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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 891

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05848 080335Z

83
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 071421Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4332
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5848

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SUCCESSOR TO U THANT

REF: STATE 119761

1. IN COURSE DISCUSSION OTHER MATTERS JULY 7 WITH NAJIB SADAGA, SECRETARY GENERAL, LEBANESE FOREIGN OFFICE, I ASKED HIM IF GOL WAS GIVING ANY THOUGHT TO SUCCESSOR FOR U THANT. HE REPLIED THAT GOL HAD RECEIVED MESSAGE THAT MORNING FROM UNDEL AMBASSADOR GHORRA ADVISING GOL U THANT, BECAUSE OF POOR HEALTH, NOT LIKELY SEEK REAPPOINTMENT AS SYG AND GOL SHOULD BE CONSIDERING OTHER CANDIDATES FOR POSITION. SADAGA EXPLAINED GOL HAD NO PARTICULAR CANDIDATE IN MIND AS YET BUT WAS GIVING MATTER THOUGHT. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION HE INDICATED JAKOBSON WAS ABLE MAN BUT HIS CANDIDACY MIGHT PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR ARABS. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERED FORMER AUSTRIAN MINISTER WALDHEIM GOOD PROSPECT. NO OTHER CANDIDATES MENTIONED.

2. I TOLD HIM WE SHARED GHORRA'S OPINION THAT U THANT UNLIKELY SEEK REAPPOINTMENT AND WE TOO THOUGHT IT WAS TIME SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO SUCCESSOR CANDIDATES.
HOUGHTON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUL 8 AM 8:53

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 668

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05786 061411Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P R 061326Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4309
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 5786

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 5585, STATE 117055 AND 116162

SUBJ: US POSITION RE RAISING JERUSALEM ISSUE IN SECURITY COUNCIL

1. AS FOREIGN OFFICE SECRETARY GENERAL NEGIB SADAGA WAS ILL LAST WEEK I GAVE RESPONSE RE US POSITION ON JERUSALEM TO FONMIN ABOUHAMAD EVENING JULY 3. IN REVIEWING OUR POSITION ALONG LINES STATE 116162 WITH APPROPRIATE ADDITIONS FROM SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES, I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING NO FINAL DECISION ON TIMING OF RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONSULTING US. OTHERWISE EFFORTS WHICH WE WERE MAKING TO MOVE INTERIM SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT OFF DEAD CENTER COULD BE JEOPARDIZED.

2. FONMIN THANKED ME AND STATED HE HAD BEEN GIVEN ESSENTIALLY SAME INFORMATION FROM THE JORDANIANS WITH WHOM THE GOL WAS IN CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS TOUCH. GOL WAS NOW STUDYING WORDING OF RESOLUTION AND FONMIN HOPED TO SEND SECRETARY GENERAL SADAGA TO AMMAN WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION. FONMIN APPRECIATED IMPORTANCE OF TIMING OF RESOLUTION AND CERTAINLY DID NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE FORWARD MOVEMENT ON INTERIM AGREEMENT.

3. HE WAS CONCERNED BY HELMS VISIT TO ISRAEL. I TRIED TO REASSURE HIM. BELIEVE HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD RECEIVE SAME GUIDANCE REQUESTED BY CAIRO IN CAIRO 1613.

2/3
71 JUL 6 PM 4:26
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05786 061411Z

4. I WILL BE SEEING SADWTA AT 11:30 (LOCAL TIME) JULY 7.
ON OTHER MATTERS SHOULD DEPT HAVE ANYTHING PARTICULAR ON
JERUSALEM ISSUE WHICH THEY WISH CONVEYED TO LEBANESE. GP-3.
HOUGHTON

COLLISIT

BEIRUT 05786 061411Z

EXDIS

BEIRUT 05786 061411Z

INFO MEMBERSHIP
TO SECRETARY
FROM MEMBERSHIP
11 JUL 1973

INFO OCT-61

ACTION 82-48

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05786 061411Z

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CONFIDENTIAL 372

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05728 021658Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

PI 021526Z JUL 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4295

126896

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 5728

EXDIS

FOR SEELYE, NEA/ARN,

1. WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED BY US INTERESTS SECTION IN ITALIAN EMBASSY, DAMASCUS, THAT SYRIANS WILL PERMIT US OFFICIAL TO COME TO DAMASCUS ONCE A WEEK TO PROCESS AMERICAN PASSPORTS AND SYRIAN VISAS. WE HAVE MADE CONSTRUCTIVE BUT NONCOMMITTAL REPLY TO SYRIANS THROUGH DR. ROMANO, COUNSELOR, ITALIAN EMBASSY, AND ARE IN PROCESS MAKING RECOMMENDATION ON PROPOSAL TO DEPT. PROPOSAL AS NOW STANDS PROVIDES CONVENIENCE TO SYRIANS BUT FROM OPERATIONAL STANDPOINT OFFERS LITTLE TO US. WE ARE MINDFUL, HOWEVER, OF IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATION INVOLVED IN SYRIANS MAKING THIS MOVE AND CONSEQUENTLY WISH TO MAKE POSITIVE COUNTER PROPOSAL. DETAILS OF SYRIAN OFFER AND OUR RECOMMENDED COUNTER PROPOSAL WILL BE SUBMITTED DEPT NEAR FUTURE.

2. WITHOUT CONSULTING ANYONE, MISSION OFFICER SENT UNCLASSIFIED LETTER DATED JUNE 28 TO ARTHUR ALLEN, CU/NEA. IN LETTER OFFICER INFORMED ALLEN INTER ALIA OF PROPOSAL WHICH HE HAD HEARD FROM SYRIAN LOCAL IN US INTERESTS SECTION. COMMUNICATION EMBODYING PROPOSAL WHICH SENT TO INTERESTS SECTION BY SYRIAN GOVERNMENT WAS MARKED SECRET. IF WE ARE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SYRIAN MOVE IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR THE TIME BEING THAT SYRIAN ACTION BE HELD VERY CLOSE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVISING ALLEN TO CLASSIFY LETTER AND NOT DISCUSS THAT ASPECT HIS LETTER WITH ANYONE ELSE.

GP-3.

HOUGHTON

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUL 2 PM 5:14

2

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CONFIDENTIAL 626

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05585 291505Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

22/M
JUN 29 PM 4:32
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
096379

O 291424Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4259
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 5585

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER SALAAM'S VISIT TO JORDAN AND JERUSALEM
ISSUE

REF: BEIRUT 5185

1. IN CALL ON SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE THIS MORNING, JUNE 29, I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE RESULTS OF PRIME MINISTER SALAAM'S RECENT VISIT TO JORDAN. HE EXPLAINED THE VISIT HAD NO PARTICULAR OBJECTIVE, BUT WAS PART OF THE ROUND OF VISITS WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAD MADE IN RECENT MONTHS. THE GOU WAS FEELING SOMEWHAT ISOLATED. LEBANON WANTED ASSURE KING IT NOT "ALLIGNED" AGAINST HIM AND SUPPORTED JORDAN AS IT DID OTHER ARAB STATES IN THE AREA.
2. HE MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS NO AGENDA FOR THE VISIT BUT THE TWO PRINCIPAL TOPICS DISCUSSED WERE THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND JERUSALEM. WITH REGARD TO THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT THERE TO MEDIATE, BUT WAS WILLING TO DO ANYTHING HE COULD TO AMELIORATE THE SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD SEEN YASSER ARAFAT THE DAY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR AMMAN AND WAS WILLING CONVEY ANY MESSAGE KING MIGHT HAVE. KING POSED NO OBJECTIONS TO SALAAM SEEING FEDAYEEN LEADERS IN AMMAN WHICH SALAAM INDICATED ARAFAT HAD SUGGESTED.
3. ON JERUSALEM, THE JORDAIANS WANTED THE LEBANESE TO

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05585 291505Z

TAKE INITIATIVE SO THAT THE JERUSALEM ISSUE WOULD BE RAISED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY A NON-ARAB STATE. THE GOLI AGREED TO DO WHAT IT COULD. IN ACTUAL FACT, THE GOLI HAS BEEN CONSULTING WITH FEISAL ON THE QUESTION AND IT PLANS TO MAKE NO MOVE, AT LEAST, UNTIL IT HAS HEARD FROM SAUDI ARABIA.

4. SADAQA THEN TOLD ME OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH LEBANON'S AMBASSADOR TO JORDAN WHO WAS IN BEIRUT YESTERDAY, JUNE 28. ACCORDING TO THE AMBASSADOR, HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY AKRAM ZOAITER, THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR HERE WHO WAS IN AMMAN, THAT THE AMERICANS HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE JORDANIANS RAISING JERUSALEM IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ZOAITER MAINTAINED THAT THE KING HAD TOLD HIM THIS.

5. SADAQA ASKED ME IF IT WERE TRUE. I TOLD HIM THAT, AS HE WELL KNEW, WE DID NOT WANT JERUSALEM RAISED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR REASONS OF WHICH HE WAS WELL AWARE. THIS WAS OUR BASIC POSITION. WE ALSO UNDERSTOOD JORDAN'S ANXIETY OVER WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE DOING IN JERUSALEM. I KNEW THAT THERE WERE TALKS GOING ON IN AMMAN BETWEEN THE JORDANIANS AND OUR AMBASSADOR, BUT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE RESULTS OF THOSE TALKS WERE.

6. COMMENT: I DO NOT THINK, FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH SADAQA, THAT THE GOLI WILL GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE JORDANIANS ON THIS ISSUE. SADAQA HIMSELF COMMENTED THAT THE GOLI WOULD NOT BE "MORE ROYALIST THAN THE KING". ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THEY WILL COOPERATE WITH THE GOJ AS THEY, TOO, FEEL STRONGLY ON THIS ISSUE.

7. IN ORDER TO REPLY TO SADAQA, I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE IN LIGHT ZOAITER'S STATEMENT AS TO WHAT I SHOULD SAY CONCERNING OUR CURRENT POSITION RE RAISING JERUSALEM ISSUE IN SECURITY COUNCIL.
HOUGHTON

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 899

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04972 111617Z

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41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

090860

R 111458Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4090

SECRET BEIRUT 4972

EXDIS:

GHALEB KAYALI, FORMER SYRIAN CHARGE IN WASHINGTON, IS PRESUMABLY NOW UNDER ARREST IN SYRIA. ACCORDING TO A CLOSE FRIEND, A FEW WEEKS BACK WHEN HE RETURNED TO SYRIA HIS PASSPORT WAS TAKEN AWAY FROM HIM. AFTER RETURNING TO BEIRUT FOR A FEW DAYS HE RETURNED TO DAMASCUS. HIS FAMILY HAS NOT SEEN HIM SINCE. ALTHOUGH NO ONE KNOWS THE REASON FOR HIS PRESUMED ARREST, IT MAY WELL BE CONNECTED WITH HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST APRIL.
BUFFUM

71 JUN 11 PM 5:23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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W 4

SECRET — 518

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04824 081930Z

52
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 081457Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4034
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4824

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 4737

1. TO PURSUE OUR INTEREST IN LEBANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD SC MEETING ON JERUSALEM, I LUNCHEDED JUNE 8 WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL FONOFF SADAGA.
2. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY WHETHER HE HAD REPORT FROM HIS AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN, HE INDICATED LATTER HAD SEEN KING HUSSEIN YESTERDAY. KING REPORTEDLY EXPLAINED TO HIM US RESERVATIONS ABOUT GOING TO SC NOW; IN ADDITION, KING SAID HE WISHED TO RESERVE HIS OWN JUDGMENT ON MATTER "FOR A FEW DAYS" WHEN HE PROMISED TO GET IN TOUCH AGAIN. SADAGA RECOGNIZED JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT PRIMARILY INVOLVED AND SAID HUSSEIN'S VIEW WOULD BE DECISIVE FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT SC SHOULD BE CONVENED. (I WENT OVER SAME GROUND WITH HIM AS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YESTERDAY IN EXPLAINING WHY WE OPPOSED RECOURSE TO SC AT PRESENT TIME.)
3. SADAGA (PLEASE PROTECT) ALSO INDICATED UN AMBASSADOR GHARRA HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO REVIEW UN ANGLE AND SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS. HOWEVER, SAID SADAGA, GHORRA HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED NOT REPEAT NOT TO TAKE ANY POSITION WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS ON POSSIBILITY OF SC MEETING PENDING GOL DETERMINATION OF ITS OWN ATTITUDE. GP-3. BUFFUM

063385
71 JUN 8 PM 8:49
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 09-15/22 per ltr. 11/22/2010
By AM NARA, Date 11/17/2010
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SECRET 745

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04049 141819Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

PIR 141620Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3816
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

71 MAY 14 PM 7:27
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009001
SITUATION ROOM
WHITEHOUSE

SECRET BEIRUT 4049

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS USINT CAIRO

SUBJ: ISRAELI APPROACH TO TAPLINE FOR PAYMENT TRANSIT FEES

REF: DEPTTEL 83946

1. CHANDLER, TAPLINE PRESIDENT, MADE PARALLEL DEMARCHE TO AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY, INDICATING SIMULTANEOUS APPROACH BEING MADE TO SISCO.
2. WE SHARE TAPLINE ASSESSMENT THAT OVERALL ARAB REACTION TO TAPLINE ACQUIESCENCE TO ISRAELI DEMANDS FOR ROYALTIES WOULD BE SERIOUS INDEED. WHILE JIDDA WILL BE ASSESSING SAUDI REACTION AND EFFECTS SUCH ACTION ON ARAMCO CONCESSION, WE BELIEVE SYRIA WOULD FORCE CLOSURE OF LINE AND LEBANON WOULD PROBABLY FEEL COMPELLED FOLLOW SUIT. MOREOVER, WE WOULD EXPECT ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT ACTION AGAINST OTHER OPERATIONS TAPLINE SHAREHOLDERS IN ARAB WORLD -- I.E. ESSO, MOBIL, TEXACO AND SOCAL.
3. ON ISRAELI MOTIVATION BEYOND THE OBVIOUSLY FINANCIAL, I STRONGLY SUSPECT IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCH PAYMENT ON ULTIMATE STATUS OF GOLAN INFLUENCES ISRAELI THINKING.
4. WHILE LEGAL DIVISION OPINION WILL BE REQUIRED, IT SEEMS TO ME MOST QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ISRAELIS HAVE GOOD BASIS IN LAW

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TO MAKE SUCH CLAIM. MY RECOLLECTION OF RIGHTS ENJOYED BY OCCUPYING POWER UNDER HAGUE CONVENTIONS DOES NOT INCLUDE RIGHT TO COLLECT ROYALTIES SUCH AS THOSE PAID BY TAPLINE TO GOVERNMENT ENJOYING SOVEREIGNTY IN AREA AS RESULT NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.

5. WE THINK THAT TAPLINE AND SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD DECLINE TO MEET DINSTEN IN NEW YORK OR ELSEWHERE ON FORMAL GROUNDS THAT TAPLINE HAS REQUESTED GUIDANCE FROM USG BECAUSE OF LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED. INCIDENTALLY, DESPITE PLEDGES OF UTMOST SECRECY, WE THINK WORD WOULD LEAK OUT FAIRLY QUICKLY INTO ARAB WORLD OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. THIS SAME OBSERVATION, OF COURSE, WOULD APPLY TO ANY DISGUISED TAPLINE PAYMENTS.

6. WE BELIEVE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WILL PROTECT TAPLINE AND US MIDDLE EASTERN OIL INTERESTS IS FOR USG TO POINT OUT TO ISRAELIS DINSTEN'S PROPOSAL PREJUDGES FINAL DISPOSITION GOLAN AND IS, AT BEST, HIGHLY PREMATURE. WE MIGHT ALSO NOTE OUR HOPES THAT NO ERRANT "BULLDOZER" WOULD DAMAGE LINE.

7. IF THIS COURSE OF USG ACTION NOT FEASIBLE, THEN TAPLINE SHOULD, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, DECLINE TO PAY ROYALTIES. EVEN THOUGH THIS MIGHT RISK CLOSURE, IT WOULD PROTECT FOR ITS PARENT COMPANIES THEIR OIL CONCESSIONS ELSEWHERE IN ARAB WORLD.

8. WE NOTE INCIDENTLTY THAT CHANDLER TOLD US THAT COST OF BYPASSING ISRAELI OCCUPIED SECTION OF LINE WOULD BE ABOUT \$60 MILLION INCLUDING PUMPING STATION WITHIN SYRIA. TAPLINE NOT PREPARED MAKE THIS SORT OF INVESTMENT. GP-3. BUFFUM

NOTE BY OCXT: BEIRUT 4049 NOT PASSED USINT CAIRO.

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W 14

SECRET 811

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42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 141527Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3812

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4042

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 MAY 14 PM 9:02

EXDIS

FOR PEDERSEN FROM BUFFUM

SUBJ: SECVISIT ME

REF: ROME 801

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMCON BASED ON MY NOTES AND FOROFF RECORD, WHICH JUST AVAILABLE TODAY.

SECRETARY MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE MAY 4. PRESENT WERE SISCO, PEDERSEN, BUFFUM, MCCLOSKEY, AND ON THE LEBANESE SIDE, SADAGA, SABRA, AND CHAMMAS.

1. AFTER WELCOMING THE SECRETARY, THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT INDICATING OUR SUPPORT FOR INTEGRITY OF LEBANON WITHIN ITS PRESENT BOUNDARIES.

2. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE HAD COME TO AREA TO LEARN FIRST-HAND THE VIEWS OF THE ARABS, TO SHOW THAT U.S. NOT PREJUDICED IN FAVOR OF ANY ONE PARTY AND THAT WE PREJUDICED ONLY IN FAVOR OF PEACE. SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE PARTIES CONCERNED COULD NOW MOVE CLOSER TOGETHER AND SAID HE PLANNED CONCENTRATE HIS EFFORTS IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV ON THIS OBJECTIVE. HE EXPRESSED VIEW LEBANESE CAN PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE BECAUSE OF THEIR RESPECTED POSITION IN ARAB WORLD.

3. ABOUHAMAD INDICATED THAT LEBANON GREATLY INTERESTED

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IN PEACE EFFORTS AND NEED TO FIND A SETTLEMENT, PARTICULARLY A SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. HE NOTED GOL POSITION RESTS ON VALIDITY 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND WAS PLEASED THAT U.S. SHARES THIS VIEW. HE EMPHASIZED LEBANESE INTEREST IN SAFE-GUARDING ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND FREEDOM. U.S. POLICY, HE SAID, CAN HELP OR HARM THESE INSTITUTIONS. GOL HOPES, IN PARTICULAR, SOLUTION WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF FACT THAT LEBANON WILL HAVE 3000,000 PALESTINIANS ON ITS TERRITORY WHOSE ABSORPTION WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. HE SAID LEBANON PREFERS REFUGEES RE-SETTLE OUTSIDE OF THIS COUNTRY AND RECEIVE INDEMNIFICATION AND/OR ACQUISITION OF SOME OTHER NATIONALITY. THEN, IF SOME PALESTINIANS WISH TO RETURN TO LEBANON WITH SOME OTHER NATIONALITY GOL WOULD ACCEPT THEM. ONE CONCRETE REQUEST FOREIGN MINISTER MADE WAS THAT U.S. TAKE NO FINAL POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT INCLUDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OR ANY OTHER DISPOSITION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH GOL.

4. SECRETARY ASSURED HIM WE WOULD CONSULT LEBANON BEFORE FINAL POSITION TAKEN ON THIS SUBJECT. SECRETARY ADDED THAT SOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE FAIR TO THE PEOPLE AND WORKED OUT IN A WAY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER CONTINUED THAT U.S. INITIATIVE WELL KNOWN AND WORLD NOW WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT U.S. WILL DO TO GET ITS PLAN IMPLEMENTED. HE RECALLED UAR HAD ACCEPTED ROGERS PLAN WITHOUT RESERVATION, BUT THAT POSITION OF ISRAEL STILL UNKNOWN. U.S. HAS SAID IT DOES NOT WANT TO PRESSURE ISRAEL, BUT WILL TRY TO PERSUADE IT TO COOPERATE IN PEACE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS. GOL WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING FUTURE U.S. INTENTIONS THIS REGARD. LEBANON IS CONVINCED THAT, LIKE ITSELF, U.S. WANTS PEACE AND WONDERS WHY WE WILL NOT PRESSURE ISRAEL. LEBANON WANTS TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WITH THE OTHER ARAB STATES, BUT IS CONVINCED THAT IF U.S. DOES NOT EXERCISE PRESSURE THERE WILL BE NO PEACE SETTLEMENT.

6. ABOUHAMAD STATED THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AIRO EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD GONE SO FAR AS TO TELL HIM THAT IF THIS WAS U.S. PRICE FOR GETTING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, UAR WOULD GUARANTEE THERE WOULD BE NO SOVIET

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MILITARY PRESENCE IN COUNTRY AFTER PEACE SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT, FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS, ABANDON SOVIET ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. HE SAID EGYPTIANS HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT RECENT ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIPARTITE FEDERATION MEANT NO, REPEAT NO, CHANGE IN SADAT'S POLICY. HE WAS SATISFIED UAR IS PREPARED TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. RIAD EXPLAINED "NO PEACE" MEANT "NO PEACE TREATY"; "NO NEGOTIATIONS" MEANT "NO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS"; AND "NO RECOGNITION" MEANT "NO FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS".

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 141527Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3813

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4042

EXDIS

FOR PEDERSEN FROM BUFFUM

SUBJ: SECVISIT ME

REF: ROME 801

7. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PARTIAL SOLUTION, E.G. OPENING SUEZ CANAL, WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF LEBANON, JORDAN AND THE UNITED STATES UNLESS ANY SUCH MOVE CLEARLY PART OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT. (SECRETARY AGREED).

8. ABOUHAMAD ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT WORRY THAT ISRAELIS PROCEEDING RAPIDLY TO TURN JERUSALEM INTO COMPLETELY JEWISH CITY. SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED AND INDICATED HIS INTENT TO RAISE THIS PROBLEM WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.

IN COMMENTING ON FOREIGN MINISTER'S REMARKS, SECRETARY RECALLED THAT ROGERS PLAN IS NOT A BLUEPRINT FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT OUTLINE WHICH LEAVES AREAS TO BE NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES. INSOFAR AS USING TERM "PRESSURE" CONCERNED, SECRETARY SAID THIS SIMPLY DOES NOT WORK IN DEALING WITH GOVERNMENTS, BUT IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP IS TO PROVIDE A PROCESS SO THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND. HE RECALLED THAT MUCH MORE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE DURING PAST YEAR AND HOPE WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS. SECRETARY NOTED THAT IT IS TRUE THERE IS MUCH SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL IN U.S., BUT EMPHASIZED THIS IS NOT ANTI-ARAB. THERE IS WIDE SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL

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AS A STATE, BUT THERE IS ALSO MUCH SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES FOR THE ROGERS PLAN AND AN INCREASING UNDERSTANDING IN THE U.S. FOR THE CURRENT ARAB POSITION. HE CITED RECENT NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIALS AS EXAMPLE. SADAT'S SPEECH, WHICH CAME OUT OPENLY, INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL, HAS CHANGED ATTITUDE OF MANY AMERICANS. THIS REGARD, SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT PRECISE NATURE OF PEACE AGREEMENT E.G. WHETHER FORMAL PEACE TREATY OR SOME OTHER FORM IS NOT THE MAIN PROBLEM.

10. SECRETARY INDICATED U.S. HAD NO PAPER AND NO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO PUT TO UAR AT THIS POINT BUT WE HAVE SPECIFIC IDEAS WE INTEND RAISE WITH EGYPTIANS. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT ANY INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD ONLY BE CONCEIVED AS PART OF FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ENTIRE PACKAGE.

11. SISCO SAID WHAT IS ESSENTIAL NOW IS TO TRY AND DEFINE THE ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT AND THIS IS WHAT WE HOPE TO OBTAIN DURING TALKS IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.
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GUARANTEES COULD USG PROVIDE FOR SECURITY OF LEBANON'S BORDERS? IN EVENT RESUMPTION ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES, WHAT SUPPORT COULD USG PROVIDE FOR LEBANON'S EFFORTS TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT? WHAT NEW AMERICAN COMMITMENT MIGHT REPLACE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950? SECRETARY CONCURRED THAT US AND LEBANON ARE LINKED BY SPECIAL TIES; SAID USG WITHIN LIMITS ITS FINANCIAL CAPABILITY WILL CONTINUE LOOK SYMPATHETICALLY ON LEBANESE REQUIREMENTS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; DECLINED ESTIMATE PROSPECTS OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT AT THIS STAGE BUT EXPRESSED HOPE CEASE-FIRE WILL CONTINUE AND SOME PROGRESS MAY BE MADE TOWARD INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UAR ON SUEZ CANAL; STATED SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD BE FORMULATED BY THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED - PALESTINIANS AND GOV - BUT THAT USG STANDS READY TO MAKE FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD SUCH SOLUTION; REAFFIRMED US INTEREST IN PRESERVATION OF LEBANON, STATING USG WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY ISRAELI AGAINST LEBANON, BUT ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD EMBARK ON SO UNWISE A COURSE; STATED THAT IT CONTINUED TO BE USG POLICY TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GOL FOR SELF-DEFENSE; AGREED WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S OBSERVATION THAT THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEBANON AND US IS BASED NOT ON ANY TREATY, BUT ON COMMUNITY OF SPIRIT. PRESIDENT SAID HE FELT REASSURED. END SUMMARY

3. SECRETARY MET WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE FOR HOUR AND HALF MAY 3, BEFORE PRESIDENT'S DINNER IN HIS HONOR. ONLY OTHER LEBANESE PRESENT WAS FONOFFI SECGEN SADAQA, WHO TOOK FULL NOTES BUT DID NOT PARTICIPATE EXCEPT TO INSERT A FEW CLARIFYING REMARKS.

4. SPEAKING CAREFULLY FROM NOTES, PRESIDENT MADE EXTENDED PRESENTATION OF PROBLEMS, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, CAUSED LEBANON BY ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, AND POLICIES GOL HAS ADOPTED TO DEAL WITH THEM. CENTRAL THEME WAS SPECIAL TIE THAT HAS LINKED LEBANON AND US: EVER SINCE LAST CENTURY, WHEN AUB FOUNDED AND EMIGRATION TO US BEGAN. NOW "EVERY FAMILY IN LEBANON

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HAS SOMEONE IN THE US."

5. PRESIDENT BEGAN WITH CONVENTIONAL ARAB THESIS THAT UN, IN CREATING ISRAEL TO RIGHT WRONG DONE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN EUROPE, COMMITTED EQUALLY EGREGIOUS WRONG AGAINST ARAB COMMUNITY IN PALESTINE, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF WHOM HAD BEEN MADE HOMELESS IN 1948 AND 1967. ISRAEL PROFESSED TO BE FORTRESS AGAINST COMMUNISM. FACT WAS THAT, BUT FOR ISRAEL, THE ARABS WOULD NOT YET KNOW EITHER COMMUNISM OR SOVIET UNION. ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM WAS COMPELLING THREE ARAB COUNTRIES -- UAR, SYRIA, AND JORDAN -- TO DEVOTE HALF THEIR BUDGETS TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES, AND EVEN LEBANON 22-25 PERCENT OF ITS BUDGET, THUS DIVERTING FUNDS FROM OVERDUE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. CONTINUED

INABILITY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO MODERNIZE ECONOMIES COULD EVENTUALLY ENABLE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY TO PREVAIL OVER ARABS' TRADITIONAL HOSTILITY TO IT.

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3736
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 4 BEIRUT 3750

EXDIS

CAIRO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SECVISIT MIDDLE EAST; SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION
WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE

6. PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT SUBJUGATION TO ISRAEL IS
NOT A VALID ALTERNATIVE FOR ARABS. AS UNIMPEACHABLE
PRO-AMERICAN LEBANESE LIKE DR. CHARLES MALIKI HAD TOLD
GOVERNOR SCRANTON IN 1969, FACED WITH CHOICE BETWEEN
ZIONISM AND COMMUNISM, ARABS WOULD CHOOSE COMMUNISM.

7. FRANGIE EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT USG HAD
DECIDED TO PLAY ROLE OF "REFEREE" (HAKAM) BETWEEN
ARABS AND ISRAELIS. LEBANON'S GREATEST VIRTUE WAS ALSO
SOURCE OF ITS GREATEST DANGER. AS ONLY DEMOCRACY
IN ME, LEBANON OFFERED HAVEN FOR POLITICAL REFUGEES
AND FORUM FOR POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS. BEIRUT HAD
BECOME PROPAGANDA CAPITAL OF ME. IN ACTUAL NUMBERS,
RADICAL COMPONENT OF LEBANESE BODY POLITIC WAS SMALL,
BUT IN LEBANON'S CLIMATE OF POLITICAL FREEDOM THEY ARE
ABLE TO CREATE A COMMOTION THAT BELIES THEIR NUMBERS.

8. MANY ARABS FROM NEIGHBORING STATES -- NOTABLY
150,000 SYRIANS AND UPWARDS OF 300,000 PALESTINIANS --
HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF LEBANON'S LIBERAL ECONOMY AND
FREE SOCIETY. PALESTINIANS WERE LEBANON'S GREATEST
PROBLEM. LEBANESE BODY POLITIC WAS SPLIT INTO TWO

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CAMPS. ONE SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN EFFORT TO EXPLOIT LEBANESE TERRITORY IN THEIR CAMPAIGN TO REGAIN THEIR LOST HOME- LAND. THE OTHER OPPOSED IT. FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES ON LEBANESE TERRITORY WERE THREATENING TO DESTROY DELICATE BALANCE ON WHICH LEBANON'S UNIQUE WAY OF LIFE IS BASED. IF THAT BALANCE SHOULD BREAK DOWN AND LEBANON'S SPECIAL CHARACTER BE DESTROYED, LEBANON WOULD NOT SURVIVE. OBVIOUSLY, DISAPPEARANCE OF LEBANON WOULD BE CONTRARY TO INTERESTS OF ITS PEOPLE. IN PRESIDENT'S OPINION, IT WOULD ALSO BE CONTRARY TO INTERESTS OF WESTERN WORLD. IF SO, IT WAS INCUMBENT ON GOL AND USG TO WORK TOGETHER FOR EVENTUAL RESETTLEMENT OF PALESTINIANS OUTSIDE LEBANON.

9. MEANWHILE, GOL HAS TO CONTEND WITH DELICATE PROBLEM POSED BY FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT SUCH OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, LEB ARMY OF 12,000 MEN IS TOO SMALL TO SEAL OFF 120- KILOMETER BORDER WITH ISRAEL. MOREOVER, SECURITY FORCES MUST SEEK TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN IN MANNER CALCULATED TO AVOID DIRECT CONFRONTATION, WHICH COULD SPLIT LEBANON IN TWO. PRESIDENT DID NOT KNOW HOW MUCH LONGER SUCH CONFRONTATION COULD BE AVOIDED.

10. SINCE 1967, LEBANON HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONTINUING SERIES OF MILITARY ACTIONS BY ISRAELI FORCES, OSTENSIBLY DIRECTED AGAINST FEDAYEEN. PRESIDENT HAD CAUSE TO SUSPECT ISRAELI HAS DESIGNS AGAINST LEBI TERRITORY ANDI WATERS. HE DEEPLY CONCERNED ISRAELI MIGHT SEIZE ON SOME FEDAYEEN ACTION AS PRETEXT FOR PURSUING TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. ISRAEL'S SKILLED INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WERE QUITE CAPABLE OF FABRICATING INCIDENT IF NECESSARY.

11. GOL ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT JERUSALEM. AMERICANS AND LEBANESE APPRECIATE JERUSALEM'S IMPORTANCE TO CHRISTIANS. IF IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO MOSLEMS AS BRIDGE BETWEEN THIS WORLD AND THE NEXT.

12. GOL WORRIED BY SIGNS UAR AND ISRAEL MIGHT CONCLUDE SEPARATE PEACE. AUTOMATIC RESULT WOULD BE ALLIANCE OF OTHER PARTIES TO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT -- JORDAN.

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SYRIA, AND PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE. INEVITABLE VICTIMS OF SUCH ALLIANCE WOULD BE LEBANON.

13. FINALLY, SAID PRESIDENT, SINCE 1967 LEB ECONOMY HAD SUFFERED SEVERELY FROM LOSS OF BUSINESS CONFIDENCE AND DECLINE IN TOURISM. GOI MUCH APPRECIATED \$5 MILLION GRANT AND \$12 MILLION CREDIT USG HAD MADE AVAILABLE FOR PURCHASES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND INDICATIONS FURTHER SUCH ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE AVAILABLE.

14. PRESIDENT CONCLUDED HIS INITIAL PRESENTATION BY POSING SEVERAL BASIC QUESTIONS. SECRETARY BEGAN BY ASSURING PRESIDENT THAT HE KNEW FROM EXPERIENCE OF THE SPECIAL TIE BETWEEN US AND LEBANON. FROM PAST SERVICE IN UGG HE HAD PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THAT SPECIAL CONCERN WHICH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAD FELT FOR WELFARE OF LEBANESE AND WHICH HAD BEEN FACTOR IN 1958 LANDING IN LEBANON. SECRETARY'S COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED BY PRESIDENT WERE AS FOLLOWS:

15. PRESIDENT ASKED IF USG WOULD BE IN POSITION TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN LARGER AMOUNTS IN THE FUTURE. THANKING PRESIDENT FOR HIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR US AID, SECRETARY REPLIED USG ALSO HAD ITS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT IT WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIDER LEBANON'S FINANCIAL NEEDS SYMPATHETICALLY.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3737
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 BEIRUT 3750

EXDIS

CAIRO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SECVISIT MIDDLE EAST; SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION
WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE

16. PRESIDENT ASKED SECRETARY'S OPINION ON PROSPECTS FOR OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM. SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT USG SEES ITS ROLE VIS-A-VIS ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, NOT AS REFEREE OR JUDGE, BUT RATHER AS THAT OF HELPING PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT. IN OBSERVING ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS DURING HIS FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE, HE HAD FORMED IMPRESSION THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD GOTTEN LOCKED INTO ARGUMENT OVER LEGITIMACY OF EACH OTHER'S POSITION. NO PRACTICAL ADVANTAGE SEEMED TO DERIVE FROM THIS KIND OF DISCUSSION. EVENTS WHICH LED TO CREATION OF ISRAEL ARE NOW BEHIND US. THEY CANNOT BE UNDONE. ANALYSIS OF THEIR MORAL ASPECTS MAY BE APPROPRIATE FOR HISTORIANS, BUT CANNOT PRODUCE A SOLUTION. OBJECTIVE OF US INITIATIVE WAS TO PUT PARTIES ON ROAD TOWARD SETTLEMENT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO DISREGARD MORAL PRINCIPLE. ON CONTRARY, USG CONSIDERS RESOLUTION 242 OFFERS FAIREST BASIS FOR A SOLUTION. US INITIATIVE IS BASED THEREON.

17. USG HAD CONCLUDED ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM IS TOO COMPLEX TO BE SOLVED ALL AT ONCE. EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO BREAK IT DOWN INTO MANAGEABLE ELEMENTS, TO

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BE DEALT WITH IN LOGICAL ORDER. FIRST ELEMENT, IN AMERICAN VIEW, SHOULD BE TERRITORIAL QUESTION. USGI HAD STARTED WITH ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN ASPECT OF THIS QUESTION BECAUSE AT THAT TIME UARG POSITION HAD SEEMED SOMEWHAT MORE RIGID THAN POSITIONS OF JORDAN AND LEBANON -- THE OTHER TWO ARAB PARTIES THAT HAD ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242. SECRETARY RECOGNIZED VALIDITY OF PRESIDENT'S OBSERVATION THAT A PARTIAL SOLUTION OF ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR LEBANON AND JORDAN. HE WOULD REGARD AN ISRAELI-UAR AGREEMENT ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION ONLY AS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION.

18. PRESIDENT SADAT HAD RESPONDED TO US INITIATIVE BY ADOPTING A FORTHCOMING POSITION. AT LONG LAST AN ARAB STATE -- THE LARGEST -- HAS AGREED TO RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. ONE OF SECRETARY'S MAIN OBJECTIVES IN GOING TO ISRAEL WILL BE TO CONVINCEN GOI TO RESPOND IN KIND. USG FEELS THAT, IN RETURN FOR CONTRACTUAL PEACE FROM ARAB SIDE, ISRAEL SHOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM MOST OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ONCE TERRITORIAL PROBLEM IS SOLVED, OTHER ELEMENTS COULD BE DEALT WITH, SUCH AS JERUSALEM AND STATUS OF PALESTINIANS.

19. IN SUMMARY, SECREARY FELT CEASE-FIRE WILL CONTINUE. HE WAS HOPEFUL OF EARLY PROGRESS TOWARD A UAR-ISRAEL AGREEMENT ON REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL; EXPLORATION OF THIS POSSIBLITY WAS SECOND MAJOR PURPOSE OF ISRAEL VISIT. SECRETARY DID NOT NOW FEEL IN POSITION TO EVALUATE PROSPECTS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

20. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED PERSONAL OPINION THAT ALL PARTIES WERE FORTUNATE THAT NASSER HAD ENJOYED ENOUGH PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE TO ACCEPT AMERICAN INITIATIVE AGAINST STRONG ARAB OPPOSITION. SADAT HAD FOLLOWED NASSER'S LEAD BUT HE WAS TOO NEW IN HIS JOB TO MAKE ANY FURTHER CONCESSIONS. NOR COULD ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER. PRESIDENT PARTICULARLY HOPED JARRING WILL CONTINUE AS MEDIATOR, SINCE HE DOUBTED ANY ARAB LEADER COULD AFFORD TO ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH

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ISRAEL. SECRETARY COMMENTED USG SEES NO NEED FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT STAGE, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY PROVE TO BE PREREQUISITE TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

21. PRESIDENT SAID HE CONCURS THAT ARGUING OVER MORALITY OF PAST ARAB AND ISRAELI ACTIONS SERVES NO PRACTICAL PURPOSE. HOWEVER, MORALITY OF CURRENT ACTIONS IS HIGHLY RELEVANT. RESOLUTION 242 HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY MAJOR ARAB PARTIES, BUT REJECTED BY ISRAEL. IT IS ARAB TERRITORY WHICH IS UNDER OCCUPATION. THESE FACTS THROW CONSIDERABLE LIGHT ON RELATIVE INTENTIONS. SECRETARY STATED USG HAD PRESSED ISRAEL TO RECOGNIZE CONCEPT OF RESOLUTION 242. FRANGIE SAID THAT GOL STANDS READY PROVIDE ANY ASSISTANCE IT CAN TO US PEACE EFFORT.

2. RE JERUSALEM, SECRETARY SAID USG BELIEVES ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD GUARANTEE RIGHTS OF ALL RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES, INCLUDING RIGHT OF ACCESS. FOR MORE DETAILED STATEMENT OF US POSITION, SECRETARY WOULD REFER GOL TO RELEVANT PARAGRAPHS OF HIS POLICY SPEECH OF 1969 (WITH WHICH SADAQA IS FAMILIAR). SECRETARY SAID USG DISAPPROVES OF THOSE CURRENT ISRAELI ACTIONS WHICH TEND TO CHANGE CHARACTER OF JERUSALEM, AND HE INTENDS RAISE THIS MATTER DURING HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3738
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 BEIRUT 3750

EXDIS

CAIRO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SECVISIT MIDDLE EAST; SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION
WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE

23. PRESIDENT ASKED SECRETARY WHAT FORMULA WOULD
OFFER BEST SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM. LEBANON, WITH
A POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER OF 240, CANNOT ACCEPT
THEIR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT IN LEBANON. ANY OVERALL
SOLUTION MUST PROVIDE FOR RESETTLEMENT IN STATES WITH
GREATER ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY. DID USG CONSIDER
CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD FACILITATE
RESETTLEMENT?

24. SECRETARY SAID USG WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO COSTS OF RESOLVING REFUGEE
PROBLEM, BUT DOES NOT FEEL QUALIFIED TO PROPOSE ANY
FORMULAS. EXPERTS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE PALESTINIANS
AND KING HUSSEIN. WE HAVE ELICITED HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS.
HE IS OPPOSED TO A PALESTINIAN STATE BUT HAS SUGGESTED
FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND JORDANIANS.
FRANGIE APPENDED PERSONAL COMMENT THAT, IF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT IS REACHED FOR RESETTLEMENT AND MONETARY
COMPENSATION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, HE STRONGLY HOPES
THAT THOSE NOW IN LEBANON WOULD BE RESETTLED OUTSIDE
BEFORE THEY RECEIVED COMPENSATION.

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25. FRANGIE SAID HIS ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE SPECIAL EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORING ARAB STATES. THESE RELATIONS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY RESUMPTION OF ARAB-ISRAEL HOSTILITIES. IN THIS EVENT, WHAT SUPPORT COULD USG PROVIDE FOR LEBANESE EFFORT TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT? SECRETARY STATED USG HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS READINESS TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FRIENDLY COUNTRIES LIKE JORDAN AND LEBANON FOR SELF-DEFENSE.

26. FRANGIE SAID THAT EVER SINCE 1967 HE HAS BEEN APPREHENSIVE ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS TOWARD SOUTH LEBANON. HE PRODUCED A BOOK SHOWING MAPS OF ISRAELI IN 1948, AS IT IS TODAY WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND AS IT IS SEEN BY ISRAELI EXPANSIONISTS, REACHING TO BORDERS OF BIBLICAL KINGDOM OF DAVID OR EVEN STRETCHING FROM NILE TO EUPHRATES. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF 1950, NOT INVOKED AGAINST ISRAEL AFTER 1967 WAR, APPEARED TO HAVE LAPSED. WHAT COMMITMENTS MIGHT USG PROVIDE FOR SECURITY OF LEBANON'S BORDERS?

27. SECRETARY SAID IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORMULATE POLICIES FOR HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS, BUT HE COULD REAFFIRM USG'S DEEP INTEREST IN PRESERVATION OF SECURITY AND STABILITY OF LEBANON. COMMITMENTS OF THIS TYPE HE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO HAVE IN MIND CAN BE MADE ONLY BY TREATY AND REQUIRE RATIFICATION BY CONGRESS. NATURALLY, ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS OWN TERRITORY FROM ATTACK. HOWEVER, IF USG HAD REASON TO SUSPECT ISRAEL OF CONTEMPLATING UNPROVOKED ACTION AGAINST LEBANON, THE USG WOULD MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO STOP IT. IF ISRAEL SHOULD ACTUALLY TAKE AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST LEBANON, USG WOULD REGARD IT WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS AND IMMEDIATELY PRESS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IN FACT, AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST LEBANON WOULD SO JEOPARDIZE ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH US THAT SECRETARY COULD NOT BELIEVE GOI WOULD EVER EMBARK ON SO UNWISE A COURSE.

28. FRANGIE STATED THAT IT IS LEBANON'S POLICY TO REPLY IN FINAL ANALYSIS, NOT ON TANKS OR CANNONS, BUT ON INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS, AND ABOVE ALL ON ITS

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SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES; NOT ON FORMAL TREATIES, BUT ON ENGAGEMENTS OF THE SPIRIT-- "FROM HEART TO HEART". THAT, SAID THE SECRETARY, IS HOW WE SEE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON.

29. BY THIS POINT IN CONVERSATION PRESIDENT'S GUESTS: HAD ARRIVED AND CONFEREES ADJOURNED FOR DINNER. PRESIDENT SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THAT SECRETARY HAD GIVEN HIM HONEST ANSWERS TO DIFFICULT QUESTIONS, WITHOUT HOLDING OUT UNREALISTIC HOPES, AND HE CONCLUDED MEETING WITH STATEMENT THAT HE HAD APPRECIATED THE CANDID TONE OF THE MEETING, AND HE FELT REASSURED.
GP-2.
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMC ONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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SECTO 98

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TALK WITH PRINCE FAHD, MAY 2

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMCON, FYI AND SUBJZCT TO CHANGE UPON REVIEW.

1. PRINCE FAHD EMPHASIZED UNDER LYING STRENGTH OF US7SAUDI RELATIONSHIP AND CHARACTERIZED THIS AS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PROMOTING AREA STABILITY. ATTACKS LEVELED AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA FOR ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH US HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT BEN A DETERRENT TO THIS RE LATIONSHIP. FAHD REGRETTED THAT CERTAIN OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD NOT REPEAT NOT FOLLOWED SAUDI POLICY OF MODERATION.

SECRET

2. SECRETARY SAID WE APPRECIATE SAUDI ARABIA'S STEADFAST AND LOYAL FRIENDSHIP AS WELL AS THE DIFFICULTIES SAUDIS FACE WITH OTHER ARAB STATES. SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT OUR DETERMINED EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A JUST AND LASTING PEACE WERE BEGINNING TO MAKE AN IMPACT IN THE AREA. HE CITED HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO CAIRO IN THIS CONNECTION

3. FAHD AGREED WITH SECRETARY AND SAID THAT ARAB COUNTRIES WITH QUOTE COMMUNIST PENETRATION UNQUOTE WERE COMING TO SAUDI ARABIA AND SAYING THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE US. WHEN IN EARLIER TIMES CERTAIN ARAB STATES HAD CRITICIZED KING FAISAL AT SOME MEETINGS FOR HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, FAISAL ALWAYS REPLIED THAT THAT WAS HIS BUSINESS AND HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT CRITICIZE THEM FOR THEIR CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR,

FAISAL HAD, HOWEVER, CHASTISED THEM FOR BEING INCONSISTENT IN OPPOSING QUOTE COLONIALISM UNQUOTE WHILE SUBORDINATING THEMSELVES TO A HIGHLY COLONIAL USSR. IRONY WAS THAT WHEN THINGS WENT BAD FOR THESE STATES, THEY WOULD ASK FAISAL TO HELP THEM PATCH UP THEIR DIFFICULTIES. FAISAL HAD TOLD LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES THEY COULD HARDLY EXPECT FORTHCOMING USG POLICY TOWARD THEM IF THEY CONTINUE TO MALIGN US.

