

**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY**

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
004	cable	<b>Acting Director, FBI to WHSR</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5870 Pages: 2	6/19/1973	B
005	cable	<b>Acting Director, FBI to WHSR</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5876 Pages: 2	6/16/1973	B
013	memo	<b>Latimer to Young</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5877 Pages: 15	9/7/1972	B
014	memo	<b>Saunders to Kissinger</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5878 Pages: 1	8/18/1972	B
017	cable	<b>Director, FBI to WHSR</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5879 Pages: 3	9/9/1972	B
019	letter	<b>Malik to the President</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5869 Pages: 20 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per HR. 3/14/14	4/20/1972	B
024	note w/attach	<b>Saunders to NSC Secretariat</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5884 Pages: 56 <b>SANITIZED</b> per 3.3(b)(6); HR. 1/22/10	12/8/1971	B
052	cable	<b>Beirut to SecState #8692</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5880 Pages: 2	7/25/1973	B
058	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #7722</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5887 Pages: 5 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per HR. 1/22/10	6/29/1973	B

FILE GROUP TITLE	<b>National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East</b>	<b>Box 0621</b>
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FOLDER TITLE **[02] LEBANON, VOL. III, January 1971-October 1973**

RESTRICTION CODES

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy  | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information.   | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.   |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.                      | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.                                       |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.   |

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DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
070	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #6198</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5881 Pages: 1	5/30/1973	B
073	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #5859</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5888 Pages: 4 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per HR. 8/1/09	5/21/1973	B
075	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #5776</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5889 Pages: 4 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per HR. 8/1/09	5/18/1973	B
077	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #5588</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5890 Pages: 8 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per HR. 1/22/10	5/15/1973	B
083	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #5016</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5882 Pages: 1	5/2/1973	B
093	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #3377</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5891 Pages: 8 <b>SANITIZED</b> per 3.3(b)(1)(b); HR. 1/22/10	3/26/1973	B
094	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #3312</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5892 Pages: 3 <b>SANITIZED</b> per 3.3(b)(1); HR. 1/22/10	3/23/1973	B
095	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #3254</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5883 Pages: 2	3/22/1973	B
099	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #2831</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5893 Pages: 2 <b>SANITIZED</b> per 3.3(b)(1); HR. 5/25/10	3/12/1973	B

FILE GROUP TITLE **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East** **Box 0621**

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101	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #2701</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5871 Pages: 3	3/8/1973	B
110	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #10343</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5894 Pages: 5 <b>SANITIZED</b> per 3.3(b)(1)(6); HR. 1/22/10	9/27/1972	B
143	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #6037</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5872 Pages: 3	7/14/1971	B
149	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #4824</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5885 Pages: 1 <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per HR. 1/22/10	6/8/1971	B
155	cable	<b>Beirut to Ankara #3633</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5873 Pages: 1	5/1/1971	B
179	telegram	<b>SecState to Beirut #221967</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5874 Pages: 2	11/10/1973	B
207	telegram	<b>SecState to Beirut #055014</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5875 Pages: 1	3/26/1973	B
254	telegram	<b>Beirut to SecState #6462</b> MR Case NLN 09-13; Doc. ID 5886 Pages: 4 <b>SANITIZED</b> per 3.3(b)(1)(6); HR. 1/22/10	6/14/1972	B

FILE GROUP TITLE **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

**Box  
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**DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]**

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4	cable	Acting Director, FBI to President <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/1 P.2</b>	6/19/73	B
5	cable	Acting Director, FBI to White House <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/2 P.2</b>	6/16/73	B
13	memo	Latimer to Young <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/3 P.15</b>	9/7/72	B
14	memo	Saunders to Kissinger <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/4 P.1</b>	8/18/72	B
17	note	Louise to Saunders w/ attachments <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/5 P.3</b>	9/9/72	B
19	letter	Malik to the President <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/6 20 pgs</b>	4/20/72	B
24	note	Saunders to the Secretariat <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/7 56 pgs.</b>	12/8/71	B
52	cable	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/8 P.2</b>	7/25/73	B
58	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/9 5 pgs.</b>	6/29/73	B
70	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/10 P.1</b>	5/30/73	B
73	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/11 4 pgs.</b>	5/21/73	B
75	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/12 4 pgs.</b>	5/18/73	B

**SANITIZED**

FOR EAC REVIEW  
6/12/2008

**SANITIZED**

FOR EAC REVIEW  
6/12/2008

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

621

FOLDER TITLE

② Lebanon Vol III January 1971 - October 1973

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77	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/13 8pgs.	5/15/73	B
83	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/14 P.1 <b>SANITIZED</b>	5/2/73	B PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
93	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/15 8pgs.	3/26/73	B
94	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/16	3/23/73	B
95	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/17 P.2 <b>SANITIZED</b>	3/22/73	B PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
99	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/18 2pgs.	3/12/73	B
101	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/19 P.3 <b>SANITIZED</b>	3/8/73	B PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
110	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/20 5pgs.	9/27/72	B
143	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/21 P.3 <b>SANITIZED</b>	7/14/71	B PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
149	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/22 1pg.	6/8/71	B
155	telegram	Beirut to <del>Secstate</del> Ankara <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/23 P.1 <b>SANITIZED</b>	5/1/71	B PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
179	telegram	Secstate to Beirut <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/24 P.2 <b>SANITIZED</b>	11/10/73	B PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
207	telegram	Secstate to Beirut <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/25 P.1	3/26/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC <b>SANITIZED</b> PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008			BOX NUMBER 621	

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

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13	memo	Latimer to Young <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/3 P.15</b>	9/7/72	B
14	memo	Saunders to Kissinger <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/4 P.1</b>	8/18/72	B
17	note	Louise to Saunders w/ attachments <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/5 P.3</b>	9/9/72	B
		[REDACTED]	4/20/72	B
24	note	Saunders to the Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/7 56 pgs.</b> SANITIZED per sec. 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 1/22/2010	12/8/71	B
52	cable	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/8 P.2</b>	7/25/73	B
58	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/9 5 pgs.</b> <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per ltr. 1/22/2010	6/29/73	B
70	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/10 P.1</b>	5/30/73	B
73	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/11 4 pgs.</b> <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per ltr. 1/22/2010	5/21/73	B
75	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/12 4 pgs.</b> <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> per ltr. 1/22/2010	5/18/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE <b>NSC</b>			BOX NUMBER 621	

FOLDER TITLE

② Lebanon Vol III January 1971 - October 1973

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83	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/14 P.1	5/2/73	B
93	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/15 8pgs. <b>SANITIZED</b> PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)(v), ltr. 1122/2010	3/26/73	B
94	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/16 <b>SANITIZED</b> PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 1122/2010	3/23/73	B
95	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/17 P.2	3/22/73	B
99	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/18 2pgs. <b>SANITIZED</b> per sec 3.3(b)(1), ltr 5/25/2010	3/12/73	B
101	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/19 P.3	3/8/73	B
110	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/20 5pgs. <b>SANITIZED</b> PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)(v); ltr. 3/122/2010	4/27/72	B
143	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/21 P.3	7/14/71	B
149	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/22 1pg. <b>DECLASSIFIED</b> PER LTR. 1122/2010	6/8/71	B
155	telegram	Beirut to <del>Secstate</del> Ankara <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/23 P.1	5/1/71	B
179	telegram	Secstate to Beirut <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/24 P.2	11/10/73	B
207	telegram	Secstate to Beirut <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/25 P.1	3/26/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

621

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

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254	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/26 4pgs. <b>SANITIZED</b> PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1)(b), ltr. 1/22/2010	6/14/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NJC

BOX NUMBER

1021

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

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14	memo	Saunders to Kissinger <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/4 P.1</b>	8/18/72	B
17	note	Louise to Saunders w/ attachments <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/5 P.3</b>	9/9/72	B
19	letter	Malik to the President <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/6 20 pgs</b>	4/20/72	B
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58	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/9 5 pgs.</b>	6/29/73	B
70	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/10 P.1</b>	5/30/73	B
73	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/11 4 pgs.</b>	5/21/73	B
75	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-13/12 4 pgs.</b>	5/18/73	B

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NSC

BOX NUMBER

621

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② Lebanon Vol III January 1971 - October 1973

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110	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/20 5pgs.	9/27/72	B
143	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/21 P.3	7/14/71	B
149	telegram	Beirut to Secstate <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/22 1pg.	6/8/71	B
155	telegram	Beirut to <del>Secstate</del> Ankara <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/23 P.1	5/1/71	B
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207	telegram	Secstate to Beirut <b>MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST</b> NLN 09-13/25 P.1	3/26/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

621

FOLDER TITLE

(2)

RESTRICTION CODES

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FILE GROUP TITLE NSC BOX NUMBER 1021

FOLDER TITLE (2)

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## MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONSECRET (XGDS)

July 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*  
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Dr. Charles Malik

Dr. Charles Malik, former Lebanese Foreign Minister, is no longer a prominent figure in Lebanese political life. He does, however, have a close relationship with President Frangie and has been speaking on instructions from Frangie in his talks with US officials. He saw Secretary Rogers while you were in San Clemente.

Malik is likely to make the following points with you:

--Lebanon is under great pressure, both internally from the fedayeen and their supporters among the Muslim community, and externally from Syria.

--President Frangie wants to know what our position would be if the Lebanese government were about to be toppled by the fedayeen or because of overt Syrian intervention. [Comment: Ambassador Buffum on Thursday of this week is discussing this issue in a general way with President Frangie, following the instructions to him which you recently cleared. A copy is attached.]

--Lebanon needs military assistance and covert aid to pro-regime villagers. [Comment: Buffum will also discuss these matters with Frangie.]

--An Arab-Israeli settlement would remove some pressure on Lebanon and allow the regime to limit the impact of the fedayeen. A settlement of the refugee problem is particularly important to Lebanon.

--President Frangie should be invited to make an official visit to the United States.

XGDS - 3  
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine  
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)

You might want to respond along the following lines:

--The United States attaches great importance to the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. In the crisis last May, we made this point to the Soviet Union and urged them to restrain the Syrians.

--Ambassador Buffum has just had a meeting with President Frangie to discuss the issue of how the US could help Lebanon stand up to fedayeen and Syrian pressures. He was instructed to explore possible actions in several different areas so that we might learn what President Frangie would regard as helpful.

--Dr. Malik will be interested to know that the President has approved the sale of A-4 Skyhawk aircraft (16) to Lebanon along with a variety of other pieces of equipment to be delivered over the next 2-6 months. The question of covert assistance has been discussed with President Frangie. If he approves, we will consider the possibility.

--The United States is working seriously on trying to find a way to break the Arab-Israeli impasses. Lack of publicity does not mean lack of action or indifference on our part.

--We have a high regard for President Frangie and have already extended an invitation to him to visit the US next year.

--How would Dr. Malik assess the strength and stability of the present Lebanese situation?

SECRET

TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad

1. This message provides instructions for you to pursue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad consultations he initiated with us last fall about steps USG might take to help Lebanon in major confrontation between GOL and fedayeen. Crisis which began in early May has now subsided but prospects for stability seem hardly better than they were before. Concessions which GOL got from fedayeen on May 17 already appear to be largely theoretical. We have reports that fedayeen are prepared to resume fighting as GOL insists on removal of heavy weapons from refugee camps. In atmosphere of uneasy truce which has prevailed since May clashes there could very easily occur a new outbreak of fighting leading to confrontation even more serious than in May with attendant risk of Syrian intervention.

2. You should tell Foreign Minister that we have had very much in mind these past months, and particularly in recent days, concern he expressed to Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Buffum last fall regarding possible confrontation between GOL and fedayeen and danger of Syrian intervention. We admire courage and

SECRET

firmness shown by President Frangie in dealing with difficult situation Lebanon facing. Lebanon is of course best judge of what it needs, but we think GOL's demand that sovereignty and authority of state be respected is not only fully justified but vital to Lebanon's continued prosperity and even its existence. Naturally we are very pleased over improvement in situation which has been taking place and hope complete return to normal will be possible.

3. You should say USG has been considering a number of possible courses of action in regard to contingency of major Syrian action against Lebanon, which Foreign Minister first raised with us last fall. We would like to share our thinking with him. Among possible steps USG might take are:

a. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

b. Some corollary steps in eastern Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position. We would welcome hearing Lebanese views on what those steps might be.

c. High-level approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and

eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention. As Foreign Minister knows, we spoke to Soviets about restraining Syrians in recent crisis.

c. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon might be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would be ready to play a role, if appropriate, in facilitating such talks.

e. Consultations between Jordan and Lebanon in same sense.

4. You should stress that the foregoing are entirely tentative, representing some obvious avenues for possible exploration. They are not meant to be all-inclusive; for example, USG would also give sympathetic consideration to Lebanese requests for emergency arms resupply, as well as to Lebanese Army's longer range needs for equipment and training. We would like to have Lebanese reaction to these ideas as well as GOL's suggestions. We stand ready to hold a continuing dialogue with Foreign Minister on this subject if he so desires.

5. In conveying foregoing, you should make point that we hope GOL will continue to keep in mind desirability of denying use of Lebanese territory to Black September and others who practice terrorist methods.

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA	HP	
7/2	7/2	18	3897

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ROGERS *Laundus* UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER  RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ S  CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Talkers for HAK mtdg with Charles Malch of Lebanon on Jul 13*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION	(_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____	(_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	(_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____	(_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	(_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	(_____)
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
7/12		HAK	X	Talkus (7/14/73)	
7/17				C Noted by HAK	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION) \_\_\_\_\_  
 OR RECORD COMMENT:) \_\_\_\_\_  
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_ JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING. **JUL 18 1973**

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D **AOC** BY \_\_\_\_\_

CYS FOR ) SA \_\_\_\_\_  
 ) HP \_\_\_\_\_  
 ORIG ) WH \_\_\_\_\_  
 TO ) PA   
 ) SF \_\_\_\_\_  
 ) NS \_\_\_\_\_  
 ) EP \_\_\_\_\_  
 DESTROY ) DY \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

NEA/ARN:DAKORN  
6/22/73 EXT 22670  
T:DR. TARR

WHITE HOUSE  
OSD/ISA:GENERAL BRETT  
ISA/DSAA:MR. GUILD  
ISA/SA:COL. BRIGGS

NEA:JJSISCO  
NEA:ALATHERTON  
PM/MAS:MR. CHAPMAN

ROUTINE BEIRUT

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: MASS, LE, US  
SUBJ: GOL REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
REF: BEIRUT 5968

1. YOU SHOULD INFORM GOL THAT USG PREPARED FURNISH 16 A-4C SKYHAWKS FOLLOWING OVERHAUL WITHIN FOUR TO SIX MONTHS AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF DOLLARS 12.0 MILLION. ALTERNATIVELY, 16 A-4B'S WITH ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT COULD BE FURNISHED WITHIN 12 MONTHS AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF DOLLARS 9.2 MILLION {DIFFERENCE IN TIME IS DUE TO FACT OLDER A-4B'S WOULD REQUIRE EXTENSIVE RECONDITIONING AND ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT}. TRANSACTION WILL BE ON SALES BASIS.  
44

*Cleared with S/S  
(Joann) 12:39 p.m.  
7/11/73  
Chris*

*207*  
DR. TARR  
DAK *M*  
WH  
JJS *M*  
BRETT *M*  
ALA *ST*  
GUILD *M*  
CHAPMAN  
BRIGGS *M*

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	3025	Saunders
6 25	6 26 9		

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ROGERS \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER  RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_

ELIOT  S  SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

TS \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Japanese request for military arms around \$45 to \$50 million*

REFERENCE: S/S *7311483* OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK.....	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO _____ TO _____	<input type="checkbox"/>
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____	<input type="checkbox"/>
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE.....	<input type="checkbox"/>
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <i>(6/30)</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
CONGRESSIONAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>7/28/73</i>	<i>Saunders</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Pres for decision (7/02)</i>	
<i>7-2</i>	<i>Hak</i>	<i>Pres</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>Decision</i>	
<i>7/11</i>				<i>Pres approval w com</i>	
<i>7/11</i>	<i>/S</i>	<i>DOMS</i>	<i>S</i>	<i>Clear cable w/ state (7/12) Saunders</i>	
<i>7/11</i>			<i>C</i>	<i>Davis notified state</i>	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) \_\_\_\_\_

OR RECORD COMMENT:) \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_ JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D *ABC* BY \_\_\_\_\_

CYS FOR ) SA \_\_\_\_\_

) HP \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG ) WH \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PA

) SF \_\_\_\_\_

) NS \_\_\_\_\_

) EP \_\_\_\_\_

DESTROY) DY \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 13 1973

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET (GDS)


July 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Clearance of Telegram to Beirut

In response to your memorandum of June 6, 1973, "Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad" (S/S 7310202), the attached revised telegram is approved.

  
Jeanne V. Davis  
Staff Secretary

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET

TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad

1. This message provides instructions for you to pursue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad consultations he initiated with us last fall about steps USG might take to help Lebanon in major confrontation between GOL and fedayeen. Crisis which began in early May has now subsided but prospects for stability seem hardly better than they were before. Concessions which GOL got from fedayeen on May 17 already appear to be largely theoretical. We have reports that fedayeen are prepared to resume fighting as GOL insists on removal of heavy weapons from refugee camps. In atmosphere of uneasy truce which has prevailed since May clashes there could very easily occur a new outbreak of fighting leading to confrontation even more serious than in May with attendant risk of Syrian intervention.

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SECRET

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- a. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
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- c. High-level approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and

eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention. As Foreign Minister knows, we spoke to Soviets about restraining Syrians in recent crisis.

c. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon might be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would be ready to play a role, if appropriate, in facilitating such talks.

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5. In conveying foregoing, you should make point that we hope GOL will continue to keep in mind desirability of denying use of Lebanese territory to Black September and others who practice terrorist methods.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 3181

SECRET (GDS)

June 28, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Cable for Clearance on Lebanon Contingencies

Since last fall the Lebanese have been hoping for some form of reply to the queries of Foreign Minister Abu Hamad concerning our policy in the event of Syrian intervention in Lebanon. You will recall that State tabled a draft telegram at the last WSAG meeting on Lebanon and it was agreed that discussion could be deferred to the next meeting. It has not been possible to hold another meeting, and with the passage of time it becomes increasingly embarrassing not to have responded in any way to the Foreign Minister's question.

Despite the lapse of time, the question has not lost its relevance, particularly in light of the clashes in May. The most recent Lebanese expression of desire for a definition of our intentions has been conveyed by Dr. Charles Malik, speaking to Secretary Rogers June 26 on behalf of President Frangie. Malik has asked to see you and the President before he returns to Lebanon about July 5, and you have a separate schedule proposal. As with Abu Hamad, these recent questions have been somewhat vague and hypothetical, and Secretary Rogers has told Malik that we cannot be precise about our own actions until we have a better idea of the context in which our help might be sought.

This brings us back to the cable which State proposed to resume the dialogue with Foreign Minister Abu Hamad (assuming he will still be in the new cabinet). State's proposed draft suggests we discuss with the Lebanese the following possible steps we might take:

- A public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
- Some "corollary steps" in eastern Mediterranean area which would demonstrate support for this position.

SECRET (GDS)

--An approach to USSR with a view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention.

--Possible consultations with Israel, with US offering to facilitate arranging such talks.

The main issue for decision involves the second point on "corollary steps in the eastern Mediterranean." This may seem to say either too much or too little, and it is in our interest not to mislead the Lebanese concerning our intentions or capabilities. We therefore recommend the substitution of the following paragraph:

--We would consider accelerated delivery of military equipment and corollary steps in the Mediterranean area to demonstrate concrete support for Lebanon. We would welcome hearing Lebanese views on what those steps might be. FYI. If subject US intervention comes up, you can refer question to Washington. However, you should feel free to discuss pros and cons from Lebanese viewpoint as well as from US viewpoint. We do not want to be excessively negative, but we do not want to be misleading either. We assume Lebanese would have reservations about overt US intervention, and you will recognize limits on our ability to play a decisive military role in such a contingency. We assume that our purpose should be, first, to put Lebanon in best position to rely on her own forces to the maximum extent possible and, second, to encourage help from other countries in the region capable of deterring Syrian intervention. END FYI.

Another alternative would be to drop all reference to corollary steps in the Mediterranean, limiting ourselves to inviting Lebanese views on how we might be of help.

In any case, the purpose of this step would be to open the door for a realistic discussion with the key Lebanese of what might be a US role in a major crisis. On the simplest level, this would show concern and dispel any notion of indifference. On a more subtle level, it would serve as a way of encouraging more precise Lebanese thinking about what they can and cannot count on from the US in a showdown. The contingency plans are ready for WSAG discussion, but perhaps this telegram need not wait since its main purpose



SECRET

DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad

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2. You should tell Foreign Minister that we have had very much in mind these past months, and particularly in recent days, concern he expressed to Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Buffum last fall regarding possible confrontation between GOL and fedayeen and danger of Syrian intervention. We admire courage and firmness shown by Presi-

SECRET

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3. You should say USG has been considering a number of possible courses of action in regard to contingency of major Syrian action against Lebanon, which Foreign Minister first raised with us last fall. We would like to share our thinking with him. Among possible steps USG might take are:

- a. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
- b. Some corollary steps in eastern Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position.

