) ASSIGNMENT OF TWO AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS TO USINT SECTION OF ITALIAN EMBASSY AND TWO OR THREE AMERICAN STAFF PERSONNEL; (B) INTEREST SECTION CHIEF COULD BE OF FIRST SECRETARY OR COUNSELOR RANK; (C) USG WELCOME TO OPEN ITS REPRESENTATION AT AN EARLY DATE, WITHIN A WEEK OR TEN DAYS IF IT SO DESIRES (ALTHOUGH IT WAS OBVIOUS SYRIANS NOT PRESSING US TO HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE IN DAMASCUS IN THAT TIME FRAME).

3. ISMAIL SAID THAT IF WE HAVE ANYTHING TO COMMUNICATE TO SARG ON THIS MATTER WHILE SECRETARY IS IN GENEVA WE MAY DO SO THROUGH SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVE THERE. OTHERWISE WE CAN MAKE CONTACT THROUGH SYRIAN UN MISSION IN NEW YORK.

4. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS CABLE TO EMBASSY ROME ALONG WITH APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS FOR INFORMING ITALIANS OF OUR AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA FOR ASSIGNMENT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL TO DAMASCUS.
BUFFUM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

73 DEC 17 AM 8:16

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL 039

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 14223 160756Z

12
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W

015406

Z D 160708Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5657

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 14223

SEND TO PLANE TOSEC

EXDIS

R.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (FRANGIE, SLEIMAN) LE
SUBJECT PROPOSED VISIT OF LEBANESE PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 245450, STATE 245606

1. DURING DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT JUST THIS WEEK ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECRETARY'S TRIP, FRANGIE COMMENTED HE AWARE FORMAL INVITATION FOR STATE VISIT TO US STILL OUTSTANDING. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, HE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO LET SITUATION IN AREA CLARIFY A BIT BEFORE SETTING A SPECIFIC DATE.

2. WHILE HE DID NOT SPECIFY REASONS, I SUSPECT AMONG OTHERS MAY BE HIS CONCERN THAT WITH ADVERSE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TO OIL EMBARGO, VISIT NOW BY AN ARAB HEAD OF STATE MIGHT NOT BE PROPITIOUS; AND PERHAPS UNCERTAINTY WHETHER HOSTILITIES MIGHT RESUME WHICH WOULD OF COURSE NECESSITATE HIS PRESENCE HERE.

3. IN LIGHT HIS COMMENTS I BELIEVE THAT PROPOSING SUCH A SPECIFIC EARLY DATE WOULD BE MISCONSTRUED ON HIS PART AND UNWELCOME.

4. PROBLEM IS MERELY A MATTER OF TIMING. HE CLEARLY

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 14223 160756Z

WANTS TO MAKE SUCH VISIT BUT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT MAJOR UNCERTAINTY IN CURRENT SITUATION DICTATES WISDOM OF DEFERRING DECISION ON SPECIFIC DATE. BUFFUM

BEFORE BEING A SPECIFIC DATE
IT IS NECESSARY TO GET INFORMATION IN THE COUNTRY AND
TO BE SURE THAT THE INFORMATION IS ACCURATE AND
RELIABLE. THE INFORMATION IS BEING OBTAINED
AND WILL BE REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.

RE: BEIRUT 14223 160756Z

URGENT BEIRUT 14223 160756Z
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE AMERICAN LEGATION BEIRUT
PRIORITY

INFO

BEIRUT 14223 160756Z

SECRETARY OF STATE
AMERICAN LEGATION BEIRUT

INFO BEIRUT 14223 160756Z
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE AMERICAN LEGATION BEIRUT
PRIORITY

INFO BEIRUT 14223 160756Z
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE AMERICAN LEGATION BEIRUT
PRIORITY

ACTION 14223 160756Z

INFO BEIRUT 14223 160756Z
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE AMERICAN LEGATION BEIRUT
PRIORITY

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Handwritten notes and stamps, including a date stamp: 13 DEC 11 AM 6:10



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73 NOV 26 PM 9:06

SECRET 284

2

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13465 261414Z

43

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

080580

R 261338Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5345

S E C R E T BEIRUT 13465

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 & 3
TAGS: PFOR, LE, XF
SUBJECT: LEBANESE POSITION AT ALGIERS SUMMIT

BEGIN SUMMARY: THANKS TO RECEIPT AFTERNOON NOV 23 OF FULL TEXT SECRETARY'S NOV. 21ST PRESS CONFERENCE AND AFTERNOON NOV. 24 OF REPORT ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S TALK WITH LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI, PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND HIS ADVISORS LEFT FOR ALGIERS SUMMIT WITH WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF ATTITUDES USG TOWARD EVOLVING SITUATION IN AREA AND TOWARD PEACE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

1. UPON RECEIPT USINFO 231010Z AFTERNOON NOV. 23, WE DISTRIBUTED COPIES OF FULL TEXT SECRETARY'S NOV. 21ST PRESS CONFERENCE TO LOCAL PRESS, AND MADE COPIES AVAILABLE TO PRESIDENCY (DIRECTOR GENERAL DIB WHO SAID HE WOULD SEE THAT PRESIDENT READ TEXT). IN TALK WITH DIB LATE NOV. 23, WE POINTED OUT VERY POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SECRETARY'S REMARKS, NOTING THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ABOUT OPENING OF PEACE TALKS SOMETIME IN DECEMBER, AS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED. WE OBSERVED THAT SECRETARY'S REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE BACKLASH FROM EXAGGERATED USE OF ARAB OIL EMBARGO MERELY STATED HARD FACTS OF SITUATION AS SEEN FROM UNITED STATES AND THAT WE HAD BEEN HEARING SAME SORT OF OPINION EXPRESSED HERE BY REPS OF WEST EUROPEAN EMBASSIES.

2. DIB SAID HE PLEASSED TO HAVE FULL TEXT WHICH MUCH MORE POSITIVE THAN ACCOUNT CARRIED WIRE SERVICES AND COMMENTED ON (NEGATIVELY) BY ARAB PRESS. HE FULLY

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 13465 261414Z

AGREED THAT SOME ARAB GOVTS. RUNNING RISK OF CARRYING OIL EMBARGO TOO FAR, HE DESCRIBED THEIR USE OF NEWLY-EMERGED SENSE OF POWER AS IN SOME WAYS RESEMBLING THAT DISPLAYED BY ISRAELIS AFTER JUNE 1967 VICTORY WHICH SUDDENLY LEFT THEM FEELING INVINCIBLE. DIB SAID THAT JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE OF FONMIN NAFFA FOR ALGIERS, WEST GERMAN AMBASSADOR HAD MADE DEMARCHE TO NAFFA AND DIB IN NAME OF NINE EEC COUNTRIES, GENTLY POINTING OUT DANGERS OF EXCESSIVE ARAB PRESSURE ON EUROPEANS. DIB SAID LEBANESE WOULD DO WHAT THEIR MODEST DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE ALLOWED TO EXPLAIN DANGERS OF EXAGGERATED USE OIL PRESSURE TO ARAB LEADERS AT ALGIERS.

3. WE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH DIB DANGERS OF ALGIERS SUMMIT ADOPTING HARD POSITION ON FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHICH COULD POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZE GENEVA PEACE TALKS. HE SAID THAT GOL FULLY AWARE OF THIS DANGER AND WOULD TRY AND DETER SUCH MOVE AS RECOGNITION PALESTINIAN GOVT. IN EXILE. THIS WOULD CREATE OBVIOUS THREAT FOR LEBANON AS WELL AS POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZING PEACE TALKS.

4. AMBASSADOR KABBANI'S REPORT OF EXCELLENT TALK WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO WAS RECEIVED IN FONOFFICE EARLY AFTERNOON NOV. 24 AND IMMEDIATELY PASSED BY FONOFFICE TO DIB FOR ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE, WHO DEPARTED FOR ALGIERS MORNING NOV. 25.

5. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE LEFT FOR ALGIERS SUMMIT WITH GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF USG ATTITUDES AND THAT HE SHOULD BE HELPFUL IN SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO MODERATE ANY EXTREME ARAB POSITIONS. EARLIER RECEIPT OF FULL TEXT SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL FOR FONMIN NAFFA AND HIS PARTY WHO LEFT MORNING NOV. 23 SOMEWHAT UNDER INFLUENCE OF UNBALANCED ARAB PRESS ACCOUNTS HEADLINING "THREAT" OF COUNTERMEASURES (BEIRUT 13448).
BUFFUM

43 NOV 50 AM 2:00

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 814

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13367 211111Z

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53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

049674

R 211019Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5308
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 13367

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR XF LE
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

IRANIAN AMBASSADOR GHADAR (PROTECT) TOLD ME FOLLOWING
NOVEMBER 21:

1. ABOUT A WEEK AGO A FATAH REPRESENTATIVE TOLD HIM PLO WAS CLOSE TO ESTABLISHING PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE. GHADAR SPECULATES ABSENCE SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT TO DATE REFLECTS INTERNAL DIVERGENCIES AMONG PALESTINIAN LEADERS ON THIS CONCEPT.
2. PLO RECENTLY REQUESTED PERMISSION OPEN OFFICE IN TEHRAN. IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SENT SHARP REJECTION OF THIS REQUEST, CITING EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL PLO IMPLICATION IN NUMEROUS ACTS OF TERRORISM IN IRAN, INCLUDING BANK ROBBERIES.
3. ARAFAT REQUESTED PERMISSION VISIT TEHRAN FOR MEETING WITH SHAH IN CONNECTION WITH HIS MOSOCW TRIP. TEHRAN NEVER PROVIDED ANSWER, THOUGH ARAFAT KEPT PRESSING.
4. SHAH'S MAIN PRE-OCCUPATION WITH PEACE SETTLEMENT (LIKE FEISAL'S) IS DISPOSITION OF JERUSALEM. HOWEVER, UNLIKE FEISAL, SHAH'S NEED TO SATISFY IRANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS HE GIVING ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO PROTECTION OF MOSLEM INTERESTS IN JERUSALEM. BUFFUM.

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TELEGRAM

'73 NOV 20 PM 2:58

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13321 201321Z

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

039364

R 201140Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5280

S E C R E T BEIRUT 13321

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SY, US, XF
SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN VIEWS ON SYRIA

1. IN CONVERSATION NOV 19 WITH HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA (VERES, WHO ALSO ACCREDITD LABANON), EMBOFF WAS TOLD CATEGORICALLY THAT SYRIAN GOVT WILL FOLLOW EGYPTIAN LEAD IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND THAT PRESENT COURSE IS DIRECTED TOWARD PEACE CONFERENCE. VERES SAID THAT SYRIAN OFFICIALS WILL LAG FEW STEPS BEHIND EGYPT, WILL MAKE TOUGHER STATEMENTS FOR PUBLIC AND INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSUMPTION, WILL BE TOUGHER BARGAINERS, AND MAY EXPRESS DISSATISFACTION WITH EGYPTIANS (AND USSR). NEVERTHELESS, SYRIANS WILL FOLLOW EGYPTIAN LEAD AND ARE ON VERY CLOSE TERMS WITH USSR.

2. WHILE VERES DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REFER TO PROBLEM OF SYRIAN DESIRE FOR PARTICIPATION OF EUROPEAN (AND AFRICAN) REPS IN PEACE TALKS (WHICH FIRST SURFACED DURING HAFEZ ASSAD'S NOV 11 MEETING WITH TWO FRENCH DEPUTIES), HE LEFT CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT AND USSR CAN MOVE SARG OFF THIS POSITION SHOULD OTHER OBSTACLES TO PEACE TALKS BE REMOVED. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT SARG WORKING WITH EGYPT TO KEEP LID ON RADICALS DURING ALGIERS SUMMIT AND THAT TWO GOVTS ARE TRYING PREARRANGE BY SERIES BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS OUTCOME BOTH OF FONMIN MEETING AND ACTUAL SUMMIT.

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3. ON SUBJECT RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND UNITED STATES, VERES SAID THAT TOP SARG OFFICIALS TAKING LINE WITH HIM THAT THEY PREPARED RECEIVED KISSINGER OR SISCO BUT ONLY IF SARG OBTAINED SOME CONCRETE CONCESSION FROM ISRAEL. SARG NOT WILLING TO RUN OF NEGATIVE REACTION FROM CERTAIN INTERNAL POLITICAL CIRCLES, IRAQ AND EVEN USSR FOR SORT OF ASSURANCE WHICH GIVEN TO SADAT. THEY SAY THEY MUST HAVE SOMETHING VISIBLE TO SHOW.

4. COMMENT: WE REPORT THIS IN IGNORANCE OF WHATEVER INFO DEPT HAS ON SYRIANS FROM OTHER SOURCES. VERES HAS BEEN IN DAMASCUS FOR ALMOST THREE YEARS AND HAS BEEN KNOWN TO EMBOFF AS RELIABLE SOURCE AT THREE DIFFERENT POSTS OVER PAST FIFTEEN YEARS.
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TELEGRAM

73 NOV 17 AM 7:55

SECRET 655

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13246 162308Z

62
ACTION SS=30

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSO=00 CCD=00 /031 W

017619

R 161607Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5256
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 13246

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PINS XF JO LE
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN AND LEBANESE POSITIONS ON ALGIERS SUMMIT
AND PEACE TALKS

1. JORDANIAN ENVOYS TALHOUNI AND RIFAI MET PRESIDENT FRANGIE NOV 15 TO DISCUSS UPCOMING ALGIERS SUMMIT AND PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION. WE ARE TOLD BY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY (DIB) THAT TALHOUNI STATED CATEGORICALLY JORDAN WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SUMMIT, EVEN THOUGH PLO ALSO EXPECTED BE PRESENT. THIS DIFFERENT FROM KHARTOUM SUMMIT WHERE JORDANIAN DEL REPRESENTED PALESTINIANS, BUT TALHOUNI SAID IT ACCEPTABLE TO GOJ.

2. CONCERNING FUTURE OF WEST BANK, TALHOUNI TOLD FRANGIE THAT GOJ PLEDGED TO LEIBERATE OCCUPIED TERRITORY BUT THAT DECISION ON FUTURE WOULD BE UP TO PALESTINIANS. GOJ BELIEVED THAT ALL PALESTINIANS WHO WISHED TO RETURN AFTER TERRITORY LIBERATED SHOULD DO SO AND IT WOULD BE UP TO THEM TO DECIDE WHETHER TERRITORY SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OR SOMEHOW LINKED TO JORDAN.

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3. ONLY OTHER POINT MADE BY TALHOUNI ON WHICH DIB REPORTED WAS HIS STATEMENT THAT EAST JERUSALEM SHOULD RE-GAIN ITS ARAB STATUS. LEBANESE REMINDED TALHOUNI THAT CHRISTIANS ALSO HAVE INTERESTS IN JERUSALEM AND ARAB GOVTS WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TAKE THIS INTO CON-SIDERATION. DIB TOLD EMBOFF THAT LEBANESE ENVOY TO VATICAN RAISED FUTURE OF JERUSALEM WITH OFFICIALS THERE ON NOV 12, JUST PRIOR TO SISCO'S VISIT. LEBANESE EN-COURAGED AT WHAT THEY WERE TOLD, NAMELY THAT VATICAN WISHES SEE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FOR HOLY PLACES BUT IS NOT PRESSING FOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM, AND THAT VATICAN FEELS STRONGLY THAT THERE MUST BE A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

4. IN RELATED CONVERSATION NOV. 14 LEBANESE FONMIN, TOLD EMBOFF THAT FATAH LEADERS ARE SO KEEN ON PARTICIPATING IN PEACE TALKS THEY HAVE INDICATED TO GOL AND OTHERS THEIR DESIRE TO BE PRESENT AT FIRST STAGE, RATHER THAN LATER STAGE AS EGYPTIANS WERE THINKING. THIS HAS CAUSED EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO EXPRESS CONCERN TO GOL.

5. COMMENT: LEBANESE POSITION ON PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION OF PALESTIANIANS AT PEACE TALKS IS STILL SOMEWHAT FLUID AS THEY CONTINUE TAKE SOUND-INGS WITH OTHER ARAB GOVTS. WHILE THEY THINK ISSUE MOST LIKELY BE RESOLVED BY AGREEMENT THAT PLO SHOULD BE PRESENT IN GENEVA. (BEIRUT 13109) THEY WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW LEAD OF EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA WHILE TAKING INTO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION ATTITUDES OF FEDAYEEN (WHO ARE THREAT TO LEBANON) AND JORDAN (WHOM GOL CONSIDERS BE NATURAL ALLY). JORDANIAN POSITION AS EXPLAINED BY TALHOUNI OFFERS SORT OF FLEXIBILITY WHICH LEBANESE BELIEVE NECESSARY IN ORDER REACH AGREEMENT AMONG MODERATE STATES ON HANDLING AT ALGIERS PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS. BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

73 NOV 16 AM 8:14
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 13175 151913Z

66
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

005384

R 151437Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5233
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 13175

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE IS
SUBJECT: UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER

REF: STATE 222716

1. FORMIN NAFFA TOLD US ON NOV 14 THAT GOL HAS DECIDED PLACE IDEA OF POSSIBLE UNEF FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON (BEIRUT 12587) IN DEEP FREEZE FOR TIME BEING, AND REVIEW SITUATION LATER IN LIGHT OF EVOLUTION PEACE TALKS.

2. COMMENT: GOL SEEMS TO HAVE REACHED ON ITS OWN POSITION OUTLINED REFTTEL. AS RESULT WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT CONVEYED OUR VIEWS TO GOL AND BELIEVE THERE NO NEED TO DO SO. CHANGE IN GOL THINKING APPARENTLY OCCASIONED BY EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON SIX POINTS, CONTINUED QUIET BY FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE TALKS AS REVEALED DURING VISIT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO. BUFFUM

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73 NOV 5 PM 10:03

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12743 051402Z

53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

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P 051029Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY

S E C R E T BEIRUT 12743

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: QVIP (JOSEPH J. SISCO)
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY TRAVEL

REF: STATE 12734

FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM

1. 1. NAFFA PLEASED TO SHIFT BOTH APPOINTMENT AND DINNER TO SATURDAY NOVEMBER 10.

2. NATURALLY I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO YOU AND ROY STAYING WITH US. BUFFUM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12981 111131Z

16
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 W

O 111116Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5151
USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

094413

S E C R E T BEIRUT 12981

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, LE
SUBJECT: UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE
ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER
REF: PEKING 1382
STATE 219383

SISCO AND BUFFUM CONCUR IN PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS
RE UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES ON ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER
AS DESCRIBED STATE 219383.
BUFFUM

73 NOV 12 AM 7:50

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12969 101305Z

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 /031 W

090249

O 101253Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5146
USMISSION NATO NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 12969

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH J)
SUBJ: ASST SECRETARY'S VISIT

REF: STATE 222092; BRUSSELS 6402

1. FOL ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED BRUSSELS REFTEL.
 2. ATHERTON AND NOYES WILL NOT RPT NOT BE WITH THE PARTY.
 3. SISCO AGREES TO A DINNER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN ELSLANDE AND AGREES TO DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING THE DINNER WITH THOSE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DINNER.
 4. ASST SECRETARY SISCO ACCEPTS WITH PLEASURE INVITATION TO ATTEND LUNCHEON OF NATO PERMREPS.
 5. SY BALDADIAN WILL BE STAYING AT THE RESIDENCE.
 6. YOU SHOULD ADVISE MEDIA THAT SISCO'S VISIT IS FOR PURPOSE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH BELGIAN GOVT AND NATO ALLIES ONLY. (SEE SEPTTEL RE GUIDANCE TO NATO).
 7. CONTROL OFFICER BROWN SHOULD IDENTIFY HIMSELF TO CRAIG UPON ARRIVAL. ASSUME HE WILL BE TAKING CARE OF PASSPORT AND ENTRANCE FORMALITIES.
- BUFFUM

73 NOV 11 AM 9:42

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ACTION SS-30

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD FLASH
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5127

S E C R E T BEIRUT 12938

EXDIS

FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH I)
SUBJ: ASST SECRETARY SISCO'S VISIT TO BEIRUT

1. REPORT SENT OTHER CHANNELS INDICATES CURRENT THREAT FROM TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPEARS DESIGNED PRIMARILY AGAINST YOU, ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT RULE OUT POSSIBLE VULNERABILITY OF OTHER SENIOR MEMBERS IN YOUR PARTY.
2. WHILE GROUP INVOLVED IS SMALL, IT MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SINCE IT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT ATTACK ON BANK OF AMERICAN IN BEIRUT AND MURDER OF AMERICAN HOSTAGE WHEN LEBANESE TROOPS STORMED THE BUILDING.
3. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS REPORT WITH CHIEF OF SURETE, COLONEL DAHDAH, WHO DISPOSED TO REGARD INFORMATION AS "DOUBTFUL." HOWEVER, HE IS NOT A PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY OFFICER AND OUR OWN EXPERTS IN THOSE FIELDS TAKE THE REPORT SERIOUSLY IN VIEW OF PRECISE NATURE OF THREAT DESCRIBED AND FACT THAT ULTIMATE SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS ONE OF THE SEVEN-MAN ASSASSINATION TEAM INVOLVED.
4. AS A RESULT, I AM INSISTING ON A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF SECURITY PROTECTION TO BE AFFORDED DURING

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12938 091217Z

YOUR VISIT, AND DESPITE HIS DOWNPLAYING OF REPORT, DAHDAM INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE FULLY IN THIS EFFORT.

5. AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, THERE NEVER CAN BE A ONE HUNDRED PERCENT GUARANTEE OF PROTECTION UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT SUBSTANTIAL AND FEASIBLE INCREASE IN PROTECTION MEASURES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT DETERRENT TO PREVENT ANY ACTUAL ATTEMPT FROM BEING MADE. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND YOU PROCEED TO BEIRUT AS PLANNED.

6. NATURALLY, WE ARE KEEPING VERY CLOSE TABS ON THE SITUATION AND SHOULD THERE BE ANY CHANGE, I WILL ADVISE YOU AT ONCE.

BUFFUM

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750/10/2000

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 602

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12734 030958Z

13
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 NSAE-00 CCO-00 /031 W
023074

O 030938Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5031

SECRET BEIRUT 12734

EXDIS

FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM

EO 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: OVIP (JOSEPH J. SISCO)
SUBJ: ASST SECRETARY TRAVEL


REF: STATE 217002

1. APPOINTMENT MADE WITH FORMIN NAFFA 5 PM NOV 11.
CAN BE SHIFTED TO SUIT YOUR CONVENIENCE.
2. IN ADDITION NAFFA WANTS VERY MUCH TO HAVE YOU DINE
WITH HIM SUNDAY NIGHT. PLEASE ADVISE. IN ACCORDANCE
WITH YOUR PREFERENCE TO AWARD SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, I WILL
NOT ORGANIZE A LUNCHEON FOR YOU SUNDAY NOON MUCH AS I
WOULD LIKE TO DO SO, BUT WILL PLAN MERELY ON FAMILY LUNCH.
BUFFUM

93 NOV 30 PM 12:30
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 4330

PAGE 01 STATE 160772

67
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 150-00 330-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:HSAUNDERS:DAV
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S:SEFRY

112583

O 242119Z JUL 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 160772

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS:PPFOR LE, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE

REFERENCE: STATE 1589589 BEIRUT 8532

1. WHILE WE ARE GRATIFIED OVER DIB'S POSITIVE REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, WE CONTINUE TO WANT TO KEEP MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL AS A WHOLE. THIS IS IMPORTANT TO US FOR GENERAL PURPOSE OF PRESERVING CONFIDENTIALITY OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AS WELL AS FOR PURPOSE OF AVOIDING COMPARISON WITH BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE. SOVIETS' DESIRE TO HAVE BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE RELEASED IS UNDERSTANDABLE, SINCE THEIR MESSAGE WAS OPENLY CRITICAL OF ISRAEL AND WAS OBVIOUSLY DRAFTED WITH AN EYE TO MAKING PROPAGANDA DISPLAY IN LEBANON. PUBLICATION OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY WHICH REFLECTS US NEED TO PRESERVE ITS UNIQUE POSITION AS MEDIATOR, AND PUBLIC COMPARISON WITH BREZHNEV'S PROPAGANDA MESSAGE COULD COST US MORE THAN WE WOULD GAIN. WE PREFER TO BE IN A POSITION OF SAYING WE SUPPORT LEBANON'S INTEGRITY IN RESPONSIBLE WAY BUT DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE IN A PROPAGANDA EXCHANGE OVER IT.

2. UNLESS IN YOUR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH DIB PERSUASIVE


74 JUL 25 AM 8:19
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 160772

REASON FOR PUBLICATION EMERGES, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO SAY WE VIEW PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, THAT WE FEEL WE MUST PRESERVE CONFIDENTIALITY AS MATTER OF GENERAL PRINCIPLE, AND WOULD NOT WANT FULL TEXT PUBLISHED. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, HAVE NO OBJECTION TO GOL'S DISCREETLY DISSEMINATING PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES OF CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND OUR LONGSTANDING FRIENDSHIP FOR LEBANON WITHOUT DIRECT QUOTATION. YOU CAN EXPLAIN TO DIS WE FEEL WE ARE IN MORE RESPONSIBLE POSITION IF WE HANDLE OUR CORRESPONDENCE THIS WAY. KISSINGER

41: 8 MA 25 10: 45
SECRET

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
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 145019

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF KHARTOUM MURDERERS

REF: STATE 144601

ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE ACTION ON REPTEL
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. SISCO

62:1 MA 2 JUL 67
SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE

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
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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 7766

74 JUL 5 AM 7:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 145003

12
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WYCLUVERIUS:DF
APPROVED BY NEA - ALATHERTON, JR.
NEA/IAI - HHSTACKHOUSE
NEA/ARN - DAKORN
S/S-O: K. KURZE

007771

P 040359Z JUL 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 145003

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
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, IS
SUBJECT: BRIDGE PROBLEMS

REF: AMMAN 3800

1. DEPT AGREES WITH EMBASSY AMMAN THAT JORDANIAN REQUEST AND A POSITIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE BRIDGE CROSSING PROBLEM WOULD BE A USEFUL STEP IN PROMOTING GREATER TACIT ISRAELI-JORDANIAN COOPERATION. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY TEL AVIV SHOULD APPROACH GOJ AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL AND PASS PRIME MINISTER RIFAI'S REQUEST, PER REFTEL; YOU SHOULD DESCRIBE PROBLEM PER PARAS 2 AND 3, NOTING THAT THIS IS GOJ DESCRIPTION OF SITUATION GIVEN US BY RIFAI AND STRESS POINT THAT RIFAI NOT ASKING FOR REDUCED ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES BUT SIMPLY ISRAELI HELP, PERHAPS BY INCREASING NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND SECURITY FORCES AT BRIDGES, IN INCREASING FLOW OF PERSONS PRESENTLY DELAYED IN BRIDGE AREAS IN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. NOTE ALSO RIFAI'S ASSURANCES PARA 5 RE GOJ SECURITY EFFORTS.

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PAGE 02 STATE 145003

2. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS OUR BELIEF THAT JORDANIAN REQUESTS OF THIS KIND ARE WORTHWHILE FIRST STEPS IN INCREASING ISRAELI-JORDANIAN TRUST AND COOPERATION WHICH, AS IN CASE OF RECENTLY REQUESTED WADI ARABA HYDROLOGICAL DATA, MORE LIKELY TO BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER STEPS IF HELD IN ABSOLUTE SECRECY.