3. FAHD THEN DISCUSSED SAUDI ARABIA'S QUOTE INTERNAL REALITIES UNQUOTE. HE STATED THAT INTERNAL SAUDI SITUATION IS EXCELLENT AND COUNTRY STABLE. THIS IS CASE DESPITE EFFORTS OF THE LAST TWO YEARS BY UNFRIENDLY ARAB STATES TO GET IN TOUCH WITH SAUDI DISSIDENTS AND CAUSE PROBLEMS. SECRETARY ASKED IF THIS INCLUDED UAR. FAHD SAID NOT REPEAT NOT ANY MORE AND ALLUDED TO PAST UNFRIENDLY MOVES BY IRAQ AND SYRIA. FAHD SAID THAT FAILURE OF REVOLUTIONS IN IRAQ AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES REFLECTED WELL ON SAUDI REGIME. SAUDIS WHO VISITED THESE COUNTRIES COME BACK DOUBLY SATISFIED.

4. SECRETARY SAW ANALOGY AS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, EAST AND WEST GERMANY, AND THE TWO CHINAS. HE SAID THE SYSTEM IN FREE SOCIETY IS INHERENTLY SO MUCH BETTER THAT WE OFTEN TELL THOSE WHO DOUBT THIS THEY SHOULD GO AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES.

5. FAHD THEN WENT INTO SOME DETAIL TO DESCRIBE EFFORT BY GROUP OF SAUDI DISSIDENTS TO CAUSE TROUBLE. SEPARATE

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03633 011447Z

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ACTION SY-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-13 SS-20 USSS-00 INR-08 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 1971 MAY 15 36
OPR-02 0-03 SSO-00 /050 W

038130

P 011404Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO USDEL RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 3697

SECRET BEIRUT 3633

SUBJ: SECVISIT ME

Handwritten:
Hamed
Sawad

SECURITY SITUATION BEIRUT 25X1

THIS MESSAGE HAS CONCURRENCE [] RSO ROCHE.

1. WE CONTINUE TO PICK UP EVIDENCE THAT SOME DEMONSTRATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN BEIRUT. SO FAR, CHIEF SPONSORS ARE LEFTISTS, STUDENT GROUPS AND PALESTINE ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING FATAH. HOWEVER, BASED ON LATEST INFO MAY 1, WE DO NOT EXPECT THEY WILL BE MASSIVE OR VIOLENT.

2. GOL SECURITY EXPERTS FULLY COOPERATIVE AND APPEAR CONFIDENT THEY CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION. (DETAILS PROVIDED SEPTEL.) THEY HAVE EARMARKED ABOUT 2,000 TROOPS AND 20 ARMORED CARS FOR SPECIAL PROTECTIVE DUTY DURING VISIT. RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS DEMONSTRATE HEALTHY CONCERN ABOUT POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS. POSSIBILITY CAN NEVER BE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED, OF COURSE, OF LAST MINUTE ORGANIZED OR INDIVIDUAL EFFORTS TO ATTACK US PERSONNEL OR INSTALLATIONS, PROVOKE INCIDENTS BETWEEN GOL SECURITY FORCES AND CROWDS OR OTHERWISE SEEK DENIGRATE SECRETARY'S VISIT. WE HAVE ALL OUR INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ALERTED FOR ANY SUCH ACTIVITY AND WE ARE KEEPING ENTIRE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE REVIEW. AT PRESENT DEGREE OF SECURITY RISK FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT CONTINUES LOOK ACCEPTABLE.

SECRET

State Dept. review completed

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03633 011447Z

3. I BELIEVE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN SUCH VISIT MINIMIZED BY FACT PRIME MINISTER CALLED IN PALESTINIAN LEADERS AND TOLD THEM TO BEHAVE, IN ADDITION TO WHICH PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS PERSONALLY CONSULTED ALL KEY POLITICAL LEADERS AND INDICATED HIS DETERMINATION VISIT SHOULD GO SMOOTHLY.
BUFFUM

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 471

PAGE 01 STATE 221967

60
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 CCO-00

DRAFTED BY S/CCT: LHOFFACKER
APPROVED BY S/S: GTWOHIE
SYWDECOURCY
S/S-01: G. TWOHIE
NEAIRDAVIES
EUR - C. FLOYD
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

[Redacted] FBI (MR PUTNAM), NSA [Redacted]

73 NOV 10 AM 8:56
STATION HOUSE
WHITE HOUSE

25X1

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O 100002Z NOV 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 221967

EXDIS , NOFORN

E.O. 11652: XGDA-2
TAGS: PINS
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE THREAT AGAINST
ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

REF: BEIRUT 12938

1. DEPARTMENT HAS INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE TO EFFECT THAT ONE DIAB OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA (AS YET UNIDENTIFIED OTHERWISE) HAS INFORMED ANTHONY ZAHLAN, KNOWN FATAH MEMBER IN BEIRUT, THAT HE ARRIVING BEIRUT VIA BOAC FLIGHT 322 ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 10 AT 5:40 P.M. DIAB REQUESTS ZAHLAN TO ARRANGE FOR UNSPECIFIED ONWARD FLIGHT TO KUWAIT.

2. FBI CHECKING OUT DIAB. CIA, SECRET SERVICE AND NSA HAVE ABOVE INFORMATION.

State Dept. review completed

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PAGE 02 STATE 221967

3. NO RPT NO KNOWN CONNECTION BETWEEN ABOVE AND REPORTED THREAT IN REPTEL BUT WE SUGGEST THAT EMBASSY PROCEED ON ASSUMPTION OF SUCH POSSIBILITY IN ORDER COVER ALL EVENTUALITIES.

4. FOR LONDON: WE UNDERSTAND CITED BOAC FLIGHT DEPARTS LONDON NOVEMBER 18 (SATURDAY), REQUEST APPROPRIATE CHECK WITH BOAC AND SPECIAL BRANCH.

5. FOR BEIRUT: PLEASE ENSURE THAT RBO ROACH AND AGENT-IN-CHARGE JOHN BALDADIAN ARE INFORMED CONTENTS THIS MESSAGE SOONEST. RUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

APR 29 PM 7:06

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SECRET 009

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03576 292017Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

021173

RI 291541Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3677
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

SECRET BEIRUT 3576

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT WHO ALSO ACCREDITED TO DAMASCUS GAVE ME INTERESTING ACCOUNT OF HIS LAST VISIT THERE. HE SAID SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL (HEAD OF EUROPEAN DIVISION, RECENTLY SYRIAN AMBASSADOR TO PARIS) TOLD HIM CREATION OF NEW TRIPARTITE FEDERATION REFLECTED INTERNAL WEAKNESS IN ALL THREE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. AS FAR AS SYRIA INVOLVED, ACCORDING TO SOURCE COUNTRY DIVIDED BETWEEN MODERATE FACTION SEEKING PEACE, WHICH NOW IN CONTROL, AND STRONG MINORITY WHICH ADHERES TO OLDER MILITANT LINE. SYRIA'S PARTICIPATION IN FEDERATION, SAID HE, WAS NECESSARY SOP TO EXTREMIST WING TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUED SYRIAN SOLIDARITY WITH REST OF ARAB WORLD.

2. SWEDISH AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS ASTONISHED AT FRANKNESS OF SOURCE IN COMMENTING ON INTERNAL DISENSION WITHIN SYRIA.
BUFFUM

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SECRET 172

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03546 291056Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 /046 W

APR 29 AM 11:32
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE

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PI 291045Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3663

SECRET BEIRUT 3546

EXDIS

TOSEC

ANKARA FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJ: SEC VISIT ME - CORRECTION BEIRUT 3524

1. PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF PARA 1. V 1) SHOULD READ
"WATERS OF THE LITANI", NOT HEADWATERS.
BUFFUM

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 850

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03524 281910Z

42

ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

010655

PI 281752Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3655
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

SECRET BEIRUT 3524

EXDIS:

LONDON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJ: SEC VISIT MIDDLE EAST

REF: BEIRUT 3456

1. FOLLOWING ARE SOME SUGGESTIONS I HOPE YOU MAY FIND USEFUL IN DEVELOPING A RESPONSE TO SOME OF THE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS PRESIDENT FRANGIE WILL PUT TO SECRETARY AS CONTAINED PARA V REFTEL:

V. 1) US FULLY SUPPORTS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON IN ALL FORESEEABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE HAVE LONG CONSIDERED A SPECIAL TIE LINKS OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND HAVE IN THE PAST DEMONSTRATED LENGTHS TO WHICH WE WILL GO TO HELP PROTECT LEBANON AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERVENTION. IT IS QUITE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO FORECAST EXACTLY WHAT FORM US SUPPORT WOULD TAKE TO COPE WITH SOME FURTHER THREAT TO LEBANESE INTEGRITY IN VIEW OF RANGE OF HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS WHICH COULD ARISE. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR OUR ASSISTANCE AND THE NATURE OF OUR HELP WOULD BE GREATLY AFFECTED BY QUESTION OF WHETHER THREAT TO LEBANON COMES FROM CLEAR, UNPROVOKED EXTERNAL THREAT (FOR EXAMPLE, BY RADICAL ARAB REGIME OR USSR), OR WHETHER THREAT APPEARS TO STEM PRIMARILY FROM INTERNAL SOURCES SUCH AS LEFTISTS OR PALESTINIAN MILITANTS. IN ADDITION, WE MUST POINT OUT THAT SINCE WE HAVE NO FORMAL TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON, CERTAIN KINDS OF COMMITMENTS CANNOT BE PROVIDED IN ADVANCE WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION AND CONSENT. AT MINIMUM, HOWEVER, WE ARE

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BOTH THROUGH FRIENDSHIP WITH LEBANON AND AS UN MEMBER WHICH IS ALSO PERMANENT MEMBER OF SECURITY COUNCIL, COMMITTED TO UPHOLD UN CHARTER PROVISIONS WHICH DEAL WITH THREATS TO PEACE. ACCORDINGLY, AT MINIMUM, LEBANON WOULD ENJOY OUR FULL POLITICAL SUPPORT AT UN. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY AS WAS RECENTLY CASE IN JORDAN THAT WE ALSO PROVIDE IMPORTANT, IF NOT CRITICAL, MATERIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT WHEN OUR FRIENDS ARE THREATENED. AS WE HAVE ASSURED LEBANESE IN PAST, WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO LEBANESE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND WOULD VIEW WITH GREATEST CONCERN ANY THREAT TO THEIR INTEGRITY FROM ANY SOURCE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO LET OUR LEBANESE FRIENDS DOWN. IN PARTICULAR WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON MEANS THE COUNTRY OF LEBANON WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES WHICH HAVE EXISTED SINCE 1949. WE HAVE NOT HAD OCCASION TO MAKE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO LEBANESE FRONTIERS IN OUR PREVIOUS BILATERAL OR FOUR-POWER TALKS ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT SINCE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE DISCUSSION. THE LEBANESE MAY BE ASSURED, HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER THAT THE OLD INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN LEBANON AND PALESTINE (ARTICLE V ISRAEL/LEBANESE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE THE PERMANENT FRONTIER BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. WE KNOW OF LEBANESE CONCERN THAT ISRAEL MIGHT TRY TO ENCRDACH UPON ITS TERRITORY, PARTICULARLY THE HEADWATERS OF THE LITANI RIVER. WHILE WE THINK ANY SUCH ACTION IS UNLIKELY, WE WISH TO ASSURE THE LEBANESE WE WOULD NOT COUNTENANCE ANY SUCH MOVE.

V. 2) WE ARE KEENLY AWARE OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE PROBLEM FOR LEBANON IN ACCEPTING PALESTINIAN REFUGEES PERMANENTLY ON ITS TERRITORY. WE WOULD COOPERATE FULLY IN WORKING OUT A SOLUTION WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE LEBANON TO INTERGRATE THESE REFUGEES AS CITIZENS OF LEBANON, WHICH WE KNOW WOULD UPSET NARROW CONFESSIONAL BALANCE OF THE COUNTRY. THERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS THIS COULD BE DONE. ONE WAY, SUGGESTED BY LEBANESE, IS CREATION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE, AND CONFERRING PALESTINIAN NATIONALITY ON REFUGEES. WE THINK IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR US TO TAKE A STAND ON THIS QUESTION BECAUSE A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING A SEPARATE STATE OF PALESTINE MUST REST ON THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA, WHICH WE ARE NOT YET

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ABLE TO ASSESS.

AS FAR AS MASSIVE MATERIAL SUPPORT IS CONCERNED, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO A SOLUTION WHICH WILL INDUCE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF REFUGEES TO ACQUIESCE IN A SETTLEMENT ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE A THOROUGH-GOING STUDY IS REQUIRED OF THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE MEANS OF ATTRACTING REFUGEES TO RESETTLE ELSEWHERE. IN THIS REGARD, WE THINK A COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE AREA UNDER NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES, SUCH AS THE WORLD BANK, WOULD REVEAL WHAT POSSIBILITIES EXIST IN THE ARAB WORLD. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF EMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE AREA TO PLACES SUCH AS THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH AMERICAN.

V. 3) IN CASE OF AN ARAB INTERVENTION, WE WOULD MAKE QUICKLY AND CLEARLY KNOWN OUR COMMITMENT TO THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. WE WOULD ALSO SEEK WAYS OF HELPING LEBANON TO ACQUIRE QUICKLY ANY ADDITIONAL MILITARY RESOURCES IT FELT IT NEEDED TO PROTECT ITS INDEPENDENCE. WE WOULD ALSO CONCERT WITH LEBANON'S OTHER FRIENDS, SUCH AS FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, TO ENSURE MAXIMUM FREE WORLD SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE POSITION.

V. 4) ASSUMING THAT IN ANY FUTURE HOSTILITIES, LEBANON CONTINUES, AS IN PAST, TO AVOID BELLIGERENT ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAELI TERRITORY, WE WOULD STRONGLY URGE ISRAELIS TO RESPECT LEBANESE NON-INVOLVEMENT AND WOULD OPPOSE ANY UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON LEBANON FROM ANY QUARTER.

V. 5) (REQUIRES SECRETARY'S PERSONAL ANSWER).

V. 6) WE APPRECIATE GENERAL COUNSEL OF MODERATION BEING GIVEN BY LEBANON TO ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. WE BELIEVE HER BEST CONTRIBUTION IS THROUGH FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDLY TIES WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS SYRIA AND IRAQ, WHERE WE HOPE GOL WILL CONTINUE ARGUE FOR MODERATION, RESTRAINT, AND SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH UAR COULD ALSO ADD ADDITIONAL AND HELPFUL VOICE OF MODERATION IN COUNCILS OF UAR GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, GOL IS IN UNIQUE

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POSITION TO ENCOURAGE KEY OFFICIALS OF LARGEST PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION (FATAH) TOWARDS POLICY OF MODERATION.

V. 7) WE WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH LEBANON, AS ONE OF OUR CLOSE FRIENDS, WITHIN OVERALL FISCAL AND CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE TO ADVANCE DEVELOPMENT OF LEBANON. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT LEBANESE STABILITY, TO WHICH WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE, MUST REST ON SATISFACTION OF INCREASING DEMANDS FROM MOST SEGMENTS OF LEBANESE POPULATION FOR EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT, AND IMPROVE STANDARD OF LIVING.
BUFFUM

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22/10/19

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Department of State

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SECRET 325

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03472 271554Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

130316

R 271451Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3640

SECRET BEIRUT 3472

EXDIS

LONDON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJECT: SEC VISIT MIDDLE EAST

REF: SECTO 4

1. PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS INDICATED PREFERENCE MEET ALONE WITH SECRETARY MONDAY EVENING BEFORE DINNER. (US INTERPRETER NICHOLAS MURPHY, FSO-5, WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT.) THIS REFLECTS FACT CONSIDERABLE DISTRUST CONTINUES EXIST BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEM LEADERSHIP, AND PRESIDENT IS APPARENTLY CONCERNED THAT IF THERE IS LARGE US REPRESENTATION IN MEETING HE WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO INCLUDE PRIME MINISTER, SAEB SALAM. HE CLEARLY FEELS HE CAN TALK MUCH MORE FRANKLY BOTH ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS WITH FEDAYEEN AND OTHER ARAB STATES IF SALAAM NOT PRESENT. AS LONG AS MEETING INITIALLY BILLED AS TETE-A-TETE HE WOULD PRESUMABLY FEEL HE COULD AVOID INVITING PM. BEIRUT TEL 3456 REVEALS SENSITIVITY OF QUESTIONS HE WILL RAISE. IT IS QUITE CONCEIVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT AT LAST MINUTE HE WOULD INDICATE INTEREST IN HAVING SISCO AND ME JOIN DISCUSSION.

2. PRIME MINISTER TOLD ME THAT FOR SECRETARY'S CALL ON HIM TUESDAY MORNING HE WOULD, AT MOST, HAVE ONE OR TWO ASSOCIATES WITH HIM. US SIDE SHOULD PREFERABLY TOTAL NO MORE THAN FOUR. IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY, I WOULD SUGGEST, FOR EXAMPLE, SISCO, SEELYE AND MYSELF. INTERPRETER WILL NOT BE NEEDED WITH SALAAM.

71 APR 28 AM 8:31
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 0347Z 271554Z

3. MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER: PRESUMABLY SAME SIZE AS PM.

4. RE PRESS CONFERENCE: ABOUT ONLY FREE TIME IN SECRETARY'S SCHEDULE FOR PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD BE 9:00 A.M. MAY 4. I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO CROWD HIS SCHEDULE THAT MUCH; IN ADDITION, THERE ARE SECURITY, PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN TRYING TO SELECT REPRESENTATIVES OF SOME FORTY-FIVE DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND 25 WEEKLIES WHICH APPEAR IN BEIRUT, PARTICULARLY SINCE PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE HELD IN THE RESIDENCE.

I BELIEVE MAIN EXPOSURE BY SECRETARY SHOULD COME IN FORM OF ARRIVAL AND/OR DEPARTURE STATEMENT TO TV AND PRESS AT AIRPORT, COMBINED WITH ANY BACKGROUNDING MCCLOSKEY MIGHT CARE TO DO AT PRESS ROOM IN PHOENICIA HOTEL. IN ADDITION, I WILL TRY TO HAVE SOME RESPONSIBLE PRESS REPRESENTATIVES AT LUNCH FOR SECRETARY MAY 4.

GP-3.
BUFFUM

10:0 AM 05 PM 17
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 232

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03456 271513Z

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51 41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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PI R 271110Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3636

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 APR 27 PM 8:16

SECRET BEIRUT 3456

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

LONDON FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SUBJ: SECVISIT MIDDLE EAST

1. GOLI HAS PROVIDED US WITH BRIEFING PAPER (TEXT BELOW) FROM WHICH PRESIDENT FRANGIE WILL SPEAK IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY. THIS PAPER HIGHLY SENSITIVE AND IS KNOWN ONLY TO PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER AND SEC GEN OF FOREIGN OFFICE. ADVANCED DRAFT MOST USEFUL TO US SINCE IT INCLUDES, IN SECTION V, QUESTIONS WHICH PRESIDENT WILL ASK AND ANSWERS TO WHICH WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL PREPARATION.

2. TO AVOID DUPLICATION GOLI HAS AGREED PRIME MINISTER SALAAM AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD SHOULD DISCUSS LEBANON'S PROBLEMS WITH SECRETARY PRIMARILY IN ARAB CONTEXT.

3. TEXT OF PAPER FOLLOWS:
"I. OUR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. 1) TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER WHICH MIGHT BE DISTURBED BY THE FEDAYEEN AND THOSE WHO SUPPORT THEM. 2) TO CONTROL FRONTIER ZONES TO FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO AVOID ISRAELI REPOSTES. 3) IN EVENT OF CONFLICT WITH FEDAYEEN TO AVOID (OR TO FACE) POSSIBLE ARAB INTERVENTION.

"II. OUR LONGER TERM PROBLEMS. 1) TO MAINTAIN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. (WE KNOW THAT ISRAELI COVETS



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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03456 271513Z

A PART OF OUR TERRITORY; IN EVENT OF GRAVE TROUBLES ISRAEL MAY ATTEMPT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN ORDER TO OCCUPY TERRITORIES IT COVETS). 2) TO ARRIVE AT SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE PROBLEM WHEREBY MOST PALESTINIANS LEAVE LEBANON. 3) TO KEEP LEBANON OUT OF CONFLICT IF HOSTILITIES RENEWED ON CANAL OR ON ALL FRONTS. 4) TO MAINTAIN UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND OUR LIBERAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURES. 5) AFTER END OF HOSTILITIES TO ADAPT OURSELVES TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES AND DEVOTE MAJOR PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

"III. OUR POLICY. 1) WE ATTEMPT TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH FEDAYEEN; A CONSTANT DIALOGUE, A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE, ETC. 2) WE REINFORCE OUR DEFENSIVE DISPOSITION IN THE INTERIOR AS WELL AS ON SOUTHERN BORDER. 3) WE WILL IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB NEIGHBORS TO DEVELOP BETTER COMPREHENSION OF OUR PROBLEMS AND OUR POLICY. 4) WE COUNT UPON OUR INTERNATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND, IN THE FIRST PLACE, UPON THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

"IV. THAT WHICH WE ALREADY KNOW OF US POLICY. 1) YOUR SUPPORT INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS INTEGRITY. 2) YOU EXERT PRESSURE UPON ISRAEL SO THAT ISRAELI RIPOSTES AGAINST FEDAYEEN ACTIONS WILL NOT BE DISPROPORTIONATE TO PROVOCATIONS. 3) IN CASE OF UNPROVOKED ISRAELI AGGRESSION YOU WILL DO ALL WHICH IS IN YOUR POWER TO PREVENT OR TERMINATE THE OCCUPATION. 4) YOU ARE DISPOSED TO ASSIST US IN STRENGTHENING OUR DEFENSE (\$5 MILLION IN AID AND A CREDIT OF \$12 MILLION WHICH MIGHT BE AUGMENTED).

"V. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT YOUR POLICY. 1) ARE YOU DISPOSED TO GUARANTEE IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON? UNDER WHAT FORM? AND ON WHAT CONDITIONS? 2) WHAT CAN YOU DO TO HELP US IN REDUCING THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES? CREATE A PALESTINIAN STATE INCLUDING THE OBLIGATORY ISSUANCE OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALITY TO ALL THE REFUGEES? PROVIDE MASSIVE MATERIAL AID TO A PALESTINIAN STATE TO ATTRACT REFUGEES TO IT? ARRANGE A GENERAL AGREEMENT INCLUDING A DIVISION OF REFUGEES AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES HAVING TRUE CAPACITY OF ABSORPTION?... 3) IN CASE OF AN ARAB INTERVENTION, WHAT CAN YOU DO? 4) IN CASE OF A GENERAL RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES, WHAT ASSISTANCE CAN WE COUNT ON FROM YOU SO WE CAN REMAIN OUT OF THE CONFLICT? 5) CONSIDERING THAT OUR

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03456 271513Z

DIFFICULTIES CANNOT BE SOLVED IN A RADICAL MANNER UNLESS THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST IS ITSELF FINALLY SOLVED. WHAT DO YOU CONSIDER ARE THE PRESENT CHANCES OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT AND IN WHAT APPROXIMATE TIME PERIOD DO YOU THINK IT MIGHT COME ABOUT? 6) DO YOU DESIRE A DEMARCHE OR SOME PARTICULAR ACTION ON OUR PART TO SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY GENERAL SETTLEMENT? 7) TO WHAT EXTENT CAN WE COUNT ON YOUR COOPERATION IN ORDER TO ASSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF YOUR COUNTRY?" GP-3
BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00870 011300Z

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ACTION SS-45

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

71 FEB 1 PM 2:24
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
122802

SECRET BEIRUT 870
EXDIS
REF: DEPTTEL 15645

1. I CONCUR IN DEPARTMENT'S JUDGMENT PARA 2 REFTEL.
LEBANESE WOULD NOT WISH GET THIS MUCH INVOLVED IN SUBSTANCE
OF JARRING'S TALKS, EVEN ORALLY, AT THIS STAGE.

2. STORIES FROM ISRAEL THAT LEBANESE HAD PROVIDED
JARRING WITH "REPLY" TO ORIGINAL ISRAELI PROPOSALS
HAVE ALREADY EVOKED STRONG DENIALS HERE WITH EXPLANATION
LEBANON CONTINUES TO STAND ON 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.
GP-3.
BUFFUM

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. IFSHIN.

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ACTION NEA-15

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0 P 281911Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2950
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USINT CAIRO
USINT ALGIERS
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 0804

1. SYRIANS HAVE GIVEN GREEN LIGHT FOR REPAIRS TO TAPLINE.
WELDING CREWS FROM LEBANON HAVE ALREADY ARRIVED SYRIA.
2. WE DO NOT HAVE DETAILS OF SETTLEMENT AS TAPLINE REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE NOT YET RETURNED FROM DAMASCUS.
BUFFUM

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00781 281504Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 281320Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2944
INFO USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 781

EXDIS

1. FOREIGN MINISTER PROVIDED US TODAY ON HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS WITH COPY OF LEBANESE ANSWER TO JARRING. IT FOLLOWS LINE WE HAD AGREED WITH LEBANESE TO EFFECT THAT, AS COUNTRY THAT DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN 67 WAR, THEY PREFER NOT GET INVOLVED IN JARRING'S NEGOTIATIONS ALTHOUGH FINAL PARAGRAPH LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE.

2. COPY WAS SENT LEBANESE UN MISSION JANUARY 27 AND WAS TO BE GIVEN JARRING LAST NIGHT OR THIS MORNING.

BEGIN TEXT: AS HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR JARRING BY LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 1969, THE POSITION OF LEBANON IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT IN ITS ENTIRETY AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN THE CONVERSATIONS RELATING TO THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, FLOWS FROM SPECIAL JURIDICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE WAR OF JUNE 1967, WHICH DID NOT AFFECT LEBANESE TERRITORY, WAS THE ORIGIN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER 67. WHILE CONCERNED BY THE CONFLICT BECAUSE OF THE TIES WHICH LINK IT AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES, BECAUSE OF THE PRIMARY INTEREST WHICH IT ATTACHES TO THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND BECAUSE OF CONSTANT ISRAELI THREATS AGAINST IT, LEBANON CONSIDERS THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ACT WHICH PRESENTLY GOVERNS ITS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL IS THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARMISTICE CONVENTION CONCLUDED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH ITS ACTIVE PARTICIPATION ON MARCH 23, 1949. THIS CONVENTION IS STILL IN FORCE, FOR REASONS WHICH NO

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LONGER NEED BE EXPLAINED AND WHICH MR. THANT EXPOUNDED IN HIS REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 19, 1967. LEBANON AND ISRAEL ARE LINKED BY ENGAGEMENTS WHICH THEY HAVE CONTRACTED. LEBANON, FOR ITS PART, HAS ALWAYS RESPECTED ITS ENGAGEMENTS.

THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION COVER MOST OF THE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW GOING FORWARD UNDER THAT AEGIS OF AMBASSADOR JARRING. IN FACT, THIS CONVENTION ESTABLISHES THAT THE ARMISTICE LINES BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL COINCIDE COMPLETELY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN LEBANON AND PALESTINE.

THIS FRONTIER HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED WITHOUT INTERRUPTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR MORE THAN 50 YEARS IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SAME CONVENTION IMPLIES THE NON-RECOURSE TO MILITARY FORCE. IT ESTABLISHES A PRECISE PROCEDURE AND CREATED A SPECIAL ORGANISM WITH THE PARTICIPATION AND UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONTROL THE EXECUTION OF THESE DISPOSITIONS.

IT THUS APPEARS THAT THE ADOPTION OF ANY OTHER POSITION BY LEBANON AT THE PRESENT TIME WOULD HAVE NO PURPOSE.

IF THE SITUATION EVOLVES, LEBANON, WHICH HAS ALWAYS FULLY COOPERATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, WILL BE INSPIRED BY THIS SPIRIT OF COOPERATION IN THE ATTITUDES WHICH IT MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ADOPT. GP-3.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2941
INFO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET BEIRUT 0762

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: TAPLINE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA

REF: STATE 13891

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF REFTEL, WE REVIEWED PRESENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH TAPLINE PRES CHANDLER. TAPLINE CHIEF NEGOTIATOR ROBINSON HAD ANOTHER SESSION WITH SYRIANS EVENING JANUARY 26 AT ONE LEVEL HIGHER IN SYRIAN HIERARCHY, NAMELY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HILAL WHO HAS OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. AT THIS NEXT LEVEL IN NEGOTIATIONS, FOUR POINTS WERE RAISED BY HILAL:

A. TAPLINE WISHED REMOVE LIMITATION ON SHIPMENTS THROUGH LINE OF 175 MILLION BARRELS ANNUALLY. HILAL ARGUED THAT ECONOMIES ON SCALE WOULD REDUCE UNIT COSTS FOR TAPLINE AND ASKED ONE-HALF CENT BARREL ROYALTIES ON EXCESS SHIPMENTS. CHANDLER BELIEVED THAT AFTER DISCUSSION COMPROMISE WOULD BE REACHED BY RAISING LIMITATION TO 190 MILLION WITHOUT INCREASED ROYALTY;

B. TAPLINE-SYRIAN AGREEMENTS HAVE PROVISION WHEREBY TAPLINE CAN SUPPLY 50 PERCENT SARG CRUDE OIL REQUIREMENTS. (THIS IS DONE BY IPC DELIVERIES WITH SEPARATE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN TAPLINE AND IPC.) TAPLINE

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WISHES TO CANCEL THIS SO-CALLED "CRUDE OPTION" AND PROPOSED \$400,000 PAYMENT TO EQUATE WITH DISCOUNT ON POSTED PRICE BEING GRANTED SYRIANS. THEN IN NEGOTIATIONS TAPLINE THREW IN ADDITIONAL \$400,000 AS SORT OF EX-GRATIA PAYMENT. HILAL POSITION WAS THAT SYRIANS WANTED CRUDE OPTION RETAINED BUT DEMANDED TAPLINE MAKE \$400,000 EX-GRATIA PAYMENT ANYHOW;

C. HIGHER ROYALTIES ON FUTURE SHIPMENTS HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY TAPLINE FOR PERIOD OF 24 MONTHS ONLY. HILAL INSISTED THESE PAYMENTS NOT BE SUBJECTED TO ANY LIMITATION;

D) HILAL INSISTED THAT RETROACTIVELY PAYMENT OF NINE MILLION DOLLARS BE MADE IN ONE LUMP SUM RATHER THAN PARTIALLY SPREAD OVER TWO YEARS (SEE BEIRUT 720 FOR DETAILS). CHANDLER SAID ON THIS POINT ROBINSON USED BRINKMANSHIP APPROACH, STATING THAT TAPLINE OWNERS WOULD MAKE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS THIS POINT AND WERE PREPARED TO SEE LINE CLOSED INDEFINITELY RATHER THAN GIVE IN. THIS POSITION DREW FROM HILAL ASSURANCES SYRIANS DID INDEED WANT TO SEE LINE REOPEN, ETC., AND SAID QUESTION WOULD BE RECONSIDERED IN NEXT DISCUSSION.

2. ROBINSON RETURNED DAMASCUS MORNING JANUARY 27 FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATING SESSION WITH HILAL, NOW UNDERWAY. AFTER OUR CONVERSATION CHANDLER TELEPHONED TO SAY HIS APPOINTMENT WITH ASAD IS FOR TOMORROW, JANUARY 28, RATHER THAN LATER TODAY.

3. WE REVIEWED SUBSTANCE REFTTEL WITH CHANDLER ON IMF AND COMMERCIAL BANK FUNDING. HE AGREED BEST COURSE IS TO AWAIT RESULTS HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ASAD. HE REITERATED TO EMBOFF THAT HIS OWNERS HAD GIVEN HIM NO LEEWAY ON INCREASED RETROACTIVITY CASH PAYMENTS BUT THOUGHT IF GOING GOT TOUGH, HE MIGHT FLOAT IDEA OF TAPLINE'S GOOD OFFICES WITH FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

4. WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF REFTTEL, RELUCTANCE TO MAKE FULL AND IMMEDIATE CASH PAYMENTS IS NOT ON PART OF TAPLINE BEIRUT BUT OF TAPLINE OWNERS IN U.S. WHO CONTROL TAPLINE THROUGH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN NEW YORK, REFERRED TO COMMONLY AS EXCON. CHANDLER SAID HE HAD VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATING JOB

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 00762 271734Z

WITH EXCON TO GET WHAT HE HAD ALREADY. WHILE ACCEPTING THE LOGIC OF DEPT'S VIEWS, CHANDLER EMPHASIZED TO EMBOFF THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE PUT IN POSITION OF APPARENTLY GOING BEHIND EXCON'S BACK TO APPEAL TO DEPT. MOREOVER, HE RECOGNIZED IT WAS GOOD NEGOTIATING TACTICS ON EXCON'S PART TO HOLD LINE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY WHEN GOING IS TOUGH. THUS, HE PLANS HOLD TO "BRINKMANSHIP" POSITION ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY HE WILL LEAVE HIMSELF LAST-MINUTE LOOPHOLE. CHANDLER SAID HE WAS FULLY AWARE

OF IMPORTANT ROLE TAPLINE COULD PLAY IN INFLUENCING NEGOTIATIONS IN LIBYA AND ELSEWHERE. HOWEVER, AT SAME TIME HE BELIEVED PENDING OUTCOME HIS CONVERSATION WITH ASAD, THAT DEPT. SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO URGE EXCON INTO MORE GENEROUS TERMS. HE REFERRED FREQUENTLY DURING CONVERSATION TO POLITICAL RISKS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE TAPLINE CLOSURES THAT WOULD MAKE PAYMENT OF FULL AMOUNTS SOMEWHAT OF A GAMBLE.

5. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE BETTER FIX ON FINAL SYRIAN POSITION AFTER CHANDLER-ASAD TALKS AND THUS ARE INCLINED TO DEFER TO CHANDLER'S WISHES FOR PRESENT. GP-3.
BUFFUM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00710 261522Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 261450Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2927
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

SECRET BEIRUT 710

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO MOSCOW

AMBASSADOR AZIMOV TOLD MEI AT RECEPTION TODAY HE IS
CONFIDENT FIGHTING WILL NOT REPEAT NOT RESUME ALONG
SUEZ AFTER FEBRUARY 5. GP-3.
BUFFUM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED MOSCOW

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P 251445Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2919

SECRET BEIRUT 0666

EXDIS

DEPT PASS JIDDA, LONDON, TEHRAN AND DHAHRAN

SUBJECT: TAPLINE NEGOTIATIONS AND REOPENING

REF: LONDON 0602 (REPEATED BEIRUT AS STATE 12351)

1. SINCE OUR LAST REVIEW SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON JAN 21 WITH TAPLINE CHIEF NEGOTIATOR ROBINSON (BEIRUT 602), HE HAD SESSION IN DAMASCUS JAN 24 AND IS RETURNING FOR ANOTHER SESSION TODAY JAN 25. PRIOR RECEIPT REFTEL, ROBINSON ASKED US DELAY OUR REQUESTED MEETING WITH HIM UNTIL THIS EVENING.

2. COMMENT: EVEN WITHOUT INFO ON REFTEL, THE SUDDENLY QUICKENED PACE THESE NEGOTIATIONS SUGGESTS TAPLINE AND SARG WERE NEARING AGREEMENT. KEY ISSUE HAS BEEN HOW MUCH SARG WILL SETTLE FOR. HOPEFULLY WE WILL HAVE BETTER FIX LATER TODAY ON PRICE OF THE RUG NOW BEING HAGGLED OVER. GP-3.
BUFFUM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 151827Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2852
INFO USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 433

EXDIS:

1. AS AUTHORIZED BY DEPARTMENT I INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTER LATE JANUARY 15 WE THOUGHT GOL WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO HANG BACK A BIT IN JARRING NEGOTIATIONS AND RESERVE COMMENT ON ISRAELI PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING OTHER THAN TO SAY THEY WERE GLAD SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WERE IN TRAIN. HE AGREED.

2. ABU HAMAD INDICATED SURPRISE AT REPORT RECEIVED TODAY FROM CHARLES MALIK WHO HAD JUST DISCUSSED ISRAELI PROPOSALS WITH U THANT. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID WHILE JARRING HAD BEEN OPTIMISTIC WITH GHORRA, U THANT TENDED TO DISMISS ISRAELI PAPER AS CONTAINING NOTHING NEW AND IMPLYING THEY OFFER LITTLE HOPE FOR MAKING PROGRESS.

3. SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY AND ALSO TOOK PESSIMISTIC LINE ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. HE SEEMED PARTICULARLY VEXED, ACCORDING TO FOREIGN MINISTER, AT US REFUSAL GET AHEAD WITH FOUR-POWER TALKS. IN ADDITION, SOVIET AMBASSADOR BASED HIS PESSIMISM ON STATEMENT HE ALLEGED SECRETARY MADE TO U THANT IN JANUARY 4 MEETING THAT US HAD FRONTIERS OTHER THAN JORDAN IN MIND WHEN WE SPOKE OF "MINOR RECTIFICATION." (SINCE AZIMOV ALSO RAISED THIS POINT WITH ME (BEIRUT TEL 347) I CAN ONLY ASSUME HE IS SPREADING STORY PRETTY WIDELY AND WONDER IF SOVIET DIPLOMATS ELSEWHERE MIGHT NOT ALSO BE TRYING TO DENIGRATE US POSITION BY CITING THIS ALLEGED REMARK.)

4. ABU HAMAD SAID EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR WAS CALLING NEXT

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AND OFFERED TO MAKE ANY POINTS TO HIM THAT WE WISHED. I SUGGESTED HE URGE EGYPTIANS SEIZE ON ISRAELI PROPOSALS AS POINT OF DEPARTURE AND THAT THEY COME BACK WITH SPECIFIC COUNTER-PROPOSALS. I ALSO HOPED LEBANESE WOULD TRY AND HELP STEER EGYPTIANS AWAY FROM SC MEETING. ON LATTER POINT, ABU HAMAD EXPRESSED OPINION RUSSIANS ARE THE ONES WHO ARE PUSHING THE EGYPTIANS TOWARD SC MEETING IN PART, PERHAPS, BECAUSE THEY ARE IRRITATED AT OUR APPROACH TO FOUR-POWER TALKS AND FACT THAT UP TO NOW US HAS GAINED THE MAJOR CREDIT FOR GETTING JARRING MISSION RESTARTED. FONMIN EXPRESSED COMPLETE CONFIDENCE THAT EGYPTIANS SINCERELY WANT PEACE. HE SAID EVERY COMMENT FROM THEM HERE AND IN CAIRO CONFIRMS THIS. (THIS IS UNANIMOUS VIEW OF ALL LEBANESE I HAVE SPOKEN TO, INCLUDING SOME WHO ARE BASICALLY VERY ANTI-EGYPTIAN. FOR EXAMPLE, HEAD OF RIGHT-WING PHALANGE, PIERRE GEMAYEL, TOLD ME YESTERDAY A LEADING EGYPTIAN RECENTLY SAID TO HIM THAT WHILE US AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM STILL EXIST AND THEY MUST BEWARE OF IT, SO DOES RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM AND IT IS ONE HUNDRED TIMES WORSE. GP-3. BUFFUM.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2851
INFO AMEMBASSY TELAVIV IMMEDIATE
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EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 398

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME 6 P.M. TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF LAST NIGHT'S ISRAELI RAID. HE SAID POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING SC HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND ALL ARGUMENTS AGAINST DOING SO WHICH I MADE TO SHAMMAS THIS MORNING WERE CONVEYED TO HIM. PRESIDENT AGREED NOT TO ASK FOR COUNCIL MEETING. HE DID SO BECAUSE OF LEBANON'S CONTINUED FERVENT DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESS OF JARRING MISSION AND BECAUSE OF FACT WE WERE MAKING DEMARCHES TO ISRAELIS TO DETER REPITITION SUCH ATTACKS. ABU HAMAD CONFIRMED WHAT SHAMMAS HAD SAID EARLIER THAT PREVAILING SENTIMENT IN CABINET HAD BEEN TO FAVOR IMMEDIATE CONVOCATION OF SC BUT PRESIDENT HAD OVERRULED THEM.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID GOL REMAINS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS RAID REFLECTED ISRAELI INTENTION SABOTAGE JARRING TALKS. HE THEN PROCEEDED PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS FROM SARAFAND WHICH HE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED AS COMING RIGHT OUT OF A JAMES BOND THRILLER. OVER YEAR AGO, HE SAID, ARMY INTELLIGENCE HAD WARNED FEDAYEEN THAT A KNOWN ESPIONAGE ISRAELI AGENT, USING NAME SA'DI, WAS ATTEMPTING TO INFILTRATE THEIR RANKS. FEDAYEEN REFUSED TO BELIEVE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, APPARENTLY CAPTIVATED BY ELOQUENT ESPOUSAL THEIR CAUSE BY SA'DI. SA'DI ALLEGEDLY ENTICED FEDAYEEN AT SARAFAND TO ORGANIZE A LARGE-SCALE FROGMAN OPERATION AGAINST ISRAEL. WHILE ISRAELIS REPORT

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ONLY ONE BOAT WITH 6-MAN TEAM LANDED, ACCORDING TO ABU HAMAD 5 FEDAYEEN VESSELS ACTUALLY HEADED FOR ISRAELI JANUARY 2 WITH TOTAL OF 25 MEN. ONLY FIRST CRAFT LANDED AND WAS IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP BY ISRAELIS WHO HAD OBVIOUSLY LAID TRAP. REMAINING FOUR VESSELS WHICH HAD HUNG BACK OUTSIDE ISRAELI TERRITORIAL WATERS TURNED AND RAN SAFELY FOR HOME. WHEN THESE FACTS CAME TO ATTENTION OF LEBANESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, THEY ADVISED REMAINING FEDAYEEN IN SARAFAND BY LETTER THAT THEY SHOULD ABANDON THEIR BASE THERE. FEDAYEEN IGNORED LETTER. DURING LAST NIGHT'S RAID SA'DI WAS SEEN AND HEARD BY FEDAYEEN AS PARTICIPANT IN ISRAELI RAIDING PARTY WHICH FINALLY CONVINCED THEM HE WAS ISRAELI AGENT AND THEIR WHOLE FROGMAN OPERATION HAD BEEN ISRAELI PROVOCATION.

3. ABU HAMAD SAID THESE DETAILS BEING TREATED IN GREAT SECRECY. HE SAID HE WAS FORCED TO CONCLUDE ISRAELIS HAD SPRUNG THIS OPERATION NOW IN EFFORT TO FORCE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT INTO CALLING SC MEETING WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE JARRING NEGOTIATIONS. (I TRIED TO DISABUSE HIM OF THIS THESIS BUT DOUBT I CONVINCED HIM.) GP-3.
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2823
INFO USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 0372

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION AND LEBANON

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ABU HAMAD CALLED ME TO HIS OFFICE JANUARY 14 TO DISCUSS JARRING MISSION. HE HANDED ME COPY OF ISRAELI PAPER ON SETTLEMENT WITH LEBANON (PAPER IDENTICAL WITH VERSION GIVEN EMBASSY TEL AVIV BY GAZIT, TEL AVIV TEL 152) WHICH JARRING HAD GIVEN GHORRA IN NY. ABU HAMAD SAID GHORRA HAD CORRECTLY TOLD JARRING HE COULD MERELY TAKE NOTE OF THE DOCUMENT AND TRANSMIT IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. (GHORRA REPORTEDLY FOUND JARRING IN OPTIMISTIC FRAME OF MIND.)

2. FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SURPRISE ISRAELI'S SEEKING TO ENGAGE LEBANON IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN SUCH FORMAL WAY AND PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT JAMES RESTON'S REPORT IN NEW YORK TIMES WHICH ALLEGEDLY QUOTES GOLDA MEIR SAYING READY TO CONCLUDE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH LEBANON BASED ON OLD INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND. HE FEARED THIS MIGHT BE EFFORT TO DIVIDE LEBANON FROM OTHER ARAB STATES.

3. FONMIN ASKED WHAT US VIEWS WERE ON ISRAELI PROPOSALS AND I RESPONDED DRAWING ON SISCO'S COMMENTS TO SHARAF THAT WE BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE USED AS A STARTING POINT FOR SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

4. FONMIN RECALLED LEBANON HAS TRADITIONALLY PREFERRED TO KEEP IN BACKGROUND OF JARRING EFFORTS AND LET UAR AND JORDAN

71 JAN 14 PM 2:48
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 22

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00372 141505Z

BE FRONT RUNNERS SINCE ISRAEL IS OCCUPYING THEIR TERRITORY WHILE LEBANON HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN '67 CONFLICT AND IS NOT OCCUPIED. HE IS DISPOSED TO RETAIN LOW PROFILE BUT SAID HE WANTED TO CONSULT ME ON INFORMAL BASIS BEFORE GIVING RECOMMENDATION TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE SINCE HE CONSIDERED MATTER EXTREMELY SERIOUS ONE AND WOULD ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO OUR ADVICE IN FORMULATING FINAL RECOMMENDATION. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO REFLECT AND SEE WHETHER MY GOVERNMENT HAD ANY ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND TO PROVIDE.

