

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
3	memo w/ATTACH	Davis to Eliot P.16 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/1	8/20/70	B
6	memo w/ATTACH	Eliot to Kissinger P.55 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 9 Oct 2008 NLN 03-93/2	8/1/70	B
9	memo w/ATTACH	Saunders to Kissinger P.14 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/3	4/17/70	B
13	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/4 P.2	12/15/70	B
14	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/5 P.3 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 8-4-2009	12/12/70	B
18	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/6 P.2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 8-4-2009	8/17/70	B
20	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/7 P.2	10/29/70	B
32	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/8 P.2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 8-4-09	9/8/70	B
40	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/9 P.2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 8-4-09	8/21/70	B
45	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/10 P.2 SANITIZED per RAC REVIEW 8/26/2008	7/29/70	B
48	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/11 P.6	7/22/70	B
49	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/12 P.2 SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 4/26/2008	7/31/70	B
52	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/13 P.1 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 8-4-09	6/22/70	D
57	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/14 P.2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr 8-4-09	6/15/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files /country Files /middle EAST

BOX NUMBER

621 PG 1 of 4

FOLDER TITLE

① Lebanon Vol II 1 Feb '70 - 31 Dec '70

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
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		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/15 P.1		
73	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED <i>Perlt 8-4-09</i>	6/11/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/16 P.1		
74	telegram	Beirut to Secstate	5/29/70	B
80	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED <i>Perlt 8-4-09</i>	5/22/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/17 P.2		
83	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED <i>Perlt 8-4-09</i>	5/21/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/18 P.2		
84	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED <i>Perlt 8-4-09</i>	5/15/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/19 P.2		
87	cable	Beirut to Secstate	4/24/70	B
95	telegram	Beirut to Secstate	3/9/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/20 P.1		
112	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED <i>Perlt 8-4-09</i>	3/5/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/21 P.1		
113	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED <i>Perlt 8-4-09</i>	3/4/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/22 P.1		
122	telegram	Beirut to Secstate SANITIZED <i>Perlt 3-30-09</i>	3/3/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/23 P.1		
134	telegram	Secstate to Beirut	12/9/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/24 P.1		
135	telegram	Secstate to Beirut	12/1/70	B
		MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/25 P.2		
FILE GROUP TITLE			BOX NUMBER	
NSC			621	
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140	telegram	Secstate to Beirut DECLASSIFIED MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/26 P.2	lt 8-4-09 8/20/70	B
160	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/27 P.2	lt 8-4-09 5/4/71	B
162	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/28 P.1	lt 8-4-09 5/3/71	B
200	telegram	Beirut to Secstate DECLASSIFIED MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/29 P.1	lt 8-4-09 4/9/70	B
224	cable	CIA to White House P.1 Exempted MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/14 NLN 09-12/30	per sec 3.3(b)(1) LM 7/31/71	13 Nov 2008 B
225	cable	CIA to White House P.1 Exempted MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/15 NLN 09-12/31	per sec 3.3(b)(1) LM 5/1/71	13 Nov 2008 B
226	note	handwritten note w/ attachments P.11 Exempted MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-93/5 NLN 09-12/32	per sec 3.3(b)(1) LM 7/1/71	13 Nov 2008 B
227	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/33 P.2	8/5/70	B
228	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/34 P.2	7/28/70	B
229	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/35 P.2	7/28/70	B
230	cable	CIA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/36 P.1	6/24/70	B
231	cable	CIA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/37 P.1	4/17/70	B
232	cable	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/38 P.2	4/8/70	B
233	cable	CIA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/39 P.1	3/30/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

WJC Files / Country Files / Middle East

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621 P. 3 of 4

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① Lebanon Vol II 1 Feb '70 - 31 Dec '70

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234	cable	Dinosa to White House Exempted MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/40 P.1 <i>Per sec 1.4(c), 3.5(c)</i>	6/21/70 5-6-2009	B
235	cable	Dinosa to White House Exempted MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/41 P.1 <i>Per sec 1.4(c), 3.5(c)</i>	11/8/70 5-6-09	B
236	cable	Dinosa to White House Exempted MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/42 P.1 <i>Per sec 1.4(c), 3.5(c)</i>	3/5/70 5-6-2009	B
237	telegram	to Beirut NLN 09-12/43 DECLASSIFIED <i>Per ftr 8-4-2009</i>	8/13/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

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6	memo w/ATTACH	Eliot to Kissinger P.55 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/2 NLN 03-93/2 DECLASSIFIED per etr 9 Oct 2008	8/11/70	B
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49	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/12 P.2	7/3/70	B
52	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/13 P.1	6/22/70	B
57	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/14 P.2	6/15/70	B

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112	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/21 P.1	3/5/70	B
113	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/22 P.1	3/4/70	B
122	telegram	Beirut to Secstate MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/23 P.1	3/3/70	B
134	telegram	Secstate to Beirut MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/24 P.1	12/9/70	B
135	telegram	Secstate to Beirut MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-12/25 P.2	12/1/70	B

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236	cable	Darnsa to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN09-12/42 P.1	3/5/70	B
237	telegram	to Beirut	8/13/70	B

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MEMOS
MISC

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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 22656

CONFIDENTIAL

October 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HHS*

SUBJECT: Appointment with the President for Charles Helou

Former Lebanese President Charles Helou will be in the United States as President Frangie's personal representative heading their UN delegation, October 13-27. He will also travel as a U.S. Government guest on a Leader Grant. President Frangie is hopeful that Helou will be able to see the President. He will be in Washington at least on the 27th for other appointments.

This is being handled apart from the UN visitors, but as you pointed out the other day, it would be desirable for the President to see an Arab leader. None will be coming to the UN, so it may be worth considering Helou in that context.

Recommendation: That you send the attached memo to the President.

Handwritten notes:
A large blue arrow points from the subject line down to the recommendation.
A large black arrow points from the recommendation down to the handwritten note.
Al - Talk informally to Haldeman

11/7/70

HAK finally judged that this would not fit into the President's schedule. HHS

I think not.

HK

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 22656

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Appointment with ex-President Charles Helou of Lebanon

Former Lebanese President Charles Helou -- whose term ended last month -- will be in this country October 13-27. He came as President Frangie's personal representative heading Lebanon's UN delegation, but he will also travel while here on a Leader Grant as a guest of our government. He had an outstanding invitation for an official visit while he was President, but there was never a time when he felt politically able to leave Lebanon for long enough.

President Frangie hopes that you might see Helou. As you know, the Lebanese are extremely concerned over recent events in Jordan and continue to seek a sense of U. S. resolve to help Lebanon should similar developments occur there.

This appointment would actually fall outside the context of your special appointments and White House dinner for chiefs of state or heads of government attending the UN ceremonies. However, it is worth noting that, as of now, you are not scheduled to see separately any Arab leader in that context. (Prime Minister Laraki of Morocco and Meir are the only Near Easterners even scheduled for the White House dinner so far.) An invitation to Helou to talk with you at this time would have the special advantage of complementing that list with a respected Arab. More important, Helou is a man of substance who showed a good deal of courage and skill in keeping Lebanon moderate and preventing a major explosion there.

Recommendation: That you approve a meeting with Charles Helou between now and October 27 with Dwight Chapin to work out the details. [He will need a French interpreter. We know he is already planning to be in Washington on October 27 for other appointments.]

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 22656

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Appointment with ex-President Charles Helou of Lebanon

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION 22656

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

*Nancy
R. Kissinger*

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FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

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Approve _____ Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

13470

October 9, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Presidential Appointment for
Former Lebanese President Charles Helou

Former President Charles Helou of Lebanon will arrive in the United States on October 13 for a visit extending through October 27. He has been designated by the current Lebanese President, Sleiman Frangie, as his personal representative. President Frangie has asked him to visit Washington in the hope of seeing President Nixon. The one day that Helou will be unavailable to see the President is October 15. Otherwise he can arrange his plans to come to Washington at any time between October 13 and October 27 at the President's convenience.

The Department strongly recommends that President Nixon receive the former Lebanese President as a manifestation of our special interest in Lebanon. The Lebanese Government has been severely shaken by recent events in Jordan and very urgently needs reassurances that its friends, especially the United States, continue to stand by Lebanon. The Lebanese are apprehensive that increased numbers of fedayeen from Jordan may seek more secure bases in south Lebanon from whence to launch guerrilla raids against Israel. These raids and Israeli counter-thrusts have already created serious internal problems for Lebanon. The Lebanese are also worried about the possibility of Syrian intervention.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

A meeting between President Nixon and former President Helou at this time would reassure the Lebanese as well as serve notice to the Syrians and the fedayeen that the United States Government continues to accord Lebanon special importance.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

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Former Lebanese President Charles Helou -- whose term ended last month -- will be in this country October 13-27. He came as President Frangie's personal representative heading Lebanon's UN delegation, but he will also travel while here on a Leader Grant as a guest of our government. He had an outstanding invitation for an official visit while he was President, but there was never a time when he felt politically able to leave Lebanon for long enough.

President Frangie hopes that you might see Helou. As you know, the Lebanese are extremely concerned over recent events in Jordan and continue to seek a sense of U.S. resolve to help Lebanon should similar developments occur there.

This appointment would actually fall outside the context of your special appointments and White House dinner for chiefs of state or heads of government attending the UN ceremonies. However, it is worth noting that, as of now, you are not scheduled to see separately any Arab leader in that context. (Prime Minister Laraki of Morocco and Meir are the only Near Easterners even scheduled for the White House dinner so far.) An invitation to Helou to talk with you at this time would have the special advantage of complementing that list with a respected Arab. More important, Helou is a man of substance who showed a good deal of courage and skill in keeping Lebanon moderate and preventing a major explosion there.

Recommendation: That you approve a meeting with Charles Helou between now and October 27 with Dwight Chapin to work out the details. [He will need a French interpreter. We know he is already planning to be in Washington on October 27 for other appointments.]

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROGRAM

NUMBER 22656 MO 10 DA 09 HR 21

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT X CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS
 HAK X _____ ROGERS _____ C X _____ NODIS
 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY
 S _____ RES DATA
 TS _____ CODEWORD
 _____ SENSITIVE
 _____ PARIS MTG
 _____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 10/09

SUBJECT: Request for Pres appointment for Former Lebanese Pres Helou during UN activities

ENCLOSURES: 2/5 (13479) (_____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
NAME: <u>Winget</u>					
	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK (_____)	
STAFF SECRETARY		<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>	MEMO TO PRESIDENT (_____)	
DIR, SECRETARIAT				REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE (_____)	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE (_____)	
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA		<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>	MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)	
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)	
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)	
UNITED NATIONS	<u>X</u>			APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)	
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY (_____)	
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)	
PLANNING GROUP				DUE DATE: <u>10/13</u>	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
<u>10/11/70</u>	<u>MW</u>	<u>Mr. Saunders</u>	<u>I concur in whatever you want to do. mem</u>
<u>10/16/70</u>	<u>Saunders</u>	<u>Secretariat</u>	<u>memo to HAK for action</u>
<u>10/16</u>	<u>Saunders</u>	<u>HAK</u>	<u>sign action memo to Pres</u>
			<u>NOT forwarded to Pres/HAK disapproved - could not fit Pres's schedule</u>

MICROFILM DATA
 DO 11/10
 INIT _____
 DATE _____

ORIG) NSC
 TO) PAF
 WHC _____
 SUBF _____

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

NOTIFY: _____

COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL
 PAF X _____ HAK APP'L
 WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA
 SUBF _____ X NS3 FORM REQUIRED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 27, 1970

FOR THE PRESS

NO. 252

UNITED STATES AND LEBANON
CONCLUDE AIR TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENT

The United States and Lebanon today concluded an exchange of notes relating to the Air Transport Agreement signed by the two Governments in 1946. The notes were signed in Beirut by Ambassador Dwight J. Porter for the United States and by Ambassador Mahmoud Hafez, Chief of Economic and Cultural Services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for Lebanon.

This exchange of notes provides for an interim route for a Lebanese airline to carry cargo and mail in an east-bound direction from Lebanon via intermediate points in Asia to New York and beyond via certain intermediate points in Europe to Lebanon. The notes also provide that U. S. airlines may continue to provide services through Lebanon to a point or points beyond India, including the United States.

The text of the exchange of notes follows:

U. S. NOTE

August 27, 1970

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the consultations held in Washington between delegations representing the Governments of the United States and Lebanon from July 6 to 9, 1970, to consider revisions of the United States-Lebanon Air Transport Agreement of 1946. The delegations recommended the following understandings relating to the Air Transport Agreement:

1. It would be premature to determine at this time a route or routes for airlines of Lebanon, as contemplated by Section 2 of the Annex to the Agreement. This matter should be considered at a time when it is possible to determine such route or routes on a basis consistent with the civil aviation policies of the two Governments. At that time, the Agreement should be generally up-dated to bring it into conformity with current air transport agreement concepts.

- 2 -

2. Pending this subsequent determination of a Lebanese route or routes and review and up-dating of the provisions of the Agreement, the Government of Lebanon is accorded rights, to be exercised by an airline authorized by the Lebanese Government, of transit and non-traffic stop in the territory of the United States of America, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in cargo and mail at New York on scheduled air services on the following route:

From Lebanon via intermediate points in Asia to New York and beyond via Shannon or Dublin, Amsterdam, and Basel to Lebanon, in an east-bound direction only.

3. Airlines designated by the Government of the United States to provide services on the route specified in Section 1 of the Annex to the Agreement may continue to provide such services to a point or points beyond India, including the United States.

These understandings are acceptable to the Government of the United States. If they are also acceptable to the Government of Lebanon, I have the honor to propose that this note, together with your Excellency's reply to that effect, shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between our two Governments effective on the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ Dwight J. Porter

His Excellency,
Amnassador Mahmoud Hafez,
Director of Economics and
Cultural Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Beirut.

LEBANESE NOTE

August 27, 1970

Excellency:

I refer to your Note of August 27, 1970, which reads as follows:

(Text of U. S. Note)

- 3 -

I confirm the foregoing on behalf of the Government of Lebanon and inform you that my Government considers that your Note and this reply constitute an agreement between our two Governments which enters into force on the date of this Note.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ Mahmoud Hafez

His Excellency,
Dwight J. Porter,
Ambassador of the United
States of America,
Beirut.

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21392
21229
ALSO
21392

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter to the President from
Lebanese Patriarch (LDX 605)

The following is a revision of the telegram to Embassy Beirut contained in your LDX 605. It has been cleared by Hal Saunders.

QUOTE

1. No formal reply from President is contemplated. However, Ambassador or designate may respond orally to Patriarch Meouchi in reply to latter's letter delivered personally by Charles Malik in April along following lines:

The President wishes to thank you for your letter of March 25 which Dr. Charles Malik was kind enough to deliver.

He appreciated receiving the Cardinal's message, and wishes to convey the fact that he continues to watch developments in the Middle East very closely. The President is encouraged by the positive responses to the U.S. peace initiative and is hopeful that negotiations may lead to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. As the Cardinal must know, the preservation of Lebanon's independence and democratic way of life has long been important to the United States Government, and we continue to attach great importance to Lebanon's freedom and integrity.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 03-93/1 per Hr. 4/2/2010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By JMR NARA, Date 5/19/2010
[p. 1 of 16]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The President extends warm personal wishes to the Cardinal.

2. If Meouchi asks for copy of text, you should indicate that you are only authorized to convey orally and that there is no text.

END



Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

21392
W

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
August 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Lebanese Patriarch

You will recall that when Charles Malik saw the President last spring, he carried to him a letter from Cardinal Meouchi, head of the Maronite Christians in Lebanon and an important political figure in view of the balance of Christians and Moslems in that country. The letter [attached] was a general appeal to the U.S. to help strengthen Lebanese democracy, which the Cardinal feels is imperiled by increasing radical and subversive forces feeding on "the hostility [as the leftists play it] of American policy to the Arab and Islamic states."

Many Lebanese remember our 1958 actions and, while they realize that military intervention would probably do more harm than good today, general appeals for U.S. support of some form keep coming. You will recall that the 40 Committee dealt with this general issue last spring after Malik's visit.

The President discussed this general problem with Malik and it was assumed that anything Malik said on his return to Beirut would constitute a reply to the Cardinal's letter. However, Ambassador Porter was recently queried by the Patriarch about whether he would get a response. Therefore, the Ambassador has suggested that he be authorized to reply orally along the following lines:

The President wishes to thank you for your letter of March 25 which Dr. Charles Malik was kind enough to deliver. He appreciated receiving the Cardinal's message and wishes to convey the fact that he continues to watch developments in the Middle East very closely. The President is encouraged by the positive responses to the U.S. peace initiative and hopeful that negotiations may lead to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. As the Cardinal must know, the preservation of Lebanon's independence and democratic way of life has long been important to the United States Government and we continue to attach great importance to Lebanon's freedom and

~~SECRET~~

SECRET -- 2

integrity. The President extends warm personal wishes to the Cardinal.

Comment: As you know from our contingency planning exercises, we have some stake in the well-being of the Lebanese Christians. In the event of intercommunal fighting or a breakdown brought about by a fedayeen-government confrontation, the Lebanese army may not be effective in protecting the internal security and we may have to rely on the strength of the Lebanese Christians to protect Americans in a deteriorated situation. For this reason, we have kept open the lines of communication as well as some modest help.

Recommendation: That Ambassador Porter be authorized to reply informally and orally to Cardinal Meouchi along the lines of the foregoing suggested response.

Approve

Disapprove

SECRET

Haug for.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

MSG. NO.

TRANSMITTED BY:
DATE & TIME:

2. TO: WH

605

[Handwritten signature]
STATE

70 AUG 13 AM 11:08

ORIGINATOR:

S/S

4. RECEIVED BY:
DATE & TIME:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DESCRIPTION:

Tel to Beirut - President's reply to msg from Patriarch Neouchi

CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO. OF PGS:

2

8. PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

9. VALIDATED BY:

[Handwritten signature]

DELIVER TO:

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

FOR:

CLEARANCE


The White House

INFORMATION

(Attention: Mr. Saunders)

PER REQUEST

Revised: 9 Jan. 1970



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

70 AUG 13 AM 11:09

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TE:
LECT
RGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

STATE

SUBJECT: President's Reply to Message from Patriarch Meouchi

No formal reply is contemplated. However,
1. Following is message from President ^{which} Ambassador or ^{respond} designate may deliver orally to Patriarch Meouchi in reply to latter's

letter delivered personally by Charles Malik in April. ~~Letter~~ ^{Message}

along following lines:
~~should not RPT not be delivered until after Presidential election in~~

~~order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. Text of letter~~ *message*

follows:

His Beatitude Eminence Paul Peter Cardinal Meouchi
Patriarch of Antioch and All the East
Bkerke, Lebanon

Your Eminence:

The President wishes to thank you
~~Thank you very much~~ for your ~~thoughtful~~ letter of March 25 which

Dr. Charles Malik was kind enough to deliver, ~~to me.~~

He appreciated the Cardinal's wishes to convey the fact
I have appreciated receiving your ¹ message, and ~~I want you to know~~
that he continues to watch very The President
that I am following developments in the Middle East closely. ~~I am~~

is encouraged by the positive responses to the U.S. our peace initiative and ~~our~~

TELETYPE UNIT	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
1/ARN:TWSeelye:mo <i>CUK</i>	8/7/70	22670	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

DISTRIBUTES:

NEA - Mr. Atherton *JK*

S/S -

NLN03-93/1 White House - *JK*

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DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM



TE:
LECT
RGE TO

Page 2 - Amembassy BEIRUT

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

hopeful that ~~current~~ ^{may} negotiations ~~will~~ lead to a resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. As ~~you~~ ^{the Cardinal must} know, the preservation of Lebanon's independence and democratic way of life has long been important to the United States Government, and ~~I can assure you that we~~ ^{we continue to attach great} ~~we~~ ^{we} continue to attach great importance to ~~your nation's~~ ^{Lebanon's} freedom and integrity.

^{The President extends} ~~With my~~ warm personal wishes, ^{to the Cardinal.} ~~Sincerely yours,~~ Richard Nixon.

~~XXXXX~~

2. If Meouchi asks for copy of text, you should indicate that you are only authorized to ~~xxxxx~~ convey orally and that there is no ^{text} signed copy.

END

TELETYPE UNIT: _____ DRAFTING DATE: _____ TEL. EXT.: _____ APPROVED BY: _____

The Honorable

Richard Nixon

President of the United States of America

(May God preserve him)

Your Excellency:

We are happy that the visit which our friend Mr. Charles Malik is making to the American capital affords us the occasion of extending to your Excellency, together with this message of ours, our best wishes to your person and to the friendly American people, coupled with our warmest prayers that God grant you success in the momentous tasks devolving upon your shoulders.

We would not have wished to divert some of your concern away from the great and vital problems which you face under these delicate international circumstances towards the issue of a small country like Lebanon, had it not been for the fact that this issue is an important part of the

to which you are devoting your utmost attention, an issue, moreover, which is intimately and directly related to the humanitarian principles to which the noble American people have dedicated themselves.

In the light of these principles the Lebanese question presents itself in perfect clarity, quite apart from the traditional concepts of politics and diplomacy, the question, namely, that Lebanon, which is perhaps the only country in this region clinging to freedom and democracy, is now threatened with respect to its system as well as to its very destiny, by virtue of the political and military developments taking place in the region, and the errors and whims which attend these developments.

One source of anxiety is the fact that the rule which has reigned in Lebanon since 1958 has been resorting to considerations and justifications which incapacitated it from responding to the wishes of the Lebanese people, and this in a small country in which subversive forces have been very active, by reason of its being surrounded by countries with radical systems differing from its free and democratic system, and owing to destructive elements infiltrating into its interior in large numbers and the presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees on its soil.

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

[p. 9 of 16]

In the face of successive waves of extremism erupting sometimes into violence the government has found itself compelled to indulge in one fundamental concession after another, for the sake of pleasing and appeasing, thereby sacrificing many of the constituents of sound orientation and the foundations on which Lebanese existence rests. This has reached such a state that the people view the government as they view the menace of radicalism itself, which hails upon them from without and elicits responses from within.

What is truly regrettable in this connection is that Lebanese policy has been swept by this current of radicalism to the extent of becoming itself a satellite, and this at a time when the Lebanese people were bracing themselves up to stand firm, not only for the sake of preserving their free democratic system, but also for the sake of playing their part in the battle of defending democratic existence in the other parts of the region. The peoples of these other parts look upon Lebanon as an element of salvation, by reason of its historical connections and international friendships-- connections and friendships which confer upon Lebanon a double role, as being at once the window through which the countries of the region catch

its principles and diverse activities, enters the region. Nor is it necessary to point out the repercussions which the destruction of the traditional role of Lebanon will produce upon both the region and the free world; and this is indeed the explanation of the process of encirclement undertaken by the forces of radicalism with a view to denying Lebanon this role.

During our visit to the United States in 1962 we called the attention of President John Kennedy to this situation and, if a speedy remedy was not forthcoming, to the dangers and pitfalls inherent therein, especially with respect to the question of the Palestinian refugees of whom there are about three hundred and fifty thousand on Lebanese soil, amounting to one-sixth of the population of the country and one-third of those who have been displaced from Palestine. We also pointed out the danger implicit in the delay in finding the desirable solutions, danger not only in relation to Lebanon but also to the entire region. The late President expressed a deep understanding of this point of view, and promised that he would lend it his special solicitude, with a view to finding the appropriate quick

solution. It is, however, painful that he was not granted time enough to

give effect to this solicitude, and that international politics has frustrated this matter, with the result that we are before a most dangerous situation in which Lebanon finds itself at present, a situation casting its shadow beyond the frontiers of Lebanon and threatening countries and elements which are continuing the struggle for the same free and democratic principles.

Before these dangers whose foreboding storms increase day by day upon the region, threatening Lebanon in its very existence, we find it indispensable to turn urgently to the President of the American nation, which is the upholder of human freedoms and principles, with an appeal to lend a quick helping hand to the Lebanese people, if it is necessary for democracy to preserve the last of its strongholds in this part of the world. This help begins by a realistic understanding of the Lebanese situation, away from the misleading slogans which are often used as coatings for political and diplomatic action. It is then consummated by taking, in the diverse realms, effective measures dictated by this understanding, not only for the salvation of Lebanon, but for the rescue

The region of the Near East is tortured by a fateful and violent struggle on two fronts--Zionist entrenchment and Communist expansion. Its children who hold fast to their authentic beliefs and free traditions find it increasingly difficult to exercise free choice. The reason is the pressure of leftist propaganda about the hostility of American policy to the Arab and Islamic states, with the result that the conservative and free elements are no longer able to express freely even their convictions, lest they be demagogically branded as supporters of American policy.

It is clear that Lebanon is the only country in the region where the majority of the population are still able to express their convictions and opinions freely, and to hold fast to them. It follows that to strengthen this freedom in Lebanon, before it is too late, is to strengthen the similar elements in the diverse countries of the region who are themselves overwhelmed, and to encourage them to stand firm. We find in such a policy no conflict with American interests in the other realms; on the contrary, such a strengthening of freedom might lead to the establishment of the desired balance in American policy in the area, all the more because the elements

NLN 03-93/1

of the radical forces aims at the very roots of their religious and social existence, and the struggle between these elements and these forces is thus one of life and death, and the danger latent therein can never be compared to any other danger.

In the light of this fact, and because the Lebanese people are incapable of confronting the enormous dangers which threaten them, the Maronite Patriarch deems it necessary to address himself to the American government, requesting them to come to the aid of Lebanon so as to enable it to surmount its present trials, basing himself on the historical responsibilities resting on the shoulders of the Patriarchate for the defense of Lebanese existence, as well as on his faith in the benevolent understanding of the American people, especially as a large number of his children are American citizens who contributed considerably to the diverse aspects of American life, and his conviction that the United States bears responsibilities for the defense of the free world, of which Lebanon is but a small part which it is not beyond the power of the great American government to save.

We believe that Dr. Charles Malik, the sincere Lebanese and the loyal friend of America, can present all clarifications expressing the truth of

NLN 03-93/1

[p. 14 of 16]

the matter, and we hope that these clarifications will meet with a
beneficent and quick response from your Excellency.

In conclusion we pray that God prosper your ways and shield dear
America with His divine protection, granting her noble people all good
and all blessing.

Cardinal

(signed) Paul Peter Meouchi

Bkerke, March 25, 1970

Patriarch of Antioch and the Rest
of the East

(Translation by Charles Malik)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PRO E

NUMBER MO DA HR

21229 08 13 09

ALSO 21392

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS _____
 HAK _____ ROGERS _____ C _____ NODIS _____
 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____
 DOC DATE: 8/12 _____ DAVIS _____ S RES DATA _____
 TS _____ CODEWORD _____
 _____ SENSITIVE _____
 _____ PARIS MTG _____
 _____ NO FORN _____

SUBJECT: Lebanon's Precarious Position As A Nation
 in the ME

ENCLOSURES: () () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME:	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

MICROFILM DATA
 DO ✓
 INIT 8/12
 DATE 8/24
 ORG) NSC
 TO) PAF ✓
 WHC
 SUBF

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK ()
- MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
- REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
- REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
- MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
- RECOMMENDATIONS ()
- JOINT MEMO ()
- APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
- CONCURRENCE ()
- DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

~~STATUS - "D"~~

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
8/12	DAVIS	ELIOT	Request for draft Reply
8/19	SAUNDER	HAK	Decision
8/19	HAIG	Saunders	Approved Recommendation
8/20	D/C	DAVIS	Need memo to Eliot?
8/20	Davis	Murphy	Eliot memo done

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
 NOTIFY: _____
 COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

DISPATCHED 8/20
 OUTSIDE RECPT.
 TOM

NSC STAFF APPROVAL
 PAF HAK APP'L
 WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA
 SUBF _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED

NLN 03-07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PRO. 2

NUMBER MO DA HR

21392 08/19/10

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES HAK FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS _____ LAIRD _____ CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS _____ C _____ NODIS _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____ S RES DATA _____ TS _____ CODEWORD _____ SENSITIVE _____ PARIS MTG _____ NO FORN _____

DOC DATE: 8/18 Saunders

SUBJECT: Letter to Pres from Lebanese patriarch, Cardinal Meouchi.

ENCLOSURES: A/S) () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION REQUIRED

NAME:	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

- MEMO FOR HAK ()
- MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
- REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
- REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
- MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
- RECOMMENDATIONS ()
- JOINT MEMO ()
- APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
- CONCURRENCE ()
- DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

SEE # 21229 FOR ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
8/19	Saunders	HAK	Decision

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____ NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL _____
 NOTIFY: _____ PAF _____ HAK APP'L _____
 COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA _____
 SUBF _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED _____



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 11486

August 19, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suleiman Franjieh Elected
New President of Lebanon

The new Lebanese President, 60-year old Suleiman Franjieh, is generally pro-Western, with close cultural ties to France. Well disposed towards the United States, his highly developed sense of impartiality should enable him to steer a steady course among Lebanon's fractious political groupings. Educated in French language schools in Lebanon's northern city of Tripoli, near his native town of Zagharta, Franjieh's studies extended barely beyond high school. Not famed for his political astuteness, Franjieh is nevertheless likable and honest. His great strength is his reputation for fairness and integrity built during the Lebanese Parliamentary elections of 1968.

Franjieh, a Maronite as all Lebanese Presidents must be, might have been expected during those elections to favor his own religious sect over other Christian groups and over the Muslims. However, as Minister of the Interior with responsibilities for maintaining law and order during a furiously fought election campaign, Franjieh steered a scrupulously impartial course. He alienated no factions during the campaign, and his election to the Presidency attests to a general belief that his sense of fairness is what Lebanon needs at this time.

CONFIDENTIAL

*9/1/70 - Already covered
in President's Daily
Brief "S. Haskinson."*

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

For most of his life Franjeh was something of a feudal lord. Until 1957 he had engaged himself solely in managing the extensive family land holdings. Only in 1957 did he enter active politics with a successful election campaign for the Lebanese Parliament. Since then he has been either a Parliamentarian or a Minister in various Lebanese cabinets. He is not a worldly man, his English is nil and his knowledge of the wide world is not extensive. The prospects are nevertheless good that he will make a successful Lebanese President.


William P. Rogers

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROCEDURE

NUMBER 21426 MO 08 DA 20 HR 08

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES HAK _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS _____
 ROGERS LAIRD _____ C NODIS _____
 LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____
 S _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ CODEWORD _____
 _____ SENSITIVE _____
 _____ PARIS MTG _____
 _____ NO FORN _____

DOC DATE: 8/19

SUBJECT: Election of Suleiman Franjich as new President of Lebanon

ENCLOSURES: 8/11486 () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Saunders

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()
 MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
 REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
 REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
 MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
 RECOMMENDATIONS ()
 JOINT MEMO ()
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
 CONCURRENCE ()
 DUE DATE: 8/27

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
9/1	Saunders	Secretariat	already covered in President's Daily Brief - SH 9/1/70

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DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____ NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL _____
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21229

17/F is

This material should
be 17/F under

21229 and forwarded
on to files to be
added to the org
package

Mrs D —

All we have
to do is call
S/S + take
them off the hook
for a reply.

This package
w/ HAK, AM,
19 AUG

HAK

Perlema

21522

Done 8/19

Call Browner

Brandt in SIS,
plan, & tell him
these two issues
crossed in trans-
mission. Their
draft telegram is
now up for approval
& they can disregard
my 8/12 note

MD

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jack Murphy -385-

S/S tells me
that their LOY 605
of 8/8 & our
21229 to state
of 8/12 apparently
crossed. Could I
see them both,
please

nm

21229

August 12, 1970

Jelton

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter to the President

The attached was left at the White House for the President.
We would appreciate having a draft of a reply suitable for
oral transmission by Ambassador Porter in Beirut.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachment

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DO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>8/27</i>
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C O P Y



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 10728

August 1, 1970

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Charles Malik, Former Lebanese Foreign
Minister and President of General Assembly,
Urges Election of Former President
Camille Chamoun as New Lebanese President

The enclosed 51-page Memorandum from Dr. Charles Malik on the Lebanese Presidential election of 1970 was handed recently to Ambassador Dwight J. Porter in Beirut with the request that it be passed to President Nixon. Malik talked with President Nixon and a number of Senators and Congressmen during a visit to Washington last April.

Part One of Malik's Memorandum concludes that for various reasons former Lebanese President Fuad Chehab should not be returned to the Presidency. Part Two promotes the candidacy of former President Camille Chamoun on the grounds that Chamoun could best preserve internal Lebanese unity and steer Lebanon most skillfully in international affairs. The internal logic of the Memorandum is that the United States should support Chamoun, Dr. Malik hinting that U.S. funds might play a role. (In a long subsequent conversation between Chamoun and Ambassador Porter on July 21 Chamoun made no request for financial assistance.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.3

NLN 03-93/2 per ltr 9 Oct 2008

~~SECRET~~

By CIM NARA Date 20 Apr 2009

GROUP 3

lp 1 of 55


Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

2

Part Three of the Memorandum consists of 50 separate statements on the Middle East, designed, as Dr. Malik sees it, to set a general framework within which the current situation in Lebanon may better be understood.

Through Ambassador Porter we are informing Dr. Malik that his Memorandum has been passed to the White House for submission to the President. No further action is required.


Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Dr. Malik's Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

A Memorandum by

10728

Charles Malik

on the Lebanese Presidential Elections of 1970

PART ONE

The Lebanese presidential elections this year appear to be the most important in the history of Lebanon. Within the general context of the troubled Middle Eastern situation these elections assume special significance. I have given this matter considerable thought, at once sustained and responsible, based on months and years of investigation and reflection. The over-all conclusion to which I came is that it is time for change in Lebanon, that such a change is necessary, and that it is possible.

I do not belong to any formal political party, nor am I active in any such party, but my sympathies in general are with the policies and objectives represented by Camille Chamoun, Raymond Edde and Pierre Gemayel, and their respective parties. This means that I have considerable reservations towards policies and procedures represented by Fouad Chehab and his followers. This is my initial political bent of mind, but, having no special political ax to grind, I shall endeavor to be as fair and objective as possible. If any of

my positions should appear arbitrary or tendentious or unrealistic, I would be most happy to have it debated as vigorously as possible.

The forthcoming government of Lebanon will be determined by the person at its head and by the policies he will pursue. In Lebanon and the Middle East in general persons determine policies far more than policies persons. This means that what a man stands for as a person is far more important than what he proclaims as his policies. It is a well-known phenomenon that two persons will subscribe exactly to the same verbal expression of policy without anything necessarily following therefrom as to how they will deliver the goods in actual practice. It all depends on the character of the person and not on the lines of policy to which he formally adheres.

Any judgment regarding the person and his policies should be governed by five criteria: (1) Whether he is a strong man in his own person, whether he has demonstrated his strength, whether he can command general popular support, and whether therefore he can really govern. (2) Whether he and his policies really serve the best interests of Lebanon. (3) Whether he and his policies conduce to peace, security and stability in the Middle East. (4) Whether he and his policies would be as helpful as possible, in a rational and constructive spirit, to the Arab world. (5) Whether he and his policies would really be in the best interests of the free world in general and the United States in particular.

These criteria mutually determine and limit one another. They are all essential and none of them can be wholly disregarded, but they cannot all be equally ideally fulfilled. The judgment

that is practically possible for any one criterion in the light of what is possible for the others. The judge's own personal character is always at play in determining how far to give in for one criterion and how far to hold firm in connection with another. The resulting harmony expresses in a very general and vague way the personal character of the judge. Thus as between two equally honest judges with perfect personal integrity honest differences of opinion could arise, and when this is the case these differences should be thoroughly argued out between them. And even after the most thorough argumentation in the friendliest of spirits and under the most favorable conditions, and with all the objective facts marshaled and taken into account, honest differences of opinion could still persist between the judges. You are then dealing with basic differences in fundamental personal philosophies, including differences in orders of priorities.

Because of the prevailing unwritten system in Lebanon the president must be a Maronite. Non-Maronites have conceded this rule as a matter of course. This simplifies things and conduces to some order. Maronite leaders prepare themselves for this post over the years and others help in this process by expecting them to undergo this preparation. It thus comes about that, practically speaking, we have before us today a group of presidential candidates who are all Maronites.

Keeping in mind the five criteria I set forth above, I can exclude, for one reason or another, all hopefuls except Fouad Chehab, Camille Chamoun, Raymond Edde and Pierre Gemayel,

who appear to fulfill in varying patterns of order and intensity all these five criteria. Almost universally in Lebanon people say these four are front-runners regardless of people's individual sympathies and regardless of the difficulties facing them or the probabilities of success or failure. Thus if vox populi, vox Dei, then my judgment appears to coincide with that of the truth.

Hopefuls such as Michel El-Khoury, Pierre Edde, Jamil Lahoud, Elias Sarkis, Suleiman Frangie, Maurice Gemayel, Farid Dahdah, Philippe Saadeh, Philippe El-Khazen, and others, are definitely, by universal consent, not front-runners; they disqualify because manifestly they do not fulfill one or another of the five basic criteria, principally the first criterion; and if any of them came to power by some process of compromise we would have a repetition of the Helou experiment which has, again by universal consent, proved a dismal failure. This does not mean that I do not have, for one reason or another, distinct preferences among these men; some of them are good timber for the future, but none of them appears to qualify for the present. To fall back, after the failure of the Helou experiment, upon second-line runners who are untried, who have not had experience in fateful high state responsibilities, who have not been in the forefront of struggle and danger, who can receive only borrowed and second-hand support from the people or support loaned or handed over by the agencies of power, including the army and the deuxième bureau (and by definition that would be pale and halfhearted if not also mortgaged), and who emerge only because they have

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been lurking in the shadows watching the giants with their parties and their popular base knock each other off, and perhaps gleefully and intriguingly helping along in that process, is definitely not the best that Lebanon merits and demands at present. I am saying nothing against any of these men personally; I am only setting forth the facts of power and rule and struggle at this most critical juncture in the history of Lebanon and the Middle East.

I must therefore in conscience concentrate on Fouad Chehab, Camille Chamoun, Raymond Edde and Pierre Gemayel.

The over-all conclusion which I stated at the very beginning and which I arrived at after months and years of responsible study and reflection is that it is time for change and that such a change is both necessary and possible. This is not an abstract or intellectual or idealistic or wishful or sentimental or tendentious conclusion; it is one which most responsibly takes account of the given, concrete, practical realities of political life in Lebanon, always in the light of the five basic criteria which must govern the choice of president.

Clearly I mean change from Chehab and his rule which has lasted twelve years, six years directly and six by proxy.

I think I know Chehab somewhat though not as well as I should wish, for it is very difficult to know Chehab very well. Some of his closest friends say they do not know him well enough. He has a noble mien; he is clean and personally above reproach; in a fundamentally confessional country he tries to be above the competing and warring confessions; he

received in 1958 a legacy of national self-laceration and he tried to heal the political and psychological wounds which the disorders of that year created, and to some extent he succeeded; he introduced social and economic reforms and he hoped for great changes in these realms; and the army and deuxième bureau are loyal to him. These are all great assets. When I say the desired change is from Chehab and his 12-year rule I am not denying his positive qualities; there is no personal feud between me and him, and indeed there is none between me and anybody; there is not the slightest wish to see him humiliated or dishonored or disrespected; Lebanon should accord him his respectful place as one of its great modern men; the change should be effected not without guaranteeing him a place of honor in the country; and because of his special relations to the army every attempt must be made not to alienate him and the army.

But having said all that, that is not all to be said. For Lebanon cannot stand eighteen years of uninterrupted Chehabist rule, twelve directly and six by proxy. Twelve years are enough. Let me explain with the five basic criteria in mind.

The army has functioned principally as a personal militia of Chehab; so much was conceded even by Robert Murphy in his book, and that related to twelve years ago; how much more would that be true today after twelve years of direct and indirect rule? The army puts Chehab's interests above every other interest, even at times above those of the country. The deuxième bureau is for the most part his private intelligence agency both for gathering information and for performing

Khatib, Sarkis, and others) who have profited enormously from this alliance and who want to perpetuate it. They use every method of intrigue, inducement, bribery, terrorism, intimidation, favoritism, partisanship, and removal of people from the limelight, towards that end. I doubt not most of this occurs against his will and perhaps without his knowledge, but, making use of his name and working from their high privileged posts under his protection, these men intend to serve their own interests through serving ~~their~~ ^{his} own. It is a form of military dictatorship when the security forces, army and deuxième bureau, concentrate their energies on serving one general, and this is not conducive to peace and security and general contentment in Lebanon. Military dictatorships have not been dazzling successes in the Middle East, either as promoting the general welfare, or as conducing to peace and security in the area, or as serving as ~~the~~ bulwarks against communism infiltrating and dominating the Middle East. And of all countries in the Middle East Lebanon stands in no need whatever for a military dictatorship, whether overt or covert.

Again, it is a well-known fact that the majority of the people are opposed to Chehab and his rule. An overwhelming majority of the Christians are opposed to him--quite openly. He may have started in 1958 with an overwhelming majority of the Muslims supporting him, but this majority has, for a variety of reasons, dwindled since perhaps to a minority. The phenomenon of Salam, Jumblatt and El-Assad now--whatever their several reasons--openly opposing him and the cliques serving him is

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significant. It is doubtful whether a majority of the Shiites support him. I am told (I cannot vouch for this) that a majority of the Shiites and a majority of the Druzes oppose him. If a person must be Maronite to be president, then his community at least must support him, but the Maronites of Lebanon do not support the candidacy of Chehab, as is clear from the fact that the Patriarch, Paul Peter Cardinal Meouchi, is bitterly opposed to him, that such leaders as Chamoun, Edde and others are his determined opponents, that Gemayel and his Kataib party would not dare publicly express their support of him without at the same time saying that they also support Chamoun and Edde equally, that it is a well-known fact that the Kataib have lost a great deal of the sympathy of the public towards them because of their collaboration with Chehab during his 12-year rule, and that all his candidates in his own district, Kisrwan--a solidly Maronite district--where he lives, were roundly and decisively defeated by the candidates of the Tripartite Alliance (the Alliance between Chamoun, Gemayel and Edde) in the parliamentary elections of 1968. If the Maronites do not support a particular Maronite candidate, and if that candidate nevertheless runs and becomes president, then the convention that the president must be a Maronite becomes a pure fiction. I can therefore say that at least 80% of the people of Lebanon, including at least 90% of the Christians, principally of the Maronites, are opposed to the return of Chehab and his rule. If Chehab should return to power it would be most discouraging to those

who believe in democracy and in the rule of the majority, and this could lead to unfortunate developments in a country which is a natural candidate to being a model of democracy and freedom in the Middle East.

Again, it was during the 12-year rule of Chehab that communism made its greatest inroads in Lebanon. Communist literature, the communist press, communist thought, communist meetings and demonstrations, the open activity of the communist party, a prevailing communist atmosphere terrorizing or at least silencing everybody (with important exceptions), the infiltration of the government at high levels by leftists, radical and moderate, by communist sympathizers, and perhaps even by secret communists, the concluding of many commercial, economic and cultural treaties with communist countries, and the Soviet Ambassador openly interfering in internal Lebanese political affairs and stridently expressing his preference for and his opposition to this or that presidential candidate (a famous incident occurred in Zahleh)--all these and other phenomena have increase 10-fold during the last twelve years. Some people argue that this is an inevitable spill over into Lebanon from the great alienation against America and the West resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict which communism is fully exploiting all over the Middle East, and that it is not fair to blame it all on Chehab and his regime. I do not agree with this explanation; the ascribing of every Western retreat in the Middle East to the tragedy of the Arab-Israeli situation, and therefore the suspending of every attempt at reversing this

retreat until this conflict is resolved, is too superficial and facile; this ascribing and suspending is a form of shirking personal responsibility and decision. I believe, on the contrary, that there has been a fundamental flaw somewhere in Chehab or in his rule which helped to bring about this phenomenal communist advance. And I believe much could have been done and much can still be done to arrest and reverse it.

Again, the amount of corruption and deterioration in governmental authority and administration during the last twelve years is unbelievable. Corruption always existed in Lebanon but its present dimensions exceed by far anything known in the past. If what people tell you is correct, you cannot conclude a single governmental transaction today--not even the simplest transaction--without greasing somebody's palm. This was not the case before. It is not correct to say that Chehab and his regime have been responsible for this moral administrative disintegration, but it is correct to say that it occurred during the last twelve years, that much could have been done to stem it, and that not enough has been done towards that end. The sharp decline in governmental authority and discipline is a byword in Lebanon today; ministers in the same cabinet appear to govern each an independent realm of his own; and there is virtual paralysis in ordinary governmental procedures. There is therefore a widespread breakdown in public authority and order.

Nor has the economic situation improved in recent years. People grumble no end economically these days, and virtually all say that prior to the advent of Chehab there was real prosperity in Lebanon and people had lots of money in their hands.

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Emigration to Australia, Canada, the United States and elsewhere has multiplied considerably in recent years, and from one village alone I know, with population less than a thousand, hundreds of young men and women have emigrated to these lands in the last decade. It is not fair to attribute all this economic decline to Chehab, for the insecurities of the disturbed situation in the Middle East had a great deal to do with it. But people do tend to blame the reigning regimes for their misfortunes. As people do not associate Chehab and his regime with prosperity and general well-being, Chehab would have a real psychological handicap to overcome in this realm were he to come to power again.

Again, Chehab never mixes with the people; he never goes out to social functions; he never makes any statements; one only surmises what he thinks or believes; when one visits him and he opens up one gets a great deal out of him; but he stays in his house all the time where he receives and chats with the army officers and the sycophants who support and flatter him and whom he helped to create and continues to help to remain standing on their feet; it is doubtful that he reads more than the local French papers, one or two papers from France and the journals of the French army; and the coterie of his immediate admirers and friends who may help in forming his opinions and attitudes is exceedingly limited, both in quantity and quality. These are his personal habits and limitations and I shall not try to explain them. They are there and I take them as they are. But there is something unhealthy about a man who would rule a country without mixing with its people, a man who regards himself wholly apart from the people he rules and

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even above them. For he does look down upon the people and says so. There are many odd things about Lebanon but perhaps the oddest is the spectacle of the head of a democratic state who rules by pulling strings in utter secrecy and without deigning to engage himself in any public debate or discussion or intercourse with the people. There is here a most dangerous esotericism. It is an insult to a country--indeed it is ridiculous--to want to rule it without desiring or being able to establish interacting, intimate, personal contacts with its people or with their leaders.

Furthermore, there is a certain vindictiveness about Chehab. He does not appear to have a sense of humor about himself. He is known for feeding upon his own rancor and resentments. He is merciless in his treatment of those who do not kowtow to him--whether merely neutral towards him, or opponents, or enemies. He persecutes and ostracizes them, and he would never permit their participation in state functions or allow their faces to be shown on television or their voices to be heard on the radio or their names to appear in the press statements of the state. He wishes to reduce them if he can to unpersons; he prefers them unmentioned or unknown or dead. I am not sure all this is the expression of his own personal character and will, for he has a certain sweetness and nobility about him which could be most charming and which he clearly manifests when he is at his best and really lets down his guard. Thus it could all be the independent design of his immediate staff. But he allows it to transpire.

Again, Chehab has cooperated only with mediocre people. Some of the best elements in the country are left to rot and waste away by themselves. He does not seem at ease in the presence of challenge and strength. He appears to be happy only with yes-men. This may be the result of his military training and career. But a small country like Lebanon cannot afford to have its ruling class made up of mediocrities and non-entities. Every talent must be mobilized and given every chance to bloom, every strength of mind and character must be enlisted in the arena of the national effort. Chehab appears to be innately incapable of utilizing the maximum available resources of men and mind.

Moreover, Chehab does not seem to have faith in Lebanon. In intimate discussions he says so openly. Some of those who collaborated closely with him during his 12-year rule (e.g. Pierre Gemayel) told me several times that he often told them that he had no faith in Lebanon and that Lebanon had no future. He said that to me on more than one occasion. This cynicism and lack of faith in Lebanon appears to be much deeper than mere disgust with the prevailing rotten economic, social, political and moral conditions and a desire to improve or even revolutionize them. It is Lebanon as such that he seems to condemn. Now it is odd--nay it is mercenary--to rule or to want to rule a country if one does not believe in it.

Again, under Chehab Lebanon lost its independence to a

large extent. It became a vassal or satellite to Egypt, wholly subservient to Nasser's will. Prior to Chehab Lebanon had an independent voice at the United Nations and in international relations in general; for twelve years now this voice has been completely lost. I do not believe Lebanon took during this period a single stand at the United Nations or ⁱⁿ international diplomacy which was at variance with the stand of Egypt at the time. Even Hussein dared establish diplomatic relations with Western Germany in the face of the non-establishment of such relations by Egypt, but Lebanon has not dared do that. It was touching to hear Chehab repeat to me in intimate chats Lebanon's foreign policy in exactly identical terms to formulations by Nasser I had just read in the press or heard on the radio. For twelve years Lebanon has not taken a single independent international position without first securing the permission of Egypt. This is the outcome, and perhaps even the contents, of the American settlement of 1958. Chehab appears to have bargained, with American blessing, his entire independence in foreign affairs for the crumbs of internal autonomy he was allowed to retain. How puny even this internal autonomy has been is demonstrated by the innumerable Egyptian interferences in Lebanon's internal affairs during the last twelve years--the establishment of the Egyptian University in Beirut, the enormous growth in the pro-Egyptian press, the role Egyptian Ambassadors (the public call them High Commissioners) have played in parliamentary and presidential elections and in the formation of cabinets, and many, many other things. Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and even Syria have openly complained of this total

doubtless been one of the causes of the spread and entrenchment of communism in Lebanon, for Egypt has served, and continues to serve, as the principal springboard for communism's infiltration of the Middle East. It is certain that the continuation of Chehabist rule will mean the continuation of the total subservience of Lebanon to Egypt in foreign affairs, and a considerable attunement of Lebanon to Egypt in internal affairs. This entails the most fateful consequences both for the character of Lebanon and for international peace and security, and I hope history will not record that America wittingly or unwittingly willed these consequences.

These appear to me to be the facts about Chehab and his rule. I am sorry they are ugly facts and I sincerely wish they were different, for Chehab has good qualities and would that these could be separated from the ugly facts! I do not believe they could be separated and therefore I believe it is time for change after twelve years of Chehabist rule. If one keeps in mind the five basic criteria one will come to the definite conclusion that, while Chehab may fulfill this or that criterion in part or in full, the pattern of his fulfillment of them leaves much to be desired and therefore a change is necessary. Thus-- to give only a few illustrations--how strong he is in his own person is questionable in view of his total subservience to Egypt, in view of the influence the clique around him exert on him, and in view of his pathological aloofness from society and the world. We also saw he does not command popular support. Whether he and his policies really serve the best interests of Lebanon is again questionable in view of his exclusive reliance on the army and the deuxième bureau, in view

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of the economic situation which deteriorated under his rule, in view of his failure to enlist the best elements in the country for public service, and in view of his fundamental disbelief in Lebanon. Whether he and his policies conduce to peace and stability in the Middle East is also questionable in view of the majority of the people being opposed to him and in view of the loss of Lebanese independence under his rule. Whether he and his policies can really help the Arab world in its present desperate need is again questionable in view of his failure to utilize the best elements in the country and in view of his subservience to Egypt, for it is highly questionable that Egyptian policy has been helpful to the Arab world rationally and constructively. Finally, whether he and his policies have been in the best interests of the free world in general and the United States in particular is clearly questionable in view of his turning Lebanon into a vassal of Egypt and in view of the fact that communism has made its greatest advances in Lebanon under his rule.

I therefore conclude that a change from the twelve years of Chehabist rule is called for. I proceed to examine whether such a change is possible.

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PART TWO

Before I take up the details of the question of possibility I must make two points absolutely clear. When great historical issues are at stake high statesmanship first comes to a decision of principle as to the best policy to be adopted under the circumstances, and then it proceeds to create the conditions for its implementation. Conditions are never so rigid and set that nothing can be done about them; conditions always yield to prior creative decision. If one is absolutely convinced in his mind that it is time for change and that such change is necessary, then one will seek, exploit and expand every shred of possibility lying around; and in extremis one will create conditions of possibility. Therefore everything depends on whether my argument for change has been convincing. If it is not convincing then it is refutable on this or that ground, and I sincerely invite such refutation. If it is convincing, then ways and means can be found to bring about the change. For the actual, concrete situation in Lebanon is so docile and malleable that if one does not take full advantage of its malleability to effect the change it is only because one is either unconvinced that the change is necessary or one has actually made up his mind that the continuation of Chehabism beyond the twelve years of its reign is itself

necessary. It is absurd to imagine that the situation in Lebanon is so formidable that a fundamental change, once one has really made up his mind that such a change was necessary, cannot be effected in it. It is wholly therefore a matter of conviction and high policy and not of the pliability or rigidity of objective conditions. Objective conditions can be manipulated and rendered docile in twenty different ways. The fundamental decision is absolutely prior--I mean, the fundamental decision of policy; let that be firm and I am sure, as I shall presently point out, conditions of possibility can be fashioned. But so long as one is halfhearted or unconvinced, or indeed is convinced of the contrary, or so long as one keeps on vacillating after the decision in the execution of it, the objective possibilities of realization themselves will either sink back once more into darkness and nebulosity or in themselves become less and less possible. Decisiveness is the thing here. It is therefore profitable to keep on reading beyond this point only if one is convinced by the preceding argument that a change now is necessary, or at least if one still has an open mind. It is less profitable--it could indeed be a waste of time--to keep on reading if one has made up his mind that a change from Chehabism is not necessary or that the exact opposite of a change is necessary.

The second point is that it has been suggested that Chehab this time will emerge as a new man altogether so that after his election he himself will effect the change

needed: he himself will dismantle the deuxième bureau, curb the army from interfering in politics, bring in new or forgotten elements into the government and administration, change some of his questionable policies, and disengage himself from some of his more shady followers. This is quite impossible, because no man can politically divorce himself from his erstwhile supporters, connections and policies, or change his psychological and mental make-up, to the extent of carrying out the radical change now called for, both in men and policies. Conversion is possible in religion, because in religion you are dealing only with your soul, but conversion is hardly possible in politics where you are dealing primarily with others. This suggestion, however, has the great value of conceding that a change from Chehabism as we have known it is needed, but it founders on the impossible or at least unproved notion that there is such a thing as a new Chehabism which is altogether different from the old.

Lebanon is a small country; even if a regime is perfect the country cannot bear its continuation for more than six years; that is why the framers of the constitution wisely foresaw this circumstance by providing that no president can succeed himself beyond the fixed 6-year term. The Helou regime is a sort of attenuated extension of Chehab because the agencies whose first personal loyalty is to Chehab and not to Helou, including the army, the deuxième bureau and many officials who were selectively appointed or promoted to high, sensitive positions in the bureaucracy, continued to function under Helou unhampered and unimpaired. Helou had

no party on which to lean, and he had no popular support and no support from the agencies of government. In fact that was why Chehab agreed to his election to the presidency in 1964. With Helou as a figurehead Chehab continued to rule the country behind the scenes, through the army, through the deuxième bureau, through the majority of the members of parliament who continued to be elected to parliament thanks to the support and active manipulations of the army and deuxième bureau, and through innumerable officials of the bureaucracy who owe their position to Chehab and his agencies. Therefore effectively Chehab ruled twelve years.

We saw that the twelve years are far from perfect. A change from Chehabism is therefore necessary for the twofold reason that twelve years are too long a period for any regime to continue ruling in a small democratic country like Lebanon even if the regime were perfect, and that in fact this 12-year regime has been far from perfect. Hence a change is called for. The return of Chehabism to power in any form appears to me not to be in the best interests of Lebanon, of peace and stability in the Middle East, and of the free world in general and the United States in particular.

My thesis is that the change from Chehab and Chehabism should be either to Camille Chamoun or to Raymond Edde or to Pierre Gemayel. A partial change, which is not what I believe in, would be from Chehab to one other than these three to whom however all three would thoroughly agree and with whom they would thoroughly cooperate. Any other change to one to whom the three would not agree or would agree under constraint would

not be a change but a continuation of Chehabist rule under one form or another. I am not interested either in the partial change or in the no change at all, so I turn to the consideration of a real change, which is either to Camille Chamoun or to Raymond Edde or to Pierre Gemayel.

Chamoun and Edde have proposed Gemayel as a candidate of national reconciliation. Without the Christian cover which Gemayel provided Chehab during his 12-year rule Chehab could never have maintained his regime. On more than one occasion when Gemayel was fed up and wanted to resign from the government Chehab told him that if he, Gemayel, resigned then he, Chehab, would have to go too. This I know for a fact. Gemayel sacrificed a great deal of his capital among his Christian following because of his collaboration with Chehab and Helou in the interest of national stability. Therefore Chehab owes Gemayel to support him now that Edde and Chamoun are putting him forward as a candidate of national reconciliation. If Chehab does that then, I think, the matter is settled and Gemayel will be elected president for the coming six years. I know Gemayel's strengths and weaknesses very well and I certainly prefer Chamoun to him (I have reason to believe that knowing his own weaknesses himself so far as the presidency is concerned, he prefers Chamoun to himself), but with Chamoun around him and with his friendship with Chehab and the army and deuxième bureau, Gemayel would make a good president of national reconciliation provided he picked out as collaborators with him fresh strong men from outside his Kataib entourage and only the best elements from the Kataib.