[b. We would consider accelerated delivery of military equipment and corollary steps in the Mediterranean area to demonstrate concrete support for Lebanon.] We would welcome hearing Lebanese views on what those steps might be, FYI. If subject US intervention comes up, you can refer question to Washington. However, you should feel free to discuss pros and cons from Lebanese as well as from US viewpoint. We do not

want to be excessively negative, but we do not want to be misleading either. We assume Lebanese would have reservations about overt US intervention, and you will recognize limits on our ability to play a decisive military role in such a contingency. We assume that our purpose should be, first, to put Lebanon in best position to rely on her own forces to the maximum extent possible and, second, to encourage help from other countries in the region capable of deterring Syrian intervention. END FYI.]

c. High-level approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention. As Foreign Minister knows, we spoke to Soviets about restraining Syrians in recent crisis.

d. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon might be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would be ready to play a role, if appropriate, in facilitating such talks.

e. Consultations between Jordan and Lebanon in same sense.

4. You should stress that the foregoing are entirely tentative, representing some obvious avenues for possible exploration. They are not meant to be all-inclusive; for example, USG would also give sympathetic consideration

SECRET

- 4 -

to Lebanese requests for emergency arms resupply, as well as to Lebanese Army's longer range needs for equipment and training. We would like to have Lebanese reaction to these ideas as well as GOL's suggestions. We stand ready to hold a continuing dialogue with Foreign Minister on this subject if he so desires.

5. In conveying foregoing, you should make point that we hope GOL will continue to keep in mind desirability of denying use of Lebanese territory to Black September and others who practice terrorist methods.

SECRET



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 6, 1973

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad

At the WASAG meeting on May 15 there was a brief discussion of a proposed telegram to Beirut authorizing consultations with Foreign Minister Abouhamad on the contingency of Syrian intervention against Lebanon. A decision on the cable was postponed owing to shortness of time. We had intended to bring it up again at the WASAG meeting scheduled for June 4, but as that meeting has now been postponed we want to resubmit the draft separately.


We believe that consultation with the Lebanese Foreign Minister on this subject is still pertinent. In the discussions which took place between Foreign Minister Abouhamad and our Charge in Beirut during and after last month's fighting between the Lebanese Army and the Fedayeen the Foreign Minister continued to ask what the United States would do in the event of Syrian intervention. He has not yet been given an answer. We believe it is important now to give Foreign Minister Abouhamad some idea of our thinking, even if in the most general terms. The telegram we propose, which has been brought up to date since the May 15 WASAG meeting, does not commit us to specific courses of action of an extraordinary nature. As such, the Foreign Minister may find it somewhat disappointing, but it should at least have the healthy effect of dissipating exaggerated expectations (which many Lebanese apparently still harbour) that the U.S. may be prepared to intervene militarily as in 1958.

SECRETGDS-DECLASS. DEC. 31,  
1981

SECRET

-2-

Your concurrence in the attached draft telegram  
is requested.

  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft telegram

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad

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2. You should tell Foreign Minister that we have had very much in mind these past months, and particularly in recent days, concern he expressed to Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Buffum last fall regarding possible confrontation between GOL and Fedayeen and danger of Syrian intervention. We admire courage and firmness shown by President Frangie in dealing with difficult situation Lebanon facing. Lebanon is of course best judge of what it needs

SECRET

GDS

SECRET

-2-

but we think GOL's demand that sovereignty and authority of state be respected is not only fully justified but vital to Lebanon's continued prosperity and even its existence.

Naturally, we are very pleased over improvement in situation which has taken place in recent days and hope complete return to normal will soon be possible.

3. You should say USG has been considering a number of possible courses of action in regard to contingency of major Syrian action against Lebanon, which Foreign Minister first raised with us last fall. We would like to share our thinking with him. Among possible steps USG might take are:

- a. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.
- b. Some corollary steps in eastern Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position.
- c. Further approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention. As Foreign Minister knows, we spoke to Soviets about restraining Syrians in recent crisis.
- d. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon would be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would be ready to play a role,

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

if appropriate, in facilitating such talks.

e. Consultations between Jordan and Lebanon in same sense.

4. You should stress that the foregoing are entirely tentative, representing some obvious avenues for possible exploration. They are not meant to be all-inclusive; for example, USG would also give sympathetic consideration to Lebanese requests for emergency arms resupply, as well as to Lebanese Army's further longer range needs for equipment and training. We would like to have Lebanese reaction to these ideas as well as GOL's suggestions. We stand ready to hold a continuing dialogue with Foreign Minister on this subject if he so desires.

5. In conveying foregoing, you should make point that we hope GOL will continue to keep in mind desirability of denying use of Lebanese territory to Black September and others who practice terrorist methods. We believe it is important to Lebanon's image before world, and to its own security, that people who were behind Khartoum murders, and other instances of international terrorism, not be allowed to work and live in freedom in Lebanon.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 5181

SECRET (GDS)

June 28, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Cable for Clearance on Lebanon Contingencies

*7/3/73*  
*Approved with the*  
*changes as*  
*outlined per phone call*  
*from Saunders 7/3/73*  
*PK*

Since last fall the Lebanese have been hoping for some form of reply to the queries of Foreign Minister Abu Hamad concerning our policy in the event of Syrian intervention in Lebanon. You will recall that State tabled a draft telegram at the last WSAG meeting on Lebanon and it was agreed that discussion could be deferred to the next meeting. It has not been possible to hold another meeting, and with the passage of time it becomes increasingly embarrassing not to have responded in any way to the Foreign Minister's question.

Despite the lapse of time, the question has not lost its relevance, particularly in light of the clashes in May. The most recent Lebanese expression of desire for a definition of our intentions has been conveyed by Dr. Charles Malik, speaking to Secretary Rogers June 26 on behalf of President Frangie. Malik has asked to see you and the President before he returns to Lebanon about July 5, and you have a separate schedule proposal. As with Abu Hamad, these recent questions have been somewhat vague and hypothetical, and Secretary Rogers has told Malik that we cannot be precise about our own actions until we have a better idea of the context in which our help might be sought.

This brings us back to the cable which State proposed to resume the dialogue with Foreign Minister Abu Hamad (assuming he will still be in the new cabinet). State's proposed draft suggests we discuss with the Lebanese the following possible steps we might take:

--A public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

--Some "corollary steps" in eastern Mediterranean area which would demonstrate support for this position.

SECRET (GDS)

--An approach to USSR with a view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention.

--Possible consultations with Israel, with US offering to facilitate arranging such talks.

The main issue for decision involves the second point on "corollary steps in the eastern Mediterranean." This may seem to say either too much or too little, and it is in our interest not to mislead the Lebanese concerning our intentions or capabilities. We therefore recommend the substitution of the following paragraph:

--We would consider accelerated delivery of military equipment and corollary steps in the Mediterranean area to demonstrate concrete support for Lebanon. We would welcome hearing Lebanese views on what those steps might be. FYI. If subject US intervention comes up, you can refer question to Washington. However, you should feel free to discuss pros and cons from Lebanese viewpoint as well as from US viewpoint. We do not want to be excessively negative, but we do not want to be misleading either. We assume Lebanese would have reservations about overt US intervention, and you will recognize limits on our ability to play a decisive military role in such a contingency. We assume that our purpose should be, first, to put Lebanon in best position to rely on her own forces to the maximum extent possible and, second, to encourage help from other countries in the region capable of deterring Syrian intervention. END FYI.

Another alternative would be to drop all reference to corollary steps in the Mediterranean, limiting ourselves to inviting Lebanese views on how we might be of help.

In any case, the purpose of this step would be to open the door for a realistic discussion with the key Lebanese of what might be a US role in a major crisis. On the simplest level, this would show concern and dispel any notion of indifference. On a more subtle level, it would serve as a way of encouraging more precise Lebanese thinking about what they can and cannot count on from the US in a showdown. The contingency plans are ready for WSAG discussion, but perhaps this telegram need not wait since its main purpose

is to identify general areas for discussion and to solicit Lebanese views.

RECOMMENDATION: That you clear the attached telegram with the bracketed paragraph 3-b substituted for the unbracketed State language. (State has no objection.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Approve but with State language for paragraph 3-b.

*HK - note change*

Limit paragraph 3-b to delivery of military equipment \_\_\_\_\_

Hold telegram for now \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: Dialogue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad

1. This message provides instructions for you to pursue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad consultations he initiated with us last fall about steps USG might take to help Lebanon in major confrontation between GOL and fedayeen. Crisis which began in early May has now subsided but prospects for stability seem hardly better than they were before. Concessions which GOL got from fedayeen on May 17 already appear to be largely theoretical. We have reports that fedayeen are prepared to resume fighting as <sup>GOL</sup> ~~fedayeen~~ insists on removal of heavy weapons from refugee camps. In atmosphere of uneasy truce which has prevailed since May clashes there could very easily occur a new outbreak of fighting leading to confrontation even more serious than in May with attendant risk of Syrian intervention.

2. You should tell Foreign Minister that we have had very much in mind these past months, and particularly in recent days, concern he expressed to Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Buffum last fall regarding possible confrontation between GOL and fedayeen and danger of Syrian intervention. We admire courage and firmness shown by Presi-

SECRET

dent Frangie in dealing with difficult situation Lebanon facing. Lebanon is of course best judge of what it needs, but we think GOL's demand that sovereignty and authority of state be respected is not only fully justified but vital to Lebanon's continued prosperity and even its existence. Naturally we are very pleased over improvement in situation which has been taking place and hope complete return to normal will be possible.

3. You should say USG has been considering a number of possible courses of action in regard to contingency of major Syrian action against Lebanon, which Foreign Minister first raised with us last fall. We would like to share our thinking with him. Among possible steps USG might take are:

a. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

b. Some corollary steps in eastern Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position.

[b. ~~We would consider accelerated delivery of military equipment and corollary steps in the Mediterranean area to demonstrate concrete support for Lebanon.~~ We would welcome hearing Lebanese views on what those steps might be. FYI. ~~If subject US intervention comes up, you can refer question to Washington. However, you should feel free to discuss pros and cons from Lebanese as well as from US viewpoint. We do not~~

want to be excessively negative, but we do not want to be misleading either. We assume Lebanese would have reservations about overt US intervention, and you will recognize limits on our ability to play a decisive military role in such a contingency. We assume that our purpose should be, first, to put Lebanon in best position to rely on her own forces to the maximum extent possible and, second, to encourage help from other countries in the region capable of deterring Syrian intervention.

END FYI.]

c. High-level approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention. As Foreign Minister knows, we spoke to Soviets about restraining Syrians in recent crisis.

d. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon might be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would be ready to play a role, if appropriate, in facilitating such talks.

e. Consultations between Jordan and Lebanon in same sense.

4. You should stress that the foregoing are entirely tentative, representing some obvious avenues for possible exploration. They are not meant to be all-inclusive; for example, USG would also give sympathetic consideration

to Lebanese requests for emergency arms resupply, as well as to Lebanese Army's longer range needs for equipment and training. We would like to have Lebanese reaction to these ideas as well as GOL's suggestions. We stand ready to hold a continuing dialogue with Foreign Minister on this subject if he so desires.

5. In conveying foregoing, you should make point that we hope GOL will continue to keep in mind desirability of denying use of Lebanese territory to Black September and others who practice terrorist methods.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

*(Duplicate)*

DOC	RECD	LOG NR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	3181	Launders

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ROGERS \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER  RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_

ELIOT  S  SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

TS \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Requests NSC concurrence in telegram to Beirut authorizing consultations w/ Lebanese FM Abouhamed re Syrian intervention*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... ( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. .... ( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR ..... ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <i>6/12</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>CRT WSAG MTG 15 May 73</i>
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>6/28</i>		<i>HAK</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>Decision (7/01)</i>	
<i>7/03</i>				<i>HAK approved recom</i>	
<i>7/03</i>				<i>C Davis sgd memo to Eliot</i>	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH *Laund* NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

OR RECORD COMMENT: \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_ JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D *ADC* BY \_\_\_\_\_

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TO ) PA

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) EP \_\_\_\_\_

DESTROY ) DY \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 6 1973

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 3254

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALEXANDER HAIG  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*  
SUBJECT: Request by Visiting Lebanese Official for  
Appointment with You

Dr. Boutros Dib, who serves the President of Lebanon in a capacity that includes the functions of your position and Dr. Kissinger's, is visiting Washington briefly. His interests include, in addition to substantive Middle East matters, the organization and functions of our executive offices in both foreign and domestic affairs. He requested today that we try to arrange a meeting in which he might talk with you about White House domestic staff operations. In view of his other commitments here he has asked us to try to arrange a meeting with you any time after 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, Tuesday, June 12. He is leaving Washington Tuesday evening.

Dr. Dib is an influential figure in Lebanon, a country with which we are anxious to maintain good relations. If your schedule permits, I would appreciate your seeing Dr. Dib for 20 to 30 minutes Tuesday afternoon.

Dr. Dib has already met with Acting Secretary of State Rush, Assistant Secretary Sisco, Senator Fulbright, Rep. Hamilton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hal Saunders of the NSC staff, and Associate Director Bridgewater of OMB. Tomorrow morning he is to meet Assistant HEW Secretary Marland and columnist Rowland Evans.

Dr. Dib speaks English adequately but has some difficulty in understanding and therefore would be accompanied by a French-English interpreter from the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION: That you schedule 20-30 minutes with Dr. Dib on Tuesday, June 12 after 3:00 p.m.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Time \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Hand carried to  
General Haig  
10:45* M  
ACTION 3254

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 11, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: *H Appelbaum for* HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
SUBJECT: Request by Lebanese Official for Meeting  
with General Haig

Attached is a memorandum from you to General Haig requesting an appointment tomorrow for Dr. Boutros Dib, who is the Lebanese counterpart of both Dr. Kissinger and General Haig. Dr. Dib asked us today to try to set up an appointment for him with General Haig tomorrow afternoon. You will recall that earlier I suggested that Dr. Kissinger meet with Dr. Dib as a friendly political gesture toward Lebanon. This, of course, proved impossible, but if a meeting could be set up with General Haig it would accomplish much the same purpose.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward to General Haig as soon as possible the attached memo requesting an appointment for Dr. Dib tomorrow afternoon.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
3254 follow-on

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

June 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG  
THROUGH: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS  
SUBJECT: Your Meeting Boutros Dib--5:30 p. m.,  
Tuesday, June 12

Thank you for agreeing to see Dr. Dib. As Director General of the Presidency in Lebanon, he is close to being your counterpart there. Since they are expanding their staff in the Presidency, we and OMB have spent several hours with him over the past few days dealing with some of the practical aspects of running an operation like this.

Dib will have the State Department's Arabic interpreter, Camille Nowfel, with him. I will bring them both over from my office.

His main desire is to meet you and to make some specific points about the problems which Lebanon faces:

1. For Lebanon, the primary problem in the Arab-Israeli context is the presence of the 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. They form an unskilled proletariat which threatens to disrupt the normal patterns of economic and social organization in Lebanon. Thus a refugee settlement is crucial for Lebanon.
2. In confronting the present situation with the fedayeen in Lebanon, the Lebanese government has asked us for help in strengthening its very small army and hopes the US will respond positively. [A memorandum from State and Defense should be coming to the White House at the end of the week, and the WSAG may discuss this on Thursday.]

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

3. Lebanon is concerned that Israel's raids into Lebanon are designed to undercut the Lebanese government and political system so as to leave Israel as the only democratic friend of the West in the Middle East.

As you know, we have just been through another crisis in Lebanon with the government again successfully facing down the fedayeen. The WSAG is again at the contingency planning business against the likelihood that there will be another flare-up.

The following points are appropriate for you to make:

--I am glad to meet a fellow member of the very small trade union of those whose jobs are to help make the work of presidents easier. I would be glad to answer any questions on that subject if I can be helpful, or to talk about Lebanon's broader interests.

--Lebanon is important to us. Close attention has been paid in the White House to the developing situation in Lebanon. We have every desire to be as helpful as possible in assisting Lebanon's effort to preserve its own integrity.

--We have admired the Lebanese government's courage in facing its problems. The government obviously has to carry the main burden.

--You understand that we will be in a position to reply to Lebanon on its military equipment requests in the very near future.

--The president wants to do what we can to help move the Arab-Israeli problem closer to a settlement. It is very important to start a negotiating process within which there can be a genuine give-and-take and a serious effort to work out an agreement.

DOC	RECD	OG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	3254	
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SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: Saunders X UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU X NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT X SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Request for appt w/ HAK for Boutros Dib who is Lebanese counterpart of HAK

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO			
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK	( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR	( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION	( )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			<u>X</u>	MEMO TO	( )
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR:	( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?	( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( )
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					
OCEANS POLICY					

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
6/11		Scowcroft X		Decision 6/13	
6/12		DC Scowcroft		sgd pres to HAK	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH X NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) \_\_\_\_\_

OR RECORD COMMENT:) \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ 3156 JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D AOC BY \_\_\_\_\_

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
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JUN 27 1973

NSC/S :

Pls. tell us number assigned  
to this action.



Thelma  
x 3330

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

NSC: 3156

June 6, 1973

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*

SUBJECT: Appointment with Your Lebanese Counterpart

Boutros Dib, who serves President Frangie of Lebanon in a capacity similar to yours, will be in the United States for a visit shortly. He will be in Washington Monday, June 11.

He is very much interested in talking with our staff and with OMB about how our executive office is organized and what we try to do for the President. He will also be talking to a few people about our Middle East policy.

So far, there is no request for an appointment with you, but this is a case where the gesture of offering an appointment could carry considerable weight. I do not need to explain to you the reasons for giving President Frangie a sense of US concerns and support. Hearing directly from you that the US will continue to do what it reasonably can to help preserve the independence of Lebanon would be extremely important.

Thus, although we do not yet have a request for an appointment, this is one of those rare occasions when I would recommend reaching out and taking advantage of this visit for purposes of showing your personal concern with the Lebanese. This could have some domestic advantage as well, since the Arab-American groups have periodically tried unsuccessfully for appointments with you and the President. This is one very productive way to show all of these people that you are concerned with their point of view.

RECOMMENDATION: That you schedule 20-30 minutes with Butros Dib on June 11.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ *HK*

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR	0156	70/00/150

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: Saunders ROGERS \_\_\_\_\_ UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER  \_\_\_\_\_ RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU  \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_

ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

TS \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Requests appt w/ HAK for Boutros Dib of Lebanon, & HAK's counterpart to Pres. Frangie

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK..... (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY <u>(C. Jarrar)</u>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR PRES. .... (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ..... (_____)
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
6/06		HAK	X	Decision (6/09)	
6/12				open on 7 Jun 12	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

OR RECORD COMMENT: \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_ JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

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JUN 14 1973

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

50 to the President  
2 July  
ACTION 3525

SECRET (XGDS)

June 28, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER  
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*  
SUBJECT: Arms Package for Lebanon

You will recall that after the end of the May fighting in Lebanon, the Lebanese government asked the US for \$45-\$50 million of military equipment to help it expand and strengthen its army. State has already notified the Lebanese that we are prepared to supply the smaller items on their list, which total about \$7.8 million. The main item for decision, as outlined in a memorandum to you from State [Tab B], is the Lebanese request for 16 A-4 Skyhawks. At Tab A is a memorandum for the President seeking approval of the A-4s. Other items on the Lebanese list will require further discussion.

In order to finance these purchases, the Lebanese will have to draw on existing credits on their own reserves. We have looked into the possibility of a small amount of grant aid, largely as a political gesture, but this does not seem desirable at present. Any grant aid for Lebanon would have to be taken out of other programs such as Turkey and Korea. The Lebanese economy is in good shape and the government can afford to draw on reserves if necessary. In an emergency, however, we might want to do this for political impact, but for now it seems sensible to stick with FMS credits.


Although the Skyhawks being sought by the Lebanese are a model that we are phasing out of our own forces, are much older than those currently being supplied to Israel, and were offered to the Lebanese in 1972, this is the first time we have sold this aircraft to an Arab country. In view of the Israeli reaction to the sale of the Phantoms--which are a quite different category of aircraft--to the Saudis, it seems reasonable to get the President's approval.

Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to the President as soon as possible.

Concurrence: R. T. Kennedy *RTK*

XGDS-1  
DECLAS-Date Impossible to Determine.  
BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)



A

MEMORANDUM

Tab A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 3525SECRET (XGDS)

July 2, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Arms Package for Lebanon

Following the Lebanese government's crackdown on the Palestinian guerrillas in May, the government asked us for \$45-\$50 million of military equipment to build up the army. The army numbers only about 14,000 men, only half of whom are combatants. In view of a possible serious crisis in Lebanon, the government is conscious of its need to increase the army's mobility and firepower, since improved equipment constitutes the quickest way to compensate for the potential numerical superiority of the guerrillas.

State and Defense have put together a package of equipment which can be delivered to the Lebanese beginning almost immediately and stretching out over the next several months. This does not respond to all the Lebanese requests because there are some items that are not quickly available or do not seem to be the most suitable weapon for the job; these will need to be discussed with the Lebanese.