COMMENT: REQUEST DEPARTMENT TAKE HARD LOOK AND PROS AND CONS INVOLVING LEBANON MORE ACTIVELY IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS. ON HASTY REFLECTION I BELIEVE DISADVANTAGES OF ENGAGING GOL ON SAME BASIS AS UAR AND JORDAN OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES. OF COURSE, LEBANON COULD BE COUNTED ON AS AN ADDITIONAL MODERATE VOICE IN THE PROCESS. HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE CAN ASSUME SUCH COUNSEL OF MODERATION WILL COME FROM LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO OTHER ARABS WHETHER OR NOT IT FORMALLY ENGAGED ON CONTINUING BASIS WITH JARRING. ADVANTAGES WOULD BE GREATER IF GOL HAD STRONG AND IMAGINATIVE REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK WHO COULD INFLUENCE OTHER PARTICIPANTS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH GHORRA EXTREMELY WELL DISPOSED TO US AND COMPLETELY MODERATE IN OUTLOOK HE ALWAYS STRUCK ME AS BEING LIGHTWEIGHT AND COMPLETELY DOMINATED BY EL-ZAYATT. EVEN IF PARTY TO NEGOTIATIONS, I ALSO SUSPECT GOL AS MATTER OF OFFICIAL POLICY TO LET UAR TAKE MAJOR LEAD. TRADITIONALLY, OF COURSE, LEBANON LIKES TO HIDE BEHIND EGYPTIAN SKIRTS WHEN IT COMES TO ANY DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL. AS DEPT AWARE GOL DOES NOT HAVE PHYSICAL OR POLITICAL STRENGTH OF EITHER JORDANIAN OR EGYPTIANS REGIMES TO TAKE LEAD IN ADVOCATING HARD DECISIONS WHAT WILL BE INVOLVED IN ACCEPTING BINDING PEACE COMMITMENTS. NATURALLY LEBANON WILL HAVE TO BE INVOLVED AT THE END OF THE PROCESS AND HAS A PARTICULAR STAKE IN DISPOSITION OF 250,000 PALESTINIANS NOW ON HER TERRITORY.

ACCORDINGLY, UNLESS DEPT SEES COUNTERVAILING REASONS, RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED GO BACK TO FONMIN AND SAY WE CONSIDER WISEST APPROACH FOR LEBANON WOULD BE TO TELL JARRING: (1) IT APPRECIATES HIS TRANSMITTAL OF ISRAELI

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 00372 141505Z

PROPOSAL, (2) GOL WELCOMES FACT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS
APPEAR IN TRAIN (3) HOWEVER, SINCE LEBANON, AS NON-
PARTICIPANT IN 1967 CONFLICT, DOES NOT HAVE SAME PROBLEMS
WITH ISRAEL AS OTHER ARAB NEIGHBORS IT PREFERS WITHHOLD
COMMENTS ON TERMS OF PEACE SETTLEMENT UNTIL STATES MORE
DIRECTLY CONCERNED MAKE HEADWAY IN RESOLVING SOME OF
THEIR DIFFERENCES. GP-3.
BUFFUM

SECRET

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 142

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00347 131618Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

115986

R 131456Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2816
INFO USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 347

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SUBJ: SOVIET COMMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST

1. PAID INITIAL COURTESY CALL JANUARY 13 ON SOVIET AMBASSADOR AZIMOV WHO HAS BEEN IN USSR MOST OF THE TIME SINCE MY ARRIVAL. DISCUSSION, WHICH WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL, CONCENTRATED ON MIDDLE EAST.

2. I SAID WE WERE ENCOURAGED TO NOTE THAT JARRING WAS STARTING OFF QUICKLY WITH SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS SINCE WE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS. AZIMOV CONCURRED THAT SPEED IS ESSENTIAL, SAYING SITUATION IN AREA IS DANGEROUS AND EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT "NO MATTER WHAT THE COST."

3. SOV AMB EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT CURRENT FIGHTING IN JORDAN MIGHT OFFER EXCUSE TO "EXTREMIST ELEMENTS" TO DISRUPT JARRING NEGOTIATION. HE DID NOT SEEK TO ATTACH BLAME TO ANYONE FOR CURRENT FIGHTING AND CONCURRED IN MY SPECULATION SOURCE OF DIFFICULTIES MIGHT BE PROVOCATEURS OF PFLP STRIKE WHO WISH SABOTAGE NEGOTIATION EFFORTS.

4. AZIMOV COMMENTED IN GENERAL THAT "UNFORTUNATELY, IN PARTS OF ARAB WORLD THERE IS STILL NOT SUFFICIENT REALISM ABOUT THE NEED FOR A SETTLEMENT BASED ON RES. 242."

5. AZIMOV MADE LOW KEY APPEAL FOR REACTIVATION FOUR-POWER

SECRET

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JAN 13 PM 6:39
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00347 131618Z

EFFORTS IN NEW YORK, BUT VOLUNTEERED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES AT THIS STAGE NOT TO GIVE IMPRESSION OUTSIDE PRESSURE BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON ISRAEL.

6. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TWICE ASKED WHAT WAS SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLEGED STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS TO U THANT IN HIS MEETING JANUARY 4 THAT PROPOSALS FOR "MINOR RECTIFICATIONS" WOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO JORDAN. HE SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION COMMENT MAY HAVE REFERRED TO ISRAELI POSITION. I SAID I COULD NOT ENLIGHTEN HIM ON THIS POINT (SINCE WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED REPORT ON SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION) EXCEPT TO SAY IT WAS WIDELY ASSUMED ISRAELIS WOULD BE ASKING FOR TERRITORIAL CHANGES ON FRONTIERS OTHER THAN JORDANIAN BORDER. I ADDED THAT AS FAR AS US POSITION CONCERNED, WE STOOD ON ROGERS PLAN OF DECEMBER 1969 AND RECALLED US HAD NEVER SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL WHAT WE MEANT BY "MINOR RECTIFICATIONS."

GP-3.
BUFFUM

NOTE BY OCT: BEIRUT 347 NOT PASSED MOSCOW.

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141/20/109

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 192

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00207 081644Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

084810

R 081635Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2780

SECRET BEIRUT 207

EXDIS:

DEPARTMENT PASS AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

REF: STATE 3133

SUBJ: ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER SITUATION

1. AT LUNCH JANUARY 8, I DISCUSSED PROBLEM INCREASED BORDER TENSION WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SABA. I SAID GENERAL NOUJAIM HAD TOLD ME SEVERAL TIMES LEBANESE ARMY TRYING TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE IN CONTROLLING BORDER INCIDENTS BUT, REGRETTABLY, WE SAW STEADY INCREASE AND ASKED TO BE INFORMED IN PRECISE DETAIL WHAT GOL WAS DOING TO DETER FURTHER ATTACKS.

2. SABA SAID IN SOME EMBARRASSMENT THAT, WHILE ISRAELIS WERE EXAGGERATING IMPORTANCE OF THESE INCIDENTS, IT IS TRUE LEBANESE MILITARY PERFORMANCE IS NOT ALL IT SHOULD BE. HE SAID IN EXPECTATION FATAH WOULD BRING MORE EXTREME ELEMENTS UNDER CONTROL, LEBANESE ARMY HAD NOT BEEN TAKING MUCH INITIATIVE OF LATE.

3. I SAID ALL INDICATIONS TO ME WERE THAT UNLESS GREATER CALM RESTORED, GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WOULD BE FACED WITH ANOTHER SERIOUS ISRAELI RAID ON ITS TERRITORY AND URGED THAT GOL ISSUE TIGHTER ORDERS TO ITS FORCES TO REDUCE FEDAYEEN VIOLENCE ACROSS THE BORDER.

4. SABA WAS DULY CONCERNED AND PROMISED RAISE MATTER WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE DURING MEETING SCHEDULED LATER TODAY.

GP-3 BUFFUM

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

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3

71 JAN 8 PM 4:52

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 486

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00041 041636Z

43
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

051642

R 041511Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2742

SECRET BEIRUT 0041

EXDIS

AT STRICTLY FAMILY LUNCHEON JANUARY 4, PRIME MINISTER SALAM TOLD ME FOLLOWING:

1. HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT OVER WEEKEND WENT EXCEEDINGLY WELL. ARAFAT WELL ALONG IN WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS TO BRING OPERATIONS OF SYRIAN-BACKED SAIGA UNDER HIS CONTROL AND NEW GOVERNMENT IN DAMASCUS FULLY SUPPORTING HIM THIS REGARD.

2. ARAFAT GAVE ASSURANCE THERE WILL BE NO MORE CROSS-BORDER FIRING FROM LEBANON INTO ISRAEL (ALTHOUGH CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS STILL PERMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CAIRO AGREEMENT); SALAM CONFIDENT THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE KEPT AS SOON AS ALL SAIGA ELEMENTS FINALLY BROUGHT UNDER ARAFAT'S CONTROL.

3. ARAFAT REASSURED GOLI HE WOULD COOPERATE IN INSISTING COMMANDOS RESPECT LEBANESE CIVIL LAW. THIS CONNECTION FATAH HAS RECENTLY HANDED OVER FOUR COMMANDOS GUILTY OF MURDER AND HAS GIVEN SALAM FREE HAND TO MOVE AGAINST SMALL COMMUNIST-LED GROUP OF COMMANDOS IN BIBLOS.

4. SALAM TREMENDOUSLY PLEASED WITH IMPROVEMENT IN INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION SINCE ADVENT HIS GOVERNMENT AND CONFIDENT THAT WITH WEEKEND'S AGREEMENT WITH ARAFAT, GOLI WILL NOW HAVE SITUATION IN COUNTRY GENUINELY UNDER CONTROL.

5. DISPITE FOREGOING SALAM FEARS ADDITIONAL ISRAELI

2
3

71 JAN 4 PM 9:48

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00041 041636Z

ATTACKS ON LEBANON FOR PURELY POLITICAL REASONS. HE ALSO CONVINCED, DESPITE MY ARGUMENTS TO CONTRARY, THAT ISRAELI HELICOPTER-BORNE ATTACK ON YATER WAS LAUNCHED TO DEMONSTRATE ISRAELI TOUGHNESS ON EVE OF JARRING'S NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT REPT NOT BECAUSE THERE WAS ANY REASON ABLE DEGREE OF PROVOCATION.

6. ALTHOUGH ARAFAT MOST CONCILIATORY IN DESIRING GOOD RELATIONS WITH GOL, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES COMPLETELY ADAMANT INSOFAR AS THEIR VIEWS ON PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT CONCERNED. COMMANDO LEADERSHIP, SAID ARAFAT, HE, WILL NOT SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN ARRANGEMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR LIQUIDATION OF ZIONIST CONTROL IN PALESTINE. FOR THIS REASON, AND ALTHOUGH HE CONVINCED EGYPTIANS SINCERELY WANT SETTLEMENT BASED ON SC RESOLUTION 242, SALAM REMAINS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE. GP-3. BUFFUM

Handwritten notes in blue ink on the right side of the page, including "GP-3" and "BUFFUM".

SECRET

28

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Handwritten date: 5/11/00/109



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SECRET 408

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00040 041542Z

54
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 041510Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2743

051230

SECRET BEIRUT 0040

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANESE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

02
71 JAN 4 PM 9:48
3
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. IN LENGTHY LUNCHEON CONVERSATION JANUARY 4 REPORTED SEPTEL, PRIME MINISTER SALAM TOLD ME HE HAD REVIEWED LEBANON'S FUTURE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS THIS MORNING. HE INDICATED GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED PURSUE INITIAL REQUEST FOR RECONDITIONED M-41 TANK AND WOULD BE INFORMING US OFFICIALLY OF THIS IN NEAR FUTURE.
2. I TOLD HIM WE WERE READY TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY TO EASE GOL POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH ACCEPTANCE US \$5 MILLION GRANT WHEN FINALLY TENDERED. HE INDICATED APPRECIATION BUT NO CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS. GP-3.
BUFFUM

SECRET

32

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 726

PAGE 01 STATE 222716

42
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:XVUNOVIC:CF
APPROVED BY S/S - D. MILLER
IO - MR POPPER
IO/UNP - MR STULL
NEA/ARN - MR KORN
S/S-O KKURZE

094984

P R 111604Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 222716

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS:PFOR, XF, LE
SUBJECT: UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE
BORDER

REF: BEIRUT 12587
ROME -- FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

DEPT BELIEVES GOL WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO AWAIT ESTABLISH-
MENT OF UNEF AND AN ENLARGED UNTSO ALONG CEASE-FIRE LINES
IN EGYPT AND SYRIA BEFORE BROACHING IDEA OF UN PRESENCE
ON RELATIVELY QUIESCENT LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER. IN DUE
COURSE, SITUATION COULD BE MORE CONDUCTIVE TO FAVORABLE
CONSIDERATION BY SC OF STRENGTHENED UN PRESENCE IN
LEBANON, AND US COULD MORE READILY GO ALONG IF UNSC

73 NOV 12 AM 7:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 222716

MEMBERS WERE ASKED TO CONSIDER EXPANDED UN PRESENCE ON LEBANESE SIDE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER, PERHAPS IN FORM OF UNEF COMPANY OR SUBSTANTIAL BOOST IN UNTSO STRENGTH. RUSH

CG. T. MA. SI. VON. CR.

SECRET


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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 350

PAGE 01 STATE 222652

43
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPM:JSCHOLLAERT:KLH
APPROVED BY EUR - MR. SPRINGSTEEN
EUR/RPM - EJSTREATOR
S/S- MR. MILLER

091630

O 101722Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 222652

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH), NATO
SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR MR. SISCO'S NOVEMBER 13
MEETING WITH THE NAC ON THE MIDDLE EAST


REF: STATE 222141

1. FINAL WORD IN SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH ONE IN
REFTEL SHOULD BE "CONDUCT" RATHER THAN "CONTACTS."
SENTENCE SHOULD READ "PRIVATELY IRRITATION CONTINUES TO
PERSIST AT THE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALLIED CONDUCT." RUSH

73 NOV 11 AM 9:42

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

NOV 11 AM 9:41
WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS ROOM

SECRET 286

PAGE 01 STATE 222628

43
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY S/CCT:LHOFFACKER:ATM
APPROVED BY S/S-0
NEA/EX:LRHUNT

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O 101648Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 222628

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS
SUBJ: POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH THREAT AGAINST
ASST. SECY SISCO

REFS: LONDON 13163 AND 13167


- PASSPORT OFFICE FURNISHES FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON KHALED MAHMUD DIAB, 300 CULLEN LAKE SHORE DRIVE, ORLANDO, FLA.
- PASSPORT D 2244032 ISSUED WASHINGTON AUG. 29, 1973 TO REPLACE ONE ISSUED MAY 15, 1973 IN MIAMI PROBABLY BECAUSE OF MENTION OF ISRAEL (POSSIBLY BIRTHPLACE) THEREIN.
- DIAB DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS ENGINEERING MANAGER OR DIRECTOR. PURPOSE OF PRESENT TRIP IS EXPORT-IMPORT BUSINESS PLUS VISITING PARENTS. POSSIBLE ITINERARY: LEBANON, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, EGYPT, SUDAN, LIBYA, TUNISIA, ALGERIA, MOROCCO, RUSH

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SECRET 627

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63
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/PP:FPSPOTTS
APPROVED BY EUR:WJSTOESSEL
EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN (DRAFT)
NEA:RDAVIES (DRAFT)
EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR(DRAFT)
S/S-O: G. TWOHIE

085306

O R 100119Z NOV 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T STATE 222141

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: OVIP (SISCO, JOSEPH), NATO


SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER FOR MR. SISCO'S NOVEMBER 13
MEETING WITH THE NAC ON THE MIDDLE EAST

1. THE MOST SEVERE PUBLIC STRAINS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS APPEAR TO HAVE PASSED; SOME OF THE ALLIES INDIVIDUALLY, AND SECRETARY LUNS FOR THE ALLIANCE COLLECTIVELY, HAVE SOUGHT IN RECENT DAYS PUBLICLY TO STRESS THAT FRICTIONS HAVE DISSIPATED. PRIVATELY, IRRITATION CONTINUES TO PERSIST AT THE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALLIED CONTACTS. AT THE SAME TIME, NONE OF THE ALLIES HAS ALTERED ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY AND THE EC-NINE ON NOVEMBER 6 ISSUED A MIDDLE EAST DECLARATION MAKING CLEAR THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES CONTINUE TO APPROACH THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE THAN WE. IN YOUR BRIEFING OF THE NAC, YOU MAY THEREFORE WISH TO BEAR THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND.

02
73 NOV 10 AM 8:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 222141

ALLIED DISSATISFACTION.

2. ALTHOUGH MOST ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TEND TO BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS LONG BEEN TOO BIASED IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR, THEY HAVE NOT CONDEMNED US MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AS SUCH; INDEED, OUR DEFENSE OF ISRAEL HAS EVOKED SOME SUPPORT AMONG GOVERNMENTS,

OPPOSITION PARTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY IN SUCH COUNTRIES AS BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS AND GERMANY.

3. THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLIANCE PROBLEM HAS ARISEN FROM THE FACT THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ASSESS THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN AN ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT WAY FROM US.

(A) MOST ALLIED GOVERNMENTS DO NOT SHARE THE US PERCEPTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE; SOME ALLIES HAVE CLOSER LINKS TO THE ARABS THAN TO ISRAEL, AND FEW SHARE THE STRONG US POLITICAL AND EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL.

(B) EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST OIL HAS GIVEN EUROPEANS A SENSE OF BEING HOSTAGE TO ARAB POLICIES.

4. THE ALLIES ALSO HAVE FUNDAMENTALLY DISAGREED WITH THE US REGARDING NATO'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS.

(A) IN THEIR VIEW THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE ALLIANCE WAS ORGANIZED DO NOT APPLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

(B) THEY BELIEVE THAT CLOSE SUPER-POWER IDENTITY WITH RESPECTIVE MIDDLE EAST CLIENTS IS SELF-DEFEATING AND INCREASES THE RISK OF EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

(C) THEY APPEAR NOT TO BELIEVE THAT SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE AREA THREATEN TO UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN FAVOR OF THE USSR; THEY BELIEVE THE US HAS

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PAGE 03 STATE 222141

OVERREACTED

5. DESPITE THE OUTCRY AT THE TIME BY SOME ALLIES, THE CRISIS IN RELATIONS RESULTED LESS FROM INADEQUATE CONSULTATION THAN THE EUROPEAN FEELING OF HAVING BEEN IGNORED, WHILE BEING EXPECTED BY THE US TO SUPPORT POLICIES IN THE FORMULATING OF WHICH THEY HAD HAD NO VOICE.

(A) THERE WAS SOME SPECIFIC ANNOYANCE THAT THE US HAD PLACED ITS FORCES AROUND THE WORLD ON ALERT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION, MUCH LESS CONSULTATION.

(B) IN THE ALLIED VIEW THE US DEMANDED DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT WITHOUT INFORMING THE ALLIES OF ITS OWN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AND INTENTIONS.

6. SOME OF THE ALLIES, PARTICULARLY THE FRENCH, ARE PROFOUNDLY FRUSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE PLAYED AND WILL PROBABLY PLAY NO ROLE IN A CRISIS AFFECTING THEIR OWN VITAL INTERESTS.

THE US APPROACH

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT WILL BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO

8. ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DIFFERENCES HAVE EXISTED OVER THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, THAT WE AND THE EUROPEANS CLEARLY ASSESS THE CRISIS DIFFERENTLY AND THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO INFORM AND CONSULT WITH THE ALLIANCE AS WE WORK FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

9. SET OUT THE RATIONALE FOR US ACTIONS SINCE OCTOBER 6.

(A) SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, US AIMS HAVE BEEN TO END THE FIGHTING SOONEST, BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE IN CIRCUMSTANCES CONDUCTIVE TO CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND CIRCUMSCRIBE SOVIET INFLUENCE.

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(B) DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE WAR, US WORKED FOR A CEASEFIRE AND REFRAINED FROM RESUPPLYING ISRAEL.

(C) WHEN THE CEASEFIRE WAS NOT ACCEPTED AND THE SOVIET AIRLIFT CONTINUED, THE US HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO MATCH SOVIET SUPPLIES. A VICTORY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ACHIEVED THROUGH SOVIET ARMS AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT WOULD HAVE DRASTICALLY SHIFTED THE BALANCE IN THE AREA, ULTIMATELY MENACING WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL.

(D) FOLLOWING US DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND ISRAELI MILITARY SUCCESSES, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO SUPPORT A CEASEFIRE THROUGH UN AUSPICES.

(E) THIS CEASEFIRE BROKE DOWN, THE SOVIETS DISPATCHED A NUMBER OF INCREASINGLY MENACING DEMARCHES WHILE ALERTING SUBSTANTIAL AIRBORNE FORCES AND THREATENED UNILATERALLY TO INTRODUCE SOVIET FORCES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST IF THE US DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN A JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

(F) IN THE US VIEW THE CONSEQUENCE OF A SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN AN AREA NOT CONTIGUOUS TO THE USSR WOULD HAVE BEEN SO GRAVE THAT THE US FELT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PLACE US FORCES ON ALERT.

10. EXPLAIN HOW IN OUR VIEW THE PATTERN OF SOVIET ACTION RAISES THE REAL RISK OF UPSETTING THE BALANCE AND RADICALIZING THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. OBSERVE THAT IN THE US VIEW THE ALLIES DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE GRAVITY OF THE THREAT--ULTIMATELY AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL--POSED BY SOVIET ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND DID NOT ADEQUATELY SUPPORT THE US DURING THE CRISIS.

12. STRESS THAT NATO NEVERTHELESS REMAINS THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT WE WILL STRIVE

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TO IMPROVE CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES WHERE THESE FAILED.

13. POINT OUT THAT WE CONTINUE TO CONSIDER DETENTE IMPORTANT AND WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO USE IT TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. IT WAS NOT OUR INTENT AND WOULD NOT BE IN THE FUTURE TO ESTABLISH A US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM.

14. OUTLINE THE RESULTS OF THE SECRETARY'S VISITS TO THE ARAB STATES AND THE BROAD US AIMS IN WORKING FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.

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73
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
USSS-00 /026 R

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NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S-0 - MISS ELTZ
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----- 043713

O 080202Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 199724

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON/ISRAEL

REF: BEIRUT 11884

1. AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON AFTERNOON OCTOBER 7 ON INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM USG OF INCIDENT REPORTED REFTEL. KABBANI SAID ISRAELIS HAD ASKED FOR ILMAC MEETING AT 6:00 PM, OCTOBER 6, AFTER SYRIAN PLANE HAD MADE FORCED LANDING AT RAYAK EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON. KABBANI DESCRIBED ATTITUDE OF ISRAELIS AS "VIOLENT AND ARROGANT." SAID ISRAELI SIDE GAVE LEBANESE A PAPER WHICH STARTED WITH WORD "ULTIMATUM" AND WARNED ANY AID LEBANON GIVES TO ARAB STATES WILL BE CONSIDERED BY ISRAEL AS AGGRESSION, AND ISRAEL WILL ACT ACCORDINGLY. KABBANI SAID GOL REJECTED ULTIMATUM AND HAS INFORMED AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES

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PAGE 02 STATE 199724

PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL OF ISRAELI DEMARCHE.

2. KABBANI SAID PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAD EARLIER CALLED CAIRO AND DAMASCUS AND ASKED WHAT HELP LEBANON COULD OFFER. WHAT FRANGIE MEANT, KABBANI STRESSED, WAS SOLELY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. SADAT HAD ASKED FOR MEDICAL HELP, AND FRANGIE HAD SENT A LEBANESE DOCTOR. KABBANI EMPHASIZED LEBANON DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE PART IN HOSTILITIES IN ANY WAY; IT CONSIDERS ITSELF BOUND BY 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. LEBANON SUPPORTS RIGHT OF ARAB STATES TO GET BACK THEIR TERRITORY, AND RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS, BUT DOES NOT INTEND TO GET INVOLVED IN FIGHTING.

3. KABBANI RECALLED USG EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. SAID USG ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT ARE VERY IMPORTANT TO LEBANON, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI ATTITUDE HE HAD RELATED.

4. ATHERTON SAID WE UNDERSTAND DILEMMA AND DIFFICULTY CURRENT SITUATION CAUSES LEBANON. WE APPRECIATE AND VALUE ASSURANCE THAT GOL HAS NO INTENTION OF BECOMING PARTY TO MILITARY CONFLICT; THIS IS VERY WISE COURSE. ATHERTON SAID WE WERE AWARE OF ISRAELI DEMARCHE FROM EMBASSY BEIRUT AND HAVE GOL REQUEST FOR HELP IN URGING ISRAELI RESTRAINT UNDER CONSIDERATION. GIVEN PRESS OF MANY MATTERS OF HIGH PRIORITY, INCLUDING THIS ONE, ON SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, HE NOT IN POSITION TO SAY MORE AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT THAT WE WOULD VERY MUCH REGRET ANY MILITARY ACTION INVOLVING LEBANON. ATHERTON NOTED THAT WE DO HAVE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH VIEW STATED BY KABBANI RE RIGHTS OF ARAB STATES TO TAKE ACTION TO REGAIN THEIR TERRITORIES, IF BY THIS IT IS MEANT MILITARY ACTION, SINCE USG SUPPORTS 1967 CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS.

5. KABBANI THEN RAISED QUESTION AS TO WHICH SIDE HAD INITIATED HOSTILITIES, SAYING THIS WAS STILL UNCLEAR. ATHERTON SAID THAT WHEN FIGHTING STARTED WE RESERVED OUR JUDGMENT AS TO HOW IT STARTED AND HAVE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THIS POSITION IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HOWEVER,

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
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ATHERTON SAID HE COULD TELL AMBASSADOR CONFIDENTIALLY AND FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION ONLY THAT WE HAVE STUDIED MATTER CAREFULLY AND ARE NOW QUITE PERSUADED THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS CARRIED OUT A COORDINATED ATTACK. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED FOR ANY ACTION, AND IT APPEARS ISRAELI FORCES WERE CAUGHT BY SURPRISE. KABBANI RECALLED THAT IN DAYS PRECEDING OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING THERE HAD BEEN PRESS REPORTS OF ISRAELI BUILD-UP ON SYRIAN BORDER AND SAID SYRIANS HAD BEEN VERY CONCERNED. ATHERTON SAID WE HAD CHECKED THESE REPORTS AT TIME AND HAD FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITY OF ANY SIGNIFICANCE IN SYRIAN BORDER PRIOR TO OCTOBER 6. KISSINGER


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'73 AUG 24 AM 8:03

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WHITE HOUSE
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PAGE 01 STATE 168431

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EX:RMGIBSON:SB
8/23/73 X22006
APPROVED BY NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/EX - MR. DAVIS
NEA/ARN - MR. WARD (SUBS)
S/S -0: K. KURZE

038359

R 232303Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 168431

EXDIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: AFSP
SUBJ: STAFF REDUCTION

REFS: (A) STATE 150091 (B) BEIRUT 9090

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM DAVIES

1. RECOGNIZE ASSIGNMENT JAMES MATTSON AS LABOR/POL OFFICER VICE RICHARD SEARING, OF WHICH POST INFORMED BY STATE 142754 NOT CONSISTENT WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION POSITION BE MOVED ON DEPARTURE INCUMBENT. SEARCH FOR ALTERNATE LOCATION LABOR REPORTING OFFICER, HOWEVER, HAS NOT RPT NOT REVEALED OTHER SATISFACTORY CENTER FROM WHICH THIS WORK CAN BE DONE.
2. AS LABOR DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA PROMISE TO BE OF CONTINUING IMPORTANCE, HOPE YOU AGREE WITH US THAT POSITION SHOULD BE CONTINUED AT BEIRUT. MATTSON IS AT PRESENT CONSULTING IN DEPARTMENT IN PREPARATION FOR MID-SEPTEMBER ARRIVAL BEIRUT. RUSH

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
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PAGE 01 STATE 164411

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC
22670 8/16/73
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
IO - AMB. POPPER
S/S - MR. GAMMON

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R 172302Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 164411

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, IS, UN
SUBJECT: SC DEBATE ON LEBANESE COMPLAINT

1. FOR BEIRUT: AMBASSADOR SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS TO FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA AND TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE OUR APPRECIATION FOR EXCELLENT COOPERATION WE HAD WITH GOL IN JUST CONCLUDED SC DEBATE. WE WANT PARTICULARLY TO COMMEND AMBASSADORS KABBANI AND GHORRA, WHO THROUGHOUT CONDUCTED THEMSELVES IN BEST TRADITION OF LEBANESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP. WHAT WE HAVE JUST SEEN IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF EFFECTIVE, RESPONSIBLE AND MODERATE STATESMANSHIP CHARACTERISTIC OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S ADMINISTRATION.
2. FOR USUN: DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR FINE TEAMWORK. MISSION'S PERFORMANCE WAS OF VERY HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL CALIBRE. ROGERS


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73 AUG 14 PM 6:17

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CONFIDENTIAL 835

PAGE 01 STATE 159816

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 /026 R

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC
8/13/73 EXT. 22670
APPROVED BY NEA:MR. SISCO
NEA:MR. ATHERTON
IO:AMB. POPPER (INFO)
S/S:MR. GAMMON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159816

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (OMISSION LINE 5, PARA 1)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, IS, UNSC
SUBJECT: US-GOL CONSULTATIONS RE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

1. ASST. SECY. SISCO TELEPHONED LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI MORNING AUGUST 13 TO SAY USG WANTS TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH LEBANON REGARDING SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON LEBANESE COMPLAINT. SISCO SAID WE DO NOT SEE JUSTIFICATION FOR ISRAELI ACTION, AND WE WANT TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WORK TOGETHER WITH LEBANON.


2. DURING CALL AT DEPARTMENT LATER SAME MORNING, KABBANI ASSURED SISCO THAT AS IN PAST GOL WANTS TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH USG. KABBANI SAID HE HOPED TEXT OF RESOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES CAN BE GOTTEN. TWO THINGS ARE IMPORTANT TO GOL, KABBANI SAID: CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI

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ACTION, AND MEASURES TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. KABBANI SAID FACT THAT ISRAEL IS SAYING THAT IT WILL TAKE SAME TYPE OF ACTION AGAIN IF IT CHOOSES MAKES IT IMPORTANT THAT MEASURES BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. KABBANI SAID SOMETHING MUST BE DONE TO INSURE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION AT BEIRUT AIRPORT WHERE DOZENS OF AIRCRAFT TRANSIT EACH DAY.

3. SISCO POINTED OUT THAT USG HAS BEEN IN FOREFRONT OF TRYING TO LEAD INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON HIJACKING PROBLEM, BOTH IN ICAO AND IN UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM. USG HAS TAKEN POSITION THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE ONE LAW AND THAT IT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL. SISCO SAID WE DO NOT VIEW AS MITIGATING FACT THAT NOBODY WAS HURT AND PLANE NOT DAMAGED IN AUGUST 10 INCIDENT. NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN EXAMINING QUESTION OF TAKING MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL IN REGARD TO CURRENT INCIDENT ONE HAS TO WEIGHT CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN REGARD TO POSSIBLE FUTURE INCIDENTS. SPEAKING FRANKLY, SISCO SAID, IT SEEMS PROBLEMATICAL THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT SO "MEASURES" WHICH WOULD SINGLE OUT ISRAEL IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. NEED IS FOR MEASURES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY.

4. IN CLOSING SISCO ASSURED KABBANI THAT WE ARE APPROACHING PROBLEM FROM POINT OF VIEW OF CLOSE US-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, WHICH GIVES LEBANON SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN MIDDLE EAST IN USG'S VIEW. SISCO STRESSED IT VERY IMPORTANT FROM BOTH USG AND GOL POINTS OF VIEW THAT USG BE ABLE TO SUPPORT WHATEVER RESOLUTION IS DEVELOPED IN SECURITY COUNCIL. ROGERS


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CONFIDENTIAL 452

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EX:RMGIBSON:EMP
7-30-73 EXT. 22006
APPROVED BY NEA/EX:LEAMON R. HUNT
NEA/ARN:EDJEREJIAN (DRAFT)
A/SY:KKNAUFF (DRAFT)
NEA/EX:WTKAMPRAD
NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S - SRGAMMON

100786

R 311610Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 150091

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AFSP
SUBJ: STAFF REDUCTION
REF: BEIRUT 8165


1. REFTEL RECOMMENDATIONS BEING DISCUSSED WITH ALL CONCERNED AGENCIES OR OFFICES. DEPARTMENT PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT BEIRUT LOCATION NOT RPT NOT ESSENTIAL FOR POSITIONS LISTED PARA 4 OR FOR GROUPS MENTIONED PARA 5, BUT IN SOME CASES MAY OFFER ADVANTAGES OVER ALTERNATE SITES. PRELIMINARY COMMENTS BASED ON DISCUSSION TO DATE FOLLOW.

2. SY HOLDS STRONG OPINION THAT RSS MUST BE LOCATED WITH RTC AND RMO. SY BELIEVES IT FEASIBLE RELOCATE BUT TENDS TO AGREE WITH YOU ABOUT (1) USEFULNESS OF GROUPS TO YOU UNDER EMERGENCY AND (2) FACT THAT FRAGILITY OF SITUATION NOT RPT NOT SO EXTREME AS TO REQUIRE REMOVAL AT THIS TIME.

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3. USIA AGREES RAPA AND REG LIBRARIAN CAN BE RELOCATED IF ESSENTIAL TO DO SO BUT ASKS BUREAU RECOMMEND SUITABLE ALTERNATIVES WHERE PRESENCE AND LOGISTICS MAY NOT BE PROBLEM. THEY ARE THEMSELVES GIVING CLOSE AND SERIOUS ATTENTION TO POSSIBILITIES. WE ARE LOOKING INTO RECOMMENDATION ON GEOGRAPHIC ATTACHE.

4. MOVE ON ABOLITION LABOR ATTACHE AND AIR ATTACHE POSITIONS REQUIRES COORDINATION WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS WHICH UNDER WAY. WILL ADVISE.

5. HOPE BEIRUT AS BASE FOR OPERATION OF CIVIL AIR ATTACHE CAN BE REASSESSED. WE SEE HIS LOCATION IN SUCH A COMMERCIAL CENTER AS USEFUL IN SUCH WAY AS NO OTHER CITY IN AREA CAN BE. CONTINUING PROSPECTS HIS PLAYING ROLE IN U.S. AIRCRAFT SALES THOUGHT VERY IMPORTANT.

6. EXPECT PROVIDE MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION ON REDUCTION SHORTLY.

ROGERS


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'73 JUL 28 AM 8:21

SECRET 885

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PAGE 01 STATE 148979

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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7/27/73 X20791

APPROVED BY NEA/ALATHERTON

PM/PA - MR. FORD

PM/MAS - MR. FARNHAM

T - MR. LEWIS

OD/ISA - LT. COL. PRADOS

DOD/DSAA - MR. GRAND PRE

OD/ISA/SA - MR. EVANS

NEA/ARN - MR. DJEREJIAN

S/S-O: K. KURZE

078039

R 280111Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECRET STATE 148979

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE, US
SUBJ: GOL REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE: 1973 FMS


REF: (A) BEIRUT 6423, (B) BEIRUT 5968, (C) STATE 096750,
(D) BEIRUT 5687

1. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF GOL INTENTIONS REGARDING UTILIZATION OF DOLLARS 10 MILLION FMS CREDIT FOR FY 73. DURING PAST TWO MONTHS GOL HAS CITED TWO REASONS WHY THIS CREDIT COULD NOT BE DRAWN UPON: FIRST WAS THAT USG WOULD HAVE TO PAY INCOME TAX ON INTEREST FROM LOAN. HAS THIS OBJECTION BEEN OVERCOME BY STATEMENT THAT USG IS NOT PREPARED TO PAY SUCH INTEREST AND SUGGESTION THAT LEBANESE FIND WAY TO PAY INTEREST THEMSELVES IF THIS A LEBANESE LEGAL REQUIREMENT (REF C)? SECOND, POTENTIALLY MORE SIGNIFICANT,

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IMPEDIMENT TO USE OF FMS IS THAT "THERE ARE NO UNOBLIGATED FUNDS REMAINING FROM 200 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS AUTHORIZED IN 1972 FOR FIVE YEAR PERIOD," I.E. GOL LACKS LEGAL BASIS FOR FURTHER BORROWING FOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (REF A).

2. HAS EMBASSY DETERMINED TO ITS SATISFACTION THAT THIS ENTIRE 200 MILLION LEBANESE POUND FUND HAS IN FACT BEEN OBLIGATED? IF NOT, HOW MUCH REMAINS TO BE SPENT?

3. STATUS OF FY 73 FMS IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN BECAUSE WE ARE IN PROCESS OF PREPARING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FUTURE FMS CREDITS TO LEBANON. AS EMBASSY AWARE, WE ARE REVIEWING THE DESIRABILITY OF ATTEMPTING TO HAVE ORIGINAL DOLLARS 5 MILLION PLANNED FOR FY 74 RAISED TO DOLLARS 15 MILLION. IF GOL IS NOT PREPARED, OR IS LEGALLY UNABLE TO UTILIZE 73 CREDITS, WE ASSUME SAME LOGIC WILL APPLY TO 74 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS, A FACTOR WHICH MAKES JUSTIFICATION DIFFICULT, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF PROBABLE SEVERE SHORTAGE OF FMS FUNDS IN FY 74.

4. IN ADDITION, WE NOTE THAT GOL HAS AT LEAST 7.5 MILLION AND POSSIBLY THE FULL DOLLARS 10 MILLION IN FMS REMAINING FROM FY 1972. THIS RESIDUE, IF COMBINED WITH DOLLARS 10 MILLION FY 73 CREDITS AND ANTICIPATED APPROPRIATION FOR FY 74 WOULD PROVIDE LEBANESE WITH APPROXIMATELY SUFFICIENT CREDIT TO PURCHASE ALL MILITARY EQUIPMENT - INCLUDING A-4C SKYHAWKS - WHICH WE HAVE OFFERED TO DELIVER WITHIN SIX MONTH PERIOD. ROGERS

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
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'73 JUL 12 AM 7:48

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PAGE 01 STATE 136029

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN:JFC
22670 7/11/73
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR
S/S-0:JMEALUM
DOD/ISA - COL. PRADOS
DOD/DSAA - MR. THIEBERGER
WH/NSC - MR. SAUNDERS
PM/MAS - MR. NORLAND
DOD/ISA/SA - COL. KELLY
DOD/ISA - GEN. BRETT

***** 058261

O 120026Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 136029

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, LE, U.S.
SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GOL

REFERENCE: BEIRUT 8034


FOR AMBASSADOR

1. DEPARTMENT PLEASED YOU WILL HAVE EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE ON JULY 12.
2. CONCERNING CLARIFICATION YOU REQUESTED REFTTEL FOR USE AT YOUR MEETING WITH FRANGIE, YOU MAY TELL FRANGIE THAT
A) GOL REQUEST FOR 155 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY IS UNDER URGENT REVIEW BY DOD AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING SENT TO THE DAO BY SEPTTEL TO PROVIDE LEBANESE ARMY WITH PRICE

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AND AVAILABILITY DATA ON 155'S AND ALSO ON M60A1 AND M48 MODEL TANKS AND TO EXPLORE FURTHER WITH LEBANESE THEIR EXACT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR THESE WEAPONS. B) ONCE THIS PHASE OF US/LEBANESE ARMY EXCHANGES IS COMPLETED AND IF WE AND LEBANESE CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE AND USEFUL, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER FEASIBILITY OF LEBANESE ARMY SENDING ARTILLERY AND ARMORED PERSONNEL TO US TO STUDY AND DISCUSS THESE ISSUES FURTHER WITH A VIEW TOWARD MAKING AVAILABLE TO GOL THE MOST SUITABLE TANK AND ARTILLERY EQUIPMENT WITH SHORTEST POSSIBLE DELIVERY LEAD TIMES.

FYI. WE WANT TO EXPLORE FULLY WITH GOL IN BEIRUT FIRST BASIC QUESTIONS INVOLVING SUITABILITY, PRICE AND AVAILABILITY OF THESE MILITARY ITEMS BEFORE MAKING FIRM COMMITMENT TO ANY VISITS OF LEBANESE ARMY MILITARY EXPERTS TO U.S. END FYI.

4. YOU MAY INFORM FRANGIE OF APPROVAL FOR SALE OF A-4 SKY-HAWKS TO LEBANON. (SEE SEPTTEL). ROGERS

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
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TELEGRAM

73 JUL 12 AM 7:48

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PAGE 01 STATE 135365

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ORIGIN SS=25

INFO OCT=01 ADP=00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN
6/22/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY T:DR. TARR
WHITE HOUSE= MR. SAUNDERS
NEA:JJSISCO
OSD/ISA:GENERAL BRETT
NEA:ALATHERTON
ISA/DSAA:MR. GUILD
PM/MAS:MR. CHAPMAN
ISA/SA:COL. BRIGGS
/S = MR. GAMMON

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 135365

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS=3
TAGS: MASS, LE, US
SUBJ: GOL REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: BEIRUT 5968


1. YOU SHOULD INFORM GOL THAT USG PREPARED FURNISH 16
A-4C SKYHAWKS FOLLOWING OVERHAUL WITHIN FOUR TO SIX
MONTHS AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF DOLLARS 12.0 MILLION,
ALTERNATIVELY, 16 A-4B'S WITH ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT
COULD BE FURNISHED WITHIN 12 MONTHS AT AN ESTIMATED COST
OF DOLLARS 9.2 MILLION (DIFFERENCE IN TIME IS DUE TO FACT
OLDER A-4B'S WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE RECONDITIONING AND
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT). TRANSACTION WILL BE ON SALES BASIS.
ROGERS

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PAGE 01 STATE 132168

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ORIGIN SS-25

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7/5/73 X21019 (WHITE HOUSE CLEARANCE 7312084)
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NSC:HSAUNDERS
NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S = MR. GAMMON

93 JUL 7 AM 9:52
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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R 061501Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECRET STATE 132168

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE
SUBJ: DIALOGUE WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

FOR AMBASSADOR BUFFUM


1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU TO PURSUE WITH GOL CONSULTATIONS FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD INITIATED WITH US LAST FALL ABOUT STEPS USG MIGHT TAKE TO HELP LEBANON IN MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. SINCE RECENT CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT AND APPOINTMENT OF NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, YOU AUTHORIZED, AT YOUR DISCRETION TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF OUR THINKING TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE, IN WHOSE NAME ABOUHAMAD WAS SPEAKING, AND, IF AND WHEN YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE, TO NEW FOREIGN MINISTER. CRISIS WHICH BEGAN IN EARLY MAY HAS NOW SUBSIDED BUT PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY SEEM HARDLY BETTER THAN THEY WERE BEFORE. CONCESSIONS WHICH GOL GOT FROM FEDAYEEN ON MAY 17 ALREADY APPEAR TO BE LARGELY THEORETICAL. WE HAVE REPORTS THAT FEDAYEEN ARE PREPARED TO RESUME FIGHTING AS GOL INSISTS ON REMOVAL OF HEAVY

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WEAPONS FROM REFUGEE CAMPS. IN ATMOSPHERE OF UNEASY TRUCE WHICH HAS PREVAILED SINCE MAY CLASHES THERE COULD VERY EASILY OCCUR A NEW OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING LEADING TO CONFRONTATION EVEN MORE SERIOUS THAN IN MAY WITH ATTENDANT RISK OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION.

2. YOU SHOULD TELL PRESIDENT FRANGIE THAT WE HAVE HAD VERY MUCH IN MIND THESE PAST MONTHS CONCERN ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED TO SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO AND AMBASSADOR BUFFUM LAST FALL REGARDING POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN AND DANGER OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION. WE ADMIRE COURAGE AND FIRMNESS SHOWN BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE IN DEALING WITH DIFFICULT SITUATION LEBANON FACING. LEBANON IS OF COURSE BEST JUDGE OF WHAT IT NEEDS, BUT WE THINK GOL'S DEMAND THAT SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF STATE BE RESPECTED IS NOT ONLY FULLY JUSTIFIED BUT VITAL TO LEBANON'S CONTINUED PROSPERITY AND EVEN ITS EXISTENCE. NATURALLY WE ARE VERY PLEASED OVER IMPROVEMENT IN SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE AND HOPE COMPLETE RETURN TO NORMAL WILL BE POSSIBLE.

3. YOU SHOULD SAY USG HAS BEEN CONSIDERING A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION IN REGARD TO CONTINGENCY OF MAJOR SYRIAN ACTION AGAINST LEBANON, WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD FIRST RAISED WITH US LAST FALL. WE WOULD LIKE TO SHARE OUR THINKING WITH PRESIDENT. AMONG POSSIBLE STEPS USG MIGHT TAKE ARE:

A. PUBLIC STATEMENT REITERATING USG SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON.

B. SOME COROLLARY STEPS IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE CONCRETE SUPPORT FOR THIS POSITION. WE WOULD WELCOME HEARING LEBANESE VIEWS ON WHAT THOSE STEPS MIGHT BE.

C. HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH TO USSR WITH VIEW TO MAKING CLEAR OUR OPPOSITION TO INTERVENTION IN LEBANON BY OUTSIDE OR REGIONAL POWERS AND ELICITING SOVIET COOPERATION IN PREVENTING SUCH INTERVENTION. AS GOL KNOWS, WE SPOKE TO SOVIETS ABOUT RESTRAINING SYRIANS IN RECENT CRISIS.

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D. IN OUR JUDGMENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON MIGHT BE REQUIRED REGARDING POSSIBLE ISRAELI ROLE IN DETERRING SYRIANS. WE WOULD BE READY TO PLAY A ROLE, IF APPROPRIATE, IN FACILITATING SUCH TALKS.

E. CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND LEBANON IN SAME SENSE.

4. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT THE FOREGOING ARE ENTIRELY TENTATIVE, REPRESENTING SOME OBVIOUS AVENUES FOR POSSIBLE EXPLORATION. THEY ARE NOT MEANT TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE; FOR EXAMPLE, USG WOULD ALSO GIVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION TO LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR EMERGENCY ARMS RESUPPLY, AS WELL

AS TO LEBANESE ARMY'S LONGER RANGE NEEDS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE LEBANESE REACTION TO THESE IDEAS AS WELL AS GOL'S SUGGESTIONS. WE STAND READY TO HOLD A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH GOL ON THIS SUBJECT IF PRESIDENT SO DESIRES.