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On the whole he fulfills the five basic criteria for the presidency to an acceptable extent, except perhaps for the fact that some Muslim deputies may not vote for him on principle, owing to the fact that the Kataib (the name of his party which is the Arabic translation of Phalanges) has attracted only radical Christians to its membership and is known for its extreme Lebanese Christian nationalism, though it has in recent years undergone a considerable doctrinal evolution from that original position. Chehab does not want Chamoun and Edde, and Chamoun and Edde do not want Chehab; this is the golden opportunity then for Chehab to agree to a friend of his with whom he collaborated, who made his continued rule possible, and whom Chamoun and Edde themselves propose now as candidate of national reconciliation.

It does not look that Chehab and the Chehabists are going to agree to Gemayel. The prospects are that Chehab will run or that the Chehabists, in default of his explicitly preventing them from proposing his candidacy, will actually go ahead and seek his election by parliament and, if elected, put him before a fait accompli. In that case I doubt that the Kataib will support Chehab. I believe that Gemayel will consult then again with Chamoun and Edde and the three of them will agree on pooling their strengths (Chamoun controls 15 votes, Gemayel 9, and Edde 5 or 6, a total of about 30 votes from a chamber of 99 deputies) for whoever of them has the best chance of getting elected. From what I know Chamoun has a better chance of being elected than either Gemayel or Edde if Chehab and his followers do not support

Gemayel. The likelihood then is that the battle will be fought between Chehab and Chamoun. Part One of this memorandum argued that it is time for change from Chehab; it follows that if the five basic criteria for the new president of Lebanon are adequately fulfilled in Chamoun, then every effort must be made to see to it that he is elected.

Raymond Edde is good material, but he suffers from weaknesses that do not stand him in good stead at this juncture. He is the most courageous politician in Lebanon, but his courage borders on rashness and lack of discrimination. He talks too much and he jumps to unwarranted conclusions. He is flippant and his spirit is characterized with levity. He thrives more on pulling others down than on putting forward constructive proposals. The habit of intrigue is more pronounced in him than in others. He always attacks the army because of its support for Chehab; he has therefore antagonized it altogether; the army is one of the most valuable institutions of security and stability in Lebanon, and he should make a sharp distinction between the army as a personal instrument of Chehab and the army as a necessary and excellent national agency. The distinction may exist in his mind but it does not come out in his pronouncements. He has in him the makings of a good statesman but these blemishes mar them considerably. He is a man of background and breeding and he is perhaps the cleverest parliamentarian in the Chamber of Deputies. He knows all the rules, he is well versed in the constitution and laws of Lebanon, and he is a master legislator. The Kataib would support Chamoun rather than Edde, because of its friendship with the army and

because of Edde's personal quarrel with Gemayel. There are other elements in parliament and the country who, between Edde and Chamoun, would for various reasons prefer Chamoun. Edde has not been as flexible and prudent in his statements about Palestine and the Palestinians as Chamoun has been.

And Edde's knowledge and practical experience of international existence and international politics is negligible compared to that of Chamoun. Thus the five criteria for the new president are better fulfilled in Chamoun than in Edde. I must therefore pass immediately to the consideration of Chamoun as the real serious alternative to Chehab at present. It is certain it is time for change: Chamoun provides the change needed.

Chamoun has strengths and has weaknesses. His strengths include:

His charming personality and his knowing when to be quiet and silent. His own special charisma. His real qualities of leadership. His strength of character. His daring and strong will.

His pragmatism and flexibility. His immense patience and capacity to suffer. As a result of his heroic experience in 1958 and his many sufferings since he has mellowed considerably, and become much wiser, deeper, more poised and more temperate.

He is a man who really forgives, who can really rise above petty personal resentments. His life of sport--he swims regularly, he goes hunting twice a week walking four or five hours each time.

His mixing with people at every level. His immense popularity among the Christians. His administration between 1952 and 1958 is characterized by and is associated in the mind of the public

with freedom, security and above all prosperity. During his administration there was not a fraction of the corruption, dirt, disorder and breakdown of authority that obtain today.

His unparalleled experience in international politics and international affairs. No presidential Maronite candidate has a fraction of his knowledge of the United Kingdom and the United States, and compared to them all his knowledge of English is excellent.

All the other candidates, so far as their cultural orientation and affiliations are concerned, have blinkers on their mind which direct them exclusively to France and French culture. Genuine Western orientation in outlook, culture, convictions and sympathies.

No Lebanese politician has the international friendships and connections that he has, especially in the Middle East; for instance, the Shah of Iran, Faysal of Saudi Arabia and Hussein of Jordan are personal friends of his, and he has good connections with Palestinians and with former leaders of Syria; in fact he has as good an international reputation as any Lebanese politician if not better than all of them.

His knowledge of Arab affairs is better than that of any other presidential candidate. His record of service in the Arab Palestinian cause (when he was Minister in London, when he represented Lebanon at the United Nations, and later when he was president between 1952 and 1958) is perhaps more massive and more impressive than that of any other Lebanese.

All his statements, for two or more years now, but especially for the past two or three months, about Nasser, about Palestine and the Palestinians, about the Arab world,

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and about his opponents and enemies, have been measured, moderate, farsighted, conciliatory and statesmanlike, and on the whole unexceptionable.

On the other hand, Chamoun suffers from many weaknesses and handicaps. He is 70 years old.

There is a streak of selfishness in his character. He is partisan and could be ruthless towards his opponents and enemies. His method of work is not through teams and parties, although he is himself head of a party, but principally by relying on himself and his own resources, including his own remarkable charismatic qualities of leadership. In this respect he is quite different from Pierre Gemayel who has forged a well-disciplined party and led it uninterruptedly for 34 years-- the longest record so far for the survival of a political party, and for its founder remaining at its head, not only in Lebanon but throughout the Arab world. His shrewdness as a politician is proverbial but sometimes he overshoots the mark. He is secretive and one often gains the impression that he is playing it very close and keeping much to himself.

The scars and memories of 1958 are still alive in the minds of many people. The outcome of that year so far as he was concerned was at once the idolization of Chamoun by the Christians and the production of a crop of enemies who are still his sworn enemies, especially among the Muslim community. In this respect and to that extent he may be viewed as a "controversial figure." Nasser and Nasserism have opposed him. Chehab and Chehabism oppose him.

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Because of the role the United States played in the events of 1958 and because he was the central figure of those events,

there is a sort of embarrassment and hesitation on the part of the United States towards him. This is a very complex matter, both psychologically and politically, but he must contend with it as a stubborn fact. It is a question whether the Soviet Union would look with favor upon his return to power, owing to his pro-Western and anti-communist record. If the French are sold on Chehab, then he will have to reckon with this additional handicap. The Vatican is important in this whole picture, and it is not clear what the Vatican's position is as between him and Chehab. Whether his feud with Jumblatt can be healed is doubtful, and this despite the fact that both oppose Chehab.

If the president were elected directly by the people, Chamoun would be elected by a landslide; but many of the 99 members of parliament who are going to elect the president were themselves elected to parliament in the first place by the machination and intervention of the army and deuxième bureau, and therefore they owe their allegiance to Chehab. Finally, elections cost money, and while the Chehabists have the coffers of the state at their disposal (or as much as there is in them), Chamoun is relatively considerably handicapped in this respect.

The question of the possibility of change from Chehab and Chehabism to Chamoun is the question of whether the handicaps of Chamoun can be overcome. We proceed to inquire into whether they can be overcome, or at least into the degree to which they can be reduced.

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On the question of age it must be recalled that Chehab is

week, each time walking four or five hours. A doctor who knows his state of health tells me he is in excellent physical shape. He certainly appears as vigorous and healthy as ever. There have been leaders in this century--e.g. Adenauer, de Gaulle and Churchill--who were entrusted with supreme political responsibility after they attained the age of 70, because of a special national need for their unparalleled experience at the time.

The five points of infirmity in terms of personal character, namely, selfishness, partisanship, his not taking to team work, his political over-shrewdness, and his secretiveness, can only be relatively overcome. These are matters of habit with him and therefore traces of them at least will always persist. But he relaxes considerably on all these points when he is at ease and when he feels he is not in a corner. Also much depends on those whom he surrounds himself with. Good people around him produce a tonic effect upon him. Moreover, the schooling he has undergone in his arduous political life has softened and saddened him considerably on all these points of character. For instance, his selfishness will not be the same old crude one, and I am sure the wisdom and largeness of spirit he has acquired will render him completely different towards his opponents from what he was before, especially as he is known to be wholly unresentful.

The psychological aftermath of 1958 is still with us so far as Chamoun is concerned. But the bitterness of feeling even on the part of Muslims has abated considerably, and is kept artificially alive for the most part only by Chamoun's Chehabist opponents. Increasing numbers of Muslims realize

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that Chehab was to an important extent behind the events of 1958, that the revolution delivered hardly anything of what it promised, that their leaders at the time were for the most part motivated by their own personal interests, that as the Union of Syria and Egypt, which was the principal cause of those events, has long since been dissolved they must now settle to living peaceably with their Christian compatriots of whom Chamoun is the unchallenged leader, and that the fat years of prosperity they saw under Chamoun have been followed by years of leanness. All this puts Chamoun in a different and more just perspective in their sight. Opinion polls, which are not wholly scientifically reliable, appear to indicate that something of the order of 30% to 40% of the Sunnis, 60% to 70% of the Shiites and 50% of the Druzes among the people would support Chamoun. I have independently checked these estimates with a dozen knowledgeable people. I must add that the figures I have used are all conservative. Salam and El-Assad prefer Chamoun to Chehab. I do not really understand the methodology involved, but I am assured by the most experienced people in these high realms that besides the supporters of Chamoun, Edde and Gemayel and about 7 or 10 others, which would number in all about 40 deputies, there is a gray area in the spectrum of parliament of between 10 and 20 deputies, of whom many are Muslims, who might be induced to go along with Chamoun even before a stampede for him has developed. I always look with scepticism upon such cheerful estimates, but there appears to be something to what these experts say.

To say that Chamoun is a "controversial figure" does not damn him. Every strong man is controversial, every strong man polarizes opinion and sentiment. Either Lebanon merits strength at its head or it is doomed to flabbiness and mediocrity. Flabby leadership serves neither itself, nor Lebanon, nor the Middle East, nor international peace and security. Flabby leadership is a contradiction in terms. Healthy democracy presupposes the possibility of vigorous opposition, but you cannot oppose nothing if nothing is at the top. You need somebody who is something, and somebody who is something is always controversial. Chehab is even more controversial than Chamoun; so is Gemayel, so is Edde; each for a different reason. Unless the thought is to fall back again upon a colorless, characterless nonentity, which I categorically repudiate at this most crucial moment in history, the real choice is not between a controversial and a non-controversial figure, but between two controversialities. The choice is between the controversiality of Chamoun and the controversiality of Chehab. That is why I am not prepared to consider second-line runners, and that is why I believe it is time for change-- for change from colorlessness and characterlessness, not to another colorlessness and characterlessness, but to color and character and strength, and for change indeed from Chehab to Chamoun.

If Nasser and Nasserism still oppose Chamoun the opposition cannot be very virulent. It can only be a hang-over from the past. This is clear from the considerably relaxed attitude of the Lebanese Muslims towards Chamoun, and from Cairo's

meaningful reticence so far as regards the Lebanese presidential elections. The Chehabists may keep on trying to fan the Muslims against Chamoun in the name of Nasser, but whether Nasser approves of that as coming from the Chehabists is questionable. There is some evidence that Nasser has developed some reservation towards Chehab and Chehabism. Moreover, if Nasser knew what is best for his interests and the interests of the Arabs he would realize that Chehab has virtually nothing to give to him and the Arabs internationally whereas no man can be more helpful to him internationally, precisely where he needs help most, than Chamoun. Whether this simple and obvious point has clicked in Nasser's mind, overwhelmed as he is by his crushing problems and burdens, or indeed whether he is free to allow it to click in his mind, I do not know.

The handicap of the opposition of Chehab and Chehabism to Chamoun belongs to the essence of the entire situation. This handicap cannot be overcome. Attempts have been afoot, e.g. by Gemayel, to try to reconcile the two, but so far these attempts have proven abortive, largely--as I understand authoritatively--on account of the truculence of Chehab. When an attempt was made a couple of years ago to assassinate Chamoun and the attempt missed by a hair's breadth, well-meaning people tried to persuade Chehab to visit Chamoun in the hospital, as that would provide an excellent opportunity for national reconciliation, but Chehab categorically refused to do so and sent him instead his brother. He told these men who urged him to visit Chamoun in the hospital

that were he to do so Chamoun would automatically become president two years hence! The two can only be reconciled by one yielding to the other, which is exceedingly unlikely, or by both subordinating themselves to a third, which does not appear to be working so far as Gemayel being that third is concerned, and which I believe is impossible or undesirable for any other third. If my argument is sound, that it is time for change, that the change is necessary, and that it must be from Chehab and Chehabism, not to another Helou, nor back to Chehab, whether the old Chehab or a metamorphosed one, but to Chamoun (having regard to his points of strength and despite all his points of weakness which must all be overcome as much as possible), then it should not be beyond the pale of ordinary diplomacy to devise ways and means of convincing Chehab to lay off his opposition to Chamoun, in the higher interests of Lebanon, the Middle East and international peace and security, or at least to let the parliamentary game take its own course without his, Chehab's, candidacy. I believe this can be done if the prior decision of principle that it is time for change is firmly taken. In this transaction the honor and place of Chehab should be absolutely preserved. It is probably the Chehabists who would then balk most, but the reasonable interests of these too (which cannot include their endless self-perpetuation as masters of Lebanon) should be preserved as much as possible. I do not believe the salvation of mankind, and of Lebanon, hangs on the perpetuation of the rule of Chehab, Karami, Himadeh, Saad, Khatib, Lahoud, Sarkis and their friends over Lebanon. I believe the exact opposite is the case. These men have ruled Lebanon long enough. Therefore they must be eased off as gently and as

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honorably as possible. None of these men is immortal, and unless they propose to constitute a cabal which will perpetuate its rule indefinitely even after one or another of them passes on, a change from the clutches of this rule will have to take place sooner or later. My thesis is that this is the moment for change, for any postponement of this moment will make the change exceedingly more difficult to bring about. This is always the mortal danger of putting all one's eggs indefinitely in the exclusive basket of one man or one ruling clique--that whereas a change at an earlier moment could have been effected peacefully, at a later moment it can only come about by violence. There are higher things to think about and to plan in terms of than Chehab and the Chehabists. To tie the fate of Lebanon, and of whatever good Lebanon can do for the Middle East and the world, to the perpetuation of Chehab and Chehabism is wholly arbitrary, wholly unwise, and I believe quite unwarranted. It is also wholly wrong if the argument of Part One of this memorandum is sound. The impasse is sophistical and false and therefore manageable.

The diffidence of the United States with respect to Chamoun in view of 1958 is understandable. I shall not go into this matter in great detail. While the United States must take into account the susceptibilities of the Muslims, and while the Muslims must certainly be integrated into the national life of Lebanon and are absolutely entitled to feel and to be wholly at home in it, the truth is that without the Christians there would be no Lebanon. We cannot say that without the Muslims there would be no Lebanon. Therefore if Lebanon as

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we know it and with all its limited but real possibilities for good is to remain the United States can antagonize the Christians or disregard their feelings only up to a certain point. The settlement of 1958 did antagonize the Christians, despite the apparently felicitous formula of enlisting Gemayel and the Kataib as the Christian cover for Chehabist rule, a cover which proved costly for Gemayel and the Kataib among their following, who are all Christian. People tell me that without the support of Chamoun it is doubtful that Gemayel would be elected to parliament, so powerful is Chamoun with the Christian grass roots and so compromised has Gemayel become with these roots on account of his collaboration with Chehab. Chamoun is not a very religious man; Christian piety is not exactly his greatest virtue; Gemayel is more religious and pious than he. Yet one of the results of the events of 1958 is that he became the undisputed symbol of the Christian ^{will} to being, endurance and independence. The Christians in general do not look upon Chehab in this fashion; on the contrary, they look upon him as having conspired to bring about the events of 1958, or as not wanting them to support the existing government, in order to accede to power himself. They view him as having committed an act of insubordination to existing legitimate authority in order to usurp it. The evidence goes a long way to proving this. If the United States supports Chehab, or if it does not now look with favor upon the return of Chamoun, or if the Christians keep on thinking that, for psychological or high political reasons, it is

despair so far as the United States is concerned. It is not then excluded that they might fall into the lap of the Russians who are doing everything they can to woo them, as they need not worry at all about the Muslims who will always be sympathetic to them on account of Palestine. I see this attempt at seducing the Christians into the embrace of the Soviets occurring before my very eyes, on all sides and in all sorts of ways, and I strongly warn against it and against its consequences. Thus by opposing or by not helping the symbol of the Christians in Lebanon--and, I repeat, without the Christians there would be no Lebanon--the United States would have only succeeded in estranging them over the present estrangement of the Muslims, and they would have nowhere to go but the way of Moscow. And if Lebanon goes exclusively the way of Paris--which is always its standing temptation, and which culturally and administratively will doubtless take place under Chehab--then it is not certain that this is in the best interests of the United States, partly because of differences of policy between Paris and Washington about the Middle East, differences which sometimes put Paris more in the camp of Moscow than in that of Washington, partly because of the intellectual influence ~~XXXX~~ of Paris upon Lebanon, both through its literature and cultural agencies in Lebanon and through the Lebanese students who study in Paris, is of a distinctly anarchical, socialist-communist, even openly anti-American nature. But whether the seduction is Moscow or Paris, this is a development fraught with the greatest consequences, at once for poor Lebanon, for the Middle East, and for the United States. Nobody is asking the United States to

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pamper the Christians and antagonize the Muslims on their account; this would be good neither for the Christians nor for America. I am only stating the objective facts of Christian political feeling ~~XXXXX~~ in relation to American policy under the circumstances. Nor need the United States be embarrassed because it is asked to create something out of nothing; it is not asked or expected to do anything of the sort; Chamoun is there as the symbol of Christian resistance and the Christian will, and as such he alone can lead Lebanon, in so far as without the Christians there would be no Lebanon, in the service of peace and security in the Middle East and in genuine cooperation with the Arabs and Muslims.

Concerning the Soviet attitude, it is a fact that Soviet and general communist influence has increased 10-fold in Lebanon during the last decade. Thus I remain to be persuaded that the hints which Azimov, the Soviet Ambassador in Lebanon, drops here and there that the Soviet Union would not look with favor upon the return of Chehab are sincere. But even if they are sincere I hope they would not by themselves all the more determine the United States to support Chehab. If communism advanced enormously under the 12-year rule of Chehab, and if there are today entrenched communists or communist sympathizers in high places in the government and the administration, and in the body politic of the country in general, then if I were in place of Azimov I would purposely declare, in agreement with Chehab, that I prefer somebody else to Chehab, indeed I would encourage him to enter into all sorts of agreements with the Americans, precisely in order to move the Americans to support him, if such support will guarantee him the return to power.

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This is elementary procedure in communist tactics. How Chehab comes to power is immaterial; the important thing is that he come to power even if that should be brought about via the Americans. I am not saying Chehab is a communist; I do not believe he is; but I am saying that under his 12-year rule communism advanced considerably and got itself entrenched in Lebanon, and therefore who could be sure it would not advance further under his second rule? Nor do I mean by communism here social justice and radical economic and social reform which Chehab keeps talking about and with which I thoroughly agree; I mean direct Soviet influence in Lebanese affairs on all levels of government, communist philosophical ideology about every aspect of human existence, violent anti-Western and anti-American ideas, the turning away of Lebanon from its fundamental liberal-cultural Western orientation, and a view of government and society which is at variance with what Lebanon has known and practiced for decades and generations. It appears to me therefore that there are far greater matters to be considered than the Mirage incident, for what that was worth, or than any other possible understandings between the United States and the Lebanese army, in relation to Israel or to any other matter. These understandings need not be jeopardized by the non-return of Chehab to power. Would the Soviet Union support Chamoun? Of this I have no idea. Certainly Chamoun is no communist and certainly he took strong anti-communist stands in the days of his rule. If the Soviets support him it would be because they are sure now of their position in the Near East and because they want to prove to the Christians of Lebanon that they are not

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their enemies. They lose nothing by supporting Chamoun, if they support him, and they may stand to gain a lot in terms of respectability and friendship in the eyes of the Christians. The Muslims they clearly have in their pocket and thus both Christians and Muslims would be their friends. It is possible then that the Soviets do not constitute at present a handicap which will impede or stand in the way of Chamoun's return to power.

I do not know that the British have an independent or an effective policy apart from that of the United States. The French probably want Chehab back, although one hears about differences among them and differences between the Quai d'Orsay and the French Embassy in Beirut. Chehab, because he knows nothing in the world except France and French culture, brought back French cultural and administrative influence to Lebanon to a considerable extent. De Gaulle is his hero and he thinks of himself as the de Gaulle of Lebanon. But nobody seems to think that the French can in general influence enough deputies in parliament to make any decisive difference in the matter of elections. And everybody seems to agree that if enough momentum is developed among the deputies for Chamoun the French will merrily go along.

The Vatican is important, but it is not reasonable to suppose that it would take a contrary line of policy to that of Cardinal Meouchi, who is outspoken in his opposition to Chehab. The agents of Chehab, including some clergy (e.g. Cortbawi), have managed during the last twelve years to create a favorable impression for Chehab in the Vatican. The Vatican's opinion of Chehab in 1958 was different. But the Vatican

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knows the Christian sympathies in Lebanon perfectly, and all it prays for is that the country be preserved, and be spared the possibility of breaking up as between Christians and Muslims. While the Vatican may be neutral in these matters, I think it would have no objection whatever to the return of Chamoun to power.

Jumblatt's quarrel with Chamoun is of long standing. They both come from the same district, the Shouf, and they both have been inveterate rivals for the leadership of the district. Also Jumblatt was a principal leader of the revolution of 1958 against Chamoun. Whether this deep-seated feud can be composed or put at rest is doubtful, although neither Chamoun nor Jumblatt has said a word against the other for more than a year, and Chamoun went out of his way the other day to praise Jumblatt for some of his policies as Minister of the Interior. The rupture between Jumblatt and Chehab appears to be final but it does not follow from this that Jumblatt and Chamoun will fall into each other's embrace. Yet there are some who say that under certain circumstances Jumblatt will vote for Chamoun. It is true Jumblatt controls only 5 or 6 votes, but combining as he is trying to do with Salam, El-Assad and others into what is called the Bloc of the Center, he becomes a part of a whole of about 15 deputies who have all sworn against the return of Chehab. They have taken no stand so far concerning Chamoun or Gemayel but most of them prefer Chamoun to Gemayel. They say they want to put forward a third candidate other than Chehab or Chamoun, a Fouad Amoun or a Jamil Lahoud, for example. A third candidate of this order--and I hope of any order--has no chance. Thus the circumstance under which Jumblatt would

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join the Chamoun ranks, despite his rivalry with him both electorally and politically (Jumblatt is the leader of the whole spectrum of leftism in Lebanon, while Chamoun of course is the leader of the right), would be when it becomes perfectly clear that the candidate of the Bloc of the Center, if such a candidate should ever seriously come into being, has absolutely no chance, which is almost certainly the case, and when it is a matter of either Chamoun or Chehab, with Gemayel and the Kataib casting their weight on the side of Chamoun, which, in view of the initiative of Edde and Chamoun of proposing Gemayel as the candidate of national reconciliation, is likely to be the case. The Jumblatt obstacle, therefore, so far as Chamoun is concerned, appears to be manageable.

On the question of the parliamentary mechanism of electing the president, and the fact that many deputies owe their allegiance to Chehab and his deuxième bureau for being elected to parliament in the first place, I think it is correct to say that if elections were held today Chehab would probably come out a winner. People differ as to exactly how many votes he has in the bag, but most people seem to think that, numerically speaking, he has enough to assure his victory. Yet five questions arise. (1) Chehab has never opened his mouth as to whether he wishes to be a candidate; it is always the Chehabists whom he created and supported who keep on proclaiming his candidacy, without a word coming from him as to whether he approves. The situation is odd in many respects, but this is perhaps the oddest feature of it. (2) Would Chehab, whether or not he speaks, accept being elected president of the Republic of Lebanon in the face of Chamoun, Edde, Gemayel, Jumblatt,

Salam, El-Assad, Frangie, and others voting against him, and the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Meouchi, outspokenly opposed to his return? Most of the people who will vote for him have no national or popular weight whatever. Would he be able to rule only on the strength of these men and only by making use of the army? I do not believe it is excluded that the popular opposition to Chehab might then break out into open insurrection, for twelve years of Chehabist rule, with all respect for Chehab, are enough and people are simply fed up with its perpetuation. (3) I am told by master technicians in Lebanese parliamentary life, whose judgment I trust, that between ten and twenty deputies of those who might vote for Chehab can be bought and sold with varying price tags, and that the remainder would automatically disintegrate the moment it becomes clear either that Chehab does not want to run or that he has no chance of winning. You are dealing then with an artificial and precarious majority. (4) I am told by people who are thoroughly versed in these abstruse matters that the United States, by three or four dignified démarches, towards the Kataib, towards Chehab, towards the Armenian deputies, and towards others, could, if it wanted to, easily prevail upon Chehab not to run. It all seems to depend therefore on whether my cumulative argument in Parts One and Two of this memorandum is convincing. (5) If the preceding four points are correct, and if the United States does nothing, simply seeing Chehab returned to power by his precarious parliamentary majority; then it must be either that there is somewhere a fundamental flaw in my argument in this respect, or that, regardless of any argument, the United States, for reasons of its own, has

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opted that Chehab be elected president of Lebanon in the elections of 1970. If you can make a difference, in a perfectly correct and dignified manner, with respect to a process unfolding before you, and if you know perfectly well that you can make this difference, and if nevertheless you choose not to make that difference, then you certainly want that process to take its own course and you have deliberately willed its result.

Finally, the handicap of funds relatively to what the Chehabists can dispose of from government money is something about which I have nothing to say. But it seems to me that if the outcome really depended only on money, Chamoun and his allies ought to be able to raise enough funds from their many wealthy friends to make the going quite rough for their opponents.

If Chamoun did not come to power, and if instead Chehab came to power, then I must have been wrong in my analysis. I must have committed a fatal error somewhere. I can never be more sincere than I am now in begging whoever is wiser than I to correct my error before Chehab comes to power.

With this, then, I rest my case for the possibility of the election of Chamoun to the presidency of Lebanon. It is time for change from Chehab and Chehabism; this change is necessary; and the change from Chehab and Helou to Chamoun is quite possible. The fear that Chamoun will divide the country has revealed itself groundless. This fear is only psychologically and subjectively determined. It is not justified by the objective facts. Chehab is more likely to divide the country than Chamoun. The situation is so many-sidedly fluid

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PART THREE

This memorandum could have ended with Part Two. With that part my argument is completed and my thesis is set forth so far as the Lebanese presidential elections are concerned. But Lebanon and its presidential elections fall within a total setting--that of the Near East, the Middle East, the Arab world and high international politics. This part is intended to supply this general framework. I shall set forth my views in the form of terse geopolitical propositions without argument or proof. They are conclusions of fully worked-out arguments.

1. From the point of ^{view of} international politics there is no over-all Arab unity.

2. One may speak of the Arab world, meaning thereby a very loose community of culture, religion and language.

3. Rather than being one, the Arab world is in fact five: North Africa, the Nile Valley, the Arabian Peninsula, Mesopotamia, and the Levant.

4. Each one of these parts has its separate identity, history, problems, culture and destiny.

5. Thus any thinking based on the conception that the Arab world is a unity will succeed only in moving from one confusion to another.

6. The destiny of North Africa is Mediterranean, European and Western.

7. Libya is a borderline case; it will be the object of a tug of war between North Africa and the Nile Valley, partly

because of its geographical location, partly now because of its petroleum riches.

8. The destiny of the Nile Valley has always throughout history been Mediterranean; its present orientation towards Asia, Africa and the communist world is an aberration because it is unnatural; therefore it will not last.

9. Egypt is a problem by itself and there is no hope for the settlement of any issue in the Middle East until the Egyptian problem is isolated and considered in itself, without mixing it with other problems.

10. The demographic Egyptian situation is at the base of almost all issues in the Middle East.

11. Yemen and South Yemen are an integral part of the Arabian Peninsula and cannot be separated from Saudi Arabia either politically or from the point of view of defense.

12. The problem of succession beyond Faysal in Saudi Arabia is crucial.

13. The modernization of Saudi Arabia can and should be accelerated without upsetting its order or its cultural patterns.

14. The Gulf principalities belong to the Mesopotamian world, both politically and from the point of view of defense.

15. Iraq is essentially unstable by reason of the fundamental differences between Kurd and Arab, Shii and Sunni, and the bedouins and the settled, and by reason of the political and cultural pulls which Iran exerts upon it.

16. The situation in the Gulf is most important, both defensively and from the point of view of oil; Europe and the West cannot afford to be absent from the Gulf; and Iran and Saudi Arabia must be brought organically into the order to be

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created and maintained there.

17. The Levant is composed of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel.

18. Confusion will continue to reign in thinking and in planning so long as one persists in using uncritically two terms, "the Arab world" and "the Middle East."

19. We saw that while we may speak of the Arab world, this does not mean that there is an effective Arab unity; there are instead five worlds; and to speak of the Middle East simpliciter in connection with the issue of Israel is to forget that Turkey and Iran are integral parts of the Middle East and yet they fall outside this issue.

20. The real problem in the Middle East is not a problem of the Middle East as a whole, but the question of the fate of that most important land bridge in the world bounded on the north by the Taurus Mountains, on the east by the Syrian desert, on the south by the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and on the West by the Mediterranean.

21. The geographical location and historical contributions of this land bridge are absolutely unique throughout the world.

22. The fate of the peoples and political communities of this land bridge has always been in the balance throughout history.

23. What is at stake is not North Africa or Egypt or the Arabian Peninsula or Mesopotamia or Iran or Turkey, but the fate of four states, three religions and two cultures occupying this world-significant land mass--the four states being Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, the three religions being Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and the two cultures

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being a general Arab culture and a new Israeli culture.

24. The historical requirement today is to promote the creation of a stable order in which Jew, Christian and Muslim, and Arab and Israeli, can live and interact together, creatively and in peace, in this great land bridge.

25. Everything about the eventual shape of things in this land bridge, territorially, economically, politically, culturally and humanly, is now fluid, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ and therefore subject to the most creative statesmanship.

26. One must therefore begin with no a priori rigid notions as to the permanence of present territorial or political or human demarcations, for nothing in this bridge has ever been permanent; one must start only with the notion that the nearest to permanence is only the three religions and the two cultures, and high statesmanship is historically challenged today with how these three religions and two cultures can live and interact together in peace.

27. Thus what one sees in the more or less distant future is a happy community of Jews more or less centered in the south, a happy community of Christians more or less centered in the north, and a happy community of Muslims more or less centered in the interior, with the Christians sharing religiously the Jewish religion and culturally Arab culture, and all three communities interacting creatively in peace, under some over-all political order.

28. Because of its unique place and meaning for the three religions and the two cultures, Jerusalem would play a unique role in this over-all order.

29. When this happens, this land bridge will enter perhaps

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into its most brilliant era of civilization and development in history; it will be a pillar of strength and balance and a beacon of light for the entire Middle East; and it will overflow in its contributions, both material and spiritual, all over the world, as it did of old when it was the cradle of all Western civilization.

30. It is only by fixing on this long-range vision, in all truth and purity, that one can obtain light on the immediate tasks of the moment, namely, on how to plan and what to do about "the Arab-Israeli conflict" and "the Middle East crisis."

31. There is no possible break-through in "the Arab-Israeli conflict" and in "the Middle East crisis" until there is a radical change of spirit and policy, and therefore of regimes, on both sides of the conflict.

32. Syria is a special clue, and as there is nothing stable or permanent or even natural about present-day Syria, the active promotion of a radical change in Syria may lead to endless new opportunities, including above all the settlement of large numbers of displaced Palestinians in the vast expanses of the north.

33. Lebanon has a modest role to play, but so long as it is a vassal of Egypt, it cannot play it; thus the liberation of Lebanon from Egypt and the consequent feeling on the part of the Lebanese that they are masters in their own house and are quite at liberty to determine their own destiny independently, is another important clue to the total situation.

34. The elements who believe in freedom, man, democracy and truth, in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, should not be discouraged by the West in general and the United States in

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particular forsaking them or selling them down the drain, as has been systematically their fate for two decades, for in the cynicism of high politics there are limits beyond which, in sacrificing one's friends one is not making new ones, but only appeasing and serving one's enemies.

35. International communism has made tremendous strides in the Middle East, militarily, politically and above all ideologically, and it is a mistake to blame it all on "the Arab-Israeli conflict."

36. It follows that in relation to the advance and entrenchment of international communism in the Middle East it is wrong to feel conscience-stricken on account of "the Arab-Israeli conflict" and to get morally paralyzed in fighting it directly, procrastinating month after month and year after year until "the Arab-Israeli conflict" is resolved.

37. The betting on Nasser to be the agent of making peace with Israel and carrying the Arabs along with him was a fatal error.

38. The betting on Nasser as an effective bulwark against the spread of international communism in the Middle East and Africa was another fatal error.

39. Therefore the two billion dollars that were invested in Nasser in various forms, and the political support of his regime between 1952 and 1967, towards these two bets, were all wasted.

40. No factor or agency has helped to draw communism into the Middle East and to enable it to entrench itself

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in the area more than Nasser and Nasserism.

41. It is absolutely necessary for America to retrieve as much of its weakened or lost position in the Middle East as possible, with or without "the Arab-Israeli conflict" on our hands, and there are real opportunities towards that end.

42. Unless military power in the Mediterranean translates itself into political realities in the Middle East, all military strength is in vain, for one must assume that international communism knows how to deny the West the convenience, if not the luxury, of a direct military confrontation.

43. I stress in particular the promotion of sound political regimes in the Middle East and the battle of ideas in the mind of youth.

44. On account of the strategic and economic importance of the Middle East, a direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is eventually inevitable, unless, before then, fundamental political changes are brought about in the Middle East which will put an end, as happened in Indonesia, to the mounting communist domination of this area.

45. Youth, youth, youth--that is the ultimate clue, and the American and other Western youth who come to the Middle East with their long hair and dirty clothes, their anarchism and nihilism, their moral degeneracy, and their addiction to drugs, are not the best influence America and the West are exporting to the Middle East.

46. There is therefore direct moral and spiritual responsibility upon the West and the United States in this whole picture, for let America and the West be healthy and wholesome,

spiritually, morally, intellectually, personally, and the health and wholesomeness that will then blow upon the East from the West will cure all our ills.

47. In this matter of health and wholesomeness relief and salvation can come only from the Church and the university.

48. Unless a determined counterrevolution is mounted in American and Western universities against the university revolution of degeneracy and nihilism and anti-intellectualism and irresponsibility of the sixties, a counterrevolution which will reassert in the strongest possible terms, both theoretically and practically, the fundamental values of mind and spirit without which there would have been no West and no Western civilization, I see little hope for the West and therefore for the Middle East, short of a direct intervention by God.

49. Had Harvard in its crisis of 1969 had the courage of closing down or dismissing half or more of its faculty-- because university problems often stem from the faculty-- paying them all indemnities for life and therefore causing its vast endowment to shrink to half or less, it would have saved its soul and therewith the soul of the American university and American and Western culture in general.

50. It may be too late to do anything about Harvard, but the vacancy of the presidency came at the right time, and thus if a new president is appointed who is tragic enough and detached enough, who knows what is really at stake in the world today on the deepest possible plane, and who can inspire and lead the Corporation and the Board of Overseers to sacrifice, if necessary, half or two-thirds of Harvard's endowment for the

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redemption of its soul, then new golden opportunities will arise for America and the West of the first order.

Rabiya, Lebanon

July 13-20, 1970

Note: Not a soul in the world, other than the writer, has seen or read this memorandum or knows anything about its existence. I typed it myself. There are only two copies of this memorandum in existence, of which this is Copy Number One. Copy Number Two is kept in my personal files. And so far as Copy Number Two is concerned, not a soul will be permitted to see it or to know anything about it before at least 50 years after my death.

C.M.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

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SUBJECT: DR CHARLES MALIK'S Exposé on 1970 E.E. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS IN LEBANON

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 10000

July 15, 1970

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Civil Aviation Negotiations with Lebanon

The civil aviation consultations between the United States and Lebanon which began in Washington on July 6, and about which you were informed in my memorandum of that date, ended successfully on July 9. The negotiating atmosphere was friendly and business-like.

The delegations agreed to recommend to their Governments an exchange of notes that would put off permanent determination of Lebanese routes to an indefinite future time. Pending this future determination, the Lebanese all-cargo airline will be accorded rights to operate scheduled flights around the world in an eastbound direction only through New York. The Lebanese agreed that US airlines could continue to operate around the world services through Lebanon (our 1946 bilateral agreement theoretically restricts our beyond rights to India.) While the Lebanese delegation called attention to the high percentage of non-US traffic carried by Pan American on its services between third country points and Beirut, it confirmed that Lebanese policy is opposed to unilateral capacity restrictions.

The proposed agreement safeguards important U.S. airline operating rights, while fully satisfying Lebanon's immediate and limited needs. The Civil Aeronautics Board supports the agreement. While several U.S. airlines which could be affected competitively by the Lebanese airline all-cargo operation (ones which do not serve Lebanon) are dissatisfied with the result, the impact is not likely to be great. In any event, the benefits which Lebanon will obtain from the limited rights granted on an interim basis do not compare with those which the U.S. will continue to enjoy under the Air Transport Agreement with Lebanon.

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It is anticipated that the formal exchange of notes will take place shortly.


Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
for Executive Secretary


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Haig


INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS
EYES ONLY

27 May 1970 *?*
June 7 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

VIA: Harold Saunders *HS*
FROM: Peter Jessup 
SUBJECT: M-41 Tanks for Lebanon

Here is the background information on M-41 tanks for Lebanon which you requested during the last 40 Committee meeting.

Attachment

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

Mr. Gaudin - P.L. N X T Mr. Gaudin

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET/NODIS

TO : INR/DDC - Ambassador Wymberley ⁶ ~~DeR~~ Coerr DATE: June 2, 1970

FROM : NEA/ARN - Talbott W. Seelye *and*

SUBJECT: M-41 Tanks for Lebanon

During the 40 Committee meeting held on May 25 the Committee chairman asked for clarification regarding our undertaking to sell 50 excess M-41 tanks to Lebanon. A report on the status of this transaction was contained in the memorandum which was circulated to members of the 40 Committee for the meeting held on May 25 and was also contained in a memorandum to the WASAG Working Group in early May outlining recent actions taken to assist Lebanon. The following is a recapitulation of what has occurred in connection with this transaction and where we stand at the present.

In consonance with the Lebanese Army's effort to improve its internal security, particularly in coping with the fedayeen, the President of Lebanon in talks with Ambassador Porter expressed the view that additional tanks would be helpful. Since the Lebanese Army already has World War II vintage M-41 tanks in its inventory, Ambassador Porter came up with the idea that we try to locate some surplus M-41 tanks. After checking with the Defense Department we informed Ambassador Porter that it would take some 18 months to rehabilitate surplus tanks. In view of the urgent, immediate problem which the Lebanese Army is currently having with the fedayeen, Ambassador Porter suggested to the Lebanese Government--and the latter agreed--that the tanks be acquired on an "as is" basis. The Lebanese sent a military team to inspect the tanks and agreed to their purchase in the full understanding that they would not be in top operating condition. DOD/ISA agreed to a concessional price of \$12,583 for each tank which would include communications and certain other essential operating equipment. On the basis of a DOD/ISA undertaking to make these tanks available at this price, we informed the Lebanese Government.

In the meantime, however, it appears that the U.S. Army is experiencing difficulty in making these tanks operable even to a limited

Can't be true had only M-4 tanks - M-41 is 1950 generation

SECRET/NODIS
Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.



SECRET/NODIS

2

extent for the concessional price quoted. We are now in the process of trying to resolve this problem since we have already made a commitment to the Lebanese Government.

NEA/ARN:TWSseelye:mo

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 9387

~~SECRET~~

April 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Letter to the President on Lebanon

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The attached letter given to the President by Charles Malik is from the religious leader of the Lebanese Christians. In that half-Christian, half-Moslem country, the Cardinal is also an important political figure.

The letter, as you know, is a general appeal to the U.S. to help strengthen Lebanese democracy. Many Lebanese remember the 1958 U.S. intervention and wish there could be a repetition in some form. Most recognize that military intervention would produce more trouble than help today. Nevertheless the general appeals keep coming.

I have intended for several days now to recommend to you either or both of the following:

1. Hold a WSAG meeting ostensibly to review last fall's contingency planning in the light of the agreements between the fedayeen and the Lebanese Government and the possibility for trouble as Lebanese elections approach. This would be a reasonable use of the WSAG and a useful prod to speed things in the bureaucratic pipeline (small quantities of military equipment).
2. Put this on the 40 Committee agenda, the reason being that we will get an increasing number of requests from the Christian community as elections near to provide political help to Christian candidates. I feel we should get the jump on these inevitable requests by considering what posture to take. A few years ago we would have stood clear, and we may want to still. But the situation has changed.

There is one other action you may want to take: Malik still has a request in to see you. You could have him in--just as a demonstration of interest.

Schedule WSAG HK
Put on 40 Committee Agenda HK
I'll see Malik HK

APR 21 1970

Swanwick

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 03-93/3 per ltr. 4/2/2010

By JMR NARA Date 5/19/2010

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Historical File

Hal

HAK asks that you
staff this but that it
be kept in the WH.

Samuel

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[p. 2 of 14]

15
I think this
makes great
sense -
Interested if
what can we
do

The Honorable

Richard Nixon

President of the United States of America

(May God preserve him)

Your Excellency:

We are happy that the visit which our friend Dr. Charles Malik is making to the American capital affords us the occasion of extending to your Excellency, together with this message of ours, our best wishes to your person and to the friendly American people, coupled with our warmest prayers that God grant you success in the momentous tasks devolving upon your shoulders.

We would not have wished to divert some of your concern away from the great and vital problems which you face under these delicate international circumstances towards the issue of a small country like Lebanon, had it not been for the fact that this issue is an important part of the intricate crisis with which the region of the Near East is afflicted and

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to which you are devoting your utmost attention, an issue, moreover, which is intimately and directly related to the humanitarian principles to which the noble American people have dedicated themselves.

In the light of these principles the Lebanese question presents itself in perfect clarity, quite apart from the traditional concepts of politics and diplomacy, the question, namely, that Lebanon, which is perhaps the only country in this region clinging to freedom and democracy, is now threatened with respect to its system as well as to its very destiny, by virtue of the political and military developments taking place in the region, and the errors and whims which attend these developments.

One source of anxiety is the fact that the rule which has reigned in Lebanon since 1958 has been resorting to considerations and justifications which incapacitated it from responding to the wishes of the Lebanese people, and this in a small country in which subversive forces have been very active, by reason of its being surrounded by countries with radical systems differing from its free and democratic system, and owing to destructive elements infiltrating into its interior in large numbers and the presence of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees on its soil.

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In the face of successive waves of extremism erupting sometimes into violence the government has found itself compelled to indulge in one fundamental concession after another, for the sake of pleasing and appeasing, thereby sacrificing many of the constituents of sound orientation and the foundations on which Lebanese existence rests. This has reached such a state that the people view the government as they view the menace of radicalism itself, which hails upon them from without and elicits responses from within.

What is truly regrettable in this connection is that Lebanese policy has been swept by this current of radicalism to the extent of becoming itself a satellite, and this at a time when the Lebanese people were bracing themselves up to stand firm, not only for the sake of preserving their free democratic system, but also for the sake of playing their part in the battle of defending democratic existence in the other parts of the region. The peoples of these other parts look upon Lebanon as an element of salvation, by reason of its historical connections and international friendships-- connections and friendships which confer upon Lebanon a double role, as being at once the window through which the countries of the region catch a glimpse of the free world and the door through which this world, with

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its principles and diverse activities, enters the region. Nor is it necessary to point out the repercussions which the destruction of the traditional role of Lebanon will produce upon both the region and the free world; and this is indeed the explanation of the process of encirclement undertaken by the forces of radicalism with a view to denying Lebanon this role.

During our visit to the United States in 1962 we called the attention of President John Kennedy to this situation and, if a speedy remedy was not forthcoming, to the dangers and pitfalls inherent therein, especially with respect to the question of the Palestinian refugees of whom there are about three hundred and fifty thousand on Lebanese soil, amounting to one-sixth of the population of the country and one-third of those who have been displaced from Palestine. We also pointed out the danger implicit in the delay in finding the desirable solutions, danger not only in relation to Lebanon but also to the entire region. The late President expressed a deep understanding of this point of view, and promised that he would lend it his special solicitude, with a view to finding the appropriate quick solution. It is, however, painful that he was not granted time enough to

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give effect to this solicitude, and that international politics has frustrated this matter, with the result that we are before a most dangerous situation in which Lebanon finds itself at present, a situation casting its shadow beyond the frontiers of Lebanon and threatening countries and elements which are continuing the struggle for the same free and democratic principles.

Before these dangers whose foreboding storms increase day by day upon the region, threatening Lebanon in its very existence, we find it indispensable to turn urgently to the President of the American nation, which is the upholder of human freedoms and principles, with an appeal to lend a quick helping hand to the Lebanese people, if it is necessary for democracy to preserve the last of its strongholds in this part of the world. This help begins by a realistic understanding of the Lebanese situation, away from the misleading slogans which are often used as coatings for political and diplomatic action. It is then consummated by taking, in the diverse realms, effective measures dictated by this understanding, not only for the salvation of Lebanon, but for the rescue of democracy in the region and the salvaging therewith of the American presence.

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The region of the Near East is tortured by a fateful and violent struggle on two fronts--Zionist entrenchment and Communist expansion. Its children who hold fast to their authentic beliefs and free traditions find it increasingly difficult to exercise free choice. The reason is the pressure of leftist propaganda about the hostility of American policy to the Arab and Islamic states, with the result that the conservative and free elements are no longer able to express freely even their convictions, lest they be demagogically branded as supporters of American policy.

It is clear that Lebanon is the only country in the region where the majority of the population are still able to express their convictions and opinions freely, and to hold fast to them. It follows that to strengthen this freedom in Lebanon, before it is too late, is to strengthen the similar elements in the diverse countries of the region who are themselves overwhelmed, and to encourage them to stand firm. We find in such a policy no conflict with American interests in the other realms; on the contrary, such a strengthening of freedom might lead to the establishment of the desired balance in American policy in the area, all the more because the elements of moderation perceive that the danger which threatens them from the side

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of the radical forces aims at the very roots of their religious and social existence, and the struggle between these elements and these forces is thus one of life and death, and the danger latent therein can never be compared to any other danger.

In the light of this fact, and because the Lebanese people are incapable of confronting the enormous dangers which threaten them, the Maronite Patriarch deems it necessary to address himself to the American government, requesting them to come to the aid of Lebanon so as to enable it to surmount its present trials, basing himself on the historical responsibilities resting on the shoulders of the Patriarchate for the defense of Lebanese existence, as well as on his faith in the benevolent understanding of the American people, especially as a large number of his children are American citizens who contributed considerably to the diverse aspects of American life, and his conviction that the United States bears responsibilities for the defense of the free world, of which Lebanon is but a small part which it is not beyond the power of the great American government to save.

We believe that Dr. Charles Malik, the sincere Lebanese and the loyal friend of America, can present all clarifications expressing the truth of

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the matter, and we hope that these clarifications will meet with a
beneficent and quick response from your Excellency.

In conclusion we pray that God prosper your ways and shield dear
America with His divine protection, granting her noble people all good
and all blessing.

Cardinal

(signed) Paul Peter Meouchi

Bkerke, March 25, 1970

Patriarch of Antioch and the Rest
of the East

(Translation by Charles Malik)

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حضرة صاحب الفخامة السيد ريتشارد نيكسون رئيس الولايات
المتحدة الاميركية حفظه الله .

فخامة الرئيس ،

يسعدنا ان نتيج لنا الزيارة التي يقوم بها الصديق الدكتور شارل مالك الى
العاصمة الاميركية المناسبة لنبعث الى فخامتكم ، مع رسالتنا هذه ، باطيب تمنياتنا
لشخصكم وللشعب الاميركي الصديق مقرونة باحر الدعاء الى الله بان يوفقكم في
المهمات الجسيمة الملقاة على كاهلكم .

وما كما نرغب في صرف بعض اهتمامكم عن القضايا الحيوية الكبرى التي تواجهونها
في هذه الظروف الدولية الدقيقة الى قضية بلد صغير كلبنان ، ولولم تكن هذه القضية
جزءاً مهماً من الازمة المعقدة التي تعانيها منطقة الشرق الادنى وتولونها بالغ
اهتمامكم ، ولولم تكن ذات صلة وثيقة ومباشرة بالمبادئ الانسانية التي نذر الشعب
الاميركي النبيل نفسه لتكريسها .

وفي ضوء هذه المبادئ تطرح المشكلة اللبنانية نفسها وتبين على جليتها ،
بمناى عن المفاهيم السياسية والدبلوماسية التقليدية ، وهي ان لبنان الذي يكاد
يكون البلد الوحيد المتمسك بالحرية والديموقراطية في هذه المنطقة ، أصبح الآن
مهتداً في نظامه بل في مصيره ، بفعل التطورات السياسية والعسكرية الجارية
في المنطقة ، وبفعل ما يرافق هذه التطورات من اخطاء واهواء .

ومن بواعث القلق ان يكون الحكم الذي قام في لبنان منذ ١٩٥٨ ، قد
وصل الى حالة بات يجد فيها من الاعتبارات والمبررات ما يجعله غير قادر على
التجاوب مع رغبات اللبنانيين ، في بلد صغير نشطت فيه القوى الهدامة ، بحكم
تطويقه ببلدان ذات أنظمة متطرفة تختلف عن نظامه الديموقراطي الحر ، وبفعل
تسلل عناصر الهدم الى داخله باعداد كبيرة ووجود مئات الألوف من اللاجئين
الفلسطينيين على أرضه .

وازاء الموجات المتلاحقة من التطرف البالغ احيانا حد العنف ، وجد الحكم
نفسه مضطراً الى السخاء بتنازلات اساسية من اجل الارضاء والاسترضاء ، مضحياً
في هذا السبيل بالكثير من مقومات الاتجاه السليم ومن القواعد التي يقوم عليها
الكيان اللبناني ، الى درجة أصبح معها الشعب ينظر الى هذا الحكم نظرتة الى
خطر التطرف نفسه الذي يهب عليه من وراء الحدود ويتفاعل من الداخل .

ومما يدعو الى الاسف حقاً ، ان السياسة اللبنانية انساق في تيار هذا
التطرف الى حد التبعية ، في الوقت الذي كان فيه الشعب اللبناني يعد نفسه
للصمود ، لا من اجل الحفاظ على نظامه الديموقراطي الحر فقط ، بل ايضاً من

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اجل الاسهام في معركة الدفاع عن الوجود الديموقراطي في سائر انحاء المنطقة التي تنظر شعوبها الى لبنان كعامل انقاذ ، بحكم ارتباطاته التاريخية وصدقاته الدولية ، وهي الارتباطات والصدقات التي تجعل للبنان دورا مزدوجا ، فهو التافذة التي تطل منها بلدان المنطقة على العالم الحر ، وهو ايضا الباب الذي يدخل منه هذا العالم الحر الى المنطقة بمبادئه ونواحي نشاطه . ولا يخفى ما في القضاء على دور لبنان التقليدي من انعكاسات على الجانبين ، وهذا ما يفسر عملية التطويق التي تقوم بها قوى التطرف لافقاده هذا الدور .


وكنا في اثناء زيارتنا الى الولايات المتحدة عام ١٩٦٢ ، قد لفتنا انظار الرئيس جون كيندي الى هذا الوضع والى ما ينطوى عليه من محاذير واطار ، اذا لم يلق معالجة سريعة ، ولا سيما لناحية قضية اللاجئين الفلسطينيين الذين يقيم منهم على الارض اللبنانية نحو ثلاثماية وخمسين الفا ، يشكلون سدس عدد سكان البلاد وثلاث عدد النازحين عن فلسطين ، واشرنا الى خطر التأخير في ايجاد الحلول المنشودة ، لا بالنسبة الى لبنان فقط بل بالنسبة الى المنطقة كلها ، فابدى الرئيس الراحل تفهما عميقا لوجهة النظر هذه ووعده بايلائها اهتماما خاصا من اجل ايجاد الحل السريع المناسب ، غير انه من الموءلم ان لا يكون قد تسنى له بذل هذا الاهتمام ، وان تكون السياسة الدولية قد حالت دون ذلك ، فاذا بنا امام الوضع البالغ الخطورة الذي يعيشه لبنان الآن ، والذي ينعكس الى ما وراء حدوده مهددا بلدانا وعناصر ما زالت تناضل في سبيل المبادئ الديموقراطية الحرة ذاتها .

وازاء الاخطار التي تشتد اعاصيرها يوما بعد يوم على المنطقة وتهدد لبنان في مصيره ، لا نجد بدا من ان نتوجه بالحاح الى رئيس الدولة الاميركية نصيرة الحريات والمبادئ الانسانية بنداء من اجل مد يد المساعدة العاجلة للشعب اللبناني ، اذا كان لا بد للديموقراطية من المحافظة علي المعقل الاخير من معاقلها في هذه البقعة من العالم ، وهذه المساعدة تبدا بتفهم الوضع اللبناني تفهما واقعيا بعيدا عن الشعارات المضللة التي كثيرا ما يطلى بها العمل السياسي والديپلوماسي ، ثم اتخاذ الاجراءات الناجعة التي يملئها هذا التفهم في مختلف المجالات ، لا لانقاذ لبنان فحسب ، بل ايضا لانقاذ الديموقراطية في المنطقة وانقاذ الوجود الاميركي معها .

فالمنطقة التي تعاني صراعا مصيريا عنيفا على جبهتين ، التمرکز الصهيوني والتوسع الشيعي ، لم يبق لابنائها المتمسكين بعقائدهم الاصيلة وتقاليم الحرة من مجال للاختيار ، وذلك تحت ضغط الدعاية اليسارية عن عداء السياسة الاميركية للدول العربية والاسلامية ، بحيث لم تعد العناصر المحافظة الحرة تستطيع الجهر حتى بعقائدها خوفا من الاتهامات الخوفائية بموالاته السياسة الاميركية .

والواضح ان لبنان هو البلد الوحيد في المنطقة الذي لا تزال غالبية

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السكان فيه تملك حرية التعبير عن عقائدها وآرائها وتحرص عليها ، وان دعم هذه الحرية في لبنان ، قبل فوات الاوان ، هو دعم للعناصر المعاكسة المغلوبة على امرها في مختلف بلدان المنطقة وتشجيع لها على الصمود ، ولسنا نرى في ذلك اى تعارض مع المصالح الاميركية في النواحي الاخرى ، وربما ادى هذا الدعم الى اقامة التوازن المنشود في السياسة الاميركية في المنطقة ، ولا سيما ان عناصر الاعتدال ترى ان الخطر الذى يهددها من ناحية قوى التطرف يستهدف كيانها الديني والاجتماعي من جذوره ، والصراع بينهما صراع موت او حياة ، ولا مجال لمقارنته باى خطر اخر .

وفي ضوء هذا الواقع ، وبالنظر الى عجز الشعب اللبناني عن مجابهة الاخطار الضخمة التي تهدده ، يرى البطريرك الماروني ان يتوجه الى الدولة الاميركية بطلب مساعدة لبنان على اجتياز محنته ، وذلك بحكم المسؤوليات التاريخية الملقاة على عاتق البطريركية في الدفاع عن الوجود اللبناني ، وبحكم ايمان البطريرك بحسن تفهم الشعب الاميركي الذى يضم عددا كبيرا من ابناء البطريركية اسهموا الى حد كبير في مختلف نواحي الحياة الاميركية ، وتجاوبا مع مسؤولية الولايات المتحدة في الدفاع عن العالم الحر ، ولبنان يشكل جزءا صغيرا منه ولا يتعذر على الدولة الاميركية الكبرى انقاذه .

وفي يقيننا ان الدكتور شارل مالك اللبناني المخلص والصديق الوفي لاميركا ، يستطيع تقديم جميع الايضاحات المعبرة عن الواقع ، آمليين ان تلقى لدى فخامتكم تجاوبا طيبا وعاجلا .

وختاماً نرجو من الله ان يوفق شخصكم ويصون اميركا العزيزة ، ويغمر شعبها النبيل بالخير والبركة .

الكردينال
بكركي في ٢٥ آذار ١٩٧٠

لوس طرس
المعظم

بطريرك انطاكيه
وسائر المشرق

/

Historical File

NLN 03-93/3

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NLN 03-93/3



PATRIARCAT MARONITE D'ANTIOCHE
ET DE TOUT L'ORIENT
BKERKE - LIBAN

حضرة صاحب الفخامة السيد ريتشارد نيكسون رئيس الولايات المتحدة الاميركية

البيت الابيض - واشنطن

[1110 1110]



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Historical File

✓
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/EXDIS

March 16, 1970

T. S. Sullivan

Henry --

The attached cable dealing with the Lebanese situation suggests that we may have some problems which are minimal to remedy.