The major items in the State-Defense package, totalling about \$20 million, are sixteen A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, 60 armored personnel carriers, 2 patrol boats, 4 helicopters, and ammunition. The Lebanese have been told that all items except the A-4 Skyhawks are available for immediate purchase. The Lebanese will be able to draw on some credits from the US Foreign Military Sales program and other commercial means to finance the sale.

There is little question that we should do everything possible to put the Lebanese in a position to cope with their security problems by themselves. The reason for bringing this package to your attention is that it does include 16 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft--the first to be offered to an Arab country. We had offered them to the Lebanese in 1972, but at that time they had not made

XGDS-1

DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET(XGDS)

SECRET (XGDS)

- 2 -

up their minds about what they needed. Their main requirement is for a subsonic ground support aircraft like the A-4; faster planes like the Mirage proved to be relatively ineffective in the May fighting against the guerrillas. The model the Lebanese are interested in is being phased out of our own forces and is considerably older than the Skyhawks the Israelis have received. Israel will have 237 newer Skyhawks by mid-1974.

The Israelis have objected to our selling the F-4 Phantom to Saudi Arabia. They have every interest in preserving the stability of Lebanon, but may believe their psychological advantage will be lessened if both their main aircraft are in Arab hands. The number of aircraft is small, however, and the Skyhawk does not begin to have the psychological significance of the Phantom. Therefore, I think we should go ahead, informing the Israelis of our decision.

The items that we would not at this point be offering to the Lebanese include tanks and heavy artillery. These will have to be discussed further because the models they have requested are not readily available and because there is some question about what is appropriate to their needs. The only items we will refuse to supply are flamethrowers and helicopter armament systems which we have consistently declined to make available to any states in the Middle East.

Recommendation: That you approve the proposal to offer 16 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft to Lebanon.

Approve



Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET (XGDS)

B



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Tab B

June 25, 1973

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Lebanese Request for Arms

For some time Lebanon has had plans to strengthen its army in order better to be able to control Arab guerrillas on its territory. Following the fighting in May between the Lebanese Army and the guerrillas, Lebanon formally submitted to us a request for a package of military equipment which it is tentatively estimated would cost a total of \$45 to \$50 million if supplied in its entirety.

We have reviewed the Lebanese request together with the Department of Defense. We find it reasonable for the most part. It does, however, include some major items to which a degree of sensitivity is attached, namely A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, M-60 or M-48 tanks and 155 millimeter howitzers. We have informed the Lebanese that we are prepared immediately to approve sale of a portion of the package, amounting to about \$7.8 million, which includes less sensitive items such as ammunition, body armor, armored personnel carriers, patrol boats, telephone systems, and UH-1H utility helicopters. We have told the Lebanese we would like to pursue discussion with them on tanks and artillery and that we are considering their request for A-4 Skyhawks.

The package the Lebanese have requested is relatively small and breaks no new ground in our policy of supplying arms to Lebanon in support of its independence and territorial integrity. We offered to sell Lebanon A-4 Skyhawks in 1972, but at that time the Lebanese were uncertain of their needs. However, their requirement for a good ground support aircraft like the A-4 became clear during the May fighting with the guerrillas.

If Lebanon now purchases the Skyhawk it will be the first time that this airplane has been acquired by an

SECRET  
XGDS-3

SECRET

-2-

an Arab country. (Israel will have 237 Skyhawks by mid-1974.) However, the Lebanese have asked for only sixteen Skyhawks; the models they are interested in (the A-4C or B) have been or are being phased out by our own forces and are much older than those we are currently supplying Israel. We do not believe that the supply of these aircraft will pose any threat to Israel. They will, however, significantly strengthen the Lebanese Army's ability to deal with the fedayeen, and thus by extension should in fact contribute to Israel's security. The Israelis may nevertheless register some objections to our providing Lebanon an aircraft which Israel alone now holds in the Arab-Israeli conflict, although we doubt those objections will be nearly as strong as in the case of our decision regarding Phantoms for Saudi Arabia. Moreover, as against possible Israeli objections, we must weigh the very adverse impact that a refusal to provide A-4s now (after having offered to sell them to Lebanon in 1972) would have on our relations with Lebanon.

We believe it is fully consonant with our long standing and publicly declared policy of support for Lebanon's independence and territorial integrity to furnish Lebanon the sixteen A-4C or B Skyhawks that have been requested, and that it is in our national interest to do so. I enclose for your review and concurrence a cable authorizing our Embassy in Beirut to inform the Government of Lebanon that we are ready to make these aircraft available on a sales basis.

*Re Muller for*  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Cable.

SECRET

## MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTIONSECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

May 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*

SUBJECT: Lebanese Contingency Plans

There are three general categories of actions which would have to be considered if the Lebanese crisis worsened: (1) US public, diplomatic and military supply steps short of direct US military movements; (2) movements by US forces ranging from a simple show of force through providing direct air support for the Lebanese army and, ultimately, landing US forces; (3) evacuation. These are dealt with briefly below and in the attachments.

1. Actions short of military intervention. The memorandum at Tab A including the State Department's draft cable for clearance discusses the kinds of steps the US might take short of direct military involvement;

--A public statement reiterating USG support for the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

--An approach to the USSR urging them to press the Syrians to quit their support for Syrian intervention by Syrian-based fedayeen.

--Consultation with Israel on a possible Israeli mobilization to cause the Syrians to draw back.

--Consultation with Jordan on the same subject.

--Airlifting of any military equipment the Lebanese requested. This would have both practical value in strengthening the Lebanese forces and a psychological value in demonstrating US support.

--Any of the above would be reinforced by the most limited of the military moves described in the next section.

XGDS - 1, 2

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

Returned from HHS  
Office

2504X

2. Military Intervention. We have detailed contingency plans for US military action to protect Lebanon from external aggression ranging through the following three options:

OPTION 1 - Show of Force

- Conduct of naval demonstrations within sight of Lebanese coast.
- Overflights of Lebanese territory from carriers.
- Alerting of ground and air units in the United States.
- Airlift of military equipment into Lebanon would serve this purpose.

Sixth Fleet would be used for the first two steps. Sixth Fleet elements can be available within 2 to 3 days depending on their location.

OPTION 2 - Air and Naval Fire Support for Lebanese Forces

- Close air support for Lebanese forces.
- Airlift of Lebanese forces within Lebanon if useful. (Could have some relevance because of range of mountains that divides Lebanon from north<sup>to</sup>south.)
- Air resupply of Lebanese forces if necessary.
- Naval gunfire support.

Sixth Fleet would be used for air and naval support. Sixth Fleet elements can be available within 2 to 3 days depending on their location.

OPTION 3 - Full-scale Intervention by US Combat Forces

- Airborne/Amphibious operation to insure control of Beirut and Rayak airfields.
- Amphibious operation to seize Beirut and Sidon ports.

--Follow-on operation to secure mountain passes between Beirut and Rayak.

--Naval and air blockade to cut off supplies and assistance to enemy elements.

--Further operations as needed.

Sixth Fleet and US-based forces would be used. Initial forces could begin arriving in the area within 48 hours. Follow-on forces would start arriving in 13 days and be fully deployed in 33 days.

3. Evacuation. A reasonable count of American personnel to be evacuated runs a little under 6,000. In considering evacuation plans, we have used a figure of about 6300 in order to include potential evacuees from other countries who may depend upon us. The normal concept of evacuation is to assemble all personnel in Beirut and evacuate them by commercial means. Air evacuation is preferred but sea could be used if required. Overland evacuation is not considered appropriate. Most of the potential evacuees are in and around Beirut.

The problem arises if the Lebanese forces are unable to assure the security of Americans at an assembly point and their safe movement to the airport which lies out of town through a heavy concentration of Palestinian refugees. This raises the possibility of a requirement for the US military to assist in evacuation. A plan for this contingency is at Tab C. The main courses of action in such a situation include the following:

--It is assumed that airfields in Turkey, Greece, Crete and Cyprus are available for staging evacuation operations.

--US aircraft would be moved into Beirut airport with an airborne infantry battalion from the US to secure the airfield and to attempt to evacuate with a minimum use of force.

--A marine battalion landing team might be used to secure the assembly area and the routes to the airport.

--If the landing were opposed, airborne assault/air land operations would be required to secure and seize the international airport with an airborne infantry brigade.

--Assuming no difficulty in obtaining overflight rights, an airborne battalion could deploy to Adana, Turkey and arrive within 36 hours notice. An additional battalion could arrive the following day. A marine battalion landing team is embarked in amphibious ships in the Mediterranean. Only those forces were moved to within 50 NM offshore, they would be within four hours of the beaches.

The additional point that should be borne in mind in connection with evacuation using US forces is that after the evacuation is completed they could then stay on for a period of time in a show of support.



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Actions to Encourage Lebanon to Move  
Against Black September and Other  
Terrorist Groups

As you know, the Black September Organization's operation in Khartoum was planned and directed from headquarters which that group has in Lebanon. Since the murder of Ambassador Noel and Counselor Moore, we have been studying steps we might take that would encourage the Lebanese Government to arrest or expel from its territory all known Black September personnel and crack down on other Palestinian organizations which engage in terrorism.

The problem is a complex one, for Lebanon is a country with which we have many ties of friendship and many common interests. Lebanon's Christian leadership would like nothing better than to see the Arab terrorists and guerrilla organizations removed altogether from Lebanese soil; this feeling is shared even by some Lebanese Moslems, although they do not express it openly. However, the Lebanese Government feels it must move cautiously, owing to the large number of Palestinian refugees on its territory (some 300,000) and the small size of Lebanon's Army (about 15,000 men). Lebanese leaders also fear that Lebanese Moslem extremists and leftists would join the Palestinian guerrilla organizations in opposing moves which might seriously weaken them, and that this could lead to civil war.

For all their very real apprehensions, Lebanon's leaders have been able to take some steps to limit the freedom of action of the guerrilla organizations.

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Last fall, after a major Israeli raid deep into Lebanon in September, the Lebanese Army moved to clear the guerrillas from the immediate area of the border with Israel. This accounts for the quiet which has prevailed along the Lebanese-Israeli border these past months. The April 9 Israeli raids have pushed the Lebanese Government further in the direction of a showdown with the terrorists. We believe that if the Lebanese Government is made to feel that it can count on the support of the United States in case of trouble it will be more readily inclined to arrest or expel the terrorists.

We are already taking steps to demonstrate our support for Lebanon. Your agreement to invite President Frangie to this country next year is a very important step. We have just informed the Lebanese that we will airlift for immediate delivery some small quantities of military materiel which they need urgently, and we are asking the Defense Department to make available right away communications equipment which the Lebanese Army needs for use against the guerrilla organizations.

Closer coordination with the Lebanese in regard to what we would do to help them in the event of a showdown with the Palestinians is another very important step we could take. Foreign Minister Abouhamad spoke to us last fall, when he was in this country for the UN General Assembly, about his concern over what would happen if Syria should intervene during a confrontation between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. The Foreign Minister, and Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief Iskandar Ghanem, later told U.S. officials in Beirut that the Army could handle the guerrillas but feared being overwhelmed by an invasion from Syria. They asked what assistance Lebanon could expect from the United States in such a situation.

Unless we are prepared to respond to Foreign Minister Abouhamad, it will be difficult for us to press the Lebanese Government to move vigorously on terrorism. I believe that a sympathetic response, coupled with a reiteration of our own concern over the freedom of action

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET-NODIS

-3-

which Lebanon allows the Black September and other terrorist groups, would now be especially timely and would encourage the Lebanese to act more firmly. The attached telegram, which I plan to send unless you perceive objections, gives Ambassador Buffum instructions for discussion of both these issues with Foreign Minister Abouhamad. You will note that while we seek to be sympathetic and forthcoming with Foreign Minister Abouhamad, the operative portion of the instruction has been couched in terms which carefully avoid any new or unusual commitments on our part.



William P. Rogers

Attachment:

Telegram to Beirut

SECRET-NODIS

DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD

1. This message provides instructions for you to pursue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad consultations he initiated with us last fall about steps USG might take to help Lebanon in event of confrontation between GOL and fedayeen. At same time, building on excellent efforts you have been making to "educate" Lebanese and keep their feet to fire on BSO/Fatah problem, we want to urge GOL to act against Black September and other terrorist groups. We believe GOL can do this without provoking showdown with Palestinian organizations and their supporters in Lebanon. Our aim is by demonstrating USG support for GOL to encourage it to deny use of its territory to BSO and others directly engaged in international terrorism. While we do not wish at this time to make a formal connection between USG support and GOL action re terrorists, Lebanese should be made aware that their continued toleration of terrorists will sooner or later affect our attitude toward Lebanon.

2. In your discussion with Foreign Minister you should tell him that we have had very much in mind these past months concern which he expressed to the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and you last fall. We have sought to show our support for Lebanon in a

SECRET/NODIS

number of ways. In military supply field, we have made available \$10 million FMS credit, have agreed to Lebanese Army's purchasing intercept and other communications equipment from American suppliers, and are planning to airlift grenade launchers, grenades, and radios which we had earlier agreed to supply to Lebanon. We will continue to give sympathetic consideration to Lebanese Army requests for equipment or training.

3. You may say that in regard to contingency of Syrian action against Lebanon in the event of a GQL-fedayeen confrontation, which Foreign Minister raised with us last fall, among possible steps which would have to be considered and studied are:

A. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon: In addition we would consider some corollary steps in Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position.

B. Possible approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention.

C. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon would be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would consider what our role might be in such talks.

D. Consultations between Lebanon and Jordan in same sense.

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4. You should stress the foregoing are at this stage no more than the most tentative and contingency ideas and represent some obvious avenues of possible exploration if matters were to move toward confrontation Lebanese have talked about. We would like to have Lebanese reaction to them as well as their suggestions, and will want to continue dialogue with Foreign Minister on this subject.

5. You should say that while we want to consult and coordinate with Lebanon for this extreme contingency, we think GOL can take much more stringent measures in regard to fedayeen than it is now doing, without provoking a confrontation. Lebanese Army's effective action in clearing fedayeen from border area these past months--a step which earlier would have been considered impossible by many Lebanese--is an example of what can be done. Foreign Minister should be aware of shock and outrage which Khartoum murders caused in United States, and of unfortunate impression created in US by fact that this criminal action was planned in Lebanon and that people who were behind it continue to live and work in freedom in Lebanon. USG wants to do all it can to help Lebanon, but Lebanese should realize that our attitude and our ability to be of assistance will necessarily sooner or later be affected if Lebanon continues to give free run of its territory to criminals like BSO.

SECRET/NODIS

B

SITUATION 4

US MILITARY INTERVENTION TO PROTECT LEBANON FROM EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

1. SITUATION: Forces of Arab States and/or Israeli Forces have invaded Lebanon and threaten to overrun the country.
2. ASSUMPTIONS: (See TAB E for basic plan assumptions)
  - a. US Forces have been requested to intervene to restore the territorial integrity of Lebanon.
  - b. Effective UN action is not anticipated.
  - c. The USSR has issued strong warnings against US intervention.
  - d. A US vital interest is involved which makes it essential that Lebanon be preserved.
3. US MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLAN: A plan has been prepared which offers a range of options from a show of force through both peaceful and forced entry to offensive operations needed to achieve the military objectives required (see TAB E).
4. DISCUSSION:
  - a. Selection of the option. The military plan contains detailed procedures needed to deploy the force to the forward area. After a minimum force is in position, force employment can vary. The plan provides two general situations, the second of which applies to this TAB. Four options are offered therein: Show of Force, Operations to

Neutralize Enemy Forces, Simultaneous Air and Amphibious Landings, and Offensive Combat Operations. The degree of force application and the orchestration of naval, air, and land forces -- to include clandestine operations -- remains under the control of the US Joint Task Force Commander.

b. Liaison with friendly military forces. The USJTFC will require a point of contact with the force to be supported from the outset. Coordination of both movements and supporting fire is essential to minimum security of friendly forces.

c. Overflight, port and base use authorization:

(1) The military plan assumes that authorization has been arranged with the Government of Turkey for operations from three final staging bases at Incirlik, Erhac and Diyarbakir and naval port facilities at Iskenderun.

(2) At second priority, facilities at Cyprus, arranged through the Governments of the UK and Cyprus, would be required. The airbases at Akrotiri and Nicosia and the port use at Famagusta and Limassol are needed.

(3) At third priority, the Governments of Greece and Italy should be asked to authorize use of national facilities.

(4) Logistic resources within Turkey, Italy, Greece, Spain, and the Azores would be needed to sustain the operation.

d. Rapid movement of tactical air squadrons and airborne forces from the United States requires priority allocation of a major portion of military airlift resources during period of deployments and until surface supply line of communications is established.

e. Worldwide reaction to US intervention would vary. The Arab Nations would regard the action as interference in Inter-Arab affairs -- and as a Pro-Israeli move. Retaliation against US citizens and installations in Arab nations and their support by Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs could be expected. Cancellation of oil arrangements in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Libya and an order to get out of Wheelus would result. On the other hand, Western Powers would recognize the external aggression and condone if not support the operation.

f. Soviet intervention is not considered to be likely provided (1) the US makes clear its intention to limit the effort to protect the Government of Lebanon and (2) the resolve of the US to confront the USSR is credible.

5. ADVANTAGES AND RISKS:

a. Show of Force. The show of force actions would include the positioning of US military ground and air forces in forward staging bases, the conduct of naval forces demonstrations within sight of the Lebanese coast, and the

overflight of Lebanese territory by US military aircraft. Operations would be initiated from air bases in Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece, as available, and by forces afloat in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea.

(1) Advantages:

(a) Would indicate US resolve to intervene more directly if necessary.

(b) Would place forces in favorable posture if further actions are required.

(c) Action is below the threshold of actual commitment of US Forces.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) Action unlikely to be effective in stopping aggression against Lebanon.

(b) Risks counter moves by Soviets with possibilities for US/USSR confrontation.

(c) Requires a US capability to act if the show of force fails.

(d) Would tend to further polarize the Arab nations against the United States.

(e) Could be interpreted as a lack of resolve to take decisive action.

b. Provide Fire Support. Tactical air squadrons could operate from bases in Lebanon, Cyprus, and Greece, as available, and from Sixth Fleet carriers striking group positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to provide close air support, airlift, and air resupply for Lebanese Forces in operations against the enemy. Six Fleet Forces can also provide naval gunfire support. The referenced overflight and base use authorizations are essential. The shortage of airfields in Lebanon would limit in-country deployment to two or three squadrons. Other land based air forces would load facilities in Turkey/Cyprus to saturation point.

(1) Advantages:

(a) Would forcibly demonstrate US resolve to preserve territorial integrity of Lebanon.

(b) Some likelihood of producing favorable termination of hostilities without US involvement in ground action.

(c) Would position air squadrons for possible expanded scope of operations.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) Risks confrontation with Soviet Union.

(b) International reaction would probably oppose our involvement.

(c) Would weaken NATO posture in Central Europe.

(d) US worldwide military posture would be degraded considerably if full force level of 10 tactical air squadrons are deployed.

(e) Would polarize all the Arab nations against the United States and probably destroy our remaining influence in the moderate Arab States.

(f) Would probably result in immediate US expulsion from Libya.

(g) Would endanger all American citizens in Arab countries.

c. Provide full spectrum of military assistance. This course of action would involve a full range of forces to assist Lebanese Forces in defeating the aggression. A coordinated joint airborne/amphibious operation would insure control of the airfields at Beirut and Rayak and the amphibious force would seize the Beirut and Sidon ports. Follow-on forces would secure the mountain passes between Beirut and Rayak. Naval and air blockade would cut-off supplies and assistance to dissident elements and aggressor forces. Subsequent operations would be conducted in conjunction with Lebanese Forces to drive out foreign forces and regain control over indigenous enemy forces. Overflight, base, and port rights for movement and operations in the objective area must be obtained from Turkey, Cyprus, Greece,

Italy, Spain, France, and the Azores and mobilization of all US reserves should be considered concurrent with decision to execute this course of action.

(1) Advantages:

(a) Sudden commitment of major US combat forces should accomplish the mission.

(b) A regime friendly to the United States would be maintained.

(c) Would demonstrate US resolve to use force to maintain friendly governments.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) Seriously risks confrontation with Soviet Union with attendant possibilities of escalation to nuclear war.

(b) Movement of forces from Germany would degrade the NATO posture in Central Europe.

(c) International reaction would probably oppose our involvement.

(d) US global posture would be further strained and difficult if not impossible to react elsewhere in the world.

(e) Would polarize all the Arab nations against the United States and probably destroy our remaining influence in the Arab States.

(f) Would probably result in immediate expulsion of the United States from Libya.

(g) Would endanger all American citizens in Arab countries.

(h) Might lead to prolonged US involvement

(i) The massive deployments and sustained support require major reallocation of airlift and sealift.