5. IN CONVEYING FOREGOING, YOU SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT WE HOPE GOL WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN MIND DESIRABILITY OF DENYING USE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY TO BLACK SEPTEMBER AND OTHERS WHO PRACTICE TERRORIST METHODS. RUSH

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6/26/73 EXT 2L019
APPROVED BY S/S - THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.
NEA/ARN:DAKORN
AMB. BUFFUM
NEA:ALATHERTON
S - LPBREMER

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 JUN 31 AM 9:59

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME

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
E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (MALIK, DR. CHARLES)
SUBJ: SECRETARY ROGER'S MEETING WITH DR. CHARLES MALIK
REF: BEIRUT 7203

1. SUMMARY: DR. CHARLES MALIK MET WITH SECRETARY JUNE 26 TO CONVEY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FRANGIE. MESSAGE WAS THAT LEBANON IS BESET WITH FUNDAMENTAL THREATS TO ITS POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE WANTED TO KNOW HOW FAR THE US WAS WILLING TO GO TO SUPPORT LEBANON'S INTEGRITY IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES. SECRETARY REITERATED US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND SAID USG PREPARED TO BE AS RESPONSIVE AS

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POSSIBLE TO LEBANON'S NEEDS, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF THE GOL'S RECENT REQUEST FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, SECRETARY MADE CLEAR USG COULD NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION OF THE LIMITS OF US SUPPORT IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES HYPOTHETICALLY. THE USG, THE SECRETARY SAID, WOULD CONSIDER THE THREATS TO LEBANON AS THEY ACTUALLY DEVELOP AND WOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE LEBANESE IN ORDER TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE USG MUST OPERATE. END SUMMARY.

2. DR. CHARLES MALIK, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER OF LEBANON, HAD A MEETING AT HIS REQUEST WITH SECRETARY ROGERS ON JUNE 26 AT THE DEPARTMENT. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM AND OFFICER

FROM NEA/ARN WERE PRESENT. MALIK STATED THAT HE HAD SEEN PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND OTHER TOP LEVEL LEBANESE OFFICIALS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON AND THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE ASKED HIM FORMALLY TO SPEAK IN HIS NAME. MALIK SAID FRANGIE, FOREIGN MINISTER ABUHAMAD AND LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GHANEM, WERE SINCERELY GRATEFUL FOR U.S. POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR LEBANON DURING LATEST CRISIS AND THAT USG'S FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING WERE SINCERELY APPRECIATED. MALIK CONVEYED FRANGIE'S PERSONAL THANKS FOR SECRETARY'S LETTER OF SUPPORT DURING MAY CRISIS.

3. CONCERNING U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, MALIK SAID BOTH PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND GENERAL GHANEM HOPED USG WOULD RESPOND PROMPTLY TO GOL'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WOULD BE DONE TO CUT DOWN THE "RED TAPE" BARRING PROMPT DELIVERIES OF SUCH EQUIPMENT. MALIK COMMENTED GOL APPRECIATED HELP OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT IN THE DRAWING UP OF THE LISTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE LEBANESE ARMY NEEDED. SPECIFICALLY, MALIK SAID FRANGIE AND GHANEM HOPE THAT USG WILL GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND TANKS.

4. MALIK, READING FROM NOTES, THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO THE LARGER ISSUES INVOLVING THE DANGERS THAT BESET LEBANON. MALIK SAID PRESIDENT FRANGIE BELIEVES

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THE FEDAYEEN CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST AND MOST PERMANENT DANGER LEBANON FACES. THE FEDAYEEN ARE BETTER ARMED THAN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND ARE RECEIVING ARMS FROM SYRIA AND IRAQ WHICH ARE ULTIMATELY PROVIDED FROM SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST SOURCES. THESE ARMS ARE DISTRIBUTED NOT ONLY TO THE FEDAYEEN BUT TO LEFTIST, RADICAL ANTI-AMERICAN GROUPS IN LEBANON. SYRIA, DR. MALIK SAID, PRESENTS THE SECOND GREATEST THREAT TO LEBANON. THE SYRIANS DO NOT RECOGNIZE LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND THEY CONTINUE TO GRIND THE IDEOLOGICAL AXE THAT LEBANON SHOULD BE ASSIMILATED INTO THE SYRIAN SYSTEM AND ENTITY. PRESIDENT FRANGIE REFUSES, MALIK SAID, TO HAVE SYRIA DICTATE TO LEBANON WHAT THE GOL'S INTERNAL POLICY SHOULD BE AND WHO SHOULD BE THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER AND WHO SHOULD BE NAMED TO THE LEBANESE CABINET. THE THIRD THREAT, MALIK SAID, WAS COL. QHADDAFI'S ANTI-GOL POLICY WHICH WAS BACKED UP BY MILLIONS OF DOLLARS WHICH THE LIBYANS SEND TO GROUPS IN LEBANON WITH THE AIM OF HAVING THE LEBANESE REGIME OVERTHROWN AND HAVING LEBANON BECOME A MUSLIM STATE. THE FOURTH THREAT TO LEBANON STEMS FROM RADICAL, LEFT-WING GROUPS WHICH HAVE INCREASED LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE GRADUAL


WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THESE GROUPS ARE LED BY THE LEFTIST DRUZE POLITICIAN KAMAL JUMBLATT WHO, MALIK SAID, IS A STRANGE CHARACTER WHO PROBABLY HIMSELF DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HE WANTS. MALIK LISTED THE OTHER THREATS TO LEBANON AS SOVIET AND COMMUNIST CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON IN SUPPORT OF THE FEDAYEEN AND LEFT-WING GROUPS, ISRAELI TERRITORIAL INTENTIONS TOWARD SOUTHERN LEBANON, THE WIDESPREAD MORAL CORRUPTION IN LEBANON, AND THE DELICATE CONFESSIONAL BALANCE WHICH CAN BE DISRUPTED AND RESULT IN CIVIL STRIFE.

5. MALIK SAID LEBANON IS FORTUNATE TO HAVE PRESIDENT FRANGIE IN POWER AT THIS TIME BECAUSE FRANGIE IS PREPARED TO FACE AND OVERCOME ALL THE THREATS TO LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. THE PRESENCE OF A STRONG AND DETERMINED PRESIDENT IN LEBANON IS A NEW SITUATION. FRANGIE HAS THREE MORE YEARS UNTIL THE END OF HIS MANDATE AND, MALIK SAID, LEBANON SHOULD NOT MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY

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TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS RESOLUTE CHARACTER.

6. DR. MALIK SAID HE HAD COME TO THE MAIN SUBSTANCE OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S MESSAGE: SPECIFICALLY, IF THE U.S. WANTS LEBANON TO CONTINUE TO EXIST AS A FREE COUNTRY ORIENTED TO THE VALUES OF THE U.S. AND THE WEST, IN GENERAL, PRESIDENT FRANGIE ASKS THE U.S. TO HELP LEBANON IN PRESERVING ITS FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. IN THIS RESPECT, PRESIDENT FRANGIE DEEPLY APPRECIATED SECRETARY ROGER'S LETTER TO HIM DURING THE MAY CRISIS. THE CRUCIAL QUESTION, MALIK SAID, WHICH FRANGIE POSES TO THE USG IS HOW FAR IS THE USG PREPARED TO GO TO HELP LEBANON RETAIN ITS FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. THE GOL IS INFORMED OF THE USG POSITION ON ISRAELI INTENTIONS TOWARD LEBANON. HOWEVER, FRANGIE WANTS TO FIND OUT WHAT THE USG ITSELF WOULD DO IN EITHER OF TWO FOLLOWING CONTINGENCIES: (A) IF SYRIA INVADED LEBANON; AND (B) IF PALESTINIAN ACTIONS LED TO THE IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. ALSO, DR. MALIK SAID, PRESIDENT FRANGIE WISHES TO KNOW WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO TO HELP PREVENT THESE CONTINGENCIES FROM ARISING IN ADVANCE.

7. DR. MALIK THEN CONVEYED HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEW WHICH HE SAID WAS ALSO THE VIEW OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE, THAT IF LEBANON IS DESTROYED, OR RADICALIZED POLITICALLY, OR ASSIMILATED INTO SYRIA, OR TAKEN OVER BY THE PALESTINIANS, IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR LEBANON PER SE AND WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U.S. LEBANON'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON SYRIA IS BECOMING A MAJOR CONCERN TO LEBANON AND SOME LEBANESE ARE THINKING OF SCHEMES TO

LESSEN THIS DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP ON SYRIA AND ARE EVEN TALKING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIRECT TERRITORIAL CONNECTION BETWEEN LEBANON AND JORDAN TO EASE LEBANON'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP TO SYRIA. HOWEVER, LEBANON CAN NEVER TRULY BE SECURE UNTIL THERE IS (A) PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG ISRAEL, JORDAN, LEBANON AND SYRIA; (B) ACCOMMODATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ISRAELI CULTURE AND ISLAMIC CULTURE; AND (C) UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE THREE GREAT RELIGIONS OF THE AREA (CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM

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
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AND JUDAISM). IF A "LAND BRIDGE" CAN BE BUILT TO JOIN THESE FORCES, MALIK SAID, THEN MANKIND WILL HAVE PASSED FROM CONSIDERATION OF SURFACE PHENOMENA TO CONSIDERATION OF THE HEART OF THE MIDDLE EAST'S PROBLEMS.

8. SECRETARY ROGERS SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET DR. MALIK AND TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S MESSAGE. SECRETARY SAID THAT COMING TO GRIPS WITH FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES UNDERLYING A DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ALL. THE USG, THE SECRETARY SAID, HAS TRIED TO BRING ABOUT A MORE RATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL AREA PROBLEMS. IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING A CEASEFIRE WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, THE SECRETARY SAID, BUT UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN TERMS OF REACHING A TOTAL SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. OF COURSE, ONE MUST ASK ONESELF, THE SECRETARY SAID, IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A SOLUTION AS DR. MALIK DESCRIBED. WHEN ONE GOES TO THE MIDDLE EAST ONE SEES FIRST-HAND THE DEPTH OF CONTROVERSIES THAT HAVE LASTED FOR CENTURIES.

9. CONCERNING THE U. S. RESPONSE TO LEBANON'S MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDS, THE SECRETARY SAID WE ARE DOING ALL THAT WE CAN TO ELIMINATE ANY RED TAPE HINDERING OUR PROMPT RESPONSE TO THE LEBANESE. HOWEVER, WHAT WE CAN DO FOR LEBANON IS NOT OPEN-ENDED. WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO EXPEDITE THE DELIVERY OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT MILITARY ITEMS THAT THE GOL HAS REQUESTED AND ARE EXAMINING ALL OUTSTANDING REQUESTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT SYMPATHETICALLY AND ON AN URGENT BASIS. SECRETARY ROGERS SAID WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN TO LEBANON AND EMPHASIZED THAT WAS PRESIDENT NIXON'S ATTITUDE, HIS OWN ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT.


10. SECRETARY ROGERS TOLD MALIK THAT HE APPRECIATED THE CLEAR AND ACCURATE EXPLANATION OF THE DANGERS AND PROBLEMS LEBANON FACES. HOWEVER, SECRETARY ROGERS POINTED OUT THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA ARE NOW MUCH BETTER THAN BEFORE AND THAT THESE IMPROVED

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RELATIONS CAN HELP REDUCE THE RISKS TO COUNTRIES SUCH AS LEBANON. WE HOPE, SECRETARY STATED, THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY/FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT OF MAY 17 CAN BE COMPLIED WITH. SOME OF THE PROBLEMS FACING LEBANON FROM THE FEDAYEEN THREAT CAN BE RESOLVED AS LONG AS PRESIDENT FRANGIE CONTINUES TO GIVE THE COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP HE HAS ALREADY DISPLAYED. WHAT HAS BEEN LACKING IS THE CREATION OF A STRONG GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON WHICH CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY FACE UP TO THE FEDAYEEN THREAT. WE FULLY AGREE WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING LEBANON'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. LEBANON IS A NATION WHICH IS RESPECTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WE APPRECIATE THE PROGRESS THE GOL HAS MADE IN BRINGING THE FEDAYEEN UNDER MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL.

11. SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING THE QUESTION ON HOW FAR THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO GO TO SUPPORT LEBANON, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT WE CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION HYPOTHETICALLY. EVER SINCE THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY SAID, WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR CLOSENESS TO LEBANON. AS SPECIFIC THREATS AND DANGERS DEVELOP, WE WILL CONSIDER THEM AND CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE LEBANESE IN ORDER TO BE AS HELPFUL AS WE CAN TO LEBANON WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE USG MUST OPERATE. AS FAR AS THE USG IS CONCERNED, LEBANON REMAINS A CLOSE AND IMPORTANT FRIEND. OUR POLICY, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, IS REFLECTED IN AMBASSADOR BUFFUM'S ATTITUDE AND THAT OF OUR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT.

12. DR. MALIK THANKED SECRETARY ROGERS FOR MEETING WITH HIM AND STATED HE WOULD CONVEY THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE. ROGERS

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6/27/73 EXT 22670
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NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S -O:W.NEWLIN

069902

R 272319Z JUN 73
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TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 126474

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, IR, LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM IRAN
REF: TEHRAN 4476

1. STATE 124050 GIVING PARTIAL USG RESPONSE TO LEBANESE ARMS REQUEST BEING REPEATED YOU FOR YOUR BACKGROUND.
2. CARDINAL POINT IS, AS YOU TOLD ALAM IN CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL, UNDESIRABILITY OF HAVING GOI ACT AS MIDDLE-MAN. YOU SHOULD REITERATE THAT WE SEE NO POINT IN GOI PROCURING EQUIPMENT FROM USG SIMPLY FOR RESALE TO GOL.
3. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS TRANSFER BY IRAN TO LEBANON OF U.S. ORIGIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT ALREADY SOLD TO IRAN. IN THIS REGARD, FROM OUR SOUNDINGS IN BEIRUT WE THINK IT IS CLEAR THAT LEBANESE

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
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PAGE 02 STATE 126474

ARMY IS NOT SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN F-5 BUT WANTS A-4; WE HAVE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR 16 A-4B OR C AIRCRAFT UNDER STUDY AND HOPE BE IN POSITION TO REPLY TO GOL SHORTLY. RE TANKS, MAIN PROBLEM FROM USG POINT OF VIEW IS THAT OF AVAILABILITY; LEAD TIME FOR SUPPLY OF M-60S IS CURRENTLY TWO YEARS. THERE ARE ALSO PROBLEMS RE AVAILABILITY M-48-A3. IF IRAN IS READY TO PROVIDE LEBANON M60 TANKS ALREADY IN ITS INVENTORY WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY A REQUEST

FOR TRANSFER. (IF DESIRED, REPLACEMENTS BY USG FOR EQUIPMENT IRAN MIGHT MAKE AVAILABLE TO LEBANON WOULD BE SUPPLIED ON SALES BASIS AND UNDER NORMAL PROCUREMENT LEAD TIMES.) SAME WOULD BE GENERALLY TRUE FOR OTHER ITEMS ALREADY IN IRANIAN INVENTORY WHICH LEBANESE MIGHT REQUEST, THOUGH OF COURSE EACH ITEM WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS. ROGERS


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6/22/73 22670
APPROVED BY T - DR. TARR
NEA - MR. SISCO
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ISA/DSAA - MR. THIEBERGER
ISA/DSAA - MR. GUILD
ISA/SA - COL. BRIGGS
S/S - MR. R. MILLER

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973 JUN 26 AM 10:53

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R 252157Z JUN 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 124050

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, LE, US
SUBJECT: GOL REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: BEIRUT 5968

1. DEPARTMENT AND DOD HAVE MADE CAREFUL REVIEW OF GOL ARMS
REQUEST TRANSMITTED REFTEL. ITEMS REQUESTED HAVE BEEN
GROUPED ACCORDING TO AVAILABILITY BY CATEGORIES, AS FOLLOWS:

A. ITEMS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE - THESE ARE THREE
MILLION ROUNDS OF .50 CALIBER AMMUNITION, 2,000 SETS OF
BODY ARMOR, THREE BAILEY BRIDGES, AND 2,500 FIRST AID
POUCHES. TOTAL ESTIMATED COST IS APPROXIMATELY DOLS. 2.6
MILLION.


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B. ITEMS AVAILABLE WITHIN 3 TO 6 MONTHS - THESE ARE 60 M 113 A1 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, 45 GUNSHIELDS FOR APCs, TWO 52 FOOT SWIFT PATROL BOATS, 17,500 FIRST AID POUCHES, 150 STARLIGHT SCOPES FOR M-16 RIFLES, 3 CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE SYSTEMS, AND 4 UH-1H UTILITY HELICOPTERS. TOTAL COST ESTIMATED AT DOLS 5.2 MILLION.

2. YOU SHOULD INFORM GOL WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE FOREGOING EQUIPMENT, ON SALES BASIS, WITHIN APPROXIMATE TIME FRAMES INDICATED ABOVE. PACKAGE WOULD TOTAL AN ESTIMATED DOLS 7.8 MILLION.

3. RE A-4 SKYHAWKS, YOU SHOULD SAY WE ARE CONSIDERING LEBANESE REQUEST AND HOPE TO BE IN POSITION TO RESPOND SHORTLY.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL GOL WE WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE DISCUSSION WITH THEM ON REMAINING ITEMS REQUESTED (REFTEL) IN ORDER BETTER TO DETERMINE TACTICAL SUITABILITY AND PRIORITIES IN LIGHT OF PRICE AND AVAILABILITY. LEBANESE ARE AWARE OF LEAD TIME AND PRICE PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO M60A1 TANK. M-48A5 TANK WITH 105 MM GUN WHICH LEBANESE SAY THEY ARE READY TO ACCEPT IN ITS PLACE (BEIRUT 6123) HAS NEVER BEEN PRODUCED IN U.S. EXCEPT IN PROTOTYPE. WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO OFFER M-48A3 WITH DIESEL ENGINE, BUT THIS MODEL HAS ONLY 90 MM GUN. WITH REGARD TO GOL'S REQUEST FOR 155 MM SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY AND ADVANCED ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT (M728 COMBAT ENGINEER VEHICLES AND ARMORED VEHICLE BRIDGE LAUN (HERS) WE WANT TO EXPLORE WITH GOL WHETHER THESE ITEMS REPRESENT BEST CHOICE IN TERMS COST AND AVAILABILITY AND OF LEBANESE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. WITH REGARD TO HELICOPTER ARMAMENT SYSTEMS, WE HAVE NEVER SUPPLIED THIS ADVANCED EQUIPMENT TO ANY COUNTRIES OF NEAR EAST. CURRENT POLICY ALSO FORECLOSES SALE OF FLAME-THROWERS. ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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DRAFTED BY NEA/TUR:RSDILLON:CF
6/18/73 EXT 20714
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
S/CCT = AMB MEYER
S/S = MR. MILLER
NEA/ARN = MR KORN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL

SECRET STATE 118682

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION THREAT
REF: BEIRUT 7064

UNLESS ANKARA HAS STRONG OBJECTION, WE BELIEVE BEIRUT
SHOULD NOT REPT NOT MAKE REQUEST OF LEBANESE ATTORNEY
GENERAL TO CHECK TALONI ACCOUNT IN NARODNEY BANK. ROGERS

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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6/15/73 EXT 20666
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR
NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
S/S -0: R. WRIGHT

73 JUN 16 PM 2:43
WHITE HOUSE
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS


SUBJECT: SISCO-DINITZ CONVERSATION JUNE 15
1. ASSTSEC SISCO SPOKE WITH ISRAELI AMB DINITZ MID-MORNING
JUNE 15. SISCO SAID WE HAVE NOTICED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF
"NERVOUSNESS" IN LEBANESE PRESS DURING LAST 24-48 HOURS.
USG PRESUMES THIS REFLECTS CONCERN ON PART OF LEBANESE
PRESS (AND NOT NECESSARILY GOL) THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT RETALI-
ATE FOR RECENT BORDER SKIRMISH DURING WHICH ONE ISRAELI
OFFICER WAS KILLED.

2. SISCO SAID USG REGRETS THIS INCIDENT, PARTICULARLY BE-
CAUSE LIVES WERE LOST, BUT HE WANTED TO PASS ON WHAT WAS
OBVIOUS--THAT ON EVE OF SUMMIT MEETING A COUNTERMOVE BY
ISRAELIS WOULD CREATE ADDITIONAL PRESSURE FOR SECURITY
COUNCIL ACTION THAT WOULD FOLLOW SUMMIT. THE BORDER
INCIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN WORK OF SPLINTER GROUP OF FEDA-
YEEN WHO ARE TRYING TO UNDERMINE WHAT ISRAELIS AND USG BOTH
THINK IS BETTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN THAN WAS
GENERALLY BELIEVED POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, SAID SISCO, AN
ISRAELI COUNTERREACTION AT THIS TIME WOULD CREATE MANY PROB-

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LEMS FOR US IN OUR IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH LEBANESE. WE HOPED ISRAEL WOULD TAKE ALL THIS INTO CONSIDERATION.

3. DINITZ SAID HE APPRECIATED SISCO'S STATEMENT AND ADDED HE HAS RECEIVED NOTHING FROM ISRAEL TO INDICATE ANY ACTION IS PLANNED. HE SAID HIS OWN INCLINATION IS TO BELIEVE THAT LEBANESE PRESS REPORTS ARE EXAGGERATIONS. ROGERS

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
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ORIGIN SS-25

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6/6/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY T:CWTARR
PM:MR. PICKERING
L/PM:JMICHEL
NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA:JJSISCO
S/S - MR. BARNES

WHITE HOUSE
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73 JUN 8 AM 8:34

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: BEIRUT 6423

1. FYI - RE YOUR QUESTION REFTEL ABOUT LOAN OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO LEBANON, DEPARTMENT IS EXPLORING POSSIBILITY BUT THIS IS VERY COMPLEX MATTER INVOLVING BROAD QUESTIONS OF LAW, POLICY AND PRECEDENT.

THERE SEEMS AT THIS POINT LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT APPROVAL FOR LOAN COULD BE OBTAINED. END FYI

2. OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL ARE BEING ANSWERED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. ROGERS


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22670 6/6/73
APPROVED BY T - DR. TARR
PM - MR. PICKERING
H - MISS FOLGER
OSD/ISA - COL. PRADOS
NEA - MR. SISCO
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
NEA/RA - COL. MUNDY
S/S - MR. BARNES

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73 JUN 7 PM 4:50

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, LE, U.S.
SUBJECT: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE


REFERENCE: BEIRUT 6423

1. WHILE WE WANT TO BE AS HELPFUL TO LEBANESE AS POSSIBLE IN FTLLING THEIR ARMS NEEDS, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CURRENTLY HAVE NO FUNDS FOR MAP GRANT AID WHICH COULD BE DIVERTED TO LEBANON AND DO NOT EXPECT TO HAVE ANY IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. MAP PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN STEADILY CUT IN RECENT YEARS. IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT AT THIS STAGE OUT- COME OF FY 1974 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BUT EVEN IF CONGRESS SHOULD PASS FULL ADMINISTRATION REQUEST (WHICH ON BASIS PAST EXPERIENCE SEEMS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE) THERE WOULD BE ALMOST NO CHANCE OF DIVERTING MAP FUNDS TO LEBANON. PAS- SAGE OF FULBRIGHT BILL OR SERIOUS CUT IN ADMINISTRATION

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BILL WOULD OBVIOUSLY MAKE SITUATION EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

2- WE DO ANTICIPATE FMS CREDIT FUNDS, IN ADDITION TO \$10 MILLION FOR FY 1973, WILL CONTINUE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR LEBANON IN FY 1974 AND AFTERWARDS AND WILL DO OUR BEST TO EXTEND HIGHEST LEVEL OF CREDIT POSSIBLE, CONSONANT WITH LEBANON'S NEEDS. HOWEVER, SINCE ARMS REQUEST SUBMITTED BY GENERAL GHANEM IN MAY (BEIRUT 5968) TOTAL AN ESTIMATED DOLS 40 TO DOLS 45 MILLION, EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT FY 1973 AND POSSIBLE FY 1974 FMS CREDITS THERE WILL BE A LARGE BALANCE WHICH GOL WILL HAVE TO FINANCE FROM ITS OWN FUNDS IF IT IS INTERESTED IN PROCURING FULL PACKAGE.

3. YOU AUTHORIZED TO PASS SUBSTANCE (ABOVE PARAS) TO GOL. LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION HOW BEST TO GET POINT ACROSS BUT GOL SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT THERE IS ANY REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF U.S. ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN FMS CREDIT (OF COURSE SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION), NOT FOR LACK OF SYMPATHY OR UNDERSTANDING BY USG FOR LEBANON'S PROBLEMS, BUT SIMPLY BECAUSE FUNDS NOT AVAILABLE. ROGERS

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
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73 JUN 7 AM 8:41

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PAGE 01 STATE 109512

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22670 6/5/73

APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO

NEA/IRN - MR. ROUSE

PM/MAS - MR. FARNHAM

NEA/RA - MR. SCHIFF

DOD/OSD/ISA - COL. PRADOS

NEA - MR. ATHERTON - MR. DAVIES

DSAA - MR. VON MARBAD

S/S - O:R. WRIGHT

OSD/ISA - GEN. BRETT

012111

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

SECRET STATE 109512

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, LE, IR, US
SUBJECT: IRANIAN REQUEST FOR TRANSFER MILITARY EQUIPMENT

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3812

1. YOU SHOULD DISCUSS WITH GOL AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL CHAMOUN'S REQUEST TO IRAN FOR TRANSFER OF F-5A'S AND 155 MM GUNS AND SHOULD SEEK VERIFICATION THAT CHAMOUN WAS IN FACT ACTING ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT REQUEST TO IRAN APPARENTLY DUPLICATES THAT MADE TO US BY GENERAL GHANEM IN MAY (BEIRUT 5968). WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO LEBANON'S PROCURING U.S. ORIGIN MATERIAL FROM IRAN IF THERE IS REAL ADVANTAGE IN DOING SO, BUT WANT TO AVOID DUPLICATION AND UNNECESSARY THREE-WAY


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PAGE 02 STATE 109512

TRANSACTIONS.

2. IF CHAMOUN WAS IN FACT ACTING AT REQUEST OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND LEBANESE ARE INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING UP ON CHAMOUN'S APPROACH, MATTER SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH GENERAL GHANEM AND HIS STAFF. SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT IRANIANS HAVE INFORMED US (TEHRAN 3697) THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE 155 MM GUN IN QUESTION IN THEIR INVENTORY BUT WANT TO BUY IT FROM USG SO AS TO RESELL TO LEBANON. THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD ELIMINATE ANY ADVANTAGE IN PRICE (UNLESS IRANIANS ARE PREPARED TO SUBSIDIZE RESALE TO LEBANON) OR EARLY DELIVERY TIME. FYI. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED A DECISION ON ADVISABILITY OF PROVIDING LEBANON 155 MM HOWITZERS. END FYI. AS FOR F-5AS, IN ADDITION TO QUESTION OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT AS DETERMINED BY USG, QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WOULD BE AS EFFECTIVE IN GROUND SUPPORT ROLE, WHICH WE ASSUME IS LEBANESE ARMY'S MAIN CONCERN, AS A-4S WHICH LEBANON REQUESTING FROM US.

3. YOU SHOULD ASSURE GENERAL GHANEM USG IS SYMPATHETIC TO LEBANON'S ARMS REQUIREMENTS AND IS PROCESSING HIS REQUEST IN THAT SPIRIT. WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM RESPONSE SHORTLY. IF HE WISHES AT SAME TIME TO PURSUE PURCHASES OF U.S. EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN, WE ARE PREPARED TO SEEK NECESSARY INTERNAL USG DETERMINATIONS TO PERMIT TRANSFER, THOUGH IN CASES WHERE IRAN DOES NOT CURRENTLY HAVE DESIRED WEAPON AND WOULD HAVE TO ORDER FROM USG SO AS TO RESELL TO GOL, WE WOULD NATURALLY PREFER TO MAKE SALE DIRECTLY. ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 619

PAGE 01 STATE 106414

61
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
6/1/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
DOD/OSD/ISA - COL. PRADOS
PM/MAS - COL. FARNHAM
S/S -O:M.EALUM

2
13

103428

P 020044Z JUN 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

SECRET STATE 106414

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE


REF: BEIRUT 5968

1. BEFORE WE CAN PROCEED SEEK DETERMINATION RE GOL
EQUIPMENT REQUEST TRANSMITTED BEIRUT 5968 WE WILL NEED
ANSWER TO QUESTION POSED PARA 7 STATE 101892 RE FINANCING,
I.E., HOW DOES GOL PROPOSE TO DEFRAY COST OF ITEMS IT IS
REQUESTING. ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 898

PAGE 01 STATE 105529

44
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
6/1/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
PM/MAS: MR. FRANHAM
DOD/OSD/ISA - GEN. BRETT
DOD/DSAA - MR. THIEBERGER
S/S - MR. BARNES

100072

P 011850Z JUN 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 105529

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE
SUBJ: LEBANESE ARMY REQUEST

REF: BEIRUT 6257

1. DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO LEBANESE ARMS SALES CASES CAN BE SENT TO BEIRUT DAO FOR HANDLING WITH APPROPRIATE LEBANESE AUTHORITY, BUT THIS WILL ENTAIL SOME DELAYS AND VERY LIKELY SOME ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS. MOST DESIRABLE METHOD, HOWEVER, IS TO HANDLE THESE CASES IN WASHINGTON IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRACTICE. IF PROBLEM IS INEFFICIENCY OF CURRENT LEBANESE MILITARY ATTACHE (FYI - WE AGREE THIS HAS BEEN THE CASE END FYI) WE WOULD URGE THAT GOL ASSIGN TO WASHINGTON CAPABLE OFFICER WHO IS KNOWLEDGEABLE IN PROCUREMENT MATTERS AND HAS CONFIDENCE OF GENERAL GHANEM. SINCE CURRENT ATTACHE IS IN ANY CASE DEPARTING WASHINGTON IN JUNE, APPOINTMENT OF REPLACEMENT COULD BE DONE ROUTINELY.

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
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 105529

2. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR DISCUSSING THIS FURTHER WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY ALONG ABOVE LINES. IF LEBANESE CONTINUE STRONGLY TO PREFER TO HANDLE SALES CASES THROUGH USDAO IN BEIRUT WE PREPARED TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS ACCORDINGLY, BUT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WELL WORTH GOL'S WHILE TO HAVE FIRST-CLASS OFFICER HERE AS ATTACHE. RUSH

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26/10/109



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 016

PAGE 01 STATE 104054

61
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USSS-00 /026

DRAFTED BY NEA/TUR:RSDILLON
5/30/73 20714
APPROVED BY S/CCT:AHMEYER
A/SY - MR. GENTILE (SUBS)
NEA - MR. DAVIES
S/S - O: NEWLIN

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 MAY 31 AM 8:46

081857

O 302359Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 104054

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU

SUBJECT; ASSASSINATION THREAT

REF: BEIRUT 6253

APPRECIATE BEIRUT'S RAPID RESPONSE. WE WOULD LIKE TO
ATTEMPT IDENTIFICATION OF TOLONI THROUGH NARODNEY BANK BUT
PREFER THAT NO ACTION BE TAKEN UNTIL AFTER JUNE 3 DEADLINE.
THEREFORE, BEIRUT SHOULD HOLD ACTION UNTIL DEPARTMENT GIVES
GOAHEAD, PROBABLY NEXT WEEK. RUSH

SECRET


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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 517

PAGE 01 STATE 103352

54
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN:GCB
5/30/73 EXT 21019

APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON

NEA/ARN:DAKORN

DOD/ISA: GENERAL BRETT

S/S - MR. BARNES

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

73 MAY 31 AM 8:46

23

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P 301814Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 103352

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MASS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
REF: BEIRUT 6123

APPRECIATE QUICK AND POSITIVE RESPONSE CONTAINED REFTEL.
YOU MAY INFORM GOL THAT DOD IS WORKING URGENTLY ON OVERALL
LIST OF REQUESTED MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR EARLY DECISION
ON WHAT SPECIFICALLY CAN BE OFFERED TO GOL BASED ON COST
AND AVAILABILITY DATA. WE WILL TRANSMIT USG RESPONSE TO
LEBANESE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS SOON AS CO-
ORDINATED STATE-DOD DECISION IS MADE. RUSH

SECRET


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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 181

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PAGE 01 STATE 097561

71
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/TUR;RSDILLON:CF
5/21/73 EXT 20714
APPROVED BY S/CCT:AMB MEYER
NEA/ARN - MR KORN (PHONE)
S/S-O W. NEWLIN

O 22004Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 097561

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, TU
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION THREAT ADDRESSED TO AMBASSADOR MACOMBER

DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES IMPORTANCE OF MOVING QUICKLY AND DID NOT RPT NOT MEAN IN SEPTEL THAT BEIRUT SHOULD REFRAIN FROM TALKING TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES PENDING INSTRUCTIONS IF IN EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT DISCUSSION SHOULD BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY. RUSH

124666
73 MAY 22 AM 9:00
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

'73 MAY 18 AM 8:39

SECRET 844

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2

PAGE 01 STATE 094202

45

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 /027 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:NEA:JJSISCO:JMP

5/16/73 EXT 22670

APPROVED BY ACTING SECRETARY

NEA - MR. ATHERTON

EUR - MR. ARMITAGE

P - MR. PORTER

WHITE HOUSE:MR. SAUNDERS

S/S - MR. BARNES

PM - MR. SPIERS

091228

O P 171522Z MAY 73 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 094202

EXDIS - TOSEC 93

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJ: GOL REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE

REF: BEIRUT 5588

1. FOLLOWING IS INTERIM REPLY TO REFTEL.


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PAGE 02 STATE 094202

2. YOU MAY ASSURE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD USG WANTS TO DO EVERYTHING IT USEFULLY CAN TO ASSIST PRESIDENT FRANGIE IN BRINGING FEDAYEEN UNDER CONTROL. MINIMAL DEMANDS FRANGIE IS MAKING ON FEDAYEEN, AS OUTLINED TO CHARGE BY ABOUHAMAD, SEEM REASONABLE AND MODERATE. LEBANESE ARE OF COURSE BEST JUDGE OF WHAT THEY NEED AND OF WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED, BUT WE THINK GOL'S INSISTENCE THAT SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF STATE BE RESPECTED IS NOT ONLY FULLY JUSTIFIED BUT VITAL TO LEBANON'S CONTINUED PROSPERITY, AND EVEN ITS EXISTENCE.

3. YOU MAY TELL ABOUHAMAD THAT WE STAND READY TOMAKE A FURTHER APPROACH TO SOVIETS. WE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING HOW BEST TO TO IT. WE WILLBE TALKING TO SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS IN SAME SENSE; WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT WE CAN USEFULLY DO WITH ABU DHABI BUT WILL GIVE POSSIBILITY FULLEST CONSIDERATION. WE WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSING WITH IRANIANS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS THEY COULD

TAKE TO DISCOURAGE IRAQI INTERVENTION SHOULD FIGHTING RESUME ON SIGNIFICANT SCALE IN LEBANON. WE UNDERSTAND KING HUSSEIN HAS ALREADY SENT MESSAGE INDICATING DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL AND HAS TAKEN AT LEAST SOME SMALL CONCRETE STEPS THIS DIRECTION. WE WILL ALSO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH JORDANIANS ON THIS MATTER.

4. WE WILL MAKE ENERGETIC EFFORT, THOUGH HOW MUCH INFLUENCE SOVIETS, SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS WILL BE WILLING TO EXERCISE ON FEDAYEEN IS PROBLEMATICAL.


5. WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT RECEIPT FROM LEBANESE ARMY OF PRECISE LIST OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION BEFORE MAKING SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS, BUT YOU MAY TELL FOREIGN MINISTER THAT IN PRINCIPLE WE STAND READY TO FILL ANY REASONABLE REQUESTS WE CAN. IF GOL WISHES A SHOW OF U. S. SUPPORT, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER FLYING ARMS AND AMMUNITION DIRECTLY INTO LEBANON, IF LEBANESE ARMY CAN ASSURE SECURITY. IF THIS NOT POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT AND DESIRABLE, WE CAN EXPLORE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY AT SOME INTERMEDIATE POINT.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 094202

6. WE ASSUME GOL IS CONTINUING TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS THROUGH ILMAC. REGARDING FOREIGN MINISTER'S QUERY ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT ISRAEL HAS NO DESIGNS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY AND DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED MILITARILY IN INTER-ARAB CONFLICTS, BUT WOULD FEEL ITSELF THREATENED IF EITHER SYRIA OR FEDAYEEN SEEMED ON VERGE OF TAKING OVER LEBANON. WE REALIZE THAT GOL DOES NOT WANT TO BE IN POSITION OF BEING SAVED BY ISRAEL AND WOULD HOPE THAT THINGS WOULD NOT COME TO THAT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE STATEMENTS MADE BY ISRAELIS DURING RECENT PHASE AND MANEUVERS IN GOLAN HEIGHTS HAVE HAD SOME SOBERING EFFECT ON SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN. WE TAKE AT FACE VALUE ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT AS LONG AS THERE IS NO OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT IT IS A LEBANESE PROBLEM, BUT IF SYRIA INTERVENES IT ALSO BECOMES AN ISRAELI PROBLEM.

7. FOR MOSCOW, JIDDA, TEHRAN, KUWAIT, AMMAN AND ABU DHABI: REQUEST SOONEST AND BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM ANY RECOMMENDATIONS, SUGGESTIONS OR VIEWS REGARDING ANY APPROACH TO HOST GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCREDITED AS REQUESTED BY ABOUHAMAD.

8. STRICTLY FYI: THE LEBANESE SITUATION WAS CONSIDERED IN THE WSAG MAY 15, AND WE ARE FOCUSING ON A HIGH PRIORITY CONTINGENCY BASIS ON WHAT OTHER THINGS THE USG MIGHT DO IN THE EVENT OF A CONFRONTATION OF THE KIND


DESCRIBED BY THE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER AND/OR OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT PLACING GOL IN JEOPARDY. IF YOU HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS HIGH PRIORITY STUDY, PLEASE SEND THEM ALONG. AS INDICATED ABOVE THIS IS AN INTERIM REPLY, AND UPON COMPLETION OF THIS STUDY WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A FULLER REPLY. END FYI.
RUSH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 203

PAGE 01 STATE 086829

50
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY OPR/WLG:JPMCDONNELL:EHH
5/8/73 EXT 20426
APPROVED BY OPR/WLG:JPMCDONNELL
NEA/EX - MR. HUNT
SS - MR. BARNES

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3

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
006479

73 MAY 8 PM 9:47

O 081729Z MAY 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO JCS J-3 COL. GIBBS NIACT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 086829

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR LE
SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR EVACUATION
REFS: A. BEIRUT 5175
B. BEIRUT 4375

1. WE AWARE THAT REF B CONFIRMS FIGURES IN YOUR A-188 FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.
2. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES POSSIBLE SEA EVACUATION MENTIONED REFTEL A, WE NEED YOUR BEST CURRENT ESTIMATE OF ACTUAL NUMBERS AMERICAN RESIDENTS AND TOURISTS AND OTHER POTENTIAL EVACUEES WHO WOULD DEPART DUE TO PRESENT CRISIS. ROGERS

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
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 451

73 APR 12 PM 10:57
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2

PAGE 01 STATE 068183

53
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
4/11/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY M - DR. TARR
NEA/EX - L.R. HUNT
OPR/WLG - MR. MCDONNELL
NEA - A.L.ATHERTON
S/S - MR. MILLER

NE

052877

0 121625Z APR 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 068183

EXDIS


E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ASEC, LEI
SUBJ: SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN LEBANON

1. GIVEN POTENTIALLY VOLATILE SITUATION IN LEBANON, AND IN ANTICIPATION OF POSSIBLY LONG PERIOD OF UNREST AHEAD, DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON THREAT TO EMBASSY EMPLOYEES AND OTHER AMERICAN CITIZENS IN LEBANON AND DESIRABILITY OF POSSIBLY THINNING DOWN USG PRESENCE. IF YOU THINK SUCH STEP DESIRABLE, NEED YOUR ESTIMATE OF TIMING AND OTHER OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
2. GOL SHOULD BE MADE CLEARLY TO UNDERSTAND, AT HIGHEST LEVEL, THAT USG EXPECTS IT TO DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO PROTECT AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS AND CITIZENS FROM DEMONSTRATIONS AND ATTACK. ROGERS

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'73 MAR 29 AM SECRET 477

PAGE 01 STATE 057787

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62
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 7026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:ERDJEREJIAN:GCB
3/28/73

APPROVED BY NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S-O: R. VIETS
NEA/ARN:DAKORN
NEA/IAI - MR. STACKHOUSE

048103

O R 290042Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 057787

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: TERRORISM IN LEBANON
REF: BEIRUT 3435 (NOTAL)

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

DEPARTMENT ENDORSES YOUR TAKING UP TERRORISM WITH PRIME
MINISTER SALAM. IF YOU CONSIDER IT USEFUL SUGGEST YOU ALSO
RAISE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER SITUATION. MARCH 24 BORDER
INCIDENT NEAR MARWAHIN INVOLVING CROSS-BORDER FEDAYEEN OPER-
ATION AND UNTSO REPORT OF DIMINISHED LEBANESE ARMY PRESENCE
IN SOUTH-CENTRAL SECTOR ARE CAUSE OF CONCERN. THIS AND
OTHER RECENT INCIDENTS IN LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AREA SEEM
TO INDICATE SLACKENING IN LEBANESE EFFORTS TO KEEP FEDAYEEN
OUT OF AREA AND PREVENT CROSS-BORDER FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS,
POLICY WHICH HAS PAID OFF SO HANDSOMELY FOR GOL WITH
PEACE AND QUIET IN SOUTH LEBANON OVER PAST MONTHS. ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 401

PAGE 01 STATE 055399

71
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN:GCB
3/26/73 EXT 21019
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
EUR/WE - MR. MAGEE (INFO)
S/S - MR. MILLER
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN

73 MAR 23 AM 8:43
RECEPTION ROOM

025722

R 262215Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 055399

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS(3)
TAGS: XF
SUBJ: CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM
REF: PARIS 7340

DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT AND COMMENTS ON POINTS RAISED IN PARA 7 OF REFTEL WHICH REPEATED TO YOU. ROGERS

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 417

PAGE 01 STATE 055014

45

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN:BDP
3/24/73 EXT 21019

APPROVED BY NEA:JJS:SCO

NEA/ARN:DAKORN

NEA:ALATHERTON

INR/DDC:JGARDNER

NEA/IAI:JTM:ANDREW

S/CCT:AMEYER

S/S:MR. MILLER

73 MAR 23 AM 8.43

2

100M

022102

P 261521Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

SECRET STATE 055014

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGD5-2

TAGS: PINR, LE

SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE WITH ISRAEL ON TERRORISM

REF: BEIRUT 3254

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

DEPARTMENT HAS DISCUSSED REFTEL [REDACTED] WHICH WILL BE REPORTING TO YOU SHORTLY THROUGH ITS CHANNELS ON THE SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED. ROGERS

25X1

State Dept. review completed

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 658

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN

APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO

NEA/ARN:DAKORN

S/CCT = AMB. MEYER

NEA:ALATHERTON

EUR/RPM = MR. BREISKY

S/S-O: W. NEWLIN

AF/N = MR. BLAKE

73 MAR 21 AM 8.30

INFORMATION ROOM

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- R 210140Z MAR 73
- FM SECSTATE WASHDC
- TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
- INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
- AMEMBASSY MADRID
- AMEMBASSY VIENNA
- AMEMBASSY BERN
- AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
- AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
- AMEMBASSY AMMAN
- USINT CAIRO
- AMEMBASSY JIDDA
- AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
- AMEMBASSY SANAA
- AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
- USINT ALGIERS
- AMEMBASSY RABAT
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- AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
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
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, XF

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PAGE 02 STATE 051644

SUBJ: CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM

REF: BEIRUT 2701

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES YOUR EXCELLENT SUBSTANTIVE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL CONCERNING REVIEW OF THE TERRORISM PROBLEM. YOUR TELEGRAM IS BEING CIRCULATED TO APPROPRIATE POSTS FOR THEIR COMMENTS AS PART OF OUR OVERALL STUDY AND EFFORTS TO FACE TERRORISM THREAT MORE EFFECTIVELY.

2. AS YOU KNOW, SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS YOU MADE ARE ALREADY BEING CARRIED OUT. FIRST, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO GAIN WIDEST POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THESIS THAT STRONG DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THAT THERE IS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION OVER THE LVNK BETWEEN BSO AND FATAH. WE HAVE ASKED OUR POSTS IN EUROPEAN AND ARAB CAPITALS TO MAKE THIS INFORMATION RE BSO-FATAH LINK AVAILABLE TO SELECTED OFFICIALS (STATE 47847). SECOND, WE PREPARED TO CONSIDER EXCHANGES OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON TERRORISM BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH INTERPOL WITH SELECTED ARAB GOVERNMENTS. THIRD, YOU WILL HAVE NOTED OUR INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN STATE 44811 URGING ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP FLOW OF FUNDS TO RADICAL PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND TO DENY FEDAYEEN USE OF ARAB PASSPORTS AND OTHER FACILITIES. FOURTH, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR MISSIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT HIGH LEVEL TO URGE FURTHER EFFORTS BE MADE TO DISCOURAGE SUPPORT OR TOLERATION BY ARAB GOVERNMENTS OF ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (STATE 46941 NOTAL). ALSO WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL UNDERTAKE EARLY FURTHER REVIEW OF PROGRESS TO DATE IN COMBATTING TERRORISM AND OF POSSIBLE FURTHER STEPS. IN THIS RESPECT, WE HOPE THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS IN NAC CAN PROVIDE FORUM FOR REINFORCING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON NUMBER OF COUNTRIES' INTERNAL SECURITY PROCEDURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM AS WELL AS PROMOTE FURTHER EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE AND APPLICABLE TECHNOLOGY.


3. CONCERNING YOUR SUGGESTION THAT SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

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BE EXPANDED. DEPT AND APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ARE REVIEWING SECURITY MEASURES ON URGENT BASIS IN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO PROVIDE MOST EFFECTIVE SECURITY FOR OUR PERSONNEL AND MISSIONS ABROAD.

