DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
140	telegram	Secstate to Beirut DECLASSIFIED ltr 8-4-09 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/26 P.2	8/20/70	B
160	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED ltr 8-4-09 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/27 P.2	5/4/71	B
162	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED ltr 8-4-09 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/28 P.1	5/3/71	B
200	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED ltr 8-4-09 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/29 P.1	4/9/70	B
224	cable	CIA to White House P.1 Exempted per sec 3.3(b)(1) ltr 13 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/4 NLN 09-12/30	7/31/71	B
225	cable	CIA to White House P.1 Exempted per sec 3.3(b)(1) ltr 13 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/5 NLN 09-12/31	5/1/71	B
226	note	handwritten note w/ attachments P.11 Exempted per sec 3.3(b)(1) ltr 13 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/5 NLN 09-12/32	7/1/71	B
227	cable	Intelligence Information Cable SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/33 P.2	8/5/70	B
228	cable	Intelligence Information Cable EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/34 P.2	7/28/70	B
229	cable	Intelligence Information Cable SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/35 P.2	7/28/70	B
230	cable	CIA to White House SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/36 P.1	6/24/70	B
231	cable	CIA to White House SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/37 P.1	4/17/70	B
232	cable	Intelligence Information Cable SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/38 P.2	4/8/70	B
233	cable	CIA to White House SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/39 P.1	3/30/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files / Country Files / Middle East

BOX NUMBER

621 P. 3 of 4

FOLDER TITLE

(1) Lebanon Vol II 1 Feb '70 - 31 Dec '70

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
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F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
3	memo w/ATTACH	Davis to Eliot P.16 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/1	8/20/70	B
6	~~memo~~ ~~w/ATTACH~~	~~Eliot to Kissinger P.55~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/2 NLN 03-93/2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 9 Oct 2008	8/1/70	B
9	memo w/ATTACH	Saunders to Kissinger P.14 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/3	4/17/70	B
13	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/4 P.2	12/15/70	B
~~14~~	~~telegram~~	~~Beirut to Secstate~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/5 P.3 DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.2009	12/12/70	B
~~18~~	~~telegram~~	~~Beirut to Secstate~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.2009	11/7/70	B
20	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/7 P.2	10/29/70	B
~~32~~	~~telegram~~	~~Beirut to Secstate~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	9/8/70	B
~~40~~	~~telegram~~	~~Beirut to Secstate~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	8/21/70	B
45	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/10 P.2	7/29/70	B
48	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/11 P.6	7/22/70	B
49	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/12 P.2	7/3/70	B
52	~~telegram~~	~~Beirut to Secstate~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/13 P.1 DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	6/22/70	B
57	~~telegram~~	~~Beirut to Secstate~~ MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/14 P.2 DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	6/15/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files / Country Files / Middle East

BOX NUMBER

621 PG 1 of 4

FOLDER TITLE

(1) Lebanon Vol II 1 Feb 70 - 31 Dec '70

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

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67	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	6/8/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/15 P.1		
73	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	6/1/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/16 P.1		
74	telegram	Beirut to Secstate	5/29/70	B
80	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8-4-09	5/22/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/17 P.2		
83	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	5/21/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/18 P.2		
84	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	5/15/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/19 P.2		
87	cable	Beirut to Secstate	4/24/70	B
95	telegram	Beirut to Secstate	3/9/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/20 P.1		
112	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	3/5/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/21 P.1		
113	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8.4.09	3/4/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/22 P.1		
122	telegram	Beirut to Secstate SANITIZED Per E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(1)(6) 8.4.2009	3/3/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/23 P.1		
134	telegram	Secstate to Beirut	12/9/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/24 P.1		
135	telegram	Secstate to Beirut	12/1/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/25 P.2		

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 621

FOLDER TITLE: (1)

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162	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED ltr 8-4-09 P.1 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/28	5/3/71	B
200	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED ltr 8-4-09 P.1 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/29	4/9/70	B
224	cable	CIA to White House P.1 Exempted per sec 3.3(b)(1) ltr 13 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/4 NLN 09-12/30	7/31/71	B
225	cable	CIA to White House P.1 Exempted per sec 3.3(b)(1) ltr 13 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/5 NLN 09-12/31	5/1/71	B
226	note	handwritten note w/ attachments P.11 Exempted per sec 3.3(b)(1) ltr 13 Nov 2008 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/5 NLN 09-12/32	7/7/71	B
227	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/33 P.2	8/5/70	B
228	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/34 P.2	7/28/70	B
229	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/35 P.2	7/28/70	B
230	cable	CIA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/36 P.1	6/24/70	B
231	cable	CIA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/37 P.1	4/17/70	B
232	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/38 P.2	4/8/70	B
233	cable	CIA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/39 P.1	3/30/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files / Country Files / Middle EAST

BOX NUMBER

627 P. 3 of 4

FOLDER TITLE

① Lebanon Vol II 1 Feb '70 - 31 Dec '70

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
234	cable	Dirnsa to White House Exempted Per Sec 1.4(E), 3.5(E) 5-6-2009 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-12/40 P.1	6/21/70	B
235	cable	Dirnsa to White House Exempted Per Sec 1.4(E), 3.5(E) ltr 5-6-09 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-12/41 P.1	4/8/70	B
236	cable	Dirnsa to White House Exempted Per Sec 1.4(E), 3.5(E) ltr 5-6-2009 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-12/42 P.1	3/5/70	B
~~237~~	~~telegram~~	~~to Beirut~~ NLN09-12/43 DECLASSIFIED Per ltr 8-4-2009	8/13/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 621

FOLDER TITLE: (1)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 701

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

102175

P R 061606Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9833
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 1809

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ENTIRE TEXT)

1. MY LONG MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MARCH 5 DEVOTED LARGELY TO PROBLEM OF ISRAELI BORDER AREA. WHILE HE HAS IN NO SENSE GIVEN UP THE STRUGGLE, HE GAVE IMPRESSION OF BEING AT THE END OF HIS ROPE AS FAR AS KNOWING WHAT TO DO TO AVOID LEBANON'S DESTRUCTION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS. HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR OUR EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL, BUT NOT SANGUINE AS TO OUR SUCCESS. HE UNDERSTOOD DILEMMA WHICH FACES USG IN POSSIBLE CHOICE BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT ISRAELI RESTRAINT WAS, IN HIS MIND, ONLY FACTOR WHICH COULD SAVE SITUATION.

2. REVIEWING THE STEPS LEBANON HAD TAKEN TO LIMIT FEDAYEEN ACTICITY, HELOU SAID HE WAS IN CONTINUAL TOUCH WITH ARMY C-IN-C NOUJAIM WHO HAD RECENTLY ORDERED INTENSIFICATION OF ARMY EFFORTS TO CONTROL INFILTRATION. NOUJAIM'S JUDGEMENT WAS THAT MOST LEBANON CAN HOPE TO DO IS LIMIT INFILTRATION. THE ARMY DOES NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO STOP IT COMPLETELY. HWLOU SAID BOTH NOUJAIM AND CHIEF OF STAFF SHUMAYYIT HAD TOLD HIM THAT LARGE-SCALE USE OF FORCE AGAINST FEDAYEEN NOW OUT OF QUESTION AS IT WOULD PRODUCE CIVIL WAR. AT BEST, A PYRHHIC VICTORY WOULD BE ACHIEVED. (COMMENT: THIS IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT COMING FROM SHUMAYYIT WHO WAS THE LEADING HAWK IN THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE FEDAYEEN LAST FALL. ALSO, NOUJAIM WAS THEN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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COMMANDER BEKAA SECTOR, AND IT WAS HIS FORCES WHICH DECISIVELY ROUTED FEDAYEEN.)

3. HELOU MENTIONED ARAFAT'S RECENT PLEDGE TO SUSPEND FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ALONG THE FRONTIER BUT SAID HE WAS NOT CONFIDENT IT WOULD EARN A RESPITE FOR LEBANON. HELOU WAS DOUBTFUL THAT EVEN COMMANDO GROUPS NOMINALLY UNDER ARAFAT'S CONTROL WOULD HEED THE ORDER AND OTHERS SUCH AS SAIQA CERTAINLY WOULD NOT. HELOU THEN INDULGED HIMSELF IN SOME BITTER AND DISPARAGING REMARKS ABOUT FEDAYEEN LEADERS. FEDAYEEN AS A WHOLE, HE SAID, ARE TOTALLY UNCONCERNED WITH THE FATE OF LEBANON AND ACTUALLY WELCOME ISRAELI ATTACKS INTO LEBANON, WHICH INTER ALIA FORGE A STRONGER FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. AT THIS POINT, HELOU TELEPHONED G-2 CHIEF LAHOUD TO LEARN OF LATEST BORDER DEVELOPMENTS. HEARING THAT AN ISRAELI FORCE HAD CROSSED INTO LEBANON (BEIRUT 1763 NOTAL), HELOU CONJECTURED THAT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE MIGHT HAVE HEARD OF ARAFAT'S PROMISE TO CEASE INFILTRATION FROM LEBANON AND THAT THE ISRAELIS, WANTING A HEATED-UP BORDER TO JUSTIFY LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS INTO LEBANON, HAD MADE THE INCURSION TO PROVOKE THE FEDAYEEN INTO RETALIATING. (COMMENT: THIS IMMEDIATE QUESTIONING OF ISRAELI MOTIVES IS INDICATIVE OF THE SERIOUS DOUBTS HELOU NOW ENTERTAINS CONCERNING ISRAELI LONG-TERM INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS LEBANON.) HELOU SAID HE HAD CAREFULLY STUDIED TEKOAH AND EBAN STATEMENTS ON FEDAYEEN INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY ORIGINATED FROM LEBANON. IN SPITE OF THE NUMEROUS INCIDENTS LISTED, THE REAL TALLY OF LOSSES AMOUNTED TO ONE WOMAN KILLED AND ONE HOUSE DESTROYED, BOTH IN THE SAME INCIDENT. THIS WAS REGRETTABLE BUT HARDLY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE LATEST MASSIVE ISRAELI THREATS. HELOU ADDED THAT IF RECENT ISRAELI THREATS AGAINST LEBANON WERE MEANT AS PART OF THE WAR OF NERVES AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN AND DESIGNED TO FORCE THE GOL TO TAKE STRONGER ACTION AGAINST HTE COMMANDOS, WELL AND GOOD. IF, HOWEVER, THEY ARE MEANT IN ERNEST AND WERE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT, IT WOULD PROBABLY MEAN THE DEMISE OF THE LEBANESE STATE.

4. HELOU THEN EXPRESSED HIMSELF AT A LOSS TO KNOW WHAT HE MIGHT DO TO EXTRICATE LEBANON FROM ITS PRESENT PREDICAMENT AND ALMOST BESEECHINGLY ASKED IF THE US LEADERSHIP, UP TO AND INCLUDING PRESIDENT NIXON, COULD OFFER ANY COUNSEL. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD ENTERTAIN ANY SUGGESTION WITH A POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS. WITH LEBANON IN EXTREMIS HE COULDN'T CARE LESS ABOUT THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD. HE SAID HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, TAKE ANY STEP WHICH WOULD EXPOSE LEBANON TO CIVIL WAR.

SECRET

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5. HELOU SAID ONLY US HAD POWER OR THE CAPACITY TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL, WHICH COULD EASE SITUATION. HE HOPED IT WAS CLEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT THERE WAS NO BASIC INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN US FRIENDSHIP FOR BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON. ON THE CONTRARY, THE US BENEFITS FROM A WINDOW TO THE EAST ENABLING IT TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE ARAB WORLD, AND ISRAEL BENEFITS FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC, PLURALISTIC STATE WITH NO AGGRESSIVE AIMS TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBORS. THERE IS THUS A SHARED US-ISRAELI INTEREST IN PRESERVING LEBANON. IN A SENSE, HELOU SAID, BOTH THE US AND ISRAEL WILL SUFFER MORE THAN THE LEBANESE FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE LEBANESE STATE. THE US WILL LOSE ITS MOST IMPORTANT AND DURABLE BRIDGEHEAD IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE LEBANESE PEOPLE WILL SOMEHOW SURVIVE; THEY WILL SEEK NEW ALIGNMENTS AND PROTECTORS. THE CHRISTIANS WILL EMIGRATE, THE SUNNIS ACCOMMODATE, AND THE SHIITES REVERT TO FIDING THEIR NATION IN THEIR RELIGION. THE US ON THE OHTER HAND WILL FIND ITSELF WITH EVEN LESS LEVERAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL WITH A HOSTILE, RADICAL STATE ON ITS BORDERS -- ONE IRRATIONAL IN ITS RELATIONS WITH BOTH ISRAEL AND THE US.
PORTER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 680

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41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

097856

P R 061606Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9834
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 1809

EXDIS

6. WE THEN TURNED TO WHAT THE US MIGHT DO TO HELP LEBANON(HELOU'S REACTION
TO SUGGESTION OF US SUPPORT FOR UN OBSERVERS REPORTED
BEIRUT 1784). IN BROADEST TERMS, HELOU SAID US HAD THREE OPTIONS.
FIRSTLY, IT COULD ARM LEBANON TO ENABLE IT TO COPE WITH THE
FEDAYEEN. SINCE THE US SEEMED RELUCTANT TO DO THIS, THE SECOND
ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO FORTIFY ISRAEL, THAT IS, GIVE ISRAEL THE
MEANS TO FORTIFY ITS NORTHERN FRONTIER AND STOP COMMANDO INFILTJQQJXD
PULT J ON.#HE SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD FAVOR ANY SUCH US ACTION.
THIRDLY, THE US CAN PREVENT JWRAZCROM# ATTACKING LEBANON, BUT

HELOU SAID HE FEARED THERE WERE LIMITATIONS ON US ABILITY TO DO
THIS.
7. HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT A US STATEMENT OF CONCERN OVER THE
DETERIORATING BORDER SITUATION AND A PUBLIC REAFFIRMATION OF US
CONCERN FOR LEBANON'S SECURITY WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME. IF
THE US WANTED TO AVOID AGGRAVATING ISRAEL BY SUCH A STATEMENT, HE
SUGGESTED THE ISRAELIS BE ADVISED BEFOREHAND. THE PURPOSE OF THE

STATEMENT
WOULD BE TO LET THE US RECOUP SOME LOST PRESTIGE IN
LEBANON AND THE ARAB WORLD, CALM PUBLIC ANXIETY IN LEBANON, AND

'70 MAR 6 PM 10:03
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EASE PRESSURE ON THE GOL. HE SAID HE DIDN'T THINK THE ISRAELIS COULD OBJECT IF IT WAS PUT TO THEM IN TERMS OF US INTEREST IN REGAINING SOME PRESTIGE IN LEBANON AND THE COMMON INTEREST IN BOLSTERING THE LEBANESE REGIME.

8. COMMENT: IF ISRAEL ATTACKS, HELOU WILL SOONER OR LATER HAVE TO COMMIT HIS TINY ARMY TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY. WHEN HE DOES, THE PALESTINIANS WILL INHERIT LEBANON, MEETING THEIR ONLY RESISTANCE FROM THOSE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO FIGHT BACK. THIS IS HELOU'S ANALYSIS, AND I CANNOT DISAGREE. HELOU NO LONGER ENTERTAINS ANY REAL HOPE THAT WE WILL INTERVENE AT ANY STAGE OF THIS PROCESS, ONCE IT HAS BEGUN TO UNFOLD. HE ASKS ONLY THAT WE EXERT OUR INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL TO BE SURE IT DOESN'T START.
PORTER

NOTE: #AS RECEIVED.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 309

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85/89
ACTION NEA-08

INFO OCT-01 RSR-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 SS-20

NSC-10 INR-06 CIAE-00 IO-04 PRS-01 EUR-12 PM-03 L-02

DODE-00 RSC-01 /069 W

092122

O 051935Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9816
INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1763

L I M D I S

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -TEXT PARA NBRED TWO

SUBJ: ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON

1. DURING AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON PRES. HELOU EVENING MARCH 5 AND IN COURSE DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN THE BORDER AREA, PRES. HELOU CALLED G-2 CHIEF LAHOUD TO INQUIRE ABOUT LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. LAHOUD REPORTED THAT A FORCE OF SOME TWO TO THREE HUNDRED ISRAELIS HAD CROSSED INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY NEAR THE JUNCTURE OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL SECTORS AT ABOUT 5 PM LOCAL AND AS OF THAT TIME (7 PM LOCAL) WERE FIRING WITH RIFLES AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS ON THE VILLAGE OF MARWAHINE.

2. PRES. HELOU CONJECTURED IT POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE HAD LEARNED OF ARAFAT'S PROMISE TO CEASE INFILTRATION ACROSS LEBANESE BORDER AND THAT ISRAELIS HAD MADE INCURSION WITH AIM OF KEEPING THE AREA HEATED UP.

3. WE UNAWARE WHAT DIPLOMATIC INITATIVES AT THE UN OR ELSEWHERE THE LEBANESE PLAN TO TAKE.
PORTER

SECRET
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 845

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52-42
ACTION NEA-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 IO-04
INR-06 CIAE-00 L-02 RSR-01 RSC-01 /068 W
090083

P R 051650Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9814
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1757

L I M D I S

1) FONMIN MAJDALANI SUMMONED BIG FOUR AMBASSADORS SEPARATELY THIS MORNING (MARCH 5) TO DISCUSS ISRAELI BORDER SITUATION FOLLOWING CABINET REVIEW LAST NIGHT. CONVERSATION COVERED MUCH OF SAME GROUND AS THAT OF YESTERDAY, IN WHICH, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, I RELAYED EBAN'S (NOW PUBLICIZED) DEMARCHE TO AMB BARBOUR.

2) MAJDALANI SAID LEBANON'S ONLY BASIS OF SUPPORT AND PROTECTION AT THIS POINT SEEMED TO BE GREAT POWERS, AND MOST PARTICULARLY US. HE SAID IT ESSENTIAL RESTRAIN ISRAEL. NEITHER US NOR LEBANON COULD LIVE WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ISRAELI INVASION. LEBANON HAD NOT BEEN IDLE IN CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN BORDER OPERATIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE DO ITS BEST. WHAT ISRAELIS WERE ASKING HOWEVER (TOTAL CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN INFILTRATION) WAS REQUESTING LEBANON COMMIT NATIONAL SUICIDE. ISRAELIS WERE PROPOSING SIMPLY THAT LEBANON DECLARE CIVIL WAR.

3) ARABS, INCLUDING HIMSELF, COULD NOT ACCEPT PREMISE THAT US COULD NOT HAVE DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI DECISIONS VIS-A-VIS LEBANON. LEBANON WAS DIFFERENT FROM EGYPT, AND ITS LONG HISTORY OF CLOSE RELATIONS WITH US WAS VIEWED THROUGHOUT AREA AS ITS MAIN

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SECRET

SUPPORT. MY REMONSTRATIONS RE LIMITS OF US INFLUENCE ON TEL AVIV FELL ON DEAF EARS. ARAB LEADERS AND MAN-IN-STREET ALIKE WOULD IN

FACT BELIEVE, SAID MAJDALANI, THAT ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON, IF IT OCCURRED, HAD SUPPORT AND AGREEMENT OF USG.

4) I INFORMED MAJDALANI OF SISCO-RABIN MARCH 4 CONVERSATION IN WHICH WE URGED CONTINUED RESTRAINT AND PATIENCE ON ISRAEL'S PART (STATE 32252). MAJDALANI PRESSED HARD FOR ISRAELI REACTION. I SAID WE AS YET UNINFORMED. MAJDALANI SAID HE GREATLY FEARED DECISION MIGHT BE TAKEN BY ISRAELI MILITARY WITHOUT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. HE REFERRED TO GEN. GOUR AS SOLDIER WITH TOUGH REPUTATION WHO TOOK DECISIONS ON HIS OWN. HE GREATLY FEARED ISRAELIS WERE DEVELOPING PAVLOVIAN REACTION WHERE MILITARY OVERKILL WAS SOLUTION TO ALL PROBLEMS, AND LEBANON APPEARED BE NEXT VICTIM.

5) MAJDALANI REPEATED HE WAS PUZZLED BY ISRAELI PROPAGANDA BUILDUP AGAINST LEBANON OVER PAST TWO WEEKS. IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE HAD BEEN INCREASED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY, BUT MOST OF IT WAS, ON BASIS LEBANESE ANALYSIS, RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT EXCEPT FOR THE ONE UNFORTUNATE CIVILIAN DEATH. LEBANESE MILITARY DESERVED CREDIT FOR KEEPING FEDAYEEN OFF BALANCE, PROHIBITING LARGE-SCALE RAIDS AND FORCING FEDAYEEN TO OPERATE INDIVIDUALLY AND THEREFORE RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVELY IN THEIR INCURSIONS INTO ISRAEL. ISRAELI REACTION AND THREATS WERE FAR OUT OF PROPORTION TO SERIOUSNESS OF RECENT FEDAYEEN ACTIONS, INDIVIDUALLY OR IN THEIR TOTALITY. GOL BELIEVED ISRAELIS WERE CREATING PROPAGANDA BARRAGE WHICH WOULD SERVE AS EXCUSE FOR MILITARY ACTION WHICH THEY PLANNING AGAINST LEBANON.

6) FROM GOL'S POINT OF VIEW, ISRAELI TIMING PARTICULARLY BAD. MAJDALANI FELT THAT THINGS WERE IMPROVING IN LEBANON AND LEBANESE WERE SLOWLY GAINING INCREASED MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN ACTIONS. (RECENT ARAFAT DECISION TO STOP FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ON BORDER WAS CLEAR PROOF THAT SITUATION NOT YET OUT OF HAND.) IT WAS SLOW, BUT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. LEBANESE ATTEMPTS TO ELICIT MORE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES RE DANGERS POSED BY FEDAYEEN PRESENCE ALSO SEEMED TO BE HAVING SOME EFFECT. ISRAEL, HE FELT, MUST BE AWARE THAT INTERNAL SITUATION WAS SOMEWHAT BETTER. WHY THEN WOULD THEY TAKE THIS POINT OF TIME TO INCREASE TEMPO OF THREATS AND SPECIFICALLY THE EXPLICIT AND UGLY

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SECRET

THREAT TO CREATE A SCORCHED EARTH CORRIDOR 10 KMS IN DEPTH ALONG BORDER? THE SUBSEQUENT EXODUS OF SOUTHERN LEBANESE INTO THE REST OF CROWDED LEBANON WOULD (AND THE ISRAELIS KNEW IT) CREATE AN INSOLUBLE PROBLEM. MAJDALANI CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WISHED HE COULD BELIEVE THAT ISRAELI THREAT WAS SIMPLY AN ATTEMPT TO DETER FEDAYEEN. UNFORTUNATELY, ARAB EXPERIENCE WITH PAST ISRAELI THREATS HAD PROVED ISRAELIS USUALLY MEANT WHAT THEY SAID, OR AT LEAST FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO LET ARABS BELIEVE THE THREATS WERE IDLE. HE THEREFORE EXPECTED LARGE-SCALE ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST LEBANON, UNLESS THE US COULD AVERT IT.
PORTER

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 946

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01728 050837Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
---------- 086498

O P 050814Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9808
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 1728

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 1727

DELIVER TO DEPT ACTION OFFICE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) HAS JUST INFORMED US MARCH 5 THAT ARAFAT'S ORDER ONLY APPLIES TO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON AGATINS ISRAEL. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, ARAFAT MADE CLEAR THAT ORDER APPLIED TO ALL FEDAYEEN GROUPS IN LEBANON.

2. AS TO GENESIS OF ORDER, KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT GOL HAD INFORMED THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON OF ISRAELI THREATS AND MADE STRONG EFFORT PERSUADE THEM TO CEASE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. KHOURY BELIEVES IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO GOL REQUEST TO FEDAYEEN HERE THAT ARAFAT ISSUED HIS ORDER. KHOURY INDICATED THAT GOL WAS IN CONTACT WITH PALESTINE ORGANIZATION IN AMMAN AND MIGHT HAVE MORE INFORMATION LATER IN DAY.

3. IN CONCLUSION, KHOURY COMMENTED "WE OF COURSE CAN ONLY FIGHT FOR TIME."
PORTER

'70 MAR 5 AM 8:51
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 09-12/21: Rev 1t 8-4-09
By P.H NARA, Date 10-22-09
(P. Log 1)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'70 MAR 5 AM 8:51 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ 085

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01727 042028Z 02

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
083383

O P 041930Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9807
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 1727

EXDIS

PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDENT, MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT)
HAS JUST INFORMED EMBASSY EVENING MARCH 4, THAT
GOL HAS RECEIVED REPORT FROM AMMAN THAT ARAFAT
HAS ORDERED FEDAYEEN UNDER HIS COMMAND TO CEASE ALL
OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL FOR NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. KHOURY WAS
NOT SURE WHETHER SAYIQA AND OTHER
FEDAYEEN GROUPS AGREED TO ORDER OR NOT BUT
EXPECTED HAVE MORE INFORMATION MID-MORNING MARCH 5.
PORTER

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN09-12/22: Pencl ltr 8-4-2009
By P.H NARA, Date 10.22.09 [P. 1 of 1]

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 284

'70 MAR 5 AM 8:52

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01726 01 OF 02 042146Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

083813

R 041735Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9805
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1225

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 1726/1

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 1372; STATE 026577

1. GENERAL NOUJAIM CALLED ON ME TODAY TO GET PROGRESS REPORT ON HIS ARMS REQUEST FROM USG. THIS WAS FOLLOW-UP TO MY LONG CONVERSATION ON SAME SUBJ WITH MICHEL KHOURY LATE LAST WEEK.

2. I EXPLAINED WASHINGTON HAD REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT THERE YET NO FIRM INFORMATION. PROBLEM ONE OF AVAILABILITY AND PRICE AND WE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO GET HIM ANSWER SOON AS POSSIBLE. I REITERATED GRANT AID NOT POSSIBLE AND SAID I HOPING WE COULD RESPOND HIS REQUEST (ASSUMING AVAILABILITY) BY ESTABLISHING BEST POSSIBLE UNIT PRICE.
NOUJAIM PLEADED FOR EARLY ANSWER, ANTICIPATING THAT CRISIS COULD COME IN LATE SPRING. HE HAD TO BE READY FOR IT. REITERATED THAT MAIN THREAT WAS FEDAYEEN AND ARMED REFUGEES, BACKED BY SYRIANS. NOUJAIM'S PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO RECEIVE ANY PART OF NEW EQUIPMENT IN TIME TO ASSURE THAT PALESTINIANS WOULD THEREBY BE DETERRED FROM ATTEMPTING A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE LEABANESE STATE. NOUJAIM DISCUSSED ARMY'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS IN DETAIL, AND SAID SAD FACT WAS

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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HE HAD NO FUNDS FOR NEW PROCUREMENT, NOR AUTHORITY TO ACCEPT LONG-TERM CREDIT. IF USG COULD WORK OUT DELIVERY OF ITEMS HE HAD REQUESTED (TANKS AND 50 CALIBER QUAD AA) AT PRICES HE COULD AFFORD TO PAY, HE WOULD HOPE WE COULD AUTHORIZE THREE YEAR CREDIT TERMS.

3. NOUJAIM HAD JUST SEEN SOVIET AMB AZIMOV. AZIMOV PREDICTED IMMINENT ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON AND CHIDED NOUJAIM FOR NOT HAVING PREPARED LEBANESE ARMY TO RESIST. AZIMOV OFFERED "NO-STRINGS" GIFT TO LEBANON OF ANY KIND OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH SHE NEEDED, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND TANKS. AZIMOV HAD LAID GROUNDWORK FOR HIS APPROACH TO NOUJAIM BY MAKING SAME OFFER EARLIER TO PM KARAME. KARAME HAD URGED NOUJAIM TO SEE AZIMOV AND TO CONSIDER SOVIET OFFER SERIOUSLY SINCE THERE NO INDICATION LEBANON ABLE FULFILL ITS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE.

4. NOUJAIM ASSURED ME HE THANKED AZIMOV BUT FENDED HIM OFF BY SAYING LEBANESE ARMY HAS, OR HAS ORDERED, WHAT IT NEEDS AT THE MOMENT. ALSO STRESSED PROBLEM OF STANDARDIZATION. AZIMOV SAID HE HOPED LEBANESE WERE GETTING RAPID DELIVERY (THEY MIGHT NEED IT"). SAID HE COULD ARRANGE A QUICK TRANSFER OF NEEDED ITEMS FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IF LEBANON ACCEPTED. NOUJAIM REPEATED HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS TO ME THAT HE WOULD NOT PROCURE SOVIET ARMS.

DID NOT INTEND LET SOVS GET THEIR FOOT IN LEBANESE DOOR. BUT HE SHOWED CONCERN OVER KARAME'S SUDDEN INTEREST IN THE MATTER, AS DO I. IN THE PAST KARAME (PRESUMABLY REFLECTING VIEWS HIS MENTOR FUAD CHEHAB) HAS ALWAYS BEEN STRONGLY OPPOSED TO DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS IN MILITARY MATTERS.

5. NOUJAIM MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD DECISION HAD BEEN MADE FOR SOVIETS TO PROVIDE ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS TO JORDAN. I SAID I HAD NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS AND ASSURED HIM THAT USG HAD BEEN SUPPLYING JORDAN WITH WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY HARDWARE. HE SAID HE WELL AWARE OF THIS SINCE MUCH OF IT TRANSITED BEIRUT PORT.

6. NOUJAIM INFORMED ME, AS KHOURY HAD EARLIER, OF LEBANON'S ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE ARMS ELSEWHERE. IN SUM, LEBANESE FOUND WESTERN NATIONS PREPARED TO SELL FOR HARD CASH, BUT NONE INTERESTED IN LENIENT TERMS, OR GIFTS. BELGIANS AND ITALIANS HAD BEEN APPROACHED (BELGIANS SPECIFICALLY FOR RIFLES) BUT NEITHER PREPARED TO PROVIDE CONCESSIONAL PRICES OR TERMS. FRENCH HAD BEEN ASKED FOR QUOTATIONS ON MANY ITEMS BUT WERE ONLY INTERESTED IN COMMERCIAL SALES AT GOING PRICES.

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FRENCH TURNED DOWN REQUEST FOR GRANT AID OR BARGAIN BASEMENT PRICING. LEBANESE HAD SEVERAL TIMES APPROACHED GOF TO ASK FRENCH TO TAKE BACK TWELVE MIRAGE AIRCRAFT LEBANON HAS ACQUIRED SINCE JUNE 67 WAR. LEBANON FURTHER ASKED FRENCH CREDIT IT WITH PROCEEDS, WHICH WOULD THEN BE USED FOR PURCHASE IN FRANCE OF OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT. KHOURY INFORMED ME FRENCH TURNED HIM DOWN COLD ON THIS PROPOSAL, MOST RECENTLY WHEN HE MADE SPECIAL TRIP TO PARIS TWO WEEKS AGO. NOUJAIM MORE OPTIMISTIC, SAYING FRENCH STILL HAD MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT.

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'70 MAR 5 AM 8:51
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 300

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81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W
083863

R 041735Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9806
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1226

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 1726/2

EXDIS

7. NOUJAIM SAID MIRAGES AN UNNECESSARY AND DANGEROUS LUXURY. HE EAGER GET RID OF THEM, FOR REASONS OF FINANCE AND POLITICS. EGYPTIANS NOW PUTTING GREAT PRESSURE ON HIM TO "LOAN" THEM A MIRAGE AND HE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO EVADE THE REQUEST. ALSO, IN EVENT OF NEW WAR, LEBANESE ARMY WOULD COME UNDER UNIFIED COMMAND (EGYPTIAN), AND HE WOULD HAVE TO SEND HIS MIRAGES WHEREEVER ORDERED IN ANY CASE. SAME WOULD APPLY IF LEBANESE AIRFIELDS RENDERED INOPERABLE. HE WOULD MUCH PREFER TO DISPOSE OF MIRAGE PROBLEM NOW, AND USE PROCEEDS TO BUY BASIC MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH HE REALLY NEEDS FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY. HELOU, SAID KHOURY, IS DESPERATE TO DISPOSE OF MIRAGES HE CANNOT FOR LONG RESIST NASSER'S INSISTENT PLEAS TO GET HIS HANDS ON ONE. (COMMENT: IF MIRAGE RETURN COULD BE EFFECTED, THIS WOULD BE GREAT BOON TO ARMY FINANCES. MIRAGES COST ROUGHLY 10 MILLION POUNDS EACH AND THE LEBANESE STILL OWE FRANCE ALMOST 30 MILLION POUNDS. IN ADDITION THERE WOULD BE REAL SAVINGS ON MAINTENANCE AND FLIGHT COSTS.)
8. BRITISH AMBASSADOR KING INFORMS ME THAT NOUJAIM RECENTLY ASKED WHAT SURPLUS EQUIPMENT UK MIGHT HAVE AVAILABLE EITHER AS GIFT OR AT GIVE-AWAY PRICES. HE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT, MOTOR TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, BUT SAID THAT ANYTHING WOULD BE WELCOME WHICH HAD UTILITY. KING HAS INFORMED NOUJAIM HE DOUBTS UK WILL BE ABLE TO HELP, BUT HAS TRANSMITTED REQUEST TO LONDON. I INFORMED KING IN GENERAL TERMS OF GOL REQUEST FROM US.

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9 COMMENT: TIME IS RUNNING OUT FOR NOUJAIM AND LEBANESE.
HE IS COMPELLED TO DO SOMETHING TO IMPROVE THE ARMY, TO ENABLE
IT TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN
THREAT. HE SEEMS TO BE GETTING NOWHERE WITH HIS TRADITIONAL
WESTERN SUPPLIERS AND AS RESULT HE AND LEBANESE GOVT ARE
INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO SOVIET BLANDISHMENTS.MANY VOICES
ALREADY ARE BEING RAISED IN LEBANON - MOST IMPORTANTLY
THAT OF MINISTER OF INTERIOR JUMBLATT- DEMANDING GOL
ACCEPT SOVIET ARMS OFFER, WHICH BECOMING GENERAL KNOWLEDGE.
WE CAN EXPECT TO HEAR MORE OF THIS IF WE AND FRENCH
ARE UNABLE TO HELP. I FEEL SURE NOUJAIM WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST SOVS,
BUT HE WILL ALSO OBEY ORDERS FROM HIS CIVILIAN BOSSES TO
ACCEPT SOVIET OFFER IF THEY FEEL THERE NO ALTERNATIVE.(ONE
CAN ALSO CONTEMPLATE LEBANESE DECIDING THERE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE
TO REQUESTING URGENT DELIVERY OF SOV ARMS IF THERE IS REAL
TROUBLE WITH FEDAYEEN.)
10 I HOPE USG CAN RESPOND FAVORABLY AND QUICKLY EVEN IF
ONLY IN PARTIAL AMOUNTS TO NOUJAIM'S REQUESTS. I
ALSO FEEL THAT LEBANESE PROPOSAL TO RETURN MIRAGES HAS MANY
PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGES. IF FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT
ALL I BACK, THIS WOULD FREE UP A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF AND RELIEVE PRE-
SSURE FROM UAR.
MONEY FOR NEW PROCUREMENT, EVEN IF FRENCH WOULD ACCEPT ONLY
THE THREE MIRAGES WHICH ARE NOT YET PAID FOR, LEBANON WOULD HAVE
30 MILLION BUDGETED POUNDS FOR USE FOR OTHER PURCHASES.
WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERATION, OF A POSSIBLE APPROACH
TO GOF IN PARIS URGING THEM TO BE AS RESRONSIVE AS POSSIBLE
TO REQUEST FOR USG SUPPORT,THIS MIGHT BE USED AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL
LEVERAGE ON FRENCH.
PORTER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'70 MAR 5 AM 8:51 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 087

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01725 01 OF 02 042026Z 02

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 083327

O P 041715Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9803
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USUN 1232

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 1725/1

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER

REF: TEL AVIV 1100, STATE 30852, BEIRUT 1673 (NOTAL)

I SAW FON MIN MAJDALANI AND CIC GEN. NOUJAIM THIS MORNING (MARCH4), PASSING ON TO FORMER GIST TEL AVIV'S 1100 AND TO LATTER GIST USDAO TEL AVIV'S 0448-MARCH 70. EBAN'S MESSAGE CAME AS NO SURPRISE TO THEM. BOTH WERE WELL-BRIEFED ON CONVERSATION OF MARCH W BETWEEN ISRAELI NORTHERN ZONE COMMANDER GEN. GOUR AND LEBANESE SENIOR DELEGATE TO ILMAC, BRIG. SAAD. IDF HAD SENT MUCH STRONGER MESSAGE TO LEBANESE THAN HAD EBAN. IT POINTED TO ESCALATION OF BORDER INCIDENTS, SPECIAL ISRAELI CONCERN ABOUT FEDAYEEN ATTACK ON CIVILIANSNAND ENDED WITH SPECIFIC THREAT THAT ISRAEL WOULD CREATE A NO-MAN'SLAND (ZONE BRULE) ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. MAJDALANI REPORTED ISRAELIS SAID ZONE WOULD BE 10 KMS IN DEPT. (WE NOTE BRIG. GEN. LANER INFORMED DATT/TEL AVIV IT WOULD BE 3-4 KMS.)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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2)MAJDALANI'S REACTION WAS TO REPEAT MOST OF POINTS CONTAINED BEIRUT'S 1673. LEBANESE ARE CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN ACTION TO LIMIT OF THEIR MEANS, HE SAID. LEBANESE MILITARY IS DENYING MOVEMENT OF LARGE FEDAYEEN GROUPS ACROSS BORDER BUT IT HAS NO NO CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND CONTROL SMALL GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. LEBANESE HAVE INSISTED WITH SOME SUCCESS THAT FEDAYEEN MUST NOT FIRE INTO ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY AND ARE MAKING DETERMINED EFFORT STOP SUCH FIRING. THERE IS NO PROSPECT THAY CAN SECURE FEDAYEEN COMPLIANCE IN POLICY OF NO INFILTRATION.

3) LEBANESE WERE TRYING BRING INDIRECT PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN TO KEEP BORDER QUIET. MAJDALANI KEPT ME WAITING FOR MY APPOINTMENT BECAUSE HE CLOSETED WITH VISITING LIBYAN FONMIN BUWAYSIR. MAJDALANI SAID HE PLED LEBANESE CASE TO LIBYAN, ASKED LIBYANS BRING PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN TO CEASE BODRER PROVOCATIONS, AND GOT SOME MILD REASSURANCES AND UNDERSTANDING IN RESPONSE. HE HAD EXPLAINED LEBANON'S INTERNAL RROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI REPRISAL, INCLUDINGPOSSIBLE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION, IF FEDAYEEN NOT BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. HE REMINDED BUWAYSIR THAT ARABS NOT READY TO FIGNT, AS NASSER MADE CLEAR IN RABAT SUMMIT. WHY THEN CREATE A SITUATION WHERE ISRAEL HAD PRETEXT TO SEIZE MORE ARAB TERRITORY?

PRES. HELOU HAD ALSO MADE IMPASSIONED PLEA YESTERDAY IN SAME VEIN TO WYRIAN INTERIOR MINISTER TAWIL, POINTING OUT INTER ALIA THAT SAIGA FEDAYEEN GROUP WAS CREATION OF AND RESPONSIVE TO DIRECTION FROM SYRIAN REGIME, BUT REFUSED DEAL REASONABLY WITH GOL. HELOU BLUNTLY ASKED TAWIL TO HAVE ORDERS ISSUED TO SAIQA TO COOPERATE WITH GOL BOTH WITH RESPECT LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY, AS WELL AS BORDER OPERATION. TAWIL AGREED, BUT LEBANESE OF COURSE EXPECT LITTLE OR NOTHING TO COME OF IT. TAWIL HOWEVER EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT ISRAEL WOULD ATTACT LEBANON, AND HELOU, FACED WITH LATEST IDF THREAT, BLUNTLY CHALLENGED THIS PREMISE.

4)MAJDALANI REVIEWED MANY ATTEMPTS GOL HAD MADE TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND TO GAIN FEDAYEEN UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANON'S DILEMMA. HE SAID GOL, WITH SUPPORT OF MOST LEBANESE, IS DETERMINED KEEP PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN THROUGH ALL POSSIBLE MEANS, BUT GOL MUST RULE OUT AS IMPOSSIBLE A REPETITION OF THE OCTOBER FEDAYEEN WAR.

5) MAJDALANI TALKED YESTERDAY WITH SOV AMB AZIMOV. AZIMOV REPORTED SOVS IN MOSCOW HAD REQUESTED ARAFAT ACHIEVE UNITY

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IN PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND AT SAME TIME DEMANDED RESPECT OF PALESTINIANS FOR SOVEREIGNTY OF HOST COUNTRIES IN WHICH THEY OPERATE. AZIMOV ALSO IMPLIED THAT SOVS SUPPORT CONTINUANCE OF HASHEMITE RULE IN JORDAN AND TAKE DIDM VIEW OF PALESTINIAN THREAT TO HUSSEIN. MAJDALANI CHARGED AZIMOV TO PUT PRESSURE ON SYRIANS AND IRAQIS TO CONTROL ACTIONS OF THEIR OWN CAPTIVE COMMANDO GROUPS (AS-SAIQA AND ARAB LIBERATION FORCE), SAYING THESE WERE GREATEST THREAT TO JORDAN AND LEBANON. HE SAID LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD FOUND ARAFAT AND FATEH RELATIVELY COOPERATIVE AND REASONABLE, BUT UNABLE SECURE COMPLIANCE OF OTHER COMMANDO GROUPS, ABOVE ALL SAIQA. AZIMOV SAID SOVS WERE APPROACHING SYRIAN AND IRAQ ON THIS POINT. (MAJDALANI IS SKEPTICAL.)

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 177

'70 MAR 5 AM 8:51
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

02

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01725 02 OF 02 042107Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /046 W
---------- 083536

O P 041715Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9804
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USUN 1233

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 1725/2

EXDIS

6) MAJDALANI THOUGH SITUATION WAS IMPROVING SLIGHTLY IN LEBANON. HE HOPED GOL WOULD BE GIVEN TIME TO MUSTER SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES TO ACHIEVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN. IF ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLAYING CREATION NO-MAN'S LAND, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD ASSURE THAT FEDAYEEN AND NOT LEBANESE WOULD CONTROL BORDER. THE NO-MAN'S LAND WOULD BECOME AN EXTRA-TERRITORIAL PALESTINIAN ENCLAVE AND, WHAT EVER THE CONSEQUENCES TO LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS WOULD ALSO BE FACED WITH A NEW AND MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION. THE END RESULT OF THIS, HE FELT, WOULD BE ESCALATED ISRAELI MILITARY REPRISALS, LEADING ULTIMATELY TO FURTHER ISRAELI AGGRESSION INTO LEBANON TO "NATURAL BOUNDARIES", I.E., THE LITANI RIVER. THIS THREAT WAS OF COURSE ALSO STATED BY IDF BRIG.GEN.LANER TO DATT.
7) I MADE SPECIAL MENTION OF ISREALI CONCERN RE CIVILIAN LOSS OF LIFE. MAJDALANI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD (AND REGRETTED) THERE HAD BEEN ONE ISRAELI CIVILIAN DEATH, BUT THAT MOST FEDAYEEN RAIDS HAD PRODUCED RELATIVELY MINOR ACTS OF SABOTAGE WITH NO SERIOUS DAMAGE. NOUJAIM POINTED OUT TO ME

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LATER
THAT IT WORKED BOTH WAYS-- ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON AT
END OF 1969 HAD KILLED AT LEAST TEN LEBANESE CIVILIANS
AND WOUNDED MANY MORE.
8) MAJDALANI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO SATISFY ISRAELIS.
SOME TIME AGO, ISRAELIS COMPLAINED BITTERLY TO LEBANESE ARMY
OF FIRINGS FROM LEBANON INTO ISRAEL. LEBANESE IMMEDIATELY
WENT TO WORK TO TRY TO STOP THIS, HAVING RECEIVED ISRAELI
ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD TAKE CARE OF INFILTRATION IF
LEBANON CONTROLLED THE ACCROSS-BORDER FIRING. NOW ISRAELIS
HAVE SWITCHED TACTICS AND ARE DEMANDING LEBANESE MUST CONTROL
INFILTRATION AS WELL. MUCH AS LEBANON WOULD LIKE TO DO SO,
IT FINDS THE TASK BEYOND ITS CAPACITY. ISRAEL, SAID
MAJDALANI, UST HERSELF BEAR SOME RESOPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING
HER OWN TERRITORY. IF THE EFFICIENT ISRAELI ARMY CANNOT
DO SO, HOW CAN ONE EXPECT THE TINY LEBANESE ARMY TO ACCOMPLISH
THE TASK, WITH A PALESTINIAN FIFTH COLUMN OF SOME 300,000
AT ITS BACK?
9) GEN NOUJAIM, WHOM I SAW LATER, EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN
OVER THE DETERIORATING BORDER SITUATION. HE REMINDED ME
HE WAS DOING EVERYTHING HE CUOULD TO STOP FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS,
AND I BELIEVE HE MEANS IT. HE WOULD LIKE TO DO MORE BUT
RESTRAINED BY SIZE OF ARMY AND BY REQUIREMENTS THAT ARMY MUST

BE DISPERSED THROUGHOUT LEBANON TO MEET MOST URGENT THREAT
FORM THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS. HE WOULD SEAL OFF THE BORDER
IF HE COULD, BUT ISRAEL SHOULD CERTAINLY KNOW THAT
THIS TASK IS BEYOND CAPACITY OF LEBANESE MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, NOUJAIM MENTIONED

AGAIN HIS URGENT ARMS REQUEST (SEPTEL) TO USG BUT
SAID IF HE HAD BUT ONE REQUEST FROM USG, IT WOULD BE TO RESTRAIN
ISRAEL. IF ISRAEL MADE GOOD ON ITS MOST RECENT THREATS
RE LEBANON, CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON, FURTURE WOULD BE INCAL-
CULABLE.(COMMENT: NOUJAIM'S UNEXPPRESSED CONCERN IS SIMPLY
THAT ISRAELI ATTACT WOULD FORCE HIM TO COMMIT LEBANESE ARMY TO
THE SOUTH, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN ITS
DESTRUCTION AND CERTAINLY RESULTING IN AN IMMEDIATE MAJOR
THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON
BY THE FEDAYEEN AND THE ARMED PALESTINIAN REFUGEES.)
10) I AM SEEING HELOU TOMORROW NIGHT (MARCH5) AND I AM
SURE I WILL GET SAME LINE. I WILL OF COURSE REITERATE TO

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HIM, AS I DID TO MAJDALANI, DEEP US CONCERN OVER BORDER SITUATION AND OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON,S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I FIND IT INCREASINGLY HARD, HOWEVER, TO CONVINCE MYSELF, LET ALONE LEBANESE, THAT ISREAL RULES OUT POLICY OF SEIZING AND HOLDING LEBANESE TERRITORY. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT IF ISREALIS CARRY THROUGH ON THEIR "NO-MAN'S LAND" THREAT, ONE SURE RESULT WILL BE TO TURN THIS COUNTRY OVER TO THE FEDAYEEN, WITH CIVIL WAR A LIKELY BY-PRODUCT. THE "JORDANIZATION" OF LEBANON WILL THEN PROCEED AT A MUCH MORE RAPID PACE THAN IT HAS IN JORDAN. MANY MORE ISRAELIS WILL DID IN THIS PROCESS THAT IF THE UNEASY STALEMATE OF THE MOMENT IS MAINTAINED IF THE STATUS QUO CONTINUES, WITH ISRAEL RETALIATING (IF IT MUST ATTACK AT ALL) ONLY ON SPECIFICALLY PIN-POINTED FEDAYEEN TARGETS, WE MAY BE ABLE AVOID A SHARP AND SUDDEN DETERIORATION. AT SAME TIME, I THINK IT ISFAIR FOR USG TO ASK ISRAEL TO ENDEAVOR IMPROVE ITS OWN NORTHERN BORDER DEFENSES. LEBANON CONNOT REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED CARRY ENTIRE BURDEN AS ISREAL'S POLICE FORCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SUGGEST RE-READING BEIRUT'S 261 OF JANUARY 11, IN WHICH HELOU DISCUSSES ISRAELI BORDER PROBLEM AND CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON.

PORTER

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SUMMARY

SECRET 316

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01673 031914Z

43
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

075584

R 031600Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9787
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1673

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 1100, STATE 30852

1) I DISCUSSED LEBANESE ISRAELI BORDER SITUATION AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY LAST WEEK AND HAVE APPOINTMENT SEE FONMIN MAJDALANI TOMORROW (WED). WE OF COURSE SELDOM HAVE CONTACT WITH A SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICIAL IN WHICH WE DO NOT RAISE QUESTION. QUITE APART FROM EBANS DEMARCHE, ISRAELIS HAVE MADE THEIR CONCERNS CLEAR IN RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND LEBANESE ARE FULLY AWARE ISRAELI ATTITUDES. THEY ALSO AWARE AND DEEPLY DEPRESSED BY INCREASED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OVER WIDER AREA OF BORDER (BEIRUT 1582 AND A97).

2) FACT IS LEBANESE WAITING WITH NUMBNESS FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE CERTAIN ISRAELI RETALIATION. WE HAVE REPORTED THIS MANY TIMES BEFORE AND I CAN ONLY REEMPHASIZE THAT LEBANESE FACED WITH CHOICE OF CONFRONTING FEDAYEEN OR ACCEPTING ISRAELI REPRISALS MUST CHOOSE LATTER. THE DAY HAS PASSED. KHOURY MADE CLEAR TO ME WHEN THE LEBANESE CAN CONFRONT FEDAYEEN IN AN ALL OUT ENCOUNTER WHICH INEVITABLY WOULD FOLLOW ATTEMPT TO BLOCK ACROSS BORDER INFILTRATION. LEBANON CAN SIMPLY NOT SURVIVE ANOTHER FEDAYEEN WAR.

3) THERE ARE MANY REASONS FOR THIS. AS CIC GEN NOUJAIM TOLD ME, THERE ARE NOW AT LEAST 50,000 ARMED MEN IN LEBANON WHO WOULD FIGHT AGAINST THE GOL WHOSE ARMY CONTAINS PERHAPS 10,000 EFFECTIVES. EVEN IF LEBANESE ARMY ACCEPTED THIS

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CHALLENGE GOL WOULD FACE THE ALL OUT HOSTILITY AND MILITANCY OF REST OF ARAB WORLD, AND SYRIA WOULD MOST CERTAINLY FIND WAYS TO INTERVENE. GOL AND ARMY INTEND EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN BUT THIS PRESSURE CAN NOT REALISTICALLY STOP INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL. IT NEVER COULD - THE ARMY DOES NOT HAVE THE MANPOWER. LEBANESE ARE THEREFORE LIMITED TO TRYING TO DEAL AND REASON WITH FEDAYEEN - A PROCESS WHICH THEY HAVE FOUND LARGELY NON-PRODUCTIVE IF NOT FUTILE.

4) KHOURY MADE CLEAR TO ME THAT PRES HELOU AND GEN NOUJAIM WERE DOING EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO KEEP FEDAYEEN IN CHECK. AT SAME TIME WE MUST FRANKLY CHRACTERIZE THEIR EFFORTS AS A REAR GUARD ACTION. FEDAYEEN BORDER CROSSINGS AND FREEDOM TO ACT AGAINST ISRAEL CANNOT BE DENIED WITHOUT STARTING IN TRAIN A PROCESS WHICH EVENTUALLY WOULD DESTROY LEBANON.

5) AS KHOURY PUT IT, WHEN I MENTIONED DEATH OF ISRAELI WOMEN, THERE HAVE BEEN CIVILIAN DEATHS ON BOTH SIDES. THIS IS PERHAPS AS "INTOLERABLE" TO LEBANON AS AN ISRAELI DEATH IS TO ISRAEL. HE REMINDED ME OF INDISCRIMINATE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ON LEBANON IN DEC AND JAN IN WHICH SEVERAL LEBANESE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED. ALSO ISRAELIS STILL HOLD DOZEN LEBANESE SOLDIERS AS HOSTAGES AS RETALIATION AGAINST AND DETERRENT TO FEDAYEEN ACTION - A TOTALLY IRRELEVANT DETERRENT AS FAR AS PALESTINIANS ARE CONCERNED. HE SUMMARIZED THE LEBANESE POSITION BY SAYING THAT FOR YEARS LEBANON ACTED AS ISRAELS POLICEMAN BUT NOW ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO ASSIST IN PROTECTING HER OWN BORDERS. TO THE EXTENT ISRAEL DID SO IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR LEBANON TO CONTINUE TO HANDLE THE FEDAYEEN.