C

SECRET

TAB C

EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS FROM LEBANON

1. SITUATION: Civil war, rioting, or insurrection has erupted within Lebanon. Governmental authorities are no longer able to control the situation. Mobs and/or military elements threaten US citizens.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. Situation has deteriorated to extent that peaceful evacuation of US citizens is no longer possible.

b. The State Department has requested the US military to assist in evacuation.

c. Majority of US citizens to be evacuated have been assembled in Beirut.

d. Airfields in Turkey, Greece, Crete, and Cyprus are available for staging evacuation operations.

e. The degree of physical resistance to US Forces cannot be accurately determined.

f. When US Forces have entered Lebanon for purposes of securing the evacuation of US Nationals, the GOL may request US Forces to remain and assist in restoring order and control by the GOL (Situation III).

3. COURSES OF ACTION:

a. Move US aircraft into Beirut airfield with Airborne Infantry Battalion from CONUS to secure airfield and attempt to evacuate with minimum use of force. (Air evacuation.)

b. Land Marine Battalion Landing Team to secure evacuee assembly area and routes to port. Low key use of Marines, i.e., no heavy equipment. (Sea evacuation.)

c. If the landing is opposed at H-hour, D-day, conduct an airborne assault/airland operations to seize and secure Beirut International Airport with an airborne infantry brigade (minus one airborne infantry battalion.) The airborne forces would be employed into the objective area from the forward staging base at Incirlik (Adana, Turkey.) Sixth Fleet carriers and Air Force tactical squadrons at the forward staging base provide fighter/recon air support.

SECRET

d. Land Marine Battalion Landing Team in force, ready for immediate combat, restore situation sufficiently to accomplish evacuation by sea and air. (Air and sea evacuation.)

e. Reinforce above operations with Airborne Battalions from Europe (one or two) to secure airfields, assembly areas, and evacuation.)

f. Deploy additional forces from the United States to Middle East in preparation for employment in event above actions or forces are inadequate for evacuation or in the event GOL requests assistance in maintaining GOL control. (Preparation for additional military reinforcement.)

#### 4. DISCUSSION:

a. Concept of Operations. The objective of any forceful evacuation is to remove US nationals from the danger zone as quickly as possible and with as little danger to them as possible. The role of US Troops is purely defensive. Their task is to secure departure sites, the routes to these sites, and escort the evacuees from their assembly points to the point of departure. On occasion it may be necessary to fight to open routes for the use of evacuees or to rescue evacuees who are isolated and cannot reach the evacuation assembly points. The range of forces earmarked for Lebanon can vary from a company designed primarily to safeguard US aircraft at the airfield and furnish escort to two battalions of airborne troops and a Marine battalion landing team capable of conducting major combat operations to rescue Americans and evacuate them by either sea or air or a combination.

b. Troop Source and Reaction Times. Assuming no difficulty is experienced obtaining overflight rights, an airborne battalion could deploy to Adana, Turkey and arrive within 36 hours notice. An additional airborne battalion could arrive the following day. Troops could then be within Beirut within three hours of notice. A Marine battalion landing team is embarked in amphibious ships in the Mediterranean. If the situation in Lebanon continued to worsen these forces could be moved to 50 NM offshore which would place them within four hours of the beaches.

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TAB C

Revised 16 June 1970

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c. Conduct of Operations. The assembly point for US nationals is at the American University Beirut. This is in the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy. It is less than 2 NM from Lebanon Harbor and the Lebanon jetty from which evacuation by sea could be accomplished. Nine and one half kilometers separate the assembly point from the airfield at Beirut. If considerable disorder exists within Beirut a minimum of an airborne battalion would be necessary to secure this route, the airfield, and escort the evacuees. If the airfield and route is under attack this would probably require two battalions. The possibility exists that some Americans may be unable to make their way to Beirut and will have to be evacuated from Tripoli and Sidon. Since there are no usable airfields close to either of these cities, evacuation will probably have to be accomplished by sea. The Marines could easily accomplish this task. The potential evacuee population is estimated to be between five and six thousand. These people can be evacuated within 48 hours using MAC aircraft from both the US and those used to deliver troops. Evacuation would be to safehavens in Greece, Cyprus, Crete, and Italy.

d. At the time a military evacuation of US Nationals from Lebanon is directed, consideration must be given to the possibility that GOL will request US assistance in restoring order and in maintaining a moderate GOL as discussed in Situation III. If this course of action appears to be a desirable possibility, the actions and missions described in Situation III are applicable with the first action for the force being the necessary evacuation measures.

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TAB C

TAB C

EVACUATION DATA LEBANON

1. Personnel to be evacuated	
a. DOD Personnel (Includes civilian personnel of DOD)	37
b. Dependents of DOD Personnel	84
c. Other USG Personnel	122
d. Dependents of Other USG Personnel	213
e. American Residents	5,000
f. Other Potential Evacuees (Other Country Personnel and Key Locals)	750
g. American Tourists	150
h. TOTAL	6,356
2. Location of Evacuees	
a. Beirut	5,406
b. Tripoli	100
c. Sidon	100
d. Country at Large	750*

\*NOTE: Remainder are of Lebanese extraction and are not expected to desire evacuation.

3. Concept of Evacuation

- a. Assembly Point: American University Beirut
- b. Safehaven: Cyprus, Greece, and Italy
- c. If possible, assemble all personnel in Beirut and evacuate by commercial means. Air evacuation preferred but use sea evacuation as required. Overland evacuation not considered appropriate.

MILITARY EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS FROM LEBANON

SITUATION 2 - SCENARIO

1. OBJECTIVES:

The objective of this scenario is to present in time phased sequence the political/military actions required in the event the forceable military evacuation of US citizens from Lebanon is required.

2. SITUATION:

Fighting between the Lebanese Army and the Fedayeen has continued to increase in intensity and threaten the safety of US Nationals within Lebanon. As a result of this situation evacuation of US nationals from Lebanon is ordered by the President. Evacuation is initiated using commercial air transport and sea vessels as available. This scenario began with the order to evacuate using peaceful means and continues through the employment of US Forces to safeguard and complete the evacuation. It terminates with the completion of the evacuation and the withdrawal of US Forces from the area.

3. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. Situation will deteriorate to the extent the US Forces will be required to safeguard and evacuate US Nationals from Lebanon.
- b. Majority of US citizens have been assembled at the American University in Beirut.
- c. Airfields in Turkey, Greece, Crete and Cyprus will be available for evacuation.
- d. Necessary overflights of France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Austria as required will be available.
- e. Only minor physical resistance in the form of sniping, roadblocks, etc., will confront US Forces.
- f. The USSR will not interfere with US evacuation operations.
- g. The GOL may request US assistance to maintain GOL while evacuation is in progress.

4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

(1) Preliminary Phase (Commitment minus three days)

<u>US ACTION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
US Ambassador, Lebanon recommends evacuation of US nationals from Lebanon.	STATE, WHITE HOUSE DEFENSE	Gravity of situation is apparent; quick response is essential.
Washington Special Action Group at White House.	WHITE HOUSE	Review, evaluate situation considering inputs from USIB, Middle East Task Force, Defense, and other interested US Government agencies and provide US policy recommendations to President and NSC.
Contact Greece, Cyprus and Italy and inform them that evacuation of US citizens from Lebanon is imminent and request their assistance.	STATE	Greece, Cyprus and Italy have been designated as safe havens for Lebanon

US ACTION

Contact International Air Carrier Companies, operating in Middle East, to request assistance in evacuation.

Determine what Commercial Shipping presently available in or near Beirut that can transport evacuees.

Obtain latest update on number of potential evacuees in Lebanon and their whereabouts.

President announces decision to evacuate American Nationals from Lebanon.

Order MAC to assign priority to STRIKECOM and provide Acft to USCINCEUR as required.

Contact Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Austria, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, and request overflight rights for movement of troops to evacuate US citizens.

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

STATE

STATE/COMMERCE

STATE

WHITE HOUSE

JCS

STATE

COMMENT

Evacuation by commercial means will be utilized if at all possible.

Available Merchant Shipping should be utilized as required.

Early identification of any group of evacuees who are cut off from assembly point in Beirut is essential for planning. Landing beaches are available at Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon. However, no airfields are close to Tripoli or Sidon.

Therefore, if evacuees must be taken from all sites, Marine BLT should take care of evacuation from Tripoli and Sidon while Airborne Bn handles Beirut.

Reordering of current priorities necessary. Additional MAC aircraft will reduce reaction time of troops in Europe.

No difficulties anticipated from these nations so long as sole purpose is evacuation of US citizens.

(2) Preparation Phase (Commitment minus 2 days)

COMMENT

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

US ACTION

USCINCEUR/CINCLANT/  
CINCSTRIKE ordered to  
prepare forces for deploy-  
ment to carry out President's  
order.

JCS

Generation time for most US  
Forces is between 48-72 hrs.  
Forces can begin immediate  
deployment following the gene-  
ration period. One Bn US  
Marines w/Sixth Flt can reach  
area within 2-3 days. Airborne  
Bn from Europe can arrive  
within one day. Airborne Bn  
from US can arrive within 2  
days.

JCS

MAC/MSTS identify resources,  
capability, and requirements in  
support CINCSTRIKE Opn Plan 7700.

JCS

Order US Sixth Fleet to  
move Carrier Task Force  
and Amphibious Task Force  
to vicinity of Lebanon.

Attack Carrier Group can operate  
effectively by approaching no  
closer than 200 NM of Lebanon.  
Amphibious force moves at  
average rate of 13 Knots and would  
have to be within 50 NM in  
order to land within 4 hours.  
Amphibious force has no heli-  
copters. Strength of Marine  
Bn Landing Team is approximately  
1600 men.

*What decision  
must be taken  
to start this section?*

*There are 5  
planned  
operations  
to be  
conducted  
in the  
Lebanon  
area  
which  
is  
not  
other  
than  
the  
one  
called  
in  
the  
order  
to  
move  
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carrier  
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amphibious  
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vicinity  
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Lebanon.  
The  
order  
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the  
President's  
order.*

US ACTION

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

COMMENT

Advise nations in Middle East, particularly Arab States of US decision. Request their cooperation.

STATE

Emphasize US will not intervene with troops unless safety of US citizens is jeopardized.

Advise UN of US action and other world capitols

STATE

All commands report orders and initiation of preparation to execute. Position and sailing time of Sixth Flt is reported.

JCS

JCS/CINCSRIKE, CINCEUR, CINCLANT review and update Middle East Contingency plan.

Availability of carrier air strike force depends on location of Fleet. Forces can be available within max of 2-3 days.

US Ambassador, Lebanon reports situation becoming very critical with fighting in streets of Beirut. Indicates US Forces may be required to complete evacuation.

STATE

Forward deployment of troops may be necessary.

USCINCEUR ordered to deploy one Airborne Battalion to Adana, Turkey for possible use in Lebanon.

WHITE HOUSE/JCS

Approximately 8 hours required to fly from Europe to Adana, Turkey. Less than 2 hours required from Adana to Beirut. USCINCEUR has adequate in theater airlift to transport one airborne battalion.

*would it be ready on basis of above checks?*

US ACTION

MAC ordered to deploy additional aircraft to Europe.

Sixth Fleet reports amphibious force located 50 NM off Lebanon, can begin landing operations within four hours.

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

JCS

SIXTH FLEET

COMMENT

MAC aircraft will be used to move troops to Middle East and evacuate US Nationals from Lebanon if necessary.

Landing beaches are available adjacent to Beirut International Airport. Landing boats could also land at Beirut Jetty in harbor. Distance from airport to American University is approx 9.5 KM, from Jetty; 2 KM. Approx one battalion required to secure routes to Afld. Landing beaches are within easy distance of Tripoli (2 KM) and within Sidon. Marines carry 30 days supply.

USCINCEUR

CINCEUR reports Airborne Bn arrival and ready at Adana, Turkey.

Airborne battalion has approximate strength of 1100 men, can make parachute assault if unable to land at Beirut. Flying time Adana to Beirut approximately 2 hours. Forces has 15 days supply with it, except for rations of which there are 5 days.

STATE

Ambassador, Lebanon requests US military force to land and evacuate US Nationals.

Operation will be under the direction of US Ambassador.

(3) Execution Phase.

<u>US ACTION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE AGENCY</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
President orders Marines and/or airborne battalions to land in Lebanon to complete evacuation.	WHITE HOUSE	US Forces will not fire unless fired upon, commanders must exercise maximum restraint on use of force.
USCINCEUR ordered to land forces and evacuate US Nationals from area.	JCS	Forces will begin landing within 3-4 hours depending on actual forces committed. Airborne troops can begin landing within 3 hours, while Marines will begin within four hours.
USCINCSRIKE ordered to deploy one airborne battalion to staging base at Adana, Turkey	JCS	This force will be positioned so as to be able to reinforce quickly. Should arrive approximately 24 hours after order to deploy is received.
Inform world governments and UN of US action.	STATE	Emphasize US intervention solely for purpose of protecting US citizens, American Forces expected to be withdrawn within one week.
USCINCEUR informs that US troops have landed and evacuation is proceeding.	USCINCEUR	USAF aircraft that delivered airborne troops plus commerial acft as available will be utilized. If necessary, some can be evacuated on Sixth Fleet vessels.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
2027

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS-1-3)

May 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*  
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Preparing for Crisis in Lebanon--Cable  
for Clearance

The recent Israeli raid on Beirut has once again raised the possibility of a crisis in Lebanon. The most likely sequence of events that might lead to serious civil conflict would be Lebanese government efforts to crack down on the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, leading to covert or open Syrian intervention on their behalf. Last fall the Lebanese Foreign Minister asked us what our attitude would be in the event of Syrian intervention.

We have owed the Lebanese a response for some months. Secretary Rogers has now prepared a memo for the President with a cable for clearance dealing with this issue [Tab A]. Secretary Rogers also intends to urge the Lebanese government "to arrest or expel from its territory all known Black September personnel and crack down on other Palestinian organizations which engage in terrorism." If we take this line with the Lebanese, we cannot avoid giving them some idea of what they might expect from us if a serious crisis ensues.

At Tab B you will find a detailed analysis of the situation in Lebanon and US options based on our contingency plans in the event of a crisis. In brief, our choices for military action in a Lebanese crisis are generally unattractive, apart from some symbolic gestures. The more important role we can play would be in providing the Lebanese government with equipment and in helping to coordinate possible responses by Jordan and Israel. In addition, we could approach the Soviets about Syrian intervention if we thought this would be helpful.

XGDS 1 - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - See attached.

SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)

The Issue for Decision

The telegram which Secretary Rogers has sent over for clearance [see red tab under Tab A] instructs Ambassador Buffum to tell Foreign Minister Abouhamad that in regard to the contingency of Syrian action against Lebanon in the event of a government-fedayeen confrontation, among those possible steps that would have to be considered are: (a) a public statement reiterating USG support for the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon and some corollary steps in the Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete US support for this position; (b) a possible approach to the USSR to restrain Syria; (c) consultation between Israel and Lebanon; (d) consultations between Lebanon and Jordan. These are proposed as no more than ideas for exploration. Presumably, the Lebanese would come back with some ideas and we would have the makings of a dialogue on this subject.

The issue is how specific we should be now in discussing with the Lebanese steps we might take in a crisis. On the one hand, we owe the Lebanese a serious answer, and we do not want them to act in expectation of either much more or much less support than we are likely to give them in a crisis. On the other hand, talking about steps we might take, even on a clearly contingent basis, usually leaves an implication of some commitment unless we are totally negative.

The issue is posed in the wording of one section of a telegram which would instruct Ambassador Buffum (a) to discuss on "the most tentative and contingency basis" without any commitment at this time what steps might be taken if there is a showdown in Lebanon and (b) to make clear to Lebanon that continued liberation of terrorists will sooner or later affect our attitude toward Lebanon.

Alternative 1 (State's initial draft) says that "among possible steps which would have to be considered are:"

"A) Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon: In addition, we would consider some corollary steps in Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position.

"B) Possible approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention.

"C) In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon would be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would consider what our role might be in such talks.

"D) Consultations between Lebanon and Jordan in same sense."

Alternative 2 (NSC Staff) would try at the outset to inject some sense that, while we would want to be responsive to Lebanon's need for help, we would be working under some limits as far as military moves are concerned. If this approach were approved, the following paragraph would be substituted for sub-paragraph "A" in alternative 1 above (State would concur in this change):

"A. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon. In addition we would consider accelerated delivery of military equipment and corollary steps in the Mediterranean area to demonstrate concrete support for this position. We would welcome hearing Lebanese views on what those steps might be. FYI: If subject US intervention comes up, you can refer question to Washington. However, you should feel free to discuss pros and cons from Lebanese viewpoint as well as from US. We do not want to be excessively negative, but we do not want to be misleading either. We assume Lebanese would have reservations about US intervention, and you will recognize limits on our ability to play a decisive military role in such a contingency. We assume that our purpose should be, first, to put Lebanon in best position to rely on her own forces to the maximum extent possible and, second, to encourage help from other countries in the region capable of deterring Syrian intervention. END FYI."

Alternative 3 would be to use the above paragraph but drop the words "and corollary steps in the Mediterranean area."

Alternative 4, of course, would be to try as non-committal an answer to the Lebanese as possible, perhaps along the following lines:

"You may say that in regard to contingency of Syrian action against Lebanon in event of a GOL-fedayeen confrontation, US would be prepared to consider steps that might be helpful to Lebanese within limits imposed by situation in which US finds itself. US would welcome discussion of this subject and, to start, would appreciate knowing what Lebanese think such steps might be."

The choice is among alternatives 2, 3 and 4 because State is already prepared to see its language changed to that in Alternative 2.

--The argument for Alternative 2 is that the Lebanese have asked a serious question and deserve a serious answer. If we simply invite their ideas without advancing any limits at the outset we risk putting ourselves in a position where we would have to be more negative than if we opened the discussion with some limited thoughts of our own.

--The argument for Alternative 3 is that it goes reasonably far without volunteering any US military moves.

--The argument for Alternative 4 is that it is the most non-committal and delays--without averting--discussion of a potentially difficult subject.

Our feeling is that straightforward discussion on a contingency basis could be useful so that the Lebanese will not expect too much of us. Even if we put the ball back in their court now, we would face the same questions eventually. Thus I would recommend Alternative 2. However, I recognize that you may prefer no initiative to mention of possible US military moves at this stage and, in that case, suggest Alternative 3.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize clearance of instructions to Ambassador Buffum along the lines of Alternative 2 above.

*Dick Kennedy concurs*

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer Alternative 3 (no initiative to raise possible US military moves but deal with issue generally if it is raised and report to Washington). \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer Alternative 4 (avoid initiating substantive discussion now) \_\_\_\_\_

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1973

SECRET/NODIS

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Actions to Encourage Lebanon to Move  
Against Black September and Other  
Terrorist Groups

As you know, the Black September Organization's operation in Khartoum was planned and directed from headquarters which that group has in Lebanon. Since the murder of Ambassador Noel and Counselor Moore, we have been studying steps we might take that would encourage the Lebanese Government to arrest or expel from its territory all known Black September personnel and crack down on other Palestinian organizations which engage in terrorism.

The problem is a complex one, for Lebanon is a country with which we have many ties of friendship and many common interests. Lebanon's Christian leadership would like nothing better than to see the Arab terrorists and guerrilla organizations removed altogether from Lebanese soil; this feeling is shared even by some Lebanese Moslems, although they do not express it openly. However, the Lebanese Government feels it must move cautiously, owing to the large number of Palestinian refugees on its territory (some 300,000) and the small size of Lebanon's Army (about 15,000 men). Lebanese leaders also fear that Lebanese Moslem extremists and leftists would join the Palestinian guerrilla organizations in opposing moves which might seriously weaken them, and that this could lead to civil war.

For all their very real apprehensions, Lebanon's leaders have been able to take some steps to limit the freedom of action of the guerrilla organizations.

SECRET/NODISXGDS - 3

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

Last fall, after a major Israeli raid deep into Lebanon in September, the Lebanese Army moved to clear the guerrillas from the immediate area of the border with Israel. This accounts for the quiet which has prevailed along the Lebanese-Israeli border these past months. The April 9 Israeli raids have pushed the Lebanese Government further in the direction of a showdown with the terrorists. We believe that if the Lebanese Government is made to feel that it can count on the support of the United States in case of trouble it will be more readily inclined to arrest or expel the terrorists.

We are already taking steps to demonstrate our support for Lebanon. Your agreement to invite President Frangie to this country next year is a very important step. We have just informed the Lebanese that we will airlift for immediate delivery some small quantities of military materiel which they need urgently, and we are asking the Defense Department to make available right away communications equipment which the Lebanese Army needs for use against the guerrilla organizations.

Closer coordination with the Lebanese in regard to what we would do to help them in the event of a showdown with the Palestinians is another very important step we could take. Foreign Minister Abouhamad spoke to us last fall, when he was in this country for the UN General Assembly, about his concern over what would happen if Syria should intervene during a confrontation between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. The Foreign Minister, and Lebanese Army Commander-in-Chief Iskandar Ghanem, later told U.S. officials in Beirut that the Army could handle the guerrillas but feared being overwhelmed by an invasion from Syria. They asked what assistance Lebanon could expect from the United States in such a situation.