SISCO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 6735

PAGE 01 STATE 121823

66
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO
NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S - MR. FRY

74 JUN 10 AM 8:09
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

0 082214Z JUN 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

088152

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 121823

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: X-GDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, IZ
SUBJECT: US-IRAQI RELATIONS

REF: BAGHDAD 338

BEIRUT POUCH BAGHDAD

1. WE REGARD IRAQI INITIATIVE DESCRIBED PARA 3 REFTTEL AS AN INTERESTING AND ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS FIRST TIME WE CAN RECALL SINCE OPENING OF USINT BAGHDAD IN FALL 1972 (OR FOR THAT MATTER SINCE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS IN 1967) THAT IRAQIS HAVE TAKEN INITIATIVE TO RAISE SUBJECT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH U.S. OR SPOKEN OF RELATIONS IN EVEN MILDLY POSITIVE WAY.

2. DEPARTMENT OF COURSE WOULD WELCOME MOVEMENT BY IRAQ TOWARD IMPROVED RELATIONS. AS YOU TOLD MISS BAQR, WE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS RESUMPTION OF TIES ANY TIME GOI SO DESIRES, THE PACE TOWARDS RESUMPTION TO BE DETERMINED BY IRAQIS. AT THIS STAGE WE BELIEVE BEST TACTIC IS TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND LEAVE INITIATIVE WITH IRAQIS. SUM OF OUR PAST EXPERIENCE WITH CURRENT GOI IS THAT TOO FORWARD A USG

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PAGE 02 STATE 121823

POSITION TENDS TO FRIGHTEN IRAQIS OFF.

3. IN LINE WITH FOREGOING, YOU SHOULD TELL MISS BAQR THAT YOUR REPORT OF YOUR MEETING WITH HER AND HER REMARKS FROM

PREPARED POSITION PAPER HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF SENIOR LEVELS OF DEPARTMENT WHERE IT WAS RECEIVED WITH INTEREST. YOU SHOULD AT SAME TIME ASSURE MISS BAQR THAT USG HAS NO DESIRE TO BECOME INVOLVED IN KURDISH PROBLEM AND SINCERELY HOPES IT CAN BE RESOLVED PEACEFULLY. RE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, YOU SHOULD SAY USG HAS GIVEN AMPLE DEMONSTRATION OF DEPTH AND SINCERITY OF ITS COMMITMENT TO BRINGING ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF TRAGIC CONFLICT WHICH HAS BEEN SO COSTLY TO PEOPLE OF MIDDLE EAST. USG INTENDS TO PURSUE ITS EFFORTS AND WOULD HOPE TO HAVE UNDERSTANDING OF IRAQ AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES OF AREA.

4. DEPARTMENT WILL BE SENDING YOU INFORMATION FOR YOUR BACKGROUND REGARDING CONFISCATED EMBASSY PROPERTY AND DOLS 2 MILLION IN FROZEN IRAQI MILITARY PURCHASE FUNDS WHICH USG HAS HELD SINCE 1967, WHICH ARE TWO MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN USG AND GOI. HOWEVER, BOTH PROBLEMS ARE COMPLEX AND IF IRAQIS RAISE THEM WE WOULD WANT YOU TO LIMIT YOURSELF TO SAYING THAT WE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THEM, WITH A VIEW TO REACHING A MUTUALLY AGREED SOLUTION, AT MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME. KISSINGER

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MIDDLE EAST

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
'74 MAY 32 AM 8:50

CONFIDENTIAL 6861

PAGE 01 STATE 115408

63
ORIGIN SS=30

INFO OCT=01 ISO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN;JMP
APPROVED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN
S/CPR = AMB. CATTO
NEA = MR. BUTCHER
S/S= MR. LUERS

----- 110170

O 010007Z JUN 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 115408

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IZ
SUBJECT: MADAM SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO U.S.


REF: BAGHDAD 338
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

1. YOU MAY ASSURE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT WE WILL GIVE MADAM HUSSEIN ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE AND WILL PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SECURITY COVERAGE FOR HER. WE WILL NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TRAVEL INFO AND NAMES OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING.
2. AT YOUR DISCRETION, YOU MAY ASK FOREIGN MINISTRY IF MADAM HUSSEIN HAS ANY SPECIAL DESIRES FOR ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN MEDICAL TREATMENT WHILE IN THIS COUNTRY. (FYI. SPECIFIC QUESTION IS WHETHER SHE WOULD WANT TO MEET WIFE OF ONE OR MORE SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT WE HESITATE TO MAKE DIRECT INQUIRY ABOUT THIS. END FYI)
3. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE RE VISIT.
4. DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON FONMIN APPROACH RE U.S.-IRAQI

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 115408

RELATIONS WILL BE SENT BY SEPTEL. KISSINGER

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FORM 88-1080



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 6861

PAGE 01 STATE 115408

63
ORIGIN SS=30

INFO OCT-01 ISO=00 SSO=00 NSCE=00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
APPROVED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN
S/CPR = AMB. CATTO
NEA = MR. BUTCHER
S/S= MR. LUERS

110170

O 010007Z JUN 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 115408

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IZ
SUBJECT: MADAM SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO U.S.

REF: BAGHDAD 338
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD

1. YOU MAY ASSURE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT WE WILL GIVE MADAM HUSSEIN ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE AND WILL PROVIDE APPROPRIATE SECURITY COVERAGE FOR HER. WE WILL NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TRAVEL INFO AND NAMES OF THOSE ACCOMPANYING.
2. AT YOUR DISCRETION, YOU MAY ASK FOREIGN MINISTRY IF MADAM HUSSEIN HAS ANY SPECIAL DESIRES FOR ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN MEDICAL TREATMENT WHILE IN THIS COUNTRY. (FYI, SPECIFIC QUESTION IS WHETHER SHE WOULD WANT TO MEET WIFE OF ONE OR MORE SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS, BUT WE HESITATE TO MAKE DIRECT INQUIRY ABOUT THIS. END FYI)
3. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE RE VISIT.
4. DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON FONMIN APPROACH RE U.S.-IRAQI

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
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FORM 88-1070

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 115408

RELATIONS WILL BE SENT BY SEPTEL. KISSINGER


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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 7747

PAGE 01 STATE 111708

71
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:JLWASHBURN:MAK
APPROVED BY IO:WBBUFFUM
NEA/IAI:WTCLUVERIUS
IO/UNP:JWKIMBALL
S/S-O:PPSARROS

74 MAR 29 AM 8:28
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

066017

P R 282343Z MAY 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK


C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 111708

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID SREF UNRWA XF
SUBJECT: UNRWA FINANCING

1. FYI. WE UNDERSTAND VIA VAN WIJK THAT UNRWA COMGEN RENNIE HAS NOW INFORMED HOST GOVERNMENTS BY LETTER THAT, UNLESS ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FORCHCOMING, RATIONS WILL BE REDUCED ON JULY 1 AND LAST THREE CLASSES IN UNRWA SCHOOLS WILL NOT OPEN WHEN ACADEMIC YEAR BEGINS SEPTEMBER 1. END FYI.
2. WITHOUT DISCLOSING SOURCE OUR INFO, REQUEST YOU SEEK FURTHER INFO RE SUBSTANCE AND TONE OF RENNIE'S LETTER. RUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 5699

PAGE 01 STATE 104361

67
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WTCLUVERIUS:DF
APPROVED BY NEA - SSOBER
IO - WBUFFUM
NEA/IAI - HHSTACKHOUSE
IO/UNP - XVUNOVIC
NEA/ARN - DAKORN
S/S - WHLUERS

068752

O 180005Z MAY 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 104361

EXDIS, TOSEC 759

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: EAID, SREF, UNRWA, XF
SUBJECT: UNRWA FINANCES

REF: BEIRUT 5403


S/S FOR ATHERTON

1. ACCORDING REFTEL SIR JOHN PLANNED INFORM UNRWA HOST GOVERNMENTS FINANCIAL FACTS WHICH WILL NECESSITATE CUTS IN SERVICES. SIR JOHN SAID HE WOULD SO INFORM HOSTS BY CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO FONMIN DURING WEEK MAY 13. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP WHETHER SIR JOHN HAS ACTED.

2. FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY. SUGGEST THAT IF SIR JOHN HAS NOT SENT LETTER TO HOST GOVERNMENTS, EMBASSY BEIRUT BE INSTRUCTED REQUEST THAT IF POSSIBLE SIR JOHN DELAY FOR WEEK OR SO, GIVING USG TIME ASSESS IMPACT OF ISRAELI RAIDS ON UNRWA CAMPS ON AGENCY'S NEEDS AND ON OUR ABILITY TO HELP MEET NEEDS. RUSH

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Department of State
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'74 MAY 17 AM 9:49

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2604

PAGE 01 STATE 103059

64
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 180-00 390-00 200-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY TEXT REC'D FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY S/S:WHLUERS
NEA:SSOBER
NSC:GEN. SCOWCROFT

052556

O 170206Z MAY 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 103059

EXDIS, TOSEC 734, ZFF JERUSALEM ONLY

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE

1. FOR BEIRUT: THE WHITE HOUSE HAS REQUESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE UPON RECEIPT OF EXECUTE MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I LEARNED TODAY WITH GREAT SORROW OF THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES IN LEBANON. ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I EXTEND MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON. I OFFER MY PERSONAL HOPE THAT PEACE CAN SOON BE BROUGHT TO YOUR TROUBLED REGION OF THE WORLD TO BREAK FOREVER THIS TRAGIC CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. IT IS TOWARD THIS GOAL THAT THE UNITED STATES IS WORKING WITH ALL ITS ENERGY. SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON. END TEXT.


2. FOR JERUSALEM: PLEASE SEND EXECUTE MESSAGE TO BEIRUT TO DELIVER FOREGOING ONCE SECRETARY HAS APPROVED TEXT WHICH HAS BEEN CLEARED BY GENERAL SCOWCROFT. RUSH

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FORM 88-1072



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'74 MAY 5 PM 1:11

CONFIDENTIAL 3910

PAGE 01 STATE 092114

10
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:JLWASHBURN
APPROVED BY IO - WILLIAM B. BUFFUM
NEA/IAI - MR. CLUVERIUS (SUBS)
S/P - MR. KONTOS
S/S:SRGAMMON

030172

R 040030Z MAY 74 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USINT DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USDEL ALEXANDRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 092114
EXDIS
TOSEC 219, DAMASCUS AND ALEXANDRIA ONLY ZFF

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EAID, SREF, UNRWA, XF
SUBJECT: UNRWA FINANCES


REF: BEIRUT 5141

ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO UNRWA COMGEN RENNIE FROM ASST. SECRETARY BUFFUM.
2. QUOTE: WHILE FULLY APPRECIATING DILEMMA YOU FACE, I MUCH REGRET HEARING THAT SINCE OUR LAST MEETING CIRCUM-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM


CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 092114

STANCES HAVE FURTHER PRESSED YOU TOWARD DECISION TO REDUCE UNRWA'S SERVICES. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE BEEN MAKING EVERY EFFORT HERE TO GET SUBSTANTIAL HELP FOR YOU IN MEETING UNRWA'S DEFICITS AND US GOVT IS TAKING VERY SYMPATHETIC VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF ASSURING THAT UNRWA PROGRAMS NOT BE DISRUPTED. BILL KONTOS AND I ARE QUITE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE FOUND A WAY TO OBTAIN FOR YOU IN JULY ABOUT DOLS 10 MILLION AS AN ADVANCE ON OUR REGULAR CONTRIBUTION. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE PROSPECTS ARE VERY GOOD THAT AT LATEST BY AUTUMN WE CAN PROVIDE SPECIAL US CONTRIBUTION FOR UNRWA LARGE ENOUGH TO MEET YOUR MOST ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTORING UNRWA TO A SOUND FINANCIAL POSITION. SPECIFICS AND TIMING OF THIS SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS, WHICH YOU WILL UNDERSTAND ARE NOW SOMEWHAT TIME-CONSUMING. FURTHER THERE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING RESPONSES TO OUR APPROACHES TO SAUDI ARABIA, UAE, AND BAHREIN. ACCORDINGLY, STRONGLY HOPE YOU CAN DEFER NOTIFICATION TO YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS OF IMPENDING REDUCTIONS IN UNRWA'S ACTIVITIES PENDING FURTHER WORD FROM ME. I FULLY RECOGNIZE NATURE OF PROBLEMS YOU FACE BUT SINCERELY BELIEVE THE OUTLOOK IS GOOD ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY ASKING YOU TO BEAR WITH US A LITTLE LONGER. UNQUOTE. RUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 601

PAGE 01 STATE 030332

12
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/AMB. GODLEY:JFC
APPROVED BY NEA - AMB. GODLEY
S/S - MR. LUERS

037817

P 141956Z FEB 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 030332

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS:APER, U.S. (GODLEY, G. MCMURTRIE)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S TRAVEL

REF: BEIRUT 1815

FOR CHARGE FROM GODLEY

1. KORN AND I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR 1815. YOUR SUGGESTIONS RE AIRPORT SOUND PERFECT. I AM CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT 1755 ON TUESDAY FEB. 26 ON MEA 252 FROM ATHENS. SUGGEST YOU COORDINATE WITH S.O. ATHENS RE USING FICTITIOUS NAME ON MANIFEST AND OTHER SECURITY MATTERS.
2. AM SCHEDULED ARRIVE ATHENS AT 1355 FEB. 23 ON TWA 840.
3. WIFE, SONS AGE 5 AND 6, NEW ZEALAND NANNY AND TWO FILIPINO MAIDS ACCOMPANYING ME.
4. AM DELIGHTED YOU AND LOIS WILL BE FREE TO DINE WITH US THAT EVENING.
5. FOR ATHENS: DO NOT RPT NOT NEED TO BE MET. WOULD

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 030332

APPRECIATE, HOWEVER, IF RESERVATIONS MIGHT BE MADE AT HILTON FOR 3 DOUBLES PLUS ONE LIVING ROOM, WITH COT TO BE ADDED IN ONE OF THE DOUBLES FOR NIGHTS OF FEB. 23 THROUGH FEB. 25. KISSINGER

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SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 910

PAGE 01 STATE 027852

71
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/IAI - MR. STACKHOUSE
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S -0: MR. EALUM

74 FEB 12 AM 8:19

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

127629

O R 112311Z FEB 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 027852

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, IS, LE
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON


REF: TEL AVIV 780

1. FOR BEIRUT: EMBASSY SHOULD RAISE LATEST FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WITH APPROPRIATE GOL AUTHORITIES AND STRESS IMPORTANCE OF GOL'S MAINTAINING CONTINUING TIGHT CONTROL OVER BORDER AREA.
2. FOR TEL AVIV: YOU MAY INFORM GOL THAT USG IS TAKING MATTER UP WITH LEBANESE, KISSINGER

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TELEGRAM

74 JAN 10 AM 8:23

SECRET 339

PAGE 01 STATE 004768

71
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IRN:JCMIKLOS:ML
APPROVED BY NEA/IRN - JACK C. MIKLOS
PM/ISO - MR. STODDART
DOD/ISA - MR. PEYER
DOD/J-3 - CAPTAIN KLEIN
CNO - CAPT. GIOVANNETTI
DOD/J-6 - COL. WILCOX

056817

P R 092219Z JAN 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
SECDEF
JCS RUHQHQA/CINCPAC
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 004768
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, IR
SUBJECT: INDIAN OCEAN COMMUNICATIONS

1. DOD HAS DECIDED THERE IS NO PRESENT REQUIREMENT FOR RETENTION OF A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT AT BANDAR ABBAS AT THIS TIME AND, AS EMBASSY MAY BE AWARE, THE USAFE MOBILE UNIT HAS BEEN DIRECTED REDEPLOY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT O/A 12 JANUARY. YOU MAY WISH TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS USG APPRECIATION FOR GOI SUPPORT OF THIS UNIT.
2. P-3 OPERATIONS AT BANDAR ABBAS SCHEDULED TO BE PHASED DOWN WITH ONE PATROL FLIGHT PER DAY PLANNED FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
3. INFO ON PURPOSE AND DURATION OF INDIAN OCEAN TASK GROUP REQUESTED IN TEHRAN 43 AS WELL AS COMMENT ON POINTS RAISED

SECRET


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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 004768

TEHRAN 227 WILL BE PROVIDED ASAP. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OCT: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MISS ELTZ, 1/9/74.

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
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670/19/2070

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Department of State
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'74 JAN 10 AM 8:23

CONFIDENTIAL 099

PAGE 01 STATE 004463

67
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY IO?UNP:XVUNOVIC:MAK
APPROVED BY IO/UNP:IMROTHENBERG
NEA/ARN:DAKORN
NEA/IAI:WTCLUVERIUS
PM/ISO:HGHAGERTY
OSD/ISA - COL. FORRELL

S/S - MR. LUERS

055522

P R 091947Z JAN 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 004463

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: ADRG, MARR, IL, XF, US
SUBJECT: USUNTSO OBSERVERS IN LEBANON

REF: USUN 5746, STATE 247511, TEL AVIV 10374,
JERUSALEM 1525, JERUSALEM 1538

1. DEPT IS CONSIDERING QUESTION OF PRESENCE US UNTSO
OBSERVERS IN LEBANON. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION
FROM BEIRUT ON GOL POSITION RE RETENTION US OBSERVERS.
HAS GOL REQUESTED US OBSERVERS BE TRANSFERRED IN ORDER
FORESTALL PRESSURE TO ACCEPT SOVIET OBSERVERS OR HAS UN
INFORMED GOL IT MUST ACCEPT SOVIET OBSERVERS IF IT IS
TO RETAIN US OBSERVERS?

2. FOR USUN: WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON UN POLICY


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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 004463

ON STATIONING SOVIET OBSERVERS IN LEBANON. HAVE SOVIETS
PRESSED UN TO SEND SOVIET OBSERVERS TO LEBANON? KISSINGER

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8/2/10/2090

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 220

PAGE 01 STATE 249911

53
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

66604
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM:EMP
12/24/73
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
S/S:MR. PICKERING

086381

R 241757Z DEC 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T STATE 249911

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUFFUM

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XX, SY, EG, YE
SUBJ: NUMAN VISIT TO SYRIA

REF: SANAA 2424

NO OBJECTION TO YOUR MEETING NUMAN BUT BELIEVE OUR PRESENT
CHANNELS TO SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ARE ADEQUATE. KISSINGER

73 DEC 26 AM 8:08

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 936

PAGE 01 STATE 245606

72-S
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY S/S:SRGAMMON:AL
APPROVED BY S/S:TRPICKERING
NEA/ARN: MR. DJEREJIAN

014032

O 152036Z DEC 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 245606

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: ADS--DECLAS FEB. 28, 1974
TAGS: OVIP, LE (FRANGIE, SLEIMAN)
SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT LEBANESE PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 245450

REQUEST YOU DEFER ACTION ON REFTEL TO PERMIT SECRETARY
TO BRING THE WELCOME WORD. RUSH

73 DEC 16 AM 9:24
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 226

PAGE 01 STATE 217468

73
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

2

DRAFTED BY NEA/EX:TWDAVIS, JR:ATM
APPROVED BY NEA/EX:LEAMON R. HUNT
NEA:JJSISCO (SUBSTANCE)
NEA:ALATHERTON (SUBSTANCE)
S/S-MR. PICKERING
S/S-EX:RMILLER

973 NOV
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
026622
PM 12:36

O 032312Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 217468

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (JOSEPH J. SISCO)
SUBJ: ASSISTANT SECRETARY TRAVEL


BRUSSELS FOR USREP NATO

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 217468

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S ITINERARY HAS BEEN AMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10

LEAVE ISLAMABAD	0930
ARRIVE BEIRUT	1245

NOTE: THIS SCHEDULE PROVIDES SUFFICIENT TIME IN BEIRUT FOR STOP IN DAMASCUS EITHER ENROUTE BEIRUT OR FROM BEIRUT IF NECESSARY

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 11

EAVE BEIRUT	1200
ARRIVE TEL AVIV	1245

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12

LEAVE TEL AVIV	0900
ARRIVE ROME	1105

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13

LEAVE ROME	0800
ARRIVE BONN	0950

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14

LEAVE BONN	0800
ARRIVE BRUSSELS	0840

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15


LEAVE BRUSSELS	0930
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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 217468

ARRIVE PARIS 1020

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16

LEAVE PARIS 0930

ARRIVE LONDON 0940

LEAVE LONDON 1500

ARRIVE ANDREWS 1810

2. PLEASE ARRANGE CONSULTATIONS ACCORDINGLY. KISSINGER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 223

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PAGE 01 STATE 217466

71
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:JJSISCO:HLK
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S - MR. PICKERING

026576

O 032310Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

73 NOV 1 PM 12:36
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 217466

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH J.)
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S TRAVEL

1. BOTH UK AND FRENCH EMBASSIES HERE HAVE CONFIRMED
THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WELCOME CONSULTATIONS WITH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO EN ROUTE BACK FROM ACCOMPANYING

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 217466

SECRETARY ON HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP. ITALIANS HAVE ALSO PRESSED US, AND SISCO HAS AGREED TO GO TO ROME. LIKEWISE, GERMANS HAVE RENDERED SEVERAL INVITATIONS FOR MIDDLE EAST CONSULTATIONS IN THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS, AND WE HAVE INDICATED THAT THERE COULD BE A STOP IN BONN IF DESIRED. GERMAN EMBASSY HAS CHECKED WITH FOREIGN OFFICE AND INFORMS US BONN WELCOMES SISCO VISIT.

2. WE WILL SEND ALL ADDRESSEES REVISED SISCO SCHEDULE.

3. FOR KUWAIT: IN LIGHT YOUR 3921, SISCO WILL NOT REPEAT NOT STOP IN KUWAIT. KISSINGER

242 - AM* BUCHENING
254 - AM* VINCIGN
255 - AM* VINCIGN
256 - AM* VINCIGN

1160 00191 120-85 220-85 100-85 100-85

011014 22420

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BY02 01 21415 21140

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51010/10/2090

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 090515Z JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8868.
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 7833

CONTROL: 2 0 9 0 Q

Recd : 9 July
01:44 A.M.

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, LE, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES

REF: STATE 142845

1. TO DATE WE HAVE HAD NO REPEAT NO INQUIRIES RE DAILY TELEGRAPH'S STORY OR STORIES THAT APPEARED IN JERUSALEM RE SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES.
2. HOWEVER WHEN I CALLED ON PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER BOUTROS DIB THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK OFF ON THIS STORY, WHICH HE SAID WAS DELIBERATE ISRAELI LEAK TO EMBARRASS LEBANESE. I HAVE NEVER SEEN THE NORMALLY SOFT-SPOKEN DIB IN A MORE BITTER AND VITRIOLIC MOOD. HE SAID THAT THIS STORY, HAD IT BEEN TAKEN UP THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD, COULD HAVE ONLY CAUSED INESTIMABLE PROBLEMS FOR THE HANDFUL OF LEBANESE WHO FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS PARTICIPATED IN FACILITATING REFUGEES TRANSITING LEBANON. THIS HANDFUL OF MEN, ACCORDING TO DIB, HAVE NOW LEARNED THEIR LESSON.
3. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO TEL AVIV. GODLEY



27. ADX 8
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

~~Z 021418Z~~ JUL 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8764
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 7604

0 4 1 4 Q
02 JUL 74 Z14 51

MODIS

EO 11652: XGDS3
TAGS: SREF LE SY
SUBJ: SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES

REF: LONDON 8235

1. DEPT WILL NOTE THAT DAILY TELEGRAPH STORY QUOTED REFTEL GIVES ALMOST COMPLETELY ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF JAN. 6 MASS EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON. WHILE WE HAD BEEN HALF EXPECTING THAT NEWS OF THIS OPERATION WOULD LEAK TO WORLD PRESS AT SOME POINT (AND ARE GLAD IT TOOK ALMOST 6 MONTHS TO DO SO), WE ARE APPALLED THAT IT HAS LEAKED IN SO MUCH DETAIL AND THAT IT RECEIVING PLAY IN ISRAELI PRESS (FBIS M012215). WE PARTICULARLY UPSET BY LIKELIHOOD THAT ARTICLE'S REFERENCE TO "PROMINENT MEMBER OF LEBANESE JEWISH COMMUNITY" WILL CAUSE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES FOR DR. YUSUF ATIYEH IN PARTICULAR AND FOR LOCAL JEWISH COMMUNITY IN GENERAL - AT WORSE PLACING THEM IN SOME DANGER OR, AT BEST, SEVERELY CIRCUMSCRIBING THEIR ABILITY TO ASSIST AND PROVIDE VALUABLE INFORMATION ON SYRIAN JEWS IN FUTURE. SAME GOES (IN SPADES) FOR THOSE GOL OFFICIALS WHO, IN COOPERATION WITH LEBANESE JEWISH COMMUNITY, HAVE IN PAST BEEN WILLING ASSIST TRANSIT OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES THROUGH LEBANON ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS.

2. FBIS REPORT MENTIONED ABOVE QUOTES "AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES" (WE PRESUME THIS REFERS TO GOL OFFICIALS) AS DISMISSING TELEGRAPH ARTICLE AS "FANTASTIC," ETC. FOR THE MOMENT WE HAVE ONLY ONE ENQUIRY WHICH WE CAN STALL FOR A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME. HOWEVER, INN LIGHT DAILY TELEGRAPH STORY, SEEMS MORE THAN LIKELY THAT DEPT MAY HAVE QUESTION AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING JULY 2 AND THAT WE WILL RECEIVE FURTHER ENQUIRIES HERE. SO FAR, ISSUE INVOLVES GOL, LEBANESE AND SYRIAN JEWRY AND OURSELVES. IT SEEMS TO US THE ONLY WAY WE CAN PROTECT ALL CONCERNED IS FOR THE DEPT AND THIS EMBASSY TO DENY KNOWLEDGE OF INCIDENT. WHILE THIS DOES NOT COINCIDE WITH ALL THE FACTS, WE CAN THINK OF NO OTHER COURSE THAT WILL PROTECT THOSE INVOLVED.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

O 311433Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8100
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 6055

CONTROL: 9708Q
RECVD: 31 MAY 74
12:07PM

NODIS - CHEROKEE

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT LE IS XF SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON AND ISRAEL, SYRIA AND FEDAYEEN

1. ENBOFF EXPLAINED VERY CAREFULLY TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S SON AND MINISTER FOR PTT TONY FRANGIE APPROPRIATE PARTS OF SECTO 774 AND 791 (NOTAL) STRESSING THAT SECRETARY WISHED PRESIDENT BE FULLY AWARE OF THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO LEBANON AND THAT SECRETARY ALSO WISHED PRESIDENT FRANGIE BE AWARE THAT OUR BASIC POLICY TOWARD LEBANON IN CONTEXT FEDAYEEN-ISRAELI TROUBLES HAS NOT CHANGED. SOME SORT OF ENGAGEMENT RE CONTROL OF PARA-MILITARY ACTION OUT OF SYRIA OBVIOUSLY ESSENTIAL AND IS PART OF 1949 LEBANON-ISRAEL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS WELL AS EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.