Al Haig

Attachment: Beirut 01989

SECRET/EXDIS

75034
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
LFSERVICE

INFO: ~~CJCS~~-1(1) DJS-1(2) JS-1(3) NMCC/DDO-1(4)
SECDEF-5(5-9) ASD/ISA-5(10-14) ASD/PA-1(15)
DIA-1(16) CSA-1(17) CNO-1(18) CSAF-1(19)
J3-1(21) SAMAA-1 (22) RF/FILE 1(23) JRB/WGS/LFSERVICE

SECRET 414

313 23 371

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01989 131545Z

EXDIS

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 131410Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9892

SECRET BEIRUT 1989

EXDIS

REF: STATE 35651

EXCLUSIVE

007825

ja -
max
Halt
R - *L -*
A strong but valid message
I hope that 23L Haig &
Hal Saunders see this.
BFA

1. LAST FALL DURING THE LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN WAR THIS EMBASSY WAS ASKED TO SUGGEST POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR ASSISTING LEBANON. TODAY, ALMOST FIVE MONTHS LATER, THE US HAS DONE NOTHING EXCEPT TO APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE A SMALL PL 480 PROGRAM. THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE AND THE SIMILAR RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS EMBASSY HAVE EITHER BEEN TURNED DOWN OR ARE IN BUREAUCRATIC LIMBO. PERHAPS THERE ARE VALID LEGAL OR PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THIS INACTIVITY, BUT THE RESULT IS THE SAME - INACTIVITY.

2. THERE IS EITHER A SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPT AND MYSELF ON THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON OR PERHAPS WE HAVE FAILED TO MAKE THE POINT WITH ENOUGH CLARITY. MAY I NOW STATE AS CLEARLY AS I CAN THAT I THINK WE ARE IN FOR REAL TROUBLE IN LEBANON WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IF NOT SOONER.

I THINK IT IS ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT THERE WILL BE A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE LEBANESE. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL BE THAT THE LEBANESE WILL CAVE IN TO THE FEDAYEEN. EQUALLY PREDICTABLE RESULT WILL THEN BE A SEVERE ISRAELI RESPONSE. AMERICAN INTERESTS WILL SUFFER GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY IN THIS PROCESS, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST OUR PRESENCE HERE.

3. THE ONLY INSTRUMENT WHICH MIGHT BRING A MEASURE OF STABILITY TO THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON IS A STRENGTHENED ARMY. THE LEBANESE TOOK A LONG TIME TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS TO TELL US WHAT KIND OF ARMS THEY WANTED. THEY WERE WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT AND, WHEN THEY FORMED ONE, PRES HELOU HAD TO GET RID OF HIS IN-

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Department of State

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COMPETENT CIC. THE NEW CIC, NOUJAIM, AFTER CAREFULLY REVIEWING HIS NEEDS AND HIS COUNTRY'S FINANCES, APPROACHED US ON FEB '19 WITH A MODEST REQUIREMENT FOR SOME WWII TANKS AND AA MACHINE GUNS -- USED EQUIPMENT WHICH THE LEBANESE HOPED WOULD BE ON OUR SURPLUS LIST, AND THEREFORE AVAILABLE FOR LITTLE OR NOTHING. THE LEBANESE, WITH AN EMPTY TREASURY, WERE FORCED TO BEG, BUT THEIR REQUEST WAS INDEED MODEST, CONSIDERING THE THREAT WHICH THEY ARE TRYING URGENTLY TO MEET.

4. TO RECAPITULATE FROM OUR EARLIER MESSAGES: (A) HELOU WANTS TO STRENGTHEN HIS ARMN NOW -- FOR A FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE WHICH HE THINKS MAY OCCUR NO LATER THAN MAY; (B) GOL CANNOT PAY GOING PRICES, EVEN FOR RECONDITIONED EQUIPMENT; (C) GOL CANNOT AT MOMENT LEGALLY ACCEPT USG CREDITS, EVEN IF WE HAVE THEM TO OFFER; (D) LEBANON HAS NO CHANCE TO GET SUBSIDIES FROM OTHER ARAB STATES; (E) HELOU DESPERATELY WANTS TO CONTINUE TO GET ARMS IN WEST, TO AVOID ACCEPTING PROFERRED SOVIET "GIFT".

5. ON MARCH 12, WE RECEIVED USG'S FIRST RESPONSE TO GOL'S REQUEST. IT SAID: (A) 18 MONTHS DELIVERY TIME FOR US-OWNED M-41'S; (B) NO OTHER TANKS AVAILABLE FROM US SOURCES; (C) LEBANESE MIGHT WISH TRY BUY THEIR M-41'S ON OPEN MARKET FROM "LEVY BROS"; (D) IF THEY DO, USG WILL TELL THEM LATER WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL VETO THE PURCHASE. THERE IS NO HOPE IN THIS REPLY WHICH I CAN USE TO BUCK UP HELOU'S AND NOUJAIM'S MORALE.

6. I AM LED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE USG CANNOT RESPOND EITHER TO THE URGENT NATURE OF THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR ARMS, OR TO THE REQUEST FOR CONCESSIONAL PRICES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I SO FRANKLY INFORM PRES HELOU. AT THIS POINT HELOU IS RELYING ON THE HOPE THAT A FRIENDLY USG, WHOSE INTERESTS HE FEELS ARE IDENTICAL WITH HIS, WILL RESPOND TO HIS URGENT PLEAS FOR HELP. (HE INDEED HAS NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN, UNLESS HE ACCEPTS THE RECENT SOVIET OFFERS.) WE CANNOT, IN ALL FAIRNESS, ALLOW HIM TO PLAN ON FALSE PREMISES. HE MUST KNOW WHERE HE STANDS AND WHAT HIS ASSETS ARE OR MAY BE, AND MAKE HIS DECISIONS ACCORDINGLY.

7. I DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE TILTING MY LANCE IN THIS MESSAGE, BUT I SEE NO RAY OF HOPE IN ANY OF DEPT'S MESSAGES THAT USG IS CONSIDERING ANY COURSE OF ACTION THAT RESPONDS TO HELOU'S REQUESTS OR TO THE REALITIES OF THE PROBLEM. IF I AM WRONG, PLEASE TELL ME.

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8. ALSO, VALID AS THE FACTS MAY BE, I CANNOT SATISFY HELOU, PROVIDE HIM SOLACE, OR ASSIST IN EASING THE SITUATION HERE BY REPEATING THE HISTORY OF OUR PAST EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON (PARA 2, STATE 362131). HELOU IS JUST AS AWARE AS I OF THE INADEQUACIES AND MISTAKES OF HIS FORMER CIC -- THE MAN WHO HELPED CREATE THIS SORRY HISTORY. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, HELLOU WHO FIRED HIM, AND PERHAPS ABOVE ALL BECAUSE HE WAS AWARE OF THE FACTS WHICH THE DEPT HAS ENUMERATED, AND WHICH HE AND I HAVE OFTEN DISCUSSED IN THE PAST.
PORTER

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SECRET 981

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 11019 301801Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

030751

R 301544Z DEC 70 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2733

SECRET BEIRUT 11019

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSISTANCE

70 DEC 30 PM 9:30
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. FOREIGN MINISTER, DECEMBER 30, TOOK INITIATIVE TO SAY GOL HAS NO INTENTION REFUSING US \$5 MILLION GIFT WHEN OFFERED. HOWEVER, HE INDICATED IN VIEW PRESS AND POLITICAL CRITICISM, HE THOUGHT TACTICS AND TIMING AND HANDLING GIFT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. HE WAS CONSIDERING STALLING BY RESPONDING TO OUR OFFER, WHEN MADE, BY INDICATING LEBANON NEEDS MORE THAN \$5 MILLION IN ASSISTANCE AND REQUEST US GRANT BE MORE COMENSURATE WITH AMOUNTS PROVIDED NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, I.E., JORDAN AND ISRAEL.

2. I ADVISED AGAINST THIS TACTIC POINTING OUT COMPLEXITIES OF SECURING SUCH GRANTS AND LIKELIHOOD REQUEST WOULD BE BE REFUSED WHICH WOULD LEAVE GOL IN EVEN MORE AWKWARD POSITION. I ALSO POINTED OUT THERE IS URGENCY ABOUT GOL DECISION ON M-41 TANKS ON WHICH WE WANT DEFINITE ANSWER NEXT MONTH. AS COUNTER PROPOSAL I SUGGESTED GOL ACCEPT GRANT, SAYING MONEY THEY THEREBY SAVED ON ARMS PURCHASES BEING APPLIED TO PRESSING SOCIAL NEEDS OF COUNTRY SUCH AS HEALTH AND EDUCATION. HE PROMISED REFLECT ON THESE COMMENTS AND CONSULT WITH US FURTHER.

3. I AM LUNCHING ALONE JANUARY 4 WITH PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS PROFESSIONAL POLITICIAN (FONMIN IS NOT) AND WILL TRY TO PERSUADE HIM OF NEED FOR EXPEDITIOUS THOUGH TACTFUL HANDLING OF OUR GRANT.

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SECRET 088

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

016262

P 281510Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2702

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 10932/1

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 208217

SUBJ: JARRING TALKS

1. SUMMARY. REQUEST INDULGENCE IF FOLLOWING COMMENTS GO BEYOND QUERY CONTAINED REFTEL RE VENUE OF JARRING TALKS. LAST TWO YEARS EXPERIENCES WITH JARRING MISSION STILL TOO FRESH TO PERMIT REACTING TO DEPTTEL WITHOUT ALSO VOLUNTEERING SOME YEAR-END THOUGHTS ON IMPORTANCE OF MANNER IN WHICH HE APPROACHES NEXT ROUND. IN BRIEF, I BELIEVE ADVANTAGES OF SHIFTING TALKS TO NICOSIA SLIGHTLY OUTWEIGH DISADVANTAGES AND DESERVE SMALL-SCALE EFFORT. OF GREATER IMPORTANCE IS NEED FOR JARRING TO BREAK AWAY FROM OLD PATTERNS AND MAKE FRESH START BY RAISING AT OUTSET QUESTION OF GUARANTEES. I CONSIDER THIS APPROACH OFFERS OPTIMUM WAY OF REDUCING FUTURE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES AMONG PARTIES AND MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL AND AMONG THE US, FRENCH AND UK.

2. VENUE:

A. REASONS CITED REFTEL FOR SHIFTING TALKS TO NICOSIA GENERALLY PERSUASIVE AND I BELIEVE IT IS WORTH A TRY BUT NOT A MAJOR EFFORT. CYPRUS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF REQUIRING PARTICIPANTS DEVOTE FULL TIME TO TALKS, WOULD BY-PASS OBSTACLES POSED BY EL FARRA, AVOID SOME OF PUBLIC EXPOSURE INEVITABLE IN NEW YORK AND PROVIDE ISRAELIS WITH COMFORT OF PHYSICAL DISASSOCIATION FROM 4- POWER TALKS. RE LATTER POINT, HOWEVER, MUST SAY I FRANKLY DOUBT CHANGE OF VENUE LIKELY TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO INCREASING ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY. THEY HAVE ALWAYS IMPRESSED ME AS ULTIMATE IN HARDHEADED NEGOTIA-

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
70 DEC 28 PM 6:54
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TORS WHO WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE MOVED MATERIALLY ON QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE BY LOCALE OF TALKS. ON NEGATIVE SIDE DEPT HAS NO DOUBT REFLECTED ON DISADVANTAGE THAT WOULD ACCRUE FROM REMOVING JARRING FROM SUCH IMMEDIATE EXPOSURE TO WASHINGTON'S VIEWS. IF TALKS ARE HELD ANYWHERE OUTSIDE NEW YORK, NICOSIA WOULD BE IDEAL SINCE AMB POPPER SO KNOWLEDGEABLE AND ARTICULATE ON THIS SUBJECT. AT SAME TIME, MUST RECALL THAT IN PAST WHEN ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS OUTSIDE NEW YORK JARRING HAS REFUSED TO MEET WITH ANY AMBASSADOR, REASONING (FALLACIOUSLY) THAT IF HE AGREES TO SEE ONE FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE HE MUST AGREE TO SEE ANY AND ALL. IN ADDITION, JARRING WOULD ALSO BE REMOVED FROM IMMEDIATE AND SALUTARY INFLUENCE EXERTED ON HIM BY BUNCHE. AT TIME OF SUBMISSION HIS LAST REPORT ANNOUNCING ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. CEASE FIRE IN NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSAL IT REQUIRED COMBINED ADVICE OF U.S. OFFICIALS AND BUNCHE TO GET JARRING TO CIRCULATE REPORT WHEN ISRAELIS OBJECTED TO FORMULATION USED. MOREOVER, SECURITY SITUATION CYPRUS PRESUMABLY MORE SHAKY THAN IN NY. IT IS FOR THESE REASON I CONSIDER DECISION TO CHANGE VENUE IS "ON BALANCE" ONE WHERE ADVANTAGES WOULD BARELY OUTWEIGH DISADVANTAGES AND THEREFORE WE SHOULD NOT PUT GREAT DEAL OF MUSCLE INTO EFFORT TO DO SO.

B. IF TALKS REMAIN IN NEW YORK, I CONCUR FULLY WITH COMMENT THAT OLD PROCEDURE OF HAVING TALKS IN SECRETARIAT TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY. JARRING HIMSELF BECAME APPALLED AT HIS INABILITY AND THAT OF PARTICIPANTS TO ESCAPE PRESS AFTER EVERY MEETING. LAST SUMMER HE TOLD ME HE HAD IN MIND MOVING HIS OWN QUARTERS FROM DRAKE HOTEL TO WALDORF SO THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD HAVE EASY ACCESS TO HIM IN BUILDING WITHOUT OUTSIDE NOTICE OF EVERY ENCOUNTER (UARI AND JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINS BOTH THEN SCHEDULED TO RESIDE IN WALDORF). AM NOT AWARE WHY HE FAILED TO DO THIS AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD INSIST ON SUCH PROCEDURE THIS TIME, ESPECIALLY IF FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE PRESENT.

C. AT RISK OF INTRUDING ON USUN PREROGATIVES, I BELIEVE IF DECISION IS MADE TO PROPOSE TALKS BE MOVED TO NICOSIA THAT INITIAL DISCUSSION SHOULD BE HELD WITH BUNCHE. HE AND ULTHANT WERE THOSE WHO FAVORED NY MOST STRONGLY AND WHOSE SUPPORT YOU WOULD NEED BEFORE TACKLING JARRING. AMONG OTHER THINGS BUNCHE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT NICOSIA BECAUSE HE FEARED CYPRUS MORE VULNERABLE TO COMMANDO EFFORTS TO SABOTAGE TALKS THAN NY. (AMB POPPER'S COMMENTS ON THIS POINT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF DEPT PURSUES NICOSIA POSSIBILITY. FEDAYEEN OBVIOUSLY ARE GROUP WITH GREATEST STAKE IN SEEING TALKS FAIL AND THEIR

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POSSIBLE COUNTER-ACTIONS MUST BE CRANKED INTO TOTAL CALCULATION.
BUFFUM

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

016370

3

P 281510Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2703

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 10932/2

EXDIS

3. APPROACH

A. TO MY MIND MORE IMPORTANT THAN QUESTION OF VENUE WILL BE MANNER OF JARRING'S APPROACH TO NEXT ROUND. WHEN HE RESUMES HIS MISSION, I BELIEVE TIME HAS COME FOR FRESH APPROACH. JARRING SPENT MANY MONTHS IN 1968 SHUTTLE BETWEEN PARTIES, TRYING TO CLARIFY THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLEMENT. HE KNOWS FROM THOSE DISCUSSIONS, AS WELL AS INSIGHTS PROVIDED BY TWO YEARS OF FOUR-POWER TALKS, WHAT GENERAL OUTLINES OF PARTIES' POSITIONS ARE EXCEPT FOR ISRAEL'S REAL POSITION ON LOCATION OF FINAL BOUNDARIES.

B. ANY OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES DISCUSSED SO FAR, SUCH AS DEFINING AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT OR ATTEMPTING TO REFINER REMAINING DISAGREEMENTS, WILL VERY SHORTLY CONFRONT GUT ISSUE ON HOW MUCH TERRITORY ISRAEL WILL SAY IT NEEDS TO ASSURE ITS FUTURE SECURITY, I.E. DISCUSSION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, WILL NO DOUBT QUICKLY LEAD TO ISRAELI CLAIM IT MUST STATION TROOPS AT SHARM EL SHEIK TO ASSURE FREE PASSAGE.

C. ONCE ISRAEL TERRITORIAL DEMANDS ARE TABLED WE WILL PRESUMABLY BE OPENLY AT ODDS WITH THEM SINCE THEY HAVE MADE QUITE CLEAR THEY WILL ASK FOR MORE THAN MINOR RECTIFICATIONS. THIS IS WITHOUT DOUBT ONE OF MAJOR REASONS ISRAELIS HAVE HESITATED TO ENTER INDIRECT TALKS WHILE WE ADHERE TO "ROGERS PLAN".

D. WHILE THIS IS GOING ON, WE WILL BE UNDER CONTINUING PRESSURE NOT ONLY FROM SOVS BUT INCREASINGLY FROM FRENCH AND PROBABLY EVEN UK TO GET FOUR POWERS MORE ACTIVELY ENGAGED TO HELP JARRING OVERCOME OBSTACLES, AS WE ARE COMMITTED TO DO, WITH CONCOMITANT STRAIN THIS WILL PUT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAELIS. OF COURSE OTHERS OF 4-POWER GROUP ARE URGING WORK BEGIN IMMEDIATELY IN THAT FORUM ON GUARANTEES.

E. TAKING ACCOUNT OF FOREGOING, AND WITH VIEW TO MINI-

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10932 02 OF 02 281633Z

MIZING POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT BOTH AMONG PARTIES TO DISPUTE, AMONG THE FOUR, AND BETWEEN OURSELVES AND ISRAELIS, I SUGGEST THIS TIME JARRING IMMEDIATELY BEGIN HIS EFFORTS BY TAKING UPI QUESTION OF GUARANTEES. HE COULD ASK, "IF YOU OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY PACKAGE SETTLEMENT, WHAT EXTERNAL GUARANTEES AND SECURITY ASSURANCES WOULD YOU CONSIDER USEFUL IN ASSURING THE AGREEMENT IS FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED?" HE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN PROCESS SUCH GUARANTEES WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTAL TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES TO EACH OTHER AND NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR THEM.

F. ONCE THIS QUESTION IS ANSWERED, THE EASIER IT SHOULD BE TO COPE WITH HEART OF PROBLEM WHICH IS SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES. ISRAELIS SHOULD, AT LEAST, BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO GENUINE NEED FOR EXTERNAL GUARANTEES SINCE THEIR LONG-STANDING POSITION OF RELYING MERELY ON CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS FROM ARABS LOOKS HOLLOW INDEED IN AFTERMATH OF EGYPTIAN CHEATING ON STANDSTILL CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. AT SAME TIME, IF DISCUSSION OF GUARANTEES PROVIDES FOR POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WITH US PARTICIPATION, AS SECRETARY HAS SO WISELY LEFT OPEN IN RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE, IT WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ISRAELIS TO INSIST ON UNREASONABLE TERRITORIAL DEMANDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT SHARMI EL SHEIKH CAN ENVISAGE INTERNATIONAL FORCE INCLUDING US TROOPS OR GUNBOATS OFFSHORE WATCHING OVER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, IT BECOMES VASTLY MORE UNTENABLE EVEN TO ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION FOR GOI TO SAY IT MUST KEEP TERRITORY THERE.

G. ACCORDINGLY, I SUGGEST JARRING BEGIN BY SAYING HE THINKS IT WOULD FACILITATE AGREEMENT IF HE COULD ESTABLISH EARLY ON JUST WHAT TYPE OF SECURITY GUARANTEES PARTIES WOULD CONSIDER NECESSARY OR USEFUL. EVEN HERE HE WILL NO DOUBT SOON ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES; WHEN AND IF HE DOES, THAT WOULD OFFER NATURAL AND REASONABLE OCCASION FOR FOUR POWERS TO START WORKING ON GUARANTEES PROBLEM BUT THEY WOULD THEN BE DOING SO ON BASIS OF PRIOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, WHICH IS A PRINCIPLE WE WISH TO ESTABLISH. GP-3
BUFFUM

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2110/109

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 121310Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2607

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 10585

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (P A R A 7)

DEPARTMENT PASS USINT CAIRO

REF: CAIRO 2706; BEIRUT 10566 AND 10495

1. WE ARE PASSING YOU BEIRUT 10566 AND 10495 ON MOST RECENT TAPLINE SYRIA DEVELOPMENTS.
2. PROBLEM IN COMMUNICATIONS AFTER 1970 CLOSURE MENTIONED REFTEL RESULTED FROM SAUDI BAN ON ANY FORMAL TAPLINE NEGOTIATIONS OF INCREASED ROYALTIES WITH SYRIA UNTIL LINE REOPENED. FEISAL LATER RELAXED STANCE SLIGHTLY TO ALLOW TAPLINE OFFER DOLLARS FIVE MILLION ADVANCE PAYMENT. SYRIANS REJECTED THIS OFFER. SYRIAN POSITION WAS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE REOPENING. (AS REFTELS SHOW, SAUDI BAN NOW LIFTED).
3. IN TAPLINE DISCUSSIONS AFTER CLOSURE THIS YEAR, SYRIAN DEMANDS MADE BY ATASSI WERE FOR PAYMENT DOLLARS FIFTY MILLION AS PRICE OF REOPENING LINE WITH LATER SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLY DOLLARS TWENTY MILLION BEING ENOUGH. THESE AMOUNTS CLEARLY EXORBITANT. FIGURES SUCH AS THOSE CITED BY CGAD TO BERGUS HAVE NEVER BEEN MENTIONED TO TAPLINE BY SYRIANS.
4. WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH TAPLINE ON POSSIBLE SOURCES FIGURES CITED BY RIAD. WE THINK ONE POSSIBLE SOURCE MAY LIE IN SYRIAN DEMANDS MADE IN MAY 1967 NEGOTIATIONS.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
ALN 09-12/S. Rendt 8-4-2009
By P. H. NARA, Date 10-22-09
[P. 1063]

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THIS PACKAGE WOULD HAVE YIELDED, IF TAPLINE HAD ACQUIESCED, ABOUT DOLLARS THREE POINT FIVE MILLION IN ADDITIONAL ANNUAL PAYMENT, I.E., ABOUT SYRIAN POUNDS FIFTEEN MILLION AT CURRENT PARALLEL MARKET RATE OF SYRIAN POUNDS FOUR POINT THREE EQUALS US DOLLAR ONE. THIS CONCEIVABLE COULD BE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THESE SYRIAN CLAIMS WITH ADDITIONAL AMOUNT BEING ADDED FOR TANKER RATE CHARGES SINCE 1967.

5. THE 1967 NEGOTIATIONS WERE BEGUN IN MAY AND WERE CONTINUING AT TIME OF WAR WITH NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 12 AT WHICH TIME TAPLINE WAS TO HAVE PRESENTED FORMAL RESPONSE TO SYRIAN DEMANDS. WITH INTERVENING WAR AND CLOSING OF LINE, JUNE 12 MEETING WAS CALLED OFF UNTIL LINE REOPENED AND SYRIAN INDICATION OF DESIRE TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS. ALTHOUGH LINE REOPENED, TAPLINE NEVER RECEIVED ANY SYRIAN REQUEST TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS PRIOR 1970 BREAK. IT HAD LONG BEEN PUZZLED BY THIS SYRIAN FAILURE TO REOPEN 1967 DISCUSSION.

6. WE SUSPECT THAT THESE DIFFERENCES IN SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION AND TAPLINE MAY STEM FROM FACT THAT THE EXORBITANT ATASSI DEMANDS MENTIONED IN PARA TWO WEREMADE IN PERSON TO TAPLINE REPS AND MAY NEVER HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN DOSSIER FROM WHICH SYRIAN REPORT TO EGYPTIANS WAS MADE. THUS, AUTHOR REPORT MAY WELL NOT HAVE KNOWN ABOUT THEM.

THIS REPORT INCIDENTALLY LENDS ADDED SIGNIFICANCE SYRIAN REMARK IN MAY WHEN THEY SUSPENDED REPAIR OF BREAK -- NAMELY THEY HAD EXAMINED TAPLINE DOSSIER AND FOUND UNSETTLED CLAIMS NEVER DEFINED BUT PRESUMABLY STEMMING FROM 1967 NEGOTIATIONS.

7. WHILE EMBOFF WAS DISCUSSING MATTER ON DEC 12 WITH TAPLINE PRES CHANDLER AND VP ROBINSON WHO WERE INFORMED ABOUT EXTREME SENSITIVITY THIS MATTER, THEIR DAMASCUS REP TELEPHONED TO CONFIRM APPOINTMENT FOR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS DEC 15 FURTHER INDICATING THAT PRIMIN HAFEZ ASAD MIGHT WELL BE AVAILABLE FOR CALL BY TAPLINE PRESIDENT CHANDLER. BOTH WILL GO TO DAMASCUS ALTHOUGH ROBINSON WILL HEAD NEGOTIATIONS FOR TAPLINE.

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8. WE SUGGEST REPLY TO UAR FONMIN ALONG FOLLOWING LINES AND DRAWING ON FOREGOING FOR BACKGROUND:

A. TAPLINE ANXIOUS TO REOPEN LINE PROVIDED IT CAN BE DONE ON ECONOMICALLY VIABLE GROUNDS. HOWEVER, EXORBITANT DEMANDS BY ATASSI PERSONALLY, FOLLOWED BY SYRIAN REJECTION OF DOLLARS FIVE MILLION ADVANCE IN ROYALTIES (PAYABLE DOLLARS TWO MILLION IN CASH AND DOLLARS THREE MILLION OVER TWO YEARS) LEFT NO GROUNDS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN LIGHT SAUDI ATTITUDE.

B. TAPLINE HAS NOW REOPENED DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIA WITH FIRST NEGOTIATING SESSION EXPECTED FOR DECEMBER 15. TAPLINE IS UNDERSTANDABLY ANXIOUS TO BRING NEGOTIATIONS TO A REASONABLE CONCLUSION AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

C. CAIRO MAY PASS ON AS EMBASSY BEIRUT'S IMPRESSION, THAT TAPLINE EXPECTS INCREASES IN TRANSIT ROYALTIES AS RESULT THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

FYI: DAMASCUS REP OF TAPLINE WAS EARLIER AUTHORIZED BY COMPANY TO STATE THIS TO SYRIANS AS HIS PERSONAL IMPRESSION. END FYI.

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NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

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[MILN09-12/5: P. 3-63]

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C O R R E C T I D C O P Y (ADDING JERUSALEM AS AN INFO ADDEE)

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GOJ ASSUMPTION OF UNRWA FUNCTIONS

REF: STATE 193722

1. GOL ATTITUDE. LEBANON'S POSITION ON THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS BASED ON THE OVERRIDING IMPERATIVE OF GETTING 225,000 REFUGEES OUT OF LEBANON. LEBANON'S BEST HOPE LIES IN AN ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT INVOLVING AN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION MASSIVE ENOUGH TO CREATE JOBS IN JORDAN OR ELSEWHERE FOR ALL PALESTINIANS. FAILING SUCH A SETTLEMENT, THERE IS EVERY LIKELIHOOD PALESTINIANS ARE HERE TO STAY. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE INCORPORATION OF THE REFUGEES INTO THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC WOULD UPSET THE EXISTING CONFSSIONAL BALANCE, NO GOVERNMENT COULD SUGGEST GRANTING PALESTINIANS LEBANESE CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT TAKING GRAVE OR PERHAPS FATAL POLITICAL RISK. ALTHOUGH MANY PALESTINIANS HAVE FOUND EMPLOYMENT IN LEBANON, ONLY A HANDFUL HOLD THEIR JOBS LEGALLY. ANY SIGNIFICANT TRANSFER OF UNRWA STAFF TO THE LEBANESE CIVIL SERVICE IS UNTHINKABLE. IT IS POSSIBLE GOL WOULD ACCEPT TAKE-OVER OF UNRWA FUNCTIONS BY JORDAN WITHOUT PROTEST, BUT ONLY ON STIPULATION THAT UNRWA WOULD RETAIN ITS TRADITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN LEBANON. GOL WILL

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STRONGLY RESIST ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT TEND TO INSTITUTIONALIZE PRESENCE OF PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY OR SUGGEST GOL HAS ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS WELFARE.

2. INADEQUACY OF LEBANESE SOCIAL SERVICES. IF UNRWA WENT BANKRUPT, GOL WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WELFARE OF RESIDENT PALESTINIANS, IF ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF PRESERVING LAW AND ORDER. HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT LEBANESE PERFORMANCE IN THIS RESPECT TO BE DANGEROUSLY INADEQUATE. GOL HAS NOT EVEN BEEN ABLE TO PROVIDE ITS OWN CITIZENS EDUCATIONAL, MEDICAL AND HOUSING STANDARDS EQUIVALENT TO THOSE MAINTAINED BY UNRWA FOR PALESTINIANS. IN HIS SPC STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 3, AMBASSADOR GHORRA REFLECTED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DEEP CONCERN AT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF ANY REDUCTION IN UNRWA SERVICES IN LEBANON.

3. PALESTINIAN ATTITUDE. THE REFUGEES HAVE HISTORICALLY OPPOSED EVERY PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO REDUCE OR TRANSFER UNRWA'S RESPONSIBILITIES, ON GROUNDS SUCH ACTION IS DESIGNED TO "LIQUIDATE REFUGEE PROBLEM" AND SUBVERT PALESTINIANS' "NATIONAL RIGHTS". WE WOULD EXPECT FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS IN LEBANON, AIDED AND ABETTED BY THE LOCAL (PALESTINIAN) STAFF OF UNRWA, TO ORGANIZE AND INTENSIFY RANK AND FILE RESISTANCE TO ANY TRANSFER OF UNRWA FUNCTIONS TO ANY HOST GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT, ANY ATTEMPT SIGNIFICANTLY TO REDUCE UNRWA'S OPERATIONS IN LEBANON -- IF NOT ELSEWHERE -- COULD PROVOKE SERIOUS DISTURBANCES.

4. CONCLUSION: WE HAVE RECOMMENDED (BEIRUT 9884) THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SEEK TO AVOID ANY POLITICALLY DISRUPTIVE ACTION IN THIS AREA WHILE THE PEACE EFFORT IS IN TRAIN. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH DISRUPTION WOULD RESULT FROM ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF UNRWA IN LEBANON -- IF NOT IN JORDAN. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS SUGGEST THEY GRUDGINGLY RECOGNIZE THEY PROBABLY COULD NOT PUT UP EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT BASED ON SC RESOLUTION 242, PROVIDED IT INCLUDES SOME GESTURE TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS' "NATIONAL RIGHTS". MEANWHILE, IN ORDER NOT TO DISRUPT CURRENT QUIESCENCE OF

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PALESTINIANS, WE WOULD EXPECT ALL HOST GOVERNMENTS
TO MAKE CONCERTED ATTEMPT TO ASSURE UNRWA'S SOLVENCY
UNTIL SETTLEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED. GP-3.
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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 021527Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2536

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FOR ACTING SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 195595

ESTABLISHMENT TWO POSITIONS IN BEIRUT ENVISAGED REFTEL
WOULD POSE NO DIFFICULTIES HERE. EXEMPT.
BUFFUM

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ACTION SS-45

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2516

SECRET BEIRUT 10192

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 9412

SUBJ: REPORTED FEDAYEEN ACQUISITION STRATEGIC POSITIONS IN BEIRUT

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1. SINCE DISPATCH REFTEL WE HAVE BEEN IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH SECURITY FORCES IN EFFORT DEVELOP FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RENTAL OF APARTMENTS BY FEDAYEEN IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS IN BEIRUT. FOLLOWING REPRESENTS CURRENT SITUATION AS WE UNDERSTAND IT.

2. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH COL. NEILOND, ARMY ATTACHE, COL HAJJ DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF/OPERATIONS, STATED THAT FATAH LEADER "ABU YOUSEF" HAD TOLD HIM ON NOVEMBER 20 THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO EVACUATE THE APARTMENTS. ARAFAT HAD AGREED PREVIOUSLY THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD EVACUATE THE 40-50 APARTMENTS ABOUT WHICH THE ARMY HAD KNOWLEDGE. ABU YOUSEF MAINTAINED THAT THE OPERATION COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN LESS THAN A FEW WEEKS. COL. HAJJ WARNED YOUSEF THAT THE ARMY KNEW THE EXACT LOCATIONS OF THE APARTMENTS AND COULD EASILY VERIFY WHEN THEY WERE EVACUATED. IN REPLY YOUSEF SIMPLY REPEATED HIS PROMISE THAT THE APARTMENTS WOULD BE EVACUATED. HAJJ COMMENTED TO THE ARMY ATTACHED THAT THE ARMY DID

NOT KNOW HOW MANY OF THE APARTMENTS WERE CONTROLLED BY FATAH WHO SUPPOSEDLY WOULD GO ALONG WITH ARAFAT'S DECISION AND HOW MANY BY OTHER FEDAYEEN GROUPS SUCH AS SAIGA WHO MIGHT OPPOSE THE DECISION. HAJJ MAINTAINED THAT THE ARMY WAS WATCHING THE OPERATION CLOSELY AND WOULD KEEP THE ARMY ATTACHE INFORMED ON PROGRESS.

3. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTERNAL SECURITY BANNA HAD TOLD THE EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICER IN EARLIER CONVERSATION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH FEDAYEEN REPRESENTATIVES.

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ACCORDING TO BANNA THE GOAL POSITION AS EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER WAS THAT ONLY LOCATIONS WHICH FEDAYEEN WOULD BE ALLOWED TO OCCUPY WOULD BE BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL. BANNA MAINTAINED THAT NO ARMY OR MILITARY TRAINED FEDAYEEN WOULD BE PERMITTED TO KEEP THESE STRATEGIC LOCATIONS.

4. WE HAVE INFO THAT SOME OF FEDAYEEN BROUGHT THEIR FAMILIES HERE AFTER THE JORDAN CRISIS. CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF THE APARTMENTS IN QUESTION MAY BE OCCUPIED SIMPLY BY THESE FAMILIES.

5. COMMENT: ARMY ATTACHE WILL CONTINUE FOLLOW MATTER WITH THE ARMY CLOSELY. WE CONSIDER THIS THE BEST WAY OF HANDLING THE PROBLEM.
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JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

REF: AMMAN 6593

TIME BUREAU CHIEF GAVIN SCOTT (PROTECT) TOLD PAO
TIME ISRAEL CORRESPONDENT CLARK WAS SOURCE OF STORY.
SCOTT, ON BASIS CLARK'S HIGHLY RESPONSIBLE RECORD,
TENDS TO BELIEVE STORY BUT HAS HAD NO RPT NO CONFIRMATORY
EVIDENCE HIS SOURCES IN BEIRUT OR AMMAN, SCOTT SAID
CLARK WOULD ONLY BUY STORY IF HE CONVINCED IT VERY HARD,
SPECULATED THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT HAVE MISREPRESENTED
KNESSET DISCUSSION OF MEETING RUMORS AS FACTUAL REPORT
TO KNESSET.

COMMENT: SINCE TIME MAKES PRACTICE CROSS-CHECKSENSITIVE
SINGLE SOURCE STORIES IN WASHINGTON, IT HIGHLY
PROBABLE CONFIRMATION WAS GIVEN BY ISRAELI EMBASSY
THERE OR OTHER SOURCES CONSIDERED REPUTABLE.
BUFFUM

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

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NY 09-12/6: Per Jtr 8-4-2009

By P. H. NARA, Date 10-22-09

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ACTION SS-45

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2435
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 9895

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI THREAT AGAINST LEBANON

1. I PAID COURTESY CALL ON LEBANESE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL NOUJAIM, NOVEMBER 16. HE QUICKLY TURNED TO HIS MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN, WHICH IS SITUATION ALONG BORDER WITH ISRAEL. HE NOTED WITH CHAGRIN THAT CONTRARY TO EXPLICIT ASSURANCE FROM ARAFAT DURING RECENT BEIRUT VISIT THAT ALL COMMANDO OFFICES OUTSIDE BEIRUT WOULD BE CLOSED DOWN, FEDAYEEN HAVE IN FACT JUST REOPENED OFFICES IN THREE VILLAGES IN BORDER AREA IN CENTRAL SECTOR OF SOUTH LEBANON, INCLUDING AAITAROUH AND MEISS EU JABAL.

2. NOUJAIM INDICATED THAT ISRAELIS, WHO HE SAID KNOW EVERYTHING THAT IS GOING ON IN THAT AREA, MADE MAJOR SCENE ABOUT THIS DURING LATEST MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING AND SAID IF OFFICES NOT REMOVED THESE VILLAGES WOULD FEEL THE FULL WEIGHT OF ISRAELI REPRISAL. NOUJAIM SAID IN ISRAELI PARLANCE THIS MEANS AIR STRIKE. HE IS STALLING NEXT MAC MEETING SINCE HE WILL BE UNABLE GIVE ISRAELIS SATISFACTION ON THIS POINT AT PRESENT TIME.

3. NOUJAIM PLEADED FOR OUR INTERCESSION WITH THE ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. HE SAID THAT OFFICES CONCERNED ARE "POLITICAL OFFICES" AND NOT RPT NOT MILITARY HEADQUARTERS. I ASKED WHETHER FEDAYEEN INVOLVED WERE ARMED AND HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAVE LIGHT ARMS ONLY BUT NOTHING IN WAY OF MORTARS OR ROCKETS. MOREOVER, HE ADDED, LEBANESE ARMY TROOPS ARE PATROLLING FRONTIER AREA AS TIGHTLY AS POSSIBLE AND HE IS

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CONFIDENT HE CAN CONTAIN MOST CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INVOLVING USE OF HEAVY WEAPONS. HE HAS THREE THOUSAND MEN ENGAGED IN ACTIVE PATROLLING TO PREVENT SUCH OPERATIONS. WHILE NATURE OF TERRAIN MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE PREVENT ALL INCIDENTS, HE CONSIDERS SITUATION IS RELATIVELY WELL UNDER CONTROL.

4. HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL AGREE APPROACH GOI URGING RESTRAINT. BUFFUM

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REF: DEPTTEL 186181

1. WE APPRECIATE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN DECIDING WHETHER TO GRANT DAHDAH FINAL CLEARANCE. EMBASSY HAS NO RPT NO INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIM OR SPARING HIM CONSEQUENCES AND MISDOING; ACCORDINGLY WE BELIEVE FURTHER INVESTIGATION CALLED FOR; HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT MANNER IN WHICH INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED AND RECOMMEND THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO PURSUE INQUIRES AT THIS STAGE IN MANNER LEAST CALCULATED AT THIS STAGE TO COME TO HIS ATTENTION.

2. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, HE IS CLOSE TO PRESIDENT OF LEBANON (DAHDAH'S BROTHER IS PRESIDENT'S SON-IN-LAW) AND HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY LATTER AS HIS POINT OF CONTACT WITH EMBASSY. HE IS ALSO A LEADING CONTENDER FOR POST OF PRESIDENCY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF INTRA OF BANK.

3. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE SUGGEST FURTHER INTERVIEW WITH MRS. CHAWKAT IN VIENNA. IF THOSE QUERIES SHOW NEED FOR STILL FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS, WE WOULD THEN WISH CONSIDER WHETHER TO APPROACH LEBANESE BUSINESSMEN, WHICH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COME TO HIS ATTENTION. AT THAT POINT, WE MIGHT CONSIDER IT PREFERABLE CONFRONT DAHDAH DIRECTLY WITH FACTS AVAILABLE TO UU, BUT WISH DEFER JUDGMENT ON THAT POINT.
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 9843

SUBJECT: ASAD TAKES OVER IN SYRIA

1. ON THE BASIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION, THE FOLLOWING IS THE EMBASSY'S PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA. THE TWO-YEAR OLD POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN (IDEOLOGICAL) AND MILITARY (PRAGMATIC) WINGS OF THE SYRIAN BAAATH REACHED APPARENT DENOUEMENT NOVEMBER 13 WHEN THE ARMED FORCES UNDER THE DIRECTION OF MINDEF HAFIZ AL ASAD SUDDENLY AND BLOODLESSLY TOOK OVER DIRECT CONTROL OF ALL INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THE MEDIA (LATTER WERE FORMERLY THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF THE CIVILIAN WING). MAJOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WERE PLACED UNDER GUARD. THE TWO TOP LEADERS OF THE CIVILIAN WING, BPS DEPSEC GEN SALAH JADID AND SAIQA CHIEF YUSUF ZU'AYYIN, WERE REPORTEDLY ARRESTED. NUR AD DIN

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AL ATASI, BPS SEC GEN AND CHIEF OF STATE, WAS PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST. BORDERS, AIRPORT, AND COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, HOWEVER, REMAIN OPEN, AND DAMASCUS RADIO CONTENT IS NORMAL, IN REFLECTION OF THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY WING HAS MERELY ASSUMED IN PUBLIC A CONTROL WHICH IT HAD ALREADY ESTABLISHED BEHIND THE SCENES - NOTABLY BY TRANSFERRING SUPPORTERS OF THE CIVILIAN FACTION FROM KEY MILITARY POSTS.

2. A NUMBER OF LESSER LEADERS OF THE CIVILIAN WING ESCAPED TO BEIRUT, INCLUDING MALIK AL AMIN, WHO HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE CONFIRMED THE INTRA-PARTY POLICY DISPUTE AND PREDICTED THE EARLY SUPPRESSION OF ASAD'S "MILITARY MUTINY" BY THE SYRIAN PEOPLE. ALTHOUGH MANY FACTS ARE STILL OBSCURE, THE INFORMED CONSENSUS IS THAT THE DOMINANT FACTION IN THE ARMED FORCES, HEADED BY ASAD, HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY RESENTFUL OF THE CIVILIANS' EFFORTS TO IMPOSE PARTY RULE OVER THE COUNTRY AND TO IMPLEMENT RADICAL BPS DOCTRINES SUCH AS "POPULAR WAR" AGAINST ISRAEL, POLITICAL EXPLOITATION OF THE FEDAYEEN, AND NON-COOPERATION WITH NON-BAATHIST OR "DEVIATIONIST" REGIMES LIKE THOSE IN CAIRO AND BAGHDAD. WE HAVE ALSO HAD A NUMBER OF REPORTS OF THE MILITARY'S UNHAPPINESS WITH THE EXTENT OF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGED BY THE ACTION OF THE CIVILIAN WING IN COMMITTING THE ARMED FORCES TO THE INGLORIOUS INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. IN REACTION TO ASAD'S OBSTRUCTIONISM THE BPS CONVENED AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF ITS 10TH NATIONAL CONGRESS IN LATE OCTOBER. REJECTING THE MILITARY'S CRITICISM OF THE CIVILIAN WING'S POLICIES, THE CONGRESS REPORTEDLY TOOK DECISIONS TO OUST ASAD AND HIS RIGHT-HAND MAN, CHIEF OF STAFF MUSTAFA TLAS, FROM THEIR POSITIONS, AND TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT FROM "GENUINE" BAATHISTS AND OTHER PROGRESSIVES (COMMUNISTS). BEFORE THE CIVILIANS COULD PUBLISH THE DECISIONS OF THE CONGRESS, ASAD MADE HIS MOVE.

3. NO FUNDAMENTAL POLICY SHIFT IS EXPECTED FROM THE ASAD TAKE-OVER. IT IS IN HIS INTEREST TO REMAIN A "BAATHIST", WHATEVER HIS PERSONAL BELIEFS. THE PRIMARY LESSON TO BE DRAWN IS THAT IN SYRIA THE ARMY IS STILL THE CENTER OF POWER. HOWEVER, IF -- AS WE SUSPECT -- ASAD HAS BEEN ABLE TO UNITE MOST OF THE ARMY BEHIND HIM UNDER THE STANDARDS OF SERVICE INTEREST AND OPPOSITION TO FANATIC BAATHISM, AND IF HE IS THE PRAGMATIST WE THINK HE IS, HE MAY IN TIME MOVE SYRIA A LITTLE CLOSER TOWARD THE OTHER RADICAL ARAB STATES AND ADOPT MORE FLEXIBLE

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AND RATIONAL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES.
BUFFUM

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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FILE DESIGNATION

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A-405

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

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OCT 26 2 52 PM 1970

Ed Roberts

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy BEIRUT

DATE: October 19, 1970

SUBJECT : Remarks of Ambassador Buffum Upon Presentation of His Credentials and President Frangie's Reply

REF :

Enclosed are copies of the text of the Ambassador's remarks upon the presentation of his credentials, and of President Frangie's reply.

The Ambassador's statement was carried in most Arabic papers and appeared also in the official National News Agency Bulletin. Of particular interest in President Frangie's reply is his recognition of the important contribution the American University of Beirut has made to Lebanon and the Middle East.

BUFFUM

Enclosures: *all m.m.*

1. Remarks of Ambassador Buffum Upon Presentation of His Credentials.
2. President Frangie's Reply.

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Drafting Date:

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BEIRUT A-405
Enclosure No. 1

Remarks of Ambassador Buffum Upon
Presentation of His Credentials - October 13, 1970

Mr. President:

It is indeed a great honor for me to serve as the envoy of the President of the United States to you and to the Republic of Lebanon. I take great pleasure in conveying his warmest wishes to you and your countrymen.

We Americans share a profound respect for the illustrious history and vital traditions of your country. For millennia Lebanon has been a major world crossroads for the exchange of ideas and trade. Its high regard for individual freedom and its historic role as a congenial home for many peoples of differing religions and philosophies have given it a unique importance.

My government and my compatriots highly esteem the friendly relations which exist between our two nations. It is my firm intention, Mr. President, to do all in my power to strengthen and deepen the special ties of friendship which link us. I particularly welcome the opportunity personally to join the large American community in Lebanon and the hundreds of thousands of Lebanese-Americans in the United States who form a living bond between our countries, two nations which share a common dedication to respect for human dignity, individual liberty and democracy.

I look forward, Sir, to a cordial and fruitful relationship with you, with the members of your government, and with the gifted people of this beautiful land.

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BEIRUT A-405

Enclosure No. 2

Remarks of President Frangie on Accepting Ambassador Buffum's
Letters of Credence (original in Arabic) - October 13, 1970

Thank you for your cordial remarks, in which I can sense your appreciation of the history of this country and of the values which Lebanon represents as a meeting point among nations. I welcome you as a representative of a great and friendly nation with which we have numerous ties-through the many Americans now resident in Lebanon as welcome guests and through the hundreds of thousands of emigrants of Lebanese descent who have enjoyed the hospitality of your country.

I would also like to pay tribute to the institutions you founded here, particularly the American University of Beirut which was established more than a century ago and which has rendered valuable services to Lebanon and the entire Middle East. We are proud that this university is a link in a unique university chain which demonstrates Lebanon's receptiveness to all types of cultures. Lebanon has been a crossroads of civilizations and is proud of its continuous effort to increase useful interaction among nations. We have always believed, moreover, that relations among peoples should be based on mutual respect and respect for the rights and dignity of man.

Hence the importance of the role which this country can undertake. Hence too the reason for our adherence to Lebanon's special role and our feeling-both as Lebanese citizens and as human beings-that we should preserve it. You are undoubtedly aware of this since you had been following the affairs of the Arab East as an expert. As such, you have taken positions, particularly concerning Lebanon, which deserve thanks.

On this occasion, I would assure you of our readiness to facilitate your mission so as to strengthen relations between our two countries. In reiterating my thanks, I would ask you to convey my sincere greetings and best wishes to His Excellency President Nixon.

Translation:

USIS:Edgard Khuri

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ACTION IO-15

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INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET BEIRUT 8623

REF: BEIRUT 7555, 8247

1. EX-PRESIDENT HELOU HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO HEAD THE LEBANESE UN DELEGATION. HE IS PRESENTLY IN ROME ON LEAVE AND INTENDS TO DEPART FOR PARIS TOMORROW, OCTOBER 6, AND WILL STAY AT HOTEL CRILLON. AN OFFICIAL CLOSE TO HIM THOUGHT THAT HELOU WOULD BE COMING TO NEW YORK AROUND THE 14TH OR 15TH OF OCTOBER BUT WAS NOT SURE. HE IS IN TOUCH WITH HELOU AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM US OF HELOU'S PRECISE TRAVEL PLANS AS SOON AS HE KNEW. EMBASSY PARIS MIGHT ALSO ASK HELOU IF THEY CALL ON HIM WHICH WE HOPE THEY WILL.

2. COMMENT. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT IN DISCUSSING HELOU'S ASSIGNMENT WITH THE EMBASSY THIS MORNING STRESSED HOPE THAT HELOU AS AN EX CHIEF OF STATE MIGHT BE GIVEN TREATMENT SOMEWHAT IN EXCESS OF THAT ACCORDED THE USUAL CHIEF OF DELEGATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT HELOU HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH AMERICANS HERE AND BELIEVED STRONGLY IN CLOSE LEBANESE/ AMERICAN RELATIONS. HE ASKED IF HELOU MIGHT POSSIBLY SEE PRESIDENT NIXON IN NEW YORK. WE EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT SUCH WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD BE IN NEW YORK ONLY LONG ENOUGH TO DELIVER ADDRESS. WE SUGGESTED THAT IF HELOU WISHED TO SEE RANKING OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON BEST TIME WOULD BE WEEK FOLLOWING OCTOBER 23. WE OF COURSE MADE NO COMMITMENT AS TO WHOM HE COULD SEE.

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3. HELOU WILL BE MAKING THE TRIP IN LIEU OF PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND FOR PRESIDENT FRANGIE. HE HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THIS EMBASSY AND IS INTERESTED IN STRENGTHENING US/LEBANESE RELATIONS. HE ALSO HAS BEEN AND PRESUMABLY STILL IS ANXIOUS TO HELP FURTHER OUR PEACE INITIATIVE ADMITTEDLY BECAUSE IT IS IN LEBANON'S INTEREST TO DO SO.

4. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED BY PRESIDENT FRANGIE AND THE GOVERNMENT WERE HELOU TO HAVE MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO WITH SUITABLE PUBLICITY. IT WOULD GIVE ADDED ASSURANCE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF OUR INTEREST IN LEBANON AND ALSO WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO OUR EVENHANDED POLICY BY BALANCING, TO SOME EXTENT MEETING PRESIDENT HAD WITH ISRAELI FON MIN GOLDA MIER. WE CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE SUCH APPOINTMENTS BE ARRANGED AND THAT HE BE GIVEN SUITABLE ATTENTION DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. WE FULLY REALISE AND WILL MAKE CLEAR TO THE GOL THAT HE CANNOT EXPECT TREATMENT ACCORDED TO CHIEFS OF STATE.
BUFFUM

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

SECRET BEIRUT 8343

EXDIS

ROME FOR SECRETARY

ROME TO BE DELIVERED TO ACTION OFFICE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT CALLED ME TO HIS HOUSE THIS EVENING TO GIVE ME RUNDOWN CAIRO CONFERENCE. ACTUALLY WHEN I ARRIVED LUCIEN DAHDAH, WHO WAS A MEMBER OF PRESIDENT'S ENTOURAGE AT CAIRO, WAS PRESENT AND GAVE ME FOLLOWING BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE.

2. HE EXPLAINED THAT WHEN GENERAL NUMEIRY'S MEDIATION COMMITTEE RETURNED TO CAIRO FROM AMMAN THEY WERE ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY CONVINCED THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH AND WAS DETERMINED TO LIQUIDATE THE FEDAYEEN. AFTER CONFERENCE DISCUSSED MEDIATION COMMITTEE REPORT IT TOO WAS MORE OR LESS CONVINCED THAT MEDIATION COMMITTEE'S CONCLUSION WAS CORRECT ONE. EMOTIONS WERE RUNNING HIGH AGAINST HUSSEIN AT THE TIME. DAHDAH REPORTED VIEWS EXPRESSED BY NUMEIRY IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WERE ACTUALLY MUCH WEAKER THAN VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED AT CONFERENCE. DAHDAH IS CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT NASSER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TONING DOWN HIS REMARKS. WITH CONFERENCE PRETTY MUCH CONVINCED OF HUSSEIN'S GUILT, ARAFAT APPEARED AT CONFERENCE AND OBVIOUSLY HAD EASY TIME ARGUING HIS

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OWN CASE. ARAFAT MADE STRONG IMPRESSION. HE ARGUED HIS CASE IN MELODRAMATIC MANNER. WEeping ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. AFTER ARAFAT'S TESTIMONY CONFERENCE WAS ON VERGE OF TAKING STRONG ACTION AGAINST HUSSEIN, INCLUDING BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, CUTTING ECONOMIC TIES, ETC.

3. AT THIS POINT, NASSER RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM HUSSEIN AND INVITED HIM FORTHWITH TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE. WHEN HE INFORMED THE CONFERENCE OF HIS INVITATION THERE WAS STRONG OPPOSITION TO HUSSEIN'S ATTENDANCE, PARTICULARLY FROM KHADAFFI OF LIBYA AND THE SOUTH YEMENI DELEGATE, BOTH OF WHOM REPRESENTED THE EXTREME WING OF THE CONFERENCE, AND ACCORDING TO DAHDAH, WERE QUITE IRRESPONSIBLE.

4. NASSER FINALLY CONVINCED CONFERENCE THAT THEY HAD TO ACCEPT HUSSEIN AS HE WAS HIS GUEST. AFTER HUSSEIN ARRIVED HE ARGUED HIS CASE FOR ABOUT AN HOUR WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM BOTH PRESIDENT NASSER AND KING FAISAL. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WAS HEATED WITH KHADAFFI AT ONE POINT DEMANDING HUSSEIN'S RESIGNATION. HUSSEIN AGREED BUT REQUESTED KHADAFFI TO ASK ARAFAT IF HE WANTED HUSSEIN TO ABDICATE. ARAFAT SAID HE DIDN'T. (IN RESPONSE MY QUERY, DAHDAH SAID ARAFAT GAVE NO REASON FOR HIS RESPONSE.) TOWARDS THE END OF THE MEETING ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN HAD GOT TO THE POINT OF FRIENDLY EXCHANGES AND THEIR RECONCILIATION (ONCE AGAIN) BROUGHT ABOUT WITH AN ABLE ASSIST FROM KING FAISAL. DAHDAH REPORTED THAT AT THIS POINT THEY EMBRACED EACH OTHER. PRESUMABLY IT WAS UNDER SUCH FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS WORKED OUT.

5. PRESIDENT FRANGIE ACCORDING TO DAHDAH WAS CONVINCED THAT NASSER WAS TRYING TO SUPPORT HUSSEIN THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE. THE HARSH TELEGRAMS WHICH NASSER SENT HUSSEIN WERE, ACCORDING TO DAHDAH, SENT NOT BY NASSER PERSONALLY BUT AT THE REQUEST OF THE CONFERENCE. HE FELT THAT WITHOUT NASSER AND ALSO KING FAISAL THE CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE GIVEN HUSSEIN SHORT SHRIFT. IN FRANGIE'S EYES, NASSER EMERGED AS THE BIG MAN OF THE CONFERENCE.

6. FRANGIE WAS PARTICULARLY UNIMPRESSED WITH KHADAFFI AND THE SOUTH YEMENI DELEGATE. STRANGELY ENOUGH BOTH HE AND DAHDAH THOUGHT NUMEIRY WAS OBJECTIVE AND SINCERE.

7. FRANGIE, ACCORDING TO DAHDAH, BELIEVED THAT ARAFAT EMERGED

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FROM THE CONFERENCE AS THE UNQUESTIONED LEADER OF THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND WOULD EVENTUALLY LIQUIDATE THE TWO PRINCIPAL EXTREMISTS, HABASH AND HAWATMI. DAHDAH REPORTED MANY OF THE EXTREMIST LEADERS HAD LEFT JORDAN FOR SYRIA AND IRAQ.

8. IT WAS PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S CONVICTION THAT BOTH ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN WERE SOMEWHAT NOW IN THE HANDS OF NASSER.

9. ONE LAST COMMENT. ACCORDING TO DAHDAH, FRANGIE IS FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT USG VIGOROUS DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER ACTION DURING THE CRISIS WAS MOST EFFECTIVE, PARTICULARLY IN ENABLING HUSSEIN EVENTUALLY TO CONFINE JORDAN CRISIS TO JORDAN.

10. COMMENT. THIS IS PRESIDENT FRANGIE'S FIRST CONFERENCE AS PRESIDENT OF LEBANON AND HIS IMPRESSIONS AS A RESULT MAY BE SOMEWHAT LESS CYNICAL AND LESS INFORMED THAN PERHAPS THEY SHOULD. WE WILL NOT TRY TO ANALYZE THE RESULTS--LEAVING THAT TO OUR BETTER INFORMED AMMAN COLLEAGUES--EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THE GOL DELEGATION APPEARS TO FEEL OUTCOME WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND ENCOURAGING. DAHDAH DREW OBVIOUS CONCLUSION THAT ALL DEPENDED ON HOW EFFECTIVELY AND FAITHFULLY ARAFAT AND HUSSEIN WOULD OR COULD IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT.
HOUGHTON

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 8325

EXDIS

REF: STATE 159037, BEIRUT 7927

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT SEPT 28 HE INDICATED GOL ASSESSMENT PROSPECTS FOR FEDAYEEN TROUBLE IN LEBANON AS RESULT JORDANIAN CRISIS REMAINS MUCH THE SAME AS REPORTED BEIRUT'S REFTEL. CONFIDANT HAD NOT YET BEEN INFORMED OF RESULTS CAIRO CONFERENCE AS FRANGIE ONLY ARRIVED BACK THIS MORNING. CONFIDANT IS SEEING HIM TODAY AND WE MAY HAVE MORE INFORMATION LATER.