Unless we are prepared to respond to Foreign Minister Abouhamad, it will be difficult for us to press the Lebanese Government to move vigorously on terrorism. I believe that a sympathetic response, coupled with a reiteration of our own concern over the freedom of action

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET-NODIS

-3-

which Lebanon allows the Black September and other terrorist groups, would now be especially timely and would encourage the Lebanese to act more firmly. The attached telegram, which I plan to send unless you perceive objections, gives Ambassador Buffum instructions for discussion of both these issues with Foreign Minister Abouhamad. You will note that while we seek to be sympathetic and forthcoming with Foreign Minister Abouhamad, the operative portion of the instruction has been couched in terms which carefully avoid any new or unusual commitments on our part.



William P. Rogers

Attachment:

Telegram to Beirut

SECRET-NODIS

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND US OPTIONS

The Situation. The problem that the Lebanese government would face would be significantly different from King Hussein's situation in 1970. For the moment, the Lebanese government is trying to exercise control over the fedayeen to prevent border crossings into Israel, but it is stopping short of provoking a complete showdown. The Lebanese army numbers only about 14,000 men and seems just barely capable of coping with this internal security problem provided that outsiders do not interfere. Syria, however, could begin putting its regular forces across the border at the rate of some 2,000 per day in the uniforms of fedayeen irregulars. At that point, given the sympathies for the fedayeen of some 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and a sizeable portion of the Muslim population, the Lebanese security forces could well be beyond their depth. If the situation got out of hand, Israel would be likely to consider entering southern Lebanon in force and might be reluctant to withdraw even after order had been restored.

In short, we may have to face a difficult situation sometime over the next several months. We owe the Lebanese government an answer on how we might respond, and we owe ourselves the advantage of advance thinking.

US Options. Against this background, we have reviewed the contingency plans which were prepared against such an emergency in order to assure their readiness and to use them as a base for developing an answer to the Lebanese. If trouble broke out, the US would have a choice among the following possible responses:

--Evacuation of US Citizens: Over 5,000 US citizens normally live in Lebanon. In the event of hostilities, evacuation could be carried out by commercial carriers, or, if this option were foreclosed, the US would introduce on short notice a minimum force to secure the evacuation staging area and the airport. This might require landing the Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Sixth Fleet.

--Evacuation with a lingering show of force in support of the Lebanese government. In the event of serious fighting in Beirut, evacuation of US citizens might require a stronger show of force than suggested above. In addition to an amphibious landing, the

XGDS - 1

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - See attached.

US could send in one airborne battalion to secure the airfield from which evacuation would be carried out. The arrival of airborne troops could also provide the nucleus for a US military presence in support of the Lebanese government. The symbolism of the US intervention would be more important than actual numbers in this scenario.

--Actual involvement of US troops to secure key installations in Beirut, thereby releasing Lebanese armed forces for military operations elsewhere. Over a period of several days, the US could send one brigade into Lebanon by sea and air. At a minimum, these forces could be expected to seize the airport and key roads into the city. Further reinforcements would require at least two weeks and adequate staging bases.

--Substantial US intervention in a Lebanese civil war. This unappealing alternative would require the initial commitment of the equivalent of one US brigade, followed by reinforcements over a period of several weeks. Once again, staging bases would be important for the success of the latter parts of this scenario.

The problems connected with any of these options make direct US troop involvement relatively unattractive:

--We would have the usual problem of staging bases. The situation in Lebanon is not as likely as was the case in Jordan in 1970 to evolve as clear-cut Syrian intervention.

--Air power is not as likely as in 1970 to prove an effective option. Unlike the armored invasion of Jordan in September 1970, Syrian involvement in Lebanon in 1972 or 1973 would be more likely to take the form of infiltration of armed irregulars and the encouragement of street fighting in Beirut.

--US troops would be enmeshed in the most difficult of civil wars.

DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: BEIRUT

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD

1. This message provides instructions for you to pursue with Foreign Minister Abouhamad consultations he initiated with us last fall about steps USG might take to help Lebanon in event of confrontation between GOL and fedayeen. At same time, building on excellent efforts you have been making to "educate" Lebanese and keep their feet to fire on BSO/Fatah problem, we want to urge GOL to act against Black September and other terrorist groups. We believe GOL can do this without provoking showdown with Palestinian organizations and their supporters in Lebanon. Our aim is by demonstrating USG support for GOL to encourage it to deny use of its territory to BSO and others directly engaged in international terrorism. While we do not wish at this time to make a formal connection between USG support and GOL action re terrorists, Lebanese should be made aware that their continued toleration of terrorists will sooner or later affect our attitude toward Lebanon.

2. In your discussion with Foreign Minister you should tell him that we have had very much in mind these past months concern which he expressed to the Secretary, Assistant Secretary Sisco and you last fall. We have sought to show our support for Lebanon in a

SECRET/NODIS

number of ways. In military supply field, we have made available \$10 million FMS credit, have agreed to Lebanese Army's purchasing intercept and other communications equipment from American suppliers, and are planning to airlift grenade launchers, grenades, and radios which we had earlier agreed to supply to Lebanon. We will continue to give sympathetic consideration to Lebanese Army requests for equipment or training.

3. You may say that in regard to contingency of Syrian action against Lebanon in the event of a GOL-fedayeen confrontation, which Foreign Minister raised with us last fall, among possible steps which would have to be considered and studied are:

A. Public statement reiterating USG support for independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon: In addition we would consider some corollary steps in Mediterranean area which would demonstrate concrete support for this position.

B. Possible approach to USSR with view to making clear our opposition to intervention in Lebanon by outside or regional powers and eliciting Soviet cooperation in preventing such intervention.

C. In our judgment consultations between Israel and Lebanon would be required regarding possible Israeli role in deterring Syrians. We would consider what our role might be in such talks.

D. Consultations between Lebanon and Jordan in same sense.

SECRET/NODIS

-3-

4. You should stress the foregoing are at this stage no more than the most tentative and contingency ideas and represent some obvious avenues of possible exploration if matters were to move toward confrontation Lebanese have talked about. We would like to have Lebanese reaction to them as well as their suggestions, and will want to continue dialogue with Foreign Minister on this subject.

5. You should say that while we want to consult and coordinate with Lebanon for this extreme contingency, we think GOL can take much more stringent measures in regard to fedayeen than it is now doing, without provoking a confrontation. Lebanese Army's effective action in clearing fedayeen from border area these past months--a step which earlier would have been considered impossible by many Lebanese--is an example of what can be done. Foreign Minister should be aware of shock and outrage which Khartoum murders caused in United States, and of unfortunate impression created in US by fact that this criminal action was planned in Lebanon and that people who were behind it continue to live and work in freedom in Lebanon. USG wants to do all it can to help Lebanon, but Lebanese should realize that our attitude and our ability to be of assistance will necessarily sooner or later be affected if Lebanon continues to give free run of its territory to criminals like BSO.

SECRET/NODIS

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA	HP	
4/11	4/11/73		2027 Saunders

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  FROM: ROGERS  UNCLAS \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS

KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ RICHARDSON \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ CODEWORD \_\_\_\_\_

ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ S \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Actions to Encourage Lebanon to move against Black Sept and other Terrorist Groups*

REFERENCE: S/S *7305870* OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK <i>SCOWCROFT</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR HAK..... ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. .... ( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ ( _____ )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( _____ )
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO _____ TO _____ ( _____ )
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( _____ )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO..... ( _____ )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ( _____ )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( _____ )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ..... ( _____ )
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP				DUE DATE: <i>4/17</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
<i>DAY</i>				

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>5/1/73</i>	<i>Saunders and Quandt</i>	<i>HAK</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Decision (5/8)</i>	
<i>5/10</i>		<i>SAUNDERS</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Per Request (5/14)</i>	
<i>5/31/73</i>	<i>Saunders Davis</i>			<i>Does State wish to drop this in view of updated version discussed in WSAG?</i>	
<i>6/1/73</i>	<i>Hochett</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>Close out - OBE per State S/S (Barner) HHS JWA</i>	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) \_\_\_\_\_

OR RECORD COMMENT:) \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_ JOINED BY LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

SEE # \_\_\_\_\_ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D **ADC** BY \_\_\_\_\_

CYS FOR ) SA \_\_\_\_\_

) HP \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG ) WH \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PA

) SF \_\_\_\_\_

) NS \_\_\_\_\_

) EP \_\_\_\_\_

DESTROY) DY \_\_\_\_\_

*JUN 4 1973*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION-8430

MAR 16 1973

*pkay*  
*in*  
*Liberia*

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger */S/*

SUBJECT: Invitations to Presidents Tolbert and Frangie

I understand you have disapproved extending invitations to Presidents Tolbert of Liberia and Frangie of Lebanon to visit you in 1973.

I am concerned that your decision not to invite President Tolbert for a State visit may have an undesirable impact on U.S. -Liberian relations. As you know, Tolbert has been trying very hard to see you since his assumption of power in 1971, but we have put him off. In October 1971, you wrote Tolbert that "even though our heavy schedules... may preclude, for the time being, a more formal kind of visit, I share your hope that we will, nonetheless, be able to find a mutually convenient opportunity to renew our old friendship." Mrs. Nixon was later received in Liberia as a Head of State. Throughout 1972, Tolbert kept putting out feelers for an invitation, and we kept turning them down. A new turn-down would follow our recent termination of grant military assistance and our inability to supply needed PL-480 rice in 1973 or 1974.

I fear that continued avoidance of a Tolbert visit will convince him that our recent actions indicate American disinterest in Liberia. This could present problems for our private investors there, whose stake is \$375 million, or possibly complicate our use of Liberia as a communications and military transit center. I, therefore, urge you either to invite Tolbert for a State visit in 1973, or let him know that you hope to receive him, and offer a dinner in his honor if he comes on a private visit in June 1973 (he has been invited by San Francisco State and Grambling College).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you invite Tolbert for a State visit during the first half of 1973, possibly in June.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

or

That you authorize our informing Tolbert that you would like to receive him for an office call, if he visits the U.S. privately in June, and offer a dinner in his honor.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8463  
7219425

December 12, 1972

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Clashes between Lebanese Army and Fedayeen

Recent days have witnessed three clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Fedayeen. The first and most significant occurred on December 8, when the Lebanese Army moved to disperse a band of Fedayeen which, contrary to the Army's instructions, had entered the southern Lebanese-Israeli border area. After a brief engagement with Army units, the Fedayeen withdrew. On December 9, Fedayeen elements ambushed a group of Lebanese gendarmes and killed one. Also on December 9, an exchange of fire occurred between Lebanese forces and Fedayeen in the Arqoub (Fatahland) area. This same area was the scene of fighting between the Army and Fedayeen on November 21.

These incidents underscore the Lebanese Government's determination to control Fedayeen activities within Lebanon and to prevent the Fedayeen from using Lebanon as a base for attacks against Israeli territory. This policy involves real risks for the Lebanese Government. The Fedayeen and their sympathizers are, predictably, attempting to place the blame for the latest clashes on the Government. There has consequently been greater tension in Lebanon recently, and there is always a possibility that clashes between the Army and the Fedayeen could spark conflict between Lebanese Christians and Moslems. Even if confessional strife is avoided, however, military action against the Fedayeen lays the Lebanese Government open to charges of being soft on Israel and laggard in support of the Palestinian cause, and these are readily exploited by radical forces and opposition politicians in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government's policy has paid off handsomely in one major respect, however: there have been no Fedayeen incursions into Israel from Lebanon, and no incidents along the Lebanese-Israeli border, since mid-September. The Lebanese Army has

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GDS--DECLAS Dec. 31, 1980

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-2-

admittedly been aided in its task by the demoralization which Fedayeen elements in Lebanon, and elsewhere, have recently suffered, and by fall weather, which discourages guerrilla operations. The Defense Attache in Beirut reports, following a tour of the south late in November, that Lebanese Army units there have been strengthened, enjoy good morale, and are actively checking and patrolling against Fedayeen infiltrators. There is, however, always a possibility that some Fedayeen might slip through and succeed in carrying out actions against Israeli border settlements, in spite of the best efforts of the Lebanese Army.

Lebanese authorities suspect that the incidents of the last few days may have been deliberately provoked by Fatah leader Arafat. They are concerned that more clashes, possibly on a larger scale, may be in the offing. President Frangie and his aides nonetheless appear intent on pursuing the measures they have taken so far to control the Fedayeen, despite these difficulties, but they will be looking to the United States for continued support and encouragement in this policy. We are expediting deliveries of material for the Lebanese Army already ordered under previous year MAP and FMS programs. At the present time we have no recommendations for United States Government actions in support of Lebanon further to those already made, but we shall be following the situation closely and will make known to the Lebanese at an appropriate time our satisfaction over the determination they have shown in the pursuit of their policy.

*Remiller for*

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	8403	Saunders
12/12	12/13	9	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT  U \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER  ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S  CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Clashes betw Lebanese Army & Sephayan along Lebanese/Israeli borders*

REFERENCE: S/S *721942.5* OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				
STAFF SECRETARY				
FAR EAST				
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
EUROPE/CANADA				
LATIN AMERICA				
UNITED NATIONS				
ECONOMIC				
SCIENTIFIC				
LR PLANNING				
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

**ACTION REQUIRED**

MEMO FOR HAK \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

MEMO FOR PRES. \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

REPLY FOR \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

MEMO \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

RECOMMENDATIONS \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

JOINT MEMO \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

REFER TO STATE \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

ANY ACTION NECESSARY *7* \_\_\_\_\_ (  )

CONCURRENCE \_\_\_\_\_ ( \_\_\_\_\_ )

DUE DATE: *12/18*

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>12/13</i>	<i>Saunders NSC/S</i>			<i>This has been dealt with in Daily Brief of 12/11 and in a separate memo related to 7229. Close file. HITS</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES  NO

MICROFILM DATA

DO *[Signature]*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG) NSC

TO ) PAF \_\_\_\_\_

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

*DEC 15 1972*



CONFIDENTIAL

8410

THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

December 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
✓ ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

This memorandum states the position of the Department of Transportation on the questions raised in the memorandum dealing with U.S. aircraft noise regulation and the Anglo-French Concorde which was distributed by Peter Flanigan on November 27th. As was explained in that paper, a decision is needed with regard to two Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM's) on aircraft noise regulation which the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to publish. Because of potential impact on the sales of the Concorde to U.S. airlines, these NPRM's clearly have significant international repercussions. However, they were developed to deal with the pressing domestic issue of aircraft noise and should be given major consideration in the review of this matter.

The recommendations of the Department of Transportation are as follows:

- 1) Both NPRM's -- i.e., the one dealing with fleet noise levels (FNL) and the one dealing with supersonic aircraft -- should be published as soon as possible with the stated qualification that these proposed regulations are not intended to establish Federal preemption over all state/local regulation of aircraft noise.

This document consists of 6 leaves,  
Copy 4 of 19, Series A

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DOT/OST CLASSIFIED  
CONTROL # 72-1118

2) The NPRM's should be published without any specified exemption for the Concorde. Significantly, these are proposed rules, not final ones. The French and British should be notified that they have an opportunity to seek an exemption for the Concorde either before or after the final regulations are promulgated. As discussed below, factors other than FAA noise regulations may adversely affect airline purchases of the Concorde and make the issuance of the final FAA regulations far less contentious vis a vis the Concorde.

I. The NPRM's Should be Published Promptly

The proposed regulations are part of a broad-gauged program to abate aircraft noise.

The Federal Aviation Administration issued a rule on November 3, 1969, which adopted a new Part 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations that prescribed stricter aircraft noise standards for new subsonic turbojet aircraft. This regulation has set an upper limit on aviation noise, and the subsequent new aircraft (B-747, DC-10, L-1011) are substantially quieter than their predecessors (B-707, 727, 737, DC-9, etc.). Despite this, there are a large number of older noisier aircraft still in the airline fleets which act as a major irritant in the vicinity of our nation's airports.

The first of the NPRM's in question, that dealing with fleet noise reduction, is designed (1) to prevent airlines from purchasing additional noisy aircraft; (2) supplement and serve as an impetus to the development of uniform international agreements and standards concerning aircraft noise; and (3) reduce the noise exposure problem at the major airports by the accelerated introduction of additional new, quieter aircraft, and the phase-out of the older models or the retrofitting of older jet aircraft with noise reduction equipment. It would accomplish this by freezing the current level of each airline fleet's noise, and implement a phased regulatory program which would require each air carrier aircraft to comply with Part 36 noise standards by the end of 1978.

This regulation would complement other recent noise abatement resources. In addition to aircraft noise standards, uniform noise abatement takeoff and landing procedures were instituted this summer at the Nation's airports. These procedures help to reduce the noise impact on the ground while maintaining the flight safety. Another proposed regulation was recently issued that would require all newly produced aircraft with existing type certificates to comply

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with Part 36. This proposal would place a lid on the noise levels of the first generation jet aircraft still in production and compliment the fleet noise proposal's goal of effecting an overall decrease in air carrier aircraft noise levels.

The second NPRM under consideration would extend current subsonic aircraft noise standards to supersonic transport aircraft. This proposal is based on the concept that the public should benefit from uniform maximum aircraft noise levels. It would require all aircraft, subsonic or supersonic, to be subject to the same minimum noise standards, and results from an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued on August 4, 1970, requesting public participation in the determination of the appropriateness of this action. Overall response to this proposal was decidedly in favor of such a rule. It should also be noted that the noise standards now proposed for supersonic aircraft are the same as the standards which were proposed for the U.S. SST.

As indicated above, we believe that these NPRM's should be issued with the explicit qualification that the proposed regulations are not intended to establish Federal preemption over all state/local regulation of aircraft noise. Exposure to noise is a very localized phenomenon with many local consequences, and we believe, consistent with the philosophy of the New Federalism, that it should be dealt with on the local level. Because the full political and financial liability implications of Federal preemption are not fully understood, it should be avoided for the time being. For example, property loss damages nationwide resulting from aircraft noise have been estimated by some to add up to many billions of dollars. The Supreme Court held in 1962 that the liability for any taking of property due to excessive aircraft noise rested with the airport operator. While it is not certain that Federal preemption will necessarily lead to Federal liability, it is significant to note that local officials have argued that, if the Federal Government exercises preemption and thus prevents local governments from taking any action to reduce aircraft noise, the injured property owners should seek compensation from the Federal Government rather than from the airport operator. These are among the issues which the Noise Control Act of 1972 assigns to the EPA for a nine-month study, and we intend to work with the EPA in the analysis of these questions.

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- 4 -

We have requested that the Solicitor General argue against Federal preemption of aircraft noise regulation in the case now before the Supreme Court involving the airport curfew imposed by the City of Burbank. The case is discussed in the memorandum circulated by Peter Flanigan. We also intend to become involved in the legal action now pending with regard to the new California airport noise exposure regulations, and to request that the Government's case rest upon the paramount Federal interest in avoiding an undue constraint or burden upon interstate and foreign commerce (and, if necessary, safety), not upon Federal preemption.

In the absence of Federal preemption, state and local regulation of aircraft noise can be expected. The Burbank curfew and the California regulations are examples. The New York Port Authority already has a regulation prohibiting aircraft which exceed certain noise levels (which would prohibit the Concorde). Other special local rules barring the landing of supersonic aircraft (such as foreign-owned SST's to which the proposed FAA rules would not apply) could be further examples. The publication and issuance of the NPRM's may persuade some states and localities that additional aircraft noise regulation is not necessary; but, until the EPA study is completed and the desirability of more comprehensive Federal regulation is evaluated, the Federal Government must actively follow on a case-by-case basis all state and local action in the area of aircraft noise exposure regulation to prevent undue burdens on interstate commerce.

## II. The NPRM's Should Be Published without any Specified Exception for the Concorde

Keeping in mind that we are recommending the publication of a proposed rule, and not the adoption of a final one, we believe the NPRM's should not reflect an exception for the Concorde. Britain and France should be afforded an opportunity to seek an exception during the rulemaking process, as should any other nation or airline, and waiver of the final rule could also be sought. But from a transportation policy standpoint, we recommend that the Federal Government not decide now whether to exempt the Concorde from otherwise applicable Federal aircraft noise regulations. (Avoiding a firm Federal decision now vis a vis Concorde is essentially Option 3 as described in the memorandum distributed by Peter Flanigan. The other two options require a firm, public decision on the Concorde now - one pro, the other con.)

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### Advantages

1. Publishing the FAA NPRM's without exception for the Concorde defers a potentially difficult Federal decision until it must be made, raising the distinct possibility that other developments may make the eventual issuance of the NPRM's far less contentious vis a vis the Concorde. For example, as described in the memorandum circulated by Peter Flanigan, the Concorde faces potential problems resulting from Government actions other than the FAA NPRM's: aircraft engine emission requirement (publicly announced by the EPA on December 5), FAA fuel reserve and fire safety requirements, possible high fare requirements of the CAB reflecting higher costs, state or local opposition to SST landings and takeoffs, and a possible Congressional ban against SST's.