6) ISRAELIS MUST OF COURSE ACCEPT MUCH BLAME FOR CURRENT DETERIORATION SITUATION IN LEBANON. THEY HAVE BEEN THREATENING LEBANON PUBLICLY EVER SINCE JUNE 1967 WAR, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THEY REVEAL TO US OF THEIR PRIVATE INTENTIONS. BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID IN DECEMBER 1968 BASICALLY ALTERED ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL BALANCE OF LEBANON AND SO SHOOK THE COUNTRY THAT FEDAYEEN WERE ENABLED TO SEIZE A FOOTHOLD AND EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. BY THE TIME THE LEBANESE CAME TO THEIR SENSES SEVERAL MONTHS LATER IT WAS

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TOO LATE AND FEDAYEEN WERE A PERMANENT FIXTURE. BY SAME TOKEN ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT TO THAT INTENDED. EACH ATTACK ONLY CONFIRMS LEBANESE CONVICTION THAT ISRAELI INTENDS ULITMATELY TO SEIZE AND HOLD LEBANESE TERRITORY. (CURRENT ISRAELI PROTESTATIONS TO USG CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH EARLIER ISRAELI THREATS MOST RECENT OF WHICH WAS DAYANS IN JANUARY BEIRUTS 261) ISRAELI RETALIATION ONLY BOLSTERS FEDAYEEN STRENGTH AND NEUTRALIZES CAPACITY OF GOL TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN. FACT IS ISRAELIS ARE GRADUALLY SUCCEEDING IN FORCING LEBANON TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE WISH AND THE WILL OF MOST LEBANESE CITIZENS. AN ADDITIONAL DAMAGING BY PRODUCT OF ISRAELI PRESSURE ON LEBANESE BORDER WILL BE A FURTHER EXODUS OF RESIDENTS OF SOUTH LEBANON. THIS HAS ALREADY ACCELERATED AS RESULT ISRAELI STATEMENT IN LAST FEW DAYS AND ISRAELIS ARE CERTAINLY AWARE OF IT. CONSEQUENCES OF ATTEMPTING TO ABSORB 200,000 TO 300,000 DISINHERITED SOUTHERNERS INTO REST OF LEBANON WILL PUT INTOLERABLE STRAIN ON THIS COUNTRY.

7) COMMENT: IT WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THEM WHEN I INFORM LEBANESE AGAIN THAT ISRAELIS HAVE ISSUED A CLEAR WARNING. THEY HAVE BEEN EXPECTING ISRAELI ACTION FOR SEVERAL DAYS. DEPTS INSTRUCTIONS THAT I ASK LEBANESE TO "STEP UP CONTROL MEASURES TO PREVENT FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIONS ORIGINATING FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY" WILL HOWEVER, FALL ON DEAF EARS. LEBANESE ARE NOT GOING TO ACCEPT ADVICE FROM USG WHICH WOULD LEAD TO CIVIL WAR, AND AS OUR PAST REPORTING SHOULD HAVE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THE LEBANESE HAVE NO CAPACITY TO EXERCISE SUCH CONTROL. NEITHER GIVEN THEIR FINANCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE THEY BEEN ABLE SECURE FROM USG OR ANY OTHER SOURCE ADDITIONAL ARMS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE LEBANESE ARMY OR LOYAL LEBANESE CIVILIANS WITH THE CREDIBLE FORCE WHICH COULD FACE DOWN THE FEDAYEEN. IF USG IS UNABLE TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL OR AT LEAST SECURE ISRAELS UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSITION THAT RETALIATION MUST BE CAREFULLY RESTRICTED TO FEDAYEEN TARGETS THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF LEBANONS EVADING ISRAELI REPRISALS WHICH WILL IN TURN LEAD TO BREAKDOWN OF LEBANONS POLITICAL STABLITY. CONSEQUENCES OF THIS WILL BE EXACT OPPOSITE OF WHAT ISRAELIS EXPECT OT ACCOMPLISH (CONTROL OF DEDAYEEL. LEBANON WILL BE INCREASINGLY DRAWN INTO SUPPORT OF ARAB CAUSE AND WILL BECOME A PAWN OF PALESTINIANS. ISRAELIS WILL THEN FEEL

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THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ESCALATE ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON AND WILL SOONER OR LATER BE FORCED MAKE GOOD ON THEIR THREATS TO SEIZE LEBANESE TERRITORY. HELOU HAS MADE CLEAR TO ME [illegible]AT IN THE EVENT HE EXPECTS USG WILL DECRY THE ACT BUT BE ABLE DO NOTHING ABOUT IT.
PORTER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Lebanon

SECRET 915

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01372 201553Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

016461

P 201453Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9724

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1372

EXDIS

1. I MET FEB 19 WITH GEN NOUJAIM AND HE PRODUCED THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR U.S. ARMS. IT IS A SIMPLE AND MODEST LIST - 50 M-41 TANKS (OR M-42S AS SECOND CHOICE); FROM 100 TO 200 .50 CALIBER QUADRUPLE AAA GUNS; 5,000 ANTI-PERSONNEL AND ANTI-TANK MINES; 10 BULLDOZERS.

2. NOUJAIM EXPLAINED THAT BUDGET LIMITATIONS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO CONTEMPLATE BUYING NEW, SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. HIS PRESENT BUDGET WAS "MAINTENANCE BUDGET" AND THERE WAS NO AUTHORITY AS YET FOR CREDIT PURCHASES. EVEN IF CREDIT AUTHORIZED BY PARLIAMENT, HE DOUBTFUL THAT FUNDS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR EXTENSIVE NEW PROCUREMENT. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR FINANCIAL AND OTHER REASONS TO EXPAND ARMY APPRECIABLY AND HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO PAY CASH EVEN FOR THE MODEST REQUEST WHICH HE WAS DISCUSSING WITH ME. HE ALLUDED TO RECENT CONVERSATION I HAD HAD WITH PRES HELOU AND SPEAKING FOR PRESIDENT AND HIMSELF SAID GOL HOPED USG WOULD BE ABLE PROVIDE A GRANT OF THE ABOVE SHOPPING LIST.

3. I SAID AS I HAD EXPLAINED TO HELOU THERE NO LEGAL AUTHORITY AVAILABLE TO THE USG OF WHICH I AWARE WHICH WOULD ENABLE US TO PROVIDE GRANT MILITARY AID TO LEBANON. I WENT INTO BACKGROUND ON CONGRESSIONAL ASPECTS AND ON THE LIMITATIONS WHICH NOW APPLIED TO GRANT AID THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. MY INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT, NO MATTER WHAT THE WILL OF USG, THERE NO WAY WHICH COULD BE FOUND TO PROVIDE A GRANT OF MILITARY EQUIP NT OF THIS NATURE. NOUJAIM THEN ASKED IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO SECURE SOME OR ALL OF THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT FROM SURPLUS STOCKS IN GERMANY OR ELSEWHERE AT PRICES SUFFICIENTLY LOW SO THAT THE GOL MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE COST. HE WAS NOT LOOKING FOR NEW EQUIPMENT, BUT ONLY TO ADD

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SITUATION ROOM

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TO EXISTING GOL INVENTORY (BASICALLY WORLD WAR II EQUIPMENT) WHICH ALREADY IN USE. ANYTHING IN "MEDIUM CONDITION" WOULD DO. HIS PROBLEM WAS TO GET DELIVERY IN A HURRY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH DUAL THREATS OF THE FEDAYEEN AND SYRIA, AND TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. WHAT IS OBSOLETE FOR YOU, SAID NOUJAIM, IS STILL USEABLE AND EFFECTIVE FOR LEBANON.

4. WE LEFT IT THAT 1) GOL SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT GRANT AID PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE; 2) I WOULD REPORT HIS REQUEST URGENTLY TO WASHINGTON TO SEE WHAT WAS BEST DEAL WE COULD WORK OUT.

5. COMMENT: OVER THE PAST 10 DAYS BOTH HELOU AND MICHEL KHOURY HAVE PRESSED ME ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF US GRANT MILITARY AID TO LEBANON. I HAVE CONSISTENTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT I FELT GRANT AID WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. BUT LEBANESE, GIVEN THEIR PRESENT FINANCIAL STRAITS AS WELL AS THE URGENCY OF THE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, ARE TURNING TO US IN DESPERATION. THEY HAVE NO OUTSIDE SUBSIDIES FROM REST OF ARAB WORLD, AS DOES JORDAN, AND NO POSSIBILITY OF GETTING THEM. IT SEEMS TO ME, IF WE ARE TO HELP LEBANON IMPROVE ITS INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITIES, THE ONLY FEASIBLE SOLUTION IS TO OFFER EQUIPMENT AT LOW UNIT PRICES WHICH MAY CONCEIVABLY BE WITHIN LEBANESE ABILITY TO PAY. I WOULD HOPE THE DEPARTMENT AND THE PENTAGON COULD APPROACH THE MATTER IN THIS LIGHT.

6. I AM ENCOURAGED THAT THE LEBANESE ARE BEING REALISTIC IN THEIR DEMANDS AND NOT PLACING UNNECESSARY STRAINS ON THE NATIONAL BUDGET. BOTH THE M-41 TANKS AND THE .50 CALIBER AAA GUNS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS IN EVENT OF ANOTHER FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION OR OF THREATENED SYRIAN INTERVENTION. THEY WOULD ALSO SERVE INHIBIT FEDAYEEN FROM RASH ACTIONS. IT SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEBANESE CONSIDER BUYING ANY SOPHISTICATED NEW EQUIPMENT AT THIS TIME, AND IT GRATIFYING THAT THEY HAVE DISPENSED WITH THOUGHTS OF HIGH-PRICED HELICOPTERS OR ROCKETS, MUCH AS THEY MIGHT WANT THEM. NOUJAIM HAS OBVIOUSLY THOUGHT THROUGH THESE REQUIREMENTS CAREFULLY, AND IN SOMEWHAT UNLEBANESE FASHION HAS SET HIMSELF REALISTIC GOALS. AS FOR INFANTRY WEAPONS THE LEBANESE SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF BUYING M-14 OR M-16 RIFLES. I PRESUME THEY ARE SECURING WHATEVER ADDITIONAL STANDARD INFANTRY WEAPONS THEY NEED FROM FRENCH SOURCES. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 888

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00905 021821Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

038255

R 021700Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9612
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

'70 FEB 3 AM 8:22
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T BEIRUT 905

DEPT PASS CAIRO

EXDIS

1. DESPITE PERSPECTIVE OF PRESIDENT'S ME PRESS CONFERENCE, ADVERSE REACTION HERE CONTINUES RUN STRONG. LEBANESE ARE DISHEARTENED, AND HAVE JOINED OTHER ARABS IN INTERPRETING STATEMENT AS DE FAVAO AGREEMENT SELL MORE PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL. GIVEN CURRENT ARAB MISTRUST OF US ME POLICY, WE CAN ASSUME THAT ARABS WILL TAKE NO REAL INITIATIVE ON US PEACE PROPOSALS UNTIL US POSITION ON FURTHER ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL ANNOUNCED.

2. WHATEVER HAS BEEN SAID PUBLICLY, LEBANESE WERE HEARTENED BY SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 9 GALAXY ADDRESS, ALTHOUGH AS WE HAVE REPORTED THEY WERE SUSPICIOUS OF US INTENTIONS AND CONJECTURED WHETHER WE WOULD RETREAT FROM POSITION LAID DOWN BY SECRETARY. MISINTERPRETING THE LETTER OF JAN 25 TO JEWISH LEADERS, THE ARABS SAW BEGINNING OF THE EROSION OF OUR DEC 9 DECISION. THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS HAS CONVINCED MOST OF THEM EROSION IS CONTINUING, AND THAT OUR SUPPORT OF ISRAEL OVERRIDES OUR DESIRE FOR PEACE.

3. ONE MUST HAVE SOME SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THIS ARAB REACTION. ARAB TARGETS ARE BEING HIT WITH IMPUNITY BY ISRAELI PLANES. THE PHANTOM HAS ADDED A NEW RANGE AND DIMENSION TO ISRAEL'S CAPACITY TO ATTACK. IN ARAB EYES ISRAELIS ARE COMMITTED TO HOLDING

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OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO REJECTING CONCEPT OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION WHICH UAR AND JORDAN AT LEAST HAVE PROFESSED TO ACCEPT. THERE ARE NO VISIBLE INDICATIONS FROM ARAB VANTAGE POINT THAT ISRAELIS HAVE SHOWN DISPOSITION TO PAY EVEN A MODEST PRICE FOR A REAL SETTLEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, ISRAEL IS BUSILY CREATING FACTS WHICH WILL CHANGE THE MAP - SETTLEMENTS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED IN OCCUPIED AREAS AND JERUSALEM IS DAILY TRANSFORMED. ONLY A HANDFUL OF DISPLACED PERSONS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO RETURN AND THE WAR IS BEING CARRIED TO HITHERTO UNTOUCHED AREAS SUCH AS LEBANON AND THE NILE.

4. IN ABOVE CONTEXT THE DISMAY OF HUMILIATED ARABS AT PROSPECT OF ADDITIONAL US ARMS FOR ISRAEL IS MORE THAN UNDERSTANDABLE. FRANKLY, I AM CONCERNED THAT DISMAY WILL TURN TO RAGE WHICH WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICAN PRESENCE IN ARAB WORLD. CERTAINLY THE ARGUMENT THAT MIRAGES TO LIBYA WILL UPSET MILITARY BALANCE IN ME IN NEXT SEVERAL YEARS HAS NO BASIS FOR ACCEPTABILITY HERE. ALL ARABS KNOW THE QUALITATIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGE HELD BY THE ISRAELIS. THEY ALSO KNOW IT WILL BE MANY YEARS BEFORE ARAB WORLD CAN FIND ENOUGH PILOTS FOR PLANES IT ALREADY HAS.

5. I UNDERSTAND THE MANY FACTORS WHICH MUST BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN MAKING DECISION ON ISRAEL'S ARMS REQUEST. I CAN ONLY EXPRESS A PERSONAL JUDGMENT THAT A FAVORABLE RESPONSE BY USG IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PROBABLY CREATE DEAD END IN OUR CURRENT PEACEMAKING EFFORTS. I ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL DO MORE DAMAGE TO OUR INTERESTS IN ME THAN DID INITIAL PHANTOM DECISION.

6. IF FAVORABLE DECISION IS TO BE MADE, I URGE THAT IT BE ONE ONLY OF PRINCIPLE WITH ACTUAL DELIVERIES TO BE HELD OFF UNTIL PEACEMAKING EFFORTS HAVE FOUNDERED ON MANIFEST ARAB OR SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE, OR UNLESS SOVIETS ESCALATE ARMS SALES TO ARABS. AS IT NOW STANDS, US ARMS SALE WILL APPEAR TO BE REWARDING ISRAEL FOR HER INTRANSIGENCE WHILE INDIRECTLY CONDEMNING ARABS. A QUID PRO QUO WOULD GO FAR TO HELP. IF ISRAEL SHOULD ACCEPT US PEACE PROPOSALS, OBVIOUSLY THERE WOULD BE A TOTALLY DIFFERENT RATIONALE FOR OUR SENDING HER ARMS. EVEN AN ISRAELI SIGNATURE ON THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WOULD MAKE THE THREAT OF THE PHANTOM DELIVERY SYSTEM LESS MENACING. BUT WITHOUT SOME INDICATION THAT ISRAELIS PREPARED ACCEPT US VIEWS ON HOW TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE ME. ARABS ARE GOING TO ASK WHAT LEVERAGE WE HAVE LEFT IN INFLUENCING ISRAELI POLICY.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 00905 021821Z

7. IF THERE IS ANY USEFUL GUIDANCE WHICH DEPT CAN PROVIDE ON THIS QUESTION, I WOULD APPRECIATE BEFORE CALLING ON PRES HELOU TOWARDS END CURRENT WEEK. ALSO, PRIMIN KARAME NOW TALKING TO NASSER IN CAIRO, AND I HOPE SEE HIM SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Lebanon

SECRET 956

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00970 041915Z

52
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

052479

R 041703Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9627
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 970

EXDIS

REF: STATE 16712

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS

1. ON FEB 4 EMBOFF REVIEWED SECRETARY'S FEB 2 CONVERSATION WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS WITH FONOFF DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, KHALIL MAKKAWI, WHO HAD NOT YET SEEN ANY REPORT FROM LEBANESE AMBASSADOR.

2. MAKKAWI FIRST REACTION ("SO YOU WANT TO BRING BACK JARRING?") REFLECTED GENERAL FEELING OUT HERE THAT JARRING EFFORT HAS RUN ITS COURSE. EMBOFF REPLIED WE SEE NO BETTER ROUTE TO A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. ALLUDING TO SECRETARY'S POINT THAT NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MUST BE BUILT ON AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW AND AN ARAB COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT ISRAEL, MAKKAWI PROTESTED THAT RESPONSIBLE ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALREADY FULFILLED THEIR SIDE OF THE BARGAIN BY ACCEPTING RESOLUTION 242. IT IS NOW UP TO ISRAEL TO FOLLOW SUIT. EMBOFF RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH ISRAELI ACTION WOULD MAKE FURTHER COMPROMISE EASIER FOR THE ARABS. UNFORTUNATELY GOI SEEMED ADAMANT AND USG HAD ALREADY GONE AS FAR AS IT COULD GO IN ADVOCATING A BALANCED FORMULA FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 242. BY AGREEING TO RESUME INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON BASIS OF 242, ARABS HAD DRAMATIC OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE UNPLEASANT POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FOR SAKE OF PEACE. IN SO DOING, THEY WOULD PLACE ISRAEL UNDER STRONG MORAL OBLIGATION TO SHOW EQUIVALENT GOOD

270 FEB 4 PM 11:13
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SECRET

FAITH AND USG WOULD HAVE NEW ARGUMENT TO USE WITH GOI.

4. MAKKAWI COUNTERED THAT PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATED THAT GOI WOULD NOT ONLY SPURN SUCH A GESTURE BUT WOULD USE ITS ALLEGED CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO TWIST THE FACTS AND SADDLE THE ARABS WITH THE BLAME FOR THE FAILURE TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS. EMBOFF EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ROGERS' PROPOSALS WOULD CONSTITUTE INCONTESTABLE EVIDENCE OF SINCERITY OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR 242. PROSPECT OF GETTING BACK ON THE ROAD TO PEACE WAS WELL WORTH THE SLIGHT POLITICAL RISK. ALTERNATIVE -- PROTRACTED WAR -- IS INFINITELY MORE PAINFUL TO CONTEMPLATE.

5. MAKKAWI ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE FOOLISH FOR ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO EXPEND POLITICAL CAPITAL IN QUEST FOR HONORABLE PEACE IF GOI IS COMMITTED TO DISHONORABLE SURRENDER. IN HIS VIEW, PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN DELTA IS TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR NASSER TO NEGOTIATE. EMBOFF COMMENTED THAT IF ISRAELI CRITICISM OF ROGERS' PROPOSALS REFLECTED UNDUE MILITANCY ON PART OF GOI, ARABS COULD EASILY EXPOSE THIS SITUATION BY ACCEPTING THOSE PROPOSALS.
PORTER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 651

2

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01633 031128Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

---------- 072998

R 031030Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9783
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 1633

EXDIS

[redacted] HAS INFORMED AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT HE HAS RECENTLY SEEN ROSENWASSER. HE REPORTED ROSENWASSER IS WELL AND WELL TREATED. THE SOURCE STATED THAT ROSENWASSER WAS STILL IN JORDAN AND ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT RPT NOT INDICATE ROSENWASSER'S PRECISE WHEREABOUTS, THE EMBOFF HAD THE IMPRESSION IT WAS AMMAN.
PORTER

'70 MAR 3 AM 10:18

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SANITIZED Per Sec 3.3(b)(1)(6)

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 09-12/23: Per Sec 3.3(b)(1)(6) ltr 8-4-2009
By P. H NARA, Date 10-22-09 (60 LW 5)
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HAK Book

Department of State

TELEGRAM

MAR 3 PM 6:49 '70
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 316

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01673 031914Z

43
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

075584

R 031600Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9787
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1673

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 1100, STATE 30852

1) I DISCUSSED LEBANESE ISRAELI BORDER SITUATION AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY LAST WEEK AND HAVE APPOINTMENT SEE FONMIN MAJDALANI TOMORROW (WED). WE OF COURSE SELDOM HAVE CONTACT WITH A SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICIAL IN WHICH WE DO NOT RAISE QUESTION. QUITE APART FROM EBANS DEMARCHE, ISRAELIS HAVE MADE THEIR CONCERNS CLEAR IN RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AND LEBANESE ARE FULLY AWARE ISRAELI ATTITUDES. THEY ALSO AWARE AND DEEPLY DEPRESSED BY INCREASED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OVER WIDER AREA OF BORDER (BEIRUT 1582 AND A97).

2) FACT IS LEBANESE WAITING WITH NUMBNESS FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE CERTAIN ISRAELI RETALIATION. WE HAVE REPORTED THIS MANY TIMES BEFORE AND I CAN ONLY REEMPHASIZE THAT LEBANESE FACED WITH CHOICE OF CONFRONTING FEDAYEEN OR ACCEPTING ISRAELI REPRISALS MUST CHOOSE LATTER. THE DAY HAS PASSED, KHOURY MADE CLEAR TO ME WHEN THE LEBANESE CAN CONFRONT FEDAYEEN IN AN ALL OUT ENCOUNTER WHICH INEVITABLY WOULD FOLLOW ATTEMPT TO BLOCK ACROSS BORDER INFILTRATION. LEBANON CAN SIMPLY NOT SURVIVE ANOTHER FEDAYEEN WAR.

3) THERE ARE MANY REASONS FOR THIS. AS CIC GEN NOUJAIM TOLD ME, THERE ARE NOW AT LEAST 50,000 ARMED MEN IN LEBANON WHO WOULD FIGHT AGAINST THE GOL WHOSE ARMY CONTAINS PERHAPS 10,000 EFFECTIVES. EVEN IF LEBANESE ARMY ACCEPTED THIS

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01673 031914Z

CHALLENGE GOL WOULD FACE THE ALL OUT HOSTILITY AND MILITANCY OF REST OF ARAB WORLD, AND SYRIA WOULD MOST CERTAINLY FIND WAYS TO INTERVENE. GOL AND ARMY INTEND EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN BUT THIS PRESSURE CAN NOT REALISTICALLY STOP INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL. IT NEVER COULD - THE ARMY DOES NOT HAVE THE MANPOWER. LEBANESE ARE THEREFORE LIMITED TO TRYING TO DEAL AND REASON WITH FEDAYEEN - A PROCESS WHICH THEY HAVE FOUND LARGELY NON-PRODUCTIVE IF NOT FUTILE.

4) KHOURY MADE CLEAR TO ME THAT PRES HELOU AND GEN NOUJAIM WERE DOING EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO KEEP FEDAYEEN IN CHECK. AT SAME TIME WE MUST FRANKLY CHRACTERIZE THEIR EFFORTS AS A REAR GUARD ACTION. FEDAYEEN BORDER CROSSINGS AND FREEDOM TO ACT AGAINST ISRAEL CANNOT BE DENIED WITHOUT STARTING IN TRAIN A PROCESS WHICH EVENTUALLY WOULD DESTROY LEBANON.

5) AS KHOURY PUT IT, WHEN I MENTIONED DEATH OF ISRAELI WOMEN, THERE HAVE BEEN CIVILIAN DEATHS ON BOTH SIDES. THIS IS PERHAPS AS "INTOLERABLE" TO LEBANON AS AN ISRAELI DEATH IS TO ISRAEL. HE REMINDED ME OF INDISCRIMINATE ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ON LEBANON IN DEC AND JAN IN WHICH SEVERAL LEBANESE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED. ALSO ISRAELIS STILL HOLD DOZEN LEBANESE SOLDIERS AS HOSTAGES AS RETALIATION AGAINST AND DETERRENT TO FEDAYEEN ACTION - A TOTALLY IRRELEVANT DETERRENT AS FAR AS PALESTINIANS ARE CONCERNED. HE SUMMARIZED THE LEBANESE POSITION BY SAYING THAT FOR YEARS LEBANON ACTED AS ISRAELS POLICEMAN BUT NOW ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO ASSIST IN PROTECTING HER OWN BORDERS. TO THE EXTENT ISRAEL DID SO IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR LEBANON TO CONTINUE TO HANDLE THE FEDAYEEN.

6) ISRAELIS MUST OF COURSE ACCEPT MUCH BLAME FOR CURRENT DETERIORATION SITUATION IN LEBANON. THEY HAVE BEEN THREATENING LEBANON PUBLICLY EVER SINCE JUNE 1967 WAR, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THEY REVEAL TO US OF THEIR PRIVATE INTENTIONS. BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID IN DECEMBER 1968 BASICALLY ALTERED ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL BALANCE OF LEBANON AND SO SHOOK THE COUNTRY THAT FEDAYEEN WERE ENABLED TO SEIZE A FOOTHOLD AND EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. BY THE TIME THE LEBANESE CAME TO THEIR SENSES SEVERAL MONTHS LATER IT WAS

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TOO LATE AND FEDAYEEN WERE A PERMANENT FIXTURE. BY SAME TOKEN ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT TO THAT INTENDED. EACH ATTACK ONLY CONFIRMS LEBANESE CONVICTION THAT ISRAELI INTENDS ULITMATELY TO SEIZE AND HOLD LEBANESE TERRITORY. (CURRENT ISRAELI PROTESTATIONS TO USG CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH EARLIER ISRAELI THREATS MOST RECENT OF WHICH WAS DAYANS IN JANUARY BEIRUTS 261) ISRAELI RETALIATION ONLY BOLSTERS FEDAYEEN STRENGTH AND NEUTRALIZES CAPACITY OF GOL TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN. FACT IS ISRAELIS ARE GRADUALLY SUCCEEDING IN FORCING LEBANON TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE WISH AND THE WILL OF MOST LEBANESE CITIZENS. AN ADDITIONAL DAMAGING BY PRODUCT OF ISRAELI PRESSURE ON LEBANESE BORDER WILL BE A FURTHER EXODUS OF RESIDENTS OF SOUTH LEBANON. THIS HAS ALREADY ACCELERATED AS RESULT ISRAELI STATEMENT IN LAST FEW DAYS AND ISRAELIS ARE CERTAINLY AWARE OF IT. CONSEQUENCES OF ATTEMPTING TO ABSORB 200,000 TO 300,000 DISINHERITED SOUTHERNERS INTO REST OF LEBANON WILL PUT INTOLERABLE STRAIN ON THIS COUNTRY.

7) COMMENT: IT WILL COME AS NO SURPRISE TO THEM WHEN I INFORM LEBANESE AGAIN THAT ISRAELIS HAVE ISSUED A CLEAR WARNING. THEY HAVE BEEN EXPECTING ISRAELI ACTION FOR SEVERAL DAYS. DEPTS INSTRUCTIONS THAT I ASK LEBANESE TO "STEP UP CONTROL MEASURES TO PREVENT FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIONS ORIGINATING FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY" WILL HOWEVER, FALL ON DEAF EARS. LEBANESE ARE NOT GOING TO ACCEPT ADVICE FROM USG WHICH WOULD LEAD TO CIVIL WAR, AND AS OUR PAST REPORTING SHOULD HAVE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THE LEBANESE HAVE NO CAPACITY TO EXERCISE SUCH CONTROL. NEITHER GIVEN THEIR FINANCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE THEY BEEN ABLE SECURE FROM USG OR ANY OTHER SOURCE ADDITIONAL ARMS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE LEBANESE ARMY OR LOYAL LEBANESE CIVILIANS WITH THE CREDIBLE FORCE WHICH COULD FACE DOWN THE FEDAYEEN. IF USG IS UNABLE TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL OR AT LEAST SECURE ISRAELS UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSITION THAT RETALIATION MUST BE CAREFULLY RESTRICTED TO FEDAYEEN TARGETS THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF LEBANONS EVADING ISRAELI REPRISALS WHICH WILL IN TURN LEAD TO BREAKDOWN OF LEBANONS POLITICAL STABLITY. CONSEQUENCES OF THIS WILL BE EXACT OPPOSITE OF WHAT ISRAELIS EXPECT OT ACCOMPLISH (CONTROL OF DEDAYEEL. LEBANON WILL BE INCREASINGLY DRAWN INTO SUPPORT OF ARAB CAUSE AND WILL BECOME A PAWN OF PALESTINIANS. ISRAELIS WILL THEN FEEL

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THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ESCALATE ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON AND WILL SOONER OR LATER BE FORCED MAKE GOOD ON THEIR THREATS TO SEIZE LEBANESE TERRITORY. HELOU HAS MADE CLEAR TO ME THAT IN THE EVENT HE EXPECTS USG WILL DECRY THE ACT BUT BE ABLE DO NOTHING ABOUT IT.
PORTER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 190

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01055 061753Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

066251

P R 061711Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9650
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1055

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 624

ON THE BASIS OF DISCREET INQUIRIES WE HAVE MADE HERE, ROSENWASSER TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE IS NOT IN LEBANON. FYI. WE HAVE SUGGESTED TO A LEBANESE MILITARY SOURCE THAT IF ROSENWASSER IS ILL APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES MIGHT WISH TO SUGGEST TO FATAH THAT HE BE SENT TO BEIRUT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. LEBANESE PRESUMABLY WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO AT THAT JUNCTURE. HOWEVER, WE FRANKLY DOUBT THAT FATAH, UNLESS ROSENWASSER IS SERIOUSLY ILL, WOULD BUY THIS ONE.
PORTER

'70 FEB 6 PM 8:56
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

CONFIDENTIAL 424

PAGE 01 STATE 137302

85
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66641
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN: AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY: NEA- MR DAVIES
NEA/ ARN- MR SEELYE
NEA/ EX- MR HUNT
S/S- O: MR HOLLY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 JUL 29 AM 8:41
2/3

061700

R 290052Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 137302

EXDIS

SUBJ: SYRIA: PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE

REF: BIERUT 6293

1. DEPT APPRECIATES EMBASSY'S CONSIDERED VIEWS RE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SARG APPROVAL FOR ASSIGNING AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER AND SECRETARY TO DAMASCUS. WE ALSO CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE AND SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZE YOU TO PROCEED AS FOLLOWS:

A) MAIOLINI SHOULD APPROACH ORALLY APPROPRIATE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY LEVEL WITH VIEW TO OBTAINING SARG APPROVAL FOR ASSIGNING AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER AND SECRETARY TO DAMASCUS

B) MAIOLINI SHOULD POINT OUT THAT CONSULAR BURDEN IN BEIRUT TOO HEAVY TO ALLOW DETAILING BEIRUT OFFICER FOR DAMASCUS WORK. ALSO OUR EXAMINATION OF WORKLOAD STATISTICS INDICATES OUR OFFICER WOULD BE WELL OCCUPIED IN SYRIAN CAPITAL.
C) MAIOLINI SHOULD SEEK ASSURANCES THAT AMERICANS ASSIGNED DAMASCUS WOULD HAVE SAME IMMUNITIES AS USINT OFFICERS OF ITALIAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS. INDICATION OF SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO DESCRIBE IMMUNITIES IN WRITING SHOULD ALSO BE SOUGHT.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 137302

D) MAIOLINI SHOULD ASSURE SYRIANS USG READY TO EXTENDRECIPROCAL PRIVILEGES IN WASHINGTON TO VISITING OFFICER FROM SYRIAN UN MISSION OR TO OFFICER ASSIGNED TO PAKISTAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

2. FORMAL WRITTEN RESPONSE TO SYRIAN NOTE WOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL COMPLETION MAIOLINI/ SARG DISCUSSIONS. WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGMENT WOULD LIMIT CONSUL'S FORMAL DUTIES TO PASSPORTS AND VISAS UNLESS ABOVE DISCUSSIONS HAVE INDICATED THAT SARG WOULD NOT OBJECT TO WIDER SCOPE. ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 495

PAGE 01 STATE 134512

87
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66643
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/EX: MR HUNT
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
NEA:MR ATHERTON
S/S-O: SEFRY

---------- 029003

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 JUL 24 AM 8:07

R 240115Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134512

EXDIS

SUBJ: SYRIA: PROPOSED AMERICAN CONSULAR PRESENCE

REF: BEIRUT 6293

1. WE APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM AND RECOMMENDATION THAT WE ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE SYRIAN PROPOSAL FOR WEEKLY VISIT TO DAMASCUS OF AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER FROM BEIRUT. HOWEVER, PRACTICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS LEAD US TO FAVOR TRYING TO OBTAIN WITHOUT DELAY SARG AGREEMENT FOR ASSIGNING AMERICAN OFFICER AND SECRETARY TO DAMASCUS.

2. CONSULAR WORKLOAD AT EMBASSY BEIRUT IS TOO HEAVY FOR AN OFFICER TO BE SPARED FROM EMBASSY COMPLEMENT FOR UP TO THREE DAYS WEEKLY IN DAMASCUS. ASSIGNMENT TO BEIRUT OF AN EXTRA OFFICER TO PERFORM DAMASCUS DUTIES WOULD PRESENT VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. FEWER DIFFICULTIES FOR DEPARTMENT WOULD BE POSED BY ASSIGNING OFFICER AND SECRETARY TO DAMASCUS.

3. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT ONCE IT IS ESTABLISHED SARG MIGHT BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO, AND RELUCTANT TO CHANGE, SYSTEM OF VISITING AMERICAN CONSULAR OFFICER. UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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SYRIANS WOULD HAVE CONVENIENCE OF VISA AND OTHER SERVICES IN DAMASCUS WHILE ADVANTAGE TO USG WOULD BE LIMITED. ACCORDINGLY, SARG COULD BE TEMPTED TO DRAG ITS FEET ON ASSIGNMENT TO DAMASCUS OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL.

4. REQUEST EMBASSY'S REACTIONS, TOGETHER WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUBSTANCE AND MANNER OF PRESENTING OUR PROPOSAL TO SARG. ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
JUL 7 AM 8:46
2

SECRET 678

PAGE 01 STATE 121371

83
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66643
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE - NEA:ALATHERTON, JR
APPROVED BY: NEA: ALFRED L ATHERTON, JR
IO/UNP: MR ARMITAGE (SUBS)
S/S-O: GLRUECKERT

020737

P R 070053Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 121371

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JERUSALEM AT UNSC

REF: BEIRUT 5786

YOU MAY IN YOUR DISCRETION INFORM SADAQA THAT WE COMMENCE OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH JORDANIANS IN NEW YORK ON JULY 7 AND THAT, IN INTEREST OF ORDERLY COORDINATION, WE BELIEVE ONGOING DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION SHOULD NOW BE CENTERED THERE. GP-3. IRWIN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 676

PAGE 01 STATE 117055

91
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66639
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
NEA/ARN - MR. KILLGORE
S/S-O:BRIMS
IO/UNP - MISS SCHRAGE (PHONE)
NEA - MR. ATHERTON

101038

P R 300105Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 117055

EXDIS

SUBJ: US POSITION RE RAISING JERUSALEM ISSUE IN SECURITY COUNCIL

REF: STATE 116162; BEIRUT 5585

WE REPEATING STATE REFTEL WHICH WILL GIVE YOU GENERAL GUIDANCE ON JERUSALEM IN ORDER TO REPLY TO SADAQA. WE NOW PLANNING HAVE FIRST CONSULTATION WITH JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF TOMORROW, JUN 30, AND WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED. ROGERS

'71 JUN 30 AM 9:08
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

'71 APR 23 AM 11:46

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2 of 3

SECRET 091

PAGE 01 STATE 069351

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TSCOTES/PSUTHERLAND
APPROVED BY: C-PEDERSEN
ARN-SEELYE
NEA-ATHERTON:SISCO
S/S: BREWSTER

097594

R 230147Z APR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 069351

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT

REF: STATE 67190

1. FOLLOWING ARE OUR IDEAS ON SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT. REQUEST YOUR COMMENT AND ANY SUGGESTED CHANGES WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE. WHEN SCHEDULES ARE FINALIZED, REQUEST THAT THEY BE TREATED AS CLASSIFIED AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO AVOID PUBLICIZING ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES. SCHEDULES MAY BE DISCUSSED WITH HOST GOVT.

SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT TO BEIRUT MAY 3-4

MAY 3

4:15 P.M. ARRIVE. DEPART BY HELICOPTER TO AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

6:30 P.M. INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR AND KEY MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

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PAGE 02 STATE 069351

7:00 P.M. CALL ON PRESIDENT FRANGIE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

8:00 P.M. STAG DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE, PREFERABLY INCLUDING ONLY FEW SENIOR LEBANESE, MEMBERS OF VISITING PARTY, AND AMBASSADOR.

MAY 4

10:00 A.M. MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE

1:00 P.M. LUNCH AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE FOR SELECTED LEBANESE LEADERS BOTH IN AND OUT OF GOVT (TO BE DESIGNATED).

3:30 P.M. DEPART FOR AIRPORT.

2. SECRETARY PREFERS AVOID SOCIAL OCCASIONS WHEREVER POSSIBLE. WE ALSO DO NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY SCHEDULE TOO CROWDED, AS TRIP WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT ONE.

GP-2 ROGERS

'71 APR 23 AM 11:46
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SECRET 943

'71 MAR 25 AM 8:21
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 049958

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66640
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:AIKILLGORE /NEA:RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/ARN-MR. SEELYE
S/S-O RDEMMONS

126386

R 250200Z MAR 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 049958

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CALL BY LEBANESE AMBASSADOR

1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI PAID COURTESY CALL MARCH 24 ON ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES, PREPARATORY TO RETURNING TO BEIRUT ON MARCH 26 FOR PERIOD OF UP TO TWO WEEKS CONSULTATIONS. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT TWO OR THREE OTHER LEBANESE AMBASSADORS WOULD BE IN BEIRUT AT SAME TIME AND HIS GOVERNMENT FELT THAT COMPARING NOTES MIGHT BE USEFUL. BEFORE LEAVING HE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING FROM MR. DAVIES A REPORT ON THE MIDDLE EAST AS SEEN BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

2. THE TOUR D'HORIZON BEGAN WITH THE RECENT WASHINGTON VISIT OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN. DAVIES SAID THAT EBAN HELD THAT THE JARRING TALKS WERE NOT AT AN IMPASSE BUT THAT THE BALL WAS IN THE UAR COURT. HE DESCRIBED ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO THE UAR AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND MADE CLEAR THAT ISRAEL HAD POSED NO CONDITIONS BUT HAD SET FORTH ITS POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL. FOR OUR PART, WE, TOO, DO NOT FEEL THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE AT AN IMPASSE BUT HOLD THAT THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO ISRAEL IN THE FORM OF A MORE DEFINITIVE

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REPLY TO JARRING. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO TELL ISRAEL WHAT ITS REPLY SHOULD BE, BUT WE ARE ENCOURAGING A RESPONSE WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS. AS MR. EBAN INDICATED, THE USG IS NOT USING PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL, BUT WE ARE ENCOURAGING THE TAKING OF POSITIONS THAT WILL ENSURE CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE CENTRAL TO A SETTLEMENT.

3. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT SENATOR JACKSON'S STATEMENT THAT INCLUSION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE WOULD MAKE PERMANENT THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE WHEREAS WE SHOULD BE TRYING TO GET THEM OUT. MR. DAVIES REPLIED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF GUARANTEES OR PEACEKEEPING FORCES. IDEALLY, A BILATERAL PEACE CONTRACT BASED ON MUTUAL CONFIDENCE MIGHT NOT REQUIRE UN FORCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PARTIES MIGHT AGREE THAT THESE WERE ESSENTIAL TO ALLAY THEIR FEARS FOR THE FUTURE. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE US OPPOSED DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE FOUR POWERS OF DETAILS OF GUARANTEES. THESE CAN ONLY BE COMPLEMENTARY AND SUPPLEMENTARY TO AGREEMENT. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE BEST WAY TO GET THE RUSSIANS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON PEACE AMONG THE PARTIES. AS FAR AS BIG FOUR PARTICIPATION IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, THIS WAS HYPOTHETICAL UNTIL SOME AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

4. DAVIES SAID OUR OVERALL VIEW ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND PEACE PROSPECTS CONTINUES TO BE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. WE SEE THE JARRING TALKS AS THE FORUM IN WHICH THE PARTIES CAN HAMMER OUT A SETTLEMENT. THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS CONTINUES. THE GUNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE BEEN SILENT FOR ALMOST EIGHT MONTHS, AND BOTH SIDES HAVE COME FURTHER FORWARD THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN THOUGHT POSSIBLE A YEAR AGO. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE ACCEPTED THE PROPOSITION OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND HAVE USED PUBLICLY THE WORD AGREEMENT WHILE THE ISRAELIS HAVE SPOKEN OF WITHDRAWAL TO RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BORDERS. ONE HAD ONLY TO LOOK BACK TO THE FRUITLESS 1968 VISITS OF AMBASSADOR JARRING TO JERUSALEM AND CAIRO IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET ACCEPTANCE OF THESE WORDS TO PERCEIVE THE DEGREE OF MOVEMENT IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS.

5. DAVIES CONTINUED THAT THE FEDAYEEN HAD SEEMED TO BE A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PEACE ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO WHEREAS HE BELIEVED THAT THE BULK OF THE PALESTINIANS NOW APPRECIATE THAT PFLP EXTREMISTS NEARLY BROUGHT THEM TO DISASTER. HE THOUGHT THAT MOST NOW WOULD

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PAGE 03 STATE 049958

ACCEPT SETTLEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE.
AMBASSADOR KABBANI INTERJECTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN FAR
TOO RUTHLESS IN PUTTING DOWN THE FEDAYEEN LAST SEPTEMBER.
A DISCUSSION ENSUED IN WHICH DAVIES POINTED OUT THAT KING HUSSEIN
HAD HAD TO FIGHT THE FEDAYEEN TO MAINTAIN HIS OWN AUTHORITY AND
THAT HE HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT FOR MONTHS IN THE FACE OF FEDAYEEN
PROVOCATION. KABBANI RECOGNIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN FEDAYEEN

EXCESSES UT FELT THAT KING HUSSEIN'S FORCES HAD
BEEN TOO RUTHLESS.
THE FEDAYEEN PHASE OF THE DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH MR. DAVIES
STATING THAT HOWEVER ONE VIEWED THE EVENTS OF LAST SEPTEMBER, THE
FEDAYEEN ARE GENERALLY IN DISARRAY AND SEEM TO BE MORE REALISTIC
NOW WITH RESPECT TO A MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
AMBASSADOR KABBANI AGREED.

6. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR SPOKE OF HIS DEEP DISTRUST OF ISRAELI
MOTIVES. HE SAW ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON HOLDING SHARM AL SHAYKH
AND ITS EMPHASIS ON SECURITY AS A COVER FOR AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY.
KABBANI NOTED WRYLY WHAT STRUCK HIM AS AN OVER-EMPHASIS IN THE
US ON SECURITY FOR ISRAEL. DAVIES NOTED THAT ONE OF THE BIGGEST
PROBLEMS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE IS THE MUTUAL SUSPICION AND
DISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US MADE MUCH
OVER SECURITY FOR ISRAEL BUT THIS MERELY REFLECTS THE HISTORICAL
CONTEXT IN WHICH THE 1967 WAR OCCURRED AND OUR CONVICTION THAT
A STABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT BE ACHIEVED
UNTIL THE ISRAELIS CAN BE MADE TO FEEL THEY WILL NOT AGAIN HAVE
TO FACE A SIMILAR SITUATION. GP-3. ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 820

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
FEB 12 AM 8:30

PAGE 01 STATE 023756

80
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66636
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE XS:MR. ACKERMAN
E/ITP/EWT:MR. FERGUSSON
DEPT. COMMERCE:WILSON SWEENEY

076328

R 112227Z FEB 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 023756

EXDIS

SUBJ: CASE OF DR. LUCIEN DAHDAH

REF: STATE 20028

1. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE HAS TAKEN DECISION TO TERMINATE JUNE 30, 1970 DENIAL ORDER AGAINST DR. DAHDAH. THIS FAVORABLE DECISION IS EXPECTED TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER IN NEAR FUTURE.

2. EMBASSY AUTHORIZED TO SO INFORM DAHDAH. IRWIN

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PAGE 01 STATE 014826

42
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 (CCO-00,CIAE-00,NSCE-00,) R

66602
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN:AIKILLGORE
S/S:MR. CARSON

---------- 098634

P R 281659Z JAN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 014826

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-LEBANON

1. IN MEETING WITH RABIN JANUARY 27 SISCO NOTED THAT WE HAD INFORMATION RECENTLY INDICATING ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF LEBANON, IN SOME CASES CLOSE TO BEIRUT. REASON FOR OUR ATTENTION AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME WAS OBVIOUS. WITH JARRING TALKS AT PRESENT JUNCTURE AND END OF CEASE-FIRE COMING UP, IT WAS IMPORTANT THERE BE NO DIVERSION. SISCO ASKED IF ISRAELI EMBASSY COULD GIVE US INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS GOING ON ON LEBANON-ISRAEL FRONT.

2. RABIN SAID HE WOULD SEND TELEGRAM TO JERUSALEM AND WOULD ASK ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICER TO BRIEF DEPARTMENT. RABIN'S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WAS DOING NOTHING. HE AND MINISTER ARGOV BOTH REFERRED TO KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT SUCCESSES AGAINST FEDAYEEN, SUGGESTING LEBANESE COULD DO SAME. RABIN COMPLAINED THAT PRESENT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS "DOING NOTHING" TO COPE WITH FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, "WORSE THAN PREVIOUS LEBANESE GOVERNMENT."

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GP-3. ROGERS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 200809

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66636
DRAFTED BY:OM/MS:JOHN MANG
APPROVED BY:O/OM:THOMAS STERN
S/S-O:MR. BRIMS

R 092346Z DEC 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL~~ USE STATE 200809

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EXDIS
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FBI PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

REFERENCE: STATE 195595 DECEMBER 1, 1970

1. IN PARAGRAPH 2, LINE 4 OF REFERENCED MESSAGE, CHANGE THE WORD POLICY TO POLICE. ROGERS

2

NOD
70 DEC 10 AM 7:44
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
038649

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN09-12/24: Per ltr. 10.15.2009
By P.H NARA, Date 10.22.09 (P. 1061)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

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PAGE 01 STATE 195595

88
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66641
DRAFTED BY: OM: MS: RGMAYS
APPROVED BY: THE ACTING SECRETARY
O/OM- MR STERN
FBI- MR SULLIVAN
O- MR MACOMBER
ARA/ LA/ MGT- MR CHAPIN INFO
NEA/ EX- MR HUNT INFO
EA/EX- MR SMITH INFO
S/S- MR BREWSTER

116382

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
70 DEC 2 PM 12:56

2/3

R 012210Z DEC 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL~~ USE STATE 195595

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FBI PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

1. A REQUEST BY THE DEPT OF JUSTICE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF FBI PERSONNEL ABROAD HAS BEEN APPROVED. THE REQUEST INVOLVES ESTABLISHING SIX NEW OFFICES WITH PERSONNEL COMPLEMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

OFFICE	COMPLEMENT AGENTS	CLERKS	TOTAL
BEIRUT	1	1	2

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30

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN09-12/25; Pt 1 10-15-2009
By PH NARA, Date 10-22-09

CP 1027

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PAGE 02 STATE 195595

CARACAS	2	2	4
LA PAZ	1	1	2
SAIGON	1	1	2
SAN JOSE	2	2	4
TEL AVIV	2	2	4

2. PURPOSE OF THESE NEW OFFICES WILL BE TO CARRY OUT LIAISON RESPONSIBILITIES. FBI LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES ARE STATIONED ABROAD TO DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN A CLOSE, COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICY AND OTHER INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH THEY VISIT. THIS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPEDITING AND INSURING THE THOROUGH COVERAGE OF LEADS ABROAD ARISING FROM INVESTIGATIONS BEING CONDUCTED BY THE FBI WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

3. SINCE THERE IS CONSIDERABLE URGENCY, PLEASE LET ME KNOW IMMEDIATELY WHETHER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW OFFICE WILL PRESENT ANY DIFFICULTIES. JOHNSON

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NSC 1/10/109

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM NOV 19 AM 7:51

SECRET 947

PAGE 01 STATE 189268

88
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66643
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN: TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA:IAI: MR STACKHOUSE
NEA: MR ATHERTON
S/S-O: MR BRIMS

---------- 035488

R 190103Z NOV 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 189268

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI TREAT AGAINST LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 9895; TEL AVIV 6354; STATE 188379

1. IF AMBASSADOR BELIEVES IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, HE AUTHORIZED INFORM GENERAL NOUJAIM THAT WE CONVEYED TO GOI CONCERN RE POSSIBLE ISRAELI AIR STRIKE ACROSS BORDER IN LIGHT OF FEDAYEEN BUILD-UP IN SOUTH LEBANON. HE MAY SAY GOI OFFICIAL HAS CHARACTERIZED NOUJAIM'S CONCERN AS QTE EXAGGERATED UNQTE AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SUCH ACTION NOT RPT NOT INTENDED. AT SAME TIME GOI OFFICIAL EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER DANGER OF RENEWED FEDAYEEN ACTION IN CENTRAL SECTOR AND BELIEVED THAT GOL SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN.

2. TEL AVIV 6362 JUST RECEIVED. AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO INFORM NOUJAIM THAT SUBSEQUENT TO CONVERSATION REPORTED PARA 1, WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY ISRAELIS OF FIVE FEDAYEEN CROSSBORDER ATTACKS IN LAST 2-3 DAYS. HE SHOULD PASS ALONG ISRAELI EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT LEBANESE WILL UNDERSTAND GOI'S ANXIETY FOR SAFETY OF BORDER SETTLEMENT. AMBASSADOR SHOULD URGE GOL TO REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS PREVENT SUCH INCIDENTS FROM OCCURRING. GP-3. ROGERS

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46

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WH

CONFIDENTIAL 677

TO OCT 29 AM 8:22 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2/3

PAGE 01 STATE 177707

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66641
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ ARN: TWSEELYE/AIKILLGORE
APPROVED BY: NEA- JOSEPH J. SISCO
S/S - MR CURRAN

---------- 034985

R 282322Z OCT 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 177707

EXDIS

SUBJ: SISCO/ EXDIS HELOU CONVERSATION

1. DURING LUNCHEON HELD IN THOMAS JEFFERSON ROOM OCTOBER 27 IN HONOR EX-PRESIDENT HELOU, ASST. SECTY. SISCO SOUGHT PRESIDENT HELOU'S VIEWS ON SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESIDENT NASSER'S DEATH. SPECIFICALLY, COULD NEW UAR REGIME AGREE TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND MAKE IT AGREEMENT STICK? SISCO NOTED THAT ON SURFACE TRANSITION IN EGYPT LOOKED SMOOTH, WHICH SUGGESTED THAT NEW GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE ALONG ROAD TO PEACE. HOWEVER, SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE COMPLICATED BECAUSE OF (1) NASSER'S DEATH; (2) JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR AND (3) GROWING SENSE OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY.

2. HELOU CONCURRED THAT MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION MAY NOW BE MORE COMPLEX THAN BEFORE. HOWEVER, HE MADE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NASSER'S DEATH ON ONE HAND AND THE JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR AND GROWING PALESTINIAN IDENTITY ON THE OTHER. NASSER'S DEATH WAS A NATURAL PHENOMENON, AN ACCIDENT. BUT CIVIL WAR AND NEW PALESTIAN ASSERTIVENESS WERE FUNDAMENTALS. THERE WAS AN INEVITABLE QUALITY ABOUT THEM.

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HELOU SAID THAT FOR PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS HE HAD SOUGHT TO DRAW ATTENTION TO REALITIES OF PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE IMPLIED THAT STRENGTHENING PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. HE IMPLIED THAT STRENGTHENING PALESTINIAN PERSONALITY AND JORDAN CIVIL WAR MIGHT BE HELPFUL TOWARDS FINDING A SOLUTION BECAUSE THEY THREW INTO SHARPER FOCUS THE BASIC REALITIES.