2. AS STATED REFTEL, GOL SHARES DEPT'S CONCERN--AS DO WE--RE POSSIBLE INCREASED FEDAYEEN MOVEMENTS AND OPERATIONS IN LEBANESE TERRITORY. HOWEVER, AS REPORTED, GOL ALSO HAS SOME CONFIDENCE IT CAN HANDLE THE SITUATION. GOL'S CONFIDENCE BASED ON SAME FACTORS REPORTED REFTEL, I.E., ASSURANCES THAT UAR, SOVIET UNION AND SYRIA DOES NOT WANT REPETITION OF JORDAN CRISIS IN LEBANON. LEBANESE ALSO FEEL FEDAYEEN MAY NEED AT LEAST TWO WEEKS TO REGROUP AND TO DECIDE WHAT SITUATION IN JORDAN LIKELY TO BE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. LEBANESE ALSO HAVE REPORT THAT FEDAYEEN MAY TRANSFER HEADQUARTERS THEIR OPERATIONS FROM AMMAN TO DAMASCUS. IN VIEW FACT FEDAYEEN AND SYRIANS HAVE NOT ALWAYS SEEN EYE TO EYE, REPORT SEEMS TO US PROBLEMATICAL BUT CONFIDANT WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISMISS IT. BELIEVE LEBANESE ALSO FEEL UNCERTAINTY IN FEDAYEEN MINDS RE POSSIBLE USG INTERVENTION IN LEBANON MIGHT BE DETERRENT FACTOR AS OBVIOUSLY SUCH OPERATION EASIER FROM LOGISTICAL POINT OF VIEW TO STAGE IN LEBANON THAN JORDAN.

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FEDAYEEN AND PALESTINIAN SUPPORTERS IN LEBANON HAVE SO FAR CAUSED LITTLE TROUBLE AND SOME LEADERS HAVE INDICATED THEY DID NOT INTEND CAUSE TROUBLE "NOW". LEBANESE BELIEVE THEY HAVE TAKEN ALL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS THEY CAN. GOL I AM SURE ANTICIPATES ONCE JORDAN SITUATION CALMS DOWN THERE WILL BE INCREASED MOVEMENT FEDAYEEN TO LEBANESE TERRITORY FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

3. IT IS OF COURSE DIFFICULT TO GAUGE WITH ANY DEGREE OF ACCURACY LEBANESE WILL TO RESIST. CONFIDANT HOWEVER WAS CERTAIN (AND WE AGREE) THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE IS A MUCH TOUGHER INDIVIDUAL THAN WAS PRESIDENT HELOU. IT IS ASSESSMENT OF BOTH OF US THAT HE WILL NOT STAND IDLY BY WHILE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY IS JEOPARDIZED. FRANGIE HAS REPUTATION FOR MAKING HARD DECISIONS AND MAKING THEM QUICKLY. CONFIDANT MAINTAINED GOL WOULD DO UTMOST AVOID SHOWDOWN WITH FEDAYEEN BUT IF SITUATION BECAME INTOLERABLE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD FIGHT. LEBANESE ARMY IS ANXIOUS RECOUP PRESTIGE LOST IN LAST ELECTION, HAS TO SOME EXTENT SAME ATTITUDE AS JAA TOWARDS FEDAYEEN, AND ALSO NOT INTERESTED IN FEDAYEEN TAKEOVER. ONE HAS TO BE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE AND ACTION OF THE GENDARERIE IN SUCH A SITUATION. AS TO CAPABILITY ARMY TO HANDLE SITUATION GOL BELIEVES ARMY SHOULD HAVE MORE FIREPOWER IF IT IS TO MEET FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE BUT HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFIC WITH US AS TO WHAT IT HAS IN MIND.

4. COMMENT. BY AND LARGE WE GO ALONG WITH THE LEBANESE ASSESSMENT. AS STATED ABOVE, IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY HERE PROBABLY WILL INCREASE ONCE THE FEDAYEEN HAVE MADE UP THEIR MINDS WHAT POSTURE THEY WILL ADOPT TOWARD HUSSEIN. IT SEEMS TO US THAT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER THEY WILL PROBABLY BE TIED DOWN BY THE JORDAN SITUATION ALTHOUGH ONE CAN NEVER BE SURE. IF THEY DO INCREASE THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO TAKE THE SAME CAUTIOUS POLICY AND BE IN THE SAME SOMEWHAT EQUIVOCAL POSITION AS THEY HAVE BEEN TO DATE. IN WAKE OF JORDAN EMERGENCY, LEBANESE LEADERS WILL BE CHARY OF INCURRING THE CHARGES OF HOSTILITY TO THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT HAS JUST LEVELLED AGAINST HUSSEIN.

5. SHOULD THE FEDAYEEN HOWEVER TRY TO PULL A JORDAN IN LEBANON, WE BELIEVE THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD FIGHT. THEY CERTAINLY WOULD DO UTMOST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO AVOID SUCH A CONFRONTATION.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08325 282246Z

HOW UNSUCCESSFUL THEY WOULD BE EITHER IN AVOIDING CONFRONTATION OR IN SUCCESSFULLY MEETING ONE WOULD DEPEND A GREAT DEAL ON WHETHER NASSER REALLY DOES NOT WANT TROUBLE IN LEBANON. AS LONG AS NASSER IS FIRM ON THIS ISSUE, THE LEBANESE MOSLEMS ARE MUCH MORE APT SUPPORT GOVERNMENT AGAINST FEDAYEEN. SHOULD NASSER TACITLY OR PUBLICLY SUPPORT THE FEDAYEEN, THE PROSPECTS FOR LEBANESE SECURITY WOULD BE BLEAK INDEED.

6. IN CONCLUSION, IN EVENT FEDAYEEN DESIRE START TROUBLE IN LEBANON, LEBANESE SECURITY RESTS ON THREE ELEMENTS: (A) LEBANON'S RESOLVE AND CAPACITY TO DEFEND ITSELF; (B) GENUINE INTEREST OF USSR, UAR, AND TO LESSER EXTENT, THE SYRIANS IN STABILITY OF LEBANON. (SYRIANS INTEREST, IF THEY HAVE IT, PROBABLY EXPLAINED BY FEAR OF US, ISRAELI AND UAR REACTION SHOULD THEY INTERVENE) AND (C) GOL CONFIDENCE IN USG'S SUPPORT. POINT (C) DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNDERTAKING BY US TO INTERVENE BUT ARISES PRIMARILY FROM A FEELING OF CONFIDENCE WHICH LEBANESE GET IN KNOWING THAT THEY HAVE THE MORAL AND TO SOME EXTENT MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE USG. WE THINK THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE THAT SUPPORT NOW.
HOUGHTON

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07768 161021Z

19
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00

CCO-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-20 O-03 AID-28 RSR-01 /102 W

122485

O 161014Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 1673

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 7768

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS MESSAGE

1. USIS HAS RECEIVED FIRST PRESS QUERY ASKING FOR COMMENT ON "STRANGE" COINCIDENCE ARRIVAL NEW AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AMMAN ON EVE ANNOUNCEMENT FORMATION NEW JORDANIAN MILITARY CABINET. WE RESPONDED CONJUNCTURE SIMPLY FORTUITIOUS.

2. ANTICIPATE RAPID UPSURGE SPECULATION THIS LINE.
HOUGHTON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 722

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07697 141454Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O 141409Z SEP 70 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1650

S E I C R I E T BEIRUT 7697

EXDIS

FOR BRUBECK FROM AMBASSADOR BROWN

1. YOU HAVE MY ARRIVAL PLANS. NEWS WILL SPEED FAST. THEREFORE, THINK IT ADVISEABLE TO SET UP PRESENTATION CEREMONY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SUBJECT YOUR VIEWS, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THIS DOWN WITHIN HOURS OF ARRIVAL. SEE WHAT YOU CAN DO.

2. THERE WILL BE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF REVERBERATION TO ALL THIS. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF SMALL PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER PRESENTATION, GIVEN FACT THERE LARGE NUMBERS US NEWSMEN IN TOWN. IF SO, I COULD GIVE BRIEF STATEMENT BUT AVOID QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. OBJECT WOULD BE SIMPLY TO STATE THAT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAS ARRIVED IN TOWN DESPITE PROBLEMS JORDAN FACES. FONOFF SHOULD BE TOLD IN ADVANCE THAT WE PLAN SUCH CONFERENCE AND I WOULD INFORM KING OF IT. IMAGINE GOJ WOULD BE FAVORABLE.

3. WOULD ALSO LIKE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON ABOVE.
HOUGHTON

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SITUATION ROOM
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Department of State

SUMMARY

TELEGRAM

SECRET 113

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07637 111810Z

50 51
ACTION NEA-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 NSAE-00

PM-03 DODE-00 L-02 AID-12 MC-02 RSR-01 RSC-01 EUR-12

/079 W

091090

P 111625Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1627

SECRET BEIRUT 7637

LIMDIS

NEA/ARN FOR BUFFUM

REF: STATE 143708

1. WITH ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON, AND HIJACKING, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS ON REFTEL UNTIL NOW. WE MOST STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT DEPARTMENT SOMEHOW FIND MEANS OF MAINTAINING \$5 MILLION CREDIT FOR LEBANON. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NOT HAVING \$5 MILLION CREDIT TO OFFER FAR OUTWEIGH MODEST SUM INVOLVED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE GOL MAYNOT USE CREDIT BUT IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT REMOVE THEIR OPTION.

2. CARDINAL POINTS OF PRESIDENT-ELECT FRANGIE'S FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE FOR LEBANON TO BE AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO, AND TO RELY ON, WASHINGTON IN THE WESTERN WORLD, AND CAIRO IN THE ARAB WORLD. HE HAS MADE THIS CLEAR IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR, PARTICULARLY THE WASHINGTON PART, AND HAS TWICE BROUGHT UP WITH THE AMBASSADOR THE SUBJECT OF ARMS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE EXTENSIVE ASSISTANCE EITHER IN THE ECONOMIC OR MILITARY FIELDS.

3. IF WE GO TO HIM NOW OR TO PRESIDENT HELOU AND INFORM THEM THAT WE ARE NOT EVEN IN A POSITION OFFER A \$5 MILLION

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07637 111810Z

CREDIT, FRANGIE IS MOST CERTAINLY GOING TO INTERPRET OUR POSITION AS INDICATING LACK OF INTEREST BY THE USG IN LEBANON. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO EXPLAIN CONVINCINGLY WHY WE CANNOT MAINTAIN THIS MODEST CREDIT IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION MAKING POSSIBLE ALMOST UNLIMITED CREDIT TO ISRAEL AND THE RECENT UPI REPORT QUOTING CONGRESSMAN STRATTON AS STATING THAT ISRAEL HAS REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM US IN THE AMOUNT OF EIGHT HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS.

4. THE PROBLEM IS THAT FRANGIE, HELOU, AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, GENERAL NUJAIM, CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT THEY OBTAIN SOME ARMS AND THEIR OPTIONS FOR DOING SO ARE LIMITED. THE LIBYANS SEEM TO BE STALLING WITH THEIR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND THE FRENCH CERTAINLY CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO GIVE THE LEBANESE GENEROUS FINANCIAL TERMS. FRANGIE KNOWS THIS. HIS ONLY REAL ALTERNATIVES ARE US AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LATTER IS OFFERING EQUIPMENT FREE. IF WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO HELP THERE WILL BE STRONG PRESSURE ON FRANGIE TO ACCEPT RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE. WE FEEL UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD TURN TO THE RUSSIANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE REDUCING OUR MAP PROGRAM TO LEBANON BY \$30,000, ROUGHLY THE COST OF OUR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM. THE AMOUNT OF THE CREDIT AND THE MAP PROGRAM ARE SO PIDDLING THAT NO LEBANESE WOULD BELIEVE THAT WE COULD NOT FIND THE MONEY, PARTICULARLY A CREDIT IF WE WANTED TO. CONSEQUENTLY THEY WILL READ POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS AS REASON FOR OUR FAILURE TO MAKE ANY CREDITS AVAILABLE.

5. WE DO NOT WANT TO BE OVER DRAMATIC BUT WE MUST EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL BE UNABLE TO CONVINCE THE LEBANESE THAT THE LOSS OF THIS MILITARY CREDIT DOES NOT INDICATE THAT THE USG HAS NOT LOST INTEREST IN LEBANON. CONSEQUENTLY WE REPEAT THAT SOME MEANS MUST BE FOUND TO MAINTAIN THIS CREDIT.

6. AMBASSADOR PORTER READ THIS CABLE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE AND FULLY CONCURS, ADDING THAT HE FEELS THAT A USG REFUSAL TO HELP LEBANON IN MILITARY PROCUREMENT (REGARDLESS OF VALIDITY OUR DOMESTIC REASONS FOR SUCH A DECISION) WILL ALMOST SURELY TURN THEM IN TIME TO SOVIET PROCUREMENT SOURCES. HOUGHTON

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07519 091544Z

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ACTION NEA-15

1970 SEP 9 17 09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 E-15 DOT-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02
INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20
USIA-12 SY-03 SCSE-00 SCA-01 UPW-01 IO-13 SSO-00
NSCE-00 RSR-01 VOE-00 O-03 /151 W

070214

R 091416Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1594
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ROME

UNCLAS BEIRUT 7519

PLS PASS USINT CAIRO

REF: BEIRUT 7423

1. ON 9/8/70 AT 1605 ZEBRA, EMBASSY RECEIVED CALL FROM PERSON SPEAKING ARABIC STATING: "THIS IS TO INFORM YOU TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION, WE ARE ADDRESSING YOU IN THE NAME OF ONE OF THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. WE REQUEST THAT YOU STOP SENDING ARMS TO ISRAEL AND WE PROTEST AMERICAN POLICY. AS WE PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED, WE WANT ONE HALF MILLION DOLLARS, HALF TO BE DELIVERED IN AMMAN AND THE OTHER HALF IN BEIRUT OR WE WILL EXPLODE ANOTHER PLANE."

2. CALLER GAVE MESSAGE, WOULD NOT GIVE NAME AND HUNG UP IMMEDIATELY.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 526

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07485 081909Z

SUMMARY

SI
ACTION IO-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-13 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10
P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /123 W
..... 062855

O R 081805Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 1580
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7485

REF: BEIRUT 7444

PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT CALLED IN DCM EVENING SEPT 8. HE EXPLAINED THAT SUBSEQUENT THEIR CONVERSATION EARLY THIS MORNING HE HAD TALKED AGAIN WITH PRESIDENT HELOU URGING A MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION RE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. AS A RESULT GHORRA'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE ALTERED TO PERMIT HIS AGREEMENT TO POSTPONEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. CONFIDANT EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS DONE IN DEFERENCE TO CURRENT DIFFICULTIES USG WITH REGARD TO HIJACKING AND REQUIREMENTS USG POSITION PEACE INITIATIVE, ETC. GOL STILL WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH US SOME ALTERNATIVE TO RESOLUTION FOR HANDLING PROBLEM FUTURE ISRAELI ATTACK BUT CONFIDANT WAS VAGUE AS TO PRECISELY WHAT GOL HAD IN MIND.
PORTER

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SUMMARY

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07481 090049Z

84

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 E-15
DOT-12 AID-28 RSR-01 (SSR) W

----- 066531

R 081515Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1579
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USMISSION USUN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 7481

SUBJ: JORDANIAN-FEDAYEEN RELATIONS

1. YUSUF SAYIGH (PROTECT), CHAIRMEN OF PLO PLANNING COUNCIL, WHO ATTENDED RECENT EMERGENCY MEETING OF PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) IN AMMAN, TOLD EMBOFF SEPT 7 HE SEES LITTLE LIKELIHOOD PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WILL BE ABLE SETTLE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH GOJ AT THIS TIME. HE BELIEVES SINE QUA NON SETTLEMENT OF CONFRONTATION IS MAJOR REORGINIZATION OF GOJ TO ELIMINATE "NUMEROUS ANTI-PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS". PERSONALLY, SAYIGH BELIEVES KING LIKELY DRAG HIS FEET AS LONG AS POSSIBLE BEFORE "BOWING TO INEVITABLE". FURTHERMORE, SAYIGH FEARS LONGER THE PERIOD OF CONFRONTATION DRAGS ON THE STRONGER WILL BE THE INFLUENCE OF THE RADICAL PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS WHEN THE KING FINALLY CAPITULATES.

2. SAYIGH STATED HE FELT RECENT PNC MEETING HAD ACCOMPLISHED VERY LITTLE. IT WAS POORLY ORGANIZED, WITH NO STANDING COMMITTEES APPOINTED TO TACKLE SPECIFIC AGENDA ITEMS. MOST OF PROCEEDINGS DOMINATED BY SET SPEECHES ECHOING FAMILIAR PLATITUDES OF EACH PERSUASION WITHIN THE PNC. NEVERTHELESS, SAYIGH

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NCN 09-12/8: Per 11 8-4-2009

By P. H

NARA, Date 10-22-09

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07481 090049Z

CONCLUDED, THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT HAD MOVED ONE MORE STEP, ALBEIT A SMALL ONE, CLOSER TO UNITY. HE BELIEVES SUCCEEDING CRISES AND CLASHES WITH GOJ WILL FORCE PALESTINIAN LEADERS TO BURY MINOR DIFFERENCES FOR THE SAKE OF ACHIEVING

IMPORTANT GOALS OF THE RESISTANCE.

3. RE PFLP PLANE HIJACKING, SAYIGH STATED THESE OPERATIONS HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF RESISTANCE MOVEMENT FOR APPROVAL AS SPECIFIED IN COMMITTEE'S CHARTER. PERSONALLY HE DEPLORED SUCH ACT OF VIOLENCE THOUGH HE APPRECIATED NECESSITY FOR DRAMATIC ACTION TO BRING PALESTINIAN CAUSE BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. SAYIGH RELUCTANTLY OBSERVED THAT POSITION OF PFLP LEADER GEORGE HABASH WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED AS RESULT SUCCESSFUL HIJACKINGS.

4. HISHAM SHIRABI, ON LEAVE FROM GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WHO ALSO ATTENDED RECENT PNC MEETING, ENDORSED SAYIGH'S VIEWS RE CONTINUING FEDAYEEN-JORDANIAN DIFFICULTIES. SHIRABI COMMENTED THAT SINCE HIS LAST VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST A YEAR AGO, PFLP HAS GROWN FROM RELATIVELY SMALL RADICAL GROUP LIVING AND OPERATING ON SHOESTRING INTO LARGE DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION THREATENING FATAH'S DOMINANT POSITION WITHIN PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. HE OPINED THAT IF HABASH WERE MUSLIM HE WOULD NOW BE IN POSITION REPLACE ARAFAT.
PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07444 081059Z

1970 SEP 8 11 10

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ACTION IO-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-13 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00

NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 PM-05 NSC-10 SS-20 RSC-01

INR-08 P-03 PRS-01 L-04 H-02 RSR-01 /104 W

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O R 080950Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1568
USMISSION USUN NY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 7444

TO BE DELIVERED TO ACTION OFFICER AT 7:00 A.M.

REF: STATE 146349

1. EMBASSY HAS TAKEN UP MATTER OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT WHO HAS DISCUSSED MATTER WITH PRESIDENT HELOU. CONFIDANT INFORMED EMBASSY EARLY THIS MORNING THAT AMB. GHORRA HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MEET WITH BUFFUM AT 9 AM SEPTEMBER 8. HE IS TO SAY THAT GOL DOES NOT WANT TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE USG ON THIS ISSUE BUT MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT REPETITION OF ISRAELI ATTACK DOES NOT OCCUR. GOL IS PREPARED TO LISTEN TO ANY ALTERNATE COURSE WHICH USG CAN SUGGEST. IT COULD BE UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY USG, STATEMENT BY 4-POWERS OR STATEMENT BY SYG. ITS EFFECT MUST BE TO DETER FURTHER ISRAELI ACTIVITY OF THIS NATURE. WE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT WAS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY THAT ANY COUNTRY BE WILLING GIVE ASSURANCES AGAINST FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACK.

2. WE EXPLAINED TO CONFIDANT THAT AMONG PROBLEMS WHICH WE FACED IN HANDLING ISSUE WAS THERE WAS PROVOCATION FOR ISRAELI

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07444 081059Z

ATTACK. ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED RE CASUALTIES WHICH IT HAD SUFFERED DURING MONTH OF AUGUST IN BORDER AREA. WHEREAS WE DID NOT CONDONE ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON, NOETHELESS PROBLEM PUT US IN A DILEMMA AS WE COULD ALSO APPRECIATE THAT ISRAELIS COULD NOT STAND IDLY BY WHEN THEIR CITIZENS WERE BEING KILLED. CONFIDANT DID NOT DEMUR BUT REPEATED THAT NONETHELESS IN VIEW SITUATION LEBANON AND IN AREA AT THIS TIME AND WEKANESS OF LEBANESE ARMY, GOL HAD NO ALTER-NATIVE BUT TO ATTEMPT DEFEND ITSELF THROUGH INTERNATIONAL FORUM. HE ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH GOL APPRECIATES THAT IF WE HAD VOTED NEGATIVELY ON THE RESOLUTION SOME OF THE OTHER POWERS MIGHT HAVE ALSO, NONETHELESS GOL WOULD NOT FEEL THE NECESSITY FOR ADDITIONAL ACTION HAD US INDICATED FULL WEIGHT ITS SUPPORT BY VOTING FOR RESOLUTION.

3. COMMENT. GOL EXTREMELY NERVOUS AND AGITATED OVER THIS RECENT ISRAELI ATTACK. AS WE HAVE REPORTED GOL CONCERNED BY WEAKENED MORALE OF THEIR ARMY AS A RESULT OF INTERNAL ATTACKS ON IT, BY THE POSSIBILITY OF SYRIAN OFFER OF TROOPS, BY THE REACTION OF THE FEDAYEEN AND LEFTIST ELEMENTS. THESE WERE ALL PRESSURES WHICH EXPLAINED PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL RESOLUTION AND TO INSIST OF SOME FURTHER ACTION ALTHOUGH WITHIN LIMITS DESCRIBED ABOVE HE APPEARS SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE AS TO WHAT FURTHER ACTION NEED BE. WE STRONGLY HOPE THAT SOUHAIL CHAMMAS WILL BE WITH GHORRA WHEN HE TALKS WITH BUFFUM AS CHAMMAS WAS FULLY BRIEFED BY PRESIDENT HELOU BEFORE HE LEFT LEBANON MORNING SEPTEMBER 6 FOR NEW YORK.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 202

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07383 041538Z

45
ACTION NEA-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 IO-04 EUR-12 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-07

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 RSR-01 RSC-01 /064 W

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R 041525Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1521
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7383

LIMDIS

USUN FOR BUFFUM

REF: BEIRUT 7389

1. PRESIDENTIAL
CONFIDANT INFORMED BOTH DR. NOWAK, HEAD,
GERMAN INTERESTS SECTION, FRENCH EMBASSY, AND US THAT
PRESIDENT HELOU WILL NOT RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY. LAST
EVENING HOWEVER FRENCH AMBASSADOR DUFOURNIER WHO RECEIVED
INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE DEMARCHE SIMILAR TO OURS REPORTS A
MORE GUARDED RESPONSE FROM HELOU. DUFOURNIER REPORTS HELOU
AS TALKING VAGUELY ABOUT COMMITMENTS, AND PROMISES AND IMP-
LYING FRANGIE SOMEHOW NOT WHOLLY FREE MAN RE THIS PROBLEM.

2. WE INCLINED HOWEVER ACCEPT PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT'S
STATEMENT RE HELOU'S POSITION. PRESIDENT AND FRENCH AMB-
ASSADOR ARE NOT VERY GOOD FRIENDS AND WE SUSPECT FRENCH
AMBASSADOR MAY BE COLORING A BIT HELOU'S REACTION.
PORTER

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SUMMARY

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 DE RUEHBE 7399 2490729
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 Z P 060729Z SEP 70
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1529
 RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 RUEHDT/USUN NY
 INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSCKIKJGQ PRIORITY
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
 RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
 BT
 S E C R E T BEIRUT 7399

Sent SC

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT CALLED THIS MORNING 0800 LOCAL TO REPORT THAT ISRAELIS STILL OCCUPY LEBANESE TERRITORY. EMBASSY ARMY ATTACHE TELEPHONED LEBANESE ARMY DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS 0830 WHO STATED ISRAELIS HAD MOVED FROM KFAR HAMMAN AND WERE NOW IN KFAR SHUBA. (INTELLIGENCE WAS FROM DIRECT OBSERVATION.)
2. ACCORDING CONFIDANT, PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL THERE WAS FIERCE BATTLE BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND ISRAELIS IN KFAR HAMMAN. NO REPORT ON CASUALTIES BUT GOL FEARS CIVILIAN LOSSES INVOLVED. GOL HAS IMPRESSION ISRAELIS NOW BEGINNING WITHDRAWAL BUT ARE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS AS EARLY LAST EVENING (AS WE REPORTED) HAD SAME IMPRESSION WHICH PROVED TO BE FALSE.
3. NEEDLESS TO SAY LEBANESE ARE NOT VERY HAPPY WITH US AFTER LAST NIGHT'S SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE AND CONTINUANCE OF ISRAELI TROOPS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY MANY HOURS AFTER ISRAELIS HAD ASSURED US (AND ISRAELI UN DELEGATE HAD ASSURED SECURITY COUNCIL) OF THEIR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. FACT THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT GOL WORD RE CONTINUANCE PRESENCE ISRAELI TROOPS IN LEBANON HAS NOT HELPED.
4. IMPERATIVE THAT WE DO UTMOST ASSURE COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL NOW. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION WHICH WE CAN PASS ON TO GOL THIS REGARD.

COMCEN NOTE: MCN'S FOLLOW OOB 07 SEPT 70.

PORTER

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1970 SEP 6 11 26Z

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OO WTE12
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O 061046Z SEP 70
FM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO GENERAL HAIG
ZEM
CONFIDENTIAL WH01765

O 061009Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1532
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USUN NY

CONFIDENTIAL BEIRUT 7401

REF STATE 146325

LEB G-2 HAS RECONFIRMED AT 1145 LOCAL THAT
ALL ISRAELI INVADING FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN
FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY EFFECTIVE 0900 LOCAL.
THEY HAVE NOT RETURNED AND ALL IS QUIET IN THAT
AREA.

PORTER
270

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 6 AM 7:38

NNNN

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TELEGRAM

6H

SECRET 909

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07245 311807Z

54
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

007686

P R 311555Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1483
INFO USMISSION USUN NY

10 AUG 31 PM 5:28

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 7245

EXDIS

SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON

1. IN MY INITIAL MEETINGS WITH PRES.-ELECT FRANGIE, HE HAS STATED THAT HIS GREATEST CONCERN AS HE TAKES OFFICE IS PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON AND DANGER THIS CREATES BOTH FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AS WELL AS POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE ISRAELI RETALIATION IN THE SOUTH. FRANGIE EXPOUNDED FURTHER ON THIS THEME TO CHARLES MALIK IN LONG CONVERSATION AUG. 30 WHICH MALIK HAS JUST REPORTED TO ME.

2. MALIK STATES THAT FRANGIE HAS ENTRUSTED HIM WITH JOB OF COMING UP WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON MEETING FEDAYEEN PROBLEM. IN VIEW MALIK'S PAST UN EXPERIENCE AND HIS MANY CONTACTS IN US, FRANGIE HAS ASKED THAT HE PARTICULARLY FOCUS ON POSSIBILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY OF INTRODUCING UN PRESENCE ALONG LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER TO CONTROL GUERRILLA ACTIVITY.

3. I GAVE MALIK A RESUME OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF LEBANON CITING USG PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WITH ISRAELI AND ELSEWHERE ON BEHALF LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I POINTED OUT THAT PRES. HELOU AND I IN PAST THREE YEARS HAVE DISCUSSED QUESTION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON MANY TIMES. I REMINDED MALIK, (A) OF MANY REASONS WHY INTRODUCTION OF UN FORCE INTO LEBANON IN OTHER THAN CONTEXT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS UNREALISTIC, (B) THAT HELOU AND FRANGIE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THIS MATTER AND I WAS SURE HELOU COULD OFFER MUCH SENSIBLE ADVICE

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07245 311807Z

TO HIM. I POINTED OUT OBVIOUS LIMITATIONS ON POSSIBLE US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AREA.

4. I GAVE AS MY PERSONAL ADVICE TO BE PASSED ON TO FRANGIE THAT HE SHOULD: (A) APPOINT A TRUSTED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO COULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH PALESTINIANS; (B) EXAMINE PROCUREMENT NEEDS AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF LEBANESE ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES; (C) CONTINUE TO CONDUCT A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE ARAB WORLD (AS HELOU HAD SUCCESSFULLY DONE) TO MUSTER MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S POSITION. I DESCRIBED US M-41 TANK OFFER AND POINTED OUT RESTRICTIONS ON GRANT AID WHICH LIMITED USG CAPACITY TO ASSIST LEBANON FINANCIALLY OR MILITARILY.

5. BOTH MALIK AND I AGREED THAT LEBANESE POPULATION, CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM, HAD NEVER BEEN SO UNITED AGAINST FEDAYEEN AS IT WAS TODAY. PROBLEM WAS NOT ONE OF WILL BUT OF CAPACITY OF LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN ALONG LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. I ASSURED MALIK, AS I HAVE FRANGIE, THAT US WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF FEDAYEEN THREAT TO LEBANON BUT WE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONCEIVE OF A SOLUTION INVOLVING INTRODUCTION OF UN FORCES WITHOUT CREATING MORE DIFFICULTIES THAN SUCH A FORCE MIGHT SOLVE. I REFERRED INTER ALIA TO POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET VETO, OF THE LUKEWARM ATTITUDE TO UN INTERVENTION ON PART LEBANON'S OTHER WESTERN FRIENDS, AND OF THE HOSTILITY OF LEBANESE TO CONCEPT OF UN FORCE. I ADDED THAT IT WAS MANIFESTLY CLEAR THAT ANY UN FORCE INTRODUCED INTO LEBANON TODAY WOULD HAVE TO BE MILITARILY VERY POWERFUL IF IT WERE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. I DOUBTED THAT US OR UN WAS PREPARED TO PROPOSE SENDING IN AN INTERNATIONAL ARMY WHICH WOULD SOONER OR LATER HAVE TO FIGHT THE PALESTINIANS. I CONCLUDED THAT RAYMOND EDDE HAD BEEN TRYING TO SEEL HIS UN FORCE PROJECT TO A SOMEWHAT NAIVER FRANGIE - A PROJECT WHICH I HAD TRIED MANY TIMES TO CONVINCED EDDE WAS IMPRACTICAL AND DANGEROUS.

6. MALIK SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE INHERENT PROBLEMS. NONETHELESS HE REQUESTED I CABLE HIS REQUEST FOR WASHINGTON'S VIEWS WHICH HE WOULD WISH TRANSMIT TO FRANGIE. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT HIS REQUEST BE COMMUNICATED TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

7. COMMENT: I HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO USING DR. MALIK AS CHANNEL TO FRANGIE BUT I MUCH PREFER TO OPERATE IN DIRECT

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CHANNELS WE HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED WITH PRES.-ELECT. HOWEVER, SINCE MALIK IS IN THE ACT AT FRANGIE'S REQUEST I SEE NO OBJECTION TO ADVISING HIM OF OUR CURRENT VIEWS REGARDING STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO PROTECT LEBANON WHILE AT SAME TIME ASSURING THAT OUR VIEWS REACH FRANGIE DIRECTLY. I WOULD DOUBT THAT DEPT CAN COME UP WITH MANY NEW IDEAS. I CAN'T.

8. MALIK ASKED FOR A REPLY THIS WEEK. I TOLD HIM I STRONGLY DOUBTED REAPPRAISAL OF LEBANESE SITUATION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN SUCH A SHORT TIME.
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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 903

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07242 311714Z

47
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10
P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 ACDA-19 AID-28
RSR-01 /143 W

007323

R 311535Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1482
DIA WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
CINCSTRIKE/USCINCPACAFSA

- BEHR _____
- BERGSTEN _____
- CHAPIN _____
- HOLDRIDGE _____
- KENNEDY _____
- LEHMAN _____
- LORD/RODMAN _____
- LYNN _____
- MORRIS _____
- OSGOOD _____
- ROBINSON _____
- SAUNDERS _____
- SMYSER _____
- SONNENFELDT _____
- WAKY _____

W

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 7242

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER

1. DATT PERSONALLY REVIEWED LEB ARMY BORDER INCIDENT LOG COVERING PERIOD 21-27/1200 AUG 70. TOTAL OF 33 INCIDENTS RECORDED: CASUALTIES - 20 FEDAYEEN KILLED, 20 WOUNDED; 2 WOMEN WOUNDED; 1 LEB MALE KIDNAPPED. DAMAGES - 7 HOUSES BLOWN UP, 5 HOUSES DAMAGED.

A. FRIDAY 21/0700 FED SMALL ARMS FIRE INTO ISRAEL NEAR BIRANIT.

0800 IDF TANKS FIRED 11 SHELLS AGAINST KFAR CHOUBA. MINOR DAMAGE - NO CASUALTIES.

2300 NUMBER U/! SHELLS FIRED FROM LEB AGAINST MISGAV AM. - FIRE RETURNED. NO CAS. - NO DAM.

B. SATURDAY 22 MORNING IDF PATROL (11 SOLDIERS/HALF TRACKS) PENETRATED 200 METERS INTO LEB AT HOURATA (ARGUB).

1200 IDF ARTILLERY SHELLING AROUND KFAR CHOUBA/HAMMAM. 15 SHELLS. NO DAM. - NO CAS.

1230 LEB OBS HEARD EXPLOSION AND SAW SMOKE/DUST 3 KS SOUTH OF LABOUNI (ISR).

C. SUNDAY 23/0900 SKYHAWK FLEW OVER AADEISSE (1500 M ALT.)

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0910 TWO IDF PLANES OVER MARJAYOUN/HASBAIYA/RACHAIYA (10 MIN).

1500 LEB OBSERVED 12 IDF SOLDIERIS PENETRATE TOWARD MAROUN ARRAS. REMAINED EAST OF VILLAGE - 2 HOURS AND WITHDREW.

1530 IDF LIGHT OBS PLANE FLEW OBER YAROUN.

D. MONDAY 24/0130 MORTAR FIRE FROM LEB AGAINST KFAR JILAADI; FIRE RETURNED; NO CAS.

0200 IDF FORCE (2 SECTIONS) PENETRATED LEB; STRUCK VILLAGE YAROUN; BLEW UP HOUSE - KIDNAPPED HASSAN SALEH - WITHDREW; NO CAS.

0507 IDF ARTILLERY SHELLING EAST OF KFAR CHOUBA.

0645 IDF ARTILLERY SHELLING EAST OF KFAR CHOUBA.

0900/1330 IDF ARTILLERY FIRED 70 SHELLS ON CHEBAA (5 LANDED IN VILLAGE) - WOMAN WOUNDED.

1330 MORTAR FIRE FROM LEB ON JEBEL AR ROUS (GOLAN) AREA.

1335-1715 IDF FIRED 30 81 MM AND 120 MM MORTAR SHELLS AGAINST AREA SOUTHEAST KFAR CHOUBA; NO CAS. NO DAM.

1530 IDF FIRED 20 120 MM MORTAR SHELLS AGAINST WADI SLOUGI.

1800 IDF FIRED 50 MORTAR SHELLS EAST KFAR CHOUBA; NO CAS. NO DAM.

2030 LEB OBSERVED LARGE FIRE SOUTHEAST AR REJEEN.

2130 IDF FIRED 5 MORTAR SHELLS ON AL MARI; NO CAS.

230/2250 IDF FIRED 26 ART SHELLS FROM NUKHAILE AGAINST RACHAIYA FOUKHAR; SHELLS LANDED SOUTHWEST TOWN; NO CAS. NO DAM.

2130-25/0130 IDF FORCE (1 REENF CO) HELIPORTED INTO AREA SOUTH OF CHEBAA; STRONG ARTILLERY COVER; BLEW UP 6 HOUSES; DAMAGED 4; 1 CIV GIRL WOUNDED; 20 FED KILLED - 20 WOUNDED.

E. TUESDAY 25/MIDDAY IDF UNIT (2 TANKS - 6 HALF TRACKS) ENTERED LEBANON TO PT SOUTHWEST KFAR CHOUBA. FIRED 30 TANK SHELLS AGAINST RACHAIYA FOUKHAR/KFAR HAMAM; WITHDREW AFTER 1 1/2 HOURS; NO CAS NO DAM.

2100-WEDNESDAY 26/0100 IDF FIRED 30 IRT SHELLS ON AREA SOUTHEAST AND WEST OF KFAR CHOUBA AND KFAR HAMAM; NO CAS. NO DAM.

F. WEDNESDAY 26/0800-0825 IDF PATROL (2 TANKS - 2 HALF TRACKS) ENTERED LEB WEST OF LABOUNI; REMAINED 1 HR WITHDREW; NO ACTION.

1050 IDF PATROL (3 HALF TRACKS - 3 ARMORED CARRIERS) ENTERED LEB EAST OF DARJAT; FIRED 40 SHELLS AGAINST KFAR HAMAM/DFAR CHOUBA; WITHDREW 1215; NO CAS. NO DAM.

1245 FED FIRED 2 ROCKETS FROM SOUTH OF AL MARI; FIRE

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FROM MAISSAT RETURNED (TEN 120 MM SHELLS) AGAINST KFAR
CHOUBA; NO CAS. NO DAM.

1730 IDF PATROL (12 HALF TRACKS) ENTERED LEB NEAR MEIS
AL JEBEL - 500 METERS - STAYED ON ROAD; REMAINED ONE HALF
HOUR. WITHDREW TO MANARA.

2000 IDF FIRED 4 SHELLS ON KFAR CHOUBA; NO DAM. NO CAS.

2315 IDF FIRED MORTARS FOR 45 MIN AGAINST MANALET FARHAN
(NEAR RAMI); NO CAS. NO DAM.

2330 FED FIRED 10 MORTAR SHELLS FOR LEB; IDF RETURNED
15 SHELLS NEAR MARWAHINE; NO CAS. NO DAM.

G. THURSDAY 27/0930 IDF FIRED 14 MORTAR SHELLS (120 MM)
FROM HOUNINE AGAINST WADI SLOUQI.

2. DURING PERIOD UNDER REVIEW LEBANESE INFORMATION, WHICH
BASED ON OBSERVATIONS, INDICATES THAT OF 33 INCIDENTS, 6
WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FEDAYEEN (EXCLUSIVE OF MINE LAYING)
AND 25 TO IDF. ALTHOUGH LEBANESE INFO ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY
ADMITTEDLY INCOMPLETE, G-2 CONSIDERS ISRAELI RESPONSE OUT OF
PROPORTION TO WHAT IT UNDERSTANDS TO BE THE PROVOCATION. IN
THE MEANTIME G-2 SOURCE MAINTAINS GOL CONTINUING PATROL BORDER
IN EFFORT CONTAIN FEDAYEEN ACTION FROM LEBANON.

3. COMMENT: EMBASSY WISHES EMPHASIZE FOREGOING REPORT ONLY
COVERS INCIDENTS THROUGH NOON THURSDAY, AUGUST 27. HEAVY
FEDAYEEN AND IDF ACTIVITY ALONG MOST OF FRONTIER OVER THE
WEEKEND WILL BE SUBJECT NEW MESSAGE. RE G-2 VIEW THAT
IDF ACTION OUT OF PROPORTION TO FEDAYEEN
PROVOCATION, WE BELIEVE IT WORTH NOTING THAT, DESPITE LARGE
NUMBER OF DISTINCT IDF OPERATIONS RECORDED BY LEB MILITARY
AND IDF'S PROVEN CAPABILITIES, RELATIVELY LITTLE PROPERTY
DAMAGE AND FEW LEBANESE CASUALTIES HAVE OCCURRED. THE PRIN-
CIPAL EFFORT HAS BEEN PSYCHOLOGICAL, ADDING TO THE EXISTING
HIGH-LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE REGION.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 475

2

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06959 221255Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

081149

R 221105Z AUG 70
FM AMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1380
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME

SECRET BEIRUT 6959

EXDIS

REF: ROME 4586

1. WITH REGARD ROME'S COMMENTS REFTEL, TACTICALLY WE STILL CONSIDER COURSE OF ACTION SUGGESTED EMBASSY'S

6950 OFFERS BEST MEANS BREAKING CURRENT IMPASSE.

2. ITALIAN APPROACH COULD STILL EMPHASIZE TO SYRIANS STRENGTH THEIR BARGAINING POSITION. IF DECIDED GOI SHOULD APPROACH SYRIANS, APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE IN ROME IN VIEW US

INTERESTS SECTION ITALIAN EMBASSY DAMASCUS, SYRIANS LIKELY INTERPRET APPROACH THERE AS BEING DONE ON BEHALF USG.
PORTER

70 AUG 22 PM 12:53
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 979

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06950 211710Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

075168

R 211520Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1374
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
RUQVDA/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0803
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION NATO

70 AUG 21 PM 6:49

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 6950

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR; BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC; PARIS ALSO FOR OECD

SUBJ: EUROPEAN OIL SUPPLY; TAPLINE SITUATION

REF: STATE 135652

1. BASED ON OUR CLOSE FOLLOWING OF TAPLINE-SYRIA DISCUSSIONS
(AS WELL AS SYRIAN IPC NEGOTIATIONS IN 1966-67), APPROACHES
TO SARG BY MAJOR POWERS ALMOST CERTAIN FURTHER CONVINCE SYRIANS

THAT THEY WERE ON RIGHT TRACK IN HOLDING UP TAPLINE TO RANSOM.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

6002-4-8 Per 7/9/91
By P. H.

NARA, Date 10-22-07

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THEY OF COURSE ALREADY HAVE GRANDIOSE IDEAS ON VALUE OF LINE AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR PRELIMINARY DEMANDS FOR ADVANCE PAYMENTS IN 20-50 MILLION DOLLAR RANGE.

2. SINCE WE ARE WITNESSING A HIGH-STAKE BARGAINING CONTEST IN BEST MIDDLE EASTERN TRADITION, WE BELIEVE THAT, IN VIEW EXTENT SYRIAN DEMANDS, TAPLINE HAS HAD ONLY ONE REAL COURSE OF ACTION -- NAMEDLY, TO PLAY IT COOL AS THEY ARE NOW DOING AND TO AWAIT SOME SYRIAN MOVE. SO FAR, TAPLINE HAS BEEN TAKING INITIATIVE AND GETTING NOWHERE.

3. REAL STUMBLING BLOCK FOR TAPLINE AND ITS PARENTS HAS BEEN FAISAL'S ADAMANT REFUSAL TO PERMIT TAPLINE TO ENTER INTO GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIANS UNTIL LATTER REOPEN LINE, HIGHLY UNLIKELY SYRIANS WILL REOPEN LINE UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. TAPLINE OFFERS TO SYRIANS MADE SO FAR HAVE ONLY BEEN FOR AN ADVANCE PAYMENT. FAISAL AUTHORIZED EVEN THIS OPENING MOVE ONLY WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE AFTER CONSIDERABLE PERSUASION BY SARG MIN PET YAMANI. TAPLINE BEIRUT HAS TIME AND AGAIN MADE IT CLEAR TO US THAT THEIR OWNERS REGARD THEIR ASSETS IN SAUDI ARABIA AS BEING OF INFINITELY GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN PIPELINE ITSELF. THUS, OWNERS ARE GOING TO ABIDE BY KING'S WISHES EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE TO DO WITHOUT PIPELINE.

4. THUS, WE RECOMMEND THAT ANY EFFORTS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN POWERS TO GET TAPLINE REOPENED SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD FAISAL TO GET HIM TO BACK DOWN FROM HIS ADAMANT POSITION, AT LEAST FAR ENOUGH FOR TAPLINE TO GET AN IDEA THROUGH ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS TO LEARN JUST WHAT SARG DOES HAVE IN MIND.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 067

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06949 211747Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

075470

R 211515Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1373
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USINT CAIRO

SECRET BEIRUT 6949

EXDIS

REF: STATE 135651

SUBJ: EILAT-ASHQELON PIPELINE

IN INTEREST PROTECTING USG POSITION IN CURRENT PEACE EFFORT, WE
FEEL STRONGLY THAT WHOEVER TRIES TO PROMOTE USE OF EILAT-
ASHQELON PIPELINE TO RELIEVE OIL-SHORTAGE EUROPE SHOULD NOT
BE USG
PORTER

70 AUG 21 PM 6 49

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 861

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06398 050209Z

85
ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

089586

R 041115Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1228
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
USMISSION USUN

70 AUG 5 AM 8:17
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 6398

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T P A R A N B R D D T W O

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: NASSER'S RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE INITIATIVE

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT TOLD EMBOFF AUGUST 3 THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HAS RECEIVED WHAT HE BELIEVES TO BE AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF A STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY NASSER IN CLOSED SESSIONS OF UAR CABINET AND ASU. HELOU WAS PASSING REPORT ON TO USG AS REFLECTION OF SINCERITY OF EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE US PROPOSALS AND DETERMINATION TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY.

2. AS RELATED BY CONFIDANT, NASSER HAD SAID THAT FOR THE LAST 18 YEARS EGYPT AND HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE THREE YEARS SINCE THE JUNE WAR. THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE HAD BEEN DENIED THE FRUITS OF PROGRESS IN ORDER TO FINANCE THE WAR EFFORT, WHILE THE OTHER COUNTRIES HAD SHIRKED THEIR SHARE. IRAQ HAD DONE VIRTUALLY NOTHING. MONEY FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT WAS GIVEN FOR POLITICAL REASONS WITH POLITICAL CONDITIONS. TODAY, THERE IS CLOSE UNDERSTANDING AMONG UAR, LIBYA, AND SUDAN, BUT ONLY AT

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THE GOVERNMENT LEVEL. THE LIBYAN AND SUDANESE PEOPLE HAVE YET TO BE CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR AN ALL-OUT STRUGGLE. LEBANON IS BOUND UP IN FEAR AND UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE. THE SYRIAN REGIME IS AN ENIGMA AND CANNOT BE COUNTED ON. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE NOT FULFILLED PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE. ALGERIA HAS SENT PLANES AND THEN TAKEN THEM BACK. MOROCCO HAS PLEDGED MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT NEVER DELIVERED. EGYPT THEREFORE CONSIDERS ITSELF JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING A POLITICAL SOLUTION.

3 ACCORDING CONFIDANT, IN RESPONSE TO THIS PRESENTATION, CABINET AND ASU GAVE NASSER CARTE BLANCHE TO DO AS HE SEES FIT. HOUGHTON

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 020

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06382 032308Z

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ACTION SS-45

02
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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

081019

R 031630Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1220
INFO USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 6382

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: ROUNDUP WITH FONMIN MAJDALANI ON ME SETTLEMENT

1. FONMIN MAJDALANI REFLECTED TO ME TODAY GENERAL LEBANESE FEELING OF OPTIMISM ON CURRENT AREA DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE THOUGHT NASSER'S STRATEGY EFFECTIVE AND WISE AND SAID GO HAD NO DOUBTS OF UAR SINCERITY.
2. VMAJDALANI HOWEVER EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN THAT LEBANON MIGHT BE POSSIBLE VICTIM OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. HE FELT FEDAYEEN MIGHT BE INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED BY INABILITY TO BREACH ISRAELI DEFENSES ON JORDAN/ISRAELI BORDER AS WELL AS BY HUSSEIN'S MEASURES TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTION IN CEASE-FIRE SITUATION, CAUSING FEDAYEEN TO CHOOSE LEBANON AS REGION IN WHICH TO CONCENTRATE THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS WOULD RESURRECT THE OLD PROBLEMS OF THE PAST AND LEBANON WOULD HOPE SECURE RESTRAINT FROM ISRAEL IF SUCH A CONTINGENCY SHOULD DEVELOP. AS USUAL, HE ADDED, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO TURN TO THE US FOR SUPPORT IN INHIBITING ISRAELI REACTION TO FEDAYEEN PROVOCATION. IN THIS REGARD MAJDALANI FELT SYRIA STILL WAS MAJOR THREAT TO LEBANON. SYRIANS, TO AVOID ISRAELI RETALIATION, WOULD CONTROL

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FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WITHIN SYRIA DURING A CEASE-FIRE, BUT WOULD EXPORT THE PROBLEM TO THE LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER. HE DID NOT SEEM OVERLY REASSURED BY MY RESPONSE THAT LEBANON IN SUCH A SITUATION WOULD CERTAINLY GET STRONG SUPPORT FROM BIG-FOUR AND NASSER.

3. NONETHELESS MAJDALANI FELT THE ME WAS READY FOR PEACE. HIS ESTIMATE WAS THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IN JORDAN WAS ENDORSING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, ESPECIALLY THE WEST BANKERS. HE NOTED THAT ARAFAT SEEMED TO BE SENSING THIS PACIFIC MOOD AND WAS VACILLATING. HE ALSO FELT OIL-RICH STATES WOULD SOON BEGIN TO CONSIDER REDUCTION FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN - A FACT WHICH ARAFAT WELL KNEW. MAJDALANI MENTIONED REPORT JUST RECEIVED FROM LEBANESE AMBASSADOR JIDDA THAT RASHAD PHARAON HAD REEXPRESSED HIS PRIVATE DELIGHT AT PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND "AT NASSER'S WISDOM", AND HAD SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THE QUESTION OF SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN. MAJDALANI HAD FEELING THAT KUWAITIS WERE EQUALLY ENCOURAGED BY RECENT EVENTS AND WRE EAGER TO REDUCE THEIR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT.

4. MAJDALANI SAW LIBYAN FONMIN BUWAYSIR YESTERDAY (AUG 2). BUWAYSIR EXPRESSED NO RESERVATIONS TO GOL RE LIBYAN SUPPORT NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE US PEACE INITIATIVE. HE TOLD MAJDALANI THAT AT KADDAFI'S REQUEST HE SCHEDULED VISIT ALGERIA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO ARGUE FOR CHANGE IN ALGERIAN OPPOSITION TO SEARCH FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. (MAJDALANI SAID BOUMEDIENNE'S POSITION BASED SOLELY ON HIS DESIRE EMBRASS NASSER). UNFORTUNATELY TRIP TO ALGIERS WAS DELAYED BY SUDDEN CONVOCATION OF TRIPOLI MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF FRONT LINE COUNTRIES (AT WHICH LEBANON WILL NOT BE REPRESENTED).

5. MAJDALANI NOT PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE BLUSTER COMING FROM BAGHDAD AT THE MOMENT, HE WAS WORRED ABOUT SYRIAN REACTION AS IT AFFECTED LEBANON'S INTERNAL STABILITY. HE ADMITTED THAT UAR HAD REASSURED GOL THAT SYRIAN PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT NEED NOT BE VIEWED WITH MUCH ALARM MAJDALANI NONETHELESS FELT THAT SYRIA MIGHT BE UNABLE RESIST OPPORTUNITY TO CAUSE TROUBLE IN LEBANON EVEN IF NASSER HAD NOT IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR CONCERN. MAJDALANI SAID HE HAD SCHEDULED MEETING WITH SOV AMB AZIMOV TO URGE SOVIETS TO SEE TO IT THAT SYRIANS DID NOT EXPORT TROUBLE TO LEBANON DURING CRITICAL MONTHS AHEAD.
PORTER

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Department of State

with
TELEGRAM

SECRET 635

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 301637Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1182
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 6278

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JULY 30, I CALLED ON PRESIDENT HELOU AT HIS REQUEST. HIS MAJOR PREOCCUPATION WAS FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. HE UNHAPPILY RESIGNED TO FUAD CHAHAB'S RETURN TO POWER. END SUMMARY.

1. PRESIDENT HELOU SAID HE THINKS FUAD CHEHAB NOW HAS ENOUGH VOTES TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT BUT THE QUESTION

REMAINS WHETHER HE WILL ACCEPT. HELOU SAID THAT HE HAS STOPPED LISTENING TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE JUST VISITED CHEHAB WHEN THEY DISCUSS WHETHER OR NOT CHEHAB WILL ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY. CHEHAB TELLS ONE VISITOR ONE THING AND ANOTHER SOMETHING ELSE, NOT BECAUSE HE WISHES TO DECEIVE, BUT BECAUSE HE HIMSELF DOES NOT KNOW IF HE WANTS TO BE PRESIDENT. HELOU SAID THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS WHY CHEHAB SHOULD NOT AGREE TO BECOME PRESIDENT:
A) HIS OWN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY WILL BE AGAINST HIM;
B) THE ARMY WHICH HAS BEEN HIS MAIN SOURCE OF STRENGTH IS NO LONGER THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT ARMED FORCE IN THE COUNTRY;
C) HE IS NO LONGER YOUNG AND THE DEMANDS OF THE JOB ARE RIGOROUS -- PERHAPS MORE THAN HE CAN TAKE; AND
D) UNDERLYING OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IS THE DISLIKE OF

70 JUL 30 PM 9:17

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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3

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HIS FRENCH-BORN WIFE TO BE AGAIN IN A SITUATION WHERE SHE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE "DIRTY LEBANES".

2. OUTWEIGHING THESE NEGATIVE CONSIDERATIONS IS WHAT HELOU BELIEVES IS THE FACTOR WHICH WILL PROBABLY INDUCE CHEHAB TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY; IT IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH HE CAN ESCAPE THE VIOLENT CRITICISM OF HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES. EVEN IF HE SHOULD REJECT THE PRESIDENCY, THE CRITICISM WHICH HE FINDS INTOLERABLE WILL NOT STOP. CHEHAB THEREFORE HAS TWO OPTIONS: LEAVE THE COUNTRY OR BECOME PRESIDENT, IN WHICH LATTER CASE HE WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPRESS CRITICISM. CHEHAB'S ACCEPTING THE PRESIDENCY WILL NOT BE AN ACT OF COURAGE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY MOTIVATED BY FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF NOT ACCEPTING. HELOU ADDED THAT THE RECENTLY IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT ALSO HELP TO OVERCOME CHEHAB'S RELUCTANCE ACCEPT PRESIDENCY.

3. HELOU SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN WORKING TO MAKE CHEHAB'S ACCESSION TO POWER TAKE PLACE IN THE BEST POSSIBLE ATMOSPHERE. HE IS TRYING AT LEAST SAVE FACE FOR THE CHAMOUNIST OPPOSITION. HE COMPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR INFANTILE STUPIDITY MADE EVEN THIS DIFFICULT. FROM THE BEGINNING THE TACTICS OF THE OPPOSITION HAD HAD THE EFFECT OF GETTING CHEHAB'S BACK UP. HAD THEY REFRAINED FROM CRITICIZING HIM AND TREATED HIM AS ABOVE THE CONFLICT IN HIS CAPACITY AS "FATHER OF THE ARMY" AND A RESPECTED ELDER STATESMAN, HE ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE RENOUNCED ANOTHER TERM. ANOTHER MISTAKE ON THE ANTI-CHEHABISTS WAS TO THINK THEY COULD DEAL WITH JUMBLATT. IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE THEY HAVE TREATED WITH HIM AND THEY HAD NOT REALIZED HOW MUCH HIS "BRAIN" HAD DETERIORATED IN THE INTERIM. HE CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO BE A STABLE ELEMENT IN ANY ANTI-CHEHAB BLOC.

4. HELOU SAID HE IS HAMPERED IN HIS EFFORTS CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF RECONCILIATION BECAUSE HE HAS ALMOST NO LEVERAGE ON CHEHAB. CHEHAB PERSONALLY DETESTS HELOU AND KNOWING THAT HELOU IS NOT WORKING AGAINST HIM. HELOU SAID THAT CHEHAB IS TOO NARROW-MINDED TO BELIEVE THAT HE (HELOU) IS CAPABLE OF PUTTING HIS PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE AND SUPPORTING CHEHAB'S CANDIDACY BECAUSE HIS REASON DICTATES THAT CHEHAB, DESPITE ALL THE NEGATIVE CONSIDERATIONS, IS STILL THE BEST MAN FOR THE COUNTRY.

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Department of State

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5. I TOLD HELOU THAT A NUMBER OF CHRISTIAN LEADERS HAD TOLD ME THEY FEARED TROUBLES IN THE STREET FROM RIGHT AND LEFT IF CHEHAB WERE ELECTED. SAYING THAT I PERSONALLY FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE CHRISTIAN RIGHTISTS WOULD BE SO SHORTSIGHTED AS TO CAUSE TROUBLE, I ASKED HELOU'S OPINION. HE AGREED THAT TROUBLE FROM THE RIGHT WAS UNLIKELY. THERE WAS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE FROM JUMBLATT AND THE LEFT, BUT NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE US PEACE INITIATIVE HAD COME AT EXACTLY THE RIGHT TIME TO DIVIDE AND WEAKEN THE FORCES WHICH MIGHT RESPOND TO JUMBLATT'S ORDERS. NASSER STILL HAD PARAMOUNT INFLUENCE OVER THE LEBANESE MUSLIM STREET. HELOU SAID THAT STRANGELY ENOUGH, IF THERE WERE TROUBLE OVER CHEHAB'S ELECTION IT MIGHT COME FROM THE ARMY. ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SHUMAYYIT IS IN AN UNHAPPY AND DISGRUNTLED STATE OF MIND AND HIS REACTION TO CHEHAB'S ELECTION COULD HAVE UNPLEASANT OR EVEN DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES. (COMMENT: THE ONLY PREVIOUS INDICATION WE HAVE HAD OF SERIOUS TROUBLES BETWEEN CHEHAB AND SHUMAYYIT CAME TO US THROUGH A PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT. OTHER AVAILABLE INFORMATION WOULD CAST DOUBT

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SERIOUS RIFT BETWEEN THEM.)

