

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
145	telegram	Amemb Beirut to CN MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/1 1p. SAINTIZED PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1), HR. 2/19/2010	1/6/69	B
199	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/2 3pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/28/69	B
200	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/3 3pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/25/69	B
201	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/4 2pgs. Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/25/69	B
202	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/5 3pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/25/69	B
203	cable	CIA to White House Situation Room MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/6 2pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	11/20/69	B
204	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/7 3pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/28/69	B
205	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/8 3pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/28/69	B
206	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/9 4pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/28/69	B
207	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/10 2pgs. Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	10/26/69	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East			BOX NUMBER 620	
FOLDER TITLE Lebanon				
[6] Lebanon Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970 [3 of 3]				

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information. | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA 14021 (4-85)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

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208	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/11 14pgs Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	9/29/69	B
209	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/12 3pgs SANITIZED PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1), HR. 7/19/2010	1/28/70	B
212	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/13 1pg. DECLASSIFIED per HR 2/19/2010	12/29/69	B
214	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/14 5pgs. DECLASSIFIED per HR. 2/19/2010	12/10/69	B
248	cable	DIRNSA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/15 1pg. Exempted PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); HR. 9/29/10	8/15/69	B
249	cable	CIA to White House Situation Rqom	11/20/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East

BOX NUMBER

620

FOLDER TITLE

Lebanon
[6] ~~Lebanon~~ Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970 [3 of 3]

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200	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/3 3pgs	10/25/69	B
201	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/4 2pgs.	10/25/69	B
202	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/5 3pgs	10/25/69	B
203	cable	CIA to White House Situation Room MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/6 2pgs	11/20/69	B
204	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/7 3pgs	10/28/69	B
205	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/8 3pgs	10/28/69	B
206	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/9 4pgs	10/28/69	B
207	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/10 2pgs.	10/26/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East

BOX NUMBER

620

FOLDER TITLE

[6] **Lebanon** Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31, 1970 [3 of 3]

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248	cable	DIRNSA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/15 1pg.	8/15/69	B
249	cable	CIA to White House Situation Room	11/20/69	B

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Lebanon
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA 14021 (4-85)



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TELEGRAM

SECRET 026

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00887 281916Z

51
ACTION SS 70

SUMMARY

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

025551

R 281627Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6952
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 779

SECRET BEIRUT 0887

SUBJ: LEBANESE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR UN FORCES IN ME

REF: STATE 12434

LIMDIS

1. I TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT HELOU (THROUGH MICHEL KHOURY JAN 28) POINTS MADE REFTEL. I STRESSED USG UNDERSTOOD AND WAS SYMPATHETIC TO HELOU'S CONCERN SANITIZE LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER. REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, THIS SEEMED AT MOMENT IMPOSSIBLE IN TERMS IMPOSITION UN FORCE.

2. I ASKED KHOURY WHETHER LEBANESE HAD PUT SAME PROPOSITION RE UN FORCES TO FRENCH. HIS REPLY WAS STRONG NEGATIVE. APART FROM TRADITIONAL FRENCH OPPOSITION UN PEACEMAKING MACHINERY, LEBANESE WERE AWARE DE GAULLE WOULD NOT PROPOSE OR SUPPORT SUCH AN ACTION WHICH WOULD MEET STRONG OPPOSITION OF ARAB STATES. HELOU HAD MADE HIS SUGGESTION TO USG BECAUSE OF OUR CONSISTENT POSITION FAVORING UN PEACE-KEEPING MACHINERY AND IN ADMITTEDLY RATHER DESPERATE HOPE WE MIGHT FIND WAY WORK OUT ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. HELOU, THOUGH DISAPPOINTED, WOULD UNDERSTAND REASONING BEHIND OUR NEGATIVE REACTION.

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00887 281916Z

3. KHOURY ELABORATED ON HELOU'S REALISTIC VIEWS ON FRENCH ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON. HELOU UNDERSTANDS FRENCH DO NOT CONTEMPLATE SENDING TROOPS OR REACTING MILITARILY IN EVENT ISRAELI ATTACK. FRENCH MOTIVATIONS FOR CURRENT PRO-ARAB STAND ARE LARGELY SELFISH, DESIGNED IMPROVE FRENCH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN ME AS WELL AS PROVIDE SOME WESTERN ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET DOMINANCE IN AREA. LEBANESE INTEND TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE FRENCH PRO-LEBANESE ATTITUDE AND WILL CONTINUE SEEK ALL POSSIBLE MANIFESTATIONS OF FRENCH PUBLIC SUPPORT WHICH MAY HAVE SOME EFFECT BOTH IN REDUCING RADICAL ARAB PRESSURE ON LEBANON AND GIVING ISRAEL SOME PAUSE.

4. IN MEANTIME SAID KHOURY, FRENCH HAVE BEEN PERFORMING WELL IN THEIR OFFERS OF ARMAMENTS TO LEBANON. THEY HAVE BEEN OUTGOING IN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE VARIETY OF ARMS AVAILABLE, AND CREDIT TERMS ARE MOST LENIENT. LEBANESE HAVE NO INTENTION COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ARMS PURCHASES OF ANY MAGNITUDE BUT THEY WILL REQUEST FRENCH ARRANGE EARLY DELIVERY (LARGELY TO BOLSTER INTERNAL CONFIDENCE) OF MODERATE AMOUNTS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND OF LIGHT EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN RIOT CONTROL. IT QUITE CLEAR TO HELOU, SAID KHOURY, THAT LEBANON CANNOT AFFORD GET INVOLVED IN ME ARMS RACE. HE ADDED THAT PRIMIN KARAME, WHO ALSO WEARS SECOND HAT AS MINFINANCE, FULLY UNDERSTOOD LEBANESE TRASURY COULD NOT STAND SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL ARMS EXPENDITURES. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 004

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00886 281905Z

SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, AID 28, NIC 01, CU 04, COM 08, E 15, LAB 06, SIL 01, RSR 01, /174 W

025502

R 281532Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6951
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 778
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
DIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 0886

SUBJECT: CHAMOUNIST OPPOSITION TO THE KARAME GOVERNMENT

1. RAYMOND EDDE'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE CHEHABIST BLOC (BEIRUT 0855) RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTIC ACCLAIM FROM ALLIANCE PARTISANS IN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. PLENARY SESSION OF TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE (EDDE, GEMAYEL, AND CHAMOUN) SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 30 IS EXPECTED TO ENDORSE MOST ELEMENTS OF EDDE STATEMENT EXCEPT HIS INDELICATE ATTACK ON PERSON OF FUAD CHEHAB. CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER ALLIANCE WILL YIELD TO URGING OF ITS ACTIVIST MEMBERSHIP, WHICH IS ADVOCATING STRIKES, RALLIES, DEMONSTRATIONS, AND WHATEVER OTHER EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY ACTION IS REQUIRED TO BRING DOWN THE KARAME GOVERNMENT (BEIRUT 0795). EDDE HIMSELF IS CONTINUING TO ADVISE THE ALLIANCE TO CONFINE ITS ACTIONS TO PARLIAMENT, BUT THE ACTIVISTS ARGUE THAT THE ALLIANCE'S 35 DEPUTITES ARE IMPOTENT IN A 99-MAN PARLIAMENT WHICH THEY FEEL IS NOT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF MAJORITY PUBLIC OPINION. SOME PHALANGIST STUDENTS HAVE ALREADY GONE ON STRIKE. ULTIMATE DECISION PROBABLY RESTS WITH CAMILLE CHAMOUN, WHO IS FAR AND AWAY THE MOST POPULAR CHRISTIAN LEADER.

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
PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00886 281905Z

2. IF CHAMOUNISTS GO ON STRIKE, IT WILL PROBABLY BEGIN JANUAR 30--WHEN NEW GOVERNMENT COMES UP FOR PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE. SITUATION WILL REQUIRE ALL KARAME'S STATECRAFT. EVEN IF CHAMOUNISTS DECIDE AGAINST EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY ACTION, HE MUST DRAFT A SOLOMONIC POLICY STATEMENT THAT WILL BE SIMULTANEOUSLY PRO-ARAB ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE MUSLIMS AND NEUTRAL ENOUGH TO REASSURE THE CHRISTIANS. MEANWHILE, NOTING JANUARY 27 MEETING OF HELOU, KARAME, AND CINC BOUSTANY AT HELOU'S NEW RESIDENCE IN BAABDA, PRESS SPECULATES THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD RESPOND TO ANY CHAMOUNIST ATTACK OUTSIDE PARLIAMENT BY IMPOSING STATE OF EMERGENCY, WHICH WOULD PERMIT PRESS CENSORSHIP AND SUMMARY ARRESTS.

3. IN ESSENCE, PRESENT CHAMOUNIST-CHEHABIST CONFRONTATION IS MERELY LATEST PHASE IN VENDETTA WHICH BEGAN IN 1957 CURRENT POWER STRUGGLE IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE INTOXICATING EFFECT THAT THE APPROACH OF THE 1970 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS HAVING ON MARONITE POLITICIANS LIKE CHEHAB, CHAMOUN, GEMAYEL, EDDE, AND FRANGIEH (WHO IS PRESENTLY ORBITING SOMEWHERE IN SPACE BETWEEN THE CHAMOUNIST AND CHEHABIST BLOCS). HOWEVER, THESE TRADITIONAL LEBANESE POLITICAL RITES ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE SHADOW OF LEBANON'S GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT WHICH CAN ALWAYS ASSUME CONFESSIONAL OVERTONES. IN 1969, AS IN 1958, WE FEAR THAT LEBANON CANNOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF PLAYING CONVENTIONAL POLITICS, AND THEREFORE WE ARE COUNSELING CAUTION. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 108

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00751 240728Z

21
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 000/070 W

002594

R 231643Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6920
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1230
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

SECRET BEIRUT 0751

LIMDIS

REF: BEIRUT 514

SUBJ: FRENCH SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

1) FRENCH HAVE BEEN MAKING SUBSTANTIAL GAIN IN LEBANON IN WAKE OF ISRAELI ARMS EMBARGO. THERE HAS BEEN OUTPOURING OF AFFECTION FOR FRANCE AND ADMIRATION FOR DE GAULLE TOGETHER WITH SIGNIFICANT GROUNDSWELL FOR GOL AND BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO FAVOR FRANCE IN COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.

2) PRIMIN KARAME REFLECTED GENUINE SENTIMENTS MOST LEBANESE IN LA MONDE INTERVIEW WIDELY PUBLICIZED LEBANON JAN 23. HE QUOTED AS SAYING LEBANON WILL ACCEPT FRENCH MILITARY AID AND PREPARED BENEFIT FROM ALL POSSIBILITIES FRENCH ASSISTANCE IN MILITARY FIELD. HE REFERRED TO CURRENT TALKS IN BEIRUT WITH FRENCH THREE-MAN MILITARY DELEGATION WHICH WILL DEFINE LEBANON'S DEFENSE NEEDS.

3) ON OTHER HAND, MICHEL KHOURY (PRES HELOU'S CONFIDANT) TELLS ME FRENCH ARE BEING VERY CAREFUL IN MAKING ANY COMMITMENTS TO

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LEBANON, EXCEPT AGREEMENT SELL ARMS. LEBANESE HOPED FRENCH DEF MIN MESSMER WOULD FOLLOW UP HIS SAUDI ARABIA-KUWAIT TRIP WITH VISIT LEBANON BUT MESSMER TURNED DOWN LEBANESE INVITATION. HELOU IS ANNOYED BY THIS REBUFF AND HAS HAD REAFFIRMED HIS AWARENESS LIMITATIONS INHERENT IN FRENCH CAPACITY ASSIST LEBANON. HE ALSO AWARE FRANCE DOES NOT INTEND GET TRAPPED INTO ANY PRE-COMMITMENTS. THIS IN TURN VERIFIED BY MESSMER KUWAIT STATEMENT JAN 22 THAT JOINT DEFENSE PACT WITH LEBANON NOT BEING CONSIDERED.

4) NONETHELESS FRENCH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, SAID KHOURY HAS PROVIDED HELPFUL DETERRENT TO ISRAEL AND AT LEAST KEPT ISRAEL GUESSING AS TO FRENCH REACTION SHOULD LEBANON BE ATTACKED LEBANESE ARE NOT ASSUMING THEY WOULD GET FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT WHICH THEY KNOW IS NOT REALISTICALLY AVAILABLE BUT THEY FEEL CONFIDENT FRANCE WOULD ATTEMPT IMPOSE ADDITIONAL SANCTUONS AGAINST ISRAEL IN RESPONSE ISRAELI AGGRESSION ON LEBANON.

5) HELOU REPEATED TO ME THROUGH KHOURY HIS UNDERSTANDING AND GRATIFICATION THAT US INTERVENTION WITH ISRAEL PLAYED MAJOR ROLE IN LAST THREE WEEKS TO RESTRAIN POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION. HE REEMPHASIZED HIS HOPE US WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS. ABOVE ALL HELOU DID NOT WISH US TO BELIEVE LEBANON EXPECTED FRENCH TO HAVE COMPARABLE DETERRENT EFFECT ON ISRAEL AS US CAN HAVE. EVEN THOUGH GRATEFUL TO DE GAULLE FOR HIS RECENT PRO-LEBANON ACTIONS, HELOU UNDERSTANDS ARMS EMBARGO HAS DESTROYED POSSIBLE FRENCH INFLUENCE ON ISRAELI POLICY.

6) IN SAME VEIN AS PARA 4, PARIS 976, KHOURY EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT DE GAULLE'S PRESENT PRO-ARAB STANCE WAS OF BENEFIT TO ALL THE WEST, PARTICULARLY US, IN COMBATTING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ARAB WORLD. IT ALSO PROVED, HE ASSERTED, THAT ARABS WERE NOT BASICALLY ANTI-WEST, AS THEIR EAGER EMBRACE OF DE GAULLE SHOWED. THEIR EXPRESSION OF ESTEEM FOR DE GAULLE WAS ALMOST TRANSPARENT REACTION OF RELIEF THAT THEY ALSO COULD CLAIM SOME NON-COMMUNIST FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS.

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SUMMARY

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ACTION IO 15

INFO NEA 13, EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 23, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02, AID 28, ACDA 16, SA 01, RSR 01, /158 W

130764

R 231431Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6910
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
US MISSION USUN NY 0679

SECRET BEIRUT 0733

REF: TEL AVIV 267

1. ISRAELI TURNDOWN OF PROPOSAL FOR STATIONING UN OBSERVERS ON ITS SIDE OF LEBANON-ISRAELI BORDER IS INDEED DEPRESSING DEVELOPMENT. IMPERFECT THOUGH PROPOSAL IS, IT APPEARS TO US TO REPRESENT A SMALL STEP FORWARD IN ACHIEVING LEBANON-ISRAEL COOPERATION FOR MAINTENANCE OF A QUIET BORDER. IT IS, IN OUR VIEW, A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE BETWEEN SEVERAL IMPOSSIBLE CHOICES WHICH ARE UNACCEPTABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS TO ONE OR BOTH PARTIES INVOLVED. ISRAEL'S REFUSAL OF PROPOSAL WILL BE VIEWED BY LEBANESE AS ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL WISHES RETAIN ITS OPTION TAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON WHEN AND IF IT SUITS ISRAEL'S INTERESTS.

2. WE PARTICULARLY ARE ATTRACTED TO AUGMENTED UN OBSERVER PROPOSAL BECAUSE IT COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT QUICKLY AND BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW IT WOULD ENHANCE LEBANESE ARMY'S ABILITY AND WILL TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. CONTRARY TO ELIZUR'S CONTENTION THAT PROPOSAL WOULD LESSEN GOL'S FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN, WE BELIEVE THAT WITH UN OBSERVERS LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDER LEBANESE

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ARMY WILL BE EVEN MORE VIGILANT IN CARRYING OUT ITS OBLIGATION TO DENY FEDAYEEN USE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY TO ATTACK ISRAEL. TRADITIONALLY, OBSERVERS ALSO SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON PART OF BOTH ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE (AS WELL AS USG) OF WHAT ACTUALLY GOES ON IN BORDER AREAS, THUS HOPEFULLY REDUCING THE CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES WHICH ARE CHARACTERISTIC OF PRESENT SITUATION.

3. ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT LEBANON PARTICIPATED IN JUNE 1967 WAR AND HAS MAINTAINED BELLIGERENT POSTURE AGAINST ISRAEL IS A CANARD NOT JUSTIFIED BY FACT. IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY ACT OF BELLIGERENCY IN THE GOL-GOI RELATIONSHIP, IT HAS BEEN RECENT ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT. AFTER HAVING EXECUTED THAT ATTACK, THEREBY FORCING LEBANON FROM ITS POSITION OF NON-INVOLVEMENT TO A MORE STRONGLY PRO-ARAB POSITION, ISRAELIS NOW EXPECT LEBANESE EAT ADDITIONAL CROW BY DEMANDING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AT BORDER WITHOUT ANY PROTECTIVE UN PRESENCE. THIS IS MANIFESTLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY LEBANESE GOVT TO ACCEPT AND ISRAEL MUST CERTAINLY BE AWARE OF THAT FACT.

4. LEBANESE ARE PERHAPS ONLY MIDDLE EASTERNERS LEFT WHO STILL CAN TALK TO ISRAELIS AND THEY WANT TO DO SO. TO DENY THEM THE UN FACADE BEHIND WHICH SUCH TALKS CAN OCCUR CAN ONLY MEAN THAT TALKS CAN NEVER TAKE PLACE. ISRAEL, IN OUR VIEW, IS INDULGING IN DOUBLE TALK. IF THERE ARE INCIDENTS IN ISRAEL CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO FEDAYEEN ACTION IT HARD TO ARGUE THAT LEBANON'S CASE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IF UN OBSERVERS ARE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN FACTS AND PLACE BLAME ON LEBANON. WE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT ISRAEL PREFERS DECIDE IN HER OWN INTERESTS WHEN AND HOW BORDER INCIDENTS SHOULD BE REVEALED LEAVING REST TO US IN DARK AS TO HOW TO ASSESS BLAME.

5. WE AGREE WITH EMB TE AVIV'S FINAL COMMENT THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE MUST BE DONE FACILITATE MEETINGS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL AT BORDER. WE MUST REPEAT, HOWEVER, THAT GOL CAN ONLY PARTICIPATE IN SUCH MEETINGS WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK AND WITH UN PRESENCE. THERE NO OTHER BASIS ON WHICH ANY LEB GOVT WHICH COULD POSSCALLY BE FORMED COULD ACCEPT TO HAVE DEALINGS WITH "THE ENEMY". WE CANNOT FORGET THAT IT IS ISRAEL NOT LEBANON WHICH KEEPS INSISTING THAT STATE OF WAR EXISTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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6. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO CONVINCING ISRAEL OF THE DESIRABILITY OF ACCEPTING THIS ONE SMALL CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DENY THE LEBANESE ASSERTION THAT ISRAEL IS NOT IN FACT SEEKING PEACE.

PORTER

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Department of State

SUMMARY
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ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02.

SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, RSR 01, /140 W
----- 117020

R 211716Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6892
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 0662

SUBJECT: LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CRISIS

REF: BEIRUT 0570

1. TWO MORE MEMBERS OF KARAME CABINET (MALOUF AND MAJDALANI) RESPONDED TO TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE PRESSURE BY RESIGNING JANUARY 21. TWO OTHERS (MURR AND ZEIN) ARE VACILLATING. ZEIN'S BROTHER TELLS US HE IS RELUCTANT TO FOLLOW HIS ALLIES OUT OF GOVERNMENT BECAUSE HIS MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY WOULD INTERPRET HIS RESIGNATION AS RESPONSE TO CHRISTIAN DISCIPLINE.

2. WITH 11 MINISTERS HAVING REPORTED FOR DUTY, KARAME GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO LIMP ALONG, ALTHOUGH IN CHRISTIAN SKYES IT IS A BASKET CASE BECAUSE KARAME SO FAR HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RECRUIT REPLACEMENTS FOR THE TWO MARONITE SEATS VACATED BY EDDE AND GEMAYEL. EVEN CHEHABIST MARONITES JEAN AZIZ AND QABALAN AL KHOURY HAVE DECLINED.

4. HOWEVER, KARAME IS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN AND MAY YET PATCH UP HIS GOVERNMENT.
PORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

47

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 241

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00224 01 OF 02 082323Z

81
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

048933

R 081418Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6753
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

31

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 0224

EXDIS:

1. ONE CANNOT HELP BUT VIEW WITH DISQUIET AND DEEPEST UNEASE CONSISTENT ISRAELI REACTION TO THIS OF SITUATION IN LEBANON SUCH AS COMMENTS BY ELIZUR IN TEL AVIV'S 74, AND AS EXPRESSED IN INTEMPERATE AND BELLIGERENT TONE ESHKOL'S PROPOSED LETTER TO HELOU. THE "FACTS" AS WE SEE THEM ARE OFTEN MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS AS TO WHAT HAS HAPPENED OR IS HAPPENING. ONE SEES A NEW CHAPTER IN ME TRAGEDY UNFOLDING WITH LEBANON AND ISRAEL EACH SET ON ITS OWN IRREVOCABLE COURSE WITH NO BEND OR GIVE IN DIRECTION OF THE OTHER. IN LEBANON'S CASE, THE DESIRE OF THE LEADERSHIP TO ACCOMMODATE TO ISRAEL IS THERE BUT THERE IS NOT YET A NATIONAL UNANIMITY WHICH CAN SUSTAIN THE LEADERS OR THE ARMY.

2. FROM HERE, ISRAEL'S POSITION APPEARS UNTENABLE, ALTHOUGH ONE SYMPATHIZES WITH AND UNDERSTANDS CLEARLY THE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH IMPEL HER TO ACT AS SHE DOES. BUT THE UNPROVOKED AND CONDEMNED BEIRUT AIRPORT ATTACK WAS CLEARLY AN INCENDIARY ACTION, AND ISRAEL, IF SHE KNOWS WHAT SHE CLAIMS TO KNOW ABOUT THE ARAB WORLD, MUST HAVE ANTICIPATED THE CONSEQUENCES. STILL, LEBANON IS LEFT TO PUT OUT THE FIRE ALONE OR FACE FURTHER ISRAEL BUFFETINGS, WHILE THE RADICAL ARAB WORLD CAN HARDLY CONTAIN ITS GLEE AT WHAT IS HAPPENING.

3. PERHAPS IT IS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE CITIZENS AND LEADERS OF BELEAGUERED ISRAEL TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN NON-BELLICOSE,

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RAELIS. BUT LEBANON IS NOW LIKE THE POTENTIAL VICTIM OF THE COBRA - RIGID WITH FRIGHT AND WAITING FOR THE STRIKE.

7. I CAN ONLY REPEAT CONCLUSION THAT ODDS HEAVILY FAVOR OUT-BREAK REAL TROUBLE ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER IN VERY NEAR FUTURE. WE MIGHT YET BE ABLE AVOID THIS IF (A) GOL CAN BE GALVANIZED INTO DECISIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST FEDAYEEN BY EARLY AND DRAMATIC PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, OR (B) THE USG, BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO APPLY SANCTIONS IF ISRAEL DOES ATTACK, CAN RESTRAIN ISRAEL WHILE A MAJOR (HOPEFULLY MULTILATERAL) EFFORT IS MADE TO FORCE LEBANON TO CONTAIN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WITHIN TOLERABLE LIMITS. PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 820

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00152 061656Z

44

ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,1030 W

035130

O 061601Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6728
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

SECRET BEIRUT 0152

30

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: ESHKOL LETTER TO PRESIDENT HELOU

REF: TEL AVIV 67 AND 68

1. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE FOR EMBASSY BEIRUT TO TRANSMIT ESHKOL LETTER TO PRES HELOU. VERY FACT OF OUR TRANSMISSION RUNS RISK OF BEING INTERPRETED AS DEGREE OF USG ASSOCIATION WITH CONTENTS OF LETTER, WHICH IN EFFECT ARE A DIATRIBE AND ANINDICTMENT OF LEB GOVT. LETTER CONTAINS NOTHING WHICH HAS NOT EITHER ALREADY BEEN MADE PUBLIC BY ISRAELI GOVT OR WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED PRIVATELY BY US WITH HELOU AND HIS GOVT SINCE ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT DEC 28. WHILE WE MAY BE OVERLY SENSITIVE, WE WOULD HATE TO RUN RISK OF EVENTUAL PUBLICATION BY ISRAELIS IN JUSTIFICATION MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST LEBANESE FOR LATTER'S FAILURE COMPLY WITH ALL DEMANDS MADE IN LETTER. IN ANY CASE, WE FAIL SEE HOW TRANSMITTAL THIS MESSAGE WOULD HAVE DESIRED EFFECT OF IMPROVING SITUATON. IN FACT IT MIGHT WELL EXACERBATE IT TO DETRIMENT OF USG INTERESTS.