3. HELOU STATED THAT HE KNOWS UAR PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT PERSONALLY. SADAT IS CULTURED, HIGHLY EDUCATED AND SURROUNDED BY PEOPLE SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER MAHMOUD RIAD WHO ARE EQUALLY CAPABLE. HELOU EXPECTED NEW EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP TO PURSUE NASSER'S POLICY LINES. IN FACT, SADAT MAY BE AT PAINS TO TAKE ACTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE HIS ATTACHMENT TO NASSER'S GUIDELINES. IN ANY CASE, HELOU IMPLIED THAT NASSER'S DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE SCENE WOULD NOT IN LONG RUN DETRACT FROM EGYPT'S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST. UAR STILL NUMBERED BETWEEN 30 AND 33 MILLION PEOPLE IN ONE ENTITY. EVEN IN KING FAROUK'S TIME EGYPT PLAED A KEY ROLE AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO WITH NASSER GONE.

4. SISCO ASKED HELOU'S VIEWS ON WHAT USG SHOULD DO IF FATAH LEADER YASIR ARAFAT SHOULD COME TO US TOMORROW AND SAY HE IS READY TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH US. HOW STRONG IS ARAFAT AND WHAT PERCENTAGE OF PALESTINIANS COULD HE PRESUME TO SPEAK FOR? WHAT SHOULD USG ATTITUDE BE? HELOU RESPONDED OBLIQUELY THAT AN ARAFAT APPROACH SHOULD NOT BE REBUFFED BUT HE AVOIDED FURTHER COMMENT.

5. HELOU EXPRESSED VIEW THAT ISRAEL DID NOT REALLY WANT PEACE. HE COULD IMAGAINE A DISCUSSION IN ISRAELI CABINET IN WHICH MOSHE DAYAN WOULD MAINTAIN THAT UAR ANTI- AIRCRAFT MISSILES CONSTITUTED A MAJOR THREAT TO SECURITY OF ISRAEL. ABBA EABN MIGHT DEMUR THAT SITUATION WAS REALLY NOT THAT BAD. BUT IN END ISRAEL USED EGYPTIAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS AS EXCUSE FOR WITHDRAWING FROM THE HARRING PEACE TALKS.

6. HELOU DESCRIBED AN AREA OF MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WESTERN CHRISTIANS AND ARABS WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL. ONE MESSAGE OF CHRISTIANITY WAS THAT WORSHIPPED MIGHT WORSHIP HIS GOD ANYWHERE. BUT ISRAELIS ARE CONCERNED WITH BIBLICAL PROPHECIES WHICH CALL FOR THEIR RETURN TO A

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PROMISED LAND AS ONLY PLACE IN WHICH GOD MIGHT PROPERLY BE WORSHIPPED. ISRAEL'S MAIN OBJECTIVE THEREFORE IS NOT SECURITY, AS US AND WESTERNERS BELIEVE, BUT RATHER TO ACHIEVE A TOTAL FULFILLMENT OF BIBLICAL PROPHECIES AS THEY RELATE TO THEM. THAT IS REASON ISRAELIS HAVE NEVER BEEN EXPLICIT ABOUT EXACTLY WHAT BOUNDARIES THEY SEEK. WESTERN CHRISTIANS IMBUED WITH IDEA OF WORSHIPPING GOD ANYWHERE ARE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THAT MAIN ISRAELI OBJECTIVE IS NOT SECURITY.

7. HELOU ADMITTED TO INDULGING IN ATMOSPHERICS AND HIGH THEORY IN HIS FOREGOING EXPOSITION. AT SAME TIME HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT SOMETHING CONCRETE MIGHT STILL EVOLVE WITH REGARD TO AN ARAB- ISRAELI SETTLEMENT BUT THIS COULD ONLY HAPPEN IF THE CENTRAOL PROBLEM WERE "SKIRTED ARDUND" AND NOT TACKLED FRONTALLY. HE SAID ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE PRECISELY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THE TERMS OF A FINAL SOLUTION WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. WHILE HELOU AVOIDED SAYING WHAT USG SHOULD DO, HE STATED ISRAEL'S ABSOLUTISM HAD RESULTED IN ARAB ABSOLUTION. THE TWO SIDES WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO GET TOGETHER BY THEMSELVES. FOR THAT REASON, HE ADVOCATED RESUMPTION OF JARRING MISSION. SUCCESS OF THAT MISSION WOULD REQUIRE THAT USG AS STRONGEST POWER AND, IN PARTICULAR, MR. SISCO AS THE KEY OFFICIAL DEALING DIRECTLY WITH MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS PUT DECISIVE WEIGHT BEHIND JARRING.

8. SISCO TOOK POLITE EXCEPTION TO HELOU'S VIEWS ON ULTIMATE ISRAELI AIMS AND IMPLICTIONS THAT THE USG IS TOO SOFT ON ISRAEL. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN ACCEPTING THE US PEACE INITIATIVE ISRAEL HAD FOR FIRST TIME: (1) ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS; (2) ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY; AND (3) ACCEPTED LIMITED CEASEFIRE RATHER THAN AN UNLIMITED ONE FOR WHICH IT HAD ALWAYS PRESSED. THESE ISRAELI CONCESSIONS HAD NOT BEEN MADE WITHOUT STRONG URGINGS FROM USG. WE WILL NOT TRY TO FORCE A SOLUTION TO ARAB/ ISRAELI PROBLEM BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT IS IMPOISSIBLE. AT SAME TIME, HELOU COULD BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A DECISIVE ROLE IN INFLUENCING THE PARTIES, ESPECIALLY ISRAEL. WE WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE ANNEXATION OF TERRITORIES. WHILE WE FEEL THAT SOME ADJUSTMENTS HAVE TO BE MADE, WE WILL NOT SUPPORT ISRAELI ACQUISITION OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIES.

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OM SISCO TOLD HELOU HE IS CONVINCED THAT AFTER NOVEMBER 5 THE MIDDLE EASTERN CEASEFIRE WILL BE EXTENDED EITHER DE FACTO OR BY AGREEMENT. HE WAS EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT JARRING TALKS WILL BE RESUMED, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY TAKE A LITTLE LONGER. USG REALIZES THAT LEFT TO THEMSELVES THE PARTIES CANNOT ACHIEVE PEACE BECAUSE OF THE EMOTIONAL, HISTORICAL AND SENTIMENTAL FACTORS SURROUNDING THE WHOLE DISPUTE. THAT IS WHY WE ARE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE RESUMPTION OF JARRING TALKS. WHEN THESE RESUME USG CAN THEN PLAY A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE. PRESENT SITUATION IS SOMETHING LIKE A VACUUM IN WHICH WE CANNOT OPERATE. IT IS ONLY IN CONTEXT OF PEACE OALUS THAT USG CAN AND WILL BRING ITS FULL INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE PARTIES.

10. MR SISCO CLOSED BY REITERATING DEEP FEELING OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS TOWARD LEBANESE PEOPLE. HE STATED THAT USG HAS HIGH REGARD FOR ROLE WHICH EX-PRESIDENT HELOU PLAYED DURING HIS SIX- YEAR TERM AS PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, DURING HELOU'S TENURE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WAS FURTHER CEMENTED. WE WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT HELOU CAME TO US AND WE HOPE THAT HE WILL COME MORE OFTEN. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO HAVE FURTHER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, WHICH WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

11. HELOU THANKED MR. SISCO FOR HIS REMARKS AND SAID THAT LEBANESE ARE VERY EAGER TO SGRENGTHEN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO EXTENT USG MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO DO SO. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR HOSPITALITY RENDERED HIM HERE AND SAID HE REGRETTED THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE DEPRTMENT'S INVITATION IN FULL (I.E. LEADER GRANT PROGRAM).

HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE, PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND ALL TOP LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE EAGER TO MAINTAIN AND FURTHER STRENGTHEN CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. ROGERS

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:AIKILLGORE:AM
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARN:MR SEELYE
NEA/IAI:MR STACKHOUSE
SS:SHOLLY

R 270029Z OCT 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 176374

EXDIS

SUBJ: REPORTED FEDAYEEN ACQUISITION OF STRATEGIC POSITIONS IN BEIRUT

REF: A. USDAO 231400Z OCTOBER 1970
B. KORN/HADASS OCTOBER 20 MEMCON (CC SENT BEIRUT)

1. DEPARTMENT IS DISTURBED BY REPORTS CONTAINED REFERENCES THAT FEDAYEEN ARE RENTING APARTMENTS AND OFFICES ALONG STRATEGIC THOROUGHFARES AND NEAR KEY INSTALLATIONS IN BEIRUT.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING EMBASSY VIEWS AND COMMENTS ON CREDENCE OF THESE REPOSTS AND, IF TRUE, WHETHER WOULD BE ADVISABLE URGE GOL ON HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS TAKE PREVENTATIVE ACTION. ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '70 OCT 27 AM 8:20 019664

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DRAFTED BY: NEA RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: NEA RODGER P DAVIES
S/S-O BAFLATIN

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P 261943Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 159037

EXDIS

1. WITH APPARENT SETBACK TO GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS IN JORDAN, IT SEEMS TO US THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF REGROUPING AND INCREASED MOVEMENT OF FEDAYEEN TO LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ALSO POSSIBILITY THAT DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR PALESTINIAN CIVILIAN BYSTANDERS IN JORDAN MIGHT ALSO RENDER THOSE IN LEBANON LESS COOPERATIVE TO FEDAYEEN THAN IN PAST.

3. REQUEST BEIRUT'S ASSESSMENT OF LIKELIHOOD OF INCREASED FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AND PRESEMES AS WELL AS GOL WILL AND CAPABILITY TO PREVENT JORDAN-LIKE SITUATION FROM OCCURRING.
ROGERS

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66641
DRAFTED B: REVISED TEXT RECD FROM WHITE HOUSE
NEA/ARN: TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA- JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA- MR ATHERTON
WH-MR SAUNDERS
NEA- MR KILGORE
S/S MR BREWSTER

069495

R 202253Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A~~ L STATE 136003

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM
PATRIARCH MEOUCHI
1. NO FORMAL REPLY FROM PRESIDENT IS CONTEMPLATED. HOWEVER,
AMBASSADOR
OR DESIGNATE MAY RESPOND ORALLY TO PATRIARCH MEOUCHI IN REPLY
TO LATTER'S LETTER DELIVERED PERSONALLY BY CHARLES MALIK IN APRIL.
ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF MARCH 25
WHICH DR. CHARLES MALIK WAS KIND ENOUGH TO DELIVER.
HE APPRECIATED RECEIVING THE CARDINAL'S MESSAGE, AND WISHES
TO CONVEY THE FACT THAT HE CONTINUES TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST VERY CLOSELY. THE PRESIDENT IS ENCOURAGED BY
THE POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE U S PEACE INITIATIVE AND IS HOPEFUL
THAT NEGOTIATIONS MAY LEAD TO A RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
PROBLEM. AS THE CARDINAL MUST KNOW, THE PRESERVATION OF LEBANON'S
INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE HAS LONG BEEN IMPORTANT
TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH GREAT
IMPORTANCE TO LEBANON'S FREEDOM AND INTEGRITY.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 09-12/26: Pers't 8.4.09
By P. H NARA, Date 10.22.09

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THE PRESIDENT EXTENDS WARM PERSONAL WISHES TO THE CARDINAL.

2. IF MEOUCHI ASKS FOR COPY OF TEXT, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT YOU ARE ONLY AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY ORALLY ANDTHAT THERE IS NO TEXT.
JOHNSON

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:PJGRIFFIN
APPROVED BY: NEA JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN MR. SEELYE NEA MR. ATHERTON NEA/UAR MR. BROWN
S/S MR. BROWN

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R 152224Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT KHARTOUM
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CAIRO BY POUCH
BT
S E C R E T STATE 113335

EXDIS

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST: CALL OF LEBANESE AMBASSADOR JULY 14
SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CLARIFIED
FOR
LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI PRESIDENT'S RECENT REMARKS ON
ME SITUATION EMPHASIZING GROWING CONCERN WITHIN USG OVER
MORE DIRECT SOVIET MILITARY ENCROACHMENTS IN UAR WHICH
COULD LEAD TO DANGEROUS AND UNDESIRABLE SUPER POWER
CONFRONTATION. SISCO SAID WE ARE HOPING FOR
POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM UAR. SHOULD NASSER REJECT OUR

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INITIATIVE, HE FEARED OPTIONS OF ALL CONCERNED WOULD BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED. AGREEING THAT US INITIATIVE REPRESENTS STEP FORWARD, AMB KABBANI REGRETTED SPATE OF UNHELPFUL SPECULATIVE ARTICLES AND STATEMENTS BY US MEDIA AND OFFICIALS EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO CREATE IMPRESSION IN ARAB WORLD THAT THERE HAS BEEN EROSION ALREADY IN OUR PEACE PROPOSALS. KABBANI STRESSED NEED FOR QUIET US DIPLOMACY AVOIDING STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL.

1. SISCO OPENED BY SAYING THAT HE WISHED TO CORRECT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING THAT MAY HAVE ARISEN ABOUT PRESIDENT'S JULY 1 TV STATEMENTS CONCERNING MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. SISCO STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO ARAB STATES IN HIS INTERVIEW WAS NOT INTENDED TO REFER TO LEBANON, JORDAN, OR OTHER ARAB MODERATES. RATHER, PRESIDENT WAS EXPRESSING HIS DEEP CONCERN THAT SEVERAL ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAVE NOT YET ACCEPTED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND THAT NONE OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE GROUPS HAVE OPTED FOR ANYTHING BUT A MILITARY SOLUTION. SISCO SAID THAT IT MUST BE OBVIOUS TO KABBANI AS ASTUTE OBSERVER US SCENE THAT THERE CONSIDERABLE CONCERN WITHIN USG OVER SOVIET ROLE IN UAR. OUR JUDGMENTS OF SITUATION DERIVED AFTER MOST CAREFUL EVALUATION OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. ALTHOUGH OUR PRINCIPAL CONCLUSION WAS ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE, NEVERTHELESS WE ARE NOT UNMINDFUL OF INCREASING SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS WHICH WE NOT SATISFIED ARE PURELY DEFENSIVE. WE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT (A) SITUATION MAY BE CREATED IN TIME THAT NEITHER OF US CAN CONTROL, AND (B) WHAT SOVIETS HAVE DONE MILITARILY IN UAR HAS BEEN IN CONTEXT UTMOST RESTRAINT ON OUR PART.

2. SISCO CONCEDED THERE HAVE BEEN GREAT MANY SPECULATIVE ARTICLES ON SITUATION, NONE OF WHICH, HE SAYS, WE PLAN COMMENT ON. HE AFFIRMED TO KABBANI THAT STATEMENT MADE TO HIM ON JUNE 20 RE OUR RESTRAINT ON SUPPLYING ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL STILL STANDS TODAY. OF COURSE, USG HAS ONGOING MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL BUT THIS FACT IS WELL KNOWN. SISCO REITERATED OUR INCREASING CONCERN OVER AREA SITUATION NOTING THIS CONNECTION THAT WE DOWNPLAYED INCREASING SOVIET ENCROACHMENTS FOR MANY MONTHS. WE NOW HAVE OBLIGATION TO ALL CONCERNED TO

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STRESS THE DANGER WITH WHICH WE REGARD THE MORE DIRECT MILITARY AND OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT OF SOVIETS IN ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

3. SISCO SAID THAT FOREGOING IS COGENT REMINDER OF URGENT NEED FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT MEETS LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. SISCO REVEALED DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED AT MEETING JULY 13 THAT NASSER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIAN LEADERS IN MOSCOW ARE CONTINUING AND THAT NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED. ACCORDING SISCO, WE ARE AWAITING CONSIDERED EGYPTIAN REPLY TO OUR RECENT INITIATIVE, WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE POSITIVE. AS HE HAD STATED PREVIOUSLY, SHOULD RESPONSE BE NEGATIVE, OPTIONS OF ALL CONCERNED WOULD RESTRICTED.

4. KABBANI REGRETTED CONSIDERABLE UNHELPFUL SPECULATION IN PUBLIC MEDIA CONCERNING OUR PEACE INITIATIVE. RE SITUATION IN GENERAL, KABBANI FELT DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. DESCRIBING ISRAELI STRATEGY OVER PAST THREE YEARS AS COMPLETE DEPENDENCE ON THEIR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, KABBANI CONCLUDED THAT ISRAELI GOAL, IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN LARGELY SUCCESSFUL, HAS BEEN TO TRANSFORM THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE INTO DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS. ISRAELIS HAVE CONSISTENTLY ACTED AS IF THEY IGNORED CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. KABBANI THOUGHT US COULD STILL REVERSE COURSE OF EVENTS IN AREA BUT TIME WAS RAPIDLY RUNNING OUT ON US. WHILE AGREEING THAT NEW US INITIATIVE REPRESENTS POSITIVE STEP FORWARD, KABBANI PLEADED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO JEOPARDIZE THIS INITIATIVE AS WELL AS TO FURTHER INFLAME AREA SITUATION.

5. COMMENTING ON STEADY DETERIORATION OF SITUATION SINCE JUNE WAR, SISCO SAID WE UNDERSTAND PRESSURES ON BOTH MOSCOW AND CAIRO TO REDRESS MILITARY BALANCE. HOWEVER, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE GOES BEYOND WHAT WE BELIEVE NECESSARY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, AND RAISES SERIOUS QUESTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANSWER TO SOVIET POLITICAL THREAT IS NOT LIMITED TO QUESTION OF PROVIDING OR NOT PROVIDING ISRAEL WITH ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, BUT RATHER A PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH RECOGNIZES LEGITIMATE CONCERNS AND INTERESTS OF ALL

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PARTIES.

6. SISCO THEN REVIEWED FOR KABBANI DEVELOPMENT OF US POLICY SINCE KOSYGIN-NIXON EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. WHEN KOSYGIN JAN 31 LETTER SENT, EVIDENCE NOW SHOS USSR HAD ALREADY TAKEN MILITARY DECISION RE UAR. NOTHWITHSTANDING REJECTION OF OUR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS AND DOCUMENTED FACT THAT RUSSIANS BECOMING MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN UAR DEFENSE, WE DECIDED, AFTER COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW BEGUN IN APRIL, TO PUT FORTH ANOTHER PEACE INITIATIVE, WHILE BEING RESTRAINED ON ISRAELI ARMS ASPECT. AT SAME TIME, WE ALSO FELT IT NECESSARY TO PUBLICLY REVEAL EXTENT OF SOVIET ROLE.

7. SISCO STRESSED ARABS MUST UNDERSTAND WE SEE NEW QUALITATIVE FACTOR OF SOVIETS IN EQUATION, WHICH HAS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSION; WE COPING WITH SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY BY POLITICAL PROPOSAL; FURTHERMORE, ARABS MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND US INTENDS TO REMAIN INVOLVED IN AREA BOTH POLITICALLY AS WELL AS MILITARILY AND THAT OUR VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT DOES NOT RESTRAIN US. WE FEEL THERE IS REAL DANGER IN PRESENT SITUATION GETTING OUT OF HAND. WHILE NOT TRYING TO DENY THAT THE PRIME FACTOR IN CONFLICT IS UNDERLYING ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE, SISCO EXPLAINED PRESIDENT IN HIS TV INTERVIEW WANTED TO GET ACROSS POINT THAT THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS OF US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- POLITICAL AND MILITARY IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH INCREASING DIRECT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA.

8. KABBANI MADE IT CLEAR THAT CONTINUED US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL CAN MEAN LOSS OF AREA FOR US EVEN WITHOUT WAR. HE ALSO REPEATED THEME THAT SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS OF US OFFICIALS AS WELL AS UNHELPFUL COMMENTS OF MEDIA HAVE GIVEN IMPRESSION IN ARAB WORLD THAT RECENT US INITIATIVE AS ANNOUNCED BY SECRETARY HAS, IN FACT, ALREADY BEEN ERODED.

9. SISCO INQUIRED IF KABBANI HAD "FEEL" FOR SUBSTANCE OF REPLY UAR WILL BE MAKING TO OUR INITIATIVE. KABBANI SAID THAT FACT IT HAS TAKEN SO LONG FOR UAR TO PREPARE ITS RESPONSE INDICATES TO HIM THAT IT WILL NOT BE TOTALLY UNRESPONSIVE. SINCE PARTIES ARE NOW ENGAGED IN CLEVER

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NEGOTIATIONS GAME, KABBANI STRESSED IMPORTANCE FOR ALL TO EXERCISE PATIENCE.

10. WHILE AGREEING WITH THIS OBSERVATION, SISCO SAID US ANXIOUS TO BUILD BRIDGES TO NASSER, BUT IT TAKES TWO TO PLAY THIS GAME. WE CONSIDER THAT OUR INITIATIVE REQUIRES MAJOR CONESSIONS ON PART OF ISRAELIS, AND WHILE PROPOSAL DOES NOT MEET ARAB POSITION ENTIRELY, THIS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED. SISCO STRESSED THAT WE NEED HELP OF UAR TO PUT ACROSS OUR INITIATIVE. WHILE AMERICANS BOTH PATIENT AND IMPATIENT PEOPLE, IT CANNOT BE EXPECTED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE MAKE THESE PEACE PROPOSALS INDEFINITELY WITHOUT RECEIVING SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE.

11. KABBANI REITERATED THAT BEST RESULTS CAN BE ACHIEVED BY QUIET DIPLOMACY, AVOIDING STATEMENTS WHICH STRESS US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND ACCENT ARMS RELATIONSHIP. AMBASSADOR DEFINED POSSIBLE BALANCE OF POWER AS REALLY MEANING EQUALITY OF MILITARY POWER BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAEL. HE SUGGESTED THAT ONLY WHEN SUCH EQUALITY ACHIEVED WOULD ISRAEL THEN FIND IT NECESSARY TO ACCEPT OUR INITIATIVE. SISCO STRESSED THAT IF POSITIVE REACTION RECEIVED FROM UAR AND SOVIETS, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO PRODUCE ISRAELIS, ALTHOUGH WE REMAIN UNCERTAIN OUR ABILITY TO DOSO. IF OUR INITIATIVE IS REJECTED, HOWEVER, SISCO CAUTIONED, THIS MIGHT BE INTERPRETED IN THIS COUNTRY AS SIGNIFYING LACK OF INTEREST ON PART OF ARAB LEADERS IN POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. CONCLUDING, SISCO SAID THAT, WHILE WE WILL CONTINUE OUR POLICY OF RESTRAINT, WE ARE UNABLE TO STOP SPECULATIVE STATEMENTS. GP-3
ROGERS

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66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGERP.DAVIES
NEA/ARN-MR.SEELYE
PM/MC-MR.BOWIE(INFO)
S/S-MR.MORTON

056438

P 200033Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 097677

EXDIS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY

REF: BEIRUT 4992

1. WE AGREE WITH BEIRUT 4992, AS WELL AS WITH PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS FROM EMBASSY, THAT GOL WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO DEVELOP RIOT CONTROL CAPABILITY. ACCORDINGLY, YOU SHOULD PROVIDE GOL WITH NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF FOLLOWING SUPPLIERS OF EQUIPMENT INDICATED: PENGUIN INDUSTRIES, P. O. BOX 97, PARKESBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 19365, TEAR GAS; TECHNIPOL INTERNATIONAL, 660 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021, TEAR GAS AND GAS MASKS; FEDERAL LABORATORIES, INC., SALTSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 15681, TEAR GAS AND GAS MASKS.

2. WE RECALL THAT ITALIAN INTERNAL SECURITY TEAM VISITED LEBANON ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO AND ADVISED LEBANESE ON RIOT CONTROL. IT MAY BE THEY MADE SUGGESTIONS TO LEBANESE THAT COULD BE PURSUED AT THIS TIME.

3. AS YOU KNOW, 5,000 M-1 RIFLES ARE BEING SHIPPED BY AIR TO LEBANESE ARMY. THEIR RECEIPT WILL FREE SAME NUMBER OF OLDER WEAPONS NOW IN USE, WHICH COULD IN TURN BE USED IN

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VARIOUS WAYS TO IMPROVE RIOT CONTROL CAPABILITY OF EITHER REGULAR FORCES OR OTHER DESIGNATED FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ALSO NOTE REPORT THAT UAR HAS DONATED 1,000 KALASHNIKOV RIFLES TO LEBANON WHICH MIGHT ALSO HAVE SOME APPLICATION THIS RESPECT. ROGERS

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APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPHJ.SISCO
NEA/ARN-T.W.SEELYE
S/S-MR.BROWN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 097653

EXDIS

1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON ASST. SECRETARY SISCO JUNE 19 ON HIS (KABBANI'S) INITIATIVE. KABBANI SAID HE WANTED TO INQUIRE ABOUT FORTHCOMING ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE SALE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL AND WISHED EXPRESS HIS CONCERN. HE SAID IN PASSING THAT HE APPRECIATED SISCO'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WITHOUT PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT. THAT IS, THERE WOULD BE NO SECRET SALES. KABBANI SAID THIS IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING.

2. KABBANI WENT ON TO SAY THAT HIS SPECIFIC CONCERN WAS THAT IF NEW PEACE INITIATIVES AND SALE ANY NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL ANNOUNCED SIMULTANEOUSLY, AIRCRAFT SALE WOULD COMPLETELY OVERSHADOW PEACE INITIATIVE AND BENEFICIAL EFFECT WOULD BE LOST. HE NOTED, IN ANY EVENT, THAT AIRCRAFT NOT NEEDED BY ISRAEL AT THIS TIME. PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT WOULD MERELY INFLAME ARAB OPINION AND WOULD SERVE

'70 JUN 20 AM 10:05 SITUATION ROOM

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 097653

AS EVIDENCE THAT U.S. EFFORTS TOWARD SETTLEMENT NOT GENUINE. HE URGED THAT THERE BE CONSIDERABLE TIME SEPARATION BETWEEN PEACE INITIATIVE AND ANY ANNOUNCEMENT ON AIRCRAFT.

3. SISCO TOLD KABBANI THAT DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE WILL HAVE BEEN LAUNCHED AND DISCUSSED IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WELL BEFORE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY KIND IS MADE ON AIRCRAFT. HE ADDED THAT THIS INITIATIVE WAS LAUNCHED TODAY (JUNE 19) AND WILL BE DISCUSSED TOMORROW IN CAIRO AND AMMAN. SISCO TOLD KABBANI HE COULD NOT DISCUSS IT WITH HIM AT THAT TIME BUT ASKED THAT HE COME IN AT 12:45 FOLLOWING DAY (JUNE 20). AT THAT TIME, SISCO SAID, HE WILL TELL KABBANI CLEARLY WHAT WE INTEND TO DO ON MILITARY SIDE AND WILL DISCUSS OUR PEACE INITIATIVE IN DEPTH. SISCO ADDED THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT KABBANI WOULD FIND THAT WHAT WE INTEND TO DO ON MILITARY ASPECT IS VERY PRUDENT.

4. IN CLOSING, SISCO ASKED THAT KABBANI NOT RPT NOT REPORT TO GOL UNTIL AFTER THEIR MEETING SATURDAY. KABBANI AGREED. ROGERS

SECRET

E.H. 10/10/07

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SECRET 431

PAGE 01 STATE 094664

85
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66648
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHBAAS 6/16/70
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN-TALCOTT W. SEELYE
AF/N-MR. BRAY (SUBS)
NEA-MR. ATHERTON
S/S-MR. BRANDT

---------- 028651

R 162349Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

S E C R E T STATE 094664

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 4660

WE AGREE THAT TRANSFER OF MIRAGE AIRCRAFT TO LIBYA AT THIS CRITICAL TIME WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT FEEL TRANSFER IS GOOD IDEA, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DECISION IN THIS CASE MUST BE MADE BY THE LEBANESE AND FRENCH ON THE BASIS OF THE MERITS OF THE CASE AS THEY SEE IT. THEREFORE, BELIEVE YOU SHOULD LIMIT YOURSELF TO MAKING DISCOURAGING SOUNDS TO LEBANESE, BUT MAKING CLEAR IT IS THEIR DECISION.
ROGERS

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SECRET 141

PAGE 01 STATE 092727

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66643
DRAFTED BY: NEA OFFICES/CEMARTHINSEN
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P DAVIES
S/S: WLLOYD

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R 130038Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT ALGIERS
USINT KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T STATE 092727

EXDIS

SUBJECT: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT

JORDAN

1. GOJ-FEDAYEEN CRISIS - SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS ON JORDAN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS HAVE BEEN SUMMARIZED FULLY IN SITREPS PREPARED BY JORDAN TASK FORCE (CONFIDENTIAL)

LEBANON

2. LEBANESE LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL - ON JUNE 9 THE GOL WROTE

'70 JUN 12 PM 11:20 SITUATION ROOM

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6. MAJOR POWER SETTLEMENT EFFORTS - AT JUNE 4 FOUR POWER DEPUTIES' MEETING, SOVIETS TOOK HARD LINE ON REFUGEE ISSUE AND TABLED UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE ON FREEDOM OF NAVIATION TAKEN VERBATIM FROM SOVIET JUNE 1969 DOCUMENT. AT JUNE 10 SESSION, SOVIETS REITERATED THEIR JUNE 1969 POSITION ON FORM OF AGREEMENT. AFTER US REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED THAT DIRECT TALKS AT SOME POINT IN NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD BE INDISPENSABLE TO OBTAIN ISRAELI AGREEMENT, SOVIET DEPUTY SAID THAT MODE OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES SHOULD BE LEFT UP TO JARRING. (SECRET/EXDIS)

7. NASSER TO MOSCOW - PRESS HAS PICKED UP STORY THAT NASSER WILL MAKE VISIT TO MOSCOW LATER THIS MONTH. WE HAVE NO HARD EVIDENCE RE NASSER'S INTENTIONS. IN WHAT MAY BE RELATED DEVELOPMENT, SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV RETURNED TO CAIRO JUNE 10 AND CALLED ON NASSER. (CONFIDENTIAL) GP3.
ROGERS

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SECRET 046

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66645
DRAFTED BY:NEA/JTF:AMB HMSYMMES
NEA/ARN TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY:THE SECRETARY
NEA MR DAYLES
WLG MR MCDONALD
S/S MR ELIOT
OSD/ISA MR BILLINGS
J-3 COL RHEA
NEA MR SISCO

006772

P 130016Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 092628

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING - LEBANON

REFERENCE: BEIRUT 4721

1. WE APPRECIATE THAT SITUATION IN LEBANON COULD GET OUT OF HAND AND AGREE THAT WE MUST BE ALERT TO SUDDEN DEVELOPMENTS. FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO PROCEED TO LIMITED EVACUATION FOREIGN NATIONALS IN JORDAN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ADD TO TENSIONS IN LEBANON. AT SAME TIME, HIGH CASUALTIES AMONG PALESTINIANS, LIBYAN AND UAR PUBLICLY EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER PFLP COURSE, AND TREND TOWARD ABATEMENT CONFLICT IN AMMAN ARE OTHER FACTORS ENTERING INTO SITUATION. WE SHALL RELY ON YOU TO KEEP US POSTED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON AND WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CALLING TO OUR ATTENTION PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 092628

2. WE HAVE NOTED YOUR OBSERVATION THAT IN SITUATION OF SECURITY BREAKDOWN, AIRPORT MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR USE AND ARE TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR PLANNING. SIXTH FLEET IS ALERTED, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU APPROPRIATELY INFORMED RE ITS MOVEMENTS AND ITS READINESS. IN CONNECTION CURRENT JORDANIAN SITUATION APPROPRIATE US AGENCIES HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION VARIOUS CONTINGENCY PLANS THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO POTENTIAL EVACUATION SITUATION IN LEBANON. YOU SHOULD NOT, OF COURSE, GIVE ANY INDICATION OF THESE MATTERS TO GOL.

3. WE PLEASED WITH ASSURANCE FROM LEBANESE LEADERSHIP THAT GOL WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY, ON WHOM OF COURSE WE MUST RELY IN FIRST INSTANCE. YOU MAY SO IFNORM CONFIDANT. YOU MAY ALSO TELL HIM THAT WE ARE WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND WE WILL AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE FEDAYEEN COURAGE TO PRESS THEIR ADVANTAGE. BELIEVE YOU HAVE TAKEN RIGHT DISCOURAGING LINE RE SIXTH FLEET.

4. SITUATION IN JORDAN HAS TAKEN SLIGHT TURN FOR BETTER AND WE ARE PLEASED THAT DEPENDENTS AND NON-ESSENTIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ARE BEING SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATED IN AN INTERNATIONAL OPERATION UNDER ICRC'S AUSPICES.

5. MEANWHILE, WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A POSITION ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO AMCITS WHO QUERY USG ABOUT WHETHER THEY SHOULD TRAVEL TO LEBANON. WE ALSO BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE A POSITION ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID TO AMCITS IN LEBANON IF IN FACT THE SITUATION DETERIORATES FURTHER. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS REGARD?

GP-3.
ROGERS

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SECRET 955

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83
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 SS-20 NSC-10 PM-05
CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 PRS-01 /073 R

66633
DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN: TALCOTT SEELYE/MMT (BY PHONE)
6-1-70
APPROVED BY S/S-O: G.RUECKERT
NEA: A.ATHERTON
IO/UNP:ARMITAGE

058778

O R 020313Z JUN 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E C R E T STATE 084071

HOLD UNTIL OPENING OF BUSINESS JUNE 2.

SUBJECT: CONTINUED ISRAELI CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS.

REF: BEIRUT 4283

1. FOR BEIRUT: AMBASSADOR SHOULD URGE THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HOLD OFF BRINGING MATTER BEFORE UNSC. AS HELOU KNOWS, WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL AND ARE AWAITING RESPONSE. AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED INFORM HELOU THAT AMBASSADOR BARBOUR AGAIN BEING INSTRUCTED TO RAISE MATTER AT H-GH GOI LEVEL. AMBASSADOR MAY STATE THAT WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THEORY THAT GOI EMBARKED ON POLICY OF ACQUIRING LEBANESE TERRITORY AND WE WOULD TAKE MOST SERIOUS VIEW OF ANY SUCH DEVEL-OPMENT.

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2. FOR TEL AVIV: AMBASSADOR BARBOUR SHOULD DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON REF MESSAGE IN COMMUNICATING TO HIGH LEVEL GOI OUR CONTINUING CONCERN WITH ISRAELI CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS INTO LEBANON. AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOTE THAT WE STILL AWAITING RESPONSE TO OUR SEVERAL EARLIER DEMARCHES AND REGRET THAT WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT RECEIVED REPLY. ISRAELIS SHOULD BE URGED TO DISCONTINUE BOTH PATROLLING AND SHELLING OPERATIONS INTO LEBANON, AND TO GIVE GOL OPPORTUNITY TO SEE WHAT IT CAN DO TO IMPLEMENT LATEST GOL EDICT TO FEDAYEEN. ISRAELIS SHOULD BE REMINDED AGAIN THAT LEBANON CONSITUTES SPECIAL US INTEREST AND WE WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED IF ISRAELI

CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS PRECIPITATED INTERNAL CRISIS IN LEBANON OR INDUCED GOL TO TAKE ILL-ADVISED FOREIGN POLICY ACTION. FINALLY, AMBASSADOR SHOULD STATE THAT WHILE WE DOING OUR BEST TO PERSUADE LEBANESE NOT REPLAT NOT TO BRING MATTER BEFORE UNSC, AT LEAST UNTIL WE HAVE HEARD FURTHER FROM ISRAELIS, WE UNLIKELY BE SUCCESSFUL AS LONG AS GOI CONTINUES TO INFRINGE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY ON REGULAR BASIS. IF UNSC DOES MEET, WE CANNOT GUARANTEE HOW WE SHALL VOTE, PARTICULARLY IN ABSENCE OF GOI RESPONSE TO ANY OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS. AS SISCO INDICATED, IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR RABIN, WE THINK NOW IS TIME FOR ISRAELIS TO EASE UP AND SEE WHAT LEBANESE CAN DO. ROGERS

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SECRET 647

PAGE 01 STATE 084041

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66639
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN - TALCOTT W. SEELYE
IO/UNP - MISS JONES
S/S - MR. GLEYSTEEN

---------- 057954

'70 JUN 2 AM 7:53

R 012346Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T STATE 084041

EXDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ICRC ROLE IN CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON

1. DEPARTMENT NOT RPT NOT ACQUAINTED WITH ROCHARD SCHEME TO SECURE FEDAYEEN WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON.

2. WE ARE SURPRISED THAT AN ICRC REPRESENTATIVE WOULD VOLUNTARILY BECOME INVOLVED IN MATTER SUCH AS THIS. SINCE IT POSSIBLE THAT ROCHARD ACTING ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN, WE HOPE THAT GOL WILL HANDLE HIM WITH GREAT CAUTION. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ABILITY ICRC, EVEN WITH BEST INTENTIONS, TO PERSUADE FEDAYEEN WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH LEBANON. GP-3
ROGERS

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SECRET 930

PAGE 01 STATE 080447

'70 MAY 26 AM 8:30

SITUATION ROOM

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22
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66662
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
APPROVED BY:NEA:ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
U:M.I.ABRAMOWITZ(BY TELEPHONE)
S/S:R.C.BREWSTER(BY TELEPHONE)
S/S-O:B.A.FLATIN

019883

P R 260339Z MAY 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 080447

EXDIS

SUBJ: NEW ISRAELI MEASURES RE LEBANESE BORDER

REF: TEL AVIV 2676

FOLLOWING IS DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTING SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR RABIN MAY 25 WHICH WAS SUMMARIZED IN SEPTEL FYI AND NOFORN.

1. ACTING SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED ON SITUATION ON LEBANESE BORDER AND SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR RABIN MIGHT LIKE TO MAKE SOME REMARKS AT THE OUTSET. RABIN SAID THAT AS WE KNEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD SIGNED TWO AGREEMENTS WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, ONE IN CAIRO BETWEEN BUSTANY AND PLO AND THE SECOND REACHED LATER ON BETWEEN JUMBLATT AND THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AN ACCORD WHICH WIDENED THE SCOPE OF THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIVITIES ALLOWED BY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THESE AGREEMENTS HAD MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS TO CARRY OUT OPERA-

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TIONS FROM LEBANON AGAINST ISRAEL. ISRAEL'S POLICY WAS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH LEBANESE REGULAR FORCES; IT WANTED THEM TO TRY AND RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER; IT WANTED THEM TO PREVENT THE USE OF LEBANON AS A BASE FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST VILLAGES AND CITIZENS. ISRAEL HAD TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES THAT UNLESS IT DID SOMETHING ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO REACT. RABIN SAID HE WAS TALKING HERE ABOUT ISRAELI CIVILIAN VICTIMS, PEOPLE WHO LIVED THEIR LIVES NEAR THE BORDER. LEBANESE OFFICIALS HAD SAID AGAIN AND AGAIN IT WAS NOT ROLE OF GOL TO BE PROTECTOR AND GUARDIAN OF ISRAEL. LATELY BEIRUT RADIO HAD TAKEN UP THIS THEME. ISRAEL HAD TRIED TO BE RESTRAINED IN ITS ACTIONS AND HAD TRIED TO RESTRICT ITS ACTIONS TO THE AREAS OF LEBANON NEAR THE SYRIAN BORDER. ISRAEL'S LAST ACTION WAS CARRIED OUT IN FACT IN AN AREA THAT WAS NOT UNDER LEBANESE CONTROL. SINCE THEN, RABIN NOTED, THERE HAD BEEN NO CASES OF KATYUSHA FIRINGS AGAINST ISRAEL IN THE NORTHERN AREA; FOR TEN DAYS THERE HAD NOT BEEN A ROCKET ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL. THUS ISRAEL'S RECENT MILITARY ACTION HAD DONE SOME GOOD. AS REGARDS FRIDAY'S BUS INCIDENT, RABIN SAID HE DID NOT HAVE TO TELL US HOW DEEPLY AFFECTED ISRAELIS HAD BEEN. ONE FAMILY HAD LOST SIX CHILDREN. THE ISRAELI PUBLIC EXPECTED ITS GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT THE CITIZENS LIVING IN THE AREA. SINCE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WAS IT COULD NOT CONTROL FEDAYEEN, GOI BELIEVED IT HAD RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF SUCH ATROCITIES AS THE BUS INCIDENT. ISRAEL UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE OTHER ASPECTS TO THIS PROBLEM. WHAT ISRAEL HAD DONE, THE POLICY IT HAD EMBARKED ON, WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE LACK OF LEBANESE ACTION TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN ATTACKS. WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SERVED AS A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO PALESTINIANS TO INCREASE THEIR ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI AND ALSO TO LEBANESE TO REDUCE THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT SUCH ATTACKS.

2. AT THIS POINT RABIN BROUGHT OUT MAP AND DESCRIBED ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS MAY 25. HE SAID ISRAEL SENT IN TWO PLATOONS TO PENETRATION OF NO MORE THAN 2 KM INTO LEBANON. ONE PLATOON WENT IN IN THE DIRECTION OF YAROUN AND THE SECOND ONE A SHORT DISTANCE TO THE EAST. ALL THESE FORCES WERE NOW BACK IN ISRAEL. A LEBANESE FORCE HAD APPROACHED THE ISRAELIS AND ISRAELIS HAD KILLED ONE

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LEBANESE SOLDIER AND TAKEN ONE PRISONER. IN YAROUN LEBANESE TROOPS IN JEEP HAD FIRED ON ISRAELI FORCES AND IDF HAD DESTROYED JEEP.

SOME FIRE HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT ISRAELIS FROM BUNKERS AND ISRAELIS HAD DESTROYED BUNKERS.

3. RABIN CONTINUED THAT ISRAELIS WERE NOT TRYING TO CARRY OUT RETALIATION. THEY DID NOT OPEN FIRE ON VILLAGES OR CIVILIAN TARGETS NOR DID THEY USE ARTILLERY EXCEPT FOR MORTARS. WHEN ISRAELIS ENTERED VILLAGE, THERE WAS NO RESISTANCE OR EXCHANGE OF FIRE. RABIN NOTED THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HAD NOT SAID IDF HAD CROSSED LINES BUT SAID IT HAD BEEN PATROLLING BORDER AREA AND ENCOUNTERED FEDAYEEN. SISCO NOTED A TICKET ITEM INDICATED ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT TO EFFECT THAT PREVENTIVE PATROL HAD CROSSED INTO LEBANON; THIS SEEMED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC DESCRIP- TION BY GOI OF WHAT HAPPENED. RABIN SAID HE WAS JUST PASSING INFORMATION HE RECEIVED FROM JERUSALEM AND HE COULD BE WRONG. RABIN SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO CREATE IMPRESSION THIS WAS END OF STORY. IF LEBANESE DID NOT ACTIVELY PREVENT FEDAYEEN ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, THERE MIGHT BE CREATED AGAIN NEED FOR ISRAEL TO DO SOMETHING. THIS WAS "IN AND OUT" KIND OF ACTION AS DESCRIBED BY RAFAEL TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR. RABIN STRESSED ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTION TO TAKE CONTROL OF TE RITORY. HE SAID THAT TWO PLATOONS OF TANKS WERE ONLY EIGHT TANKS. IT WAS HIGH TIME THE LEBANESE STARTED TO DO SOMETHING. THIS AREA WAS NOT NEXT TO SYRIAN BORDER AND ISRAELIS HAD EXPECTED LEBANESE TO DO BETTER.

4. SISCO SAID THAT WE HAD INFORMATION INDICATING JUMBLATT WAS TRYING TO GET THE FEDAYEEN PUSHED BACK TO THE NORTH AND EAST. WE DID NOT KNOW IF HE COULD SUCCEED BUT THIS WAS EFFORT BY LEBANSE MINISTER INTERIOR AND WE FELT WE SHOULD SEE WHAT HE COULD DO.

5. RABIN SAID THAT IF THERE WAS WRONG MAN TO BE ENGAGED IN THIS ACTIVITY IT WAS JUMBLATT. THE RIGHT ELEMENT TO BE DOING THIS WAS THE LEBANESE ARMY. RABIN AGAIN REFERRED TO JUMBLATT'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

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6. ACTING SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO UNDERSTAND CLEARLY POSITION GOI REGARDING CONTINUATION OF THIS KIND ACTIVITY. RAFAEL HAD SPOKEN OF ISRAELI PATROLS IN LEBANON AND LATER TALKED OF IN AND OUT ISRAELI PATROLS. IF PATROLS WERE TO TAKE PLACE ON A CONTINUING BASIS WE HAD HERE SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN ISRAELI POLICY FOR DEALING WITH SITUATION.

7. RABIN SAID HE COULD NOT SAY WHAT WOULD BE FREQUENCY OF PATROLS; THIS WOULD DEPEND ON SUCCESS OF LEBANESE ARMY IN CONTROLLING INCIDENTS EMANATING FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE AMOUNT OF ACTION ON THE LEBANESE SIDE. ISRAEL WOULD NOT PATROL FOR THE SAKE OF PATROLLING. RABIN COULD NOT SAY WHETHER IT WOULD BE EVERY DAY OR EVERY TWO DAYS. ISRAEL WOULD DECIDE ON THE BASIS OF THE SITUATION.

8. ACTING SECRETARY SAID WE NEED UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT IMPLICATIONS WERE. WE UNDERSTOOD AN SYMPATHIZED WITH ISRAELI PEOPLE IN THE SITUATION THEY FACED. WE WERE SADDENED BY THE SCHOLLBUS INCIDENT AND WE RECOGNIZE THE PAIN AND INSECURITY THAT PEOPLE LIVING ON THE BORDER FELT. QUESTION WAS WHAT THIS NEW POLICY WOULD ACCOMPLISH, WHAT THE LEBANESE REACTION WOULD BE. IT MADE A DIFFERENCE IF THE POLICY ENVISAGED A CONTINUING PATROLLING ACTIVITY. THE IMPRESSION CREATED WAS THAT THIS WAS A KIND OF DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS POLICIES. OUR CONCERN WAS WHAT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THIS POLICY WOULD BE. RABIN SAID ISRAELIS WERE OUT OF LEBANON. ACTING SECRETARY SAID, TODAY YES. RABIN SAID HE COULD NOT PROMISE MORE.

9. ACTING SECRETARY SAID AMBASSADOR BARBOUR HAD EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS TO RAFAEL. THESE VIEWS WERE AN ACCURATE EXPRESSION OF THE REACTION WE HAD HAD IN WASHINGTON. ACTING SECRETARY READ AT LENGTH FROM PARAS 9 AND 10 OF REFTEL, AND COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO HIM TO BE A JUSTIFIED REACTION. WE THOUGHT THE RESULT OF ISRAELI POLICY WOULD BE TO CONTRIBUTE TO UNDERMINING THE HELOU GOVERNMENT AND THE LEBANESE SYSTEM. THIS WAS NOT IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST OR OUR OWN. THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WAS DIFFICULT. OUR CONCERN WAS THAT WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE DOING WOULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

10. RABIN SAID THAT IF THE LEBANSESE WANTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR STRUCTURE OF INDEPENDENCE THEN THEY MUST DO SOMETHING ABOUT

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FEDAYEEN. ISRAEL WOULD NOT ALLOW FATAH TO OPERATE AGAINST IT. ISRAEL HAD SHOWED RESTRAINT IN LEBANON AND WOULD NOT DESCRIBE THIS KIND OF OPERATION AS RETALIATION. THIS WAS A KIND OF PREVENTIVE REACTION.

11. ACTING SECRETARY SAID WE HAD ON OTHER OCCASIONS TALKED OF POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING UN OBSERVERS ALONG BORDER. IF ISRAELIS COULD, AS THEY SAID, DO SOMETHING GOOD WITH TWENTY OR THIRTY ISRAELI SOLDIERS, WHY NOT CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF MODEST UN FORCES.

12. RABIN SAID THAT THE UN DOES NOT FIGHT, AT BEST THEY WERE OBSERVERS WHO DID NOT PREVENT FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS. RABIN REFERRED TO SITUATION ALONG SUEZ CANAL LINE. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW UNSYG COULD KEEP OBSERVERS THERE WITHOUT GIVING THEM PROPER SUPPORT. ISRAELI TROOPS ON THE OTHER HAND, RABIN SAID, WOULD BE ABLE TO PUSH BACK CONCENTRATIONS OF FEDAYEEN. THEIR PRESENCE WOULD SERVE TO SHOW VILLAGERS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY DID NOT RESIST FEDAYEEN ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

13. ACTING SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT IF YOU SEE A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE ARE OPERATIONS SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK THE RESULT WILL BE THAT LEBANON WILL HAVE TO DO SOMETHING IN FACE OF VIOLATIONS OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. IT WILL FIND SOMEONE ELSE TO HEOP THEM. THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS IN PREVENTING NIGHT CROSSINGS; IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR PATROLS TO SEAL THE BORDER COMPLETELY. THE SITUATION WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO THAT ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE JORDAN CEASEFIRE LINE WHERE CROSSINGS STILL CONTINUED.

14. RABIN SAID HE COULD POINT OUT ONE EXPERIENCE IN WHICH ISRAELI PATROLLING ACTIVITY HAD WORKED, IN THE SAFI AREA SOUTH OF THE DEAD SEA. THERE ISRAEL HAD SENT PATROLS INTO JORDAN TERRITORY AND THE FATAH HAD MOVED BACK. THEN THE JORDANIANS SAID THEY WERE READY TO TAKE OVER AND PREVENT FATAH ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA. SINCE THEN SITUATION IN THAT AREA HAD BEEN RELATIVELY GOOD.

15. SISCO REFERRED TO ISRAELI DEFENSIVE ACTIONS WHICH HAD PROVED SO SUCCESSFUL IN THE BET SHEAN VALLEY. HE ASKED WHETHER MANPOWER WAS A PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL. WAS IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR

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THE ISRAELIS TO DO ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDER WHAT THEY HAD DONE ALONG THE JORDANIAN BORDER IN THE WAY OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES?

16. RABIN SAID THAT THE TERRAIN WAS DIFFERENT ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDER. ISRAEL WAS DOING MORE ALONG THE LINE THAT SISCO REFERRED TO BUT IT COULD NOT GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO CROSS THE LINE.

17 SISCO NOTED THAT ISRAELI CROSSINGS OF JORDANIAN CEASEFIRE WERE INFREQUENT; IT HAD NOT PROVED DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY BECAUSE OF UTILIZATION OF OTHER DEFENSIVE MEASURES. WHAT WE WERE SAYING WAS THAT ISRAEL HAD ADOPTED A POLICY OF REGULAR PATROLS THAT WOULD LEAVE THE OTHER SIDE NOT KNOWING WHAT ITS INTENTIONS WERE ON A PARTICULAR OCCASION. FOR EXAMPLE, HOW WOULD THE LEBANESE KNOW WHAT ISRAEL WAS DOING THIS MORNING, WHETHER IT WAS AN INVASION OR NOT. HOW COULD LEBANON STAND A SITUATION SUCH AS THIS.

18. ACTING SECRETARY SAID THAT AMBASSADOR HAD HEARED OUR CONCERNS. WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD THAT TURMOIL WOULD BE CREATED ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDER. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD FEEL IT MUST COUNTER SOMEHOW ISRAELI PATROLS. ANY REACTION COULD BRING FORTH A DETERIORATION OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. WE COULD NOT SEE ANY GOOD COMING FROM THE NEW ISRAELI POLICY AND FELT IT WOULD PRODUCE A SITUATION WORSE THAN THAT EXISTING. WE APPEALED TO ISRAEL TO REEXAMINE THE

MATTER, TO RECONSIDER SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION SO THAT THE RESULT WOULD NOT BE TO ISOLATE ISRAEL. WE ARE INEVITABLY CONCERNED. WE WERE PLEDGED TO SEE THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE AREA DID NOT SHIFT AND YET WE SAW A SITUATION IN WHICH OUR CONCERN FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY WAS BRINGING ABOUT A DETERIORATION OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS A WHOLE. THIS FORCES US TO REEXAMINE THE COURSES BY WHICH WE CAN SERVE BOTH OBJECTIVES, TO SEE THAT MILITARY BALANCE DOES NOT SHIFT AND PRESERVATION OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. WE DO NOT WANT TO BE FACED WITH A CHOICE OF GIVING UP OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO INSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

19. RABIN SAID HE DID NOT SEE ANY RELATION BETWEEN THE PROBLEM OF PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE AGGRESSION OF

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SOVIET-SUPPORTED STATES ON THE ONE HAND AND THE LEBANESE PROBLEM ON THE OTHER. HE SAID AMERICAN INTERESTS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED IF THE US COULD GET THE LEBANESE TO ELIMINATE ACTIONS THAT THREATENED ISRAEL.