4. RE SUGGESTION THAT USG EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF HOW HELPFUL THIS TYPE OF ACTION WOULD BE IN PERSUADING LEBANESE TO MOVE MORE VIGOROUSLY AGAINST FEDAYEEN AND ARE EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES. PLEASE LET US KNOW OF SPECIFIC ITEMS OR PROGRAMS YOU WOULD RECOMMEND, BEYOND THOSE PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION.


5. OTHER DETAILED SUGGESTIONS REFTEL ARE ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION IN OUR OVERALL CAMPAIGN TO COMBAT TERRORISM. ROGERS

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22670 3-5-73
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO
S/CCT - AMB. MEYER
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S - MR. BARNES

73 MAR 5 AM 8:26
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 070023Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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S E C R E T STATE 041440

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: ADS, XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, LE, US
SUBJECT: TERRORIST LEADERS IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 14055: 264

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

1. UNLESS YOU PERCEIVE OBJECTION, DEPARTMENT WOULD LIKE YOU TO RAISE AGAIN WITH GOL, AS YOU DID IN DECEMBER AND JAN. FOLLOWING TERRORIST ATTACK ON EMBASSY (PER REFTELS), ISSUE OF RESIDENCE OF TERRORIST LEADERS IN LEBANON. IN DOING SO, YOU SHOULD STATE YOU ACTING ON DEPARTMENT'S SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION.

2. YOU SHOULD RECALL REPRESENTATION YOU MADE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE DECEMBER 28 (BEIRUT 14005) AND YOUR REQUEST AT THAT TIME THAT SALAH KHALAF AND OTHER TOP TERRORIST LEADERS EITHER BE ARRESTED OR EXPELLED. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT FRANGIE AT TIME GAVE YOU NO ENCOURAGEMENT TO THINK THAT ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST KHALAF OR OTHERS, AND WE KNOW

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THAT KHALAF HAS SUBSEQUENTLY CONTINUED TO RESIDE AND WORK IN LEBANON. WE ALSO KNOW FROM RELIABLE SOURCES THAT BSO ACTION IN KHARTOUM WAS PLANNED IN BEIRUT PERSONALLY BY KHALAF. AS AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE IN DECEMBER, DANGER IS THAT LEBANON WILL BECOME KNOWN AS CENTER FOR TERRORISM.

3. YOU SHOULD SAY THAT IN VIEW OF BSO'S COLD BLOODED MURDER OF TWO US DIPLOMATS IN KHARTOUM WE ARE SURE THAT GOL WILL AGREE THAT KHALAF AND ALL OTHERS ASSOCIATED WITH BSO CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS CRIMINALS OF MOST DEPRAVED SORT. USG AND AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, GOL'S CONTINUING TO AFFORD KHALAF FREEDOM TO LIVE AND WORK IN LEBANON. ACCORDINGLY, USG STRONGLY HOPES THAT LEBANON WILL TAKE STEPS TO DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM BSO, PREFERABLY BY ARRESTING KHALAF AND MEMBERS OF HIS GANG BUT AT VERY LEAST BY EXPPELLING THEM. WE RECOGNIZE THT EXPULSION WOULD NOT PREVENT KHALAF AND BSO FROM FINDING OTHER HEADQUARTERS FOR THEIR OPERATIONS BUT AT LEAST IT WOULD DEPRIVE THEM OF USE OF LEBANON'S EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IT WILL PROTECT LEBANON'S REPUTATION AS LAW ABIDING COUNTRY AND CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST TOURISM AND COMMERCE. ROGERS

08:00 AM 9-11-50

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
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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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3/2/73 EXT 21029
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/ARN:DAKORN
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NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S - MR. BARNES

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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S E C R E T STATE 041111

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E.O. 11652: XGDS3
TAGS: PBOR, LE, US, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI RAID INTO NORTH LEBANON

73 MAR 5 AM 8:21


WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. SUMMARY: LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON ASST
SECY SISCO TO DISCUSS IMPLICATIONS OF FEB 21 ISRAELI RAID
INTO NORTH LEBANON. KABBANI STRESSED THAT DISTINCTION
MUST BE MADE BETWEEN ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH PRO-
VOKED BY FEDAYEEN CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS, AND ISRAELI
PREEMPTIVE RAIDS AIMED AGAINST FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON.
FEB 21 INCIDENT WHICH FALLS INTO LATTER CATEGORY, KABBANI
SAID, HAS CREATED NEW SITUATION IN LEBANON WHICH IS UNDER-
MINING GOL'S POLITICAL POSITION AND ABILITY TO RESTRAIN
FEDAYEEN. SISCO EXPLAINED US POSITION IN DETAIL AND SAID
HE WOULD DISCUSS PROBLEM WITH ISRAELIS. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR KABBANI ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER SHAMMAS
CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO MARCH 1 TO DISCUSS FEB 21
ISRAELI RAID INTO NORTH LEBANON AND ITS BROADER IMPLICA-

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TIONS FOR LEBANON.

3. KABBANI SAID LATEST ISRAELI RAID MUST BE VIEWED IN CONNECTION WITH UNPROVOKED ISRAELI AIR STRIKES AGAINST LEBANON ON OCTOBER 15, 1972, AND SUBSEQUENT ISRAELI PRO- NOUNCEMENTS THAT VERY PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN CONSTITUTES PROVOCATION JUSTIFYING MILITARY RETALIATION. KABBANI REFERRED TO CLOSE USG-GOL CONSULTATIONS SINCE SEPTEMBER

1972 ON FEDAYEEN SITUATION AND LEBANESE UNDERSTANDING FROM WHAT ISRAELIS TOLD USG THAT ISRAEL WOULD REFRAIN FROM MILITARY RETALIATION AS LONG AS LEBANON ISRAEL BORDER REMAINED QUIET AND THERE WERE NO CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS. GOL, KABBANI SAID, UNDERSTOOD EXPLICITLY THAT ISRAELI OBJECTIVE WAS NOT TO HAVE GOL LIQUIDATE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON, BUT TO EFFECTIVELY CONTROL LEBANON'S SOUTHERN BORDER WITH ISRAEL. IT WAS WITHIN THIS CONTEXT THAT GOL ENTERED INTO CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH US IN ITS EFFORTS TO KEEP BORDER QUIET AND ASSURE THAT ISRAELIS WERE FULLY AWARE OF GOL'S EFFORTS TO DO SO. GOL'S DECISION NOT RPT NOT TO RESORT TO UNSC AFTER OCTOBER INCIDENT WAS ALSO RESULT OF USG-GOL DISCUSSIONS AND US ADVICE THAT UNSC DEBATE WOULD BE INOPPORTUNE AND WOULD HAVE NO PRODUCTIVE RESULT.

4. KABBANI SAID HE SUSPECTED FEB 21 ISRAELI ATTACK ON FEDAYEEN BASES IN NORTH LEBANON CAUSED MUCH GREATER NUMBER OF CASUALTIES THAN GENERALLY REPORTED. HE CITED A LE MONDE ARTICLE ACCORDING TO WHICH 95 PERSONS WERE KILLED AND 25 WOUNDED AS CONTRASTED WITH GENERALLY ACCEPTED FIGURE OF 30 KILLED AND 20 WOUNDED. KABBANI CHARACTERIZED FEB 21 ISRAELI RAID AS COMPLETELY UNPROVOKED. GOL HAD THOUGHT ISRAELIS WERE SATISFIED BY EFFECTIVE CONTROLS EXERTED ON FEDAYEEN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. KABBANI EMPHASIZED THAT GOL HAS DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO KEEP BORDER AREA CLEAR OF FEDAYEEN. KABBANI SAID GOL'S POLITICAL POSITION IS NOT NOW AS STRONG AS IT WAS BEFORE THE FEB 21 RAID. FEDAYEEN MAY NOW PRESS FOR RENEWAL OF THEIR ACTIVITIES ON LEBANESE TERRITORY, ON GROUNDS THAT GOL'S POLICY OF CONTROLLING BORDER TO AVOID ISRAELI RETALIATION HAS FAILED. KABBANI POINTED OUT GOL HAD AGAIN HEADED US ADVICE NOT TO CALL UNSC MEETING ON

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FEB 21 INCIDENT. GOL, KABBANI SAID, UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANCE OF PRESENT US EFFORTS TO TRY TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT AND DECIDED NOT TO EXACERBATE SITUATION BY CALLING UNSC MEETING. HOWEVER, KABBANI STATED THAT GOL'S POSITION IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT IN RESPECT TO LEBANESE PUBLIC OPINION, OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS, AND THE FEDAYEEN. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES LEBANON, AS A SMALL COUNTRY, MAY IN FUTURE FIND IT INCREASINGLY NECESSARY TO RESORT TO THE UN.


5. SISCO STATED WE HAD GIVEN THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY KABBANI LONG AND HARD THOUGHT AND THIS ISSUE WAS A MATTER OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN GOL AND USG. SISCO SAID WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ANSWER GOL'S SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON

THIS ISSUE IN ONLY GENERAL TERMS. NEVERTHELESS, US OBJECTIVES ARE THE SAME AS THOSE OF GOL, I.E., THAT LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER SHOULD BE A BORDER OF QUIET. BUT GOL SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN PARTICULAR AS CONCERNS OUR PUBLIC STANCE ON THESE INCIDENTS. SISCO SAID WE FEEL GOL AND LEBANESE ARMY HAVE TAKEN INCREASINGLY MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN. WE ALSO SEE THESE ISRAELI ACTIONS IN VERY AMBIVALENT TERMS. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT WE DO NOT APPROVE OF THESE ISRAELI ACTIONS AND CONSIDER LINE BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL THE ESTABLISHED BORDER. THUS, WE VIEW THESE ISRAELI ACTIONS AS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST SOVEREIGN LEBANESE TERRITORY. WE HAVE TRIED TO DO WHAT WE CAN, IN PRIVATE, TO LIMIT ISRAELI RETALIATION. HOWEVER, WHAT MAKES SITUATION DIFFICULT FOR US, FRANKLY, IS REALIZATION THAT BOTH LEBANESE ACTIONS AND ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST FEDAYEEN HAVE HAD EFFECT OF REDUCING FEDAYEEN STRENGTH.

6. SISCO STRESSED WE HAVE NOT TOLD ISRAELIS WE CONSIDER FEB 21 OR OTHER RAIDS TO BE A GOOD THING. IT COULD BE POINTED OUT, SISCO REMARKED, THAT FEB 21 RAID WAS SURGICAL OPERATION CONDUCTED AGAINST FEDAYEEN INSTALLATIONS AND THAT GOL HAD NOT TO OUR KNOWLEDGE CLAIMED THAT EVEN SINGLE LEBANESE CITIZEN HAD BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED (KABBANI AND SHAMMAS ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WITH A NOD), BUT HE WOULD NOT EMPHASIZE THIS ASPECT SINCE WE ALL KNOW

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ISRAELIS COULD ERR IN FUTURE. IN TERMS OF PRACTICAL RESULTS OF MAINTAINING A PEACEFUL BORDER BOTH LEBANON'S AND ISRAEL'S ACTIONS ARE COMPLEMENTARY. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS ANALYSIS OBVIOUSLY DISREGARDS POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH INACTION IN WAKE OF ISRAELI RAID CAUSES GOL.

7. SISCO MADE CLEAR USG DOES NOT ENDORSE OR APPROVE OF THESE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS, REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT IN SOME CASES THEY DO HELP KEEP THE BORDER SITUATION QUIET. SISCO REITERATED USG COMMITMENT TO LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. WE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER ANY ISRAELI ACTION THAT TENDED TO JEOPARDIZE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON.

8. AMBASSADOR KABBANI SAID GOL'S MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT THE FEB 21 RAID HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. GOL JUSTIFIED ITS RESTRAINTS ON FEDAYEEN BY STRESSING THAT A TRANQUIL BORDER WOULD PREVENT ISRAELI MILITARY

RETALIATION AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORY. THIS RATIONALE HAS NOW BEEN DESTROYED BY FEB 21 RAID, KABBANI CLAIMED. WHETHER VICTIMS OF THESE ISRAELI RAIDS ARE LEBANESE OR PALESTINIAN, IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT THEY ARE LIVING IN LEBANESE TERRITORY AND UNDER ITS SOVEREIGN CONTROL. REFERRING TO FREEDOM PALESTINIANS ENJOY IN LEBANON, KABBANI SAID, "WE CANNOT TURN LEBANON INTO A CONCENTRATION CAMP." THIS IS ESPECIALLY CASE, HE SAID, AS LONG AS THE FEDAYEEN ARE NOT UNDERTAKING CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ISRAEL. AMBASSADOR KABBANI ASKED SISCO TO CONVEY TO ISRAELIS GOL'S POSITION THAT A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN FEDAYEEN CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS WHICH COULD BE VIEWED AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR MILITARY RETALIATION, AND PREEMPTIVE RAIDS AGAINST FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. SISCO SAID WE UNDERSTAND GOL'S PROBLEM AND WILL DISCUSS IT WITH ISRAELIS. ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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2/23/73 EXT 21019
APPROVED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN

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S/S - MR. BARNES

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S E C R E T STATE 034165

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAELI RAID ON NORTHERN LEBANON

REF: STATE 33927

REFTEL SHOULD BE CORRECTED AS FOLLOWS: WORD "NEEDED" IN
SECOND SENTENCE, PARAGRAPH 4, PAGE 2, SHOULD READ "HEEDED".
GDS. ROGERS


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2/23/73 21019
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR. SISCO
NEA/MR. LATHERTON
NEA/IA - MR. MCANDREW
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
IO/UNP - INFO
S/S - MR. MILLER

73 FEB 22 PM 10:21
STATE HOUSE
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S E C R E T STATE 033927

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (REFERENCE)

SUBJECT: ISRAELI RAID ON NORTHERN LEBANON

REF: STATE 33803

1. ASST. SECY SISCO TELEPHONED LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI FEB. 23 TO RESPOND TO HIS INQUIRY CONCERNING POSSIBILITY GOV CALLING UNSC MEETING RE FEB. 20-21 ISRAELI RAID ON NORTH LEBANON (STATE 33714). SISCO REFERRED TO AMBASSADOR BUFFUM'S DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN ABOUHAMAD (BEIRUT 2093) AND STATED THAT AMB BUFFUM HAD MADE CERTAIN POINTS TO FONMIN ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND HAD ASKED FOR DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS WHICH ARE NOW BEING SENT. SISCO SAID HE WANTED PERSONALLY TO CONVEY DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS TO KABBANI IN CONTEXT OF DESIRE FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS.


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
2. SISCO TOLD KABBANI THAT OUR ADVICE WOULD BE TO HOLD OFF AND NOT PURSUE THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI RAID ON NORTH LEBANON IN A FORMAL WAY WITHIN UNSC. TIMING WAS WRONG AND THERE WOULD BE NO PRACTICAL RESULT EMANATING FROM UNSC MEETING. SISCO ALSO POINTED OUT THAT REACTION FROM MIDDLE EAST TO RECENT EVENTS, REGARDLESS OF DEEP PERSONAL FEELINGS, HAS BEEN ONE OF RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY. UNSC MEETING ON THIS ISSUE WOULD MAKE MATTERS MORE DIFFICULT.

3. REFERRING TO LIBYAN AIRLINE CRASH IN SINAI, SISCO SAID THIS INCIDENT ONLY POINTS OUT NECESSITY OF GETTING ON WITH JOB OF OBTAINING SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ARAB/ISRAEL CONFLICT AND NOTED HAFIZ ISMAIL PRESENTLY IN US. SISCO COMMENTED WORLD REACTION TO AIRCRAFT DOWNING IS VERY CLEAR AND THAT MATTER WILL BE RAISED IN ICAO. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO NEED FOR ANY ARTIFICIAL STIMULATION OF THIS ISSUE IN UNSC SINCE WORLD OPINION WILL MANIFEST ITSELF.

3. SISCO EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION TO KABBANI PERSONALLY AND TO GOL FOR TAKING INITIATIVE IN CONSULTING WITH USG ON PRIOR BASIS. SISCO STRESSED HE HOPED US ADVICE WOULD BE NEEDED. KABBANI REPLIED THAT IN HIS OPINION UNSC MEETING WOULD CERTAINLY NOT ACHIEVE ANY PRODUCTIVE END. HE SAID ALSO SC ROUND WOULD NOT ADD ANYTHING USEFUL. KABBANI UNDERTOOK CONVEY US VIEWS TO GOL.

4. SISCO LATER CALLED KABBANI AND ADDED ON OTHER POINT. HE SAID RECENT EVENTS HAD STIMULATED A SEARCHING QUESTIONING AMONG AND BETWEEN ISRAELIS THEMSELVES NOT ONLY ABOUT THE INCIDENT BUT ALSO ABOUT THE LONG RUN VIABILITY OF THE PRESENT STATUS QUO. SUCH A SEARCHING, INTROSPECTIVE SCRUTINY WOULD NOT BE FURTHER ENCOURAGED BY OUTSIDE PROPAGANDA ATTACKS EMANATING FROM UNSC. KABBANI AGREED.

5. GDS. ROGERS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 395

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43
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC
22670 2-23-73
APPROVED BY S - THE SECRETARY
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
IO - MR. HERZ
NEA - MR. SISCO
S/S - MR. ELIOT

73 FEB 27 PM 10:27
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 033803

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAELI RAID ON NORTHERN LEBANON

REF: STATE 33714; BEIRUT 2093

1. FULLY ENDORSE EXCELLENT PRESENTATION YOU MADE TO FONMIN ABOUHAMAD (BEIRUT 2093). YOU SHOULD TELL ABOUHAMAD YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REITERATE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED IN EARLIER CONVERSATION AND TO URGE THAT LEBANON NOT RPT NOT ASK FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. YOU MAY USE POINTS PARAGRAPH FIVE STATE 33714 IN FURTHER REVIEWING USG THINKING.

2. WE WILL BE MAKING PARALLEL REPLY TO AMBASSADOR KABBANI HERE TODAY.

3. FYI. FROM REMARKS OF LEBANESE EMBASSY PERSONNEL HERE WE GET IMPRESSION THAT GOL BEGAN SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER CALLING SC MEETING ONLY AFTER ISRAELIS SHOT DOWN LIBYAN AIRLINER, AND THAT LEBANESE SEE MEETING MAINLY AS

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OPPORTUNITY TO CASH IN ON WORLD CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AS RESULT OF LATTER INCIDENT. HOWEVER IT NOW APPEARS VIRGUALLY CERTAIN THAT THERE WILL BE NO SC MEETING ON THE PLANE INCIDENT (AS LIBYANS ARE PLANNING INITIATIVE IN ICAO INSTEAD.) IN VIEW OF POSITION YOU TOOK WITH ABOUHAMAD AND LINE WE HAVE TAKEN HERE WITH AMB KABBANI, WE HAVE IMPRESSION LEBANESE WILL NOT RPT NOT PRESS FOR SC MEETING, AMONG OTHER REASONS BECAUSE OF EVIDENT NEGATIVE EFFECT

IT WOULD HAVE ON MOMENTUM NOW DEVELOPING ON MIDDLE EAST CONSULTATIONS. END FYI.


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PAGE 01 STATE 033714

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:EDJEREJIAN
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: R VIETS
NEA - MR SISCO
NEA - MR ATHERTON
NEA/ARN - MR KORN
IO - MR DEPALMA

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EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY - CAPTION

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: ISRAELI RAID ON NORTHERN LEBANON

1. AMBASSADOR KABBANI TELEPHONED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FEBRUARY 22 TO INFORM DEPARTMENT THAT GOL CONSIDERING CALLING MEETING OF UNSC TO DEBATE FEBRUARY 20-21 ISRAELI RAID ON FEDAYEEN BASES IN NORTH LEBANON. KABBANI SAID HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO SEEK USG VIEWS ON GOL RECOURSE TO UNSC IN ACCORDANCE WITH LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S UNDERTAKING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO TO CONSULT, IN ADVANCE, ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST BROUGHT UP WITHIN UN FRAMEWORK. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED IF USG WOULD SUPPORT GOL CALL FOR UNSC MEETING AND IF USG WOULD SUPPORT GOL IN DEBATE OF THIS ISSUE.


2. KABBANI SAID POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS IN LEBANON OF

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ISRAELI RAID, COUPLED WITH ARAB PUBLIC REACTION OVER CRASH OF LIBYAN AIRLINER IN SINAI, HAVE BECOME SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY UNSC MEETING AND CON- DEMNATION OF ISRAEL.

3. ATHERTON REPLIED HE WOULD CONSULT IMMEDIATELY WITHIN DEPARTMENT IN ORDER TO CONVEY OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS TO KABBANI AND GOL.

4. DEPARTMENT NEEDS IMMEDIATELY EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS ISRAELI RAID ON NORTH LEBANON AND EXTENT OF POLITICAL PRESSURES ON PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO PROTECT GOL'S POLITICAL FLANKS BY RAISING ISSUE IN UNSC.

5. FYI. OUR PRESENT THINKING ON RESPONSE TO KABBANI IS: (A) WE CAN SEE NO REPEAT NO PRODUCTIVE RESULT FROM UNSC DEBATE AT THIS TIME; (B) WE CAN MAKE NO REPEAT NO ADVANCE COMMITMENT RE POSITION WE WOULD TAKE IN DEBATE, BUT WOULD NOT WANT GOL TO BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT WE COULD SUPPORT RESOLUTION WHICH FAILED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF FEDAYEEN TERRORIST ASPECT OF PROBLEM; (C) UNSC DEBATE COULD NOT COME AT WORSE TIME AND COULD HAVE MOST ADVERSE EFFECTS ON CURRENTLY ACTIVE USG EFFORTS TO PLAY CON- STRUCTIVE ROLE IN SEEKING ACHIEVE SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. IN ADDITION, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ADVERSE EFFECTS FOR GOL AND UNRWA RESULTING FROM DEBATE THAT WOULD INEVITABLY CALL ATTENTION TO PROBLEM OF FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN REFUGEE CAMPS. END FYI.

6. REQUEST EMBASSY COMMENTS ON ABOVE PROPOSED RESPONSE TO GOL.


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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:EPDJEREJIAN:JMP
10/20/72 EXT 21019
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
NEA:ALATHERTON
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: USG-GOL CONSULTATIONS ON CONTINGENCY OF FURTHER
ISRAELI ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON

1. ASST. SECRETARY SISCO TELEPHONED LEBANESE AMBASSADOR
KABBANI OCTOBER 20 TO INFORM HIM THAT MR. ATHERTON HAD
REPORTED FULLY HIS OCTOBER 19 CONVERSATION WITH KABBANI
(SEE EARLIER MESSAGE SAME SUBJECT). SISCO ASSURED KABBANI
THAT WE UNDERSTAND HE WAS UNDER URGENT INSTRUCTIONS FROM
BEIRUT TO DETERMINE, ON CONTINGENCY BASIS, US POSITION IN
UNSC ON POSSIBLE FUTURE ISRAELI ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON.
SISCO SAID WE WERE REFLECTING ON DIFFICULT QUESTIONS POSED
BY GOL. HOWEVER, SISCO COMMENTED, WE NOT REPEAT NOT IN
POSITION TO GIVE GOL CONCRETE ANSWERS AT THIS MOMENT.
MEANWHILE, HE WANTED KABBANI TO KNOW THAT WE ARE CONTINUING
OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS.

2. KABBANI EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION TO SISCO FOR
FOREGOING INFORMATION.


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10/18/72 EXT 21019
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
IO/UNP:JARMITAGE
S/S:MR. BARNES
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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET STATE 191655

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANESE REQUEST FOR USG/GOL CONSULTATIONS AGAINST
CONTINGENCY OF FUTURE ISRAELI ATTACK

1. DURING COURSE OF CALL ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ATHERTON, OCTOBER 19, LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI RAISED
SUBJECT OF ADVANCE USG/GOL CONSULTATIONS IN ANTICIPATION
OF ANOTHER UNPROVOKED ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON.
KABBANI SAID IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR GOL TO DO
NOTHING, IF ISRAEL ATTACKS WITHOUT PROVOCATION FOR THIRD
TIME WITHIN RECENT MONTHS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PROBABLE,
GIVEN HIGH-LEVEL ISRAELI POLICY STATEMENTS, THAT ISRAEL
WILL ATTACK AGAIN. FOR THESE REASONS, GOL SEEKS TO CON-

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SULT ON A PRIOR BASIS WITH USG ON FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION.

2. SPECIFICALLY, KABBANI SAID, GOL WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT USG POSITION WOULD BE IN EVENT OF ANOTHER ISRAELI ATTACK, ESPECIALLY IN REFERENCE TO U.S. POSITION IN UNSC. GOL DOESN'T WANT TO PRESENT USG WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY CALLING FOR EMERGENCY SESSION OF UNSC AFTER ANOTHER ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON. USG AND GOL SHOULD SEEK TO AGREE ON COURSE OF ACTION IN ADVANCE. FAILING AGREEMENT, USG SHOULD AT LEAST UNDERSTAND WHY GOL MIGHT FEEL IT HAD TO GO SEPARATE COURSE RATHER THAN HAVE THIS COME AS SURPRISE. MORE IMPORTANT, GOL REALIZES THAT U.S. USE OF VETO IN UNSC WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE WHAT SEEMS TO BE NEW ISRAELI POLICY OF REPRISALS WITHOUT PROVOCATION. NEVERTHELESS, GOL'S OPTIONS ARE NARROWING IN FACE OF FREQUENCY ISRAELI ATTACKS.


3. ATHERTON SAID HE COULD DO NO MORE AT THIS POINT THAN TAKE KABBANI'S QUESTION UNDER ADVISEMENT, BUT NOTED AS PRELIMINARY COMMENT THAT IT VERY DIFFICULT TO GIVE ANSWER TO HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION. HOWEVER, HE DID NOTE THAT SYRIANS MADE SAME APPROACH AS LEBANON CONCERNING OCTOBER 15 AIR STRIKES--I.E., LETTER TO SC PRESIDENT BUT NO CALL FOR SC MEETING. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT HAD SYRIANS GONE TO UNSC, THEN LEBANON WOULD HAVE HAD TO RESORT TO SC ALSO WHERE U.S. WOULD PROBABLY EXERCISE VETO THEREBY SIGNALLING GREEN LIGHT FOR ISRAELIS TO STRIKE AGAIN. KABBANI SAID LEBANESE WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN DISSUADING SYRIANS FROM RESORTING TO UNSC. ATHERTON SAID LEBANON DID RIGHT THING, AND KABBANI REPLIED THAT LEBANON DID NOT WANT TO PLAY INTO ISRAELI HANDS.

4. KABBANI EXPLAINED HIS PERSONAL POSITION THAT IT BECOMING MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON TO REMAIN INACTIVE IN WAKE OF ISRAELI STRIKES. LEBANON'S POSITION BEING CHARACTERIZED AS EXTREMELY WEAK ONE AND OTHER ARAB STATES URGING LEB NON TO GO BEYOND LETTERS OF PROTEST. U.S. PRESS TREATMENT OF USG APPROACHES TO GOI AND GOL FOLLOWING OCT. 15 ISRAELI ATTACK--PARTICULARLY WASHINGTON STAR STORY ALLEGING USG HAD GIVEN NOD TO NEW ISRAELI DOCTRINE--HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL TO GOL IN DEALING WITH ARAB CRITICISM. ISRAEL ON ITS PART, IS IN A GOOD POSITION BECAUSE, IF LEBANON GOES TO UNSC, THEY FEEL ASSURED OF A

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U.S. VETO. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF LEBANON STAYS AWAY, ISRAEL DOES NOT RISK BEING SUBJECTED TO INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION.

5. KABBANI INFORMED DEPTOFF BY PHONE AFTER MEETING WITH ATHERTON THAT HE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM BEIRUT THAT GOL WANTED TO HAVE QUESTION OF USG-GOL CONTINGENCY PLANNING DISCUSSED AT HIGHEST LEVEL. KABBANI SAID GOL IS PRESSING EMBASSY FOR A TIMELY ANSWER CONCERNING U.S. ATTITUDE ON THIS QUESTION AND SPECIFICALLY ON TACTICS WITHIN UNSC.

6. DECLASSIFICATION. XGDS 5(B) IRWIN


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ORIGIN SS-25

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DRAFTED BY IO/UNP:JWKIMBALL:PJA
6/5/72 EXT 28114
APPROVED BY U-THE UNDER SECRETARY
IO/UNP:JAARMITAGE
E/TT:BWREIN
IO - MR. DE PALMA
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
S/S - MR. MILLER

72 JUN 7 AM 9:22
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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P R 061549Z JUN 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T STATE 099470

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PROPOSAL FOR COMBATting INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

REF: BEIRUT 06066

FOR AMB. BUFFUM FROM UNDER SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTAINED REFTEL AND AGREES GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE
GALVANIZED TO MORE EFFECTIVE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN IN SEPTEL
THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOW ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION
OF LOD INCIDENT BY ICAO COUNCIL WHICH NOW IN SESSION IN
MONTREAL. SINCE THIS EFFORT ALREADY UNDER WAY, WE INTEND
TO FOLLOW-UP QUICKLY IN ICAO CHANNEL. THIS WOULD NOT
PRECLUDE TYPE OF ACTION YOU HAVE SUGGESTED IN SC CONTEXT
AND WE WILL BE GIVING YOUR SUGGESTIONS CAREFUL


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CONSIDERATION. MEANWHILE WE WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS OTHER
ADDRESSEES ON BEIRUT REFTEL.
GP-3 ROGERS

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
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62
ORIGIN SS-25

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DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:MSTERNER:DD
5/25/72 EXT 22365
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
S/S - MR. MILLER

72 MAY 26 AM 8:02

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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R 251959Z MAY 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 092585

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUFFUM FROM SISCO

REF: CAIRO L469; BEIRUT 5597

1. WHILE I APPRECIATE REASONS PROMPTING JERRY TO SUGGEST WE APPROACH JENKINS, I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE. SUCH INTERVENTION WOULD QUICKLY GET AROUND AND LOOK LIKE ATTEMPT BY US TO KEEP PRESS FROM CALLING SHOTS AS THEY SEE THEM, WHICH I DO NOT THINK WE CAN DO. I CAN SEE WHY EGYPTIANS NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT JENKINS' MAY 15 PIECE, BUT IT CONTAINS NOTHING OUTRAGEOUSLY UNTRUE AND IN FACT IS NOT ALL THAT WIDE OF THE MARK. I DON'T THINK IT PROVIDES VERY GOOD BASIS FOR SPEAKING TO NEWSWEEK IN ANY CASE.

GP-1 JOHNSON


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41
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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:DMRANSOM:MAM
5/5/72 EXT 22686
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
NEA/ARP - MR. TWINAM
NEA/IRN - MR. MIKLOS
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
S/S - MR. MILLER

72 MAY 9 PM 6:38

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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R 091518Z MAY 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT SANAA

SECRET STATE 080518

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO YAR

REF: STATE 62081, SANAA 236, TEHRAN 2015 (REPEATED TO
BEIRUT)

- 1. REQUEST APPROPRIATE STATE OFFICIAL REPLY TO HASHEM BIN HASHEM DRAWING ON STATE REFTEL.
- 2. SUBSTANCE OF BUFFUM CONVERSATION WILL BE PASSED FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN, SANAA AND JIDDA BY CAS. ROGERS

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63
ORIGIN SS-25

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5/2/72 EXT 20695
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
S/S-O : J. BRIMS

72 MAY 3 AM 8:31
2
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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R 030042Z MAY 72
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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 076514

EXDIS

SUBJ: CONTACTS WITH A SYRIAN OFFICIAL

REF: AMMAN 1861

1. REFTEL (REPEATED TO YOU) REPORTS A REQUEST THAT FSO PATRICK THEROS CALL ON A SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL IN LATTER'S OFFICE WHENEVER THEROS VISITS DAMASCUS. IN OUR VIEW THESE CALLS COULD SERVE PURPOSE OF LESSENING DISTANCE BETWEEN SARG AND USG WHICH DAMASCUS HAS GIVEN SOME EVIDENCE OF DESIRING. HOWEVER, BEFORE AUTHORIZING THESE CONTACTS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING YOUR VIEWS.

2. IN YOUR DISCRETION YOU MAY ALSO WISH SEEK VIEWS RE THIS DEVELOPMENT OF MAIOLINI, AMERICAN INTERESTS SECTION, ITALIAN EMBASSY, DAMASCUS. IRWIN

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41
ORIGIN SS-25

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DRAFTED BY NEA:JJSISCO:MTB
3/17/71 EXT 29588
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
IO/UNP:JOHN KIMBALL
S/S - MR. MILLER

WHITEHOUSE
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P 171715Z MAR 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

SECRET STATE 046017

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUFFUM

1. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE COMMENT IN USUN 953 TO THE EFFECT THAT NEXT STEP SEEMS TO BE UP TO GOL. DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH THIS JUDGMENT. THEREFORE, SUGGEST YOU LAY LOW ON THIS ISSUE FOR THE TIME BEING LETTING LEBANESE TAKE ANY FURTHER INITIATIVE. APPEARS THAT SOVIETS AND CHINESE ARE PLAYING "CAT-AND-MOUSE" GAME, WHICH IS ALL THE MORE REASON TO APPROACH IDEA OF ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS WITH CARE.

GP-3 ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 369

PAGE 01 STATE 042361

17
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

66664
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TSEELYE
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: MR. MAGEE
NEA: MR. ATHERTON

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MAR 11 PM 3:36
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

O 111126Z MAR 72 ZFF6
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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 042361

EXDIS

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 1603; (B) BEIRUT 2686

TEL AVIV 1603 IS ONLY RESPONSE WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM ISRAELIS.
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 140

PAGE 01 STATE 041293

81
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66640

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR. NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J. SISCO
S/S-O:BRIMS

972 MAR 10 AM 7:52
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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P R 100337Z MAR 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 041293

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER SITUATION

REF: STATE 40607

YOU MAY INFORM TOP LEBANESE OFFICIALS THAT IN CONTEXT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS RE NEED TO USE GOL-GOI MAC CONTACTS TO DEAL WITH BORDER PROBLEMS, WE ARE TAKING UP WITH THEM PROBLEM OF LATEST AIR ATTACKS IN ARGUB AND THEIR OBSERVATION POST INSIDE LEBANON. FYI: YOU SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT GO BEYOND SAYING WE ARE TAKING UP THESE MATTERS. WE DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO POSITION OF SUGGESTING TO GOL THAT WE HAVE TAKEN SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ON THESE ISSUES AT THIS POINT. END FYI. GP-3. ROGERS

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SECRET 871

WHITE HOUSE
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72 JAN 13 AM 8:54

PAGE 01 STATE 006622

80
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ ARN: EGABINGTON
APPROVED BY: NEA- MR SISCO
NEA- ARN AIKILLGORE S/S-O- JSBRIMS

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 006622

EXDIS

SUBJ: CALL OF LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI ON ASST SECY SISCO

1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO JANUARY 12 TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS AND RECENT INCIDENTS ALONG LEBANESE BORDER. KABBANI BEGAN BY STATING ISRAELI RETALIATORY RAIDS INTO LEBANON WERE DISTRESSING TO GOL SINCE LATTER FELT RAIDS OUT OF PROPORTION TO INCIDENTS. SISCO NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER FEDAYEEN SHELLINGS IN ILMAC FORUM PRIOR TO RETALIATORY RAIDS AND HAD STATED THAT SHELLINGS MUST STOP OR ISRAEL WOULD RETALIATE. KABBANI SAID LEBANON WAS DOING ITS BEST TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN BUT ISRAELI RETALIATORY POLICY CREATED INTERNAL PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH FEDAYEEN, ISRAEL SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON CANNOT CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITES ENTIRELY AND INCIDENTS ARE BOUND TO OCCUR. SISCO NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WOULD TAKE NO ACTION ALONG BORDER AS LONG AS FEDAYEEN

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DID NOT CREATE INCIDENTS. BORDER HAD BEEN QUIET FOR A PERIOD OF MANY WEEKS BUT SHELLING OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS HAD RECENTLY RESUMED. ISRAELI PHILOSOPHY IS THAT THEIR RESPONSE MUST BE SEVERE ENOUGH TO TEACH FEDAYEEN A LESSON. KABBANI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAELI VIEWPOINT BUT SPECULATED THAT ONE REASON ISRAELIS HAD REACTED IN SUCH A MANNER WAS BECAUSE ARAFAT WAS SAID TO BE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AND ISRAELIS WERE HOPEFUL OF CAPTURING HIM. KABBANI NOTED THAT GOLD HAS HANDLED RELATIONS WITH FEDAYEEN WELL OVER PAST YEAR AND HAS TRIED TO CONVINCED FEDAYEEN THAT IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST TO AVOID INCIDENTS WITHIN LEBANON.

2. KABBANI SAID HIS MAIN REASON IN CALLING ON SISCO WAS TO DISCUSS JARRING MISSION AND USG EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE INTERIM SUEZ CANAL AGREEMENT. KABBANI ASKED IF THESE TWO EFFORTS WERE COMPTABILE AND COMPLEMENTARY. IN RESPONSE SISCO SAID TWO INITIATIVES ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND COULD PROCEED MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY. USG HAS NEVER CONSIDERED TALKS ON INTERIM AGREEMENT AND OUR OWN ROLE THEREIN AS SUBSTITUTE EITHER FOR JARRING MISSION OR OVERALL SETTLEMENT. WHATEVER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON EITHER FRONT WOULD BE IN INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES. SISCO NOTED THAT WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED AT TIME OF GA MIDDLE EAST DEBATE THAT WE WERE ONLY ABLE TO ABSTAIN ON MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION. WE HAD WANTED TO BE IN POSITION TO VOTE AFFIRMATIVELY. WE THOUGHT THAT GA COULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN RELAUNCHING JARRING MISSION IF IT HAD ADOPTED RESOLUTION MORE IN LINE WITH OAU REPORT. WE HAD TOLD EGYPTIANS AT THE U N THAT U S WOULD BE PREPARED TO VOTE AFFIRMATIVELY IF ME RESOLUTION WERE TO FOLLOW PATTERN IN OAU REPORT. THIS WOULD HAVE MEANT REFERENCE TO JARRING'S FEBRUARY 8 MEMORANDUM BEING IN PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS AND A CALL FOR RESUMPTION OF JARRING MISSION ON BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242 IN PRINCIPAL OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH. FORMULA SUCH AS THIS WOULD ALLOW EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO POINT TO THAT ASPECT OF RESOLUTION WHICH BEST SUITED THEM. EGYPT, HOWEVER, HAD SAID THAT IT COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH OUR SUGGESTIONS. EGYPT WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT RESOLUTION DID NOT RECEIVE GREATER SUPPORT, BUT IT SAID TO US THAT GA WAS BEHIND US AND NOW WAS TIME TO GET ON WITH EFFORTS FOR PEACE.

3. SISCO SAID THAT JARRING HAD RETURNED TO NEW YORK JANUARY 11. WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIM AND HIS MISSION AND HOPE HE CAN

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FIND SOME WAY TO LAUNCH A SERIOUS DIALOGUE. WE ARE STRUCK BY FACT THAT BOTH SIDES ARE LOOKING FOR DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVES RATHER THAN RESORTING TO FORCE. JARRING WILL TALK BOTH TO EGYPT'S AND JORDAN'S REPRESENTATIVES SINCE LATTER FEEL WOMEWHAT OUT OF PICTURE BECAUSE FOCUS HAS BEEN ON EGYPT- ISRAELI FRONT. THIS PROCESS CAN PROCEED AT WHATEVER PACE JARRING AND PARTIES DESIRE. WE BELIEVE JARRING HAS RESUMED THESE CONVERSATIONS PRIMARILY AT THE BEHEST OF EGYPT SINCE EGYPT WANTED TO BE IN POSITION TO POINT TO AN ON- GOING NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

4. TURNING TO INTERIM SUEZ CANAL AGREEMENT, SISCO SAID THAT WHEN WE PRESENTED TO EGYPT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO OUR PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY WITH U S PLAYING A MIDDLE ROLE SADAT'S REACTION WAS POSITIVE. ISRAELI REACTION WAS NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE, BUT REQUESTED CLARIFICATIONS ON CERTAIN POINTS. SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US AND ISRAELIS OVER THIS MATTER. OBJECT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IS TO TRY TO OBTAIN AN AFFIRMATIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO ENGAGE IN PROXIMITY TALKS. SISCO SAID HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT A POSITIVE RESPONSE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING WITHIN NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. IF POSITIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE IS FORTHCOMING WE WILL THEN SEE HOW EGYPT VIEWS MATTER. SITUATION HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE COMPLICATED OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS FOR BOTH SIDES. EGYPT HAS ADOPTED, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, POSITION THAT PROXIMITY TALKS MUST BE LINKED TO POSITIVE ISRAELI REPLY TO JARRING'S FEBRUARY 8 MEMORANDUM. IF ISRAELIS AGREE TO ENGAGE IN PROXIMITY TALKS IT WILL PROBABLY BE WITH NO PRECONDITIONS. IT WILL THEN BE UP TO EGYPTIANS TO DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED.

5. IN LAST TWO MONTHS U S POSITION ON INTERIM AGREEMENT HAS BEEN AS FOLLOWS: WE REMAIN AVAILABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AND THIS CARRIES WITH IT CERTAIN IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS OF INITIATIVE ON OUR PART. IN REVIEWING OUR ACTIONS OVER PAST THREE YEARS, USG HAS TAKEN ONE INITIATIVE AFTER ANOTHER. RESULTS HAVE NOT BEEN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY TO US OR TO OTHER PARTIES, BUT SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. HOWEVER, PROXIMITY TALKS PROPOSAL WILL HAVE TO BE PUT TO TEST NOT BY US BUT BY ISRAEL AND EGYPT. IF WE ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE AN AFFIRMATIVE INDICATION ON PROXIMITY TALKS FROM ISRAEL WE WILL PUT THIS TO EGYPT AND SADAT WILL HAVE TO DECIDE HIS

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POSITION, KNOWING THAT USG IS STILL MAKING ITSELF AVAILABLE. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS A FALSE NOTION TO BELIEVE THAT U S WOULD BE INACTIVE DURING 1972. WHEN AND IF WE GET TO POSITION THAT WE GO TO EGYPTIANS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WHATEVER OPPORTUNITY WE OFFER BE GRASPED. IF IT IS NOT GRASPED THEN THIS STRENGTHENS ARGUMENT THAT USG POSTURE SHOULD BE MORE PASSIVE IN 1972. USG WILL PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IF WE ARE GIVEN OPPORTUNITY. SISCO EMPHASIZED LEBANON CAN BE HELPFUL IN EXPLAINING THIS TO ARAB GOVERNMENTS. SISCO NOTED THAT JUST AS THERE SHOULD BE NO AUTOMATIC ASSUMPTION OF A LESS ACTIVE ROLE IN AN ELECTIN YEAR, THERE SHOULD BE NO AUTOMATIC ASSUMPTION THAT USG WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE, IT'S UP TO PARTIES PRIMARILY.

8. KABBANI SAID HE AGREED WITH SISCO'S REMARKS BUT THAT ISRAEL HAS ACTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CREATE DISSENSION BETWEEN ARAB WORLD AND U S. ISRAEL HAS EXPLOITED PHANTOM ISSUE TO CREATE DIFFICULTY BETWEEN U S AND ARAB COUNTRIES. SISCO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD KABBANI'S POINT OF VIEW BUT THAT USG HAS NO INTEREST WHATEVER IN FOCUSING ATTENTION ON QUESTION OF PHANTOMS. SISCO WAS STRUCK BY FACT THAT EVERYONE WAS PLAYING THIS ISSUE IN A MORE RESTRAINED MANNER THAN IN PAST. THERE WOULD BE NO COMMENTS ON QUESTION OF PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL BEYOND WHAT WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID AFTER MEIR VISIT TO U S AND PRESIDENT'S RECENT COMMENTS. SISCO SAID IT WAS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT AN EGYPTIAN SPOKESMAN HAD SAID THERE WOULD BE NO MORE OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS ON THIS ISSUE UNLESS USG GIVES CONFIRMATION OF SUPPLYING PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL. GP-3. ROGERS

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SECRET 546

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66633
DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE: NEA/ARN: AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY: S/S: RHMILLER
NEA: MR. ATHERTON

066172

R 042355Z JAN 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 001240

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE:

QUOTE:

PRESIDENT NIXON WISHES TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO LET PRESIDENT FRANGIE KNOW WHAT HE IS DISCUSSING DURING HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE HEADS OF SEVERAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO HIS TRIPS TO MOSCOW AND PEKING.

MOSCOW VISIT

THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS CURRENT CONSULTATIONS IS REVIEWING THE GENERAL STATE OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, PREPARATORY TO HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN MAY 1972. HE IS MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF QUOTE DEALING OVER THE HEADS UNQUOTE OF ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ANY MEATTER WHERE THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS MIGHT BE AFFECTED.

THE PRESIDENT IS INDICATING DURING THE CONSULTATIONS THAT SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE EITHER BEFORE OR DURING THE MOSCOW VISIT, IN SUCH BILATERAL AREAS AS ARMS CONTROL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

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PEKING VISIT

THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IS THAT THE PRC AND OURSELVES ACHIEVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS, AND THAT WE ESTABLISH A CONTINUING MEANS OF REMAINING INFORMED ABOUT THESE POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, HE HOPES THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE ON AT LEAST THE BEGINNING OF EXCHANGES IN NON-POLITICAL FIELDS SO THAT OUR TWO PEOPLES WILL BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER.

THE PRESIDENT IS EMPHASIZING THAT NEITHER SIDE IS UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DEPTH AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT SEPARATE US. HAVING BEEN TWO DECADES IN DEVELOPING, THESE DIFFERENCES WILL NOT BE EASILY RESOLVED. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE TO MAKE A BEGINNING TOWARD CLARIFYING OUR POSITIONS AND TOWARD WORKING OUT THE REAL DIFFERENCES THAT STAND BETWEEN US. TO THE EXTENT WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE HELPED REDUCE TENSIONS IN ASIA AND THE WORLD, WHICH SHOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO ALL NATIONS.