2. I SUGGEST THAT, IF LETTER IS TO BE DELIVERED, IT BE DONE DIRECTLY AT WASHINGTON, NEW YORK OR SOME CAPITAL IN WHICH BOTH ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES. THIS WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE TOO DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 039

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00071 062025Z

SI
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

036070

O P 061911Z JAN 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

SECRET AMMAN 0071

EXDIS:

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT

1. VICEROY PRINCE HASSAN HAS JUST PASSED URGENT MESSAGE TO US IN WHICH HE REVEALED GREAT CONCERN OVER THIS AFTERNOON'S BBC BROADCAST (POSSIBLY CARRIED OTHER AREA STATIONS AS WELL) THAT ISRAELI IDF SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER HAD STATED THAT ATTACK ON EILAT WOULD BE MET WITH IMMEDIATE ATTACK ON AQABA. ASKED US TO MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS THAT JORDAN HAD DONE EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD TO PREVENT INCIDENTS IN AQABA/EILAT AREA.

2. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV POINTING OUT: A) WE CONVINCED GOJ HAS INDEED DONE EVERYTHING IT CAN TO PREVENT INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA; B) KING HELD MEETING WITH TOP SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND JAA AUTHORITIES SATURDAY, THE 4TH, TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT NO PRECAUTIONS WERE OVERLOOKED (AND INCIDENTALLY TOLD BRITISH THAT JAA AREA COMMANDER IN AQABA HAD BEEN REPLACED); AND C) BOTH GOJ AND US DISTURBED BY RECENT THREATENING, ALMOST INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS (E.G., ALLON AND IDF AREA COMMANDER) IN A SENSITIVE SITUATION CHARACTERIZED BY WIDESPREAD ARAB EXPECTATIONS, HOWEVER UNREASONABLE THAT ISRAELIS WOULD TAKE STRONG MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON OR JORDAN PRIOR JANUARY 29TH.

3. SINCE WE ARE VERY MUCH PARTY TO THIS AFFAIR (BY PASSING EBAN WARNING TO HUSSEIN, AND BY FOLLOWING UP AT LOWER LEVELS TO ENSURE THAT GOJ PRECAUTIONS ACTUALLY BEING TAKEN, BELIEVE WE HAVE RIGHT TO EXPECT ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE MORE THAN USUAL RESTRAINT.

GP-3. SYMMES

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SECRET 489

PAGE 01 STATE 017740

45
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66608
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:TAWAHL
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/IAI-MR. ATHERTON, JR. DRAFT
NEA/ARN-MR. SEELYE DRAFT
NEA-MR. DAVIES
S/S-MR. BROWN

70 FEB 5 PM 5:52
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

..... 059059

P R 051721Z FEB 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 017740

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL

REF: BEIRUT 905


1. IF QUESTION FUTURE US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL ARISES IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH HELOU OR KARAME, SUGGEST YOU BE GUIDED BY WHAT PRESIDENT SAID IN JANUARY 30 PRESS CONFERENCE AND GENERAL LINE TAKEN BY AMBASSADOR SYMMES IN TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN (AMMAN 528, PARA. 4).

2. YOU SHOULD CAUTION AGAINST SPECULATING OR DRAWING PRE-MATURE CONCLUSIONS RE NATURE OF DECISION WHICH PRESIDENT SAID IN PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD BE MADE WITHIN 30 DAYS. FYI. RE QUESTION OF LINKAGE BETWEEN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUESTS AND ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD US PROPOSALS FOR MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, YOU WILL RECALL THAT SECRETARY SPECIFICALLY

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STATED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AT DECEMBER 23 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THERE IS NO LINKAGE. END FYI.

GP-3.
ROGERS

REC-2 MAR 2 1978

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41
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66610
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN/BAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN:SEELYE
NEA/DAVIES
E/TT:LOY
INR/DDC:BUFORD
SY:LYNCH
S/S: BROWN

70 112
JAN 30 PM 4:28
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

024640

P R 301625Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL KARACHI

S E C R E T STATE 014632

EXDIS

SUBJ: TREATENED HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 809

1. ALERT SENT TO PANAM BEIRUT BY NEW YORK HEADQUARTERS
RESULTED FROM INFORMATION CONTAINED IN CAS REPORT AND
PASSED BY DEPT JAN 28 TO SECURITY OFFICERS
OF BOTH PAN AMERICAN AND TWA. GIST OF REPORT (ORIGIN OF
WHICH PROTECTED) WAS THAT LEBANESE SOURCE HAD RECEIVED
INFORMATION THAT FATAH COMMANDOS HAD BEEN REQUESTED HIJACK
AMERICAN AIRLINER TO IRAQ. WOULD BE HIJACKERS REPORTEDLY
PROMISED DOLS 12,000 TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION.

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2. REPORT DID NOT INDICATE WHICH AMERICAN AIRLINE WAS THREATENED BUT, SINCE PAN AMERICAN AND TWA ONLY US AIRLINES OPERATING SCHEDULED SERVICES IN AREA, BOTH WERE INFORMED. REPORT WAS PASSED WITH CAVEAT THAT THIS WAS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION AND THAT WE HAD NO RPT NO CONFIRMATION BUT WISHED AT LEAST ALERT COMPANIES TO POSSIBILITY HIJACKING ATTEMPT IN ORDER THAT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES MIGHT BE TAKEN.

3. WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS REPORT AND NO ACTION EXPECTED OF ADDRESSEES. THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DISCUSSED LOCALLY, SINCE IT MIGHT CAUSE UNDUE ALARM. INQUIRIES SHOULD BE ANSWERED WITH RESPONSE THAT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION REGARDING A SPECIFIC THREAT TO A GIVEN AIRLINE, BUT THAT SITUATION SUCH THAT ROUTINE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES WOULD SEEM ADVISABLE. GP-3. ROGERS

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66645
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J SISCO
J/PM MR CHAPMAN (INFO)
DOD/ISA COL. CCLARK (INFO)
NEA/IAI ALATHERTON (INFO)
NEA/ARN TWSEELYE
S/S MR LEVITSKY

076463

R 170028Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 007920

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR LEBANON

1. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO, DEPARTMENT OFFICER ON JANUARY 16 INFORMED LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI THAT WE ARE FOLLOWING LEBANON'S BORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS CLOSELY AND HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO ISRAELIS OVER THEIR RECENT ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON. WE HAVE TOLD ISRAELIS THAT WE CONSIDER LEVEL AND SIZE OF THESE ATTACKS OUT OF PROPORTION TO FEDAYEEN PROVOCATIONS. WE HAVE ALSO INDICATED OUR BELIEVE THAT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS DOING ALL IT CAN WITHIN LIMITATIONS OF CAIRO AGREEMENT TO CONTAIN FEDAYEEN. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE REITERATED TO ISRAEL OUR SPECIAL INTEREST IN LEBANON. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS OVER THE LAST SIX DAYS.

2. DEPARTMENT OFFICER CONTINUED THAT IN ORDER BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON AND WITH VIEW TO HELPING LEBANON IMPROVE ITS SECURITY CAPABILITIES, WE HAVE AUTHORIZED AMBASSADOR PORTER TO OFFER FOR SALE TO GOL LARGE

70 JAN 17 AM 9:59
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM


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QUANTITY OF M-14 RIFLES. THESE RIFLES ARE MORE THAN MATCH FOR THE KALESHNIKOV AND SHOULD ADDITIONALLY PROVIDE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT TO THE LEBANESE ARMY.
ROGERS

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92
ORIGIN SS-45

2

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66638
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY:NEA:RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR SEELYE
S/S:MR BROWN

054350

R 132005Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 005147

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 261 AND 258

1. DAVIES (NEA) RECEIVED ISRAELI COUNSELOR ARGOV JANUARY 12 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO REVIEW SITUATION ON ISRAEL'S BORDERS WITH LEBANON AND JORDAN,
2. REGARDING SITUATION IN JORDAN, DAVIES INFORMED ARGOV IN CONFIDENCE THAT HUSSEIN HAD SENT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT IN WHICH HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CONSEQUENCES ISRAELI SHELLING CIVLIAN TARGETS IN JORDAN. HUSSEIN STATED HE HAD INSTRUCTED JAA NOT FIRE ON ISRAEL FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY AND TO PREVENT OTHERS FROM DOING SO. DAVIES NOTED THAT, WHILE WE CANNOTBE CONFIDENT OF JORDANIAN ABILITY CONTROL ALL FIRING FROM IRBID HEIGHTS, WE WANT GOI BE AWARE OF KING'S DESIRES AND INTENTIONS.
3. REGARDING LEBANON, DAVIES DREW ON CONTENTS REFTELS AND EMPHASIZED LEBANESE FEARS ABOUT ISRAELI TERRITORAL AMBITIONS SOUTHERN LEBANON. READING SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM BEIRUT 261, DAVIES HIGHLIGHTED ADVERSE EFFECTS ON

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LEBANON OF ISRAELI ATTACKS AND GOL'S ATTEMPTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN.

4. DAVIES ASSURED ARGOV WE FULLY AWARE DIFFICULTY POSED BY FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. HE SAID, HOWEVER, WE QUESTIONS WHETHER GOI TACTICS OF EXCESSIVE AND INDISCRIMINATE RETALIATION ARE IN ISRAEL'S BEST LONG-RUN INTERESTS. ARGO REPLIED THAT BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR GOL "DO SOMETHING" ABOUT FEDAYEEN. HE NOTED ALSO THAT IN OCTOBER GOL HAD UPPER HAND AND SHOULD HAVE PRESSED ADVANTAGE. ARGOV ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT LEBANON AT MERCY OF ARAB STATES. IN CONCLUSION, HE SAID HE WOULD REORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GP-3
ROGERS

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Lebanon

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 212

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89
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66640

DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:TW SEELYE:DOS/ISA:COL. CLARK
APPROVED BY:NEA:RP DAVIES
J:U. ALEXIS JOHNSON (SUBS)
OSD/ISA:MR. NUTTER (SUBS)
S/S:BA FLATIN
PM/MAS:MR. SCHMELZER
NEA/RA:COL. BUNTE

039833

R 102301Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO CINCSTRIKE

SECRET STATE 004280

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: SALE OF M-14 AND/OR M-16 RIFLES TO LEBANON AND JORDAN


1. FYI. USG UNDERTAKING TO SELL APPROXIMATELY 3,000 M-14 RIFLES TO JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND RECENT INTEREST EXPRESSED BY LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN PURCHASING M-14 RIFLES ARE AFFECTED BY FACT THAT COLT PRODUCTION SCHEDULE NOW PERMITS COMMERCIAL SALE OF M-16S -- INFORMATION WHICH COLT HAS COMMUNICATED TO LEBANESE ARMY. SITUATION RESULTS FROM INCREASE IN COLT'S PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AND FACT ARMY NO LONGER ACCEPTING TOTAL OUTPUT (ADVANCE DELIVERY). THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT COULD CAST DOUBT ON CREDIBILITY OF PAST ASSERTIONS TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS THAT M-16 NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE. ACCORDINGLY, WE NEED EMPHASIZE THAT WE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND IT IS STILL TRUE THAT M-16S NOT RPT NOT AVAILABLE FROM USG STOCKS.

2. WE APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR PORTER'S DESIRE THAT LEBANESE ARMY BE

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FULLY EQUIPPED WITH EITHER M-14S OR M-16S AND IN TERMS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH LEBANESE WE WOULD LIKE TO BE IN POSITION OF OFFERING LEBANESE OPTION OF PURCHASING EITHER RIFLE IN SIMILAR QUANTITIES. WE ARE UNABLE AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, TO AUTHORIZE LEBANESE PURCHASE OF M-16S PENDING REVIEW OF IMPLICATIONS INTRODUCTION OF M-16S INTO AREA. WE HOPE TO COMPLETE REVIEW SHORTLY AND WILL INFORM POSTS OF OUR DECISION.

3. MEANWHILE, WE CAN BE HELPFUL TO LEBANON WITH REGARD TO PROVISION OF M-14S. TOTAL OF 6,000 M-14S CAN BE SOLD TO LEBANON WITHIN TIME FRAME THREE MONTHS FROM RECEIPT OF LETTER OF OFFER BY DIVERTING ASSETS FROM US FORCES REBUILD PROGRAMS. WE ALSO PREPARED SEND QUALIFIED M-14 AUTHORITY FROM US ARMY FOR PURPOSE REVIEWING WITH LEBANESE MILITARY THEIR M-14 REQUIREMENTS. END FYI.

4. FOR BEIRUT: IN ACCORDANCE WITH FOREGOINT GUIDELINES, AMBASSADOR PORTER IS AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIGHEST LEBANESE AUTHORITIES THAT USG IS PREPARED TO ASSIST GOL IN REEQUIPPING ITS ARMED FORCES WITH MODERN RIFLES.

A. USG CAN SELL GOL IMMEDIATELY QUANTITY OF 6,000 M-14 RIFLES FOR DELIVERY WITHIN NINETY DAYS AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF LETTER OF OFFER. COST OF EACH RIFLE DOLS 122 PLUS SHIPPING CHARGE. FYI. IF QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL QUANTITIES OF M-14S RAISED, AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT WE WILL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. IF QUESTION OF PURCHASING M-16S RAISED, AMBASSADOR AUTHORIZED RESPOND THAT WE WILL EXAMINE REQUEST CLOSELY. END FYI.

B. IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, USG WOULD BE PLEASED TO DISPATCH US ARMY OFFICER KNOWLEDGEABLE WITH M-14 RIFLE TO CONSULT WITH LEBANESE MILITARY.

C. WE ASSUME THAT GOL INTENDS TO PAY CASH FOR THIS TRANSACTION AND WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION OF THIS FACT. CASH SALES WOULD ENABLE TRANSACTION TO BE EXPEDITED. FYI. WHILE WE HAVE IN MIND EARMARKING CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FMS CREDIT FOR LEBANON, ONCE IT BECOMES AVAILABLE, WE CANNOT YET INFORM GOL OF THIS FACT SINCE WE DO NOT YET HAVE AN APPROPRIATION. INASMUCH AS COST OF RIFLES IS NOT RPT NOT PROHIBITIVE, WE WOULD HOPE GOL WOULD AGREE TO CASH TRANSACTION AND RESERVE ANY REQUEST FOR CREDIT WHICH IT MAY WISH TO MAKE FOR OTHER ARMS PURCHASES. END FYI.

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5. FOR AMMAN.: IF AND WHEN HE DEEMS FIT, AMBASSADOR SYMMES AUTHORIZED TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO APPROPRIATE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT COLT INDUSTRIES NOW HAS A CAPACITY TO PRODUCE M-16 RIFLES FOR COMMERCIAL SALE. NO SUCH RIFLES, HOWEVER, ARE AVAILABLE FROM USG STOCKS AND AS YET USG HAS NOT AUTHORIZED SALE OF WEAPON IN MIDDLE EAST. MEANWHILE, USG IS PLEASED THAT IT HAS BEEN ABLE TO MEET JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS FOR 3,000 M-14 RIFLES SINCE THESE RIFLES ARE AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE USE AND BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW M-14S ARE MORE SUITABLE FOR USE BY GOJ'S INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES THAN ARE M-16S.

FYI. WE ANTICIPATE SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES OF M-14S WILL BECOME AVAILABLE FROM US STOCKS IN FY 71 AND COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM REBUILD 12 MONTHS FROM ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER SUBJECT TO POLICY DECISION TO DO SO. END FYI. GP-3.
ROGERS

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
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 194

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 PCH-10 /056 R

66640
DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:PJ GRIFFIN
APPROVED BY:NEA:JJ SISCO
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
NEA:MR. DAVIES
S/S:MR. LLOYD

039638

R 102050Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM BY POUCH
AMMAN BY POUCH
CAIRO BY POUCH
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW BY POUCH

S E C R E T STATE 004257

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CALL OF LEBANESE AMBASSADOR

SUMMARY: DURING CALL BY LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI ON JANUARY 6, SISCO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF USING PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED UNDER JARRING AUSPICES ON BASIS OF CURRENT U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS. ALTHOUGH INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSE TO THESE PROPOSALS NEGATIVE, SISCO INDICATED U.S. NOW LOOKING FOR POSITIVE INDICATIONS FROM UAR IN THIS REGARD. SISCO SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GOL ASSISTANCE IT CAN GIVE IN THIS REGARD BUT WE RECOGNIZE THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE IN VIEW DELICATE POSITION LEBANON FINDS ITSELF.

SISCO SAID WE NOT AT ALL SURE WE COULD PRODUCE ISRAELIS BUT US IS PREPARED USE ITS DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE ONCE ARAB COMMITMENTS TO NEGOTIATE IS FORTHCOMING ON BASIS TWO US DOCUMENTS. KABBANI STRESSED THERE HAS BEEN NO EROSION OF MODERATE ARAB POSITION AS

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RESULT OF RABAT CONFERENCE AND THAT UAR AND JORDAN HAVE EMERGED WITH MORE FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE PEACEFUL SOLUTION. DESPITE RECENT FLAREUPS ALONG BORDER, KABBANI SAID GOL DID NOT BELIEVE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD ESCALATE TO POINT OF ENDANGERING LEBANESE SECURITY. SISCO UNDERScoreD NEED FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY IN BORDER REGION. KABBANI CONCERNED SUCH ATTEMPT BY ARMY WOULD PROVOKE GOL-FEDAYEEN CLASH AND WONDERED IF ISRAEL TRYING TO ESCALATE MILITARY SITUATION AT TIME WHEN ALL OTHER PARTIES WORKING FOR PEACE. SISCO ACKNOWLEDGED FEDAYEEN HAVE BECOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE. END SUMMARY.

1. RABAT CONFERENCE. SISCO ASKED FOR AMBASSADOR'S OPINION ON RABAT CONFERENCE. KABBANI SAID RESULTS WERE NOT AS BAD AS DEPICTED, AND AT LEAST THERE HAD BEEN NO BACKSLIDING OF ARAB MODERATES' POSITION. KABBANI EMPHASIZED THAT ARAB COUNTRIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED TOOK MODERATE, REALISTIC POSITION AT CONFERENCE WHICH INDICATES THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF REALITIES INVOLVED.

2. SISCO ASKED IF KABBANI AGREED WITH IDEA THAT TWO MAJOR ARAB COUNTRIES CONCERNED -- UAR AND JORDAN -- HAD EMERGED FROM RABAT WITH AS MUCH OR MORE FLEXIBILITY. KABBANI STATED THAT THERE NO QUESTION THAT THEY EMERGED WITH MORE FLEXIBILITY. UAR AND JORDAN NOW IN POSITION TO CONVINCe THEIR PEOPLE OF NEED FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

3. SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSALS. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT U.S. DOUBTS REGARDING SOVIET ROLE IN BIG POWER DISCUSSIONS HAVE INCREASED. SISCO CHARACTERIZED SOVIET REPLY OF TEN DAYS AGO AS BEING VERY NEGATIVE AND RETROGRESSIVE. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT IT UNNECESSARY FOR ALL PARTIES TO AGREE TO EVERY WORD IN THESE DOCUMENTS. OBVIOUSLY EACH PARTY WILL FIND SOMETHING THAT IT LIKES WHILE REJECTING OTHER PARTS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE IS THAT ALL PARTIES AGREE THAT THERE IS ENOUGH IN THE DOCUMENTS TO RESUME TALKS THROUGH JARRING. IF WE CAN GET NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED AGAIN, SISCO SAID HE FEELS CONFIDENT THERE WILL BE MORE FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY PARTIES THAN HAS BEEN CASE WITH RESPECT TO BIG POWER TALKS.


4. SISCO EMPHASIZED FOLLOWING POINTS TO KABBANI: (A) THERE NO DOUBT THAT FEDAYEEN HAVE BECOME IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE IN ARAB WORLD. OPTIONS NASSER AND HUSSEIN POSSESS NOW MAY BECOME MORE RESTRICTIVE WITH PASSAGE OF TIME. SPECIFICALLY, EACH OF ESTABLISHED

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GOVERNMENTS MAINTAINS IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN STATES, BUT WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THIS ATTITUDE COULD CHANGE AS OPPORTUNITIES ARE LOST. SISCO STRESSED THAT AT PRESENT WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY BASED ON TWO U.S. DOCUMENTS TO MOVE FORWARD IN SEARCH FOR PEACE. WE BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TEST SITUATION IN SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE WAY NOT BE IRRETRIEVABLY LOST. (B) SISCO CANDIDLY TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT WE ARE NOW UNCERTAIN OF OUR ABILITY TO PRODUCE ISRAELIS ON THE BASIS OF OUR CURRENT FORMULAS. HOWEVER, IF WE CAN GET SOME POSITIVE INDICATION FROM BOTH CAIRO AND AMMAN OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THESE PROPOSALS, WE ARE PREPARED TO DO WHAT WE CAN WITH ISRAELIS DESPITE THEIR NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.

5. SISCO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR RECENT STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT HELOU TO AMBASSADOR PORTER THAT HE PREPARED TO HELP IN SEARCH FOR PEACE. HE STRESSED THAT ANYTHING GOL COULD DO TO URGE APPARENT MOVEMENT ON PART OF UAR AND JORDAN WOULD BE HELPFUL. HOWEVER, HE MUST DEFER TO LEBANESE JUDGEMENT HOW BEST TO PROVIDE SUCH ASSISTANCE.

NOTING THAT HELOU WENT TO RABAT WITH IDEA IN MIND TO BE HELPFUL, KABBANI EXPHASIZED THAT HELOU, WHO HAS ALWAYS TAKEN POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, LOOKS AT U.S. PLAN FROM MOST FAVORABLE ASPECT.

6. IN RESPONSE TO SISCO'S REQUEST, KABBANI SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE HIS OPINION ON U.S. PROPOSALS. KABBANI NOTED THAT IT HAD BEEN WIDELY SPECULATED THAT THE TIMING OF U.S. PROPOSALS WAS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE RABAT CONFERENCE. TO COUNTERACT THIS IMPRESSION KABBANI STRESSED THERE SHOULD BE NO U.S. RETREAT NOW FROM VARIOUS POINTS CONTAINED THEREIN NOR SHOULD WE APPEAR TO SURRENDER TO STRONG ISRAELI CRITICISM. KABBANI ALSO MENTIONED SOME RECENT PRESS COMMENTARIES SUGGESTING THAT U.S. SHOULD DISENGAGE ITSELF FROM ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION IN VIEW OF "POLITICAL AND MILITARY REALITIES INVOLVED." HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT U.S. WOULD NOT BE SO SHORTSIGHTED AS TO BE CONSIDERING SUCH POLICY. PRINCIPAL REASON GOL HAS ALWAYS OPPOSED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES IS LIMITED PROSPECT FOR THEIR SUCCESS. GOL BELIEVES BIG POWERS MUST CONTINUE PEACE EFFORTS AS THIS OFFERS ONLY REALIZABLE CHANCE OF PROGRESS. AGREEING WITH KABBANI'S ANALYSIS, SISCO SAID THIS IS ALL MORE REASON, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF NEGATIVE SOVIET REACTION TO OUR PROPOSAL, WHY SOME POSITIVE INDICATION FROM CAIRO IS NOW NECESSARY. IN ABSENCE OF UAR POSITIVE INDICATION RAISON D'ETRE OF


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BIG POWER TALKS IS LACKING. U.S. HAS PUT FORWARD REASONABLE PROPOSALS AND THEREFORE SHOULD LOGICALLY EXPECT SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THEM. OTHERWISE THERE LITTLE PURPOSE IN CONTINUING BIG POWER DIALOGUE. WE UNDERSTAND JORDANIANS ARE INCLINED TOWARD APPROVAL AND NOW WE NEED SOME WORD FROM CAIRO.

7. SISCO REJECTED IDEA ADVANCED BY SOME COMMENTATORS THAT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 9 AND JORDANIAN PROPOSALS TABLED IN MEETING OF FOUR WERE STRICTLY TACTICAL MANEUVERS; HE STRESSED BOTH WERE LONG IN PREPARATION AND REPRESENTED ADOPTION OF FUNDAMENTAL POSTURE WHICH WE CONSIDER JUST AND FAIR. HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT OUR VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED AND DISTORTED BOTH BY SOVIETS AND IN ARAB WORLD. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT AT LEAST THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANYTHING NEGATIVE THUS FAR FROM CAIRO SO THIS MAY BE READ AS HOPEFUL SIGN. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS HARD LINE SOVIET POSITION IS IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSIVE ISRAELI ATTITUDE.

8. SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON. SISCO ASKED KABBANI FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF INTERNAL SITUATION. KABBANI REPLIED THAT AS OF TWO DAYS AGO IT DID NOT SEEM SO GOOD IN LIGHT OF STATEMENT BY PHALANGIST LEADER GAMAYEL THAT FEDAYEEN SHOULD LEAVE LEBANON. DESPITE RECENT FLAREUP ALONG BORDER GOL DOES NOT BELIEVE SITUATION WILL ESCALATE TO POINT OF ENDANGERING COUNTRY'S SECURITY. HOWEVER, HE ADMITTED THAT CONTINUED BORDER TENSION COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT PRECARIOUS INTERNAL BALANCE.