2. TONY FRANGIE SAID HIS FATHER WOULD BE VERY PLEASED AT COMMUNICATION FROM SECRETARY AND WOULD FIND IT REASSURING. TONY SAID HE INTERPRETED OUR POSITION AS BEING ESSENTIALLY WHAT IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN VIS-A-VIS LEBANON, FEDAYEEN AND ISRAEL; I.E., USG WOULD DO ITS BEST TO HELP BUT THERE WOULD INEVITABLY BE PROBLEMS BEYOND OUR POWER TO PREVENT. HE SAID PRESIDENT FORESEES DIFFICULT TIMES AHEAD WITH FEDAYEEN BUT IS WORKING TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OF OTHER ARAB STATES IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM. RECENT TRIP OF PRIME MINISTER AND FONMIN TO GULF IS ONE FACET OF THIS EFFORT.

3. ANOTHER FACET, ACCORDONG TO TONY, WAS HIS OWN TRIP LAST WEEK TO DANASCUS WHERE HE STAYED OVERNIGHT AND WAS ABLE TO TALK TO KEY SARG LEADERS. TONY SAID THAT SARG ATTITUDE ON FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, AS INTIMATED SECTO 774, FITS EXACTLY WITH WHAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 6055, 31 MAY 74

AND WITH PATTERN OF PAST SARG ACTIONS (INCLUDING RAPID, BRUTAL, EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION OF SYRIAN SECURITY SERVICES WHEN TWO FEDAYEEN GROUPS BEGAN SHOOTING AT ONE ANOTHER ON MAY 20). TONY SAID THAT SYRIANS HAD IMPRESSED HIM AS HAVING MOST SERIOUS INTENTIONS OBTAIN AND THEN STRICTLY RESPECT DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL. THEY WANT TO PUT AN END TO FIGHTING AND RELATED PROBLEMS AND GET ON WITH BUILDING SYRIA ECONOMICALLY.

4. IN ECONOMIC CONTEXT, TONY SAID HE HAD EXPLORED WITH SARG, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS FATHER, WHAT GOL COULD DO TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAD ONCE BEEN CLOSE BUT HAD FALLEN OFF BADLY OVER PAST TWENTY YEARS. SYRIANS HAD BEEN VERY RECEPTIVE, ACCORDING TO TONY, AND CONCRETE ACTIONS SHOULD BEGIN IN NEXT FEW WEEKS.

5. COMMENT: WE KNOW FROM TALKS WITH KEY LEBANESE ARMY OFFICIALS AS WELL AS OTHER SOURCES THAT GOL AWARE OF PREPARATIONS BY FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING FATAH, FOR STEPPED-UP ACTIONS INSIDE ISRAEL, INCLUDING INFILTRATION FROM LEBANON WHICH LIABLE BRING IDF RETALIATION AND MORE DIFFICULTIES FOR LEBANON. (RECENT LEVEL IDF SHELLING ALONG BORDER ALREADY CAUSING SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH LOCAL POPULATION.) LEBANESE ARMY ALSO FEARS FEDAYEEN EXTREMIST GROPS, WORKING WITH IRAQ AND LIBYA, WILL ENGAGE IN SMALL-SCALE INCIDENTS INSIDE LEBANON TO KEEP THINGS STIRRED UP AND, IF POSSIBLE, SET OFF EXPLOSION BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN WHICH COULD UPSET IMPROVING SITUATION IN AREA. SAME FEARS VOICED BY TONY FRANGIE WHO POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON IS ONLY COUNTRY BORDERING ISRAEL TOO WEAK POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY TO CONTROL ITS INTERNAL SITUATION. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE DOING HIS BEST OBTAIN SUPPORT OTHER ARAB GOVTS AND ALSO STRENGTHEN LEBANESE ARMY.

6. PLEASE REPEAT AS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE. GODLEY

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 01210
RECD: 1 JUN 74 7:08AM

P 010858Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8130
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 6094

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE US
SUBJECT: VISIT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WHEN I SAW FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFAH HE ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESIDENT NIXON VISITING THE MIDDLE EAST. I TILD HIM I HAD NO NEWS OF SUCH A TRIP AND HAD ONLY SEEN THE PRESS SPECULATION. NAFFAH SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT VISITED ALL OTHER STAES BORDERING ISRAEL HE WOULD "HAVE TO" VISIT LEBANON AS WELL. I ASKED NAFFAH IF THIS WAS THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE GOL. HE THOUGHT FOR A FEW SECOND AND THEN RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A "PERSONAL OFFICIAL INQUIRY." GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

O 041645Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8193
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 6245

CONTROL: 0862Q
RECD: 04 JUN '74 2:03pm

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

REF: BEIRUT 6188

1. AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL JUNE 4 I DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE OUR PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE CONTAINED DEPTTEL 116131. TOGETHER WITH INFORMAL FRENCH TRANSLATION PREPARED IN EMBASSY. PRESIDENT READ LATTER SLOWLY AND WITH GREAT CARE. HE FLUSHED AND THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO TELL ME AN ARAB PARABLE. AN IRRELIGIOUS MUSLIM WAS FORCED BY HIS RELIGIOUS WIFE TO GO TO THE MOSQUE. UPON ARRIVAL HE FOUND THE DOORS SHUT AND WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE TO THE LORD FOR RELIEVING HIM OF HIS OBLIGATION. FRANGIE CONTINUED THAT OUR PRESIDENT, BY HIS APPRECIATION OF THE LEBANESE SCENE, HAD RELIEVED FRANGIE OF HIS GREAT BURDEN. IN ALL HONESTY, FRANGIE CONTINUED, HE HAD TO RECOGNIZE HE COULD NOT AT THIS TIME GUARANTEE SUFFICIENT SECURITY IN HIS COUNTRY TO RECEIVE OUR PRESIDENT. THE LATTER, HOWEVER, OBVIOUSLY UNDERSTANDING FRANGIE'S POSITION, HAD TAKEN THE RESPONSIBILITY ON HIS OWN AND HAD MADE A WISE DECISION. AT THIS POINT I NOTED THAT I COULD NOT AUTHORIZE THE PUBLICATION OF OUR PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. FRANGIE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SUCH AN AUTHORIZATION IF THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE.

2. FRANGIE, OBVIOUSLY MOST APPRECIATE AND TOUCHED BY SUBSTANCE AND FORM PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, THEN ASKED WHAT THE FUTURE HELD FOR THIS PART OF THE WORLD. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT I COULD NOT REPLY OFFICIALLY TO HIS INQUIRE. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I BELIEVED THERE WAS WORK TO BE DONE NOT ONLY IN THE PALESTINIAN AND ARAB WORLDS BUT ALSO IN ISRAEL IN PREPARING FOR THE NEXT STEP. WHILE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE PLAN GENERATED BY OUR RECENT SUCCESSES MUST BE MAINTAINED, I NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT

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TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 6245, 04 JUN'74

IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES UNTIL BOTH SIDES KNEW THEIR MINIMAL AND OPTIMA POSITIONS AND WERE PREPARED IN BOTH CAMPS TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS NECESSARY TO ANY SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. THE PRESIDENT NODDED IN ASSENT AND AFTER I ASKED HIM HOW HE SAW THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION TODAY HE REFERRED TO THE CAIRO MEETING NOW GOING ON AMONG PALESTINIANS. HIS LATEST INFO THEREON WAS THAT ALTHOUGH SCHEDULED FOR ONLY TWO DAY, HE UNDERSTOOD IT WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE CURRENT WEEKS. HE SAID HE WAS QUITE SURE THAT NOT ONLY ARAFAT BUT ALSO THE SAJQA LEADERS AS WELL AS HAWATMEH WERE WISE AND COULD FIND A COMMON GROUND. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HABASH WILL BE MEETING WITH ARAFAT WHEN ARAFAT RETURNS TO BEIRUT AND HE THOUGHT THAT SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE MIGHT COME OUT OF THIS MEETING. HE DISMISSED JIBRIL AS AN IRAQI PAWN WHO WAS TOTALLY UNCONSTRUCTIVE.

3. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID HE SPOKE TO UNSYG YESTERDAY DURING LATTER'S BRIEF VISIT TO LEBANON AND ASKED IF WALDHEIM COULD INCREASE THE UN OBSERVERS IN LEBANON FROM THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH OF 38 TO BETWEEN 150 AND 250. WALDHEIM SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER. FRANGIE HAD TAKEN THIS ACTION, FOR HE SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM, GIVEN THE LOCAL LEBANESE POLITICAL SITUATION, TO BRING INTO LEBANON A UN FORCE. I INQUIRED IF HE HAD GAINED ANYTHING FROM THE CONVERSATIONS WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDOAM. HE DISMISSED THIS WITH A WAVE OF THE HAND STATING ALTHOUGH SAJQA WAS UNDER TIGHT SYRIAN CONTROL AND WAS THEREFORE A SOUND ELEMENT, THE SYRIANS DIDN'T GIVE A HOOT ABOUT THE GOL'S PROBLEMS WITH THE REFUGEES AND AS FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED WOULD LIKE TO SEND ALL THE REFUGEES FROM SYRIA TO THE LEBANON. (PRESIDENT IS OBVIOUSLY TALKING ABOUT REDAYEEN AND REFUGEES AT SAME TIME.)

4. THE REFUGEES, ACCORDING TO FRANGIE, PRESENT THE MOST DIFFICULT LONG TERM PROBLEM FOR THE GOL. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, FRANGIE CONSIDERED THAT HE WAS "RESPONSIBLE" FOR THEIR PRESENCE HERE, I.E. HE COULD NOT THROW THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY UNTIL THERE WAS SOME PLACE TO WHERE HE COULD SEND THEM. HE HAD NO ONLY A MATERIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR WELL-BEING HERE BUT ALSO A VAGUE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR. NOTWITHSTANDING THE LATTER, HE COULD NOT

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TELEGRAM

-3- BEIRUT 6245, 04 JUN '74

IMPLEMENT HIS MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM FOR ALTHOUGH HE HAD TRIED LAST MAY, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO CONTROL THEIR ACTIVITIES HERE. THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED THAT IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO FIND SOME SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM THIS SOLUTION, HE RECOGNIZES, IS DIFFICULT, FOR EVEN IF A WEST BANK AREA MIGHT BE SET ASIDE FOR THEM, IT WOULD BE TOO SMALL TO ACCOMMODATE ALL THE REFUGEES NOW IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, ELIMINATE SOME OF THE GOL'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REFUGEES IN THAT IF THEY WERE TO MISBEHAVE HERE THEY COULD BE SENT TO THEIR HOMELAND. FEW WOULD GO, ACCORDING TO THE PRESIDENT, AND MANY WOULD REMAIN IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS WOULD OF COURSE PRESENT TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE GOL IN THAT IT WOULD DISCOMBOBULATE THE DELICATE RELIGIOUS BALANCE NOW EXISTING IN THIS COUNTRY. HE DID NOT HOWEVER SEE HOW THIS COULD BE AVOIDED AND THEREFORE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE LONGER TERM FUTURE FOR HIS COUNTRY. HE ASKED WHAT THE GREAT POWERS COULD DO TO EASE THE LEBANON'S FUTURE PROBLEMS. ALL I COULD RESPOND WAS THAT OUR PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT WE WOULD DO OUR VERY BEST TO ASSURE A JUST AND HONORABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT I WAS CONFIDENT THAT MY GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES FACING LEBANON. GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 01250

RECD: 1 JUN 74 7:14 AM

R 010526Z JUN 74
FM ANEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8121
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 6086

NODIS - CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT

REF: BEIRUT 6055

1. AT 1630 LOCAL MAY 31 I SAW NAFFAH AND REVIEWED WITH HIM SECTO 774 AND 791. HE SAID HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THESE MESSAGES WHICH CONFIRMED WHAT HE HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED TO THE PRESS HERE AS HIS REACTION TO MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT HEADLINED IN ANY OF THE LEBANESE PRESS AND WAS BURIED IN LONGISH ARTICLES RE KINNESET APPROVAL OF DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND ISRAELI RIGHTIST ATTACKS AGAINST MRS. MEIR. BELIEVE THAT IMPACT OF MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT WAS MINIMIZED, DUE TO FACT THAT AS ANTICIPATED SECTO 756, SPECULATIVE PRESS STORIES HAD ALREADY APPEARED AND MADE HER ACTUAL STATEMENT OLD SHOE NEWS.

2. NAFFAH SAID HE TOLD PRESS THAT MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT REFERRED TO SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AND THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO CHANGE IN U.S. OVERNEMNT POLICY. GODLEY

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06018 301554Z

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ACTION CCO-00

INFO DCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

O 301526Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8092

087631

S E C R E T BEIRUT 6018

EXDIS HANDED AS NODIS/CHEROKEE.

ED 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: STATEMENT RE TERRORISTS

REF: SECTO 774

1. ASSUME MEIR STATEMENT MENTIONED REFTEL APPLIES ONLY TO RAIDS ACROSS SYRIAN-ISRAELI BORDER AND NOT TO FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS ACROSS LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. IF SUCH IS NOT CASE, GOL WILL BE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY MEIR'S STATEMENT WHICH THEY WILL INTERPRET AS GIVING ISRAELIS CARTE BLANCHE TAKE WHATEVER ACTION THEY CHOOSE AND WITH USG'S BLESSING IN EVENT FEDAYEEN CROSS, OR ARE SUSPECTED OF CROSSING, INTO ISRAEL WITH ENSURING INCIDENT. LEBANESE WILL ARGUE SYRIANS WITH SUBSTANTIAL ARMY MUCH BETTER EQUIPPED FORESTALL FEDAYEEN CROSSING THAN LEBANESE WITH SMALL ARMY AND DIFFICULT TERRAIN.

2. AS LEBANESE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RAISE QUESTION, I URGENTLY REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO EXPLAIN THAT MEIR'S STATEMENT DOES NOT APPLY TO LEBANON AND THAT USG POSITION RE FEDAYEEN BORDER CROSSING OR SUSPECTED CROSSINGS WILL BE DETERMINED BY ITS UNDERSTANDING OF FACTS OF EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE.
GODLEY

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CONTROL: 9106Q
RECD: 29 MAY '74R 291458Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1488
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8071
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 5973

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: NA
TAGS: OGEN EG
SUBJ: TRANSMISSION OF FORMS FOR GRADUATE STUDY APPLICATION
REF: STATE 110844 AND BEIRUT 57731. DR. HASSAN L. TOBGY OF THE FORD FOUNDATION IS
FLYING TO CAIRO MAY 30, AND BRINGING YOU APPLICATION
FORMS FOR "ADMISSION TEXT FOR GRADUATE STUDY
IN BUSINESS." AS EVER.

GODLEY

BT
#5973

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER S/S-O, MR. NEWLIN.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05822 240833Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 (CCO) W
----- 024833

Z O 240814Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7994

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5822

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

JERUSALEM FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US SY IS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR SECRETARY FROM SARG VIA SCOTES

1. SCOTES CALLED URGENTLY AT 1100 MAY 24 TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN MESSAGE AT 0900 FOR SECRETARY WHICH HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TRANSMIT AS YET DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES. SCOTES TALKED AROUND MESSAGE ON PHONE TO EMBOFF AND ASKED THAT IT BE RELAYED FLASH TO SECRETARY. MESSAGE AS DICTATED BY SCOTES, WHO HOPES SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS, IS AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: GROMYKO'S FRIEND SAW SCOTES EARLY MAY 24 BEFORE GOING HUNTING. HE ASKED SCOTES TO TELL SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT HIS BOSS WANTS SECRETARY TO HAVE CLEARLY IN MIND THAT "HARVARD" POCKET LINE ON BASIS 10/6 RPT 10/6 LINE IS CONSIDERED "IMPORTANT AND BASIC". UNQUOTE.
GODLEY

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 5033Q
RECD: 16 MAY 11 40Z

O 161046Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 2591
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7858
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 5541

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1
TAGS: PFOR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE HELD BY GOI AND MAALOT MASSACRE

REF: SECTO 429

1. FIRST THING THIS MORNING I SOUGHT IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH NAFFA. MY CALL CROSSED WITH ONE FROM HIS SECRETARY INVITING ME TO APPEAR AT 11:30 LOCAL. I INITIATED CONVERSATION BY GIVING HIM GIST REFTEL, EMPHASIZING IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THE SECOND PARAGRAPH THEREOF. HE THEN RAISED HIS SUBJECT WHICH, AS EXPECTED, WAS CONCERN RE ISRAELI REPRISAL AND HOPE THAT WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT SUCH ACTION FOR IF THERE WAS REPRISAL ALL HE COULD DO WOULD BE, OF COURSE, AGAIN TO GO TO SECURITY COUNCIL. CITING MRS. MEIR AND DYAN'S STATEMENTS HOLDING LEBANON RESPONSIBLE, NAFFAH REVIEWED AT GREAT LENGTH THE USUAL LEBANESE POSITION RE FACT THAT ERRORISTS DID NOT COME FROM LEBANON, LEBANESE INABILITY TO CONTROL TERRORISTS, NOTWITHSTANDING GREATER ISRAELI MILITARY AND DETECTION CAPABILITY EVEN GOI COULD NOT PRECLUDE SUCH ACTIONS, ETC, ETC.

2. TOLD NAFFAH THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS TO THE SECRETARY BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT ANY ACTION ON OUR PART WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED BY AN IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE OF A STRONG REPEAT STRONG STATEMENT BY THE GOI CONCERNING AND DISASSOCIATING ITSELF FROM SUCH TERRORISTIC ACTIONS. NAFFAH ALLEGED HE WOULD DO SO.

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TELEGRAM

-2- SECRET BEIRUT 5541, NODIS, MAY 16

3. DISCUSSED FOREGOING WITH BOUTROS DIB, FRANGIEH'S CHEF DU CABINET, AND ALSO FOREIGN OFFICE DORECTOR OF US AFFAIRS, KHALIL HADDAD, WHO TELEPHONED ME ON BEHALF OF PRIME MINISTER TO ASCERTAIN OUR VIEWS.
4. I CANNOT, OF COURSE, FORESEE WHAT WILL BE SAID BUT I BELIEVE I HAVE FOR THE MOMENT LEANED AS HEAVILY AS I CAN ON THESE OFFICIALS.
5. BRITISH CHARGE RECEIVED SIMILAR REQUEST THIS A.M. AND WAS PRECEDED BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND FOLLOWED BY PRC AMBASSADOR. WE DO NOT KNOW BUT ASSUME SOVIET CHARGE ALSO CONVOKED. GODLEY
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#5541

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TELEGRAM

O 131606Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7807
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 5446

CONTROL: 3904Q
RECVD: 13 MAY 74
1:19PM

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US, IS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE HELD BY GOI

REF BEIRUT 5374

1. SUBJECT FON MIN NAFFAH DESIRED TO DISCUSS WITH ME THIS MORNING WAS IMPLEMENTATION PARA 4 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION RE RELEASE AND RETURN TO LEBANON OF ABDUCTED LEBANESE CIVILIANS. NAFFAH ASKED IF WE COULD HELP IN THIS CONNECTION WITH GOI. I TOLD HIM I WOULD TRANSMIT HIS REQUEST TO SECRETARY'S PARTY AND TO DEPARTMENT. NAFFAH SAID THAT IF WE COULD NOT HELP HE WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH UNSYG WALDHEIM BUT BEFORE DOING SO WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR OUR ASSISTANCE AND/OR VIEWS.
2. NAFFAH SAID HE HOPED ISRAELIS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT TIE THIRTEEN CIVILIANS IN WITH THE TWO ISRAELI PILOTS. LATTER ARE BEING KEPT BY GOL AND THERE IS NO REPEAT NO QUESTION OF THEIR BEING HANDED OVER TO SYRIANS. FOR THE MOMENT GOL CANNOT REPEAT NOT RELEASE THEM TO GOI. THEY HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN VISITED BY CRC AND NAFFAH ASSURED ME THAT THEY ARE WELL TREATED AND THEIR ONLY COMPLAINT BEING LACK OF HEBREW OR ENGLISH LITERATURE. THIS IS BEING SUPPLIED.
3. I ASKED NAFFAH IF HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THE THIRTEEN WERE LEBANESE CITIZENS. HE WAFFLED ON THIS POINT, INDICATING THEY ALL HAD LEBANESE NAMES. I PRESSED HIM SAYING THAT IF ANY HAPPENED TO BE PALESTINIANS, THIS MIGHT COMPLICATE THE MATTER. HE RETORTED HE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT GIVE FORMAL ASSURANCE BUT HE THOUGHT THEY WERE ALL SIMPLE LEBANESE LOCAL INHABITANTS.

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TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 5446, 13 MAY 74

4. ACTING DIRECTOR GENERAL FOREIGN OFFICE FATTAL PRESENT DURING FOREGOING PORTION OF CONVERSATION. I REQUESTED THAT I SEE NAFFAH ALONE, THEN REVIEWED WITH HIM SECTO 332. NAFFAH ASKED THE QUESTIONS ANTICIPATED AND WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF OBTAINING CONFIRMATION MANY OF THE POINTS THAT HE HAD ALREADY READY ABOUT OR HEARD BUT ON WHICH HE HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION. WHILE NON-COMMITTAL, HE NODDED IN AGREEMENT RE OUR VIEWS ON ARAB SUMMIT.

5. SUBSEQUENTLY SAW PRESIDENT'S CONFIDANT BOUTROS DIB AND TOUCHED UPON SECTO 332. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, HE SAID PRESIDENT WAS FURIOUS WITH PRIME MINISTER SOLH FOR INDICATING THAT GOL PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH IDEA OF ARAB SUMMIT. DIB SAID HE AGREED COMPLETELY WITH OUR VIEWS AND WOULD PRESS POINT WITH PRESIDENT BUT DID NOT BELIEVE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE. THIS TENDS TO EXPLAIN WHY NAFFAH WAS VAGUE WITH ME ON THIS POINT.

GODLEY

BT
#5446

NOTE: NOT passed Secretarys party by OC/T

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Department of State

with
TELEGRAM

7

SECRET

O 101154Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7774
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 5374

3212Q
1974 MAY 10 1222Z

NOOIS

REPEAT TO SECRETARY'S PARTY AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR LE US
SUBJECT: INFORMING GOL ON PROCESS OF DISENGAGEMENT TALKS

REF: BEIRUT 5312

1. HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY LEBANESE FONOFFICE THAT FONMIN NAFFA WILL MEET SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM MAY 11 OR 12 APPARENTLY TO DISCUSS PROGRESS OF DISENGAGEMENT TALKS AND RELATED QUESTIONS, INCLUDING SYRIAN POSITION ON CALL FOR ARAB SUMMIT.

2. FONMIN NAFFA HAS ASKED ME MEET WITH HIM, FOR WHAT REASON I DO NOT KNOW, MAY 13. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WELL WORTH OUR WHILE IF I COULD GIVE NAFFA OR FRANGIE SOME SORT OF OFFICIAL READING OF OUR VIEWS ON DISENGAGEMENT TALKS AND RELATED QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY SINCE I WAS UNABLE DO SO DURING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE.

GODLEY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 2798Q

RECD: 9 MAY 74 7:00AM

O 091009Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7744
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5312

NODIS

DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO SECRETARY AS APPROPRIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US
SUBJECT: CALL ON PRESIDENT FRANGIE

REF: DEPT 095787

1. I HAD CORDIAL 40 MINUTE CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH PRESIDENT TOUCHING ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS BEING REPORTED SEPTELS. PRESIDENT BEGAN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS BY INQUIRING WHETHER I HAD ANY NEWS RE SECRETARY'S TRIP. SAID I HAD NONE BUT CONTINUED TO BE OPTIMISTIC. HAD NOTED THIS MORNING'S PRESS REPORT RE SYRIA'S ALLEGED CONVOCATION ARAB SUMMIT. PRESIDENT SAID HE INTERPRETED THIS AS AN OPTIMISTIC SIGN. PRESIDENT SAID THAT MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA, GULF STATES, SAUDI ARABIA AND LEBANON ARE BEHIND SECRETARY IN HIS CURRENT EFFORTS. ONLY LIBYA AND IRAQ ARE OPPOSED, AND HE DESCRIBED ASSAD AS HALF-OPPOSED AND HALF FOR. ASSAD, ACCORDING TO FRANGIE, HAS DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN THAT CONTRARY TO PRESIDENT BAKR, ASSAD RULED SYRIA DESPITE BAATH PARTY, WHEREAS PARTY RULES IN IRAQ. ASSAD THEREFORE NEEDS BACKING OR COVER OF ARAB LEADERS BEFORE HE CONCLUDES A DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

2. PRESIDENT THEN EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN RE TIMING, NOTING THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE, NO TIME HAD BEEN INDICATED FOR ARAB SUMMIT. TIMING WAS IMPORTANT LEST LIBYANS OR IRAQIS MOUNT ANOTHER KIRYAT SHEMONA, FOR PRESIDENT SAID THEY HAD CAPABILITY TO DO SUCH AND HE FEARED ANOTHER TRAGEDY OF THIS SORT COULD OCCUR AT ANY MOMENT.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE -2- BEIRUT 5312, MAY 9

3. RE QADHAFI, PRESIDENT DISMISSED HIM AS IRRESPONSIBLE AND CRAZY AND IT WAS OBVIOUS PREIDENT CONSIDERS HIM AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS INDIVIDUAL.
4. HOPE SECRETARY'S PARTY WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE ME SOMETHING TO TELL PRESIDENT FOR HE OBVIOUSLY HAS NOTED OTHER ARAB LEADERS BEING ADVISED. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR BITTER BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS HE FEELS A BIT LEFT OUT. GODLEY

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Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 2131Q

RECEIVED: May 7, 1974 637PM

O 072155Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7721
BT
CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 5255

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: TFOR/LE
SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIEH

PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR SISCO FROM AMBASSADOR.
AM HAVING FIRST TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIEH THURSDAY
9:00 AM LOCAL. ARE THERE ANY POINTS YOU OR SECRETARY WISH
ME TO RAISE.

GODLEY

BT
#5255

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

WH L X for How.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1 9 7 5Q

RECD: 07 MAY '74, 1231P

O 071521Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7716
 BT
 S E C R E T BEIRUT 5250

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR US XF
 SUBJECT: 'ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG

REF: STATE 89704

SUMMARY: EMBOFF CONVEYED TO KHALIDI ON MAY 6 MESSAGE CONTAINED PARA 2 REFTEL, MAKING CLEAR THAT MESSAGE WAS FOR KHALIDI AND NOT ADDRESSED TO ANYONE ELSE. HE UNDERSTOOD AND WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF ATTENTION GIVEN HIS CONVERSATION OF APRIL 20 AND OF RECEIVING RESPONSE, WHICH COMES AT TIME OF STEPPED-UP EFFORTS BY RADICAL FEDAYEEN LEADERS TO FORCE HAND OF MORE MODERATE LEADERS. END SUMMARY.

1. KHALIDI COMMENTED THAT WHILE SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE WAS NOT AS "PALPABLE" AS ONE MIGHT HAVE HOPED, IT WAS NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGING. HE PARTICULARLY STRUCK BY SENTENCE NOTING THAT NO POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE, SINCE THIS HAD BEEN ONE OF MAIN FEARS OF MORE MODERATE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP. KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH OF MAY 1ST ALSO REPRESENTED, TO KHALIDI, SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN TRYING MEET PRINCIPAL CONCERNS OF 'ARAFAT AND THOSE ALLIED WITH HIM.