THE PRESIDENT IS STRESSING THAT HE HAS THE INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES VERY MUCH IN MIND AS HE HEADS TOWARD PEKING. HE HAS NO INTENTION OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES; THE TALKS WILL, IN FACT, FOCUS ON US-PRC BILATERAL ISSUES. GIVEN OUR DIFFERENCES, THE QUESTION OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL NOT ARISE. NOR WILL US TREATY COMMITMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES BE AFFECTED.

ECONOMIC ISSUES.

THE PRESIDENT IS EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE REALIGNMENT OF EXCHANGE RATES. THIS AGREEMENT -- WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR A RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY -- IS A MANIFESTATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE MAJOR TRADING NATIONS TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF ALL. IT IS, FURTHER, EVIDENCE THAT ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES WHICH WE MAY HAVE WITH OUR TRADING PARTNERS CAN AND WILL BE SOLVED ADMICABLY IN A SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IT WOULD BE

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INCORRECT FOR CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, OR ANY OTHER NATION TO SEE SUCH ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES AS REPRESENTING AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIVIDE FREE WORLD NATIONS. END MESSAGE.

2. USG DOES NOT INTEND TO MAKE DELIVERY OF MESSAGE PUBLIC. WOULD APPRECIATE HOST GOVERNMENT ALSO MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH FACT AND CONTENT OF MESSAGE. (FYI-SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE BEING SENT TO SELECTED OTHER LEADERS. END FYI). ROGERS

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INTERNATIONAL ROOM
24 AM 1:44

TELEGRAM

SECRET 122

PAGE 01 STATE 230830

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

66636
DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY MSTERNER
APPROVED BY NEA: ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
NEA/ARP TWINAM S/S-0: SEAN HOLLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 230830

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICERS 9 AM DECEMBER 24

REF: BEIRUT 11257

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES HOUGHTON'S ACCOUNT OF SALEH APPROACH. OUWEIDA MAY HAVE SEEN SADAT AS HE CLAIMS, AND SADAT MAY INDEED HAVE GIVEN HIM SOME ENCOURAGEMENT "TO SEE WHAT YOU CAN GET FROM THE AMERICANS." WE SUSPECT OUWEIDA HAS CONVERTED FISHING LICENSE ALONG THESE LINES INTO FULL-BLOWN NEGOTIATING MISSION. WE ALSO DETECT STRONG ODOOR OF MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD IN PROCEEDINGS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SADAT HAS HAD CLOSE BROTHER HOOD CONTACTS THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER. HOWEVER, EVEN SUPPOSING SADAT HAS GIVEN OUWEIDA SOME KIND OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO GET IN TOUCH WITH US, WE QUESTION WHETHER THERE IS ANY ADVANTAGE IN SETTING UP CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH SADAT THROUGH INTERMEDIARY WHO MAY HAVE POLITICAL PREJUDICES AND OBJECTIVES OF HIS OWN. WE BELIEVE BEST COURSE IS TO TURN THIS ONE OFF QUIETLY BUT FIRMLY, BUT LEAVING OPENING FOR SADAT TO COME BACK TO US ON OUTSIDE CHANCE THAT THIS IS BONA FIDE APPROACH.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO SALEH.

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INDICATING YOU ARE DOING SO UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM DEPARTMENT.

3. WE APPRECIATE SALEH'S EFFORTS TO CONVEY TO US MESSAGE FROM MESSRS. OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR WALSH IS NOW IN US ENROUTE TO NEW ASSIGNMENT IN USA AND IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO MEET WITH OUWEIDA AND AZOUNI. USG HAS, MOREOVER, VERY RELIABLE AND CONFIDENTIAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO PRESIDENT SADAT PRESENTLY IN EXISTENCE, AND WE ARE CONCERNED THAT DEALING THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS COULD LEAD TO CONFUSION. WE ARE, OF COURSE, READY TO RECEIVE AND GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO ANY COMMUNICATION PRESIDENT SADAT WISHES TO CONVEY TO US THROUGH EXISTING CHANNELS. IF PRESIDENT WISHES US TO DEAL WITH HIM THROUGH OUWEIDA, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO SO UPON THE PRESIDENT'S INDICATING THIS DIRECTLY TO MINISTER BERGUS IN CAIRO.

4. FOR CAIRO: THIS IS FYI ONLY AND WE ARE NOT ASKING YOU TO TAKE ANY ACTION IN CAIRO AT THIS TIME.
ROGERS

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ORIGIN SS-25

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DRAFTED BY:NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
APPROVED BY:THE SECRETARY
S/S:MR. ELIOT
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
NEA:MR. ATHERTON
NEA:MR. SISCO

071319

R 051536Z JAN 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 001476

EXDIS

REF: CAIRO 3273; STATE 230830

1. FYI. WE HAVE CAREFULLY REFLECTED ON HOW TO HANDLE MESSRS. OWEIDAH AND AZOUNI IN LIGHT OF SADAT'S REMARKS TO BERGUS DURING COOPER MEETING. SADAT HAS NOT INDICATED HE WISHED THIS CHANNEL BE USED. FROM HIS OBLIQUE COMMENT MOST PLAUSIBLE CONCLUSION SEEMS TO BE THAT OWEIDAH AND AZOUNI ON OWN INITIATIVE WITH SADAT TALKED UP IDEA THEY HAD GOOD CHANNEL TO USG (NAMELY, AMBASSADOR WALSH) AND NO OBJECTION ENTERED TO THEIR PURSUING CONTACT TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD PRODUCE. FROM THIS WE DOUBT THAT SADAT HAS GIVEN THEM ANYTHING NEW OR STARTLING TO SAY THAT HE COULD NOT TRANSMIT TO US IN EXISTING CHANNELS. WITH RENEWED EFFORT TO GET TALKS STARTED ON INTERIM AGREEMENT A POSSIBILITY IN NEAR FUTURE, WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED NOT TO OPEN ANOTHER CHANNEL, THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES ABOUT WHOM WE KNOW VERY LITTLE, WHICH COULD LEAD TO CONFUSION AND CROSS WIRES WHILE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY. WE ARE PERSUADED THAT IF SADAT REALLY WANTED US TO USE OWEIDAH AND CO. HE WOULD HAVE TOLD US SO. ANYTHING OWEIDAH AND AZOUNI MAY SAY WILL LEAVE US WONDERING WHETHER IT CAME FROM SADAT OR WAS

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COOKED UP BY THESE TWO, LEAVING US IN POSITION OF HAVING TO FIND OPPORTUNITY TO CHECK INFORMATION OUT WITH SADAT HIMSELF. WE SEE LITTLE TO BE GAINED BY SUCH CUMBERSOME PROCEDURE AND TO CONTRARY GOOD DEAL OF OPPORTUNITY FOR MISCHIEF-MAKING OR CONFUSION. END FYI.

2. FOR BEIRUT: HOUGHTON SHOULD CONVEY FOLLOWIING MESSAGE TO OWEIDAH AND AZOUNI, IF THEY STILL IN BEIRUT. WE HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THEIR MESSAGE TO US DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT SADAT. HIS COMMENT TO US WAS THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD INITIATIVE FOR THIS APPROACH HAD COME FROM USG. USG HAS NOT AUTHORIZED ANY SUCH INITIATIVE. WE ARE SATISFIED WITH THE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WE HAVE DEVELOPED WITH PRESIDENT SADAT IN CAIRO-- INCLUDING OF COURSE DIRECT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND OUR MINISTER IN CAIRO.

3. FOR CAIRO: YOU SHOULD CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO HAFEZ ISMAIL. WITH RESPECT TO OWEIDAH AND AZOUNI, WE HAVE INFORMED THEM THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING SINCE IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT US INITIATIVE TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THESE GENTLEMEN. WE ARE ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH EXISTING ESTABLISHED CHANNELS BETWEEN PRESIDENT SADAT AND USG. HOWEVER, WE REMAIN READY TO GIVE OUR CLOSE CONSIDERATION TO ANY MESSAGE PRESIDENT WISHES CONVEY TO US THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNEL, AND IF PRESIDENT INDICATES THAT HE WISHES US TO USE OWEIDAH AND AZOUNI FOR THIS PURPOSE, WE WILL BE PLEASD TO DO SO.


GP-1. ROGERS

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; T. W. SEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA; JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA; MR. ATHERTON
PM/MAS; MR. DOROUGH (SUBS)
NEA/RA; COL. BUNTE (SUBS)
DOD/ISA; COL. STEPP
S/S; MR. MILLER

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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EXDIS

SUBJ: US ARMS PROGRAM FOR LEBANON

REFS: A. BEIRUT 9368
B. BEIRUT 9493

MATTER OF INFORMING GOL OF WHAT USG HAS IN MIND RE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON OVER COMING FIVE YEARS IS COMPLICATED, AND SEELYE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS AND EXPLAIN TO AMBASSADOR UPON ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT SHORTLY.

FOR SEELYE: THESE FIGURES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH AMB. BUFFUM. THEY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE REVEALED TO GOL WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

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APPROVED BY: NEA-SISCO
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S-JOHNSON
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

SECRET STATE 166080

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S NEAR EAST TOUR D'HORIZON WITH LEBA-
NESE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD

SUMMARY

IN MEETING WITH SECRETARY SEPT 8 LEBANESE FONMIN ABOU-
HAMAD STRESSED IMPORTANCE TO SURVIVAL OF MODERATE SADAT
REGIME IN EGYPT OF EARLY INTERIM CANAL SETTLEMENT. ABOU-
HAMAD EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IF SADAT UNABLE SOON TO DEMON-
STRATE PROGRESS ON SETTLEMENT, HIS POSITION INTERNALLY
WILL BE SERIOUSLY WEAKENED. HE CONTENDED SOVS DO NOT LIKE
OR TRUST SADAT AND THAT SOV POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED
IF CANAL SETTLEMENT NOT FOLLOWED UP BY OVERALL PEACE


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SETTLEMENT. SECRETARY EMPHASIZED US DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE CANAL SETTLEMENT AS FIRST STEP TOWARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT EGYPT WOULD SEE THAT ADVANTAGES IN MOVING AHEAD ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT JUSTIFY PLACING LESS EMPHASIS ON WORDS SUCH AS "TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL" AS PRECONDITION TO CANAL SETTLEMENT. SECRETARY EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT EGYPT WOULD RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US IF INTERIM SETTLEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED AND THAT IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE SITUATION IN AREA WOULD IMPROVE.

END SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING MEETING WITH ASST SECY SISCO (SEPTEL) LEBANESE FONMIN KHALIL ABOUHAMAD MET WITH SECRETARY ON SEPT 8 AND CONTINUED TALK THROUGH WORKING LUNCHEON. ALSO PRESENT ON LEBANESE SIDE WERE AMB NAJATI KABBANI AND SUHAIL SHAMMAS, DIR OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY.

2. SECRETARY WELCOMED LEBANESE FONMIN TO WASHINGTON AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CORDIAL WELCOME WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED IN LEBANON DURING HIS MAY VISIT. SECRETARY SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH WHAT HE SAW AND WAS PLEASED TO HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH LEBANESE LEADERS, INCLUDING PRES FRANGIE AND PRIMIN SALEM.

3. ASST SECY SISCO COMMENTED THAT ABOUHAMAD HAD GIVEN HIM VERY INTERESTING ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEAR EAST. HE SUGGESTED THAT ABOUHAMAD MIGHT WISH TOUCH ON SOME OF THESE POINTS WITH SECRETARY. ABOUHAMAD SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING IN MOVING TOWARD INTERIM SETTLEMENT. SADAT NEEDS SUCH SETTLEMENT SOON IN ORDER MAINTAIN SUPPORT OF EGYPTIAN PEOPLE. AS MODERATE, PRAGMATIC LEADER IT IN LEBANON'S AND USG INTERESTS THAT SADAT REMAIN IN POWER. IN ADDITION, ABOUHAMAD STATED IT IMPERATIVE THAT INTERIM SETTLEMENT BE STEP TOWARD AND LINKED WITH OVERALL SETTLEMENT. OTHERWISE ONLY SOVIET UNION WOULD BENEFIT THEREFROM.

4. ABOUHAMAD SAID THAT HIS RECENT TRIP AROUND AREA HAD REVEALED CLEARLY THAT SECRETARY'S EARLIER VISIT HAD BEEN

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VIEWS AS AN IMPORTANT STEP BY ALL ARAB COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THOSE NOT PARTICULARLY FRIENDLY TOWARD USG. SECRETARY'S VISIT HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT USG SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN SETTLEMENT. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT USG WOULD CONTINUE ITS ACTIVE ROLE IN THIS REGARD AND WOULD SUCCEED. ABOUHAMAD COMMENTED FACETIOUSLY THAT "WHETHER WE LIKED IT OR NOT" NAMES OF ROGERS AND SISCO HAVE BECOME INTIMATELY LINKED WITH CURRENT HISTORY OF MIDDLE EAST.

5. SECRETARY SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT HIS TRIP TO AREA WAS CONSIDERED CONSTRUCTIVE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT USG WOULD CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT. HE APPRECIATED CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE LEBANON WAS PLAYING IN THIS REGARD. SECRETARY STRESSED NEED FOR MORE ACTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND SAID THAT SEPARATE TRIPS BY CONCERNED OFFICIALS TO COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS TENDED TO INVITE PUBLICITY AND MADE IT DIFFICULT TO PURSUE QUIET DIPLOMACY.

6. SECRETARY ASKED ABOUHAMAD ABOUT LEBANON'S RELATIONS WITH UAR. ABOUHAMAD REPLIED THAT LEBANESE-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS ARE VERY CLOSE AND EXCELLENT. THERE IS MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION. LEBANESE GOVT IS CONVINCED THAT SADAT IS DOING HIS BEST AND DESERVES TO BE SUPPORTED. HE CONTENDED THAT SOVS DO NOT LIKE OR TRUST SADAT. IF SADAT IS UNABLE TO OFFER HIS PEOPLE SOON SOME PROGRESS ON A SETTLEMENT AND HAS TO RELY ON SPEECHES, HIS POSITION WILL BE WEAKENED. IF CANAL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED, SADAT WOULD WIN POPULAR PLAUDITS FOR HAVING SUCCEEDED WHERE NASSER FAILED.

7. SECRETARY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON WORDS. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF STUMBLING BLOCKS SEEMS TO BE INSISTENCE THAT ISRAEL AGREE IN ADVANCE TO "TOTAL" WITHDRAWAL. WE THINK IF WE CAN GET PROCESS STARTED WHEREBY ISRAELIS WITHDRAW A DISTANCE, EGYPTIANS CROSS CANAL, CANAL IS OPENED, EGYPT IS RUNNING CANAL AND JARRING NEGOTIATIONS ARE RECOMMENCED, THIS WOULD GENERATE FAVORABLE CLIMATE AND BE OF GREAT ADVANTAGE TO EGYPT. IT WOULD SEEM SHORT-SIGHTED TO ALLOW SUCH A DEVELOPMENT TO FOUNDER AS A RESULT OF INSISTENCE ON THE USE OF CERTAIN WORDS IN THE AGREEMENT. SECRETARY SAID THAT AN ISRAELI UNDER-

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TAKING IN CONNECTION WITH AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT TO COMMIT ITSELF TO "FULL AND TOTAL" IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSC RES 242 SHOULD BE ENOUGH FOR THE TIME BEING.

8. ABOUHAMAD SAID HE AGREED THAT CERTAIN TERMINOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO OBSTRUCT PROCESS OF MOVING AHEAD ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT. HE AGREED THAT QUESTIONS OF NUMBERS OF EGYPTIANS CROSSING CANAL AND DISTANCE ISRAELIS WITHDREW IN CONTEXT INTERIM SETTLEMENT ARE NOT OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE PER SE-- BUT THIS IS CASE ONLY AS LONG AS EGYPT'S POSITION THAT ULTIMATELY THERE MUST BE TOTAL ISRAELI EVACUATION OF SINAI IS NOT RPT NOT JEOPARDIZED. PERHAPS SUCH ASSURANCES COULD BE PROVIDED IN SOME OTHER MANNER. ABOUHAMAD CONTINUED BY NOTING THAT ARABS ARE EMOTIONAL PEOPLE WHO DO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO WORDS. FURTHERMORE, ARAB SENSITIVITY TO TERMINOLOGY "TOTAL WITHDRAWAL" MUST BE VIEWED IN CONTEXT OF HISTORY OF ISRAELI-ARAB DISPUTE WHERE ISRAEL HAS OVER PERIOD OF TIME TAKEN MORE AND MORE ARAB TERRITORY.

9. SISCO SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT OF FIRST IMPORTANCE TO SADAT IN CONNECTION INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD BE GRAPHIC PICTURES ON FRONT PAGES OF ARAB NEWSPAPERS SHOWING WITHDRAWAL OF FIRST ISRAELI SOLDIERS FROM CANAL. THIS WOULD GIVE SADAT TREMENDOUS KUDOS WITHIN EGYPT AND WOULD APPEAR TO BE OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE TO JUSTIFY SADAT'S ATTACHING LESS IMPORTANCE TO CERTAIN WORDS AT THIS MOMENT. SECRETARY NOTED THAT SO OFTEN IN NEGOTIATIONS A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AND EFFORT IS SPENT ON WORDS, BUT ONCE AGREEMENT CONSUMMATED CAREFULLY WORKED OUT WORDING BECOMES SUBSUMED IN THRUST OF OVERALL AGREEMENT. IF EGYPT CAN GET INTERIM SETTLEMENT LEADING TOWARD OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT, WHY QUIBBLE AT THIS POINT OVER WORDS "TOTAL" OR "COMPLETE"?

10. ABOUHAMAD NOTED THAT KING FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA HOLDS VIEW THAT INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD ONLY EHLP SOVS AND ISRAELIS OVER LONG RUN. SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT AGREE. HE THOUGHT INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD REDUCE TENSIONS AND WOULD FACILITATE RESUMPTION OF USG DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD REINFORCE BASIC ARAB LIKING FOR AMERICANS AND INTENSIFY ARAB

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DISTASTE FOR SOVS. SADAT WOULD GET FULL CREDIT FOR INTERIM SETTLEMENT. ISRAELI IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IN FORM OF INCIPIENT ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE BIG PLUS. USG WOULD BE IN POSITION TO HELP SADAT IN PRACTICAL TERMS. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT ONLY ELEMENT THAT SEPARATES ARABS FROM US IS ISRAELI QUESTION. UNLIKE SOVS USG HAS NO INTENTION OF TELLING ARABS WHAT TO DO. PROGRESS ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD BENEFIT BOTH LEBANON AND US. ISRAEL WOULD BE UNDER GREAT PRESSURE TO WITHDRAW FURTHER. SISCO COMMENTED THAT ALSO ISRAELIS WOULD BE OPERATING IN A LESS FAVORABLE STRATEGIC POSITION.

11. ABOUHAMAD INDICATED HE WAS NOT ARGUING AGAINST INTERIM SETTLEMENT BUT ONLY EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT IT WOULD CREATE NEW ARMISTICE LINES WHICH WOULD BECOME PERMANENT IF NO FURTHER PROGRESS WERE MADE. ABOUHAMAD ASKED SECRETARY WHETHER IN HIS VIEW INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD REDUCE SOV INFLUENCE IN EGYPT. SECRETARY SAID WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE SO. ABOUHAMAD SAID THAT HE IS CONFIDENT EGYPTIANS WISH TO REDUCE SOV PRESENCE, BUT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT OTHER POLITICAL ELEMENTS IN AREA WOULD FOCUS ON ABSENCE OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL IN CONNECTION WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERIM SETTLEMENT AND ACCUSE SADAT OF HAVING SOLD OUT. THIS MIGHT BE SEIZED AS OCCASION FOR MOVING AGAINST SADAT SO THAT "PARTIAL" GAIN TO SADAT DERIVED FROM LIMITED SETTLEMENT WOULD BE NEGATED. SECRETARY SAID THAT WE WILL NEVER GET AGREEMENT IF WE KEEP LOOKING AHEAD AT ALL POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT EVENTUALLY OCCUR.

12. ABOUHAMAD NOTED POSSIBILITY THAT EGYPT MIGHT DECIDE TO KEEP CANAL CLOSED SINCE IN THIS FASHION IT WOULD RETAIN BARGAINING COUNTER RE ACHIEVING OVERALL SETTLEMENT. SECRETARY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ISRAEL HAS MORE TO GAIN BY CONTINUED CLOSURE OF CANAL. IT WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO KEEP CANAL CLOSED.


13. SECRETARY CLOSED CONVERSATION BY REITERATING USG DETERMINATION TO PROCEED TOWARD SETTLEMENT. HE SAID HE SPOKE FOR PRESIDENT IN ASSERTING THAT WE DEFINITELY DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND THAT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT BE THE FINAL SETTLEMENT. OUR NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES THAT WE MOVE TOWARD

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AN OVERALL SOLUTION. AT SAME TIME WE DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT AN OVERALL SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT FIRST ACHIEVING AN INTERIM CANAL SETTLEMENT.

GP-3 ROGERS

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
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EXDIS

SUBJ: SISCO-ABOUHAMAD EXCHANGE ON MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY: IN WIDE-RANGING EXCHANGE ON US-GOL RELATIONS AND SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST, FONMIN ABOUHAMAD REAFFIRMED CLOSE US-GOL BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF LEBANON IN MIDDLE EAST. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED UNHAPPINESS AT LACK OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST. FONMIN NOTED THAT INSPITE OF ATTRACTIVE SOVIET ARMS OFFERS, GOL HAD DECIDED TO PURCHASE MAJORITY OF ITS ARMS FROM US. GOL HAD RECEIVED APPROVAL FOR FIVE-YEAR ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAM BUT HOPED USG COULD HELP OFFSET COSTS OF THIS PROGRAM. TURNING TO EVENTS IN ARAB WORLD, ABOUHAMAD FELT ENCOURAGED BY MODERATION OF NEW SYRIAN GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVED CURRENTLY STRAINED SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS WOULD BE PUT ON RIGHT TRACK ONCE HUSSEIN REACHED ACCOMMODATION WITH FEDAYEEN. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER SADAT'S POSITION.


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BELIEVING THAT IF THERE IS NO PROGRESS TOWARD INTERIM SETTLEMENT, SADAT'S POSITION WOULD BE IN JEOPARDY. SISCO CONCURRED IN LEBANESE ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS IN SYRIA AND NOTED WE AGREE WITH LEBANESE VIEW ON IMPORTANCE OF ATTAINING INTERIM SUEZ CANAL ARRANGEMENT. SISCO REVIEWED HIS RECENT TRIP TO ISRAEL AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT INTERIM SETTLEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED BY END OF THIS YEAR. END SUMMARY.

1. LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER KHALIL ABOUHAMAD, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR KABBANI AND SUHAIL SHAMMAS, CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO SEPTEMBER 8 TO DISCUSS EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SISCO BEGAN BY STATING THAT HE WAS STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS HAD SEEMED MORE FLUID AND MORE DEVELOPMENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A CONCENTRATED PERIOD OF TIME IN THE ARAB WORLD THAN IN RECENT YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE IMPORTANT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UAR, COUP AND COUNTER-COUP IN SUDAN, DISSENSION BETWEEN UAR, SUDAN AND RUSSIA, DIFFICULTIES JORDAN WAS HAVING WITH ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS, AND SAUDI ARABIA'S AND UAR'S EFFORTS TO EASE THESE DIFFICULTIES, AND DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA. SISCO NOTED HE HAD NEVER SEEN PERIOD WHERE ARAB WORLD WAS SO PREOCCUPIED WITH INTER-ARAB DEVELOPMENTS. HE ASKED FOR ABOUHAMAD'S VIEWS.

2. ABOUHAMAD BEGAN BY COMMENTING ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND LEBANON AND THEN MOVED ON TO COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY COMMENTS. ABOUHAMAD ASSURED SISCO THAT LEBANON'S POLICY IS TO BE OPEN TO WESTERN WORLD AND HAVE CLOSEST COOPERATION POSSIBLE. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT LEBANON'S IMPORTANCE WOULD NOT BE EVALUATED BY ITS PHYSICAL SIZE. IT SHOULD BE VIEWED AS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST. IT HAS IMPORTANT ROLE IT CAN PLAY IN THE POLITICS OF THE REGION. ONE EXAMPLE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF LEBANON'S SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH ITS MANY PROBLEMS IS WHAT IS HAPPENING IN SYRIA TODAY. SYRIA HAS TRIED MANY DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE LAST 20 YEARS BUT IS NOW TRYING TO APPLY LEBANESE EXAMPLE. ABOUHAMAD VIEWED THIS AS SIGN OF ENCOURAGEMENT.

3. HOWEVER, ABOUHAMAD SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPROACH WESTERN WORLD FOR NOT PROVIDING TYPE OF ASSISTANCE THAT LEBANON MERITS. LEVEL OF SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IS NOT COMMENSURATE WITH LEBANON'S NEEDS. HE NOTED CONTINUING DEFICIT IN BALANCE OF TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IN ADDITION, LEBANON IN CONTRAST TO MANY OTHER MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES HAD NO NATURAL RESOURCES EXCEPT

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ITS PEOPLE. HE NOTED LACK OF RESPONSE TO LEBANON'S REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. PARLIAMENT HAD JUST VOTED 200 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS APPROPRIATION FOR ACQUISITION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. MINISTER OF DEFENSE SABA HAD VISITED WESTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AS WELL AS MOSCOW. PRICES QUOTED IN WESTERN EUROPE FOR ARMS WERE FOUND TO BE EXTREMELY HIGH. LEBANON HAD DECIDED TO PURCHASE ARMS ON GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS IN HOPES OF SAVING MONEY. HOWEVER, GOI WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ARMS AGENTS FROM SAME COUNTRIES SABA HAD VISITED WERE OFFERING REDUCTIONS UP TO 20 PERCENT LESS THAN PRICES OFFICIALLY QUOTED. ABOUHAMAD CITED THIS AS EXAMPLE OF LACK OF RESPONSE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST. EASTERN EUROPE AND SOVIET UNION ON OTHER HAND HAD OFFERED LONG-TERM CREDITS AND 2 PERCENT INTEREST RATE. ABOUHAMAD SAID BASIC ERROR OF WESTERN EUROPE WAS THAT IT CONSIDERED LEBANON SIMPLY AS BUYER OF ARMS, FORGETTING THAT LEBANON NEEDED THESE ARMS FOR GOOD REASONS. SABA WILL BE VISITING WASHINGTON WITHIN NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS AND HOPES TO ENGAGE IN TALKS WITH US OFFICIALS ON LEBANON'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

4. ABOUHAMAD SAID THAT POLITICAL DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN AT HIGHEST LEVELS IN GOI TO EARMARK BULK OF 200 MILLION LEBANESE POUNDS APPROPRIATION FOR PURCHASE OF ARMS FROM US OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS. HOWEVER, FINANCIAL RESOURCES VOTED FOR THIS ARMS PROGRAM WERE BEING DIVERTED FROM EQUALLY IMPORTANT PROJECTS THAT LEBANON NEEDS FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS NECESSITATED THIS. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT USG WOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING LEBANON ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP REPLACE FUNDS TAKEN AWAY FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

5. ABOUHAMAD NOTED CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND LEBANON. HOWEVER, HE SAID CHALLENGE OF COMMUNISM IN ARAB WORLD COULD BEST BE MET BY US OFFERING ITSELF AS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. SUCH ROLE ON PART OF US WOULD DRAMATICALLY CHANGE ITS IMAGE IN MIDDLE EAST FROM "SELLER OF PHANTOMS" TO A NATION TRULY INTERESTED IN PRESERVING PEACE. ABOUHAMAD SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY CONFIDENT THAT SECRETARY ROGERS' VISIT TO THE AREA AND SISCO'S VISITS HAD CONVINCED THEM THAT US HAS GOOD FRIENDS IN ARAB WORLD WHO WANT TO WORK WITH US. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US WOULD ENCOURAGE THESE FRIENDS AND DO WHAT IT COULD TO HELP THEM.

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6. FOREIGN MINISTER REGAN HIS SURVEY OF AREA BY TURNING TO SYRIA. SINCE COUP IN SYRIA OF LAST YEAR THERE HAS BEEN RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON. PRESIDENT ASAD STRONGLY FAVORS CLOSE COOPERATION OF LEBANON. AT PRESENT TIME SILENT STRUGGLE IS GOING ON WITHIN SYRIA BETWEEN ASAD AND BA'ATH PARTY. BEFORE COUP OF LAST YEAR BA'ATH PARTY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICY PLANNING AND FORMER CHIEF OF STATE DR. ATASI WAS MERELY AGENT OF PARTY. TODAY, HOWEVER, ASAD WANTS TO ASSUME POWER FOR HIMSELF WITHOUT BA'ATH PARTY CALLING THE SHOTS. ABOUHAMAD INDICATED THAT THIS TENSION BETWEEN ASAD AND BA'ATH PARTY ACCOUNTED FOR ESCALATION OF TENSION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA. BECAUSE OF THIS SILENT STRUGGLE WITHIN SYRIA, ASAD HAD TO TAKE MEASURES VIS-A-VIS JORDAN SO THAT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE WEAKENED INTERNALLY. HOWEVER, MILITARY IN SYRIA ARE REALISTS AND MORE MODERATE THAN CIVILIAN ELEMENTS OF BA'ATH PARTY. ABOUHAMAD MENTIONED THAT WIFE OF GENERAL TLAS, COMMANDER OF SYRIAN ARMY, WAS COUSIN OF PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL'S WIFE. TELL AND TLAS HAD GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT MOST DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN JORDAN AND SYRIA. DURING RECENT FIGHTING BETWEEN JORDAN AND FEDAYEEN, SYRIA HAD RESISTED BEING DRAWN INTO FRAY. HOWEVER, ELEMENTS WITHIN SYRIA ACCUSED TLAS OF REACHING TACIT AGREEMENT WITH TELL WHEREBY SYRIA WOULD DO NOTHING IF JORDAN MOVED AGAINST FEDAYEEN. ASAD HAD TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST JORDAN IN ORDER TO CIRCUMSCRIBE PRESSURE BY SYRIAN EXTREMISTS. HOWEVER, ABOUHAMAD SAID THAT IF JORDAN CAN REACH SOME TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION WITH FEDAYEEN, ASAD WILL SUSPEND ALL MEASURES WHICH SYRIA HAS TAKEN AGAINST JORDAN.

7. ABOUHAMAD TURNED TO EFFORTS BEING MADE BY SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOME TYPE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND FEDAYEEN. WORKING PAPER WHICH SAQQAF AND KHOULY HAD PRESENTED TO KING HUSSEIN CONTAINED ONLY FOUR PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS, AMONG WHICH WERE GOJ ADHERENCE TO CAIRO AND AMMAN AGREEMENTS AND RESPECT FOR JORDAN'S SOVEREIGNTY. THIS WORKING PAPER WAS ACCEPTED BY HUSSEIN BUT HUSSEIN ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY ITS VAGUENESS BY ATTACHING EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM WITH WHICH SAQQAF AND KHOULY AGREED IN SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, ARAFAT DID NOT AGREE WITH HUSSEIN'S INTERPRETATION AND PUT FORTH HIS OWN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM. ABOUHAMAD SAID THIS WAS WHERE SITUATION STOOD WHEN HE LEFT LEBANON, BUT HE HAD IMPRESSION THAT FAVORABLE RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM WOULD BE WORKED OUT THROUGH GOOD OFFICES OF UAR AND

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SAUDI ARABIA. KING FAISAL IS PERSONALLY TRYING TO FIND COMMON INTERPRETATION WHICH ALL SIDES COULD ACCPET. IN AN ASIDE ABOUHAMAD NOTED THAT FAISAL IS EMERGING AS THE ARBITER OF INTER-ARAB DIFFERENCES AND IS GRADUALLY CONSOLIDATING THIS POSITION. SADAT COULD HAVE ACTED AS CO-ARBITER BUT HE LOST HIS ROLE BECAUSE OF HIS OPEN ATTACKS ON KING HUSSEIN. ABOUHAMAD'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT HUSSEIN COULD NOT ACCEPT FEDAYEEN OPERATING IN ANY WAY WITHIN JORDAN WHICH ENDANGERS JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY.

8. ABOUHAMAD EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT FEDAYEEN ARE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR TRYING TO REACH PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE BELIEVED THAT TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT COULD MAKE ISRAELI POSITION MORE RIGID AND DEMANDING. FEDAYEEN MAY BE ONE OF THE FACTORS WHICH MAKES ISRAEL ADOPT MORE FELXIBLE VIEWPOINT. HOWEVER, ABOUHAMAD WANTED TO DRAW CLEARCUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN FATAH AND EXTREMIST GROUPS. HE SAID THAT IF ONE IS FAMILIAR WITH INTERNAL MAKEUP OF FEDAYEEN, ONE WOULD BE PROMPTED TO EXTEND SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO ARAFAT. IF ARAFAT WERE OUSTED (AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT HIS POSITION IS BECOMING MORE TENUOUS), ONE COULD PREDICT ADVERSE RESULTS. LEBANON HAS NO INTEREST IN SEEING ARAFAT OUSTED. ABOUHAMAD NOTED THAT FATAH HAD STRONG WORKING RAPPORT WITH FAISAL.

9. TURNING TO THE UAR, ABOUHAMAD SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED OVER SADAT'S POSITION. IF SADAT IS NOT ASSISTED BY MOVEMENT TOWARDS PEACE BY END OF YEAR, SADAT'S INTERNAL POSITION COULD BE JEOPARDIZED. ABOUHAMAD COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE UNDER "WISE, MODERATE AND PRACTICAL MAN LIKE SADAT." SADAT'S POSITION ON INTERIM CANAL SETTLEMENT, ABOUHAMAD SAID, WAS NOT ONLY IN BEST INTERESTS OF UAR BUT ALSO IN BEST INTERESTS OF LEBANON AND US. INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS ISOLATED, SEPARATE AGREEMENT NOT WITHIN FRAME-WORK OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT, WOULD CAUSE SADAT GREAT DIFFICULTY. ABOUHAMAD SAID HE BELIEVED SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD MEAN INCREASE IN SOVIET INFLUENCE. HOWEVER, INTERIM SETTLEMENT LINKED TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT WOULD BRING ABOUT DECREASE IN SOVIET INFLUENCE WHICH SADAT WOULD LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN. LEBANESE HOPE WAS THAT SOME TYPE OF INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD BE ARRIVED AT SOON AND WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT. SADAT SAID GOL BELIEVES THAT RUSSIANS DO NOT TRUST AND ARE NOT HAPPY WITH SADAT. THIS IS ONE REASON WHY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED SHOULD HELP HIM ALONG WITH SATISFACTORY

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AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW HIM TO LESSEN SOVIET INFLUENCE. IN CLOSING, ABOUHAMAD STRESSED THAT SADAT WAS UNDER TIME LIMIT AND EFFORTS MUST BE TAKEN TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

10. SISCO RESPONDED THAT HIS VIEWS PARALLELED ABOUHAMAD'S TO GREAT EXTENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WE SHARE LEBANON'S ASSISSMENT WITH REGARD TO SYRIA. IT IS CLEAR THAT SYRIA WISHES TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO END ITS ISOLATION. SOME WEEKS AGO WE HAD RECEIVED A SEMI-OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, AND WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE READY TO WORK TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH SYRIA. AT SAME TIME WE REALIZE THAT KEY TO IMPROVEMENT OF US RELATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WHO BROKE RELATIONS WITH US RESTS WITH CAIRO.

11. SISCO CONTINUED THAT WE CONCUR IN THE LEBANESE VIEW THAT OBTAINING AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE MODERATE SADAT REGIME. SISCO SAID THAT HIS RECENT TRIP TO ISRAEL DEMONSTRATED THAT WHILE THERE ARE CONTINUING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UAR REGARDING CANAL SETTLEMENT AND WHILE THERE IS NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES, OUR DIFFERENCES WITH ISRAEL RELATE LESS TO SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF CANAL SETTLEMENT THAN THEY DO TO OTHER BILATERAL MATTERS. SISCO SAID HE HAD FOUND FLEXIBILITY IN THE ISRAELI POSITION RE A NUMBER OF SPECIFICS, INCLUDING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERIM SETTLEMENT AND OVERALL SETTLEMENT, CEASEFIRE, ZONES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SUPERVISING MECHANISMS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN BACK IN TOUCH WITH THE UAR ON THIS SUBJECT BECAUSE THERE ARE OTHER ELEMENTS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL WHICH NEED TO BE RESOLVED. NEVERTHELESS, SISCO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WE WILL GET AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT BY THE END OF THE YEAR. BOTH SIDES HAVE STRONG AND COMPELLING REASONS TO AGREE. IN ISRAEL'S CASE THE QUESTION OF ARMS IS A VERY DELICATE ONE AND AT MOMENT THIS REPRESENTS THEIR GREATEST CONCERN. SISCO NOTED THAT US, USSR, ISRAEL AND UAR ALL FAVOR INTERIM AGREEMENT.


11. FOREIGN MINISTER STRESSED IMPORTANCE THAT INTERIM SETTLEMENT BE STEP IN DIRECTION OF OVERALL SOLUTION. OTHERWISE REOPENING OF CANAL WITHOUT FURTHER MEASURES TOWARD PEACE SETTLEMENT WOULD SERVE ONLY SOVIET INTERESTS. SISCO AGREED THAT LIMITED SETTLEMENT BY ITSELF IS CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT. AMONG OTHER THINGS IT FAILS TO DEAL WITH PALESTINE PROBLEM AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE SEE INTERIM SETTLEMENT AS BASIS FOR FURTHER ONGOING EFFORTS.

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ATTRACTION TO ISRAELIS IS THAT INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD BE PRACTICAL TEST FOR PEACE. HOWEVER, ISRAELIS WILL NOT GO ALONG WITH SETTLEMENT IF THEY REQUIRED IN ADVANCE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN T J SCOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA ALFRED L. ATHERTON
NEA/ARN MR. SEELYE
S/S MR. CURRAN

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R 032140Z SEP 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME

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71 SEP 4 AM 9:01
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T STATE 162884

EXDIS

SUBJ: SYRIA: AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE

REF: BEIRUT 7741: STATE 159358

DEPARTMENT FULLY AWARE OF NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN YOUR
RELATIONS WITH MAIOLINI AND THEREFORE AGREES THAT YOU
SHOULD CONTINUE YOUR INFORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM.
DEPARTMENT APPROVES SUGGESTED GUIDELINES GIVEN IN PARA 5
YOUR REFTEL, WHICH BEING PASSED TO ROME. ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 155697

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

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APPROVED BY: NEA; MR ATHERTON
NEA/EX: MR HUNT
EUR/AIS: MR JOHNSON
SCA: MR SMITH, JR
S/S-O: BRIMS

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

..... 006698

R 250030Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 155697

EXDIS

SUBJ: SYRIA: AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE

REF: (A)BEIRUT 7358 (B) ROME 5321

1. DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH AMBASSADOR BOZZINI'S RECOMMENDATION, CONCURRED IN BY EMBASSY BEIRUT, THAT WE AWAIT FORMAL SYRIAN NOTE ON DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES BEFORE SENDING BEIRUT EMBASSY OFFICER TO DAMASCUS. WE ALSO CONCUR IN BEIRUT'S RECOMMENDATION THAT OUR POSTURE ON QUESTION SHOULD BE THAT USINT HAS REPLIED TO SYRIAN NOTE OF JUNE 22 AND THAT WE ARE AWAITING SYRIAN RESPONSE TO USINT NOTE.

2. FOR ROME: PLEASE CONVEY TO FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES AMBASSADOR BOZZINI'S RECOMMENDATION AND CONCURS IN IT. WOULD HOPE FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL INFORM BOZZINI AND MAIOLINI THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT KEILANY'S PROPOSAL THAT OUR CONSULAR OFFICER BEGIN VISITING DAMASCUS UNDER AUTHORITY OF JUNE 22 NOTE WE ASK THAT MAIOLINI CONVEY NOTHING IN WRITING TO KEILANY AND SAY NOTHING ORALLY TO HIM ON VISITING CONSUL MATTER UNTIL AFTER HE HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH EMBASSY

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BEIRUT.

3. FOR BEIRUT: EMBASSY REQUESTED TAKE EARLY OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS FOREGOING WITH MAIOLINI AND BRIEF HIM RE APPROACH TO KEILANY. RESPONSE SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ORAL AND NOT RPT NOT IN WRITING. KEILANY SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE MERELY AWATING SYRIAN WRITTEN RESPONSE TO USINT NOTE BEFORE GIVING FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO VISITING CONSUL MATTER. ROGERS

EXDIS

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY BEIRUT
URGENT 10/11/52

SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
10/11/52

STATE DEPT WASH DC

10/11/52

BT

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Handwritten notes and stamps: 10/11/52, 10/11/52, 10/11/52

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66639

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ARN:AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR. DAVIES
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
SCA - MR. DALE
NEA/EX - MR. HUNT
EUR/AIS - MR. JOHNSON
S/S-O:MR. BRIMS

71 AUG 6 8:23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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R 060024Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 143185

EXDIS

SUBJ: SYRIA: PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE

REF: BEIRUT 6701


1. FOR BEIRUT: DEPARTMENT WELCOMES EMBASSY'S READINESS TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FROM BEIRUT SO AS TO ESTABLISH US PRESENCE IN DAMASCUS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. SCHEDULING OF OFFICERS ON ROTATING BASIS WHENEVER POSSIBLE WOULD SEEM PROVIDE REASONABLE BASIS HANDLING DAMASCUS WORKLOAD. WE NOTE AND WELCOME SARG INDICATIONS THAT FULL DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES WOULD BE EXTENDED TO VISITING AMERICAN OFFICER, THAT OFFICER MIGHT REMAIN TWO OR THREE DAYS AT A TIME IN DAMASCUS AND THAT RELATED CONSULAR ACTIVITIES COULD BE PERFORMED IN ADDITION TO VISA AND PASSPORT WORK.

2. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY SHOULD INSTRUCT MAIOLINI TO RESPOND FAVORABLY IN WRITING TO SARG FOREIGN MINISTRY NOTE. NOTE SHOULD SPELL OUT IN APPROPRIATE TERMS AS SUGGESTED IN EARLIER CABLES OUR EXPECTATIONS WITH REGARD TO IMMUNITIES.

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AMERICAN OFFICER WILL ENJOY IN SYRIA. NOTE SHOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT RECIPROCAL FACILITIES AND IMMUNITIES IN WASHINGTON WOULD BE ASSURED FOR VISITING SYRIAN CONSULAR OFFICER FROM SYRIAN MISSION TO UN.

3. MAIOLINI SHOULD ORALLY EXPLAIN TO KEILANY THAT WHILE USG HAD HOPED FOR IMMEDIATE ASSIGNMENT TO DAMASCUS OF AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER, WE ARE ACCEPTING SYRIAN OFFER AS ORIGINALLY MADE AS AN EARNEST OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. VISITING CONSULAR OFFICER, WHOSE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES WE WISH TO HAVE IN WRITING, IS NOT ALTOGETHER SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT FOR USG AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT AMERICAN OFFICER AND SECRETARY CAN BE ASSIGNED TO DAMASCUS IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME. WE WILL APPRECIATE CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MAIOLINI AND KEILANY WITH A VIEW TO FINDING BEST TIME FOR ASSIGNING OFFICER TO DAMASCUS.

4. FYI; AS RECOGNIZED BY EMBASSY, ASSIGNING EXPERIENCED OFFICER TO BEIRUT FOR COVERAGE OF DAMASCUS CONSULAR WORK PRESENTS PROBLEMS FOR DEPARTMENT. IF OFFICER SHOULD ARRIVE EARLY IN BEIRUT, AND DAMASCUS ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE LONG DELAYED, QUESTION WOULD ARISE OF FULL UTILIZATION OF OFFICER'S POTENTIAL. WE ARE THEREFORE INCLINED FOR MOMENT TO HOLD OFF ON READYING OFFICER FOR EARLY ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT. RATHER, WE PREFER WATCHING DAMASCUS DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY WHILE HAVING EXPERIENCED OFFICER READY TO MOVE ON SHORT NOTICE WHEN, AS KEILANY SEEMS TO BELIEVE LIKELY, PARTIAL PRESENCE CAN BE CONVERTED IN REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE TO OFFICER ASSIGNED TO DAMASCUS. END FYI.

5. FOR ROME. EMBASSY REQUESTED DISCUSS AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY CURRENT STATUS OF PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE DAMASCUS WITH VIEW TO ASSURING THAT VISITING AMERICAN OFFICER WILL POSE NO PROBLEMS FOR ITALIAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS OR FOREIGN MINISTRY ROME. HIGHLY VALUED ROLE OF ITALIAN EMBASSY AS PROTECTOR OF US INTERESTS IN SYRIA WILL CONTINUE UNCHANGED. VISITING AMERICAN OFFICER WILL ACT UNDER AEGIS OF ITALIAN EMBASSY AND AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT CALL INTO QUESTION ROLE OF ITALY AS PROTECTING POWER.