9. SISCO ASKED KABBANI IF IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR LEBANESE ARMY TO REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY ALONG BORDER. KABBANI STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT THIS WOULD RESULT IN ARMY CLASHING WITH FEDAYEEN. AS HE UNDERSTOOD CAIRO AGREEMENT, IT WAS BASICALLY INTENDED TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. HE THOUGHT ARMY WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO THIS WITHOUT, HOWEVER, RISKING OPEN CLASH. IN REPLY TO SISCO'S QUESTION ABOUT PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS, KABBANI SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT GOL HAD THINGS UNDER CONTROL AND THAT NO PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN BY COMMANDOS. HE SUMMARIZED THAT SECURITY SITUATION IN CAMPS HAD IMPROVED RECENTLY.

10. KABBANI CONFIDED THAT HE HAD BEEN WORRIED FOR SOME TIME THAT, IF IN FACT ISRAEL IS TRYING TO PROVOKE A FOURTH WAR WITH ARABS, THEN WE COULD EXPECT THERE WOULD BE NO FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR OR MASSIVE ASSAULTS THIS TIME, BUT GOL WOULD SIMPLY ESCALATE

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
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MILITARY SITUATION SLOWLY. KABBANI DOUBTED IF WORLD, INCLUDING U.S., WOULD BE WILLING ACCEPT THIS ISRAELI TACTIC. HE WONDERED AT POSSIBILITY THAT WHILE WE ARE WORKING FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION, PERHAPS GOI HAS ALREADY ADOPTED PLAN FOR STEADILY RISING MILITARY ESCALATION.

11. KABBANI SAID GOL IS WILLING TO DO WHATEVER IT CAN TO PROMOTE A JUST AND FAIR SETTLEMENT BUT HE HOPED U.S. DOES NOT RPT NOT SEE GOL-GOI BORDER SITUATION AS ALARMING FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST. RESPONDING THAT WE DEFINITELY DO NOT RPT NOT WANT NEW LEBANESE CRISIS, SISCO REPEATED WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AUTHORITY OF GOL REASSERTED IN BORDER AREAS. NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERING DIFFICULT LEBANESE INTERNAL PROBLEMS WE PREPARED TO DEFER TO GOL'S ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION ALONG BORDER. SISCO SAID THAT WHILE STRONGER FEDAYEEN POSITION POST-RABAT MIGHT BE ARGUMENT FOR COMPROMISE WITH THEM NOW, OVER LONG TERM GOL MUST CONTROL INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION. IF SOME WAY COULD BE FOUND TO DISCOURAGE FEDAYEEN FROM INSTIGATING ACTS AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY, SISCO THOUGHT GOL-GOI BORDER WOULD RETURN TO QUIETTUDE OF PAST YEARS. KABBANI EESPECIALLY PLEASSED TO HEAR FROM SISCO THAT GOI APPARENTLY HAS NO DESIGNSON LEBANESE TERRITORY.

12. KABBANI CLOSED DISCUSSION BY GIVING HIS ANALYSIS OF RECENT SKIRMISHES ALONG BORDER. OBSERVING ISRAELI DESIGN TO CREATE MAJOR CRISIS WITH LEBANON, KABBANI ASKED WHY ISRAELIS HAD SEIZED LEBANESE HOSTAGES RATHER THAN CONCENTRATING RETALIATION ON FEDAYEEN WHO RESPONSIBLE FOR KIDNAPPING ISRAELI FARMER. HE ANSWERED QUESTION HIMSELF SAYING ISRAELIS DID NOT SEEK DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN IN ORDER AVOID CASUALITIES. KABBANI THOUGHT KIDNAPPED FARMER WOULD HAVE BEEN RETURNED IN DUE COURSE TO ISRAEL THROUGH RED CROSS. HOWEVER, GOI REFUSES TO DEAL WITH RED CROSS AS WELL AS FEDAYEEN AND INSTEAD PUNISHES LEBANON BY SEIZING DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF HOSTAGES. SISCO COMMENTED THAT IT CLEAR ISRAELI ACTION NOT ONLY DIRECT RETALIATION BUT WAS MEANT AS DETERRENT TO FUTURE ACTS OF THIS KING. GP-3
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 000785

82
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66642
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA/RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/IAI/TAWAHL
S/S MIKE HORNBLOW

000944

R 030051Z JAN 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECRET STATE 000785

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU'S RENEWED INTEREST IN PEACE
SETTLEMENT.

REF: BEIRUT 047 AND 048

1. WE WELCOME PRESIDENT HELOU'S CONSTRUCTIVE OUTLOOK TOWARD PEACE
SETTLEMENT AND HIS DESIRE PLAY USEFUL MEDIATORY ROLE. WHILE WE
SHARE WITH YOU DOUBT WHETHER GOL IN POSITION PLAY PRODUCTIVE
ROLE, WE CERTAINLY SHALL KEEP THIS IN MIND. AMBASSADOR MAY SO
INFORM PRESIDENT HELOU AND STATE THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO
OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY UPCOMING VISIT PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISER AND MICHEL KHOURI TO EXPLORE SUGGESTION FURTHER. GP-3.
ROGERS


70 JAN 3 AM 8:39
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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WHITE HOUSE
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82
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66648
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APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/RA:COL. BUNTE (DRAFT)
PM:RJBARNARD
DOD/ISA-MR. PRANGER
S/S-MR. BROWN

018565

R 110024Z DEC 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 205505

EXDIS

SUBJ: ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON


REF: BEIRUT 10122

- 1. AMBASSADOR MAY INFORM HELOU AND OTHER APPROPRIATE GOL OFFICIALS FOLLOWING:
 - A. M-14 RIFLES. USG PREPARED TO SELL LEBANON SOME 6,000 M-14 RIFLES AT COST DOLS 122 EACH. WHICH USG CALCULATES SUFFICIENT FOR MILITARY FORCE THE SIZE OF LEBANESE ARMY. WE PLAN TO SHIP RIFLES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOLLIVING RECEIPT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM GOL. BECAUSE OF FACT RIFLES IN EXTREMELY SHORT SUPPLY AND WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN FROM U.S. ARMY STOCKS, SHIPMENT WILL BE UNDERTAKEN IN PHASES. FYI WE RECOGNIZE THAT LEBANESE HAD ORIGINALLY EXPRESSED INTEREST IN LARGER QUANTITY OF RIFLES. OUR FIGURE BASED BOTH ON ESTIMATED NEEDS OF LEBANESE ARMY, TOGETHER WITH LIMITED NUMBER M-14S AVAILABLE. END FYI.
 - B. CREDIT. SHOULD LEBANESE RAISE QUESTION OF CREDIT, YOU

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MAY SAY A FORMAL REQUEST WILL BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. FYI REGRETFULLY, WE CANNOT AUTHORIZE YOU AT THIS POINT TO ASSURE GOL RE CREDIT AVAILABILITY BUT FOR YOUR INFORMATION WE THINK THAT WE CAN PROVIDE DOLS 5 MILLION. END FYI.

C. HELICOPTERS. WE ARE PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN GOL REQUEST FOR PURCHASE HELICOPTERS BUT WOULD NOTE THAT HELICOPTERS ARE EXPENSIVE TO PURCHASE, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN. THEY ARE ALSO DIFFICULT TO OPERATE AND ARE VULNERABLE. NEVERTHELESS, IF GOL WISHES TO INITIATE PURCHASE REQUEST, WE PREPARED TO RESPOND. UNFORTUNATELY, DELIVERY CANNOT BE ANYWHERE NEAR AS PROMPT AS M-14 SHIPMENTS AND WE ESTIMATE DELAY OF NUMBER OF MONTHS. FYI WHILE DELIVERY DATES ON EHLICOPTERS INDICATED IN SEPARATE DEPARTMENT ARMY MESSAGE COULD POSSIBLY BE IMPROVED, PRICES QUOTED (DOLS 1.4 AND DOLS 1.8 MILLION) ARE REPRESENTATIVE FOR HELICOPTERS THIS TYPE AND CANNOT BE SUBSIDIZED. ALTERNATIVE HELICOPTERS WITH LOWER PRICE WOULD HAVE MUCH SMALLER TROOP CARRYING CAPACITY, I.E. ABOUT EIGHT MEN INSTEAD OF FORTY. SAME WOULD APPLY TO OTHER THAN U.S. SOURCES. WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT GOL NOT RPT NOT DELAY ITS DECISION TO PURCHASE M-14 RIFLES PENDING RESOLUTION QUESTIONS THEY MAY HAVE RE HELICOPTERS IN ORDER NOT RPT NOT TO DETRACT FROM GOOD WILL ACCRUING FROM PROMPT SUPPLY M-14'S. IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PRICE AND AVAILABILITY HELICOPTERS REQUIRED, PLEASE SEND REQUEST THROUGH ORDINARY CHANNELS PURSUANT TO USDAO MESSAGE 0733.

D. OTHER AID. WE HAVE NOTHING NEW TO ADD TO INFORMATION ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU RE ECONOMIC MATTERS.

2. YOU MAY ASSURE HELOU THAT WE WISH TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE AND THAT HIS REQUESTS HAVE RECEIVED THE ATTENTION OF HIGHEST AUTHORITIES. GP-3.
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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83
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 PCH-02 /048 R

66648
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE 12/2/69
APPROVED BY: NEA-JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/RPDAVIES
NEA:P:GSMITH (SUBS)
S/PRS:RJMCCLOSKEY (INFO)
S/S-MR. TAYLOR

69 DEC 3 AM 8:16
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

P R 030015Z DEC 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CAIRO BY POUCH

102710

SECRET STATE 200895

EXDIS:

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 9900

1. RE PARA 6 REFTTEL, LAST WEEK DEPARTMENT INTERCEDED WITH TOM LAMBERT OF LOS ANGELES TIMES TO PERSUADE HIM NOT RPT NOT TO PRINT STORY OF EXCHANGE, WHICH HE HAD OBTAINED FROM UNSPECIFIED SOURCE. LAMBERT ACCEPTED OUR VIGOROUS REPRESENTATIONS THAT LEAK MIGHT CAUSE WHOLE DEAL TO ABORT AND THUS ULTIMATELY PLACE IN JEOPARDY LIVES OF TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS.

2. SUGGEST YOU SIMILARLY APPROACH ANY OTHER US CORRESPONDENTS WHO HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF DEAL. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHO THEY ARE.

3. BEIRUT'S 9899 JUST RECEIVED. COMMEND YOUR INTERCESSION WITH JESSE LEWIS. GP-3.

RICHARDSON

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69 NOV 26 AM 8:53

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 197912

88

ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66633

DRAFTED BY:NEA/ARN:BHAAS

APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN:TALCOTT W. SEELYE

J/PM:MR. BARNARD SUBS MC:MR. KAUFFMAN SUBS S/S MR. BROWN

066948

R 252253Z NOV 69

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

SECRET STATE 197912

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANESE MILITARY PROCUREMENT IN U.S.

REF: BEIRUT 9568


1. SARKIS SOGHANALIAN MADE INITIAL CONTACT IN DEPARTMENT AS SUGGESTED REFTEL. SOGHANALIAN STATED THAT LEBANES SECURITY FORCES WOULD PREFER PURCHASE GAS CALLED "SICKENING AGENT (DM)" RATHER THAN TEAR GAS. THIS GAS DESCRIBED IN BROCHURE PUT OUT BY LAKE ERIE CHEMICAL COMPANY, ROCK GREEK, OHIO. SOGHANALIAN NOT SPECIFIC ON QUANTITIES OF GAS REQUIRED OR ON BUDGET AVAILABLE THIS PURPOSE. HE STATED QUANTITY WILL BE DETERMINED AFTER HIS CONSULTATION WITH LAKE ERIE CHEMICAL AND HE INDICATED HE MIGHT BE ABLE SPEND AS MUCH AS HALF MILLION DOLLARS. SOGHANALIAN ALSO STATED THAT IT IMPORTANT AVOID U.S. IDENTIFICATION WITH RIOT CONTROL GASES, AND HE SAID THAT IF PURCHASE CONCLUDED HE WOULD ARRANGE AT SOME TRANSIT POINT SUCH AS VIENNA TO MODIFY SHIPPING DOCUMENTS TO OBSCURE ORIGIN OF GASES.

2. SOGHANALIAN ALSO CONSULTED WITH OFFICIALS OF POLITICAL/MILITARY AFFAIRS AND MUNITIONS CONTROL. HE WAS ADVISED OF EXPORT LICENSE REQUIREMENTS AND WAS INFORMED THAT HIS APPLICATION WOULD BE EXPEDITED.

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PAGE 02 STATE 197912

3. SOGHANALIAN WAS RATHER VAGUE AND LEFT IMPRESSION THAT HE NOT QUITE SURE OF WHAT HE WISHED TO BUY. HE DEPARTING FOR OHIO EVENING NOVEMBER 25, AND WE ASSUME HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH LAKE ERIE WILL SERVE TO CLARIFY HIS REQUIREMENTS.

4. SOGHANALIAN PERSISTED IN RAISING QUESTION OF HIS PURCHASING M-14 RIFLES FOR LEBANESE ARMY. HE WAS INFORMED EMPHATICALLY THAT QUESTION OF SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT SUCH AS REFLES IS MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED ON GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT BASIS AND THAT WE HAD NO RPT NO INFORMATION TO GIVE HIM ON THIS MATTER.

GP-3
ROGERS

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0620/03/157

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 834

39

PAGE 01 STATE 196803

SUMMARY

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN BHBAASIEK
11/23/69
APPROVED BY NEA/MR. DAVIES
SYS-0 MR. RICH
NEA/ARN SEELYE

055635

Z 240429Z NOV 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH
USINT CAIRO

SECRET STATE 196803

EXDIS

REF. BEIRUT 9676

1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ICRC THAT OUR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAELIS IS THAT THEY PREPARED TO EXCHANGE WITH UAR A NUMBER OF UAR PERSONNEL PLUS TWO SYRIAN PILOTS IN RETURN FOR TWO ISRAELI PILOTS HELD IN UAR PROVIDED SARG RELEASES TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS AT LEAST 48 HOURS BEFOREHAND. WHILE WE CANNOT ULTIMATELY GUARANTEE ISRAELI PERFORMANCE, WE HAVE NO DOUBT THEY DEALING IN GOOD FAITH. FURTHERMORE, YOU MAY HAVE ICRC ASSURE SYRIANS THAT ISRAELIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO USG THAT THEY WILL MEET THEIR PART OF BARGAIN. USG FULLY EXPECTS THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR PART OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT MAY BE REACHED.

2. WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ISRAEL WITH REGARD ADDITIONAL SYRIAN PERSONNEL NOW DEMANDED BY SARG AS PART OF EXCHANGE. SARG SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT ISRAEL HAS MET ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (TWO ISRAELIS FOR TWO SYRIANS) AND SARG SHOULD NOT BE THE ONE TO RENEGE.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 834

PAGE 01 STATE 196803

81
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN BHBAASIEK
11/23/69
APPROVED BY NEA/MR. DAVIES
SYS-0 MR. RICH
NEA/ARN SEELYE

69 NOV 24 AM 8:46
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

055635

Z 240429Z NOV 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH
USINT CAIRO

SECRET STATE 196803

EXDIS

REF. BEIRUT 9676


1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ICRC THAT OUR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAELIS IS THAT THEY PREPARED TO EXCHANGE WITH UAR A NUMBER OF UAR PERSONNEL PLUS TWO SYRIAN PILOTS IN RETURN FOR TWO ISRAELI PILOTS HELD IN UAR PROVIDED SARG RELEASES TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS AT LEAST 48 HOURS BEFOREHAND. WHILE WE CANNOT ULTIMATELY GUARANTEE ISRAELI PERFORMANCE, WE HAVE NO DOUBT THEY DEALING IN GOOD FAITH. FURTHERMORE, YOU MAY HAVE ICRC ASSURE SYRIANS THAT ISRAELIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO USG THAT THEY WILL MEET THEIR PART OF BARGAIN. USG FULLY EXPECTS THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR PART OF WHATEVER ARRANGEMENT MAY BE REACHED.
2. WE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ISRAEL WITH REGARD ADDITIONAL SYRIAN PERSONNEL NOW DEMANDED BY SARG AS PART OF EXCHANGE. SARG SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT ISRAEL HAS MET ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (TWO ISRAELIS FOR TWO SYRIANS) AND SARG SHOULD NOT BE THE ONE TO RENEGE.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 393

PAGE 01 STATE 195787

92
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66636
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: J:U ALEXIS JOHNSON
NEA:MR SISCO
NEA:MR DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR SEELYE
NEA/IAI:MR ATHERTON
NEA/UAR:MR PARKER
S/S:MR LEVITSKY

041475

0 210103Z NOV 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T STATE 195787

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 9635

1. DETAILS OF THREE-CORNERED EXCHANGE SPELLED OUT
PARAGRAPH ONE BEIRUT 9635 ARE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT.
BECAUSE OF ITS EXTREME SENSITIVITY, PROPOSAL HAS BEEN
HELD VERY CLOSELY TO DATE. FACT THAT IT PICKED UP IN
DAMASCUS AND BEING PLAYED BACK MAKES IT APPARENT THAT
LEAKAGE OCCURRING. NEVERTHELESS, WE WISH CONTINUE HOLD
IT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE.

2. TWA AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN REPAIRED AND COULD DEPART
DAMASCUS AT ANY TIME. WE BELIEVE DEPARTURE AIRCRAFT

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PROVIDES EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR SARG PERMIT DEPARTURE PASSENGERS WITH MINIMUM FANFARE. TWA ALSO VERY INTERESTED, SINCE IT RELUCTANT REPATRIATE AIRCRAFT AND LEAVE TWO PASSENGERS AS PRISONERS IN DAMASCUS.

3. ISRAELIS EXTREMELY AGGRAVATED AT SYRIA'S BAZAAR HAGGLING AND THERE DISTINCT DANGER THAT DEAL MAY FALL THROUGH. DESPITE THIS, YOU SHOULD URGENTLY APPROACH UARG AND, DRAWING ON BEIRUT 9635, URGE UAR DO WHATEVER POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE SARG TO RELEASE PASSENGERS IN RETURN FOR TWO SYRIAN PILOTS TO BE RELEASED INTO UAR CUSTODY. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THIS IS WHAT SYRIANS PROPOSED ORIGINALLY AND THEY NOW APPARENTLY RENEGING. FUTHERMORE, UARG SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION PROPOSED EXCHANGE IS CLEARLY IN INTEREST OF UAR TO WHICH OVER 50 EGYPTIAN NATIONALS WILL BE REPATRIATED.

GP-3. ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 791

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47
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R

66607
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN - TALCOTT W. SEELYE
NEA/IAI - MR. WAHL
E/TT - MR. LOY (INFO)
S/S - MR. BROWN

024966

O 181555Z NOV 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 193557

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
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

1. TWA CONTACTED DEPARTMENT MORNING NOVEMBER 18 TO REPORT THAT NEW YORK HEADQUARTERS HAD JUST RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM TWA PARIS OFFICE WHICH PASSED CRYPTIC MESSAGE THAT NOVEMBER 19 WOULD BE "MAGIC DATE" IN DAMASCUS. NO FURTHER INFORMATION SUPPLIED.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENT YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS REPORT. GP-3.
ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 385

PAGE 01 STATE 191882

89
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01, 1946 R

66639
DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP:TJCAROLAN
APPROVED BY: IO - SAMUEL DE PALMA
NEA/IAI - MR. WAHL
IO/UNP - MR. DAY
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
S/S - MR. TAYLOR
IO/OIA - MR. LAWRENCE

02/03

001424

R 140111Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USMISSION USUN NY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 191882

EXDIS

SUB: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON


1. NOV 13 NY TIMES CARRIED FRONT-PAGE DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT ARTICLE DATED BOURJ EL-BARAJNEH REFUGEE CAMP, LEBANON, NOV 12 AND HEADLINED: "COMMANDOS RULE 14 REFUGEE CAMPS - LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ARE OUSTED BY PALESTINIANS FROM UN SETTLEMENTS" (TEXT BEING POUCHED). AUTHOR DESCRIBES VISIT UNDER PFLP AUSPICES TO BOURJ EL-BARAJNEH CAMP WHICH HE FOUND TOTALLY UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL, GUARDED AND PATROLLED BY ARMED COMMANDOS, AND SCENE OF GUERRILLA TRAINING ACTIVITIES. ATMOSPHERE IS DESCRIBED AS "ELECTRIC", WITH CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS "LONG PROHIBITED BY THE AUTHORITIES," INCLUDING NEW PFLP HEADQUARTERS, PROCEEDING AT RAPID PACE. ONE YOUNG MAN TOLD SCHMIDT OF PLANS TO HOLD ELECTIONS TO A PEOPLE'S COUNCIL. "HE SAYS THAT EACH OF THE VARIOUS COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS IS CARRYING ON MILITARY TRAINING SEPARATELY, BUT THAT A SYSTEM TO

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SHARE AUTHORITY IS BEING WORKED OUT. HE OBSERVED 'WE ARE HAPPY NOW, WE WON'T ACCEPT THE RETURN OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HERE. WE WON'T LET THE GENDARMES BACK UNLESS WE ARE ALL KILLED.' IMPLICATION IS THAT SIMILAR CONDITIONS EXIST IN 13 OTHER REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON. ONLY CAMP NOT UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL REPORTED TO BE MAR ELIAS, "A FEW HUNDRED YARDS FROM UNRWA HEADQUARTERS."

2. ANOTHER SHORT ARTICLE QUOTES MICHELMORE AS SAYING IN NY HE WAS CONFIDENT LEBANESE AUTHORITIES WOULD BE ABLE CARRY OUT THEIR POLICING RESPONSIBILITY. AT SAME TIME, MICHELMORE STRESSED THAT MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER IN CAMPS IS HOST GOVT RESPONSIBILITY. ARTICLE DRAWS ATTENTION TO FACT THAT ANNUAL UNGA DEBATE ON UNRWA AND ARAB REFUGEES IS SCHEDULED BEGIN SOON (COMMENT: PROBABLY NOV 17) AND THAT CONGRESS NOW CONSIDERING FY 1970 US CONTRIBUTION TO UNRWA (COMMENT: HOUSE FLOOR ACTION ON AID AUTHORIZATION BILL SCHEDULED NOV 19-20).

3. FOR BEIRUT: IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, DEPT WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING AS MUCH DETAILED INFO AS POSSIBLE ON CURRENT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AMONG REFUGEES AND IN UNRWA CAMPS, AS WELL AS ASSESSMENT BY AGENCY OFFICIALS OF WHAT AVENUES, IF ANY, REMAIN OPEN TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO ALLEVIATE SITUATION.

4. FOR USUN: REQUEST YOU PURSUE SAME OBJECTIVE WITH MICHELMORE, ASSURING HIM OF OUR DESIRE ADOPT AS HELPFUL AND SYMPATHETIC POSITION AS POSSIBLE IN REPLYING TO PROBABLE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ON THIS SUBJECT. WE WONDER, IN PARTICULAR, IF AT SOME STAGE IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS FOR UNRWA, WITH GOL AGREEMENT, TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN ANY CAMP WHERE GOL AUTHORITY MAY NO LONGER EXIST (AND ASSISTANCE THEREFORE PRESUMABLY GOING TO FEDAYEEN), AND WHETHER MICHELMORE WOULD VIEW THIS AS POSSIBLE UNDER UNRWA'S MANDATE. GP-3
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 838

PAGE 01 STATE 191141

81
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01/046 R

66633
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN: MR. SEELYE S/S MR. TAYLOR
NEA/IAI: MR. ATHERTON

125441

R 130157Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 191141

EXDIS

SUBJ: JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPER

REF: STATE 189515: BEIRUT 9199

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI NOVEMBER 12 TO HAND HIM COPY JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPER ON ISRAEL-UAR ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT.

2. SISCO TOLD KABBANI THAT, SINCE THEY LAST DISCUSSED SUBJECT, THERE HAD BEEN TWO PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS:

(A) SUBSEQUENT TO CONSULTATIONS AT UN, WE AND SOVIETS AGREED ON RHODES-TYPE FORMULA AND (B) ON OCTOBER 28 WE MADE MAJOR NEW PROPOSAL TO SOVIETS TO BREAK IMPASSE. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT FOR FIRST TIME WE ARE SAYING CLEARLY AND CATEGORICALLY THAT FORMER INTERNATIONAL

2
69 NOV 13 AM 8:32
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 220

PAGE 01 STATE 191690

81
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

66647
DRAFTED BY: AF/N: FGWISNER
APPROVED BY: AFN: CWBRAY III
AF/I: MR. RUCHTI
DOD/ISA: MR. LARDNER
S/S: MR. BROWN
J/PM: MASP: MR. SCHMELZER
AID/AFR/NA: MISS VARRATI (INFO)

000689

R 132303Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T STATE 191690

EXDIS

SUBJ: TUNISIAN SECURITY DISCUSSIONS

REF: TUNIS 6475

1. POINTS YOU RAISE ON CONDUCT SECURITY DISCUSSIONS WITH GOT WELL TAKEN. WE REALIZE HOW RESTRICTIVE GUIDANCE SEEMS TO BE; HOWEVER, PURPOSE OF GUIDANCE WAS TO AVOID DEVELOPMENT OF A SECURITY PLAN WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS JOINT USG-GOT ASSESSMENT WITH IMPLICATION US FULLY SHARED GOT ESTIMATE OF THREAT AND COMMITTED IN ADVANCE TO FULFILLMENT OF PLAN. PARAGRAPHS 3B AND C STATE'S 170374 WERE WRITTEN WITH INTENT THAT MORE THAN NARROW TECHNICAL DATA BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN USLOT, USAID AND RESPONSIBLE GOT OFFICES.

2. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT EMBASSY, USLOT AND USAID COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE: (A) ENGAGING IN CONTINUING DIALOGUE, OFFERING SUGGESTIONS HOW BEST TO PREPARE PLAN AND GIVING TECHNICAL DATA, (B) ENCOURAGING REALISTIC FRAMEWORK BY POINTING OUT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS GOT MIGHT HAVE IN SUPPORTING FORCES AND EQUIPMENT CONSIDERED, AND (C) POINTING OUT AS APPROPRIATE INABILITY OF USG (OR OTHER DONORS)

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TO CONSIDER EXPENSIVE END ITEMS OR SUPPORTING OVERLY AMBITIOUS FORCE STRUCTURE. IN SHORT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE THAT OF A FRIEND WHO OFFERS ADVICE, WITHOUT BECOMING ENMESHED IN DECISION MAKING PROCESS.


3. YOU SHOULD SUBMIT COMPLETE GOT PLAN WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS, SEPARATELY APPENDED BUT NOT DISCUSSED WITH GOT, FOR CONSIDERATION HERE. ONCE WE HAVE STUDIED GOT SUBMISSION AND YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS WE WILL BE ABLE DECIDE IF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS HERE ARE ADVISABLE.

4. WE AWARE CLOWES REPORT DID NOT SEE THREAT EMANATING FROM LIBYA BUT FEEL COUP HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY MILITARY REALITIES INVOLVED. WHILE WE APPRECIATE FULLY PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT COUP HAS HAD ON TUNISIAN LEADERSHIP, WE DO NOT SEE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT OF LIBYAN CAPABILITIES ON THE HORIZON THAT WOULD POSE A REAL THREAT TO TUNISIA.

5. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE AS RESPONSIVE TO TUNISIA AS WE CAN, BUT FUNDING OF FY 1970 WORLD-WIDE MAP PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE IN DEEP TROUBLE IN CONGRESS. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAS JUST COMPLETED MARK-UP OF PROGRAM AND HAS RECOMMENDED SUBSTANTIAL MAP CUTS (DOLS 75 MILLION OUT OF DOLS 425 MILLION). IT WILL BE SOME WEEKS BEFORE SENATE ACTS ON AUTHORIZATION BILL AND APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS ENACTED BUT SOUNDINGS APPEAR OMINOUS AND WE ANTICIPATE STILL GREATER CUTS. WE SHALL TRY TO GET MODEST INCREASE IN FY 1971 FOR TUNISIA BUT, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THAT FY 1970 MAP COULD BE RAISED ABOVE DOLS 3.5 MILLION.
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SECRET 280

PAGE 01 STATE 185151

83
ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

66642
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI: WBSMITH
APPROVED BY: NEA/JOSEPH J SISCO
EUR: MR SWANK
S/S MR BROWN

69 NOV 1 AM 9:50

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

051300

R 010038Z NOV 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET STATE 185151

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SISCO-TOMKINS TALK ON LEBANON

1. WHILE MEETING WITH UK MINISTER TOMKINS ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, SISCO BRIEFED HIM ON DISCUSSION OF LEBANON IN SISCO-DOBRYNIN SESSION OCT 28. SISCO HAD EXPLAINED TO DOBRYNIN (1) WE VIEW SITUATION IN LEBANON SERIOUSLY AND WITH CONCERN AND (2) WE ARE NOT ADDING TO OR SUBTRACTING FROM ANY PREVIOUS US STATEMENTS RE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON AND OUR CONCERN FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE.

2. SISCO HAD RAISED CHARGE IN TASS STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT US INTERVENING IN LEBANESE SITUATION OR INTENDING TO DO SO, AS WELL AS FACT THAT SOVIETS HAVE PICKED UP ALLEGATIONS RE US CITIZENS IN ISRAELI ARMED FORCES. TOLD DOBRYNIN US HAS NOT ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EXCHANGE BECAUSE SITUATION IN LEBANON DIFFICULT. SOVIETS,

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HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET OUR SILENCE.

3. SISCO HAD MADE CLEAR SOVIET STATEMENTS NOT HELPFUL FOR ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING TWO POWER TALKS ON ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. PROBLEM WAS NOT U.S. INTERVENTION, BUT FACT THAT SYRIA BEARS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING ON AND AGGRAVATING LEBANESE CRISIS. SOVIETS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IF SITUATION BECAME MAJOR CHALLENGE IT LIKELY TO INVITE REACTION FROM OTHER QUARTERS WITH FURTHER DETERIORATION IN AREA AND DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR BOTH SOVIETS AND US. OUR ADVICE TO SOVIETS, THEREFORE, WAS TO HALT PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS AND TO DO WHAT IS NEEDED: EXERCISE INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN DAMASCUS.

4. TOMKINS REMARKED HE DID NOT LIKE TASS STATEMENT. ASKED IF SISCO THOUGHT IT PROMPTED BY SOVIET MISUNDERSTANDING OF US STATEMENT RE LEBANON OF OCT 10 OR WAS INTENDED TO COUNTER US STATEMENT.

5. SISCO REPLIED THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING WHATEVER WITH SOVIETS. AS SISCO HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED, US STATEMENT WAS NO ACCIDENT. MOREOVER, SOVIETS WERE PRESENT IN AUDIENCE AND KNEW THAT US STATEMENT WAS DIRECTED TOWARD CONCERN OVER RECENT ISRAELI INCURSIONS. SUBSEQUENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA AMOUNTS TO MANEUVERING TO GAIN CREDIT FOR QUOTE TELLING AMERICANS TO STAY OUT UNQUOTE. SOVIETS THUS ENGAGED IN TACTICAL POLITICAL EXPLOITATION OF TENSION.

6. SISCO ADDED THAT IN OUR JUDGMENT SOVIETS DO NOT WANT MAJOR SHOW-DOWN IN LEBANON. ALSO, WE DO NOT BELIEVE UAR WANTS SYRIAN BAATHIST ASCENDANCY IN LEBANON. SISCO REPLIED NEGATIVE TO TOMKINS' QUESTION WHETHER SOVIETS HAD INDICATED US SHOULD NOT TAKE SERIOUSLY TASS STATEMENT. SISCO SAID HE HAD MADE DELIBERATE AND CAREFUL PRESENTATION TO DOBRYNIN RE LEBANON, LEAVING NO CHANGE THAT SOVIETS NOT UNDERSTAND.

7. SISCO NOTED US CONSELLING RESTRAINT WITH ISRAELIS AND HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT ALLON STATEMENT RE LEBANON UNHELPFUL, WHICH IS OUR VIEW. ALLON STATEMENT, NEVERTHELESS, REFLECTS FIRM MOOD OF ISRAELI PEOPLE. SISCO UNABLE TO FORESEE WHAT ISRAELIS MIGHT DO IF SUBSTANTIAL TAKEOVER OF LEBANON.

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BY SYRIANS APPEARED IMMINENT.

8. SISCO COMMENTED HE HAD IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS MAY SHARE OUR CONCERN THAT ISRAEL, IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, MIGHT TAKE MAJOR ACTION WITH RESPECT TO LEBANON. IT APPEARED LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT SOVIETS WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT SITUATION ONLY UP TO A POINT. PURPOSE OF SISCO'S CONVERSATION RE LEBANON WITH DOBRYNIN WAS TO MAKE CALM, STRAIGHT-FORWARD STATEMENT OF OUR VIEWS. US INSTEAD COULD HAVE MADE PUBLIC COUNTER BLAST, BUT THIS WOULD INJECT ELEMENT OF CONFRONTATION.

9. TOMKINS ASKED IF US HAS LEFT SOVIETS IN DOUBT ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE US REACTIONS OR MOVES IN LEBANON SITUATION. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS CASE TO EXTENT THAT HE HAD NEITHER ADDED NOR SUBTRACTED FROM US STATEMENT ON INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. ARAB MEDIATION EFFORTS GOING FORWARD,

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN CONFLICT HAS NOT DEVELOPED, AND SITUATION HAS EASED SOMEWHAT. WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT LEBANESE OF ALL STRIPES RESENT SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT. ALSO, NASSER WATCHING CLOSELY TO INSURE SYRIANS DO NOT GET UPPER HAND.

10. SISCO SUMMARIZED BY SAYING WE HAD ADVISED SOVIETS BEST THING THEY COULD DO WAS EXERCISE INFLUENCE WITH SYRIANS. IN THIS CONNECTION, SISCO OBSERVED THERE WAS NO SOVIET OR US MEDIATION EFFORT CURRENTLY GOING ON, BUT WE BOTH STANDING BY AS ARAB EFFORTS BEING PURSUED. GP-3. ROGERS

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
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TELEGRAM

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83
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66642
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA/JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARN MR SEELY
EUR/FBX MR LONG
S/S MR BROWN

69 NOV 1 AM 9:50
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

050207

R 312058Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET STATE 184687

EXDIS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS

REF: STATE 182824

1. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION ON ANOTHER SUBJECT OCTOBER 30, ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO BRIEFED FRENCH AMBASSADOR LUCET ON SISCO'S OCTOBER 28 DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON LEBANESE CRISIS.

2. SISCO TOLD LUCET THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH DOBRYNIN FACT THAT U.S. HAS BECOME TARGET OF CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT US IN ARAB WORLD. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FALSE ACCUSATIONS REGARDING SERVICE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IDF AS WELL AS DISTORTIONS OF SISCO'S OCTOBER 10 STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. OUR STATEMENT ON LEBANON HAS BEEN INTENTIONALLY

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MISINTERPRETED AS INTERFERENCE IN LEBANON'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.

3. SISCO ALSO NOTED THAT HE HAD TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT, WHILE WE DO NOT INTEND BE DRAWN INTO PUBLIC DEBATE, SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET OUR SILENCE. WE VIEW LEBANESE SITUATION WITH CONCERN AND HOPE MEDIATION EFFORTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IT OUTCOME THESE EFFORTS IS SITUATION IN WHICH ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO PEACEFUL ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT ARE STRENGTHENED. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SYRIA BEARS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT CRISIS. DOBRYNIN WAS ALSO TOLD THAT WE HOPE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT SITUATION COULD EVOLVE WHICH COULD POSE DIFFICULT CHOICE FOR BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. SISCO TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT, IF SOVIETS INTERESTED IN CALMING SITUATION, THEY SHOULD TAKE FIRM LINE IN DAMASCUS. DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD REPORT SISCO'S REMARKS TO MOSCOW. GP-3.

ROGERS


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81
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66639
DRRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
S/S - MR. GLEYTEEN

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R 310046Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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S E C R E T STATE 184395

EXDIS

SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS

REF: STATE 182824


1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI OCTOBER 30 TO COMPARE NOTES ON LEBANESE CRISIS AND TO INFORM KABBANI OF POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN WITH SOVIETS.

2. SISCO ASKED KABBANI'S ASSESSMENT LEBANESE REACTION TO SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT CRISIS. KABBANI SAID LEBANESE BASICALLY WANT TO BE LEFT IN PEACE AND WOULD PREFER HANDLE FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES. SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IS NOT TO THE LEBANESE A QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN, BUT OF SYRIAN INTERFERENCE IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS. LEBANESE OPPOSED TO THIS. AS FOR MEDIATION EFFORTS UNDERWAY CAIRO, KABBANI OBSERVED THAT FACT THAT NASSER PROPOSED MEDIATION INDICATES HE FEELS AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. KABBANI OPINED SOME CONCESSION TO FEDAYEEN NECESSARY - ONLY

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QUESTION IS HOW MUCH. KABBANI ALSO NOTED THAT LEBANESE ARE BUYING TIME, INASMUCH AS LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE PROBLEMS AS LONG AS BASIC ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE UNRESOLVED.

3. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT ON OCTOBER 28 HE HAD RAISED WITH DOBRYNIN FACT THAT U.S. HAS BECOME TARGET OF CAMPAIGN TO DISCREDIT US IN ARAB WORLD. SISCO SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO FALSE ACCUSATIONS REGARDING SERVICE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IDF AS WELL AS DISTORTIONS OF SISCO'S OCTOBER 10 STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. STATEMENT ON LEBANON HAD BEEN MADE IN CONTEXT CONCERN OVER ISRAELI INCURSIONS AND IT DISTURBING IT TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT AND DISTORTED. SISCO NOTED HE ALSO TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT, WHILE WE DO NOT INTEND BE DRAWN INTO PUBLIC DEBATE, SOVIETS SHOULD NOT MISINTERPRET OUR SILENCE. WE VIEW LEBANESE SITUATION WITH CONCERN AND HOPE MEDIATION EFFORTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF OUTCOME THESE EFFORTS IS SITUATION IN WHICH ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO PEACEFUL ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT ARE STRENGTHENED. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SYRIA BEARS MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT CRISIS. SISCO TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT IF SOVIETS INTERESTED IN CALMING SITUATION, THEY SHOULD TAKE FIRM LINE IN DAMASCUS. WE ARE SURE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THAT SITUATION COULD DEVELOP WHICH COULD POSE DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS. SISCO ALSO INFORMED KABBANI THAT WE DID NOT RETRACT ANYTHING WE HAVE SAID IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INTEGRITY.

4. SISCO ALSO STATED THAT DURING MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN WE MADE MAJOR EFFORT TO BREAK DEADLOCK ON ACHIEVING COMMON DOCUMENT ON ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT.

5. SISCO QUERIED KABBANI ON IRAQI AND SYRIAN ATTITUDES IN CURRENT CRISIS. KABBANI SAID IRAQIS WOULD NOT WANT PRO-SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. KABBANI SAID MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF LEBANESE IS NATURE OF COMPROMISE WITH FEDAYEEN AND REACTION TO IT. HE NOTED THAT SOME ELEMENTS, SUCH AS THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE, WILL NOT ACCEPT MAJOR CONCESSIONS TO FEDAYEEN. HE ALSO SAID ISRAELI FOREBEARANCE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AT THIS JUNCTURE. SISCO NOTED THAT WE CAN BE OF HELP ON THIS. GP-3
ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 182820

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APPROVED BY: NEA/SISCO
NEA/ARN/SEELYE
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R 290122Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON

69 OCT 29 AM 8:27

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET STATE 182820

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANON CRISIS

REF: PARIS 16569 AND 16586

1. FRENCH AMB LUCET CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO ON OCT 28 TO CONVEY TO SISCO FURTHER COMMENTARY FROM ALPHAND ON PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT TO CALM LEBANESE SITUATION. LUCET NOTED THAT ALPHAND HAD SEEN BLAKE, AND LUCET'S PRESENTATION FOLLOWED CLOSELY POINTS RAISED IN REFTELS. LUCET REITERATED THE IMPORTANCE FRENCH ATTACH TO RESUMPTION OF FOUR-POWER TALKS, AND, WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS, NOTED THAT ALPHAND BELIEVES THE LESS SAID THE BETTER.


2. SISCO SAID WE ENTIRELY AGREE WITH ALPHAND THAT FURTHER PUBLIC CONTROVERSY IS NOT HELPFUL. SISCO WENT ON TO NOTE THAT WE AGREE WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL

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FRENCH ASSESSMENT THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES IN THE AREA ARISE FROM IMPASSE OVER POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT AGREE, SISCO SAID, THAT ONE CAN LOOK AT LEBANESE SITUATION IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER PROBLEMS IN AREA. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE WHEN CONSIDERING THE IMPACT AND BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF LEBANESE SITUATION FOR OTHER ARABS AND ARAB-ISRAEL CONFRONTATION. IF CRISIS CONTINUES AND IF SERIOUS CONFRONTATION OCCURS, ISRAELIS MIGHT BE STIMULATED INTO ACTION AND THIS COULD HAVE VERY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES INDEED. ULTIMATE OBJECT OF FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS IS TO FIND MEANS OF BRINGING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE AREA, AND ANYTHING THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS LINE WOULD BE HELPFUL TO SITUATION PREVAILING IN LEBANON.

3. SISCO INFORMED LUCET HE HAD SEEN DOBRYNIN EARLIER IN THE DAY AND TOLD LUCET THAT HE HAD CONVEYED A NUMBER OF POINTS:

A. WE THINK IT VERY UNHELPFUL THAT SOVIET PRESS AND PROPAGANDA HAVE DISTORTED (1) ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN IDF AND (2) OUR STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. SUCH DISTORTIONS ARE HARDLY HELPFUL IN FACILITATING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

B. DOBRYNIN WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF GETTING INTO PUBLIC EXCHANGE ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION.

C. WE HAVE BEFORE US DELICATE AND SERIOUS SITUATION. SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN, SINCE IT COULD STIMULATE REACTIONS THAT MIGHT POSE BOTH THE US AND USSR WITH DIFFICULT CHOICES. SOVIETS WERE URGED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN DAMASCUS TO ALLEVIATE SITUATION IN LEBANON.

4. LUCET RESPONDED SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY THAT GOF IS DOING ITS BEST IN DAMASCUS AS WELL AS OTHER ARAB CAPITALS TO COOL SITUATION. SISCO COMMENTED THAT, REGARDING ALPHAND'S UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE OF RESUMING FOUR-POWER TALKS, WE WILL TAKE THE MATTER

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
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
UNDER ADVISEMENT.

5. LUCET INQUIRED ABOUT LATEST SISCO-DOBRYNIN MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. SISCO SAID THAT WE HAVE BEGUN TO FOCUS ON MORE CONCRETE ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE, INCLUDING BORDERS, AND WE ARE SEEKING COMMON LANGUAGE FOR JOINT US/USSR DOCUMENT. GP-3.
ROGERS

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ORIGIN SS 45

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APPROVED BY: NEA JOSEPH J. SISCO

NEA/ARN - TWSEELYE

NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES

S/S - MR. GLEYSTEN

032408

P R 291936Z OCT 69

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T STATE 182970

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US ROLE IN LEBANESE CRISIS

REF: AMMAN 5217, STATE 182026

1. DEPARTMENT HAS NO REPEAT NO PRESENT INTENTION GETTING USG INVOLVED IN OR PUBLICLY ASSOCIATED WITH ANY COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH MAY EMERGE OUT OF LEBANESE CRISIS AND ENTAIL GOL ACCOMMODATION TO FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES BEST POLICY FOR USG AT PRESENT IS TO MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE WHILE CURRENT INTER-ARAB EFFORTS AT MEDIATION IN PROGRESS. STATE 182026 DESIGNED TO ELICIT POSTS' VIEWS ON POSSIBLE DESIRABILITY OUR RAISING OUR PROFILE IN LEBANON SLIGHTLY AS OFFSET TO WHAT SEEMED TO TO PUBLIC CREDIT BEING GIVEN TO SOVIETS FOR ALLEGED SUCCESSFUL PEACEMAKING EFFORTS. AS IT TURNS OUT, "STORY" THAT SOVIETS PLAYING KEY ROLE IN LEBANESE MEDIATION INITIATIVES FEATURED ONLY BY CERTAIN SEGMENTS OF US PRESS AND NOT ECHOED EITHER IN AREA MEDIA OR, APPARENTLY, IN SOVIET MEDIA. IN ANY CASE, WE DECIDED

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
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BEST CONTINUE AVOID ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY
CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO CANARD THAT WE ARE IN COLLUSION
WITH GOL IN PLOT TO ROLL UP FEDAYEEN.

3. WE AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR PORTER'S POSTURE OF
REMAINING AVAILABLE TO HELOU IF HE WISHES TO SEE HIM. GP-3.
ROGERS


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87
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APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
EUR/FBX:MR LONG
S/S- MR LLOYD

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P R 252155Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 181404

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 8894

1. IN SEEKING MEANS TO TRY REDUCE SYRIAN PRESSURE ON LEBANON, WE HAVE CONSIDERED WHICH GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE AND WILLING EXERT SOME PRESSURE ON SARG. WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS POSSIBILITY FRENCH MIGHT BE HELPFUL.

2. WE HAVE APPROACHED GOF IN ATTEMPT PERSUADE FRENCH TO TAKE INITIATIVE IN OBTAINING FOUR-POWER STATEMENT CALLING ON ALL CONCERNED TO REFRAIN FROM ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DEEPEN CRISIS. FRENCH RESPONSE WAS LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT FRENCH COULD BE PERSUADED MAKE UNILATERAL APPROACH IN DAMASCUS.

THEREFORE, WHEN YOU SEE MICHEL KHOURY SUGGEST TO HIM THAT GOL ASK GOF APPROACH SARG IN DAMASCUS TO URGE THAT PRESSURE BY TAKEN OFF LEBANON. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM KHOURY WE ARE MAKING PARALLEL APPROACH THROUGH FRENCH EMBASSY WASHINGTON. GP-3
ROGERS


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66640
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APPROVED BY: NEA: RP DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR. SEELYE
NEA/P: MR. SMITH
S/S: MR. GLEYSSTEEN

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 180949

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 8846 AND STATE 180291

1. REGARDING PARAGRAPH 3 BEIRUT 8846, DEPARTMENT DID NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND IN STATE 180291 TO SUGGEST TRIPARTITE STATEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY MULTI-PARTY STATEMENT TO BE EFFECTIVE MUST INCLUDE SOVIETS.

2. REGARDING PARAGRAPH 5 BEIRUT 8846, WE WILL OF COURSE AVOID ANY IMPLICATION WE COORDINATING OUR ACTION WITH HELOU. RE YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE ISSUE BACKGROUNDER YOUR ATTENTION INVITED TO NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE DATED OCTOBER 24, IN WHICH CORRESPONDENT PETER GROSE STATES THAT SISCO STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH WARNING AGAINST THREATS "FROM ANY SOURCE", WAS REALLY DIRECTED AT ISRAELI REVENIATORY RAIDS AGAINST LEBANESE TERRITORY RATHER THAN MILITARY


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TELEGRAM

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66638
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APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH SISCO
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
NEA/IAI: MR ATHERTON (INFO)
EUR/FBS: (INFO)
S/S: MLEVITSKY

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET STATE 180294

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CRISIS IN LEBANON

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN FRENCH COUNSELORS CABOUAT AND DESBANS OCTOBER 23 IN CONNECTION LEBANESE CRISIS. SISCO OUTLINED BASIC FACTS AS REPORTED OFFICIALLY BY LEBANESE ARMY. HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT GOL HAS FELT COMPELLED MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN IN ORDER (A) AVOID PROVOKING ISRAEL AND (B) PREVENT "JORDANIZATION" OF LEBANON. HE NOTED THAT FEDAYEEN ATTEMPT MOVE TO ANOTHER AREA SOUTHERN LEBANON PRESENTED DIRECT CHALLENGE TO GOL AUTHORITIES WHICH IN TURN LED TO BLOODY CLASH.

2. SISCO EXPLAINED THAT NOT ONLY HAVE DOMESTIC TENSIONS BEEN HEIGHTENED BUT RADICAL STATES SUCH AS IRAQ, SYRIA

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
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AND UAR HAVE JOINED IN ATTACKS ON GOL. NOTING THAT THESE EVENTS HAVE LED TO SERIOUS DETERIORATION WHICH COULD CAUSE CIVIL STRIFE AND THREATEN WESTERN INTERESTS, SISCO SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE COUNSEL NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO.

3. SISCO ALSO SAID WE WOULD RAISE SUBJECT WITH BRITISH AND WILL BE MEETING WITH UAR MINISTER GHORBAL. NO DECISION REACHED ON WHETHER WE WILL RAISE THIS WITH SOVIETS BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY.

4. SISCO ADDED WE HAVE URGED ISRAELIS PRACTICE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT. IN THIS CONNECTION, MORNING OCTOBER 23 ISRAELI MINISTER ARGOV PHONED SISCO TO SAY THAT WE WERE AUTHORIZED REASSURE LEBANESE RE ISRAELI INTENTIONS TOWARD SOUTHERN LEBANON (SEE SEPTTEL).

5. CABOUAT SAID HE HAS RECEIVED LITTLE INFORMATION FROM BEIRUT, BUT ONE CABLE FROM FRENCH EMBASSY BEIRUT SAID HELOU TRYING PERSUADE KARAME NOT RESIGN. SISCO NOTED WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO GIVE HELOU GUIDANCE IN ANY ASPECT OF HANDLING CRISIS.