6. IN CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, HELOU SAID THAT HE WAS NOW RESIGNED TO CHEHAB'S RETURN TO POWER BUT DID NOT WANT TO GIVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A SURE THING. CHEHAB HIMSELF DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY AND THE FINAL DECISION MAY WELL BE DETERMINED BY THE STATE OF HIS DIGESTION, BLOOD PRESSURE, OR WIFE'S HUMOR ON THE DAY HE MUST DECIDE. IF HE DECIDES NOT TO ACCEPT, THE TWO BEST MEN FOR THE JOB, PIERRE EDDE AND MICHEL KHOURY, MIGHT YET HAVE A CHANCE.

7. COMMENT: WE ASSESS THE SITUATION AS DOES HELOU. A BETTER CANDIDATE THEN CHEHAB COULD BE FOUND, BUT THE SELF-SERVING AND PERSONALLY AMBITIOUS OPPONENTS OF CHEHAB HAVE APPARENTLY DESTROYED THE CHANCES OF IDENTIFYING AND ELECTING A GOOD COMPROMISE CANDIDATE. CHEHAB (IF HE FINALLY ACCEPTS) IS NOW ALMOST SURE OF VICTORY.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 925

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06247 291904Z

42
ACTION SS-45

02/3

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 291631Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1174
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

..... 049227

SECRET BEIRUT 6247

State Dept. review completed

EXDIS

REF: PARIS 9919

SUBJECT: LEBANESE ARMS REQUIREMENTS

1. COUNSELOR FRENCH EMBASSY BEIRUT CONFIRMED STATUS MIRAGE DEAL AS DESCRIBED BY NANTEUIL REFTEL. ACCORDING COUNSELOR, ALL 11 (ONE OF PLANES CRASHED RECENTLY) TO BE RETURNED TO FRENCH AND WILL THEN BE INCORPORATED IN FRENCH AIR FORCE. MONEY FOR MIRAGES WILL BE PLACED IN ACCOUNT FOR LEBANESE USE IN FRANCE. COUNSELOR REPORTS THAT ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT PRECLUDE TANKS LEBANESE SEEM PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN ARMORED CARS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS.

2. COUNSELOR MENTIONED THAT LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER KHADAFI HAD ORIGINALLY OFFERED RUSSIAN TANKS TO THE LEBANESE. WHEN OFFER REFUSED HE AGREED TO PAY FOR FRENCH TANKS. COUNSELOR WAS NOT CLEAR AS TO STATUS DEAL BUT MAINTAINED THERE WAS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN LIBYAN DEAL AND RETURN OF M2RAGES FROM LEBANON TO FRANCE.

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3. DCM ADVISED FRENCH COUNSELOR THAT GOL WERE NOT TAKING THE M-41 TANKS.

PORTER

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FILE DESIGNATION

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RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

EXDIS

FROM : American Embassy, BEIRUT DATE: July 14, 1970

SUBJECT : Soviets Offer Support to Michel Khoury for Presidential Elections

REF :
EXDIS

Michel Khoury asked to see me urgently on July 9 to impart the following information.

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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

On the previous day, Soviet Ambassador Azimov had invited himself to lunch at Khoury's, together with the "No. 2 man" at the Soviet Embassy. The upshot of the meeting was that the Soviets suggested to Khoury that, if he elected to run for the Presidency, he would receive Soviet support. The news, judging from Khoury's agitated state, came as a bit of a shock to him.

POST ROUTING

TO:	Action	Info.	Initials
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DCM			
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FILE			

Azimov repeated his firm opposition to Fuad Chehab. He conceded that Chehab might win the election, but, in the process, would expose Lebanon to great danger. The Baath Party, the Palestinians, and other "progressive" groups - above all, Kamal Jumblatt's party - would react strongly to Chehab's return to power. And perhaps, added Azimov, so would the Chamounists, and the other strong rightist opponents of Chehab. Together, they could create serious trouble. Azimov stated that Nasser would no longer support Chehab (with strong implication that Nasser was obeying Soviet dictum in this regard). Also, the Iraqi Baath, the Palestinians, and the Lebanese progressive parties had all agreed to endorse Khoury.

Action Taken:
Date:
Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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Drafted by: AMB:DJPorter/mm
Drafting Date: Phone No.: Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

The Syrian Baath had informed the Soviets they had no objection to Khoury, although they would continue in the first instance to support the candidacy of Jamil Lahoud. Interestingly, Azimov also suggested that the Algerians would lend Khoury support. (COMMENT: We have known for some time that Algerian Ambassador Taleb has been actively opposing Chehab.)

Azimov gave high praise to Jumblatt, and said he would be the Soviet candidate if the Lebanese confessional system allowed. Since it was impossible, the Soviets, with Jumblatt's blessing, were turning to Khoury as the compromise candidate who would have the best chance of running the country in the current critical period. Azimov reminded Khoury that, as he had previously stated, the Soviets want Lebanon to remain as it is. He believed Khoury had the best chance of assuring this outcome.

Khoury said his response to Azimov was as follows: (a) He supports Chehab and will continue to do so until and unless Chehab declines. (b) Khoury would accept the role as a compromise candidate, but only if his support came from the traditional Lebanese political structure. (c) If he received such support, obviously he would not turn down support from Jumblatt and his allies - support which might make it possible for him to govern more effectively.

Khoury told Azimov that he was in no way a leftist. He supported the evolution of the Lebanese political system and was aware of the necessity for securing the cooperation of those political elements which would cause serious internal problems in Lebanon. But he could not accept the label of being Jumblatt's candidate. He thought Azimov got the point that such support now would be a real kiss of death.


He thanked Azimov for the "unsolicited gift", and, at Azimov's urging, said he would again discuss the matter with him in the light of ongoing political developments.

Khoury said I was the first and only person to whom he had imparted Azimov's approach, which, he added, was a total surprise. He said he wished the USG to be in no doubt about his reaction, or to think he was playing games. He conjectured that Azimov was attempting

to support him because he had in the past kept his lines open to the leftists and the Palestinians, and had maintained a continuing dialogue with them. Much of this had been an intellectual exercise on his part, but nonetheless he had established a personal rapport. Also, Khoury had no past political entanglements. He had always supported Chehab, but had never been in the Chehab apparatus, and often had been critical of it. He assumed that Jumblatt found him the "least objectionable" of the many potential candidates, and had so advised Azimov. Khoury was inclined to take Azimov's approach seriously, although he stated that he could not be sure how many other potential candidates had been similarly approached.

COMMENT: Khoury is a serious candidate. He and I have discussed the possibility many times in the past. He has always made totally clear that he would support Chehab, if Chehab had a chance. If he did not, Khoury's hat was in the ring as a compromise candidate. We have also had long philosophical discussions in recent weeks in which he has discussed the drawbacks of Chehab's candidacy. Khoury has shown grave ^{concern} about the second-rate politicians who surround Chehab, the use of the G-2 apparatus to bring him to and perpetuate him in power, and Chehab's inability to grasp the nature of the forces at work in Lebanon. There is no doubt as to Khoury's intelligence and dedication, or of his ability to analyze the flaws in Lebanese society. His problem is that he has no real political base (except his name), and he is not considered by most Lebanese to be the "strong personality" which seems to be the most wanted attribute in the next President. His candidacy is nonetheless one to be reckoned with. Perhaps Azimov had this in mind in making his approach. As Khoury said, "the man is far from stupid."


PORTER



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA-15

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H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01
SS-20 USIA-12 RSR-01 /134-W

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R 241616Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1139

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 6123

SUBJECT: SYRIA AND PEACE INITIATIVES

1. MAIOLINI, USINT DAMASCUS, TOLD US JULY 24 THAT SYRIANS HAVE BEEN APPARENTLY SHUT OUT OF ALL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EGYPTIANS AND RUSSIANS ABOUT PEACE INITIATIVES AND HAVE BEEN THRASHING AROUND SEEKING INFORMATION. HE BELIEVED THAT SUDDEN TRIP OF SARG MININT RABAH TAWIL JUST BEFORE NASSER'S 23 JULY SPEECH REPRESENTED SUCH AN ATTEMPT.

2. MAIOLINI ALSO REPORTS THAT SARG FONOFF OFFICIALS ARE NOW QUITE OPEN IN STATING THAT SYRIA WILL GO ALONG WITH ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT, A FEELING WHICH HIS DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES IN DAMASCUS SHARE.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 ACDA-19 NIC-01 MC-02 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03

RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 RSR-01 /137 W
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R 031303Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 984
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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State Dept. review completed

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
DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: ARE SYRIANS SEEKING SAM-3 MISSILES?

1. JOHN COOLEY, CS-MONITOR CORRESPONDENT BEIRUT (PROTECT) INFORMED US JULY 3 THAT HE HAD PICKED UP REPORT FROM DAMASCUS, ORIGINATING IN FEDAYEEN CIRCLES, THAT SARG ACTIVELY SEEKING SAM-3 MISSILES FROM SOVIETS CONSEQUENCE LAST WEEK'S ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN IDF AND SYRIAN FORCES.

2. WE NOTED TO HIM WE HAD NOTHING ON THIS REPORT ALTHOUGH WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IN VIEW SYRIAN FONDNESS FOR NEW GADGETRY, MILITARY OR OTHERWISE, AND SYRIAN DESIRE TO KEEP UP WITH UAR.

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
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 799

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05477 011646Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

001310

R 011614Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 968

SECRET BEIRUT 5477

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT HELOU ON LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE

1710
1 PM 4:18
SITUATION ROOM

1. IN OUR JUNE 29 MEETING, PRES. HELOU BROUGHT UP SUBJECT FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, HE SAID, MININT JUMBLATT HAD PUBLICLY SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST ELECTORAL SOLUTION WOULD BE TO RENEW HELOU'S MANDATE. AT THE TIME, IT WAS NOT TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY. HELOU SAID THAT IN A RECENT CONVERSATION, SOVIET AMBASSADOR AZIMOV HAD ASSURED HIM THAT JUMBLASS WAS MOST SERIOUS IN MAKING THE PROPOSAL. ACCORDING TO HELOU, THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS ALSO NOW BEGINNING TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE IDEA. (WE HAVE ALSO HEARD IT BROACHED, MORE OR LESS SERIOUSLY, BY POLITICAL LEADERS). THIS HAS COME ABOUT BECAUSE AS THE ELECTIONS APPROACH, PEOPLE ARE OBLIGED ACTUALLY TO FOCUS ON THE CANDIDATES RATHER THAN ON THE THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF A CHANGE OF PRESIDENT. VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES, HELOU SAID HIS MUCH-CRITICIZED RULE BEGINS TO TAKE ON A MORE FAVORABLE ASPECT. HE SAID THAT HE DOES NOT HIMSELF FAVOR THE IDEA BECAUSE HE FEELS A CHANGE OF PRESIDENT BENEFICIAL FOR THE STATE. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, HE WAS NOT BEING TOO FORCEFUL IN HIS DENIALS AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE WAS ORCHESTRATING THE "MANDATE RENEWAL" MOVEMENT TO GIVE HIM INCREASED LEVERAGE IN GOVERNING THE COUNTRY AS A LAME DUCK PRESIDENT AND TO INCREASE HIS INFLUENCE ON THE CHOICE OF A SUCCESSOR.

2. COMMENT: I BELIEVE HELOU SINCERE IN SAYING HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN ANOTHER TERM. HIS EAGERNESS AT THE PROSPECT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05477 011646Z

OF BEING RELIEVED OF THE BURDEN OF OFFICE IS EVIDENT AND GENUINE, AND EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION HE HAD TALKED AT LENGTH OF HIS PLANS AFTER LEAVING OFFICE. AT SAME TIME, HE IS ONLY HUMAN IN BOTH SEEING THE JOKE AND ACCEPTING THE FLATTERY OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH HIS RENEWAL IS BEING SERIOUSLY DISCUSSED. IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE HE HEARD SOME KIND WORDS, AND HE HAS BEEN ALMOST VILIFIED THROUGHOUT LEBANON'S MOST RECENT CRISES FOR ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROVIDE STRONG LEADERSHIP. END COMMENT.

3. HELOU SAID THAT CHEHAB IS STILL THE FRONT RUNNER BUT THAT HE IS BEGINNING TO WEAKEN. HE DOES NOT THINK CHEHAB CAN IMPOSE A SURROGATE SUCH AS ELIAS SARKIS. HELOU SAID THAT FOR THE MOMENT HE FAVORS CHEHAB -- THOUGH IN HIS HEART HE IS AGAINST HIM -- BECAUSE REASON STILL DICTATES THAT CHEHAB IS THE BEST MAN FOR LEBANON. THIS MAY NO LONGER HOLD TRUE, HE SAID, AS THE TIME FOR ELECTION APPROACHES.

4. HELOU SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE ELECTION WOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST, AT THE EARLIEST.
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05/10/1979



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TELEGRAM

SECRET 611

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05219 241601Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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O 241539Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0892

SECRET BEIRUT 5219

EXDIS

REF: STATE 99554

1) WE REALIZE SECRETARY MUST SPEAK TO MANY AUDIENCES IN PROPOSED DRAFT STATEMENT. WE DO NOT FEEL STATEMENT WILL SUCCESSFULLY REACH THE ARAB AUDIENCE.

2) THE CLAUSE AT END FIRST PARAGRAPH - QUOTE OR TO DISCUSS PUBLICLY OUR DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL UNQUOTE - WILL ONLY CONFIRM STRONG AND OFTEN-STATED ARAB SUSPICIONS THAT WE INTEND TO HELP ISRAEL UNDER THE TABLE.

3) IT IS THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE DECISIONS UNQUOTE WHICH WILL DRAW ARAB FIRE. THEY WILL ASSUME THAT USG HAS ALREADY MADE PRO-ISRAELI DECISION AND IS SIMPLY COVERING UP.

4) WE PROPOSE DELETING PHRASE QUOTED PARA 2 ABOVE, AND ENDING FIRST PARAGRAPH WITH QUOTE DETAILS OF THE POLITICAL INITIATIVE. UNQUOTE WE PROPOSE ADDING AT END OF SECOND PARA OF TEXT THE FOLLOWING: QUOTE - THE USG DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE ANY ACTION AT THIS TIME WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE THIS INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE THEREFORE MADE NO NEW COMMITMENTS ON AIRCRAFT SALES. UNQUOTE

5) WE BELIEVE THIS ADDITION WOULD EMPHASIZE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PEACE INITIATIVE. IT WOULD NOT FORECLOSE OUR FUTURE OPTIONS. IT WOULD PUT ARABS AND SOVS ON SPOT TO RESPOND, AND IT WOULD REDUCE OUR VULNERABILITY AS A PROPAGANDA TARGET. IT IS IN ANY CASE WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED ARAB LEADERS PRIVATELY. WE SHOULD GET SOME BENEFIT FROM IT.

PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 475

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 0513Z 221945Z

88-83
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

070569

R 221720Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0873
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 513Z

EXDIS

REF: PARIS 8130, STATE 94664

- 1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) ADVISED ME OVER WEEKEND THAT FRENCH HAD TURNED DOWN LEBANESE PROPOSAL SELL ITS MIRAGES TO LIBYA. HE GAVE IMPRESSION FRENCH REFUSAL WAS FINAL, ALTHOUGH HE ALLUDED AT ONE POINT TO LEBANESE DESIRE TRY AGAIN, AT LEAST TO DISPOSE OF MIRAGES WHICH STILL NOT PAID FOR.
- 2) CONFIDANT ADMITTED HELOU MIGHT RETURN FROM TRIPOLI MEETING WITH NEW INFORMATION. ALSO SAID HELOU INTENDING PRESS GADAFFI FOR MORE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON LIBYAN SUPPORT IN CASH OR KIND FOR LEBANESE ARMS ACQUISITION.
- 3) RE PARA 2, PARIS 8130. REASON FOR NOFORN CAPTION IN OUR 4660 IS THAT FRENCH HERE SHOW GREAT SENSITIVITY WHEN FRENCH-LEBANESE BILATERAL MATTERS DISCUSSED WITH US. WE THINK IT BETTER, AS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, TO AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO LEBANESE-US CONVERSATIONS RELATING TO FRENCH.
- 4) I ALSO PASSED TO CONFIDANT GUIDANCE SET FORTH STATE 94664. PORTER

NOTE: LIMDIS DELETED, EXDIS ADDED PER SS/O, MR. TWINING, 6/22/70.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NW409-12/13: Per 7th 8-4-2009
By P. H
NARA, Date 10-22-09 (P. 1061)

10 JUL 23 AM 9:29
ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 124

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05086 201417Z

47
ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 1046 W

060794

P 201320Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 856

S E I C R E T BEIRUT 5086

EXDIS:

DEPT PASS INFO CINCSTRIKE

REF: BEIRUT 4912 (NOTAL)

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG

SUBJ: SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN LEBANON

- 1) HAD FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION ON SUBJECT WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MORNING JUNE 20, IN WHICH HE REPORTED RESULTS RECENT MEETING WITH PRES. HELOU AND GEN. NOUJAIM.
- 2) LEBANESE OF COURSE INTEND DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE PROTECT CHANCERY AND PRIVATE AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS, HE SAID. APART FROM PROBLEM OF ADEQUACY OF AVAILABLE SECURITY FORCES TO DEAL WITH SPREAD-OUT AMERICAN PRESENCE, THERE WERE TWO IMMEDIATE CONCERNS: (A) QUESTION OF GETTING SOME WARNING TO ALLOW SECURITY FORCES TO TAKE PRECAUTIONARY MOVES, AND (B) NEAR-INDEFENSIBILITY OF CHANCERY BUILDING, BOTH IN TERMS ITS LOCATION AND ITS PHYSICAL LAY-OUT.
- 3) RE (B) I CONCURRED, AND EXPRESSED MY APOLOGIES THAT USG HAD FACED GOL WITH A DIFFICULT SECURITY PROBLEM. WE HAD BEEN PROPOSING FOR FIVE YEARS TO MOVE THE CHANCERY, BUT HAD NOT YET SUCCEEDED. WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS.
- 4) RE (A) - QUESTION OF WARNING - USG WOULD TRY TO ALERT GOL IN ADVANCE OF ANY DECISIONS WHICH MIGHT BE PRETEXT FOR VIOLENT

70 JUN 20 PM 12:15

SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05086 201417Z

PALESTINIAN ACTION, BUT IT DIFFICULT PREDICT WHAT MIGHT SET THEM OFF. I SAID I KNEW OF NO PROPOSED USG ACTIONS OR ANNOUNCEMENTS WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED BY REASONABLE LEBANESE TO BE PATENTLY PRO-ISRAEL, OR ANYTHING OTHER THAN A BALANCES APPROACH TO PEACE. BUT WE AGREED WE HAD TO BE PREPARED FOR CONTINGENCY THAT PALESTINIANS MIGHT REACT MOST VIOLENTLY TO SERIOUS PROSPECT OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH, AS CONFIDANT CONCURRED, LEBANESE MORALE WOULD AT SAME TIME BE BOLSTERED.

5) HE SAID ARMY, WITH CONCURRENCE INTERIOR MINISTER JUMBLATT, EXPECTED APPLY IMMEDIATE CURFEW AT FIRST INDICATION MAJOR TROUBLE. THE MOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL MEASURE, AND WOULD ALLOW AMERICANS TO BE CONCENTRATED AND PROTECTED IN EVACUATION ASSEMBLY AREA. HE ASSUMED US WOULD BE TAKING OWN MEASURES TO ALERT US FORCES FOR SWIFT EVACUATION, EVEN THOUGH HE THOUGHT REMOVAL OF US PRESENCE BEIRUT WOULD BRING SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, CREATING BAD PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCK AMONG LEBANESE, AND CORRESPONDINGLY EMBOLDENING FEDAYEEN.

6) I ASSURED HIM OF US DETERMINATION REMAIN IN LEBANON. WE WOULD KEEP AN EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC MISSION, EVEN IF NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS HAD TO LEAVE. WE EXPECTED RETAIN A CHANCERY MISSION COULD WORK IN. WE HAD NO INTENTION DESERTING LEBANON OR, FOR THAT MATTER, THE ARAB WORLD, AND WOULD RESIST EVACUATION UNTIL AND UNLESS THERE NO ALTERNATIVE. I ALSO DENIED EMPHATICALLY CURRENT RUMORS IN BEIRUT THAT AMERICAN COMMUNITY HAS BEEN PLACED ON EMERGENCY ALERT STATUS, AND SAID WE HAD TAKEN NO ACTIONS TO RESTRICT TOURIST TRAVEL OR TO WARN AMCITS, EXCEPT (TEN DAYS AGO) TO SUGGEST PRUDENCE IN THEIR MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES.

7) COMMENT: I ASSUME (A) EMB WILL BE ABLE HANDLE QUESTION OF ALERTING LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES ON BASIS OF CONTINUING STATE OF PLAY AS REPORTED BY DERT, AND (B) APPROPRIATE US MILITARY UNITS WILL BE IN POSITION TO MOVE QUICKLY, AND POSSIBLY ON SHORT NOTICE, BASED ON DEPT'S AND EMB-BEIRUT'S ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

W4

SECRET 436

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04992 181618Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

042369

P 181500Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 821

SECRET BEIRUT 4992

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 4990

02
70 JUN 18 PM 2:42
SITUATION ROOM

1. IN MY DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT DESCRIBED REFTTEL I AGAIN EXPRESSED MY CONCERN THAT LEBANESE SECURITY FORNS HAVE DEVELOPED NO EFFECTIVE CAPACITY FOR MOB CONTROL SHORT OF GUNFIRE. HE AGREED AND SAID HE HAD RECENTLY LOOKED INTO THE MATTER AND BEEN INFORMED BY ARMY THAT THEY HAD NOTHING EXCEPT VERY LIMITED AMOUNT OF TEAR GAS.

2. I SAID WE HAD MADE OFFERS IN THE PAST TO HELP WITH THIS PROBLEM AND THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE OR NO RESPONSE FROM SECURITY FORCES. URGED HIM DISCUSS MATTER AGAIN WITH GENERAL NOUJAIM AND ASK NOUJAIM TO APPOINT A QUALIFIED OFFICER WHO COULD SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY IN DISCUSSING THIS PROBLEM WITH EMBASSY. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW IN WHAT WAY WE COULD HELP BUT WE COULD CERTAINLY PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OR ADVICE RE PROCUREMENT SOURCES, ETC.

3. COMMENT: I DON'T KNOW WHAT WILL COME OF THIS BUT I HOPE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER INTERESTED AGENCIES WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF LEBANESE SHOW ANY INTEREST. IF USG HAS SURPLUS STOCKS OF TEAR GAS OR OTHER RIOT CONTROL MATERIAL, INCLUDING GAS MASKS, I RECOMMEND WE BE PREPARED TO OFFER IT TO LEBANESE ON AN URGENT BASIS.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 317

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04989 181442Z

28

47

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

041576

P 181330Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 819

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4989

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 4912

1) ON JUNE 17 I HAD SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ABOUT THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN BEIRUT. I SAID I REALIZED THAT WE HAD HAD ASSURANCES FROM LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ON PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN EVENT OF MOB ATTACK, BUT IN VIEW FAILURE OF SECURITY UNITS TO PROTECT BURNED-OUT JORDANIAN EMB, AND OBVIOUS DESIRE GOL TO AVOID CLASHES WITH PALESTINIANS, I WANTED CURRENT GOL VIEW WITH RESPECT TO PROTECTION AMERICAN CHANCERY AND PRIVATE INSTALLATIONS.

2) CONFIDANT SAID CIC GEN. NOUJAIM AND PRES. HELOU HAD REVIEWED MATTER CAREFULLY, NOUJAIM'S INTENTIONS WERE TO USE ARMY TO BLOCK OFF AND DIVERT MOB AT SOME DISTANCE FROM EMBASSY. IF MOB GOT OUT OF CONTROL, ARMY WOULD THEN SET UP PERIMETER DEFENSE AROUND AUB CAMPUS TO WHICH OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS WOULD WITHDRAW.

3) I SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO EVACUATE EMB AND LEAVE IT TO THE MOB. WE HAD TO HAVE COMMUNICATIONS AND PEOPLE WOULD BE IN BUILDING. I REFERRED TO "NO-SHOOT" ORDERS WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO GENDARMERIE AND POLICE AND SAID I HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS GENDARMES COULD HOLD BACK DETERMINED MOB IN VICINITY OF EMBASSY. CONFIDANT ADMITTED THAT IF LIVES WERE THREATENED IN EMB BUILDING, ARMY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO SHOOT. I QUESTIONED WHETHER, AT THAT LATE STAGE, ARMY WOULD BE ABLE DO SO.

4) IN ANSWER HIS QUESTION, I SAID WE HAD NO PERSONNEL TO

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04989 181442Z

DEFEND EMB. SUBSTANTIAL TIME WAS REQUIRED TO GET ADEQUATE US MILITARY FORCES TO AREA AND MEANTIME IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT USG HAD REASSURANCES THAT LEBANESE WOULD TRY PROVIDE ADEQUATE DEFENSE, EVEN IF THIS INVOLVED DRAWING ARMY AWAY FROM SOUTHERN BORDER. HE SAID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WOULD BE DONE, BUT I SENSED HE WAS SKEPTICAL WHETHER LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WOULD BE ADEQUATE FOR THE JOB, PARTICULARLY IN SITUATION WHERE ONE COULD PREDICT WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE THROUGHOUT LEBANON, AS RESPONSE, FOR INSTANCE, TO USG ANNOUNCEMENT RE PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL. HE PROMISED DISCUSS MATTER AGAIN URGENTLY WITH BOTH NOUJAIM AND HELOU AND TO GIVE ME AS HONEST AN APPRISAL AS HE COULD OF WHAT PROTECTIVE MEASURES GOL WOULD BE ABLE TAKE.

5) COMMENT: ABOVE GLOOMY ANALYSIS SUMS UP SERIOUSNESS OF OUR SECURITY PROBLEM HERE. ALSO POINTS TO NECESSITY OF AS FAST A REACTION TIME AS POSSIBLE IN EVENT US MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FOR EVACUATION. WE UNDERTAKING DETERMINED CAMPAIGN TO STIFFEN BACKBONE OF LEBANESE AND TO FORCE THEM TO WARN FEDAYEEN THAT NO FURTHER ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS WILL BE TOLERATED. I HAVE ALSO TALKED TO DEAN OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS (PAPAL NUNCIO) WHO HAS MADE STRONG PRESENTATION TO FONMIN CONCERNING ATTACK ON JORDANIAN EMB AND DEMANDING ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. CONSENSUS OF VIEWS OF MY AMBASSADORIAL COLLEAGUES IS THAT LEBANESE MAY BE INCAPABLE OF CONTAINING SERIOUS PALESTINIAN UPRISING WITHOUT EXPOSING BEIRUT TO FATE OF AMMAN. IN SAME BREATH, THEY ASK WHEN PHANTOM DECISION IS TO BE ANNOUNCED.

6) MANY AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY LEADERS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN TO ME IN LAST FEW DAYS, URGING THAT USG REJECTION OF PHANTOM SALE IS ONLY WAY TO AVOID MAJOR DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS HERE, AND EVENTUAL EVACUATION AMERICAN COMMUNITY. ALL COMMENT ON (A) THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF SECURITY SITUATION HERE, AS RESULT RECENT EVENTS IN JORDAN, AND (B) THE EROSION IN CONFIDENCE IN A LEBANON FACED WITH A SIMILAR PALESTINIAN THREAT. THEY CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY US INTERESTS IN ARAB MIDDLE EAST MUST BE GIVEN UP IN ORDER PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH A US SECURITY GUARANTEE FOR WHICH, AS VIEWED HERE, THERE IS NO NEED. THEY ALSO CANNOT COMPREHEND WHY, IN VIEW OF IMMINENT DANGER TO US INTERESTS, A WAY CANNOT BE FOUND TO REASSURE ISRAEL WITHOUT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04989 181442Z

71 AS ONE LONG-TERM RESIDENT IN ME PUT IT - THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHANTOM DECISION IS THAT IT WILL BE FIRST PUBLIC DECISION PRES. NIXON HAS TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF PLANES FOR ISRAEL. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IN THIS CONTECT THAT ARAB WORLD WAS WATCHING AND WAITING FOR THE DECISION.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 028

170 JUN 17 0419 : 43
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04912 170819Z

21
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

030800

P R 161714Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 802
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
CINCSTRIKE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4912

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (P A R A 5)

P A S S D E F E N S E A N D C A I R O

R E F : B E I R U T 4 8 4 6

1) WE ARE ENTERING INDETERMINATE PERIOD UNEASY TRUCE IN
LEBANON. FEDAYEEN ARE FEELING THEIR OATS AFTER JORDAN
"VICTORY" BUT ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT BULK OF FEDAYEEN
LEADERSHIP - WITH EXTREMIST GROUPS A BIG QUESTION MARK - ARE
NOT EAGER TO PRECIPITATE SHOWDOWN IN LEBANON. LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES ARE APPREHENSIVE AND REALIZE SITUATION IS EXPLOSIVE.
THEY DO NOT INTEND PROVOKE FEDAYEEN, AND AS RESULT WE CAN LOOK
FORWARD TO SITUATION IN WHICH INITIATIVE FOR ACTIVE GRAVITATES
SLOWLY INTO FEDAYEEN HANDS.

2) APART FROM LEBANESE DISINCLINATION START BLOOD BATH OR
CIVIL WAR, THERE IS CONCERN TO KEEP THINGS QUIET, TO ALLOW
UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BE CARRIED OUT IN RELATIVELY
UNTRoubLED ATMOSPHERE. WE RELIABLY INFORMED PRES HELOU ANXIOUS
HOLD ELECTIONS EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AFTER JULY 23 SO THAT
AT LEAST THIS ELEMENT OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY CAN BE
ELIMINATED. HELOU NOT SURE WHETHER HE CAN SUCCEED. IF HE

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DOES NOT, ELECTION STRUGGLE AND INCREASING LAME-DUCK STATUS OF HELOU WILL TEND TO OVERHEAT ALREADY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE, AND DIVERT LEBANON FROM THE PRIMARY THREAT - THE PALESTINIANS AND THE GROUPS SUPPORTING THEM.

3) WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED THE SEVERAL INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD UPSET DELICATE PALESTINIAN-LEBANESE STALEMATE AND START NEW TROUBLES HERE. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE WOULD BE ANNOUNCEMENT PHANTOM SALES TO ISRAEL OR OTHER US OVERT ACTION WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ANTI-ARAB OR ANTI-PALESTINIAN. OUR MAJOR CONCERN, IN TERMS OF SECURITY OF AMERICANS HERE, IS THAT LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES MIGHT BE LESS THAN VIGOROUS IN THEIR PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF A COUNTRY WHICH WAS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE OF ITS SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. WE DOUBT FOR INSTANCE THAT A DETERMINED DEFENSE OF THE CHANCERY BUILDING AGAINST MOB ATTACK WOULD BE MADE, WHEN THE LEBANESE KNEW INEVITABLE RESULT WOULD BE TO START AN AMMAN-TYPE BATTLE WITH FEDAYEEN.

4) IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ASSURANCES. THOSE WE HAVE FROM A VARIETY OF OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRES HELOU AND CIC GEN NOUJAIM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DEMAND SUCH ASSURANCES AND EMPHASIZE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY NEGLIGENCE ON PART SECURITY FORCES. THE FACT REMAINS THAT WE STILL HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE CAPABILITIES AND PERHAPS THE WILL OF LEBANESE SECURITY UNITS UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES.

5) WE ARE MAKING SECRET PLANS FOR AN IMPROVISED COMMAND POST WITH RUDIMENTARY COMMUNICATIONS WHICH WE CAN USE IF CHANCERY WERE DENIED TO US. AS SITUATION STANDS AT MOMENT WE BELIEVE DANGER IS NOT IMMINENT. IT COULD BECOME SO IN A FLASH IF PALESTINIANS FEEL THEY HAVE ADEQUATE PRETEXT TO MOVE.

6) FACT IS THAT AMERICAN COMMUNITY HERE HAS BECOME A HOSTAGE TO COURSE OF FUTURE EVENTS. WE CANNOT MOVE IT OUT BECAUSE THIS IN ITSELF WOULD DESTROY LEBANESE MORALE AND CONVINCE RADICAL PALESTINIANS THAT VICTORY WAS THEIRS. WE WILL KEEP DEPT CONTINUOUSLY INFORMED AS TO HOW WE SENSE CURRENT MOOD. THE UNIVERSITIES WILL BE RECEASSED IN TWO TO THREE WEEKS AND THIS WILL REMOVE ONE OF MORE DANGEROUS ELEMENTS. WE HOPE THINGS WILL CONTINUE TO EASE IN JORDAN WHICH SHOULD BRING SOME SURCEASE HERE, EVEN THOUGH IT WILL SOLVE NOTHING IN LONG RUN.

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04912 170819Z

7) IN MEANTIME, WE THINK SERIOUS THREAT WHICH EXISTED HERE
LAST WEEKEND HAS ABATED, AND THAT USG LEVEL OF ALERT FOR
EVACUATION CONTINGENCY CAN BE LESSENE. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR
THE SUPPORT WE HAVE RECEIVED.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 207

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04859 151929Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 151747Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 785
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN

019142
70 JUN 16 AM 8:31
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4859

EXDIS:

SUBJ: SITUATION IN LEBANON

1. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) TELLS ME (JUNE 15) THAT GOL FEELS JUNE 15TH WILL PASS WITHOUT SERIOUS INCIDENT AND THAT SITUATION FOR THE SHORT TERM IS SOMEWHAT EASED. HOWEVER, NOTHING HAS BEEN SOLVED AND THE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDAYEEN REMAIN.
2. MINISTER OF INTERIOR, JUMBLATT, WITH ARAFAT'S APPROVAL IS PUTTING INTO EFFECT TODAY THE GOL RESTRICTIONS ON CARRYING ARMS WITHOUT PERMITS AS WELL AS ON CROSS-BRODER FIRING INTO ISRAEL. QUESTION OF ARMS PERMITS HAS LITTLE MEANING. FEDAYEEN CAN AND WILL GET PERMITS FROM THEIR OWN LEADERS SO RESTRICTION IS MORE LIKELY TO AFFECT ARMED LEBANESE CIVILIANS. EVEN THIS WILL HAVE LITTLE APPLICABILITY SINCE CIVILIANS ONLY LIKELY TO BE CARRYING ARMS IF SITUATION BECOMES SERIOUS - AT WHICH POINT THEY WILL NOT BE QUESTIONED. ON QUESTION OF SHOOTING INTO ISRAEL, ARAFAT IS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING LEBANON'S DEMANDS. SAME IS NOT TRUE OF EXTREMIST GUERILLA GROUPS SUCH AS PFLP. HABASH HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE SUBJECT. HE WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO DO WHATEVER HE WISHES, UNLESS FEDAYEEN COORDINATION MEASURES BEGIN HAVE SOME REAL MEANING.
3. LEBANESE ARE SHOCKED BY STORIES OF DESTRUCTION AND DEATH COMING OUT OF AMMAN. IT OBVIOUS THAT GOL AND LEBANESE

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN09-12/14, Rev 8-4-2009
By P.H. NARA, Date 10-22-09 (P. 1062)

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04859 151929Z

SECURITY AUTHORITIES WILL GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID REPEATING THE AMMAN EXPERIENCE IN BEIRUT. QUESTION IS WHETHER DESTRUCTIVE INSTINCTS OF EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN WILL BE GOVERNED BY SIMILAR INHIBITIONS. INDICATIONS AT THE MOMENT ARE THAT FEDAYEEN DO NOT WISH TO OVERREACH THEMSELVES IN LEBANON, AT LEAST UNTIL THEY HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR GAINS IN AMMAN. UNLESS THINGS ERUPT AGAIN IN JORDAN, NEXT CRISIS IN LEBANON IS LIKELY TO DEVELOP FROM ISRAELI REACTION TO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH, WHICH GOL, DESPITE ITS BEST EFFORTS, WILL NOT BE ABLE TOTALLY TO CONTROL.

4. I EXPLAINED USG EFFORTS KEEP ISRAEL RESTRAINED, AND ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING OF LEBANESE SITUATION. GOL GRATEFUL OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS, HE SAID, BUT HIS ATTITUDE RE LEBANESE ABILITY TO APPLY RIGOROUS CONTROL MEASURES ON FEDAYEEN WAS ONE OF REALISTIC DUBIOUSNESS.
PORTER

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1970 JUN 15 17 16Z

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04842 151531Z

53 40
ACTION NEA-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 RSR-01 RSC-01 /041 W

017668

R 151350Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 778

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4842

LIMDIS

FOR SAUNDERS, NSC, WHITE HOUSE

1) PROF. A.J. MEYER LEFT HAND-WWRITTEN LETTER TO BE POUCHED TO YOU. I HAVE DECIDED (WITHOUT HIS PERMISSION) SEND IT BY CABLE BECAUSE IT MAKES SO MUCH SENSE AND BECAUSE OF TIME FACTOR. TEXT FOLLOWS:

2) QUOTE: - I HAVE JUST COMPLETED FIVE-DAY STOPOVER BEIRUT, AND AM ABOUT GO ON TO JIDDA FOR DISCUSSIONS ON SAUDI ARABIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN. SINCE THINGS BEIRUT ARE SO DISMAL, I HAVE DECIDED WRITE YOU NOW INSTEAD OF AWAITING COMPLETION TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

3) QUOTE: - IN MORE THAN 20 YEARS OF WORKING WITH ME, I HAVE NEVER FELT SO LOW. US INTERESTS OF ALL KINDS ARE IN REAL JEOPARDY AND (FOR THE FIRST TIME) ONE CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY OF WIDESPREAD PHYSICAL VIOLENCE TO AMERICAN CITIZENS RESIDENT IN AREA. DAMAGE TO OIL FACILITIES, CANCELLATION OF ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS OF SEVERAL KINDS AND FURTHER INTERRUPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US WILL CERTAINLY BE CONCOMITANTS OF FURTHER DISINTEGRATION OF US-ME RELATIONSHIP.

4) QUOTE: - THE PALESTINIANS TO WHOM I HAVE TALKED (GUERILLAS AS WELL AS THOSE NOT INVOLVED IN THE MOVEMENT) REMAIN IN A "SAMSON" MOOD AND ARE FAR MORE CONCERNED WITH DESTRUCTION THAN WITH PROPOSING POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS. THESE PEOPLE, HOWEVER, ARE THEMSELVES CONCERNED WITH SOV PENETRATION AND RESIDUAL RESULTS OF THE DISORDER NOW SPREADING THROUGH JORDAN. THEY REALLY DO NOT WANT WHAT IS HAPPENING TO CONTINUE - BUT PREFER

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TO GO ON RATHER THAN ACCEPT STATUS QUO. THE LATTER TO THEM REPRESENTS JOINT CREATION OF ISRAELI "HAWKS", A US DEDICATED TO FINANCING ISRAEL'S EXPANSIONIST MILITARY ADVENTURES, AND THEIR OWN (LARGELY INEFFECTUAL) ARAB LEADERS. THEY ARE REALLY BITTER, AND INCREASINGLY DESTRUCTIVE.

5) QUOTE: - I AM CONVINCED THAT FOR US TO INCREASE ISRAEL'S OFFENSIVE CAPACITY DRAMATICALLY AT THIS JUNCTURE -BY PROVIDING MORE PHANTOMS - WOULD SERVE NOBODY'S INTEREST. A NEW ANNOUNCEMENT OF DELIVERY OF SUCH WEAPONS COULD WELL SET OFF A MASSIVE ANTI-MAERICAN REACTION AND BLOOD BATH. IT WOULD MAKE ARABS PUSH HARDER THAN

EVER ON SOVS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH LONG-RANGE OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY. IT WOULD STILL VOICES OF MODERATE ARABS, OF WHICH THERE ARE MANY. IT COULD INCREASE FLOW OF ARAB OIL MONEY TO THE GUERILLAS AND REVOLUTIONARY ARAB STATES. AND ISRAELI WOULD GAIN ONLY A SHORT-TERM INCREASE IN THE EXTENT OF ITS ALREADY MASSIVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER ITS NEIGHBORS.

6) QUOTE: - I AM ALSO CONVINCED EVEN MORE FULLY NOW OF THE OBVIOUS - THAT ISRAEL IS FAR FROM BEING IN ANYTHING RESEMBLING REAL JEOPARDY, ATTACKS OF REAL CONSEQUENCE ON TARGETS WITHIN ISRAEL REMAIN OUT OF QUESTION FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE. COMMANDO RAIDS ACROSS CANAL AND GUERILLA ATTACKS IN NORTH WILL CONTINUE. BUT CRUSHING BLOWS, OR DAMAGE, OF CONSEQUENCE TO ISRAELI CITIES AND FACTORIES, REMAINS OUT OF QUESTION.

7) QUOTE: - FOREGOING ADDS UP TO THE SUGGESTIONS WHICH BY NOW HAS BECOME EVIDENT - THE US SHOULD UP ARRANGEMENTS FOR MORE PHANTOMS UNTIL MORE DIPLOMATIC MEASURES HAVE BEEN TRIED. THESE LATTER SHOULD HOPEFULLY BEGIN TO BRING IN PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES OF BELLIGERENT ME NATIONS, THE SOVS, AND OUR NATO PARTNERS. IF WEAGREE TO PROVIDE PHANTOMS NOW, WHILE ISRAEL STILL DOES NOT NEED THEM, CHANCES OF BRINGING OFF NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE MADE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE. AND ONE COULD PUSH THE RUFRINET GN PROVIDING EGYPT WITH MORE EFFECTIVE, AND LONGER RANGE, STRIKING POWER - WHICH THEY SO FAR HAVE NOT DONE.

8) QUOTE: - OBVIOUSLY ABOVE SUGGESTIONS RUNS COUNTER TO ARGUMENTS OF THOSE NOW PUTTING PRESSURE ON US CONGRESSMEN, WHO IN TURN

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ARE DOING SAME TO WHITE HOUSE. SOMEHOW THESE WELL-INTENTIONED LLEGISLATORS HAVE TO BE CONVINCED THAT ISSUE TODAY IS NOT ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL AT MOMENT, BUT THE MUCH MMORE FUNDAMENTAL ONE OF WHETHER A SERIES OF MULTI-LATERAL MISCALCULATIONS (BY ISRAEL'S LEADERS, THE USG, THE PALESTINIANS, AND SEVERAL ARAB STATES) WILL MOVE THE WORLD'S LAO SUPER-POWERS NEARER TO A REAL CONFRONTATION. I STILL DO NOT BELIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS OUT OF QUESTION. BUT TO DELIVER PHANTOMS NOW COULD WELL MAKE IT SO.

9) QUOTE: - FORGIVE PREACHING TONE THIS MEMO. IT IS WRITTEN IN HASTE AND AS I SAID, I AM REALLY DEPRESSED. ALL THE BEST. A.J. UNQUOTE.
PORTER

NOTE: AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0752
INFO USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4784

EXDIS

1. IN MY SOMEWHAT DISCOURAGING TALK WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT THIS MORNING WE REVIEWED POSSIBILITY OF US INTERVENTION IN A DETERIORATING LEBANESE SITUATION (SEPTEL). ALSO EXPLORED OTHER POSSIBILITIES.

2. HE DID NOT FEEL THAT A UNEF FORCE WOULD BE ABLE TO CALM SITUATION UNLESS IT WERE VERY LARGE OR BACKED UP WITH PROMISES OF INTERVENTION BY MAJOR POWERS. HE REPEATED THAT HELOU DID NOT FEEL THAT HE COULD REQUEST UNEF FORCES WITHOUT ASSURANCES OF FAVORABLE RESPONSE, E G WITHOUT RESIGNATION OF GOVT IN ANY CASE.

3. WE ALSO DISCUSSED QUESTION OF WHETHER USG PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT INITIATIVE COULD INFLUENCE EVENTS. HE BELIEVED THAT, IF US NOW PREPARED COME UP WITH PROPOSALS WHICH NASSER COULD ACCEPT, SITUATION IN LEBANON AND JORDAN COULD BE STABILIZED. HE SAID HE WAS "90 PERCENT" SURE THAT NASSER STILL WAS THE KEY TO THE SITUATION, IF HE COULD REASSERT LEADERSHIP BY ASSURING AN HONORABLE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO REST OF ARAB WORLD. HOWEVER, A COMPROMISE US PROPOSAL WHICH WAS LESS THAN EMBATTLED ARAB LEADERSHIP COULD ACCEPT WOULD PROBABLY DO NO GOOD AND PERHAPS GREAT HARM. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE DISCUSSING MATTER URGENTLY WITH NASSER BECAUSE TIME WAS INDEED SHORT.

4. I ASKED WHAT IF THE US ALSO PROVIDED MODEST REASSURANCES TO

ISRAEL RE AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF PEACE INITIATIVES?

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HE RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE GOOD, BUT WAS PERHAPS ACCEPTABLE SO LONG AS OUR PEACE PROPOSALS COULD BE ACCEPTED BY ARAB WORLD. HE REALIZED WE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TIE THE TWO MATTERS TOGETHER. COMMENT: LEBANESE ARE OF COURSE GRASPING AT ANY STRAW WHICH WOULD REDUCE TENSIONS HERE, AND CONFIDANT'S VIEWS MAY BE TOO OPTIMISTIC. ON OTHER HAND, WHILE THE PALESTINIANS MIGHT REACT STRONGLY AGAINST PROPOSALS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, LEBANESE AND OTHER MODERATE ARABS WOULD HAVE THEIR MORALE AND BACKBONE STRENGTHENED. I AM NOT SURE I TOTALLY AGREE WITH CONFIDANT'S VIEWS, BECAUSE IT SEEMS IMPROBABLE AT THIS POINT THAT USG COULD PUBLICLY ENUNCIATE DETAILS OF A SETTLEMENT WHICH ON THE FACE OF IT NASSER COULD ACCEPT. HOWEVER, CONFIDANT'S VIEWS ARE WORTHY OF NOTE AS THEY RELATE TO LEBANESE SITUATION. I WILL TRY TO GET HELOU'S PRIVATE VIEWS ON MY NEXT VISIT.

5. I ALSO THROW OUT FOR THE THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION QUESTION OF WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT START DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIERS. THIS MAINLY

DEPENDS ON WHETHER AND WHEN WE DECIDE HUSSEIN HAS WON OR LOST. LEBANESE BELIEVE HE HAS SUFFERED ALMOST TOTAL DEFEAT. I REALIZE ALL THE PITFALLS, AND FACT THAT WE MIGHT DESTROY THE MORE MODERATE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP IF THEY ACCUSED OF RECEIVING OUR EMBRACE. BUT WE COULD PERHAPS STRENGTHEN MODERATES BY A QUIET ATTEMPT TO TALK TO THEM, THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY OR A NON-OFFICIAL

AMERICAN CONTACT IN FIRST INSTANCE. THEY ARE NOW A STATE WITHIN A STATE, IN TWO COUNTRIES, AND THEY ARE BEING CAPTURED BY LEFTIST GROUPS WHICH HAVE THE EVICTION OF USG AS A PRIME OBJECTIVE. I WISH I HAD SOME CLEAR IDEAS AS TO HOW TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM. IT CAN ONLY BE DONE GRADUALLY AND QUIETLY, AND WE MAY HAVE TO DEFEND BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND HUSSEIN IN THE PROCESS.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04775 131403Z

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010353

O 131249Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0748
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4775

EXDIS

REF: STATE 92628

SUBJ: CONTINGENCY PLANNING - LEBANON

1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT INFORMED ME THIS MORNING (JUNE 13) THAT LEBANESE BELIEVE WEEKEND SHOULD BE QUIET, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF NO PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS. OF COURSE THE EVOLVING SITUATION IN JORDAN WILL ULTIMATELY DETERMINE ACTIONS FEDAYEEN HERE, AND THINGS COULD SUDDENLY CHANGE.

2) FOR LONGER RUN, LEBANESE ANXIETY CONTINUES. THEY FEEL LEFT IS IS GAINING GREATER INFLUENCE IN PALESTINIAN ACTIONS AND THAT MODERATE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP IS NOT ABLE HAVE MAJOR INFLUENCE ON EVENTS. THE BURNED-OUT JORDANIAN EMBASSY BUILDING HERE ATTESTS TO THIS FACT.

3) LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES UNDERSTANDABLY TRYING DESPERATELY AVOID PRECIPITATING SHOOTING CONFRONTATION WITH PALESTINIANS. JUMBLATT HAD ISSUED NO-SHOOT ORDERS WITH REGARD YESTERDAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS, AND FEDAYEEN TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO BREAK THROUGH CORDON TO SACK JORDANIAN EMBASSY. GOLHOPES THIS WILL HAVE RELEASED SOME PENT-UP PALESTINIAN EMOTIONS, BUT FEELS SURE THEY WILL BUILD UP AGAIN TO POINT OF EXPLOSIVE PRESSURE. AND OF COURSE INITIATIVE REMAINS WITH FEDAYEEN, SPECIFICALLY ITS MOST EXTREME ELEMENTS.

4) LEBANESE HAVE AGAIN REASSURED US THEY WILL DEFEND AMERICAN LIVES, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL UNITS OF THINLY-SPREAD LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES WILL PUT UP DETERMINED RESISTANCE.

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5) THERE STILL UNEASY STALEMATE BETWEEN LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES AND BULK OF PALESTINIANS WHO KNOW FEDAYEEN COULD ALSO SUFFER GREATLY IN A CONFRONTATION. BUT WITH CURRENT WAVE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM THAT EXISTS, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO AVOID INCIDENTS WHICH MIGHT SPARK AN EXPLOSIONGL AT THAT POINT LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WILL CERTAINLY JOIN THE FIGHTING (IN FACT, THEY MAY BE GREATEST DETERRENCE TO FEDAYEEN EXTREMISTS) AND LEBANESE WILL FACE PROSPECT OF CONFSSIONAL WAR. LEBANESE DO NOT SEE HOW THEY CAN EXTRICATE THEMSELVES FROM SUCH A SITUATION WITHOUT INTERVENTION - ABOVE ALL THAT OF USG.

6) ON OTHER HAND, LEBANESE DO NOT WANT FEDAYEEN TO THINK GOL HAS LOST ITS NERVE. THEY STRESS THAT RADICAL FEDAYEEN OBJECTIVE IS TO REMOVE AMERICAN PRESENCE FROM LEBANON AND THAT ANY INDICATION THAT AMERICANS WERE BEING FRIGHTENED OFF WOULD EMBOLDEN FEDAYEEN HASTEN OUR DEPARTURE. ABOVE ANALYSIS IS THAT OF PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT AND I MUST GENERALLY CONCUR.

7) QUESTION OF TRAVEL AMCITS TO LEBANON POSES HARD DILEMMA FOR ME. I RECOMMEND AT MOMENT THAT WE DO NOTHING PUBLICLY TO DISCOURAGE TRAVEL OR INDICATE OUR CONCERN ABOUT SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN LEBANON. THERE IS VERY LITTLE TOURIST TRAVEL TO LEBANON NOW, EXCEPT ON PART LEBANESE-AMERICANS WHO IN MOST CASES ABLE TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES. THE ITINERANT AMERICAN POPULATION IS LARGELY BUSINESSMEN, AND THEIR NUMBERS NOT LARGE. OUR PROBLEM IS LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICAN RESIDENTS HERE, WHICH WILL IMPROVE SOME WHEN SCHOOLS CLOSE IN TWO WEEKS. I ALSO THINK THE GRAPEVINE WARNING SYSTEM WILL REDUCE ITINERANT TRAVEL HERE TO A TRICKLE IN VERY NEAR FUTURE. OF COURSE I AM ALSO INFLUENCED BY BAD EFFECT SUCH AN AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HAVE ON MORALE PRES. HELOU AND REST OF OUR LEBANESE FRIENDS. I THEREFORE COME DOWN ON THE SIDE OF HOLDING OFF FOR A WHILE LONGER IN RESTRICTING TRAVEL.

8) RE SIXTH FLEET. I REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT MIGHT BE TO INVOLVE FLEET IN LEBANESE SITUATION, BUT I AM REASSURED THAT IT IS ON ALERT AND CAN BE USED IN EXTREMIS. WE MAY NEED IT. CONFIDANT ALSO INFORMED ME THAT HELOU, PERHAPS TAKING NOTE OF MY CAUTIOUS REMARKS REPORTED BEIRUT'S 4721, DOUBTS WHETHER IN LAST ANALYSIS US WOULD USE SIXTH FLEET TO INTERVEN, OR HELP STABILIZE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I SAID US MUST BE PREPARED TAKE STEPS PROTECT ITS NATIONALS BUT THAT IT IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT TO DISCUSS WHAT USG ROLE COULD BE IN QUESTION OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN LEBANON.

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CONFIDANT SAID HELOU NONETHELESS WANTS TALK ABOUT MATTER FURTHER AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME. HOPEFULLY ADDED THAT PERHAPS SIXTH FLEET ROLE IN PROTECTING US NATIONALS MIGHT ALSO SERVE PROVIDE SOME PROTECTION TO LEBANON. HE ALSO QUERIED ME ABOUT 82ND AIRBORNE ALERT.

9) I SENT WORD TO HELOU URGING THAT HE OR PRIMIN KARAME MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT ATTEMPT SOOTHE SITUATION. CONFIDANT

SAID THEY HAD BEEN CONSIDERING ALL POSSIBILITIES BUT HAD NOT DEVELOPED FORMULA WHICH THEY THOUGHT WOULD BE HELPFUL. KARAME, HE ADDED, WAS NOT SHOWING MUCH BACKBONE. PORTER

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

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O 131115Z JUN 60
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0746
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECRET BEIRUT 4771

EXDIS

REF: STATE 91817

1) APPRECIATE DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS. PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT TOLD ME THIS MORNING (JUNE 13) GOL COULD NOT UNDERSTAND CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESSURE ON SOUTHERN BORDER, IN FACE OF OBVIOUS PROBLEMS FACING LEBANON. TWO MORE LEBANESE KILLED YESTERDAY (HE DID NOT HAVE DETAILS) IN AREA WEST OF HASBANI.

2) THIS WAS CREATING REAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN MINDS GOL LEADERSHIP, PARTICULARLY HELOU, WHO BEGINNING LOSE FAITH IN US CAPACITY (OR PERHAPS WILLINGNESS) CONTROL BORDER SITUATION.

3) IN THIS CONNECTION WE SHOULD BRACE OURSELVES AND PERHAPS ISRAELIS AS WELL TO FACE FACT THAT LEBANESE ARE NOT GOING TO BE ABLE APPLY THEIR PROMISED RESTRICTIONS ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ON JUNE 15. THIS WOULD SURELY LEAD TO INCIDENTS WHICH COULD QUICKLY ESCALATE. WE HAVE TO RECONCILE OURSELVES TO THIS UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH.

4) TEL AVIV 3060 JUST RECEIVED. WE WILL QUIETLY TRY GET LEBANESE ARMY TO CONSIDER "COORDINATION," BUT DOUBT THEY CAN RUN RISK OF DOING SO, GIVEN PRESENT TEMPER IN LEBANON. ONLY SURE ANSWER IS FOR ISRAELI PATROLS TO STAY OUT OF LEBANON.
PORTER

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ACTION SS-45

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O 121430Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0716
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

70 JUN 12 PM 2:49
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 4721

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 4682

JOINT/STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJ: SIXTH FLEET - LEBANON

1) WE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON SECURITY SITUATION HERE. IT IS DANGEROUS BUT LEBANESE AUTHORITIES BELIEVE DAY WILL PASS PEACEFULLY. BIG PROBLEM IS LACK OF DISCIPLINE AMONG EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS WHICH COULD TOUCH OFF CONFRONTATION WITH LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES AND POSSIBLY CIVILIAN POPULATION. THE INFECTION FROM AMMAN HAS REACHED PALESTINIANS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS HERE.

2) SITUATION SUFFICIENTLY UNSTABLE THAT WE BELIEVE USG MUST BE ABLE REACT QUICKLY TO SUDDEN DEVELOPMENTS. I RECOMMEND THAT NEAREST SIXTH FLEET UNITS BE ALERTED AND BE READY TO MOVE. THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO PUBLICITY. THIS COULD ADVERSELY INFLUENCE SITUATION. AFTER WHAT HAPPENED IN AMMAN WE SIMPLY CANNOT PREDICT WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN LEBANON.

3) I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED RE SIXTH FLEET READINESS AND TIME IT WOULD TAKE GET HERE.

4) I JUST SAW PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT ABOUT LEBANESE SITUATION. IF IT DETERIORATES AS IT DID IN AMMAN, CONFIDANT SAYS HELOU WOULD ASK FOR SIXTH FLEET INTERVENTION IF HE THOUGHT USG RESPONSE WOULD BE FAVORABLE. I SAID WE SHOULD THINK NOW ONLY

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IN CONTEXT OF PROTECTION AMERICAN LIVES WHICH WOULD BE MISSION OF JP FORCES, IF ALL OTHER SOLUTION FAILED. I REMINDED HIM THAT SIXTH FLEET DID NOT HAVE LARGE TROOP CONTINGENT. CLOSEST TROOPS WOULD HAVE TO FLY IN FROM EUROPE OR CONUS AND WE COULD NOT COUNT ON THIS AS PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY.