20. ATHERTON NOTED THAT TWO YEARS PREVIOUSLY ISRAEL HAD HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS ALONG THE JORDANIAN CEASEFIRE LINE AND IT HAD IN THE END COPED WITH THEM BY LAYING EMPHASIS ON MEASURES TAKEN ON THE ISRAELI SIDE. RABIN ANSWERED THAT ISRAEL HAD CONTROLLED THE SITUATION ALONG THE JORDANIAN LINE BY USING BOTH MEASURES ON ITS SIDE AND OTHER KINDS OF ACTIONS. ISRAEL WAS NOT TRYING TO BRING ABOUT THE JORDANIZATION OF LEBANON. THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE, HOWEVER, BETWEEN THE TWO AREAS. MOST OF THE JORDANIAN CEASEFIRE LINE WAS NOT POPULATED WHEREAS ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDER IT WAS.

21. SISCO SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE NEW ISRAELI POLICY NOT BE ANNOUNCED; THIS COULD CIRCUMSCRIBE FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES. SISCO SAID THAT LEBANESE COULD NOT TAKE THIS KIND OF INFRINGEMENT OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY. WE KNEW THAT PUTTING THE EMPHASIS ON MEASURES TAKEN FROM THE ISRAELI SIDE WOULD MEAN THE COMMITMENT OF MORE RESOURCES BY ISRAEL. BUT WE FELT THAT IF ISRAEL CONTINUED ON THE NEW POLICY IT WOULD HAVE TO COMMIT EVEN MORE RESOURCES IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE MORE SAIGA, MORE ARAB STATES THAT MIGHT COME TO HELP LEBANON. THIS WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL BUT IT SHOULD COMPARE THE COMMITMENTS OF RESOURCES THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED NOW AND IN THE FUTURE.

22. ACTING SECRETARY SAID THAT SISCO WAS RIGHT REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON WHAT SHOULD BE SAID PUBLICITY. WE SHOULD SEE WHAT JUMBLATT COULD DO BEFORE PATROLS BECAME A REGULAR INSTITUTION. WE DID NOT KNOW WHAT JUMBLATT'S PROSPECTS WERE BUT THE CHANCES WERE BETTER IF THE NEW PATROL POLICY WAS NOT ANNOUNCED.

23. RABIN SAID ISRAEL WAS NOT INTERESTED IN HAVING THE FACT OF ITS NEW POLICY ANNOUNCED TO THE LEBANESE; IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE US ONLY. SISCO SAID WE HAD PASSED NOTHING TO THE LEBANESE. RABIN SAID HE WOULD GO FURTHER AND ASK THAT WE NOT PASS THE INFORMATION TO THE LEBANESE.

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24. ACTING SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DISTURBED ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY IF IT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED BEFORE. BECAUSE IT NOT ANNOUNCED WE COULD CONSULT ON THE MATTER AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS WE HAD DISCUSSED TODAY. COURSE ISRAELIS HAD DECIDED ON DID NOT LOOK TO US AS CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.

25. SISCO SAID WE DID NOT HAVE SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO ISRAELI PROBLEM BUT WHEN WE BELIEVED ALTERNATIVE COURSE WOULD LED TO A WORSE SITUATION, WE MUST SAY SO. WE HAVE NOT SAID THAT ISRAELIS MUST NOT DO ANYTHING. WE WOULD TELL AMBASSADOR PORTER NOT TO CONVEY OUR KNOWLEDGE OF ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS AS PASSED TO US. SISCO SAID HE WNATED RABIN TO KNOW AT THIS POINT THAT WE HAD CONTINUED OUR EFFORTS WITH LEBANON TO PERSUADE THEM TO TAKE ACTION TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN.

26. ACTING SECRETARY ASKED WHAT RABIN WOULD SAY IF WE EXPRESSED TO LEBANESE DEEP CONCERN ABOUT PRESENT SITUATION AND ASKED AMBASSADOR PORTER TO PURSUE WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THE OBJECTIVES OF MOVING THE FEDAYEEN OUT OF THE WESTERN PART OF THE BORDER.

27. RABIN SAID HE COULD NOT SAY MORE THAN HE HAD ALREADY SAID. ISRAEL'S PURPOSE WAS TO AVID CLASHES WITH LEBANESE FORCES BUT ITS PATROLS WOULD CROSS INTO LEBANON IF NEED BE. ACTING SECRETARY REMARKED LEBANESE WOULD NOT TAKE THIS, THEY NOT THAT SUPINE.

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RICHARDSON

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (LINE 1 OF NUMBERED PARA 21 WORD "FUNDING" SHLD READ "FINDING" AND LINE 8 OF NUMBERED PARA 21, WORD "APPROPRIATE" SHLD READ "APPRECIATES")

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SUBJECT: ARAB AMBASSADORS APPEAL RE PHANTOMS

1. SUMMARY. ON MAY 20 AT THEIR REQUEST LIBYAN, MOROCCAN AND LEBANESE AMBASSADORS CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO TO EXPRESS ON BEHALF OF OTHER ARAB AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON THEIR DEEP CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE U.S. DECISION TO SELL ADDITIONAL PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL WHICH WOULD BE AGREED UPON DURING ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S CURRENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. SISCO INFORMED AMBASSADORS THAT NO RPT NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN CONCERNING PHANTOM SALE. SISCO INDICATED US CONCERN ABOUT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AREA AND RISE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE WHICH NEITHER IN INTEREST OF US OR AREA STATES THEMSELVES. SISCO POINTED TO FOLLOWING FOUR DECISIONS TAKEN BY PRESIDENT NIXON OVER ISRAEL'S OBJECTIONS AS SIGNS OF US EVEN-HANDED POLICY IN AREA: (1) US OFFER TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH UAR, (2) INITIATION OF FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS, (3) FORMULATION OF OUR OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER PROPOSALS, AND (4) DEFERRAL OF SALE OF PHANTOMS. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT OUR CURRENT EVALUATION OF AREA SITUATION WILL BE BASED ON HARD-NOSED ASSESSMENT OF US INTERESTS IN AREA SUCH AS CONTINUED US CONCERN FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRITY. OTHER COMPLICATED ELEMENTS IN ASSESSMENT INCLUDE (A) IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET MOVES, (B) IMPACT OF DECISION OF SALE OF MORE PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL ON CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS, ARABS, ISRAEL AND ON US/USSR RELATIONS IN AREA AND ELSEWHERE. SISCO STATED THAT DESPITE FATALISM ENCOUNTERED ON RECENT TRIP HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY BELIEF OF ALL THAT US STILL HAS ROLE TO PLAY IN AREA. SISCO NOTED THAT KEY TO PEACE SOLUTION IS INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

2. ON MAY 20 AT THEIR REQUEST LIBYAN AMBASSADOR FATHI ABIDIA, MOROCCAN AMBASSADOR AHMED OSMAN, AND LEBANESE AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN NEAR EAST WHICH ABIDIA DESCRIBED AS EXPLOSIVE AND DANGEROUS.

3. ACTING AS SPOKESMAN FOR GROUP, ABIDIA CONTINUED THAT TWO FACTORS ARE WORKING IN AREA TO MAKE IT SO UNSTABLE. FIRST IS COMMUNISM WHICH IS DAILY BECOMING A SERIOUS THREAT

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TO AN AREA WHICH CONTAINS OVER HALF OF WORLD'S KNOWN OIL RESERVES. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, IT IS AREA ON WHICH WESTERN EUROPE IS TOTALLY DEPENDENT FOR ITS OIL. AT THE SAME TIME, BY THREATENING NEAR EAST, COMMUNISM IS ALSO THREATENING SURROUNDING AREAS. ARABS ARE NEITHER ANTI-SOVIET NOR ANTI-US, AND WISH CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH ALL. THEY HAVE NO RPT NOT DESIRE, HOWEVER, TO BE UNDER CONTROL OF ANYONE, CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT THAT OF COMMUNISM.

4. ABIDIA CONTINUED THAT SECOND FACTOR IN AREA IS ARAB/ISRAELI CONFRONTATION WHICH IS ESCALATING DAILY AND WHICH IS PAVING WAY NOT RPT NOT ONLY FOR COMMUNISM BUT FOR ANOTHER DANGEROUS EXPLOSION. THIS TIME SUCH AN EXPLOSION MIGHT INVOLVE GREAT POWERS IN ADDITION TO ARABS AND ISRAELIS AND THUS LEAD TO THIRD WORLD WAR.

5. ABIDIA STATED THAT IT IS THESE TWO FACTORS, DANGER OF COMMUNISM AND DANGER OF THIRD WORLD WAR RESULTING FROM ARAB/ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, WHICH ARE DIRECT PRODUCT OF JUNE 1967 WAR. ISRAEL, HOWEVER, POWERFUL IN ITS VICTORY, BELIEVES IT IS STRONG ENOUGH NOW TO LAST OUT ANY CONTINUED DETERIORATION IN AREA. ISRAEL DOES NOT RPT NOT APPRECIATE FACT THAT ANOTHER CONFLICT IN AREA WILL FURTHER ENDANGER ITS POSITION. AT SAME TIME US MUST ALSO REALIZE THAT SUCH CONFLICT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS EFFECT ON ARAB/US RELATIONS.

6. ABIDIA ASKED WHAT, IN VIEW OF THIS DANGEROUS SITUATION, HAVE THE THREE PARTIES, THE ARABS, ISRAELIS AND US, DONE TO RESCUE SITUATION AND SERVE PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NEAR EAST.

7. REPLYING TO HIS QUESTION ABIDIA NOTED THAT ARABS HAVE GOTTEN THE MESSAGE (SIC) AND AT KHARTOUM CONFERENCE AGREED TO SEEK POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PALESTINE PROBLEM INSISTING, HOWEVER, ON ONE THING ONLY - JUSTICE. ARABS THUS SUPPORT UN NOVEMBER RESOLUTION AND ARE PREPARED DO EVERYTHING TO IMPLEMENT IT. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, ARABS HAVE ALSO DECIDED THAT IN ORDER FACE CONTINUED ISRAELI AGGRESSION, THEY MUST BUILD UP THEIR ARMED FORCES WHICH THEY HAVE DONE.

8. CONCERNING ISRAELIS, ABIDIA DESCRIBED THEM DRUNK WITH THEIR VICTORY AND MAD WITH THEIR MILITARY POWER. ABIDIA

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STATED THAT ISRAELIS ARE INSISTING ON DICTATING SOLUTION IN AREA WHICH WILL GIVE THEM EVERYTHING AND OBLIGE THEM TO GIVE NOTHING IN RETURN. FOR THIS REASON ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN PUTTING OBSTACLES IN WAY OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION.

9. CONCERNING OUR FRIENDS, THE AMERICANS, ABIDIA SAID HE HAD TO SPEAK FRANKLY. HE NOTED FIRST, HOWEVER, THAT AS MAJOR POWER, US IS OBLIGED TO SEEK PEACE AND JUSTICE IN NEAR EAST PARTICULARLY AS IT HAS LONG DECLARED ITSELF COMMITTED TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES IN AREA. ABIDIA ADDED THAT US IS ALSO OBLIGED TO SEEK PEACEFUL SOLUTION BECAUSE ITS AREA INTERESTS ARE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO IT. ABIDIA EXPRESSED HIS REGRET THAT PREVIOUS DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN GUIDED BY ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS AND HAD ADOPTED ONE-SIDED POLICY IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL. THUS, US SUPPLIED MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL IN FORM OF PHANTOMS, ROCKETS AND NAPALM. IN ADDITION, US GAVE ISRAEL COMPLETE POLITICAL SUPPORT. RESULT OF THIS ONE-SIDED POLICY HAS BEEN STEADY DETERIORATION IN US/ARAB RELATIONS. THIS POLLICY HAS ALSO ENCOURAGED ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AND WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE ITS AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND TO REFUSE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE ARABS.

10. ABIDIA STATED THAT AS RESULT OF THIS MASSIVE AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND OF OVERWHELMING ISRAELI POWER, IT HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO DO ANYTHING TO BREAK OUT CURRENT DEADLOCK IN AREA EITHER THROUGH BIG POWERS AND UN OR THROUGH ARAB CONCESSIONS.

11. ABIDIA CONTINUED THAT AGAINST THIS DANGEROUS BACKGROUND, ISRAEL WHICH HAS PRODUCED OR IS ABOUT TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CONTINUES TO OCCUPY TERRITORY OF ITS NEIGHBORS, HAS NOW APPLIED TO US FOR MORE WEAPONS IN ORDER TO COMMIT MORE AGGRESSION. ABIDIA EMPHASIZED THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES AS WELL AS ENTIRE ARAB WORLD, DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL NEEDS THESE WEAPONS. RATHER ISRAEL NEEDS SOME ONE TO AWAKEN HER TO REALITIES IN AREA AND TO URGE HER TO IMPLEMENT UN RESOLUTION BY COMING HALF-WAY TO MEET ARABS BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

12. ABIDIA CONCLUDED THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD COME

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TO SISCO IN NAME OF ALL ARABS TO URGE THAT ADDITIONAL PHANTOMS NOT RPT NOT BE GIVEN TO ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, THE ARABS WISHED TO EXPRESS TO U.S. THEIR BELIEF THAT GOLDEN KEY TO AREA SETTLEMENT IS IN HANDS OF PRESIDENT NIXON, SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE SISCO. ABIDIA NOTED SADLY THAT US HAS NOT RPT NOT YET USED THIS GOLDEN KEY BUT THAT ARABS HOPE IT WILL DO SO SOON.

13. SISCO EXPRESSED HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR CALL BY AMBASSADORS AND EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS VERY TIMELY. SISCO STATED THAT EVALUATION OF ISRAELI REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PHANTOMS WHICH THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED FOUR WEEKS AGO IS MOVING ALONG BUT THAT NO RPT NO DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THIS MATTER. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT US IS NOT RPT NOT LOOKING AT THIS PROBLEM FROM NARROW POINT OF VIEW OF SIMPLE ARMS REQUEST. RATHER IT IS ATTEMPTING TO PUT THIS REQUEST INTO BROADER REGIONAL CONTEXT PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN NEAR EAST OVER LAST FEW WEEKS.

14. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TREND IN AREA IS NOT RPT NOT TO OUR LIKING. INCREASE IN SOVIET INFLUENCE IS NOT RPT NOT IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST ANY MORE THAN IT IS IN INTEREST OF AREA STATES THEMSELVES. CERTAINLY ALL ARABS SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET SOVIETS OUT ONCE THEY HAVE ENTRENCHED THEMSELVES. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS OBVIOUS EXAMPLE. SISCO STRESSED THAT US INTEREST NO RPT NO GREATER THAN INDIVIDUAL ARAB COUNTRIES TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION IN AREA PERMITTING AN INCREASE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. THUS, US AND ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE COMMON INTEREST WHICH PERHAPS CAN BE EXPRESSED IN NEGATIVE TERMS OF WHAT BOTH SIDES DO NOT RPT NOT WISH TO HAPPEN.

15. SISCO AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR ABIDIA THAT CORE OF PROBLEM IN AREA IS ARAB/ISRAELI DISPUTE. THIS DISPUTE, HOWEVER, MUST BE VIEWED IN ALL OF ITS COMPLEXITIES WHICH THIS ADMINISTRATION FULLY APPRECIATES. DURING PAST 15 MONTHS IT HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCT OF US FOREIGN RELATIONS, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS ATTEMPTED TO REASSESS OUR POLICY IN AREA. OUT OF THIS REASSESSMENT HAVE COME FOUR DECISIONS WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON HAS TAKEN IN SINCERE

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BELIEF THAT THEY MIGHT HELP ACHIEVE PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION TO AREA'S PROBLEMS: (1) US OFFER TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UAR WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS. WHEN UAR PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DR. FAWZI MAHMOUD CAME TO WASHINGTON FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER FUNERAL, HE WAS EVEN INVITED TO WHITE HOUSE, GESTURE MOST UNUSUAL TO A HIGH-RANKING FOREIGN OFFICIAL WITH WHOSE COUNTRY THE US HAD NO RPT NO RELATIONS. EGYPTIANS DECIDED, HOWEVER, THAT TIME WAS NOT RPT NOT YET OPPORTUNE. SISCO NOTED THAT DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO AREA HE AGAIN DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH PRESIDENT NASSER AND BOTH ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS STILL NOT RPT NOT YET MUTUAL AREA OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD FACILITATE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. NONETHELESS, PRESIDENT NASSER AGREED THAT CONTINUANCE OF OUR PRESENT DIALOGUE IS A GOOD THING AND MAY LEAD TO EVENTUAL RESUMPTION. WHAT ARABS MUST APPRECIATE CONCERNING THIS DECISION IS THAT US MADE DIPLOMATIC MOVE WITH WHICH ISRAELIS DID NOT RPT NOT AGREE. (2) INITIATION OF TWO-AND FOUR-POWER DISCUSSIONS. THIS AGAIN WAS STEP TAKEN BY US ON PROCEDURAL MATTER OVER ISRAELI OBJECTIONS. (3) FORMULATION OF ROGERS PLAN CONSISTING OF OUR OCTOBER AND DECEMBER PROPOSALS. HERE AGEIN ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS US DISASSOCIATED ITSELF FROM ISRAELIS WHO DESCRIBED THESE PROPOSALS AS APPEASEMENT OF THE ARABS. (4) DEFERRAL OF SALE OF PHANTOMS, AGAIN OVER OBJECTIONS OF ISRAELIS.

16. SISCO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THESE DECISIONS WOULD BE VIEWED IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE BY ARABS AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT UNFAIR TO CRITICIZE AS ONE-SIDED US NEAR EAST POLICY IN LIGHT OF THESE DECISIONS. US HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, LEBAN AND MOROCCO AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND IS TRYING TO BE HELPFUL. SISCO EMPHASIZED IT WAS NOT RPT NOT IN US INTEREST TO PUT ALL ITS EGGS IN ONE BASKET. US, HOWEVER, SEES NOTHING INCONSISTENT BETWEEN ITS FUNDAMENTAL POSITION IN SUPPORT OF EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL POSITION OF WISHING TO DEVELOP AND NURTURE ITS RELATIONS WITH ARABS.

17. SISCO INFORMED AMBASSADORS THAT HE HAD CARRIED ONE MESSAGE TO BOTH NASSER AND GOLDA MEIR DURING HIS RECENT TRIP TO NEAR EAST. AS LONG AS ISRAEL AND EGYPT MAINTAIN THEIR MAXIMUM POSITIONS, WE WILL NOT RPT NOT ACHIEVE OUR GOAL OF A JUST AND PEACEFUL SO-

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LUTION. GREATER FLEXIBILITY, THEREFORE, IS REQUIRED ON BOTH SIDES.

18. SISCO AGREED WITH ABIDIA THAT THE US HAS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE AREA AND STATED THAT US INTENDS TO EXERCISE THEM. SITUATION HAS INDEED, BETWEEN MOST DIFFICULT RECENTLY. WITH SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN EGYPT'S AIR DEFENSE, A NEW FACTOR HAS BEEN INTRODUCED. WE MUST ANALYZE THIS SITUATION FROM EVERY ANGLE. SISCO EXPRESSED WISH THAT PROBLEM WERE SIMPLE MATTER OF DECIDING TO GIVE OR NOT RPT NOT TO GIVE PHANTOMS. IT, HOWEVER, MORE COMPLICATED. US MUST CONSIDER: (A) IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SOVIET MOVE ON ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT, (B) IMPACT OF DECISION TO GIVE MORE PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL ON OUR ON-GOING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION, (C) IMPACT OF SUCH DECISION ON OUR ARAB FRIENDS AND ON ISRAEL, (D) IMPACT OF SUCH A DECISION ON MAJOR POWER ASPECTS OF THE NEAR EAST PROBLEM AND US/USSR RELATIONS IN AREA AND ELSEWHERE.

19. IN REPLY TO CONCERN EXPRESSED BY LEBANESE AMBASSADOR THAT DECISION ON PHANTOMS WOULD BE MADE DURING ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S CURRENT VISIT, SISCO REITERATED THAT DECISION ON PHANTOMS HAD NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN TAKEN AND ASSURED AMBASSADORS THAT DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF OUR HARD-NOSED ANALYSIS OF OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT ONE OF THESE INTERESTS REMAINS TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON.

20. SISCO NOTED DESPITE FATALISM ENCOUNTERED DURING HIS RECENT TRIP, HE HAD ALSO BEEN MOST IMPRESSED BY CONTINUING BELIEF EXPRESSED BY BOTH CRITICS AND FRIENDS THAT US STILL HAS POSITIVE ROLE TO PLAY THERE. UNDERSTANDABLY EACH COUNTRY HAS TENDENCY TO OVERESTIMATE US ABILITY ACHIEVE WHAT EACH PARTICULAR COUNTRY DESIRES. IN ANY EVENT, SISCO SAID HE HAD TOLD NASSER THAT NEITHER FRANCE, UK NOR USSR CAN HELP UAR ACHIEVE KIND OF POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH IT WANTS. ONLY US CAN DO THIS. SISCO SAID HE ALSO TOLD NASSER THAT INSISTANCE ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OR STEPS WHICH WOULD ALTER FUNDAMENTALLY JEWISH CHARACTER OF ISRAEL WOULD NOT RPT NOT ACHIEVE SUCH POLITICAL SOLUTION. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS DECLARED HE ENVISAGES NO RPT NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE MAP OF AREA.

21. SISCO INDICATED THAT THE PROBLEM NOW IS FINDING THE GOLDEN KEY TO A SETTLEMENT WHICH AMBASSADOR ABIDIA MENTIONED. IN HIS VIEW THIS MEANS FINDING WAY TO BEGIN IMPORTANT PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

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BY WHICH US DOES NOT RPT NOT MEAN FACE-TO-FACE TALKS AT OUTSET. IN THIS REGARD THE US HAS TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY WHAT ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN HAS RECENTLY BEEN SAYING THAT ARABS WOULD BE AMAZED AT WHAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO OFFER ONCE THESE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. IN ANY CASE, THE US APPRECIATES THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE PAINFUL FOR BOTH SIDES BUT BOTH SIDES MUST BE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME DISCOMFORT IN ORDER ACHIEVE JUST AND LASTING PEACE. ROGERS

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E.O. 11652/10/109

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TELEGRAM

W4

SECRET 579

PAGE 01 STATE 080422

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66644
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IAI:STACKHOUSE
APPROVED BY:NEA:ATHERTON
S/S:MORTON

018806

P R 260019Z MAY 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 080422

EXDIS

SUBJ: NEW ISRAELI MEASURES RE LEBANESE BORDER

REF: TEL AVIV 2676

FOLLOWING SUMMARY IS UNCLEARED, NOFORN AND FYI ONLY, SUBJECT TO REVISION UPON REVIEW.

1. ACTING SECRETARY CALLED IN AMB. RABIN TODAY TO REGISTER OUR DISAGREEMENT WITH NEW ISRAELI MILITARY POLICY ON LEBANESE BORDER. POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAVIV, ASST. SEC. SISCO, DEPT. ASST. SEC. ATHERTON AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR STACKHOUSE ALSO PRESENT.

2. RABIN'S REMARKS FOLLOWED CLOSELY RAFAEL PRESENTATION (REFTEL), LAYING STRESS ON SIRAELI READINESS CANCEL NEW POLICY WHEN LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BRINGS ABOUT CESSATION FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS ACROSS BORDER. ACTING SECRETARY SAID AMBASSADOR BARBOUR HAD EXPRESSED SAME VIEWS WE HAD. WE WERE SADDENED AT LOSS OF ISRAELI LIVES AND SYMPATHETIC WITH ISRAEL AS IT TRIED TO COPE WITH DIFFICULT PROBLEM. BUT WE

70 MAY 26 AM 8:30
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DID NOT BELIEVE THIS NEW POLICY WOULD ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES IT SOUGHT. IT WAS INFRINGEMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY TO WHICH LEBANESE MILITARY WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND, WOULD FURTHER DESTABLIZE SITUATION IN LEBANON, COULD BRING IN MORE OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, AND COULD ULTIMATELY END IN MEANING ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO COMMIT MORE RESOURCES TO ITS DEFENSE IN THAT AREA THAN IF IT CONCENTRATED NOW ON OTHER MEASURES OF DEFENDING ITSELF WITHOUT INCURSIONS INTO LEBANON. ACTING SECRETARY ALSO RAISED POSSIBILITY OF UN ROLE ON BORDER, TO WHICH RABIN GAVE STANDARD ISRAELI OBJECTIONS. RABIN INDICATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD PERSIST IN THIS NEW POLICY UNTIL LEBANON PREVENTED FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS.

3. RABIN STRESSED FACT ISRAEL PLANNED TO CARRY OUT PATROLS ON CONTINUING BASIS WAS FOR OUR INFORMATION ONLY AND ASKED THAT IT NOT BE PASSED TO LEBANESE. ACTING SECRETARY AGREED AND URGED THAT ISRAEL GIVE NO PUBLICITY AT ALL TO POLICY. (SO FAR, ISRAELI PUBLIC TREATMENT HAS CONVEYED NO HINT THAT TODAY'S ACTION WAS OTHER THAN A ONE-TIME AFFAIR. THERE IS SOME BASIS TO HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT IRREVOCABLY LOCKED INTO THEIR NEW POLICY AND THAT OUR REPRESENTATIONS MAY THUS HAVE SOME EFFECT).

4. FOR BEIRUT: AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED INFORM HIGHEST LEVELS GOL FOR THEIR CONFIDENTIAL INFO THAT WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS BOTH IN TEL AVIV AND IN WASHINGTON RE LATEST ISRAELI MILITARY INCURSION. EMBASSY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT REVEAL CONTINUING NATURE OF ISRAEL'S NEW DEFENSIVE PATROL POLICY.

5. FULL REPORT OF CONVERSATION BY SEPTEL.

GP-3.
RICHARDSON

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SECRET 335

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87
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66635
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPHJ.SISCO
NEA-RPDAVIES
NEA-ALATHERTON
S/S-MR.BROWN

017650

P 252041Z MAY 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 079905

EXDIS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT OF KAMAL JUMBLATT

REF: BEIRUT 4016

WHILE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS MAY MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR JUMBLATT MAKE U.S. VISIT AT THIS TIME, YOU AUTHORIZED INFORM HELOU WE HAVE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO US VISIT BY JUMBLATT DELEGATION. WE WOULD WISH DISCUSS FURTHER APPROPRIATE TIMING.

GP-3 RICHARDSON

70 MAY 26 AM 8:30
SITUATION ROOM
02, 3

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PAGE 01 STATE 062625

47
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

2/3

66608
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY:NEA:ALFRED L ATHERTON
DIA:LT COL MCRAE (SUBSTANCE)
S/S:ALDEN IRONS

016806

R 251839Z APR 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 062625

EXDIS

SUBJ: FORGED DIA LETTER

REF: BEIRUT 0252 AND 0258

DEPARTMENT CONCURS YOUR HANDLING THIS LETTER AND FULLY ENDORSES APPROACH YOU PLAN TAKE WITH JUMBLATT, TOGETHER WITH CONTINGENCY STATEMENT.

GP-3. ROGERS

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PAGE 01 STATE 049939

46
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 RSC-01 /047 R

66606
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN:TALCOTT W. SEELYE
S/S:MR IRONS

019379

P 062018Z APR 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 049939

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO PRESIDENT HELOU AT EARLIEST TIME YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE: QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON WITH GREAT INTEREST. THE ASTUTE MANNER IN WHICH YOU HAVE DIRECTED THE AFFAIRS OF STATE IN YOUR COUNTRY IN THE FACE OF MANY DIFFICULTIES IS INDEED IMPRESSIVE. IT REMAINS A MATTER OF DEEP CONCERN TO ME AND MY GOVERNMENT THAT LEBANON'S STABILITY AND INDEPENDENCE BE PRESERVED AND THAT LEBANON BE ENABLED TO PURSUE ITS DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. MY GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO FACILITATE THIS OBJECTIVE. (PARA) MANY OF THE PROBLEMS FACING LEBANON TODAY ARE A DIRECT RESULT OF THE ARAB ISRAEL CONFRONTATION. RECOGNIZING THIS, WE ARE VIGOROUSLY PURSUING OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A WAY OF ACHIEVING LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THIS REGARD BECAUSE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST--AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF OUR FRIENDSIN THE AREA--TO ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE SETTLEMENT. (PARA) I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR PORTER, WHO IS RETURNING TO LEBANON SHORTLY, TO DELIVER THIS MESSAGE TO YOU PERSONALLY AND TO CONVEY TO YOU ON MY BEHALF MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS. SINCERELY, (SIGNED) RICHARD NIXON. UNQUOTE.

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2. SIGNED ORIGINAL, WHICH DATED APRIL 3, IS BEING POUCHED.

3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE TEXT, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DESIRES TO DO SO.
ROGERS

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82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66636
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON
S/S:MR MORTON

071041

P R 030134Z MAR 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 030852

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAEL-LEBANON BORDER INCIDENTS

REF: TEL AVIV 1100

1. YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO GOL SOONEST SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL. WHEN SO DOING YOU SHOULD INFORM LEBANESE THAT WE AWARE OF INCREASING NUMBER OF INCIDENTS ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. WE APPRECIATE THAT LEBANESE ARMY HAS TAKEN SOME MEASURES TO CONTROL DEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, WE ALSO APPRECIATE THAT SITUATION WHEREIN MOTHER OF SIX CHILDREN KILLED BY FEDAYEEN ACTION IS INTOLERABLE TO ISRAEL. WHILE WE HAVE COUNSELED RESTRAINT TO ISRAELIS IN PAST, AND CONTINUE TO DO SO, IT IS EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THEM CONTINUE EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN SITUATION SUCH AS THIS.

2. YOU SHOULD ADVISE GOL THAT WE INTERPRET ISRAELI MESSAGE IN REFTEL AS CLEAR WARINING THAT THAT IS WOULD BE PRUDENT FOR LEBANESE TO STEP UP CONTROL MEASURES TO PREVENT FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIONS ORIGINATING FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY.

ROGERS

'70 MAR 13 AM 8:57

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

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82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66642
DRAFTED BY:NEA/JJSISCO
APPROVED BY:JOSEPH J SISCO
S/S DIRK GLEYSTEEN

011406

'70 MAR 14 AM 10:38

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

P 140156Z MAR 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 037955

EXDIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

I WILL WANT TO HAVE A THOROUGH AND DETAILED REVIEW WITH YOU PROMPTLY UPON YOUR ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON REGARDING REQUESTS OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OVER RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS.GP-3.
ROGERS

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'70 MAR 6 AM 8:07
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 576

PAGE 01 STATE 033093

89
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66645
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN MR T. W. SEELYE
EUR/FBX MR TANGUY (BY TELEPHONE)
S/S-O:B.A. FLATIN

092917

P R 060324Z MAR 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 033093

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR LEBANON

REFERENCE: PARIS 2569, BEIRUT 1726

WE CONCUR IN PARIS' ASSESSMENT THAT DIRECT APPROACH TO GOF ON QUESTION OF TAKING BACK MIRAGES IS NOT LIKELY PROVE EFFECTIVE OR WELCOME. HOWEVER, WE WOULD FIND IT VERY USEFUL, AS SUGGESTED PARIS 2569, TO HAVE READING ON FRENCH INTENTIONS AND FOR EMBASSY TO CONVEY TO GOF SENSE OF URGENCY FELFT BY GOL. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN VIEW OF REPORT WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THAT ISRAELI FORCE OF 200 TO 300 MEN CROSSED FRONTIER TODAY AND WERE LAST REPORTED ATTACKING VILLAGE OF MARWAHINE.
ROGERS

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SECRET 143

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PAGE 01 STATE 025984

43
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66607
DRAFTED BY: NEA/UAR:RBPARKER
APPROVED BY: NEA- JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA- MR. DAVIES
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
S/S - MR. BROWN
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS

017528

'70 FEB 20 PM 5:03
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

R 201737Z FEB 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 025984

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT'S 1211

1. PARA 5 REFTEL QUOTES RASHID KARAME AS SAYING NASSER THOUGHT USG HAD REBUFFED HIS INITIAL ATTEMPTS ESTABLISH CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH PRES NIXON AND US SHORTLY AFTER INAUGURATION. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO TELL KARAME WE APPRECIATE HIS REMARKS BUT THAT NASSER APPEARS NOT TO HAVE INFORMED HIM FULLY.

2. IT TRUE NASSER HAS SPOKEN FROM TIME TO TIME OF HIS INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS, BUT HE HAS ALWAYS SAID THAT RESTORATION WAS CONTINGENT ON SOME CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICY ON ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION, OR THAT HE NEEDED SOME "GESTURE" TO JUSTIFY RESTORATION TO HIS PEOPLE. HE OF COURSE HAS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO ADOPT SUCH POSTURE, BUT IT HAS BEEN OUR CONSISTENT POSITION THAT RESTORATION RELATIONS SHOULD NOT BE BURDENED WITH POLITICAL

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CONDITIONS OF THIS SORT, AND THAT IT IS PRECISELY WHEN THERE ARE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO SOLVE BETWEEN COUNTRIES THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE MOST USEFUL. WE HAVE NEVERTHELESS SOUGHT TO FOLLOW FAIR AND BALANCED POSITION ON ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION, THE MOST CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF THAT POSITION BEING OUR FORMULATIONS OF OCTOBER 28 AND DECEMBER 18, AND HAVE HOPED THAT AT SOME POINT THIS WOULD LEAD UAR TO FIND RESTORATION IN ITS INTEREST. WE HAVE FURTHERMORE MADE CLEAR ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG (INCLUDING PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO DR. FAWZI AFTER EISENHOWER FUNERAL) OUR OWN INTEREST IN RESUMING RELATIONS, BUT OUR MOVES IN THIS REGARD HAVE NOT BEEN RECIPROCATED. WE DO NOT WISH TO GO INTO TIRESOME RECITATION OF CHAPTER AND VERSE THIS REGARD, BUT THERE IS AMPLE, WRITTEN EVIDENCE THAT ABSENCE OF RELATIONS IS NOT DUE TO ANY LACK OF INTEREST ON OUR PART.

3. REGARDING IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS MENTIONED BY KARAME, THERE HAS BEEN STEADY FLOW OF PROMINENT AMERICANS THROUGH CAIRO SINCE LATE 1967. ALL OF THEM HAVE GOTTEN SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM NASSER, I.E., HE WANTS POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND HE NEEDS SOME GESTURE FROM UNITED STATES AS JUSTIFICATION FOR RESUMING RELATIONS. WHEN WE HAVE TAKEN THESE CONVERSATIONS SERIOUSLY, WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED. FOR EXAMPLE, IN MARCH 1969 NASSER AGREED WITH ROBERT ANDERSON ON VERBATIM TEXT OF AMERICAN STATEMENT REGARDING SETTLEMENT WHICH HE SAID WOULD SUFFICE AS BASIS FOR RESUMPTION. TEXT, WRITTEN OUT BY ANDERSON IN NASSER'S PRESENCE, WAS "PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MUST COME AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME." THIS WAS MORE THAN MET BY SECRETARY'S SPEECH OF MARCH 27, IN WHICH PEACE LINKED DIRECTLY TO WITHDRAWAL (AND WHICH DRAFTED AND APPROVED BEFORE WE KNEW OF ANDERSON-NASSER CONVERSATION). NASSER DID NOT FOLLOW THROUGH, HOWEVER, FOR REASONS OF HIS OWN. WHATEVER THOSE REASONS WERE, SUCH EXPERIENCES DO NOT ENCOURAGE US TO BELIEVE VISITS BY PRIVATE AMERICANS WILL IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS OR LEAD TO RESTORATION RELATIONS.

4. WE NEVERTHELESS REMAIN READY TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH THE UAR AND TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF A SETTLEMENT AT ANY TIME. WE HAVE SO INFORMED THE EGYPTIANS ON FREQUENT OCCASIONS, BUT THEY ARE AT PRESENT AVOIDING MEANINGFUL

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DIALOGUE WITH US AND MAKE NO BONES ABOUT IT. KARAME KNOWS AS WELL AS WE DO THAT CONVERSATIONS THROUGH NEWSPAPER EDITORS AND TV COMMENTATORS ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES SPEAKING OFFICIALLY AND FOR THE OFFICIAL RECORD. WE UNDERSTAND NASSER'S PRESENT RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO SUCH DISCUSSIONS, BUT THERE IS NOT MUCH WE CAN DO ABOUT IT UNTIL HIS OFFICIALS ARE WILLING TO TALK BUSINESS.
GP-1.
RICHARDSON

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87
ORIGIN SS-45

02

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66633
DRAFTED BY:NEA/IAI/WBSMOTH
APPROVED BY:NEA/JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
S/S-MR. BREWSTER

087038

R 102255Z FEB 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

'70 FEB 11 AM 7:5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T STATE 020497

EXDIS

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS

REF: AMMAN 970

1. EMBASSY HANDLED WELL THE DIFFICULT DISCUSSION FEB 2 WITH FONOFF OFFICIAL MAKKAWI ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SITUATION.

2. QUESTION OF HOW TO PHRASE ANY REFERENCE TO A RESUMPTION OF JARRING ACTIVITY (PARA 3 REFTEL) IS COMPLICATED. WHILE ACTIVITY IN WHICH JARRING ENGAGED IN 1968 AMOUNTED TO INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS OF A PRELIMINARY KIND, WE BELIEVE RESUMPTION OF JARRING'S MISSION, IF IT IS TO GET ANYWHERE, MUST INVOLVE MIXTURE OF INDIRECT AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ALONG RHODES PATTERN AND WOULD HOPE THIS PROCESS COULD BEGIN WITH FEW OR NO PRELIMINARIES SUCH AS ANOTHER TOUR BY JARRING OF AREA CAPITALS.

3. US POSITION IS THAT CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES MUST BE ONE WHICH NOT ONLY DOES NOT PRECLUDE A

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MIXTURE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT SESSIONS, BUT EMBRACES BOTH KINDS OF TALKS. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT TAKE PLACE AT OUTSET, BUT FORMULA MUST MEAN DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME STAGE UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. JARRING CAN HANDLE THIS IN SUCH A WAY TO DOWNPLAY PROCESS, AND EACH SIDE CAN PUBLICLY JUSTIFY ENGAGEMENT IN ITS OWN TERMS, ONE STRESSING DIRECT, OTHER STRESSING INDIRECT.

4. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ENSURE OUR POSITION IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY APPROPRIATE GOL OFFICIALS AS OCCASION ARISES.

GP-3
RICHARDSON

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TELEGRAM

WH (H)

CONTROL: 480Q
RECD: MAY 3, 19
3:44 P.M.

P 031740Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3709
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3675

NODIS

SECTO 95

FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY

I HAVE COMPLETED A WHIRLWIND 24-HOUR STAY IN SAUDI ARABIA WHICH, AS IN THE CASE OF TURKEY, LEAVES ME REASSURED ABOUT THE STEADFAST FRIENDSHIP OF FAISAL, DESPITE HIS OBSESSIVE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE "ZIONIST-COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY" AND HIS UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN THAT AS LONG AS THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE FESTERS HE IS VULNERABLE IN THE ARAB WORLD BECAUSE OF HIS OPENLY DECLARED CLOSE FRIENDSHIP FOR THE U.S. THIS ATTITUDE WAS BSST EPITOMIZED BY THE VARY ABLE FOREIGN MINISTER SAQQAF, WHO SAID "WE WILL BE YOUR FRIEND NO MATTER WHAT." SAUDIS ARE OBVIOUSLY SATISFIED WITH OIL SITUATION.

THE ANACHRONISM OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN MONARCHY IS FAMILIAR TO YOU. YET PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN DEFENSE, IN EDUCATION, EVIDENCE OF BUILDING IS EVERYWHERE, AND SLOWLY--ADMITTEDLY TOO SLOWLY -- SOME MODERNIZATION DOES APPEAR, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BEING AVAILABILITY OF TV. WHAT SURPRISED ME WAS THE CALIBER OF THE KING'S COURT MINISTERS YOUNG, VIGOROUS, HANDSOME ARABS (THE SAUDIS, AS YOU KNOW, ARE THE PUREST STRAIN OF ARAB WITH LESS OUTSIDE MIXTURE), WHO ARE SEEKING WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN OLD AND NEW, BUT IN WAYS WHICH HELP ASSURE INTERNAL SECURITY. IN THIS LATTER CONNECTION, PRINCE FAHD, A HALF BROTHER OF THE KING, ON OF THE BEST, GAVE ME A FULL PICTURE OF HOW EFFECTIVELY AN OFFICER PLOT OF ABOUT A YEAR AGO HAS BEEN HANDLED. IN SHORT, THE KNOWN HEIR APPARENT AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF MINISTERS ARE FRIENDLY TO THE US. AS ONE OF OUR OFFICERS SAID, AS WE TALKED TO 30 OR SO MINISTERS, "LOOK AROUND AND YOU WILL SEE A ROOM FULL OF FRIENDS OF THE US."

THE SAUDIS SEEM SATISFIED WITH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. YOU ARE TOUGH NEGOTIATORS, SAID SAQAAF, BUT ONCE THE CONTRACT IS SIGNED, THE WORK DONE IS EXCELLENT, WE WANT NO OTHER." OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS IN GOOD SHAPE, INCLUDING TRAINING. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY PROUD THAT SOME 2,000 SAUDIS HAVE BEEN STUDENTS IN THE US.

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

SECRET

IN OUR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS, 4 HOURS OF WHICH WERE IN TWO INSTALLMENTS WITH FAISAL, 3 AREAS WERE DISCUSSED. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHILE HE CONTINUES TO SEE A ZIONIST-COMMUNIST PLOT, HE IS WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT AGREED TO BETWEEN ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND EGYPT AND CLAIMS A DIRECT SUBSTANTIVE INTEREST ONLY ON JERUSALEM. HE EXPRESSED HOPE SOME STEP FORWARD WOULD RESULT FROM MY TRIP, WHICH IN TURN WOULD PROVIDE A FAVORABLE SETTING FOR A POSSIBLE ONE-DAY STOP IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

ON THE PERSIAN GULF, I URGED GREATER SAUDI DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SHEIKS IN ORDER TO HELP BRING ABOUT EARLY FEDERATION OF THE TRUCIAL STATES AND CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE SHAH. KING FAISAL FAVORS A STRONG US PRESENCE IN THE M.E., HE BELIEVES A SETTLEMENT WILL LEAD TO THE EGYPTIANS TELLING THE SOVIETS TO GET OUT, AND HE IS CONVINCED THIS IS SADAT'S DESIRE. I AGREED A SETTLEMENT WILL CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO REDUCED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA, BUT POINTED OUT THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE INDICATED WILL BE NO EASY TASK TO GET THE RUSSIANS OUT.

ON NORTH YEMEN, WHICH IS ANXIOUS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US, I MADE CLEAR WE ARE READY TO MOVE FROM OUR LIMITED US PRESENCE OF THE KIND WE HAVE IN CAIRO TO FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WHENEVER CONDITIONS MAKE IT POSSIBLE. THE SAUDIS, AS WE DO, SEE OUR PRESENCE THERE AS A COUNTER TO THE MAOIST AND SOVIET ACTIVITY GOING ON FURTHER SOUTH IN ADEN. AT FAISAL'S URGING, WE WILL ALSO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN PROVIDE SOME SMALL AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NORTH YEMEN BEYOND THE PRESENT VERY MODEST PROGRAM.

AS I HOPE TO DE ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I WAS ABLE TO SEE SOMETHING OF THE CITY OF RIYADH AND THE PEOPLE. IN THE OLD CITY, THERE WERE FRIENDLY HANDSHAKES AND AT THE UNIVERSITY I FOUND REASONABLY BALANCED VIEWS IN A GIVE AND TAKE SESSION ON OUR MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY WITH 200 STUDENTS.

ROGERS

BT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ Eyes only - Gen Haig

Control: 6 9 7 Q
Recd: May 4, 1971
7:57 a.m.

O 040950Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3717
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 3692

NODIS

SECTO 100

FOR PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY

1. ALONG WITH FAISAL WE HAVE A VERY CLOSE FRIEND IN HUSSEIN WITH WHOM I HAVE SPENT THE LAST 24 HOURS. AGAIN I BALANCED MY TIME BETWEEN WARM AND FRIENDLY TALKS AND SEEING THE AREAS OF THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS AND GEOGRAPHICAL POINTS RELEVANT TO A SETTLEMENT.

2. HIS PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATION WAS THAT HE NOT BE LEFT IN THE LURCH WITH THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WHILE THE EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS AGREE ON A SUEZ CANAL PARTIAL SETTLEMENT. I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO GET THE PARTIES TO RELATE ANY INTERIM SETTLEMENT TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. HIS STRONG AND IMPRESSIVE PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL CAME UP WITH A FRESH IDEA WHICH I MAY EXPLORE IN TEL AVIV; NAMELY, GETTING A SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED ON JERUSALEM SO THAT JORDAN WILL NOT BE ON THE SIDELINE WHILE THE INTERIM SETTLEMENT IS BEING EXPLORED BY THE UAR AND ISRAEL THROUGH US. YOU WILL BE PLEASED I AM SURE, AS WE WERE, THAT THEY WOULD LIKE US TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE IN-BETWEEN ROLE ON THIS ASPECT, BUT WE WILL HAVE TO GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT AS TO WHERE THIS WOULD LEAVE JARRING IF WE ARE PRESSED TO TAKE ON THIS JOB AS WELL. MOREOVER, JERUSALEM IS SO COMPLICATED THAT EARLY POSITIVE RESULTS ARE UNLIKELY; BUT IF AN ACTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE KING, WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE A SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE TOWARD IT.

3. I ALSO AGREED TO TAKE UP WITH PRIMIN MEIR THE JORDANIAN CONCERN OVER THE CONTINUOUS UNILATERAL STEPS BEING TAKEN BY ISRAEL AMOUNTING TO DE FACTO ANNEXATION AND TRANS-FORMATION OF CHARACTER OF JERUSALEM. WE HAVE LONG BEEN CONCERNED THAT THESE STEPS ARE PREJUDICIAL TO AN OVERALL SOLUTION. THE JORDANIANS ARE HOLDING OFF ON AN SC MEETING PENDING THE RESULTS OF MY DISCUSSIONS ON

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN09-12/22: Per ltr 8-4-2009
By P.H NARA, Date 10-22-09

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THIS TRIP. THE KING IN HIS GENTLE AND ALMOST APOLOGETIC WAY PLEADED THAT WE DO EVERYTHING WE CAN WITH ISRAEL. HE IS A REALIST; HE DOES NOT EXPECT THE MOON, BUT HE WANTS ENOUGH PROGRESS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN FULLY HIS UPPER HAND AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION, MY TRIP AROUND JORDAN WAS USEFUL. THE KING AND HIS BROTHER PRINCE HASSAN DELIGHTED IN PERSONALLY DRIVING ME AND SISCO RESPECTIVELY THROUGH THE WHOLE CITY OF AMMAN TO SHOW HOW QUIET IT IS, HOW HE IS IN FULL CONTROL, AND TO POINT OUT THE KEY LOCATIONS AND BATTLES OF THE SEPTEMBER CRISIS. THIS MORNING WE TOOK A THREE-HOUR HELICOPTER TRIP ALL ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER UP TO THE POINT IN THE NORTH WHERE ISRAEL, JORDAN, SYRIA, AND LEBANON JOIN, AND RETURNED VIA THE NORTHERN AREA AND IRBID WHERE JORDANIAN TANKS LICKED THE SYRIANS. WE FOLLOWED THE WHOLE LENGTH OF THE EAST GHOR CANAL BUILT WITH AMERICAN MONEY AND SAW WHAT WATER AND IRRIGATION CAN MEAN TO THIS PART OF THE WORLD. ABOVE ALL, IT POINTED UP POIGNANTLY HOW SENSELESS THE ANIMOSITY IS AND HOW BENEFICIAL PEACE WOULD BE TO ALL.

AFTER THE FINAL LUNCHEON AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S HOME KING HUSSEIN IN AN EXTRAORDINARY GESTURE INSISTED ON FLYING US TO THE AIRPORT BY HELICOPTER. HE FLEW THE HELICOPTER HIMSELF. AT THE AIRPORT HE AND I REVIEWED THE TROOPS AND THEN HE WAITED AT THE RAMP AND WAVED GOODBYE AS WE TOOK OFF. END GP-3.

ROGERS

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[NLN09-12/27 P. 2062]

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HAK

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

P R 031628Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3707
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 5174
BT
~~S E C R E~~ T BEIRUT 3670

CONTROL: 463Q
RECD: MAY 3, 197
2:44 P.M.

NODIS

SECTO 94

SUBJ: SECVISIT ME: KING HUSSEIN'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER

FOLLOWING IS REPLY OF KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER, LEFT WITH THE KING YESTERDAY. ORIGINAL WILL BE CARRIED BACK WITH US.

BEGIN QUOTE

THE ROYAL PALACE, AMMAN, JORDAN, MAY 3, 1971

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

IT HAS BEEN A PRIVILEGE AND PLEASURE FOR ME TO WELCOME TO JORDAN THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM ROGERS. IN JORDAN HE IS AMONGST FRIENDS.

I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, FOR THE KIND LETTER WHICH THE SECRETARY HAS DELIVERED TO ME, AND FOR THE ASSURANCES OF CONTINUED FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT.

I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE PASSING THROUGH A VERY CRITICAL STAGE IN OUR COMMON SEARCH FOR PEACE. TIME IS RUNNING OUT, AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE UNITED STATES, WILL NOT ALLOW THIS LAST CHANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE TO RUN OUT.

I FEEL THAT MY TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN USEFUL AND PRODUCTIVE, BUT WOULD ASSURE YOU OF OUR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE POLICY OF CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE ME THE HONOUR OF WELCOMING YOU IN JORDAN AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU.

YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,

HUSSEIN. END QUOTE.

ROGERS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN09-12/28: Per Ltr 8-4-2009
By P.H NARA, Date 10-22-09 (106)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH

KAK 8

'71 APR 22 AM 11:46

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CN-7432Q
22 Apr 71
1336Z

O 221200Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3579
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3293

NODIS

SUBJECT: SECVISIT ME

REF: STATE 068315

1. FOLLOWING OUR BEST ESTIMATE SITUATION SECRETARY AND PARTY LIKELY FACE DURING BEIRUT VISIT.
A. AS INDICATED PREVIOUS MESSAGES, DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PROBABLE. THERE PROBABLY WOULD BE MARCH THROUGH BEIRUT OF BETWEEN 5,000-10,000 PERSONS ORGANIZAED BY PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND LEFTIST GROUPS GENERALLY (PFLP, COMMIES, PPS, STUDENTS, ETC.). SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD REQUIRE PERMIT BY GOVERNMENT. IF GOVERNMENT PERMITTED DEMONSTRATIONS, AT MINIMUM IT WOULD INSIST DEMONSTRATORS BE UNARMED AND WOULD HAVE SECURITY FORCES ACCOMPANY DEMONSTRATORS. WE COULD ASK GOVERNMENT TO REFUSE PERMISSION (WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DONE IN PAST) BUT GOVERNMENT ITSELF WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER BETTER TO PERMIT GROUPS LET OFF STEAM IN "LICENSED" DEMONSTRATIONS RATHER THAN REFUSE ANY FORM OF PROTEST. EVEN IN SUCH DEMONSTRATION CANNOT COMPLETELY RULE OUT POSSIBILITY SOME ELEMENTS COULD INFILTRATE WITH ARMS AND TOUCH OFF INCIDENTS.

IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ATTACKS WOULD BE MADE ON US OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS IN AREA (EMBASSY BUILDING AND USIS CULTURAL CENTER) AND US BUSINESS INSTALLATIONS (BANK OF AMERICA, TAPLINE, ETC.). IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WITH NUMBERS OF SECURITY FORCES AVAILABLE TO PROTECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL UE INSTALLATIONS IN BEIRUT, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS WILL BE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED.

ALL FOREGOING WOULD BE FAR-REMOVED FROM SECRETARY PERSONALLY, ASSUING HE CONFINES VISIT TO AREA OF RESIDENCE AND PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. WE ARE ASSIGNING TOP PRIORITY TO COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ON ANY MEASURES EXPECTED AGAINST VISIT TO ASSURE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ADVANCE NOTICE. IN PAST SUCH EFFORTS HAVE AFFORDED ADEQUATE NOTICE.

B. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS:

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(1) AIRPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE: CLEAR BALCONIES, COVER ROOFTOPS, REMOTE PARKING OF AIRCRAFT, CLOSE CONTROL OF PRESS AND ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA.

(2) SECRETARY'S IMMEDIATE PARTY HELICOPTER FROM AIRPORT TO POINT CLOSEST TO RESIDENCE. HELICOPTER LANDING AREA WOULD BE STRICTLY CONTROLLED. MOTORCADE FROM HELIPORT TO RESIDENCE (OR AIRPORT TO RESIDENCE AS ALTERNATE IF HELICOPTER USE NOT POSSIBLE) WITH MINIMUM OF FOUR MOTORCYCLES AND THREE SECURITY CARS.