2. KHALIDI DESCRIBED AS "UNFORTUNATE" AND "HASTY" THE REACTION "OF PLO MEMBER FAROUK KADDOUMI (ABUL LATOF) WHO HAD SAID PUBLICLY IN RESPONSE TO KING'S SPEECH THAT PLO "CATEGORICALLY REFUSES TO AGREE OR COOPERATE WITH KING HUSSEIN." KHALIDI SAID THAT IT UNDERSTOOD BY 'ARAFAT AND HIS FOLLOWERS, NO MATTER WHAT THEY MIGHT SAY PUBLICLY, THAT IN ORDER SURVIVE WHATEVER FORM OF PALESTINIAN ENTITY MIGHT EMERGE ON WEST BANK WOULD HAVE TO COOPERATE WITH JORDAN AND KING HUSSEIN AND, ALTHOUGH THIS NOT AS WELL UNDERSTOOD,

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 5250, 07 MAY '74

WITH ISRAEL AS WELL. REAL QUESTIONS FOR 'ARAFAT AND OTHERS ARE: A) WHO WILL BE ORIGINAL RECIPIENT OF TERRITORY ON WEST BANK (AND GAZA) WHICH ISRAEL MIGHT RETURN, AND WHO WOULD BE ULTIMATE RECIPIENT; B) WHAT WOULD BE ORIGINAL POLITICAL FORM OF THIS TERRITORY (I.E., INDEPENDENT OR NOT) AND WHAT COULD BE ULTIMATE FORM; AND C) HOW AND WHEN WOULD ANY CHANGES IN RECIPIENT AND POLITICAL FORM BE DECIDED. ENBOFF SUGGESTED THAT IT UP TO PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND KEY ARAB GOVTS TO TRY AND REACH AGREED POSITION ON SUCH POINTS. USG WOULD NOT BE TAKING LEAD. KHALIDI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS CLEARLY BUT IT VERY DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT EVEN WITHIN PLO. THAT IS WHY 'ARAFAT NEEDS ENCOURAGEMENT.

3. IN THIS CONTEXT, KHALIDI CONFIRMED EARLIER REPORT WE HAD OF MEETING IN BEIRUT ON MAY 8 OR 9 OF PLO EXCOM PLUS SUCH PROMINENT FEDAYEEN LEADERS AS HABASH OF PFLP AND HAWATMEH OF PLO/EX COM AND WILL, IN HIS OPINION, BE EQUALLY INDECISIVE. MEETING PROVOKED BY STRUGGLE BETWEEN THOSE WHO OPPOSE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING ISRAELI-SYRIAN DIS-ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, AND OPPOSE 'ARAFAT. AS YET HABASH, FOR EXAMPLE, TO KHALIDI'S RECENT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, STILL REFUSING MEET 'ARAFAT PRIVATELY IN EFFORT TRY AND IRON OUT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION. ALSO, HABASH'S PEOPLE AND OTHERS TRYING FORCE EARLY MEETING OF PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS IN DAMASCUS, RATHER THAN LATER MEETING IN CAIRO, IN ORDER MAXIMIZE PRESSURE ON 'ARAFAT AND OTHER FEDAYEEN AS WELL AS SARG TO ABANDON EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. KHALIDI BELIEVES MODERATES WILL SUCCEED IN FENDING OFF DEMAND FOR EARLY PNC MEETING ALTHOUGH PRESSURES ARE INCREASING.

4. COMMENT: BELIEVE THAT MESSAGE IS EXCELLENT RESPONSE, BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND IN TIMING, WHICH SHOULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT OF PROVIDING ENCOURAGEMENT TO MORE MODERATE FEDAYEEN LEADERS RE USG ATTITUDE WHILE AT SAME TIME MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THEY MUST COME TO GRIPS WITH OWN PROBLEMS AND NOT EXPECT USG TO TAKE LEAD IN RESOLVING INTRA-PALESTINIAN AND INTER-ARAB DIFFERENCES. MESSAGE SHOULD ALSO SERVE KEEP OPEN CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH KHALIDI AND ENCOURAGE HIM CONTINUE USE HIS MODERATING INFLUENCE WITH FEDAYEEN LEADERS.

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L.H. Witt
TELEGRAM

P 231454Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7991
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 5816

CONTROL: 5816Q
RECVD: 23 MAY 74
1:05PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US XF
SUBJECT: 'ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG

REF: A. STATE 89704; B. BEIRUT 5250


SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO WALID KHALIDI, 'ARAFAT KEENLY INTERESTED IN MESSAGE OF MAY 1 (REF A) ABOUT WHICH KHALIDI INFORMED 'ARAFAT ONLY ON MAY 21. 'ARAFAT SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN REFERENCES TO PRIVATE, OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF DEPT INTEREST IN "PALESTINIAN ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT," THAT "LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIANS" MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SETTLEMENT, AND THAT DEPT "HAS NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT." 'ARAFAT WAS RELATIVELY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS OF GETTING PLO AGREEMENT ON IDA OF "PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY" FOR WEST BANK AND GAZA, ALTHOUGH HE SAID PLO COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA TALKS IF THEY WITHIN EXCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK SC RES 242 (WHICH HAS NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN PEOPLE). 'ARAFAT ALSO DEPLORED MAALOT INCIDENT, BECAUSE IT INVOLVED CHILDRE, BUT SAID NEITHER HE NOR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD OPPOSE OPERATIONS INSIDE ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. ON MAY 22 EMBOFF MET PALESTINIAN INTELLECTUAL WALID KHALIDI IN ORDER HEAR REPORT ON CONVERSATION LATTER HAD WITH YASSER 'ARAFAT ON MAY 21. KHALIDI EXPLAINED THAT DUE TO 'ARAFAT'S RECENT ABSENCES FROM LEBANON AND ALMOST COMPLETE PREOCCUPATION WITH HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WHILE HERE, ONLY ON MAY 21 HAD HE BEEN ABLE DISCUSS WITH 'ARAFAT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH EMBOFF ON MAY 5 DURING WHICH LATTER CONVEYED TO KHALIDI MESSAGE CONTAINED REF A. KHALIDI SAID THAT HE HAD INFORMED 'ARAFAT IN DETAIL OF MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HIM, AND THAT 'ARAFAT HAD BEEN KEENLY INTERESTED.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 5816, 23 MAY 74

KHALIDI SAID THAT, AFTER TALKING TO 'ARAFAT, IN INTEREST OF AVOIDING ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, HAD WRITTEN OUT A REPLY TO DEPT'S MAY 1 MESSAGE WHICH 'ARAFAT HAD APPROVED.

2. TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM KHALIDI WHICH HE GAVE EMBOFF ON MAY 22 READS AS FOLLOWS:

"I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE MESSAGE YOU TRANSMITTED TO ME; AND THOUGHT FIT TO SHOW IT INFORMALLY TO A LEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALITY. HE CAREFULLY READ IT AND SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN IT BECAUSE OF ITS REFERENCE TO "HIGH LEVELS OF THE DEPARTMENT". HIS ATTENTION WAS ALSO ATTRACTED BY THE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE "WHOLE QUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT" HAS BEEN AND REMAINS VERY MUCH ON THE DEPARTMENT'S MIND; AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS "NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGMENT". LIKEWISE HIS ATTENTION WAS ATTRACTED BY THE STATEMENT THAT "ANY SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS" AS WELL AS BY THE REFERENCE TO A JUST SETTLEMENT".

3. KHALIDI SAID 'ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT, APROPOS OF CONTACTS WITH USG, SOVIET FONMIN GROMYKO HAD PRESSED HIM DURING RECENT MEETING IN DAMASCUS ABOUT WHAT CONTACTS HE, 'ARAFAT, HAD WITH AMERICANS. 'ARAFAT HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE TRYING EXTABLISH CONTACT THROUGH VARIOUS PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE AND OTHER FRIENDS BUT HAD NOT AS YET DONE SO. EMBOFF REMARKED TO KHALIDI THAT SITUATION APPEARED UNCHANGED IN THIS REGARD. KHALIDI SAID TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEGE IT WAS UNCHANGED AND THAT AT LEAST FOR PRESENT 'ARAFAT SEEMED CONTENT WITH STATUS QUC, ALTHOUGH HE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF WHAT KHALIDI HAD TO TELL HIM ABOUT OFFICIAL POSITION OF DEPT.

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TELEGRAM

-3- BEIRUT 5816, 23 MAY 74

4. ACCORDING TO KHALIDI, GROMYKO CONTINUING PRESS 'ARAFAT FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS. 'ARAFAT HAD TOLD KHALIDI THAT QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION REMAINS TO BE DECIDED, BUT THAT IN ANY EVENT PLO COULD NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATION IF TALKS CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN FRAMEWORK SC RES 242. THIS RES DOES NOT ECONTAIN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIANS AS PEOPLE OR THEIR INTEREST OR RIGHTS. KHALIDI THEN ADDED, ON PERSONAL BASIS, THAT PERHAPS SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE FOUND BY EXTRAPOLATION (AND IMPROVEMENT) OF PAST STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR LINK GENEVA WITH PALESTINIANS, SUCH AS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER MADE AT FIRST SESSION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE LAST DECEMBER AND THAT WHICH APPEARED IN JOINT US-USSR COMMUNIQUE WHICH REFERRED TO INTERESTS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND GENEVA CONFERENCE IN SAME DOCUMENT. PERHAPS, WHEN PROPER TIME AROSE, CO-CHAIRMAN COULD FIND SOME LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE TO PLO APPROVAL OF PARTICIPATION. EMBOFF TOLD KHALIDI HE WOULD REPORT THIS, AS WELL AS OTHER REMARKS, TO DEPT.

5. 'ARAFAT TOLD KHALIKI THAT HE PLEASE THAT, AT LAST, SOME PROGRESS BEING MADE IN MOVING PFLO LEADER GEORGE HABASH AWAY FROM CATEGORIC REJECTION OF IDEA OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK AND GAZA. HABASH HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT PHRASE PALESTINIAN "POPULAR ARMED AUTHORITY" OVER ANY TERRITORIES LIBERATED. THIS IS FIRST TIM HABASH HAS AGREED TO ANYTHING LESS THAN TOTAL AUTHORITY OVER ALL OF FORMER PALESTINIAN MANDATE AND 'ARAFAT CONSIDERED IT VERY SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGH, ALTHOUGHT MORE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO GET HABASH TO ACCEPT "NATIONAL AUTHORITY". KHALIDI NOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SISCO AND ATHERTON IN WASHINGTON LAST YEAR ABOUT NEED PROCEED IN "STEPS" TO INDUCE PALESTINIAN REALISM. HE CONSIDERS 'ARAFAT'S HANDLING OF PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN STATE AS FALLING WITHIN THAT CONCEPT. KHALIDI ALSO CONSIDERS HABASH MOVEMENT TO BE SIGNIFICANT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT HABASH'S

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

4- BEIRUT 5816, 23 MAY 74

UNYIELDING ATTITUDE IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH KHALIDI THREE WEEKS AGO. HOWEVER, HE READILY ADMITTED THAT TO PERSONS NOT FULLY STEEPED IN PALESTINIAN THEOLOGY, WHICH CAN BE VERY JESUITICAL, IMPORTANCE OF SUCH NUANCES WOULD BE HARD TO APPRECIATE.

6. CONCERNING MA'ALOT INCIDENT AND LIKELIHOOD OF REPE- TITIONS, KHALIDI SAID 'ARAFAT HAD DEPLORED FACT THAT FEDAYEEN HAD TAKEN CHILDREN HOSTAGE AT MA'ALOT AND 'ARAFAT BELIEVES THIS WAS DONE BY MISTAKE, THAT FEDAYEEN HAD NOT PLANNED THIS IN ADVANCE. SAME THING HAD HAPPENED AT KIRYAT SHIMONA. HOWEVER, 'ARAFAT HAD ALSO SAID THERE NOTHING HE OR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD DO TO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS WITHIN ISRAEL. THIS ALL MORE TRUE IN VIEW OF INTENSE PALESTINIAN ANGER AFTER DELIBERATE ISARLI DESTRUCTION OF NATATIYEH REFUGEE CAMP WITH SO MANY CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGESS.

7. EMBOFF THANKED KHALIDI FOR HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TRY AND IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN USG AND 'ARAFAT, EVEN AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO HIMSELF. (KHALIDI SAYS HIS PICUTRE HAS APPEARED ON FRONT PAGE OF JERUSALEM ARABIC-LANGUAGE PAPER AS BEING AMERICA'S FAVORITECOLLABORATOR AMONG PALESTINIANS). KHALIDI SAID PRESENT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION OBVIOUSLY VERY DANGEROUS FOR EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY AFTER MA-'ALOT (WHICH HE SEES AS SERIOUS BLOW TO HOPES OF PLO GETTING ANY SORT OF HEARING IN ISRAEL) AND ISRAELI RETALIATION. HE PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. GODLEY

BT

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TELEGRAM



O 221346Z APR 74
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7479
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4665

CONTROL: 5 8 5 8Q
 RECD: 22 APR '74 11:18AM

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON, NEA

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, US, XF
 SUBJECT: 'ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG

SUMMARY: ON APRIL 20 WALID KHALIDI MADE URGENT, FERVENT REQUEST FOR EARLY CONFIDENTIAL ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG FOR 'ARAFAT AND OTHER "MODERATE" FEDAYEEN LEADERS. KHALIDI SAID HE SPEAKING AT EXPRESS REQUEST OF 'ARAFAT WHO UNDER INCREASINGLY HEAVY PRESSURE FROM FEDAYEEN RADICALS, IRAQ AND LIBYA FOLLOWING KIRYAT SHIMONA RAID. 'ARAFAT WANTS SOME INDICATION FROM USG THAT HE IS NOT STRUGGLING IN VAIN TO PRESERVE FEDAYEEN COMMITMENT TO IDEA OF PARTICIPATING IN SOME FASHION IN GENEVA TALKS WITH OBJECTIVE OF CONSTITUTING SOME FORM OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK; I.E., THAT USG LOOKS WITH FAVOR UPON GENERAL LINE OF 'ARAFAT AND OTHER "MODERATES". ACCORDING TO KHALIKI 'ARAFAT IS NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY COMMITTED TO ANY SPECIFIC FORM EITHER OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA OR OF "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK, AND 'ARAFAT REALIZES FULL WELL THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL REMIAN AS JORDAN'S CHIEF OF STATE, WITH SUPPORT OF OTHER ARAB GOVTS, AS WELL AS USG AND ISRAEL. KHALIDI ALSO SAID THAT SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO FAVORABLE OUTCOME FOR "MODERATE" FEDAYEEN AND ARAB LEADERS IN STRUGGLES WITH RADICALS. HOWEVER, 'ARAFAT NEEDS SOME INDICATION RIGHT AWAY OF USG ATTITUDE. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER LUNCH ON APRIL 20 WALID KHALIDI HAD LONG TALK WITH EMBOFF OAKLEY, FIRST TIME WE HAVE HAD ANY REAL CONTACT WITH HIM SINCE LAST DECEMBER. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD SEEN 'ARAFAT ON APRIL 17, HE TOLD HIM ABOUT LUNCH SCHEDULED WITH OAKLEY. 'ARAFAT ASKED KHALIKDI TO CONVEY THROUGH EMBOFF TO WASHINGTON HIS NEED FORM SOME VERY EARLY INDICATION OF USG ATTITUDE TOWARD POSITION 'ARAFAT AND OTHERS HAVE ADOPTED AND DEFENDED SINCE OCTOBER WAR FAVORING PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS WITH ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK.

2. KHALIDI SAID 'ARAFAT HAS HAD MANY SECOND-HAND REPORTS OF USG ATTITUDE TOWARD HIS POSITION AND FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

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TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 4665, SECTION 1 OF 2, 22 APR '74

BUT THESE REPORTS TEND TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER. RECENT VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN TO WASHINGTON AND HIS SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN CAIRO WITH SADAT HAVE GENERATED WIDESPREAD IMPRESSION AMONG PLO LEADERS AND RANK-AND-FILE THAT USG AND PERHAPS EVEN EGYPT SUPPORTING HUSSEIN AS REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIANS AND NOT RPT NOT INTERESTED IN TRYING FIND PLACE IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FOR 'ARAFAT AND OTHER REASONABLE FEDAYEEN LEADERS. MOREOVER, IRAQ, LIBYA, PFLP AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD AND SPENDING LOTS OF MONEY TO SWING FATAH AWAY FROM MODERATE POSITION OF 'ARAFAT AND COMPANY. THEIR NEGATIVE LINE HAS HAD INCREASING SUCCESS SINCE HUSSEIN VISITS TO WASHINGTON AND CAIRO AND ESPECIALLY SINCE SHOCK WAVE OF KIRYAT SHIMONA OPERATION HAS SWEEP THROUGH FEDAYEEN. KHALIDI SAID 'ARAFAT VERY UPSET OVER THIS OPERATION BECAUSE IT JEOPARDIZES HIS LEADERSHIP POSITION, BECAUSE 'ARAFAT BELIEVES IT MUCH MORE LIKELY STRENGTHEN ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE RE NEGOTIATING WITH PALESTINIANS THAN INDUCE ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE, AND BECAUSE SHARP UPSURGE IN FEDAYEEN TERRORISM COULD DESTROY HOPE OF EVER REACHING NEGOTIATING STAGE.

3. BECAUSE OF THESE GROWING PRESSURES, KHALIDI SAID, 'ARAFAT NEEDS MORE BADLY THAN BEFORE A CLEAR INDICATION OF ATTITUDE USG. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO WHEN IT WAS THOUGHT SECRETARY KISSINGER MIGHT BE GOING TO KUWAIT AFTER MOSCOW AND WOULD MEET WITH SHEIKH JABER AL-SABAH, KHALIDI HAD BEEN ASKED BY 'ARAFAT TO SEE IF JABER COULD OBTAIN FROM THE SECRETARY A CLEAR READING ON USG ATTITUDE TOWARD PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS, CREATION

OF PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY ON WEST BANK, ETC. KHALIDI HAD GONE TO KUWAIT AND HAD TALKED TO JABER BUT THE SECRETARY'S TRIP HAD NOT MATERIALIZED.

4. EMBOFF TOLD KHALIDI THAT ONE REASON WHY USG HAD NOT BEEN ABLE CONVEY

CLEAR ATTITUDE RE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM TO VARIOUS INTERESTED PARTIES WAS RECENTLY EXPLAINED PUBLICLY BY UNDER SECRETARY SISCO, NAMELY THE DIFFERNCES IN POSITION BETWEEN DIFFERENT ARAB GOVTS, AND DIFFERNCES AMONG AND BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER PALESTINIANS. OBVIOUSLY IT UP TO ARABS SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCE

FIRST. EMBOFF ASKED KHALIDI IF HE WOULD AGREE THAT THIS SITUATION UNLIKELY BE MUCH IMPROVED UNTIL AFTER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA HAD BEEN REACHED, THEREBY MAKING IT EASIER FOR SYRIA, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND JORDAN TO AGREE AMONG SELVES AND HOPEFULLY WITH PALESTINIANS ON HOW BEST SEEK SETTLEMENT OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-3- BEIRUT 4665, SECTION 1 OF 2, 22 APR '74

PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND BRING UNDER CONTROL
RADICAL SUCH AS PFLP AND PFLP/GC. KHALIDI SAID HE AGREED
COMPLETELY. SYRIA IS DEFINITELY THE KEY AND UNTIL THERE IS SYRIAN-
ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT 'ARAFAT WOULD NOT EVEN DARE
MEET SECRETARY KISSINGER, SOMETHING HE WANTS TO DO EVEN MORE
BADLY NOW THAT HE HAS MET GROMYKO. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT BY
SAME REASON, KHALIDI AND 'ARAFAT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT USG

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5875Q

RECD: 22 APR 74 12:17PM

O 221346Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7480
BT
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4665

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NOT LIABLE MAKE ANY GESTURE TOWARD FEDAYEEN WHICH WOULD FURTHER UPSET ALREADY TROUBLED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL, THEREBY JEOPARDIZING CHANCES OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. KHALIDI REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS BUT BELIEVED THAT USG COULD AND SHOULD SEND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO 'ARAFAT, EITHER THROUGH KHALIDI OR ANY OTHER CHANNEL WHICH USG WAS CERTAIN HAD ACCESS TO AND CONFIDENCE OF 'ARAFAT.

5. EMBOFF ASKED KALIDI ABOUT ATTITUDE OF 'ARAFAT AND FEDAYEEN GENERALLY TOWARD KING HUSSEIN. KHALIDI SAID THAT 'ARAFAT AND MORE REALISTIC FEDAYEEN REALIZE FULL WELL THAT ALL ARAB GOVTS. IN AREA, AS WELL AS USG AND ISRAELI, WANT KING HUSSEIN TO REMAIN, AT LEAST ON EAST BANK. EVEN IRAQI GOVT. WANTS HUSSEIN TO STAY ON SO AS TO AVOID MORE DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL. SYRIA WANTS HUSSEIN TO STAY AND REMAIN STRONG SO AS TO HELP PROTECT SOUTHEASTERN SYRIA FROM ISRAEL OR IRAQ. SAUDI ARABIA WANTS HUSSEIN REMAIN AS BUFFER BETWEEN IT AND IRAQ, SYRIA, ISRAEL AND EVEN PALESTINIANS. 'ARAFAT ACCEPTS THIS AND HAD TOLD ARAB LEADERS SO ALTHOUGH HUSSEIN OBVIOUSLY VERY UNPOPULAR WITH FEDAYEEN RANK-AND-FILE AS WELL AS RADICAL LEADERS. QUESTION IS "QUALITY OF RECIPROCITY" BETWEEN PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK AND JORDAN ON ONE SIDE AND ISRAEL ON OTHER SIDE. 'ARAFAT AND COMPANY, ACCORDING TO KHALIDI, HAVE NO ABSOLUTE PRECONCEPTIONS AS TO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PALESTINIAN WEST BANK AND HUSSEIN'S EAST BANK. (NOTE: KALIDI HAS FOR TWO YEARS ADVOCATED HUSSEIN-PLAN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BANK.)

6. EMBOFF ASKED KHALIDI WHETHER 'ARAFAT, IN ASKING FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG FOR PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS AND CREATION PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK, WAS ASKING THIS FOR PLO. KHALIDI SAID THIS NOT RPT NOT THE CASE. 'ARAFAT IS PRAGMATIC IN APPROACHING THESE ISSUES AND NOT RULING OUT ANY OF SEVERAL OPTIONS. PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA COULD BE PLO, SOME OTHER BODY OR GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WITH

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SUPPORT OF PLO, OR SOME SORT OF COALITION BETWEEN PLO AND OTHERS. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN DISCUSSIONS BY ALL INTERESTED PARTIES. TYPE OF BODY TO ADMINISTER ANY WEST BANK ENTITY AND ITS RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND ISRAEL ALSO WIDE OPEN AND WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT DURING LATER STAGES.

7. KHALIDI ENDED CONVERSATION WITH STRONG PERSONAL PLEA FOR EARLY, POSITIVE REPLY TO 'ARAFAT'S APPEAL, SENT THROUGH HIM OR ANY OTHER CHANNEL. HE SAID PRESSURE ON 'ARAFAT AND OTHERS, INCLUDING HIMSELF, HAS BECOME VERY GREAT AND THEY RUNNING INCREASING RISK OF ASSASSINATION BY RADICALS, YET THERE IS NO CLEAR SIGNAL FROM USG THAT COURSE THEY ARE PURSUING HOLDS ANY REAL HOPE. IF SIGNAL DOES NOT COME SOON, IT MAY BE TOO LATE. 'ARAFAT AND COMPANY HAVE COME VERY FAR, INDEED, ON ROAD TO REALISM AND MODERATION WHEN ONE CONSIDERS WHERE THEY BEGAN AND CLIMATE IN WHICH THEY LIVING. BUT THE CANNOT HOLD OUT INDEFINITELY WITHOUT SOME ENCOURAGEMENT AND HOPE OF SUCCESS.

8. COMMENT: A. THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS OF FACT WHICH SEEM TO WARRANT MENTION: 1) KHALIDI IS KNOWN TO BE CLOSE TO 'ARAFAT; 2) KHALIDI HAS BEEN VERY RELIABLE IN PAST CONTACTS WITH THIS EMBASSY; 3) HE WAS IN KUWAIT AT THE TIME MENTIONED, APPARENTLY ON BEHALF OF BOTH 'ARAFAT AND THE INSTITUTE OF PALESTINE STUDIES; 4) 'ARAFAT IS UNDER VERY HEAVY PRESSURE FROM PFLP, PFLP/GC, LIBYA, IRAQ, ETC., AND HIS PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE ARE ERODING AFTER KIRYAT SHIMONA; 5) 'ARAFAT AND OTHER SO-CALLED MODERATES APPEAR BE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER ATTITUDES OF BOTH UNITED STATES AND EGYPTIAN GOVTS. AFTER VISITS OF HUSSEIN TO WASHINGTON AND CAIRO.

B. WE ARE UNAWARE OF WHAT POSITION USG HAS TAKEN IN TALKS WITH ISRAELIS, JORDANIANS AND EGYPTIANS WITH RESPECT TO QUESTIONS OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA AND POSSIBILITY OF PALESTINIAN ENTITY ON WEST BANK. WE ALSO UNAWARE OF WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN SAID TO 'ARAFAT THROUGH VARIOUS THIRD-PARTIES, INCLUDING EGYPTIANS, ABOUT ATTITUDE OF USG TOWARD HIS EFFORTS AND THOSE OF OTHER FEDAYEEN "MODERATE" LEADERS.

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C. WE RECOMMEND THAT USG CONSIDER COMMUNICATING TO 'ARAFAT THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNEL SEEMS BEST SOME STATEMENT REPEATING, PERHAPS IN SOMEWHAT MORE POSITIVE LANGUAGE, OUR INTEREST IN SEEING THAT LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIANS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, OUR BELIEF THAT THERE SHOULD BE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA TALKS, AND WHATEVER WE CAN SAY ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF PALESTINIAN ENTITY ON WEST BANK (OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT BEING PRECISE AS TO NATURE OF SUCH ENTITY). IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT SHOULD 'ARAFAT AND HIS SUPPORTERS BE REPLACED AS DOMINANT FORCE IN FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, OR SHOULD 'ARAFAT TRY AND GET AHEAD OF GROWING CURRENT OF RADICALISM BY REVERSING HIS "MODERATE" COURSE, UNREST IN THIS PART OF ARAB WORLD WILL INCREASE CONSIDERABLY WITH CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN DIFFICULTIES FOR OUR EFFORTS FIND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT CARE ABOUT 'ARAFAT PER SE BUT WE BELIEVE IT IN OUR INTERESTS, THOSE OF MODERATE ARAB GOVTS. AND OF ISRAEL TO DO WHAT WE APPROPRIATELY CAN TO ENSURE VIABILITY OF SO-CALLED MODERATE ELEMENT AMONG FEDAYEEN.