2. It defers a final decision on the NPRM's until the American airlines, which represent a potential market for the Concorde, decide whether to exercise their option based on the aggregate of the present circumstances, including their estimates of the economic performance (costs and demand) of Concorde operation. Six U.S. airlines (Pan Am, Continental, Braniff, American, Eastern and TWA) hold options on 32 Concorde to be exercised in March 1973. A general decision not to buy the Concorde will lessen the significance of subsequent Federal action which restricts the operations of the plane.

3. Issuing the NPRM's without exceptions for the Concorde should help discourage Congressional initiatives, thus leaving flexibility to deal on a case-by-case basis with the Concorde, the Russian TU-144, or future SST's, including those of U.S. manufacture.


4. It should be applauded by environmentalists and avoid the domestic criticism that the Administration favored the British and French at the expense of legitimate environmental interests.

### Disadvantages

The absence of an exemption in the NPRM's for the Concorde will be clear notice that the Concorde may be barred for U.S. airline ownership and operation. The British and French appear to be

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gravely concerned that such action by the FAA will heavily and adversely affect the decision of U.S. airlines to exercise their options in March 1973. Thus, appeals to the President from the highest levels of the British and French Governments may be provoked.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John W. Olyne". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "J" and a long horizontal flourish at the end.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG-NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	8410	Soumyant
12/08	12/08/77		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER *X* \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C *X* \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 'S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *DOT Position on Aircraft Noise Levels & Impact on Anglo-French Concorde*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APPTS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	( )
EUROPE/CANADA	<i>X</i>			RECOMMENDATIONS	( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( )
ECONOMIC		<i>X</i>		ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( <i>X</i> )
SCIENTIFIC		<i>X</i>		CONCURRENCE	( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:	<i>12/12</i>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING				<i>See top pg 6</i>	
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>12/13</i>	<i>RFL</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>		<i>NAR per Sfeldt</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO *[Signature]*

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG) NSC \_\_\_\_\_

TO ) PAF \_\_\_\_\_

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

*0-15 1972*

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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A

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIALACTION Outside System  
August 31, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *K*

SUBJECT: Letter from Charles Malik of Lebanon

Dr. Charles Malik has written you an epic letter -- 20 pages at Tab B -- outlining his broad perceptions of current and future trends in the Mid-East. They begin and end with the premise that the vitality of American and Western influence -- political, intellectual and spiritual -- has eroded while the "communist glacier" moves forward. He argues for a renewed US assertiveness with some ideas on a long-term Mid-East peace. He admires your leadership.

Malik feels he has a special relationship with you and with the US. A knowledgeable man, he inclines in outlook towards the 50s when, above all, the US played a more active role in the area and in Lebanon. He longs for that degree of US re-engagement; it takes the form of pressing for US involvement in Lebanese elections so that our friends remain in power. There is also the element of a generation gap; he views with suspicion and sadness the modern mores of today's youth, hopes for a revival of the traditional values in which he was groomed and generally suspects communists and radicals at work in influencing the young.

The highlights of Malik's letter are contained in a short summary over the letter at Tab B. You are basically familiar with his thinking.

You have written him before and he never forgets when you do. He wanted you to have this letter before the Moscow trip but it did not arrive in time. The letter at Tab A is a timeless reply.

Recommendation: That you sign the letter at Tab A to Dr. Malik (Cleared with Mr. Price.)

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## LETTER FROM CHARLES MALIK

His letter covers a wide range of issues, not all conclusively. Underlined are his ideas for a Mid-East peace.

--The problem of the fedayeen and Palestinian refugees remain crucial to the long-range destiny of Lebanon. Lebanon cannot absorb them.

--The way the Lebanese political system is arranged, communists and radicals can coattail in. The US should be involved.

--He sees neither the US nor Western Europe doing much to prevent or neutralize the spread of communism in his area.

--The Mid-East situation is not just a regional or Arab/Israeli problem. It is a question of the fate of the greatest land bridge in the world. Specifically, it involves the fate of four countries (Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), three religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and two cultures (Israeli and Arab) in a confrontation. (Egypt will survive.) The problem is to create a new order among all these elements, central to protecting the land bridge:

--He sees Israel as dominant; it must be restrained with its neighbors.

--Jordan and Lebanon can be brought into such an order.

--The key is Syria, not Egypt, since there are too many differences between it and the Fertile Crescent states. We should not think of an Israeli/Egyptian balance but rather focus on balance within the Fertile Crescent. Syria is an integral part of the area, forming with its neighbors the land bridge. Its large areas could become the home of the Palestinians.

--The US must keep active in the Mediterranean and with NATO.

--Good will come from your Peking trip as long as we remain 'vigilant.' He is disturbed that strategic weapons rhetoric has shifted from "superiority" to "parity" and warns again the US must remain strong.

--He describes at length how the "communist glacier" is moving forward while the West gets equated with "imperialism" and "colonialism".

--"So far as Lebanon and the Arabic-speaking Near East are concerned, America has been withdrawing, not only politically but also intellectually and spiritually."

Saying "God has willed that America be today at the pinnacle of world power," he closes with a recitation of our virtues, a plea that we reassert ourselves and that "you are the man" to do this.

1. 253X

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


September 8, 1972

Dear Dr. Malik:

I have wanted to thank you for sharing your thinking with me concerning the situation in your area, and also for the expressions of great faith which you have in our shared values. Your experience and your thoughts make it always a pleasure to hear from you. I know that others here have also benefitted by having your thoughts on matters important to both of our nations. Lebanon and the United States, indeed, have an important friendship and shared interests to be maintained and nurtured to the benefit of all.

I recall with pleasure your visit here to the White House. I am pleased to know that you and your family have enjoyed the mementos of that occasion.

Sincerely,



The Honorable  
Dr. Charles Malik  
Beirut  
Lebanon

*Dispatched through A.P. Ash*

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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B

ACTION

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

May 10, 1972

FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: A. R. ASH *aka*

SUBJECT: Confidential and Personal  
Letter to the President from  
Charles H. Malik of Lebanon

[22 of 22]  
NIN 09-13/889 LP

Attached is a 20-page "strictly confidential and personal" letter to the President from Charles Malik of Lebanon (former President of the UN General Assembly). Malik entrusted the letter to the FBI representative in Beirut, in order to avoid local censorship, and asked that it be delivered to the President. The letter was brought over today by Mr. Haynes, FBI liaison officer.

*✓ yes*

ACTION: suggest that this be referred to Hal Saunders who has handled previous letters from Malik to the President.

(Ma Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sept. 9~~th~~ 1972

~~1 Mrs. Davis~~

2 Mr. Saunders

*Louise  
JTK*

Please give letter to Rus  
Ash for transmittal through  
his channel.

Louise

*Charles Habib Malik*

Rabiya, Lebanon

April 20, 1972

cc'd 5/10

Strictly confidential and personal

The Honorable  
Richard M. Nixon  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  
United States of America

Dear President Nixon:

I am taking the liberty of writing you this letter about matters that are on my mind and that I believe would interest you. I hope you will have the time to read my views before your departure for Moscow. I fervently apologize for my intrusion knowing how busy you are and what tremendous burdens you carry. In fact I would have written you much oftener but I have again and again refrained from doing so lest I seem presumptuous or lest I appear to be impertinently trying to impose myself on you.

First permit me to thank you most sincerely for the inscribed copy of the Bible which you sent me in the fall of 1970 and for the autographed photograph of yourself which I received last December. My family and descendants for as long as we exist shall treasure the Bible and the photograph with pride and love.

Let me now set forth my general comments which I know you would be interested in though of course in varying degrees. I begin with the relatively less and proceed to the relatively more important matters. Perhaps your assistants may ponder the matters in which you may not be particularly interested.

I

The fidayeen appear to be in a state of frustration and disarray. Both the radicals (e. g. the Habash group) and the more moderates

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PER HR. 3/14/2014

By WJH/ARARA, Date 3/10/2015

SEP 09 13 2007 [p. 3 of 22]

April 20, 1972

(e.g. the Arafat group, Fath) are each splitting up into radical and moderate wings. In both camps I think the moderates are more numerous and still in control. But the radicals are desperate and in their psychological state they might do lots of harm, to others and to themselves. They say they have now given up the practice of skyjacking planes, but I fear they would resume this activity if they should find it paid, both materially and from the point of view of morale and propaganda. Political assassination is always in the books for them.

I know from good authority that the leadership of Fath wants to discontinue any attacks on Israel from Lebanese territory, but the radicals, abetted and aided by the Syrian Sa'iqah, do not listen to them. The Lebanese of the south are fed up with the fidayeen and are making their demands strongly felt by the Government of Lebanon that the Lebanese army displace and replace the fidayeen. Much of this displacement has already taken place. The problem of the fidayeen and the Palestinian refugees in general, whatever turn events might take in the immediate future, remains the most important problem so far as the determination of the long-range destiny of Lebanon is concerned. Lebanon cannot permanently absorb these 350,000 non-Lebanese or more on its soil without irreparably destroying its fundamental character.

The recent Cairo conference of the diverse Palestinian groups on developing a united strategy to oppose the regime and policy of King Hussein has partially succeeded. Hussein's isolation is deeper now and the attacks on him are increasing in virulence, and it is the declared policy of the fidayeen now to overthrow him. But the divisions and rivalries among these groups have not been healed. While many of the fidayeen themselves are becoming increasingly convinced that they are being used as pawns by some Arab states (Iraq using them against Egypt and Syria, Syria and Egypt against Iraq, Syria against Lebanon, Libya against Saudi Arabia and Jordan, etc.; further, Egypt using them as bargaining points in its negotiations with the United States) as well as by international communism, so long as these people remain desperate and destitute, without a country and without solid hope, they will develop a nihilistic attitude which does not care if they are used by anybody for any purpose.

## II

I am writing in the midst of the Lebanese parliamentary elections. These elections are taking place on the three Sundays of April 16, 23 and 30. I hope the United States Government has been following the development of this important national event which takes place every four years. I do not expect too significant a change in the over-all composition of the Chamber as a result of the elections. There are inherent reasons for this stability in Lebanon. Most of the old faces will be returned. Considering the poverty of performance of past Chambers, this is regrettable. The fact is that the Executive in Lebanon is far more decisive than Parliament. Family connections, special combinations, tradition and money play the determining role in these elections. By "special combinations" I mean something distantly analogous to what are called "united fronts" in European political practice. A person with some grass-root base may pay lots of money to be included on the ticket of a prominent leader; running alone he has no chance of being elected, but carried along on the ticket of the leader he might be elected. In this way a communist in Tripoli or a radical in Sidon or Tyre might reach the Chamber. The results of the Beirut and Tripoli elections which have just been announced show that radical elements, who, although ostensibly non-communist, are nevertheless openly friendly to communism and always stand ready to cooperate with its agents, can reach the Chamber on their own without running on a "united front" ticket; thus the new Chamber is going to have (so far) a deputy with avowed allegiance to Iraq ( a new deputy from Tripoli) and another with avowed allegiance to Egypt (a new deputy from Beirut). People openly say now that Egypt and Iraq are going to be represented in the Lebanese Parliament by these two men at least.

Although I cannot ascertain the truth of the matter (I think the truth of it is not unascertainable), I am told that lots of money has been pouring into Lebanon from both Iraq and Syria for intervening in the Lebanese national elections. The communists appear to act more through their well-organized communist parties than by venal money methods. Considering the importance of little Lebanon for the balance of forces in the Near East, and also so far as its being a significant listening post and a free center for disseminating influence in the whole area is concerned, it is obvious neither Israel, nor Iran,

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nor Jordan, nor Saudi Arabia, nor Egypt, nor the United States, nor the countries of Western Europe, nor the Soviet Union, can afford to be uninterested in the outcome of the Lebanese parliamentary elections. I wish to call attention in particular to the elections of April 30, ten days hence, which, for a variety of reasons, are especially decisive for the country as a whole. One or two or three men getting into the Chamber from the non-liberal, anti-Western, anti-American, pro-communist camp, and an equal number failing to reach the Chamber from the other Camp, could, again for a variety of reasons, appreciably alter the character of the national legislature.

## III

An assortment of discontented persons, radicals, revolutionaries, Baathists or Baathist sympathizers, fidayeen supporters, communists or communizing persons, anti-Americans, and anti-Westerners in general, appear to be forming a united front under the ostensible leadership of Kamal Jumblat. This front is becoming quite vociferous. Jumblat is a very complex person, and who is using whom, he the other radicals or the other radicals him, God knows. The association is mutually advantageous. They can always find a cause or target that will bring them together. I think they will give the Franjeh administration a great deal of trouble during the balance of Franjeh's term.

The so-called "right" which opposes this combination is impotent and somewhat decadent; they are established and satisfied; they are complacent and rich; they take the permanence of their control for granted; they quarrel among themselves for influence and power; they do not have sufficient social vision; they are not supported by great world revolutionary movements; even their common interests do not bring them together; they repeat hackneyed slogans; some of them would yield to the radicals and make alliances with them both to curry favor with them and to spite one another. In short, the so-called "right" is fairly inept and corrupt; they are not adequate to the great historic occasion; they keep on ruling more by inertia than by merit, because Lebanese society is essentially traditional and conservative. But something must be done in the coming two or three years if Lebanon is to absorb the vision and discontent welling up from below, as well as the revolutionary winds blowing upon it from without, and remain the free, liberal, Western-oriented country that it has always been, a country in which the spiritual values

of its diverse communities will not be overwhelmed or overturned. This is a matter to be pondered further, profoundly and responsibly.

## IV

Important disagreements appear to be breaking out between Egypt and its two allies, Syria and Libya. The Soviet Union is perhaps the ultimate cause behind these disagreements. Nor can they agree, it seems, on a joint policy towards Israel. The internal Egyptian situation is exceedingly delicate. The Egyptian army is the decisive element here, and some knowledgeable people have told me that the United States has greater influence in the Egyptian army than the Soviet Union. I do not know how true this is. I doubt that there is a will to fight in Egypt; at least this is what everybody who knows something about the internal Egyptian situation seems to think. This is true quite independently from any restraining Soviet counsel: it is inherent in the Egyptian character itself. The Arabs confuse anybody, and I am satisfied Moscow now is quite confused. The Egyptians want to wrest concessions by threatenings and blusterings. The Soviets do not care for Palestine or Arab rights; they do not want another defeat of Soviet arms in the hands of the Arabs; they will use the Egyptian state of mind to strengthen their presence in Egypt and their hold upon the lost Arab masses.

A pregnant situation like this one offers great opportunities, and not only for the Soviets. I am certainly interested in justice, peace and stability for all in this region, and in their development in freedom to their utmost possibilities. I want the flame of man and freedom to remain burning in the Near East; this flame has been dimming for years now and the danger today is that it will be extinguished. Youth everywhere in these lands are feeding upon hatred and rebellion, and stark nihilism is the hallmark of their soul. In their despair they think communism is the ark of their salvation. They just imbibe revolutionary communist literature. Hardly anybody reads the great literature of the West; almost everybody is reading Marx, Lenin, Mao, Che Guevara, and the pornography that reaches us from Europe and America. I want the great spiritual values which originated here and which helped to form all Western civilization not to be overwhelmed while America disposes of the strength and influence God has bestowed upon her precisely by reason of having taken over herself the great legacy of these values. How to exploit the present conjuncture of developments is the challenge

of the moment. I trust America is in a position now--despite her terrible ordeal in Southeast Asia--to turn part of her not inexhaustible attention to this challenge.

## V

Iraq has recently concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union. In other respects too the Soviet Union is getting more and more entrenched in Iraq. It is indicated therefore that Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Nato must make countermoves. It is essential that Iran and Saudi Arabia, resolutely backed by the United States and the West, cooperate in relation to the multitude of political entities in the Gulf. I hope America too will independently plant herself firmly in that region. While Kuwait, Syria and Egypt appear to be somewhat alarmed by the Soviet moves in Iraq, and are trying to consolidate their relations against these moves, and while Iraq, with its Kurdish and sunni-shii problems and with its strained relations with Iran, is internally quite unstable, international communism knows very well how to dominate Iraq in the face and indeed because of these adverse circumstances. A dominating Soviet presence in Iraq, Syria and Egypt, despite the inherent rivalries, bickerings and fears that have always characterized these countries among themselves, is a very serious development in the Middle East. It would seal the fate of other countries, such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, and it would definitely affect the relations of Iran and Turkey with the West. In this connection three recent developments in Turkey appear to me to be quite ominous; political kidnappings, internal political instability, and the visit of the Soviet President to Turkey. The communist glacier will keep on inexorably advancing everywhere until it is stopped by resolute force, or at least it will cast an eroding and neutralizing shadow upon everything falling within a stone's throw from where it has reached.

Can America and Western Europe afford to allow the Middle East to be thus absorbed or neutralized by international communism? I see them doing nothing significant to stop it, let alone to reverse its forward march. This would be a tragic fate, as the Middle East, or at least the Near East, was never in its history dominated by deep Asian forces or by forces hailing from as far north as Russia. Rome, Hellenism and Byzantium ruled and transformed the Near East for a thousand years or more, and Islam itself was a native Middle-Eastern product; even the Turks, who gravitated westwards from Asia, had to settle in Asia

Minor and take on Islam before they could establish their hegemony over these lands. In the nineteenth century and for the first half of the twentieth century the dominating influence--political, economic and intellectual--in the Near East was all European and Western. The most important fundamental values which determined the life and spirit of Western Europe and America and for which the West today is fighting for its very life, all originated and spread out from the Near East--if in this context we include Greece under this term. Should all this be reversed now and should the Middle East fall under the iron influence of Moscow or Peking, or at least should the West keep on supinely retreating from the eastern Mediterranean, then we would be witnessing an historic occurrence of the first order of magnitude. Together with the softening of mind, morals and will that has been going on internally in Europe and America, this development in the Middle East could very well spell the doom of Western civilization.

## VI

To obtain clarity of vision and precision of analysis three fallacies must be gotten rid of: to continue speaking of the Middle East in general, to continue speaking of the Arab world in general, and to continue speaking of the Arab-Israeli conflict simpliciter. This mode of speaking which has been uncritically in vogue over the years has vitiated and obfuscated much thinking. That it is not a question of the Middle East is evident from the fact that Turkey and Iran are important parts of the Middle East and are not touched by the problem, and that even other parts of the Middle East, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt, are really only distantly affected by it. That it is not a question of the Arab world is evident from the fact that the Sudan and North Africa (despite the loud protestations of Libya and Algeria) are not vitally concerned and that even the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia are unevenly concerned and are withal hopelessly divided among themselves on this issue. And that it is not just an Arab-Israeli conflict is evident from the fact that we are not here before an ordinary political-economic-military confrontation to which ordinary international categories of conflict apply, but before one where the Old Testament and the Koran play a decisive role, and from the fact that Moscow and Washington are as vitally implicated in the situation as are the Israelis and their neighbors.

What is at stake is none of these things; what is at stake is essentially the fate of the land bridge stretching between the Taurus Mountains on the north and the Suez Canal and the Red Sea on the south, and between the Mediterranean on the west and the Syrian desert on the east. This is probably the greatest land bridge in the world, considering its strategic location and what actually came out of it in history. What is at stake is the fate of four countries (Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), three religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), and two cultures (an Israeli culture and an Arab culture in the broad sense of the term). Unless one focuses sharply and only on this land bridge and on the four countries, three religions and two cultures inhabiting it, one remains hopelessly confused. The existence of Egypt is not in jeopardy whatever the fate of Sinai, but it is obvious that it is the very existence of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria that is in question.

The problem then is to create a new order among these four countries, three religions and two cultures, all living and contiguously coexisting on the same clearly demarcated land bridge--clearly demarcated both from the geographical and historical point of view. If such an order of peaceful interaction can be created--and the trend of history is bound to create it--then this land bridge will be a tremendous source of strength and stability both for this area and for the world.

Israel will be dominant but I see no alternative for a long time to come. Every other alternative, such as Egypt or Iraq dominating Syria, or the Arabs of the Middle East joining together into one realm, is not viable, partly because of the inherent disparities and rivalries among the Arabs, partly because the world, including Israel, Turkey, Iraq and, I believe, the West and the Soviet Union, would not feel comfortable under such conditions. I repeat, I am not thinking ideally, as idealistic thinking in these matters is irresponsible; I am considering real, viable alternatives. And if there is no alternative to Israel playing a dominant role, then the only question is to restrain this role and induce it to be as humane and just as possible.

The challenge of statesmanship as I see it, then, is to promote an order in which the four countries, the three religions and the two cultures would each be relatively independent, happy and free, and all creatively interacting with one another without fear from one another and under conditions of mutual respect. It would appear that

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Jordan and Lebanon could be integrated into such an order. Syria with the mentality prevailing at present in that country would of course balk, and balking it would make it impossible or very difficult for Lebanon and Jordan to go along. But if the real problem is not that of the Middle East, nor that of the Arab world, nor that of a political-military-territorial conflict between Arab and Israeli; if the problem is to focus sharply on the peoples and cultures of this historic-strategic land bridge, and to ask the question of what international and intercultural order must emerge among them; and if, as this question is seriously asked, Syria stands out as perhaps the principal key to the answer; then, clearly, all effort must be concentrated on the Syrian problem.