5) HELOU'S FEELING, ACCORDING CONFIDANT, IS THAT IF SITUATION GETS OUT OF CONTROL IN LEBANON AND US DOES NOT INTERVENE, THIS WILL BE END OF BOTH LEBANON AND US PRESENCE IN ARAB WORLD. HELOU WELL AWARE OF ALL THE DRAWBACKS OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION. REALIZES IT WAS NEXT TO WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEM. WORST WAS DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON AND EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON REMAINING MODERATE ARAB STATES, AS WELL AS US INTERESTS.

6) HELOU ALSO WORRIED ABOUT SYRIAN INTERVENTION ON BEHALF PALESTINIANS IF CIVIL WAR ERUPTED. I SAID I THOUGHT SYRIANS HAD HEALTHY RESPECT FOR POSSIBLE ISRAELI INTERVENTION IN THIS CASE, BUT I OF COURSE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. CONFIDANT SAID SYRIANS COULD INVADE LEBANON FROM THE NORTH WHERE ISRAELIS COULD NOT GET TO THEM. I WONDERED IF SYRIANS WERE PREPARED GO THIS FAR. HELOU BELIEVES THEY ARE, SAID CONFIDANT.

7) WE HAVE SOLEMN ASSURANCES FROM LEBANESE LEADERSHIP INCLUDING CIC GEN. NOUJAIM, THAT THEY WILL DO EVERYTHING PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY. QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY HAVE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. I THINK WE MUST ANTICIPATE SOME INCIDENTS IN BEIRUT WHICH COULD LEAD TO SHARP DETERIORATION. I HOPE I AM WRONG, BUT USG MUST PLAN ACCORDINGLY. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S PRELIMINARY THINKING THIS SUBJECT. I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH CONFIDANT OR HELOU TOMORROW MORNING (JUNE 13).

8) ALSO, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY UNEF INTERVENTION, PERHAPS USING PART OF CYPRUS FORCE. HELOU DOES NOT BELIEVE ANY ARAB STATE COULD BE OF MUCH HELP. NASSER WANTS TO HELP, BUT HIS INFLUENCE GREATLY LIMITED, AND LEBANON CERTAINLY WISHES AVOID INVITING IN UAR ARMY (EVEN IF NASSER WOULD BE PREPARED SEND IT).

9) HELOU FEELS THAT, AT THIS MOMENT, ANY US ACTIONS TO WARN

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ITS CITIZENS AWAY FROM LEBANON, OR TO START EVACUATION, WOULD GIVE FEDAYEEN COURAGE TO PRESS THEIR ADVANTAGE, TO ULTIMATE END OF ELIMINATING US PRESENCE HERE.

10) REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE TO MILITARY COMMANDS.
PORTER

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SECRET 062

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04682 111619Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P 111525Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 694
TEL AVIV 2454

125527

70 JUN 11 4:57
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 4682

EXDIS

SUBJ: SITUATION IN LEBANON

1) WE CANNOT RULE OUT THAT EVENTS IN JORDAN WILL HAVE OVERWHELMING AND SUDDEN INFLUENCE ON LEBANESE SITUATION. AT MOMENT PALESTINIANS AND THEIR ALLIES IN LEBANON ARE QUIET BUT THEY ARE ALMOST BOUND GIVE VENT TO THEIR FEELINGS IF FIGHTING IN JORDAN CONTINUES. WE BELIEVE FEDAYEEN DO NOT WISH TO START A SECOND FRONT, BUT PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS MIGHT EASILY GET OUT OF CONTROL.

2) WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS THAT DEMONSTRATIONS PLANNED FOR TOMORROW (JUNE 12) BUT WA OPTIMISTIC THEY WILL NOT BECOME VIOLENT, UNLESS JORDANIAN FIGHTING ESCALATES.

3) WE MUST IN ANY CASE PLAN FOR CONTINGENCY THAT SITUATION IN LEBANON CAN GET MUCH WORSE. IF IT DOES, WE SERIOUSLY QUESTION WHETHER BEIRUT AIRPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR EVACUATION, AND SUGGEST DEPT BEGIN PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION BY SEA. WE WILL BE SUBMITTING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THIS ALTERNATIVE.

4) IT ALSO VITAL THAT ISRAEL DO NOTHING TO AGGRAVATE SITUATION IN LEBANON. WE PUZZLED OVER REPORTS OF A BRIEF BUT BLOODY ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI ARMORED PATROL AND LEBANESE FORCE YESTERDAY (JUNE 10) NEAR BLIDA IN WHICH THREE LEBANESE SOLDIERS KILLED, ACCORDING G-2 SOURCES HERE. GIVEN NATURE OF RECENT ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONVERSATIONS, WE FAIL UNDERSTAND WHY IDF WOULD RUN PATROL ACTION IN BROAD DAYLIGHT IN

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VICINITY OF LEBANESE ARMY UNITS, PARTICULARLY WITH JORDANIAN SITUATION SO UNSETTLED. WE HOPE DEPT CAN URGE ISRAELIS TO BE PARTICULARLY RESTRAINED AT THIS MOMENT WHEN LEBANESE ARMY MAY BE REQUIRED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY MISSION, RATHER THAN BORDER DEFENSE.
PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 333

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04608 101901Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

118071

R 101413Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 658
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT04608

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 2837

1. GENERAL NOUJAIM INFORMED ARMA MAY 15 HE HAD MET WITH ISRAELIS MAY 14 ON BORDER PROBLEM. WE REPORTED SUBSTANCE CONVERSATION BY LETTER BECAUSE OF ITS SENSITIVITY AND BECAUSE #

WITH THE ISRAELIS HIMSELF (WHICH WE

DOUBT

OR HAD SENT MESSAGE IN FASHION REPORTED REFTEL. IN ANY

EVENT, SUBSTANCE OF NOUJAIM'S MESSAGE WAS ALMOST PRECISELY THAT REFERRED TO IN REFTEL. IN CIRCUMSTANCES ONE WONDERS WHY ISRAELIS PLACING SO MUCH STOCK IN NOUJAIM'S MESSAGE NOW, WHEN THEY HAD SAME ASSURANCES FROM HIM TWO WEEKS EARLIER. AS WE HAVE OFTEN REPORTED, IT HAS BEEN EVIDENT FOR A LONG TIME THAT GOL OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO ISOLATE FEDAYEEN IN SUCH A FASHION THAT ISRAELI RETALIATORY RAIDS WOULD NOT DESTROY LEBANESE PROPERTY OR LIVES OR

CAUSE SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEM. IN EFFECT, "LET'S YOU AND HIM FIGHT IN THE ARAB" (MT. HERMON AREA).

2. COMMENT: LEBANESE PLAYING VERY DANGEROUS GAME IN DEALING WITH THE ISRAELIS AS THEY HAVE RECENTLY. A LEAK OF THESE CONVERSATIONS TO FEDAYEEN OR MEMBERS MOSLEM COMMUNITY COULD HAVE SERIOUS INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN LEBANON. THE EFFECT WOULD RUB OFF ON US AS USG, IDENTIFIED WITH CURRENT REGIME HERE AND GENERALLY CONSIDERED AS ANTI-FEDAYEEN, WOULD BE CONSIDERED CO-CONSPIRATOR. IN ANY EVENT THE BORDER CONVERSATIONS ARE SIMPLY A MEANS

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04608 101901Z

OF BUYING A LITTLE MORE TIME. AS LONG AS THERE IS ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WE FEAR QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THERE WILL BE TROUBLE ON THE LEBANESE BORDER, BUT HOW MUCH AND WHERE.
PORTER

NOTE: # OMISSION.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

LETTER BEFORE ON THE SENSITIVITY AND SECURITY OF
THE BORDER... INFORMATION... WITH THE... WHICH...

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1970 JUN 10 13 09Z

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HCD 062

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04586 101256Z

54 42
ACTION OPR-01

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NEA-08 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 NSC-10 INR-06 O-03 SY-01 PER-01
AID-12 RSR-01 RSC-01 /065 W

----- 115369

O 101223Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0652

~~SECRET BEIRUT 4586~~

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 89694; BEIRUT 4584

WE DO NOT WISH TO INTERFERE AMMAN'S BUSINESS BUT ON BASIS ADMIN
OFFICER CHAMPAGNE'S EXPERIENCE 1967 EVACUATION AMMAN, WE STRONGLY
SUGGEST THAT ANY EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS FROM AMMAN NOT REPEAT
NOT BE PLACED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS.
PORTER

SECRET LIMDIS



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TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL 597

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04525 081951Z

92

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04

NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13

RSR-01 /107 W

----- 101517

R 081645Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0630
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 4525

SUBJECT: QADHAFI VISITS LEBANON

1. QADHAFI ARRIVED AT BEIRUT AIRPORT FROM DAMASCUS MORNING JUNE 7. RIDING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU IN OPEN CAR WHICH QADHAFI HAD REPORTEDLY REQUESTED, HE AND RECEPTION PARTY INCHED THEIR WAY ALONG AIRPORT ROAD THROUGH CROWD ESTIMATED AT 80,000 TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, WHERE HE HAS BEEN HAVING TALKS WITH LEBANESE LEADERS. QADHAFI WAS WARMLY RECEIVED BY POPULACE, BY PRESIDENT HELOU AT DINNER LAST NIGHT, AND BY BEIRUT PRESS, WHICH WELCOMED HIM AS FRIEND OR FOE OF UNRESTRICTED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY, DEPENDING ON COLORATION OF THE PAPER DOING THE WELCOMING.

2. ACCORDING ANWAR, FIRST ROUND OF TALKS FOCUSED ON EASTERN FRONT AND GOL-FEDAYEEN RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH QADHAFI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON IS STILL UNCLEAR, JUNE 7 BEIRUT PRESS QUOTES HIM IN DAMASCUS AS HAVING REJECTED SURRENDER OF ANY ARAB TERRITORY, "WHETHER USURPED IN 1948 OR 1967," AND DECLARED THAT CONVENTIONAL WAR WILL BE REQUIRED TO LIBERATE PALESTINE, AND LIBYA WILL STAND IN THE THICK OF THE BATTLE.

3. NAHAR REPORTS THAT QADHAFI WILL MEET SOON WITH 'ARAFAT, POSSIBLY IN BEIRUT, POSSIBLY IN CAIRO. HAYAT REPORTS THAT QADHAFI HAS

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04525 081951Z

ADVISED JORDAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND LEBANON THAT THE CRITICAL MILITARY SITUATION ON THE SUEZ CANAL REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE FEUD BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THAT HE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY NASSER TO MEDIATE THIS DISPUTE. ACCORDING HAYAT, MEDIATION EFFORT HAS NOT SHOWN RESULTS.

4. DEMONSTRATION ON AIRPORT ROAD WAS EXTREMELY DISTURBING AS POSSIBLE PORTENT OF THINGS TO COME. LEBANESE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE WERE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE THOUSANDS OF YOUTHFUL LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS WHO SWARMED AROUND THE OFFICIAL CARS AS THEY LEFT THE AIRPORT. AS NAHAR HAS REPORTED, DEMONSTRATION WAS STRONGLY NASSERIST. QADHAFI WAS GREETED BY SHOUTS OF "NASSER, NASSER" AND "WE WANT ARAB UNITY." SOME WORE BATTLE FATIGUES AND CARRIED WEAPONS. NOT ONLY WERE ROCKETS FIRED IN ADJOINING REFUGEE CAMPS, APPARENTLY AS SORT OF UNOFFICIAL SALUTE TO QADHAFI, BUT DISCIPLINE WAS SO BAD THAT SOME DEMONSTRATORS ACTUALLY CARRIED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS INTO TERMINAL AND FIRED WELCOMING BURSTS FROM BALCONY OVERLOOKING TARMAC. SYMPATHIES OF CROWD WERE CLEARLY PRO-FEDAYEEN, ANTI-GOL, ANTI-US, AND IN SOME CASES EVEN ANTI-QADHAFI. MOOD WAS UGLIER THAN WE HAVE SEEN SINCE 1967. SEVERAL OFFICIAL CARS, INCLUDING THAT OF US AMBASSADOR, WERE BUMPED AND WROUGHT ON THEIR WAY BACK FROM THE AIRPORT. ANTI-US THEMES, INEVITABLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL BE REINFORCED BY REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO QADHAFI AT LAST NIGHT'S BANQUET. ACCORDING PRESS, HE CRITICIZED US FOR PROVIDING AN AGGRESSOR WITH DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS, WARNED THAT US INTERESTS ARE IN DANGER, AND PREDICTED THAT US "MAY ONE DAY FIND THAT SHE HAS LOST ISRAEL -- VERY SOON PERHAPS."

5. GOL IS MORTIFIED BY BREAKDOWN OF ORDER AT AIRPORT. ALTHOUGH IT HAS MANAGED TO KEEP THE TRUTH OUT OF THE PRESS, WE DETECT A GRADUAL EROSION OF LAW AND ORDER WHICH WILL COMPLICATE NOT ONLY PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS BUT ALSO BODES NO GOOD FOR THE STABILITY OF THE GOL.

PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04518 081935Z

43
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

101402

R 081605Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0625
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

2
SITUATION ROOM
170 JUN 8 PM 10:53

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4518

EXDIS

SUBJ: EBAN SENDS MESSAGE TO LEBANESE

1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) TOLD ME FOLLOWING AT KAZZAFI DINNER LAST NIGHT (JUNE 7).

2) EBAN CALLED IN GREEK CATHOLIC BISHOP (NAME UNSPECIFIED) LAST WEEK AND ASKED HIM RELAY MESSAGE DIRECT TO PRES. HELOU. BISHOP NOW IN BEIRUT, ASKING SEE HELOU. LEBANESE UNDERSTAND GIST OF MESSAGE IS (A) ISRAEL HAS NO TERRITORIAL DESIGNS ON LEBANON; (B) ISRAEL RECOGNIZES DIFFICULT INTERNAL PROBLEMS FACING LEBANON; BUT (C) ISRAEL WILL BE FORCED RETALIATE WHENEVER FEDAYEEN ACTION CAUSES LOSS OF ISRAELI LIVES.

3) AS CONFIDANT POINTED OUT, THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN MESSAGE THAT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN RELAYED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS, INCLUDING USG. ALSO, HELOU HAS NOTHING TO REPLY TO EBAN THAT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN SAID TO ISRAELIS, BOTH IN ILMAC MEETINGS AND OTHERWISE.

4) HELOU NOW DEBATING WHETHER HE SHOULD RECEIVE THE EMISSARY BISHOP. HE FEARS IF HE DOES, EBAN WILL LATER PUBLICIZE FACT THAT A COMMUNICATION WAS PASSED TO LEBANESE PRESIDENT. IF HE DOES NOT, ISRAELIS WILL BE IN POSITION TO SAY LEBANON IGNORED GESTURE. WE GUESS THAT HELOU WILL END UP BY HAVING EMISSARY RECEIVED BY PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTUIT, BUT THE EXERCISE SEEMS TO ADD LITTLE TO THE UNEASY GOI-GOL RELATIONSHIP.
PORTER

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 09-12/15: Per ltr 8-4-2009

By P.H. NARA Date 10-22-09

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SECRET 324

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04351 031323Z

42

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

069009

O R 031230Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0575
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

70 JUN 3 AM 11:56

SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 4351

EXDIS:

PLEASE PASS CAIRO

REF: BEIRUT 4311; TEL AVIV 2810

1) WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT EVENING JUNE 2 AND MORNING JUNE 3. AT LATTER MEETING HE ALSO REFERRED TO CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS NIGHT JUNE 2 (TEL AVIV 2810). GOL VERSION OF MEETING IS THAT ISRAELIS SET FORTH ULTIMATUM TO LEBANON - IF LEBANON MADE COMPLAINT TO SC, ISRAEL WOULD INCREASE ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY ON LEBANESE BORDER.

2) HELOU HAD IN FACT MADE DECISION NOT TO ASK FOR FORMAL SC ACTION AND ISRAELIS WERE SO INFORMED. DECISION WAS BASED ON CESSATION OF ISRAELI FIRING INTO LEBANON YESTERDAY (WHICH GOL GRATEFULLY ATTRIBUTES TO US INTERVENTION), AS WELL AS HELOU'S DECISION THAT HE COULD NOT CONTROL EVENTS IN SC IF HE FILED COMPLAINT. HE GREATLY FEARED THIS WOULD PUT HIM IN SOV-SYRIAN EMBRACE AND ISOLATE HIM FROM USG.

3) HELOU CATEGORIZES ISRAELI THREAT AS ALMOST INTOLERABLE ACT OF ARROGANCE. HE ASSUMES ISRAELIS NOT PREPARED ADMIT THAT THEY RESPONDING TO DEMARCHES IN AGREEING CEASE BOMBARDMENT OF SOUTH LEBANON, AND WERE UNABLE RESIST TEMPTATION TO TRY AND EXTRACT SOME FINAL ADVANTAGE FROM LEBANON. HELOU HOPED ISRAELIS DID NOT BELIEVE (OR EXPECT HIM TO BELIEVE) THAT LEBANESE ACTION NOT

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04351 031323Z

TO GO TO SC WAS RESULT OF THEIR THREATS AND BLACKMAIL. CONFIDANT REPEATED THAT THIS LEBANESE DECISION BASED ESSENTIALLY ON DESIRE NOT TO ISOLATE ITSELF FROM USG.

4) HELOU NONETHELESS FEELS HE MUST TAKE SOME ACTION BECAUSE HE STILL FIRMLY BELIEVES, AND WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE DISSUADE HIM, THAT ISRAELIS DO HAVE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF OCCUPYING SOUTH LEBANON. HE THEREFORE SENDING REPORT FOR THE RECORD TO SC SETTING FORTH NATURE OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN LAST SEVERAL DAYS AND DESCRIBING RESULTANT REFUGEE PROBLEM. THIS WILL LAY GROUNDWORK FOR A LATER COMPLAINT TO SC, WHEN AND IF NECESSARY. CONFIDANT ASKED WHETHER US WOULD BE CONCERNED BY SUCH ACTION. USING GUIDANCE PARA 2 STATE 84056, WE INDICATED THIS WOULD CAUSE NO SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. (COMMENT: HELOU WILL HOLD OFF ON THIS ACTION UNTIL THIS EVENING (JUNE 3). IF DEPT HAS ANY NEW GUIDANCE IT SHOULD BE SENT BY IMMEDIATE.)

5) WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY ISRAELIS NOW INTEND CARRY OUT ON BORDER. YESTERDAY THERE WAS NO SHOOTING, BUT SHALLOW PATROL ACTION CONTINUED. WE NOTE TEL AVIV PRESS REPORT THIS MORNING THAT ROCKETS FIRED FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY AT KIRYAT SHEMONA AREA FOR FIRST TIME SINCE MAY 12. FORTUNATELY THERE NO CASUALTIES, BUT THERE BOUND TO BE REPETITION SUCH INCIDENTS DURING CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD, WHEN LEBANESE TRYING CURB SUCH FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY BY PERSUASION OR PATROL ACTION. FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP STILL IN CAIRO DEBATING QUESTION OF COOPERATION WITH GOL PROPOSALS RESTRICT THEIR ACTIONS. GOL, ALTHOUGH MILDLY OPTIMISTIC, UNABLE PREDICT OUTCOME. IN ANY CASE, EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO VIOLATE ANY GOL-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT WHICH MIGHT EMERGE.

6) THERE WILL THEREFORE BE PRETEXT FOR FUTURE ISRAELI REPRISALS. IF GOI CAN EXERCISE CONTINUED RESTRAINT, AND HOPEFULLY IF INCIDENTS REMAIN AT TOLERABLE LEVEL, GOL CAN HAVE CHANCE OF BRINGING FEDAYEEN ATTACKS UNDER MORE EFFECTIVE CONTROL. LEBANESE EFFORTS TO DO SO WOULD BE VITIATED BY A MAJOR ISRAELI REPRISAL ACTION, WHICH WOULD IN TURN HARDEN HELOU'S CONVICTIONS RE ISRAELI DESIGNS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 649

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04311 021426Z

52
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

061945

R 021300Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 565
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

2/3
70 JUN 2 PM 2:34
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 4311

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

REF: STATE 84071; BEIRUT 4283; TEL AVIV 2784

1. EMBASSY OFFICER CALLED ON PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT, INFORMED HIM OF LATEST US REPRESENTATION TO ISRAELIS, AND URGED THAT GOL HOLD OFF GOING TO SECURITY COUNCIL. AFTER EXPRESSING THANKS FOR LATEST EFFORT, CONFIDANT ASKED IF THERE ANY PARTICULAR PERIOD USG WANTED LEBANON TO DELAY. UNFORTUNATELY, EVENTS MOVING RAPIDLY AND PRESSURES LIKELY BUILD UP SOON FOR SOME GOL ACTION. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE PARTICULAR TIME IN MIND BUT WE HOPEFUL EARLY REPLY OUR DEMARCHES TO GOI.

2. REPEATING THAT GOL CANNOT LONG HOLD OFF TAKING SOME ACTION, CONFIDANT SAID THAT ONE WAY BUY TIME WOULD BE FOR USG ISSUE STRONG STATEMENT DEPLORING ISRAELI "AGGRESSION" AGAINST LEBANON. THIS COULD BE USED AS EXCUSE TO WAIT BEFORE GOING TO SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO DEFLECT ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO URGING LEBANON TURN TO ARAB STATES AND SOVIETS. CONFIDANT EXPRESSED URGENT HOPE FOR FAVORABLE ISRAELI RESPONSE US DEMARCHES BECAUSE, "IF US CANNOT RESTRAIN ISRAELI, WHO CAN?" CONFIDANT SAID IT BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT REFUTE LOGIC THOSE WHO SAY THAT IF LEBANON'S SUPPOSED FRIEND THE US IS UNABLE OR UNWILLING CONTROL ISRAEL, THEN LEBANON MUST LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR PROTECTION.

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3. CONFIDANT SAID THAT IS LAST TWO DAYS THERE HAD BEEN TWO ILMAC MEETINGS. IN MEETING MAY 31, ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE HAD ASKED WHY LEBANESE ALWAYS RAN TO SECURITY COUNCIL. IN SECOND MEETING JUNE 1, CALLED AT LEBANON'S REQUEST, LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE HAD INFORMED ISRAELIS OF GOL INTENTION GO TO

SECURITY COUNCIL. ISRAELI REP HAD REPLIED THAT IF LEBANON REFRAINED FROM GOING TO SECURITY COUNCIL, ISRAEL WOULD "REDUCE" ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES.

4. CONFIDANT SAID ARMY HAD THUS FAR AVOIDED CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS BUT EXTENT ISRAELI ACTIVITIES AND FACT ARMY SITTING ON ITS HANDS BECOMING INCREASINGLY WIDELY KNOWN IN FEDAYEEN CIRCLES, AMONG POPULATION IN THE AREA, AND IN THE ARMY, WHERE IT CREATING MORALE PROBLEM. AT SOME POINT, PERHAPS IN NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE, ARMY WOULD BE OBLIGED REACT. CONFIDANT THEN CALLED PRESIDENCY TO ASCERTAIN LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN BORDER AREA. HE WAS INFORMED THAT ISRAELIS WERE AGAIN PATROLLING IN CENTRAL MILITARY ZONE AND THAT ARMY "AWAITING" RESUMPTION ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT. HE EXPLAINED THAT PATTERN HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED OF COMMENCING ARTILLERY FIRING IN EARLY AFTERNOON.

5. AFTER ACKNOWLEDGING EMBOFF'S STATEMENT THAT US HAD NO INDICATION ISRAELIS CONTEMPLATING OCCUPATION LEBANESE TERRITORY, CONFIDANT REPEATED HELOU NONETHELESS CONVINCED THIS WAS ISRAELI INTENTION. REITERATING MUCH OF WHAT HE HAD TOLD AMBASSADOR PREVIOUS EVENING, CONFIDANT SAID ISRAELIS NOW IN PRELIMINARY STAGE DEPOPULATING AREA. TO SUPPORT CONTENTION ISRAELIS USING BOMBARDMENT FORCE CIVILIAN EVACUATION, CONFIDANT SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY ARMY CINC NOUJAIM THAT AS OF LAST NIGHT THERE NO INDICATION OF RECENT FEDAYEEN CASUALTIES FROM ISRAELI ACTION. IN PAST GOL HAD BEEN ABLE ESTIMATE QUICKLY AND FAIRLY ACCURATELY EXTENT FEDAYEEN LOSSES BECAUSE FEDAYEEN USE HOSPITALS IN SIDON, BEIRUT, AND ELSEWHERE, ADDITIONALLY, CONFIDANT SAID HE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT ISRAELIS HAD ATTEMPTED FRIGHTEN POPULATION OF VILLAGES THEY HAD OCCUPIED IN MAY 12 ACTION. ACCORDING CONFIDANT, ISRAELIS HAD SEPARATED MEN FROM WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND TOLD MEN THAT NEXT TIME IDF RETURNED THEY WOULD KILL EVERYONE, INCLUDING CHILDREN.

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04311 021426Z

CONFIDANT SAID ALL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED LEBANESE CONCLUSION ISRAELIS ENCOURAGING EXODUS LOCAL POPULATION AND WANT IT BE PERMANENT.

6. COMMENT: TEL AVIV'S 2784, GIVING ISRAELI VERSION ILMAC MEETING JUST RECEIVED. WE WILL USE IT IN NEXT DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT. WE ARE STRUCK, HOWEVER, WITH CHANGE OF EMPHASIS BY IDF REPS IN THEIR DEMANDS ON LEBANON. IT SHOULD BE OBVIOUS, AND RABIN AND OTHERS HAVE ADMITTED AS MUCH TO USG IN PAST, THE LEBANON DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO OUST FEDAYEEN FROM LEBANON BY MILITARY ACTION. THEY ARE TRYING RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY TO A SMALL AREA (ARQUB) AND TO PLACE A TOTAL BAN ON CROSS-BORDER FIRING. EVEN THIS MAY BE MORE THAN THEY CAN DO, BUT AT LEAST THEY INTEND TO TRY. IF ISRAEL IS EXPECTING THE IMPOSSIBLE FROM GOL, AND EXPECTING US TO SUPPORT ITS DEMANDS FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE, WE ARE NOT GOING TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON DE-FUSING BORDER SITUATION.

7. I HOPE IN OUR CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS WE CAN MAKE THIS POINT WITH GREAT EMPHASIS. CONFIDANT HAS INFORMED ME THAT REPORTS FROM PALESTINIANS' MEETING IN CAIRO ARE STILL INCONCLUSIVE, BUT LEBANESE STILL HAVE SOME OPTIMISM THAT MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS WILL ACCEPT GOL ATTEMPT TO USE CAIRO AGREEMENT AS BASIS FOR RESTRICTING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. THE ISRAELIS WILL IN TURN HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT THEY MUST DEFEND THEIR OWN BORDER AGAINST INFILTRATION.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 594

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04283 012317Z

85-83
ACTION NEA-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 NSCE-00 IO-04 PM-03 INR-06 CIAE-00
NSAE-00 PRS-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 RSR-01 /054 W
057738

O P 012144Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 554 IMMEDIATE
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
USUN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4283

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: UNCEASING ISRAELI PRESSURE ON LEBANON

1. THIS EVENING (JUNE 1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT REQUESTED SEE ME URGENTLY AT HELOU'S BIDDING. REPORTED HELOU FEELS HE CAN NO LONGER FAIL RESPOND TO CONSTANT ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON.

2. SITUATION EVEN WORSE THAN EMB HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, ACCORDING CONFIDANT. EACH DAY SINCE ORIGINAL (MAY 22) MAJOR REPRISAL ACTION ON LEBANESE SOUTHERN VILLAGES, THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI ACTION-SHELLING, TANKS OR APC PATROLS, AERIAL BOMBING. TODAY ISRAELIS CARRIED OUT HEAVY AIR ATTACKS, AND BEGAN BULLDOZING TWO ROADS INTO LEBANON, ONE ALREADY 800 METERS LONG, IN AITA CHAAB-RMAICH AREA, CONSIDERABLY WEST OF BENT JREIL. LEB ARMY HAS NOT RESPONDED, AND HELOU HAS WAITED FOR USG & OTHER COUNTRY EFFORTS TO HAVE EFFECT IN RESTRAINING GOI, TO NO AVAIL. HELOU ASSUMES ISRAELIS AWARE OF PAINFUL EFFORTS GOI MAKING TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN, AND CAN ONLY CONJECTURE GOI NOW INTENDS SABOTAGE THESE EFFORTS. WHATEVER THEIR INTENT, EFFECT IS ONE OF PUTTING HELOU IN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AND REINFORCING PALESTINIAN CONTENTION THAT ISRAEL INTENDS OCCUPY SOUTH LEBANON REGARDLESS OF PROVOCATIONS OR LACK THEREOF.

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3. HELOU NOTES THAT THERE NO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY FROM LEBANESE SIDE IN SOME TIME, AND HAS REACHED CONCLUSION THAT CURRENT ISRAELI ATTACKS ARE PRELUDE TO INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF PORTIONS OF SOUTH LEBANON. WHAT OTHER CONCLUSION CAN HE REACH, SAID CONFIDANT? ISRAELIS BRUSHING ASIDE STRONG U.S. INTERVENTIONS, AND IGNORING LEBANESE EFFORTS BRING SITUATION UNDER CONTROL.

4. GOL NOW ESTIMATES CURRENT REFUGEE OUTFLOW FROM SOUTH AS 50,000 SINCE MW 12, DATE OF FIRST ISRAELI LARGE-SCALE RAID. ISRAELI RANDOM ATTACKS IN RECENT DAYS HAVE PRODUCED SNOW BALL EFFECT, AND IT IMPOSSIBLE GET POPULATION TO RETURN IN FACE CERTAIN BELIEF THAT ISRAEL PREPARING MOUNT SEIZE AND HOLD OPERATION INTO LEBANON.

5. GOL HAS KEPT LID ON PUBLICITY RE RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS, HOPING NOT CREATE EXCESSIVE ALARM IN POPULACE OR TO LEND WEIGHT TO FEDAYEEN CONTENTION THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE TOTAL FREEDOM OF ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS SECRECY NO LONGER POSSIBLE, HELOU MUST TAKE SOME ACTION. HE WISHED TAKE MATTER TO SC TODAY, BUT AGREED WAIT UNTIL HE HAD USG RESPONSE, WHICH HE HOPES RECEIVE JUNE 2.

6. IF USG CAN PROVIDE SOME REASSURANCE THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS WILL CEASE (OR BE REDUCED TO A TOLERABLE LEVEL), OR CAN PROVIDE GUARANTEE OF SUPPORT FOR LEBANON TO OPPOSE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, HE WILL HOLD OFF TAKING MATTER TO SC. HE DOES NOT WISH TO SET UP APPARENT CONFRONTATION WITH USG IN SC, AND IS AFRAID THIS WILL BE INEVITABLE RESULT IF HE RAISES PROBLEM OF ISRAELI ATTACKS, EVEN WITHOUT PROPOSED SC ACTION. FEELS SURE SOVS AND SYRIANS WILL IMMEDIATELY

RUN WITH THE BALL, AND INTRODUCE TOUGH RESOLUTION WHICH LEBANON CANNOT INFLUENCE OR REFUSE AND WHICH US CANNOT ACCEPT. (IN THIS CONNECTION, CONFIDANT SAID SYRIANS & SOVS TOLD LEB: AFTER MAY 6 INCIDENT THEY WOULD PUBLICLY OPPOSE US COMPROMISE RESOLUTION EVEN IF LEBANON ACCEPTED.)

7. BARRING ASSURANCES THAT ISRAELI WILL COOL THINGS DOWN IN BORDER AREAS, HELOU ASSUMES THAT SHE PLANS INVADE LEBANON. "CLASSIC PATTERN" OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION TECHNIQUE APPEARS TO LEB: TO BE EMERGING - FIRST DEPOPULATE, THEN MOVE IN. IF USG CANNOT HELP, THERE NO WAY HELOU FEELS HE CAN AVOID CERTAIN SOVIET ATTEMPT TAKE OVER AS PROTECTOR OF LEBANON, IN SC AND OTHERWISE. CONFIDANT SAID HELOU HAD HOPED HE MIGHT SOMEHOW AVOID, IN LEBANON, THE SOVIET ENTRAPMENT WHICH HAD BEEN FATE OF OTHER ARAB NATIONS. DECISION WAS NO LONGER

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04283 012317Z

HIS TO MAKE, IF ISRAEL AND LEBANON'S TRADITIONAL FRIENDS GAVE HIM NO ALTERNATIVE.

8. HELOU WAS PICTURED BY CONFIDANT AS MAN WHO FEELS HE HAS NOWHERE TO TURN. I HAVE REPORTED HIS COMMENTS CAREFULLY, AS I SENSE EVENTS ARE QUICKLY REACHING A WATERSHED IN US-LEBANESE RELATIONS. IF USG CANNOT PROVIDE LEBANON WITH ANY MEASURE OF PROTECTION FROM ISRAELI ATTACK OR INTIMIDATING PROVOCATIONS, DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS, HELOU MUST RE-THINK HIS BASIC POLICIES. THE ONLY PLACE HE CAN TURN IS TO THE ARAB WORLD, AND THIS PRESENTS A FAMILIAR HISTORICAL PATTERN OF SOVIET INTRUSION AND US DISPLACEMENT. HELOU SAYS HE CAN KEEP THE COUNTRY TOGETHER "FOR A WHILE" IF ISRAELI PRESSURES SUBSIDE. I THINK IT IS WORTH A MAJOR EFFORT ON PART USG TO GIVE HIM THE CHANCE.
PORTER

S/C NOTE: RELATIVE MCN'S WILL BE SENT VIA SVC IN AM

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SECRET 352

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04279 012013Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

056749

R 011816Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 550

SECRET BEIRUT 4279

EXDIS

SUBJ: RIFLES FOR LEBANON

1. IN ARMA CONVERSATION WITH GEN NOUJAIM MAY 29, LATTER STATED HE WOULD SEND MESSAGE TO BRIG. GOLMEIH ASKING HIM TO MAKE OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR M-1 RIFLES AND AMMUNITION THROUGH TALCOTT SEELYE. HE ALSO STATED HE WOULD PREFER USE MAC AIRLIFT, AND GOL PREPARED TO PAY FREIGHT CHARGES. HE WOULD EXPECT HAVE THE RIFLES ARRIVE IN INCREMENTS, AND DESIRES A SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION TO ACCOMPANY EACH SHIPMENT OF RIFLES.

2. WE WOULD PREFER RIFLES BE PACKED IN CRATES NOT MARKED TO SHOW CONTENTS. WITH PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF ETA SUCH SHIPMENTS, EMBASSY WOULD DESIGNATE OFFLOADING AREA IN MILITARY SECTOR OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR PURPOSES SECURITY AND CONVENIENCE.

3. COMMENT: THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF POLITICAL RISK INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTING THESE RIFLES BY MAC FLIGHT. NOUJAIM APPARENTLY FEELS THAT SPEED OF DELIVERY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN RISK INVOLVED. WE AGREE.
PORTER

10 JUN 2 AM 1:53

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SECRET 330

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04278 011944Z

83
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 2046 W

056577

R 011815Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 549
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 4278

EXDIS:

DEPARTMENT PASS INFO USINT CAIRO

REF: BEIRUT 4227

ACCORDING TO ARTICLE DATED LINED TEL AVIV APPEARING IN DAILY STAR MAY 31, ICRC REPRESENTATIVE REFERRED TO REFTEL IS ANDRE ROCHAT, "HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS DELEGATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST". IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE ARTICLE WHETHER HE IS ON SPECIAL MISSION TO AREA OR STATIONED HERE. HIS EFFORTS APPEAR IN GENERAL CONCERNED WITH PRISONERS OF WAR INCLUDING UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO VISIT ISRAELI PILOTS NOW BEING HELD IN SYRIA. ARTICLE STATES HE TRANSITTED RAS NAQUORA FROM LEBANON TO TEL AVIV ON MAY 30. PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

70 JUN 2 AM 7:53
SIGNAL ROOM
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SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 741

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04241 011225Z

53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

R 011019Z JUN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 538

054206

70 JUN 02 1 PM 2:42
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4241

EXDIS

REF: STATE 079905

SUBJ: POSSIBLE VISIT OF KAMAL JUMBLATT

1) MESSAGE REFTEL PASSED TO KHOURY (PROTECT). JUMBLATT AND HELOU HAVE ALREADY HAD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION DESIRABILITY OF TRIP, AND JUMBLATT ACCEPTED HELOU'S SUGGESTION THAT DECISION BE PUT OFF FOR A WHILE.

2) IN VIEW JUMBLATT'S (APPARENTLY) COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON QUESTION BRINGING FEDAYEEN UNDER SOME CONTROL, HELOU MAY NOW FEEL THAT JUMBLATT SHOULD BE GIVEN CHANCE TO GO TO US. WHETHER JUMBLATT WILL NOW BELIEVE THIS WILL SERVE HIS POLITICAL AMBITIONS REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

3) NO ACTION BY DEPT REQUESTED. WE WILL REPORT AGAIN WHEN WE HEAR FROM HELOU.
PORTER

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 09-12/16: Per Lett 8-4-2009

By P.H NARA, Date 10-22-09

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SECRET 929

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04227 291558Z

50
ACTION SS-45

2

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

045829
70 MAY 29 PM 3:52
SITUATION ROOM

R 291400Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE 0531
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4227

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ICRC ROLE IN CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON

- 1) PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT REPORTED FOLLOWING SOMEWHAT BIZARRE STORY EVENING MAY 28.
- 2) ICRC REP ROCHARD (NOT PERSONALLY KNOWN TO THIS EMB) HAD JUST BEEN IN TOUCH WITH PRES. HELOU TELLING OF HIS SECRET EFFORTS SECURE FEDAYEEN WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON, WEST OF HASBANI RIVER. ROCHARD ASKED HELOU'S AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE HIS WORK, AND OF COURSE RECEIVED AFFIRMATIVE REPLY. PRESUMABLY ROCHARD ACCEPTS SOME JURISDICTION IN ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER PROBLEM BECAUSE OF RED CROSS INTEREST IN GETTING NEW LEBANESE REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES.
- 3) ROCHARD SAID HE HAD HAD INITIAL CONTACTS WITH FEDAYEEN (CONFIDANT BELIEVED FATAH) AND WITH ISRAEL. FEDAYEEN OWED HIM GREAT DEAL, SAID ROCHARD, MENTIONING RECENT RELEASE OF THE FIFTY KARAMEH PRISONERS AND CURRENT EFFORTS WITH GOI ON ADDITIONAL PRISONER RELEASES. ROCHARD, BASED ON HIS PRELIMINARY FEDAYEEN CONTACTS, EXPRESSED SOME OPTIMISM THAT HE COULD GET THEM TO WITHDRAW, OR AS MINIMUM, CEASE OPERATIONS IN ABOVE-MENTIONED AREA. HE MENTIONED NO NEW QUID PRO QUOS, APPARENTLY BELIEVING THAT EFFORTS HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN ON THEIR BEHALF WOULD PROVIDE

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SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE ON FEDAYEEN.

4) ROCHARD ALSO INDICATED THAT MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH US REPS (UNSPECIFIED). I HAD TO ADMIT THAT SCHEME WAS UNKNOWN TO THIS EMBASSY.

5) HELOU FRANKLY PUZZLED AND HARDLY SANGUINE ABOUT ROCHARD'S SCHEME, BUT OF COURSE WILLING ACCEPT HELP FROM ANY QUARTER. HE FOUND SOMEWHAT NAIVE ROCHARD'S SUGGESTION THAT, FOLLOWING FEDAYEEN WITHDRAWAL, BORDER OBSERVATION WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY ICRC PERSONNEL.

6) COMMENT: WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS OR INFO ADDRESSEE POSTS MIGHT HAVE. DO NOT PROPOSE, HOWEVER, THAT WE ASK ANY QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME WHICH MIGHT REVEAL OUR KNOWLEDGE ROCHARD'S EFFORTS. GOL DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE WAS ACTING IN PERSONAL OR OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
PORTER

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25 JUN 68 10 3:25

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SECRET 726

SUMMARY 47

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04113 261729Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

023859

O R 261630Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0494
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4113

E X D I S

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: 80422

1) BOTH YESTERDAY AND TODAY (MAY 26) WE REPORTED TO PRESIDENTIAL INTERMEDIARY OUR EFFORTS WITH GOI, AND ISRAELI REACTION. PRESENTATION TODAY FOLLOWED GUIDANCE REFTEL, BUT DID NOT REVEAL ONGOING PATTERN ISRAELI PATROL ACTIVITY IN LEBANON.

2) ISRAELIS HAVE NOW MADE PUBLIC THEIR NEW DEFENSIVE POLICY. WE NOTE REUTER'S ITEM MAY 26 REPORTING PRESS CONFERENCE OF GENERAL GUR IN WHICH ANNOUNCED NEW "POLICY OF PATROLLING THE LEBANESE SIDE OF THE FRONTIER ... AS LONG AS NECESSARY..." AND THAT TWO SMALL PATROLS CROSSED BORDER TODAY AND TOOK UP OBSERVATION POSITIONS 500 METERS INSIDE LEBANESE BORDER.

3) PRESIDENTIAL INTERMEDIARY INFORMED US MAY 25 THAT JUMBLATT STILL DETERMINED TRY TO SECURE FEDAYEEN CONCURRENCE TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM ALL OPERATIONS OUTSIDE ARKOUR AREA. TODAY INTERMEDIARY INFORMED US FATAH HAD REACHED CONCLUSION THAT CROSS-BORDER FIRING WAS TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ERROR, ENRAGING ISRAEL AND DAMAGING LEBANON. FATAH ALSO CONCERNED THAT RECENT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AND ISRAELI RETALIATION HAD INDIRECTLY BROUGHT AUGMENTATION RIVAL SAIQA'S STRENGTH IN LEBANON. GOI EXPECTS FATAH SHORTLY TO MAKE DECISION CEASE BOTH CROSS-BORDER FIRING AND ALL ACTIVITY IN CENTRAL BORDER SECTOR, I.E. WEST OF HASBANI RIVER. NEXT

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PROBLEM WOULD BE FOR FATAH AND GOL TO SECURE AGREEMENT OTHER
COMMANDO GROUPS ABIDE BY THIS DECISION.

4) HELOU ALSO MAKING EFFORT WITH OTHER ARAB STATES TO BRING
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON FEDAYEEN. HE SENDING SECRET LETTERS TO ALL
ARAB HEADS OF STATE REQUESTING MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON,
I.E. ARMS AND MONEY -- NOT TROOPS. IN ANTICIPATION OF NEGATIVE
RESPONSES, HE ALSO ASKING ALL ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY THE
STRONG FINANCIAL SUPPORTERS OF FEDAYEEN, TO ACCEPT PRINCIPLE THAT
POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO LEBANON AND THE ARAB CAUSE FROM ISRAELI
RETALIATION IS GREATER THAN DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ISRAEL BY
FEDAYEEN ACTION FROM LEBANON. HE REQUESTING ARAB LEADERS DO EVERY-
THING POSSIBLE ASSIST HIM IN MAKING THIS POINT TO FEDAYEEN. HELOU
NOT SANGUINE ABOUT RESPONSES, BUT FEELS LETTER MIGHT HAVE SOME
IMPACT AND PROVIDE BACKING TO GOL'S OWN EFFORTS WITH FEDAYEEN.

5) WE ALSO DETECT CERTAIN GROUNDSWELL OF ANGER IN LEBANON AGAINST
FEDAYEEN WHOSE ACTIONS LED TO NEW REFUGEE PROBLEM. WE DOUBT THIS
WILL SUBSTANTIALLY LATER PRESENT BALANCE BETWEEN PRO- AND ANTI-
FEDAYEEN FACTIONS IN LEBANON, BUT IT HAS MADE FEDAYEEN NERVOUS, AS
WITNESS FATAH DECISION PARA 3 ABOVE, AS WELL AS REPORTS WE ARE
RECEIVING THAT FEDAYEEN PROVIDING CASH SUBSIDIES TO SOUTHERN
LEBANESE WHO HAVE SUFFERED LOSS THROUGH ISRAELI RETALIATION.
FEDAYEEN ARE ALSO URGING SOUTHERN POPULACE TO RETURN HOME. UNFORTUN-
ATELY, WRATH OF SOUTHERNERS IS DIVIDED BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND GOL,
WHICH DID NOT PROTECT OR DEFEND THEM.

6) HOWEVER WE NONETHELESS THINK GOL HAS FIGHTING CHANCE TO SECURE
FEDAYEEN WITHDRAWAL TO ARKOUB AREA. EVEN THIS WOULD BE SOME SORT
OF NEAR MIRACLE AND THE ARKOUB PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH
LATER. IT MIGHT BE A MANAGEABLE PROBLEM IF FEDAYEEN WILL ACCEPT
AND ENFORCE BAN ON CROSS-BORDER FIRING.

7) STRONG INTERVENTION OF ACTING SECRETARY, ASST SECRETARY SISCO,
AND AMB BARBOUR GREATLY APPRECIATED BY GOL AND EMBASSY. WE CONCUR
FULLY WITH THEIR ARGUMENTATION AND WITH CONCLUSIONS THEY HAVE PRE-
SENTED TO GOI. ISRAELI PUBLIC ARROGATION TO THEMSELVES OF POLICING
POWER IN SOUTH LEBANON, INFRINGING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, WILL
HARDLY IMPROVE LEBANESE CHANCES OF COMING TO AGREEMENT WITH
FEDAYEEN, OR OF GETTING REFUGEES TO GO BACK TO THE SOUTH. WE ALSO
CONCLUDE THAT IT BOUND TO LEAD TO CLASH WITH LEBANESE ARMY.
PORTER.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04029 241941Z

SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03
RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 SR-01 ORM-03 ACDA-19 RSR-01
/126 W

012247

O P 241850Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0470
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4029

REF: BEIRUT 4028

1. AFTER CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL, CONFIDANT REPORTED TO PRESIDENT HELOU AND RETURNED LATER WITH FOLLOWING IMPORTANT AND PERHAPS HOPEFUL INFORMATION.
2. MININT KAMAL JUMBLATT PAID VISIT TO SOUTH LEBANON THIS MORNING AND SAW MANY OF REFUGEES AND SOUTHERN LEADERS IN SIDON. HW WAS SHOCKED AT THE EXTENT OF THE REFUGEE EXODUS AND WAS MET WITH AN OUTPOURING OF PROTESTS AND ANGRY COMPLAINTS. IF THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT DEFEND US, SAID THE SOUTHERNERS, WE INSIST THAT FEDAYEEN ACTION MUST BE CONTROLLED SO AS TO AVOID RRPRISAL ON CIVILIAN TARGETS.
3. JUMBLATT, WHO HAS RISEN TO HIS PRESENT EMINENCE LARGELY ON THE

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04029 241941Z

BASIS OF HIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT, SEEMS TO HAVE HAD A CHANGE OF HEART AFTER VIEWING THE AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE ISRAELI MAY 22 REPRISALS. ON HIS RETURN TO BEIRUT, HE REPORTED TO HELOU, AND TOGETHER THEY WORKED OUT A PROPOSAL WHICH JUMBLATT PROMISED TO TRY TO SELL TO THE FEDAYEEN. PROPOSAL IS THAT FEDAYEEN AGREE WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM SOUTH LEBANON WEST OF HASBANI RIVER -- I.E., BACK TO ARQUB AREA TO WHICH THEY WERE ORIGINALLY RESTRICTED. HELOU (AS A BLUFF) TOLD JUMBLATT THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO FORCIBLY REMOVE FEDAYEEN IF THEY DIDN'T LEAVE VOLUNTARILY. JUMBLATT SEEMED IMPRESSED WITH THE ARGUMENT.

4. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT. POSSIBLY THE ATTEMPT WON'T SUCCEED, BUT JUOWLATT'S CONVERSION, EVEN IF ONLY TEMPORARY, IMPROVES THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS. HELOU ORBVIOUSLY HOPES USG WILL USE THIS AS ARGUMENT FOR RESTRAINT WITH ISRAEL (ALTHOUGH WE MUST BE CAREFUL IN PROCESS NOT TO COMPROMISE HIM OR JUMBLATT). ANY NEW ISRAELI ATTACK WOULD DESTROY THE CHANCE OF GETTING THE FEDAYEEN TO MOVE OUT OF THE AREA, AS WELL AS PROVIDING ASSURANCE TO THE FLEEING LEBANESE CIVILIANS TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. IF JUMBLATT CAN GET AGREEMENT WITH FEDAYEEN, LEBANESE ARMY WILL THEN HAVE VALID EXCUSE FOR USING FORCE AGAINST DISSIDENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS WHO REFUSE TO HONOR IT.

5. ISRAELIS MAY BE UNHAPPY THAT ARQUB AREA STILL AVAILABLE TO FEDAYEEN, BUT THEY SURELY CAN ACCEPT THIS ARRANGEMENT AS A VAST IMPROVEMENT OVER PRESENT SITUATION. IT SHOULD GREATLY IMPROVE THEIR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, AND IT MIGHT PRESERVE A MODERATE LEBANON. IT MAY NOT WORK, BUT IT IS SURELY WORTH A LITTLE RESTRAINT TO SEE IF IT MIGHT.
PORTER

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SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 SR-01 ORM-03 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 RSR-01 ACDA-19

/126 W

012156

O 241715Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0469
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN
CINCSTRIKE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4028

PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT GAVE FOLLOWING PICTURE OF SITUATION IN LEBANON THIS AFTERNOON (MAY 24):

1. LEB ARMY IS BRACING ITSELF FOR ANOTHER ISRAELI BLOW. LEB S HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS FROM SEVERAL ARAB CAPITALS THAT ACTION IS IMMINENT. ARMY WILL HAVE TO FIGHT THIS TIME - KNOWING FULL WELL IT WILL BE DESTROYED. MOOD OF ARMY IS THAT IT HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SHOOT BACK, IN RESPONSE TO ANY ISRAELI ACTION, WHETHER A RAID OR REPETITION OF MAY 22 ARTILLERY SHOOT.

2. MOOD OF LEB POPULATION UGLY. ISRAELIS HAVE AROUSED ANGER AND HATRED - NOT FEAR. CONFIDANT CITED ILLUSTRATION OF MODERATE PRIMIN KARAMI'S ADAMANT REFUSAL MAY 23 TO AGREE WITH HELOU'S PROPOSAL THAT GOL ISSUE STATEMENT CONDEMNING ATTACK ON ISRAELI SCHOOL BUS. CONFIDANT ADDED THAT ALL LEBANESE CONDEMN THE BUS ATTACK, BUT

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ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIAN TARGETS HAD SO AROUSED THE COUNTRY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A MOSLEM LEADER TO MAKE AN ANTI-FEDAYEEN PUBLIC STATEMENT.

3. REFUGEE EXODUS FROM SOUTH ESTIMATED AT 25,000 IN LAST THREE DAYS, LARGELY TO SIDON, TYRE AND BEKAA. SOUTHERNERS ARE DEMANDING PROTECTION, AND SHIA LEADERS PROPOSING GENERAL STRIKE TO EXPOSE GOVT'S FAILURE TO DEFEND OR HELP THEM. IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS THAT VILLAGES BEING VACATED BECOME HAVENS AND OPERATING BASES FOR FEDAYEEN, WHO UNTIL NOW HAVE BEEN KEPT OUT OF MOST POPULATED AREAS OF SOUTH. ISRAELI ACTION, AS HELOU HAS PREDICTED, HAS ONLY ENHANCED FEDAYEEN FREEDOM OF ACTION AND CREATED A POTENTIAL REFUGEE PROBLEM FOR LEBANON WHICH, IF NOT RESOLVED SOON, WILL BRING A NEW FACTOR OF INSTABILITY INTO AN ALREADY BASICALLY UNSTABLE SITUATION.

4. ARMY ALSO DISTURBED THAT FEDAYEEN, FEELING A NEW SENSE OF IMMUNITY FROM ARMY ORDERS OR THREATS ARE MOVING INTO AREAS, (MOSTLY VACATED VILLAGES) ADJACENT TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THIS INCREASES LIKELIHOOD OF DIRECT IDF-LEB ARMY ENGAGEMENT, WHICH GOL HAS BEEN AT GREAT PAINS TO AVOID, AND HAS SO ASSUMED ISRAELIS.

5. I REVIEWED SUBSTANCE USG MOST RECENT TALKS WITH ISRAELIS, SAYING WE TRYING HARD URGE RESTRAINT, THAT FACTS NOT EASY TO COME BY, AND I COULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE ISRAELIS' GUARDED RESPONSE. CONFIDANT CONJECTURED THAT ISRAELIS INTER ALIA, PUTTING PRESSURE ON USG AFTER APPARENT FAILURE OF EBAN'S WASHINGTON VISIT, ALTHOUGH HE IN NO WAY MINIMIZED DANGER OF POSSIBLE NEW ISRAELI THRUST.

6. CONFIDANT RELATED RECENT GOL ATTEMPTS GET FEDAYEEN TO CEASE ROCKET FIRING ACROSS BORDER, SAID HE HAD SEEN YESTERDAY WRITTEN ASSURANCE GIVEN TO LEB ARMY BY "EIGHT FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION" WITH WHICH GOL MAINTAINED LIAISON, IN WHICH PROMISE WAS GIVEN TO OPERATE ONLY WITHIN "ENEMY TERRITORY" AND TO STOP ALL SHOOTING FROM LEBANESE SOIL. AGREEMENT WAS, HE THOUGHT, BEING HONORED BY MAJOR GROUPS, BUT TINY RENEGADE PFLP GENERAL COMMAND OPERATED ON ITS OWN AND REFUSED ACCEPT DECISIONS OR DISCIPLINE OF UNIFIED PALESTINIAN COMMAND. LEBANESE HAD RAISED SUBJECT WITH ARAFAT, BUT EVEN ARAFAT HAD POINTED OUT THAT BUS ATTACK WAS MOUNTED FROM ISRAELI, NOT LEBANESE, TERRITORY - THEREFORE, AGREEMENT WAS NOT VIOLATED.

7. WE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. LEBANESE DOING THEIR

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04028 241843Z

BEST TO GET SUPPORT OF OTHER ARAB STATES TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN, BUT HE FELT LITTLE COULD COME OF IT. THE KEY WAS IN ISRAEL'S HANDS. IF ISRAEL COULD BE SATISFIED WITH THE TREMENDOUS DAMAGE ALREADY DONE TO LEBANON IN ITS INITIAL REPRISAL, PERHAPS TIME COULD BE BOUGHT TO ALLOW SOME STABILITY TO BE RESTORED, AND BETTER RESTRAINTS PUT ON FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS. HE URGED USG USE ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO HOLD OFF. IF THIS FAILED, LEBANON WOULD BE FINALLY IN THE WAR, UNWILLING AS THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE WERE TO ACCEPT THIS FATE. ADDITIONALLY THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY DESTROYED, AND WITH IT WOULD VANISH THE OCYY INSTRUMENT WHICH CAN MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. LEBANON WOULD EITHER DISINTEGRATE IN THIS PROCESS, OR BECOME A PAUN OF THE PALESTINIANS. THE LOSS TO US INTERESTS WOULD BE TREMENDOUS AND IT HARD TO SEE IN LONGER RUN HOW ISRAELI INTERESTS COULD BE WELL-SERVED.

8. CONFIDANT SAID HELOU HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN HIS OWN AGONIZING REAPPRIASAL OF THE SITUATION, AND DOES NOT SEE ANY WAY HE CAN SUCCESSFULLY CONFRONT THE FEDAYEEN, AS THE ISRAELIS DEMAND CIVIL WAR AND THE ACTIVE HOSTILITY OF THE ARAB WORLD WOULD RESULT AND PERHAPS SYRIAN OR OTHER ARAB TROOPS WOULD DEMAND THE RIGHT TO DEFEND LEBANON. IN THAT EVENT, ISRAEL WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO ACT IN ANY CASE AND LEBANON WOULD BE AN OUTCAST IN THE ARAB WORLD.