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TELEGRAM

O 121517Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7376
BT
CONTROL: 3 5 1 0 Q
APRIL 12, 1974
1:06 PM
SECRET BEIRUT 4342

NODIS

DEPT PASS TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE; DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE AND DIA
WASHDC IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PMIL LE IS SY
SUBJECT: TWO ISRAELI PILOT POWS

REF: BEIRUT 4316

1. AFTERNOON APR 12 DCM DISCUSSED WITH BOUTROS DIB OF
PRESIDENCY GOL POSITION VIS-A-VIS TWO ISRAELI PILOT
POWS. DIB EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE TOLD HIM YESTERDAY
GOL WOULD NOT HAND PILOTS OVER TO SYRIA AND DIB FELT
GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE FIRM IN THIS POSITION.
EVENTUALLY, WHEN HOSTILITIES WITH SYRIA CEASE AND TIME
IS PROPITIOUS LEBANESE WILL RETURN PILOTS ACROSS
FRONTIER TO ISRAEL. HE MAINTAINED GOL MUST FOLLOW
DICTATES OF LAW VIS-A-VIS TWO PRISONERS.

2. DIB HOWEVER MAINTAINED THAT PRESSURE BY SYRIANS
INTENSE, PARTICULARLY SO IN ABSENCE PRESIDENT ASSAD
IN MOSCOW. DIB EXPLAINED HE HAD TWO HOUR CONVERSATION
WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS THIS MORNING AT HIS HOME ON SUBJECT
OF PRISONERS. HE DESCRIBED SYRIANS AS HIGHLY EXCITED
AND PERSISTENT IN THEIR REQUEST THAT PILOTS BE HANDED
OVER TO SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. DIB THOUGHT HE HAD
CALMED THEM DOWN BY THE END OF THE CONVERSATION BUT
NOT COMPLETELY. HE MAINTAINED HE HELD FIRM TO LINE GOL
MUST RETAIN ISRAELI PRISONERS.

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NOTE: NOT PASSED TO TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, AND DIA
BY OC/T 4/12/74.

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O 121343Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7370
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 4316

3473Q
APRIL 12, 1974
10:52 AM

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DEPT PASS UN TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE; INFO DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AND INFO DIA IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: TWO ISRAELI PILOT POWS

REF: BEIRUT 4270 AND BEIRUT 4274

1. AT 1030 LOCAL TIME EX-PRESIDENT CHAMOUN IN RATHER
EXCITED STATE PHONED TO INFORM ME HE HAD "RELIABLE" REPORT THAT
ISRAELI REPS AT ILMAC MEETING EVENING APIL 11 HAD
DEMANDED REPATRIATION OF TWO CAPTURED IAF PILOTS AND
SET NOON TODAY DEADLINE FOR LEBANESE RESPONSE TO
THIS DEMAND. CHAMOUN DESCRIBED ISRAELI ACTION AS
"ULTIMATUM" WHICH HE TOOK VERY SERIOUSLY, DUE TO
YESTERDAY'S "TRAGIC" INCIDENT AT KIRYAT SHEMONA. CHAMOUN
STATED GOL POSITION WAS BASED ON LAW, I.E. GOL
SHOULD RETAIN POWS. GIVEN MY CONCERN ARISING
FROM LAST EVENING'S CONVERSATION WITH PRIMIN
(BEIRUT 4270) THAT GOL MIGHT ACCEDE TO SYRIAN REQUEST,
I TOLD CHAMOUN THAT I CONSIDER GOL POSITION SOUND AND
IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED. CHAMOUN WELCOMED THIS
STATEMENT BUT URGED THAT USG INTERVENE WITH ISRAELIS
TO PERSUADE THEM TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS SUBJECT. I
TOLD CHAMOUN THAT I DESIRED FIRST ASCERTAIN FACTS
RE ILMAC MEETING AND WOULD THEN REPORT TO DEPARTMENT.

2. WE SUBSEQUENTLY BROUGHT CHAMOUN'S REPORT TO ATTENTION
LEBANESE ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS
(KANAAN) WHO, UPON CHECKING, TOLD US THAT IT WAS ACCURATE,
THAT HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSION OF WHAT TO DO ABOUT ISRAELI
"ULTIMATUM" WAS GOING ON AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. WE HAVE
ALSO LEARNED FROM UNTSO SOURCE (PROTECT) THAT ISRAELIS
HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR REPLY DURING THIS MORNING.

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-2- SECRET BEIRUT 4316 NODIS

3. AT 1300 LOCAL I WAS TELEPHONED BY GHOSN, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO STATED THAT THE GOL'S POSITION WAS BEING PREPARED ON THE TWO ISRAELI PILOTS. I TOLD HIM OF CHAMOUN'S INQUIRY THIS MORNING AND THAT SUBSEQUENT INQUIRIES BY EMBASSY MODIFIED SOMEWHAT THE NATURE OF THE "ULTIMATUM" AS DESCRIBED BY CHAMOUN. GHOSN SAID THAT THE "ULTIMATUM" WAS DELIVERED LAST NIGHT BY ISRAELI ILMAC REPS BUT WAS NOT CONSIDERED AN ULTIMATUM AS SUCH IN THAT IT WAS BASED ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. GHOSN SAID THAT POSITION HE WAS PREPARING WAS THAT GOL SHOULD REST ON LEAGAL POSITION TEMPERED WITH HUMANITARIAN FACTORS, E.E. THAT GOL WOULD RETAIN THE TWO PILOTS BUT WOULD TREAT THEM IN A MOST HUMANITARIAN MANNER. I TOLD GHOSN I WELCOMED THIS POSITION ON THE PART OF THE GOL FOR I BELIEVED IT WAS A FAR WISER ATTITUDE THAN THE ONE HE AND PRIMIN PRESENTED TO ME LAST NIGHT, E.E. NEGOTIATING WITH THE SYRIANS OVER THE FATE OF THE TWO PILOTS. GHOSN RESPONDED AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED THAT LITTLE LEBANON WAS UNDER TREMENDOUS PRSSURE FROM BIG SYRIA COMPLICATED BY PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN, ETC, ETC. HE NEVERTHELESS CONTINUED THAT THIS OF COURSE WAS A FACTOR THAT HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AND WAS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR GOL'S CURRENT POSITION.

4. MY CONCERN RE GOL'S POSITION VIS-A-VIS SYRIA WAS ALSO BASED ON INFORMATION WE HAD THIS MORNING THAT LEBANESE ARMY G-2, COLONEL BUSTANI, WAS ORDERED LAST NIGHT TO PROCEED TO DAMASCUS TO NEGOTIATE RE PILOTS. HE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PLACED UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THIS TRIP WILL TAKE PLACE.

5. COMMENT: I REALIZE THAT THE VIEWS I HAVE EXPRESSED ON FOREGOING MAY WELL BECOME COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN BEIRUT. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT RETAINING THE TWO PILOTS IN GOL'S HANDS IS WISEST COURSE AT THIS POINT. THIS MAY NOT BE PLEASING TO GOI BUT IT IS MY CONSIDERED OPINION THAT IT IS THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS -- CERTAINLY

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THE MOOD OF THE PRIME MINISTER LAST EVENING AND THAT OF HIS ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS TO ACCEDE TO SYRIAN PRESSURE. ISRAELI ACTION LAST EVENING AT THE ILMAC CERTAINLY WAS CONSTRUCTIVE, FOR GIVEN LEBANESE JITTERS RE REPRISAL FOR KIRYAT SHEMONA, IT TILTED THE GOL TOWARD MAINTAINING ITS POSITION THAT POWS SHOULD REMAIN IN LEBANON AND NOT REPEAT NOT BE HANDED OVER TO THE SYRIANS.

GODLEY

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CONTROL: 3 1 5 6 Q

Received: Nov., 10, 1973 846 PM

O 110018Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5149
RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 002
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, US, MX
SUBJECT: SISCO BRIEFING OF LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SUMMARY: I BRIEFED LEBANESE FONMIN AND KEY
MINISTRY OFFICIALS EVENING NOVEMBER 10 ON PROGRESS TO
DATE AND LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. AFTER BRIEFING WE
DINED WITH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY
HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY FOUND EGYPTIANS
HAVE "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES" AND WILLING
MAKE CLEAR TO ALL CRITICS, THAT THEY BELIEVE THIS
WILL PRODUCE LONG-AWAITED RESULTS.

LEBANESE REASSURED BY CLARIFICATION OF HOW WE SEE PEACE TALKS
DEVELOPING. THEY WISH PARTICIPATE BUT NOT IN
DISCUSSING DISENGAGEMENT. PRIMARY OBJECTIVES ARE
DEFINITIVE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PRESENT BORDERS WITH
ISRAEL AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE. I URGED THAT THEY SEEK UNIFIED ARAB POSITION
ON LATTER POINT AND THAT THEY CONSULT, CLOSELY WITH
ARAB LEADERS SUCH AS KING HUSSEIN. LEBANESE SEEMED
VERY PLEASED WITH OUR REASSURANCES, AND I TOLD THEM
WE WISHED INTENSIFY CONSULTATIONS AS WE MOVE INTO
NEXT PHASE OF SEARCH FOR JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT.
THEY WOULD WELCOME A VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.
END SUMMARY.

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2. IN TWO-HOUR MEETING AT LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY NOVEMBER 10, I BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA AND HIS TOP ASSISTANTS ON PROGRESS TO DATE. FONMIN AND PRIME MINISTER (WHO JOINED US LATER FOR DINNER) HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY SAW SADAT AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS. THEY DESCRIBED EGYPTIANS AS HAVEING "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES' EFFORTS TO TRULY SEEK JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST." FONMIN ALSO EXPRESSED HIS AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD, AS WELL AS THOSE OF USG GENERALLY.

3. I GAVE THEM A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HOW WE SEE IMPROVED CHANCES FOR PEACE IN AREA, PARTICULARLY GREATER REALISM ON BOTH SIDES, AND OUR DETERMINATION CONTINUE USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO HELP CONTINUE FORWARD MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, ROAD AHEAD IS DIFFICULT AND USG WILL NEED ALL SUPPORT IT CAN GET FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRY IF IT IS TO BE ABLE USE ITS INFLUENCE AS IT MIGHT WISH. IN THIS CONNECTION, ARAB OIL EMBARGO IS DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD. IT TENDS TO TURN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ARABS AND MAKE IT SEEM THAT USG BEING BLACKMAILED INTO DOING SOMETHING WHICH IS ACTUALLY IN ITS OVERALL INTEREST. IN ORDER HELP EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH PUBLIC OPINION, ARAB COUNTRIES LIKE LEBANON WHO UNDERSTAND PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD USE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE WITH OIL-PRODUCING ARAB STATES TO EASE EMBARGO. FONMIN NOTED THAT LEBANON NOT AN OIL PRODUCER AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT GET OTHER ARABS GIVE UP USE THIS WEAPON.

3. IN DESCRIBING LIKELY FUTURE PROGRESS, I WAS ABLE CLARIFY LEBANESE CONFUSION OVER NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 LINES AS PART OF SIX-POINT AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSION OF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE UP FIRST WEEKS OF PEACE TALKS. LEBANESE HAD ASSUMED DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL LIKELY BE CONCLUDED BY TIME PEACE

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TALKS BEGIN NEXT MONTH AND THAT TALKS WOULD THEREFORE ENTER IMMEDIATELY INTO OTHER ISSUES. UPON HEARING HOW MANY PROBLEMS WILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED ON DISENGAGEMENT AND THAT WE AND EGYPTIANS SEE DISENGAGEMENT AS COVERING MORE THAN MERE OCTOBER 22 LINES, FONMIN SAID THAT LEBANESE HAD NO DESIRE PARTICIPATE IN THAT PHASE OF PEACE TALKS. THEY DO WISH TO PARTICIPATE AT APPROPRIATE EARLY STAGE IN ORDER OBTAIN DEFINITIVE INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR BOUNDARIES WITH ISRAEL AS SET FORTH IN 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS POINT, THEY ATTACHE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND OUR LONG-STANDING SUPPORT OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES, WITH WHICH ISRAEL IS ALSO IN AGREEMENT.

4. I SAID THAT FROM OUR TALKS WITH EGYPTIANS WE HAD REACHED TENTATIVE JUDGMENT THAT NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS ON IMPLEMENTING SIX POINTS, INCLUDING EXCHANGE OF POWS, COMPLETING UN FORCE, WORKING OUT CONFERENCE DETAILS. I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS MIGHT TOUCH UPON QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT, REALISTICALLY THIS LIKELY TO BE PRIME FOCUS OF OPENING PHASES OF CONFERENCE. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND THAT OF PALESTINIANS WOULD BE MATTER FOR CONSULTATION IN FIRST PART OF CONFERENCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CAIRO HAD TOLD LEBANESE THAT CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

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CONTROL: 3 1 5 9 Q

Received: Nov., 10, 1973 908PM

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 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5150
 RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 003
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 S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979

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FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

5. FONMIN SAID THAT UNLESS QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY THERE COULD NEVER BE ANY REAL OR LASTING PEACE IN AREA. LEBANON WOULD HAVE LIKED TO ABSORB SOME OF 250,000 PALESTINIANS LIVING THERE BUT UNABLE TO DO SO FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS. ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPENSATION FOR REFUGEES THAT WOULD BE USED SO AS TO INDUCE THEM TO RETURN TO TERRITORY OR COUNTRY SET ASIDE FOR THEM. THERE MUST BE SUCH A TERRITORY OR COUNTRY IF SETTLEMENT IS TO WORK. IN 1971, USG PROMISED CONSULT GOL ON QUESTION SOLUTION FOR PALESTINIANS. FONMIN SAID HE ASSUMED THIS STILL TRUE. I SAID IT CERTAINLY WAS, WE ARE CONSULTING ON THIS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL VERY MUCH APPRECIATE FRANK AND CONCRETE LEBANESE VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE APPROPRIATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD HAVE TALKS ON THIS MATTER AND TRY TO REACH AGREED POSITION. IT IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO TALK TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, PARTICULARLY HUSSEIN, SO AS TO REACH SENSIBLE POSITION AND NOT ALLOW SOVIETS OR OTHERS SPLIT ARABS AT CONFERENCE ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTER. FONMIN SAID THAT LEBANESE WOULD CONSULT WITH OTHER ARABS AND WITH PALESTINIANS. HE NOTED THAT PLO ALREADY REPRESENTS PALESTINIANS IN ARAB LEAGUE. HE URGED THAT USG CONTINUE USE ITS INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN HELPING BRIDGE POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN ARAB STATES FRIENDLY TO US.

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6. I CLOSED BY SAYING WE DELIGHTED HAVE THIS OCCASION TALK WITH LEBANESE, THAT WE INTEND INTENSIFY OUR TALKS WITH THEM AS WE MOVE AHEAD IN THIS MOST SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY. FONMIN EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR OUR VISIT.

7. COMMENT: LEBANESE EXUDED ENTHUSIASM FOR EFFORTS OF US, AND SECRETARY'S IN PARTICULAR, IN PAST WEEKS. THEY STRESSED THAT CONFIDENCE IN THE US HAS BEEN RESTORED THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. THEY EXPRESSED FEAR THAT US-USSR AUSPICES WOULD BE A DEVICE FOR SPRADING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND THEY WERE REASSURED WHEN I DESCRIBED HOW WE INTEND TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ARABS, WHILE MAINTAINING OUR CONSULTATIVE LINKS WITH THE SOVIETS. THEY ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO PARTICIPATE AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE BUT WOULD LIKE TO SEE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION RESOLVED BEFOREHAND. ON THIS ISSUE, THEY FIND THEMSELVES BETWEEN HUSSEIN ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PLO ON THE OTHER. I STRESSED THROUGHOUT THEY OUGHT TO CONCERT WITH HUSSEIN AND DEVELOP A COMMON ARAB POSITION. LEBANESE WANT A SETTLEMENT, AND THEY WANT IT CLEARLY AND VISIBLY TO COME UNDER US AUSPICES. IF A TRIP TO DAMASCUS IS WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP, A STOP HERE IS A MUST.

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-2- BEIRUT 12979 Section 1 Of 2 November 10, 1973

2. IN TWO-HOUR MEETING AT LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY NOVEMBER 10, I BRIEFED FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA AND HIS TOP ASSISTANTS ON PROGRESS TO DATE. FONMIN AND PRIME MINISTER (WHO JOINED US LATER FOR DINNER) HAD JUST RETURNED FROM CAIRO WHERE THEY SAW SADAT AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS. THEY DESCRIBED EGYPTIANS AS HAVING "REGAINED CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES' EFFORTS TO TRULY SEEK JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST." FONMIN ALSO EXPRESSED HIS AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION FOR YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD, AS WELL AS THOSE OF USG GENERALLY.

3. I GAVE THEM A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HOW WE SEE IMPROVED CHANCES FOR PEACE IN AREA, PARTICULARLY GREATER REALISM ON BOTH SIDES, AND OUR DETERMINATION CONTINUE USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO HELP CONTINUE FORWARD MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, ROAD AHEAD IS DIFFICULT AND USG WILL NEED ALL SUPPORT IT CAN GET FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRY IF IT IS TO BE ABLE USE ITS INFLUENCE AS IT MIGHT WISH. IN THIS CONNECTION, ARAB OIL EMBARGO IS DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD. IT TENDS TO TURN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ARABS AND MAKE IT SEEM THAT USG BEING BLACKMAILED INTO DOING SOMETHING WHICH IS ACTUALLY IN ITS OVERALL INTEREST. IN ORDER HELP EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH PUBLIC OPINION, ARAB COUNTRIES LIKE LEBANON WHO UNDERSTAND PROBLEM OF PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD USE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE WITH OIL-PRODUCING ARAB STATES TO EASE EMBARGO. FONMIN NOTED THAT LEBANON NOT AN OIL PRODUCER AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT GET OTHER ARABS GIVE UP USE THIS WEAPON.

3. IN DESCRIBING LIKELY FUTURE PROGRESS, I WAS ABLE CLARIFY LEBANESE CONFUSION OVER NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT RETURN TO OCTOBER 22 LINES AS PART OF SIX-POINT AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSION OF DISENGAGEMENT WHICH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE UP FIRST WEEKS OF PEACE TALKS. LEBANESE HAD ASSUMED DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL LIKELY BE CONCLUDED BY TIME PEACE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-3- BEIRUT 12979 Section 1 Of 2 November 10, 1973

TALKS BEGIN NEXT MONTH AND THAT TALKS WOULD THEREFORE ENTER IMMEDIATELY INTO OTHER ISSUES. UPON HEARING HOW MANY PROBLEMS WILL NEED TO BE RESOLVED ON DISENGAGEMENT AND THAT WE AND EGYPTIANS SEE DISENGAGEMENT AS COVERING MORE THAN MERE OCTOBER 22 LINES, FONMIN SAID THAT LEBANESE HAD NO DESIRE PARTICIPATE IN THAT PHASE OF PEACE TALKS. THEY DO WISH TO PARTICIPATE AT APPROPRIATE EARLY STAGE IN ORDER OBTAIN DEFINITIVE INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR BOUNDARIES WITH ISRAEL AS SET FORTH IN 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS POINT, THEY ATTACHE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR REPEATED SUPPORT FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND OUR LONG-STANDING SUPPORT OF PRESENT BOUNDARIES, WITH WHICH ISRAEL IS ALSO IN AGREEMENT.

4. I SAID THAT FROM OUR TALKS WITH EGYPTIANS WE HAD REACHED TENTATIVE JUDGMENT THAT NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS WOULD BE TAKEN UP WITH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS ON IMPLEMENTING SIX POINTS, INCLUDING EXCHANGE OF POWS, COMPLETING UN FORCE, WORKING OUT CONFERENCE DETAILS. I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TALKS MIGHT TOUCH UPON QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT, REALISTICALLY THIS LIKELY TO BE PRIME FOCUS OF OPENING PHASES OF CONFERENCE. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT QUESTION OF LEBANESE PARTICIPATION AND THAT OF PALESTINIANS WOULD BE MATTER FOR CONSULTATION IN FIRST PART OF CONFERENCE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT CAIRO HAD TOLD LEBANESE THAT CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR FIRST WEEK IN DECEMBER.

NOTE: PASSED BY OC/T

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Department of State

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CONTROL: 3 1 5 9 Q

Received: Nov., 10, 1973 908PM

O 110018Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5150
RUEHCR/USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE 003
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 12979

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR SECRETARY FROM SISCO

5. FONMIN SAID THAT UNLESS QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY THERE COULD NEVER BE ANY REAL OR LASTING PEACE IN AREA. LEBANON WOULD HAVE LIKED TO ABSORB SOME OF 250,000 PALESTINIANS LIVING THERE BUT UNABLE TO DO SO FOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REASONS. ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPENSATION FOR REFUGEES THAT WOULD BE USED SO AS TO INDUCE THEM TO RETURN TO TERRITORY OR COUNTRY SET ASIDE FOR THEM. THERE MUST BE SUCH A TERRITORY OR COUNTRY IF SETTLEMENT IS TO WORK. IN 1971, USG PROMISED CONSULT GOL ON QUESTION SOLUTION FOR PALESTINIANS. FONMIN SAID HE ASSUMED THIS STILL TRUE. I SAID IT CERTAINLY WAS, WE ARE CONSULTING ON THIS RIGHT NOW, AND WE WILL VERY MUCH APPRECIATE FRANK AND CONCRETE LEBANESE VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION. WE BELIEVE APPROPRIATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD HAVE TALKS ON THIS MATTER AND TRY TO REACH AGREED POSITION. IT IMPORTANT FOR LEBANON TO TALK TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS, PARTICULARLY HUSSEIN, SO AS TO REACH SENSIBLE POSITION AND NOT ALLOW SOVIETS OR OTHERS SPLIT ARABS AT CONFERENCE ON SUCH IMPORTANT MATTER. FONMIN SAID THAT LEBANESE WOULD CONSULT WITH OTHER ARABS AND WITH PALESTINIANS. HE NOTED THAT PLO ALREADY REPRESENTS PALESTINIANS IN ARAB LEAGUE. HE URGED THAT USG CONTINUE USE ITS INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN HELPING BRIDGE POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN ARAB STATES FRIENDLY TO US.

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Department of State

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-2 - BEIRUT 12979 Section 2 of 2 November 10, 1973

6. I CLOSED BY SAYING WE DELIGHTED HAVE THIS OCCASION TALK WITH LEBANESE, THAT WE INTEND INTENSIFY OUR TALKS WITH THEM AS WE MOVE AHEAD IN THIS MOST SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY. FONMIN EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR OUR VISIT.

7. COMMENT: LEBANESE EXUDED ENTHUSIASM FOR EFFORTS OF US, AND SECRETARY'S IN PARTICULAR, IN PAST WEEKS. THEY STRESSED THAT CONFIDENCE IN THE US HAS BEEN RESTORED THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. THEY EXPRESSED FEAR THAT US-USSR AUSPICES WOULD BE A DEVICE FOR SPRADING OF SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND THEY WERE REASSURED WHEN I DESCRIBED HOW WE INTEND TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ARABS, WHILE MAINTAINING OUR CONSULTATIVE LINKS WITH THE SOVIETS. THEY ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO PARTICIPATE AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE BUT WOULD LIKE TO SEE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION RESOLVED BEFOREHAND. ON THIS ISSUE, THEY FIND THEMSELVES BETWEEN HUSSEIN ON THE ONE HAND AND THE PLO ON THE OTHER. I STRESSED THROUGHOUT THEY OUGHT TO CONCERT WITH HUSSEIN AND DEVELOP A COMMON ARAB POSITION. LEBANESE WANT A SETTLEMENT, AND THEY WANT IT CLEARLY AND VISIBLY TO COME UNDER US AUSPICES. IF A TRIP TO DAMASCUS IS WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR EUROPEAN TRIP, A STOP HERE IS A MUST.

BUFFUM

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#2979

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 120810Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7352
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 4274

CONTROL: 3 4 0 9 Q
Recd : 12 April
0446 A.M.

NODIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PMIL LE IS SY
SUBJ: LEBANESE POSITION RE CAPTURED ISRAELI AIRMEN
REF DEPTTEL 74530 AND BEIRUT 7240

SUGGEST CONSIDERABLE CAUTION AND REALISM BE EXERCISED
IN EVALUATING LEBANESE INTENTIONS RE TWO ISRAELI
PILOTS. I CERTAINLY DO NOT REPEAT NOT CONCUR THAT
GOL HAS "NO INTENTION" OF HANDING THEM OVER TO SYRIA.
PRIMIN AND GHOSN LAST NIGHT WERE TIMID, FRIGHTENED, LITTLE
MEN, PREPARED TO COMPROMISE ON ANYTHING. WE
WILL CONTINUE DISCREET EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN SOME GOL REALISM.
GODLEY

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O 111550Z APR 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7346
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 4265

CONTROL: 3 2 0 2Q
RECD: 11 APR '74 12:50PM

NODIS
DEPT PASS INFO DAMASCUS, TEL AVIV
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANESE POSITION RE CAPTURED ISRAELI AIRMEN
REF: STATE 73372

1. ALTHOUGH WE IN NO POSITION ASCERTAIN POSITIVELY WHERE TRUTH LIES RE SYRIAN ALLEGATION THAT IAF PHANTOM WAS SHOT DOWN AND ISRAELI ALLEGATION TO CONTRARY, WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT LEBANESE AIR FORCE G-2 INFORMED AIRATT APRIL 11 THAT AIRCRAFT HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN SHOT DOWN. LEBANESE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO EXAMINE WRECKAGE MINUTELY TO DATE, HOWEVER, OWNING TO ADVERSE WHEATHER CONDITIONS IN AREA OF IMPACT.

2. WHILE WE HAVE NOT DWELLED ON QUESTION OF TWO CAPTURED AIRMEN IN OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH GOL OFFICIALS, WE FEEL REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THERE IS LITTLE DANGER GOL WILL HAND THEM OVER TO SYRIA. GOL'S AWARENESS OF ISRAELI SENSITIVITIES IN THIS REGARD WAS UNDOUBTEDLY REINFORCED BY THIS MORNING'S TRAGIC INCIDENT AT KIRYAT SHEMONA. ON OTHER HAND, DECISION TO RETAIN IAF CREWMEN UNTIL SYRIAN-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED REPORTEDLY WAS CONFIRMED AT GOL CABINET MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE LATE APRIL 10, AND DCM HOUGHTON HAD OCCASION TO LEARN FROM MINDEF MAALOUF THIS MORNING THAT GOL WILL FOLLOW INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THAT REPATRIATION OF IAF AIRMEN WILL NOT OCCUR UNTIL CONCLUSION OF "CEASEFIRE" (MAALOUF PRESUMABLY WAS REFERRING TO SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC). APPEARS, THEREFORE, THAT BOTH AIRMEN WILL PROBABLY SPEND URATION IN LEBANESE CONFINEMENT (WHICH WE KNOW TO BE RELATIVELY COMFORTABLE BY MOST STANDARDS).

3. FORMER PRIMIN KARAME, IN LUNCHING WITH AMBASSADOR AND DCM APRIL 11, APPEARED CONFIDENT IAF AIRMEN WOULD REMAIN IN GOL CUSTODY AND THAT THIS WOULD CAUSE NO PROBLEMS WITH SYRIA. AS KARAME IS GENERALLY WELL INFORMED ON SARG ATTITUDES, WE BELIEVE HIS ASSESSMENT IS CORRECT.