(3) SECRETARY'S RESIDENCE: WILL RESIDE WITH AMBASSADOR. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WHERE THERE IS MAXIMUM SECURITY. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE PRESENTLY HAS APPROXIMATELY 15 GENDARMES ASSIGNED. WOULD REQUEST INCREASE THIS NUMBER. MARINE GUARD WILL BE ASSIGNED AT RESIDENCE DURING VISIT.

(4) REMAINDER OF OFFICIAL PARTY, STAFF AND PRESS MOTORCADE TO HOTEL: MOTORCYCLE ESCORT; SEDANS FOR SENIOR OFFICERS EACH WITH GOL SECURITY IN RIGHT FRONT SEAT; BUS FOR STAFF AND PRESS WITH GOL SECURITY ON BUS; GOL SECURITY FOLLOW VEHICLE.

(5) CREW MOTORCADE: BUS FOR CREW WITH GOL SECURITY ON BUS.

(6) ALL MOTORCADES WILL REQUIRE TRAFFIC CONTROL AT CRITICAL POINTS. MOTORCADES WILL BE IN RADIO CONTACT WITH EMBASSY SECURITY CONTROL CENTER.

(7) HOTEL SECURITY: PLAN TO PLACE STAFF, PRESS AND CREW ON LIMITED NUMBER OF FLOORS. EACH FLOOR WILL HAVE ENOUGH GOL UNIFORMED POLICE TO COVER ENTRANCE POINTS. WILL REQUEST GENERAL SECURITY COVERAGE OF HOTEL AND EXTERIOR.

(8) PARTY SHOULD BE BRIEFED BEFORE ARRIVAL ON SECURITY PRECAUTIONS TO INCLUDE TRAVEL ON BUDDY SYTEM, AVOIDING PHOTOGRAPHY OF REFUGEE CAMPS, USE OF HOTEL TAXIS OR MOTOR POOL VEHICLES, NOT ACCEPTING UNSOLICITED PACKAGES.

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(9) MARINE GUARD POST WILL BE SET UP AT S/S OFFICE IN EMBASSY. ADDITIONAL MARINE GUARD WILL BE ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY LOBBY.

(10) WE WOULD REQUEST INCREASED GOL SECURITY AT EMBASSY, JFK CULTURAL CENTER AND USIS REGIONAL SERVICES CENTER.

(11) SECURITY CONTROL IN EMBASSY WILL BE LOCATED IN NCOIC'S OFFICE IN LOBBY STAFFED BY MARINE GUARD, GOL LIAISON OFFICER AND ONE EMBASSY LOCAL SECURITY INVESTIGATOR.

(12) CLOSED PANEL TRUCK AND FOLLOW CAR WITH MARINE GUARD ESCORT WILL BE PROVIDED FOR CLASSIFIED AND GOL SECURITY FOLLOW CAR.

(13) BAGGAGE WILL BE UNDER AMERICAN CONTROL UPON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE. GOL SECURITY FOR BAGGAGE TO TO BOTH AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE AND HOTEL.

C. WITH SECRETARY AND IMMEDIATE PARTY BEING FLOWN BY HELICOPTER TO LANDING POINT IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF RESIDENCE, BEING HOUSED THERE, AND HIS MOVEMENTS RESTRICTED TO A RELATIVELY SMALL AREA IN VICINITY OF RESIDENCE, WE SEE MINIMAL RISK OF BOMBING, ASSASSINATION, OR OTHER TYPE OF ATTEMPT ON SECURITY SECRETARY AND THOSE STAYING IN RESIDENCE. WE, OF COURSE, CANNOT COMPLETELY EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY ISOLATED ACT BY FANATIC BUT STRONGLY DOUBT LIKELIHOOD. RESIDENCE IS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO LEBANESE ARMY HEADQUARTERS AND PRESIDENCY, BOT OF WHICH HEAVILY GUARDED EVEN IN NORMAL TIMES. OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY WHO WILL BE HOUSED IN TOWN OBVIOUSLY SOMEWHAT MORE VULNERABLE BUT ALSO SOMEWHAT LESS CONSPICUOUS TARGETS. WE BELIEVE SECURITY MEASURES WHICH GOL AND MISSION WILL TAKE MAKE RISK MANAGEABLE. GP-3.

BUFFUM

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WH HAK 8

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 211116Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3567
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3246

Control: 6871Q
Recd: April 21, 1971
7:56 a.m.

NODIS

1. PER DEPTEL 67190 I INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUHAMAD NOON APRIL 21 SECRETARY DESIRES VISIT LEBANON FIRST WEEK IN MAY.

2. ABOUHAMAD'S RESPONSE WAS IMMEDIATE AND POSITIVE. HE SAID SECRETARY WOULD BE WELCOME HERE ANY TIME (AS PRESIDENT FRANGIE HAS TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY).

3. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID TIMING OF VISIT WAS ESPECIALLY GOOD SINCE HE WILL BE VISITING CAIRO APRIL 27-30 AND WILL BE HAPPY CONVEY TO SECRETARY HIS IMPRESSIONS OF CURRENT SITUATION IN UAR.

4. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE REPORTED LONG TALK YESTERDAY WITH UAR AMBASSADOR WHO EMPHASIZED THAT RECENT MEETING AND COMMUNIQUE ON ESTABLISHMENT TRIPARTITE FEDERATION IN NO WAY CHANGED UAR FOREGIN POLICY. IN PARTICULAR, HE STRESSED UAR GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO SC RES 242, TO ROGERS PLAN, AND TO ANSWERS RECENTLY GIVEN JARRING ABOUT EGYPTIAN POSITION. GP-3.

BUFFUM

BT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'71 APR 21 AM 9:58

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

8

HAK

SECRET

'71 APR 20 PM 1:17

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

P 201035Z APR 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3553
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 3209 - CORRECTED COPY

6 4 3 5 Q
20 APR 71 Z16 30

NODIS

REF: STATE 66514

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. BELIEVE VISIT DESCRIBED REFTEL HIGHLY DESIRABLE. (SECURITY ASPECTS DISCUSSED SEPARATE CHANNEL.) YOUR APPEARANCE WOULD BE WELCOME EVIDENCE IN LEBANON OF CONTINUING DEPP US CONCERN ABOUT NEED TO MOVE TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND OF YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN AREA. IT WOULD ALSO OFFER WELCOME OPPORTUNITY FOR YOU TO MEET WITH NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER STRONGLY PRO-WESTERN CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT, FRANGIE.

2. RISK THAT TRIP WOULD CREATE UNDUE EXPECTATIONS IS QUITE MANAGEABLE HERE GIVEN PRECAUTIONS ENVISAGED.

3. SEE NO PROBLEM IN ITINERARY DESCRIBED AND WOULD WELCOME YOU MOST WARMLY AT ANY POINT. GP-3.

BUFFUM

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

Wld

12

R 271110Z JAN 71
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2932
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 0731

6 6 6 4 Q
1971 JAN 27 1209Z

NODIS

1. DURING CONVERSATION JANUARY 27 WITH PRESIDENT FRANGIE I SAID WE HAD IMPRESSION THERE WAS INDICATIONS OF INCREASING RESENTMENT AMONG FATAH LEADERSHIP WITH HABBASH AND PFLP AND THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE EFFORT BY ARAFAT TO BRING HABBASH UNDER CONTROL. FRANGIE SAID HE IS SURE IT WILL NOT WORK. HABBASH IS "TOO MUCH OF A FOX." EVEN IF HE MAKES TACTICAL RETREATS BY TEMPORARY INDICATIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE, HE WILL SEEK EVERY OPPORTUNITY FOR PROVOCATIONS TO CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT FOR EXISTING REGIMES IN AREA.

2. HE SPOKE WITH CONCERN ABOUT WHAT PFLP MIGHT DO AFTER FEBRUARY 5, LEADING ME TO BELIEVE HE HAD SEEN SAME REPORT CAS TRANSMITTED IN NLB 11,453 OF JANUARY 23.

3. FRANGIE COMMENTED THAT PFLP CONSISTED OF HIGHLY TRAINED CADRE AND HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THEY TRIED SOMETHING LIKE ADDITIONAL HIGHJACKINGS. GP-3.

BUFFUM

'71 JAN 27 AM 9:36
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

11 32

6 4 2 1 Q
1970 DECEMBER 30
1:37 P.M.

'70 DEC 30 PM 4:22
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

R 301545Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2734
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 11020

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 10980

1. BY WAY FURTHER COMMENT ON CONVERSATION WITH FRANGIE, I HAVE AGAIN REVIEWED INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF MAJOR COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. COMMANDOS HAVE FOR LONG TIME HAD STOCKPILES OF WEAPONS, INCLUDING ROCKETS AND MORTARS IN LEBANON. WE KNOW OF NOTHING NEW IN THIS REGARD.

2. OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT REMAINS IN DISARRAY AFTER JORDANIAN CLASHES AND THAT GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION HERE BETTER THAN AT ANY RECENT PERIOD. ACCORDINGLY, WE DOUBT LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS FULL-SCALE CLASHES BETWEEN COMMANDOS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES. CONSIDERABLE RISK EXISTS, HOWEVER, THAT, IN DESPERATION, CERTAIN PALESTINAISN, ESPECIALLY OF PFLP STRIPE, MAY RESORT TO INCREASED INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF TERRORISM SUCH AS KIDNAPPING AND ASSASSINATION.

3. CAS CONCURS.
GP-3.
BUFFUM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

'70 DEC 30 AM 8:36

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

CONTROL: 62200
RECD: DEC 29, 1970
9:25 P.M.

P 291547Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2714
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 10980

NODIS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE SECURITY AND ARMS SUPPLY

SUMMARY: IN MEETING DECEMBER 29 PRESIDENT FRANGIE TOLD ME THAT DESPITE IMMINENT RESUMPTION OF JARRING NEGOTIATIONS HE IS MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT FUTURE SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON AND MADE CLEAR US PROPOSED $5 MILLION GRANT OF ARMS WOULD BE MOST WELCOME AS WELL AS ANY ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE WE COULD SUPPLY.

1. HE IS WORRIED THAT INCREASED PROBLEMS FOR FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN MAY LEAD COMMANDOS TO TRANSFER MORE OF THEIR OPERATIONS TO LEBANON. (WE HAVE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATING SUCH A POSSIBILITY, IN FACT, BEING CONSIDERED BY FEDAYEEN.) HE CONFIRMED REPORTS THAT FEDAYEEN GROUPS HAVE BEEN RENTING APARTMENTS IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS AROUND BEIRUT (BEIRUT 10665) AND SAID THEY HAVE EVEN ACQUIRED ONE NEAR PRESIDENCY IN YARZEH SUBURB. FRANGIE MAINTAINED THE FEDAYEEN HAVE NOT ONLY MODERN RIFLES OUTCLASSING LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES, BUT EVEN ROCKETS AND MORTARS WHICH HAVE BEEN SMUGGLED INTO BEIRUT AND STORED HERE. HE ALSO CONCERNED THAT COMMUNIST ELEMENTS ALLEGEDLY NOW BEGINNING TO INFILTRATE COMMANDO MOVEMENT SUCCESSFULLY IN WAKE OF DEFEAT FEDAYEEN HAVE SUFFERED IN JORDAN.

2. FRANGIE HAD NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS OR REQUESTS TO MAKE IN FACE OF WHAT HE REGARDS AS SERIOUS LONG-TERM THREAT TO HIS COUNTRY'S SECURITY. IT WAS OF INTEREST TO ME THAT HE DWELLED AT GREAT LENGTH ON THIS SUBJECT WHILE SHRUGGING OFF BRIEFLY LAST NIGHT'S ISRAELI RAID ON LEBANESE VILLAGES.

3. HE INDICATED WORRY THAT DESPITE SECURITY SITUATION HE WAS OBLIGED TO SQUEEZE DEFENSE BUDGET TO MEET PRESSING NEEDS IN SOCIAL SECTOR, SUCH AS HEALTH AND EDUCATION. THIS CONNECTION, HE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT DESPITE PRESS AND POLITICAL CRITICISM OF US PROPOSED $5 MILLION GRANT, RECEIPT OF SUCH GIFT FROM US WOULD BE MOST WELCOME FROM HIM. HE NOTED THAT HE

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SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

HAD NO ILLUSIONS LEBANON COULD EQUIP DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT ADEQUATELY TO RESIST ISRAELI INCURSIONS AND SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND ON US TO ASSURE SUCH OPERATIONS KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS. HE GREAT NEED, AS HE PUT IT FRANKLY, WAS TO ASSURE FUTURE INTERNAL SECURITY OF COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT IF ARMS FLOW FROM OUTSIDE TO FEDAYEEN CONTINUES AS IN PAST, BY YEAR FROM NOW HE MIGHT HAVE TO SEE TO IT SOMEHOW THAT EVERY LOYAL LEBANESE WAS ALSO ARMED.

4. I USED OCCASION TO INFORM PRESIDENT FRANKLY THAT IN PREVIOUS YEARS LEBANESE OFFICIALS HAD NOT RESPONDED QUICKLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY WHEN SERIOUS OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED THEMSELVES FOR SUPPLY OF ARMS FROM US. I URGED THAT IN EVENT US FINALLY ABLE MAKE FIRM OFFER OF $5 MILLION GRANT HIS EXPERTS BE PREPARED SIT DOWN WITH OURS ON SHORT NOTICE AND INDICATE WHAT THEIR PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS ARE. I SAID I BELIEVED LIST SHOULD INCLUDE ARMS NEEDED FOR GENDARMERIE AS WELL AS ARMY. HE PARTICULARLY CONCURRED ON LATTER POINT, SAYING TO HIS MIND GENDARMERIE HAS GREATER NEED THAN REGULAR ARMY SINCE THEY WOULD BEAR INITIAL BRUNT OF ANY CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN.

COMMENT: I HOPE THAT THIS NATURAL OCCASION FOR GOING INTO ARMS SUPPLY PROBLEM WILL SERVE TO LIGHT A FIRE UNDER LEBANESE BUREAUCRACY AND THAT THEIR FUTURE PERFORMANCE WILL BE GREATER THAN IN PAST WHEN AND IF WE CAN OFFER GRANT.
GP-3. BUFFUM
BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 281118Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2695
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 10911

5 8 5 4 Q
1970 DECEMBER 28
7:31 A.M.

'70 DEC 28 AM 11:50
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: STATE 207537

1. LEBANESE ARMY STAFF RECENTLY COMPLETED STUDY OF TOTAL LONG-RANG MILITARY EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED BY GENERAL NOUJAIM. THIS STUDY NOW BEING REVIEWED BY DEFENSE AND FINANCE MINISTRIES AND IS STILL SUBJECT TO CABINET APPROVAL. AS SOON AS USG APPROVAL OF GRANT OBTAINED WE WILL, OF COURSE, URGE THIS PROCESS BE EXPEDITED. UNTIL WE ABLE TO MAKE FIRM COMMITMENT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO GO FURTHER THAN WE ALREADY HAVE IN EXPRESSING HOPE TO NOUJAIM GOL WILL BE PREPARED MOVE QUICKLY IF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL RECEIVED.

2. IN ORDER TO DEVELOP CONCRETE $5 MILLION ARMS PACKAGE, LEBANESE WOULD REQUIRE CURRENT COST AND AVAILABILITY DATA. THE ONLY SUCH INFORMATION THEY PRESENTLY HAVE ON MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IS THAT CONCERNING THE M-41 TANKS. HOWEVER, FACT THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT STUDY HAS BEEN COMPLETED WILL OBVIOQVLY FACILITATE TASK OF PRODUCING SHOPPING LIST OF $5 MILLION WHICH WOULD REFLECT THEIR CURRENT PRIORITIES. NOUJAIM HAS ALREADY AGREED THAT THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR PRODUCING SUCH A LIST WOULD BE FOR U.S. SERVICE ATTACHES, ARMED WITH COST AND AVAILABILITY DATA, TO WORK TOGETHER WITH LEBANESE STAFF OFFICERS IN A JOINT PROJECT.

3. WE DOUBT PRESS CRITICISM OF U.S. GRANT, WHICH IS CONTINUING, IS LIKELY TO DETER GOVERNMENT FROM ACCEPTING OFFER. AMBASSADOR SOUNDED TUENI OUT ON THIS AT RECENT DINNER PARTY AND HE WAS CONFIDENT GOL WOULD OVERRIDE CRITICISM AND WELCOME OFFER. HOWEVER, WE ARE WATCHING THIS CLOSELY, AND AMBASSADOR PLANS GET INFORMAL READING OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S VIEWS ON SUBJECT IN NEXT MEETING WITH HIM, 9 A.M. DECEMBER 29. IF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON SUBJECT WOULD APPRECIATE HEARING BY THEN. GP-3

BUFFUM

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Department of State TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET

11

R 271555Z OCT 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2299
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9359

6858Q

27 Oct 70 17 47 Z

NODIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CORRECTION IS REFERENCE NUMBER.

SUBJ: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 161364

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR $5 MILLION GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON. DETAILS FOLLOW BY AIRGRAM.

2. LEBANON'S OVERALL ECONOMIC GROWTH CAME TO AN ABRUPT HALT IN OCTOBER 1966 WITH THE FAILURE OF THE INTRA BANK FOLLOWED BY THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE 1967 WITH ITS CONTINUING POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS. THERE WAS SOME IMPROVEMENT IN 1968 AND 1969, BUT KEY SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY WORSENED IN 1970 WITH LITTLE PROSPECT FOR EARLY IMPROVEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OVERALL AREA PEACE SETTLEMENT. FOREIGN TRADE DEFICIT NOW RUNNING AT RATE OF OVER $500 MILLION PER ANNUM; TOURISM DECREASED 23 PERCENT FIRST SEVEN MONTHS OF 1970; TRANSIT TRADE WHICH WAS ON INCREASE UNTIL MID-1970 ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY CLOSURE TAPLIEN AND RECENT JORDANIAN CONFLICT; AND BUILDING CONSTRUCTION BARELY HALF OF PRE-1967 WAR LEVEL. GOL EXPENDITURES HAVE EXCEEDED REVENUES EACH YEAR SINCE 1962. FOR 1970 A RECORD LL 130.5 MILLION DEFICIT IS ESTIMATED DESPITE NEW FISCAL MEASURES AND A MEAGER PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAM. PREVIOUS DEFICITS HAVE BEEN LARGELY COVERED BY ACCUMULATED SURPLUSES WHICH ARE NOW EXHAUSTED. TREASURY BORROWING IS LIMITED BY STRONG PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR A BALANCED BUDGET WHILE GOVT OVERDRAFTS ON THE CENTRAL BANK FACE STATUTORY LIMITATION. AS ADDITIONAL OR INCREASED TAXES ARE RULED OUT BY THE PRESENT DEPRESSED STATE OF THE ECONOMY AND A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SHORT-TERM DEFICIT FINANCING IS NOT POSSIBLE POLITICALLY, INCREASED EXPENDITURES FOR DEVELOPMENT OR DEFENSE CAN ONLY BE FINANCED BY REDUCED GOL EXPENDITURES IN OTHER AREAS OR BY FOREIGN ASSISTANCE. IN VIEW OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, IT WOULD BE BOTH DIFFICULT AND UNDESIRABLE TO REDUCE GOL EXPENDITURES. THUS IF THE GOL IS TO SECURE ADDITIONAL ARMS WHICH IT AND WE CONSIDER NECESSARY FOR LEBANON'S INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IT WILL HAVE TO HAVE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. AT THE MOMENT, EXCEPT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THERE SEEMS NO SOURCE FOR SUCH AID OTHER THAN THE USG. IN ANY EVENT, FOR REASONS ADVANCED IN BEIRUT'S 8555, WE BELIEVE USG SHOULD BE THE ONE TO PROFFER MILITARY GRANT AID TO THE GOL.

BUFFUM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

W 14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'70 OCT 9 PM 12:50

R 091145Z OCT 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2092
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8792

CONTROL: 2406Q

RECD: OCT 9 14 26Z

NODIS

REF: STATE 153180

SUBJECT: .30 CALIBER AMMUNITION

OUR IMPRESSION MEETING DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS WITH FORMER BEIRUT DEFENSE ATTACHE JOSEPH BRUDER IN WASHINGTON MET REQUIREMENT REFTEL. IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE, PLEASE SO INFORM US AND WE WILL SUBMIT NECESSARY DATA.

BUFFUM

BT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

13

O 031430Z OCT 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2010
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8555

7930
1970 OCT 3 PM 12:09

NODIS

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 161364; BEIRUT 8235

1. WE MOST STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BE GRANTED TO GOL TO INCREASE CAPACITY OF ITS SMALL ARMY (THIRTEEN THOUSAND ARMY, FIVE THOUSAND GENDARMERIE) TO HANDLE JORDAN-TYPE SITUATION IN LEBANON. ARMY AT PRESENT OPERATING BY AND LARGE WITH OBSOLESCENT EQUIPMENT. IN ORDER TO AUGMENT ARMY'S CAPABILITY TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH AND MOB ACTION IN CITIES, LEBANESE ARMY - IN OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS - HAS PLACED TOP PRIORITY ON INCREASING ARMOR PROTECTING FIRE POWER AND MOBILITY OF LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, WE SUGGEST FOLLOWING ILLUSTRATIVE MILITARY PACKAGE WHICH WOULD BE FINANCED BY US GRANT AID. WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT ARMS PACKAGE DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT BULKOF ANY ARMS PACKAGE SHOULD BE FOR PURCHASE OF ARMORED CARS AND M41 TANKS. AVAILABLE INFORMATION INDICATES UNIT PRICE STAGHOUND ARMORED CAR AROUND DOLLARS FORTY-THREE THOUSAND AND OVERHAULED M-41 TANK AROUND DOLLARS FORTY THOUSAND. ALTHOUGH FRENCH HAVE SOLD FEW ARMORED CARS TO LEBANESE, LIBYAN OFFER WHICH WAS FOR ONE HUNDRED ARMORED CARS SEEMS TO BE AT IMPASSE. CONSEQUENTLY LEBANESE REQUIREMENT COUPLED WITH LEBANESE ARMY CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN EQUIPMENT INDICATES A MIX OF APPROXIMATELY FIFTY TANKS AND FIFTY ARMOED CARS WHICH WE ESTIMATE WOULD CONSTITUTE EIGHTY PERCENT OF ARMS PACKAGE OF DOLLARS FIVE MILLION. IN ADDITION, PACKAGE SHOULD INCLUDE M55 QUADRUPLE FIFTY CALIBRE AA GUNS BECAUSE OF HIGH POTENTIAL IN ITS GROUND ROLE AS A DETERRENT AGAINST MOB ACTION. PACKAGE SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY MACHINE FIFTY CALIBRE GUNS AND A SUPPLY OF LAND MINES. ALTHOUGH ARMY ALSO NEEDS LIGHT INFANTRY WEAPONS, WE HAVE REPORT GOL ATTEMPTING OBTAIN REQUIREMENTS FROM BELGIANS. WE EUR.-5E OPTIMISTICALLY THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT LEAST TWO WEEKS FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO MAKE DETAILED AND DEFINITIVE REQUEST FOR AID.

3. EMBASSY IS ALSO INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE REQUIREMENTS FOR RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT LATER MESSAGE.

4. NO RPT NO DOUBT THAT GOL FACES POTENTIALLY SERIOUS TROUBLE FROM FEDAYEEN AND THAT ITS ARMY MUST BE STRENGTHENED IF IT IS TO

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HANDLE OR DETER POTENTIAL JORDAN-TYPE SITUATION IN LEBANON. AS WE HAVE REPORRTED PREVIOUSLY, GOL SHARES OUR CONCERN THAT IN DUE COURSE:
A) THERE MAY BE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN NUMBERS AND ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE BORDERS; AND B) THAT FEDAYEEN ADN RADICAL ELEMENTS MAY ATTEMPT INSTIGATE INTERNAL STRIFE IN LEBANON AS IN JORDAN.

5. PRESIDENT NASSER'S DEATH INCREASES GOL'S ANXIETY ABOUT HANDLING FUTURE TROUBLE. GOL, HAS OVER PAST YEARS, PLACED HEAVY RELIANCE ON UAR POLITICAL SUPPORT BOTH TO DETER FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. WITH NASSER'S DEATH, GOL CAN NOT RPT NOT BE CERTAIN OF UAR SUPPORT. NEUTRAL UAR POSITION VIS-A-VIS LEBANON COULD REMOVE RESTRAINT ON SYRIA AND HEIGHTEN POSSIBILITY SYRIAN INTERVENTION SHOULD TROUBLE START HERE. THIS IS CAUSE FOR GENUINE CONCERN GOL. NASSER'S DEATH MAKES GOL FEEL MORE VULNERABLE AND ALSO SOMEWHAT MORE ISOLATED.

6. GOL HANDLING OF FEDAYEEN CRISES LAST OCTOBER INDICATES GOL WILL DEFEND ITSELF. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE ARMS PACKAGE RECOMMENDED ABOVE WOULD MATERIALLY INCREASE GOL'S CAPACITY TO RESIST HOSTILE FORCES LEBANON.

7. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF CONTEMPLATED AID. IN LAST ANALYSIS, LEBANON LOOKS TO US FOR ITS ULTIMATE SALVATION. PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S RECENT REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE FROM US (BEIRUT 8054) UNDERLINES THIS POINT. MATERIAL ASSISTANCE OF TYPE CONTEMPLATED WOULD REASSURE GOL AND STIFFEN ITS RESOLVE AND THAT OF ITS ARMY TO DEFEND LEBANON.

. RECENTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT FRANGIE, AS WE HAVE REPORTED, IS A MUCH TOUGHER INDIVIDUAL THAN WAS PRESIDENT HELOU. HE HAS HIS OWN POWER BASE AND WE BELIEVE HAS NO RPT NO INTENTION PERMIT FEDAYEEN TAKE OVER LEBANON WITHOUT BATTLE. OUR READING HIS CHARACTER INDICATES HE WOULD ACT QUICKLY AND RESOLUTELY IN FACE ANY THREAT TO LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE. THIS ASSISTANCE WOULD GREATLY REINFORCE HIS CONFIDENCE IN US AND THEREBY HIS OWN CONFIDENCE IN HANDLING FEDAYEEN PROBLEM.

9. ONE MORE IMPORTANT POINT: THE ASSISTANCE WOULD INCREASE GOL'S CAPABILITY TO PROTECT THE FIVE THOUSAND PLUS AMERICANS NOW RESIDING IN LEBANON. WORTHY OF NOTE IS FACT GOL HAS ARMED EMBASSY GUARDS WITH M16 RIFLES WHICH GOL PURCHASED THEMSELVES. INCREASED NUMBER OF ARMORED CARS WOULD GIVE ADDED ASSURANCE SAFETY AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THE EMBASSY. AT PRESENT, GOL IS SO SHORT OF SUCH VEHICLES THAT DURING RECENT TROUBLE IN JORDAN, LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES HAD TO REMOVE ONE OF ARMORED CARS STATIONED OUR EMBASSY TO PROTECT JORDAN EMBASSY.

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10. AS DEPARTMENT IS WELL AWARE, GOL CASH POSITION HAS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATED AND LEBANON'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS IN ABSENCE AREA PEACE ARE SOMBER. PRESIDENT FRANGIE TOLD AMBASSADOR PORTER EARLY SEPTEMBER GOL WAS OPERATING WITHOUT ANY RESERVES. IN OUR JUDGMENT, GOL CANNOT RPT CANNOT AFFORD PAY FOR PACKAGE OUT OF ITS OWN RESOURCES.

11. THIS PACKAGE GIVES FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT USG IS NOT ONLY INTERESTED IN SECURITY OF ISRAEL BUT IN THE SECURITY OF ITS ARAB FRIENDS AS WELL.

12. IN SUM, ILLUSTRATIVE PROGRAM WE HAVE DESCRIBED ABOVE WOULD:
A) INCREASE GOL'S CAPABILITY TO RESIST HOSTILE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY;
B) WOULD STIFFEN GOL'S RESOLVE TO DO SO; AND
C) WOULD INCREASE ITS CAPABILITY (IT HAS ALREADY SHOWN WILLINGNESS) TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PLUS AMERICAN CITIZENS NOW LIVING IN LEBANON.

BT

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WH (7)

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 7237Q
RECD: SEP 28, 1970
4:28 P.M.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM TO SEP 28 PM 8:54

R 281801Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1926
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8341

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 8246

DEPT PASS TO ROME FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT CALLED ME 6:30 MONDAY EVENING SEPT 28. HE HAD CONVEYED DEPT'S REPLY (STATE 158523) TO PRESIDENT FRANGIE ON LATTER'S RETURN FROM CAIRO THIS MORNING. FRANGIE WAS DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT USG WAS NOT IN POSITION GIVE SPECIFIC UNDERTAKING IN HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION BUT WAS GRATEFUL AND REASSURED BY DEPT'S MESSAGE WHICH HE CONSIDERED STRONGER THAN THOSE SENT PRES HELOU.

2. IN CAIRO HE ALSO HAD HAD SATISFACTORY TALKS WITH PRES NASSER WHOM HE MET WITH ALONG TWICE. PRES NASSER HAD CONVEYED IMPRESSION TO FRANGIE ON TWO OCCASIONS THAT FRANGIE COULD COUNT ON HIS SUPPORT AND PARTICULARLY SO IN ANY STRUGGLE WITH THE FEDAYEEN. NASSER HAD MDE IT ABUDANTLY CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HIS SUPPORT WOULD BE MORAL AND THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF USING EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS ANY PLACE BUT ON EGYPTIAN SOIL. CONFIDANT MADE POINT THAT NASSER'S ASSURANCES TO FRANGIE WERE UNSOLICITED.

3. FRANGIE HAS INVITED NASSER TO VISIT LEBANON AND HOPES HE WILL DO SO IN THE NEXT TWO/THREE MONTHS.

HOUGHTON

BT

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10 WH

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

7 4 3 6 Q
1970 AUG 31 PM 2:26

P 311551Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1484
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 7246

NODIS

FOR ASST SECY SISCO

REF: BEIRUT 7245

1. REFTEL SETS FORTH CHARLES MALIK'S REENTRY INTO LEBANESE POLITICAL PICTURE AS ONE OF MANY ADVISERS WHO AT MOMENT HAVE PRES-ELECT FRANGIE'S EAR. WHILE I DO NOT WISH TO OFFEND AN OLD FRIEND, I DO FEEL WE MUST BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT USING HIM AS CHANNEL TO FRANGIE. I WOULD MUCH PREFER ASSUME DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH PRES-ELECT AND I AM ALREADY DOING SO. THE TRUTH IS THAT MALIK ALSO WISHES RESUME POLITICAL ACTIVITY, PERHAPS AS FRANGIE'S ROVING AMB OR AS LEBANESE REP AT UN. HIS CURRENT ENDEAVOURS ON BEHALF FRANGIE MUST ALSO BE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF HIS OWN AMBITIONS. I HAVE SOME DOUBTS THAT FRANGIE WILL GIVE HIM AN IMPORTANT POST, BUT THIS REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

2. MALIK ASKED ME SPECIFICALLY TO REMIND PRESIDENT NIXON OF CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH PRESIDENT SOME FOUR MONTHS AGO. YOU REMEMBER THAT ONE OF MALIK'S RECOMMENDATIONS WAS TO PROVIDE ARMS FOR CERTAIN PRIVATE GROUPS IN LEBANON. HE RENEWED THAT RECOMMENDAIION TO ME TODAY (AUG 31). I DID NOT COMMENT, NOR REVEAL IN ANY WAY MY OWN VIEWS. AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE NO SECRETS IN LEBANON.

PORTER

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

(12) WH

SECRET

CONTROL: 7 5 1 1Q
RECD: Jul 30, 4 44PM '70

'70 JUL 30 PM 9:29

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

R 301656Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1187
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 6283

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO AND USUN

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: BEIRUT 6282

1. EMBASSY OFFICER MET WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT TODAY JULY 30 TO GET RUNDOWN ON LAST NIGHT'S MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT HELOU, PRIMIN KARAME, MASS SABRI KHOLI, AND UAR AMBASSADOR SABRI.

2. ACCORDING CONFIDANT, HELOU RECEIVED STRONG IMPRESSION THAT UAR SERIOUS IN ACCEPTING US INITIATIVE AND DETERMINED FOLLOW THROUGH.

3. KHOLI HAD SAID THAT FROM HIS CONTACTS IN DAMASCUS HE CONVINCED SYRIAN OPPOSITION TO UAR ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE INITIATIVE WILL NOT BE TOO VOCIFEROUS AND THAT ULTIMATELY SYRIANS WILL GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER EGYPT ACCEPTS. KHOLI ASCRIBED PRESENT SYRIAN HARD LINE TO TWO FACTORS. FIRST IS SYRIAN BAATHI REGIME'S COMPETITION WITH IRAQI BAATH. SECOND IS INTERNAL SYRIAN BAATH POLITICS. SOME WITHIN PARTY ARE ACCUSING ATASI ON HAVE BEEN TOLD OF ROGERS' PROPOSAL BY NASSER DURING LIBYAN SUMMIT AND THEREFORE OF BEING IN ON NASSER'S INTENTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING. TO DISPROVE THIS, AND AVOID CHARGE OF DEVIATION WITHOUT PARTY CONCURRENCE, ATASI IS, AT LEAST FOR PRESENT, ENCOURAGING THE HARD LINE.

4. ACCORDING CONFIDANT, KHOLI TOLD HELOU THAT HE UN-CONCERNED ABOUT NEGATIVE IRAQI REACTION AS HE CONVINCED IRAQIS WILL BE UNABLE EXERT SERIOUS INFLUENCE ON EVENTS.

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SECRET

5. CONFIDANT SAID THAT BOTH SABRI AND KHOLI HAD EXPRESSED GREAT RESPECT FOR AMBASSADOR PORTER AND CONFIDENCE IN HIM AS SOMEONE WHO BOTH UNDERSTAND'S AREA'S PROBLEMS AND WHO HAS INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON. HELOU CHIMED IN TO SAY AMBASSADOR PORTER TRUE FRIEND OF LEBANON AND OF THE ARABS. KHOLI AND SABRI EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS EXISTED BETWEEN HELOU AND PORTER AND SAID UAR DESIRES THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP CONTINUE UNDER NEXT PRESIDENT. ACCORDING CONFIDANT, THEY TOLD HELOU LEBANON ONLY REMAINING COUNTRY IN MIDDLE EAST WHERE THERE IS A US AMBASSADOR WHO IS BOTH KNOWLEDGEABLE AND WHO HAS INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON, AND CONTINUATION OF CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IS THEREFORE REGARDED AS BENEFICIAL TO EGYPT.

PORTER

BT

NOT PASSED CAIRO AND USUN BY OC/T

PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 301656Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY ~~BEIRUT~~
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1186
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 6282

CONTROL: 7 5 0 3Q
RECD: Jul 30, 4 21PM '70

'70 JUL 30 PM 9:29
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND USUN

SUBJECT: US PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 121161

1. DURING MY CALL ON PRESIDENT HELOU JULY 29, HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED BY UAR ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE INITIATIVE THOUGH HE REMAINS SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL OF CHANCES FOR SUCCESS. NONETHELESS, HE SAID, HE IS BEING PUBLICLY OPTIMISTIC BECAUSE THIS MIGHT HELP THE PROCESS GET STARTED.

2. HELOU SAID HIS GREATEST CONCERN AT PRESENT CONCERNING PEACE INITIATIVE IS THAT PALESTINIANS WILL STEP UP GUERRILLA ATTACKS FROM SYRIA, JORDAN AND LEBANON AND THAT ISRAELIS WILL BUILD THIS UP IN THE INFORMATION MEDIA AS A SIGN OF ARAB BAD FAITH AND AS JUSTIFICATION FOR NOT ACCEPTING US PROPOSALS, OR ENGAGING IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. AN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS POSSIBILITY IS THAT EVEN IF TALKS DO GET STARTED ISRAELIS WILL USE INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AS PRETEXT FOR A MASSIVE ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA OR JORDAN OR POSSIBLY, THOUGH LESS LIKELY AGAINST LEBANON. SUCH A MASSIVE ATTACK MIGHT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ARABS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATING. WITH A VIEW TO FORECLOSING THIS POSSIBILITY, HELOU SAID HE HAD SUGGESTED TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN A RECENT MEETING THAT THE SOVIET PRESS HINT AT FEDAYEEN-ISRAELI COLLUSION AIMED AT STOPPING THE PEACE INITIATIVES. SUCH STORIES MIGHT THEN BE PICKED UP IN ARAB AND PERHAPS WORLD PRESS AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE SABOTAGED. I SAID I HAD NO INDICATION WASHINGTON WAS AT PRESENT CONCERNED WITH IMMINENT ISRAELI MILITARY MOVE.

3. HELOU SAID THAT UAR AMBASSADOR SABRI HAD CALLED ON HIM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND TO GET HIS OPINION ON THREE POINTS: A) WHAT WILL BE REPERCUSSION OF UAR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVE IN THE ARAB WORLD? B) WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS? AND C) IS THE US INITIATIVE SINCERE OR MERELY A MANEUVER? HELOU DID NOT SAY HOW HE HAD REPLIED TO THE FIRST QUESTION. AS FOR THE SECOND, HE HAD

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TRIED TO BE OPTIMISTIC. IN REPLYING TO THE THIRD, HELOU SAID HE HAD ASKED SABRI WHAT HE MEANT BY A MANEUVER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SABRI THAT IN ANY CASE THE US INITIATIVE WAS AN IMPORTANT AND SERIOUSLY MADE STEP. IF IT SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING PEACE TO THE REGION, IT WOULD GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS A BOLD AND SINCERE INITIATIVE; IF IT FAILED, IT WOULD BE CALLED AN INSINCERE MANEUVER. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CHANCE TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE. HELOU SAID THAT SABRI HAD THEN ASKED HIM TO PASS ON ANY INDICATIONS HE MIGHT GET FROM ME CONCERNING US INTENTIONS, PARTICULARLY RELATING TO SINCERITY OF US INITIATIVE.

4. HELOU SAID HE WAS DINING THAT SAME EVENING WITH AMBASSADOR SABRI AND NASSER'S PERSONAL ENVOY, HASSAN SABRI KHOLI, AND ASKED WHAT "INDICATIONS" HE SHOULD PASS ON TO THEM (WITHOUT DIVULGING THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER IN THESE TERMS). I REPLIED THAT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE HE COULD PASS ON THE ASSURANCES I HAD MADE TO HIM THAT US INITIATIVE IS NOT A PLOY BUT A SERIOUS AND SINCERE ATTEMPT TO ARRIVE AT A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THEN, USING THE GUIDANCE IN STATE 121161, I TOLD HELOU THAT WHILE WE DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES, WE INTEND DO ALL WE CAN OVERCOME OBSTACLES TO PEACE. I SAID IT VITALLY IMPORTANT NOT ONLY PERSUADE EGYPTIANS OF US GOOD INTENTIONS BUT ALSO CONVINCE THEM PATH OF NEGOTIATIONS HOLDS REAL PROMISE OF PEACE. ONCE CONVINCED OF THIS, THE EGYPTIANS WILL BE MORE WILLING NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND CONSIDER THE HARD COMPROMISES WHICH WILL BE NECESSARY. I REPEATED THAT BOTH SIDES MUST BE PREPARED FOR REALISTIC COMPROMISE.

5. HELOU SAID HE INTENDED PASS ON TO KHOLI AND SABRI THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM BY SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC AT THE TIME OF OUR MEETING BUT THAT I HAD RESTORED HIS CONFIDENCE WITH MY ARGUMENTS.

6. HELOU SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT FEEL THAT LEBANON, AS NON-BELLIGERENT, WAS UNDER ANY OBLIGATION TO COME OUT PUBLICLY IN SUPPORT EITHER OF THE US PEACE PLAN OR NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT, HE HAD NONETHELESS AUTHORIZED AMBASSADOR SABRI AT THEIR LAST MEETING TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY TO THE EFFECT THAT HE (HELOU) HAD GIVEN HIS FULL SUPPORT TO NASSER'S ACTION IN AGREEING TO THE US PROPOSAL. HE SAID HE FELT THE POSSIBILITY OF STIFFENING EGYPTIAN DETERMINATION TO GO AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS WAS WORTH THE RISK OF TROUBLES BY PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS IN LEBANON. HE REITEREATED THAT MOSLEM LEBANESE STILL LOOKED TO NASSER FOR GUIDANCE AND LEADERSHIP. THIS WOULD LESSEN PALESTINIAN CAPACITY TO STIR UP CONFESSIONAL STRIFE AND TO DIVIDE LEBANESE PEOPLE. NASSER RESPONSE TO US INITIATIVE WAS "PERFECTLY TIMED" FROM POINT OF VIEW LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY.

PORTER

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NOT PASSED CAIRO, AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND USUN BY OC/T

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NODIS

DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU ON PEACE INITIATIVE,
PRESIDENT'S TV INTERVIEW

1. AT BEGINNING OUR MEETING JULY 7, PRESIDENT HELOU SAID HE HAD ASKED ME COME THAT DAY BECAUSE HE EXPECTED HAVE IN HAND PRIOR TO THE MEETING A) SOME FIRM INDICATION OF THE RESULTS OF NASSER'S CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS AND B) A REPORT ON A SCHEDULED MEETING BETWEEN NASSER AND ARAB AMBASSADORS IN MOSCOW. HE REGRETTED HE HAD RECEIVED NEITHER AND ON SUBJECT OF US INITIATIVE HE ONLY ABLE PASS ON WHAT HE HAD TOLD EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR SABRI IN THEIR LAST MEETING. HELOU SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SABRI THAT I HAD REQUESTED HIM (HELOU) TO BE LESS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT US PEACE INITIATIVE AND THAT I CONSIDERED IT REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR BREAKTHROUGH TO PEACE. HELOU SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED SABRI TO PASS ON TO NASSER MY HOPE THAT THE UAR WOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE US PEACE INITIATIVE BECAUSE THE US AND EGYPTIAN POSITIONS ON SUBSTANCE ARE IN FACT VERY CLOSE, WHAT IS LACKING IS CONFIDENCE, AND NOW IS THE TIME FOR EGYPT TO PUT US SINCERITY TO THE TEST. HELOU SAID THAT HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS HE HAD ANY INFORMATION FROM MOSCOW WHICH WOULD REFLECT ON NASSER'S THINKING.

2. COMMENT: AS I SUSPECTED, AND, IN SPITE OF MY URGING, PRESIDENT HELOU DOES NOT NOW SEEM WILLING TO ENGAGE HIMSELF BEYOND SERVING AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION. WHETHER HE WILL BE WILLING DO MORE LATER DEPENDS, I THINK, ON WHAT COMES OUT OF NASSER'S MOSCOW TALKS. END COMMENT.

3. PRESIDENT NIXON'S TV INTERVIEW. HELOU SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S TV INTERVIEW HAD BEEN VERY NEGATIVELY RECEIVED IN THE ARAB WORLD, PARTICULARLY AS HIS REMARKS WERE CONSIDERED AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT SECRETARY ROGERS

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HAD SAID AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AND SEEMED TO CAST DOUBT ON THE SINCERITY OF THE US PEACE INITIATIVE. HELOU SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD REFLECTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS FOR SOME TIME HE HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY COULD HAVE SOME FORTUITOUS BENEFIT. THE US PEACE INITIATIVE HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN THE ARAB WORLD WITH SKEPTICISM, RESERVE, AND EVEN A DEGREE OF REFUSAL. HELOU SAID THAT SINCE HE THOUGHT THE CHANCES FOR ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF THE US INITIATIVE HAD LOOKED SLIM IN ANY CASE, PERHAPS THE "THREATENING AND DESPAIRING" TONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTERVIEW MIGHT BE USEFUL IN SHOCKING THE ARABS INTO TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INITIATIVE. BUT, HELOU ADDED, THE TROUBLE WITH THREATS IS THAT THEY CAN BE MADE ONLY ONCE, OR AT THE MOST TWICE. IF NOT THEN FOLLOWED UP WITH ACTION, THE ADVERSARY IS GRATUITOUSLY MADE TO LOOK HEROIC WHILE THE ONE MAKING THE THREAT LOSES CREDIBILITY.

PORTER

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 1 5 7 9 Q
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R 071546Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4122
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1008
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NODIS

FOR CHARGE

1. DUTCH AMB IS ATTEMPTING GET APPOINTMENTS FOR HIM IN AMMAN LATE THIS WEEK WITH PRIMIN AND FNMIN. HE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO LEND SUPPORT US PEACE INITIATIVE.

2. HE PLANS TELEPHINE YOU AND HOPES TO SEE YOU PRIOR HIS APPOINTMENTS.

PORTER

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NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 5168

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO - NEA

1. AT CONCLUSION OF OUR JUNE 29 MEETING, PRES. HELOU SAID SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSEDLY THAT HE WISHED BROACH WITH ME DIRECTLY SUBJECT OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY. HE SAID HE HAD RECENTLY SEEN FORMER PRES. CHAMOUN AND DEPUTY MUGHABGHAB WHO MADE URGENT APPEAL FOR ARMS FOR THEIR PARTISANS. HELOU SAID HE REPLIED HE COULD NOT HELP THEM AS HE JUST WAS UNABLE ARRANGE TO GIVE THEM ARMS. IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO GET INVOLVED IN ARMING CHRISTIANS WITHOUT CAUSING BITTER LEBANESE MOSLEM AND PALESTINIAN REACTIONS. CHAMOUN THEN SUGGESTED HE USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS. HELOU SAID HE HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL BUT AGREED TO THINK ABOUT IT.

2. APOLOGIZING FOR THE APPARENT INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF A COUNTRY DISCUSSING SUCH A SUBJECT WITH A FOREIGN AMBASSADOR, HELOU SAID, AFTER LONG DELIBERATION, HE HAD DECIDED ASK ME DO WHAT I COULD TO ARM THE CHRISTIANS. HE AND ARRIVED AT THIS DECISION ABOVE ALL ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. HE COULD NOT WITH CLEAR CONSCIENCE LEAVE CHRISTIANS TO GO TO BED EACH NIGHT IN FEAR OF BEING ANNIHILATED BY BETTER-ARMED PALESTINIANS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. HE DOUBTED WHETHER THE ARMS WOULD EVER HAVE TO BE USED, BUT FELT CHRISTIANS HAD THE RIGHT AT THE VERY LEAST TO GO DOWN FIGHTING WITH GUNS IN THEIR HANDS.

3. HELOU SAID HE WAS MAKING THE APPEAL ON HUMAN GROUNDS, BUT THAT RATIONAL ARGUMENTS COULD BE FOUND TO SUPPORT IT. ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR IS THAT IF CHRISTIANS BEGIN TOO STRONGLY TO FEAR BEING OVERWHELMED, THEY MIGHT GIVE UP EFFORT TO MAINTAIN AN ECONOMICALLY LIBERAL, DEMOCRATIC AND WESTERN-ORIENTED LEBANON. A NEGATIVE ARGUMENT, HE CONCEDED, IS THAT AFTER HAVING BEEN ARMED, CHRISTIANS MIGHT MIS-CALCULATE AND ATTEMPT TO USE THEM IN A CRISIS. RATHERE EMOTIONALLY, HELU SAID THIS IS RISK WHICH HE, AS HUMAN BEING, FEELS MUST BE TAKEN. THE CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND TO A CRISIS IN ANY CASE, OR BE OVERWHELMED. THEIR STRENGTH, ON OTHER HAND, WAS STRONG DETERRENCE TO PALESTINIANS TAKING MATTERS IN THEIR OWN HANDS.

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4. AS TO MODALITIES OF DELIVERING ARMS, HELOU SAID HE WOULD LEAVE IT TO US. HE SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF CACHEING ARMS NEARBY (POSSIBLY IN CYPRUS), TO BE GIVEN OUT WHEN NEEDED, OR ELSE GIVING CHRISTIANS MONEY TO PURCHASE ARMS. HE SAID IF THEY HAD ADEQUATE FUNDS, CHRISTIANS WOULD SOMEHOW FIND MEANS OF PURCHASING ARMS. HE NOTED THAT, APPEARANCES TO CONTRARY, THERE JUST WAS NOT ENOUGH CASH LIQUIDITY IN THE ESSENTIALLY LANDED CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY TO PAY FOR SUFFICIENT ARMS, WHICH VERY EXPENSIVE AND HARD TO COME BY IN BLACK MARKET.

5. IN PARTING BID FOR US ARMS SUPPORT FOR CHRISTIANS, HELOU SAID IT COULD VERY WELL BE A MOVE WHICH WOULD SAVE US FROM HAVING TO INTERVENE MILITARILY TO RESCUE ITS CITIZENS -- AN INTERVENTION WHICH WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR US.

6. I SAID I COULD ASSURE THAT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD RECEIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, BUT WHATEVER USG DID WOULD BE DONE IN COMPLETE SECRECY. I WOULD NOT EVEN INFORM HIM OF NATURE OF OUR RESPONSE, AND USG WANTED RECEIVE NO CREDIT FROM LEBANESE CHRISTIAN LEADERS.

7. HELOU'S STRONG VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION REAFFIRM MY NEWLY REVISED JUDGMENT. I BELIEVE MATTER DESERVES URGENT ATTENTION IN WASHINGTON, AND RECOMMEND DECISION IN PRINCIPLE BE MADE SOON AS POSSIBLE SO NECESSARY OPERATIONAL PLANNING CAN TAKE PLACE QUICKLY. THE BEST WAY TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT UNEASY STALEMATE IN LEBANON IS TO ASSURE THAT OUR FRIENDS ARE STRONG - NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE THIS MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE BEST PROTECTION FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE AMERICAN PRESENCE HERE.

8. ALL OF THE OLD ARGUMENTS (WHICH I HAVE SUPPORTED FOR FIVE YEARS) AGAINST USG ASSISTANCE IN ARMING PRIVATE LEBANESE GROUPS ARE, IN MY OPINION, BEING RAPIDLY OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS.

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NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 5517

1. I HAVE NOT SEEN HELOU SINCE PRES. NIXON'S TV COMMENTS ON ME. I NOW HAVE APPOINTMENT TOMORROW AFTERNOON (JULY 7).

2. OF COURSE I INTEND FOLLOW PAST GUIDANCE IN ALL PARTICULARS AND ESPECIALLY ON US POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND FINAL BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS. HELOU WILL SURELY WANT TO REFLECT ON IMPORT PRESIDENT'S REMARKS. IN VIEW OUR REQUEST THAT HELOU LEND HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT TO US PEACE INITIATIVE, WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE DEPT. MAY WISH TRANSMIT.
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BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5518

N O D I S

1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT TOLD ME TODAY (JULY 2) HE TALKED YESTERDAY WITH SOV AMB AZIMOV. AZIMOV'S CURRENT LINE IS AS FOLLOWS: (A) NEGOTIATING PROBLEM BETWEEN US AND SOVS AT MOMENT IS QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION OF WITHDRAWAL ASPECTS OF RESOLUTION 242. HE MADE STRONG PRESENTATION OF SOV INSISTENCE ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, INCLUDING FROM JERUSALEM, AND SAID SOVS COMMITTED TO THEIR POSITION. (B) FRENCH HAVE IDENTITY OF VIEWS WITH SOVS AND BRITISH ARE MOVING MUCH CLOSER. HE STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT RESULTING "ISOLATION" OF US IN BIG FOUR TALKS WOULD BE BEST WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.

2) CONFIDANT WAS INTRIGUED BY TODAY'S BEIRUT PRESS RE-PLAY OF ISRAELI PRESS COMMENT ON NEW SOV PEACE PROPOSALS. AZIMOV HAS NOT, HOWEVER, PROVIDED GOL WITH ANY INFO ALONG THESE LINES.
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1970 JUN 30 18 13Z

NODIS

DEPT PASS OTHER ADDRESEES AS APPROPRIATE

REF: STATE 101599 AND BEIRUT 5439

1. IN COURSE OUR JUNE 29 DISCUSSIONS US PEACE INITIATIVE, I ASKED PRES. HELOU DO WHETEVER HE COULD ELICIT FAVORABLE UAR AND JORDANIAN REACTIONS. PRESIDENT HELOU EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS DO WHAT HE COULD BUT HE DID NOT THINK THAT WOULD BE VERY MUCH SINCE NASSER'S RESPONSE WOULD BE GOVERNED BY CONSIDERATIONS OUT OF HELOU'S CONTROL (REFTEL). HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING SEND SUHAMMAD SABRA, CHIEF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE OF FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO CAIRO TO PASS ON MY ASSURANCES TO HELOU THAT A) DETAILS OF US AND EGYPTIAN POSITIONS ON WITHDRAWAL ACTUALLY VERY CLOSE AND B) US SINCERE IN PRESENT INITIATIVE AND DESIRES OVERCOME LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN UAR-US RELATIONS.