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
PAGE 03 STATE 143185

6. FOR BEIRUT: INITIATION OF VISITING CONSULAR OFFICER ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL (A) WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES IS IN HAND AND (B) ITALIANS HAVE INDICATED PROCEDURE PRESENTS NO PROBLEM FOR THEM.
GP-3. ROGERS

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R 091308Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4648
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OCT. 9, 1973

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DEPT ALSO PASS TEL AVIV

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, LE
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COMMUNICATION TO GOVT OF LEBANON

REF: STATE 199794

1. AMBASSADOR TRANSMITTED ISRAELI ASSURANCES CONTAINED REFTEL TO SEC GEN OF LEBANESE FONOFFICE (SADAQA) MORNING OF OCT 9. HE DREW SADAQA'S ATTENTION TO RAPIDITY WITH WHICH SECRETARY, PERSONALLY, HAD TAKEN UP MATTER WITH GOI FOLLOWING DEMARCHE BY PRIME MINISTER SOLH (BEIRUT 11884).
2. SADAQA WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF WHAT USG HAD DONE AND WENT ON TO COMMENT ON HOW PLEASED AND IMPRESSED HE, PERSONALLY, AND FONMIN NAFFA HAD BEEN BY THEIR MEETING WITH SECRETARY IN NEW YORK, AND BY ASSURANCES HE HAD GIVEN THEM OF CONTINUING USG INTEREST IN LEBANON AND ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE.
3. AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT ASSURANCES SECRETARY HAD OBTAINED CONTAINED CLEAR IMPLICATION THAT GOL HAD RESPONSIBILITY ON ITS SIDE PREVENT MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL, AND WENT ON TO DISCUSS SERIOUSNESS OF PRESENT FEDAYEEN ACTIONS (SEE SEPTTEL).

BUFFUM

NOTE: NOT PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T.

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08 OCT 73¹⁹⁷⁵Z^Q1559

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E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS, PFOR
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION WITH LEBANESE

REF: STATE 199715

1. DURING MEETING WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, ISMAIL, OCTOBER 8 ON ILMAC MEETING (SEPTEL), I MADE ALL POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL, WHICH CONSTITUTES HELPFUL GUIDANCE.
2. ISMAIL APPRECIATED MESSAGE AND PROMISED PASS ON TO OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS. (PM SOLH TELEPHONED HIM WHILE I WAS THERE AND ISMAIL CONVEYED GIST AT THAT TIME).
3. ISMAIL SAID HE CONSIDERED PRESENT SITUATION OFFERS US UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO RECOUP MANY OF OUR LOSSES IN ARAB WORLD SINCE 1967 AND THOUGHT OUR POSTURE OF CONCENTRATING ON MEANS OF STOPPING FIGHTING AND GETTING SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN APPORTIONING BLAME, MARKS GOOD BEGINNING.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1532
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 4089

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, LE (FRANGIE)
SUBJECT: INVITATION FOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE

REF: STATE 61240

1. CONVEYED INTITION FOR STATE VISIT TO PRES FRANGIE APRIL 9. HE ACCEPTED WITH PLEASURE AND ASKED I CONVEY HIS DEEPEST APPRECIATION TO PRES NIXON. HE LOOKS FORWARD WITH GREAT ANTICIPATION TO MAKING PRESIDENT'S ACQUAINTANCE.
2. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT THE DATE WOULD BE SET AT MUTUAL CONVENIENCE HE SAID HE WOULD WELCOME AN INDICATION FROM PRES NIXON AS TO WHAT PERIOD WOULD SUIT HIM BEST.
3. ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT GET INTO DETAIL, WHEN I INFORMED HIM THAT STATE VISIT NORMALLY CONSISTED OF TWO DAYS IN WASHINGTON AND FOUR DAYS ELSEWHERE (A-999, JANUARY 31, 1972) HE REPLIED, AS I EXPECTED, THAT HE COULD NOT ABSENT HIMSELF FROM LEBANON FOR SUCH LONG PERIOD. IN ADDITION, HE OBSERVED THAT WITH LARGE LEBANESE COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTED AROUND U.S. HE WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PICK AND CHOOSE AMONG THE MANY HE KNEW WOULD WISH OFFER HIM HOSPITALITY. ACCORDINGLY, HE PREFERS TO CONFINE HIS VISIT TO SHORT TRIP TO WASHINGTON ONLY.

COMMENT: FRANGIE WAS OPENLY DELIGHTED AT INVITATION AND VERY CONSCIOUS THAT VISIT REPRESENTS HISTORIC "FIRST" IN US-LEBANESE RELATIONS.

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BT
SECRET BEIRUT 3707

CONTROL: 141Q
APRIL 2, 1973
7:47 AM

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJ: TERRORISM IN LEBANON

1. DURING WEEKEND OUTING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOU-HAMAD, I MADE SAME PITCH AS RECENTLY WITH PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER RE NECESSITY OF LEBANON GETTING RID OF KNOWN TERRORISTS.
2. ABOUHAMAD SAID GOVT FULLY IMPRESSED WITH DEPTH OUR CONCERN THIS SUBJ. HE BELIEVED CLIMATE IS NOW RIPE HERE AMONG TOP LEADERS, INCLUDING SAEB SALAM, TO EXPEL AT LEAST SALAH KHALAF, WHOM WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AS KEY TERRORIST LEADER. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID MAIN QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED IS METHODOLOGY AND TIMING OF EXPLUSION SO THAT IT WILL CAUSE AS FEW LOCAL REPERCUSSIONS AS POSSIBLE.
3. WHILE HE DID NOT SAY SO, IN INTERPRET THIS TO MEAN GOVT WILL NEGOTIATE SALAH KHALAF'S EXPULSION WITH ARAFAT RATHER THAN TAKING HIM PHYSICALLY WHICH WOULD INVOLVE A FIRE FIGHT SINCE THE MAN GOES ACCOMPANIED BY NUMEROUS ARMED BODYGUARDS.
4. IN COMMENTING ON PROBLEMS POSED FOR LEBANON IN TAKING SRONG ANTI-FEDAYEEN ACTION, FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED WITH SOME ANNOYANCE THAT IT HAS BEEN MORE THAN SIX MONTHS SINCE HE RAISED QUESTION IN NEW YORK ABOUT WHAT US WOULD DO TO HELP LEBANON IF THERE IS CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN AND THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE. I OBSERVED THAT QUESTION HE HAD POSED WAS OF UTMOST DELICACY AND FELT SURE IT WAS BEING GIVEN THE THOUGHTFUL ATTENTION IT DESERVED.

BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

O 280830Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1299
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3520

CN: 9269Q
REC'D: MARCH 28, 1973
3:43 A.M.

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, LE (FRANGIE)
SUBJ: INVITATION FOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE

REF: STATE 56481

1. MOST PLEASED PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION FORTHCOMING.
2. SINCE EARLY VISIT NOT FEASIBLE, I SEE NO COMPELLING REQUIREMENT FOR VISIT THIS FALL AS OPPOSED TO NEXT YEAR. ACCORDINGLY, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING AUTHORIZATION TO EXTEND INVITATION TO PRES FRANGIE NOW FOR VISIT AT MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME IN 1974. TRUST INSTRUCTION WILL ALSO COVER HANDLING OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF INVITATION.

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#3520

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH

R 261100Z OCT 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9147
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 11558

7526Q
1972 OCT 26 1237Z

72 OCT 26 PM 12:17

13

NODIS

SUBJ: FRANGIE AND SECURITY SITUATION

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT FRANGIE NOW GETTING SATISFACTORY COOPERATION FROM PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP RE SOUTH LEBANON BUT UNSURE HOW LONG IT WILL CONTINUE. HE IS INTENT ON MAINTAINING QUIET IN SOUTH; HE ALSO WANTS IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOL EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS BUT FINDS LATTER MORE DIFFICULT OF TWO PROBLEMS. TO IMPROVE LEBANESE SECURITY CAPABILITY HE HAS INITIATED STEPS DESIGNED TO INTRODUCE COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN LEBANON DURING COMING YEAR. END SUMMARY

1. FOLLOWING UP RECENT KORN VISIT AND OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND COMMANDING GENERAL RE SECURITY PROBLEMS, I ASKED PRESIDENT FRANGIE OCTOBER 25 DURING HOUR-LONG TETE A TETE HOW HE SAW SECURITY SITUATION EVOLVING. FRANGIE SAID FOR MOMENT HE IS RECEIVING SATISFACTORY COOPERATION FROM PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN HIS PROGRAM TO RESTORE STABILITY ALONG THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER AND IN THE ARQUB. (BEIRUT TEL 11539 CONTAINS ADDITIONAL DETAIL RE ARQUB.) HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT PREDICT HOW LONG SUCH COOPERATION WOULD CONTINUE. HE FEARS THAT IN ADDITION TO PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL FEDAYEEN RIVALRIES IN LEBANON THERE WILL BE INCREASING EFFORT BY LIBYA AND SYRIA, INTER ALIA, TO PURSUE NATIONAL PLICIES AGAINST EACH OTHER THROUGH CHOSEN ELEMENTS AMONG PALESTINIAN MILITANTS, WITH LEBANON PAYING THE PRICE OF RESULTING FRICTION AND INCIDENTS.

2. I SAID WE WERE IMPRESSED BY SUCCESSES OF ARMY SO FAR IN MAINTAINING QUIET ALONG THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER. PRESIDENT ASSERTED HE IS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF BORDER. I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF DOING SO, POINTING OUT MAJOR REASON WE WERE ABLE TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN RECENT PRIVATE DEMARCHE TO ISRAELIS CRITICIZING THEIR LATEST AIR RAID WAS FACT THAT LEBANON HAD ESTABLISHED SUCH A GOOD RECORD RECENTLY IN QUIETING DOWN THE BORDER.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- BEIRUT 11558, OCTOBER 26

3. FRANGIE CONFIRMED THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO IMPROVE LEBANESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO MEET ITS FUTURE REQUIREMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, HE HAS ALREADY INITIATED CONSULTATIONS WITH POLITICAL LEADERS LOOKING TOWARD THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE. SINCE LEBANON HAS NEVER HAD CONSCRIPTION DURING LAST 300 YEARS, HE SAID THIS WILL TAKE SOME WORK, BUT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT DURING COMING YEAR SUCH LAW WILL BE ENACTED. THIS CONNECTION, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO MAINTAIN TRADITIONAL BALANCE OF CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS IN ARMED FORCES.

4. I REITERATED STRONG US INTEREST IN GOL DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS OPERATING ON ITS TERRITORY. HE POINTED TO WELL-KNOWN DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS. THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID THAT WHEN HE RECEIVED REPORTS FEDAYEEN WERE RENTING SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF APARTMENTS IN DOWNTOWN BEIRUT HE PERSONALLY ORDERED EXAMINATION OF ALL RENTAL CONTRACTS SIGNED BY ARAB OF ANY NATIONALITY TO SEE WHETHER ANY FEDAYEEN WERE INVOLVED. RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, TERRORISM PROBLEM INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO COPE WITH, SINCE PALESTINIANS HAVE ALSO ENLISTED SUPPORT OF NON-ARABS SUCH AS EUROPEANS AND TURKS. HE INDICATED LEBANESE SECURITY IN PROCESS OF MODERNIZING ITS RECORD SYSTEM, WITH USE OF COMPUTERS, BUT PROCESS WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE TWO YEARS TO COMPLETE. PRESIDENT CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD WELCOME ANY AND ALL ASSISTANCE USG MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE IN INTELLIGENCE FIELD TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE.
GDS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

72 OCT 21 PM 12:07

O 211016Z OCT 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9087
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 11404

6 4 1 1 Q
Oct 21, 1972
7:07 a.m.

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 11400

1. FOLLOWING UP ON FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD'S TALK WITH US AFTERNOON OCT 20 (REFTEL), LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL GHANEM RAISED SAME EVENING QUESTION OF POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN. GHANEM SAID HE HAD MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SUBSEQUENT TO OUR AFTERNOON MEETING AND ASSURED HE ENDORSED WHAT FONMIN HAD SAID. GHANEM STRESSED HIS DEEPEST CONCERN IN EVENT OF CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA AND SAID HE MUST KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC ACTION USG CAN TAKE TO NEUTRALIZE SYRIANS.
2. GHANEM SAID THAT AS REGARDS EQUIPMENT ARMY WOULD NEED TO CONTROL AND EVENTUALLY CONFRONT FEDAYEEN HE HAS TWO SPECIFIC AND URGENT REQUESTS. GHANEM SAID ARMY AND GENDARMERIE URGENTLY NEED PACKAGE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, MOSTLY COMMUNICATIONS VANS TO IMPROVE ARMY'S AND GENDARMERIE'S COMMUNICATIONS BUT ALSO JAMMING AND INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT TO ENABLE ARMY TO DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK (GHANEM SAID GOL NOW HAS NO EQUIPMENT FOR JAMMING OR INTERCEPT OF FEDAYEEN COMMUNICATIONS). GHANEM ESTIMATED THIS PACKAGE WOULD COST IN NEIGHBORHOOD OF EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS. HE SAID FINANCING IS SECONDARY PROBLEM AND INDICATED THAT IF NECESSARY GOL WOULD BEAR COST. IMPORTANT THING, GHANEM STRESSED, IS TO GET THIS EQUIPMENT TO LEBANON RIGHT AWAY. WE ASKED FOR SPECIFIC LIST OF ITEMS AND GHANEM PROMISED TO GIVE IT TO US SOONEST. GHANEM MENTIONED THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF AN AMERICAN ARMS SUPPLY FIRM (HE DID NOT HAVE NAME AT HAND) WAS CURRENTLY IN BEIRUT AND HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS REGARDING COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WITH HIS STAFF.
3. GHANEM SAID OTHER URGENT ITEM IS TO HAVE RIGHT AWAY EQUIPMENT IN FY 1971 MAP PACKAGE WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN DELIVERED. GHANEM SAID HIS STAFF HAD RECENTLY INQUIRED OF

NON-CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- Beirut 11404, Oct 21

EMBASSY DATT AS TO WHEN LEBANON COULD EXPECT DELIVERY OF THIS EQUIPMENT AND HAD BEEN INFORMED IT WOULD BE HANDED OVER BY JULY 1973. THIS IS NOT SOON ENOUGH, GHANEM STRESSED. TO BE ABLE TO FACE UP TO FEDAYEEN PROBLEM ARMY MUST HAVE THIS MATERIAL IN HAND RIGHT AWAY.

4. GENERAL GHANEM SAID NIGHT SENSORY EQUIPMENT WOULD ALSO BE VERY HELPFUL TO ARMY IN PREVENTING FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS. HE WAS VAGUE IN REGARD TO OTHER EQUIPMENT ARMY MIGHT NEED BUT SAID HE WOULD WELCOME VISIT OF A US MILITARY TEAM TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION.

5. WE VOICED SATISFACTION WITH MEASURES TAKEN BY ARMY IN RECENT WEEKS AND EXPRESSED STRONG HOPE THAT THESE WOULD BE PURSUED WITHOUT LETUP. GHANEM SAID ARMY WOULD DO ITS BEST BUT IN VIEW OF NATURE OF TERRAIN AND ARMY'S SMALL SIZE AND POOR EQUIPMENT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE COMPLETE SUCCESS IN PREVENTING INFILTRATIONS ACROSS LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT ONE OR TWO PERSONS COULD ALWAYS SLIP THROUGH, WE POINTED OUT THAT ARMY COULD DETECT AND REMOVE ANY CONCENTRATION OF FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH AND IT IS ESSENTIAL IT CONTINUE TO DO SO. GHANEM AGREED.

6. WE ARE SENDING BY SEPARATE CABLE LIST OF STILL UN-DELIVERED FY 71 MAP GRANT ITEMS. USG ABILITY TO MOVE THIS EQUIPMENT OUT RAPIDLY FOR DELIVERY TO LEBANESE ARMY, AND QUICK RESPONSE RE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WHEN GHANEM GIVES US HIS LIST, COULD WELL MAKE THE DIFFERENCE IN HOW VIGOROUSLY LEBANESE ARMY PURSUE ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN IN FUTURE. LIKEWISE, SPEED-UP IN DELIVERY OF FY 72 FMS ITEMS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. WE BELIEVE INFORMATION RE EQUIPMENT NEEDS OF LEBANESE ARMY IS FOR MOST PART ALREADY AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON AS RESULT VISIT BY DOD THIEBARGER/PLUMMER TEAM THIS PAST SPRING. PROBLEM, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IS TO ASSIGN SUFFICIENTLY HIGH PRIORITY IN TERMS OF US NATIONAL SECURITY TO DELIVERIES FOR LEBANON TO ASSURE RAPID AVAILABILITY OF ITEMS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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17 PM 12-22

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SECRET

R 171127Z OCT 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8990
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 11156

4756Q
1972 OCT 17 1234Z

NODIS

SUBJ: AID FOR LEBANON

1. FONMIN ABOUHAMAD SAID OCT. 16 THAT DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO NEW YORK SECRETARY AND SISCO HAD INDICATED U.S. WILLING TO PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO FONMIN, NO INDICATION GIVEN WHAT FORM SUCH AID WOULD TAKE, E.G., EQUIPMENT, GRANT AID, OR LOANS. ACCORDINGLY, HE NOW WISHED TO INQUIRE WHAT SPECIFIC TYPE ASSISTANCE U.S. ENVISAGED.
2. I SAID IN ABSENCE REPORT ON SECRETARY'S TALK WITH HIM I COULD ONLY REFER QUESTION TO DEPT FOR REPLY, BUT POINTED OUT NORMALLY WE WOULD EXPECT GOVT CONCERNED TO PROVIDE CONCRETE INDICATION OF WHAT IT WANTED FROM US.

GDS.
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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

OCT

R 061700Z OCT 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8872
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 10811

CONTROL: 1 8 6 6Q
RECD: 06 OCT 72 2:07PM

OCT 10 05

NODIS

DEPT PASS INFO TO TEL AVIV AND USUN

REF: STATE 181730

SUBJ: LEBANESE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDAYEEN

1. BASED UPON CONVERSATIONS OCT 5 AND 6 WITH RELIABLE AND WELL-INFORMED SENIOR GOL OFFICIALS, (GOV OF SOUTH, LAHOUD, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF KANAAN, AND ASSISTANT C/S FOR INTELLIGENCE BOUSTANI), SITUATION IN SOUTH LEBANON REMAINS AS DESCRIBED IN OUR PREVIOUS TELEGRAMS. NONE OF OUR OTHER REPORTS CONTAINS CONTRARY INFO.
2. FEDAYEEN ARE AT LEAST TEN AND PROBABLY THIRTEEN KILOMETERS BACK FROM BORDER IN SOUTH, AND ARE OUT OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES. THE LEBANESE ARMY ROADBLOCKS AND MOBILE CHECKPOINTH REMAIN NUMEROUS IN SOUTH AND ARKUB AND ARE SUCCESSFULLY PREVENTING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WHICH FEDAYEEN PREVIOUSLY ENJOYED. (ROADBLOCKS HAVE BEEN REDUCED OUTSIDE OF SOUTH SINCE STATE OF EMERGENCY LIFTED ELSEWHERE. SEE BEIRUT 10717). IN ARKUB, MOST FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN MOVED NORTH OF CHEBAA-HASBAYAH ROAD, AS CALLED FOR IN SEPT 17 ARMY DIRECTIVES. NUMBER REMAINING SOUTH OF THIS ROAD IS UNDER ONE HUNDRED AND, AS IN SOUTH, OUT OF VILLAGES. THERE ARE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF FEDAYEEN IN AND AROUND TYRE AND SIDON, INCLUDING REFUGEE CAMPS, IN ABSENCE OF ANYPLACE ELSE TO GO. FEDAYEEN WHICH HAVE MOVED OUT OF SOUTHERN ARKUB HAVE MOVED TO NORTHERN ARKUB AND BEKAA, WITH SOME REPORTEDLY HAVING GONE BACK TO SYRIA.
3. REPORTEDLY FEDAYEEN ARE NOT RPT NOT PRESSING ARMY IN SOUTH AND ARKUB AND ARE RESIGNED TO LIVING WITH STATUS QUO FOR PRESENT, WHILE LEADERS CONTINUE WORK ON LEBANESE POLITICAL LEADERS IN EFFORT BRING ABOUT SOME RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT A FEW LIGHTLY-ARMED FEDAYEEN MIGHT NOT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- BEIRUT 10811, OCT'72

DECIDE INFILTRATE PAST LEBANESE ARMY CONTROLS AND START SOMETHING WITH ISRAEL BUT THERE ARE NO PRESENT INDICATIONS EITHER OF GOL WEAKENING AT POLITICAL LEVEL OR FEDAYEEN EFFORTS SLIP PAST ARMY CONTROLS.

4. ARMY ATTACHE WILL TOUR SOUTHERN LEBANON OCT 9. WE WILL SUBMIT FURTHER UPDATING OF OUR INFO ON SITUATION AFTER HE RETURNS.
GDS.

BUFFUM

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO TEL AVIV AND USUN BY OC/T.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SEP 15 PM 3:45
WHITE HOUSE

R 150937Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8490
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9831

CONTROL: 3 7 1 9 Q
SEPTEMBER 15, 1972
7:13 AM

NODIS

SUBJ: SOVIET APPROACH TO LEBANESE

1. SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON SOVIET OFFER TO LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTAINED BEIRUT 9830 WAS FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD. HE SAID WHILE I WAS FREE TO REPORT INFORMATION, HE DID NOT WANT TO BE QUOTED AS SOURCE. I CAN ONLY SPECULATE HE MADE THIS EXCEPTIONAL REQUEST EITHER BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN TO INFORM US OR BECAUSE THIS WEEK'S ANDERSON COLUMN QUOTING A BEIRUT DESPATCH RAISES QUESTION ABOUT INTEGRITY OF LEBANESE COMMUNICATIONS WITH US, OR BOTH.

2. ABOUHAMAD REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT ON REACTION OF FRANGIE OR SALAAM TO SOVIET OFFER. I ASKED WHETHER LEBANESE THOUGHT SOVIET MILITARY OFFER WOULD BE EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO FURTHER ISRAELI AIR STRIKES AND HE REPLIED HE THOUGHT IT WOULD SERVE PRIMARILY AS A SYMBOL OF SOVIET INTEREST IN LEBANON. HE CONCLUDED FROM AZIMOV'S CONVERSATION, THAT SOVIETS ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO BEIRUT AS GATEWAY TO MIDDLE EAST.

COMMENT: LEBANESE ARE TRADITIONALLY VERY LEERY OF GETTING INVOLVED WITH RUSSIANS, AND COMING ON HEELS OF EXPULSION SOVIET ADVISERS FROM EGYPT, I DOUBT THERE IS LIKELIHOOD GOL WILL NIBBLE AT THIS BAIT EVEN THOUGH GOVERNMENT IS FEARFUL OF FUTURE ISRAELI ATTACKS AND SMARTING BITTERLY FROM OUR VETO IN SC.

SOVIETS ARE NO DOUBT MAKING A MAJOR PLAY FOR LEBANON PARTLY IN HOPES OF RECOUPING SOME OF PRESTIGE LOSS FROM EGYPTIAN IMBROGLIO. ABOUHAMAD SAID SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PRESSING HIM HARD TO VISIT MOSCOW AND HE MUST NOW ACCEDE TO REQUEST SINCE HE HAS JUST ACCPETED INVITATION FROM CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO VISIT PEKING IN NOVEMBER.

XGDS-1.
BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

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S. Harg

CONTROL: 2629Q
RECD: 12 SEP'72 11AM

R 121240Z SEP UW
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8441
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9695

NODIS

SUBJ: ISRAELI PEACE PLAN

1. TIME MAGAZINE'S ROME BUREAU CHIEF, JIM BELL, CURRENTLY IN BEIRUT SINCE HIS OFFICE PROVIDES BACK-UP SUPPORT FOR COVERAGE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL. SINCE HE IS OLD FRIEND, I ASKED HIM BACKGROUND OF RECENT TIME STORY ON ALLEGED ISRAELI PEACE OFFER TO EGYPT.

2. HE SAID "PROVIDING IT GOES NO FURTHER," HE WILLING TO INDICATE THAT SOURCES FOR STORY WERE GENERAL ELIZUR, ALLON, AND EBAN. BELL SAID TIME'S LOCAL CORRESPONDENT HAD REPORTED TO ROME HE HAD IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE STORY, SO BELL SUMMONED HIM TO ROME WHERE STORY WAS WRITTEN. HE CONSIDERED STORY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTED FIRST TIME ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN WILLING TO DRAW LINES ON A MAP (PRECISE COORDINATES WERE PROVIDED). PLAN HAF BEEN AT LEAST ONE MONTH IN THE MAKING, ACCORDING TO BELL.

3. BELL SAID HE RECOGNIZED TIME WAS BEING USED FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSE SINCE LEAKAGE OF THIS STORY APPEARED DESIGNED AS COUNTER TO RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY DAYAN ON PEACE SETTLEMENTM HOWEVER, AFTER MUCH SOUL SEARCHING, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE ADVERSE IMPACT ON ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT, BELL DECIDED STORY BONA FIDE AND DESERVED PUBLICATION.

4. GIVEN BILL'S STRICTURES, REQUEST THIS BE HELD TIGHTLY IN DEPARTMENTM
GDS.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 080640Z SEP 72
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8392
 BT
 S E C R E T BEIRUT 9541

CONTROL: 1 6 2 8 Q
 RECD: 8 SEPTEMBER 72 - 3 25AM

NODIS

REF: STATE 163676

NO OBJECTION TO HOLDING OFF INDORMING ITALIAN FONOFF.
 WE UNDERSTAND MAIOLINI WAS PLANNING WIRE FONOFF TODAY IN
 VERY GENERAL TERMS THAT MORE ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON ESTABLISH-
 MENT US PRESENCE APPEAR TO BE TAKING PLACE. BELIEVE
 THAT IS ADEQUATE COMPROMISE BETWEEN NECESSARY COURTESY TO
 ITALIANS AND IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING SECURITY. XGDS 5B (4).
 BUFFUM
 BT
 #9541

72 SEP 8 AM 8:40
 WHITE HOUSE
 SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

SEP 5 10 52 AM '72
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R 050730Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8348
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9413

SEPTEMBER 5, 1972, 4:52 AM

NODIS

DEPT PASS TO ROME

SUBJ: USINT DAMASCUS

REF: BEIRUT 9356 AND STATE 160353

SUMMARY: DCM HAD CORDIAL BUT BRIEF INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER KHPEIFAOU SEPTMBER 3 RE ASSIGNMENT AMERICAN OFFICER AND SECRETARY USINT SECTION DAMASCUS. DRAFT NOTE FORMALIZING ARRANGEMENT GIVEN PRIMIN FOR HIS CLEARANCE. HE AGREED REPLY WITHIN WEEK. CHANCES OF POSITIVE RESPONSE FIFTY-FIFTY. END SUMMARY.

1. DCM MET BRIEFLY WITH PRIMIN KHLEIFAOU SEPTMBER 3 IN MRS. BOUSTANY'S PRESENCE. MRS. BOUSTANY WHO HAD PRE-ARRANGED APPOINTMENT MET WITH PRIMIN FIRST AND ARRANGED APPOINTMENT ON SPOT FOR DCM WHO ARRIVED SEPARATELY AT PRE-ARRANGED TIME. MRS. BOUSTANY PREFERRED THAT MEETING BE BETWEEN KHLEIFAOU AND DCM ALONE BUT PRIMIN WANTED HER TO STAY.

2. KHLEIFAOU WAS VERY CORDIAL ALTHOUGH APPEARED SOMEWHAT NERVOUS. AFTER INQUIRING ABOUT KHLEIFAOU'S HEALTH AND EXPRESSING STRONG USG'S INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS, DCM STATED HE UNDERSTOOD PRIMIN HAD AGREED TO ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER AND SECRETARY TO US INTEREST SECTION ITALIAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS WITH RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT FOR SYRIANS IN PAKISTAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON. PRIMIN NODDED HIS ASSENT. TO FORMALIZE ARRANGEMENT, DCM EXPLAINED USG WISHED TO HAVE NOTE SENT VIA ITALIAN EMBASSY BUT FIRST, OF COURSE, WANTED PRIMIN'S APPROVAL OF NOTE WHOSE TEXT WAS SIMILAR TO THAT SENT EGYPTIAN AND IRAQI GOVTS (STATE'S 124862). DCM THEN HANDED PRIMIN COPIES OF NOTE IN ENGLISH AND ARABIC. KHLEIFAOU READ NOTE QUICKLY, HAD NO QUESTIONS, AND PROMISED TO MAKE DECISION RE NOTE WITHIN ONE WEEK. DCM NOTED THAT CHIEF OF US INTEREST SECTION, DR.

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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 9413, SEPTEMBER 5

MAIOLINI, EXPECTED TO RETURN TO ROME ON TRANSFER IN APPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS. SUGGESTED THAT RATHER THAN HAVE ITALIANS REPLACE MAIOLINI, AMERICAN OFFICER COULD TAKE HIS PLACE. DCM INDICATED THIS DID NOT MEAN AMERICAN OFFICER HAD TO BE ASSIGNED IN TWO WEEKS BUT THAT DEPARTURE MAIOLINI PROVIDED NATURAL TIME FOR TRANSITION (STATE'S 157913). KHLEIFAOU I LISTENED CAREFULLY BUT MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. DCM THEN ASKED PRIMIN IF HE COULD INFORM HIS GOVT THAT PRIMIN WOULD GIVE ANSWER RE NOTE IN WEEK AND THAT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS. PRIMIN AGREED. IN DEFERENCE PRIMIN'S HEALTH AND IN KNOWLEDGE HIS APPOINTMENTS WERE LIMITED IN TIME AND NUMBER, DCM TOOK HIS LEAVE.

3. KHLEIFAOU I DID NOT REQUEST WHO AMERICAN OFFICER WOULD BE AND CONSEQUENTLY DCM DID NOT TELL HIM. KHLEIFAOU I ALSO DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF DEBTS SO DCM DID NOT EITHER. IN LIGHT USG POSITION ON IPC NATIONALIZATION, DCM PARTICULARLY WISHED AVOID POSSIBILITY PRIMIN SEEKING ASSURANCE EXIM WILLING PROVIDE FINANCE AMERICAN FIRMS BE AWARDED CONTRACTS BY SARG IF BOUSTANY DEBT SETTLED. THE OBJECT WAS TO KEEP INTERVIEW AS SIMPLE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO RISK RAISING ANY ISSUES WHICH MIGHT COMPLICATE ULTIMATE DECISION.

4. EXCEPT FOR BEING NERVOUS, KHLEIFAOU I SEEMED IN GOOD SHAPE ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT MAKE VALID JUDGMENT AS DCM HAD NEVER MET HIM BEFORE.

5. COMMENT: DIFFICULT MAKE PROGNOSIS AS RESULT OF INTERVIEW ALTHOUGH ON THE FACE OF IT THE PROSPECTS OF FAVORABLE RESPONSE WOULD APPEAR GOOD. AMPLE OPPORTUNITY GIVEN PRIMIN DISCUSS PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN EITHER TIMING OR SUBSTANCE RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT BUT HE DID NOT. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES ON THIS ONE AS WE KNOW THERE ARE. MRS. BOUSTANY INDICATED TO DCM SEPTEMBER 4 IN POST-MORTEM THAT KHLEIFAOU I HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH HER ABOUT PROS AND CONS OF GOING AHEAD WITH PROJECT AND NEEDED REASSURANCE. HE HIMSELF WAS IN FAVOR BUT OBVIOUSLY HAD OPPOSITION AMONG HIS MORE RADICAL COLLEAGUES. IT IS PERHAPS A MEASURE OF THE SITUATION THAT DESPITE HER URGING, HE WOULD NOT SEE DCM ALONE. SHE SEEMS TO GIVE A FAVORABLE RESPONSE A FIFTY-FIFTY CHANCE.

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TELEGRAM

-3- BEIRUT 9413, SEPTEMBER 5

6. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT PRIMIN WILL GIVE POSITIVE SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE BUT IN DEFERENCE RUSSIANS AND INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT SUGGEST TIMING OF ASSIGNMENT BE DELAYED A WHILE. WE ARE CONCERNED RE FONMIN KHADDAM'S POSITION AS HE WAS ONE WHO REFUSED LAST YEAR SEND NOTE RE DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES FOR OFFICER VISITING DAMASCUS THREE TIMES A WEEK FROM BEIRUT HANDLE CONSULAR AFFAIRS. KHLEIFAUI MUST HAVE CLEARED PROPOSAL WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AND ONE WOULD THINK THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN SUCH A FORTHRIGHT POSITION WITHOUT REASONABLE EXPECTATION HE WOULD BE SUPPORTED.

7. AS THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT ASSIGNMENT AMERICAN OFFICER MAY MATERIALIZE NEAR FUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW INFORM HIGH-RANKING ITALIAN FONOFFICE OFFICIAL RE SITUATION WITHOUT INDICATING KHLEIFAUI POINT OF CONTACT. DOUBT IF THIS WILL COME AS GREAT SURPRISE TO ITALIAMS, AS MAIOLINI HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO FONOFFICE CONVERSATION WITH SYRIAN FONOFFICE OFFICIAL (ABOUT THREE WEEKS BACK) WHO COMMENTED SOMEWHAT CRYPTICALLY THAT TIME FOR DISCUSSION OF ASSIGNMENT AMERICAN OFFICER MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE IN MONTH OR SO. HE ALSO HAS SPECULATED IN REPORTS TO FONOFFICE THAT RECENT VISITS AMBASSADORS YOST AND HART MIGHT HAVE INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. WE SHOULD STRONGLY ENJOIN FONOFFICE OFFICIAL TO HOLD MATTER CLOSELY PENDING FINAL DECISION. WE WILL BE DOING SAME.

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TELEGRAM

O 010850Z SEP 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8336
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9356

3 7 Q
RECVD: 01 SEP 72
5:29AM

NODIS

SUBJ: USINT DAMASCUS

REF: STATE 157913

1. SINCE HOUGHTON/SEELYE LETTER AUGUST 18 WE HAVE LEARNED THAT MAIOLINI'S DEPARTURE DELAYED ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG. PRESUMABLY ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE IS HOLDING HIM OVER IN ORDER TO HELP NEW ITALIAN AMBASSADOR GET SETTLED. MAIOLINI AT THE MOMENT IS THE ONLY ITALIAN SUBSTANTIVE OFFICER IN THE EMBASSY WITH ANY EXTENDED EXPERIENCE IN SYRIAN AFFAIRS. WE IMAGINE HE WILL PROBABLY REMAIN INTO OCTOBER BUT WE WILL KNOW DEFINITELY WHEN WE HAVE CHANCE TO TALK TO HIM PERSONALLY.

2. IN ANY EVENT HE IS LEAVING. WE SEE NO DIFFICULTY IN PUTTING FORTH DEPARTMENT'S PROPOUL REFTEL. OUR EFFORTS TO SEE PRIME MINISTER KHLEIFAQWI HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY HIS RECOVERY FROM HIS OPERATION IN LONDON (BEIRUT 8856), AND WE SUSPECT BY SOME SYRIAN HESITANCY IN LIGHT SOVIET/EGYPTIAN RELATIONS AND GENERAL AREA SITUATION. HE IS BACK IN OFFICE BUT HIS STAFF HAS BEEN LIMITING BOTH THE NUMBER AND DURATION KHLEIFAQWI APPOINTMENTS.

3. TO DATE MRS. BOUSTANY HERSELF HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE HIM AND WE SUSPECT IN DEFERENCE TO HIS HEALTH HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO PRESS HIM. SHE IS TRYING TO OBTAIN APPOINTMENT FOR DCM SUNDAY AT WHICH TIME WE PROPOSE TO SHOW KHLEIFAQWI DRAFT NOTE (STATE 124682), WHICH ITALIANS WOULD SEND SYRIAN FOREIGN OFFICE AFTER KHLEIFAQWI'S CLEARANCE AND IN GENERAL TRY TO GET FINAL AGREEMENT FOR ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICER.

4. IF PRIME MINISTER ASKS, MAY WE GIVE SCOTES NAME AS OFFICER TO BE ASSIGNED TO DAMASCUS?

5. DOES DEPARTMENT HAVE ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE?

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4 8 6 5 Q

20 JULY 7 22 AM

P 201035Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7939
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 7872

NODIS

DEPT PASS TO LONDON AS PRIORITY

SUBJ: USINT DAMASCUS

REF: DEPT 129518; LONDON 6693

72 JUL 20 AM 10:07

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. IN LATE AFTERNOON JULY 19, BEFORE LONDON REFTTEL RECEIVED, WE HAD TO GIVE MRS. BOUSTANY NAME OF LAMBRAKIS AS CONTACT BECAUSE OF HER PLANNED DEPARTURE FOR LONDON MORNING JULY 20. SHE HAS CARD OF INTRODUCTION FROM PRATT TO LAMBRAKIS AS IDENTIFICATION.

2. FOR LONDON: (A) MRS. BOUSTANY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN LONDON HOTEL RESERVATIONS PRIOR DEPARTURE. HOWEVER, SHE SAID SHE COULD BE REACHED THROUGH MR. JACK HOLMES OR MISS POWELL, THOMAS STOREY (ENGINEERS) LIMITED, 8 SOUTH WARF LONDON W2, TELEPHONE 01-262-3456. WE WOULD APPRECIATE LONDON'S INFORMING HER OF LAMBRAKIS-OPLINGER SWITCH. (B) ON MODUS OPERANDI, WE INVARIABLY MEET HER OUTSIDE EMBASSY. SHE MAY WELL WISH CONTINUE THIS PRACTICE ESPECIALLY SINCE SHE IS PLANNING TO CARE FOR PRIMIN KHLIFAOU'S THREE SMALL CHILDREN SO AS TO PERMIT MRS. KHLIFAOU SPEND MORE TIME WITH HER HUSBAND. ALSO SHE OBVIOUSLY WILL WISH TO CONTINUE KEEPING HER AMERICAN EMBASSY CONTACTS AS DISCREET AS POSSIBLE. (C) SHE ALSO TOLD US JULY 19 SHE MAY HAVE TO TRAVEL TO U.S. FROM LONDON BUT HER U.S. VISA HAD JUST EXPIRED. WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO HER RECEIVING NEW VISA IN LONDON SINCE SHE IS OBVIOUSLY "WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN" TO US. SHE RECEIVED 6 MONTH B-1 VISA IN JAN 1972.

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-2 - BEIRUT 7872 NODIS

3. FOR DEPT:

A. WE INFORMED HER SUBSTANCE DEPTTEL 128892. SHE TOOK NEWS PHILOSOPHICALLY ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED.

B. SHE ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY MEDICAL CARE FOR KHLEIFAQI IN U.S. PRATT NOTED THAT THE POSSIBILITY HAD OCCURRED TO US BUT IN VIEW KHLEIFAQI'S REFUSAL SOVIET OFFERS, WE HAD NOT INITIATED SUCH PROPOSAL. SHE INDICATED SHE MIGHT DISCUSS IT WITH KHLEIFAQI ALTHOUGH SHE HAD NOT YET BROACHED IT TO HIM.

XDGS-4.

HOUGHTON

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TELEGRAM

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P 180940Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7902
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 7758

4161Q
1972 JUL 18 1022Z

NODIS

SUBJECT: USINT DAMASCUS

REF: BEIRUT 7693

JUL 18 AM 11:49
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. MRS. BOUSTANY REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH PRATT JULY 17 AT WHICH SHE REITERATED HER INTENTION TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON PRESENT OPERATION. SHE NOTED THAT SHE WAS ENCOUNTERING EXPENSES AT A TIME WHEN SHE WAS SHORT ON CASH BUT REEMPHASIZED ANY UNFAVORABLE RESPONSE TO REFTEL FROM WASHINGTON WOULD NOT IN ANY EVENT CAUSE HER TO BREAK OFF ONGOING DISCUSSIONS.

2. SHE HAD HOPED TO SEE KHLIFAQOI PRIOR LATTER'S DEPARTURE TO LONDON BUT HE LEFT DAY EARLIER THAN PLANNED, JULY 16 OR 17, THUS SHE MISSED HIM. HIS WIFE AND THREE CHILDREN ARE JOINING HIM THERE SHORTLY. SHE PLANS SPEND 10 DAYS IN LONDON BEGINNING JULY 20 AND EXPECTS TO SEE HIM THERE. PRATT ASKED SHE PASS TO KHLIFAQOI WORD OF USG WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT OF ONE OFFICER AND ONE SECRETARY TO USINT DAMASCUS. PROPOSED DRAFT FOR KHLIFAQOI'S CONSIDERATION NOT PASSED SINCE WE DEEM IT ADVISABLE THAT THIS DRAFT BE DISCUSSED FACE TO FACE WITH HIM.

3. MRS. BOUSTANY ALSO ASKS FOR NAME RESPONSIBLE OFFICER EMBASSY LONDON WHO CAN PASS TO US ANY MESSAGES ARISING FROM HER CONVERSATIONS WITH KHLIFAQOI.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: (A) DEPT BRIEF LONONDON TO EFFECT THAT MRS. BOUSTANY SERVING AS INTERMEDIARY IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIMIN ON ASSIGNMENT US PERSONNEL TO USINT DAMASCUS AND THAT ANY MESSAGES FROM HER BE PASSED AS SECRET NODIS. (B) DEPT GIVE US NAME OFFICER SHE SHOULD CONTACT AT LONDON. SGDS - 4.

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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JUL 16 PM 12

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 3 6 9 7 Q
RECD: 15 JUL 72Z 13 31

R 151145Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7886
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 7693

NODIS

SUBJ: USINT DAMASCUS

REF: STATE 124682

1. SUMMARY: A POSSIBLE COMPLICATION HAS ARISEN IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIANS RE ASSIGNMENT U.S. OFFICER TO USINT DAMASCUS. MRS. BOUSTANI HAS REQUESTED SOME FORM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PRIME MINISTER KHLEIFAQOI TO INSURE WELFARE HIS FAMILY. BOUSTANI CLAIMS REQUEST HER OWN AND KHLEIFAQOI NOT AWARE HER ACTION. INSISTS ON RESPONSE FROM USG WHICH EMBASSY RECOMMENDS BE NEGATIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. PURSUANT TO REFTEL, PRATT REQUESTED MRS. BOUSTANI ON JULY 13 TO OBTAIN APPOINTMENT FOR HIM WITH PRIME MINISTER KHLEIFAQOI. HOWEVER, SHE WAS SURPRISINGLY NON-COMMITTAL RE HIS REQUEST ALTHOUGH SHE ASSURED HIM THAT PRIME MINISTER WAS STILL INTERESTED IN GOING AHEAD WITH ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER IN DAMASCUS. THE REASONS FOR HER ATTITUDE WERE NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR BUT A RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PRATT-BOUSTANI CONVERSATIONS MAY PROVIDE AT LEAST A PARTIAL EXPLANATION FOR "SLUFFING OFF" IBIS REQUEST.

3. A FEW CONVERSATIONS BACK MRS. BOUSTANI REFERRED A NUMBER OF TIMES TO THE FACT THAT GENERAL KHLEIFAQOI WAS AN HONEST MAN, HAD NO INDEPENDENT RESOURCES AND WAS DEPENDENT ON HIS SALARY. HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF HIS FAMILY SHOULD ANYTHING HAPPEN TO HIM. THE CLEAR IMPLICATION WAS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT OFFER KHLEIFAQOI INSURANCE FOR HIS FAMILY'S WELFARE IN FORM OF SOME TYPE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. PRATT FUDGED THE ISSUE BUT WHEN HE SAW MRS. BOUSTANI ON JULY 13 SHE ASKED HIM POINT BLANK IF HE HAD A RESPONSE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO "HER REQUEST."

4. BEFORE MENTIONING THIS TO THE DEPARTMENT PRATT AND

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-2-BEIRUT 7693, JULY 15

CHARGE DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD FIND OUT FROM MRS. BOUSTANI WHETHER HER REQUEST WAS A CONDITION FOR EITHER THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN OFFICER OR A FURTHER MEETING BETWEEN PRATT AND KHLEIFAOU. CONSEQUENTLY, AT FIVE O'CLOCK ON FRIDAY JULY 14 THE CHARGE AND PRATT MET WITH MRS. BOUSTANI. AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR WHAT SHE HAD DONE TO DATE, THE CHARGE ADVISED HER THAT IN MOVING AHEAD WITH THIS PROJECT, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSUMED THAT BOTH SYRIA AND THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WAS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT AS UNLESS THERE WAS SUCH A MUTUAL DESIRE IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN OFFICER WOULD SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE. IN THIS CONTEXT WE WERE SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BY A REQUEST SHE HAD MADE TO MR. PRATT AND WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT SHE WAS PROPOSING THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFER SOME SORT OF ASSISTANCE TO PRIME MINISTER KHLEIFAOU TO ENSURE THE WELFARE OF HIS FAMILY. WAS THIS A CONDITION FOR EITHER A MEETING BETWEEN PRATT AND KHLEIFAOU OR FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF A U.S. OFFICER IN DAMASCUS.

5. MRS. BOUSTANI QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT KHLEIFAOU KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THE PROPOSAL WHICH WAS HER OWN IDEA. KHLEIFAOU WAS A GOOD AND HONEST MAN AND SHE WANTED TO HELP HIM. HER PROPOSAL WAS NOT A CONDITION FOR EITHER PRATT'S MEETING WITH KHLEIFAOU OR THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN OFFICER TO DAMASCUS. THE CHARGE RESPONDED THAT HE WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR THIS AS SUCH A CONDITION WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DID NOT FAVOR ACTION OF THIS NATURE. MRS. BOUSTANI INSISTED, HOWEVER, THAT SHE WANTED A RESPONSE WHICH THE CHARGE UNDERTOOK TO OBTAIN. HE ASKED IF IN THE MEANTIME SHE WOULD OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT FOR PRATT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS HE HAD A MESSAGE TO PASS ON TO THE PRIME MINISTER. SHE INDICATED THAT SHE WOULD DO THIS BUT SAID SHE HAD HAD SOME DIFFICULTY RECENTLY IN CONTACTING KHLEIFAOU AS HE HAD NOT BEEN IN HIS OFFICE. (FRIDAY IS NON-WORK DAY IN DAMASCUS.) HOWEVER SHE HOPED TO SEE HIM JULY 15, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE GOES TO LONDON FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT EARLY NEXT WEEK.