9. WE ALSO DISCUSSED POSSIBLE UNEF PRESENCE ON BORDER (SEPTEL).
PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 318

SUMMARY

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04027 241510Z

53
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00
PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 NIC-01 AID-28 RSR-01 /112 W
----- 011847

O 241435Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0468
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 4027

REF: STATE 79531; TEL AVIV 2647

1. WE HAVE ALSO HAD REPORTS FROM LEBANESE ARMY RE INCREASE IN IDF STRENGTH AND ACTIVITY ON LEBANESE BORDER. ATMOSPHERE IN BEIRUT IS TENSE, AND LEBANESE ASSUME THAT ISRAELI REPRISAL ACTION PROBABLY NOT OVER.
2. LIKE DEPT., WE HAD THOUGHT FIGURE OF 20 LEBANESE CIVILIANS DEAD AND 40 WOUNDED MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT MEASURE OF RETALIATION. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS THAT SIZABLE CIVILIAN EXODUS HAS BEGUN FROM SOUTH LEBANON IN AREA WHICH ISRAELIS SHELLED.
3. GOL IS CERTAINLY CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS TO BRING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY UNDER SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL. DEPT. IS AWARE OF MY RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH GOL ON THIS SUBJECT. TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS CONTACTS WITH CAIRO SEEKING NASSER'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EFFORT. GOL MAY NOT SUCCEED, BUT IN OUR VIEW EACH ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON FURTHER DIMINISHES THE PROSPECTS GOL MIGHT HAVE TO SECURE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN.
4. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LEBANESE ARMY GEN. NOUJAIM RETURNING FROM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04027 241510Z

CAIRO VISIT TONIGHT MAY 24.
PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 749

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04017 221835Z

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53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

003367

R 221625Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 465
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

70 MAY 22 PM 8:40

SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 4017

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA

1. IN PART AS RESULT MEETINGS NOTED TEL AVIV'S 2404 AND JERUSALEM 209, I RAISED GENERAL SUBJECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE CONTACTS WITH MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) MAY 18. HE CONFIRMED CONTACTS THROUGH ILMAC. IN ADDITION, KHOURY SAID HE AND HELOU WERE AWARE THAT CERTAIN CHRISTIAN LEADERS HAD BEEN ENCOURAGING ISRAEL TO HAVE A BASH AT THE FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON--AMONG THEM THE MARONITE PATRIARCH. KHOURY CATEGORIZED THEIR ATTITUDE AS TREMENDOUSLY DANGEROUS TO LEBANON AND SELF-DEFEATING. AS HE POINTED OUT, WHEN ISRAEL ATTACKS FEDAYEEN ON LEBANESE SOIL, IT IS NOT PALESTINIANS BUT LEBANESE WHO SUFFER AND WHOSE COUNTRY IS ENDANGERED. HOWEVER, SAID KHOURY, THERE NOT MUCH HELOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. THE INGRAINED CONCEPT OF LOOKING FOR AN EXTERNAL POWER TO FIGHT THEIR BATTLES IS SO DEEP IN THE OLD-SCHOOL LEBANESE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY THE GAME, EVEN AT RISK TO THEMSELVES AND THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. SINCE FRANCE, UK AND US ARE NO LONGER AVAIL- ABLE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, THE OLDDIEHARDS HAVE NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN BUT ISRAEL. KHOURY ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPOS- SIBLE TO PLAY SUCH A GAME IN TOTAL SECRECY AND UNFORTUNATELY MANY OF THE MUSLIM LEBANESE LEADERS (AND OF COURSE THE PALESTINIANS) HAFFDEEP SUSPICIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S COLLUSION WITH THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS. HE ADDED THAT OF COURSE THE ISRAELIS WERE ALSO BADLY MISLED BY THE OCCASIONAL PLEAS FOR HELP THEY GOT FROM THIS GROUP OF LEBANESE, WHOSE VIEWS WERE NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE COUNTRY. OF COURSE, IF THE SITUATION SHOYLD DETER- IORATE TO CIVIL WAR, SOME OF THE EMBATTLED LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY LOOK FOR ANY POSSIBLE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 09-12/17 Per Itt 8-4-2009

By P.H. NARA Date 10-22-09

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04017 221835Z

FROM ANY SOURCE, AS A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED DIA BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 739

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04016 221814Z

IS A STRONG ADVOCATE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN FRAMEWORK UN RE-
SOLUTION AND HE BELIEVES USG HAS ADOPTED A MORE "BALANCED"
POSITION DURING NIXON ADMINISTRATION. ALSO, JUMBLATT WOULD GREATLY
BENEFIT FROM AN EXPOSURE TO AMERICAN SCENE, TO BALANCE HIS WOOING
BY EAST EUROPEANS AND SOVS. HE HAS NOT VISITED US IN MANY YEARS.

P 221624Z MAY 70

4. ON OTHER HAND, HELOU DOES NOT WANT ENHANCE JUMBLATT'S POLITICAL
STATURE AND THEREBY LEND SUPPORT TO HIS RADICAL POLITICAL FOLLOWING.
IF JUMBLATT WERE TO ARRIVE IN US COINCIDENTALLY AT A TIME OF NEW
US PEACE INITIATIVES, HE COULD REAP A WINDFALL AND EARN UNDESERVED
CREDIT - A CREDIT WHICH HELOU WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE FOR SOMEONE
ELSE (OR HIMSELF). IN OTHER WORDS, HELOU WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED TO
US VISIT BY JUMBLATT, BUT HE WOULD BE GOVERNED BY US REACTION AND
GUIDANCE AS TO TIMING. OF KAMAL JUMBLATT TO US

5. MY ADVICE TO HELOU WAS THAT HE STALL UNTIL I CAN GET DEPT'S BLE
REACTION, BUT ENDEAVOR FIND OUT WHETHER JUMBLATT HAS GENUINE
INTEREST IN MAKING TRIP. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT WE STAND TO GAIN MORE
FROM A SUCCESSFUL JUMBLATT US VISIT THAN WE MIGHT LOSE. JUMBLATT
IS AN INTELLIGENT MAN AND MUCH MORE MODERATE IN HIS PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS THAN IN HIS PUBLIC ESPOUSEMENT OF SOCIALISM, OR ANON'S
HIS PUBLIC CRITICISM OF USG POLICIES. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT PEACE
CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT US PARTICIPATION AND HE WANTS PEACE.
HE HAS AN EGO WHICH WOULD BE SERVED BY A GOOD RECEPTION IN US AND,
AS INTERMEDIARY REMARKED, THE AMBITIOUS JUMBLATT IS NOW - AND WILL
CONTINUE TO BE - A MAJOR POWER ON LEBANESE POLITICAL SCENE. PRO-
FACT HE WOULD CONSIDER GOING TO US, WHICH IS CONSIDERED PUBLIC
ENEMY #2 BY HIS FOLLOWERS, IS IN ITSELF PROOF OF HIS INDEPENDENCE
AND HIS RECOGNITION OF US ROLE IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ATT WILL
FINALLY DECIDE TO GO. NOT ONLY IS HE A BUSY MAN BUT HE FEARS

6. I AGREE WITH HELOU'S COMMENT THAT IT WOULD BE MISTAKEN TO
ALLOW JUMBLATT TO DERIVE OR CLAIM CREDIT FOR HAVING MADE SIGNI-
FICANT CONTRIBUTION TO ME POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT
FIND HIM USEFUL IN THE ENDEAVOR. EXCEPT FOR THIS CAVEAT,
HOWEVER, I WOULD RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED INFORM HELOU WE HAVE
NO OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO US VISIT BY JUMBLATT AND SMALL
ENTOURAGE, SUBJECT TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF TIMING. TO US VISIT
WOULD CATER TO JUMBLATT'S EGO AND PERHAPS MAKE IT EASIER FOR

7. DEPT NOTE THIS VISIT IS NOT (AT MOMENT AT LEAST) RELATED TO IS-
SUBJECT DISCUSSED BEIRUT'S 3782 AND 3968. PURPOSE OF JUMBLATT'S
TRIP, GHORAYEB TELLS ME, WOULD BE MORE FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS
TO PRESENT CASE OF LEBANON AND ARABS. HE WOULD EXPECT TO MEET WITH

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 04016 221814Z

CONGRESS, MEDIA, INTELLECTUALS, AS WELL AS ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.
THE TRIP WOULD REPRESENT THE BEGINNING OF A CONTINUING EFFORT TO
IMPROVE THE ARAB-AMERICAN DIALOGUE.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 04011 221849Z

FIND GREAT PERSONAL SATISFACTION IN MAKING A SUCCESSFUL CONTRI-
BUTION TO PEACE IN THE ME. MAJDALANI ADDED THAT OF COURSE THIS
WAS FOR LEBANON MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH. IN THE LONG RUN ONLY
PEACE COULD SAVE THE LEBANESE STATE.

4. I DID NOT REVEAL I HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH HELOU
(REFTEL) BUT I ASSURED MAJDALANI THAT I WOULD PASS HIS COMMENTS
TO WASHINGTON.

5. IN THE COURSE OF CONVERSATION MAJDALANI
SET CONSIDERABLE STORE
IN THE GROWTH OF DISSENT IN ISRAEL. HE ALSO ALLUDED TO LEBANESE
BELIEF THAT THERE WAS FAVORABLE SHIFT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION
ON THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. HE VOICED CONCERN THAT AS THESE TWO
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS WERE OCCURRING, EVENTS WERE MOVING FAST IN THE
ARAB WORLD AWAY FROM A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND TOWARD A SERIOUS
RUPTURE IN THE US/ARAB RELATIONSHIP. HE HOPED THE PERSISTENT
RUMOURS WERE CORRECT THAT THE US WAS URGENTLY ENGAGED IN DEVEL-
OPING NEW INITIATIVES OR A NEW APPROACH TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 757

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03968 211833Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

126506

P 211751Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 446
USMISSION USUN

2/3

70 MAY 21 PM 4:12

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3968

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO PRIORITY

SUBJ: POSSIBLE LEBANESE ROLE IN ME POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

REF: BEIRUT 3782

1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) RE-OPENED ABOVE SUBJECT AT LUNCH WITH ME TODAY. TO HELOU'S SURPRISE, UAR AMBASSADOR SABRI IS RELENTLESSLY PURSUING THE MATTER. SABRI HAS NOW DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH HELOU TWICE IN RECENT DAYS. HELOU HAS INFORMED SABRI THAT IT WOULD BE EXTERMRLY DIFFICULT TO LEAVE COUNTRY IN PRESENT TROUBLED TIMES, BUT THAT HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO "SERVE AS ARAB ADVOCATE" UTILIZING EMBASSY BEIRUT AS COMMUNICATION CHANNEL. IN RESPONSE SABRI'S QUESTION HELOU HAS STATED THAT HE HAS NOT DISCUSSED QUESTION OF LEBANESE ROLE IN ME SETTLEMENT DIRECTLY WITH ME USING EXCUSE THAT "I HAVE NOT CALLED ON HIM IN SOMETIME". HE HAS ALSO AVOIDED RESPONSE SABRI'S POINTED QUESTIONING ABOUT HELOU'S SPECIFIC THOUGHTS ON WHAT ROLE LEBANON COULD PLAY.

2. KHOURY ASKED WHERE THINGS STOOD. I EXPLAINED I HAD RECEIVED NO ANSWER REFTEL FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS; CAREFUL STUDY OF THE ME PROBLEM WAS IN PROCESS AND THERE WAS NOTHING WE COULD SAY AT THIS TIME. I HAD NO ADVANCE INFORMATION AS TO OUTCOME OF USG RE-ANALYSIS, AS IT RELATED TO PEACE EFFORTS, BUT I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN REACHED ON NEW PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL. KHOURY AND I AGREED THAT WHEN SABRI MADE THIRD CALL ON HELOU THIS AFTERNOON HELOU WOULD INFORM HIM THAT: (A) HE HAD NOT YET HAD OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS POSSIBLE LEBANESE ROLE WITH ME; (B)

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN 09-12/18: Per Str. 8-4-2009

By RAH NARA, Date 10-22-09 (P 1062)

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03968 211833Z

HE DID NOT INTEND TO DO SO UNTIL THERE SOME INDICATION OF A NEW USG APPROACH TO ME SETTLEMENT AND (C) HE EXPECTS I WILL BE CALLING ON HIM WHEN AND IF I HAD SOMETHING TO RERORT ABOUT US ME POLICY DELIBERATIONS. HELOU WILL OF COURSE THEN GET IN TOUCH WITH SABRI AFTER HE HAS MADE HIS OWN EVALUATION AS TO WHETHER HIS PERSONAL PARTICIPATION, OR SOME OTHER LEBANESE ACTION, WOULD BE HELPFUL.

3. I SENT WORD TO HELOU THAT I WOULD GET WORD TO HIM WHEN I HAD RESPONSE FROM DEPARTMENT BUT THAT I COULD VISUALIZE THERE MIGHT BE SOME DELAY. ADDED THAT I COULD OF COURSE GIVE NO ASSURANCES TO HIM ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AS TO OUTCOME USG POLICY REVIEW ON EITHER PHANTOM SALE OR NEW PEACE INITIATIVES. I COULD ONLY ASSURE HIM THAT USG FULLY AWARE OF IMPLICATIONS OF RHANTOM DECISION WHICH WE HAD BEEN FORCED TO BRING UP FOR SECOND LOOK BECAUSE OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN UAR. ADDED THAT I HOPED HE COULD MAKE SABRI UNDERSTAND DIFFICULTIES WHICH THIS NEW ELEMENT POSED FOR US.

4. HELOU IS IMPRESSED WITH UAR PERSISTENCE IN PUSHING FOR POSSIBLE LEBANESE PARTICIPATION IN SEARCH FOR SETTLEMENT. IN ASKING FOR TODAY'S APPOINTMENT SABRI MADE CLEAR HE ACTING UNDER CAIRO INSTRUCTIONS. HELOU DOES NOT KNOW BUT IS INCLINED BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS AT LEAST GENERALLY AWARE THAT UAR EXPLORING THIS QUESTION WITH LEBANON. KHOURY CONJECTURES THAT NASSER IS POSSIBLY TRYING TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT CHANNEL WITH USG TO BYPASS SOVIET FILTER.

5. I WILL BE SEEING KHOURY NEXT SATURDAY P.M., MAY 23RD. PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.



Department of State

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SECRET 798

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03782 151508Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

089448

P 151403Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 397
USMISSION USUN

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3782

EXDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE LEBANESE ROLE IN ME POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

1) MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) TOLD ME THIS MORNING (MAY 15) THAT FONMIN MAJDALANI (WITHOUT PRES HELOUS KNOWLEDGE OR PERMISSION) HAD EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION WITH UAR EMISSARY, MOHAMMED FEYEK DURING LATTERS RECENT VISIT LEBANON, ON SUBJECT WHETHER LEBANON COULD PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN ACHIEVING ME POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. MAJDALANI MENTIONED INTER ALIA POSSIBILITY OF HELOU OR OTHER LEBANESE OFFICIAL VISITING US TO SERVE AS INTERMEDIARY AND ADVOCATE FOR ARAB POSITION.

2) UAR AMB SABRI RETURNED FROM CAIRO YESTERDAY, AND IN CONVERSATION WITH HELOU EXPRESSED NASSERS CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN EXPLORING FURTHER WHAT LEBANON MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH. HELOU NOW MUST RESPOND TO NASSERS QUERY.

3) KHOURY REPORTED HELOUS STRONG DOUBTS THAT HE (OR LEBANON) COULD MAKE AN EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION. NOT ONLY IS HELOU PERSONALLY PESSIMISTIC OVER PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BUT HE ALSO UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY MODERATING OR INTERLOCUTOR ROLE LEBANON MIGHT PLAY COULD CAUSE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH PALESTINIANS AND RADICAL ARAB STATES, ABOVE ALL, SYRIA. DESPITE THE FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES, HOWEVER, HELOU PREPARED TO EXAMINE MATTER FURTHER WITH USG AND WOULD ACCEPT OUR JUDGMENT IF WE FELT HIS PARTICIPATION WOULD BE HELPFUL.

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

NLN09-12/19. Per 8.4.2009

By P.H. NARA, Date 10.22.09 (P.1082)

70 MAY 15 PM 4:27

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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4) LATER IN MORNING I HAD BRIEF CONCERSATION WITH HELOU IN WHICH HE MADE TWO POINTS: (1) THE MAY 1 SPEECH HAS COMMITTED NASSER TO AN IRREVOCABLE COURSE WHICH ULTIMATELY WOULD CAUSE GREAT DAMAGE TO ARAB/US RELATIONSHIPS AND NEW OUTBREAK HOSTILITIES; (2) HELOU PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING IF IT WOULD HELP AVOID THIS IMPENDING CATASTROPHE. IF USG HAS IN MIND A NEW APPROACH TO ME PROBLEM, OR IS CONSIDERING TACTICAL CHANGES WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO EFFECTIVE COMPROMISE, HE LEAVES TO USG THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER HIS INTERVENTION OR PARTICIPATION COULD BE USED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.

5) COMMENT: HELOU HAS NO REAL STOMACH FOR A PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEARCH FOR A ME SETTLEMENT AND HE WOULD RUN GREAT RISKS IF HE TRIED. HIS MOTIVES, NO MATTER HOW HONORABLE, WOULD BE SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM FROM RADICAL ARABS. HE WILL SURELY BREATHE A SIGH OF RELIEF IF WE DECLINE HIS OFFER, ON OTHER HAND, IF NASSER SEES THIS AS AN INTERESTING PROSPECT, IT DESERVES A HARD LOOK.
PORTER

TS: A M9 21 MAY 68

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18/10/100

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03674 122146Z

52
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 IO-13 PM-05 NSC-10 SS-20 RSC-01
L-04 H-02 P-03 PRS-01 INR-07 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
CCO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 ACDA-19 RSR-01 /134 W
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O P 121515Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0371
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 3674

SUBJECT: LEBANESE SITREP NO. 1.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03674 122146Z

REF: BEIRUT 3646 (NOTAL);
BEIRUT 3652 (NOTAL)

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. ACCORDING TO G-2, ISRAELI ARMORED FORCE WHICH ENTERED 'ARQUB EARLY THIS MORNING HAD BY 1430 ADVANCED NORTH ALONG EAST BANK OF HASBANI RIVER TO POINT JUST WEST OF FARDIS, WHERE IT WAS BEING ENGAGED BY LEBANESE ARMED FORCES. ISRAELIS HAVE OCCUPIED RASHAYYA AL FUKHAR AND HIBARIYE AND, ACCORDING UNCONFIRMED REPORTS, HAVE EXCHANGED FIRE WITH FEDAYEEN IN THIS AREA.
2. G-2 REPORTS THAT, AS ISRAELI COLUMNS WERE MOVING NORTH THIS MORNING, THEY CAME UNDER FIRE FROM LEBANESE ARTILLERY WEST OF HASBANI WHICH DISABLED FIVE ISRAELI TANKS. ISRAELI AIR FORCE RIPOSTED BY BOMBING LEBANESE MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE MARJAYOUN-NABATIYE AREA. WE HAVE NO FIRM INFORMATION ON CASUALTIES AND NO CONFIRMATION OF BEIRUT RADIO CLAIM THAT LEBANESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT HAS SHOT DOWN ONE PHANTOM.
3. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION BEARING ON MISSION OF ISRAELI FORCE OTHER THAN UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT ISRAELI AIR FORCE HAS CUT SOME OF THE ROADS LEADING FROM 'ARQUB TO LEBANON PROPER AND SYRIA. ACCORDING DAMASCUS RADIO 1300, SYRIAN ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT HAVE ENGAGED ISRAELI FORCES. WE NOTE ISRAELI CLAIMS THREE SYRIAN MIG-17'S SHOT DOWN.
4. LEBANESE CABINET IS IN CONTINUOUS SESSION. PRESIDENT HELOU HAS CALLED IN BIG-FOUR AMBASSADORS (SEPTEL). GOL HAS CALLED FOR SPECIAL MEETING OF UNSC AND NAMED FOUR-MAN DELEGATION TO CONVEY COMPLAINT TO THAT BODY.
5. AT 1200, BEIRUT RADIO BEGAN BROADCASTING STATEMENT BY PRIMIN KARAME ACCUSING ISRAEL OF EXPLOITING RECENT BORDER INCIDENTS AS PRETEXT FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON. ASCRIBING ALL THE MISFORTUNES TO ISRAEL, KARAME PROCLAIMED THAT UNITED LEBANON, AS INTEGRAL PART OF ARAB WORLD, WILL DEFEND ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND NEUTRALITY WITH DETERMINATION.
6. AT 1645 REUTERS QUOTED LEBANESE OFFICIALS TO EFFECT AIRCRAFT



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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03674 122146Z

SHOT DOWN OVER LEBANON WAS NOT RPT NOT PHANTOM BUT SYRIAN MIG
SHOT DOWN BY ISRAELIS.
PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03675 121827Z

43-42
ACTION NEA-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSCE-00 NSC-10 IO-04 L-02 INR-06 CIAE-00
NSAE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 RSR-01 RSC-01

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065447

0 121533Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0372
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T BEIRUT 3675

LIMDIS

REF: BEIRUT 3667

1) IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS EMBASSY HAS FULL SYMPATHY WITH ISRAELI IN CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN OPERATING FROM LEBANON, AND WITH THEIR REACTION TO RECENT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. ONE HAS EQUAL SYMPATHY FOR LEBANESE WHO ARE CAUGHT IN DILEMMA NOT OF THEIR MAKING AND BEYOND THEIR CAPACITY TO ESCAPE.

2) LEBANESE, NOTING INCREASING VOLUME OF PUBLIC ISRAELI THREATS, HAVE BEEN EXPECTING THIS ATTACK FOR DAYS. THEY HAD HOPED - AS IN PAST - THAT SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF ISRAELI REPRISALS WOULD BE LIMITED TO HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS AGAINST FEDAYEEN TARGETS SO THAT LEBANESE ARMY WOULD NOT HAVE TO BECOME INVOLVED. TODAY (MAY 12) ISRAELIS HAVE INVOLVED LEBANESE MILITARY.

3) THIS MAKES IT A NEW BALLGAME IN LEBANON. LEBANESE HAVE NEITHER THE MANPOWER NOR THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO BUILD A LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT BUT THERE WILL BE STRONG PRESSURE ON GOL NOT TO TRY. THIS LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT HAS, ALBEIT UNWILLINGLY,

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03675 121827Z

FURTHER COMMITTED THEM TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. THIS HAS BEEN A LONG-TIME MAJOR FEDAYEEN OBJECTIVE. AS FOR THE FEDAYEEN (WHATEVER THE MILITARY SUCCESS OF THEIR ISRAELI RAID), THEY WILL HAVE DERIVED THE SAME SORT OF BOOST IN MORALE WHICH THEY GOT FROM KARAMEH RAID ON WEST BANK IN MARCH 1968. IN THE POLITICAL EQUATION, LEBANESE RADICAL ELEMENTS ARE BOUND TO FEEL STRONGER, AND THE CONSERVATIVE "NEUTRALISTS" WILL CORRESPONDINGLY BE MUTED.

4) WE ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO EXPERIENCE A RISE IN ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING, VIRULENCE OF WHICH WILL DEPEND IN LARGE PART ON USG ACTIONS

IN SC. QUESTION WILL BE WHETHER LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES, FORCED AS THEY NOW ARE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER, WILL IF NEEDED BE ABLE PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE. WITH OUR LARGE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND MANY AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENTS HERE, WE FORESEE POSSIBILITY OF REAL TROUBLE.

5) OUR ACTIONS IN THE SC DEBATE ON THIS INCIDENT WILL HAVE A MAJOR EFFECT ON OUR CAPACITY TO SURMOUNT THIS POTENTIAL CRISIS IN LEBANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS. I REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT IGNORE THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF THE ISRAELIS OVER THEIR RECENT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN GALILEE. AT SAME TIME, I FEEL WE MUST DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM SUPPORT FOR THE REPRISAL OF THIS NATURE AND MAGNITUDE. WE STILL DO NOT HAVE ALL DETAILS, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT A SIZEABLE MILITARY OPERATION IS UNDERWAY AT THE MOMENT, THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH THE ISRAELIS EITHER DID NOT KNOW, OR HAVE IGNORED. THIS EMBASSY HAS PREDICTED THEM FREQUENTLY, AND DEPT HAS MADE OUR VIEWS CLEAR TO GOI ON MANY OCCASIONS.

6) WE HOPE OUR STANCE IN THE SC DEBATE CAN EMPHASIZE OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON AND FOR THE CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON INNOCENT LEBANESE CIVILIANS DURING THE REPRISAL RAID. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ATTACK DOES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE PROVOCATIONS. ALSO, WHILE WE CANNOT IGNORE THE LEGITIMATE ISRAELI CONCERNS, WHICH LED TO THE REPRISAL, WE DO HAVE SOME IMPORTANT US INTERESTS TO PROTECT IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT OUR ACTIONS AND WORDS IN SC MAY HAVE TO TAILORED ACCORDINGLY.

7) WE HAVE BEEN SEARCHING FOR NEW APPROACHES. THE ONLY ONE WHICH OCCURS IS THE ANCIENT QUESTION OF UN FORCES ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. IT SEEMS TO HAVE MOST OF THE DRAWBACKS WHICH WE HAVE FORESEEN IN THE PAST AND CERTAINLY IT WOULD BE STRONGLY RESISTED BY

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03675 121827Z

FEDAYEEN, THE OTHER ARAB STATES, AND THEREFORE THE SOVS. IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT FOR PRES. HELOU TO ASK FOR AN EFFECTIVE UN FORCE TO PRESENT - EVEN ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER; BUT HE WOULD BE HAPPY HAVE SUCH A FORCE "IMPOSED" ON LEBANON. POSSIBLY THE USG, HOPEFULLY WITH BIG FOUR SUPPORT, CAN REQUEST AN INCREASE IN SIZE AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNMO'S. THIS ACT IN ITSELF WOULD HAVE LITTLE PRACTICAL VALUE, BUT IT WOULD AT LEAST INDICATE A US CONCERN FOR THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND MIGHT BE FIRST STEP LEADING ULTIMATELY TO A POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF A UNEF, IF THIS LATER SEEMED ESSENTIAL. WE WERE STRUCK BY KABBANI'S ADVOCACY OF PROPOSAL FOR MORE UN OBSERVERS (STATE 71186, PARA 3).

8) GOL IS ESSENTIALLY PARALYZED AT THIS POINT. IT IS NOT CAPABLE OF TAKING EFFECTIVE INITIATIVE TO PROTECT ITSELF. IT IS LIMITED TO SEEKING SUPPORT FROM UN AND ITS WESTERN FRIENDS TO MITIGATE OR AVERT THE DISASTER WHICH IT SEES IN THE OFFING.
PORTER

SECRET LIMDIS

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 138

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03032 171257Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

093488

O 171236Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 189

SECRET BEIRUT 3032

EXDIS

FOLLOWING BEIRUT TEL SENT ACTION TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE INFO
NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 17 APR 70 REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE.

SECRET BEIRUT 3023

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 1967

FOR SISCO

1) FONMIN MAJDALANI INFORMED US THIS MORNING LEBANESE
HAVE AUTHORIZED PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION IN DOWNTOWN AREA
AT 1600 HOURS SATURDAY, WITH AGREEMENT ON PART
DEMONSTRATION LEADERS THAT NO WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED.
MAJDALANI EXPRESSED NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT YOUR VISIT.

2) IN VIEW NEW AND LATER ARRIVAL TIME BEIRUT, WE INTEND
REVISE SCHEDULE SO YOU WILL NOT LEAVE AREA OF RESIDENCE
EXCEPT FOR TWO-MINUTE DRIVE TO PRESIDENCY. PROPOSE
INVITE PRIMIN AND FONMIN TO LUNCH AT RESIDENCE AND
HAVE ALTERNATE PLANS USE HELICOPTER FROM AIRPORT TO
RESIDENCE IF NECESSARY. YOU WILL THEREFORE NEVER BE
WITHIN CITY.

3) THEREFORE FEEL WE CAN AVOID EXPOSURE TO DEMONSTRATIONS.
RESIDENCE BEING ADJACENT TO PRESIDENCY IS IN HEAVILY DEFENDED

2/3

70 APR 17 PM 1:12
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03032 171257Z

AREA OUTSIDE CITY.

4) WE DO NOT KNOW HOW NEWS OF SYMMES' PNG MAY AFFECT SITUATION. WILL TRY GET ASSESSMENT AND INFORM YOU BY 1400. THIS WOULD GIVE YOU OPTION OF TAKING DIRECT AIR FRANCE FLIGHT FROM TEL AVIV TO TEHRAN THIS EVENING. AS OF NOW HOWEVER WE EXPECT YOU IN BEIRUT. PORTER

SI : I M T I RQA 07
SI : I M T I RQA 07
SI : I M T I RQA 07

SECRET

88/10/107



Department of State

WEH
TELEGRAM

SECRET 137

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03031 171301Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

093510

O 171234Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 188

SECRET BEIRUT 3031

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 3023

FOR SISCO

70 APR 17 PM 1:12

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1) EMBOFF SAW PRIMIN KARAME AT NOON AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WHERE HE WAS CONSULTING WITH PRES HELOU. KARAME INDICATED NO RESERVATIONS ABOUT YOUR VISIT BEIRUT. WE CONTINUE RECEIVE REPORTS OF POSSIBLE DEMONSTRATIONS IN CITY IN ADDITION TO ONE MENTIONED REFTEL BUT YOU WILL AVOID THEM.

2) WE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT WHEN MEA WILL GET YOU HERE FROM NICOSIA BUT WE WILL PLAY EVERYTHING BY EAR IF YOU ARE DELAYED. SUGGEST YOU HAVE LUNCH ENROUTE IF THERE IS DELAY YOUR DEPARTURE NICOSIA. MEA 262 NORMALLY DEPARTS NICOSIA 1200, ARRIVING BEIRUT 1240.

3) WE HAVE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED MEETING WITH KARAME AT 1430 AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY 1515 MEETING WITH PRES HELOU. WE WILL TRY SOMEHOW FIT FONMIN INTO PICTURE IF WE CAN GET HIM UP TO RESIDENCE IN YARZE.

4) WE NOW PLAN HELICOPTER TRANSPORT TO AND FROM AIRPORT AS PRIMARY ALTERNATIVE.

5) YOUR VISIT HERE WILL PRODUCE SOME STATIC BUT THE SECURITY RISKS ARE, WE BELIEVE, MINIMAL AND

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 03031 171301Z

GOL DETERMINED KEEP IT THAT WAY. SEE YOU SOME TIME TOMORROW.
PORTER

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 271

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02992 161243Z

45
ACTION SS-45

2/3

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

085348

O P 161220Z APR 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 177
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET BEIRUT 2992

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SISCO VISIT

1. FONMIN MAJDALANI INFORMED EMBASSY AT 1330 THAT GOL IS UNAWARE OF ANY REASON WHY SISCO VISIT TO LEBANON WOULD CREATE ANY SECURITY PROBLEM GOL COULD NOT HANDLE. HOWEVER, MININT JUMBLATT IS MEETING TODAY WITH FEDAYEEN AND RADICAL LEADERS IN SEARCH OF THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO "MAKE TROUBLE" DURING VISIT. HE PROMISED INFORM EMBASSY SOONEST OF THE RESULTS OF THIS MEETING.

2. MAJDALANI REITERATED KEEN GOL INTEREST IN RECEIVING SISCO IN ORDER TO PRESENT ITS POINT OF VIEW FIRST HAND. AS OF NOW, WE SEE NO PAROCHIAL REASON FOR CANCELLING VISIT.
PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02987 161124Z

21
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

084986

P R 161010Z APR 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0176
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

70 APR 16 AM 11:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 2987
EXDIS
SISCO VISIT

REF: STATE 055669

SECURITY FOR VISIT FULLY COORDINATED LEBANESE SURETE, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ARMY. ALL COOPERATIVE AND CONFIDENT THAT MEASURES TAKEN WILL MINIMIZE RISK. MCCABE WILL BRIEF SY OFFICERS ON ARRIVAL. LEBANESE HAVE MET ALL OF OUR REQUESTS.
PORTER

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. TWINING, 4/16/70.

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SECRET 664

26

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02969 151534Z

54
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

078328

O 151515Z APR 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECSTATE WASHDC 169

SECRET BEIRUT 2969

EXDIS

FROM PORTER TO SISCO

1. AT MOMENT BEIRUT IS QUIET. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS OF SERIOUS TROUBLE BREWING, ALTHOUGH WE WILL KNOW MORE TOMORROW. WE ARE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES AND LEADERSHIP. NONE HAVE EVIDENCED SENSE OF ALARM.

2. ADMITTEDLY EVENTS OF NEXT FEW HOURS IN AMMAN COULD HAVE DRAMATIC EFFECT ON BEIRUT SITUATION BUT AS OF MOMENT I BELIEVE YOUR TRIP HERE CAN BE HANDLED WITHOUT SERIOUS RISK. THERE WILL PROBABLY BE SOME DEMONSTRATIONS BUT NOT OF THE KIND EXPERIENCED IN AMMAN AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO AVOID THEM.

3. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IT OBVIOUSLY BETTER IF YOU GO TO BOTH AMMAN AND BEIRUT. BYPASSING AMMAN MIGHT EMBOLDEN PALESTINIANS HERE TO DISRUPT THINGS BUT EVEN IF YOU ELIMINATE AMMAN I STILL RECOMMEND VISIT BEIRUT SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION TOMORROW. GOL WANTS YOUR VISIT. AS YOU WELL AWARE, FEDAYEEN WOULD SEIZE ON THE CANCELLATION OF BEIRUT VISIT AS A VICTORY FOR THEM OVER LEBANON.
PORTER

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SECRET 731

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02944 151559Z

42

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

078505

R 151046Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0167

SECRET BEIRUT 02944

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y F O R T E X T . P A R A 4 .

SUBJECT: ARMS

1. IN OUR MEETING APRIL 13 PRES HELOU WAS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR OUR POSITIVE REPLY TO GOL ARMS REQUEST. HE SAID HE REGRETTED STATE OF LEBANESE FINANCES HAD MADE IT ESSENTIAL ASK OUR ASSISTANCE AND HE APPRECIATED USG'S SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE. HE AWARE LEBANESE ARMY TEAM NOW IN US INSPECTING TANKS, AND HE HOPEFUL DELIVERY OF TANKS SELECTED COULD BE MADE SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. HE SAID, OF THE ADDITIONAL THREE MILLION DOLLARS HE HAD RECENTLY ALLOCATED TO ARMY, PERHAPS A HALF MILLION COULD BE SET ASIDE FOR THIS ARMS PURCHASE. THE ALLOCATION WAS ORIGINALLY MADE, AND WAS REQUIRED FOR, FINANCING ARMY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH LEBANON SUCH AS BUILDING SHELTERS AND PROVIDING CERTAIN SOCIAL SERVICES TO THE FRONT-LINE INHABITANTS. FEDAYEEN PRESENTLY ACTIVE IN THE FIELDS TRYING TO WOO SUPPORT OF SOUTHERN LEBANESE, AND GOL IN COMPETITION WITH FEDAYEEN FOR LOYALTY OF POPULATION IN BORDER AREA.

3. IN EXTENDED CONVERSATION ON LEBANESE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION REPORTED SEPTEL, HELOU MADE SPECIAL POINT OF NECESSITY FOR MAINTAINING A STRONG ARMY WHICH WAS CRITICAL INSTITUTION IN KEEPING BALANCE WITH FEDAYEEN.

4. CIG GEN NOUJAIM JUST INFORMED DATT THAT SENIOR MEMBER LEBANESE MILITARY TEAM NOW IN US, BRIGADIER HAMDAN, HAS NOT COMMUNICATED WITH BEIRUT. NOUJAIM THEREFORE ASSUMES HAMDAN'S MISSION PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY. NOUJAIM GAVE IMPRESSION THAT HAMDAN HAS AUTHORITY

70 APR 15 PM 4:47
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 02944 151559Z

PURCHASE UP TO A TOTAL OF FIFTY TANKS. HE ALSO INFORMED US HAMDAN HAS AUTHORITY PURCHASE SOME OF THE 50-CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS WITH MOUNTS WHICH WE OFFERED ALONG WITH TANKS. PORTER

TP: 4 M9 21 99A DT
SITTING ROOM
WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

6/10/109



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TELEGRAM

SECRET 361

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02775 091115Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

039569

P 091000Z APR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 128
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

SECRET BEIRUT 2775

EXDIS

1. ROBERT ANDERSON WRITING UP DETAILS HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SAUDIS INCLUDING TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR MEETING WITH FAISAL FOR REPORTING SEPARATELY. HE ASKED ME TO REPORT FOLLOWING.
2. FAISAL AT END CONVERSATION ASKED ANDERSON MEET WITH KAMEL ADHAM AT AIRPORT PRIOR ANDERSONS DEPARTURE. ADHAM HAS APPARENTLY JUST RETURNED TO COUNTRY.
3. ANDERSON SAID THE PURPORT ADHAMS MESSAGE VERY CLEAR ALTHOUGH EXPRESSED IN USUAL OBLIQUE ARAB FASHION. KING FAISAL, SAID ADHAM, IS PAYING OFFICIAL VISIT TO INDONESIA AND JAPAN DURING MAY (DATES NOT YET FIRM) AND WISHES RETURN VIA US FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON. ADHAM SAID KING BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL HE GIVE HIS EVALUATION OF DETERIORATING SITUATION IN ME DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT. OBVIOUSLY FAISAL EXPECTS USG TAKE INITIATIVE EXTEND APPROPRIATE INVITATION. PORTER

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SECRET 597

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01830 01 OF 02 091447Z

02

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

109236

P R 091346Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9844
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

70 MAR 9 PM 2:41

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 1830

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: TEL AVIV 1168 AND 1169 (NOTAL)

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER

1. TEL AVIV'S 1168 CITED A TWO-DAY PERIOD OF QUIET ON THE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE HOPE THAT ISRAEL'S HARD LINE AGAINST LEBANON HAS FINALLY PAID OFF.

2. TEL AVIV 1169 CUT SHORT THIS LINE OF SPECULATION BY REPORTING A NEW CLASH BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND THE IDF AT SHATULA MARCH 5 IN WHICH AN ISRAELI SOLDIER WAS KILLED.

3. THE RECENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE BORDER DRAMATIZES THE IMMENSE COMPLEXITY OF THE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON. IF THERE IS ANY WAY TO CONTROL THE PROBLEM, IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE BLUDGEON APPROACH. AFTER A YEAR AND A HALF OF FEDAYEEN-WATCHING, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY ANTI-FEDAYEEN STRATEGY MUST TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS OF LIFE.

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4. FRAGILITY OF THE LEBANESE STATE - WE APPRECIATE IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR ISRAELIS TO UNDERSTAND LEBANON, ALTHOUGH WE PRIVATELY SUSPECT THEY UNDERSTAND IT BETTER THAN THEY ADMIT TO US. LEBANON IS AS DIVERSE AS ISRAELI IS MONOLITHIC. WHEN THE FEDAYEEN HIT THE IDF, ALL ISRAELI WINCES, BUT AN IDF REPRISAL HAS A DIFFERENT MEANING FOR EACH LEBANESE SECT AND FACTION. TO THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT, EACH REPRISAL IS AN ADDED REASON FOR EXPELLING THE PALESTINIANS; TO THE MUSLIM MAJORITY, IT IS NEW EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM; TO THE FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES, IT IS ANOTHER ADVANCE IN THEIR LONG-RANGE STRATEGY TO INVOLVE LEBANON IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR; TO THE SYRIANS AND THEIR LEBANESE BAATH ADHERENTS IT IS ANOTHER BLOW TO THE PROSPERITY AND STABILITY OF LEBANON. LEBANESE DISUNITY MAGNIFIES FEDAYEEN INFLUENCE. THEY DO NOT YET CONTROL LEBANON, BUT THEY HAVE THE INITIATIVE. IN THE SHORT RUN, BY ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, THE IDF EXACERBATES COMMUNAL STRESSES, WEAKENS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND REDUCES ITS CAPACITY FOR DEALING WITH THE FEDAYEEN. IT ALSO SERVES TO HEAP RIDICULE ON THE SMALL LEBANESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH NEITHER HAS, NOR INTENDS TO HAVE, THE CAPACITY TO RESIST ISRAELI ATTACK.

5. TACIT LEBANON-ISRAELI ALLIANCE. - SO FAR, LEBANON IS RUN BY A CONSERVATIVE COALITION THAT WISHES IT COULD SUPPRESS FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. IT SHARES WITH ISRAEL A HEARTY DISTASTE FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE ISRAELIS MAY FIND IT TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO CHARGE GOL COLLUSION WITH THE FEDAYEEN. THEY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY MISTAKEN TO BELIEVE THE CHARGE. LAST YEAR'S SERIES OF BLOODY FEDAYEEN-LEBANESE CLASHES, CULMINATING IN THE OCTOBER INSURRECTION, SHOWED BEYOND QUESTION WHERE THE GOL'S TRUE SYMPATHIES LIE. LEBANON IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE AN ADMINISTRATION AND HIGH COMMAND MORE WILLING TO TAKE ON THE FEDAYEEN THAN PRES HELOU AND GEN NOUJAIM. THE OTHER DAY NOUJAIM CONFIDED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE COULD STILL DEFEAT THE FEDAYEEN MILITARILY - BUT LEBANON WOULD COLLAPSE IN THE PROCESS. NO ONE AWARE OF SYRIA'S DESIGNS ON LEBANON, AND SAIGA'S MACHINATIONS THEREIN, COULD ARGUE THE POINT. LAST OCTOBER THE LEBANESE FOUGHT THE FEDAYEEN IN A WAR WHICH, IN WINNING, THEY LOST. ISRAELI SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE LEBANESE TO TAKE THAT ROAD AGAIN, NOR SHOULD THE USG.

6. FEDAYEEN ELUSIVENESS. - TIME IS THEIR WEAPON. CONSEQUENTLY THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED A FLEXIBLE STRATEGY, PERIODICALLY LAUNCHING NEW INITIATIVES, BUT PULLING BACK INTO THE HILLS WHENEVER THEY RUN INTO AN OBSTACLE. BY PATIENT APPLICATION OF THIS

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01830 01 OF 02 091447Z

STRATEGY IN 1969, THE FEDAYEEN FINALLY ACHIEVED THEIR KEY OBJECTIVE OF BREAKING INTO SOUTH LEBANON. NOW, USING THE SAME FORMULA, ARAFAT HAS BOBBED OUT OF IMMEDIATE GOL RANGE BY REPORTEDLY AGREEING TO FREEZE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES ON THE BORDER. PROBABLY HE MEANS IT, BUT SOONER OR LATER HE WILL BE BACK ON THE OFFENSIVE. MEANWHILE THE GOL AND THE IDF WILL HAVE TO CONTEND WITH TPP VARIOUS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS THAT REJECT PLO DISCIPLINE AND COMMITMENTS. THE PFLP, NOT FATEH, HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE SHATULA INCIDENT CITED ABOVE.
PORTER

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 1830

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REF: TEL AVIV 1168 AND 1169 (NOTAL)

EXDIS:

SUBJ: LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER
7. EVOLVING ARAB ATTITUDES.- ISRAEL'S GREATEST STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGE DERIVES FROM ARAB DISUNITY. CONTRARY TO ISRAELI ANALYSES,
HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A PERMANENT CMMDITION. IN FACT,
PRESENT ISRAELI STRATEGY IS WORKING AGAINST COMMUNAL DIVISION IN
LEBANON. MOST LEBANESE PREFER NEUTRALITY. HOWEVER, IF FORCED TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN AND TACIT ALLIANCE WITH
ISRAEL, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO OPT FOR THE FEDAYEEN. THE IDF
SEEMS BENT ON IMPOSING THAT CHOICE ON THE LEBANESE. ALSO, ALL
LEBANESE, EVEN THE NEUTRALISTS, TAKE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB
TERRITORY AS EVIDENCE OF A POLICY OF EXPANSIONISM. MOREOVER,
DEEP DOWN, ALL THE LEBANESE REGARD EACH NEW ARAB DEFEAT AS A BLOW
TO ARAB SELF-RESPECT. HENCE THE GRADUAL PERMEATION OF ARAB SOCIETY
BY THE FEDAYEEN MYSTIQUE, THE READINESS OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS
TO CONDEMN ANY ARAB REGIME THAT DECLARES WAR ON THE FEDAYEEN, AND
THE BELLIGERENT STATEMENTS BY THE MOST CONSERVATIVE LEBANESE
LEADERS, INCLUDING SHIA LEADER KAMEL AL-ASSAD AND MARONITE LEADER
CAMILLE CHAMOUN, EACH OF WHOM HAS JUST ISSUED A CALL FOR FULL

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MOBILIZATION. ISRAEL'S PRESENT MILITARY STRATEGY, WHATEVER ITS SUCCESS IN THE PAST, IS STEADILY PROMOTING THE ANTI-ISRAEL TREND. NO LEBANESE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT THE FEDAYEEN'S APPARENTLY MINOR ACHIEVEMENTS ALONG THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER ARE SUCH AS TO WARRANT A THREAT BY THE IDF TO CAUTERIZE A TEN-KILOMETER STRIP OF LEBANESE TERRITORY.

8. THE ISRAELI DILEMMA.-- NO CLEAR CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATIONSHIP CAN BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY AND ANY PROLONGED PERIOD OF QUIET ON THE LEBANESE FRONTIER. OBVIOUSLY, WHEN THE IDF ATTACKS, THE FEDAYEEN RUN FOR COVER, BUT EACH TIME THEY COME BACK, ARMED WITH A LITTLE MORE POPULAR SUPPORT, PUTTING ASIDE THE UNDERSTANDABLE LEBANESE TENDENCY TO ATTACH ULTERIOR MOTIVES TO PAST ISRAELI STATEMENTS OF INTEREST IN SOUTH LEBANON, TO ISRAEL'S REPUDIATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, TO INTEMPERATE ISRAELI WARNINGS, AND TO THE IDF'S READINESS TO CROSS THE FRONTIER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE POSITIONS ARE PRIMARILY THE PRODUCT OF INTENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE SMALL BUT STEADY LOSS OF LIFE, PLUS THE PRESENT ISRAELI LEADERSHIP'S PROPENSITY FOR OVERREACTING, IN THE BELIEF THAT THE ARABS (EVEN THE PACIFIC LEBANESE) WILL THEN ACT IN THE INTEREST OF ISRAEL. THE POINT IS, IF ISRAEL REALLY WANTS TO KEEP BORDER INCIDENTS FROM ESCALATING RAPIDLY, ITS PRESENT STRATEGY IS WRONG. IT IS NOW STARTING ON A COURSE WHICH WILL GRADUALLY FORCE LEBANON INTO THE RADICAL AND MILITANT ARAB CAMP. MANY FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE WILL BE KILLED IN THE PROCESS, BUT SURELY MORE ISRAELIS AS WELL.

9. FOR TWENTY YEARS LEBANON HAD A RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST WITH ISRAEL. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS CERTAINLY MORE FRAGILE NOW, AND THE GOL IS LESS IN CONTROL OF ITS OWN DESTINY -- BUT THERE IS STILL A STRONG WILL TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE IF ISRAEL CAN ABANDON PROVOCATIVE LEGALISMS, SUCH AS THE PERSISTENT CANARD THAT THE GOL, WHICH STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED ANY ACT OF MILITANCY IN 1967, "DECLARED WAR ON ISRAEL." IT CAN STOP SNIPING AT THE GAA, WHICH HELPED KEEP THE BORDER QUIET FOR TWENTY YEARS. IT MUST STOP OBSTRUCTING THE ACTIVITIES AND THE POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER OF THE SMALL UN OBSERVER TEAM. IF THE LEGALISMS ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO HER THAN FACTS, THEN ISRAEL HERSELF MUST BEAR MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR TODAY'S UNHAPPY SITUATION.

10. ISRAEL MUST THEREFORE MINIMIZE THE GOL'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY, AND NURTURE WHAT REMAINS OF THE GOL/GOI COMMUNITY OF INTEREST. THIS COMMUNITY OF VIEWS STARTS WITH A MUTUAL DISTRUST OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND A DESIRE TO AVOID WAR. THE FEDAYEEN DO NOT YET CALL THE TUNE IN

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LEBANON, EXCEPT IN THEIR NOW-ESTABLISHED RIGHT TO EXIST IN THE COUNTRY. BUT IF ISRAEL CONTINUES TO STRAFE LEBANESE ROADS AND ASSUME POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES ON LEBANESE TERRITORY, PERHAPS SOME DAY THEY WILL. TWO DAYS AGO, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, A LEBANESE SOLDIER DIED IN A FIREFIGHT WITH THE IDF. THE LEBANESE ARMY IS NO MENACE TO THE IDF, BUT IT IS THE ONLY FORCE WHICH CAN COUNTER THE FEDAYEEN. IF IT IS COMMITTED TO THE FIGHT AGAINST ISRAEL, THE LEBANON WHICH COULD RETAIN MUTUAL INTERESTS WITH ISRAEL WILL CEASE TO EXIST. THIS SHOULD SERVE AS A MEASURE OF RESTRAINT TO THE IDF TO CONFINE ITS OPERATIONS TO THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE LINE, WITH AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF CROSS-BORDER REPRISAL ACTIONS. THE ISRAELI DETERRENT IS A POWERFUL ONE, BUT IT WILL NOT SUCCEED IF IT IS OVER-USED AGAINST LEBANON.

1. IN CONCLUSION, AS LONG AS THERE IS NO SETTLEMENT AND THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO OCCUPY ARAB TERRITORY, FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE NO MATTER WHAT THE ISRAELIS DO. THE NECESSITY IS TO MINIMIZE ITS INCIDENCE. IF THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT POLICY TOWARD SUCH ACTIVITY, THE END RESULT WILL BE A SITUATION ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDERS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT ALONG THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CEASE-FIRE LINES. ISRAEL WOULD THUS BE FACED WITH THREE BATTLEFRONTS RATHER THAN TWO. THE MILITARY ASPECT DOES NOT APPEAR TO DISTURB THEM, BUT THE PROSPECT OF A RADICAL AND HOSTILE LEBANON SHOULD. AS AN AREA SETTLEMENT IS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, IT WOULD APPEAR IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO HELP US PLAY FOR MORE TIME AND TO SEE IF WE CAN KEEP LEBANON FROM THE EQUALLY BLEAK PROSPECTS OF CIVIL WAR, OR TOTAL ALIGNMENT WITH THE ARAB MILITANTS. IF WE DON'T SUCCEED, CHANCES FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE ME WILL BE PERHAPS FATALLY DAMAGED.

2. IN THE PROCESS, THE US STANDS TO LOSE MUCH. INDEED, WE HAVE MUCH MORE TO LOSE THAN DOES ISRAEL. AS PRES HELOU SOMBERLY TOLD AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK, HE MAY BE THE LAST AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE WITH WHOM THE LEBANESE CHIEF OF STATE CAN DEAL OPENLY, AS A FRIEND. PORTER

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EXDIS

LONDON FOR SISCO

1. ROBERT ANDERSON INFORMED ME THIS MORNING HE ARRIVING CAIRO THIS EVENING. HE GUEST OF UARG AND THEY MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR VISIT WHICH INCLUDE MEETING WITH NASSER.

2. ANDERSON REGRETS DEEPLY HIS VISIT COINCIDES WITH SISCO'S - SAYS ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE SOMETIME AGO AND HE REGRETS HE CANNOT ALTER SCHEDULE. PURPOSE OF UAR VISIT IS DISCUSSION OIL CONCESSIONS ALTHOUGH HE, OF COURSE, EXPECTS TO HAVE USUAL GENERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH UAR OFFICIALS.

3. IF SISCO HAS ANY SPECIAL WORD TO COMMUNICATE TO ANDERSON HE CAN BE REACHED THROUGH EMBASSY BEIRUT UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 1900 HOURS LOCAL TIME TODAY (1700 GMT) OR, OF COURSE, THROUGH BERGUS.

4. FOR BERGUS: ANDERSON WILL BE EITHER AT HILTON OR SHEPPARDS. HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AT SOME POINT, BUT HE BEING MET BY UAR OFFICIALS. HE DEPARTS CAIRO SUNDAY NITE RETURNING BEIRUT. PORTER

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE

1. QAIMAQAM ALEY INFORMED FSL BY TELEPHONE 1330 THAT HEAVY FIRE WAS BEING EXCHANGED BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND SECURITY FORCES IN KAHHALE, AND FEDAYEEN HAD ALREADY TAKEN SEVEN CASUALTIES.
2. ANOTHER FSL TELEPHONES FROM AIRPORT AREA AT 1430 TO REPORT HEAVY EXCHANGE OF FIRE BETWEEN FEDAYEE OBD SMITILA CAMP AND SECURITY FORCES DEPLOYED BETWEEN SHATILA AND THE SEA.
3. ABOVE REPORTS PRELIMINARY NOT REPEAT NOT YET CONFIRMED BY VD.

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SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN TO IMPLICATE USG IN THE LEBANESE CRISIS

1. SOME OF THE REPORTING AND COMMENTARY ON THE MARCH 25 PALESTINIAN-LEBANESE CLASH AT KAHHALE (RESULTED IN NINE COMMANDO DEATHS) HAS ASCRIBED THE INCIDENT TO AN "IMPERIALIST PLOT." IN MARCH 26 EDITORIAL, EXTREMIST AL MUHARRIR MADE FIRST SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF US ROLE IN PROVOKING THE CLASH. AMIN AL 'AWAR ACCUSED CIA OF HAVING ENGINEERED "AMBUSH" IN CONNECTION WITH CONTINUING EFFORT TO SUPPRESS FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. ON MARCH 27, MUHARRIR BECAME EVEN MORE SPECIFIC, NAMING "VARIOUS LEBANESE ELEMENTS" AND "FOREIGN EMBASSIES, HEADED BY THE US EMBASSY."

2. IT APPEARS THAT THE THEME OF AMERICAN COMPLICITY IS BEING ORCHESTRATED FROM CAIRO. THE CAIRO-BASED SAWT AL 'ASIFAH (FATAH) HAS DESCRIBED THE UNKNOWN WHO FIRED ON THE PALESTINIANS AS "THE SLAVES OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT." ACCORDING MARCH 27 ARAB WORLD, CAIRO'S SEMI-OFFICIAL AL GUMHURIA HAS CITED ITS BEIRUT CORRESPONDENT AS SOURCE FOR REPORTING THAT US EMBASSY PAID LL THREE MILLION TO ARRANGE KAHHALE AFFAIR AND OTHER RECENT ANTI-FEDAYEEN CONSPIRACIES.

3. MARCH 27 BEIRUT LE SOIR PICKED UP GUMHURIA STORY UNDER HEADLINE "AS AL GUMHURIA SEES THINGS IN LEBANON: AN AMERICAN-ZIONIST PLOT TO LIQUIDATE THE FEDAYEEN." LE SOIR ACCOUNT ALSO CONTAINS

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ALLEGATION THAT US HAS BEEN FURNISHING ANTI-FEDAYEEN LEBANESE WITH ARMS THROUGH MUHAMMAD STAYTIYYAH (THE SMUGGLER KILLED BY THE FE-DAYEEN MARCH 24.)

4. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH DOUBTFUL LEBANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT PRESS ALLEGATION, CHARGE IN INTEREST SECURITY AMERICAN COMMUNITY INTENDS TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN TO SENIOR LEBANESE OFFICIAL WITH WHOM HE HAS AN APPOINTMENT TOMORROW.
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SUBJ: LEBANESE SECURITY SITUATION

REF: BEIRUT 2390

1. IN MEETING NOON FRIDAY MARCH 27, MICHEL KHOURY INFORMED ME THAT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING LAST NIGHT AGREED THAT MINISTER OF INTERIOR KAMAL JUMBLATT WOULD FOR THE TIME BEING BE GIVEN FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING CURRENT LEBANESE CRISIS. GROUP CONSISTING OF PRES HELOU, PRIMIN KARAME, CINC GEN NOUJAIM, HIS DEPUTY GEN SHEMAYYIT, AND HEAD OF G-2, GABBY LAHOUD AGREED TO JUMBLATT'S REQUEST THAT ARMY, INCLUDING G-2, NOT BE INVOLVED IN RESTORATION OF ORDER. JUMBLATT WAS TO USE HIS OWN PERSUASIVE POWERS PLUS THE GENDARMERIE TO CALM THE SITUATION. KHOURY MENTIONED THAT IN COUNCIL MEETING JUMBLATT MADE NUMBER OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS INCLUDING CHARGE PRESENT TROUBLES RESULTED FROM "AMERICAN PLOT." WHEN ASKED FOR SPECIFICS BY PRES HELOU, HE BECAME VERY VAGUE.

2. ACCORDING KHOURY, PHALANGE, FATAH, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY ALL WORKING TO RESTORE CALM. KHOURY BELIEVES ONLY GROUPS INTERESTED

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IN CONTINUING CONFLICT ARE SAIQA AND LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS THE BAATHIS AND THE COMMUNISTS. HE MAINTAINED SYRIANS ACTIVELY SUPPORTING LEFTIST GROUPS HERE AND THEREBY EXERTING HEAVY PRESSURE ON GOVERNMENT. SAIQA HAS PLAYED HEAVY ROLE IN KEEPING POT BOILING. KHOURY ENCOURAGED THAT UP TO NOW CRISIS HAS NOT DEVELOPED CONFES-SIONAL HUE. THERE NO DISPOSITION AT MOMENT TO OUST JUMBLATT (REFTEL) ALTHOUGH PRIMIN KARAME WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME SUCH DEVELOPMENT. PRIMIN APPRECIATES, HOWEVER, THAT TO DO SO WOULD INVOLVE HIS OWN RESIGNATION AND HE APPARENTLY CONCURS WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHERS THAT CABINET CHANGE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE DANGEROUS.

3. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, GOVERNMENT SOMEWHAT WORRIED AND PERPLEXED AS TO JUMBLATT'S POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. HE OBVIOUSLY STRONGEST POLITICAL LEADER IN GOVERNMENT WITH NO REAL POLITICAL COUNTER AT MOMENT. INFLUENCE FORMER PRES FUAD CHEHAB, KHOURY MAINTAINS, HAS DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY AND PROCESS IS CONTINUING. KHOURY MENTIONED THAT MANY PEOPLE ARE TELLING JUMBLATT THAT HE SHOULD BE PRESIDENT EVEN THOUGH AS DRUSE THIS NOT POSSIBLE. KHOURY MAINTAINS THAT SOVIET EMBASSY ACTIVITY GREATER THAN IT HAS EVER BEEN BEFORE AND DIRECTED, ACCORDING KHOURY'S INFORMATION, IN DEVELOPING SUPPORT FOR JUMBLATT. UAR EMBASSY ON THE OTHER HAND HAS BEEN QUIET AND ACCORDING TO KHOURY DOES NOT LIKE JUMBLATT AS HE IS ENEMY OF SOME OF THEIR LEBANESE FRIENDS SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER.