6. IN CLOSING, CABOUAT SAID HE WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GP-3
ROGERS


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TELEGRAM

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82

ORIGIN SS 45

INFO OCT 01, /046 R

66641

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA- JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN- MR SEELYE
NEA- MR DAVIES
EUR- INFO
S/S MLEVITSKY

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P 240233Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
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USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T STATE 180293

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CRISIS IN LEBANON

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO CALLED IN BRITISH AMBASSADOR FREEMAN OCTOBER 23 TO DISCUSS LEBANESE CRISIS. SISCO NOTED SITUATION PRESENTS SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ULTIMATELY TO WESTERN INTERESTS. UNLIKE EVENTS OF APRIL, OUTSIDE ELEMENTS CLEARLY INVOLVED. NASSER'S MESSAGE TO HELOU (SISCO NOTED HELOU'S ANODYNE RESPONSE) AND SYRIAN ATTACK ON LEBANESE BORDER POSTS IMMENSELY COMPLICATED PROBLEM. SISCO COMMENTED ON REPORTS THAT LEBANESE PLANNING ON TAKING ISSUE TO ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL AND EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT MUCH HELP WOULD COME OF IT FOR LEBANON.

2. SISCO TOLD FREEMAN WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS AND THEY ALSO REGARD SITUATION AS SERIOUS THREAT TO GOL. WE TOLD

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ISRAELIS THIS NO TIME FOR PROVOCATIONS FROM THEIR SIDE, AND ISRAELIS GAVE US ASSURANCES THEY HAVE NO DESIGNS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. OUR OPTIONS ARE LIMITED, SISCO ADDED, BUT WE ARE ATTEMPTING EXPLOIT DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE CALLED IN FRENCH EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES OCTOBER 23 AND ASKED THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT USE ITS GOOD OFFICES IN DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO EGYPTIAN MINISTER GHORBAL. GHORBAL WAS TOLD THAT SITUATION IN LEBANON WILL MAKE SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT, AND WE DO NOT SEE HOW UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN LEBANON COULD POSSIBLY SERVE UAR LONG RANGE INTERESTS. SISCO ADDED THAT WE HAVE NOT RAISED MATTER WITH SOVIETS NOR HAVE WE DECIDED WHETHER IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO DO SO.

3. SISCO NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT U S OFFICIAL STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN GROSSLY DISTORTED IN EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE OF MIDDLE EAST. HE SPECIFICALLY NOTED HOW PRESIDENT'S USE OF WORD "SUBSTANTIAL" IN ADDRESS TO UNGA HAD BEEN TWISTED. SISCO'S STATEMENT OF OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY ALSO BEING MISINTERPRETED IN SOME QUARTERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, SISCO INFORMED FREEMAN OUR STATEMENT MADE AT HELOU'S BEHEST. THIS FACT SOMEHOW PICKED UP BY BBC AND GIVEN CONSIDERABLE PLAY. WE HAVE SAID NOTHING ON THE SUBJECT AND NO QUESTIONS HAVE ARISEN HERE. REGARDING ALLEGED SERVICE U S PERSONNEL IN IDF, UAR HAS CONDUCTED DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST U S POSSIBLY TO COVER THEIR BACKING OFF ON RHODES FORMULA.

4. FREEMAN SAID HE UNABLE SAY MUCH SINCE HE HAS ASKED LONDON FOR VIEWS BUT HAS NOT YET RECEIVED REPLY. HE SAID THAT OFF TOP OF HIS HEAD HE BELIEVES BRITISH ASSESSMENT SITUATION LEBANON SAME AS THAT USG. HE DOUBTED THAT BRITISH COULD BE OF MUCH HELP IN DAMASCUS OR BAGHDAD BUT THOUGHT THERE POSSIBILITY IN CAIRO. HE SAID HE WOULD ADVISE LONDON OF HIS TALK AND WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH SISCO FOLLOWING DAY. GP3.
ROGERS

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APPROVED BY: NEA/SISCO
NEA: DAVIES
EUR: INFO
S/S: LEVITSKY

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P 240232Z OCT 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANESE SITUATION

1. IN MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO OCT 23 LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI DESCRIBED DETAILS OF CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHICH HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. REPORT CORRESPONDED WITH OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE THIS SUBJECT ISSUED BY LEBANESE ARMY AND IT PLACED STRESS ON FACT FEDAYEEN FIRED FIRST. KABBANI SAID THAT "RESIGNATION" OF KARAME HAD COMPLICATED MATTERS AND THAT COORDINATED SYRIAN ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANESE BORDER CUSTOMS POSTS HAD FURTHER EXACERBATED SITUATION. HE SPECULATED THAT LATTER ATTACKS INTENDED TO DIVERT LEBANESE ARMY FROM PLACING FURTHER PRESSURES ON FEDAYEEN. KABBANI REPORTED THAT CURFEW HAD BEEN IMPOSED IN MAIN LEBANESE CITIES.


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WM KABBANI DEPLORED FACT THAT LEBANESE REGIME HAD RECEIVED ABSOLUTELY NO SUPPORT FROM ANY OUTSIDE ARAB COUNTRY. ON CONTRARY, ITS ACTION HAD BEEN STRONGLY CRITICIZED BY EXTREMIST ARAB REGIMES. IRAQ HAD EVEN OFFERED HELP OF TROOPS TO FEDAYEEN. KABBANI NOTED THAT HUSSEIN'S POSITION, AS REFLECTED IN HIS MESSAGE TO YASIR ARAFAT, EQUIVOCAL.

3. KABBANI CHARACTERIZED GOL'S CONVENING OF ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL AS URGENT MEASURE DESIGNED UPSTAGE SIMILAR LIBYAN PROPOSAL AND TO ENABLE GOL TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE, I.E., TO SUBMIT COMPLAINT. HE THOUGHT POSSIBLE THAT GOL MIGHT SEEK TO PERSUADE COUNCIL MEDIATE BETWEEN LEBANESE REGIME AND FEDAYEEN AND, AS FIRST STEP, STOP THE FIGHTING.

4. IN DISCUSSION RE NASSER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT HELOU, KABBANI CHARACTERIZED THIS MESSAGE AS "APPEAL" FROM NASSER TO HELOU ON FEIGNED ASSUMPTION LEBANESE ARMY ALONE HAD TAKEN DECISION TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN. IN RESPONSE SISCO QUERY RE WHAT USG MIGHT TELL UAR AT THIS JUNCTURE, KABBANI EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT WE SHOULD POINT OUT TO UAR THAT FEDAYEEN NOT ONLY ENDANGERING LEBANESE SECURITY BUT UAR INTERESTS AS WELL.

5. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT WE HAVE TALKED TO FRENCH AND WILL SHORTLY BE TALKING TO BRITISH RE LEBANESE SITUATION BUT THAT WE DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO WEIGH IN WITH SOVIETS. KABBANI AGREED THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL AND STATED THAT HAD SOVIETS WISHED, THEY "COULD HAVE STOPPED THE SYRIANS BY NOW". KABBANI STRESSED THAT HE WAS ONLY EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS.

6. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH DEPT OFFICER KABBANI REGRETTED THAT HELOU HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN MORE FLEXIBLE IN DEALING WITH FEDAYEEN IN PAST MONTHS. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT CURRENT TURN OF EVENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD HELOU DONE SO. HE SAID THAT IF LEBANON HAD TO MAKE CHOICE BETWEEN MAJOR INTERNAL DIVISIONS OR CLOSING RANKS BEHIND POLICY OF ACQUIESCING IN FEDAYEEN EFFORTS, LATTER PREFERABLE--EVEN IF THIS WOULD INVITE MORE FREQUENT ISRAELI RAIDS. ARMY POSITION OF DEFENDING AGAINST OUTSIDE ADVERSARY WOULD BE FAR MORE TENABLE THAN FIGHTING INTERNALLY AGAINST FEDAYEEN.

7. FOLLOWING RETURN TO EMBASSY KABBANI CALLED BY TELEPHONE TO REPORT RECEIPT NEW REPORT FROM HIS GOVERNMENT WHICH SPELLED OUT CLEARLY SYRIAN GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION WITH FEDAYEEN IN ATTACKS

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
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LAUNCHED AGAINST BORDER POSTS ON NIGHT OCT 22. IN ONE INSTANCE 30 MILITARY LORRIES AND ARMORED CARS BACKED BY FEDAYEEN, AND IN ANOTHER INSTANCE 140 PARATROOPERS WERE INVOLVED. HE CITED THREE OTHER INSTANCES IN WHICH EITHER ARMORED CARS OR LORRIES WERE DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN, AS WELL AS SYRIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL.

GP-3.
ROGERS

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SUMMARY

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: TW SEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA: JJ SISCO
NEA RP DAVITT
S/S: W LLOYD

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T STATE 160289

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 7808

CONCUR THAT PROPOSED CONTACTS WITH TWO BAATH OFFICIALS WORTH
TRYING. GP-3.
RICHARDSON


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80
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

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66640
DRAFTED BY: NEA: JJ SISCO
APPROVED BY: JJ SISCO
NEA: MR. DAVIES
S/S: MR. GLEYSTEN
EUR: MR. SWANK

69 SEP 20 AM 9:16

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

053174

R 191946Z SEP 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING


1. BEFORE HIS MEETING TO DISCUSS ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, SISCO TOOK DOBRYNIN ASIDE TO RAISE WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A BILATERAL MATTER BETWEEN US. SISCO SAID WE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT SYRIA HAS NOT YET FOUND IT POSSIBLE TO RELEASE TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS ON HIJACKED TWA PLANE. SISCO RECALLED THAT UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON HAD RAISED MATTER INITIALLY WITH TCHERNIAKOV AND THAT IN SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE WE HAD WORD FROM MOSCOW THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT DID NOT CONSIDER MATTER CLOSED. SISCO UNDERSCORED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SOVIETS MAKING A FURTHER EFFORT IN ORDER TO SECURE PROMPT RELEASE OF PASSENGERS. SISCO CITED COMMON INTEREST WE HAVE IN KEEPING AIRWAYS FREE AND DESIRABILITY OF REMOVING THIS ISSUE AS IRRITANT. FINALLY, SISCO INDICATED VERY INDIRECTLY CONCERN THAT IF PASSENGERS NOT RELEASED ISRAEL MAY AT SOME POINT FEEL COMPELLED TO TAKE FORCEFUL COUNTER ACTION.

2. DOBRYNIN WAS NON COMMITTAL. HE SAID THAT SOVIETS HAD PASSED

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
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OUR MESSAGE TO THE SYRIANS. SISCO DID NOT GET THE IMPRESSION FROM DOBRYNIN THAT SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING MORE. SUGGEST APPROPRIATE FOLLOW UP ON THIS MATTER IN MOSCOW. OUR HOPE IS THAT SECRETARY ALSO WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE MATTER WITH GROMYKO MONDAY EVENING. GP-3.
RICHARDSON

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83
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 R

66636
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA:JOSEPH J SISCO
NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
NEA:RPDAVIES
S/S:MR BRANDT

69 SEP 18 AM 8:19
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 158496

EXDIS

SUBJ: US-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND CURRENT STATUS OF
US-USSR BILATERALS

SUMMARY: DURING TOUR D'HORIZON ON SEPT 17 WITH LEBANESE
AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI, ASST. SECRETARY SISCO CONFIRMED
USG INTENTION TO CONTINUE CURRENT US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS
IN HOPE OF ACHIEVING GUIDE-LINES FOR EVENTUAL ARAB-ISRAELI
PEACE SETTLEMENT. SISCO ASSURED KABBANI USG VALUES GREATLY
ITS CLOSE TIES WITH LEBANON. MOREOVER, LEBANON'S TERRI-
TORIAL INTEGRITY AND PRESERVATION ARE OF GREAT CONCERN TO
USG WHICH HAS SO INFORMED ISRAEL AT HIGHEST LEVELS.
KABBANI AGREED CURRENT BILATERAL EFFORTS HOULD CONTINUE
TO SEEK PEACE SETTLEMENT BEFORE EXTREMISM OVERWHELMS PRES-
ENT MODERATE ARAB FORCES. SISCO POINTED OUT NEED FOR

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
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GREATER UAR COOPERATION IN CLARIFYING PROPOSALS BEING DISCUSSED IN BILATERALS. AMONG OTHER THINGS, UAR SHOULD MAKE COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND DIRECT DISCUSSIONS, THEREBY FORCING ISRAEL TO FACE UP UNEQUIVOCALLY TO QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. END SUMMARY

1. IN RESPONSE TO ASST. SECRETARY SISCO'S INVITATION, LEBANESE AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI CALLED ON SEPT 17 FOR DISCUSSION US-LEBANESE RELATIONS AND TOUR D'HORIZON ON CURRENT STATUS OF US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS.


2. SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 18 TO LAY GROUND FOR GROMYKO-SECRETARY ROGERS MEETINGS NEXT WEEK. DURING THESE LATTER MEETINGS USG EXPECTS RENEW EFFORTS TO SEE IF WE CAN CLOSE GAP WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN US-USSR ON PEACE SETTLEMENT. RECENT EVENTS IN AREA COMPELLING REASONS FOR CONTINUED INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO FIND SETTLEMENT IN AREA. US INTENDS TO DO WHAT IT CAN. OUR PROPOSALS WITH SOVIETS ARE NOT LAST WORD. IN THIS REGARD US REALIZES IT RELATIVELY EASY TO ESTABLISH IN THEORETICAL TERMS WHAT PEACE SETTLEMENT OUGHT TO BE. IN LAST ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, MAJOR POWERS CAN ONLY PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR USE BY PARTIES INVOLVED. (KABBANI AGREED) US PROPOSALS, THEREFORE, TRYING TO MEET LEGITIMATE NEEDS AND DESIRES ON BOTH SIDES.

3. SISCO CONTINUED THAT SOME PEOPLE OVER-ESTIMATE US ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SHAPE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT. DESPITE THIS LIMITED ABILITY, US INTENDS TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK FOR SETTLEMENT WHICH MAY NOT BE AGREEABLE TO BOTH SIDES BUT WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE FAIR IN TERMS OF REALITIES IN AREA. US REALIZES IT HAS BEEN AND WILL BE HEAVILY CRITICIZED BY BOTH SIDES BECAUSE OF EVENTUAL OUTLINES OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT BUT US REMAINS CONVINCED THAT EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS, DESPITE CRITICISM.

4. SISCO ASSURED KABBANI US TIES TO LEBANON CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENCED BY THREE FACTORS: (A) SPECIAL AND WARM RELATIONSHIP OVER THE YEARS; (B) TRADITIONALLY CLOSE COOPERATION TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN AREA; AND (C) USG CONCERN FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD SISCO EMPHASIZED TO KABBANI USG ENVISAGES NO CHANGE IN PRESENT

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ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER. LEBANON WAS NOT PARTY TO JUNE 1967 WAR AND THEREFORE IS NOT INVOLVED IN PRESENT EFFORTS ATTEMPTING TO DEAL WITH RESULTS OF THAT WAR. USG HAS MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR IN THIS REGARD TO ISRAELIS WHO ALSO HAVE NOT MADE ANY SUGGESTIONS THAT PRESENT ISRAELI-LEBANON BORDER BE AFFECTED BY CURRENT PEACE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS. (KABBANI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT RECENTLY GIVEN ANY SIGNS INDICATING DESIRE TO CHANGE BORDER, BUT IN PROVIOUS YEAR HAD DECLARED THIS OBRDER NOT ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY TO THEM. IT IS THESE EARLIER STATEMENTS WHICH CONTINUE TO CAUSE LEBANON CONCERN.)

5. IN REPLY TO SISCO'S QUESTION CONCERNING PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON, KABBANI STATED LEBANON NOW GOING THROUGH ON OF MOST DIFFICULT TIMES IN ITS HISTORY AS CONSEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN SURROUNDING AREA. IN FACT, NOT ONLY IS LEBANON'S SECURITY THREATENED BUT ITS VERY EXISTENCE. IF EVENTS IN AREA GET OUT OF CONTROL, MANY LEBANESE FEAR WORSE. ONE RESULT WOULD BE CONTRADICTIONARY REACTIONS AMONG THE LEBANESE WITH SOME ESPOUSING EXTREMIST POSITIONS, WHILE OTHER TRYING SUPPORT PRESENT REGIME. THIS COULD HAVE SERIOUS EFFECTS ON LEBANON'S UNITY.

6. SISCO ASSURED AMBASSADOR USG AWARE OF DIFFICULTIES FACING LEBANON. HE INFORMED KABBANI THAT USG AT HIGH LEVELS HAS MADE KNOWN ITS CONCERN ABOUT DETERIORATING LEBANESE SITUATION TO ISRAELIS. BOTH HERE AND IN TEL AVIV WE HAVE CANDIDLY AND SPECIFICALLY TOLD ISRAELIS THAT NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO MAKE LEBANON'S CURRENT PROBLEMS MORE DIFFICULT FOR ITS GOVERNMENT. ANY SUCH MOVES WOULD BE IN INTERESTS OF NO ONE, INCLUDING LEBANON, USG AND ISRAEL.

7. KABBANI EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THESE EFFORTS. HE ADDED ISRAELIS MUST APPRECIATE PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON SECONDARY TO PRESERVATION OF MODERATE PRO-WESTERN LEBANON WHICH COULD BE HELPFUL TO CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT PEACE SETTLEMENT IN AREA. IF MODERATE LEBANON ENGULFED BY EXTREMISM, THIS WOULD ONLY ADD EXTRA WEIGHT TO ALREADY SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN NEAR EAST.

8. IN DISCUSSING PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, KABBANI

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AGREED WITH SISCO THAT MANY REFUGEES WILL NOT OPT TO RETURN TO ISRAEL SHOULD CHOICE BE GIVEN TO THEM. IMPORTANT ASPECT FOR ARABS, HOWEVER, IS CONFIRMATION OF PRINCIPLE OF RETURN WHICH ISRAELIS HAVE NOT IN THE PAST BEEN WILLING TO MAKE. KABBANI BELIEVED ARABS WOULD ACCEPT PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO REFUGEE PROBLEM ONCE PRINCIPLE OF RETURN IS CLEARLY ESPOUSED BY ISRAELIS.


9. DISCUSSING JORDANIAN ASPECT OF POSSIBLE ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, SISCO INFORMED KABBANI THAT USG HAS NEVER ENVISAGED A JORDAN LIMITED TO EAST BANK. SO CALLED ALLON PLAN IN USG OPINION IS NON-STARTER. WE BELIEVE WEST BANK, SUBJECT TO MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS ON RECIPROCAL BASIS, SHOULD BE RETURNED TO JORDAN AS PART OF EVENTUAL PEACE PLAN.

10. KABBANI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US VIEWS ON JORDANIAN ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT. HE CONTINUED IF ISRAELIS REALLY DESIRE LONG TERM SOLUTION TO PALESTINE PROBLEM, THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO SHARE WITH ARAB PALESTINIANS WHAT USED TO BE PALESTINE AND NOT DEMAND ALL OF IT. ISRAEL MUST ALSO LEARN TO LIVE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. IF IT CONTINUES TO ASK FOR TERRITORY, ARAB EXTREMISTS IN AREA WILL POINT TO THIS AS PROOF THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WISH SETTLEMENT. THUS, CURRENT UNGA MAY BE LAST OPPORTUNITY FOR ISRAEL TO CONVINCED ARABAS IT DESIRES PEACE. IF ISRAELIS ADHERE TO HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THIS PROBLEM, THEN ARABS WILL BE FORTHCOMING IN PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES. ATTEMPTS TO ARRIVE AT SETTLEMENT BY FOCUSING FIRST ON PRACTICAL ASPECTS, AND THEN GOING ON TO PRINCIPLES WILL NOT WORK.

11. SISCO ASSURED KABBANI USG HAS NEVER ENDORSED IN ITS PROPOSALS TO SOVIETS ISRAELI POSITION ON NEED FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT OUTSET. US DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THERE MUST BE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME STATE IN JARRINGS PRESENCE. TIMING COULD BE LEFT TO JARRING. ISRAELIS ON OTHER HAND BELIEVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT INITIAL STAGE IS SINE QUA NON THAT ARABS RECOGNIZE ITS EXISTENCE. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT ISRAELIS SHORT-SIGHTED IN THIS REGARD CITING EXAMPLE OF FRANCE AND GERMANY WHICH HAVE ALWAYS ENJOYED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT HAVE WAGED THREE MAJOR WARS AGAINST EACH OTHER OVER

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LAST CENTURY. KABBANI REITERATED THAT FOR ISRAEL MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO BE ACCEPTED BY NEIGHBORS AND NOT INSIST ON PAPERS WHICH CAN BE ABROGATED AT ANY TIME.

12. SISCO TOLD AMBASSADOR KABBANI WE HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT DISTRESSED BY VIGOROUS OBJECTIONS TO OUR JULY PROPSALS FROM BOTH ISRAEL AND UAR WITH FORMER ACCUSING US OF MAKING TOO MANY CONCESSIONS AND LATTER ASSERTING THAT WE ARE PRO-ISRAELI.

13. SISCO CONTINUED USG CANNOT UNDERSTAND UAR WHICH ON ONE HAND HAS TOLD US NOT TO LEAVE IT EXCLUSIVELY TO SOVIETS WHILE ON THE OTHER HAND MAKES NO EFFORTS TO HELP US DEFINE SPECIFIC POSITIONS DURING THESE CURRENT BILATERALS. UAR SHOULD TELL USG POINT BY POINT IN SEPCIFIC CONRETE TERMS WHAT TO CHANGE IN OUR PROPOSALS. SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING OUR PROPOSALS AS PRO-ISRAELI DOES NOT HELP. DOUBTLESS UAR WOULD REACT NEGATIVELY IF USG DECIDED ON BASIS UAR'S POSITION THAT PRESENT GAP IN BILATERALS UNBRIDGABLE AND THEREFORE USG SHOULD CEASE PARTICIPATION IN THESE BILATERALS. (KABBANI AGREED). IF USG DID THIS, SISCO CONTINUED, ISRAELIS CERTAINLY WOULD BE PLEASED BECAUSE THEY HAVE ALL ALONG OPPOSED BILATERALS. IN EFFECT, UAR'S CURRENT POSITION OF UNWILLINGNESS TO REACT SPECIFICALLY, AND UNWILLINGNESS TO COMMIT ITSELF TO PEACE AND NEGOTIA-TIONS, IS PLAYING IN HANDS OF ISRAELIS, WHO HAVE INSISTED ALL ALONG THAT NO MOVEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED IN BILATERALS.

14. KABBANI COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS UAR WOULD SAY THAT IT HAS GONE FAR ENOUGH AND NOW IT WAITS FOR ISRAELI REACTION.

15. SISCO REPLIED THAT IF UAR WOULD BE MORE FORTHCOMING, IT WOULD HELP US IN EXERTING INFLUENCE ON ISRAELIS TO GET THEM TO COME ALONG. CERTAINLY UAR SHOULD TRY TO "TEXT" ISRAELIS BY STATING UAR'S POSITION EXPLICITLY AND THEREBY FORCE ISRAELIS TO DO LIKEWISE. AT PRESENT TIME, THEREFORE, FOLLOWING MUST STILL BE OBTAINED: (A) BINDING UAR COMMIT-MENT TO PEACE; (B) UAR WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AT SOME TIME FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AT AUSPICES JARRING; (C) CLEAR CUT STATEMENT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; (D) CLARIFICATION OF PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN SHARM AL SHAKYH AREA; AND (E) AGREED LANGUAGE ON REFUGEE PROBLEM WHICH BALANCES

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PRINCIPLE OF FREE CHOICE AND REALITIES OF SITUATION.

16. KABBANI REPLIED THAT HE WAS RATHER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ARAB RESPONSE TO THESE POINTS BUT EMPHASIZED THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. PRESENCE AMONG PALESTINIANS OF RADICALS AND EXTREMISTS CAN HAVE DANGEROUS RESULTS. ONE POSSIBILITY IS EMERGENCE OF NEW GENERATION OF PEOPLE WHO, IN ABSENCE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT, WOULD BE PREPARED TO FIGHT ON EVEN IF IT MEANT THEIR SELF DESTRUCTION. THIS DEVELOPMENT NOT TURE TWO YEARS AGO, BUT IF IT IS PERMITTED TO CONTINUE FOR TWO MORE YEARS, SITUATION IN AREA WILL BE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. ISRAELIS MUST THEREFORE REALIZE THAT NOW IS TIME FOR SOLUTION BEFORE TOO LATE.

17. SISCO REPLIED THAT HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR THAT IT IS LATE. IN BASEBALL TERMS, WE ARE IN EIGHTH, IF NOT NINTH INNING. HOWEVER, GAME NOT YET OVER.

18. KABBANI ADDED THAT RECENT ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL OF PAHNTOMS HAS NOT HELPED AND PERHAPS USG COULD USE FUTURE DELIVERIES AS LEVERAGE OVER ISRAELIS.