2. COMMENT: IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT HELOU ANXIOUS FOR SUCCESS US INITIATIVE AND HE WILLING DO WHAT HE CAN REASSURE NASSER CONCERNING US INTENTIONS. HIS ATTITUDE ABOUT WHAT LEBANON MIGHT DO, HOWEVER, REFLECTED HIS PESSIMISM OVER ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS. HE WILL PASS ON ANY MESSAGE WE CARE TO SEND, BUT CLEARLY DOES NOT FEEL THAT HIS PERSONAL INFLUENCE WILL PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. I WILL KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON HIM, ALTHOUGH I DOUBT THAT HE WILL DO MUCH UNLESS NASSER'S MOSCOW TALKS GIVE HIM ENCOURAGEMENT TO DO SO.

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S E C R E T BEIRUT 5439

NODIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT HELOU ON US PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: BEIRUT 5167 AND 5308

1. MUCH OF JUNE 29 DISCUSSIONS US PEACE INITIATIVES WITH PRESIDENT HELOU WAS ELABORATION OF HIS VIEWS AS PASSED TO US BY CONFIDANT AND REPORTED REFTELS. AT LIBYAN SUMMIT THERE HAD BEEN NO GENERAL DETAILED DISCUSSION US PEACE INITIATIVES. HELOU BELIEVES THIS WAS BECAUSE NASSER AND HUSSEIN DID NOT WANT GIVE OPPORTUNITY TO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY SYRIANS AND IRAQIS, TO STAKE OUT THEIR PREDICTABLY NEGATIVE POSITIONS AND THUS LIMIT FREEDOM ACTION EGYPT AND JORDAN.

2. MOST OF DISCUSSION US INITIATIVE AT WHICH HELOU HAD BEEN PRESENT FOCUSSED ON QUESTION DELIVERIES AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. IN TWO CONVERSATIONS WITH NASSER, ONE PRIVATE AND ONE AT WHICH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ATASI, TUNISIAN PRIMIN LADGHAM, AND TWO LIBYAN RCC MEMBERS PRESENT, NASSER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED US HAD AGREED TO REPLACE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT LOSSES. HELOU SAID NASSER FOUND SOME SOLACE IN THIS AS AN INDICATION EGYPTIANS KNOCKING DOWN MORE AIRCRAFT THAN ISRAELIS ADMITTING. BUT, HELOU SAID, NASSER DISTURBED BY OPEN-ENDED NATURE THIS PRESUMED US COMMITMENT TO REPLACE ANY NUMBER OF ISRAELI AIRCRAFT REGARDLESS OF HOW AND WHERE LOST. GIVING HIS SUBJECTIVE IMPRESSION NASSER'S REACTION AT LIBYAN CONFERENCE TO US INITIATIVES, HELOU SAID IT HAD BEEN INITIALLY SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE BUT FOLLOWED BY VERY DEEP RESERVATIONS. HELOU ADDED THAT THESE RESERVATIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE REJECTION.

3. HELOU SAID THAT SYRIAN PRESIDENT ATASI HAD TOLD HIM AT LUNCH JUNE 26 (DURING UNSCHEDULED BEIRUT STOPOVER CAUSED BY CLOSING SYRIAN AIRSPACE) THAT THERE NOTHING NEW IN US PROPOSALS AND THAT DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ONLY BEING DELAYED THREE MONTHS. DISTURBINGLY, HELOU SAID ALMOST SAME POSITION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR AZIMOV WHO TOLD HIM INITIATIVE CONTAINED NOTHING NEW AND, AS FOR AIRCRAFT, "WAIT UNTIL SEPTEMBER".

4. GIVING HIS OWN VIEWS, HELOU SAID THAT WHILE HE WELCOMED US INITIATIVE, HE PESSIMISTIC THAT ANYTHING WOULD COME FROM IT. AT MOST, HE EXPECTED IT WOULD PROVIDE A TEMPORARY EASING OF TENSIONS AND RESULT IN A SOMEWHAT LESS DANGEROUS SUMMER. ULTIMATELY, THE INITIATIVE WOULD FAIL BECAUSE BOTH SIDES WOULD REJECT IT. HELOU SAID THAT WHILE HE CONVINCED OF NASSER'S DESIRE FOR PEACE, HE EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT NASSR WOULD ACCEPT THE CONTINUATION, AND EVEN THE DEEPENING, OF THE WAR RATHER THAN "THE SUICIDE WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTANCE OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT BASED UPON LOSS OF ARAB TERRITORY". HELOU SAID HE BELIEVED NASSER SINCERE WHEN HE HAD SAID EVACUATION OF GOLAN MUST PRECEDE SINAI. NASSER UNABLE ACCEPT A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD MARK HIM IN HISTORY AS THE MAN WHO HAD LED THE ARABS TO A PERMANENT LOSS OF THEIR LAND. I ASKED HELOU WHETHER NASSER WOULD FEEL AS STRONGLY ABOUT JERUSALEM. HE REPLIED THAT NASSER MIGHT BE WILLING ACCEPT A SOLUTION CALLING FOR LESS THAN TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, BUT THAT THIS PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR HUSSEIN, AND THAT IN THIS MATTER NASSER COULD NOT DO OTHER THAN FOLLOW HUSSEIN'S LEAD.

5. THE ISRAELIS HELOU DESCRIBED AS NO LESS NEGATIVE TOWARDS US INITIATIVE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT, AS USUAL, THEY WOULD BE SKILLED ENOUGH PUT ONUS FOR REJECTION ON ARABS. SOMEWHAT BITTERLY HE ADDED "THE ISRAELIS HAVE A GOLDEN ADVOCATE IN THE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE BACKED UP BY THE IMBECILES WHO ARE THE ARAB LEADERS".

6. IN UNLIKELY EVENT ARAB STATES SEEMED BE MOVING TOWARD ACCEPTANCE US INITIATIVE, HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT THERE TWO DANGERS: 1) EXPLOSION OF PALESTINAINS IN JORDAN AND LEBANON WITH POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION IN FORMER; 2) ISRAELI MILITARY INITIATIVES TO PROVOKE ARAB STATES INTO REJECTIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS, OR EVEN RESOLUTION 242.

7. I TOLD HELOU I HOPED HE OVERLY PESSIMISTIC BECAUSE THIS VERY SERIOUS INITIATIVE UNDERTAKEN BY PRESIDENT NIXON PRECISELY BECAUSE HE AWARE DANGERS IN CONTINUATION

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3. HELOU SAID THAT SYRIAN PRESIDENT ATASI HAD TOLD HIM AT LUNCH JUNE 26 (DURING UNSCHEDULED BEIRUT STOPOVER CAUSED BY CLOSING SYRIAN AIRSPACE) THAT THERE NOTHING NEW IN US PROPOSALS AND THAT DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ONLY BEING DELAYED THREE MONTHS. DISTURBINGLY, HELOU SAID ALMOST SAME POSITION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR AZIMOV WHO TOLD HIM INITIATIVE CONTAINED NOTHING NEW AND, AS FOR AIRCRAFT, "WAIT UNTIL SEPTEMBER".

4. GIVING HIS OWN VIEWS, HELOU SAID THAT WHILE HE WELCOMED US INITIATIVE, HE PESSIMISTIC THAT ANYTHING WOULD COME FROM IT. AT MOST, HE EXPECTED IT WOULD PROVIDE A TEMPORARY EASING OF TENSIONS AND RESULT IN A SOMEWHAT LESS DANGEROUS SUMMER. ULTIMATELY, THE INITIATIVE WOULD FAIL BECAUSE BOTH SIDES WOULD REJECT IT. HELOU SAID THAT WHILE HE CONVINCED OF NASSER'S DESIRE FOR PEACE, HE EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT NASSR WOULD ACCEPT THE CONTINUATION, AND EVEN THE DEEPENING, OF THE WAR RATHER THAN "THE SUICIDE WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTANCE OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT BASED UPON LOSS OF ARAB TERRITORY". HELOU SAID HE BELIEVED NASSER SINCERE WHEN HE HAD SAID EVACUATION OF GOLAN MUST PRECEDE SINAI. NASSER UNABLE ACCEPT A SOLUTION WHICH WOULD MARK HIM IN HISTORY AS THE MAN WHO HAD LED THE ARABS TO A PERMANENT LOSS OF THEIR LAND. I ASKED HELOU WHETHER NASSER WOULD FEEL AS STRONGLY ABOUT JERUSALEM. HE REPLIED THAT NASSER MIGHT BE WILLING ACCEPT A SOLUTION CALLING FOR LESS THAN TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, BUT THAT THIS PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR HUSSEIN, AND THAT IN THIS MATTER NASSER COULD NOT DO OTHER THAN FOLLOW HUSSEIN'S LEAD.

5. THE ISRAELIS HELOU DESCRIBED AS NO LESS NEGATIVE TOWARDS US INITIATIVE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT, AS USUAL, THEY WOULD BE SKILLED ENOUGH PUT ONUS FOR REJECTION ON ARABS. SOMEWHAT BITTERLY HE ADDED "THE ISRAELIS HAVE A GOLDEN ADVOCATE IN THE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE BACKED UP BY THE IMBECILES WHO ARE THE ARAB LEADERS".

6. IN UNLIKELY EVENT ARAB STATES SEEMED BE MOVING TOWARD ACCEPTANCE US INITIATIVE, HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT THERE TWO DANGERS: 1) EXPLOSION OF PALESTINAINS IN JORDAN AND LEBANON WITH POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION IN FORMER; 2) ISRAELI MILITARY INITIATIVES TO PROVOKE ARAB STATES INTO REJECTIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS, OR EVEN RESOLUTION 242.

7. I TOLD HELOU I HOPED HE OVERLY PESSIMISTIC BECAUSE THIS VERY SERIOUS INITIATIVE UNDERTAKEN BY PRESIDENT NIXON PRECISELY BECAUSE HE AWARE DANGERS IN CONTINUATION PRESENT SITUATION -- DANGERS WHICH PRES. HELOU HIMSELF HAD OUTLINED TO ME AND WHICH HAD BEEN REPORTED TO WASHINGTON. I NOTED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL (WHICH WOULD PRESUMABLY REQUIRE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER PRESENCE) COULD CONCEIVABLY OFFER OPENING WEDGE FOR SOMETHING LIKE "HELOU PLAN," I.E., INTERPOSING UN FORCE BETWEEN COMBATANTS. HELOU SAID THAT TO BE EFFECTIVE, CEASE-FIRE WOULD HAVE TO BE "GENERALIZED" TO INCLUDE JORDANIAN, SYRIAN, AND EVEN LEBANESE CEASE-FIRE LINES AND BE BACKUP BY ARMED UN OBSERVERS IN CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS. IF THIS WERE NOT DONE AND THERE WERE ACTIVITY ON ANY FRONT, ISRAELIS WOULD CLAIM ARABS BREAKING CEASE-FIRE AND SHOWING BAD FAITH AND USE THIS AS PRETEXT UNDERTAKE WHAT ACTIONS THEY SAW FIT.

7. WHILE PRESIDENT HELOU STILL BELIEVES HIS PLAN OF INTERPOSING UN FORCE WAS, AT LEAST AT ONE TIME, THE ONLY PRACTICAL ONE, HE NO LONGER DEFENDS IT WITH SUCH VIGOR AS HE FEELS ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE AND GROWTH PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT MAY HAVE RENDERED IT PASSE. IN SOMEWHAT PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE US INITIATIVE, HELOU SAID ITS BASIC FLAW IS THAT IT APPLIES LOGIC TO AN IRRATIONAL SITUATION. HE LIKENED IT TO PAINTING A NAIL ON THE WALL AND TRYING TO HANG A REAL PICTURE FROM IT. "YOU CAN PAINT TEN, A HUNDRED NAILS, BUT YOU WON'T BE ABLE HAND THE PICTURE". HELOU SAID HE FEELS TIME HAS COME WHEN, IF US WANTS ME SOLUTION, IT MUST "GO BACK TO ZERO" AND RETHINK WHOLE PROBLEM. THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE, HE SUGGESTED, BY BRINGING IN OUTSIDERS WHO CAN EXAMINE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA FROM FRESH VIEWPOINT IT CAN BE DONE BY THOSE WHO HAVE ALL ALONG BEEN WORKING ON ME, BUT THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE CONSCIOUS EFFORT BREAK OUT OF SET THOUGHT PATTERNS OF PAST.

8. HELOU SAID IN SPITE HIS PESSIMISM HE WOULD DO WHATEVER HE COULD HELP SUCCESS US INITIATIVE (SEPTEL).

PORTER

BT

SECRET NODIS

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NNNNVV EHA154
RR RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 7464Q 1772012
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 261800Z JUN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
R 261459Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0929
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5308

SECRET
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HAK Folder—
not sent electronically

RECEIVED
WHCA

1970 JUN 26 20 24Z

NODIS

REF: AMMAN 2934

DEPT PLEASE PASS APPROPRIATE POSTS.

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT INFORMED ME JUNE 23 AFTER HELOU'S RETURN FROM LIBYA, THAT HUSSEIN AND NASSER BOTH HAD INFORMED HELOU THAT THEIR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT USG INTENDED REPLACE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT LOSSES. RIYAD, ACCORDING HELOU, HAD EVEN GLOOMIER VIEW (UNSPECIFIED) RE US POLICY RE AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL. I ASSURED GOL THIS DID NOT ACCORD OUR INFORMATION AND GAVE SIMILAR PRESENTATION AS DID AMMAN (PARA 3, REFTEL). I ALSO URGED HELOU TO CLARIFY US DECISIONS WITH EGYPTIAN AMB HERE AND I BELIEVE THIS WAS DONE JUNE 23 OR 24.

2. GOL OF COURSE NOT UNDER PALESTINIAN GUN TO SAME DEGREE AS HUSSEIN. THEY THEREFORE INCLINED SHOW MORE CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM THAT US INTIATIVE MAY BE FIRST STEP ON ROAD TO PEACE THAN DID ZAID RIFAI. LEBANESE DO EXPECT INTRANSIGENT PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION TO PEACE INITIATIVE, AND CONSTANTLY INQUIRE AS TO HOW US PROPOSES HANDLE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THERE IS ALMOST TOAL AGREEMENT HERE AMONG LEBANESE, AND DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, THAT RESOLUTION 242 PROVISIONS RE JUST SETTLEMENT REFUGEE PROBLEM (INTERPRETED AS LIMITED REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION AND RESETTLEMENT) IS NOT IN ITSELF ADEQUATE APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF PALESTINIANS. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS NO LONGER A "REFUGEE PROBLEM AND CANNOT BE TREATED AS SUCH.

3. MANY LEBANESE FEEL QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS MUST BE SETTLED IN JORDAN, POSSIBLY EBEN AT EXPENSE OF HASHEMITE REGIME. UNTIL OUTLINES OF PALESTINIAN "SOLUTION" BEGIN TO EMERGE, LEBANON WILL BE VERY CUATIOUS IN PUBLICLY SUPPPORTING US INTIAIVE, IN FEAR THIS MIGHT BRING PALESTINIANS INTO STREETS OF BEIRUT.

4.

4. I WILL BE SEEING PRES. HELOU AFTERNOON JUNE 29, AND HOPE GET HIS ANALYSIS OF SITUATION. IN MEANTIME, I THINK WE CAN SAFELY ASSUME LEBANESE WILL CONTINUE PLAY PASSIVE ROLE WITH RESPECT US PEACE INITIATIVE. THEY, LIKE ALL OTHER MODERATES IN MIDDLE EAST, DESPERATELY HOPE USG INITIATIVE WILL SUCCEED. THEY SERIOUSLY DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT NASSER, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN MAKE BOLD RESPONS, AND THEY URGE USG NOT TO BE DISHEARTENED BY NASSER'S APPARENTLY MILITANT STATEMENTS WHCIH THEY VIEW ONLY AS NECESSARY DEFENSE MECHANISM ON HIS PART. THEY ALSO POINT OUT NASSER GREATLY INHIBITED BY JORDANIAN SITA UATION AND HIS DESIRE NOT PUT HUSSEIN MORE ON SPOT.

5. COMMENT: WE ARE ALSO BEGINNING HEAR ANALYSIS THAT USG INITIATIVE HAS "PREDICTABEL" PRO-ISRAELI BIAS, BECAUSE US PROPOSALS ALLEGEDLY REQUIRE ISRAEL MAKE NO COMMITMENTS FOR PEACE UNTIL JORDAN AND UAR HAVE DONE SO. SINCE ARABS BELIEVE (AND ASSUME USG MUST KNOW) THAT HUSSEIN IS CAPTIVE OF HIS SITUATION AT MOMENT AND INCAPABLE OF ACCEPTING ANY "PEACE" NITIATIVE, THEY REASON THAT USG HAS SET UP SITUATION IN WHICH ARABS WILL APPEAR BE OBSTRUCTING PEACE EFFORRTS. ISRAEL WIL L THEN SEEM ENTITLED TO (AND WILL GET) PHANTOMS. I ALSO BELIEVE THIS IS VULNERABLE ASPECT OF OUR CURRENT PROPOSALS, AND ONE WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY HANDLE. OTHERWISE WE WILL BE UNABLE REGAIN ARAB CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS -- AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE INITIATIVE.

PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CN: 68650
RECD: 25 JUN 70
710 AM

O 251016Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 900
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5233

NODIS

REF: AMMAN 2964; STATE 100492

1. WE OF COURSE AGREE WITH AMMAN'S ANALYSIS OF LIKELY PALESTINIAN AND EXTREMIST ARAB REACTION TO SECRETARY'S PROPOSED STATEMENT. OUR VIEWS WERE SPELLED OUT BEIRUT'S 5219.

2. EXCLUSION OF PHRASE QUOTE OUR DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO UNQUOTE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL IN REVISED TEXT IS VERY HELPFUL, THOUGH TEXT OF COURSE STILL LIABLE TO DISTORTION AND MISREPRESENTATION.

3. WE THINK WE CAN SQUEAK BY WITH STATEMENT AS IT STANDS, ALTHOUGH WE CAN EXPECT A CRITICAL ARAB PRESS, WHICH WILL ASSUME AT OUTSET THAT WE ARE COVERING UP HIDDEN COMMITMENTS ON AIRCRAFT SALES. WE THINK AMMAN'S PROBLEM MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN OURS.

4. OBVIOUSLY A GREAT MANY GOVERNMENTS IN ARAB WORLD AND ELSEWHERE ARE GOING TO BE AWARE THAT THERE ARE NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS RE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL AT MOMENT. WE ASSUME THIS WILL LEAK AND WILL SERVE TO MITIGATE POSSIBLE MISREPRESENTATIONS OF STATEMENT. WE HOPE THAT ANY QUESTION AND ANSWER HANDLING IN SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE WILL NOT HAVE TO EMPHASIZE OUR LONG-RANGE COMMITMENTS RE PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL.

PORTER

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
RECEIVED
25 JUN 70 8:58 AM
DEPT. OF STATE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

(10)

SECRET

CONTROL: 6 7 1 2Q
RECD: JUN 24 633PM '70

70 JUN 24 PM 11:12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O 242145Z JUN 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0897
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5227

NODIS

FOR SISCO

REF: STATE 99770

1. DIRGEN MININFO HAS JUST INFORMED US BEIRUT RADIO AT MIDNIGHT WILL CARRY DENIAL BY FONMIN, CALLING ON PRESS TO BEWARE OF MISLEADING RUMORS NOW CIRCULATING RE US PROPOSAL ON ME AND CALLING ATTENTION TO STATEMENT BY PRIMIN THIS MORNING THAT PRESENT ME SITUATION REQUIRES GREATEST DISCRETION AND ANY OFFICIAL COMMENT ON PEACE INITIATIVES WOULD BE PREMATURE.

2. BELIEVE WIRE STORIES ON THIS SUBJECT FROM BEIRUT BEGAN WITH STORY BY IZZAT SHUKRI WHICH HIT REUTERS WIRE ABOUT 1900 LOCAL. SHUKRI SEEMS TO HAVE USED LEAKS FROM OTHER CAPITALS, NOTABLY MAARIV STORY WHICH WAS PLAYED UP LOCALLY THIS MORNING, TO PRY SUFFICIENT ADDITIONAL INFO FROM GOL TO PRODUCE SEMI-ACCRATE STORY.

3. ORIGINAL CUSTODIANS OF THIS INFO WERE HELOU, KHOURY, AND MAJDALANI -- FROM WHOM I EXTRACTED PROMISE TO REVEAL IT TO NO ONE ELSE BUT SADAQA AND LEB AMB TO UAR, WHO IS NOW HERE.

4. AS SOON AS REUTERS STORY HIT WIRES, WE UNDERTOOK TO SHOOT IT DOWN: FIRST BY ISSUANCE OF STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR EMBASSY TO COMMENT ON A SPECULATIVE STORY; SECOND, BY GETTING MININFO TO GET OUT A DENIAL AND RELAYING FACT OF THIS DENIAL TO PRESS CONTACTS.

5. I AM SEEKING LATE-NIGHT APPOINTMENT WITH KHOURY TO INVOKE HELOU'S PERSONAL ATTENTION TO GETTING THE LID BACK ON.

PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

Recommended by Saunders 6/10

O 231615Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0881
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5167

6 1 8 4 Q

1970 JUN 23 PM 12 22

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 5129

1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT INFORMED ME MORNING JUNE 23 THAT HE HAD HAD CHANCE BRIEF HELOU (WHO JUST BACK FROM TRIPOLI) ON US PEACE INITIATIVE. HELOU'S INITIAL REACTION FAVORABLE BUT HE FORESEES PROBLEMS AND ASKS USG TO BE PATIENT IF THERE NO IMMEDIATE RESULTS. HE BELIEVES IT WILL TAKE TIME TO PREPARE THE CLIMATE AND NASSER WILL HAVE TO MOVE SLOWLY TO PROTECT HIMSELF. HELOU HAD NOTED PRIMIN MEIR'S LATEST STATEMENT DEMANDING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND HE CONSIDERED THIS SETBACK. MANY ARABS WILL ASSUME SHE EXPRESSING USG VIEWS. ON OTHER HAND, HE FULLY REALIZED DIFFICULTIES USG MUST BE HAVING IN SECURING ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE ON NEW APPROACH. HELOU OPINED THAT A VISIBLE GAP BETWEEN US AND ISRAELI VIEWPOINTS MIGHT HAVE HELPFUL EFFECT IN IMPROVING ARAB CLIMATE OF OPINION FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2) BOTH HELOU AND FONMIN MAJDALANI WHOM I SAW LATER WERE CONCERNED ABOUT TIMING AND CONTENT US PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH THEY ASSUME WILL BE INCLUDED IN SECRETARY ROGERS' JUNE 24 PRESS CONFERENCE. BOTH URGED THAT AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE BE SAID WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO CONFIRM WIDELY-HELD ARAB VIEW THAT THIS JUST ANOTHER US-ISRAELI CONSPIRACY. REFERRED TO SECRETARY'S GOOD INITIATIVE IN DECEMBER 9 SPEECH WHICH LOST ITS IMPACT BECAUSE ARABS BELIEVED IT DESIGNED MAINLY TO PUT RABAT SUMMIT INTO DISARRAY. THEY ACCEPTED LOGIC OF MY COMMENTS THAT US MUST NOT LET ISRAEL FEEL ISOLATED IF WE ARE TO HAVE DESIRED INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI POLICY. BUT BOTH FELT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE FOR SECRETARY TO SPEAK PRIMARILY TO ARAB PUBLIC OPINION; OTHERWISE USG WOULD BE OPENING ITSELF TO INEVITABLE ATTACK WHICH WOULD IN TURN INHIBIT RESPONSE OF MODERATE ARAB LEADERSHIP -- ABOVE ALL NASSER.

3) MAJDALANI URGED THAT WE EMPHASIZE PHANTOM DECISION IS NEGATIVE. HE ASKED WHY IT NECESSARY PROMISE PUBLICLY COMPLETION OF DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL UNDER EXISTING CONTRACTS. EVERYONE KNOWS THIS WILL BE DONE, BUT ARAB EXTREMISTS WILL TWIST STATEMENT TO IMPLY IT COVER-UP FOR HIDDEN NEW COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL. HE SAID USG SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IT TAKING CONSCIOUS ACT OF RESTRAINT TO ALLOW SHOOTING TO STOP AND TALKING TO START. WE CAN GIVE OUR PRIVATE ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL, HE SAID, BUT HE HOPES WE WILL BE ABLE AVOID MAKING A PUBLIC CONTINGENT COMMITMENT FOR FUTURE AIRCRAFT SALES. THIS WILL BE CONSIDERED FORM OF BLACKMAIL ON ARABS.

SECRET

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4) BOTH HELOU AND MAJDALANI WERE WORRIED ABOUT EFFECT OF US ANNOUNCEMENT ON PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON AND JORDAN. MAJDALANI URGED US KEEP THIS SPECIAL PROBLEM IN MIND WHEN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. HE ALSO CONCERNED BY ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO PALESTINIANS IN PROPOSED JARRING STATEMENT. IN RESPONSE HIS QUESTION, I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER USG ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD MAKE SOME MENTION OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, BUT I WOULD REPORT HIS CONCERN.

5) HELOU REPORTS THAT, IN PRIVATE TALK WITH NASSER, IN LIBYA, THERE WAS GENERAL DISCUSSION OF US PEACE INITIATIVE. HELOU NOT CLEAR HOW WELL NASSER HAFRBEEN BRIEFED AT TIME OF TALK. HE REPORTED NASSER PLEASED THAT US HAD RESPONDED TO MAY 1 SPEECH, BUT HE CHARACTERIZED NASSER AS RESERVED AND SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL OF FEASIBILITY OF US APPROACH. NASSER MENTIONED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT US HAD MADE DECISION REPLACE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT LOSSES - FACT WHICH LEADS ME TO QUESTION HWEHTER NASSER HAD RECEIVED LATEST US COMMUNICATION. HELOU REPORTS HIS FIRM BELIEF, HOWEVER, THAT NASSER STILL STRONGLY SUPPORTS POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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DE RUQMBE 5155 2741342
ZNY SSSSS
O 231330Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 879
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5155

6 1 2 2 Q

1970 JUN 23 AM 10 24

LIMDIS

WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING AS FAR IN ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE TIME AND TEXT ANNOUNCEMENT ON PHANTOMS IN ORDER TO ADVISE SECURITY FORCES HERE.

PORTER

BT

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER MR. GARDNER BROWN S/S-O.

'70 JUN 23 AM 11:58

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5891Q
RECD: JUN 22, 1970
3:56 P.M.

R 221700Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0871
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5130

NODIS - NOFORN

DEPT PASS AMMAN CAIRO LONDON MOSCOW PARIS USUN TEL AVIV JIDDA KUWAIT

REF: STATE 96540

1. WE WELCOME DEPARTMENT'S NEW PEACE INITIATIVE AND BELIEVE DEPARTMENT HAS EVOLVED ON THE WHOLE REASONABLE INTERIM SOLUTION ISRAELI ARMS PROBLEM. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT TO ANTICIPATE PALESTINIAN REACTION, OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT WILL GIVE THE LEBANESE RENEWED HOPE.

2. TO INSURE HOWEVER THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S INTENDED ANNOUNCEMENT WILL HAVE AS FAVORABLE RECEPTION IN THE ARAB WORLD AS POSSIBLE, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS TO THE PUBLIC STATEMENT OUTLINED REFTEL.
(A) THAT SENTENCE (E) IN SECOND PARAGRAPH "THAT THE US STRONGLY DESIRES TO MAINTAIN ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WHO DESIRE OUR FRIENDSHIP" SHOULD BECOME CONSIDERATION (B) AND (B) SHOULD BECOME CONSIDERATION (C). THIS WOULD ENHANCE EMPHASIS ON POINT THAT WE WISH TO MAINTAIN OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARAB WORLD AS WELL AS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND WOULD HELP DISPELL CURRENT MODERATE ARAB FEELING THAT THE US HAS LOST INTEREST IN THE ARABS AND USG ASSETS IN THE ARAB WORLD.
(B) AGAIN WITH AN EYE TO ARAB RECEPTIVITY, WE SUGGEST IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH THAT "DELIVERIES OF AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WILL BE LIMITED AND NOT GO BEYOND" BE AMENDED TO "NO DELIVERIES OF AIRCRAFT WILL BE MADE TO ISRAEL BEYOND THE TOTAL NUMBER CONTEMPLATED UNDER PREVIOUS CONTRACTS". IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS IN VIEW OF THE CONTINGENT ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE ON AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT. IT IS A MORE POSITIVE STATEMENT FROM THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW.

3. ALSO, WE URGE THAT THERE BE NO FURTHER EMPHASIS IN USG STATEMENTS ON ULTIMATE NEED FOR SOME FORM OF DIRECT ARAB-ISRAELI TALKS. IT HAD TO BE SAID ONCE, BUT FURTHER ITERATION OF THIS POINT WILL BE A RED FLAG TO ARABS, AND ONE WHICH MAY ADD TO SUSPICIONS OF US MOTIVES. IF WE REACH POINT WHERE ARABS ARE PREPARED TO AGREE, IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO GET BOTH SIDES IN SAME ROOM.

PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5885Q
RECD: JUN 22, 1970
3:27 P.M.

Recommended by Saunders

P 221745Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0870
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5129

NODIS

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 97788

1) IN ABSENCE PRES. HELOU LIBYA, I BRIEFED PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT AFTERNOON JUNE 22 AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL. HE WILL INFORM HELOU UPON HIS RETURN TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING. I AM ALSO BRIEFING FONMIN MAJDALANI TOMORROW MORNING.

2) CONFIDANT WAS OF COURSE GREATLY HEARTENED. AT SAME TIME HE POINTED OUT CHANCE OF REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE PUSHES US INTO CRITICAL PERIOD IN TERMS OF PALESTINIAN AND EXTREMIST REACTION, PARTICULARLY IN JORDAN AND LEBANON. HE THOUGHT WE WOULD HAVE TO ACT WITH GREAT PRUDENCE AND CAUTION IN RECOGNITION THIS PROBLEM.

3) CONFIDANT SAID ALL LEOWNESE EVIDENCE HOLDS THAT NASSER WANTS POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THEY ALSO BELIEVE SOVS MORE REALISTIC RECENTLY AND ANXIOUS REDUCE TENSION IN AREA. CONFIDANT CITED RECENT CONVERSATION OF LEBANESE TOURISM MINISTER BABIKIAN IN LONG SESSION WITH VINOGRADOV IN MOSCOW. BABIKIAN CAME AWAY WITH STRONG IMPRESSION THAT SOVS DESPERATELY WISH AVOID ESCALATION AND WERE MAKING IT CLEAR TO ALL THEIR ARAB CLIENTS THAT THEY DESIRED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

4) IN RESPONSE CONFIDANT'S QUESTION, I SAID I DID NOT KNOW UAR OR ANY OTHER REACTION AS YET. HE SAID WE MUST NOT BE DISAPPOINTED IF NASSER DOES NOT GIVE CLEAR-CUT RESPONSE. NASSER WILL HAVE TO PROTECT HIMSELF IN HIS RELATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS AND RADICAL ARAB LEADERS. HE WILL THEREFORE INDULGE IN HEDGING AND SOME "IFS". HE ALSO ASSUMED NASSER MIGHT TRY TAKE CREDIT FOR NEW PEACE INITIATIVE AS EGYPTIAN VICTORY. I SAID NO OBJECTION TO NASSER SAVING HIS FACE, SO LONG AS THIS MOVED US TOWARDS PEACE.

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5) CONFIDANT SAID PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE PUBLICLY MENTIONED IN SOME CONTEXT, HOPEFULLY BY USG. IN ANY CASE, PROPOSED JARRING STATEMENT SHOULD MAKE SOME SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PALESTINIANS, PERHAPS USING SIMILAR LANGUAGE TO THAT OF NASSER'S MAY 1 SPEECH, E.G., "FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE JUST AND LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE OF PALESTINE." THIS MIGHT SERVE TO NEUTRALIZE EXTREMIST GROUPS AND TO BUY TIME FOR SEEKING A SOLUTION WITHOUT VIOLENT PALESTINIAN OPPOSITION. IT MIGHT ALSO SAVE HUSSEIN.

6) HE ALSO HOPED WE WOULD NOT GIVE NASSER A DEADLINE AND WE WOULD NOT MAKE OUR UNILATERAL US ANNOUNCEMENT PREMATURELY. STATEMENT MIGHT AROUSE THE PALESTINIANS AND NASSER WOULD THEN BE FORCED INTO A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

7) RE CEASEFIRE. HE BELIEVED A DETERMINED EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PUT IT INTO EFFECT. PERHAPS AT SAME TIME THERE COULD BE A GRADUAL INCREASE IN UN OBSERVER FORCES WHICH WOULD IN ITSELF HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT. EVEN IF CEASEFIRE OCCASIONALLY VIOLATED, IT WAS MUCH BETTER THAN NONE AT ALL.

8) RE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION LEBANON, HE REPEATED THAT US ANNOUNCEMENT NO MATTER HOW MODERATE AND BALANCED IT MIGHT BE, STILL MIGHT BE SIGNAL FOR PALESTINIANS TO APPLY PRESSURE AND DO ALL THE DAMAGE THEY COULD TO OBSTRUCT PEACE. HE REQUESTED USG PROVIDE ADVANCE NOTICE TO GOL OF OUR ANNOUNCEMENT SO MAXIMUM SECURITY PRECAUTIONS COULD BE TAKEN, INCLUDING PREPARATIONS FOR A GENERAL CURFEW.

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SECRET

TELEGRAM

6 3

R 231515Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0882
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5168

6 2 0 7 Q

1970 JUN 23 PM 1 20

NODIS

FOR ASSITANT SECRETARY SISCO

1) THANKS FOR YOUR NOTE OF JUNE 15. FYI, HELOU SENT WORD TO ME TODAY (6/23) URGING USG SUPPLY ARMS TO CHRISTIAN ELEMENTS. HE BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE TO PALESTINIAN VIOLENCE. HE SAID, BASED ON HIS RECENT TALKS WITH SEVERAL CHRISTIAN LEADERS, HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT OUR SUPPORT WOULD NOT EMBOLDEN CHRISTIAN GROUPS TO TAKE MILITANT ACTION ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE. THEY WERE TOO DEEPLY CONCERNED AND WORRIED ABOUT INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION, AND WOULD DO NOTHING ON THEIR OWN TO START BLOOD BATH.

2) I GAVE NON-COMMITTAL RESPONSE AND SAID IF WE DID GET INVOLVED THIS ACTIVITY I WOULD NOT ADMIT IT EVEN TO HIM. CONFIDANT, WHO TRANSMITTED HELOU'S MESSAGE, SAID HELOU WANTED US GET CREDIT WITH THE CHRISTIAN GROUPS. HE FELT IT WOULD GIVE THEM REASSURANCE. I SAID I DISAGREED WITH THIS APPROACH - US HAND SHOULD NOT SHOW.
PORTER
BT

70 JUL 6 PM 11:01
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

(10)

SECRET

CONTROL: 5195Q
RECD: JUN 19, 1970
4:51 P.M.

P 191840Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 843
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 5069

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

1. ALTHOUGH WE INTEND CONTINUE OUR INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIANS CONNECTED WITH THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. FEDAYEEN OFFICIALS TEND TO JUDGE THE US MORE AND MORE AS A HOSTILE POWER AND THEREFORE TO SHUN OFFICIAL US CONTACTS. EVEN SOME OF OUR FRIENDS AMONG THE PALESTINIAN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY FIND THAT THE DIALOGUE HAS RUN DRY. THEY DO NOT SUPPORT THE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION; WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A JEWISH-MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN STATE. MORE AND MORE OF THEM ARE ESPOUSING THE RADICAL VIEW THAT THE US CAN BE BROUGHT AROUND ONLY BY DETERMINED HARASSMENT OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONNEL.

2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE COULD AS SUGGESTED BRIEF FATAH/CONNECTED PROFESSORS AT AUB LIKE YUSUF SAYIGH, ZUHAYR AL'ALAMI AND NABIL SHA'H. WE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, GUARANTEE THAT ANY OF THESE CONTACTS COULD PASS THE MESSAGE INTACT TO FATAH LEADERS OR--IF THEY DID--THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD PRODUCE A CONSTRUCTIVE REACTION, INSURE AGAINST MISREPRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION, OR MODERATE THE PALESTINIAN REACTION THERETO. THIS CHANNEL HAS BEEN USED ONLY ONCE FOR OPERATIONAL MATTERS (AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN JORDAN) AND HAS NOT REALLY BEEN TESTED. THE POINT IS THE US-FEDAYEEN CIRCUIT IS NOT YET READY TO HANDLE TRAFFIC OF SUCH IMPORT. THERE HAS BEEN NO GROUND WORK LAID. SECOND, THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE JORDANIAN DISTURBANCES AND ON THE EVE OF AICAIUIOM ANNOUNCEMENT IS NOT PROPITIOUS. OUR CREDIBILITY IS VERY MUCH AT ISSUE. IN ORDER TO DEVELOP SOME MEANS OF FEDAYEEN CONFIDENCE IN THE US, WE NEED SOME TANGIBLE DEMONSTRATION OF US DETERMINATION TO BREAK THE NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK. A STATEMENT FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ALONG THE LINES OF SENATOR HATFIELD'S EXCELLENT REMARKS CONCERNING THE REFUGEES WOULD BE HELPFUL. WE RECALL THE INTENSE INTEREST EVOKED HERE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S REFERENCE TO PATNSTINE IN HIS BEIRUT DEPARTURE STATEMENT AND HIS STATEMENT AFTER TEHRAN MEETING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USG MIGHT DEMONSTRATE A DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF IMMEDIATE DP REPATRIATION TO THE WEST BANK. FAILING SOME SUCH EARNEST OF US SINCERITY, WE BELIEVE CONSULTATION WITH PALESTINIANS OF TYPE SUGGESTED BY DEPT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.

SECRET

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3. THESE CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT ALTER THIS EMBASSY'S BELIEF THAT AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO OPEN A PERMANENT CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP. THE USG CHOSE TO OPEN LINEUYLMETHE FEDAYEEN ON THE HOSTAGE QUESTION. THE ICRC HAD TO DEAL WITH THE FEDAYEEN IN ORDER TO EVACUATE THE FOREIGNERS FROM AMMAN. AS THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT GAINS IN INFLUENCE AND COHESION, THE NEED FOR A US-FEDAYEEN DIALOGUE WILL CONTINUE TO GROW.

4. IN ORDER TO BREAK DOWN THE BARRIER OF SUSPICION AND SURMOUNT THE PROBLEMS DESCRIBED ABOVE, THE USE MAY HAVE TO RESORT TO SPECIAL DEVICES, E.G., ARRANGE THE VISIT OF A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION TO NEW YORK, OSTENSIBLY TO APPEAR BEFORE THE UN; ARRANGE FOR AN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OR PRIVATE AMERICAN ORGANIZATION. (AFME, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE) TO SET UP A PALESTINIAN COLLOQUIUM; SET UP INFORMAL PALESTINIAN CONTACTS WITH CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES; EMPOWER A PROMINENT JOURNALIST WITH ARAB ENTREE TO SPEAK TO FEDAYEEN LEADERS IN THE SECRETARY'S NAME; SEND KNOWLEDGEABLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM OUTSIDE THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON UNPUBLICIZED FACTFINDING TRIPS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. BY SUCH MEANS, IT MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE USG TO DEVELOP MEANINGFUL EXCHANGES WITH MORE MODERATE FEDAYEEN LEADERS--EXCHANGES WHICH MIGHT BE FOLLOWED UP BY EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO EXTENT OUR AVAILABLE MANPOWER ALLOWED.

PORTER

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN BY OC/T.

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

WH

13

'70 JUN 18 PM 3:34

SITUATION ROOM

USIA RECEIVED

P 181332Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 820
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 4990

4 6 7 2Q

JUNE 18 11 AM

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 4989

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

1) MICHEL KHOURY URGED JUNE 17 THAT USG PROVIDE ARMS ASSISTANCE TO CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY OF LEBANON. HE FELT MAJOR RESTRAINT ON PALESTINIANS CAME FROM FACT OF ADEQUATE CHRISTIAN PARAMILITARY STRENGTH. HE SAID CHRISTIANS HAD BEEN DOIN A LOT ON THEIR OWN AND WERE BETTER ARMED THAN A YEAR AGO, BUT THEY STILL NEEDED CONSIDERABLE HELP AND SHOULD HAVE IT QUICKLY. THIS ASSURANCE OF BACK-UP SUPPORT WOULD ALSO GREATLY IMPROVE CAPACITY AND WILL OF THE ARMY TO MEET FEDAYEEN AND RADICAL THREATS.

2) COMMENT: KHOURY IS NOT ONE OF THE MILITANT CHRISTIANS, EITHER BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION OR BY CONVICTION. THIS IS FIRST TIME HAS EVER RAISED THIS SUBJECT WITH ME.

PORTER

BT

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH (9)

SECRET

R 091600Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0643
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 4563

CONTROL: 2166Q
RECD: JUN 9, 1970
4:00 P.M.

NODIS

REF: STATE 88816

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

1) I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR GIVING US PREVIEW OF EVENTS. WE DO HAVE TWO SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN LEBANON - (A) OUR SUBSTANTIAL AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT, AND THE COMMUNITY (AROUND FIVE THOUSAND), ARE SPREAD OUT AND IN A VULNERABLE POSITION, (B) JUNE 15 IS THE DATE SET FOR APPLICATION OF LEBANESE RESTRUCTIONS ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. GOL IS APPROACHING THIS DATE WITH MUCH APPREHENSION.

2) I AM AFRAID OUR AMERICAN COMMUNITY WILL HAVE TO REMAIN A HOSTAGE TO EVENTS. ANY ATTEMPT TO ALERT THEM IN ADVANCE MIGHT CAUSE SOME PANIC, AND PREDISPOSE THE LEBANESE TO ANTICIPATE THE WORST POSSIBLE US DECISION ON AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL.

3) IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, USG NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVES PROVIDE MEASURE OF REAL HOPE OF PEACE TO LEBANESE, I THINK WE CAN SQUEAK BY WITHOUT MAJOR TROUBLES ON A STATED POLICY OF A "VERY MODEST ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL IN FORM OF REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT." WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR WE TAKE STEP RELUCTANTLY, AND THAT THERE ARE NO HIDDEN COMMITMENTS. I AM SURE YOU WILL DO YOUR BEST TO MAKE THE CARROT MUCH LARGER THAN THE STICK, FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ARAB WORLD.

4) PALESTINIAN REACTION IS ANOTHER MATTER. THE NEARER THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACE APPEARS, THE MORE DANGEROUS THEY MAY BECOME. JUNE 15 IS NOT IN ITSELF THE MAGIC DATE, BUT SOON THEREAFTER WE CAN EXPECT SOME LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN INCIDENT WHICH COULD SPARK OFF SOMETHING LIKE THE EVENTS IN AMMAN TODAY. THE WILL OF THE LEBANESE TO BE TOUGH WITH THE FEDAYEEN WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY TODAY'S AMMAN CONFRONTATION AND ARAB WORLD REACTION, AND I CANNOT CLEARLY PREDICT OUTCOME. IF ARAB WORLD CONDEMNS HUSSEIN, LEBANESE WILL GET VERY GUNSHY, AND PALESTINIANS AND RADICAL GROUPS MIGHT TRY TO HIT OUT AT US PRESENCE.

5) ALL IN ALL, IF SHAPE OF NEW US INITIATIVES ACCURATELY REFLECTED IN EVANS-NOVAK COLUMN JUNE 8 WASHINGTON POST, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE WILL EXPERIENCE SHARP DETERIORATION USG POSITION IN LEBANON, AS WOULD BE CERTAIN CASE IF WE MADE ADD-ON AIRCRAFT SALE TO ISRAEL. I WILL OF COURSE ASSURE THAT OUR PLANNING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES IS AT MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY.

FORTER

SECRET

JUN 9 70 PM 9 02 SITUATION ROOM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

MSG. NO. 938

1. TRANSMITTED BY: M A Parker 2. TO: WH

DATE & TIME DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1970 JUN 2 PM 5 35

'70 JUN 2 PM 5:36

3. ORIGINATOR: INR/OOC - Gardner 4. RECEIVED BY: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DATE & TIME:

5. DESCRIPTION: Memo - 6/2/70

6. CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS: Secret/NODIS

7. NO. OF PGS: 2 8. PRECEDENCE 9. VALIDATED BY:

10. DELIVER TO: Mr Jessup - X3334 FOR: CLEARANCE

INFORMATION

PER REQUEST

Revised: 9 Jan. 1970

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OPTIONAL FORM
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET/NODIS

TO : INR/DDC - Ambassador Wymberley DeR Coerr DATE: June 2, 1970

FROM : NEA/ARN - Talcott W. Seelye

SUBJECT: M-41 Tanks for Lebanon

During the 40 Committee meeting held on May 25 the Committee chairman asked for clarification regarding our undertaking to sell 50 excess M-41 tanks to Lebanon. A report on the status of this transaction was contained in the memorandum which was circulated to members of the 40 Committee for the meeting held on May 25 and was also contained in a memorandum to the WASAG Working Group in early May outlining recent actions taken to assist Lebanon. The following is a recapitulation of what has occurred in connection with this transaction and where we stand at the present.

In consonance with the Lebanese Army's effort to improve its internal security, particularly in coping with the fedayeen, the President of Lebanon in talks with Ambassador Porter expressed the view that additional tanks would be helpful. Since the Lebanese Army already has World War II vintage M-41 tanks in its inventory, Ambassador Porter came up with the idea that we try to locate some surplus M-41 tanks. After checking with the Defense Department we informed Ambassador Porter that it would take some 18 months to rehabilitate surplus tanks. In view of the urgent, immediate problem which the Lebanese Army is currently having with the fedayeen, Ambassador Porter suggested to the Lebanese Government--and the latter agreed--that the tanks be acquired on an "as is" basis. The Lebanese sent a military team to inspect the tanks and agreed to their purchase in the full understanding that they would not be in top operating condition. DOD/ISA agreed to a concessional price of $12,583 for each tank which would include communications and certain other essential operating equipment. On the basis of a DOD/ISA undertaking to make these tanks available at this price, we informed the Lebanese Government.

In the meantime, however, it appears that the U.S. Army is experiencing difficulty in making these tanks operable even to a limited

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extent for the concessional price quoted. We are now in the process of trying to resolve this problem since we have already made a commitment to the Lebanese Government.

NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:no

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

(12)

5643Q

MAY 25, 5:55 PM 1970

10 MAY 25 PM 9:31

SITUATION ROOM

R 251645Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0485
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 4089

NODIS

SUBJ: RIFLES FOR LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 3694

WE MOST STRONGLY HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY M-1 RIFLES BY MAC AIRCRAFT AS SUGGESTED REFTEL. WITH IMPACT ON SOUTH LEBANON OF ISRAELI RETALIATORY RAIDS OF MAY 12 AND MAY 22 THE REQUIREMENT FOR THESE RIFLES HAS BECOME EVEN MORE URGENT. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LEBANESE ARMY GENERAL NOUJAIM ONLY RECENTLY UNDERLINED HIS INTEREST TO ARMA IN RECEIVING THE RIFLES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GOL STILL HAS UAR OFFER TO SUPPLY ARMS FREE OF CHARGE AND OUR UNDERSTANDING YASSIR ARAFAT HAS ALSO AGREED TO SUPPLY ARMS TO WIN FRIENDS AMONG SOUTH LEBANESE.

PORTER

BT

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 171048Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 186
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3026

Control: 4833Q
Recd : 17 Apr 70
10:46 a.m.

NODIS

1. ROBERT ANDERSON SHOWED ME MEMCON HIS TALK WITH NASSER APRIL 13 WHICH INCLUDED DETAILED DIALOGUE ON NASSER'S CHANGED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVS. ANDERSON'S VIEW WAS THAT NASSER BELIEVES SOVS ARE COMMITTED TO GIVING HIM SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT AND SOV PERSONNEL TO MAN IT. RESULT WOULD BE THAT WAR WITH ISRAEL "WAS ABOUT TO TAKE A NEW AND DIFFERENT TURN92 ANDERSON, WHO KNOWS NASSER WELL, FELT NASSER MEANT WHAT HE SAID, ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NASSER MIGHT BE USING HIM IN A DISINFORMATION ATTEMPT. ANDERSON REPORTED THAT HE HAD GENERAL CORROBORATION OF NEW DIMENSION OF SOV ASSISTANCE FROM DR KAISSOUNI. EXCERPTS FROM MEMCONS WHICH FOLLOW ARE UNCLEARED AND UNEDITED BY ANDERSON. HE HAD PLANNED TO REPORT PERSONALLY AFTER HIS RETURN US, BUT IN VIEW NEW INTELLIGENCE RECENTLY RECEIVED RE NATURE SOV MILITARY SUPPORT TO UAR, I FEEL COMPELLED SUBMIT THIS WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION AND PRIOR HIS RETURN. I WILL ALSO SHOW TO SISCO.

2. QTE - NASSER STATED THAT THE WAR WITH ISRAEL WAS ABOUT TO TAKE A NEW AND DIFFERENT TURN. HE STATED THAT WHEN THE ISRAELIS BEGAN BOMBING DEEP INTO THE INTERIOR AND NEAR CAIRO IN DECEMBER, HE WAS IN GREAT TROUBLE. EARLY IN JANUARY HE CALLED BREZHNEV AND SIMPLY SAID THAT ON A CERTAIN DAY HE WAS COMING TO MOSCOW AND THAT DECISIONS HAD TO BE MADE CONCERNING INCREASED SOV ASSISTANCE TO THE UAR. HE SAID, "I DID NOT ASK IF I COULD COME; I JUST ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS COMING AND I PICKED OUT THE DATE." UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW, NASSER SAID HE WENT IMMEDIATELY TO BREZHNEV. HE SAID THAT HE WAS COMING NOT ONLY TO ASK FOR NEW AND SUFFICIENTLY SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS BUT ALSO FOR THE TRAINED MEN WHO COULD OPERATE THEM. HE TOLD BREZHNEV THAT HE, NASSER, HAD LOST HIS HONOR IN 1967 AND THE QUESTION WAS NO LONGER THE HONOR OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UAR, IT WAS A QUESTION OF THE HONOR OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION. HE WANTED TO KNOW IF BREZHNEV WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT CHALLENGE BECAUSE HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVS COULD AFFORD TO BE DEFEATED BY ISRAEL AND REMAIN IN POWER. HE TOLD BREZHNEV THAT HE WANTED NOT ONLY AN ABILITY TO DEFEND HIS COUNTRY AGAINST ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS BUT HE WANTED TO HAVE THE ABILITY TO RETALIATE. HE STATED THAT NASSER'S PRESENT EQUIPMENT WAS SUCH THAT A GOOD MANY OF HIS AIRCRAFT COULD NOT REACH TARGETS IN ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE ISRAELI PLANES HAD REACHED

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SECRET

Beirut 3026, Section 1 dtd 17 Apr 70 Control: 4833Q

TARGETS IN EGYPT WHEREVER THEY MIGHT BE LOCATED. HE TOLD BREZHNEV THAT HE WAS GOING TO STAY IN MOSCOW UNTIL THE SOVS TOOK A POLICY DECISION AND THAT THIS DECISION SHOULD INCLUDE A DETERMINATION BY MOSCOW THAT ANY RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST ISRAEL SHOULD BE ON A SUSTAINED BASIS AND NOT ON AN OCCASIONAL BASIS. NASSER STATED THAT HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT BREZHNEV WAS THE REAL POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THERE WAS NOT A TROIKA OR DEIVISION OF AUTHORITY AS WAS REPORTED IN THE NEWSPAPERS. BREZHNEV TOLD HIM THAT THIS DECISION WAS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT HE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT NOT ONLY WITH HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES BUT WITH THE MARSHALS OF THE SOV FORCES AND THAT THIS WOULD TAKE TIME. NASSER TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD WAIT AND DID WAIT FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS. HE STATED THAT HIS POSITION WAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY ALEXANDER SHELEPIN AND DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE MINISTER IN CHARGE OF MILITARY LOGISTICS VISITED HIM AND EXPRESSED COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR NASSER'S POSITION. WHEN ASKED IF THERE WAS AN AREA OF DEBATE BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN ON THE ONE HAND AND SHELELPIN AND SUSLOV ON THE OTHER, NASSER REITERATED THAT DECISIONS OF THIS KIND WERE IN FACT TAKEN BY BREZHNEV AND HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY SUBSTANTIAL DEBATE GOING ON. WHEN ASKED IF HE WERE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS IN THE SOV ECONOMY AND ITS GROWING PROBLEM WITH CHINA, HE SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS MORE CONCERN ABOUT THE ECONOMY THAN WITH CHINA, ALTHOUGH HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE PROBLEMS. HE STATED THAT HE HAD MET WITH ALL OF THE SOV MARSHALS AND ATTENDED A DINNER GIVEN BY THEM IN HIS HONOR AND THAT HE HAD THEIR FULL SUPPORT. HE SAYS THAT THE SOV GOVERNMENT IS MILITARILY ORIENTED BECAUSE THAT IS THE ONLY SECURE WAY OF MAINTAINING POWER. NASSER STATED THAT HE NOW HAD SOV SUPPORT FROM THE COMPANY LEVEL UP TO AND INCLUDING THE DEPT OF DEFENSE AND THAT IN A VERY SHORT TIME THE COMPLEXION OF THE WAR WOULD CHANGE. HE SEEMED VERY CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD HAVE FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING EGYPT AND STATED THAT WITHOUT THE RUSSIAN COMMITMENT OF BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL HE WOULD FACE A FIVE-YEAR WAIT BUT THAT WITH THIS COMMITMENT THE COMPLEXION OF THE WAR WOULD SOON CHANGE. NASSER SAID THAT HE HAD REFUSED IN THE PAST TO ALLOW HIS ARMY TO ATTACK TARGETS IN ISRAEL OR THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT BE PROTECTED FROM THE AIR AND BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST NASSER AND NASSER WOULC BE UNABLE TO RETALIATE.