4. KHOURY HIMSELF WAS NOT SURE OUTCOME JUMBLATT'S EFFORTS RESTORE CALM BUT HOPEFUL THAT EASTER WEEKEND INTERVAL MIGHT PROVIDE SUITABLE ATMOSPHERE TO BRING SITUATION BACK TO NORMAL. HE STATED CRISIS ONLY APPLIED TO BEIRUT AND SURROUNDING AREAS AND THERE NO TROUBLE OF WHICH HE AWARE IN OTHER PARTS OF COUNTRY.

5. COMMENT. STEEL HELMETED GENDARMES ARE MUCH IN EVIDENCE IN KEY PARTS OF CITY ALONG WITH ARMORED CARS. WHATEVER JUMBLATT'S UL-TIMATE POLITICAL OBJECTIVESS, HE APPEARS TO BE ENERGETICALLY TAKING MEASURES TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION. IT IS HARD TO ENVISION ANY OTHER LEBANESE POLITICAL LEADER AT MOMENT WHO HAS THE POTENTIAL TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION WITHOUT GENEROUS USE OF FORCE IF IT IS NOT JUMBLATT. WE ARE HOPEFUL HE WILL SUCCEED.

6. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT DISPROVE KHOURY'S STATEMENTS ABOUT ROLE OF SYRIA AND SAIQA IN CURRENT SITUATION WE BELIEVE HE MAY HAVE OVER-STATED SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT. WE FAVOR INTERPRETATION SYRIAN ROLE AS OUTLINED NLB 10372, I.E., THAT SYRIANS TACTICALLY DO NOT WANT TO

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STIR UP TROUBLE AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT BECAUSE THEY NOT YET READY TO EXPLOIT THEIR ASSETS IN LEBANON AND THAT IT IS YOUNG HOT HEADS ON BOTH SIDES WHO INCITE INCIDENTS. KHOURY, IN MY JUDGMENT, IS BY AND LARGE AN OBJECTIVE AND HONEST REPORTER BUT PRESUMABLY A GOOD DEAL OF HIS INFORMATION ORIGINATES FROM G-2 WHICH ALWAYS PLAYS UP SYRIANS AS MISCHIEF MAKERS AND, OF COURSE, MANY TIMES G-2 IS RIGHT. KHOURY MAY ALSO FOR SAME REASON HAVE OVERSTRESSED EXTENT OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN CRISIS.

7. ALL AMERICANS ARE SAFE AND WE HAVE INSTRUCTED EMBASSY PERSONNEL TO AVOID TENSE AREAS AND KEEP AS LOW A PROFILE AS POSSIBLE. AS INCIDENTS HAVE SO FAR BEEN ISOLATED AND FULLY COVERED IN PRESS, WE HAVE FELT ISSUANCE OF CAUTIONARY ADVICE TO AMERICAN COMMUNITY THROUGH SELECTED LEADERS WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE AND MIGHT UNDULY ALARM THEM.
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 2022

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SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU

1. AT HIS REQUEST I CALLED ON PRES HELOU MARCH 14 FOR A LAST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS PRIOR MY CONSULTATION VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO SPECIFIC NEW APPROACH TO MAKE BUT HOPED I WOULD EMPHASIZE IN WASHINGTON THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS TWO MAJOR REQUESTS: A) THAT THE US PREVENT ISRAEL FROM LAUNCHING A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK INTO LEBANON AND, B) THAT WE SEE THAT LEBANON HAS ARMS WITH WHICH TO AT LEAST PUT UP A SHOW OF DEFENDING ITS TERRITORY IN THE EVENT ISRAEL DOES ATTACK. THESE ARMS WOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE FOR USE AGAINST THE BAATHISTS AND OTHER SUBVERSIVE GROUPS, AND MIGHT INHIBIT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING MAKING A PUBLIC POLICY DECLARATION, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF A NOTE TO BE CIRCULATED AT THE U. N.

2. PRES HELOU FORCEFULLY REITERATED HIS BELIEF THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO CARRY OUT ITS THREATS OF MASSIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON IT WOULD WORK AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND THE U.S. THE PRESENT REGIME WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY COLLAPSE, TO BE REPLACED BY A RADICAL GOVERNMENT. THE U.S. WOULD LOSE ITS

BEST, AND PERHAPS MOST USEFUL, FRIEND IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND ISRAEL WOULD BE CONFRONTED WITH AN EVEN MORE ACTIVE NORTHERN BORDER. IF THE ISRAELIS DID CREATE A SCORCHED-EARTH ZONE ALONG THE FRONTIER, THIS WOULD NOT DISTURB THE COMMANDOS. ON THE CON-

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TRARY, EVEN IF IT DIDN'T BRING DOWN THE REGIME, IT WOULD GIVE THE FEDAYEEN A WIDER SCOPE FOR ACTION. TO ILLUSTRATE THE "INCALCULABLE TRAIN OF EVENTS" WHICH MIGHT BE SET IN MOTION BY AN ISRAELI ATTACK, HELOU CITED THE EXAMPLE OF RECENT GOVERNMENT TROUBLES IN DEALING WITH SQUATTERS ON PRIVATE LAND NEAR BEIRUT AT MKALLES. OSTENSIBLY, THESE SQUATTERS ARE SHIA REFUGEES FROM THE BORDER AREA. IN FACT, HE SAID, ONLY SOME OF THEM HAVE COME TO BEIRUT FOR PERSONAL SECURITY REASONS. THE LARGE MAJORITY ARE FROM THE BAALBEK-HEROBL AREA IN THE NORTH, AND ARE USING PUBLIC CONCERN WITH SECURITY IN THE SOUTH AS A PRETEXT TO TAKE OVER PRIVATE PROPERTY AND "ALTER THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE" OF LEBANON. HE SAID THAT THIS IS JUST ONE EXAMPLE OF THE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS OF THE, THUS FAR LIMITED, ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEMS OF COPING WITH THE UNREST AND BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC ORDER RESULTING FROM MORE EXTENSIVE ATTACKS WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY GREATER.

3. I THEN TOLD HELOU THAT, AS HE KNOWS, THE ONLY SURE WAY OF PREVENTING ISRAELI ATTACKS IS BY LIMITING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. I INQUIRED IF IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE OR PUSH THE FEDAYEEN BACK INTO ARGUB AREA AROUND MT HERMON. HELOU AGREED WITH THE OBJECTIVE, AND SAID THE GEN NUJAIM HAD RECENTLY ASSURED HIM THAT THE WESTERN SECTOR IS FIRMLY IN ARMY CONTROL AND THAT THE ARMY IS PRESENTLY TRYING TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR. HELOU WAS NOT CONFIDENT HOW SUCCESSFUL HE WOULD BE IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

4. I THEN ASKED IF THE FEDAYEEN WERE BEING AT ALL REASONABLE. HELOU SAID THERE HAD RECENTLY BEEN A DECLINE IN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW TO WHAT HE SHOULD ATTRIBUTE IT, OR HOW LONG THE RELATIVE LULL WOULD LAST. IT MIGHT BE DUE TO RECENT RAINS IN THE AREA, TO THE FEDAYEEN HEEDING GOLI REQUESTS TO LIMIT THEIR ACTIONS, TO ARMY PRESSURES, OR TO THE FEDAYEEN COMMANDERS BECOMING MORE "BOURGEOIS". THIS LATTER HE EXPLAINED BY SAYING THAT WHEN THE FEDAYEEN BECOME ESTABLISHED IN AN AREA THEIR LEADERS TEND TO THINK MORE AND MORE ABOUT THEIR PAY, THEIR PRESTIGE AND THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE. THEY THEN CARRY OUT ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL ONLY WHEN NECESSARY TO BOLSTER THEIR POSITIONS. AFTER FURTHER DERIDING THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS, HELOU SAID THAT OF THEM ALL, ONLY YASIR ARAFAT OCCASIONALLY SHOWS SOME REASONABLENESS. UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS THIS TRAIT -- WHICH ENABLES HELOU TO RESPECT HIM -- WHICH WILL LEAD TO ARAFAT'S BEING SWEEP

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ASIDE AS AN INFLUENTIAL FIGURE IN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. IT IS THE RADICAL GEORGE HABBASH TYPES WHO WILL COME TO DOMINANCE, AND WITH THEM THE INFLUENCE OF RED CHINA, NOT MILITARILY OR POLITICALLY, BUT INTELLECTURALLY.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 152

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02022 02 OF 02 150912Z

11
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

016283

P R 141710Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9904
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN

2

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 2022

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY PARA SEVEN

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU

6. AS HELOU TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF ARMS, I TOLD HIM THAT HIS REQUEST WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON AND THAT I WOULD GET WORD TO HIM AS SOON AS A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. HELOU THEN REPEATED ESSENTIALLY WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY, SAYING THAT NEW ARMS WOULD NOT ENABLE THE LEBANESE ARMY TO RESIST AN ISRAELI ATTACK. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, HOWEVER, BOTH IN THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, THE ARMY MUST BE ABLE TO PUT UP A SHOW OF DEFENDING THE COUNTRY. ONLY THEN WILL ARMY MORALE HOLD UP AND THE POPULACE HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMY -- BOTH REQUISITES FOR PRESERVING THE REGIME. BEYOND THAT, NEW WEAPONS ARE NEEDED IN THE EVENT OF A SHOWDOWN WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND TO COPE WITH THE BAATHISTS AND OTHER GROUPS WORKING FOR GE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD BE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE AFTER A MAJOR ISRAELI ATTACK. A DISTURBING RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THIS REGARD IS THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNISTS FOR THE FIRST TIME HAVE BEGUN TO ARM THEIR PARTISANS. THE POTENTIAL ENEMIES OF LEBANON, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, ARE INCREASING THEIR PRESSURES AND GAINING STRENGTH, WHILE THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES BECOME RELATIVELY WEAKER.

7. HELOU THEN NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SEEMED TO BE PREPARING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK FOR AN ATTACK ON LEBANON SHOULD THEY

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CONSIDER IT NECESSARY. HE POINTED TO RECENT STATEMENTS BY MEIR, EBAN, DAYAN AND ALLON (HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC) AND THE RECENT GUIDED TOUR FOR JOURNALISTS IN ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER AREA AS INDICATIONS OF THIS. HELOU, THEREFORE, IS PLANNING TO MAKE A PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT TO REFUTE ISRAELI CONTENTIONS THAT LEBANON IS TO BLAME FOR THE UNSTABLE BORDER. ELOU SAID HE WAS NOT YET DECIDED ON HOW IT SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC -- WHETHER HE SHOULD BROADCAST IT, HAVE FONMIN MAJDALANI MAKE THE DECLARATION, OR DISTRIBUTE IT AS A NOTE AT THE U. N. IN ANY CASE, HE WOULD HIMSELF BE IDENTIFIED AS THE AUTHOR TO GIVE IT GREATER FORCE. THE THRUST OF HIS ARGUMENT WILL BE THAT IF THERE ARE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON, IT IS BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS DRIVEN THEM FROM THEIR HOMES. IF THERE ARE FEDAYEEN AMONG THEM, IT IS BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO ABIDE BY A WHOLE SERIES OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS. PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY MUST THEREFORE REST WITH ISRAEL. SECONDARILY THE FAULT LIES WITH THE U.N., THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE FOUR POWERS WHO HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE APPLICATION OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. LEBANON, WHICH IS NOT FIGHTING ISRAEL, AND HAS NEVER DISTURBED THE PEACE OF THE AREA, IS LESS RESPONSIBLE THAN ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE U.N. FOR THE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE WHICH HAS BEEN INFLICTED ON IT. IN HIS STATEMENT, HE MIGHT OFFEND OTHER ARAB STATES. THIS DID NOT DISTURB HIM -- HIS SOLE CONCERN NOW WAS TO RALLY SUPPORT FROM THE WESTERN FRIENDS OF LEBANON, AND HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED NO EFFECTIVE HELP FROM HIS ARAB NEIGHBORS. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT HIS ARGUMENTS MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. HE WISHED TO FOREWARN THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS INTENT. HE HOPED BY THE STATEMENT TO GET THE TRUE FACTS BEFORE THE EYES OF THE WORLD AND TO UNDERCUT ANY ISRAELI PRETEXT FOR ATTACKING LEBANON, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE (PARTICULARLY THE U.S.) WHO WERE RESTRAINING ISRAEL. HE SAID HE IS CONVINCED THE ISRAELIS CANNOT LIGHTLY REJECT ANY US REPRESENTATION COUCHED IN TERMS OF CONCERN FOR MANIFEST U.S. INTERESTS IN LEBANON AND HE HOPES TO MAKE CLEAR HOW ISRAELI POLICY IS ENDANGERING THOSE INTERESTS.

8. IN CONCLUDING THE MEETING, HELOU AGAIN URGED WE DO ALL WE CAN TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS. HE FOR HIS PART WOULD DO ALL HE COULD TO RESTRAIN THE FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, HE REMARKEZ"3507) 16, THE ISRAELIS CAN BETTER SUPPORT THEH ZEDAYEEN THE CAN LEBANON. FOR THEM IT IS A QUESTION OF A FEW HOUSES AND TRACTORS AND OCCASIONALLY AND REGRETTABLY A LOST LIFE. FOR LEBANON IT IS A QUESTION OF NA-

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TIONAL EXISTENCE. ISRAEL HAS THE MEANS TO TRACK DOWN AND ELIMINATE THE FEDAYEEN WHICH CROSS INTO ITS TERRITORY. LEBANON DOESN'T HAVE THE MENAS TO STOP THEM. WHEN I TOLD HELOU THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELIS WERE IN THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING THEIR NORTHERN BORDER DEFENSES, HE EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION AND SAID HE HOPED THE FORTIFICATIONS WOULD BE FINISHED BY SPRING WHEN HE EXPECTED AN UPTURN IN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS RESIGNED TO PROSPECT ISRAEL MIGHT OCCASIONALLY CARRY OUT "VERY LIMITED" REPRISALS AGAINST FEDAYEEN TARGETS IN LEBANON, IF THE PROVOCATION WERE GREAT. HOPEFULLY HE COULD COPE WITH THE INTERNAL FALLOUT SO LONG AS IT WERE RETALIATION WITHOUT ESCALATION AND THE TARGET WAS NOT LEBANON ITSELF.
PORTER

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SECRET 057

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02022 02 OF 02 141821Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

014594

P R 141710Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9904
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN

02

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 2022

EXDIS

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU

6. AS HELOU TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF ARMS, I TOLD HIM THAT HIS REQUEST WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON AND THAT I WOULD GET WORD TO HIM AS SOON AS A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. HELOU THEN REPEATED ESSENTIALLY WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY, SAYING THAT NEW ARMS WOULD NOT ENABLE THE LEBANESE ARMY TO RESIST AN ISRAELI ATTACK. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, HOWEVER, BOTH IN THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, THE ARMY MUST BE ABLE TO PUT UP A SHOW OF DEFENDING THE COUNTRY. ONLY THEN WILL ARMY MORALE HOLD UP AND THE POPULACE HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMY -- BOTH REQUISITES FOR PRESERVING THE REGIME. BEYOND THAT, NEW WEAPONS ARE NEEDED IN THE EVENT OF A SHOWDOWN WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND TO COPE WITH THE BAATHISTS AND OTHER GROUPS WORKING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD BE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE AFTER A MAJOR ISRAELI ATTACK. A DISTURBING RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN THIS REGARD IS THE FACT THAT THE COMMUNISTS FOR THE FIRST TIME HAVE BEGUN TO ARM THEIR PARTISANS. THE POTENTIAL ENEMIES OF LEBANON, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, ARE INCREASING THEIR PRESSURES AND GAINING STRENGTH, WHILE THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES BECOME RELATIVELY WEAKER.

7. HELOU THEN NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SEEMED TO BE PREPARING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK FOR AN ATTACK ON LEBANON SHOULD THEY CONSIDER IT NECESSARY. HE POINTED TO RECENT STATEMENTS BY MEIR, EBAN, DAYAN AND ALLON (HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC) AND THE RECENT

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GUIDED TOUR FOR JOURNALISTS IN ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER AREA AS INDICATIONS OF THIS. HELOU, THEREFORE, IS PLANNING TO MAKE A PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT TO REFUTE ISRAELI CONTENTIONS THAT LEBANON IS TO BLAME FOR THE UNSTABLE BORDER. HELOU SAID HE WAS NOT YET DECIDED ON HOW IT SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC -- WHETHER HE SHOULD BROADCAST IT, HAVE FONMIN MAJDALANI MAKE THE DECLARATION, OR DISTRIBUTE IT AS A NOTE AT THE U. N. IN ANY CASE, HE WOULD HIMSELF BE IDENTIFIED AS THE AUTHOR TO GIVE IT GREATER FORCE. THE THRUST OF HIS ARGUMENT WILL BE THAT IF THERE ARE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON, IT IS BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS DRIVEN THEM FROM THEIR HOMES. IF THERE ARE FEDAYEEN AMONG THEM, IT IS BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO ABIDE BY A WHOLE SERIES OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS. PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY MUST THEREFORE REST WITH ISRAEL. SECONDARILY THE FAULT LIES WITH THE U.N., THE SECURITY COUNCIL HQCZ UODC

QCMUBTADAE LVVUITH#THE FOUR POWERS WHO HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE APPLICATION OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. LEBANON, WHICH IS NOT FIGHTING ISRAEL, AND HAS NEVER DISTURBED THE PEACE OF THE AREA, IS LESS RESPONSIBLE THAN ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE U.N. FOR THE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE WHICH HAS BEEN INFLICTED ON IT. IN HIS STATEMENT, HE MIGHT OFFEND OTHER ARAB STATES. THIS DID NOT DISTURB HIM -- HIS SOLE CONCERN NOW WAS TO RALLY SUPPORT FROM THE WESTERN FRIENDS OF LEBANON, AND HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED NO EFFECTIVE HELP FROM HIS ARAB NEIGHBORS. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT HIS ARGUMENTS MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. HE WISHED TO FOREWARN THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS INTENT. HE HOPED BY THE STATEMENT TO GET THE TRUE FACTS BEFORE THE EYES OF THE WORLD AND TO UNDERCUT ANY ISRAELI PRETEXT FOR ATTACKING LEBANON, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE (PARTICULARLY THE U.S.) WHO WERE RESTRAINING ISRAEL. HE SAID HE IS CONVINCED THE ISRAELIS CANNOT LIGHTLY REJECT ANY US REPRESENTATION COUCHED IN TERMS OF CONCERN FOR MANIFEST U.S. INTERESTS IN LEBANON AND HE HOPES TO MAKE CLEAR HOW ISRAELI POLICY IS ENDANGERING THOSE INTERESTS.

8. IN CONCLUDING THE MEETING, HELOU AGAIN URGED WE DO ALL WE CAN TO RESTRAIN THE ISRAELIS. HE FOR HIS PART WOULD DO ALL HE COULD TO RESTRAIN THE FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, HE REMARKED RUEFULLY, THE ISRAELIS CAN BETTER SUPPORT THE FEDAYEEN THAN CAN LEBANON. FOR THEM IT IS A QUESTION OF A FEW HOUSES AND TRACTORS AND OCCASIONALLY AND REGRETTABLY A LOST LIFE. FOR LEBANON IT IS A QUESTION OF NATIONAL EXISTENCE. ISRAEL HAS THE MEANS TO TRACK DOWN AND ELIMI-

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NATE THE FEDAYEEN WHICH CROSS INTO ITS TERRITORY. LEBANON DOESN'T HAVE THE MEANS TO STOP THEM. WHEN I TOLD HELOU THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELIS WERE IN THE PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING THEIR NORTHERN BORDER DEFENSES, HE EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION AND SAID HE HOPED THE FORTIFICATIONS WOULD BE FINISHED BY SPRING WHEN HE EXPECTED AN UPTURN IN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS RE-SIGNED TO PROSPECT ISRAEL MIGHT OCCASIONALLY CARRY OUT "VERY LIMITED" REPRISALS AGAINST FEDAYEEN TARGETS IN LEBANON, IF THE PROVOCATION WERE GREAT. HOPEFULLY HE COULD COPE WITH THE INTERNAL FALLOUT SO LONG AS IT WERE RETALIATION WITHOUT ESCALATION AND THE TARGET WAS NOT LEBANON ITSELF.
PORTER

NOTE: HAS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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LEB.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/EXDIS

March 16, 1970

Henry --

The attached cable dealing with the Lebanese situation suggests that we may have some problems which are minimal to remedy.

Al Haig

Attachment: Beirut 01989

SECRET/EXDIS



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01989 131545Z

COMPETENT CIC. THE NEW CIC, NOUJAIM, AFTER CAREFULLY REVIEWING HIS NEEDS AND HIS COUNTRY'S FINANCES, APPROACHED US ON FEB '79 WITH A MODEST REQUIREMENT FOR SOME WWII TANKS AND AA MACHINE GUNS -- USED EQUIPMENT WHICH THE LEBANESE HOPED WOULD BE ON OUR SURPLUS LIST, AND THEREFORE AVAILABLE FOR LITTLE OR NOTHING. THE LEBANESE, WITH AN EMPTY TREASURY, WERE FORCED TO BEG, BUT THEIR REQUEST WAS INDEED MODEST, CONSIDERING THE THREAT WHICH THEY ARE TRYING URGENTLY TO MEET.


4. TO RECAPITULATE FROM OUR EARLIER MESSAGES: (A) HELOU WANTS TO STRENGTHEN HIS ARMY NOW -- FOR A FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE WHICH HE THINKS MAY OCCUR NO LATER THAN MAY; (B) GOL CANNOT PAY GOING PRICES, EVEN FOR RECONDITIONED EQUIPMENT; (C) GOL CANNOT AT MOMENT LEGALLY ACCEPT USG CREDITS, EVEN IF WE HAVE THEM TO OFFER; (D) LEBANON HAS NO CHANCE TO GET SUBSIDIES FROM OTHER ARAB STATES; (E) HELOU DESPERATELY WANTS TO CONTINUE TO GET ARMS IN WEST, TO AVOID ACCEPTING PROFFERED SOVIET "GIFT".

5. ON MARCH 12, WE RECEIVED USG'S FIRST RESPONSE TO GOL'S REQUEST. IT SAID: (A) 18 MONTHS DELIVERY TIME FOR US-OWNED M-41'S; (B) NO OTHER TANKS AVAILABLE FROM US SOURCES; (C) LEBANESE MIGHT WISH TRY BUY THEIR M-41'S ON OPEN MARKET FROM "LEVY BROS"; (D) IF THEY DO, USG WILL TELL THEM LATER WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL VETO THE PURCHASE. THERE IS NO HOPE IN THIS REPLY WHICH I CAN USE TO BUCK UP HELOU'S AND NOUJAIM'S MORALE.

6. I AM LED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE USG CANNOT RESPOND EITHER TO THE URGENT NATURE OF THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR ARMS, OR TO THE REQUEST FOR CONCESSIONAL PRICES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I SO FRANKLY INFORM PRES HELOU. AT THIS POINT HELOU IS RELYING ON THE HOPE THAT A FRIENDLY USG, WHOSE INTERESTS HE FEELS ARE IDENTICAL WITH HIS, WILL RESPOND TO HIS URGENT PLEAS FOR HELP. (HE INDEED HAS NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN, UNLESS HE ACCEPTS THE RECENT SOVIET OFFERS.) WE CANNOT, IN ALL FAIRNESS, ALLOW HIM TO PLAN ON FALST PREMISES. HE MUST KNOW WHERE HE STANDS AND WHAT HIS ASSETS ARE OR MAY BE, AND MAKE HIS DECISIONS ACCORDINGLY.

7. I DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE TILTING MY LANCE IN THIS MESSAGE, BUT I SEE NO RAY OF HOPE IN ANY OF DEPT'S MESSAGES THAT USG IS CONSIDERING ANY COURSE OF ACTION THAT RESPONDS TO HELOU'S REQUESTS OR TO THE REALITIES OF THE PROBLEM. IF I AM WRONG, PLEASE TELL ME.

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01989 131545Z

8. ALSO, VALID AS THE FACTS MAY BE, I CANNOT SATISFY HELOU,
PROVIDE HIM SOLACE, OR ASSIST IN EASING THE SITUATION HERE
BY REPEATING THE HISTORY OF OUR PAST EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON (PARA
2, STATE 362131. HELOU IS JUST AS AWARE AS I OF THE INADEQUACIES
AND MISTAKES OF HIS FORMER CIG. -- THE MAN WHO HELPED CREATE THIS
SORRY HISTORY. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, HELLGKWHO FIRED HIM, AND PERHAPS
ABOVE ALL BECAUSE HE WAS AWARE OF THE FACTS WHICH THE DEPT HAS
ENUMERATED, AND WHICH HE AND I HAVE OFTEN DISCUSSED IN THE PAST.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 414

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01989 131545Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

007825

R 131410Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9892

SECRET BEIRUT 1989

EXDIS

REF: STATE 35651

70 MAR 14 AM 10:38

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. LAST FALL DURING THE LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN WAR THIS EMBASSY WAS ASKED TO SUGGEST POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR ASSISTING LEBANON TODAY, ALMOST FIVE MONTHS LATER, THE US HAS DONE NOTHING EXCEPT TO APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE A SMALL PL 480 PROGRAM. THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE AND THE SIMILAR RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS EMBASSY HAVE EITHER BEEN TURNED DOWN OR ARE IN BUREAUCRATIC LIMBO. PERHAPS THERE ARE VALID LEGAL OR PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THIS INACTIVITY, BUT THE RESULT IS THE SAME - INACTIVITY.

2. THERE IS EITHER A SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPT AND MYSELF ON THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON OR PERHAPS WE HAVE FAILED TO MAKE THE POINT WITH ENOUGH CLARITY. MAY I NOW STATE AS CLEARLY AS I CAN THAT I THINK WE ARE IN FOR REAL TROUBLE IN LEBANON WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IF NOT SOONER.

I THINK IT IS ALMOST INEVITABLE THAT THERE WILL BE A SERIOUS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND THE LEBANESE. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL BE THAT THE LEBANESE WILL CAVE IN TO THE FEDAYEEN. EQUALLY PREDICTABLE RESULT WILL THEN BE A SEVERE ISRAELI RESPONSE. AMERICAN INTERESTS WILL SUFFER GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY IN THIS PROCESS, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST OUR PRESENCE HERE.

3. THE ONLY INSTRUMENT WHICH MIGHT BRING A MEASURE OF STABILITY TO THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON IS A STRENGTHENED ARMY. THE LEBANESE TOOK A LONG TIME TO MAKE UP THEIR MINDS TO TELL US WHAT KIND OF ARMS THEY WANTED. THEY WERE WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT AND, WHEN THEY FORMED ONE, PRES HELOU HAD TO GET RID OF HIS IM-

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COMPETENT CIC. THE NEW CIC, NOUJAIM, AFTER CAREFULLY REVIEWING HIS NEEDS AND HIS COUNTRY'S FINANCES, APPROACHED US ON FEB 19 WITH A MODEST REQUIREMENT FOR SOME WWII TANKS AND AA MACHINE GUNS -- USED EQUIPMENT WHICH THE LEBANESE HOPED WOULD BE ON OUR SURPLUS LIST, AND THEREFORE AVAILABLE FOR LITTLE OR NOTHING. THE LEBANESE, WITH AN EMPTY TREASURY, WERE FORCED TO BEG, BUT THEIR REQUEST WAS INDEED MODEST, CONSIDERING THE THREAT WHICH THEY ARE TRYING URGENTLY TO MEET.

4. TO RECAPITULATE FROM OUR EARLIER MESSAGES: (A) HELOU WANTS TO STRENGTHEN HIS ARMH NOW -- FOR A FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE WHICH HE THINKS MAY OCCUR NO LATER THAN MAY; (B) GOL CANNOT PAY GOING PRICES, EVEN FOR RECONDITIONED EQUIPMENT; (C) GOL CANNOT AT MOMENT LEGALLY ACCEPT USG CREDITS, EVEN IF WE HAVE THEM TO OFFER; (D) LEBANON HAS NO CHANCE TO GET SUBSIDIES FROM OTHER ARAB STATES; (E) HELOU DESPERATELY WANTS TO CONTINUE TO GET ARMS IN WEST, TO AVOID ACCEPTING PROFFERED SOVIET "GIFT".

5. ON MARCH 12, WE RECEIVED USG'S FIRST RESPONSE TO GOL'S REQUEST. IT SAID: (A) 18 MONTHS DELIVERY TIME FOR US-OWNED M-41'S; (B) NO OTHER TANKS AVAILABLE FROM US SOURCES; (C) LEBANESE MIGHT WISH TRY BUY THEIR M-41'S ON OPEN MARKET FROM "LEVY BROS"; (D) IF THEY DO, USG WILL TELL THEM LATER WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL VETO THE PURCHASE. THERE IS NO HOPE IN THIS REPLY WHICH I CAN USE TO BUCK UP HELOU'S AND NOUJAIM'S MORALE.

6. I AM LED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE USG CANNOT RESPOND EITHER TO THE URGENT NATURE OF THE LEBANESE REQUEST FOR ARMS, OR TO THE REQUEST FOR CONCESSIONAL PRICES. IF THIS IS THE CASE, I BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I SO FRANKLY INFORM PRES HELOU. AT THIS POINT HELOU IS RELYING ON THE HOPE THAT A FRIENDLY USG, WHOSE INTERESTS HE FEELS ARE IDENTICAL WITH HIS, WILL RESPOND TO HIS URGENT PLEAS FOR HELP. (HE INDEED HAS NOWHERE ELSE TO TURN, UNLESS HE ACCEPTS THE RECENT SOVIET OFFERS.) WE CANNOT, IN ALL FAIRNESS, ALLOW HIM TO PLAN ON FALST PREMISES. HE MUST KNOW WHERE HE STANDS AND WHAT HIS ASSETS ARE OR MAY BE, AND MAKE HIS DECISIONS ACCORDINGLY.

7. I DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE TILTING MY LANCE IN THIS MESSAGE, BUT I SEE NO RAY OF HOPE IN ANY OF DEPT'S MESSAGES THAT USG IS CONSIDERING ANY COURSE OF ACTION THAT RESPONDS TO HELOU'S REQUESTS OR TO THE REALITIES OF THE PROBLEM. IF I AM WRONG, PLEASE TELL ME.

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8. ALSO, VALID AS THE FACTS MAY BE, I CANNOT SATISFY HELOU, PROVIDE HIM SOLACE, OR ASSIST IN EASING THE SITUATION HERE BY REPEATING THE HISTORY OF OUR PAST EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON (PARA 2, STATE 36213). HELOU IS JUST AS AWARE AS I OF THE INADEQUACIES AND MISTAKES OF HIS FORMER CIC -- THE MAN WHO HELPED CREATE THIS SORRY HISTORY. IT WAS, AFTER ALL, HELLGKWHO FIRED HIM, AND PERHAPS ABOVE ALL BECAUSE HE WAS AWARE OF THE FACTS WHICH THE DEPT HAS ENUMERATED, AND WHICH HE AND I HAVE OFTEN DISCUSSED IN THE PAST. PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01934 111936Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

125551

P 111703Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9872

SECRET BEIRUT 1934

EXDIS

REF: STATE 26577; BEIRUT 1726

SUBJ: ARMS FOR LEBANON

1. IN MY LAST MEETING WITH HELOU, HE OF COURSE INQUIRED RE STATUS LEBANESE ARMS REQUEST. I RESPONDED USG HAD MATTER UNDER URGENT CONSIDERATION, BUT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO COME UP WITH ANSWERS ON AVAILABILITY AND PRICES. I REITERATED THAT REGRETTABLY GRANT AID NOT LEGALLY POSSIBLE, BUT WE ENDEAVORING BE AS RESPONSIVE AS WE COULD. REPEATED THAT USG MIGHT BE ABLE OFFER SOME CREDITS WHEN AND IF LEBANESE PARLIAMENT PROVIDED NECESSARY AUTHORIZATION TO UTILIZE THEM.

2. HELOU WAS DISTRAUGHT AT LACK OF PROGRESS. HE DID NOT HOWEVER PUSH MATTER FURTHER, EXCEPT TO REFER IN PASSING TO LEBANESE FAILURE SECURE FAVORABLE ARMS DEAL FROM ANY OF ITS TRADITIONAL WESTERN SOURCES, AND TO EXPRESS HIMSELF IN A RESIGNED "WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE" GESTURE. HELOU DOES NOT FEEL HE NEEDS TO GILD THE LILY WITH ME WHEN DISCUSSING NEEDS OF LEBANESE ARMY AND HE MOST CERTAINLY ASSUMES THIS EMBASSY AND USG MUST UNDERSTAND URGENCY OF HIS REQUEST. HE IS TOO GALLIC TO POUND THE TABLE AND INDULGE IN CHARACTERISTIC ARAB HYPERBOLE AND HE HAS ALREADY MADE CLEAR HE EXPECTS CRISIS TO OCCUR THIS SPRING.

3. THE URGENCY IS VERY REAL IN MY OPINION. I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN EXPECT LEBANESE TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH IN CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN WHEN FEDAYEEN WELL AWARE LEBANESE ARMY MAY NOT HAVE THE MUSCLE TO SUPPRESS PALESTINIAN INSURRECTION WHICH WOULD BE INEVITABLE RESULT.

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 01934 111936Z

4. MICHEL KHOURY TELLS ME THAT ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SHMAYET HAS OFFERED ONCE AGAIN TO HAVE A BASH AT THE FEDAYEEN IN SOUTHWEST LEBANON, TO PUSH THEM BACK TO THEIR FORMER ARKOUB AREA OF OPERATIONS NEAR MT HERMON. SHMAYET REFUSED TO PREDICT THE CONSEQUENCES IF ATTEMPT WERE MADE AND HELOU HAS RELUCTANTLY REFUSED TO SANCTION THE EFFORT. I CANNOT FAULT HIM IN THIS DECISION AND I BELIEVE HIS JUDGMENT IS CORRECT - THAT HE CANNOT WIN IN A SHOWDOWN WHICH IS TRIGGERED OFF BY LEBANESE INITIATIVE.

5. HELOU HAS ASKED TO SEE ME LATE THIS WEEK (PROBABLY MARCH 13) BEFORE MY CONSULTATION TRIP TO WASHINGTON. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ARMS QUESTION WHICH I MIGHT GIVE HIM. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF USG SUPPORT WILL HAVE DIRECT INFLUENCE ON HIS POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN. USG SUPPORT MAY NOT BE DECISIVE AGAINST THE EXISTING HEAVY ODDS, BUT WITHOUT IT THE ODDS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PREVAIL.
PORTER

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SUMMARY

W/H
TELEGRAM

SECRET 565

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01875 101829Z

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ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

118162

R 101640Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9855
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 1875

SUBJ: BEIRUT PRESS COMMENTARY ON US AMBASSADOR'S DELIVERY OF ISRAELI MESSAGE TO THE GOL

REF: BEIRUT 1756

EXDIS:

1. THE AMBASSADOR'S DELIVERY OF A MESSAGE ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF TO FONMIN MAJDALANI MARCH 4 HAS PROVOKED A FLOOD OF EDITORIAL COMMENT. ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY STAR CARRIED THE STORY STRAIGHT: USG, ACTING OUT OF CONCERN FOR LEBANESE WELFARE, HAD INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR TO DRAW GOL ATTENTION TO FACT THAT COMMANDO ESCALATION WAS CAUSING SHARP REACTION IN ISRAEL. UNFORTUNATELY, GOL CHOSE TO LEAK THE NEWS THAT IT HAD REQUESTED USG TO RELAY A WARNING TO GOL, AND GOL FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS PUBLICIZED THE MARCH 2 THREAT BY ISRAEL'S NORTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER TO USE SCORCHED-EARTH TACTICS AGAINST LEBANON. CONSEQUENTLY, MAJORITY OF PRESS COMMENT WAS UNFRIENDLY TO USG.

2. EVEN NORMALLY PRO-WESTERN COMMENTATORS ADOPTED THE PREMISE THAT THE USG, HAVING AGREED TO CARRY ISRAEL'S MESSAGES, HAS THEREBY ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISRAEL'S SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS. DAMASCUS MENA HELPED PROPAGATE THIS THESIS BY REPORTING THAT HELOU HAD ASKED US AMBASSADOR TO ASK USG TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM CARRYING OUT ITS THREAT. SEVERAL PAPERS ALLEGED THAT US AMBASSADOR HAD EVEN GIVEN GOL ASSURANCES ON THIS POINT. ABU JAWDAH OF INDEPENDENT AN NAHAR WROTE THAT, AT THE VERY TIME US AMBASSADOR WAS ASSURING LEBANON THAT IT WILL KEEP ISRAEL IN LINE, THE IDF WAS ATTACKING

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A PEACEFUL LEBANESE VILLAGE, THUS UNDERMINING THE AMBASSADOR'S CREDIT WITH THE GOL.

3. SHARPER DEGREE OF CRITICISM CAME FROM THOSE PUBLICATIONS WHICH INTERPRETED US DELIVERY OF ISRAELI MESSAGE AS EVIDENCE OF US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL'S CURRENT POLICIES. HAVING LEARNED OF THE VARIOUS APOCALYPTIC COURSES OF ACTION BEING THREATENED BY ISRAEL -- AIR ATTACK, SCORCHED-EARTH POLICY, AND INVASION -- MOST PAPERS REPORTED THAT ALL THESE ELEMENTS HAD FIGURED IN THE MESSAGE TRANSMITTED BY THE US AMBASSADOR, AND MANY WENT ONE STEP FURTHER BY SUGGESTING THAT THE USG HAD ENDORSED ISRAEL'S MILITARY STRATEGY. AL ANWAR OF MARCH 8 OBSERVED, "WHEN THE AMBASSADOR CAUTIONS AGAINST THE DANGER OF ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, THIS MEANS THAT HE IS CONVEYING THE THREAT OF SUCH AN INVASION." BAATHIST AR RAYAH OF MARCH 5 COMMENTED THAT, IN COMMUNICATING US CONCERN, THE AMBASSADOR "USED THE SAME LOGIC AND METHOD USED BY ISRAEL IN JUSTIFYING ITS AGGRESSIONS AGAINST THIS OR THAT ARAB STATE."

4. FINALLY, THE PROFESSIONAL ANTI-AMERICANS SEIZED ON US DELIVERY OF ISRAELI MESSAGE AS FURTHER "EVIDENCE" OF STANDARD THESIS OF US-ISRAELI COLLUSION. COMMUNIST AN NIDA OF MARCH 5 ACCUSED USG OF ENCOURAGING ISRAEL TO THREATEN LEBANON AND THEN PASSING SAME ON TO GOL. AL MUHARRIR OF MARCH 9 ALLEGED EXISTENCE OF AN AMERICAN-ISRAELI PLAN TO ISOLATE LEBANON FROM ARAB WORLD AND TORPEDO FEDAYEEN EFFORT. EVEN THE NORMALLY TEMPERATE AL ANWAR, AFTER SUGGESTING GOI USING USG AS CAT'S PAW, REPORTED ON MARCH 8 THAT SOVIET SOURCES BELIEVE THAT US TRANSMITTAL OF THE ISRAELI THREATS WAS PART OF A DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO INDUCE LEBANON TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. AL ANWAR'S MARCH 8 CARTOON SHOWED THE US AMBASSADOR AS A PONTIUS PILATE WASHING HIS HANDS AFTER THE LATEST ISRAELI ATTACK ON LEBANON. ON MARCH 9 AL ANWAR QUOTED OFFICIAL CIRCLES AS CLAIMING THAT THE US AMBASSADOR HAD DENIED THE IMMINENCE OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK OF WHICH HE HAD FOREKNOWLEDGE.

5. COMMENT: REACTION SUMMARIZED ABOVE ILLUSTRATES THE VARIOUS DISADVANTAGES ATTENDANT ON USG'S TRANSMITTING MESSAGES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. THE INCIDENT HAS ADDED A LITTLE MORE TARNISH TO THE IMAGE OF DISINTERESTED IMPARTIALITY WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF US PEACE EFFORT. THE FUTILITY OF THE PARTIES FOR LEAKING SECRET

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 01875 101829Z

DEMARCHES TO THE PRESS RULES OUT ANY HOPE OF PRESERVING
SECURITY IN SUCH MATTERS. THIS EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS
THAT USG SHOULD HABITUALLY ENCOURAGE ISRAEL TO RELY
ON UN CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATING WITH THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 416

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01869 101749Z

42

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

117523

R 101626Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9852
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 1869

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: SOVIET ARMS OFFER TO LEBANON

1. IN MY MARCH 5 MEETING WITH PRES HELOU HE BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF SOVIET ARMS OFFERS, EMPHASIZING THAT HE NOT RAISING SUBJECT TO PRESSURE THE US, HE SAID SOVIETS URGING HIM ACCEPT ARMS GRATIS.

HE HAD REFUSED ALL OFFERS THUS FAR AND INTENDED DO SO IN FUTURE. AT MOMENT, HE COULD ASSURE US THAT HE COULD HOLD LINE. HOWEVER, HE FEARFUL OF CONSEQUENCES IF ISRAELIS CARRY OUT THREATS AND ATTACK LEBANON IN FORCE. LEBANESE ARMY WILL BE UNABLE PUT UP DETERMINED SHOW OF RESISTANCE. (WHETHER COMMITTED OR NOT TO RESIST ISRAELI ATTACK, EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION WILL BE THE SAME). LEFTIST PRESS AND GENERAL PUBLIC WILL BERATE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT HAVING PREPARED ARMY TO DEFEND COUNTRY, AND HEAVY PRESSURES WOULD BUILD UP TO ACCEPT SOVIET OFFER.

2. IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY SAID HE EXPECTED MININT KAMAL JUMBLATT TO BEGIN CAMPAIGN SOON WITHIN GOVERNMENT, OR PERHAPS EVEN PUBLICLY, TO ACCEPT SOVIET OFFER. KHOURY SAID SOVIETS WERE INTHUNG#HELOU AND GOL UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE TO ACCEPT ARMS "GIFT." HE DID NOT DOUBT THAT HELOU WOULD RESIST, BUT ALSO WONDERED WHETHER PRESIDENT COULD MAINTAIN PRESENT POSTURE IF BORDER SITUATION CONTINUED DETERIORATE.

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3. KHOURY SAID IRAQI MINDEF HARDAN TAKRITI, WHO MADE WHIRLWIND VISIT TO LEBANON LAST WEEK, HAD OFFERED IRAQI TROOPS TO DEFEND LEBANESE-ISRAEL BORDER. HELOU HAD DUCKED THIS ONE, BUT THE OFFER IN ITSELF REVEALED NATURE OF NEW KIND OF PRESSURE NOW ON LEBANON TO ACCEPT EXTERNAL AID. WE HEAR SYRIANS ARE ALSO SAYING THAT, IF LEBANON CANNOT DEFEND ITSELF, OTHER ARABS MUST DO IT FOR THEM. TO AVOID THIS FATAL ARAB EMBRACE, HELOU MAY INCREASINGLY BE PRESURED TO CONSIDER LESSER EVIL OF TURNING TO SOVIETS FOR ARMS.

4. IN MY CALL ON JUMBLATT TODAY, HE RESPONDED TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHAT WE COULD DO TO ASSIST LEBANON BY URGING THAT WE GIVE LEBANON ARMS -- MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY AA AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. IT WAS A SURPRISING APPROACH FROM HIM, BUT I ACCEPT IT AS GENUINE. I'M SURE HE IS SAYING THE SAME THING TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, BUT AT LEAST HE IS WILLING TO ADMIT USG TO THE COMPETITION.
PORTER

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SECRET 597

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 01830 01 OF 02 091447Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

109236

P R 091346Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9844
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 1830

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: TEL AVIV 1168 AND 1169 (NOTAL)

EXDIS

SUBJE: LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER

1. TEL AVIV'S 1168 CITED A TWO-DAY PERIOD OF QUIET ON THE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS FOR THE HOPE THAT ISRAEL'S HARD LINE AGAINST LEBANON HAS FINALLY PAID OFF.

2. TEL AVIV 1169 CUT SHORT THIS LINE OF SPECULATION BY REPORTING A NEW CLASH BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND THE IDF AT SHATULA MARCH 5 IN WHICH AN ISRAELI SOLDIER WAS KILLED.

3. THE RECENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE BORDER DRAMATIZES THE IMMENSE COMPLEXITY OF THE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON. IF THERE IS ANY WAY TO CONTROL THE PROBLEM, IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE BLUDGEON APPROACH. AFTER A YEAR AND A HALF OF FEDAYEEN-WATCHING, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY ANTI-FEDAYEEN STRATEGY MUST TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS OF LIFE.

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4. FRAGILITY OF THE LEBANESE STATE - WE APPRECIATE IT MAY BE DIFFICULT FOR ISRAELIS TO UNDERSTAND LEBANON, ALTHOUGH WE PRIVATELY SUSPECT THEY UNDERSTAND IT BETTER THAN THEY ADMIT TO US. LEBANON IS AS DIVERSE AS ISRAELI IS MONOLITHIC. WHEN THE FEDAYEEN HIT THE IDF, ALL ISRAELI WINCES, BUT AN IDF REPRISAL HAS A DIFFERENT MEANING FOR EACH LEBANESE SECT AND FACTION. TO THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT, EACH REPRISAL IS AN ADDED REASON FOR EXPELLING THE PALESTINIANS; TO THE MUSLIM MAJORITY, IT IS NEW EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM; TO THE FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES, IT IS ANOTHER ADVANCE IN THEIR LONG-RANGE STRATEGY TO INVOLVE LEBANON IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL WAR; TO THE SYRIANS AND THEIR LEBANESE BAATH ADHERENTS IT IS ANOTHER BLOW TO THE PROSPERITY AND STABILITY OF LEBANON. LEBANESE DISUNITY MAGNIFIES FEDAYEEN INFLUENCE. THEY DO NOT YET CONTROL LEBANON, BUT THEY HAVE THE INITIATIVE. IN THE SHORT RUN, BY ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LEBANON, THE IDF EXACERBATES COMMUNAL STRESSES, WEAKENS THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND REDUCES ITS CAPACITY FOR DEALING WITH THE FEDAYEEN. IT ALSO SERVES TO HEAP RIDICULE ON THE SMALL LEBANESE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH NEITHER HAS, NOR INTENDS TO HAVE, THE CAPACITY TO RESIST ISRAELI ATTACK.

5. TACIT LEBANON-ISRAEL ALLIANCE. - SO FAR, LEBANON IS RUN BY A CONSERVATIVE COALITION THAT WISHES IT COULD SUPPRESS FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. IT SHARES WITH ISRAEL A HEARTY DISTASTE FOR THE PALESTINIANS. THE ISRAELIS MAY FIND IT TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS TO CHARGE GOL COLLUSION WITH THE FEDAYEEN. THEY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY MISTAKEN TO BELIEVE THE CHARGE. LAST YEAR'S SERIES OF BLOODY FEDAYEEN-LEBANESE CLASHES, CULMINATING IN THE OCTOBER INSURRECTION, SHOWED BEYOND QUESTION WHERE THE GOL'S TRUE SYMPATHIES LIE. LEBANON IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE AN ADMINISTRATION AND HIGH COMMAND MORE WILLING TO TAKE ON THE FEDAYEEN THAN PRES HELOU AND GEN NOUJAIM. THE OTHER DAY NOUJAIM CONFIDED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE COULD STILL DEFEAT THE FEDAYEEN MILITARILY - BUT LEBANON WOULD COLLAPSE IN THE PROCESS. NO ONE AWARE OF SYRIA'S DESIGNS ON LEBANON, AND SAIGA'S MACHINATIONS THEREIN, COULD ARGUE THE POINT. LAST OCTOBER THE LEBANESE FOUGHT THE FEDAYEEN IN A WAR WHICH, IN WINNING, THEY LOST. ISRAELI SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE LEBANESE TO TAKE THAT ROAD AGAIN, NOR SHOULD THE USG.

6. FEDAYEEN ELUSIVENESS. - TIME IS THEIR WEAPON. CONSEQUENTLY THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY FOLLOWED A FLEXIBLE STRATEGY, PERIODICALLY LAUNCHING NEW INITIATIVES, BUT PULLING BACK INTO THE HILLS WHENEVER THEY RUN INTO AN OBSTACLE. BY PATIENT APPLICATION OF THIS

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STRATEGY IN 1969, THE FEDAYEEN FINALLY ACHIEVED THEIR KEY OBJECTIVE OF BREAKING INTO SOUTH LEBANON. NOW, USING THE SAME FORMULA, ARAFAT HAS BOBBED OUT OF IMMEDIATE GOL RANGE BY REPORTEDLY AGREEING TO FREEZE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES ON THE BORDER. PROBABLY HE MEANS IT, BUT SOONER OR LATER HE WILL BE BACK ON THE OFFENSIVE. MEANWHILE THE GOL AND THE IDF WILL HAVE TO CONTEND WITH TPP VARIOUS GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS THAT REJECT PLO DISCIPLINE AND COMMITMENTS. THE PFLP, NOT FATEH, HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE SHATULA INCIDENT CITED ABOVE.
PORTER

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SECRET 712

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

109504

P R 091346Z MAR 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9845
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 1830

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: TEL AVIV 1168 AND 1169 (NOTAL)

EXDIS:

SUBJ: LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER
7. EVOLVING ARAB ATTITUDES.- ISRAEL'S GREATEST STRATEGIC
ADVANTAGE DERIVES FROM ARAB DISUNITY. CONTRARY TO ISRAELI ANALYSES,
HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY A PERMANENT CMMDITION. IN FACT,
PRESENT ISRAELI STRATEGY IS WORKING AGAINST COMMUNAL DIVISION IN
LEBANON. MOST LEBANESE PREFER NEUTRALITY. HOWEVER, IF FORCED TO
CHOOSE BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN AND TACIT ALLIANCE WITH
ISRAEL, LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO OPT FOR THE FEDAYEEN. THE IDF
SEEMS BENT ON IMPOSING THAT CHOICE ON THE LEBANESE. ALSO, ALL
LEBANESE, EVEN THE NEUTRALISTS, TAKE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB
TERRITORY AS EVIDENCE OF A POLICY OF EXPANSIONISM. MOREOVER,
DEEP DOWN, ALL THE LEBANESE REGARD EACH NEW ARAB DEFEAT AS A BLOW
TO ARAB SELF-RESPECT. HENCE THE GRADUAL PERMEATION OF ARAB SOCIETY
BY THE FEDAYEEN MYSTIQUE, THE READINESS OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS
TO CONDEMN ANY ARAB REGIME THAT DECLARES WAR ON THE FEDAYEEN, AND
THE BELLIGERENT STATEMENTS BY THE MOST CONSERVATIVE LEBANESE
LEADERS, INCLUDING SHIA LEADER KAMEL AL-ASSAD AND MARONITE LEADER
CAMILLE CHAMOUN, EACH OF WHOM HAS JUST ISSUED A CALL FOR FULL

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MOBILIZATION. ISRAEL'S PRESENT MILITARY STRATEGY, WHATEVER ITS SUCCESS IN THE PAST, IS STEADILY PROMOTING THE ANTI-ISRAEL TREND. NO LEBANESE IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT THE FEDAYEEN'S APPARENTLY MINOR ACHIEVEMENTS ALONG THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER ARE SUCH AS TO WARRANT A THREAT BY THE IDF TO CAUTERIZE A TEN-KILOMETER STRIP OF LEBANESE TERRITORY.

8. THE ISRAELI DILEMMA.-- NO CLEAR CAUSE AND EFFECT RELATIONSHIP CAN BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN ISRAEL'S AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY AND ANY PROLONGED PERIOD OF QUIET ON THE LEBANESE FRONTIER. OBVIOUSLY, WHEN THE IDF ATTACKS, THE FEDAYEEN RUN FOR COVER, BUT EACH TIME THEY COME BACK, ARMED WITH A LITTLE MORE POPULAR SUPPORT. PUTTING ASIDE THE UNDERSTANDABLE LEBANESE TENDENCY TO ATTACH ULTERIOR MOTIVES TO PAST ISRAELI STATEMENTS OF INTEREST IN SOUTH LEBANON, TO ISRAEL'S REPUDIATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, TO INTEMPERATE ISRAELI WARNINGS, AND TO THE IDF'S READINESS TO CROSS THE FRONTIER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THESE POSITIONS ARE PRIMARILY THE PRODUCT OF INTENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE GOI TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE SMALL BUT STEADY LOSS OF LIFE, PLUS THE PRESENT ISRAELI LEADERSHIP'S PROPENSITY FOR OVERREACTING, IN THE BELIEF THAT THE ARABS (EVEN THE PACIFIC LEBANESE) WILL THEN ACT IN THE INTEREST OF ISRAEL. THE POINT IS, IF ISRAEL REALLY WANTS TO KEEP BORDER INCIDENTS FROM ESCALATING RAPIDLY, ITS PRESENT STRATEGY IS WRONG. IT IS NOW STARTING ON A COURSE WHICH WILL GRADUALLY FORCE LEBANON INTO THE RADICAL AND MILITANT ARAB CAMP. MANY FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE WILL BE KILLED IN THE PROCESS, BUT SURELY MORE ISRAELIS AS WELL.

9. FOR TWENTY YEARS LEBANON HAD A RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST WITH ISRAEL. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS CERTAINLY MORE FRAGILE NOW, AND THE GOL IS LESS IN CONTROL OF ITS OWN DESTINY -- BUT THERE IS STILL A STRONG WILL TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE IF ISRAEL CAN ABANDON PROVOCATIVE LEGALISMS, SUCH AS THE PERSISTENT CANARD THAT THE GOL, WHICH STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED ANY ACT OF MILITANCY IN 1967, "DECLARED WAR ON ISRAEL." IT CAN STOP SNIPING AT THE GAA, WHICH HELPED KEEP THE BORDER QUIET FOR TWENTY YEARS. IT MUST STOP OBSTRUCTING THE ACTIVITIES AND THE POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER OF THE SMALL UN OBSERVER TEAM. IF THE LEGALISMS ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO HER THAN FACTS, THEN ISRAEL HERSELF MUST BEAR MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR TODAY'S UNHAPPY SITUATION.

10. ISRAEL MUST THEREFORE MINIMIZE THE GOL'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY, AND NURTURE WHAT REMAINS OF THE GOL/GOI COMMUNITY OF INTEREST. THIS COMMUNITY OF VIEWS STARTS WITH A MUTUAL DISTRUST OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND A DESIRE TO AVOID WAR. THE FEDAYEEN DO NOT YET CALL THE TUNE IN

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LEBANON, EXCEPT IN THEIR NOW-ESTABLISHED RIGHT TO EXIST IN THE COUNTRY. BUT IF ISRAEL CONTINUES TO STRAFE LEBANESE ROADS AND ASSUME POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES ON LEBANESE TERRITORY, PERHAPS SOME DAY THEY WILL. TWO DAYS AGO, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME, A LEBANESE SOLDIER DIED IN A FIREFIGHT WITH THE IDF. THE LEBANESE ARMY IS NO MENACE TO THE IDF, BUT IT IS THE ONLY FORCE WHICH CAN COUNTER THE FEDAYEEN. IF IT IS COMMITTED TO THE FIGHT AGAINST ISRAEL, THE LEBANON WHICH COULD RETAIN MUTUAL INTERESTS WITH ISRAEL WILL CEASE TO EXIST. THIS SHOULD SERVE AS A MEASURE OF RESTRAINT TO THE IDF TO CONFINE ITS OPERATIONS TO THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE LINE, WITH AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF CROSS-BORDER REPRISAL ACTIONS. THE ISRAELI DETERRENT IS A POWERFUL ONE, BUT IT WILL NOT SUCCEED IF IT IS OVER-USED AGAINST LEBANON.

11. IN CONCLUSION, AS LONG AS THERE IS NO SETTLEMENT AND THE ISRAELIS CONTINUE TO OCCUPY ARAB TERRITORY, FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WILL CONTINUE NO MATTER WHAT THE ISRAELIS DO. THE NECESSITY IS TO MINIMIZE ITS INCIDENCE. IF THE ISRAELI CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT POLICY TOWARD SUCH ACTIVITY, THE END RESULT WILL BE A SITUATION ALONG THE LEBANESE BORDERS VERY SIMILAR TO THAT ALONG THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CEASE-FIRE LINES ISRAEL WOULD THUS BE FACED WITH THREE BATTLEFRONTS RATHER THAN TWO. THE MILITARY ASPECT DOES NOT APPEAR TO DISTURB THEM, BUT THE PROSPECT OF A RADICAL AND HOSTILE LEBANON SHOULD. AS AN AREA SETTLEMENT IS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, IT WOULD APPEAR IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST TO HELP US PLAY FOR MORE TIME AND TO SEE IF WE CAN KEEP LEBANON FROM THE EQUALLY BLEAK PROSPECTS OF CIVIL WAR, OR TOTAL ALIGNMENT WITH THE ARAB MILITANTS. IF WE DON'T SUCCEED, CHANCES FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THE ME WILL BE PERHAPS FATALLY DAMAGED.

12. IN THE PROCESS, THE US STANDS TO LOSE MUCH. INDEED, WE HAVE MUCH MORE TO LOSE THAN DOES ISRAEL. AS PRES HELOU SOMBERLY TOLD AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK, HE MAY BE THE LAST AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE WITH WHOM THE LEBANESE CHIEF OF STATE CAN DEAL OPENLY, AS A FRIEND. PORTER

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