19. SISCO REITERATED THAT ARABS, AND SPECIFICALLY UAR, MUST GIVE USG SOMETHING TO WORK WITH, IF PRESENT BILATERAL EFFORTS ARE TO ACHIEVE ANY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE.
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SUMMARY

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NEA: DAVIES

S/S: BROWN

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SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON


REF: BEIRUT 8524, BEIRUT 8525, STATE 151169

1. WHEN YOU SEE SHEIKH MICHEL KHOURY EARLY THIS WEEK YOU MAY FOLLOW UP OUR INTERIM REPLY TO PRESIDENT HELOU'S REQUESTS (STATE 151169) WITH FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

2. TELEGRAM HAS BEEN DESPATCHED TO OUR EMBASSIES AT JIDDA AND TEHRAN INSTRUCTING THEM TO URGE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN RESPECTIVELY REVIEW THEIR CURRENT RELATIONS WITH LEBANON. IN THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA WE HAVE URGED A MORE SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT TO GOL'S CURRENT PROBLEMS. IN THE CASE OF IRAN WE HAVE ADVOCATED THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, YOU

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MAY DRAW ON MATERIAL CONTAINED IN MESSAGE OF INSTRUCTIONS DESPATCHED TO JIDDA AND TEHRAN. AT SAME TIME YOU SHOULD URGE GOL TO MAKE ITS OWN REPRESENTATIONS SINCE IN OUR VIEW DIRECT APPROACH BY GOL IS LIKELY TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OUR INTERCESSION ON GOL'S BEHALF. IN WAKE OF LIBYAN DEVELOPMENTS GOL MIGHT FIND JIDDA AND TEHRAN MORE RESPONSIVE TO FURTHER DIRECT EFFORTS.

3. WE ARE ARRANGING FOR PUBLIC STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WHICH WOULD EXPRESS CONCERN AT RECENT INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE ALONG LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER AND STRESSING USG CONCERN FOR SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF LEBANON.

4. WE ARE PLANNING CALL IN ISRAELI AMBASSADOR AT HIGH LEVEL FOR PURPOSE MAKING ANOTHER DEMARCHE RE ISRAEL EXERCISING RESTRAINT IN LIGHT OF DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHALL INDICATE THAT PRESIDENT HELOU REQUESTS MORATORIUM ON ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS FOR PURPOSE ENABLING HELOU AND MODERATES TO IMPROVE THEIR CONTROL OVER INTERNAL SITUATION. ISRAELI RAIDS ONLY SERVE TO STRENGTHEN EXTREMISTS AND IF MODERATES ARE TO HAVE CHANCE TO RECOUP SITUATION, THERE MUST BE RESPITE FROM FURTHER ATTACKS. WE SHALL ASK ISRAELI DESIST FROM FURTHER ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANON OVER COMING FEW WEEKS, NOTING THAT WHILE NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE AGAINST FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS DURING PERIOD OF MORATORIUM, HELOU HAS UNDERTAKEN TO DO ALL HE CAN TO PREVENT THEM. FYI WE PREFER NOT TO SET SPECIFIC TIME LIMIT ON MORATORIUM. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE REQUEST THAT YOU SEEK TO PERSUADE GOL TO WITHDRAW ITS CONDITION THAT IN MAKING DEMARCHE TO ISRAELIS WE MAKE NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF PRESIDENT HELOU'S EFFORT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. WE BELIEVE THIS INFORMATION MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN INDUCING ISRAELIS TO "LAY OFF" AND IN ANY CASE WOULD URGE THAT GOI KEEP THIS CONFIDENTIAL. END FYI.

5. ADDITIONALLY, YOU AUTHORIZED CONFIDENTIALLY TO CONVEY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT THAT GOI HAS SEVERAL TIMES ASSURED US IT ENVISAGES NO CHANGE IN ISRAELI-LEBANESE BOUNDARY. WE WOULD BE DEEPLY CONCERNED IF ISRAELIS ENDEAVORED TO SEIZE TERRITORY IN SOUTHERN LEBANON.

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
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RECEIVED ANY RESPONSE FROM NEW YORK. WE NOTE THAT IN
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YORK LATTER WAS LIKELIHOOD TO SUGGESTION RE INCREASE IN
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EXDIS

SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 8524, BEIRUT 8525, STATE 151169

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
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1969 AUG 21 00 00

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 140865

PLEASE PASS TO SAN FRANCISCO FOR SECRETARY ROGERS AND SAN CLEMENTE FOR DR. KISSINGER.

FOLLOWING SUMMARY MAY BE USEFUL IN DISCUSSION US VOTE ON LEBANESE RESOLUTION. UNSC SCHEDULED MEET AFTERNOON AUG 21.

SENTIMENT IN UNSC AT OUTSET CONSIDERATION LEBANESE COMPLAINT AGAINST ISRAEL FOR AUG 11 AIR ATTACK WAS HEAVILY SYMPATHETIC TO LEBANON AND CRITICAL OF ISRAEL FOR WHAT WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED REACTION OUT OF PROPORTION TO PROVOCATION. FIRST DRAFT RESOLUTION INFORMALLY CIRCULATED WAS TOTALLY ONE SIDED AND ANTI ISRAELI. WE DECIDED SEEK MORE BALANCED TEXT IN ORDER PREVENT ADOPTION OF COMPLETELY ONE SIDED RESOLUTION. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS LEBANESE CONVICTION THAT US SUPPORT FOR RESOLUTION WAS MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR IT TO MAINTAIN SOME MEASURE OF INTERNAL STABILITY AND TO STRENGTHEN ITS HAND IN KEEPING FADAYEEN IN CHECK.

AMBASSADOR YOST ESTIMATES THAT NO MORE THAN TWO OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS WOULD JOIN US IN ABSTAINING ON CURRENT TEXT. PARAGUAY WOULD PROBABLY DO SO AND UK MIGHT, BUT THIS NOT CERTAIN. WE WOULD EXPECT OTHERS TO VOTE IN FAVOR.

ALTHOUGH ISRAEL, AS IN PAST, HAS COMPLAINED ABOUT FACT THAT DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNS ISRAELI AIR ATTACK WHILE DEPLORINGG "ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE", IT HAS FOCUSED ITS OBJECTIONS IN PARTICULAR ON PREAMBULAR PROVISION "RECALLING" THE 1949 LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IF THIS PROVISION IS INCLUDED, EBAN HAS SAID GOI WOULD PUBLICLY STATE ISRAEL NOT HENCEFORTH BOUND BY OBLIGATIONS THEREUNDER. HOWEVER, AS EARLY AS AUG 1967 EBAN STATED IN PRESS CONFERENCE THAT LEBANON DECLARED WAR ON ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 AND THUS ABROGATED ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. LEBANON'S POSITION IS THAT SINCE IT DID NOT TAKE PART IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL IN 1967, ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STILL IN EFFECT. ISRAEL HAS LONG BEEN AWARE THAT WE DO NOT SHARE ITS VIEW AND CONSIDER LEBANESE-ISRAELI ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STILL IN FORCE, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT SO STATED PUBLICLY. FACT IS THAT 1949 ARMISTICE AND 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES ARE IDENTICAL AND COINCIDE WITH INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER.

AMBASSADOR YOST STRONGLY DOUBTS THAT FURTHER CHANGES OF SIGNIFICANCE CAN BE OBTAINED IN DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN PARTICULAR, IT CLEAR LEBANON ATTACHES MAJOR IMPORTANCE REFERENCE TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WHICH IT CONSIDERS VITAL TO ITS POSITION. LEBANON ALSO CONSIDERS CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ATTACK (WHICH IS STEP BACK FROM ORIGINAL LANGUAGE CONDEMNING ISRAEL) ESSENTIAL TO MEET ITS INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND CONTROL OF FADAYEEN

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IF DECISION IS THAT WE SHOULD ABSTAIN BECAUSE OF STRONG ISRAELI REACTION, AMBASSADOR YOST COULD BE AUTHORIZED MAKE FINAL ATTEMPT PERSUADE LEBANON TO DELETE REFERENCE TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS PRICE FOR AFFIRMATIVE US VOTE. HOWEVER, SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THIS COULD INCREASE LEBANESE RESENTMENT AT US ABSTENTION.

SHOULD DECISION BE TAKEN TO AUTHORIZE US AFFIRMATIVE VOTE FOR DRAFT RESOLUTION AS IT NOW STANDS, RECOMMEND AMB. YOST SEEK ADDITION OF FOLLOWING LANGUAGE TO SIXTH PREAMBULAR PARA, RECALLING ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: "AND THE CEASEFIRE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTIONS 233(1967) AND 234(1967)," BEFORE INFORMING LEBANON OF US SUPPORT FOR PRESENT TEXT.

FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED EXPLANATION IN EVENT AFFIRMATIVE US VOTE:

"MY DELEGATION HAS JOINED IN SUPPORTING THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE COUNCIL HAS JUST ADOPTED IN THE INTERESTS OF ENDING THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS HAMPERED EFFORTS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS I INDICATED IN MY STATEMENT LAST THURSDAY, THE ESSENTIAL TASK OF THE SC AND OF THE PARTIES AT THIS TIME IS TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE FAVORABLE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN PROGRESS LOOKING TOWARD AGREEMENT ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

"THE RESOLUTION THAT WE HAVE ADOPTED IS NOT IN ALL OF ITS DETAILS WHAT MY DELEGATION WOULD HAVE PREFERRED. WE VOTED FOR IT NEVERTHELESS BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION DEALS WITH ALL TYPES OF VIOLENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND DOES NOT SINGLE OUT ONLY ONE PARTY FOR CRITICISM. I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY, HOWEVER, TO REMIND THE COUNCIL THAT WHILE IT MAY BE NECESSARY AT TIMES TO RECOGNIZE VARYING DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY, UNLESS IN CARRYING OUT ITS DUTIES THE COUNCIL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE JUST CONCERNS OF ALL WHO TURN TO IT, WE CANNOT BE EFFECTIVE OR EXPECT TO HAVE OUR ACTIONS RESPECTED.

"I AM CONFIDENT THAT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHARE MY SINCERE HOPE THAT ALL CONCERNED WILL REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN ORDER THAT CALM CAN BE RESTORED, NOT ONLY BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL BUT ELSEWHERE THROUGHOUT THE AREA. AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK A JUST AND LASTING PEACE AND NOT MERELY RESTORATION OF THE ARMISTICE SITUATION. WE MUST MOVE BEYOND THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS TO GENUINE PEACE". GP-3.

ROGERS

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1969 AUG 21 00 53

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 140198

SAN CLEMENTE FOR DR. KISSINGER

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT UNSC LEBANESE RESOLUTION WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH YOU ON THE PHONE:

QUOTE:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT S/AGENDA/1498/REV. 1,

HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER OF THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF LEBANON (DOCUMENT S/9383),

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL,

GRIEVED AT THE TRAGIC LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROPERTY,

GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE VIOLATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS,

RECALLING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON OF MARCH 23, 1949;

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 262 (1968),

MINDFUL OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

1. CONDEMNS THE PREMEDITATED AIR ATTACK BY ISRAEL ON VILLAGES IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN VIOLATIONS OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS;


ASTERICK 2. DEPLORES THE EXTENSION OF THE AREA OF FIGHTING;

3. DEPLORES ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE AND DECLARES THAT SUCH ACTIONS OF MILITARY REPRISAL AND OTHER GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE CANNOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER FURTHER AND MORE EFFECTIVE STEPS AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER TO ENSURE AGAINST REPETITION OF SUCH ACTS.

ASTERICK WE UNDERSTAND LEBANON WOULD BE WILLING TO REVERSE THE ORDER OF PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3, MAKING THIS PARAGRAPH THE LAST ONE. END QUOTE

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INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, IO 13, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, ACDA 16, USIE 00, /114 R

66648

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS 8/12/69
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES
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O R 122237Z AUG 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 135415


REF: BEIRUT 6708

BEIRUT DELIVER TO CHARGE OPENING OF BUSINESS AUGUST 13

1. WE ENDORSE POSITION CHARGE TOOK WITH YUSEF SALEM (PARAGRAPH 3 REFTEL) REGARDING REQUEST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON ISRAELI ATTACK. WE HAVE NOW LEARNED FROM USUN, HOWEVER, THAT GOL HAS CALLED FOR SC MEETING, WHICH SCHEDULED FOR 5:00 PM AUGUST 13. WHEN YOU MAKE YOUR FAREWELL CALL ON SALEM YOU SHOULD STATE THAT WE SURPRISED DECISION ALREADY TAKEN TO REQUEST SC MEETING. WHILE DECISION OF COURSE WILL BE BASED ON GOL ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION, WE BELIEVE SC MEETING

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WILL LEAD TO ACRIMONIOUS AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE DEBATE.

2. USG CONSISTENTLY OPPOSES ALL VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE. IN ORDER BE CONSISTENT IN FORMULATING USG POSITION ON LEBANESE COMPLAINT BEFORE SC, WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THOSE ACTS WHICH ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED THE ISRAELI ATTACK. WHILE ISRAELI ATTACK DEPLORABLE AND APPARENTLY RESULTED IN CIVILIAN INJURIES AND DEATHS, WE CANNOT CONSIDER IT IN ISOLATION FROM OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE ACROSS CEASE-FIRE LINES. IF, AS GOL ALLEGES, ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STILL IN EFFECT, THIS CLEARLY IMPOSES OBLIGATION ON GOL PREVENT PROVOCATIVE ACTS FROM ITS TERRITORY, WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY SUCCESSFUL IN DOING.

3. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD BE UNABLE SUPPORT ONE-SIDED COUNCIL ACTION CRITICAL ONLY OF ISRAEL AND HOPE GOL WILL NOT PRESS FOR SUCH ACTION. WE SUGGEST THEY CONSIDER DESIRABILITY OF BALANCED CONSENSUS STATEMENT WHICH, WHILE PERHAPS NOT FULLY MEETING ALL GOL DESIRES, WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF UNANIMOUS COUNCIL OPINION BEHIND IT.

4. FOR USUN. SUGGEST YOU TAKE SAME LINE AS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE AND OTHER DELS, AS APPROPRIATE.
GP-3.

RICHARDSON

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 108201

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66633
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA: JJSISCO
NEA: MR DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
NEA/UAR: MR PARKER
S/S: MHORNBLow

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
R 010033Z JUL 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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EXDIS

- 1. LEBANESE AMB KABBANI CALLED ON SISCO AND DAVIES JUNE 30 PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE JULY 2 FOR LEAVE AND CONSULTATION IN BEIRUT. SISCO PROVIDED KABBANI WITH FOLLOWING BRIEFING ON STATE OF PLAY US-SOVIET BILATERAL TALKS:
- 2. SISCO STATED WE GAVE SOVIETS NUMBER OF CONCRETE POINTS IN EARLY MAY INCLUDING FOLLOWING:
 - A. PARTIES TO CONFLICT EXPECTED AT SOME POINT MEET TOGETHER UNDER AUSPICES JARRING.
 - B. IT EXPECTED THAT STATE OF PEACE WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND BELLIGERENCY ENDED.
 - C. ISRAEL EXPECTED ACCEPT PRINCIPLE WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE BORDERS AND FORMER INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES NOT NECESSARILY

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EXCLUDED.

- D. FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ AND TIRAN.
 - E. RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ALL NATIONS IN AREA.
 - F. SINAI TO BE DEMILITARIZED.
 - G. STATUS GAZA TO BE WORKED OUT BY JORDAN, ISRAEL AND UAR.
 - H. PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE WORKED OUT FOR SHARM AL-SHEIKH.
 - I. EXPLICIT US SUPPORT UN RESOLUTIONS ON REFUGEES AND ENDORSEMENT PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE BY REFUGEES, TEMPERED, HOWEVER, BY PRACTICAL PROCEDURE AND COMMITMENT RE HOW MANY REFUGEES ISRAEL COULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE BACK.
 - J. SISCO SAID IT DESIRABLE THAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS AGREE TO OBLIGATE THEMSELVES TO TAKE MEASURES TO PREVENT LAUNCHING OF TERRORIST ATTACKS FROM THEIR TERRITORIES. HE NOTED THAT THIS ELEMENT OF USG POSITION WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO GOL BECAUSE OF LEBANON'S SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH FEDAYEEN.
3. FOLLOWING GROMYKO'S TRIP TO CAIRO, SISCO STATED, SOVIETS GAVE US COUNTERPROPOSAL WHICH SHOWED SOME ADVANCES, BUT NUMBER FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN. ONE OF POSITIVE ASPECTS IS THAT SOVIETS ENVISAGE BINDING AGREEMENT AMONG PARTIES. ALSO, WE HAVE COMMON UNDERSTANDING WITH SOVIETS ON NECESSITY OF PACKAGE DEAL. SISCO EMPHASIZED AT THIS POINT THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF PACKAGE MUST BE AGREED TO BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS. OTHER POSITIVE ASPECTS OF SOVIET PROPOSAL ARE RECOGNITION OF NECESSITY RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY NATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST, NEED FOR PERMANENT AGREEMENT AND ENDORSEMENT PRINCIPLE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH TIRAN.
4. AMONG DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY SOVIET PROPOSAL ARE INSISTENCE ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-JUNE 5 LINES AND FAILURE ENDORSE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH SUEZ WITHOUT RESERVATION. SOVIET FORMULA PROPOSES ISRAELIS USE SUEZ "IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION OF 1888," WHICH WOULD GIVE UAR RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH ISRAELI SHIPPING. ALSO, SOVIETS FAILED

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TO BE EXPLICIT ON OBLIGATIONS WHICH FLOW FROM END OF BELLIGERENCY. REFUGEES POINT DOES NOT CONTAIN NECESSARY SAFEGUARDS.

5. SISCO SAID THAT IN SPITE OF DEFICIENCIES IN SOVIET COUNTER-PROPOSAL, WE THINK THERE SUFFICIENT ADVANCES TO JUSTIFY CONTINUATION BILATERAL TALKS. WE ARE NEITHER OPTIMISTIC NOR PESSIMISTIC, BUT BELIEVE CONTINUATION OF TALKS IMPORTANT.

6. REGARDING SITE OF BILATERAL TALKS, SISCO STATED SOVIETS HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED MOSCOW. FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, INCLUDING PROXIMITY TO UN AND SITE OF FOUR-POWER TALKS, WE PREFER WASHINGTON. WHILE WE DO NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY FEW ROUNDS OF TALKS IN MOSCOW, WE DO NOT FAVOR PERMANENT CHANGE IN VENUE.

7. KABBANI QUESTIONED WHETHER ISRAELIS REALLY WANT PEACE AND SUGGESTED THEY MAY EVEN WANT ANOTHER WAR FOR PURPOSE OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. SISCO SAID HE CONVINCED BOTH ISRAEL AND UAR WANT PEACE. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS FINDING TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH. IN CONTEXT PEACE SETTLEMENT, KABBANI ASKED SISCO ABOUT OUR THINKING ON STATUS LEBANON. HE NOTED THAT LEBANON WAS NOT A COMBATANT IN 1967 WAR AND THAT GOL REGARDED ISRAEL-LEBANON ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS STILL VALID. SISCO AGREED THAT LEBANON WAS NOT ENGAGED IN THE WAR BUT NOTED THAT PEACE SETTLEMENT COULD NOT IGNORE LEBANON. HE SAID HE WOULD GIVE THIS QUESTION FURTHER THOUGHT.

8. SISCO NOTED THAT LAST FIRDAY'S AHRAH HAD SCATHING ARTICLE ON US POLICY AND POINTED OUT TO KABBANI THAT, CONTRARY EGYPTIAN ALLEGATION, USG NOT TRYING TO DIVIDE ARABS. KABBANI DISMISSED HEYKAL WITH COMMENT THAT U.S. SHOULD NOT TAKE HIM SERIOUSLY. GP-3 ROGERS

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53
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

66638
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH SISCO
NEA: MR. DAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR. SEELYE
NEA/IAI: MR. ATHERTON
S/S: MR. SHEPARD
IO/UNP: MISS BROWN (INFO)

051098

P 281724Z JUN 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 107369

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 5255

1. WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU TEXT OF SOVIET JUNE 17 DOCUMENT AND COMMENTS ON IT (STATE 101232 AND 101233) STRICTLY FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. IN ADDITION, WE ARE SENDING YOU TEXT OF U.S. FORMULATIONS GIVEN SOVIETS (STATE 86465) AS BASIS FOR YOUR DISCUSSION WITH HELOU AS WELL AS STATE 83050 WHICH INDICATES CARE WE HAVE EXERCISED IN INFORMING OTHERS OF OUR FORMULATIONS.

2. IN YOUR MEETING WITH HELOU YOU MAY INFORM HIM THAT WE REGARD NOTE HANDED TO SECRETARY ON JUNE 17 BY SOVIET CHARGE AS EVIDENCE OF SERIOUSNESS OF EXCHANGE VIEWS BETWEEN US AND USSR AND THAT SOVIETS ALSO APPEAR TO REGARD IT AS SUCH. BILATERAL EXCHANGE CONSTITUTES SOME PROGRESS TOWARD MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT INASMUCH AS IT HAS NARROWED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON CERTAIN POINTS, BUT SERIOUS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN.

3. FOREGOING SHOULD PROVIDE HELOU WITH SUFFICIENT UNDER-

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STANDING US POSITION, BUT AVOIDS GETTING INTO PRECISE
DETAILS WHICH ARE BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD IN USG.

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PAGE 01 STATE 087841

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66631
DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: JBECHELIA
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: L KILDAY

123038

Z 302119Z MAY 69 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ANEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH

UNCLAS STATE 087841

EMBASSY TEL AVIV PHONED DEPARTMENT AND REQUESTED FOLLOWING MESSAGE
BE PASSED TO YOU.

QUOTE: EMBASSY TEL AVIV NOTIFIED AT 2045 ZULU THAT TAPLINE
WAS BLOWN UP APPROXIMATELY 2030 ZULU VICINITY BANIAS. NO
OTHER INFORMATION YET AVAILABLE. UNQUOTE. ROGERS

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PAGE 01 STATE 087844

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DRAFTED BY: S/S-O: PHEROS
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: HHEYKANN

123079

Z 0 302149Z MAY 69 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMCONSUL DHAKRAH
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

UNCLAS STATE 087844

REF: STATE 087841

FOLLOWING RECEIVED BY PHONE FROM TEL AVIV.

QUOTE: OIL IS BEING DISCHARGED AT A VERY FAST RATE AND
ISRAELI AUTHORITIES DID NOT SHUT OFF VALVE AT FIRST BUT NOW
DOING SO. UNQUOTE. ROGERS

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 087829

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ORIGIN SS 30

SUMMARY

25

INFO OCT 01/031 RI

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHBAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA - RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN - MR SEELYE
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NEA/IAI - MR BAHTI
S/S - MR WALKER

122516

R 301822Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 087829

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 4375; STATE 75037; BEIRUT 4366; NJA 7262

1. WE COMMEND YOUR HANDLING OF HELOU IN YOUR MAY 26 MEETING. WE UNDERSTAND HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT POSSIBILITY OBTAINING OUTSIDE HELP IN COPING WITH CURRENT PROBLEM IS SLIGHT. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND HIS ANXIETY OVER CONSEQUENCES POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN INTERNAL ORDER IN LEBANON, AND, GIVEN LEBANESE CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES, IT NATURAL HE WOULD HOPE FOR OUTSIDE INTERVENTION TO AVOID SUCH CALAMAITY.

2. WE NOTE HELOU SUGGESTS USG GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO DEMARCHE TO USSR ON NASSER'S POSITION ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS LEBANON. YOU WILL RECALL THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO ASKED SOVIET AMBASSADOR

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DOBRYNIN (STATE 65039) TO CONVEY REQUEST HIS GOVERNMENT INTERVENE WITH SARG TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN. INITIAL SOVIET REACTION WAS QUERY WHY GOL DID NOT APPROACH USSR DIRECTLY IF REALLY CONCERNED. SOVIETS EVENTUALLY APPROACHED SYRIANS, APPARENTLY AFTER REQUEST RECEIVED FROM LEBANESE. IN LIGHT THIS EXPERIENCE WE BELIEVE REQUEST TO SOVIETS THAT THEY APPROACH UAR RE FEDAYEEN SHOULD BE MADE IN FIRST INSTANCE BY GOL. DEPENDING ON SOVIET REACTION, WE COULD FOLLOW-UP IN SUPPORT OF LEBANESE REQUEST, ALTHOUGH SOVIETS ALREADY FULLY AWARE OUR CONCERN.

3. HELOU'S SUGGESTION RE "INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION" MAY BE WHAT PROMPTED FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT IN SUPPORT LEBANESE INTEGRITY. THIS PROPOSAL CONVEYED IN PARIS 7095 TO WHICH WE HAVE REPLIED SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

4. REGARDING HELOU'S SUGGESTION THAT COUNTRIES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO UNRWA MAKE REPRESENTATIONS SYG, WE CONCUR WITH YOUR COMMENT. ALSO, INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN STATE 75037 STILL VALID.

5. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE POSITION YOU TOOK WITH HELOU THAT HIS DIPLOMATIC POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN PROPORTION TO STAND HE ADOPTS IN DEFENDING LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. WE AGREE THAT FIRM LINE WITH FEDAYEEN IS CRITICAL AT THIS JUNCTURE AND WILL BE IMPORTANT IN OBTAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IF REQUIRED.