6. COMMENT: WE OBVIOUSLY STILL DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE REQUEST FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE COMES FROM KHLEIFAOU OR FROM MRS. BOUSTANI AS SHE WOULD HAVE MADE THE SAME RESPONSE IN EITHER CASE. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOW IN A POSITION TO RESPOND TO HER WITHOUT OSTENSIBLY REBUFFING KHLEIFAOU. WE REALIZE THAT TURNING DOWN MRS. BOUSTANI'S REQUEST COULD,

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-3-BEIRUT 7693, JULY 15

ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY JEOPARDIZE OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS BUT WE QUESTION WHETHER THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE WORTH PURSUING IF WE HAVE TO BUY OUR WAY IN. IT MAY BE AS MRS. BOUSTANI MAINTAINS A PERSONAL SUGGESTION WHICH WOULD FIT WITH HER LEBANESE CHARACTER. IT MAY ALSO BE SIMPLY A MOVE BY KHLEIFAQOI TO SEE IF HE CAN OBTAIN A LITTLE INSURANCE FOR HIS FAMILY THROUGH THE DEAL. IF, HOWEVER, HE HAS ACTUALLY CLEARED HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRATT WITH ASSAD, WHICH WE THINK HE MUST HAVE DONE IF HE IS ON THE LEVEL, WE DOUBT THAT OUR REFUSAL TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WILL IN ITSELF LEAD SARG TO REFUSE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROJECT. WE ALSO ARE BEARING IN MIND THAT SECURITY OF SARG AND KHLEIFAQOI'S POSITION IS BY NO MEANS ASSURED.

7. CONSEQUENTLY WE RECOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM MRS. BOUSTANI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT WE REGRET THAT THE PROVISION OF SUCH ASSISTANCE TO AN INDIVIDUAL MEMBER OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WE THEREFORE CANNOT ACCEDE TO HER REQUEST.

8. WE HAVE TRIED TO THINK OF APPROPRIATE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD HELP KHLEIFAQOI BUT HAVE NO SUGGESTIONS AT THE MOMENT. WE THOUGHT OF OFFERING MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BUT AS HE HAS ALREADY TURNED DOWN SUCH ASSISTANCE FROM THE RUSSIANS WE DOUBT IF HE WOULD FEEL HE COULD ACCEPT MEDICAL HELP FROM US.

9. FINALLY, AS WE CONSIDER (AND SHE CERTAINLY DOES) USG YYS SOME OBLIGATIONS TO MRS. BOUSTANI FOR SERVICES RENDERED, WE HOPE DEPT CAN FACILITATE ASSISTANCE REQUESTED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL CONCERNING MRS. BOUSTANI'S INTEREST OBTAINING AGENCY REPRESENTATION FOR AMERICAN FIRM BIDDING ON LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES TELECOMMUNICATIONS TENDER.
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TELEGRAM

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P 030830Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7769
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 7246

RECVD: 03 JUL 72
6:11AM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
JUL 3 1 39 PM '72

NODIS

1. MRS. BOUSTANY REPORTED FOLLOWING TO PRATT IMMEDIATELY AFTER HER RETURN FROM DAMASCUS AFTERNOON JULY 1.

A. MRS. BOUSTANY SAW PRIMIN KHLEIFAOU MORNING JULY 1 WHO INFORMED HER SARG HAD DECIDED ACCEPT ONE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC OFFICER TO BE PERMANENTLY RESIDENT DAMASCUS AT BEGINNING AS PART OF ITALIAN EMBASSY WITH GRADUAL STAFF EXPANSION FEW MONTHS THEREAFTER. PRIMIN THOUGHT FIRST TASK OF OFFICER SHOULD PRIMARILY BE TO WORK OUT ECONOMIC ISSUES AT OPERATING LEVEL OF SARG BUT RAISING MAJOR ISSUES WITH HIM THROUGH MRS. BOUSTANY-- AT LEAST AT BEGINNING. (NOT CLEAR AT THIS POINT WHETHER US OFFICER WOULD BE AUTHORIZED HANDLE CONSULAR FUNCTIONS) MRS. BOUSTANY NOT SURE IF DECISION TO ACCEPT OFFICER WAS MADE AT CABINET OR BA'TH PARTY REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL BUT SHE SAID PM HAD CLEARED IT WITH OTHERS.

B. ON TIMING: PRIMIN TOLD HER US ABSTENTION IN UNSC LAST WEEK HAD MADE THINGS DIFFICULT AND A LITTLE MORE TIME WAS NEEDED BEFORE OFFICER COULD COME IN. ALSO PLANNING FOR PRESIDENT ASSAD'S VISIT TO USSG IN COMING WEEK HAD PRE-EMPTED ATTENTION (PRIMIN GOING ALSO). IMPLICATION WAS THAT SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM USSR WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR US RESPONSE. MRS. BOUSTANY URGED STRONGLY THAT USG SHOULD ACCEPT PROPOSAL AND BE PREPARED TO NAME OFFICER FOR THIS POSITION AT SAME TIME SO AS NOT TO LOSE MOMENTUM ON THIS DEVELOPMENT.

C. ON SPECIFIC US-SARG BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES, PRIMIN SAID ACTION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO MINECON BUT HIS REPORT HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT PRIMIN OFFICE. MINECON HAD GONE TO ALGERIA PREVIOUS DAY. MRS. BOUSTANY HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SEE FAMOUS KHLEIFAOUI TEMPER IN ACTION. HE WAS CLEARLY EMBARRASSED BY HIS INABILITY TO PROVIDE ANSWER PROMISED TO PRATT DURING JUNE 12 MEETING.

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TELEGRAM

-2- BEIRUT 7246, 3 JUL 72

2. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. WE RECOGNIZE CHANCES LEAKAGE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS INCREASING WITH SARG GOVT CLEARANCE PM'S DECISION. NEVERTHELESS, WE DEEM IT STILL DESIRABLE CONTINUE TIGHT NODIS SECURITY CONTROLS ON THESE DISCUSSIONS. (AT OUR REQUEST MRS. BOUSTANY EMPHASIZED TO KHLEIFAOU I WE WERE NOT RPT NOT INFORMING ITALIAN EMBASSY ABOUT THESE DISCUSSIONS AND WOULD AWAIT WORD FROM HIM WHEN IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO DO SO: PM GAVE ASSURANCES ON THIS POINT.)

B. BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED MOVE AHEAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. IN VIEW PRATT'S LONG FAMILIARITY SYRIA AND ESPECIALLY US-SYRIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES (NINE CONSECUTIVE YEARS -- FROM DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT VANTAGE POINTS), HIS PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH KHLEIFAOU I, AND HIS PRESENT AVAILABILITY WOULD MAKE IT LOGICAL FOR HIM TO BE NAMED TO DAMASCUS IN BEGINNING FOR THIS DUTY.

C. RE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES, WE CONSIDER THIS CAN BE GIVEN LESSER PROMINENCE THAN WE DID IN 1971 EXCHANGE OVER CONSULAR REPRESENTATION, FIRST BECAUSE OF HIGH LEVEL NATURE OF SARG PROPOSAL AND SECOND BECAUSE WE THINK OFFICIAL STATUS OF AMERICAN OFFICER IN SYRIA COULD BE FORMALIZED BY SARG ISSUANCE OF SYRIAN DIPLOMATIC IDENTITY CARD WHICH IN ITSELF CARRIES ASSURANCES OF PERSONAL DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY. THIS WOULD GIVE US SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES TO BEGIN OPERATIONS.

3. WE CONSIDER IT MOST IMPORTANT TO GET FOOT IN DOOR NOW, PARTICULARLY WHILE WE HAVE HIGH LEVEL EAR TO WHICH WE CAN BRING ANY OPERATING PROBLEMS UNRESOLVABLE AT LOWER ECHELONS.

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 6971Q

RECD: 26 JUN 15 13Z

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261437Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7713
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 7003

NODIS

SUBJ: SYRIA: KHLEIFAOU DISCUSSES U.S. CREDIT PROBLEMS

REF: BEIRUT 6462

SUMMARY: KHLEIFAOU TOLD MRS. BOUSTANY JUNE 25 HE IS MEETING INTERNAL SKEPTICISM RE USG GOOD FAITH IN MAKING CREDITS AVAILABLE IF CLAIMS SETTLED. WE REQUEST BY JUNE 29 SPECIFIC EXIM PC BE EXTENDED SUBJECT TO BOUSTANY CLAIM SETTLEMENT.

1. MRS. BOUSTANY REPORTED JUNE 26 ON HER CONVERSATION PRECEDING DAY WITH PRIMIN KHLEIFAOU WHO WAS EXCEEDINGLY ANXIOUS TO SEE HER AND ASKED SHE MAKE SPECIAL TRIP TO DAMASCUS. HE TOLD HER THAT HE IS ENCOUNTERING INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO REGULATING U.S.-SYRIAN CREDIT PROBLEMS. HE SAID ATTITUDE OF OFFICIALS IS, "WHY BOTHER TO SETTLE; USG MERELY STRINGING YOU ALONG; AND SETTLEMENT WILL NOT RESULT IN CREDIT FACILITIES." HE FURTHER REITERATED HIS PROMISE TO HAVE REPORT ON U.S.-SYRIAN CREDIT PROBLEMS AND HAS SET APPOINTMENT FOR MRS. BOUSTANY AT 1200 HOURS JULY 1 IN DAMASCUS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH HER ON MATTER.

2. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: WE ARE NOT SURPRISED AT THIS INTERNAL OPPOSITION, AND, IN FACT, PRATT HAD REFERRED INDIRECTLY TO THIS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH KHLEIFAOU JUNE 12 WHEN HE NOTED ADVANTAGES TO SARG. FOR SETTLEMENT. THUS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD STRENGTHEN OURS AND KHLEIFAOU'S POSITION WERE WE ABLE TO GIVE TO MRS. BOUSTANY FOR PASSING TO HIM SOME SPECIFIC INDICATION OF POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO SYRIA AS RESULT SETTLEMENT OUTSTANDINGS. WE ACCORDINGLY PROPOSE THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED GIVE AS EXAMPLE OUR WILLINGNESS TO OFFER PC ON GENERAL ELECTRIC-MITSUI USA REQUEST FOR PC COVERING GAS TURBINES (STATE 63051), RETAINING, OF COURSE, CONDITION FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUSTANY CLAIM. (FYI: MRS. BOUSTANY AND WE

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-2- S E C R E T BEIRUT 7003, NODIS, JUN 26

BELIEVE, AS RESULT HER CONVERSATION, THAT PRIMIN ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD BUT FEELS TOO VULNERABLE WITHOUT HAVING IN HAND SOME COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE SUCH AS THIS PC WHICH HE CAN USE TO OVERCOME HIS INTERNAL SKEPTICS.

3. IF DEPT OR EXIM PREPARED TO MENTION OTHER POSSIBLE PC'S THIS WOULD BE ADDITIONAL HELP. WE ARE NOT PROPOSING CCC WHEAT CREDIT OFFER AS WE DID IN 1970 AND 1971 BECAUSE SYRIA HAS GOOD CROP WITH EXPORTABLE SURPLUS THIS YEAR.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: RESPONSE BY JUNE 29 INDICATING POSSIBILITIES. GP-1.

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#7003

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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14 JUNE 10 13 AM

O 141354Z JUN 72 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7597
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 6514

JUN 14 PM 3:59
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MODIS

SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS

REF: STATE 105474

IN LIGHT PRATT/KHLEIFAQUI CONTACT (EMBTCL 6462 WHICH
CROSSED REFTCL) STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE POSTPONE FURTHER
THEROS CONTACTS UNTIL WE HAVE BEEN ABLE CARRY KHLEIFAQUI
CONVERSATION FURTHER. BELIEVE THEROS MEETING AIRASH AT
THIS TIME MIGHT CONFUSE AND POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZE TALKS
WITH KHLEIFAQUI. SUGGEST AMMAN BE INSTRUCTED DEFER ACTION.
GP-1.

BUFFUM

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TELEGRAM

72 JUN 14 PM 14
INTELL COSM

P 140723Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7579
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 6462

CN: 36930
Rec'd: June 14, 1972
5:53 a.m.

NODIS

NOFORN

SUBJ: SYRIA: CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER

SUMMARY: IN APPOINTMENT JUNE 12 ARRANGED THROUGH INTERMEDIARY OF LEBANESE BUSINESSWOMAN AND LEGATT, WHO IS FRIEND OF LATTER, ECON COUNSELOR PRATT DISCUSSED WITH SARG PRIMIN KHLIFAOU I IN DAMASCUS OUTSTANDING U.S.-SYRIAN ECONOMIC ISSUES. KHLIFAOU I'S RECEPTION OF PRATT VERY WARM AND CORDIAL. REVIEW OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND PRESENTATION OF REASONS FOR U.S. POSITION RESULTED IN KHLIFAOU I'S ASSURANCES HE WOULD HAVE SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLVING OUR OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITHIN TWO WEEKS. END SUMMARY.

ACTION REQUESTED: THIS FIRST MEETING WITH SENIOR SYRIAN OFFICIAL AFTER FIVE YEARS' BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WAS A HIGHLY TENTATIVE AND GUARDED AFFAIR. WE CONSIDER IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT VERY FACT OF THIS MEETING, AS WELL AS SUBSTANCE, MUST BE HELD TO THE STRICTEST OF NEED-TO-KNOW CRITERIA. ANY PREMATURE LEAK COULD KILL THIS START OF DIALOGUE WHICH WE REGARD AS PROMISING. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP THIS MESSAGE WITH OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY.

1. [REDACTED], LEBANESE BUSINESSWOMAN (PLEASE PROTECT) WHO IS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH PRIMIN KHLIFAOU I, HAS KEPT LEGATT WELL INFORMED HER DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIMIN IN WHICH SHE URGED HE SEEK CLOSER RELATIONS WITH WEST, PARTICULARLY U.S., ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

[REDACTED] HER URGINGS LED SARG PRIMIN AGREE TO APPOINTMENT WITH PRATT FOR JUNE 12 IN HIS DAMASCUS OFFICE UNDER CONDITIONS OF STRICTEST SECRECY, E.G., PRATT WAS CARRIED ON PRIMIN APPOINTMENT LIST ONLY AS VISITING FOREIGN BUSINESSMAN [REDACTED] AND USED

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PER SEC. 3.5(b)(1)

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

NLN 09-13/26 per sec 3.3(b)(1)(v), Hr. 1/22/2010
By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010

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TELEGRAM

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-2- BEIRUT 6462, JUNE 14, 1972

TOURISM IN DAMASCUS AS COVER. HE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO PRIMIN'S CONFERENCE ROOM UPON ARRIVAL, WITHOUT PASSING THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES.

2. PRIMIN'S RECEPTION PRATT MARKED BY HIGH DEGREE CORDIALITY AND FRANK INTERCHANGE OF VIEWS. PRIMIN LEFT CABINET MEETING AND KEPT MINISTERS WAITING FOR OVER ONE HOUR WHILE HE TALKED WITH PRATT.

3. HE OPENED WITH USUAL REMARKS ABOUT NO QUARREL WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE WHOM HE LIKED AND RESPECTED, BUT IT WAS USG POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST THAT HE OPPOSED. HE SAID SYRIA WAS SMALL COUNTRY AND DID NOT WANT TO BE SWALLOWED UP AND HAD TO PROTECT ITSELF BEST WAY IT COULD. PRATT NOTED NEW-STAGE WORLD POLIITICS EMERGING, SYMBOLIZED BY PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISITS TO PEKING AND MOSCOW. PRIMIN'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE HOPED U.S. AND USSR WOULD NOT COMBINE AND SWALLOW UP SMALL COUNTRIES. THEN SAID HE THOUGHT MOSCOW MEETING LEFT BOTH VIETNAMESE AND MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS UNSOLVED. THRUST OF THIS PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE WAS KHEIFAQI'S CLEAR IMPLICATION SYRIAN SELF-DEFENSE WAS MAJOR REASON FOR CLOSE SYRIAN RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS.

4. PRATT POINTED TO VARIOUS CREDIT OFFERS U.S. HAD MADE TO SYRIA AS EVIDENCE U.S. POLICY NOT SO ENTIRELY ONE-SIDED AGAINST SYRIA AS HE THOUGHT, CITING FIRST CCC CREDIT OFFERS FOR \$25 MILLION WHEAT IN BOTH 1970 AND '71. PRIMIN APPEARED UNFAMILIAR WITH THESE OFFERS. PRATT EXPLAINED LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT TERMS THAT USG COULD OFFER BECAUSE LACK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHICH PROHIBITED PL-480 AGREEMENTS.

5. RE EXIM OFFERS, PROBLEM OF BOUSTANY CLAIM RAISED AND HE WAS GIVEN BRIEFING PAPER ON U.S. CREDIT OFFERS AND EXPOSITION OF PROBLEMS (COPY POUCHED NEA/ARN). PRATT POINTED OUT ADVANTAGES FOR SYRIA IN SETTLING THESE PROBLEMS, CITING ON ILLUSTRATIVE BASIS HIS CONVERSATION WITH G.E. REP FEW DAYS EARLIER WHO NEEDED EXIM CREDITS IN ORDER TO COMPETE ON SYRIAN PROJECTS, AND NOTED TO HIM CREDIT TERMS WERE RECOGNIZED AS ESSENTIAL FOR ANY BIDDING ON SYRIAN PROJECTS. THIS LED TO LONG DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN SYRIA. HIS PARTICULAR

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v-3- BEIRUT 6462, JUNE 14, 1972

INTERESTS WERE IN FIELDS OF IRRIGATION, TELEVISION, AND TOURISM. (WE NOTED PAN AM INTERNATIONAL HOTEL INTEREST.)

6. PRIMIN ASKED HOW TO SETTLE THESE ISSUES, ESPECIALLY BOUSTANY CLAIM AND PL-480 INDEBTEDNESS. PRATT, WHILE MAKING CLEAR HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE WASHINGTON RESPONSE, SUGGESTED SARG COME FORWARD WITH PROPOSALS ON HOW THESE PROBLEMS MIGHT BE HANDLED; PERHAPS GOVERNOR CENTRAL BANK MIGHT WORK ON PROBLEMS, EITHER DIRECTLY WITH U.S. REP OR THROUGH INTERMEDIARY OF PROTECTING POWER. PRECEDENT OF U.S.-EGYPTIAN DEBT RESCHEDULING ALSO NOTED WHICH INTERESTED HIM. HIS RESPONSE WAS THEN, "LET ME HAVE TWO WEEKS TO GET YOU AN ANSWER AND BOTH THESE PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED." KHLEIFAQWI CLOSED MEETING BY EXPRESSING HOPE PRATT WOULD COME BACK TO SYRIA IN FUTURE.

7. PRIMIN ALSO MADE POINT [REDACTED] ASIDE THAT IF HE THOUGHT IMPROVEMENT OF U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS WOULD BE IN BEST INTERESTS OF SYRIA, HE WAS PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH DECISION WITHOUT REGARD TO CRITICISM HE MIGHT FACE.

8. COMMENTS:

A. PRATT DID NOT RAISE DIRECTLY REOPENING AMERICAN STAFF AT USINT SINCE THRUST OF CONVERSATION INDICATED THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE. [REDACTED]

B. QUESTION OF \$18,000 PAST DUE OBLIGATION ON AID SILOS LOAN NOT RAISED BECAUSE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS LOAN WERE SUFFICIENTLY THORNY TO LEAD TO POSSIBLE RECRIMINATIONS MARRING THIS FIRST EXCHANGE.

C. [REDACTED], WHO SERVED AS INTERPRETER, LATER TOLD PRATT THAT SHE HAD BEEN GREATLY WORRIED ABOUT RECEPTION HE WOULD RECEIVE FROM PRIMIN IN VIEW OF HIS REPUTATION AS HARD AND STERN TASKMASTER WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS. BOTH SHE AND PRATT

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PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)(6)

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PER SEC. 3.3(b)(6)

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-4- BEIRUT 6462, JUNE 14, 1972

WERE AGREEABLY SURPRISED BY WARMTH AND COURTESY OF RECEPTION. PRIMIN MADE POINT OF THANKING HER ON DEPARTURE FOR HAVING ARRANGED VISIT.

9. IMPRESSIONS OF KHEIFAQWI: KHEIFAQWI APPEARED SELF-CONFIDENT AND MUCH IN CONTROL. HE IS HARD-WORKING, ENERGETIC AND IMPRESSIVE IN HIS OUTSPOKEN, STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. HE APPEARED THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH EVEN MINOR DETAILS OF GOVERNMENT PROJECTS. WE HAVE EARLIER RELAYED REPORTS THAT HE MIGHT SOON BE OUT OF PREMIERSHIP BECAUSE OF HIS MARTINET ATTITUDE AND INSISTENCE ON MAKING ALL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. HOWEVER, AT NO TIME DURING CONVERSATION DID HE GIVE ANY INDICATION HIS POSITION INSECURE. WE THINK HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT POLITICAL RISKS OF MEETING AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC OFFICER (WHICH COULD BE USED AS WEAPON TO UPSET HIM) REFLECTS, IN FACT, HIS CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO SURVIVE. GP-1.

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TELEGRAM

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12

P R 171037Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6662
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3017
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 1870
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 2944

72 MAR 17 12:36
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE

NODIS

REF TEL AVIV 1748

1. I QUERIED DR SADAQA ABOUT ALLEGED MARCH 12 MEETING BETWEEN LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS. HE CHECKED AND FOUND THERE WAS NO MEETING IN THE NORMAL SENSE OF AN ILMAC MEETING. ALL THAT HAPENED WAS LEBANESE MILITARY TURNED OVER TO ISRAELI MILITARY THE THREE CIVILIANS WHO HAD WANDERED INTO LEBANON BY MISTAKE AS REPORTED MYTEL 2855. (NO WONDER ISRAELIS SAY "MEETING" WAS SUCCESSFUL). GAZIT'S APPARENT EFFORT TO PARLY THIS INFO IMPRESSION THAT MEETINGS GOING ON AS USUAL AND EVERYTHING JUST FINE, IS DISINGENUOUS TO PUT IT MILDLY.

2. SADAQA HAS JUST PHONED BACK TO SAY GOL HAS NOW QUESTIONED CLOSELY LEBANESE CAPTAIN WHO HANDED OVER THREE ISRAELIS AT RAS NAQURA MARCH 12. CAPTAIN STATES ONLY SUBJECT DISCUSSED WAS RETURN OF ISRAELIS, AND HE CARRIED OUT ORDERS TO CONFINE HIMSELF TO THIS POINT. ISRAELIS REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THEIR EARLY RELEASE AND GOOD TREATMENT. IN SUM, NO RPT NO CHANGE IN GOL POSITION AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

GP-3

BUFFUM

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2944

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

73 OCT 9 AM 11 10

WRITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 2 0 2 3Q

O 090010Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 1069
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 7966
BT
S E C R E T STATE 199794

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: IS, PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAELI COMMUNICATION TO GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON
FOR AMBASSADOR BUFFUM

SECRETARY HAS RECEIVED FOLLOWING ASSURANCE FROM THE ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT WHICH IT ASKED THAT WE COMMUNICATE TO GOL:
ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION OF VIOLATING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY
PROVIDED LEBANON REFRAINS FROM MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST
ISRAEL. KISSINGER

NEA:JJSISCO
10/8/73 X 29380
NEA:JJSISCO

S/S-0 - MISS ELTZ

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TELEGRAM

73 OCT. 9 AM 11:48

O 082058Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1065
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7962
BT
SECRET STATE 199772

WH CONTROL 2 0 0 9Q
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, LE, SY, IS
SUBJ: LEBANESE DEMARCHE
REF: BEIRUT 11884

1. MATTER REFERRED TO REFTEL HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH ISRAELIS BY SECRETARY.
2. YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT INFORM LEBANESE AT THIS TIME. WE EXPECT TO HEAR BACK FROM ISRAELIS SHORTLY, AT WHICH TIME YOU MAY BE AUTHORIZED INFORM LEBANESE OF OUR ACTION.
3. WE HAVE INFORMED UK HERE OF ABOVE, SINCE THEY TOO HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR REQUEST. THEY HAVE INSTRUCTED THEIR EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV TO EXPRESS HOPE ISRAELIS WILL EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN REGARD TO LEBANON EVEN IF THERE IS PROVOCATION.
KISSINGER

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:BDF
29380 LO/8/73
NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO

S/S-0 - MR. WRIGHT

|S/S - MR. BARNES

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CONTROL: 19 2 00

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 8 PM 1:45

O 072330Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1055
BT
SECRET STATE 199715

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PINS PFOR
SUBJECT: CONSULTATION WITH LEBANESE

1. WE WANT TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH GOL AS DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR. WE KNOW YOU ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH TOP GOL LEADERS. YOU AUTHORIZED TO MAKE USE OF FOLLOWING IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE, PRIME MINISTER SOLH AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS.

2. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT IN CURRENT SITUATION THAT USG AND LEBANON REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH AND EXCHANGE VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. EVIDENCE IN OUR HANDS CLEARLY INDICATES THAT FIGHTING BROKE OUT AS RESULT OF COORDINATED AND SIMULTANEOUS AIR AND LAND ATTACKS BY ARMED FORCES OF SYRIA AND EGYPT BEGINNING AT ABOUT 1200 GMT OCTOBER 6. ISRAELIS BECAME AWARE OF IMPENDING ATTACK SOME HOURS BEFOREHAND AND INFORMED USG. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THEIR ARMED FORCES WERE CAUGHT LARGELY BY SURPRISE.

3. COURSE THAT LEBANON IS FOLLOWING IS BOTH WISE AND COURAGEOUS. DECISION NOT TO ENTER FIGHTING SERVES BEST INTEREST BOTH OF LEBANON AND OF ARAB PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, AND WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS IS WIDELY RECOGNIZED. WE HOPE GOL WILL TAKE NECESSARY MEASURE TO INSURE THAT LEBANESE TERRITORY IS NOT USED IN ANY WAY BY ELEMENTS WHICH MIGHT WANT TO INVOLVE LEBANON IN HOSTILITIES, EVEN

INDIRECTLY, AGAINST GOL'S BETTER JUDGMENT AND ITS BEST INTERESTS.

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- 2 - STATE 199715, 7 OCT '73

4. USG INTEREST AT THIS POINT IS NOT TO FOCUS ON ASSESSING BLAME FOR WHAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED BUT TO BRING AN END TO FIGHTING AND LOSS OF LIFE. WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO REESTABLISH CONDITIONS NEEDED TO PURSUE NEW COURSES OF ACTION TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD MAY WELL BE DIFFICULT. USG AND GOL WILL NEED TO STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT. AS SECRETARY TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER NAFFA DURING MEETING IN NEW YORK OCTOBER 5, WE ATTACH HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH LEBANON AND TO MAINTENANCE OF LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. KISSINGER

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:CFF
10/6/73 EXT 29380
S:THE SECRETARY

NEA:JJSISCO
S/SO:MR. NEULIN

NEA:ALATHERTON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 7401Q
RECD: 24 APR 73 6:15 PM

R 242250Z APR 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 8775
BT
S E C R E T STATE 077293

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, LE
SUBJ: FRANGIE VISIT TO US

IF: EIRUT 4089, STATE 61240

1. MONTH OF FEBRUARY 1974 TENTATIVELY APPEARS TO BE BEST TIME ON PRESIDENT'S CALENDAR FOR FRANGIE VISIT. YOU MAY SO INFORM FRANGIE AND ASK IF FEBRUARY WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO HIM, BUT SHOULD EMPHASIZE PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE NATURE OF YOUR INQUIRY. ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:EDDJEREJIAN

APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES

CLEARANCES: NEA:MR.ATHERTON
S:CPR:MR.RUWE
S/S:MR.BARNES

NEA:ARN:MR.KORN
P:MR.PECK
WHITE HOURS:MR. SAUNDERS

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TELEGRAM

R 032119Z APR 73 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 8350
BT
SECRET STATE 061240

CONTROL: 0781Q

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

978 APR 4 AM 8:22

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIF, LE (FRANGIE)
SUBJ: INVITATION FOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE
REF: STATE 56481, BEIRUT 1299

1. YOU ARE HEREBY AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND NOW AN INVITATION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE TO MAKE A STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AT A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME IN 1974. YOU SHOULD TELL PRESIDENT FRANGIE THAT THE PRESIDENT LOOKS FORWARD WITH GREATEST PLEASURE TO MEETING AND HAVING HIM AS A GUEST IN WASHINGTON.
2. IF THIS IS AGREEABLE TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND HE ACCEPTS, WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT PERIODS WOULD BE MOST CONVENIENT FOR HIM. IN REGARD TO PUBLICITY, WE PREFER NO ANNOUNCEMENT AT THIS TIME AND WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH GOL RE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WHEN DATE FOR VISIT AGREED UPON PRESUMABLY LATER THIS YEAR. IF KNOWLEDGE OF INVITATION BECOMES PUBLIC WE WOULD CONSIDER LOW KEY CONFIRMATION OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. RUSH

NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JFC
3/30/73 22670
NEA:JJSISC0

NEA/MR. ATHERTON
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS
P - MR. PECK

S/S - MR. BARNES

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 9178Q

RECD: 27 MAR '73 6:30PM

O 272315Z MAR 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 8235
BT
SECRET STATE 056481

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, LE (FRANGIE)
SUBJECT: INVITATION FOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE

1. DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED BY WHITE HOUSE THAT PRESIDENT HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO INVITATION TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE FOR THIS FALL IF WE CONSIDER IT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT VISIT TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR, BUT WOULD PREFER THAT FRANGIE BE PROMISED AN INVITATION FOR A VISIT IN 1974. IN LATTER CASE, YOU WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE NOW AN INVITATION FOR VISIT AT MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME IN 1974.

2. FOREGOING IS FYI ONLY. DEPARTMENT WILL BE MAKING RECOMMENDATION TO PRESIDENT SOONEST. WITHOUT RAISING THIS MATTER WITH GOL, REQUEST YOUR CURRENT VIEWS. ROGERS

BT
#6481

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: DAKORN APPROVED BY: NEA: JJSISCO
CLEARANCES: NEA: MR ATHERTON S/S: MR. BARNES
WHITE HOUSE: MR. SAUNDERS

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TELEGRAM

WH

CONTROL: 1 1 3 0Q
RECD: 04 OCT '72, 7:14PM

R 042247Z OCT 72 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5827
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4433
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7884
BT
SECRET STATE 181730

NODIS

USUN FOR ASST. SECRETARY SISCO

SUBJECT: LEBANESE RESTRICTIONS ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY

1. DEPARTMENT HAS NOTED UPI PRESS REPORTS OCTOBER 3 FROM BEIRUT CONTAINING STATEMENTS BY PLO SPOKESMAN KAMAL NASSIR THAT FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS WILL WITHDRAW FROM SOUTHERN VILLAGES AND TOWNS AND THAT THERE ONLY A FEW FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL SECTOR. WE WOULD APPRECIATE VERIFICATION THRU EMBASSY CONTACTS OF ACTUAL SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN LIGHT OF KAMAL NASSIR'S STATEMENTS.

2. WE ALSO SUGGEST THAT, IF FEASIBLE, DATT MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANOTHER FIRST HAND TOUR OF SOUTH CENTRAL SECTOR IN LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. FYI. WE WANT TO CONTINUE HAVING AS DETAILED AN EXCHANGE AS POSSIBLE WITH THE ISRAELIS HERE CONCERNING THE ACTUAL RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS PLACED ON THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. OUR MAIN PURPOSE IS TO AGREE IF POSSIBLE ON A COMMON DATA BASE AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO KEEP THE SITUATION ON LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER QUIET. EMBASSY/DATT REPORTING TO DATE HAS BEEN EXTREMELY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. END FYI.

4. XGDS (1). IRWIN
BT
#1730

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:EPDJerejian
NEA/IAI:HHStackhouse

APPROVED BY: NEA:ALAtherton
S/S-Mr.Eliot

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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

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O 080247Z SEP 72 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 5392
BT
SECRET STATE 163676

CONTROL: 1 5 9 3Q
RECD: 07 SEP '72 1057PM

NODIS

SUBJ: USINT DAMASCUS

REF: BEIRUT 9413

1. UNLESS YOU HAVE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATIONS, WE WOULD PREFER NOT RPT NOT TO INFORM HIGH-RANKING ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL JUST YET. WHILE WE FULLY APPRECIATE NEED TO AVOID GIVING INADVERTENT OFFENSE TO ITALIANS, WE BELIEVE THAT DAMASCUS TALKS AT SENSITIVE JUNCTURE WHOSE POSITIVE OUTCOME WE WOULD NOT WISH IN ANY WAY TO ENDANGER BY POSSIBILITY OF PREMATURE LEAK. IN VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER'S PROMISE TO PROVIDE ANSWER BY SEPTEMBER 10, WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE SUFFICIENT TIME TO INFORM ITALIANS SHOULD REPLY PROVE TO BE AFFIRMATIVE.

2. YOUR REFTTEL NOT RPT NOT BEING REPEATED TO ROME.

3. DECLASSIFICATION XGDS 5B (4). ROGERS
BT
#3676

DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES:GCB
APPROVED BY:NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA?ARN:DKORN
S/S-O MEALUM

NEA:ALATHERTON

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH
22 AUG 30 AM 7:40

R 292130Z AUG 72 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5301
BT
SECRET STATE 157913

CONTROL: 7 6 6 0Q
RECD: 29 AUG '72, 5:55PM

NODIS

SUBJ: US INTERESTS SECTION DAMASCUS

1. RE HOUGHTON-SEELYE LETTER AUGUST 18 INFORMING OF MAIOLINI'S DEPARTURE ON TRANSFER FROM DAMASCUS IN NEXT FEW WEEKS, BELIEVE THIS MIGHT OFFER A GOOD PEG FOR AN APPROACH TO SARG WITH A PITCH FOR ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER TO REPLACE MAIOLINI. POINT COULD BE MADE THAT WITH MAIOLINI'S DEPARTURE IT WOULD BE THE EASIEST AND MOST NATURAL THING TO PROCEED WITH PLAN TO INSTALL US OFFICER IN ITALIAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS.

2. WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR JUDGMENT WHETHER TIME IS RIPE NOW FOR SUCH A MOVE. WE DO NOT WANT TO FORCE A NEGATIVE SYRIAN RESPONSE, BUT IF IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE BY TAKING THIS INITIATIVE TO BRING SARG TO TAKE FINAL STEP IN GIVING AGREEMENT FOR ASSIGNMENT OF AN AMERICAN OFFICER IN DAMASCUS, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO MISS THE OPPORTUNITY.

3. WE ASSUME BEST CHANNEL FOR DOING THIS WOULD BE TO GO TO KHLEIFAUI, EITHER THROUGH MRS. BOUSTANY, OR IN HER COMPANY. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER ACCOMPANYING MRS. BOUSTANY FOR DISCREET TALK WITH KHLEIFAUI, AS PRATT DID IN JUNE, IF YOU THINK THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. XGDS. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (4). IRWIN
BT
#7913

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:DAKorn
NEA-Mr. Atherton
NEA/ARN-Mr. Scotese

APPROVED BY: NEA-Mr. Sisco
S/S-Mr. Ackerman

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 4 0 4 70
RECD: 17 JUL 72, 6:54PM

WHITE HOUSE
SITTING ROOM
JUL 21 PM 1:30

R 172201Z JUL 72 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4871
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE
BT
SECRET STATE 128892

NODIS TOSEC 33

PASS JANE ROTHE IN SAN CLEMENTE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
SUBJECT: USINT DAMASCUS
REF: BEIRUT 7693

1. WE AGREE WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 7 REFTTEL AND
AUTHORIZE YOU TO REITERATE TO MRS. BOUSTANI THAT SUCH
ASSISTANCE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF U.S. GOVERN-
MENT.

2. MEANWHILE, WE FOLLOWING UP WITH COMMERCE CONCERNING
MRS. BOUSTANI'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING AGENCY REPRESENTATION
FOR BIDDING BY AMERICAN FIRM ON LEBANESE INTERNAL
SECURITY FORCES TELECOMMUNICATIONS TENDER.

EXEMPT FROM GDS E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (4) IRWIN
BT
#8892

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TJScotes
NEA:ALAtherton

APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDavies
S/S:Mr.Eliot

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET
12 JUL 72 AM 10:02

2 4 4 9 Q
July 11, 1972
5:29 p.m.

R 112103Z JUL 72 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4815
BT
SECRET STATE 124682

NODIS

SUBJ: USINT DAMASCUS
REF: BEIRUT 7246, 7311

1. WE ENCOURAGED BY DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED IN REFTELS AND WISH TO COMPLIMENT EMBASSY--AND PARTICULARLY NORMAN PRATT--FOR EXPERT HANDLING OF THIS MATTER. WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE PROMPTLY AND IN DOING SO BELIEVE WE SHOULD REGULARIZE KHLEIFAOU I UNDERTAKING. SINCE KHLEIFAOU I APPEARS TO HAVE CLEARED ARRANGEMENT INTERNALLY (BEIRUT 7246), BRINGING UNDERTAKING OUT INTO OPEN SHOULD PRESUMABLY CAUSE HIM NO PROBLEM. IN ANY CASE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY FOR SARG FOREIGN MINISTRY TO BE IN ON ACT AT AN EARLY DATE.

2. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROPOSE THAT YOU SUBMIT INFORMALLY TO KHLEIFAOU I FOR HIS CONSIDERATION FOLLOWING DRAFT TEXT OF A NOTE WHICH AT APPROPRIATE POINT WE WOULD WISH SUBMIT TO SARG FOREIGN MINISTRY THROUGH THE ITALIANS. WE ASSUME THAT PRIME MINISTER WOULD PASS WORD TO FONMIN BEFOREHAND IN ORDER TO PAVE THE WAY. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO KHLEIFAOU I THAT TEXT IS SIMILAR TO AGREEMENTS WE HAVE MADE WITH THE IRAQIS AND EGYPTIANS, AMONG OTHERS. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM KHLEIFAOU I THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ASSIGN OFFICER PROMPTLY.

3. TEXT OF PROPOSED DIPLOMATIC NOTE FOLLOWS: QUOTE: THE EMBASSY OF ITALY, REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN SYRIA, WISHES TO INFORM THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO ASSIGN ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY ONE OFFICER WITH DIPLOMATIC STATUS AND ONE NON-DIPLOMATIC CLERICAL EMPLOYEE TO THE STAFF OF THE EMBASSY OF ITALY IN SYRIA. AT THE SAME TIME THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO THE ASSIGNMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA OF ONE OFFICER OF EQUIVALENT STATUS AND ONE NON-DIPLOMATIC CLERICAL EMPLOYEE TO THE STAFF OF THE EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN IN WASHINGTON. END QUOTE.

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TELEGRAM

-2- State 124682 July 11

4. FYI. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF EMBASSY'S RECOMMENDATION RE OFFICER ASSIGNMENT, BUT ARE DEFERRING DECISION FOR MOMENT. WE ALSO NOTE KHLEIFAQUI UNDERTAKING TO PERMIT GRADUAL STAFF EXPANSION AT LATER STAGE. END FYI.

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION E.O. 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (4) IRWIN

NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES:TWSEELYE:BDF
7/10/72 EXT 21019
NEA:JJSISCO

NEA:ALATHERTON

NEA/EX:LRHUNT
S/S- MR. MILLER

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Department of State

WHITE HOUSE
SITING ROOM

TELEGRAM

'72 JUN 29 PM 12:55

SECRET

CONTROL: 7816Q

RECD: 28 JUN '72 10:21 PM

P 290141Z JUN 72 ZFFA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4710
BT
SECRET STATE 117273

NODIS

SUBJ: DIALOGUE WITH SARG PRIME MINISTER KHLEIFAWI

REF: BEIRUT 7003; BEIRUT 6462

1) DEPARTMENT INTRIGUED BY APPARENT WILLINGNESS OF KHLEIFAWI TO PURSUE DISCUSSION INITIATED WITH PRATT THROUGH MRS. BOUSTANY. WE SHARE BEIRUT'S ENTHUSIASM FOR CONTINUING DIALOGUE.

2) UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE AT THIS TIME ANY INDICATION FOR USE OF MRS. BOUSTANY OF WHAT IF ANY BENEFITS TO SYRIANS MIGHT FLOW FROM SETTLEMENT OF DEBT.

3) ONE NEW COMPLICATING FACTOR (WHICH SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE COMMUNICATED TO MRS. BOUSTANY OR TO SARG) IS THAT OF IPC NATIONALIZATION. USG POSITION ON IPC IS NOT SETTLED AND CANNOT BE WITHIN TIME FRAME YOUR NEEDS. OBVIOUSLY THERE IS RISK OF COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IMPACT ON KHLEIFAWI SHOULD HE ACT ON ASSUMPTION THAT BOUSTANY CLAIM IS SOLE OBSTACLE TO US FINANCING, ONLY TO LEARN THEREAFTER THAT POTENTIAL UNRESOLVED IPC COMPENSATION ISSUE IS FURTHER BARRIER. THIS IS ANOTHER REASON WHY WE CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT ARM MRS. BOUSTANY WITH INDICATION OF POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO SYRIA REQUESTED YOUR 7003.

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-2- STATE 117273 28 JUN '72

4) MEANWHILE, WE WONDER WHETHER ELEMENT NEEDED TO WIN SYRIANS OVER IS INDEED ANOTHER CONDITIONAL OFFER OF PROJECT FINANCING. IF SARG IS CLEARLY AWARE OF WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE IN THIS REGARD, IT SHOULD NEED NO FURTHER PROOF. IF KHLEIFAWI SERIOUSLY INTERESTED AND POLITICALLY SECURE ENOUGH TO SEE WHERE DIALOGUE MIGHT LEAD, IT SEEMS TO US HE SHOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME "SKEPTICS" WHO CONTEND THAT PAYMENT OF TINY BOUSTANY CLAIM IS UNACCEPTABLE CONDITION PRECEDENT. IF BASIC PROBLEM IS POLITICAL RISK, IT IS HARDLY LIKELY THAT RENEWED PC'S CAN OVERCOME IT.

5) THEREFORE, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WE BELIEVE BEST THING FOR MRS. BOUSTANY TO DO WHEN SHE MEETS PRIME MINISTER KHLEIFAWI ON JULY 1 IS TO REITERATE USG INTEREST IN DOING BUSINESS WITH SYRIA ON COMMERCIAL FRONT, INCLUDING WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF CREDIT IN PARTICULAR CASES. IT SEEMS TO US SHE MIGHT TURN ARGUMENT AROUND AND SUGGEST KHLEIFAWI TEST USG BY UNDERTAKING TO PAY BOUSTANY CLAIM, AS HE SUGGESTED HE WOULD DO IN FIRST MEETING REPORTED IN BEIRUT 6462.

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652.

IRWIN

BT

#7273

DRAFTED BY: NEA;ARN PASUTHERLAND APPROVED BY: NEA; MR. ATHERTON

CLEARANCES: NEA: ARN: TWSEELYE E/IFD: MR. KENNEDY

E/IFD: MR. WINDER S/S-O: J.M. EALUM

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R 250018Z AUG 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1351
INFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9495
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0603
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5731
RUDIC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2538
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3203
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 8907
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9629
BT
SECRET STATE 155695

7284Q

August 24 8:18 PM 1971

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'71
AUG 25 AM 9:40

NODIS

SUBJ: BRIEFING ON SISCO TRIP TO ISRAEL

1. AMBASSADOR KABBANI OF LEBANON CALLED ON DEPUTY ASST. SECY. ATHERTON AUGUST 24 TO DISCUSS SISCO TRIP TO ISRAEL. ATHERTON SAID THAT SISCO HAD PUT FORTH NO FORMAL PROPOSALS BUT HAD SUGGESTED SPECIFIC IDEAS ON KEY ISSUES FOR INTERIM ARRANGEMENT FOR ISRAELIS TO CONSIDER. WE PLAN TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM BETWEEN NOW AND BEGINNING OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY. WE REALIZE THAT TIME IS IMPORTANT AND THAT SADAT FEELS HE NEEDS SOMETHING CONCRETE BY END OF THIS YEAR. ATHERTON NOTED THAT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IF BOTH SIDES SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY AND MODERATE THEIR POSITIONS. WE HAVE MADE INTERIM REPORT TO SADAT ON DISCUSSIONS AND HAVE INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET REACHED STAGE FOR MORE CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO. SADAT'S REACTION TO OUR REPORT WAS CALM AND UNDERSTANDING.

2. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT ISRAEL WANTS INTERIM SUEZ CANAL ARRANGEMENT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, REALIZING THAT PRESENT SITUATION CANNOT LAST INDEFINITELY. AS MONTHS PASS, DANGER OF RENEWED SHOOTING INCREASES. GOI SEES IN CANAL ARRANGEMENT WAY OF DISENGAGING MILITARY FORCES WHILE WORKING ON LARGER QUESTIONS OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT. OUR VIEW IS CLEAR ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD REDUCE RISK OF HOSTILITIES AND BE STIMULUS TO OVERALL SETTLEMENT. INTERIM ARRANGEMENT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD ON THESE TERMS AND NOT BECOME NEW STATUS QUO.

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-2- STATE 155695, August 24, 1971

3. KABBANI EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT ISRAEL WAS TRULY INTERESTED IN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. HE BELIEVED ISRAEL WOULD STALL, THINKING THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE. DURING THIS PERIOD THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO CREATE FACTS IN JERUSALEM AND BUILD SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE NOTED THAT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE COMING TO THE FORE IN ISRAEL SINCE CEASEFIRE OF LAST YEAR. ATHERTON SAID MANY PEOPLE IN ISRAEL REALIZE THERE MUST BE PEACE IN ORDER TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THESE PROBLEMS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT MOST FRUITFUL AVENUE OF APPROACH AT THIS TIME IS INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. ATHERTON PUT GREAT STRESS ON CREATION OF NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE AND SAID THAT SUEZ CANAL ARRANGEMENT COULD ACHIEVE THIS BOTH WITHIN ISRAEL AND THE UAR. CLOSING, ATHERTON SAID WE PLAN TO CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE AND HOPE TO LAY FURTHER GROUNDWORK BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION IN SEPTEMBER. WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY HOPEFUL ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR INTERIM AGREEMENT. ROGERS
BT

Drafted by: NEA/ARN - E G Abington
Approved by: NEA - Alfred L Atherton
Cleared by: NEA/ARN - Mr Killgore
S/S-O - Mr Brims

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