For two decades I have been urging that the key country in the Near East is not Egypt but Syria. Even when people felt that Nasser's Egypt would solve the problem and did everything they could to strengthen him towards that end, I maintained that that was an illusion. I maintained this on purely objective grounds. What has happened is not only that Nasser solved nothing but he opened the doors of the Middle East to international communism in such a way that this is today the most decisive factor in the situation. Egypt could not dominate the other Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East so as to bring about a permanent settlement of peace; it could not dominate them, partly because of fundamental differences of interests and mentalities, partly because the Egyptians are not empire builders, partly because, even if they were, Israel and others could not look with equanimity upon them carrying out such a project. The balance of peace to be sought, then, is not between Israel and a strong and unified Arab world under the hegemony of Egypt (the dream of the State Department or at least of some members in it, in the late fifties and early sixties); such a balance is unstable and unworkable. The real balance is between the order to be created among the four countries, the three religions and the two cultures in the land bridge to which I referred, on the one hand, and both the Nile Valley and Iraq and the Gulf region, on the other.

Egypt is the key, not in the positive sense of supplying decisive political and economic factors towards a final settlement of peace, but in the negative sense of being able to obstruct such a settlement, and therefore of making it necessary for those interested in this settlement to prevent it, by appeasement or otherwise, from

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obstructing it. One may say, with all respect, that Egypt has here a nuisance rather than a constitutive value. But Syria is the key in the positive sense of being able to form with its neighbors in the land bridge a firm political order that could create a lasting peace in the area by withstanding pressure both from the south and the east and the north. Moreover, Syria is the only country in the Middle East where the dispersed Palestinian refugees could peacefully and happily and productively settle. Syria, then, is the positive key in the double sense of providing, in the vast stretches of the Gezira in the north, the only possible solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, and of forming with its natural neighbors, if a radical change of mentality is effected, a political unit that could guarantee an effective equilibrium of forces in the Near East. Egypt can neither form such a unit nor solve the problem of the refugees. The mentality of the Palestinians is much closer to the Syrian than to the Egyptian mentality; they could not live and prosper in Egypt, as they could in Syria, nor could Egypt itself possibly absorb them economically and demographically even if they could live in it.

The moral appears to be: concentrate on Syria and vast horizons will open up; no such horizons open up wherever else one concentrates. This requires a profound study of Syrian demography (the characteristics of the Alawites and Druzes and the differences between Aleppo and Damascus), of the policy that obtains and whether anything can be done to change it, and, above all, of the Soviet presence in Syria. There is a slight change in recent years in Syria's readiness to open up to the outside world; this change should be encouraged and exploited to the utmost. The aim is the formation of a peaceful and positive order between Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. In that order I see no possibility of eliminating Israel; on the contrary, I see every possibility of Israel playing a dominant role. In that order I want to see a happy and stable Lebanon whatever the cost, a Lebanon in which its fundamental traditional values are conserved. Lebanon will require special terms and special international guarantees. Important territorial changes might also be necessary. What is essential is a Lebanon in which a rooted Western-oriented Christian culture would be secure and free. Exactly what shape Syria and Jordan will take is an open question. These two countries are not as firmly formed and as historically rooted as Israel or Lebanon, or as Egypt for that matter. Several modalities would suggest themselves concerning both Syria and Jordan. Everything depends on whether the great powers, and above

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all America, will guarantee this order in such a way as to restrain Israel from exploitative domination of its neighbors. It is in Israel's own interests that she scrupulously exercise such restraint; it is indeed in the interest of the stability of the whole new order of the land bridge. There is no substitute for the peoples directly concerned working out the new order among themselves. Israel has a positive and historic role to play, but it cannot be one that will embitter and alienate its neighbors, or seek to dominate them. If the political communities that will arise in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, however they may be related among themselves, could be made to feel that they can live in peace and friendship with Israel, with their independence, happiness and development quite secure, while at the same time positively and intimately interacting with it, then a truly historic political reality will emerge in the Near East, with incalculable possibilities for good for these peoples, for the Middle East and for the world. The exact political, cultural and economic relations that will constitute this new order are matters to be worked out in detail. I believe Jerusalem will play a central role. The fact that America appears to be destined to be most creative and perhaps even decisive in this historic process should give America the deepest sense of satisfaction. America should never shirk the responsibilities of this destiny: it should seize it and make it its own, in joy and freedom.

I find it necessary here to say that in my heart there is not the slightest trace of malice or ill will towards anybody. I love Egypt, Syria and Jordan; I crave the utmost happiness and peace for the peoples of these lands; there is much that links me to them. As a believing Christian, I know how much I owe--how much all Christians owe--the Old Testament and the living tradition that created it; as one thoroughly impregnated with Western values, I know the immense contributions of the Jews to the Graeco-Roman-Judaeo-Christian civilization. There is only love and gratitude in my heart towards the Jews in Israel and everywhere. In a simple spirit of total love I sincerely feel that a firm and internationally guaranteed political order between the four countries, the three religions and the two cultures existing in the great land bridge of the eastern Mediterranean, provided they do not just coexist but creatively interact with one another, will conduce to the maximum happiness and peace for all peoples concerned. Any other vision or arrangement will not conduce to as much happiness and peace.

I know the immense practical-political difficulties involved. In

these matters I hate utopian ideas or schemes. But all other ideas, including letting things drift as at present, including also all the plans and resolutions of the United Nations and all the plans, "doctrines" and proposals of the United States, the Soviet Union and Egypt, appear to me to be bedeviled with practical-political difficulties that are at least as formidable, and no other idea holds out, practically and politically, greater prospects for peace and stability, for the development and happiness of the peoples of the area, than the vision I set forth. I also know perfectly that the translation of this idea into fact requires the utmost skill and statesmanship, but if my reading of the trend of events is not wholly mistaken, I see history distinctly drifting in the direction I indicated.

## VII

The Mediterranean as a whole is becoming one of the principal foci of world attention. There is not a single Mediterranean country that does not raise important problems bearing, in one form or another, upon world strategy. One can review these countries one by one, from Spain to Lebanon, both north and south, taking on of course Malta and Cyprus in the sweep, and one will find that everywhere there are uncertainties, fluidities, opportunities for strategic decision, one way or the other. The recent drama of Malta has analogues everywhere.

I hope that (a) Cyprus and Malta will remain firmly in Western hands; (b) the situation between Turkey and Greece will be eased and their differences even reconciled; (c) a modicum of coherence and stability will eventuate in Italy; (d) a vision will be developed for Yugoslavia after Tito; (e) the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean will not be lost to the Soviets; (f) the United States will establish the closest naval and military arrangements with Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean; (g) the new facilities developed and granted to the Soviet Union in Syria and Egypt will be more than neutralized or matched by the development by the West of counter facilities elsewhere-- wherever possible; (h) the United States will not interpret the presence of preponderant power in the Mediterranean, should such a preponderance last, as an end in itself or as only a precaution against a possible military confrontation with the Soviet Union (to me an unthinkable prospect), but that such power will conduce to favorable internal political realities throughout the Mediterranean world; and (i) that Nato will not disintegrate into a medley of squabbling partners

before this common danger, but will take resolute joint action.

In short, we in the eastern Mediterranean desperately need to feel the withdrawn presence of the West, and especially the United States, vigorously reasserted in our midst. One's heart bleeds when one finds the Americans here, who have done so much for these peoples, psychologically constantly on the defensive; this is a most demoralizing thing, both for the Americans and for the nationals of these lands. Nor can I possibly attribute this only to the so-called "Arab-Israeli conflict."

### VIII

Your visit to China impressed everybody here. The thoughtful saw in it a sign of strength, in that America is able to move so freely, first to China and later next month to Moscow. I believe only good can come in the long run from these two visits of yours. I am of course assuming that behind these two ventures absolute vigilance is maintained. From my superficial readings I am profoundly disturbed about the world balance in nuclear and other strategic weapons. The apparent retrogression from "superiority" to "parity" to "sufficiency" is most upsetting: at least I do not understand it. Those with set hostility against America have not changed their mind as a result of your trips to China and Russia--only great political achievements in the international field, visible and impressive (a victory on the battlefield, a political defeat sustained by the adversaries of America), will lead them to reconsider their position. The agony of the Vietnam war has not been helping the American image. The moon exploits are wonderful, but people say the Soviets match your moon achievements with space exploits of their own; and in any event it is not technological advances by themselves that sway people's hearts, but how these advances are translated into the realities of international politics.

So long as international communism (namely, the materialistic-atheistic interpretation of man, society, history, government and the nature of things in a manner quite opposed to the classical American interpretation, as embodied in the American Declaration of Independence and the American Constitution, in the writings of the greatest American Presidents, thinkers, poets, men of letters, and men of God, and in the theory and practice of the fundamental American institutions at their best--the church, the university, the corporation, the family;

and not only the theoretical communist interpretation of these things, but the rise, spread and apparent success of whole governments and systems all over the world on the basis of this interpretation) appears to move from strength to strength, both politically and psychologically (entrenchment in Russia, China and Eastern Europe; vigorous communist parties in France and Italy; Cuba; Chile; Marxist anti-Americanism in Latin America; communist successes in Vietnam and Southeast Asia; communist penetration of the Middle East; the spread of Marxist thinking, in one form or another, all over the world, including Western Europe and America, so that the non-communists are so conditioned and terrorized now that they would not dare refer to communism and the communists pejoratively or even critically, whereas the communists have succeeded in identifying Western Europe and America with "imperialism," "colonialism" and "capitalism," and in concentrating all evil in these "systems," with the result that the "imperialists" and "capitalists" are ashamed and apologetic about their "imperialism" and "capitalism," and protest no end that they are neither "imperialist" nor "capitalist"), so long as this Western decline continues, communism and its associates and friends are going to keep on gaining in respectability, power and prestige all over the world, and more and more peoples are going to be converted to their creed. And let there be no illusion whatever about one thing: that, beyond all politics, economics, social justice and so-called "peace," the real ultimate aim of this whole movement is the total eradication from the world, from even the memory of history, if that were possible, of the deepest values of freedom, man and God that have always characterized the highest moments of Western history for 4000 years.

## IX

Communist and Western influence cannot coexist indefinitely in the Middle East. If, as things appear to be shaping up, whether driftingly or by design, there is going to be a division of the Arabic-speaking Near East into zones of influence between Russia and the West, with Iraq, Syria and Egypt forming the Russian zone of influence, and the rest falling more or less under Western influence, we shall have a most precarious Middle East. Iran and Turkey will be outflanked, politically and militarily, and Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, left to themselves, will be reduced sooner or later. America and the West must therefore

see that coexistence here is impossible, whatever its possibility elsewhere, and that the historical drift of things will bring about the liquidation of either communist or Western influence from these parts. So far the trend is decisively in the direction of liquidating Western influence. Nor can these countries evolve, separately or together, a genuine neutralism whereby they would be strong enough, militarily, politically, technologically and intellectually, to be independent from both influences in such a way as to be able to keep them both at bay. Arab nationalism is not a strong enough backbone for this neutralism, nor is Islam, although both can put up a good enough fight for a time. But they will sooner or later be overwhelmed in view of the might, from every point of view, of the immense onslaught from without.

The West might say, and to a large extent rightly: Israel will represent us and will establish for us the necessary balance. This could happen only if the new order, which I discussed above, between the four countries, the three religions and the two cultures, in the great land bridge in the eastern Mediterranean, were developed and consolidated. But this would mean, as matters stand at present, the elimination of the Soviet presence in Syria and therefore the collapse of the doctrine of coexistence or of the policy of partition into zones of influence. Here again Syria appears to be the principal key. Moreover, Russian and Eastern European influence is very strong in Israel by reason of the great Jewish immigration into that country over the years from these lands. From the point of view of rootedness in cultural background the Russian and Eastern European mentality is far more present in Israel than in the rest of the Middle East. In fact it is not present at all outside Israel. Russia and Eastern Europe have demographically and culturally invaded the Middle East via Israel. Despite her vast connections with the West and her present dependence upon America, Israel could therefore conceivably serve one day as the instrument for the eventual liquidation of Western influence from the Near East and the bringing of this region under Russian influence or even Russian domination. The Jews are present and potent everywhere, and the resulting cosmopolitanism produces an essential Israeli ambivalence so far as the coexistence of East and West in the Middle East is concerned. In fact a complete reversal of roles and destinies could one day conceivably take place, with the whole of Western Asia falling under Soviet influence, and Egypt and the whole of Africa falling under Western influence. Coexistence then would be on a continental rather than on a regional basis.

It appears sometimes that the development of events will inevitably necessitate the neutralization of the entire Middle East--Turkey, Iran,

Israel, the Arabs and all. Would Turkey want to withdraw from Nato and would the West look with indifference upon Turkey taking this step? Would Russia give up her privileged positions in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and her strong naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean? But even if the whole Middle East were neutralized after the Austrian or Swedish fashion, by solemn international treaties between the countries of the region and Russia, Europe and America, where would the peoples of the Middle East turn to economically and intellectually? For a long time to come they will need economic and technical assistance from without and a European language and culture to learn from and lean upon. Neither Persian, nor Turkish, nor Arabic, nor Hebrew is enough when it comes to science and technology, and the formation of generic ideas, in all walks of life, in the strenuous conditions of modern existence. Where would these peoples pursue their higher education--in Moscow and Leningrad, in Munich and Freiburg, in Paris, in London and Oxford, in Boston and San Francisco? Would their foreign mainstay be the Russian or the German or the French or the English or the American language and culture? Thus the military and political neutrality of Austria and Sweden is quite different from any neutrality that can arise in the Middle East; the neutrality of Austria and Sweden is possible because both countries already belong to a wider all-embracing culture (in both instances, to European civilization in general, although to the Germanic and Western branch of that civilization in particular, far more than to the Russian and Eastern European branch); whereas, in the case of the countries of the Middle East, if they are neutralized politically and militarily, they will still have to search outside their own culture for techniques and sources of fundamental ideas. If they are neutral in the sense of being in general outside European civilization, they are not neutral in the deeper sense of needing necessarily to relate themselves organically and intellectually to one or another branch of that civilization. It is one thing to be neutral within a total civilization, and it is another thing in this interdependent world to be neutral outside it.

These are some of the deepest difficulties that face the art of forging peace in the Middle East.

So far as Lebanon and the Arabic-speaking Near East are concerned, America has been withdrawing, not only politically, but also intellectually and spiritually. The flooding of the bookstores in

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these lands by Marxist, communist, anti-Western and anti-American literature is simply fantastic. The press and the media, outside Lebanon, are massively biased against America and the West. In this respect the press and media have been wholly incorporated inside the Iron Curtain. The broadcasts from Damascus are indistinguishable from those from Moscow, except in being more extreme. Even in Lebanon the situation is very disturbing. The communist embassies and communist cells are doing a superb job here. Except for special rare cases, the rank and file of virtually all youth between fifteen and thirty are saturated with communist slogans and with anti-Western venom. A whole new generation is spiritually formed and warped in this way. This is most serious and most far-reaching in its consequences. "If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?" And the foundations are always of the nature of mind and will. Hardly anybody, again except for rare instances, knows anything or cares to know anything about the deeper values of Western and American existence. They are perpetually bombarded with an unreasoning fare of hatred. This is a development that has descended upon this region only during the last two decades. American embassies and American cultural attachés, as well as the United States Government in general, are not devoting adequate attention to this matter. Nor can this situation be remedied easily or mechanically. It takes a profound meditation upon the whole place and meaning of America in the world before light can be shed on this whole issue. If America has given up these countries politically, is it in her best interests to give them up intellectually and spiritually? If matter and force are the ultimate principle of communism, and if man and spirit are really the ultimate principle of the great Western tradition, is it not wholly paradoxical that the communists nevertheless attend to the realm of ideas far more seriously than those whose whole civilization is based fundamentally on mind and spirit? Perhaps the ultimate weakness of the Western stance in the world is this neglect of the realm of the mind.

X

God has willed that America be today at the pinnacle of world power and world responsibility. This is a tremendous honor which America cannot turn her back upon or renounce. America must

fulfill this charge in confidence and dignity.

The lacerations of the Vietnam war have handicapped America. So also has the moral decay in her intellectual community. Tired and frustrated, America is tempted to abdicate her unique place in the world. This America cannot do. This, I am confident, America will not do.

America will recover and will utter her healing word.

Everything depends on the moral and spiritual recovery of America.

Despite the great tribulations of Vietnam, you have given America and the world a most reassuring leadership. May nothing happen between now and November to cause the American people to hesitate in returning you to the White House!

The coming four years, culminating in the great celebrations of 1976, could be among the most decisive four years in history. A new start in Western civilization could be ushered in. How much the world needs this new beginning!

From pure love for the truth and for the future of mankind, I sincerely feel that everything in the coming months must be subordinated to ensuring the continuation of your leadership. Within limits, all other issues and decisions can wait, except in so far as they help towards the desired end.

America is a moral nation, and I know her immense resources, both moral and material. I also know America can be aroused and mobilized when the clarion call is sounded.

After the moral and intellectual ravages of recent years it will probably take more than four years to restore to America her moral health and her sense of destiny. It may take as much as a generation. But marvels can be achieved in four years: at least the right start and the right direction can be secured. If as a result of this right start and right direction America should regain its absolute self-confidence and its firm sense of destiny by 1980 or 1990, I should be most happy, whether or not I am around then.

What is the right start and the right direction?

It is not a start from nothing, neither is it a direction towards

something wholly new. The start and the direction are both what America has always known. As Jeremiah put it: "Thus saith the Lord, Stand ye in the ways, and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls."

All this hedonism whereby the immediate pleasure and kick is the thing, is not American.

All this disintegration of the family and its wonderful virtues of home and hearth is not American.

All this worship of violence and sex, of the sensational and morbid, in television and the media, all this disregard for beauty, peace, grace, truth, and the higher things, is not American.

All this social irresponsibility of youth is not American.

All this turning of the heart of the children away from their fathers is not American.

All this relativism in matters of truth and morals is not American.

All this radical separation between moral and intellectual excellence in university existence is not American.

All this despair of man, mind and truth is not American.

All this unchecked upsurge of the lower, the elemental, the dark, the irrational, is not American.

All this perpetual coddling of the lower and more primitive, of the unformed and less formed, is not American.

All this doubting of America's immense potentialities is not American.

All this flight from shouldering world responsibility is not American.

All this passing by on the other side before those who struggle and suffer for America's own fundamental values, is not American.

All this spurning of history and its solid findings is not American.

April 20, 1972

All this reticence and shyness in relation to one's own roots and origins is not American.

All this worship of things and machines to the detriment of man who made them, is not American.

All this adoration of man himself rather than of Him who made him is not American.

All this timidity and sense of shame in acknowledging the Lord God is not American.

All this doubting and diffidence on the part of the Church with respect to its unique message, all this failing to see the desperate need of the world today for this message, is not American.

I know you believe these things; I know you have done what you could to sensitize America to them.

The start and the direction are precisely these things. They are that America become American.

And I am persuaded that once America becomes once again truly American, nothing in this whole world can stand in the way of America discharging her God-willed destiny--not indeed alone, but together with those who share her destiny with her.

And I am also persuaded that from your own experience and trials, as well as from your own personal character, you are the man to give, under God, both America and the world, the new start and the new direction.

For the American system is such that the White House and its master can make the most decisive difference in the moral tone and in the whole determination and destiny of the American people.

Faithfully yours,

*Richard M. Nixon*  
—



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 7, 1972

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Agreement with Lebanon

In the past six months we have had three rounds of civil aviation consultations with Lebanon - one in Washington and the last two in Beirut. These talks have resulted in ad referendum agreement covering a variety of issues.

Originally requested by Lebanon to "challenge" the large expansion of Pan American's capacity brought about by its introduction of 747 aircraft to and through Beirut in 1971, and to seek expanded route authority for Lebanon's all-cargo airline (TMA), the lengthy discussions finally culminated on June 13 in the initialling of a new, updated Air Transport Agreement, and a draft exchange of notes. We expect that the Agreement will be formally signed, and the notes exchanged, in Beirut within the next few weeks.

The new Air Transport Agreement is almost identical to the standard U.S. draft agreement. The U.S. route is a reaffirmation of the very broad and flexible round-the-world rights we have previously claimed (but Lebanon disputed) under the 1946 Agreement. The Lebanese routes will permit TMA to continue its eastbound round-the-world all-cargo service and inaugurate a westbound service to New York and beyond to the Far East. The Lebanese passenger airline (MEA) will be able to operate, via Europe, to New York only. (TMA is anxious to inaugurate a westbound all-cargo service, but MEA appears to have no immediate interest in beginning service to the U.S.)

The Agreement also contains our standard Bermuda capacity language, including an explicit commitment by both sides to take no unilateral action against the

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

schedules (including capacity) or airlines of the other country. To assuage Lebanon's fears about another sizeable increase in Pan American's capacity or other potentially disruptive changes in its pattern of operations, the US side informally noted that it did not expect such events to take place and that it would not in any case condone patently excessive capacity.

The Agreement will be accompanied by an exchange of notes calling for consultations no later than September 30, 1975, in order to consider possible amendments to the route exchange. If there is no agreement on the bilateral route regimen to be in effect after May 1976, the Agreement will automatically expire.