6. REPORT CONTAINED IN NUA 7262 INTERESTING IN THIS CONTEXT. IF INDEED ARAFAT'S OBJECTIVE IS MERELY TO FORCE DEPLOYMENT ISRAELI TROOPS NORTHERN ISRAEL, CHANCE OF INCIDENTS MAY BE REDUCED, ALTHOUGH WE SOMEWHAT DUBIOUS FEDAYEEN WOULD IN FACT REFRAIN FROM ALL CROSS-BORDER RAIDS. MOREOVER, NOT ALL FEDAYEEN ARE UNDER ARAFAT'S CONTROL AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY SA'IGA, MAY CAUSE INCIDENTS AND THEREBY PROVOKE ISRAELI RETALIATION.

7. REPORTING AND COMMENTARY IN BEIRUT 4366 PARTICULARLY TIMELY AND USEFUL TO US IN UNDERSTANDING HELOU'S MOOD IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

GP-3. ROGERS:

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RPPAGANELLI 5/14/69
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NEA/UAR:RBPARKER
S/S-MR. WALSH

016190

R 150111Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 076791

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANESE CRISIS

1. IN REVIEWING WAYS OF SUPPORTING PRESIDENT HELOU'S ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION IN PRESENT LEBANESE CRISIS IT OCCURS TO US THAT INFLUENCE OF FORMER PRESIDENT CHEHAB COULD BE DECISIVE. A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY CHEHAB OF SUPPORT FOR HELOU COULD WELL PROVIDE HELOU WITH THE AMMUNITION HE NEEDS TO ENFORCE HIS DESIRE TO SUPPRESS THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON. IT MIGHT ALSO EMBOLDEN OTHER LEADERS TO FOLLOW SUIT AND TO STATE PUBLICLY WHAT THEY HAVE THIS FAR CONVEYED TO HELOU ONLY PRIVATELY.

2. CHEHAB'S ASSETS MAKE HIM UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO TIP THE BALANCE IN HELOU'S FAVOR. CHEHAB IS LEBANON'S MOST PRESTITIOUS POLITICAL FIGURE. HIS FATHER IMAGE AS THE "SAVIOR" OF

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LEBANON IN THE 1958 CRISIS STILL HAS POTENCY. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT IS HIS CROSS-CONFESSIONAL CREDIBILITY-LEBANON'S MUSLIMS CONTINUE TO REGARD CHEHAB AS THE PRESIDENT WHO DID MOST FOR LEBANON'S MUSLIM COMMUNITY. IN ADDITION, CHEHAB IS PERSONA GRATA WITH NASSER AND MOST VARIETIES OF ARAB NATIONALISTS. FURTHER, CHEHAB RETAINS GREAT INFLUENCE AND A STRONG BASE OF SUPPORT IN THE LEBANESE ARMY.

3. OBVIOUSLY CHEHAB'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS COULD INHIBIT HIS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT PUBLICLY HELOU'S ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION AS IT HAS INHIBITED OTHER LEBANESE POLITICIANS, PARTICULARLY CHRISTIANS, FROM PUBLICLY SUPPORTING HELOU. THEREFORE, SOME STRONG URGING IS PROBABLY REQUIRED BY OTHER RESPECTED MEMBERS OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM LEADERSHIP TO INDUCE HIM TO DO SO. THEY WOULD NEED TO CAST THEIR APPEAL IN TERMS OF WHAT IS IN LEBANON'S BROADER, LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND EMPHASIZE, IF TRUE, THAT CHEHAB'S PUBLIC SUPPORT COULD MAKE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF HELOU'S POLICY.

4. IF AMBASSADOR CONCURS IN OUR ASSESSMENT, HE MIGHT WISH TO ENCOURAGE ELEMENTS CLOSE TO CHEHAB TO SEEK TO PERSUADE HIM TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT SUPPORTING HELOU'S FIRM POLICY TOWARD FEDAYEEN. IN ADDITION, AMBASSADOR MAY WISH MAKE SIMILAR RECOMMENDATION WHEN HE NEXT SEES CHEHAB.
GP-3. RICHARDSON

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Lebanon

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 075037

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INFO OCT 01, 1969 R

66637
DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP:T CAROLAN
APPROVED BY: IO:S DEPALMA
IO/UNP:MISS BROWN
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
NEA:MR. SISCO
SYS:MR. BROWN

130860

R 122349Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 075037

EXDIS

SUBJ: UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 3868, 3881

1. POSSIBILITY OF USING SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS AS PEG FOR UN INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANESE CRISIS WAS TIED TO US SUGGESTION (PARA IC, STATE 65333) THAT GOL MIGHT SEEK TO HAVE SYG, IN LIGHT UN CONCERN WITH REFUGEE PROBLEM, APPOINT REP TO VISIT LEBANON AND REPORT ON REFUGEE ASPECTS IN PRESENT SITUATION. ROLE OF SUCH SYG REP WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION IN CAMPS AND SERVE AS BRAKE ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN THEM AS ENVISAGED BY HELOU. EXTENSIVE UN SERVICES HELOU HAS IN MIND, AS EMB COMMENTS, WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. IT APPARENT FROM AMB'S MAY 5 CONVERSATION WITH MICHELMORE THAT LATTER DOES NOT BELIEVE PRESENT SECURITY CONDITIONS IN REFUGEE CAMPS REQUIRE HIM DO MORE THAN COMMUNICATE PRIVATELY

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TO SYG HIS CONCERN RE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON UNRWA OPERATIONS IN LEBANON. MICHELMORE MIGHT AT SOME POINT CONCLUDE IT NECESSARY AUGMENT UNRWA STAFF IN LEBANON TO ENSURE CONTINUANCE OF AGENCY OPERATIONS AND SO INDICATE TO SYG. IT SEEMS CLEAR, HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE CONDITIONS HAVE REACHED POINT WHERE THIS NECESSARY. IN ANY EVENT, SUCH ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL COULD NOT FUNCTION AS OBSERVERS IN SENSE HELOU HAS IN MIND, AND WE SEE NO WAY THEIR PRESENCE COULD BECOME BASIS FOR INTRODUCING UN "POLICE TEAMS" AND EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHING UNEF-TYPE OPERATION IN LEBANON. THUS, WHILE UNRWA STAFF IN LEBANON COULD BE AUGMENTED WITHOUT SPECIFIC SC OR GA AUTHORIZATION, SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT MEET HELOU'S PROBLEM.

3. MICHELMORE TOUCHED ON HEART OF PROBLEM IN STATING THAT MAINTENANCE OF ORDER IN UNRWA CAMPS IS PRIMARILY HOST GOVT RESPONSIBILITY. THIS ONCE AGAIN POINTS UP KEY FACT, WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY EMPHASIZED TO HELOU, THAT ANY INITIATIVE FOR UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON WILL HAVE TO ORIGINATE WITH GOL ITSELF. WHILE UNRWA MIGHT BE WILLING ASSOCIATE ITSELF IN SOME FASHION WITH GOL REQUEST FOR UN ASSISTANCE IN EVENT LEBANESE FEEL UNABLE MAINTAIN SECURITY IN AND AROUND UNRWA CAMPS, WE GATHER NO SUCH SITUATION NOW EXISTS. IN ANY CASE WE WOULD STILL FIND IT HARD TO VISUALIZE HOW UN PRESENCE DESPATCHED FOR SUCH LIMITED PURPOSE COULD EVOLVE INTO UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORT.

4. YOU SHOULD INFORM HELOU OF OUR VIEWS, MAKING CLEAR THAT, WHILE WE APPRECIATE HIS DESIRE OBTAIN UN INVOLVEMENT ON GOL'S BEHALF WITHOUT ATTRACTING UNDUE PUBLIC ATTENTION, WE REMAIN CONVINCED GOL ITSELF MUST (A) APPROACH SYG DIRECTLY, AND (B) OBTAIN SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCENCE OF OTHER ARAB STATES FOR SUCH A MOVE.

GP-3. RICHARDSON

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Lebanon

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ORIGIN SS 30

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INFO OCT 01/031 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: TW SEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA: JJ SISCO
NEA: RP DAVIES
IO: E BROWN
SYS: MR. BROWN

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R 122348Z MAY 69
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 075036

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU AND SITUATION IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 3881

1. WE KEENLY AWARE DIFFICULT DILEMMA FACING PRESIDENT HELOU AND APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS TO STIFFEN HIS BACK RE FEDAYEEN. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO ALL YOU CAN TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE IMPERATIVE OF FACING UP TO THE FEDAYEEN AND LEFTIST THREAT AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. POLICY OF CAVING IN TO FEDAYEEN CAN ONLY LEAD TO DISASTER IN LONG RUN.

2. WHILE IN NO WAY WISHING TO SUGGEST A DIMINUTION IN US CONCERN AND POLITICAL SUPPORT, WE BELIEVE THAT HELOU SHOULD CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANON'S FUTURE RESTS ESSENTIALLY IN HIS HANDS AND IN HANDS OF LEBANESE COLLECTIVELY. OUTSIDE HELP CAN BE MARGINAL AT BEST AND HE SHOULD AVOID LOOKING TO EXTERNAL FACTORS AS CRUTCH. THERE MAY BE POSSIBILITIES FOR A UN ROLE, ALTHOUGH WE NOTE THAT HELOU FINDS IT POLITICALLY UNFEASIBLE TO REQUEST

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AUGMENTATION OF UN FORCE ALONG BORDER, AT LEAST AT THE MOMENT. A FORCE OF SIZE AND NATURE COMPARABLE TO UNEF, WITH SUBSTANTIAL TROOP CONTINGENTS FROM NUMBER OF STATES, WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE AND, EVEN IF PROVED POSSIBLE, US MILITARY PARTICIPATION THEREIN MUST BE RULED OUT. WE ARE COMMENTING IN SEPTEL ON GOL SUGGESTION RE SENDING OBSERVERS TO UNRWA CAMPS.

3. YOU MAY ASSURE HELOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AND THAT WE ARE CONTINUING OUR REPRESENTATIONS IN CERTAIN ARAB CAPITALS RE FUNDING OF FEDAYEEN. NEITHER INITIATIVE, EVEN IF IT PRODUCED RESULTS, HOWEVER, IS LIKELY TO AFFECT IMMEDIATE SITUATION IN LEBANON. BEST HOPE IS FIRM GOL POLICY VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN, COMBINED WITH INFORMATIONAL CAMPAIGN EMPHASIZING DANGERS TO LEBANON AND HER OPEN, PLURALISTIC SOCIETY OF AN ALLIANCE WITH FEDAYEEN. WE NOTE THAT GOL HAS ALREADY HAD SOME SUCCESS IN THIS REGARD BY STRESSING SYRIAN AND SUBVERSIVE CHARACTER OF SAIQAH AND THREAT THIS POSES TO LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY. THERE MAY BE MORE THAT HELOU CAN DO THROUGH PUBLIC INFORMATIONAL MEDIA TO CONVINCCE LEBANESE OF PITFALLS IN FOLLOWING PATH INDICATED BY FEDAYEEN LEADERS.

4. ONE THOUGHT OCCURS TO US, ARISING FROM IMPRESSION THAT FEDAYEEN ISSUE IN LEBANON TODAY HAS BECOME TO GREAT EXTENT CATALYTIC AGENT FOR LEFTIST CAUSE AND VEHICLE FOR ACCUMULATED GRIEVANCES OF LEBANON'S LESS PRIVILEGED. IN YOUR NEXT TALK WITH HELOU WE WONDER IF IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FOR YOU TO EXPLORE THIS ASPECT, AND INQUIRE WHETHER STEPS IN DIRECTION OF SOCIAL AND PARLIAMENTARY REFORM MIGHT NOT AMELIORATE SITUATION SOMEWHAT. OBVIOUSLY NOTHING CONCRETE COULD BE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL GOVERNMENT FORMED BUT PUBLIC STATEMENT SIGNIFYING INTENTION TO GRAPPLE MORE ACTIVELY WITH THESE PROBLEMS MIGHT SWEETEN PIL OF STRONG ARM POLICY TOWARD FEDAYEEN. WE NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT OF 99 MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, ONLY TEN COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "MODERNISTS", WITH REMAINDER FITTING IN CATEGORY OF TRADITIONAL, OLD-LINE POLITICIANS (BEIRUT A-74). WHILE RECOGNIZING VERY REAL OBSTACLES WHICH INHIBIT CHANGE IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF LEBANON, WE THROW IDEA OUT AT THIS TIME FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH. AT MINIMUM THERE MIGHT BE PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE IN ARRANGING FOR NEW GOVERNMENT TO COME TO POWER ON A REFORM PLATFORM DESIGNED TO ATTRACT MANY OF THOSE TO WHOM FEDAYEEN ISSUE HAS GREATEST APPEAL.

GP-3. RICHARDSON

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 488

PAGE 01 STATE 070266

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INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 R

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APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH SISCO
DOD/ISA: RMURRAY (PARA 1, D)
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NEA/UAR: RBPARKER
J: RSDILLON (SUB)
S/S: MR. GLEESTEEN
NEA/ARP: WDBREWER
IO: DEPALM
S/CPR: SLKING
WH: HAL SAUNDERS

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AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T STATE 070266

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 3678 (NOTAL)

1. WE IMPRESSED BY COURAGE AND DEVISIVENESS BEING DIS-
PLAYED BY PRESIDENT HELOU AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE. HIS
DECISION TO CRACK DOWN ON FEDAYEEN, WHILE A DELICATE ONE,
IS OBVIOUSLY THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO HIM IF

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LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND MODERATION IS TO BE MAINTAINED. WE APPRECIATE NEED FOR "HAND HOLDING" AND WISH TO BE AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT COMMITTING OURSELVES TO ANY SORT OF INTERVENTION. FOLLOWING ARE OUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS WHICH YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT HELOU IN YOUR MEETING WITH HIM ON MAY 6. MEANWHILE, WE ARE GIVING URGENT ATTENTION TO WHAT ELSE WE MIGHT DO TO REASSURE HELOU OF OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON.

2. WHILE IN YOUR LAST TALK WITH HELOU YOU ALLUDED TO A NUMBER OF STEPS WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN TO SEEK TO AMELIORATE THE SITUATION, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO RECAPITULATE FOR HIS BENEFIT WHAT WE HAVE DONE. ACCORDINGLY, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO HIM THE FOLLOWING, NOTING THAT YOU ARE DOING SO UNDER INSTRUCTIONS:

A. USG SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. YOU HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE SECRETARY TO UNDERSCORE USG SUPPORT FOR THE FIRM GOL POLICY OF KEEPING FEDAYEEN IN LINE (SEPTEL). YOU MAY AGAIN INFORM HELOU THAT USG SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S INTEGRITY REMAINS UNDIMINISHED AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER MAKING PUBLIC STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD AT APPROPRIATE TIME IF DEEMED DESIRABLE. IN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN BALANCE AND TO ASSIST IN INSURING CONTINUATION OF CHRISTIAN-MOSLEM SOLIDARITY, WE ARE EXPLORING WAYS OF DEMONSTRATING TO TRADITIONAL AND MODERATE MOSLEM COMMUNITY IN LEBANON OUR SPECIAL INTEREST AND CONCERN IN LEBANON'S WELFARE. FYI. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE RECALL HELOU'S EARLIER EXPRESSION OF INTEREST THAT WE INVITE EX-PRIME MINISTER KARAME TO WASHINGTON. SINCE KARAME APPEARS TO BE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR PRIME MINISTER IN ANY NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH IS FORMED, WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP OPEN POSSIBILITY EXTENDING INVITATION TO KARAME -- IF AND WHEN HE BECOMES PRIME MINISTER AGAIN -- TO MAKE VISIT TO US. THIS DEMONSTRATION OF OUR HIGH REGARD FOR KARAME COULD CONCEIVABLY UNDERSCORE OUR BROAD SUPPORT FOR LEBANON AND HELP AVOID CREATING IMPRESSION THAT IN BACKING PRESIDENT HELOU WE ARE LIMITING OURSELVES TO CHRISTIAN SEGMENT. STRESS THAT FOREGOING FOR YOUR INFO ONLY SINCE STILL IN EXPLORATORY STAGE. END FYI.

B. EFFORTS TO CALL OFF SYRIANS. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE

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THAT EFFORTS TO CALL OFF SYRIANS WILL BE FRUITFUL. WE NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, FAILURE OF EX-PRIME MINISTER YAFI TO OBTAIN ANY SATISFACTION DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS. NEVERTHELESS AS HELOU KNOWS, WE HAVE CALLED DANGEROUS SITUATION TO ATTENTION OF SOVIETS AND HAVE SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF THEIR INTERCESSION WITH SARG. WE ARE STILL AWAITING SOVIET REPLY TO OUR REPRESENTATIONS. HELOU MIGHT BE REASSURED TO LEARN THAT OUR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THAT SOVIETS DID NOT APPROVE OF RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN LEBANON AND APPEAR TO DISFAVOR FEDAYEEN SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS. PURSUANT TO OUR REQUEST, FRENCH HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO DAMASCUS. POSSIBLE HOPEFUL DEVELOPMENT IS RECENT VISIT OF ATASSI AND ASAD TO CAIRO, WHERE THEY MAY HAVE RECEIVED CAUTIONARY ADVICE FROM NASSER.


C. REPRESENTATIONS RE FUNDING OF FEDAYEEN. IN CASE YOU HAVE NOT MENTIONED MATTER TO HELOU, YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM OF OUR RENEWED EFFORTS IN RIYADH, KUWAIT AND TRIPOLI TO INDUCE GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA TO PREVENT FURTHER FLOW OF FUNDS FROM THEIR COUNTRIES TO FEDAYEEN. WE HAVE STRESSED BASIC INCOMPATIBILITY OF INTERESTS OF THESE MODERATE GOVERNMENTS WITH ULTIMATE FEDAYEEN OBJECTIVES. WHILE WE HAVE NOT HAD MUCH LUCK AS YET, THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT SOME SOUL-SEARCHING IS NOW GOING ON IN THESE CAPITALS.

D. SELECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM HELOU CONFIDENTIALLY THAT WE ARE ENCOURAGING SAUDIS TO CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIVE TO URGENT LEBANESE ARMS NEEDS. WE HAVE IN MIND ARMS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES. RE ARMS REQUESTED OF US, YOU MAY TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE MOVING AHEAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE IN OBTAINING PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA AND THAT WE ARE ASSIGNING HIGH PRIORITY TO PROCUREMENT OF ITEMS REQUESTED.

E. POSSIBLE ROLE OF UN. AS HELOU KNOWS, WE HAVE EXAMINED INTENSIVELY POSSIBILITIES OF UN ROLE CURRENT SITUATION. YOU MIGHT SUGGEST THAT, IF HELOU WISHES PURSUE UN ROLE FURTHER, LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION CONFIDENTIALLY WITH UNSYG WITH VIEW TO GETTING U THANT'S JUDGMENT ON WAYS IN WHICH UN COULD

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BE HELPFUL, LIMITATIONS HE SEES ON UN INVOLVEMENT, ETC. (IN THIS REGARD LEBANESE MIGHT CONSIDER SENDING SPECIAL REP TO NEW YORK FOR THIS PURPOSE, SINCE WE UNDERSTAND CHAMMAS HAS JUST LEFT NEW YORK TO RETURN TO BEIRUT, AND PERMREP IS RELATIVE NEW COMER WITHOUT MUCH STATURE.) IN DISCUSSION WITH SYG, LEBANESE COULD EXPLORE INTER ALIA POSSIBILITY (A) SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BEING SENT TO LEBANON BY SYG AND (B) OBSERVER FORCE BEING ESTABLISHED, PERHAPS BY AUGMENTATION OF PRESENT UNTSO COMPLEMENT (STATE 65333, PARAS IC AND DJ). YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD OPERATE EXCLUSIVELY ON LEBANESE SIDE OF BORDER, SINCE ISRAEL WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REFUSE TO ACCEPT FORCE ON ITS SIDE. WE HOPE THAT LEBANESE WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMBASSADOR YOST IN NEW YORK IF THEY UNDERTOOK SUCH APPROACH TO SYG.

F. REPRESENTATIONS WITH ISRAEL. AS YOU HAVE TOLD HELOU, WE HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL ON TWO OCCASIONS: IN THE PAST WEEK WITH REGARD TO ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF EXERCISING RESTRAINT. WE HAVE ALSO CONVEYED HOPE THAT ISRAELIS CAN STRENGTHEN THEIR INTERDICTION CAPABILITIES ON ISRAELI SIDE OF BORDER. YOU MAY TELL HELOU THAT ISRAELIS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COVER WHOLE LENGTH OF BORDER BUT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SUGGEST THAT ISRAELIS ARE MAKING SPECIAL EFFORT TO TRY TO CLOSE OFF ROUTES OF INGRESS THROUGH ISRAELI-HELD SYRIAN TERRITORY.

3. RE WHAT MORE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO FOR HELOU, YOU MAY INFORM HIM THAT WE ARE GIVING MATTER URGENT ATTENTION AND WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM FURTHER. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE ARE PUSHING AHEAD VIGOROUSLY IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE SETTLEMENT. OBVIOUSLY, ONLY LONG-RUN ANSWER TO CURRENT LEBANESE PROBLEMS IS SUCH A SETTLEMENT. YOU MAY TELL HIM THAT OUR BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING.

4. FOR USUN: SUGGEST YOU EXPLORE IMPLICATIONS OF LEBANESE SITUATION WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH, PARTICULARLY ROLE THAT UN MIGHT PLAY. YOU MAY DRAW ON STATE 65333 FOR THIS PURPOSE.

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TELEGRAM

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DRAFTED BY: NEA: RPD AVIES

APPROVED BY: NEA: RPD AVIES

S/S: JHAWLEY

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TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NY

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EXDIS

NOFORN

REF: BEIRUT 3659

1. AT LUNCH WITH BITAN, ASST DIR GEN ISRAELI FONOFF, AND ISRAELI
MIN ARGOV, DAVIES (NEA) GAVE ASSESSMENT LEBANESE DEVELOPMENTS
AND PASSED ON CHEHAB'S REQUEST FOR INCREASED ISRAELI EFFORTS
APPREHEND POSSIBLE INFILTRATORS.

2. BITAN SAID GOI HAD RESPECT FOR CHIHAB AND FELT THAT IF HE
SUPPORTING HILU, THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE THAT FEDAYEENI COULD BE
BACKED DOWN BY LEBANESE ARMY. ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT LEBANESE
ARMY WAS NOW USING ITS FULL CAPABILITIES TO PREVENT FEDAYEENI
ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND DID NOT WANT TO MAKE DIFFICULTIES
FOR LEBANON. PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL WAS THAT IT DID NOT HAVE
THE TYPE OF MILITARY FORCES ALONG LEBANESE BORDER TO SEAL IT
OR APPREHEND INFILTRATORS MISSED BY LEBANESE. HE PROMISED TO

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RELAY SUGGESTION TO JERUSALEM.

3. ON RECEIPT REFTEL, DAVIES CONTACTED ARGOV AND PASSED GIST OF PARA 3 SAYING SOURCE COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BUT WAS CONSIDERED AUTHORITATIVE. NOTED ALSO THAT FROM TOPO MAP AREA OF ALLEGED BUILD-UP SEEMED TO OVERLOOK LIKELY INFILTRATION ROUTE FROM SYRIA TO LEBANON.

4. ARGOV UNDERTOOK TO PASS THIS INFO TO FOREIGN OFFICE. ROGERS

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: BH BAAS
APPROVED BY: NEA: JJ SISCO
NEA: RP DAVIES
NEA/ARN: TW SEELYE
NEA/IAI: AL ATHERTON
S/S: RL BROWN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

066540

SECRET STATE 068447

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 3601

1. WHILE ISRAELI STATEMENT AS ENVISAGED REFTEL MIGHT HAVE DESIRABLE EFFECT ON MUSLIM EXTREMISTS, WE FEEL THE PITFALLS WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES. FOR ONE THING, SUCH STATEMENT WOULD EXACERBATE EXISTING TENSIONS, WOULD PROVIDE GRIST FOR SOVIET AND EXTREMIST ARAB PROPAGANDA MILLS AND MIGHT CAUSE FURTHER DETERIORATION SITUATION IN LEBANON. IT MIGHT ALSO HAVE EFFECT OF MAKING LEBANESE DEFENSIVE AND CONCOMITANTLY CREATE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN. FURTHERMORE, OUR ROLE IN ENCOURAGING SUCH STATEMENT COULD EASILY BE LEAKED AND WOULD CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT IN BOTH ISRAEL AND LEBANON. FINALLY, SUCH ACTION WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR PAST URGINGS TO ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT, BOTH IN WORD AND DEED, AND MAKE LESS CREDIBLE ANY FUTURE REQUESTS WE MIGHT MAKE IN THIS REGARD.