GODLEY

NOTE: NOT PASSED INFO DAMASCUS OR TEL AVIV BY OC/T.



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CONTROL: 2 1 3 1 0
RECD: 08 APR 74Z 16 11

O 081458Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7277
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4075

NOOIS
FOR ATHERTON NEA
DEPT PASS USINT DAMASCUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
By JHS NARA, Date 4/20/2012

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR XF US SY
SUBJ: INFORMATION ON SYRIAN GENERAL CHEHABI

1. FOLLOWING INFO ON SYRIAN SPECIAL ENVOY TO WASHINGTON GENERAL HIKMAT CHEHABI OBTAINED BY EMBOFF FROM LEBANESE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE BOUSTANY. AS DISCUSSED WITH USINT DAMASCUS (SCOTES), THIS INFO MEANT TO PROVIDE FIRST-HAND IMPRESSION OF HOW TO TREAT CHEHABI IN ORDER OBTAIN MOST FAVORABLE REACTION -- AS WELL AS INDICATION OF HOW CHEHABI LIKELY PERFORM AS NEGOTIATOR.

2. BOUSTANY HAS ENGAGED IN SEVERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHEHABI OVER PAST YEAR CONCERNING SYRIAN- LEBANESE PROBLEMS AND HAS KNOWN HIM PERSONALLY FOR MANY YEARS. EMBOFF QUERIED BOUSTANY ABOUT CHEHABI AS POSSIBLE RPT POSSIBLE SYRIAN ENVOY, NOTING THAT THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF OTHER CANDIDATES. BOUSTANY AND EMBOFF AGREED CONVERSATION WOULD BE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AND DEAL ONLY WITH CHEHABI'S PERSONALITY, NOT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. ON BASIS THREE YEARS OF CLOSE EMBASSY COOPERATION WITH BOUSTANY, WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL RESPECT CONFIDENCE.

3. BOUSTANY SAID THAT CHEHABI IS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO ASSAD AND WILL ACT AT ALL TIMES IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM HIM. IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LEBANESE, CHEHABI NEVER ACTED ON OWN AND EACH TIME HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH QUESTION FOR WHICH HE HAD NOT

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-2-BEIRUT 4075, April 8, 1974

ALREADY BEEN GIVEN ANSWER HE REFERRED IT TO DAMASCUS FOR FUTURE REPLY. CHEHABI, ACCORDING TO BOUSTANY, REPORTS DIRECTLY TO AND RECEIVES ORDERS DIRECTLY FROM ASSAD. CHEHABI IS POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS IN THAT HE ASPIRES EVENTUALLY TO POST OF PRIME MINISTER, BUT HIS FATE IS SO COMPLETELY LINKED TO THAT OF ASSAD THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT HIS LOYALTY TO HIM. BOUSTANY SAID HIS EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT CHEHABI WILL REPORT FULLY AND ACCURATELY TO ASSAD, AND THAT HE HAS EXCELLENT MEMORY AND SEIZES PROBLEMS QUICKLY. ALTHOUGH ASSAD MAKES ALL DECISIONS, THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONS WHEN CHEHABI'S REPORTS TO ASSAD HAVE BEEN "WARMER" (I.E., MORE POSITIVE) THAN USUAL BECAUSE CHEHABI HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY TREATMENT HE RECEIVED AND ARGUMENTS HE WAS GIVEN.

4. BOUSTANY SAID THAT CHEHABI REMAINS CALM ON SURFACE BUT OCCASIONALLY ANGER CAN BE DETECTED BY TONE OF HIS VOICE OR REDDENING OF VISAGE. CHEHABI CAN LIE (AT LEAST TO LEBANESE) ON INSTRUCTION, BUT BOUSTANY HAS FOUND THAT BEST NEGOTIATING APPROACH IS TO BE PERFECTLY FRANK IN ORDER ASSURE THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD RECEIVES ACCURATE PICTURE.

5. CONCERNING CHEHABI'S PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS, BOUSTANY OBSERVED THAT HE IS VERY SENSITIVE TO MATTERS OF PROTOCOL AND TO FLATTERY "IN BEST ORIENTAL TRADITION". HE COMES FROM POOR FAMILY IN NORTH SYRIAN VILLAGE BUT IS PLEASED TO BE CONSIDERED (FALSELY) MEMBER OF FAMOUS CHEHAB CLAN OF SYRIAN-LEBANESE ARISTOCRACY. CHEHABI IS FAMILY MAN, DEVOTED TO THREE TEEN-AGE CHILDREN (TWO BOYS, OLDEST 17, AND ONE GIRL). HE LIKES SPORTS AND MUSIC. HE IS MODERATE DRINKER AND SOMEWHAT STYLISH (E.G., ALLOWS HIS HAIR TO GROW TO MODERATE LENGTH). HE SUFFERS FROM ULCER OR SOME SIMILAR STOMACH AILMENT WHICH HE HAS NOT HAD TIME TO HAVE CORRECTED. THIS SOMETIMES CAUSES HIM SUFFER DISCOMFORT AND STOMACH PAINS AFTER MEALS AND MAKES DISCUSSIONS MORE DIFFICULT. BOUSTANY SUGGESTED THAT CHEHABI "WOULD NOT REFUSE" AND LIKELY BE VERY PLEASED BY GIFT OF HANDSOMELY ENGRAVED

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-3-BEIRUT 4075, April 8, 1974

REVOLVER FOR HIMSELF AND PERHAPS SOME PRESENTS FOR WIFE AND CHILDREN AS WELL.

6. BOUSTANY SAID CHEHABI KNOWS ALL OF SYRIA'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY, AND IS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN PURSUING SYRIAN LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. SHOULD USG BE ABLE POINT OUT PERSUASIVELY HOW SYRIA WOULD GAIN IN THESE FIELDS FROM PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, IT COULD HAVE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON CHEHABI. AT SAME TIME, CHEHABI LOOKS AT WORLD THROUGH FILTER OF SYRIAN NATIONALISM. HE HAS UNSHAKABLE FAITH IN SYRIA AND ITS PEOPLE AS PUREST OF ARAB NATIONALISTS AND THOUGHTEST OF ARAB WARRIORS. HE IS EXTREMELY PROUD OF PERFORMANCE SYRIAN ARMY IN OCTOBER WAR. HE RESENTFUL OF RUSSIANS, ALTHOUGH HE SPEAKS THEIR LANGUAGE AND HAS BEEN TRAINED IN USSR. HE ALSO DOES NOT CARE FOR EGYPTIANS, AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT SYRIA RATHER THAN EGYPT SHOULD PLAY LEADING ROLE IN ARAB WORLD. HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO UNITED STATES AND KNOWS LITTLE ABOUT U.S. HE SPEAKS LITTLE, IF ANY, ENGLISH.

GODLEY

BT
#4075

NOTE: NOT PASSES USINT DAMASCUS BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

R 141520Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6485
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 1857

CONTROL: 3985Q
RECVD: 15 FEB 74
0404Z

HAK
SCOWROFT
RODMAN
MCFARLANE
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, US
SUBJ: WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE

REF: STATE 28080

WASHINGTON POST BEIRUT CORRESPONDENT JIM HOAGLAND TOLD
EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE FEB. 13 THAT, DURING MID-JANUARY
TRIP TO ISRAEL, ONE OF POST'S STRINGERS IN ISRAEL TRIED
TO PEDDLE HIM VERY STORY THAT LATER EMERGED UNDER
MARILYN BERGER'S BYLINE. HE STATED THAT "HE WOULDN'T
TOUCH IT WITH A TEN-FOOT POLE" SINCE IN HIS VIEW IT CAME
STRAIGHT FROM ISRAELIS. HOUGHTON

BT
#1857

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CONTROL: 4489Q
RECD: FEB 16, 1974
1844Z

O 160802Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6520
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 1955

SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPARTMENT PASS JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA
SUBJECT: ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT ENABLE SAUDIA ARABIA UNILATERALLY
LIFT OIL BOYCOTT

REF: JIDDA'S 0769

1. FOLLOWING COMPROMISE HAS PROBABLY BEEN CONSIDERED AND DISCARDED BUT SUGGEST IT IN CASE IT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE. COULD NOT SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER OIL PRODUCING STATES LIFT THE EMBARGO ON OIL SALES TO THE U.S. BUT LIMIT SUCH SALES TO HALF WHICH THE U.S. WOULD BE ENTITLED PENDING THE CONCLUSION OF THE ISREAL-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.
2. SUCH MIGHT SOLVE OUR PROBLEM BY LIFTING THE OIL EMBARGO - EVEN IF ONLY PARTIALLY - AND MIGHT SOLVE SYRIA'S POLITICAL PROBLEM BY RETAINING SOME LEVERAGE AGAINST THE U.S. UNTIL DISENGAGEMENT CONCLUDED. WOULD ALSO SEEM BE EASIER FOR SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD IT DECIDE LIFT EMBARGO UNILATERALLY.

HOUGHTON

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#1955

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00510 141839Z

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ACTION CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

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Z 141820Z JAN 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLAUM 6015
WHITE HOUSE FLASH

SECRET BEIRUT 0510

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAM 86970

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A)

REF: SECTO 25

1. SECRETARY'S MESSAGE HAS BEEN PASSED ISCOtes DAMASCUS. HE WILL ENDEAVOR OBTAIN PRESIDENT ASAD'S REACTION TONIGHT BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC AS SARG CLOSES AT 2:00 PM AND HE HAU BEEN UNABLE REACH THEM ON OTHER MATTERS. CONFIDENT HAVE REPLY EARLY TOMORROW MORNING IF NOT TONIGHT.

2. IN SCOTES JUDGMENT, CHANGE IN SCHEDULE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE PRESIDENT ASAD.
BUFFUM

Sent

74 JAN 14 PM 11:23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Scowcroft
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CONTROL: 0938Q
RECD: 5 JAN '74 9:48PM

O 060205Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5882
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 0147

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF LE SY
SUBJ: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 0145

PAN AM CHARTER FLIGHT CARRYING SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES DEPARTED
BEIRUT AIRPORT AT 0055 ZULU. EVACUATION OPERATION PROCEEDED
WITHOUT INCIDENT.

BUFFUM

BT
#0147

74 JAN 6 AM 11:52
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Scowcroft
McFarlane
Rosen
Sundt
TELEGRAM

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O 051500Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5880
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 0145

893Q
JAN. 05, 1974
11:00 AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF LE SY
SUBJ: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 0141

1. FINAL DETAILS OF JAN 6 EVACUATION OPERATION HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT HERE BETWEEN PAN AM SECURITY OFFICER SALM AND LEBANESE ARMY (AND HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY RSO AND EMBOFFS). PLAN IS SATISFACTORY TO ALL CONCERNED, AND OPERATION SHOULD PROCEED SUCCESSFULLY IF IMPLEMENTED AS AGREED., LEBANESE ARMY PROMISES THAT VILLA AT STAGING AREA WILL HAVE ADEQUATE SECURITY, THAT VAN CARRYING REFUGEES WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY ARMED ESCORTS IN CIVILIAN ATTIRE DURING JOURNEY TO AIRPORT, AND THAT ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE TIMELY NOTIFICATION TO AIRCRAFT IN EVENT EMERGENCY ARISES. SALM AND HIS ASSISTANT GUNTHER KOLKE INTEND, AFTER CONDUCTING SEARCH AND IDENTITY CHECKS AT VILLA, TO PROCEED TO AIRPORT IN FOLLOW-CAR IMMEDIATELY BEHIND VAN.
2. OPERATION ALMOST OBOITED AT MID-DAY WHEN LOCAL PAN AM DIRECTOR TAYLOR INSISTED TO LEBANESE ARMY THAT EXPLICIT GOL CLEARANECE WAS NEEDED FOR AIRCRAFT TO LAND. PROBLEM WAS FINALLY RESOLVED BY HAVING SENIOR ARMY OFFICER DIRECT TRANSPORTATION MINISTER (CHRISTIAN) TO AUTHORIZE AIRPORT DIRECTOR (ALSO CHRISTIAN) INFORM TAYLOR THAT FLIGHT WAS CLEARED. THIS WAS DONE QUICKLY, WITH ARMY TAKING LINE THAT AIRCRAFT WILL BE DELIVERING "SECRET" EQUIPMENT FOR LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THAT BOTH MINISTER AND AIRPORT DIRECTOR SHOULD KEEP THEIR MOUTHS SHUT.
3. WE WISH REITERATE OUR STRONG DESIRE THAT NO RPT NO PUBLICITY BE ALLOWED TO EMERGE ABOUT THIS OPERATION AFTER IT HAS BEEN COMPLETED

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-2- S E C R E T BEIRUT 0145 NODIS

IN ADDITION TO CAUSING ACUTE EMBARRASSMENT AND EVEN DANGER TO PAN AM AND GOVTS CONCERNED, SUCH PUBLICITY WOULD ALSO JEOPARDIZE MOUNTING FUTURE OPERATIONS OF THIS KIND ON BEHALF OF OTHER SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES. DR. ATIYEH IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER POSSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE TERMS "THAT BROOKLYN GANG" (DWEK AND CO.) WILL BEHAVE IN INDISCREET MANNER WHEN SOME OF THIS FLIGHT'S PASSANGERS EVENTUALLY ARRIVE IN US, AND HE AGAIN REQUEST USG DO ITS UTMOST TO PREVENT THIS.

4. PAN AM BEIRUT REQUESTS THAT CONTENTS PARA 1 ABOVE BE PASSED TO PAN AM HEADQUARTERS NEW YORK.

BUFFUM

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Gen. Scowcroft
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SCOWCROFT

O 041945Z JAN 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5876
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 0141

CONTROL: 0707Q
RECD: 04 Jan '74, 3:31PM
*MCPAALANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS*

NODIS

E.O. : GDS
TAGS: SREF, SY, LE
SUBJ: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 0139; STATE 1603

1. EMBOFF AND PAN AM'S SALM MET EVENING JAN 4 WITH DR. ATIYEH AND LEBANESE ARMY OFFICER ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF JAN 6 EVACUATION OPERATION. SALM AND OFFICER, WHO REQUESTED HIS IDENTITY REMAIN SECRET, WORKED OUT FOLLOWING SCENARIO FOR EVACUATION:

EVENING JAN 5: REFUGEES TO BE ASSEMBLED BY LEBANESE ARMY IN SECLUDED VILLA NORTH OF BEIRUT, WHERE ALL SECURITY (E.E., BODY AND HAND-BAGGAGE SEARCH) AND IDENTITY CHECKS WILL BE CARRIED OUT BEGINNING 2300 HOURS LOCAL BY SALM AND TWO OTHER PAN AM SECURITY OFFICIALS. GRAND RABBI WILL BE PRESENT TO ASSIST IN IDENTITY CHECKS. AS EACH REFUGEE COMPLETES CHECKS, HE OR SHE (HALF OF THEM ARE FEMALE) WILL BOARD LARGE, VENTILATED, UNMARKED VAN AND NOT BE PERMITTED LEAVE IT (IN ORDER ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVE ISOLATION) UNTIL ENTIRE PARTY ARRIVES AT MILITARY RPT MILITARY SECTION OF BEIRUT AIRPORT. (VAN IS FITTED WITH BENCH-SEATS TO ACCOMODATE 100 OCCUPANTS.) SALM AND ONE OTHER PAN AM SECURITY OFFICIAL WILL ACCOMPANY REFUGEES IN VAN ON JOUNEY (APPROXIMATELY 30-45 MINUTES) TO AIRPORT.

EARLY MORNING JAN 6: UPON ARRIVAL AT PLANESIDE, REFUGEES WILL IMMEDIATELY EMPLANE. LOCAL PAN AM DIRECTOR TAYLOR AND MAINTENANCE CHIEF NASIR (BOTH AMCITS) WILL BE AT PLANESIDE TO ASSIST PASSENGERS AND CREW. UPON LOADING, AIRCRAFT WILL TAKE OFF IMMEDIATELY. ARMY PROMISES SALM THAT ADEQUATE PERIMETER SECURITY PRECAUTIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED WHILE AIRCRAFT IS ON GROUND.

2. ATIYEH TOLD EMBOFF AND SALM AFTER MEETING THAT HE BELIEVES ABOVE SCENARIO, IF STRICTLY ADHERED TO, SHOULD ENABLE OPERATION TO PROCEED WITHOUT MISHAP. SALM AND WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE ABOVE PLAN IS PROBABLY BEST THAT COULD BE DEvised, OPERATION WILL HAVE TO BE JUDGED BY ITS EXECUTION. SALM PLANS TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ABOVE-MENTIONED OFFICER THROUGHOUT JAN 5 IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT EVERYTHING GETS CARRIED OUT AS PLANNED.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

-2 - BEIRUT 0141, 04 Jan. '74

3. ONE UNSETTLED DETAIL IS THAT OF GOL CLEARANCE FOR AIRCRAFT TO LAND. ARMY OFFICER TOLD SALM THAT HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH TAYLOR IN MORNING JAN 5 TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER, ADDING THAT UNDER NO RPT NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TAYLOR APPROACH LEBANESE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES.

4. TAYLOR REQUESTS DEPT PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PAN AM NEW YORK: HE PREFERS THAT NO RPT NO "SETUP WIRE" BE SENT TO PAN AM BEIRUT VIA COMPANY CHANNELS, REASON BEING THAT TAYLOR PLANS BE IN AIRPORT OPERATIONS OFFICE AT TIME CONTACT IS MADE WITH INCOMING AIRCRAFT. BUFFUM

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Department of State

uH E.O.
Scowcroft
McFarlane
Skuynders
Rodman

TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 041355Z JAN 74
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5874
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 0139

0 6 2 1 Q
04 JAN 73 Z15 07

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, SY, LE
SUBJ: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

REF: STATE 974 AND 1094

1. EMBOFF AND PAN AM REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER SALM SAW DR. ATIYEH AT 1030Z JAN 4 TO REVIEW ARRANGEMENTS DESCRIBED REFTELS. ATIYEH CONFIRMED HE HAS NOTIFIED LEBANESE AUTHORITIES OF ARRIVAL PAN AM CHARTER FLIGHT AND OBTAINED THEIR AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE DEPARTURE OF 94-96 SYRIAN JEWS IN EARLY MORNING HOURS JAN 6. SCENARIO, ACCORDING TO ATIYEH, WILL HAVE REFUGEES DELIVERED TO UNKNOWN STAGING AREA LATE JAN 5, WHERE THEY WILL UNDERGO IDENTITY CHECK AND BE LOADED INTO CLOSED, WINDOWLESS VAN FOR DELIVERY TO PLANESIDE AT AIRPORT CARGO AREA.

2. IN RESPONSE TO EMBOFF'S REQUEST THAT HE AND/OR SALM BE PUT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH LEBANESE OFFICIALS CONCERNED, ATIYEH NOTED HE SCHEDULED MEET WITH THEM THIS AFTERNOON AT 1400Z AND WOULD SUBMIT THIS REQUEST TO THEM. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HAD REFUSED ALL RPT ALL DIRECT CONTACT WITH FRENCH EMBASSY IN COURSE OF DOCUMENTATION PROCESS AND MIGHT REFUSE BE PLACED IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH US. EMBOFF EMPHASIZED EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF OUR CONTACTING GOL OFFICIALS DIRECTLY ON THIS MATTER IN VIEW OF ESSENTIAL SECURITY STIPULATIONS LAID DOWN BY USG AND PAN AM, AND ATIYEH PROMISED HE WOULD STRONGLY URGE THEM MEET WITH US. EMBOFF RAISED POSSIBILITY OF OUR CONTACTING PRESIDENCY OFFICIAL BUTROS DIB, AND ATIYEH REPLIED THAT WHILE DIB IS OBVIOUSLY AWARE OF SITUATION OF SYRIAN JEWS IN LEBANON, DIB IS NOT AWARE (IN ATIYEH'S OPINION) OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE FOR THIS DEPARTURE. ATIYEH HAS BEEN ENJOINED BY HIS OFFICIAL LEBANESE CONTACTS NOT TO WIDEN CIRCLE OF PERSONS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THIS OPERATION WITHOUT OBTAINING PRIOR PERMISSION FROM THEM. HE REQUESTED THAT BEFORE CONTACTING DIB OR ANY OTHER GOL OFFICIAL ON THIS MATTER, WE AWAIT RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST TO BE PLACED

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-2- BEIRUT 0139, JAN 04, NODIS

IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH PERSONS WITH WHOM HE IS DEALING. (CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THESE PERSONS DO NOT RPT NOT INCLUDE DIB.)

3. ATIYEH ALSO TOOK LIST OF SECURITY STIPULATIONS CONTAINED STATE 1094 FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HIS LEBANESE CONTACTS, AND PROMISED RAISE WITH THEM QUESTION RE PROPER HANDLING OF PAN AM'S APPLICATION FOR AIRCRAFT LANDING PERMIT. (SUCH APPLICATIONS ARE NORMALLY SUBMITTED TO DIRGEN CIVIL AVIATION ZUHAYR BEYDOUN, A MOSLEM, AND ARE GENERALLY REFUSED IF--AS IN THIS CASE--THEY INVOLVE "FIFTH FREEDOM" CHARTER FLIGHTS.) EMBOFF POINTED OUT, AND ATIYEH AGREED, THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER REASON WHY DIRECT CONTACT WITH LEBANESE AUTHORITIES INVOLVED IS ESSENTIAL FOR EMBASSY AND PAN AM.

4. ON SUBJECT OF HIS PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT AIRPORT JAN 6, ATIYEH SAID THIS IMPOSSIBLE. POINTED OUT THAT HE IS NOT RPT NOT PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH MOST OF REFUGEES INVOLVED AND THEREFORE COULD NOT CONCLUSIVELY IDENTIFY THEM IN ANY CASE. ONLY PERSON WHO COULD DO SO IS GRAND RABBI, WHOM ATIYEH BELIEVED WOULD BE EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO BE ON HAND AT AIRPORT (FOR REASONS OF HIS OWN SECURITY IN FUTURE). AT EMBOFF'S URGING, ATIYEH PROMISED TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH GRAND RABBI AND HIS LEBANESE CONTACTS WITH VIEW TO OBTAINING PERMISSION FOR RABBI AND PAN AM SECURITY OFFICIALS TO PERFORM IDENTIFY CHECKS EITHER AT AIRPORT OR, IF THIS NOT POSSIBLE, AT STAGING AREA BEFORE REFUGEES ARE LOADED INTO SEALED VAN.

5. WE FEEL IT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNWISE TO HAVE EMBASSY PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS OPERATION, EITHER AT STAGING AREA OR AIRPORT. HOWEVER, RSO WILL REVIEW PROTECTION AND SECURITY PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT BOARDING IN ADVANCE, BUT SINCE WE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER EXECUTION OF SUCH PROCEDURES AND NO EMBASSY PERSONNEL WILL BE ON HAND AT AIRPORT OR STAGING AREA, EMBASSY OBVIOUSLY CANNOT ASSURE SECURITY PROCEDURES WILL PROTECT AIRCRAFT FROM DANGER OF HIJACKING.

6. WE EXPECT TO HEAR FROM ATIYEH EVENING JAN 4 RE WILLINGNESS OF LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH US AND PAN AM ON THIS MATTER, AS WELL AS THEIR WILLINGNESS MEET PAN AM'S SECURITY STIPULATIONS. ATIYEH FULLY AWARE OF

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Department of State

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-3- BEIRUT 0139, JAN 04, NODIS

IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THESE MATTERS AND WILL DO HIS BEST PERSUADE LEBANESE OFFICIALS BE FORTHCOMING. WILL REPORT RESULTS SOONEST.

7. BY SAME TOKEN, WE AND ATIYEH ARE VERY CONCERNED THAT INTERESTED INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN US AND ELSEWHERE WILL CREATE PUBLICITY ABOUT DEPARTURE OPERATION AFTER IT IS SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED. ATIYEH BEGS THAT USG DO ITS UTMOST TO ENSURE THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN. WE WILL CONTINUE DO OUR BEST IMPRESS IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY ON ALL CONCERNED, BUT WITH 96 PASSENGERS, PERSONNEL AT AIRPORT, AND GOL SECURITY PERSONNEL AT BOTH STAGING AREA AND AIRPORT, RISK OF LEAKS IS NOT A SMALL ONE. WE NEED NOT EMPHASIZE DAMAGE THAT WOULD RESULT IN OUR RELATIONS WITH LEBANON, SYRIA AND REST OF ARAB WORLD SHOULD OPERATION BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

BUFFUM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

*Scowcroft
McFarlane
Spaulding
Rosen*

SECRET

R 190808Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MADRID 192
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5716
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 14369

CN: 4874Q
REC'D: DECEMBER 19, 1973
5:32 A.M.

WODIS/CHEROKEE

MADRID FOR TOSEC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR
SUBJECT: GENEVA CONFERENCE

FOR THE RECORD, LAST SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE RECEIVED
PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE FOR DAMASCUS TALKS WITH SYRIAN
OFFICIALS DECEMBER 18 WAS CONTAINED IN SECTO 173. KORN
AND I DEPARTED BEIRUT 7 A.M. SINCE MAIN DAMASCUS ROAD
WAS CLOSED DUE TO SNOW AND WE WERE REQUIRED TO TAKE
LONGER SOUTHERN ROUTE. SUBSEQUENT GUIDANCE, SUCH AS
SECTO 181, ARRIVED AFTER MY DEPARTURE WHICH, BECAUSE OF
COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS WITH SYRIA, COULD NOT BE SENT ON
TO ME. BUFFUM

BT
#4369

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

SCOWCROFT

CONTROL: 4598Q
RECD: DEC 18, 1973
1733Z

CORRECTED COPY

Z O 181544Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MADRID FLASH 188
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5710
RUEHCR/US DEL GENEVA NIACT IMMEDIATE 424
RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NIACT IMMEDIATE 2538
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 869
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 4714
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1150
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 14360

MRN 14360 VICE
14260
LL
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

MADRID FOR SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR
SUBJECT: SYRIAN ATTITUDE RE GENEVA CONFERENCE

REF: SECTO 173

1. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM HAS TOLD US BY PHONE FROM DAMASCUS AT 1515Z THAT HE AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR KORN ARE AWAITING APPOINTMENT AT 1530Z WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. AS YET NO DECISION TAKEN ON SARG ATTENDANCE ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT DECISION WILL BE MADE KNOWN PUBLICLY SOME TIME TODAY. AMBASSADOR MET WITH FONMIN EARLIER DECEMBER 18 BUT GOT NO DEFINITE RESPONSE.
2. CARDILLI (USINT) CALLED AT 1725Z TO SAY LOCAL DAMASCUS PRESS HEADLINING SARG NON-ATTENDANCE AT GENEVA.
3. AMBASSADOR WILL RETURN BEIRUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH ASSAD AND WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY BY TELEGRAM ON HIS TALKS.