*for Robert H. Miller*  
Robert H. Miller  
Acting Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	5382	Hormats
07 07 72	08 10		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER X \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU X \_\_\_\_\_ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_

*Miller, R*

S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_

TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Civil Aviation Agreement w/ Lebanon*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	( <u>X</u> )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>		MEMO _____ TO _____	( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( )
ECONOMIC	<u>X</u>			ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <u>7/12</u>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING				<i>No action necessary.</i>	
CONGRESSIONAL				<i>RH</i>	

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>7/10/72</i>	<i>Hormats</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>			

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO [Signature]

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88

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

Ⓢ

*[Handwritten signature]*

June 8, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *7he*

SUBJECT: Armed Personnel Carriers for Lebanon

The Lebanese for some time have been asking us for fifty armed personnel carriers, the top priority item in modernizing their military forces. Given the terrain and the major problem they have with the Fedayeen, this is entirely logical.

The Pentagon is quite willing to provide these but so far not as quickly as the Lebanese feel is necessary given their internal security problem.

There is one ready-made solution which could get these APCs to Lebanon this summer if we will approve it. As you recall, part of the one-time exception for Pakistan was some 200 APCs. These have been rolling off the production line this spring and have been put in storage. More than a hundred are now there. Since it is unlikely that these will be sent to Pakistan before the November elections here, fifty could be taken out of the warehouse for delivery to Lebanon now and could be replaced by next spring. Even doing that, there would still be more than 150 in the storehouse ready to begin delivery to Pakistan in November if the President wished. The fifty taken out could be replaced before the end of that series of deliveries and the Pakistanis would never need to know of the juggle.

Given the high priority with which both Lebanon and Israel put on the Lebanese ability to control the Fedayeen, this seems an easy solution. The US has a strong interest in improving the capability of the Lebanese to deal with this problem and the President of Lebanon seems determined to do so, even though it is a difficult political problem for him. I see this as a bit of strong preventive medicine to try to avoid reaching the kind of situation Jordan reached in the summer of 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize clearance of a telegram which would permit the Pentagon to take 50 APCs from the storehouse to be replaced by next spring with 50 from the continuing production for Pakistan, at no financial loss to the Pakistanis.

Approve

AK

Other

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBP	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	4671	10/60/100
6 8	6 8 11		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER  \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C  \_\_\_\_\_ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 'S \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 'TS \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Lebanese Request for Armed Personnel Careers*

REFERENCE: S/S \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK ( )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. ( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE ( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE:
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
6/8	Sawyers	Hak	2	Decision (6/9)	
6/29				HAK Approved Request	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

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TO ) PAF  \_\_\_\_\_

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

JUL 3 1972

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC-1181

LEBANON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 17, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Visit by Lebanese President Frangie  
(S/S 7201360)

The President's schedule this year will not permit a visit by President Frangie. However, it should be considered for next year's schedule.

Jeanne W. Davis  
Staff Secretary

Done 3/17/72

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 29, 1972

H/DP  
ACTION

1181

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK  
SUBJECT: Official Visit by Lebanese President

President Frangie has let us know of his interest in making an official visit to Washington. Secretary Rogers in the attached memorandum recommends you invite him for this year, leaving the time to be decided later. Among other things, it would be the first time a Lebanese President has ever officially visited. Frangie recognizes your scheduling problems in the near future and if an early visit is not possible, would welcome early announcement of a later visit.

Frangie's interest stems from his deep and increasing concern about Soviet influence in Lebanon and the Arab world. He believes it has made great headway in the last year. Lebanon, for example, felt compelled to buy a small amount of Soviet arms for the first time to assuage domestic critics. He anticipates that it will expand as the Chinese begin to develop a presence. He has also expressed concern about Israeli designs on parts of Lebanese territory from which the fedayeen--which he has made every effort to control--operate. He wants reassurance of US support for the integrity of Lebanon.

In addition to these points, there is the general case to be made in the context of the close US-Lebanese relations that have prevailed over the years and the general pattern of US support for our moderate friends in the area. The Saudis and Jordanians have been here; the Lebanese have not. We have invited them before, but former President Helou could never find a safe political moment to come. Frangie, who has emerged as a stronger President than anticipated, is essentially asking whether those earlier invitations might still be open.

SECRET

SECRET

- 2 -

If this were a normal year, Frangie's visit would be a natural thing to do. The issue is really just how much you feel your schedule can stand. There is, of course, general advantage--both in the Middle East and here--in a show of concern about the area that has been called the most dangerous and also the area of most obvious Soviet penetration.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve an official visit by President Frangie to be announced soon with the timing to be worked out for later this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Other   H  

*will try for next  
year*

*Copy to  
Kenny*

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Visit to Washington by Lebanese President Frangie

Our Ambassador to Lebanon informs us that President Frangie has taken the initiative to seek an early invitation to visit Washington. Frangie and other Lebanese officials are very concerned that the recent Israeli threat to occupy and hold Lebanese territory if there are more fedayeen cross-border attacks reflects a basic Israeli design to expand territorially into Lebanon. Frangie wishes to reassure himself of United States Government support for Lebanon.

In addition, Frangie feels he needs to counteract increasing Soviet influence in Lebanon. During the course of last year the Soviets pressed an attractive arms offer on Lebanon which the Lebanese accepted in part, sent high-level officials to visit Beirut, and invited President Frangie to visit Moscow (which he has not accepted to date). The establishment of a Communist Chinese Embassy in Beirut is expected to bring about an intensified Soviet effort in Lebanon to expand their influence.

While I recognize that your schedule is very tight, I believe that if at all possible you should extend an invitation to Frangie now for an official visit this year while, if you wish, leaving the date of the visit open. Frangie may be the strongest President Lebanon has ever had. He has stood up to the fedayeen and boldly launched a program to modernize the army for internal security purposes, with which we are helping. He strongly supports our peace efforts. Despite our close relations with Lebanon over an extended period, no Lebanese President

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

has ever made an official visit to the United States before.

In the light of increased Soviet efforts in Lebanon, together with Frangie's apprehensions regarding Israeli intentions, an invitation for such a visit would help demonstrate throughout the Middle East USG support for one of its closest friends in the area. Our other friends, including Israel, would certainly approve. The invitation would strengthen Frangie's hand in seeking to counteract Soviet inroads into Lebanon, give a psychological boost to the Lebanese regime and pro-Western elements in the country, and provide tangible evidence of our support for states in the area which espouse moderation and support our peace efforts. The enthusiastic welcome which would be accorded President Frangie by the influential Lebanese-American community would further strengthen the ties between Lebanon and this country. Conversely, since Frangie has felt compelled to take the initiative to seek an invitation, not to invite him could have an unfortunate impact, particularly in the atmosphere currently prevailing in the area.



William P. Rogers

SECRET

1R

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION  
1181

SECRET

February 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*

SUBJECT:

*Handwritten scribble*

Official Visit for Lebanese President

President Frangie is seeking an official invitation to visit Washington. Secretary Rogers (at back) recommends the President invite him now but leave the date unspecified. The attached memo explains the circumstances.

RECOMMENDATION: That you send the attached memo to the President.

Concurrence: Jeanne Davis

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112

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR		
02 02	02 02 16	01181	

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ~~###~~ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER \_\_\_\_\_ ROGERS, W ~~###~~ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S ~~##~~ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT TO D.C. BY LEBANESE PRES. ~~FRANZIE~~. FRANGIE.

REFERENCE: S/S 7201360 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	REC	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<del>###</del>	<del>###</del>	<del>X</del>	MEMO FOR HAK _____ ( _____ )
STAFF SECRETARY	<del>###</del>	<del>###</del>	<del>X</del>	MEMO FOR PRES. _____ ( <del>###</del> )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE _____ ( _____ )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH _____ ( _____ )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<del>##</del>		<del>X</del>	MEMO _____ TO _____ ( _____ )
EUROPE/CANADA		<del>##</del>		RECOMMENDATIONS _____ ( _____ )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____ ( _____ )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE _____ ( _____ )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY _____ ( _____ )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____ ( _____ )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: 2/7
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
2/27/72	Saunders	HAK	X	Pres for Deawwi (2/28)	
3/17				Pres decided next year	
3/17	D	DAVIS	S	Memo to Eliot (3/21)	
3/17				Davis ogd memo to Eliot	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO Eliot  
 JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)  
 SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM  
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO 85m

3/20/72

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 29, 1972

ACTION

1181

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT: Official Visit by Lebanese President

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In addition to these points, there is the general case to be made in the context of the close US-Lebanese relations that have prevailed over the years and the general pattern of US support for our moderate friends in the area. The Saudis and Jordanians have been here; the Lebanese have not. We have invited them before, but former President Helou could never find a safe political moment to come. Frangie, who has emerged as a stronger President than anticipated, is essentially asking whether those earlier invitations might still be open.

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- 2 -

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RECOMMENDATION: That you approve an official visit by President Frangie to be announced soon with the timing to be worked out for later this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Other   H  

*will try for next  
year*

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 2, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Visit to Washington by Lebanese President Frangie

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SECRET

SECRET

-2-

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William P. Rogers

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12/8/71

TO THE SECRETARIAT

At the time we received the attached there seemed to be no appropriate occasion to send it forward and there hasn't been any requirement since. I believe you will want this original for filing.



Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

NLN 09-13/7 per sec 3.3(b)(6), HY. 1/22/2010

By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010

[P. 1 OF 56)

918



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

LEBANON

S/S 10728

August 1, 1970

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Charles Malik, Former Lebanese Foreign  
Minister and President of General Assembly,  
Urges Election of Former President  
Camille Chamoun as New Lebanese President

The enclosed 51-page Memorandum from Dr. Charles Malik on the Lebanese Presidential election of 1970 was handed recently to Ambassador Dwight J. Porter in Beirut with the request that it be passed to President Nixon. Malik talked with President Nixon and a number of Senators and Congressmen during a visit to Washington last April.

Part One of Malik's Memorandum concludes that for various reasons former Lebanese President Fuad Chehab should not be returned to the Presidency. Part Two promotes the candidacy of former President Camille Chamoun on the grounds that Chamoun could best preserve internal Lebanese unity and steer Lebanon most skillfully in international affairs. The internal logic of the Memorandum is that the United States should support Chamoun, Dr. Malik hinting that U.S. funds might play a role. (In a long subsequent conversation between Chamoun and Ambassador Porter on July 21 Chamoun made no request for financial assistance.)

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

NLN 09-13/7: P. 20556

~~SECRET~~

2

Part Three of the Memorandum consists of 50 separate statements on the Middle East, designed, as Dr. Malik sees it, to set a general framework within which the current situation in Lebanon may better be understood.

Through Ambassador Porter we are informing Dr. Malik that his Memorandum has been passed to the White House for submission to the President. No further action is required.

  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Dr. Malik's Memorandum on  
*Lebanese Presidential  
Elections of 1970.*

~~SECRET~~

# EXEMPT

per sec 3.3(b)(6), E.O. 13526  
per ltr. 1/22/2010

MR Case Number NLN 09-13/7, pages 4-56

AM  
11/15/2010

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

35190

December 9, 1971

FOR BOB HORMATS

Concur in not forwarding.  
We will keep in mind.

  
Hal Saunders

To Sam Haskins,

Sam,

Do you have any  
objections to our not  
send it this to HAT.

Bob Hunt



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7118926

35024

35190

November 24, 1971

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Negotiations with Lebanon


Negotiations will begin in Washington on November 29 on Lebanon's request for additional airline route rights and its complaint over the capacity offered by Pan American on its operations to and through Beirut.

As reported in my memorandum of July 15, 1970, the last round of civil aviation negotiations with Lebanon ended with agreement to grant the Lebanese all-cargo carrier (Trans Mediterranean Airways) an eastbound round-the-world route through New York on a temporary basis. TMA has been operating this route since last spring, and now wishes to expand the service to include westbound round-the-world operations as well. In addition, the Lebanese passenger airline, Middle East Airlines, is reportedly interested in trans-Atlantic service to the U.S., perhaps starting as early as April 1972. We are obliged by the existing Air Transport Agreement eventually to grant Lebanon permanent route rights to the United States. However, our aviation policy will not permit us to grant rights as extensive as the combination sought by the two influential Lebanese flag carriers, one of which will undoubtedly be disappointed by the outcome.

The Lebanese will also raise the matter of the capacity offered and the admittedly high percentage of non-US origin passengers carried by Pan American on its services to Beirut. Lebanon has already restricted Pan Am's so-called Fifth Freedom traffic in connection with introduction of the airline's 747 service to Beirut, despite the fact that Lebanon assured us during the July 1970 negotiations that it would avoid such unilateral restrictions on capacity.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

While it may be necessary for Pan American to make certain adjustments in the traffic it carries on some segments in order to bring its operations into consonance with the Agreement's capacity principles, our main goal in these talks will be to obtain more meaningful assurances of Lebanon's adherence to these liberal capacity principles, including the concept of no unilaterally imposed restrictions.

  
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

HORMATS

- ATTN: MILDRED MARSHALL  
BELIEVE IT OR NOT, MILLIE,  
THE NUMBER ON THIS HAS  
CHANGED AGAIN.  
THE NEW NUMBER IS 35190  
SORRY FOR THE TROUBLE, I  
HOPE IT WILL BE THE LAST FOR  
THIS ONE.

STEVE



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~35024~~  
35790

November 24, 1971

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Negotiations with Lebanon

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT \_\_\_\_\_ U \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_

KISSINGER ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ ROYERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ BUO \_\_\_\_\_ EXDIS \_\_\_\_\_

HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C \_\_\_\_\_ EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_

S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_

TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Civil Aviation Negotiations w/ Lebanon*

REFERENCE: S/S *7118936* OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	(_____)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO _____ TO _____	(_____)
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	(_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	(_____)
ECONOMIC	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			ANY ACTION NECESSARY ?	( <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	(_____)
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <i>11/30</i>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING				<i>No actn necessary.</i>	
CONGRESSIONAL				<i>RY</i>	

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<i>12/10/71</i>	<i>Homats</i>	<i>NSC/S</i>			

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

ORIG) NSC

TO ) PAF

WHC

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

DEC 13 1971



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 9, 1971

LEBANON

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Lebanon Concludes First Arms Deal  
with Soviet Union

The first Soviet arms ever to enter Lebanon will do so pursuant to a deal signed in Beirut on November 3 providing for Lebanon to purchase 20 new Soviet 122mm Howitzers, including fire control equipment, and a five-year supply of spare parts and ammunition. In doing so, the Lebanese Government resisted Soviet pressure to send Soviet military experts. The Soviets also agreed to Lebanese demands that the repayment period be lengthened from five to seven years.

Lebanon's decision to buy Soviet arms is unfortunate. The symbolism of Lebanon's turning to the Soviets even in a limited way will not be lost in other Middle Eastern countries. It is a bow to leftist opinion within Lebanon which has long decried the country's exclusive reliance on Western sources of supply. As such, the Lebanese Government probably sees it as an insurance policy against leftist criticism if Lebanon now proceeds, as the Government says it will, to fill the balance of its needs from the West. The cost of the Howitzers (\$2.7 million) is hardly more than 3 per cent of Lebanon's planned military modernization program, and we concur with Embassy Beirut's view that it is a one-shot arrangement.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "David Rumsfeld for".

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive SecretaryCONFIDENTIAL

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR	34546	Saunders
11/19/71	11/18/71		

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: ELIOT X U \_\_\_\_\_ LOG IN/OUT ONLY \_\_\_\_\_  
 KISSINGER X ROGERS, W \_\_\_\_\_ LOU \_\_\_\_\_ NO FORN \_\_\_\_\_ NODIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 HAIG \_\_\_\_\_ LAIRD, M \_\_\_\_\_ C X EYES ONLY \_\_\_\_\_ LIMDIS \_\_\_\_\_  
 S \_\_\_\_\_ CODE WORD \_\_\_\_\_ RES DATA \_\_\_\_\_  
 TS \_\_\_\_\_ SENSITIVE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: *Lebanon Concluded First Time Deal w/ Soviet Union*

REFERENCE: S/S 7118012 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_ NOT XEROXED \_\_\_\_\_

APP'TS: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ HAK \_\_\_\_\_ TALKER \_\_\_\_\_ MEMCON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE REQ. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR	MEMO FOR HAK	( <u>X</u> )
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES.	( )
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	( )
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	( )
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<u>X</u>			MEMO _____ TO _____	( )
EUROPE/CANADA		<u>X</u>		RECOMMENDATIONS	( )
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	( )
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	( )
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	( )
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	( )
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: <u>11/15</u>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS		<u>X</u>		COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
<u>12/8/71</u> <del>11/19</del>	Saunders	Secretariat		Used in HAK brief for 11/17 with original as attachment. Close out. HHSaunders. <u>HHS</u>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH \_\_\_\_\_ NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

SEE LOG \_\_\_\_\_ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO \_\_\_\_\_

JOINED BY LOG \_\_\_\_\_ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: \_\_\_\_\_ SA, \_\_\_\_\_ HP, \_\_\_\_\_ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM DATA

DO ✓

INIT \_\_\_\_\_

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

Cy

ORIGT \_\_\_\_\_ NSC ✓

TO ) PAF ✓

WHC \_\_\_\_\_

SUBF \_\_\_\_\_

**DEC 13 1971**



THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*Not handled. P did  
not see.*

September 3, 1971

*A*

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Contingent Gift for President of  
Lebanon

We have been advised that the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, who will be visiting Washington next week, is bringing "a personal gift" from President Frangié to you. The Foreign Minister is not scheduled to call upon you and we shall arrange to accept any such gift for transmittal to the White House.

I would like to suggest sending back with him as a gift for President Frangié from you a Presidential Accutron gilded-bronze desk clock.

*EMJ*  
Emil Mosbacher, Jr.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION  
25155

CONFIDENTIAL

January 18, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Lebanese Request for Statement on Israeli Raid

You may have seen Beirut 459 in which the Lebanese Foreign Minister asked for a statement of the U. S. position on last week's Israeli raid into Lebanon.

The background is that, right after the Israeli raid, Marvin Kalb asked Secretary Rogers whether the raid would have any effect on the peace talks. The Secretary said he thought not. He did not go on to reiterate the usual U. S. position that we regret all cross-border attacks. The Lebanese have mis-read his answer as U. S. acquiescence in the Israeli raid.

Sisco has recommended to Secretary Rogers that our Embassy in Beirut state, in reaction to the misinterpretations of the Secretary's statement, that our position remains as always. His thought is that this would have the requested impact in Lebanon with the fewest ripples in Israel or here.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED  
WHSA

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00459 181402Z

1971 JAN 18 14 18

50  
ACTION MEA-15

INFO	OCT-01	IO-13	ACDA-19	EUR-20	AF-12	RSR-01	SSO-00
	NSCE-00	CCG-00	USIE-00	CIAE-00	DODE-00	PM-05	H-02
	INR-08	L-04	NSAE-00	NSC-10	P-03	RSC-01	PRS-01
							SS-20
							/135 W

016858

U 181340Z JAN 71  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 28600

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 459

REF: BEIRUT 450

1. FOMMIN CALLED ME AT 3 P.M. TO URGE PERSONALLY US ISSUE ADDITIONAL STATEMENT RE ISRAELI RAID QUICKLY. HE IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM PRESS TODAY AND MUST GIVE SPECIFIC EXPLANATION TO PARLIAMENT TOMORROW AS TO ATTITUDE OF US TOWARD ISRAELI RAID.
2. LEBANESE GOVT INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT ITS POSITION AND US POSITION ON THIS MATTER GIVEN PRESS REPORTS FROM TEL AVIV SOME ISRAELIS CALLING FOR REPETITION OF SARAFAND RAID.
3. IT IS FEARED IN TOP GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HERE, INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER, THAT MILDNESS OF US REACTION WILL ENCOURAGE ISRAELIS TO STRIKE AGAIN.
4. OF COURSE I HAVE INFORMED THEM OF OUR PRIVATE EFFORTS BUT THEY HAVE TO COPE WITH AN APPREHENSIVE PUBLIC WHO CAN ONLY JUDGE SITUATION AS IT APPEARS ON PUBLIC RECORD. (THERE WERE SEVERAL FALSE ALARMS ABOUT REPETITION OF ISRAELI RAID INCLUDING NEAR PANIC IN ONE CROWDED MOVIE THEATRE WHICH WAS FORTUNATELY EMPTIED WITHOUT CASUALTY.)
5. ALL THIS ADDS URGENTLY TO NEED FOR FURTHER US STATEMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00459 181402Z

FOMMIN ASKED BE INFORMED TONIGHT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE HOW USG PROPOSES RESPOND TO HIS REQUEST.

6. HE IS MOST FRIENDLY TO US, TRIED TO PUT BEST POSSIBLE GLOSS ON OUR POSITION OVER WEEKEND BUT SIMPLY NEEDS SOME MORE AMMUNITION. GP-3.  
BUFFUM

*Secretary - Kahl -  
but effect peace negoti-  
None -  
115 - important -  
we've taken note of  
minister's position  
Don't permit rumors  
as always - depts  
cross-border rumors*