PORTER

BT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 171048Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 187
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3026

Control: 4877Q
Recd : 17 Apr 70
11:16 a.m.

NODIS

3. QTE - HE STATED THAT IN A SHORT TIME HE THOUGH THE AIR STRENGTH WOULD BE SO EVENLY BALANCED THAT HIS GROUND FORCES COULD AGAIN BECOME EFFECTIVE. I TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD READ IN THE NEWSPAPERS THAT THE NEW RUSSIAN MISSILE, SA-3, WAS BEING PUT INTO OPERATIONAL POSITIONS IN THE UAR AND BY SOV TECHNICIANS BUT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK HIM A DIRECT QUESTION WHICH, IF HE DID NOT WANT TO ANSWER, HE COULD SAY SO. I THEN ASKED HIM IF HE HAD A COMMITMENT FROM THE SOVS TO SUPPLY PILOTS AND AIRCRAFT THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED A MATCH FOR THE US PHANTOMS. HE PONDERED THE QUESTION FOR SEVERAL MINUTES AND THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER NOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION DIRECTLY, BUT HE WOULD SAY THAT HE WOULD NO LONGER HAVE TO FIGHT A PURELY DEFENSIVE WAR AND THAT WHEN IT CAME HIS TURN TO RETALIATE, IT WOULD BE ON A SUSTAINED BASIS.

4. QTE - NASSER SAID THAT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ALTHOUGH HE WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AS WERE THE SOVS, NEVERTHELESS HE WOULD NOT NOW HAVE TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS AS HAD BEEN THE CASE. UNQTE.

5. FOLLOWING IS EXCERPT ANDERSON'S CONVERSATION WITH KAISSOUNI.

6. QTE - KAISSOUNI ASKED ME IF I HAD THE SAME VIEW I HAD ONCE EXPRESSED -- THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY MAINTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY FOR QUITE A WHILE DUE TO THEIR SUPERIOR TRAINING -- AND WHEN I REPLIED THAT I STILL DID, HE REPLIED, " WHAT IF WE GET LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM TRAINED PROFESSIONAL ON THE OUTSIDE?" I REPLIED BY SAYING OF COURSE IF THIS ASSISTANCE WAS FORTHCOMING IN SUFFICIENT BODY, IT COULD CHANGE THE WHOLE MILITARY POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KAISSOUNI SAID, "THAT IS EXECTLY WHAT I THINK WE WILL DO. I THINK IN A VERY SHORT TIME WE WILL BE MORE THAN A MATCH FOR ISRAEL." THIS STATEMENT TOOK ON ADDED SIGNIFICANCE IN VIEW OF MY SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH NASSER WHICH ARE REPORTED SEPARATELY. UNQTE.

PORTER

HT

SECRET

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WH Nation 14

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 1051322
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 168
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2959

4 0 2 4 Q

1970 APR 15 AM 9 32

NODIS

SUBJ: M-1 RIFLES FOR LEBANESE ARMY

1) IN THE TEN DAYS SINCE MY RETURN, I HAVE NOT RAISED SUBJECT OF EARLIER LEBANESE REQUEST FOR RIFLES BECAUSE (A) I WANTED TO TEST SINCERITY OF LEBANESE INTENTIONS AND (B) I WAS HOPING FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON.

2) TODAY (APRIL 14) CIC GENERAL NOUJAIM SUMMONED DATT TO DISCUSS SUBJECT OF RIFLES. NOUJAIM SAID IT ESSENTIAL GET AN ANSWER QUICKLY SINCE VILLAGE LEADERS IN SOUTH LEBANON WERE DEMANDING WEAPONS FOR VILLAGE DEFENSE, AND LEBANESE ARMY WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND. NASSER, HE SAID, HAD MADE OFFER THREE MONTHS AGO TO PROVIDE LEBANON ALL THE SMALL ARMS IT NEEDED IN THE SOUTH AT NO COST. LEBANESE DUCKING THIS OFFER BUT ARE AFRAID PRESSURES WILL MOUNT UNLESS ANOTHER SOURCE OF SUPPLY QUICKLY FOUND. NOUJAIVDADMITTED THAT HE HOPED ARMS WOULD BE USED BY VILLAGERS TO KEEP OUT FEDAYEEN. SINCE CAIRO AGREEMENT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ARMY TO ACT DIRECTLY AGAINST FEDAYEEN WITHOUT PRECIPITATING MAJOR INTERNAL DISTURBANCES, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT VILLAGERS BE ABLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES. IF FEDAYEEN ATTACKED VILLAGES THIS OF COURSE WOULD GIVE ARMY PRECTXT TO PUT PRESSURE ON FEDAYEEN.

3) DATT TOLD NOUJAIM THAT WE HAD BEEN LOOKING INTO AVAILABILITY M-1'S. THEY WERE AVAILABLE BUT THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF RECONDITIONING, AND WE HOPED HAVE ANSWER FOR HIM SHORTLY. HE ADDED THAT USG UNABLE PROVIDE RIFLES AS GIFT, BUT HOPED WE COULD SELL AT NOMINAL PRICE.

4) COMMENT: GOL CLEARLY GOING TO HAVE TO DO SOMETHING TO ARM SOUTHERN VILLAGERS. UNDERSTANDABLY LEBANESE PREFER NOT TO GIVE NASSER THE CREDIT. I REPEAT MY EARLIER ENDORSEMENT FOR A FAVORABLE USG RESPONSE TO LEBANESE ARMYS REQUEST FOR M-1 RIFLES, AND HOPE ARRANGEMENTS CAN SHORTLY BE WORKED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, I.E., THAT A DEAL BE COMPLETELY OVERT TRANSACTION AS FAR AS LEBANESE ARMY CONCERNED, BUT THAT UNIT PRICE BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. IDEALLY, THE M-1'S SHOULD BE SOLD AT A "SCRAP-VALUE" PRICE. THE FACT THAT THEY ARE USEABLE WEAPONS WOULD BE FORTUITOUS.
PORTER

'70 APR 15 AM 11:21
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

W 1d 11

'70 APR 9 AM 10:40

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O 091000Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 127
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 2774

CN-2388Q
April 9, 1970
5:54 a.m.

NODIS

1. ROBERT ANDERSON HAD LONG MEETING YESTERDAY WITH KING HUSSEIN WHICH HE SUMMARIZING AND REPORTING SEPARATELY. ANDERSON ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH HUSSEIN GAVE HIM IN STRICTIST CONFIDENCE.

2. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAS RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT IRAQIS PLANNING ATTACK ON TWO GERMAN TANKERS AT ABADAN IN FUTURE. HUSSEIN SAID TANKERS WERE FLYING IRANIAN FLAG. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY WERE NOW IN PORT OR THE NATURE OF THE SABOTAGE ATTEMPT, BUT WANTED INFORMATION PASSED ON IMMEDIATELY TO USG FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.

3. DEPARTMENT PASS INTERESTED POSTS AS APPROPRIATE.

PORTER

BT

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 09-12/29; Pet Ltr 8-4-2009
By P.H NARA, Date 10.22.09

~~SECRET~~

CP 1 of 1

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(11) WH

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

IN CONTROL: 14540
RECD: April 6, 1970
6:18 P.M.

O R 062132Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0108
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3824
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 0999
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2320
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2614
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1621
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2685

NODIS

1. ANY OFFICIAL U.S. VISITOR TO BEIRUT WILL CREATE OPPORTUNITY FOR ANTI-AMERICAN PROPANGANDA CAMPAIGN IN PART RADICALS AND SOME PALESTINIAN GROUPS. I DO NOT BELIEVE HOWEVER THAT LEBANESE WILL ALLOW SECURITY SITUATION TO GET OUT OF HAND, OR THAT FEDAYEEN WILL USE OCCASION OF SISCO VISIT TO ATTEMPT TO CHALLENGE LEBANESE AUTHORITY. WE HAVE HAD NO INDICATION FROM HELOU THAT HE IS CONCERNED ENOUGH TO QUESTION WHETHER VISIT SHOULD OCCUR.

2. ISOLATED INCIDENTS ARE ALWAYS POSSIBLE, BUT WE WOULD TRY AVOID PUBLICIZING ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES, AS WELL AS SCHEDULED APPOINTMENTS TIMES IN BEIRUT. SECURITY SITUATION IN CITY IS MUCH BETTER AT MOMENT AND WE HAVE NO INDICATION IT WILL DETERIORITE IN NEAR FUTURE.

3. WE WILL FACE COMPARABLE THREATS IN FUTURE WITH REGARD TO ANY PROPOSED VISIT OF U.S. OFFICIALS. IF WE ACCEPT THREATS AT FACE VALUE, ANY CHANCE OF DIALOGUE WITH ARABS IS FINISHED. I BELIEVE RISKS ARE MININAL, AND THAT SISCO TRIP TO AREA IS IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO TEST CURRENT ARAB VIEWS. LEBANESE STOP-OVER IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN CAIRO OR AMMAN, BUT NONETHELESS NECESSARY TO BUTTER SAGGING LEBANESE MORALE. IF SISCO SEEING NASSER, THIS WILL SERVE TO EASE SITUATION HERE, AND REDUCE SECURITY RISK.

4. PREDICTALLY, FEDAYEEN WILL CHARGE SISCO WITH CONSPIRACY AFTER THE FACT, BUT THIS IS NOW PAR FOR THE COURSE. IF WE WORRY UNDULY ABOUT THIS TYPE OF DENIGRATION, WE WILL SOON FIND OURSELVES EXCLUDED FROM THE ARAB WORLD.

5. WE WILL OF COURSE WATCH SITUATION CLOSELY, AND REPORT ANY DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD ALTER ABOVE JUDGEMENT.

PORTER

BT

PASSED AMMAN, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JIDDA AND KUWAIT BY OC/T.
4-6-70

SECRET

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 291104Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 054
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2473

INCN: 7 3 6 6Q
MARCH 29, 1970
6:41 A.M.

NODIS

REF STATE'S 45899 AND 45900

INFORM DUTY OFFICER 0900 HOURS MARCH 29

FOR AMBASSADOR PORTER

SAW KHOURY THIS MORNING MARCH 29 AND INFORMED HIM CONTENTS REFTELS STRESSING URGENCY AND NECESSITY MAKE DECISION SOONEST. HE MOST APPRECIATIVE DEPARTMENT'S AND YOUR EFFORTS. ADVISED KHOURY COL. BRUDER REQUESTING APPOINTMENT WITH GENERAL NAUJAIM AND ASKED HE OR OTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL CALL NAUJOUM TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE HIS SEEING BRUDER THIS WEEKEND. HE AGREED DO SO. JUST INFORMED NAUJAIM SEEING BRUDER 1300 LOCAL TIME. ALTHOUGH I GAVE KHOURY DETAILS PROPOSED, FEEL FAR BETTER FOR FORMAL PRESENTATION BE MADE BETWEEN NAUJAIM AND BRUDER, SO THAT TECHNICAL ASPECTS PROPOSAL CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY GOL.

KHOURY MOST INTERESTED IN TERMS OF 120 DAY PAYMENT AFTER DELIVERY EQUIPMENT WITH SUBSEQUENT PROSPECT CREDIT (I MADE ALL THE CAVEATS) AS HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAS TOLD US BEFORE GOL HAS NO MONEY. ACCORDING KHOURY, ARMY HAS USED UP RESERVES AND "60 MILLION LEBANESE POUND FUND" HAS BEEN ALMOST USED UP IN SOUTH FOR FORTIFICATIONS, SHELTERS, INDEMNITIES ETC. INDICATED WOULD REQUEST PARLIAMENTARY CREDIT BUT CONCERNED AT PROSPECT FACING QUERIES FROM DEPUTIES AS TO WHY GOL PUTTING ALL EGGS IN WESTERN BASKET AND NOT ACCEPTING SOVIET OFFERS. SAID PROBLEM FURTHER COMPLICATED BY FACT SHIITE MUFTI MUSA BADR DURING RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO SAW PRESIDENT NASSER WHO OFFERED SUPPLY ALL LIGHT ARMS NEEDED FOR SOUTH. INFORMED HIM RIFLE PROBLEM STILL BEING DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.

DO WE HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT CREDIT TERMS LIKELY BE?

BELIEVE THIS ALL WE CAN DO FOR MOMENT. GRATEFUL YOUR MESSAGE AS GOL BEEN ANXIOUSLY AWAITING FURTHER WORD OUR POSITION. NEEDLESS TO SAY THEIR ANXIETY HAS INCREASED AS A RESULT RECENT EVENTS. ALL THE BEST.

HOUGHTON

BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH 13

SECRET

'70 MAR 18 PM 2:49

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

45 6 2Q

1970 MAR 18 PM 1 39

R 181510Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9938
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2149

NODIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 037919

1. AMBASSADOR SAW REFTEL BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE MARCH 16 AND WILL DISCUSS IN DETAIL DURING HIS FORTHCOMING CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON. MEANTIME, WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER CLARIFICATION ON FEW OF POINTS RAISED.

2. PRESIDENT HELOU IS MUCH AWARE AND APPRECIATIVE OF EFFORTS MADE TO MAKE AVAILABLE SALES TO GOL OF 6,000 M-14 RIFLES. HIS PROBLEM HOWEVER AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT IS MONEY. AS FAR AS TRANSPORT OF THE M-1 RIFLES IS CONCERNED, GENERAL NOUJAIM IN HIS INITIAL TALK WITH THE AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT GOL WOULD HANDLE DELIVERY FROM US TO LEBANON (BEIRUT 1350). THESE RIFLES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN SOUGHT FOR PURPOSE OF ARMING THE SOUTHERN VILLAGERS. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THE PUBLIC IS DEMANDING THAT BORDER VILLAGES BE ARMED. THE GOL WILL SIMPLY BE SELECTIVE ABOUT WHICH VILLAGE.

HOUGHTON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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3955Q

R 161610Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9913
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 2070

MAR 16, 1970 3:09 PM

NODIS

REF: STATE 37959

SUBJ: POUIFAPE USG CONTACTS WITH FEDAYEEN

AMBASSADOR PORTER WILL DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF CONTACTS WITH THE FEDAYEEN DURING HIS PERIOD OF CONSULTATION IN THE DEPARTMENT, PROBABLY BEGINNING MARCH 23.

HOUGHTON

BT

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WH

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

12

PP 111702Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE PRIORITY 9871
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 1933

Control: 2663Q
Recd : 11 Mar 70
1:21 p.m.

REF: STATE 27912

NODIS

1. THINK FAVORABLE US RESPONSE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR GIFT OF M-1 RIFLES OR CARBINES WOULD HAVE A PARTICULARLY SALUTARY EFFECT AT THIS MOMENT. POLITICAL PLUS TO USG IN BOLSTERING LEBANESE BACKBONE WOULD FAR OFFSET THE COST. PERHAPS WE COULD FIND COVERT WAY TO SUBSIDIZE THE DEAL, IF THERE NO OTHER FEASIBLE SOLUTION.

2. I CAN UNDERSTAND DEPARTMENT'S PUZZLEMENT OVER APPARENT INABILITY LEBANESE TO PROCURE M-1'S COMMERCIALLY. WE KNOW LEBANESE ARMY IS AWARE OF AVAILABILITY AND PRICE IN OPEN MARKET. I CANNOT HONESTLY SAY THAT LEBANESE CANNOT AFFORD TO DO SO. THEY TELL ME CONSTANTLY AND CONSISTENTLY THEY ARE STRAPPED AND THAT NO FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE WHICH ARE NOT ALREADY PROGRAMMED OR COMMITTED FOR OTHER ITEMS. I CAN ONLY ACCEPT THIS STATEMENT AT FACE VALUE.

3. APART FROM PRACTICAL END USE OF RIFLES, WHAT PRES HELOU AND GEN NOUJAIM REALLY WANT FROM USG AT THIS POINT IS A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST. I THINK THEY VIEW THIS REQUEST ABOVE ALL IN THAT LIGHT.

PORTER

BT

'70 MAR 11 PM 4:35
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

W14 Lebanon

SECRET

FEB 20 PM 2 30 WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

P 201051Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9718
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 1350

Control: 4775Q
Recd : 20 Feb 70
10:22 a.m.

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 1104

1. SINCE DISPATCH REFTEL WE HAVE HAD SPECIFIC REQUESTS DIRECTLY FROM PRES HELOU AS WELL AS FROM MICHEL KHOURY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GEN NOUJAIM, REQUESTING A US GRANT OF SMALL ARMS WITH WHICH LEBANESE ARMY CAN EQUIP LOYAL SOUTHERN VILLAGES. RATIONALE OF HELOU'S REQUEST CONTAINED IN MEMCOM HIS CONVERSATION WITH LINCOLN FEB 9 (POUCHED TO SEELYE FEB 13). NOUJAIM REAFFIRMED THE REQUEST TO ME AGAIN TODAY AT HELOU'S BIDDING, ASKING SPECIFICALLY FOR 5,000 WEAPONS.

2. I HAVE REITERATED TO ALL CONCERNED THE LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON US GRANT MILITARY AID AND HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE REQUEST WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR USG TO RESPOND TO, NO MATTER HOW FAVORABLY WE MIGHT VIEW IT IN PRINCIPLE. LEBANESE HAVE STRESSED URGENCY OF ASSISTANCE, AND HAVE ASKED THAT THIS SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR US SUPPORT BE GIVEN SPECIAL CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON. FRANKLY I THINK HELOU VIEWS THE MATTER AS MUCH IN PSYCHOLOGICAL AS IN FINANCIAL TERMS. HE WANTS AND NEEDS THE REASSURANCE OF A TANGIBLE US GESTURE, AND HE CAN'T BELIEVE THAT WE UNABLE TO FIND A WAY TO DO IT.

3. NOUJAIM INFORMED ME TODAY THAT HE NOW ESTIMATES THERE AT LEAST 50,000 WEAPONS IN LEBANON IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO DON'T SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. THE REQUESTED GIFT OF 5,000 WORLD WAR II RIFLES MAY NOT GO FAR IN REDRESSING THIS IMBALANCE, BUT HELOU AND THE ARMY FEEL IT WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IN STIFFENING THE RESISTANCE OF THE SOUTH LEBANESE TO AVOID FEDAYEEN TAKEOVER OF THE AREA - A TAKEOVER WHICH THE ARMY CAN'T OPENLY RESIST. NOUJAIM WAS EMPHATIC THAT THIS WAS AN ANTI-FEDAYEEN MEASURE. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE, HE EMPHASIZED, NO EFFECT WHATSOEVER ON ISRAEL, EXCEPT THAT IT MIGHT DENY SOME PORTIONS OF THE BORDER TO FEDAYEEN USE.

4. NOUJAIM WOULD ENVISION, IF US PREPARED TO OFFER WEAPONS, THAT LEBANESE ARMY WOULD ACCEPT THEM AS GIFT AND WOULD MAKE OWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSPORT FROM US TO LEBANON. LEBANESE ARMY WOULD THEN MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS ON DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPONS AND THE US WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED. HE WOULD HOPE WE COULD ALSO PROVIDE MODEST AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION AS ONETIME ARRANGEMENT. LEBANON WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ABLE SECURE AMMUNITION ON ITS OWN. NOUJAIM HAD NO

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PREFERENCE FOR M-1 CARBINE OVER RIFLE, STIPULATING ONLY THAT HE WOULD HOPE TO STANDARDIZE ON ONE OR TWO TYPES. HE WAS NOT CONCERNED THAT M-1 NOT AS JAZZY AS KALASHNIKOV WHICH FEDAYEEN, MAINLY SAIQA, ARE PASSING ON TO THEIR SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON, BUT FELT THAT GIFT OF ANY RELIABLE WEAPON TO SOUTHERN LEBANESE WOULD CEMENT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANESE ARMY WHICH GOL HOPES TO ATTAIN.

5. COMMENT: I THINK THE LEBANESE PROPOSAL TO ARM SELECTED LOYAL SOUTHERN VILLAGES IS A GOOD ONE, PARTICULARLY AS ONE VIEWS PATTERN OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN JORDAN. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC DEMAND FOR SUCH MEASURES (ALTHOUGH OF COURSE OSTENSIBLY FOR PROTECTION AGAINST ISRAELI ATTACK), AND EVEN THE RADICALS COULD NOT PUBLICLY OBJECT. IT IS, OF COURSE, ONLY A HALF-MEASURE AND WILL NOT HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE UNHAPPY INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON. BUT IT IS BETTER THAN NOTHING. THE COST TO THE USG SHOULD BE MINIMAL SINCE WE ARE CONSIDERING ONLY WEAPONS WHICH I PRESUME ARE SURPLUS TO PRESENT U.S. REQUIREMENTS. I RECOMMEND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF THE REQUEST, ABOVE ALL FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST IT WILL GIVE TO HELOU AND THE LEBANESE ARMY. I THINK HELOU VIEWS THIS REQUEST AS SOMETHING BIGGER THAN THE APPARENT VALUE OF THE ASSISTANCE ITSELF. IT IS, IN HIS MIND, A REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN.

6. I, OF COURSE, MADE NO COMMITMENTS AND HAVE SIMPLY INFORMED LEBANESE I HAVE ASKED WASHINGTON FOR URGENT CONSIDERATION.

PORTER

BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH
LOB

12

R 091724Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9663
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 1104

1965Q
1970 FEB 9 PM 1:08

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT A-55

FOR SISCO-NEA

SUBJ: GOL REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH LEBANON

1) IN CONVERSATION ON FEB 3, MICHEL KHOURY RETURNED TO QUESTION US ASSISTANCE SOUTH LEBANON. HE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED US PROVIDE RIFLES OR CARBINES AS GRANT TO LEBANESE ARMY. ARMY WOULD IN TURN GRADUALLY DISTRIBUTE THOSE OR OTHER SMALL ARMS TO CERTAIN TRUSTED CHRISTIAN AND SHIA VILLAGERS IN SOUTH LEBANON TO BE USED OSTENSIBLY FOR BORDER DEFENSE, BUT IN FACT TO PROVIDE POINTS OF RESISTANCE AGAINST FEDAYEEN.

2) THE ARMY KNOWS WELL WHICH VILLAGERS AND CLANS CAN BE COUNTED ON, SAID KHOURY, AND WILL DERIVE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT IN ITS EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY THROUGH PROVIDING MEANS FOR SOUTHERNERS TO STAND OFF FEDAYEEN ATTEMPTING UTILIZE VILLAGES AS BASES. KHOURY SAID SYRIAN BACKED SAIQA WERE ALREADY DISTRIBUTING WEAPONS TO SOME LEBANESE IN SOUTH, CONCENTRATING ON AREAS OF STRONG BAATH PARTY MEMBERSHIP. OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS WERE FOLLOWING SUIT, WITH RESULT THAT "PRO-LEBANESE" SOUTHERNERS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED AND ALIENATED FROM GOL, WHICH SEEMED BE DOING NOTHING FOR THEM.

3) KHOURY'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WAS ALSO IN CONTEXT OF CONVERSATION WHICH (A) STATED BLUNTLY THAT ARMY AND LEBANESE TREASURY IN MOST DIFFICULT FINANCIAL STRAITS, AND (B) STRESSED NEED FOR MORALE BOOST TO ARMY AND GOL FROM WESTERN FRIENDS INTERESTED IN LEBANON'S SECURITY. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS EVEN ISRAELIS WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A US GRANT. HE ORIGINALLY ASKED FOR MODERN AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, BUT I SAID THIS WAS CLEARLY OUT OF QUESTION. HE THEN SAID ANY EFFECTIVE WORLD WAR II RIFLE OR CARBINE WOULD BE RECEIVED WITH GRATITUDE. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, HE FELT SURE, TO KEEP ARRANGEMENTS CONFIDENTIAL, BUT IN ANY CASE US GRANT WOULD BE TO LEBANESE ARMY AND WHAT ARMY DID WITH IT SHOULD NOT CAUSE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE TO US. I SAID I HAD NO IDEA WHETHER RIFLES OR

'70 FEB 9 PM 5
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CARBINES WERE AVAILABLE, AND BEFORE WE DISCUSSED MATTER FURTHER, YWOULD PREFER TO QUERY WASHINGTON FOR POLICY GUADANCE.

4) COMMENT: I RECOMMEND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF THIS REQUEST. IT SHOULD COST US VERY LITTLE AND WOULD PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL RETURNS. GOL AND NEW CIC GEN NOUJAIM ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO KEEP THE FEDAYEEN OFF BALANCE AND TO DISCOURAGE INFILTRATION INTO ISRAEL. A TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF US SUPPORT WOULD GO FAR TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTINUE AND STRENGTHEN THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST FEDAYEEN. SUGGEST DEPT TAKE NO FINAL ACTION UNTIL I DISCUSS WITH PRES HELOU.

PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

W18

8

SECRET

GER/5
R 101208Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9666
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 1117

0 0 2 1 7 9
FEB 10 8:12 AM 1970

NODIS

DEPT PASS ACTION AMEMBASSY JIDDA

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM F.B. LINCOLN

ACCEPT WITH THANKS USE OF RESIDENCE DURING STAY MARCH 3 AND 4.
PLEASE CANCEL JIDDA PALACE.

PORTER

BT

FEB 10 8:12 AM 70
RECEIVED

NOTE: NOT PASSED JIDDA BY OC/T

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

(12)

SECRET

R 120010Z JUN 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0575
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8179
INFO RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS 3327
RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 8960
RUESGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2234
RUESAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 6777
RUESRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 5657
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3991
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 6991
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 8248
RUESAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 6318
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 7239
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2130
RUEHCR/USINT KHARTOUM 2258
RUQVKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3994
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9958
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4236
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 2641
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0754
RUESBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 8742
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 3524
RUQVAN/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 8385
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9883
RUEIKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4333
RUESTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4472
RUESKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9203
RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO 0054
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 STATE 104750/1

CONTROL: 3 7 5 5Q
12 Jun'71, 8:10PM

'71 JUN 12 AM 10:04
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

SUBJ: CALL ON ASST. SECY. SISCO BY LEBANESE UN AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR AT UN GHORRA, ACCOMPANIED BY LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI, PAID A COURTESY CALL ON SISCO ON JUNE 10 DURING A VISIT TO WASHINGTON. SISCO GAVE HIM A TOUR D'HORIZON OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SISCO SAID WE ARE ENCOURAGED AS A RESULT OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP. WE WERE ABLE TO CONVEY SOME POSITIVE IDEAS ON BEHALF OF THE ISRAELIS TO SADAT FOR HIS CONSIDERATION SADAT SAID THAT THESE IDEAS WERE VERY USEFUL AND THAT NOW HE KNOWS WHAT THE ISRAELIS WANT RATHER THAN WHAT THEY DON'T WANT. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

THE RECENT SOVIET/UAR TREATY IS A COMPLICATING FACTOR IN THE ME. HE AND GHORRA AGREED THAT THE SOVIET/UAR TREATY DOESN'T ALTER FUNDAMENTALLY THE FACT THAT MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHAT PROGRESS OCCURS IN THE COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS. WE HAVE NEVER ASSUMED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT IN THE ME IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION, NOTED SISCO. FURTHERMORE, ONLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF A GENUINE OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN THERE BE HOPE FOR NEUTRALIZING AND THEREBY LESSENING SOVIET INFLUENCE. COMMENTING ON DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S JUNE 9 STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SISCO REITERATED OUR CONSTANT POSITION SINCE 1967. WE DON'T WANT OUR ARAB FRIENDS TO THINK THAT WE ACCEPT WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE DOING. ON THE SECRETARY'S RECENT TRIP WE RECORDED WITH THE ISRAELIS OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR RESPONSE TO JARRING. WE WERE ABLE TO GET FROM THEM POSITIVE IDEAS ABOUT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. ON THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE SC MEETING ON JERUSALEM, WE FEEL THAT JORDAN AND LEBANON SHOULD NOT CALL FOR AN SC MEETING. SISCO, AFTER EXPRESSING HIS CONCERN OVER THE ARMS SITUATION IN THE ME, SAID WE HAVE NEVER HAD A BETTER OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IN THE ME AND WE MUST NOT LOSE IT. END SUMMARY.

2. MR. SISCO OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY REFLECTING THAT MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE HIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE ENCOURAGED AS A RESULT OF THE TRIP. WE WERE ABLE TO CONVEY SOME IDEAS ON BEHALF OF THE ISRAELIS TO SADAT FOR HIS CONSIDERATION. SADAT SAID THAT THESE IDEAS WERE VERY USEFUL AND THAT NOW HE KNOWS WHAT THE ISRAELIS WANT RATHER THAN WHAT THEY DON'T WANT. SADAT SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO SACRIFICE CLARITY FOR SPEED. HE ALSO WANTED TO AVOID A SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES AND SAID HE WANTS TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH US. SADAT INDICATED THAT HE INTENDS TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IF EGYPT AND ISRAEL REACH AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR THE REOPENING OF SUEZ. SISCO COMMENTED THAT THE US HAS PLACED NO CONDITIONS ON RECOGNITION AND THAT WE ARE PLANNING TO: 1) INCREASE THE SIZE OF OUR DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN EACH COUNTRY; 2) SEE ABOUT RESCHEDULING OUR DEBT WITH THE UAR; AND 3) CONSULT CLOSELY ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

3. TURNING TO DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT, SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RECENT SOVIET/UAR TREATY IS A COMPLICATING FACTOR. HE SAID THAT IT IS EASY BOTH TO OVER-DRAMATIZE ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND TO UNDER-ESTIMATE IT. WE ARE AVOIDING EITHER EXTREME. SISCO SAID THAT WHAT THE TREATY MEANS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICS IN EGYPT, BY PROGRESS ON THE QUESTION OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS, AND BY THE PLAY OF ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE LONG RUN IMPLOCATIONS OF THIS TREATY. WE ARE RESERVING JUDGMENT ON THE TREATY WHEREAS OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIETS AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE EGYPTIANS, HAVE ALREADY DRAWN FAR-REACHING CONCLUSIONS. SISCO COMMENTED

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

THAT THE TREATY MUST NATURALLY CONCERN MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES SUCH AS LEBANON. IN SUM, SISCO SAID THAT WE SHOULD RESERVE JUDGMENT RATHER THAN TRY TO DISCUSS WHERE THE ARAB WORLD WANTS TO GO OR SHOULD GO.

4. COMMENTING ON MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM SADAT SINCE THE CONDLUSION OF THE TREATY, SISCO NOTED: (A) THERE HAS BEEN NO ALTERATION OF THE US/EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE; (B) THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE INTERIM SETTLEMENT; (C) SADAT HAS TAKEN NOTHING BACK OF WHAT HE SAID TO THE SECRETARY AND TO SISCO DURING THEIR TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST; THEREFORE EGYPT IS STILL INTERESTED IN AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

5. SISCO SAID WE MUST LOOK AT WHAT EGYPT'S INTERESTS ARE. SADAT ACTED WITH DISPATCH IN A MAJOR CHALLENGE TO HIS AUTHORITY. HE IS IN THE PROCESS OF REFURBISHING BOTH THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION AND HIS POSITION. WE THINK THIS IS A DESIRABLE STANCE: FOR EGYPT TO THINK IN TERMS OF ITS OWN INTEREST. SISCO SAID HE HAS BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT SADAT HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE DEDICATED TO A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

6. COMMENTING ON THE UAR/SOVIET TREATY SISCO EXPRESSED VIEW

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INFO RUFNRS/USINT ALGIERS 3328
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RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2131
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RUQVKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3995
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3764Q

June 11, 8:10 PM 1971

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THE TREATY IS BASICALLY A SOVIET MOVE. THE SOVIETS WERE GETTING CONCERNED OVER MEASURES WHICH SADAT HAD TAKEN INTERNALLY, AS WELL AS OVER THE ACTIVE ROLE WHICH AMERICAN DIPLOMACY HAS PLAYED IN THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS. A LEGITIMATE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOT ACHIEVABLE IF THE UNITED STATES PURSUES THE OBJECTIVES OF ONLY ONE SIDE.

7. WE HAVE NEVER ASSUMED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION, NOTED SISCO. THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIETS IS A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN PICTURE. THE SOVIETS ARE PURSUING A POLITICAL STRATEGY THROUGH STRENGTHENING EGYPT MILITARILY. THE SOVIETS,

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NOTED SISCO, HAVE A PRESENCE IN EGYPT FAR BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE UAR A BULWARK AGAINST ISRAEL; THEREFORE, WE CAN ASSUME THAT SOVIET DESIGNS ARE PARAMOUNT IN THEIR POLICY.

8. WHAT'S THE ANSWER TO THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE? THE ANSWER MUST BE REACHED IN THE POLITICAL ARENA THROUGH A PEACE AGREEMENT. WE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST ARE WORKING TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL PEOPLE OF THE AREA WILL HAVE FEEDOM OF CHOICE. EGYPT IS INTERESTED IN PURUSING A POLICY OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT. ONLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF A GENUINE OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT CAN THERE BE HOPE FOR NEUTRALIZING AND THEREBY LESSENING SOVIET INFLUENCE. SISCO COMMENTED ON THE DIMINUTION IN THE FACE OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE LARGE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. HE NOTED HOW MUCH EASIER IT IS TO GET THE SOVIET UNION IN THAN OUT.

9. IN SUM, SISCO SAID THAT WE WILL RESERVE JUDGMENT RE UAR-USSR TREATY AND PURSUE OUR SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE WILL BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE IN THE FUTURE WHETHER EGYPT CAN PURSUE A POLICY ENABLING HER TO PURSUE EGYPTIAN INTERESTS. THE UNDERPINNING OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN EGYPT IS THE ARMY WHICH IS SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIETS. WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT THAT EGYPT HAS BECOME A SATELLITE; WE WILL WAIT AND SEE HOW MUCH ROOM FOR MANEUVER IT HAS.

10. SISCO TURNED TO THE PROSPECT OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IN RELATION TO AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT SADAT HAD AGREED THAT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE. BOTH SIDES LOOK ON IT AS A PRACTICAL STEP TOWARD PEACE. SISCO NOTED THE FOLLOWING LIMITATIONS ON AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT: IT CANNOT BECOME AN END IN ITSELF, A NEW PERPETUATION OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION; NOR DOES IT TOUCH JERUSALEM, THE REFUGEES AND PALESTINIANISM, ALL OF WHICH ARE ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE WHICH WE MUST NOT FORGET.

11. COMMENTING ON DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S JUNE 9 STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, SISCO NOTED THAT BOTH JORDAN AND LEBANON HAD SHOWN CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. FURTHERMORE, KING HUSSEIN IS CONCERNED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT DON'T TOUCH HIM--HE IS AFRAID THAT EGYPT WILL GO ITS OWN WAY. SISCO NOTED THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY HAD TAKEN UP THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THEIR RECENT VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE TOLD GHORRA THAT LEBANON'S INCREASED CONCERN REFLECTS OUR OWN INCREASED CONCERN PARTICULARLY AS WE FEEL THAT WE CANNOT LET DOWN LEBANON AND JORDAN. TWO OF OUR BEST

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ARAB FRIENDS. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT DEMARCHES MADE BY US HAVE HAD NO PRACTICAL EFFECT ON JERUSALEM, SISCO SAID THAT WE ARE KEEPING AT IT LIKE A DROP OF WATER ON ROCK. HE COMMENTED THAT JERUSALEM HAS BEEN MENTIONED AT LEAST SIX TIMES TO THE ISRAELIES WITHIN THE LAST FOUR WEEKS. ONE POSITIVE RESULT OF THIS HAS BEEN THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NO LONGER MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON JERUSALEM, WHICH RUBBED SALT IN THE ARAB WOUNDS. IN SUM, SISCO REITERATED OUR CONSTANT POSITION SINCE 1967. WE DON'T WANT OUR ARAB FRIENDS TO THINK THAT WE ACCEPT WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE DOING (EVEN IF WE CAN'T REVERSE WHAT THEY ARE DOING).

12. THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SISCO NOTED THAT ON THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT WE HAD RECORDED WITH THE ISRAELIS ONCE AGAIN OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH THEIR RESPONSE TO JARRING. WHILE ADMITTING THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO CHANGE THEM ON THIS, WE WERE ABLT TO GET FROM THEM POSITIVE IDEAS ABOUT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. ISRAELI IDEAS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

A. AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT SHOULD ENTAIL AN OBLIGATION FOR

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4238
RUQVHN/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 2643
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0756
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RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 3526
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RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 9885
RUEIKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4335
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3773Q
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EGYPT TO CLEAR, OPEN AND OPERATE THE CANAL.

B. ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW X KILOMETERS, THE DISTANCE BEING DEPENDENT UPON WHAT KIND OF A CEASEFIRE THE EGYPTIANS ACCEPT. IF THE EGYPTIANS ACCEPT A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT A FORMAL DEADLINE, IT WOULD HAVE A SALUTARY EFFECT ON THE SIZE OF THE ZONE EVACUATED BY ISRAEL, AND ON WHAT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL.

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C. ISRAEL WOULD AGREE THAT THE LINE TO WHICH THEY WITHDREW AS PART OF AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT WOULD NOT BE A FINAL FRONTIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. SADAT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT NOT BE FINAL.

13. SISCO SAID THE FOLLOWING ARE AREAS WHERE THERE ARE STILL MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SIDES RE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT:

(A) EGYPTIAN INSISTENCE ON CROSSING THE CANAL;

(B) THE LENGTH OF HHE CEASEFIRE AND THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION;

(C) ISRAEL'S NATURAL CONCERN AT WHAT POINT THE CANAL WILL BE OPENED TO ISRAELI VESSELS AS WELL AS TO ISRAELI CARGOES. SISCO NOTED THAT SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE SOVIET/UAR TREATY SADAT HAS REITERATED HIS COMMITMENT TO AN INTERIM AGREEMENT.

14. SISCO SAID THAT HE THINKS WE HAVE REACHED THE STAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WHERE WE CAN IDENTIFY POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND POINTS ON WHICH THE PARTIES MUST UNDERTAKE NEGOTIATION, ACCOMMODATION, AND CONCESSION. WE BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE PUT FORTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IDEASM BOTH WILL HAVE TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

15. TURNING TO THE POSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM, SISCO SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THE PROBLEMS FACING LEBANON AND JORDAN WHICH MAY OBLIGE THEM TO CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. HE SAID, SPEAKING FRANKLY TO GHORRA, THAT WE FEEL JORDAN AND LEBANON SHOULD NOT CALL FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. IT IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE PRACTICAL RESULTS. FURTHERMORE, WE DO NOT WANT TO HAVE TO VOTE DIFFERENTLY FROM OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO PROGRESS TOWARD AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. SISCO POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO LIMIT SUCH A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO JERUSALEM. THE WHOLE MIDDLE EAST WOULD CERTAINLY GET DRAGGED INTO THE DISCUSSION WHICH WOULD PLAY UP TO ANY DELAYING TACTICS THAT EITHER SIDE MIGHT HAVE. WHEN SHOUTING BEGINS, NOTED SISCO, DIPLOMACY STOPS.

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16. SPEAKING CANDIDLY, SISCO EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN OVER THE ARMS SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE NOTED THAT SO FAR WE HAVE HELD BACK ARMS SHIPMENTS SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE SOVIET-UAR TREATY. ISRAEL HAS EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER ARTICLE 8 OF THE TREATY. OUR ARAB FRIENDS URGE US NOT TO SEND MORE ARMS TO ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT NEW DECISIONS ARE REQUIRED FOR ANY ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL AND THE MATTER IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME NEW SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE SHOWING UP IN EGYPT DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. SISCO SAID WE ARE FRANKLY FEARLFUL ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF NEW DELIVERIES. ANY TURMOIL RESULTING FROM FURTHER ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS BUT NOT THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON. REFLECTING ON THE OVERALL SITUATION, SISCO SAID THAT WE HAVE NEVER HAD A BETTER OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WE MUST NOT LOSE IT.

GHORRA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AT HAVING HEARD DIRECTLY FROM SISCO OUR LATEST THINKING ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE AGREED THAT THIS IS A GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE AND COMMENTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE OF FEBRUARY 15 TO JARRING OFFERED SOMETHING NEW IN BOTH FORM AND CONTENT. COMMENTING ON AN INTERIM SOLUTION GHORRA SAID HE FELT

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3782Q

June 11, 8:10 PM 1971

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THAT ISRAEL, EGYPT AND THE SOVIETS WANTED IT.
HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION IN
THE FOUR-POWER TALKS BOUT THIS AND ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS
WOULD EFFECT AN INTERIM SOLUTION IN THE FOUR-POWER FORUM.

18. SISCO SAID HE ATTACHED SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO EGYPT'S
REITERATING HER DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS.
HE NOTED ALSO THAT AS A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE THE SOVIETS
ARE INTERESTED IN AN INTERIM SOLUTION BUT STATED
WE DO NOT INTEND TO DO THIS THROUGH THE FOUR-POWER
MEETINGS.

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19. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN GETTING CREDIT FOR OUR EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OBVIOUSLY SOME SOVIET SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ANY INTERIM OR FINAL SETTLEMENT, PARTICULARY AFTER THEIR CONNIVANCE IN 1970 AT VIOLATING THE CEASEFIRE STANDSTILL AGREEMENT. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO PIN DOWN THAT NO RUSSIANS WILL CROSS THE CANAL IN AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. WHATEVER THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS HAAVE TO BE A PART OF IT SO THAT THEY WILL HAVE A RESPONSIBLE ROLE. WE DO NOT WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OF OUR SPEAKING FOR THE ISRAELIS AND THE SOVIETS FOR THE EGYPTIANS. WE ANT PEACE AND OUR CLIENTS ARE BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS.

20. SISCO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED AT THE MISCONCEPTIONS CIRCULATED BY THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB WORLD. COMMENTING ON THE GENESIS OF THE ROGERS PLAN HE SAID THAT ON OCTOBER 28, 1969 A PAPER WAS SENT TO THE SOVIETS WHICH AFTER SOME WEEKS WAS TURNED DOWN. THIS BECAME THE DECEMBER 9, 1969 "ROGERS PLAN". THE SOVIETS REACTED BELATEDLY AND NEGATIVELY, AND EVEN BRIEFINGS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DISTORTED.

21. GHORRA STATED HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY TO THE EGYPTIANS AND NOT THROUGH THE SOVIETS. SISCON CONCURRED AND SAID THAT IF THE US-EGYPT DIALOGUE COMES TO AN END THERE IS NO POINT IN CONTINUNING THE DIALOGUE THROUGH THE SOVIET UNION. GHORRA SAID THAT THE US-EGYPTIAN DIALOGUE CENTERING ON AN INTERIM SOLUTION IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND QUERIED WHETHER A DIALOGUE WOULD DEVELOP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNITION AND ISRAEL. SISCO SAID THAT WE WERE NO AWARE OF ANY SUCH CONTACT AND NOTED THAT WITH ANY ENCOURAGEMENT FROM MOSCOW THE ISRAELIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. GHORRA SAID IT WOULD BE INTERESTING IF ISRAEL AND THE USSR REESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT THE SAME TIME AS THE US AND EGYPT.

22. GHORRA SAID THAT THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UAR AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOWS THAT SADAT IS INSISTING ON HIS OWN CONCEPTION OF NONALIGNMENT. HE QUERIED WHETHER THE TREATY CHANGED THE EGYPTIAN CONCEPTION OF NONALIGNMENT. SISCO COMMENTED THAT WHEN US INFLUENCE AND SOVIET INFLUENCE ARE EQUAL IN EGYPTN THEN THERE WILL BE GENUINE NONALIGNMENT.

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23. GHORRA COMMENTED ON ARTICLE 8 OF THE SOVIET-UAR TREATY. HE NOTED THAT MUCH DEPENDS ON WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. SISCO AGREED THAT THE TREATY DOESN'T ALTER THE FACT THAT EVERTHING WILL DEPEND ON WHAT PROGRESS OCCURS IN THE COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS. IF THERE IS PROGRESS TOWARD AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT, NOTED GHORRA, THEN THE TREATY WILL BE LIKE ANY OTHER BILATERAL SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY. IF NOT, IT WILL ASSUME MORE IMPORTANCE. GHORRA OPINED THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE BOTH WITH THE EGYPTIAN/SOVIET TREATY AND WITH THE UNION OF ARAB STATES. THE LATTER COULD CREATE A CLIMATE NOT CONDUCIVE TO SETTLEMENT UNLESS THERE IS FORWARD MOVEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

24. SISCO ASKED GHORRA IF HE THOUGHT THE TREATY WOULD INFLUENCE THE PLEBISCITE IN SEPTEMBER. GHORRA SAID THAT THIS TOO DEPENDED ON PROGRESS OR LACK OF SAME IN MOVING TOWARD AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT. IF THERE IS PROGRESSS SADAT WILL HAVE ROOM TO MANEUVER. LACK OF PROGRESS, HOWEVER, WILL RESULT IN SADAT'S GETTING SUCKED INTO ALL THE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS RAMIFICATIONS OF THE UNION AND THE TREATY. GHORRA SAID THAT ALL HINGES ON ISRAEL'S RESPONSE.

25. COMMENTING ON ISRAELI FAITS ACCOMPLIS IN THE PAST WHICH HAVE LEAD TO THE CREATION OF PERMANENT FACTS, GHORRA NOTED THAT THIS HAD WORKED FOR ISRAEL IN 1948. WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AND A POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING GHORRA SAID HE SAW NO WAY OF DELAYING WHAT ISRAEL IS DOING.

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3791Q
June 11, 8:10 PM 1971

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HE EXPRESSED CONCERN AS A CHRISTIAN AT THE PROSPECT OF JERUSALEM BECOMING A JEWISH CITY. HE NOTED THAT THERE ARE MORE CHRISTIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAN THERE ARE ISRAELIS. HE FELT THAT THE JUDAIZATION OF JERUSALEM WILL CREATE A PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE. GHORRA SAID THAT HE FELT THAT EVERYBODY TENDS TO SHY AWAY FROM INVOLVEMENT IN JERUSALEM. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE EEC WHICH RECENTLY SHIED AWAY FROM MENTION OF JERUSALEM. HE STATED THAT HE FELT AN INTERIM SUEZ SETTLEMENT WOULD HELP THE OVERALL MIDDLE EASTERN ATMOSPHERE, BUT HE IS AFRAID THAT JERUSALEM WON'T BE THERE AS A NON-JEWISH CITY IF THE ISRAELIS

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CONTINUE TO CHANGE ITS CHARACTER AND DIMINISH ITS ARAB POLULATION. HE SAID HE WAS AFRAID THAT EVEN A SECURITY COJNCIL MEETING COULD NOT DIVERT THE ISRAELIS FROM THEIR PLAN TO JUDAIZE JERUSALEM.

26. SISCO AGREED ON THE CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN JERUSALEM EXPRESSED BY MANY RELIGIOUS GROUPS, INCLUDING CHRISTIANS. IN CONCLUSION, HE URGED AMBASSADOR GHORRA TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH HIM AND SEE IF WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS.

27. GHORRA WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY PLEASED WITH FULL EXCHANGE WHICH TOOK PLACE.

GP-3

ROGERS

BT

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May 27, 5:37 PM 1971

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INFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000
RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 0000
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0000
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
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RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0000
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0000
BT
S E C R E T STATE 093457

NODIS

SUBJ: BRIEFING FOR LEBANESE AMBASSADOR RE SECRETARY'S ME TRIP AND CURRENT STATUS PEACE EFFORTS

SUMMARY: DURING GENERAL BRIEFING MAY 26 ON SECRETARY'S TRIP TO ME AND CURRENT STATUS PEACE EFFORTS ASST SECY SISCO TOLD LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI THAT US SOMEWHAT MORE ENCOURAGED ABOUT SITUATION FOLLOWING SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT. UAR NOW STUDYING ISRAELI VIEWS ON ELEMENTS OF INTERIM CANAL AGREEMENT, AS CONVEYED TO SADAT BY SISCO MAY 9. SISCO STRESSED THAT DESPITE AREAS OF COMMONALITY, SERIOUS DIFFERENCES STILL EXIST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UAR RE INTERIM SETTLEMENT. WITH REGARD OVERALL SETTLEMENT, SISCO SAID ISRAELIS GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THEY WILLING TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION. KABBANI STRESSED LEBANESE CONCERN RE ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. SISCO STATED WE MADE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS OUR CONCERN OVER THESE UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHICH PREJUDGE FINAL SETTLEMENT. RE LEBANON, SISCO URGED IT ADOPT "A PSYCHOLOGY OF GREATER SELF CONFIDENCE" RE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. END SUMMARY.

1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO MAY 26 TO DISCUSS SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST, INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ON SUEZ CANAL AND LEBANESE CONCERN RE JERUSALEM. SISCO ASKED KABBANI HOW HE VIEWED SECRETARY'S TRIP. KABBANI SAID HE BELIEVED TRIP HAD BEEN USEFUL ALTHOUGH HE WONDERED IF IT WOULD RESULT IN PROGRESS TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. TRIP DID HAVE VALUE OF IMPROVING ATMOSPHERE IN ARAB WORLD. IT STRENGTHENED REALATIONS BETWEEN US AND ARAB COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY UAR AND HELPED TO BUILD TRUST AND COOPERATION. KABBANI SAID PARTIES TO DISPUTE WERE NOT PROGRESSING TOWARDS PEACE AS MUCH AS HAD BEEN HOPED FOR. HE STILL FOUND NO COOPERATIVE COMING FROM TEL AVIV. ONLY POSITIVE MOVEMENT HAD COME FROM CAIRO. HE BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT

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READY TO MAKE PEACE AND WOULD WAIT FOR STATUS QUO TO BECOME PERMANENT. ISRAEL WOULD TAKE VIEWPOINT THAT IF EXTREMISTS IN UAR CAME OUT ON TOP, ISRAEL WOULD SAY IT COULD NOT COME TO TERMS WITH THE. IF MODERATES CAME TO POWER, ISRAEL WOULD NOT RESPOND IN POSITIVE FASHION TO HLP THEM STAY IN POWER.

2. SISCO SAID HE HAD BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY TALKS WITH LEBANESE LEADERS AND PRESIDENT FRANGIE IN PARTICULAR. HE NOTED COMMON OBJECTIVES AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN US AND LEBANON. HOWEVER, SISCO SAID HE WAS CONERNED OVER FACT THAT IN LEBANON HE FOUND MORE PESSIMISM OVER POSSIBLITY OF PEACE SETTLEMENT THAN IN REST OF ARAB WORLD. KABBANI SAID HE AGREED, BELIEVING LEBANESE TO BE MORE REALISTIC. SISCO SAID WE FEEL LEBANESE ARE REALISTIC BUT WHAT WORRIES US IS THAT IS LEBANESE LEADERSHIP IS REFLECTING THIS PESSIMISM TO THE PEOPLE, IT CAN CREATE TYPE OF CONDITIONS WE ARE ALL TRYING TO AVOID.