BUFFUM

BT
#4360

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 4598Q
RECD: DEC 18, 1973
1733Z

Z O 181544Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MADRID FLASH 188
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5710
RUEHCR/US DEL GENEVA NIACT IMMEDIATE 424
RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NIACT IMMEDIATE 2538
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 869
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 4714
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 1150
BT

SECRET BEIRUT 14260

NODIS/CHEROKEE

MADRID FOR SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR
SUBJECT: SYRIAN ATTITUDE RE GENEVA CONFERENCE

REF: SECTO 173

1. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM HAS TOLD US BY PHONE FROM DAMASCUS AT 1915Z THAT HE AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR KORN ARE AWAITING APPOINTMENT AT 1530Z WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. AS YET NO DECISION TAKEN ON SARG ATTENDANCE ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT DECISION WILL BE MADE KNOWN PUBLICLY SOME TIME TODAY. AMBASSADOR MET WITH FONMIN EARLIER DECEMBER 18 BUT GOT NO DEFINITE RESPONSE.

2. CARDILLI (USINT) CALLED AT 1725Z TO SAY LOCAL DAMASCUS PRESS HEADLINING SARG NON-ATTENDANCE AT GENEVA.

3. AMBASSADOR WILL RETURN BEIRUT IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH ASSAD AND WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY BY TELEGRAM ON HIS TALKS.

BUFFUM

BT
#4360

SCOWROTT
MCFARLANE
SAUNDERS
RODMAN

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TELEGRAM

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W 14
COPY 8 OF 8 COPIES
CONTROL: 7158Q
RECD: 28 NOV 73 6AM

0 280913Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5376
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 13541

Scowcroft
LL
Sanders

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR XF
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FOLLOW-UP TRIP BY SECRETARY

REF: STATE 233104

1. LEBANESE GOVT WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE SECRETARY VISIT BEIRUT.
2. I BELIEVE ANOTHER SWING THROUGH THE AREA WOULD BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF SINCERITY AND VIGOR OF SECRETARY'S EFFORTS TO GET PRODKTIVE PEACE-TALKS UNDER WAY AND VERY MUCH HOPE HE WILL DECIDE TO MAKE TRIP. BUFFUM

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1 EXTRA COPY ISSUED 20 NOV. '73
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*WH. Eyes Only
Gen Secwcraft
Direct*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 5 6 2 8Q
RECD: 20 NOV, 5:25PM

R 201545Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5302
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 13354

*SECWCRYPT
McFARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS*

73 NOV 21 AM 7:41

*WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM*

NODIS - CHEROKEE

DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS TO OTHER POSTS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, LE
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE TALKS

REF: BEIRUT 13172

SUMMARY: THERE IS INCREASING TALK HERE OF PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE PRIOR TO GENEVA PEACE TALKS. COMPLICATIONS SUCH MOVE WOULD ENTAIL FOR PEACE CONFERENCE AND LONGER TERM FUTURE OF WEST BANK ARE OBVIOUS. I RECOMMEND DEPT CONSIDER WHETHER DIPLOMATIC DEMARCHES, STARTING WITH USSR, MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO FORESTALL PRECIPITOUS ACTION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE PEACE CONFERENCE.
END SUMMARY

1. AT LUNCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA NOVEMBER 20, MAIN POINT WHICH EMERGED WAS PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE TALKS. LEBANESE POSITION IS SIMPLE. THEY WILL SUPPORT WHATEVER FORMULA OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED ACCEPT AND WHICH STANDS SOME CHANCE OF GETTING THE PALESTINIANS OFF THEIR BACKS.

2. DURING VISIT THIS WEEK TO SAUDI ARABIA BY PRIMIN SOLH AND NAFFA, SAUDIS INDICATED PLO PARTICIPATION IN CONFERENCE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. SAUDIS AND LEBANESE ENVISAGE THAT AT A SUBSEQUENT STAGE REFERENDUM COULD BE HELD TO DETERMINE STATUS OF WEST BANK.

3. MAJOR COMPLICATION, AS WE SEE IT, IS POSSIBILITY THAT PRIOR TO PEACE CONFERENCE, PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS MAY FORM A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE. NAFFA CONFIDED THAT IN HIS LAST DISCUSSION WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS A WEEK AGO, THEY INDICATED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO HIM THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING THIS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

- 2 - BEIRUT 13354, 20 NOV '73

4. IN NAFFA'S VIEW, ALGIERS CONFERENCE MIGHT WIND UP APPROVING A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY, THIS PROBLEM GOES FAR BEYOND COMPETENCE OF EMBASSY BEIRUT. NEVERTHELESS, THE POTENTIAL DANGERS IN FORMATION OF PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE STRIKE ME AS BEING SERIOUS ENOUGH TO FLAG FOR DEPARTMENT'S URGENT ATTENTION. FOR EXAMPLE, IF ISRAEL SHOULD REFUSE THE PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE CONFERENCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE, WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES DIRECTLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS ISSUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PROBABLY ALL ARAB GOVERNMENTS EXCEPT PERHAPS JORDAN. ADDITIONAL COMPLICATION IS FACT THAT FORMATION OF SUCH GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE COULD BE DELIBERATE TOOL OF FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP TO AVOID HOLDING A REFERENDUM AS PROPOSED BY HUSSEIN THEREBY FORECLOSING IMPORTANT AND CONSTRUCTIVE OPTION. IN OUR OPINION, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHAT IS DECIDED BETWEEN PLO LEADERSHIP AND RUSSIAN OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW. SHOULD THEY REACH AGREEMENT NOW ON GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE, THE DIE WOULD PROBABLY BE CAST FOR ALGIERS CONFERENCE DECISION IN SAME VEIN, CAUSING FOREGOING PROBLEMS AND PERHAPS MORE AS WELL.

ACCORDINGLY, EVEN THOUGH TIME TO AFFECT MOSCOW TALKS IS PRESUMABLY VERY LIMITED, IT MAY BE WORTH THE EFFORT FOR USG TO URGE UPON SOVIETS NECESSITY OF LEAVING ALL OPTIONS OPEN REGARDING FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINIANS IN GENEVA CONFERENCE. OTHER DEMARCHES, FOR EXAMPLE IN AMMAN, MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Scowcroft

O 200820Z NOV 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5272
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 1330Z

5 4 3 4 Q LL
Nov 20, 1973
09:27Z

Sander

NODIS-CHEROKEE

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, LE
SUBJECT: US POSITION ON PEACE CONFERENCE

FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTOR SADAQA ASKED TO SEE ME EARLY NOVEMBER 20 TO ASCERTAIN US POSITION ON PEACE CONFERENCE BEFORE GOING TO ALGIERS. HE SAID LEBANON IS MINDFUL OF US ASSISTANCE OVER THE YEARS AND WOULD LIKE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE AT THE ALGIERS MEETINGS. (HE DEPARTS NOON LOCAL TIME NOVEMBER 22.) IN PARTICULAR, GOL WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. UNDER WHAT AUSPICES WOULD WE ACCEPT CONFERENCE? GOL REALIZES WE HAVE PROPOSED US-SOVIET CO-PRESIDENCY BUT NOTES THAT SYRIA IS DEMANDING EUROPEAN (AND AFRICAN) PARTICIPATION. FOR OUR INFO, GOL REPORTS, BASED ON VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA YESTERDAY BY FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER, THAT FEISAL WOULD LIKE EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION BUT WOULD NOT INSIST ON IT. LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT EUROPEANS PARTICIPATE, BUT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WISH TO TAKE POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT WITHOUT KNOWING US VIEWS FIRST.
2. WOULD US CONTINUE TO OPPOSE PARTICIPATION OF ZOIANT SC XEMBERS IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE AREA ESTABLISHED IN CONNECTION WITH A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT?
3. DO WE HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL POINTS TO MAKE ON PETROLEUM EMBARGO GOING BEYOND WHAT SISCO SAID, I.E., NEED TO HAVE FULL SUPPORT OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION FOR OUR EFFORTS TO FACILITATE SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY CONTINUING EMBARGO?
COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY, IT IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR OUR VIEWS BY MODERATE PARTICIPANTS LIKE LEBANON IN ALGIERS CONFERENCE. WOULD HOPE TO HAVE REACTION TO FOREGOING, AND ANY OTHER POINTS DEPT MAY WISH TO MAKE BY COB NOV 21 IF POSSIBLE.

BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

O 012258Z MAY 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3850
INFO RUEHHAK/USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE 0088
BT
SECRET STATE 089704

CONTROL 0258Q

74
APR 32 AM 11:38

WHITE HOUSE
STATION ROOM

NODIS
TOSEC 127

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, XF
SUBJECT: ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG

REF: (A) BEIRUT 4665, (B) SECTO 77

1. FYI. COMMUNICATION WITH ARAFAT IS NOT SOMETHING WE CAN UNDERTAKE AT THIS TIME, FOR IT WOULD INVOLVE DANGERS TO OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND JORDAN AS WELL AS OTHER POSSIBLE COMPLICATIONS, AND WE OF COURSE ARE NOT IN POSITION TO GIVE ARAFAT THE ASSURANCES HE SEEMS TO BE SEEKING. HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MISTAKE TO GIVE KHALIDI IMPRESSION HIS MESSAGE IS BEING COMPLETELY IGNORED. WHAT WE WANT TO DO IS MAKE GENERAL RESPONSE TO KHALIDI ASSURING HIM OF OUR CONCERN RE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY MENTIONING ARAFAT. END FYI.

2. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY OFFICER SHOULD TELL KHALIDI THAT HIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SEEN WITH INTEREST AND APPRECIATION AT HIGH LEVELS OF DEPARTMENT. WE WANT KHALIDI TO BE ASSURED THAT WHOLE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN ROLE IN SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS VERY MUCH ON OUR MIND AND WILL BE ONE OF THE SUBJECTS SECRETARY WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS ON HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP. IMMEDIATE NEXT STEP IN SETTLEMENT PROCESS IS SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT, BUT AFTER THA IS ACHIEVED WE WILL BE HOLDING CONSULTATIONS RE HOW TO PROCEED SUBSEQUENTLY. KHALIDI SHOULD KNOW THAT

WE HAVE NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT. WE HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT ANY SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF PALESTINIANS. WE DO APPRECIATE AND ARE ENCOURAGED BY INTEREST OF ELEMENTS OF PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IN EXPLORING QUESTION OF JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF LONG-STANDING ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

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TELEGRAM

-2- STATE 89704, 1 MAY '74

3. IF KHALIDI RAISES QUESTION OR IF THERE APPEARS TO BE ANY DOUBT IN HIS MIND, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT FOREGOING IS RESPONSE TO HIS REMARKS TO EMBASSY OFFICER ON APRIL 20 AND IS NOT A MESSAGE FROM USG FOR ARAFAT. HE IS OBVIOUSLY FREE TO CONVEY ITS SUBSTANCE TO HIS PALESTINIAN FRIENDS, THOUGH WE INTEND THIS COMMUNICATION WITH KHALIDI TO REMAIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. RUSH

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
4/26/74 EXT 22670
THE SECRETARY

NEA:ALATHERTON
P:JJSISCO
S/S - MR. GAMMON

NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA:IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE

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W. N. LAX

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

4

O 111809Z APR 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEBSE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3561
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0058
INFO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0380

3230Q
APRIL 11, 1974
2:21 PM

BT
SECRET STATE 073745

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANESE POSITION RE CAPTURED ISRAELI AIRMEN

REF: STATE 73372

1. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES' APPROACH TO THE LEBANESE REGARDING CAPTURED ISRAELI AIRMEN WHICH WAS REPORTED REFTEL WAS MADE AS THE RESULT OF A REQUEST FROM ISRAELI AMBASSADOR DINITZ IN TELECON WITH UNDER SECRETARY SISCO APRIL 10. DINITZ SAID THAT HE WAS MAKING REQUEST ON BEHALF OF THE PRIME MINISTER HERSELF.
2. IN SEPARATE, BUT APPARENTLY UNCOORDINATED, APPROACH ISRAELI MINISTER SHALEV CALLED ATHERTON APRIL 10 TO EXPRESS ISRAELI CONCERN OVER IAF PILOT AND NAVIGATOR CAPTURED BY LEBANESE. GOI HAS ASKED FOR THEIR RETURN WITHOUT RESULTS.
3. SHALEV SAID GOI WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE USG COULD PROVIDE IN GETTING PILOT AND NAVIGATOR BACK TO ISRAEL. SHALEV SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE LEBANON HOLDS ANY OTHER ISRAELI PRISONERS AT THIS TIME.
4. ATHERTON SAID WE WOULD TAKE ISRAELI REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT COULD NOT GIVE IMMEDIATE ANSWER. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ICRATG APPROVED BY: NEA ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
CLEARANCES: P MR. RAPHAEL S/S WILUERS

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 3000Q

RECD: 10 APR '74 9:29P

R 110259Z APR 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3545
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0049
INFO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS 0377
BT
SECRET STATE 073372

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PMIL, LE, IS, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANESE POSITION RE CAPTURED ISRAELI AIRMEN

REF.: BEIRUT 4220

1. ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES TELEPHONED LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI TO NOTE THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA ON THE QUESTION OF TURNING THE TWO CAPTURED ISRAELI PILOTS OVER TO THE SYRIANS. DAVIES SAID THAT WHILE SUCH DECISIONS WERE FOR THE GOL TO REACH, AS A PARTY INTERESTED IN ENCOURAGING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, WE FELT THAT SURRENDERING THE CAPTURED PILOTS TO SYRIA WOULD COMPLICATE THE SITUATION BOTH FOR SETTLEMENT AND AREA RELATIONS.

2. KABBANI SAID HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE EXCHANGE BUT FELT REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT THE GOL WOULD RETAIN PILOTS PENDING SOME FORM OF SYRIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT.

3. KABBANI SAID HE WOULD REPORT OUR VIEWS TO BEIRUT. KISSI
BT
#3372

DRAFTED BY: NEA: RPDAVIES APPROVED BY: NEA: RPDAVIES
CLEARANCES: NEA: ALATHERTON, JR. (SUBS) NEA/ARN DAKORN (SUBS)
P: JJSISCO (INFO) S/S: WHLUERS

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
Department of State

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'74 FEB 14 AM 8:39

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 3 6 0 1 Q

RECD: 14 FEB 74 10:02P

O R 140153Z FEB 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2734
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9492
BT
SECRET STATE 030026

HAK
SCOWROFT
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NODIS
BEIRUT PASS USINT DAMASCUS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SY, IS
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REACTION TO MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT ON GOLAN
REF: DAMASCUS 55

YOU SHOULD TELL SYRIANS THAT USG HAS TAKEN UP MRS. MEIR'S STATEMENT ON GOLAN WITH ISRAELIS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY WE WANT SARG TO KNOW THAT STATEMENT CAUGHT US BY SURPRISE AND DOES NOT REFLECT USG VIEWS. WE ARE AWARE THAT ASSAD IS IN TRIPOLI AND WOULD PREFER TO HAVE ABOVE MESSAGE SENT TO HIM BY SYRIANS FROM DAMASCUS RATHER THAN WE TAKE IT UP DIRECTLY WITH HIM IN TRIPOLI. KISSINGER

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:KM
22670 2/12/74

THE SECRETARY

XNEA:ALATHERTON
XS/S - SFRY
XS - MR. EAGLEBURGER

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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 25 10
RECD: 10 FEB 74 9:04 PM

HAK
Scowcroft
McFarlane
Rohman
Saunders

O 110160Z FEB 74 ZFFG
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCOR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2673
INFO RUEHCOR/USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5994
RUEHCOR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3947
BT
SECRET STATE 027121

MODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: AGDS
TAGS: PFOR, SY, US

SUBJ: RESPONSE TO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ASSAD TO THE SECRETARY
REF: DAMASCUS 97


BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS

1. SCOTES SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT ASSAD IN MOST EXPEDITIOUS MANNER.
2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

THE SECRETARY WANTS TO THANK PRESIDENT ASSAD FOR THE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO HIM THROUGH MR. SCOTES THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 9. THE SECRETARY IS CONFIDENT THAT ON THE BASIS OF PRESIDENT ASSAD'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL SET FORTH IN HIS LETTER OF FEBRUARY 5, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, HE IS CONFIDENT HE CAN ELICIT A CONCRETE PROPOSAL FROM THE ISRAELIS AND, AS SOON AS RED CROSS VISITS BEGIN, GET THEM TO SEND A SENIOR OFFICIAL TO WASHINGTON FOR INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED IN HIS FEBRUARY 5 LETTER TO PRESIDENT ASSAD, AS SOON AS THE OIL EMBARGO QUESTION HAS BEEN RESOLVED, HE WILL INITIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS THE STEPS OUTLINED IN OUR PROCEDURAL PROPOSAL.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE -2- STATE 27121, FEB 11

THE SECRETARY UNDERSTANDS THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE NOW UNDER WAY AMONG THE ARAB LEADERS CONCERNED ON THE QUESTION OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO. HE WELCOMES THIS DEVELOPMENT AND LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING THE RESULTS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE SO THAT HE CAN GET THINGS MOVING WITH REGARD TO DISENGAGEMENT ON THE SYRIAN FRONT. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SECRETARY REITERATES WHAT HE HAS SAID BEFORE -- FURTHER STEPS ON OUR PART MUST AWAIT A SOLUTION OF THE EMBARGO QUESTION.

THE SECRETARY WANTS PRESIDENT ASSAD TO KNOW THAT HE IS COMMUNICATING ALSO WITH PRESIDENT SADAT, KING FAISAL AND PRESIDENT BOUNEDIENE IN THE ABOVE SENSE. MEANWHILE, HE WANTS AGAIN, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT NIXON AND ON HIS OWN BEHALF, TO ASSURE PRESIDENT ASSAD OF OUR DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AS A FURTHER INITIAL STEP TOWARD A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. EMD MESSAGE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: S:S:MR. GAYMON

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TELEGRAM

Control: 2 3 0 3 Q

Received: February 8, 1974 508PM

O 082107Z FEB 74 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2661
 BT
 S E C R E T STATE 026914

Scowcroft
RODMAN
McFARLANE
SAUNDERS

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
 TAGS: PFOR, SY, US
 SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION RE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
 TO PRESIDENT ASSAD

BEIRUT PLEASE PASS DAMASCUS

REF: STATE 024425

WE UNDERSTAND FROM YOU THAT SYRIANS HAVE ASKED FOR
 FOLLOWING TWO CLARIFICATIONS IN SECRETARY'S MESSAGE
 TO ASSAD:

1. REGARDING THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE, "WE HAVE FOR THE
 MOMENT SIMPLY SAID THAT WE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT WE AND
 SOVIETS SHOULD COORDINATE OUR EFFORTS, BECAUSE SECRETARY
 FIRST WANTED TO GET PRESIDENT ASSAD'S VIEWS." WE UNDER-
 STAND FROM YOU THAT SYRIANS WANT TO KNOW WHETHER WE HAVE
 INFORMED SOVIETS THAT WE ARE SEEKING ASSAD'S VIEWS ON THIS
 POINT. YOU CAN RESPOND THAT SECRETARY HAS SAID TO THE
 SOVIETS THAT WE INTEND TO CONSULT BOTH PARTIES REGARDING
 FUTURE US/SOVIET EFFORTS.

2. SECOND CLARIFICATION BEING SOUGHT BY SYRIANS RELATES
 TO THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE IN OUR MESSAGE: "HE HAS NOT
 REVEALED TO SOVIETS ANY OF THE MATTERS DISCUSSED IN
 CONFIDENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND HIMSELF AND TO EXPRESS
 THE HOPE THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD WILL KEEP HIM INFORMED OF

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

-2- State 26914 February 8, 1974

ANYTHING HE MIGHT TELL SOVIETS ABOUT THESE MATTERS SO THAT NO MISUNDERSTANDINGS ARISE." WE UNDERSTAND FROM YOU THAT THE SYRIANS WANT TO KNOW WHETHER THIS ALSO APPLIES TO SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES WE HAVE SENT TO ASSAD; IN OTHER WORDS, HAVE THE SOVIETS BEEN TOLD OF THE RECENT FORMULA SENT TO ASSAD FOR HIS CONSIDERATION AS A POSSIBLE MEANS TO GET SYRIAN/ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT TALKS STARTED. YOU CAN TELL ASSAD THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD PRECISELY NOR HAVE THEY BEEN SHOWN A TEXT OF THE IDEAS SENT TO ASSAD, THOUGH THEY ARE AWARE THAT WE HAVE FORWARDED SOME SUGGESTIONS TO THE SYRIANS.

KISSINGER

BT
#6914

Drafted by: NEA:JJSisco
Approved by: THE SECRETARY
Clearances: S/S- Mr. Luers

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TELEGRAM

WIA
SCOWC
McFarlane
Spungers
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CONTROL: 6 9 4 8Q

O 292353Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2515
BT
SECRET STATE 019342

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, SY, IS, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT ASSAD

BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS FOR SCOTES

1. SCOTES SHOULD CONVEY FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT ASSAD IN MANNER HE DEEMS MOST APPROPRIATE.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

AS SECRETARY KISSINGER INFORMED PRESIDENT ASSAD IN HIS LAST MESSAGE, HE CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON JANUARY 20 PRESIDENT ASSAD'S PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES ON THE SYRIAN FRONT. THE SECRETARY HAS BEEN IN FURTHER COMMUNICATION WITH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND WANTS TO BRING PRESIDENT ASSAD UP TO DATE ON WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND.

WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS, DESPITE INITIAL RESISTANCE ON THEIR PART, TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO ENTER DISENGAGEMENT TALKS WITH SYRIA. WE HAVE ALSO OBTAINED THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA OF CARRYING OUT SUCH TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY WORKING GROUP TO WHICH SYRIAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE ATTACHED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ISRAELIS HAVE REITERATED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO THE POW ISSUE, AS THE SECRETARY INDICATED TO PRESIDENT ASSAD WOULD BE THE CASE. NEVERTHELESS, THE SECRETARY WANTS PRESIDENT ASSAD TO KNOW THAT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT, FOLLOWING THE PATTERN DEVELOPED IN PURSUING EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT, HE CAN PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO SEND GENERAL DAYAN TO WASHINGTON WITH A RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT ASSAD'S PROPOSAL ONCE SYRIA HAS PROVIDED A LIST OF POW'S AND HAS AGREED TO RED CROSS VISITS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2 - STATE 019342, 29 JAN'74

IN KEEPING WITH HIS UNDERTAKING TO DEAL WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD IN FULL CANDOR, THE SECRETARY WANTS TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT HIS JUDGMENT THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO MAKE THE PRISONER LIST AVAILABLE AND TO PERMIT RED CROSS VISITS, THERE WILL BE A DELAY IN GETTING SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. THE SECRETARY REITERATES HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE IN FACILITATING SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AS A STEP TOWARD A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE.

SECRETARY KISSINGER WILL LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING PRESIDENT ASSAD'S VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO THIS MESSAGE AND MEANWHILE CONVEYS TO THE PRESIDENT HIS WARM PERSONAL REGARDS. END TEXT. KISSINGER

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR./HLK
1/29/74 EXT 29464
THE SECRETARY

NEA - MR. SISCO

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TELEGRAM

0 230204Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2430
BT
SECRET STATE 014549

CONTROL: 5166Q
RECD: 22 JAN 74 9:58PM

*SLOWCROFT
MCCARLANE
RODMAN
SAUNDERS*

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, SY
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD FROM SECRETARY

BEIRUT PASS TO SCOTES IN DAMASCUS

1. SCOTES SHOULD TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT ASAD:

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I AM SENDING THIS BRIEF INTERIM REPORT TO CONFIRM TO YOU THAT, DURING MY STOP IN ISRAEL EN ROUTE BACK TO WASHINGTON SUNDAY EVENING, I TRANSMITTED YOUR PROPOSAL ON THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. THE ISRAELIS TOLD ME THEY WOULD BE WORKING ON A REPLY AND, AS SOON AS I HEAR FROM THEM, I WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH YOU.

3. MEANWHILE, I WANT TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR THE HOSPITALITY ACCORDED TO ME AND THE MEMBERS OF MY PARTY DURING OUR BRIEF VISIT TO DAMASCUS. I WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE OUR USEFUL PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS IN THE CAUSE OF A JUST AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE. I AM ALSO GRATIFIED AT THE PROGRESS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED YOUR DECISION TO RELEASE JONATHAN BATES, THE YOUNG AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO HAS BEEN IN CUSTODY IN YOUR COUNTRY. WHEN I INFORMED PROFESSOR BATES, JONATHAN'S FATHER, OF YOUR DECISION, HE WAS DEEPLY MOVED AND ASKED THAT I CONVEY TO YOU HIS GRATITUDE FOR THIS HUMANITARIAN ACT.

4. WARM PERSONAL REGARDS. HENRY KISSINGER. END TEXT
KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: S:S:MR. LUERS

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TELEGRAM

O 040110z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2137
BT
SECRET STATE 002375

CONTROL: 0776Q

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, LE, SY, U.S.
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWS FROM LEBANON

74
JAN 5 AM 10:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

REF: BEIRUT 139

1. DEPARTMENT HAS PASSED MESSAGE PARA FOUR REFTEL TO PAN
AM NEW YORK OFFICE. KISSINGER

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC
22670 1/4/74
NEA - MR. ATHERTON

S/S - MR. LUERS

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TELEGRAM

SCOWCROFT

O 042017Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2124
BT
SECRET STATE 001672

CONTROL: 0710Q
MCFARLAND
RODMAN
SAUNDERS

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, SY, LE, U.S.
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWS FROM LEBANON

1. PAN AM INFORMS US AIRCRAFT NOW SCHEDULED ARRIVE BEIRUT
AT 2:30 A.M. LOCAL TIME JANUARY 6 INSTEAD OF 1:00 A.M.
AS EARLIER PLANNED. KISSINGER

NEA/ARN: DAKORN: JFC
22670 1/4/74
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S - MR. LUERS

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TELEGRAM

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WH 6

O 041800Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2122
BT
SECRET STATE 001603

0 6 6 8Q

1603

44

74 JAN 5 AM 10.2
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, SY, LE, US
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

REF: 738475 5874

1. WE WOULD PREFER EMBASSY HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH INVOLVED LEBANESE AUTHORITY BUT DO NOT WANT TO INSIST ON THIS IF IT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE OPERATION TO ABORT. WE DO HOWEVER NEED DR. ATTIYEH'S ASSURANCE THAT EVERYTHING IS IN ORDER.
2. AGREE THAT EMBASSY PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN EXECUTION OF SECURITY PROCEDURES. WE MADE CLEAR IN OUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH PAN AM THAT RSO'S ROLE WOULD BE LIMITED TO REVIEWING SECURITY PROCEDURES WITH PAN AM SECURITY OFFICER AND THAT RSO COULD NOT BE PRESENT AT AIRPORT.
3. RE PARA 4 REFTEL, PAN AM READY TO AGREE TO IDENTITY CHECK BY GRAND RABBI AND PAN AM OFFICIALS AT STAGING AREA BUT WANT TO BE ASSURED THAT ONCE IDENTITY CHECK PERFORMED PASSENGERS WILL BE EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED AND NO ONE BE ALLOWED JOIN OR LEAVE GROUP. EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM TAYLOR AND WILLIAMS OF PAN AM AND SHOULD SEEK TO ARRANGE THIS WITH DR. ATTIYEH. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY:
NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC

APPROVED BY:
NEA - MR. AHERTON

CLEARANCES:
SY/FO - MR. DITTMER
S/S - MR. LUERS

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TELEGRAM

Scowcroft
McFarlane
Spencer
Rosen

CONTROL: 0463Q

O 032238Z JAN 74 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2109
BT
SECRET STATE 001094

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, SY, LE, U.S.
SUBJECT: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

74 JAN 4 AM 11:42

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CABLE GIVEN DEPARTMENT BY PAN AM FOR TRANSMISSION TO EMBASSY BEIRUT FOR TAYLOR, SALM, AND WILLIAMS OF PAN AM FROM GROSSMAN AND WICK OF PAN AM NEW YORK OFFICE:

BEGIN TEXT: REFERENCE CHARTER H053/06JAN BEY/ORY FOR UNITED HIAS SERVICE, THE SET-UP MESSAGE FOR WHICH WILL FOLLOW VIA THIS COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL IN A SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAM, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES MUST BE ARRANGED AND EXECUTION ASSURED:

1. THERE MUST BE PERIMETER SECURITY PROVIDED BY LEBANESE AUTHORITIES AROUND AIRCRAFT WHILE IT IS ON GROUND.
2. THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE HANDLED IN THE CARGO AREA OF THE AIRPORT-
3. ABSOLUTELY NO BAGGAGE IS TO BE LOADED.
4. THERE MUST BE A STRINGENT LIMITATION ON AND FULL INSPECTION OF ANY ARTICLE TO BE HAND CARRIED ONTO THE AIRCRAFT. THIS WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY COMPANY SECURITY OFFICERS.
5. DOCTOR ATTIYEN, HEAD OF LEBANESE JEWISH COMMUNITY, MUST BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT DURING THE HANDLING OF THE AIRCRAFT AND MUST PERSONALLY AND POSITIVELY IDENTIFY EACH AND EVERY PASSENGER BEFORE AND DURING BOARDING OF AIRCRAFT.
6. PROPER DOCUMENTATION FOR FRANCE MUST BE HELD BY EACH PASSENGER.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2- STATE 1094, 03 Jan '74

7. TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE HANDLED BY U.S. CITIZEN EMPLOYEES. IF IT IS NECESSARY TO USE LEBANESE CITIZENS, THOSE SELECTED SHOULD PREFERABLY BE CHRISTIAN. END TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECOND PAN AM MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN ABOVE MESSAGE:

BEGIN TEXT:

NYCSFPA 031935

CONTAINS OPNS IN 36 HOURS

FOLLOWING OPNL SETUP MSG FOR CHTR H053/06 BEY/ORY
STOP

NOTE FOLLOWING MANDATORY INFO:

ONE/IN NO CASE WILL ANY INFO BE DIRECTED TO BEY IN CONTEXT THIS OPN PRIOR 042230 AND AFTER THAT ONLY TPC DEEMED URGENT

TWO/FLT CARRYS CARGO DESIGNATOR BUT WILL BE PASSENGER RPT PASSENGER CHARTER FOR APPROX 100 PAX

THREE/NO RPT NO FUEL ONLOAD AT BEY STOP A/C TO BE FUELED ATH/BEY/ORY

FOUR/BAGGAGE WILL BE CARRY ON ONLY, NO BELLY LOAD

FIVE/PAR SALES OFFICE OF RECORD

SIX/FERRY POSITIONING FLT CANNOT BE USED FOR ANY OTHER REVENUE OPN

SEVEN/OPTIE TH05306 HEL/ATH/BEY USING EQUIP ARHEL
AT 2204

LVHEL 042315/050015L ARATH 050355Z/0555L LVATH

052230/060030L ARBEY 060025Z/0225L STOP OPTIE H05306

BEY/ORY LVBAY 060055Z/0255L ARORT 060515Z/0615L STOP

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TELEGRAM

-3- STATE 1094, 03 Jan '74

REROUTE/RESKED TC 75206 ORY/LHR INSTEAD OF HEL/LHR

LVORY 061110Z/12106 ARLHR 061215Z/1315L

EIGHT/BLOCK TIME HEL/ATH COMPUTED OVHD HAM/FRA., END TEXT.
RUSH

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC

22670 1/3/74

NEA - MR. ATHERTON

S/S - MR. GAMMON

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TELEGRAM

Scowcroft
McFarlane
Brundage
Rosen

CONTROL: 0448Q

O 032154Z JAN 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2104
BT
SECRET STATE 000974

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SREF, SY, LE
SUBJ: EVACUATION OF SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES FROM LEBANON

74 JAN 4 AM 11.12

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. MIAS HAS INFORMED DEPARTMENT THAT DR., ATTIYEH HAS ARRANGED WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTACT FOR PERMISSION FOR CHARTERED AIRCRAFT TO LAND AT BEIRUT AIRPORT ABOUT 0100 HOURS LOCAL TIME SUNDAY JANUARY 6 TO TAKE OUT SYRIAN JEWISH REFUGEES. REFUGEES WILL BOARD IMMEDIATELY, WITHOUT ANY LUGGAGE, AND PLANE WILL TAKE OFF RIGHT AWAY FOR PARIS. MIAS SAYS ITS PARIS OFFICE HAS ARRANGED THROUGH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY FOR REFUGEES TO BE ALLOWED TO ENTER FRANCE. MIAS EXPECTS ABOUT 96 PERSONS TO BE INVOLVED IN THIS AIR-LIFT.

2. AT DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST PAN AM HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT, WHICH WILL BE A 707. TO MAINTAIN SECRECY OF OPERATION PAN AM HAS ASKED DEPARTMENT TO TRANSMIT TO EMBASSY THROUGH CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS MESSAGES FOR PAN AM'S SENIOR AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN BEIRUT., WE WILL BE DOING THIS BY SUBSEQUENT CABLES. PAN AM ALSO WANTS ITS SECURITY OFFICER IN BEIRUT AND ANOTHER SECURITY OFFICER IT WILL BE SENDING FROM ATHENS TO REVIEW PROTECTION AND SCREENING PROCEDURES FOR AIRCRAFT BOARDING WITH EMBASSY RSO. DEPARTMENT AGREES. PAN AM WANTS TO BE ASSURED THAT SECURITY PROCEDURES WILL PROTECT AIRCRAFT FROM DANGER OF HIJACKING.

IN ADDITION, PAN AM INSISTS, AS CONDITION FOR ITS AGREEMENT TO CARRY OUT OPERATION, THAT GOL PROVIDE PERIMETER SECURITY AROUND AIRCRAFT WHILE IT IS ON THE GROUND.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2 - STATE 0974, 03 Jan '74

3. BECAUSE OF PAN AM'S AND OUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN THIS UNDERTAKING WE OF COURSE WANT TO BE SURE THAT DR. ATTIYEH'S ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOL ARE FIRM. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEND EMBASSY OFFICER TO SEE ATTIYEH, CHECK OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ARRANGEMENTS AS RELATED PARA 1 ABOVE AGAINST HIS AND FIND OUT WHO HIS LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTACT IS. EMBASSY SHOULD THEN CONFIRM THESE ARRANGEMENTS DIRECTLY WITH ATTIYEH'S GOL CONTACT OR WITH DIRECTOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S OFFICE BOUTROS DIB., IN DOING SO EMBASSY SHOULD SEEK ASSURANCE REQUESTED BY PAN AM THAT GOL PROVIDE PERIMETER SECURITY FOR AIRCRAF. PLEASE INFORM DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY RE RESULTS THESE

CONTACTS.

4. EMBOFF SHOULD TELL ATTIYEH THAT PAN AM INSISTS THAT EITHER HE OR GRAND RABBI BE PRESENT AT BOARDING OF AIRCRAFT TO IDENTIFY EACH PASSENGER., RUSH

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
1/4/74 EXT 22670
NEA:JJSISCO

NEA - MR.ATHERTON
S/S - WHLUERS

SY - MR. DITTMER

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'74 JAN 2 AM 11:05 CONTROL: 0 0 1 90

O R 020359Z JAN 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2084
INFO RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0491
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 000018

NODIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SY, U.S.
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA

1. PLEASE PASS TO THOMAS SCOTES FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER TO PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA:

2. QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT, PURSUANT TO OUR CONVERSATION OF DECEMBER 15, I HAVE SELECIED THOMAS J. SCOTES TO BE IN CHARGE OF THE AMERICAN INTERESTS SECTION IN DAMASCUS WITH THE RANK OF COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY. MR. SCOTES IS BEING ASSIGNED TO DAMASCUS FROM OUR EMBASSY IN TUNIS. HE SPEAKS ARABIC AND HAS HAD EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MR. SCOTES WILL BE ARRIVING IN DAMASCUS ON JANUARY 3; HIS FAMILY WILL JOIN HIM LATER IN THE MONTH.

3. WITH MR. SCOTES ARRIVAL IN DAMASCUS, WE SHALL HAVE ESTABLISHED A CHANNEL OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT MR. SCOTES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO PASS ACCURATELY AND FULLY ANY MESSAGES YOU MAY WISH TO TRANSMIT DIRECTLY TO ME. AT THE SAME TIME, I SHALL USE HIS PRESENCE IN DAMASCUS TO KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND ELSEWHERE RELATING TO EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN ADDITION, I AM CERTAIN THAT HIS PRESENCE WILL FACILITATE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE

UNITED STATES, PARTICULARLY IN THE ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL AREAS. MEANWHILE I LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING SOON IN WASHINGTON THE OFFICER WHOM YOU HAVE CHOSEN TO HEAD YOUR INTERESTS SECTION HERE.

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- 2 - STATE 000018, 2 JAN '74

4. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE DISCUSSIONS ON DISENGAGEMENT ON THE EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI FRONT ARE PROCEEDING. I EXPECT TO BE MEETING THIS WEEK WITH THE ISRAELIS WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT MORE OF THE DETAILS. I ALSO PLAN ON EXPLORING ISRAELI VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF DISENGAGEMENT ON THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN FRONT ON THE ASSUMPTION OF EVENTUAL SYRIAN PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY TALKS, AND I WILL COMMUNICATE WITH YOU FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THESE TALKS.

5. AGAIN WITH MY BEST WISHES FOR 'ID AL-ADHA AS WELL AS FOR THE NEW YEAR. WARM REGARDS. HENRY KISSINGER.
UNQUOTE. RUSH

NEA/ARN:SEWARD:CFE
J2/31/73 EXT: 22670
S- THE SECRETARY

NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
NEA - MR. SISCO
S/S - 0-TWOHIE

NEA - MR. ATHERTON
NEA/ARN - MR. SCOTES

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TELEGRAM

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R 150052Z DEC 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1939
BT
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 245450

CONTROL: 3 8 3 0 Q

RECD: 14 DECEMBER 73 -
8 34 PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (FRANGIE, SLEIMAN), LE
SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT OF LEBANESE PRESIDENT

1. WHITE HOUSE HAS PROPOSED DATE OF FEBRUARY 5, 1974 FOR LEBANESE PRESIDENT SLEIMAN FRANGIE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. UNLESS ANY PROBLEMS FORESEEN IN RAISING SUBJECT AT THIS TIME, REQUEST EMBASSY EXPLORE WITH GOL FEASIBILITY THIS DATE FOR FRANGIE'S VISIT AND, IF POSSIBLE, CONFIRMATION OF THIS DATE.

2. FYI: WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN SCOPE PAPER FOR SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 16 VISIT TO LEBANON THAT IF SUBJECT OF VISIT IS RAISED BY LEBANESE, SECRETARY SHOULD SAY WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO WELCOMING PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO US NEXT YEAR AT A DATE MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TO HIM AND PRESIDENT NIXON. END
FYI. RUSH

BT
#5450

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN:GCB
APPROVED BY: NEA MR. DAVIS
WHITE HOUSE MR. QUANDT
S/S MR. GAMMON

73 DEC 15 PM 3:18
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 9 4 8Q

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUESOR/USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 217478

NODIS

EO: 11652 GDS
TAGS: PROR, LE, US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING LEBANESE AMBASSADOR ON MIDDLE EAST
REF: BEIRUT 12357

SUMMARY

LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON DEPT ASST SECRETARY ATHERTON NOV. 22 TO PRESENT GOL AIDE MEMOIRE ON SC RESOLUTION 338 (REFTEL) AND TO INQUIRE ABOUT STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESOLVE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. ATHERTON STRESSED POSITIVE CHARACTER OF TALKS WITH FAHMI IN WASHINGTON, THE UNPARALLELED OPPORTUNITY WHICH NOW EXISTS TO WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE US DETERMINATION TO BECOME AND STAY INVOLVED IN PEACE MAKING EFFORTS. WE ARE WORKING TO STABILIZE THE CEASE-FIRE AND RESOLVE PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE POWS AND THE RESUPPLY OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY WHICH WILL IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE FOR MOVING TO THE STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. ARAB OIL RESTRICTIONS ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TO AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN ANY PROCESS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT AND WE WOULD HOPE GOL COULD HELP PERSUADE OTHER ARABS OF ADVANTAGE OF GETTING THESE LIMITATIONS LIFTED. DURING HIS TRIP THE SECRETARY WILL WANT TO EXPLORE ESPECIALLY WITH EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS, IDEAS ON MODALITIES OF GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AND HEAR THEIR IDEAS ON THE ELEMENTS OF A FAIR SETTLEMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH ANY PARTY ESTABLISHES PRECONDITIONS TO NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON CAUTIONED IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO BE SPECIFIC ON THE QUESTION OF HOW PALESTINIAN INTERESTS WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

73 NOV 5 AM 10:36

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TELEGRAM

- 2 - STATE 217478, 4 NOV '73

1. ATHERTON SAID TALKS WITH EGYPTIAN FM FAHMI HAD BEEN CONDUCTED IN A "MOST EXCELLENT ATMOSPHERE" WITH BOTH PARTIES SEEKING TO ESTABLISH BASIS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVE US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT IN WAKE OF WAR WE ARE FACED WITH A NEW SITUATION AND AN UNPARALLELED OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. THE UNITED STATES HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, BUT IN ORDER TO BECOME FULLY ENGAGED IN PROCESS OF WORKING FOR PEACE, WE ALSO NEED TRUST AND GOOD RELATIONS IN ARAB WORLD. THE EGYPTIANS APPEAR TO APPRECIATE THIS FACT, AND TALKS WITH FAHMI HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN THIS SPIRIT.

2. ATHERTON SUGGESTED WAR HAS CREATED NEW CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCIVE TO PEACE; THERE WERE NO TOTAL VICTORS OR VANQUISHED, THE BELIEF IN ISRAELI MILITARY INVINCIBILITY HAS CHANGED, THE ARABS ARE MORE SELF-ASSURED AS A RESULT OF THE WAR. THE WAR HAS ALSO BROUGHT ABOUT AN AMERICAN POSITION OF ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, AND THE UNITED STATES IS SERIOUS ABOUT STAYING ENGAGED.

3. ATHERTON STATED OUR TALKS WITH FAHMI CENTERED ON STABILIZING THE CEASE FIRE AND ESTABLISHING A SOUND BASIS FROM WHICH TO MOVE ON TO STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. EGYPTIANS HAD TWO PRIMARY CONCERNS: RESUPPLY OF THE 3RD ARMY AND RESTORATION OF THE OCTOBER 22 CEASE FIRE LINES. ISRAEL HAS EMPHASIZED THE EARLY AND FULL RETURN OF POWS. ATHERTON EMPHASIZED POWS CONSTITUTED VERY EMOTIONAL PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL, A PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED. DURING OUR TALKS IN MOSCOW WE AND THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY PRISONER EXCHANGE. WE HOPE TO RESOLVE THE CEASE-FIRE AND POW ISSUES SOON AND MOVE ON TO THE NEXT STAGE - HOW TO CARRY OUT PARAS. 2 AND 3 RESOLUTION 338.

4. ATHERTON NOTED US AND SOVIET GOOD OFFICES ARE AVAILABLE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IF PARTIES DESIRE, BUT WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED STAGE OF WORKING OUT SPECIFICS. ON HIS TRIP SECRETARY WILL WANT TO DETERMINE HOW EGYPT AND JORDAN SEE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. SECRETARY ALSO WANTS TO HEAR EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN VIEWS ON ELEMENTS OF A FAIR SETTLEMENT, BUT IN FIRST INSTANCE IT WILL BE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTIES THEMSELVES TO BRING THESE IDEAS FORWARD IN NEGOTIATIONS. OUR MAJOR CONCERN IS TO ENSURE

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TELEGRAM

- 3 - STATE 217478, 4 NOV '73

THAT NO ONE LAYS DOWN PRECONDITIONS BEFORE ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS THEREBY CREATING AN OBSTACLE TO STARTING TALKS. ATHERTON STRESSED SENSE OF URGENCY IN MOVING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS; WE WANT TO MOVE QUICKLY BEFORE THE SITUATION BEGINS TO FREEZE AS IT DID IN 1967.

5. AMBASSADOR KABBANI ASKED "IF THE UNITED STATES WAS TALKING ABOUT THE BIG PROBLEM YET." ATHERTON REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT. WE WERE STILL WORKING ON SETTING THE STAGE. IN THIS REGARD, ATHERTON SAID THERE WAS ONE ADDITIONAL POINT HE WISHED TO MAKE AND IT CONCERNED QUESTION ARAB OIL RESTRICTIONS. THE U.S., BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL, WILL OBVIOUSLY PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN ANY PROCESS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT. TO DO SO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL NEED THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION, AND ARAB PRESSURE ON OUR OIL SUPPLY COULD WELL DAMPEN SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS. THREATS OF THIS SORT MAKE IT HARDER TO GET PUBLIC OPINION BEHIND OUR ROLE; A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO LIFT THE RESTRICTIONS. ANYTHING THE GOL COULD CONTRIBUTE IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE HELPFUL.

6. KABBANI SAID HE WOULD INFORM BEIRUT OF US CONCERN ABOUT OIL QUESTION BUT, EXPRESSING A PERSONAL OPINION, DOUBTED HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO TELL KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA TO "UNDO WHAT HAS BEEN DONE..." HE SUGGESTED AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF PUBLIC OPINION; IF THE US PUBLIC IS INCONVENIENCED BY AN OIL BOYCOTT, THE PEOPLE WILL BE MORE KEENLY AWARE THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM, THAT ISRAEL IS RESPONSIBLE," AND THERE MAY BE PRESSURE GENERATED TO FORCE A SOLUTION. ATHERTON SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THE SITUATION WOULD TURN IN THIS DIRECTION.

7. ATHERTON SAID HE HOPED IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE USG HAS ADOPTED A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CITED THE RESUPPLY OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY AS ONE EXAMPLE OF OUR RESOLVE. ATHERTON ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS THE FIRST COUNTRY TO PROPOSE A CEASE-FIRE AT THE UN; OUR ORIGINAL IDEAS HAD BEEN TO GO BACK TO THE OCTOBER 6 LINES, BUT WE HAD ALSO CALLED FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE A WEEK BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF RES. 338 - AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE NO ISRAELI TROOPS ON THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL AND NO SUBSTANTIAL ISRAELI PRESENCE BEYOND THE OCTOBER 6 LINES ON THE GOLAN. THERE HAD BEEN NO SUPPORT FOR THE SUGGESTION.

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TELEGRAM

- 4 - STATE 217478, 4 NOV '73

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM KABBANI ABOUT THE US RESUPPLY EFFORT TO ISRAEL, ATHERTON SAID WE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO START. WE HAD WAITED UNTIL AFTER THE

SOVIETS HAD UNDERTAKEN THEIR AIRLIFT: ONCE THE SOVIET AIRLIFT HAD REACHED MAJOR PROPORTIONS THERE HAD BEEN NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESPOND. WE MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WITH A CEASE-FIRE WE WOULD CEASE OUR RESUPPLY EFFORTS IF THE SOVIETS WOULD DO SO.

9. KABBANI GAVE ATHERTON A COPY OF A GOL AIDE MEMOIRE OUTLINING LEBANON'S POSITION ON RES. 338 (BEIRUT 12357) AND ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING SPECIAL MR. SISCO WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IN BEIRUT. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT MR. SISCO WANTED TO REPORT TO THE GOL ON OUR IMPRESSIONS OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP AND TO LISTEN TO LEBANESE VIEWS ON A REASONABLE AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. ATHERTON SAID SISCO WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE POINTS RAISED IN THE LEBANESE AIDE MEMOIRE, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS STILL TOO SOON TO BE SPECIFIC ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. WHO REPRESENTS THE PALESTINIANS? FIRST PROBLEM IS TO GET GOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, BUT WE REALIZE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH DOES NOT ADDRESS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WOULD NOT BE DURABLE.

10. FINALLY, ATHERTON SAID THAT WHILE WE ARE IN INTENSE DIALOGUE WITH THE JORDANIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS, WE FEEL THE LACK OF MORE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. ATHERTON SAID SECRETARY WOULD BE MEETING WITH THE SYRIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 2. KISSINGER

METASKFORCE: JCRAIG:MJJ
11/2/73 EST 29380

NEA:JJSISCO

NEA/ARN: SEWARD
NEA - MR ATHERTON

S/S- HGBARNES

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TELEGRAM

P 240230Z NOV 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1636
INFO RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 5259
RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8526
RUEHSD/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4644
RUEHSD/USINT ALGIERS 6937
RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3307
RUEHSD/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 8965
RUEHSD/USINT CAIRO 5232
BT
SECRET STATE 231283

CONTROL: 63600
RECD: 23 NOV 73 9:15PM

NOV 24 AM 10:16
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, XF, US
SUBJECT: LEBANESE AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON ASST. SECY SISCO
NOVEMBER 23

1. SUMMARY. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON ASST. SECY. SISCO NOVEMBER 23 TO ASK FOR RUNDOWN ON UPCOMING DEVELOPMENTS. SISCO SAID WE HOPE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN BY MID-DECEMBER UNDER JOINT US/USSR AUSPICES, WITH UN PLAYING A ROLE. SISCO REVIEWED FOR KABBANI USG VIEWS ON OTHER ISSUES; E.G., PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION, ROLE OF EUROPEANS, AND OIL EMBARGO. WITH REGARD TO LATTER, SISCO SAID NOW THAT WAR HAS ENDED ARABS SHOULD REALIZE THAT EMBARGO HAS BECOME COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND SHOULD FIND WAYS TO EASE IT. USG NOT LIKELY TO BE IN A POSITION TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THREAT BY ARABS. END SUMMARY.
2. RESPONDING TO KABBANI'S QUESTION CONCERNING HIS VISIT TO BEIRUT, ASST. SECY. SISCO DESCRIBED HIS CONSULTATIONS THERE AS THE MOST USEFUL EVER. SISCO SAID THERE HAD BEEN A GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.
3. IN RESPONSE TO KABBANI'S REQUEST FOR INFO ON THE PEACE CONFERENCE, SISCO SAID WE BELIEVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONFERENCE BY MID-DECEMBER ARE POSSIBLE. SISCO SAID WE HAVE PROPOSED THESE DATES TO EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS. WE ENVISION CONFERENCE TAKING PLACE UNDER JOINT US/USSR AUSPICES. WALDHEIM WILL BE PRESENT AT OPENING, AND UN WILL PLAY SUPPORTING/TECHNICAL ROLE. FIRST

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE -2- STATE 231283, NOV 24

CONCERN OF CONFERENCE LIKELY TO BE DISENGAGEMENT AND SEPARATION OF FORCES. KABBANI AGREED THIS WOULD NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVE LEBANON.

4. CONCERNING PALESTINIANS, SISCO SAID IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR UPCOMING ARAB SUMMIT TO MAKE A PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE ISSUE TENDING TO PREJUDGE THE QUESTION. WE BELIEVE ISSUE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT APPROPRIATE EARLY PHASE OF PEACE CONFERENCE. SISCO SAID WE REALIZE DELICATE POSITION OF LEBANON CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS. HE POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON HAS SHARED INTEREST WITH JORDAN IN SEEING A STABLE SITUATION CREATED IN THE WEST BANK AS A RESULT OF ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT. KABBANI OBSERVED THAT INITIAL NON-PARTICIPATION BY LEBANON IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE WILL SUPPORT POSITION OF INITIALLY EXCLUDING PALESTINIANS. KABBANI ASKED IF INVITATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE WILL COME FROM UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR FROM US AND USSR. SISCO REPLIED THAT THIS MATTER HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED.

5. KABBANI ASKED ABOUT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACE CONFERENCE. SISCO SAID PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED GOOD OFFERS OF SOVIETS AND OURSELVES. TO BROADEN PARTICIPATION WOULD COMPLICATE CONFERENCE, IMPEDE PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT, AND CREATE DIFFICULT SET OF PROBLEMS. ISRAEL WOULD PROBABLY BE UNWILLING TO ATTEND CONFERENCE WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH PRESENT. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, PROMISED TO KEEP OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS INFORMED, AND AGREED TO UN PRESENCE.

6. KABBANI ASKED IF USG WOULD CONTINUE TO OPPOSE PARTICIPATION OF UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, EVEN IN FRAMEWORK OF A SETTLEMENT. SISCO SAID OUR POSITION WILL DEPEND ON WHAT DECISIONS ARE REACHED AS RESULT OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT. FOR YEARS ISRAEL OPPOSED UN FORCE, BUT NOW IT HAS ACCEPTED UNEF. WHAT ROLE ANY UN FORCE WILL PLAY IN FUTURE DEPENDS IN PART ON SUCCESS OF UNEF IN PRESENT SITUATION. IF UNEF DOES DO A GOOD JOB, WE WOULD NOT PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF ISRAELI IDEAS CONCERNING CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IT COULD PLAY IN FUTURE. HOWEVER, SISCO SAID, WE BELIEVE IT BEST MAJOR POWERS NOT BE INCLUDED IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE SINCE THEIR INJECTION WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL, BUT WE ARE NOT RULING ANYTHING OUT AT THIS STAGE IN CONNECTION WITH AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

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7. KABBANI SAID HE HOPED USG WOULD NOT ACCUSE ARABS OF OIL BLACKMAIL; STATEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT IN US ARE NOT HELPFUL. ARAB AIM IS TO ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT, NOT TO PRESSURE US. SISCO REPLIED WE DO NOT WISH CONFRONTATION WITH ARAB FRIENDS. WE UNDERSTAND WHAT THEIR AIM IS. HOWEVER, WAR HAS ENDED NOW AND ARABS SHOULD REALIZE THAT MEASURES THEY TOOK IN TIME OF WAR ARE NOW COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WE HAVE PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT CEASEFIRE AND IN SIX-POINT AGREEMENT. BOTH SIDES HAVE SAID WE ARE ACCEPTABLE AS CATALYST AND AGREE ONLY US CAN BRING ABOUT FAIR SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE MADE ALL-OUT COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. NEVER BEFORE HAVE CONDITIONS BEEN MORE FAVORABLE. THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE AS EVIDENCED BY RECENT POLL IN ISRAEL, AND A CHANGE IN ARAB PERSPECTIVE AS WELL. NOW ARABS MUST ASK WHAT THEY CAN DO TO ASSIST US. ARABS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR USG TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WHILE UNDER THREAT. ARABS SHOULD FIND WAY TO EASE OIL BOYCOTT. KISSINGER

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