3. SISCO SAID SECRETARY HAD EMBARKED ON HIS TRIP AS CALCULATED RISK. WE HAD SET MODEST OBJECTIVES BECAUSE PRESS HAS PROPENSITY FOR EXCITING UNDUE EXPECTATIONS FROM SUCH A TRIP. ONLY OBJECTIVE WE SET WAS WHETHER WE COULD NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN PARTIES. WE ALSO WANTED TO SHOW TO OUR ARAB FRIENDS THAT USG IS MAKING EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT. SISCO SAID THAT WE WERE CAREFUL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ARAB SENSIBILITIES. HE CITED EXAMPLE OF GREAT CAUTION EXERCISED IN TERMS OF APPEARANCES WHEN SECRETARY AVOIDED FLYING OVER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TOOK PRE-CAUTIONS VISITING JERUSALEM. SISCO SAID THAT IN ARAB WORLD WE FOUND LESS QUESTIONING OF OUR MOTIVES. HE NOTED THAT ARABS ARE GIVING SOME CREDIT TO FACT THAT USG IS SINCERELY TRYING TO BRING ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT.

4. SISCO SAID IN ISRAEL WE PURSUED TWO PATHS IN OUR CONVERSATIONS. FIRST, WE NOTED THAT EGYPTIAN REPLY TO JARRING'S FEBRUARY INITIATIVE HAD BEEN POSITIVE AND WE FELT ISRAEL SHOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING. WE REITERATED OUR POSITION THAT ISRAELI REPLY DID NOT MATCH POSITIVE NATURE OF EGYPTIAN RESPONSE. IN THIS REGARD WE DID NOT ACHIEVE ANY CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITION. SECOND MAJOR THRUST OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WAS ON POSSIBILITY OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ON REOPENING SUEZ CANAL. SISCO SAID HIS CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN HAD PROVED PARTICULARLY HELPFUL. ISRAEL HAD GIVEN US SOME POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS WHICH WERE CONVEYED TO SADAT. SISCO NOTED THAT LEBANESE HAD MADE POINT TO US (AS DID JORDANIANS) THAT NO INTERIM SETTLEMENT TOUCHES FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS THAT LEBANON AND JORDAN ARE FACED WITH -- JERUSALEM, QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, AND OCCUPATION OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY. WE TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR TO GOL THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THIS AND THAT WE WOULD NOT LET LEBANON AND JORDAN DOWN.

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5. SISCO SAID BOTH SIDES SEE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AS PRACTICAL TEST FOR PEACE. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD HELP IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE IN AREA WHICH BOTH SIDES FELT TO BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. SISCO HAD CONVEYED TO SADAT ON BEHALF OF ISRAEL THAT ISRAEL IN ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WOULD LIKE EXPLICIT COMMITMENT ON PART OF UAR NOT ONLY TO CLEAR AND OPERATE THE SUEZ CANAL BUT TO OPEN IT TO VESSELS OF ALL NATIONS INCLUDING THOSE OF ISRAEL. ISRAELI SUSPICION WAS THAT UAR WOULD CLEAR CANAL AND AT TIME THEY WERE READY TO OPEN IT WOULD SEEK FURTHER CONCESSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL FROM ISRAEL. ISRAEL WANTED UAR TO KNOW THAT IT WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW X RPT X NUMBER OF KILOMETERS FROM EAST BANK OF CANAL. HOWEVER, NUMBER OF KILOMETERS ISRAEL IS WILLING TO WITHDRAW AND KIND OF PRACTICAL SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS ARE INTRICATELY LINKED WITH KIND OF CEASEFIRE UAR IS WILLING TO ACCEPT. DAYON HAD SAID THAT IF ISRAEL HAS TO OPERATE UNDER SIX MONTHS CEASEFIRE, THEN THEY COULD NOT WITHDRAW MANY KILOMETERS FROM SUEZ CANAL, SINCE ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO REOCCUPY TERRITORY IN EVENT THAT HOSTILITIES RESUMED. HOWEVER, IF UAR AGREED TO MORE OPEN-ENDED CEASEFIRE, THEN THIS WOULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON ZONE OF WITHDRAWAL AND NATURE OF PRACTICAL SUPERVISORY ARRANGEMENTS SINCE ISRAEL COULD PLAN THAT ONCE IT HAD WITHDRAWN FROM CANAL IT WOULD NEVER BE NECESSARY TO REOCCUPY THIS TERRITORY.

6. SISCO THEN TURNED TO PRIMARY CONCERNS OF EACH SIDE. FIRST, ISRAEL BELIEVES THAT NO INTERIM ARRANGEMENT SHOULD WORK TO ITS MILITARY DISADVANTAGE AND THEREFORE NO MILITARY FORCES SHOULD CROSS CANAL. SECOND, ISRAEL WANTS IT MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT WHATEVER COMMITMENT IT MAKES ON WITHDRAWAL IN CONTEXT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT NOT RPT NOT PREJUDGE ISRAELI POSITION ON FINAL SETTLEMENT. PRIMARY EGYPTIAN CONCERN IS THAT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT NOT BECOME NEW STATUS QUO AND NOT BE USED AS PRETEXT FOR INDEFINITE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF UAR TERRITORY.

7. SISCO SAID THAT ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO COMMIT ITSELF EXPLICITLY THAT THE LINE TO WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS IS NOT FINAL LINE. ISRAEL WAS AWARE OF SADAT'S NEED TO DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD THAT UAR HAD REASSUMED AUTHORITY OVER CANAL. SISCO HAD RAISED THIS POINT WITH SADAT AND ASKED IF THERE WERE NOT REP NOT SOME WAY TO DEMONSTRATE EGYPTIAN CONTROL TO WORLD OTHER THAN HAVING TROOPS REOCCUPY TERRITORY. SISCO SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THERE IS WAY TO LINK INTERIM ARRANGEMENT TO ONGOING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE OVERALL SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, REAL DIFFICULTIES REMAIN ON EACH SIDE, FOR EXAMPLE, MATTER OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS CROSSING CANAL.

8. SISCO EMPHASIZED TO KABBANI THAT HE WAS ABLE TO CONVEY CONSTRUCTIVE ISRAELI IDEAS TO SADAT. PROOF OF THIS WAS THAT SADAT HAD SAID THAT HE NOW KNEW WHAT ISRAEL WANTED AND NOT JUST WHAT ISRAEL DID NOT RPT NOT WANT. SADAT SAID THAT HE

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NEEDED COUPLE OF WEEKS TO STUDY IDEAS AND DID NOT WANT TO FORSAKE CLARITY AND UNDERSTANDING FOR SPEED. HE DID NOT WANT ANYTHING TO ARISE WHICH WOULD BE SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND CONTENTION BETWEEN UAR AND ISRAEL AND ONE HAND AND UAR AND USG ON OTHER.

9. SISCO SAID HE DID DETECT A WILL TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON BOTH SIDES. BOTH SIDES SAY THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE. IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH SIDES, THERE WERE NO POLEMICS, NO DEADLINES OR THREATS AND THEREFORE HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS SOME HOPE. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS HAD OCCURRED IN UAR. ALSO, WHILE SOVIET UNION WANTS CANAL OPEN, IT IS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED OVER US ACTIVITY AND INFLUENCE IN UAR. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THIS WAS PODGONRY'S VISIT TO UAR. SISCO SAID THAT USG WAS NOT NAIVE ENOUGH TO THINK THAT ANY EGYPTIAN LEADER SHOULD OR WOULD DISREGARD SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN UAR. USG IS NOT TRYING TO REPLACE RUSSIAN POSITION IN EGYPT BUT WE BELIEVE THAT EGYPT IS SINCERELY INTERESTED IN PURSUING POLICY OF BALANCED NON-ALIGNMENT.

10. SISCO NOTED THAT SADAT HAD MADE STRONG SPEECH ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENT LAST THURSDAY. ALSO, UAR FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TRIED TO GIVE US PAPER ON EGYPT'S POSITION ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WHICH WE REFUSED TO ACCEPT BECAUSE WE DID NOT FEEL IT TO BE RESPONSIVE. SINCE THEN BERGUS HAS HAD NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONS WITH HIGH-LEVEL EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS. WE DETECT SOME TACTICAL STIFFENING BUT DO NOT FEEL THAT THERE HAS BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF POSITION ON EITHER SIDE RE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT.

11. SISCO NOTED THAT IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED IN CAIRO AT CONCLUSION SECRETARY'S VISIT THAT THREE STEPS WERE BEING TAKEN TO IMPROVE US/UAR RELATIONS. FIRST, WE HAD AGREED TO SMALL INCREASES IN SIZE OF OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS SECTIONS. SECOND, WE HAD AGREED TO ACCELERATE DISCUSSIONS ON UAR DEBT TO USG. FINALLY, WE HAD AGREED TO MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS ON WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE.

12. SISCO SAID THAT IT WILL TAKE TIME FOR EVENTS TO DEVELOP ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. HE NOTED THAT USG HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH RECENT EVENTS IN UAR. WE FEEL THEM TO BE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEYOND DIRECT INFLUENCE OF US. WE THINK THAT ISRAEL SHOULD ASK ITSELF WHAT IT COULD DO TO AID IN CONSTRUCTIVE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN CAIRO. KABBANI INTERJECTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS PEACE SINCE 1967 AND THIS WAS THE FAULT OF ISRAEL NOT UAR. USG COULD INFLUENCE ISRAEL TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE. SISCO DISAGREED THAT NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND SAID THAT WE BELIEVE WE DID DEVELOP SOME FLEXIBILITY ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT AS RESULT OF SECRETARY'S TRIP.

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13. KABBANI ASKED IF DAYAN WAS SPEAKING NAME OF ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DURING HIS TALKS SUEZ CANAL. SISCO NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN INTERNAL ARGUMENT IN ISRAEL WHEREBY DAYAN HAD BEEN ACCUSED OF SPECIFYING NUMBER OF KILOMETERS TO WHICH ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW. SISCO HAD TOLD SADAT THAT NUMBER OF KILOMETERS ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED BY ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BUT OULD BE INFLUENCED BY TYPE OF CEASEFIRE UAR WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT. HE HAD TOLD SADAT THAT ANY AGREEMENT ON CANAL WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBMITTED TO KNESSET BY PRIME MINISTER MEIR.

14. KABBANI QUESTIONED TALKING MERELY ABOUT WITHDRAWAL IN TERMS OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENT AND FELT THAT QUESTION IN ITS ENTIRETY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. SISCO SAID THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED ON BASIS OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO TRY TO ACHIEVE INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. HOWEVER, UAR AND ISRAEL SEEMS TO FEEL THAT BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS IS TO PROCEED IN THIS DIRECTION. WE FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT INTERIM ARRANGEMENT CANNOT TAKE PLACE OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT SINCE IT DOES NOT SOLVE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS IN AREA. IF WE STOP THERE, THEN WE LEAVE CONDITIONS FOR NEW WAR. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO ACHIEFE NEW STATUS QUO.

15. KABBANI SAID SITUATION WAS IMPOSSIBLE AS WELL AS DANGEROUS ONE FOR BOTH JORDAN AND LEBANON. UNLESS OVERALL SETTLEMENT IS ACHIEVED, SITUATION IN LEBANON WILL REMAIN VERY PRECARIOUS. SISCO SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE GOL TO REFLECT VIEW THAT IT CANNOT FACE UP TO SITUATION. GOVERNMENT HAD TO REFLECT STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE. WHAT WAS NEEDED, IN HIS JUDGMENT, IN LEBANON WAS PSYCHOLOGY OF POSITIVE SELF CONFIDENCE. IN THIS REGARD, LEBANON SHOULD STRENGHTEN ITS ARMY. SISCO NOTED THAT US WOULD HELP IN THIS TASK. KABBANI SAID THAT SITUATION WOULD NOT BE SOLVED IN LEBANON BY MERELY PROVIDING MORE ARMS. ARMY AND THE COUNTRY CAN BE DIVIDED OVER QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS. BETTER COURSE WOULD BE TO SOLVE PROBLEM IN POLITICAL WAY. KABBANI SAID THAT EVEN MODERATE PALESTINIANS ARE SO EMOTIONAL ON PROBLEM THAT THEY CANNOT THINK RATIONALLY.
SISCO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS AND KNEW THAT LEBANON FEARED THAT WHAT HAD OCCURRED IN JORDAN WOULD OCCUR IN LEBANON.

16. IN RESPONSE TO SISCO'S QUERY WHY LEBANON SEEMED MORE PESSIMISTIC, KABBANI SAID THAT LEBANON SINCE 1967 HAD BEEN GOING DOWN IN EVERY ASPECT. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WAS DOWN,X IMMIGRATION WAS INCREASING RAPIDLY, SOCIAL UNREST WAS RISING, STUDENTS WERE DEMONSTRATING LABOR UNREST WAS GROWING AS WAS LEFTISM AND PROBLEM OF PALESTINIANS WAS INCREASING. EVEN STRENGHTENING THE ARMY WILL NOT SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS SINCE THERE ARE INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ARMY. HOWEVER, KABBANI SAID THAT LEBANESE LEADERS WERE NOT TALKING TO PEOPLE IN PESSIMISTIC MANNER BUT DID HAVE TO CONSIDER IN REALISTIC TERMS THESE DIFFICULTIES.

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17. TURNING TO SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM, KABBANI NOTED THAT LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD JUST RETURNED FROM ROME AFTER TALKS WITH POPE ON ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. LEBANON WAS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THIS PROBLEM BECAUSE OF JERUSALEM'S IMPORTANCE TO MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS. JERUSALEM IS BECOMING BIT BY BIT JEWISH CITY AND ARAB WORLD WAS FACED BY ISRAELI FAIT ACCOMPLIS. SISCO SAID THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. WE HAD STRONG TALKS WITH ISRAELIS ON THIS MATTER BECAUSE OX ACONCERN EXPRESSED BY JORDANIANS, LEBANESE AND SAUDI ARABIANS. WE HAD ALSO TALKED TO POPE ON THIS MATTER AND HE WAS VERY CONCERNED BY ISRAELI ACTIONS. WE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS OUR NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM SINCE THESE UNILATERAL ACTIONS WOULD PREJUDGE FINAL SETTLEMENTS. KABBANI REPEATED JERUSALEM'S SPECIAL IMPRTANCE TO MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS. IF ISRAEL IGNORED THESE FEELINGS, THERE WOULD NEVER BE PEACE IN AREA. SISCO SAID THAT WE WERE VERY DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MATTER AND WILL STAY IN TOUCH WITH LEBANESE. IN RESPONSE TO KABBANI QUESTION ABOUT HOW ISRAELIS REACTED DURING DISCUSSIONS ON JERUSALEM, SISCO SAID THAT ISRAELIS HAD ADMITTED THAT THEIR POSITION IS GETTING WEAKER. ROGERS
BT

Drafted by: NEA/ARN - E G Abington
Cleared by: NEA/ARN - Mr Seelye
S/S - Mr Curran
Approved by: NEA - Joseph J Sisco

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

162971

(13) 36

INDICATE:
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

20 OCT 70 21 48Z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

STATE: 162971

NODIS

SUBJ: Illustrative List of Military Equipment

REF: State 161364

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 70 OCT 3 AM 9:37

Would appreciate Embassy's providing DEPT by opening of business October 3 preliminary list of military equipment which/ in your judgment GOL would require in connection possible $5 million grant assistance. We appreciate that you have not had sufficient time to come up with definitive illustrative list, which you should still plan to send when it is ready. At this point we need whatever you can give us.

END

PTR W I N

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
NEA:ARN:TWSeelye:jfc	10-2-70	22670	NEA - Mr. Atherton

CLEARANCES:

P/M - Mr. Dorough

S/S - Mr. Curran

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FORM 4-62

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TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ~~BEIRUT~~ 6003
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
BT
S E C R E T STATE 105327

NODIS

REF BEIRUT S 5439

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. I READ WITH GREAT INTEREST YOUR CONVERSATION WITH HELOU. I HAVE ONE SUGGESTION: PLEASE AVOID TAKING ANY INITIATIVE WITH RESPECT TO PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN PARA 7. WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSED AN INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER PRESENCE, THOUGH OF COURSE DO NOT PRECLUDE IT. OUR PRESENT CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL CALLS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON EACH OF THE PARTIES TO USE ITS OWN MEANS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH ANY AGREED CEASEFIRE. WHETHER PRESENT UNTSO PERSONNEL MIGHT PROVE TO BE A USEFUL MECHANISM IS SOMETHING WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO RAISE AT THIS POINT UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE IS AN AGREEMENT ON THE KIND OF CEASEFIRE WE HAVE IN MIND WHICH INCLUDES A STANDOFF BETWEEN THE PARTIES SO THAT NEITHER WOULD SEEK TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIVE MILITARY POSITION AGAINST THE OTHER.

2. RE PARA 5 REFTEL, IF HELOU OR OTHERS AGAIN MAKE POINT ABOUT NASSER'S INABILITY ACCEPT PEACE SETTLEMENT BASED ON QUOTE LOSS OF ARAB TERRITORY UNQUOTE, YOU MAY IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL POINT OUT THAT SUCH BLANKET STATEMENT GIVES MISLEADING IMPRESSION OF KIND OF SETTLEMENT USG HAS SAID IT COULD SUPPORT. WHILE RES. 242 DOES NOT SPECIFY TOTAL WITHDRAWAL EVERYWHERE TO PRE-JUNE 5, 1967 LINES, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRINCIPLE OF NON-ACQUISITION OF OF TERRITORY BY WAR, WE BELIEVE ANY CHANGES IN THOSE LINES MUST BE AGREED BETWEEN PARTIES AND INSUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE. GP-3. JOHNSON
BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

W17 10 100664

INDICATE:
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☐ CHARGE TO

25 Jun 70 17 03Z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

STATE 100664

NODIS

1. Rather than encouraging the Lebanese government to issue denials, it is better that they let what they have said stand. ~~had to say stand.~~ Best posture at this juncture is merely that they not repeat not go out of their way to repeat the specific details. We are not anxious for them to issue denials.

2. This also being communicated to Kabbani here.

END

GP-3

'70 JUN 25 PM 4:34

SITUATION ROOM

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSisco:lab | DRAFTING DATE: 6/25/70 | TEL. EXT.: 29588 | APPROVED BY: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES: S/S Mr. Brewster

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SECRET
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

099770

INDICATE:
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

24 JUN 70 19 29Z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH

STATE 099770

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR PORTER FROM SISCO

1. Lebanese are doing entirely too much talking to the press. Am distressed to get AP ticker indicating Karame revealing details. Please see Helou and Karame & and see what you can do to put lid on situation, though damage may have been done. FYI More said on concrete details, more will be pressure on Israel to react publicly and negatively at this time. END FYI.

END

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
JUN 24 2 53 PM '70
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ORIGINATOR	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT	APPROVED BY:
NEA:JJSisco:ntb	6/24/70	29588	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

S/S - Mr. Brown

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SAUNDERS
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097783

Department of State

TELEGRAM

N.H.

INDICATE:
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20 Jun 70 22 02Z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY
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USINT CAIRO "
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Amembassy PARIS "
Amembassy LONDON "
Amembassy MOSCOW "

EXDIS NODIS

STATE 097788

SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Peace Initiative

1. As follow-up to call on him by Lebanese Ambassador Kabbani on June 19 (State 97653), Assistant Secretary Sisco briefed Kabbani June 20 on details our current peace initiative. Sisco stressed our deep concern re deteriorating situation in Mibdle East, and said we had spent past 5-6 weeks in thorough and searching analysis of this situation. Principal conclusion was that major effort must be made at this point toward achieving solution. This was reinforced by encouraging signs emanating from UAR (e.g. Nasser's May 1 appeal, his TV interview on "The Advocates") and from Israel (e.g. internal disquiet with Government's hard-line policy, Prime Minister Meir's

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:amp	6/20/70	22670	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:
NEA - Mr. Atherton
S/S - Mr. Morton

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT #2

accepting
public statement supporting UNSC Resolution).

text of proposed Jarring report to SYG which we are
2. Sisco handed Kabbani/paper proposing parties accept as basis for talks. Sisco said that we had had preliminary talks with Israel, UAR and Jordan. We had also informed British, French and Soviets. Sisco said essence of initiative is to get indirect talks started under on basis of
Jarring preceded by commitment by Israel to principle of withdrawal and commitment by UAR and Jordan to enter into just with Israel,
and lasting peace, including recognition of Israel's right to exist. Both commitments would accord with language of UNSC resolution. Sisco said in all frankness that we do not repeat not know whether we can get Israeli agreement but we shall try.

3. Sisco emphasized that foregoing would be only "wedge or deep-opener" and ensuing Two Power and Four Power talks would be necessary to help in filling in framework and working our out detailed documents.

[illegible]

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT #3

4. Re arms, Sisco said that delivery of US aircraft to Israel would be limited to levels not going beyond commitments in past contracts during period in which we pursuing political initiative. At same time he noted we had made contingent arrangements re sale of further aircraft. These arrangements could be affected by whether cease fire in effect or not, or whether negotiation had brought substantial measure of success and progress. Sisco said we consider we have acted with restraint on arms, and expressed hope Lebanese would help assure positive Arab reaction is forthcoming.

5. Kabbani was pleased with this development and commented later that he thought this represented most important step forward since June 1967 war. In response his question whether there would be public announcement, Sisco replied we would have to say something but would do so in most modulated manner possible. We desire avoid any kind of public comment which might impair peace initiative.

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT #4

6. FOR BEIRUT: Drawing on foregoing Ambassador Porter authorized on highly confidential basis brief appropriate GOL officials.

END

ROGERS

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(13)

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19 JUN 70 01 197

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
USUN NEW YORK

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy OTTAWA
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
Amconsul JERUSALEM

70 JUN 19 AM 9:58

SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

STATE 096508

SUBJECT: US Demarches on UNRWA Financial Crisis

REF: Beirut 4843

In interest of avoiding steps that might conceivably have adverse impact on receptivity of area GOVTS to new ME peace initiative that we hope to launch in days ahead, DEPT has decided delay for time being demarches to UNSYG and UNRWA COMGEN outlined State 92815. You should therefore defer such demarches pending receipt X further notification from DEPT. In interim, trust you will report promptly any new INFO that bears on UNRWA's

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IO/UNP:TCarolan:clh	6/18/70	28114	IO - Samuel De Palma

CLEARANCES:

IO/UNP - Mr. Armitage
IO/OIA - Mr. Lawrence
NEA - Mr. Atherton
NEA/IAI - Mr. Stackhouse
NEA/ARN - Mr. Scotes
S/S - Mr. Brown

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XXXXX Page 2 of telegram to BEIRUT and USUN NEW YORK

current and projected financial position, e.g. indications how Michelmore plans treat subject in 1970 Annual Report.

END

[ROGERS]

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019216

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

STATE 019216

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 989 and 971

1. We fully share your sense of urgency over the proposed program, and preliminary measures have been taken that will permit us to move rapidly as soon as necessary statistics received. High level interest already exists in this program and no bureaucratic delays are anticipated.

2. Regarding statistical requirement, we need the very latest, up-to-date information, and that already available in Washington is necessarily dated. Also, officers on scene in Beirut are in much better position than Washington officials to evaluate and comment on data. We note in Beirut 971 that pertinent information being air pouched February 9 and should be available in Washington shortly thereafter.

ROGERS

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NEA/ARN:BHBaas/bhb	2/6/70	20695	NEA - Rodger P. Davies

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN: TWSeelye

S/S - Mr. Brandt

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

13

1 4 0 7 Q
1970 FEB 6 AM 9:11

'70 FEB 6 PM 4:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

R 061314Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT - CORRECTED COPY (MRN)
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9644
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 1034

NODIS

PLEASE PASS USUN, USINT CAIRO.

1) ROWLAND EVANS, JUST RETURNED FROM VISITS UAR AND SYRIA, PHONED ME THIS MORNING (FEB 5) FROM AIRPORT AS HE WAS DEPARTING BEIRUT.

2) ESSENCE OF GUARDED PHONE CONVERSATION WAS THAT NASSER HAD TALKED TO HIM FOR HALF HOUR IN TOTAL PRIVACY AFTER CONCLUSION TELEVISED INTERVIEW. EVANS SAID NASSER CLEARLY TRYING TRANSMIT MESSAGE THROUGH HIM TO USE THAT (A) HE WAS UNDER INCREASING INTERNAL PRESSURES FROM BOTH ASU AND ARMY TO ADOPT WAR POLICY. HE FELT INCREASINGLY ISOLATED IN HIS ATTEMPTS KEEP DOOR OPEN FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. (B) HE WAS REACHING END OF HIS ROPE AND FELT HE WOULD SOON HAVE TO DROP HIS POLICY OF MODERATION OR BE OVERWHELMED BY INTERNAL OPPOSITION. (C) HE IMPLIED FEAR THAT HE BEING FORCED INTO POSITION OF TOTAL DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS. SOVS MIGHT SOON BE ABLE DICTATE INTERNAL POLICY OF UAR.

3) NASSER ASKED EVANS' ADVICE RE WHAT STEPS HE MIGHT TAKE VIS-A-VIS US. EVANS SUGGESTED (A) THAT HE MAKE SOME GESTURE OF INTEREST IN FORMULATIONS IN SECRETARY'S DEC 9 SPEECH AND IN USG OCT 28 PROPOSALS; (B) THAT HE SEND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF STATURE SUCH AS FAWZI ON SPECIAL MISSION TO WASHINGTON. GHORBAL WAS A GOOD TECHNICIAN BUT AT THIS POINT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF NASSER WAS NEEDED. EVANS DID NOT INDICATE EXTENT NASSER'S RECEPTIVITY TO SUGGESTIONS. MY CONVERSATION WITH EVANS WAS HASTY AND INCOMPLETE. HE PROMISED FILL IN NEA ON HIS RETURN WASHINGTON LATTER PART NEXT WEEK.

PORTER

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TELEGRAM

WH

10

SECRET

R 051403Z FEB 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9633
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 989

1 0 6 4 Q
1970 FEB 5 9:56 AM

NODIS

FOR DAVIES AND SEELYE, NEA

1) I WOULD APPRECIATE INTERVENTION AT HIGH LEVEL TO GET THE PL-480 AGREEMENT WITH LEBANON MOVING. WE ARE NOW IN SLOW PROCESS OF PROVIDING STATISTICS WHICH IN FACT COULD BE OBTAINED FROM AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE REPORTS ALREADY IN WASHINGTON. I UNDERSTAND NECESSITY FULFILL THESE REQUIREMENTS AND WE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE COMPLY. MY CONCERN IS THAT WE ARE ENTERING A PERIOD OF BUREAUCRATIC DRIFT WHICH MAY DELAY DECISION FOR WEEKS AND TEND TO NEUTRALIZE THE POLITICAL AND OTHER ADVANTAGES WE HOPE TO OBTAIN, UNLESS SOMEONE SPEEDS UP THE PROCESS.

2. PRESIDENT HELOU HAS CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED AND ARRANGED FOR A UNIQUELY RAPID PASSING OF LEGISLATURE TO ALLOW LEBANON TO NEGOTIATE AND SIGN PL-480 AGREEMENT. THIS WAS DONE AGAINST POTENTIALLY STRONG AND DANGEROUS LEFTIST OPPOSITION, WITH HELOU TAKING ACTION ON UNDERSTANDING THAT USG WAS ANXIOUS AND READY TO MOVE AHEAD. ANY SUBSTANTIAL DELAYS ARE GOING TO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS IN HELOU'S MIND AND INDEED COULD THROW THE WHOLE PROGRAM INTO JEOPARDY, GIVEN THE FAST MOVING NATURE OF EVENTS IN THE MIDEAST THESE DAYS.

3. WE NEED THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF A PL-480 AGREEMENT NOW, BOTH IN OUR AND HELOU'S INTERESTS. I HOPE THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE THE BASIS FOR USG INTEREST IN THIS AGREEMENT CAN BE GIVEN OVERRIDING EFFECT AND NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS CAN BE SENT TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PORTER

BT

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

037919

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10 MAR 13 PM 11:43
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ACTION: AmEmbassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

STATE 037919

NODIS
SUBJECT: Arms for Lebanon
REF: Beirut 1933, Beirut 1934, State 36213, Paris 2654

1. As Embassy has noted from State 36213, we feel that we have been reasonably responsive to Lebanese requests for arms. In particular, we would note the considerable efforts we expended to make available for sale to the GOL 6,000 M-14 rifles. If President Helou personally not aware of this, perhaps he should be so informed. We would like Helou to understand that we want to be as helpful as possible but there are limitations to what we can do. Overt grant assistance is impossible. We have carefully examined the possibility of covert grant assistance but have rejected this course of action as being too risky and as inadvisable. We are sympathetic to idea of providing military credit and have tentatively

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NEA:ARN.TWSeelye/BHBaas:am	3/13/70	20695	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:
NEA - Mr R. P. Davies
INR/DDC - Mr. J. Gardner
S/S - Dirk Gleysteen
S/PM - Mr. Barnard

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ACTION:

earmarked over-all amount for Lebanon. However, FMS credit appropriation has not yet been approved and, in any case, modest cost of rifles requested would seem to argue against use of FMS credit for this purpose.

2. Appears to us that minimal cost of rifles requested should not be deterrent if Lebanese want and need them badly enough. Lebanese budget undoubtedly tight, but sums involved are so small that rifles could presumably be purchased forthwith if GOL assigned high enough priority to this transaction. We note in this connection from Paris 2654 that French Government giving strong consideration to taking back some Mirages. If this occurs, would immediately release funds which would enable GOL purchase substantial quantities of military equipment.

3. Further problem is that to satisfy urgent nature of Helou's request arms would have to be shipped

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ACTION:

expeditiously, presumably by air. This would be bound to attract popular attention in Lebanon and arouse suspicion that we were indeed helping Helou to suppress the fedayeen. Recalling how such a popular belief last October contributed to Lebanon's internal troubles, we hesitate to involve ourselves in operation which might make situation more difficult, rather than easier, for Helou. While we wish to support the Lebanese Government, we would prefer to do so in a manner that cannot be depicted as a USG campaign against fedayeen. This would only exacerbate the situation and make the fedayeen appear more heroic to the Arab public.

4. In all frankness, we must admit to lack of clarity re principal object of this endeavor. On one hand, Helou tells us that he cannot crack down on fedayeen since this would plunge country into civil war and

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ACTION:

destroy the Republic. On other hand, he and Khoury contend that these arms are needed to take a harder line against fedayeen. (Earlier we understood rifles were for purpose arming of southern villagers.) Meanwhile implication is that gift of arms from USG is needed primarily as psychological gesture.

5. Re need for psychological gesture by us, would hope that PL 480 program -- which we have arranged for just this reason -- would to great extent meet this requirement. In tangible terms this program is substantial since commodities are valued at $7.2 million, whereas 5,000 M-1 rifles would have value of probably less than $100,000. The PL 480 program has further virtue of being an economically constructive venture.

6. In conclusion, we regret to have to say that we are unable to

/ [redacted] supply [redacted] arms to

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the Lebanese Government other than through the open, straight-forward channels we have utilized in the past.

7. Beirut's 1989 just received. Re GOL request for M-41 tanks, we indicated only approximate time frame and do not rpt not foreclose possibility of earlier delivery of tanks on staggered basis. Problem is that these tanks are in extremely poor condition and must undergo major rehabilitation. Cost of tanks is expected to be reasonable. We did not indicate that "no other tanks available from U.S. sources". Lebanese request limited to M-41's and M-42's. We indicated latter extremely difficult to acquire. There would be normal requirement for MC clearance should Lebanese obtain M-41's on open market. This does not rpt not mean U.S. veto. It means it not rpt not possible give clearance in absence specific request. We prepared discuss at length other points mentioned in Beirut 1989 upon Ambassador's return.
GP-3.

END

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
Amembassy AMMAN

STATE 095495
NODIS

SUBJECT: Peace Initiatives and Palestinian Contacts

REF: State 088816

1. As per reftel, peace initiatives now being prepared as part of serious U.S. effort break out of current Near East negotiating impasse. In addition to explaining matter to Arab governments when initiatives are ready, we are also considering possibility of attempting dialogue with Palestinians. We have no illusions we will win wide support for our efforts among Palestinians, particularly militant elements, but such effort could perhaps help assure against blatant misrepresentation or misunderstanding of our position, give Palestinians feeling we recognize they are legitimate interested party and in some measure moderate or diffuse opposition to our initiatives. This might be done, for example, through contacts with well-placed Palestinian intellectuals possibly on AUB faculty who could (a) presumably convey

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NEA/ARN:TJScotes:no	6/17/70	21019	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES: NEA/ARN - T. W. Seelye
NEA - Mr. Atherton
S/S Mr. Brandt

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ACTION:

substance of our initiatives to responsible fedayeen leadership and (b) provide us with useful reaction to these initiatives.

2. Would appreciate soonest your evaluation of this proposal and, if you agree to this course of action, suggestions re Palestinians to be contacted and how this might be accomplished without causing political furor.

END

[illegible] 7PM 18 RECEIVED

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11 037959

Department of State
TELEGRAM

33

INDICATE:
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14 MAR 70 02 38 Z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy ~~AMMAN~~ BEIRUT

STATE 037959

SUBJECT Possible USG Contacts with Fedayeen

REF: State 20697

N O D I S

Dept well aware of Embassy preoccupation with other important problems ~~and~~ over past several weeks, but would appreciate, if at all possible, early reply to reftel re possible USG contacts with fedayeen.

GP-3

END ROGERS

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NEA/ARN:TJScotes:gvl	3/13/70	21019	NEA -Rodger P. Davies

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5 FEB 70 21 10Z

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ACTION: AmEmbassy BEIRUT

INFO: AmEmbassy TEHRAN
NODIS
STATE 017931

SUBJECT: GOL Request for Assistance in South Lebanon

REF: Beirut A-55

1. We share your concern over situation which exists in South Lebanon and we pleased that GOL is adopting measures to contain fedayeen. We also share your view re importance of GOL assisting villagers in Southern Lebanon, particularly in social and economic fields. While provision of arms to villagers might have short-term benefits in psychological sense, in long run it would appear that social and economic development would contribute most effectively to stabilizing southern area.

2. With foregoing in mind, we believe that PL-480 program proposed by Lebanese, provides excellent

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70 FEB 5 PM 8:36

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NEA:ARN:BHBaas/am	2/4/70	20695	NEA:RPDavies

CLEARANCES:
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INR/DDC - Mr. Gardner
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opportunity for us to be helpful. Portion of proceeds from sale of commodities approved under program could be used for economic and social projects in South. You might suggest this to Khoury as way in which GOL and USG can cooperate in ameliorating conditions in South Lebanon.

3. We can conceive of no other way in which we can be helpful other ~~xx~~ than through our outstanding offer to supply small arms to the GOL to assist in containing the fedayeen and thereby providing village security.

END

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 136516

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS [redacted]

EXO DPI

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~~SECRET~~ /~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ [redacted]

DIST 5 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY LEBANON/ARAB STATES 06 15 49 z AUG 70

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per sec. 3.3(b)(1)

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF THREE PALESTINIANS ON THE UAR'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROGERS PEACE PLAN

[redacted]

1. [redacted] A LEADING FATAH OFFICIAL EXPRESSED DEEP BITTERNESS AT UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL A B D - A L - N A S I R'S "BETRAYAL" OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BY HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROGERS PEACE PLAN. THE OFFICIAL SAID THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION LEFT OPEN TO THE PALESTINIANS IS TO "SPOIL" THE CEASEFIRE IN JORDAN BY CARRYING OUT AS MANY INCIDENTS AND FORAYS INTO ISRAEL AS POSSIBLE. CONTINUING, THE FATAH OFFICIAL SAID HE KNOWS THAT WITH THE AVERAGE LEBANESE MUSLIM's LOYALTY STILL GOING SOLIDLY TO NASIR, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY

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• ~~SECRET~~ /~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 11-21/5830, per sec. 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13
By: MLH, NARA; Date: 3/9/2015

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NOTHING THE PALESTINIANS CAN DO IN LEBANON. IF THE PALESTINIANS ATTEMPTED ANY SERIOUS VIOLENCE IN LEBANON, IT WOULD ONLY RESULT IN THEIR BEING KILLED BY THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, WITH THE FULL APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MUSLIM POPULATION.

2. [redacted] A PALESTINIAN WHO IS LESS RADICAL IN HIS OUTLOOK THAN THE FATAH OFFICIAL SAID THAT WITH NASIR'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE ROGERS PLAN, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO HOPE LEFT FOR PALESTINIANS ANYWHERE THROUGH THE USE OF VIOLENCE. WITHOUT NASIR SOLIDLY BEHIND THEM, HE SAID, THERE IS NOTHING PALESTINIANS CAN DO TO ALTER THE COURSE OF EVENTS.

3. STILL ANOTHER PALESTINIAN, WHO RECENTLY VISITED THE WEST BANK, EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE, AMONG WEST BANK ARABS HE KNOWS, TO THE ROGERS PEACE PLAN AND THE UAR'S AND JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF IT. HE COMMENTED THAT THE HOPE ENGENDERED AMONG THE WEST BANKERS BY THE PEACE PLAN AND DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE UAR HAD TOTALLY KILLED OFF ANY POPULAR SUPPORT FOR COMMANDO ACTION.

5 4 3 2 1 4. [redacted] DISSEM: NONE. [redacted]

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(2 pp.)

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11/18/2014

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DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 131106

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

EXO DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

281611Z [redacted]

DIST 28 JULY 1970

SANITIZED
per sec. 3.3(b)(1)

COUNTRY: LEBANON

DOI : [redacted]

SUBJECT: 1. REPORTED DECISION BY SUAD SHIHAB TO ANNOUNCE HIS CANDIDACY FOR THE LEBANESE PRESIDENCY

2. COMMENTS OF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

[redacted]

1. ACCORDING TO LEBANESE ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL YUSUF S H U M A Y I T, EX-PRESIDENT FUAD S H I H A B AGREED ON 26 JULY TO ACCEPT NOMINATION FOR THE LEBANESE PRESIDENCY, AND THIS WILL BE ANNOUNCED PROBABLY LATE IN THE DAY

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 11-21/5832, per sec. 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13
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per sec. 3.3(b)(1) [redacted]

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(classification) *(dissem controls)*

OF 28 JULY. SHIHAB CALCULATES THAT HE HAS THE VOTES OF FIFTY SEVEN DEPUTIES AND HOPES TO WIN OVER AT LEAST TEN MORE BY THE EVENING OF 28 JULY. SHIHAB HAD TRIED TO HAVE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ILYAS S A R K I S NOMINATED, BUT THIS DID NOT WORK. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHUMAYIT SAID HE TOLD SHIHAB, "IT'S EITHER YOU OR NO ONE." SHUMAYIT ALSO SAID THE DATE OF THE ELECTIONS WILL BE ANNOUNCED WITHIN TWO DAYS AND THAT THE DATE WILL PROBABLY BE SET FOR 31 JULY.

2. SHUMAYIT ALSO HAS INFORMATION THAT FORMER PRESIDENT KAMIL S H A M U N WILL ALSO ANNOUNCE HIS OWN CANDIDACY WITHIN TWO DAYS, SIMPLY TO FIGHT SHIHAB. WHEN IT WAS SUGGESTED TO SHUMAYIT BY A FRIEND THAT THIS WOULD RESULT IN TROUBLE POSSIBLY BREAKING OUT, SHUMAYIT SAID HE AGREED, BUT THAT HE WILL ATTEMPT TO EFFECT A NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS OR, IF UNSUCCESSFUL, DEFINITELY AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

3. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMY COUP D'ETAT, ORGANIZED BY LEBANESE G-2 IF SHIHAB LOSES, SHUMAYIT SAID SUCH SPECULATION IS NONSENSE, BECAUSE NO COUP WOULD BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT HIS (SHUMAYIT'S) PARTICIPATION.

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA. GP-1

REPORT CLASS: ~~S E C R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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per sec. 3.3(b)(1)

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~~S E C R E T NOFORN DISSEM~~ CITE [redacted]
COUNTRY: LEBANON/JORDAY/ARAB STATES/WEST GERMANY/UNITED KINGDOM/ROMANIA
DOI: [redacted]
SUBJECT: PLANS OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) AND OTHER COMMANDO GROUPS IN LEBANON AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS IF PHANTOMS ARE SOLD TO ISRAEL.

[redacted]

1. FOLLOWING THE JUNE 1970 CRISIS BETWEEN THE COMMANDOS AND THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, ARIF B A G H D A D I, A SYRIAN JOURNALIST WITH "ILA AL AMAM," THE BEIRUT ORGAN OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE - GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC) [redacted] WAS ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN LEBANON IF THE UNITED STATES SOLD A NEW BATCH OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. BAGHDADI, BASING HIS STATEMENTS ON WHAT HE HAD HEARD AROUND HIS NEWSPAPER OFFICE, MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.

2. IF AMERICA SELLS PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL, THE LEADER OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), GEORGE HABBASH, HAS ALREADY DECIDED ON AN OPEN STRUGGLE AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS. SPECIFICALLY, BOMBS WILL BE THROWN AT BUILDINGS HOUSING AMERICAN BUSINESSES, AMERICAN AUTOMOBILES WILL BE SABOTAGED, ATTACKED, OR STOLEN, THERE WILL BE ATTACKS AND DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, POPULAR

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DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE STREETS, STRIKES TO SHOW THE DISSATISFACTION OF THE PEOPLE, AND TRANSPORT WORKERS WILL REFUSE TO UNLOAD SHIPS AND PLANES ON WHICH THERE ARE AMERICANS.

3. WHEN ASKED IF THERE WOULD BE KIDNAPPINGS OF AMERICANS AS THERE HAD BEEN IN JORDAN, BAGHDADI, GIVING HIS PERSONAL OPINION, REPLIED THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS DIFFERENT. IN JORDAN THE COMMANDOS' INFLUENCE WAS MUCH STRONGER; IN LEBANON THERE WAS NO PLACE WHERE CAPTIVES COULD BE HELD SECURELY, AND MOST HOTELS HELD TOO MANY OTHER FOREIGNERS. CAPTIVES MIGHT BE HELD IN REFUGEE CAMPS, BUT EVEN IN THE CAMPS THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES TO PREVENT OR COUNTERACT IT.

4. BAGHDADI FURTHER STATED THAT ALL THE LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE PRO-CHINESE FACTIONS, ARE INTERESTED IN ATTACKING THE AMERICANS FIRST, BUT OTHER FOREIGNERS, THE WEST GERMANS, THE ENGLISH, AND THE ROMANIANS, WOULD POSSIBLY BE INCLUDED. [redacted] COMMENT: WHEN [redacted] MENTIONED THE ROMANIANS, HE WAS PROBABLY "THINKING LIKE A SYRIAN", BECAUSE SYRIA HAD BROKEN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA OVER ROMANIA'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON 24 AUGUST 1969. POSSIBLY HE ALSO REMEMBERED PRESIDENT NIXON'S 1969 VISIT TO ROMANIA.) ACTIONS AGAINST THE AMERICANS WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE HELP IN UNITING THE PALESTINIAN GROUPS, PARTICULARLY FATAH, SA'IQA, THE PFLP, THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, AND THE COMMUNIST AL-ANSAR GROUP, AROUND A COMMON ANTI-"FOREIGN" ACTION, ABOUT THE ONLY COMMON GROUND THEY COULD ACHIEVE SINCE THE GROUPS ARE DIVIDED ON NEARLY EVERY ISSUE. THE COMMON AIR OF THESE GROUPS WOULD ALSO BE TO REDUCE THE POWER OF THE ESTABLISHMENTS IN JORDAN AND IN LEBANON AND REPLACE THEM WITH THE POWER OF THE COMMANDO MOVEMENT, WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM FREELY TO APPLY PRESSURE ON AMERICA IN ORDER TO REALIZE VICTORY OVER ISRAEL.

5. [redacted] COMMENT: BAGHDADI NEVER MENTIONED NOR WAS ASKED ABOUT PFLP-GC PLANS, BUT PRESUMABLY THEY WOULD FOLLOW THE FOREGOING OUTLINED SCHEME.)

6. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA [redacted]

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COUNTRY: LEBAANON/ARAB STATES
DOI: [redacted]
SUBJECT: DECISION OF LEBANESE INTERIOR MINISTER KAMAL JUMBLATT TO PERMIT A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION IN BEIRUT 18 APRIL AGAINST THE VISIT OF U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE JOSEPH SISCO

[redacted]

1. ON THE MORNING OF 17 APRIL AT A MEETING WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, LEBANESE MINISTER OF INTERIOR KAMAL J U M B L A T T ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO PERMIT A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE VISIT TO LEBANON OF U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE JOSEPH S I S C O BY PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS AND LEFT WING GROUPS TO TAKE PLACE 18 APRIL AT 1600 HOURS. THE DEMONSTRATORS WILL ORGANIZE IN BEIRUT'S WESTERN SUBURBS AND WILL MARCH THROUGH THE BASTA AREA TO THE SERAIL. JUMBLATT COMMENTED THAT MR. SISCO WOULD HAVE COME AND GONE BY THAT TIME. WHEN JUMBLATT WAS ASKED BY LEBANESE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS NASSIM M A J D A L A N I WHETHER JUMBLATT COULD GUARANTEE A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION, JUMBLATT REPLIED THAT NO ONE COULD MAKE SUCH A GUARANTEE.

2. [redacted] DISSEO: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA USAREUR USAFE USCINCEUR CINCSOUTH COMSIXTHFLT CINCUSNAVEUR [redacted]

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NLN 11-21/5834, per sec. 3.3(b)(1); ltr. 11/6/13
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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS [redacted]

ADDED: EXO, DDI

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[redacted]

DIST 8 APRIL 1970

COUNTRY LEBANON/USSR

DOI [redacted] 00 14 39Z APR 70

SUBJECT PROJECTED OPENING OF LEBANESE MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICE IN MOSCOW

[redacted]

1. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES MAJOR-GENERAL JEAN N U J A Y M STATED [redacted] THAT HE HAD INITIATED PLANS TO OPEN A MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICE IN MOSCOW WHICH WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL BLOC COUNTRIES. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE IN LEBANON'S INTEREST TO HAVE A MILITARY ATTACHE OFFICE IN MOSCOW.

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2. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA

[redacted]

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~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~ CITE [redacted]
COUNTRY: LEBANON/ARAB STATES
DOI : [redacted]
SUBJECT: 1. STEPS TAKEN BY LEBANESE INTERIOR MINISTER TO PROTECT U.S. INSTALLATIONS
2. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CURRENT LEBANESE CRISIS

[redacted]

1. [redacted] COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL PRESS OF 30 MARCH 1970, THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) ANNOUNCED ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE EXPLOSIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN BEIRUT LATE 28 MARCH NEAR THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND AT THE AMERICAN (GARBLED) COMPANY BUILDING ON THE AIRPORT ROAD. IN ADDITION, THE PFLP HAS ALSO ANNOUNCED ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LATE 29 MARCH EXPLOSIONS AT THE JOHN F. KENNEDY CENTER BUILDING AND AT THE BANK OF AMERICA, OPPOSITE THE MAIN POST OFFICE BUILDING.)
2. ON THE EVENING OF 29/30 MARCH, LEBANESE INTERIOR MINISTER RASHAD J A N B L A T T CONTACTED RAMSEY B A R K, DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL SECURITY, AND ASKED THAT HE INCREASE THE PROTECTIVE FORCES AROUND ALL UNITED STATES INSTALLATIONS. BARR, HOWEVER, INFORMED JUMBLATT THAT HE DID NOT DO MUCH MORE THAN HE WAS ALREADY DOING, AND HE SUGGESTED [redacted] BE CALLED UPON FOR ASSISTANCE

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THAT PERHAPS THE LEBANESE ARMY SHOULD BE CALLED [illegible]
DURING THE NIGHTTIME HOURS. JUMBLATT THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE IN ORDER, BUT HE MADE NO PROMISES. RAMA ALSO SUGGESTED THAT STREETS IN FRONT OF AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS BE BLOCKED OFF AT NIGHT, SINCE THIS WOULD STOP THE PFLP FROM SHOOTING ROCKETS WHILE RIDING PAST SUCH INSTALLATIONS IN CARS. JUMBLATT CONSIDERED THIS TO BE A GOOD IDEA. JUMBLATT LATER CONTACTED LEBANESE ARMY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF COLONEL FAVZI K H A T I B AND ASKED HIM FOR TROOPS TO HELP PATROL AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS AT NIGHT. FAVZI REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT PLAN ANYTHING FOR THAT EVENING, BUT WOULD WORK OUT A PLAN ON THE MORNING OF 30 MARCH.

3. LEBANESE G-2 MAJOR SAMI K H A T I B WAS SENT TO CAIRO BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ON 28 MARCH, IN AN EFFORT TO HAVE THE UAR USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE COMMANDOS TO CALM DOWN THE SITUATION; HOWEVER, NO ONE HAS MUCH HOPE FOR POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THIS ACTION.

4. LIBYAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND UNITY SALIH B U W A Y S I R ARRIVED IN LEBANON 29 MARCH. JUMBLATT WANTED TO RESTRICT BUWAYSIR'S MEETINGS IN BEIRUT AND IN PARTICULAR DID NOT WANT HIM TO MEET WITH UAR AMBASSADOR IBRAHIM S A B R I. IN SPITE OF JUMBLATT, BUWAYSIR DID MEET WITH SABRI, AND THE LATTER TWO ARE ALLEGEDLY NOW WORKING TOGETHER WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO CALM THE CRISIS.

5. BEIRUT PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION OFFICE DIRECTOR SHAFIQ AL-H U T, WHO HAS ADVOCATED A POSITION OF MODERATION ON THE PART OF THE COMMANDOS, IS FAST LOSING POPULARITY. HE IS IN A CONSTANT BICKER WITH COMMANDO LEADERS AND AS A RESULT IS FAST LOSING HIS INFLUENCE.

6. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCMEAFSA USAREUR USAFE USCINCEUR CINCSOUTH CONSIXTHFLT CINCUSNAVEUR [redacted]

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ltr. 5/6/2009

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MSG. NO. 605

TRANSMITTED BY: [illegible] DEPT OF STATE

DATE & TIME: '70 AUG 13 AM 11:08

2. TO: WH

ORIGINATOR: S/S

4. RECEIVED BY: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DATE & TIME:

DESCRIPTION: Tel to Beirut - President's reply to msg from Patriarch Meouchi

CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS: CONFIDENTIAL

NO. OF PGS: 2 8. PRECEDENCE PRIORITY 9. VALIDATED BY:

DELIVER TO: Mr. Henry A. Kissinger FOR: CLEARANCE X

The White House INFORMATION

(Attention: Mr. Saunders) PER REQUEST

Revised: 9 Jan. 1970

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 09-12/43; Per ltr 8-4-2009
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Department of State
TELEGRAM

'70 AUG 13 AM 11:09
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ATE:
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HARGE TO

STRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

STATE

SUBJECT: President's Reply to Message from Patriarch Meouchi

1. Following is message from President which Ambassador or designate may deliver orally to Patriarch Meouchi in reply to latter's letter delivered personally by Charles Malik in April. Letter ~~xx~~ should not RPT not be delivered until after Presidential election in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. Text of letter follows:

His Beatitude Eminence Paul Peter Cardinal Meouchi
Patriarch of Antioch and All the East
Bkerke, Lebanon

Your Eminence:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter of March 25 which Dr. Charles Malik was kind enough to deliver to me.

I have appreciated receiving your message, and I want you to know that I am following developments in the Middle East closely. I am encouraged by the positive responses to our peace initiative and am

AFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
EA/ARN:TWSeelye:no	8/7/70	22670	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CARANCES:

NEA - Mr. Atherton

S/S -

White House -

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

ICATE:
COLLECT
CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

hopeful that current negotiations will lead to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. As you know, the preservation of Lebanon's independence and democratic way of life has long been important to the United States Government, and I can assure you that we continue to attach great importance to your nation's freedom and integrity.

With my warm personal wishes. Sincerely yours, Richard Nixon.

~~END~~

2. If Meouchi asks for copy of text, you should indicate that you are only authorized to ~~xxxxx~~ convey orally and that there is no signed copy.

END

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:

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[NLN09-12/43: P. 3063]

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