2. THEREFORE, WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY THAT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT RPT NOT ASK ISRAELIS MAKE PROPOSED STATEMENT.

GP-3. ROGERS

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APPROVED BY: NEA: JJSISCO
NEA/ARN: MR BAAS
S/S: MR BROWN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 067131

EXDIS

REF BEIRUT 3545

1. DANGER OF CONFESSIONAL CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON WHILE REAL, MAY BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT BY VERY FACT THAT MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS THEMSELVES AWARE OF AND CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY (BEIRUT 3390).

2. RISING TIDE EMOTIONALISM AND FEAR AND CONSIDERATIONS OF RESORT TO ARMS, PRIMARILY BY CHRISTIAN GROUPS, WHILE PART OF THE PATTERN OF LEBANON IN CRISIS, IS COUNTER TREND WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE WEAKENED.

3. ROLE OF EMB IN SITUATION WHERE TRADITIONALLY THE VARIOUS CONFESSIONAL GROUPINGS SEEK TO LINE-UP EXTERNAL SUPPORT BECOMES AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS EVOLVING SITUATION. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE YOUR POSITION OF COUNSELING CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO PRESIDENT HELOU IN HIS EFFORTS TO RESOLVE POLITICAL AND FEDAYEEN DIFFICULTIES.

4. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD MEET PHALANGIST AND OTHER REQUESTS FOR ARMS BY REAFFIRMING US CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE STRUCTURE AND MATURITY OF ITS LEADERSHIP. US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON IS FIRM AND WE ARE WORKING QUIETLY THROUGH A NUMBER OF CHANNELS TO SEEK

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
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TO ALLEVIATE PRESSURES ON THE GOVT. OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH ANY PARTICULAR GROUPING WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH OUR POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVT AND, INDEED, IN OUR CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE LEADERSHIP. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS FOR ALL TO RISE ABOVE NARROW PARACHIALISM AND TO RALLY TO SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT. GP-3 ROGERS

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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON
APPROVED BY: NEA:MR SISCO
S/S-O: WWOESSNER
66643

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET STATE 044798

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 2460

- 1. APPREICATE TIMELY VIEWS REFTEL.
- 2. CONCUR IN RECOMMENDATION THAT APPROACHES TO ARAB GOVERNMENT BE DELAYED. WE WILL SEND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS HERE MONDAY. MEANWHILE ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD HOLD OFF ON MAKING APPOINTMENTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS FOR THIS EXERCISE. ROGERS

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APPROVED BY: NEA:MR SISCO
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
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EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 2460

- 1. APPRECIATE TIMELY VIEWS REFTEL.
- 2. CONCUR IN RECOMMENDATION THAT APPROACHES TO ARAB GOVERNMENT BE DELAYED. WE WILL SEND FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS HERE MONDAY. MEANWHILE ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD HOLD OFF ON MAKING APPOINTMENTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS FOR THIS EXERCISE. ROGERS

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SUMMARY

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP: BREWER
APPROVED BY NEA: HART
NEA: DAVIES
66647

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY ADEN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME

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
SUBJ: US - YEMEN RELATIONS

REF: BEIRUT 659

1. IN EVENT MUHAMMAD NUMAN AGAIN CONTACTS YOU PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE, YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM USG REMAINS INTERESTED IN ORDERLY RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YEMEN ONCE CIVIL WAR HAS BEEN LIQUIDATED. WHILE IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT REPUBLICAN MILITARY POSITION MUCH IMPROVED IN RECENT WEEKS, WE BELIEVE IT STILL PREMATURE FOR US CONSIDER MEETING FORMALLY WITH YARG REPS TO DISCUSS RESUMPTION TIES. HOWEVER, AS IN PAST WE REMAIN PREPARED MEET INFORMALLY WITH YARG REPS IN NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, OR ELSEWHERE IN ORDER EXCHANGE VIEWS AND KEEP CHANNELS COMMUNICATION OPEN.

2. FOR JIDDA: VIEW LIKELIHOOD REPUBLICAN POSITION WILL CONTINUE GRADUALLY IMPROVE, WE EXPECT RECEIVE PERIODIC YARG FEELERS SOLICITING RESUMPTION RELATIONS. WHILE WE WOULD NOT WISH FOREVER TO REBUFF SUCH YEMENI ADVANCES, WE WOULD NOT WISH UNDULY TO PROVOKE KING FAISAL. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD

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APPRECIATE YOUR KEEPING US CURRENTLY INFORMED AS TO YOUR READING SAG ATTITUDE TOWARD YARG DEVELOPMENTS. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AS TO WHETHER YOU FEEL MIGHT BE USEFUL INFORMALLY SOUND KING FAISAL OUT ON HIS READING PROBABLE EVOLUTION DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN AND WHETHER NEW SITUATION BEING CREATED WHICH WOULD SUGGEST NEW POLICIES WORTH CONSIDERING. GP-3. ROGERS

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
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TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
S/S:WBRANDT
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET STATE 002768

EXDIS

SUBJ: GOL CONCERN OVER LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER

REF: STATE 1944

1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR NAJATI KABBANI AT HIS REQUEST CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES JANUARY 7. IN GENERAL, KABBANI RAISED SAME POINTS HE RAISED WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HART PREVIOUS DAY (REFTEL).

2. KABBANI MADE REFERENCE TO ESHKOL-HELOU MESSAGE CONVEYED HIM PREVIOUS EVENING BY DEPT. KABBANI SAID HE REALIZED THAT GOL HAD RETURNED LETTER TO ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, HE REPORTED CONTENTS OF LETTER TO HIS GOVERNMENT MERELY AS INFORMATION. DAVIES NOTED THAT FACT THAT ISRAELIS DELIVERED LETTER TO LEBANESE UNDER AUSPICES ILMAC IS TACIT RECOGNITION OF ILMAC BY GOI, A POINT LEBANESE MIGHT KEEP IN MIND.

3. KABBANI SAID THAT HE HAS RECEIVED REPORTS OF INCREASED ISREALI TROOP CONCENTRATION ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER DURING PAST 24 HOURS. HE WONDERED RHETORICALLY IF THERE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN TROOP BUILDUP AND ESHKOL LETTER. HE WENT ON TO SAY

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
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
THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HIMSELF HAD PHONED FUAD BOUTROS MORNING JANUARY 7 AND ASKED THAT BOUTROS CONVEY TO THE SECRETARY HELOU'S PERSONAL CONCERN OVER THE ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. DAVIES ASSURED KABBANI HELOU'S PERSONAL CONCERN WOULD BE CONVEYED TO SECRETARY.

4. DAVIES TOLD KABBANI THAT WHILE WE FULLY SYMPATHETIC WITH LEBANESE APPREHENSIONS, WE BELIEVE ISREAL'S PRIMARY CONCERN AT THIS TIME IS WITH FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. WE NOTE THAT THERE IS CONCENTRATION OF FEDAYEEN AT MT. HERMON AND THE ISRAELIS ALSO ARE AWARE OF THIS. WE WERE STARTLED TO LEARN FROM GENERAL BOUSTANY THAT LEBANESE LIAISON OFFICERS ARE ATTACHED TO FEDAYEEN UNITS. BOUSTANY SAID THIS IS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN BUT TO ISRAELIS IT WILL APPEAR TO BE GOL COMPLICITY. IF TROUBLE IS TO BE AVOIDED ON BORDER GOL MUST FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITY UNDER GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN AND PREVENTING ATTACKS FROM ITS TERRITORY ON ISRAEL. KABBANI POINTED OUT IT VERY DIFFICULT GOL CRACK DOWN ON FEDAYEEN AT THIS TIME AND REITERATED HOPE ISRAELIS WOULD PRACTICE RESTRAINT AT THIS CRITICAL PERIOD.

5. DAVIES ASSURED KABBANI WE HAVE NO INDICATION ISRAELIS PLANNING ATTACK ON LEBANON AND THAT WE HAVE MADE OUR CONCERN OVER LEBANON'S WELL BEING ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO GOI. WITH REGARD ISREALI TERRITORIAL AMBITION, ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD US OFFICIALLY THAT THEY SATISFIED WITH EXISTING BORDER. THUS, WE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE THEY WISH SEIZE LEBANESE TERRITORY PARTICULARLY IN VIEW WORLD OPINION FOLLOWING KHALDEH AIRPORT RAID. IN CONCLUSION DAVIES TOLD KABBANI OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON HAS BEEN AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IN PAST AND WE WISH SEE LEBANON REMAIN STABLE. GP-3. RUSK

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 004211

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APPROVED BY: NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES
S/S - MR. BROWN
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S E C R E T STATE 004211

EXDIS

SUBJ: LEBANESE VIEWS RE ILMAC AND ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER PROBLEMS

REF: STATE 2017

1. DURING CALL ON DEPARTMENT OFFICER JANUARY 9 LEBANESE AMBASSADOR KABBANI REPORTED RECEIPT OF MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVERNMENT INDICATING THAT REFUSAL OF LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVE ON ILMAC TO ACCEPT ISRAELI MESSAGE ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE. GOL AUTHORITIES FELT THAT POLITICAL CHARACTER OF MESSAGE MADE ILMAC UNSUITABLE VEHICLE FOR ITS TRANSMISSION. NEVERTHELESS, AMBASSADOR SAID THAT GOL APPRECIATED FACT THAT DEPARTMENT HAD AGREED PASS MESSAGE AND ALSO THAT WE HAD DONE SO ORALLY RATHER THAN FORMALIZING EXCHANGE BY TRANSMITTING TEXT OF MESSAGE.

2. KABBANI STATED FURTHER THAT GOL HAD IMPRESSION THAT MESSAGE CONTAINED UNDERCURRENT OF THREAT. THIS DISTURBED GOL, WHICH BELIEVED THAT THREATS WERE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND THAT HOPE


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FOR PEACEFUL BORDER LAY IN COMBINATION OF GOL EFFORTS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN, ISRAELI RESTRAINT AND ISRAELI RECOURSE TO ILMAC MACHINERY.

3. DEPT OFFICER EXPRESSED REGRET THAT GOL HAD NOT SEEN FIT USE ILMAC AS AVENUE FOR RECEIVING MESSAGE SINCE FACT GOI SOUGHT USE ILMAC THIS PURPOSE POSITIVE SIGN. LATTER SEEMED TO SUGGEST GOI INCLINATION ACCORD ILMAC INSTRUMENTALITY MORE LEGITIMACY AND GOL WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL ADVISED CAPITALIZE ON THIS DEVELOPMENT.

4. AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBILITY ISRAELIS MIGHT ATTACK LEBANON WITH VIEW SEIZING LEBANESE TERRITORY. DEPARTMENT OFFICER REPLIED THAT WE HAD MADE STRONG CASE TO ISRAELIS BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV THAT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DOING ITS UTMOST CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND THAT GOL SHOULD NOT BE HELD CULPABLE EVERY TIME FEDAYEEN SLIPPED BY LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES ALONG BORDER. PROMPTNESS AND VIGOR OF OUR CENSURE OF ISRAELI ATTACK ON KHALDEH AIRPORT, TOGETHER WITH OUR FOLLOW-UP REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAELIS, HAVE, WE BELIEVE, IMPRESSED ON ISRAELIS STRENGTH OF USG OPPOSITION TO FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON. AS TO PROSPECT SUCH ATTACK, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT ISRAELIS INTEND TO BE RESTRAINED. AT SAME TIME, ISRAELIS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT FURTHER FEDAYEEN ATTACKS WOULD CREATE NEW SITUATION. DEPT OFFICER EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT WHILE SOME FORM OF ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST FUTURE FEDAYEEN ATTACKS COULD BE EXPECTED, UNLIKELY THAT ISRAEL WILL MAKE MILITARY FORAY INTO LEBANON.

5. DEPT OFFICER MENTIONED WE EXPLORING WAYS AND MEANS OF INVIGORATING ILMAC MACHINERY ALONG ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER. REFERRING TO MINISTER RAYMOND EDDE'S SUGGESTION RE ESTABLISHMENT UNEF ALONG BORDER, DEPARTMENT OFFICER WONDERED WHETHER LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT UNEF FORCE ON LEBANESE SIDE ONLY VIEW ADAMANT GOI OPPOSITION STATIONING SUCH FORCE ON ISRAELI TERRITORY. AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED VIEW THAT NEW LEBANESE CABINET MIGHT CONSIDER EDDE'S UNEF PROPOSAL, WHICH HE STRESSED ENVISAGES STATIONING FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER. WHEN DEPT OFFICER NOTED THAT UNEF FORCE IN GAZA LOCATED ONLY ON UAR TERRITORY, AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED PRECEDENT BUT HESITATED TO PREDICT GOL REACTION TO ONE-SIDED DEPLOYMENT.

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A-55

SECRET/NODIS

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
 INFO : Amembassy TEHRAN

COPY NO. 9 SERIES B

FROM : American Embassy, BEIRUT DATE: January 28, 1970
 SUBJECT : GOL Request for Assistance in South Lebanon

REF :

NODIS

Michel Khoury informs me that President Helou and the Lebanese security forces have developed a strategy to try to increase the estrangement that is beginning to take place between the Lebanese residents of the South and the Fedayeen.

We have been aware for sometime there has been a cooling off in the attitude of the Lebanese public vis-a-vis the Fedayeen, now including Lebanese Muslims as well as Christians. This stems largely from the excesses of the Fedayeen and the armed refugees. Villagers in the South however (predominantly Shia Muslim, but with a substantial sprinkling of Christians) have been generally disenchanted with their Government and have in the past year tended to respond emotionally and favorably to the Fedayeen cause. Now, however, with the fear of Israeli reprisal and a new understanding that the Fedayeen cannot protect the Lebanese in the South, the villagers are beginning to become disenchanted.

The Fedayeen have become a magnet drawing Israeli retaliation rather than the staunch defenders which they claimed to be. Also, Fedayeen have shown a noticeable lack of courage under Israeli fire which has also offended the border villagers.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Prepared by: AMB:DJPorter:ks 1/28/70

Contents and Classification Approved by:

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NLN 09-11/12 per sec 3.3(b)(1), HY. 2/19/2010

By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010

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Page 2
Beirut's A-55
January 28, 1970

The Lebanese, according to Khoury, are quietly trying to build up friction between the Shia villagers and the Fedayeen - not to the point of open hostilities, but at least to the point where the villagers will not cooperate with the Fedayeen. The Lebanese Army is spearheading this project and will begin providing some arms to those villages which appear to have the best will to resist the Fedayeen. The GOL, of course, also realizes it must provide other assistance to the villagers in the social and economic fields in order to regain their loyalty to Lebanon. This takes money, which the hard-pressed GOL is trying to find.

Khoury urged that the USG participate in some way, assisting the GOL in a clandestine manner. He would hope we could channel funds through religious or other institutions or directly to the Lebanese military to help out.

My answer was non-committal. I inquired whether the Lebanese had been able to get assistance from other Arab states. He said there was not any hope of such assistance. Lebanon had hoped that Iran, which has had a special relationship with the Shia population of Lebanon, could assist. But there was no way at this point to establish the direct contact with the Iranian government, in view of the diplomatic break and the general deterioration in relationships. Khoury hoped that the USG might intercede to get the Shah to provide financial and other support, not to the GOL but direct to the Shia community.

I said it was my frank view that, in view of the Shah's animosity toward Lebanon as well as his recent difficulties with Iraq, it would be extremely difficult to secure any significant aid from that quarter. Khoury reiterated that he was not suggesting the Shah deal directly with the GOL but rather directly with the Shia populace, perhaps through Moussa Sadr, religious leader of the Lebanese Shia. He thought Sadr would use financial aid effectively and honestly for the benefit of the Shia population. With such financial support, together with the measures the GOL planned to take,

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Page 3
Beirut's A-55
January 28, 1970

the Shia would in turn feel emboldened to stand off the Fedayeen. I promised nothing.

COMMENT: Department's and Embassy Tehran's comments, if any, would be appreciated. I think GOL is on the right track, and wish USG had the capacity to help. If we did, however, there is no mechanism we could use

As
for Iranian aid, it would seem to be a non-starter, if for no other reason than the ineffectiveness of the Iranian services.

PORTER



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WHITE HOUSE
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NODIS

DEPT PASS INFO PARIS

REF: STATE 14564, PARIS 1082

1) LEBANESE REQUEST TO GOF FOR ARMS PROBABLY MADE DIRECTLY BY EX-PRES. FUAD CHEHAB, USING HIS PRIVATE CHANNELS TO GOF, ALTHOUGH REQUEST WOULD CERTAINLY RECEIVE BLESSING OF HELOU. WE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED REPORT THAT GOL CONSIDERING PURCHASE UNKNOWN NUMBER AMX TANKS AND SS-11 ANTI-TANK MISSILES. TERMS REPORTEDLY TEN YEARS AT 3.5 PERCENT.

2) AS REPORTED PREVIOUSLY GOL UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO CONSIDER ARMS PROCUREMENT FROM SOVS AND EAST EUROPE, AND ARE AWARE THAT THEY CAN OFTEN GET A BETTER PRICE. BUT GOL AND LEBANESE MILITARY WISH AVOID PROCUREMENT FROM COMMUNIST SOURCES, PREFERRING MAINTAIN TRADITIONAL WESTERN SOURCES -- IN PAST PRIMARILY FRANCE AND US. AT MOMENT FRANCE CLEARLY POLITICALLY MORE ACCEPTABLE IN ARAB WORLD AS SUPPLIER THAN IS USG. HELOU DURING RECENT TALK WITH CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS POINTED OUT APOLOGETICALLY INTERNAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY LEBANESE DESIRE PROCURE WEAPONS FROM USG.

3) LEBANESE TREASURY IS UNABLE FUND SUBSTANTIAL NEW ARMS PROCUREMENT. IT QUITE CLEAR LEBANESE HAVE BEEN HOPING SECURE MORE FAVORABLE PRICES AND TERMS (OR EVEN GRANTS) FROM ANY WESTERN SOURCE, AND THEY HAVE, AND WILL UNDERSTANDABLY CONTINUE TO, SHOP AROUND. IN PAST THEY HAVE RECEIVED GIFTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM US IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND THEY STILL INDULGE IN WISHFUL THINKING THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER USG WILL RESPOND AGAIN IN SAME FASHION. AS PARIS POINTS OUT THEY ALSO HOPEFUL THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR NEEDS WILL BE PROVIDED GRATIS BY FRANCE.

4) NEED FOR PROCUREMENT ADDITIONAL ARMS IS CERTAINLY REAL. LEBANESE PLAN TO ARM SOME OF THE BORDER VILLAGERS, PERHAPS CREATING AN ORGANIZED MILITIA WHICH WOULD SERVE AS AUXILIARY FORCE. THIS MUST BE GARDE NATIONALE MENTIONED PARIS TEL. HOPE IS TO CREATE INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO FEDAYEEN IN BORDER AREAS. NEED FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPON ALSO VERY URGENT IN VIEW OF CONTINUOUS THREAT OF ISRAELI AIR ATTACK.

5) COMMENT: I WOULD OF COURSE PREFER TO SHOW OPEN USG SUPPORT

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-2- BEIRUT 862, JANUARY 30 (NODIS)

FOR LEBANON BY PROVIDING DEFENSIVE WEAPONS TO LEBANESE ARMY. HOWEVER, MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IS TO GET GOOD ARMS FROM ANY SOURCE QUICKLY INTO HANDS OF LEBANESE, TO IMPROVE CAPABILITY EFFECTIVELY TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND DISSIDENT REFUGEES. THIS FIFTH COLUMN IS MAIN THREAT AT MOMENT TO INTEGRITY OF LEBANESE STATE. LEBANESE MILITARY WILL NEVER HAVE CAPACITY EFFECTIVELY TO RESIST MAJOR ISRAELI ATTACK IF IT COMES, AND GOL HAS NO INTENTION OF WASTING ITS LIMITED RESOURCES TO EFFECT A FUTILE BUILD-UP OF THE ARMY FOR THIS PURPOSE. ON OTHER HAND, GOL MUST MAKE A PUBLIC GESTURE OF SEEMING TO PROVIDE A MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST ISRAELI AIR AND GROUND RAIDS IN SOUTH LEBANON, FOR SAKE OF ARMY AND PUBLIC MORALE.

6) IF FRANCE CAN PROVIDE ARMS TO LEBANON ON FAVORABLE TERMS AND GET THEM HERE QUICKLY, I SEE NO BASIS FOR US OBJECTION, EVEN THOUGH I WOULD REGRET LOSING LEVERAGE AND INFLUENCE WHICH DERIVES FROM OUR POSITION AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF LEBANESE ARMY PROCUREMENT. I WOULD THINK, GIVEN NATURE OF THE ARMAMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED, THAT MATTER COULD BE HANDLED WITHOUT PUBLICITY OF THE SORT ATTENDANT ON THE MIRAGE SALE TO LIBYA.

7) IDEALLY, US INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED IF BOTH WE AND FRENCH (AND POSSIBLY OTHER WESTERN POWERS, SUCH AS ITALY) WERE INVOLVED IN SUPPLYING LEBANESE NEEDS. THIS WOULD SERVE BUTTRESS CONCEPT OF BROAD WESTERN POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. NATURE OF DEFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WE ASSUME LEBANESE WILL BE BUYING SHOULD CAUSE NO ALTERATION IN ARMS BALANCE IN ME. ALSO, MAGNITUDE OF PROCUREMENT SHOULD BE MODEST, LIMITED ABOVE ALL BY LEBANESE ABILITY TO PAY. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF FRENCH COULD, BY OFFERING FAVORABLE PRICES AND TERMS, FOR ONCE DO SOMETHING TANGIBLE FOR THIS COUNTRY, FOR WHICH THEY PROFESS SO MUCH AFFECTION. IN MY FIVE YEARS HERE, THEIR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN LARGELY DIRECTED TO MILKING THE PLACE DRY.

PORTER

BT

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TELEGRAM

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LEBANON

5544Q

P 291740Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 218.
BT
SECRET PARIS 1082

JAN 29, 1970 1:20 PM

NODIS

SUBJECT: FRENCH ARMS TO LEBANON

1. DIRECTOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS DE LEUSSE ASKED ME TO CALL JAN 28 AND INFORMED ME THAT GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON ON JAN 20 MADE NEW REQUEST FOR ARMS NOT ONLY FOR LEBANESE ARMY BUT FOR ITS GARDE NATIONALE WHICH IS BEING USED TO HELP CONTROL FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON. ARMS FOR GARDE NATIONALE INCLUDE MACHINE GUNS, MACHINE PISTOLS, AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES. ARMS FOR ARMY INCLUDE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, 20 MM, 30 MM, AND 40 MM GUNS, 12.7 AUTOMATIC RIFLES, AND ANTI-TANK GUNS "LRAC." LEBANESE INDICATED THEY WOULD PREFER NOT TO PAY FOR THESE ARMS, WHICH POSES PROBLEM FOR GOF. DELEUSSE SAID FOREGOING REQUEST PRESENTS GOF WITH COMPLICATED DECISION. ON ONE HAND, FRANCE MUST REPLY TO LEBANESE AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO TURN THEM DOWN GIVEN FRANCE'S ROLE AS QUASI DEFENDER OF LEBANON. ON OTHER HAND, FRENCH DO NOT WANT THROUGH ARMS SALES TO ESCALATE WAR IN MIDDLE EAST (SIC).
2. I ASKED ABOUT AMOUNTS INVOLVED. DELEUSSE SAID NUMBERS OF GUNS REQUESTED WERE RELATIVELY SMALL. I COMMENTED THAT THIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE A TRANSACTION OF LIBYAN DIMENSIONS WITH SAME POSSIBLE UNSETTLING EFFECT, BUT, OF COURSE, WOULD HAVE TO BE CLOSELY CONSIDERED. FURTHERMORE, DELEUSSE SAID, FRENCH DO NOT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON.
3. DELEUSSE SAID OUTSIDE OF POMPIDOU, DEBRE AND SCHUMANN, ONLY THREE PEOPLE IN FOREIGN OFFICE KNOW OF THIS REQUEST. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT POMPIDOU ANXIOUS TO COORDINATE FRENCH ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST VERY CLOSELY WITH US AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW: (A) WHETHER WE HAVE HAD SIMILAR REQUESTS FROM GOL FOR ARMS AND (B) WHAT ARE OUR VIEWS ABOUT FRENCH MAKING THESE ARMS AVAILABLE.
4. I SAID TO MAKE JUDGEMENT WE MIGHT NEED MORE INFORMATION. DELEUSSE TOOK POINT AND SAID THAT IF WASHINGTON WISHED, HE WOULD TRY TO GET MORE INFORMATION BUT HE REITERATED THAT NUMBERS OF WEAPONS WERE SMALL. DELEUSSE REQUESTED ONLY SMALLEST

SECRET

-2- PARIS 1082

29 January 1970

NODIS

NUMBER AMERICAN OFFICIALS BE INFORMED LEBANESE REQUEST. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION NOT RPT NOT BE DISCUSS WITH FRENCH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND PARTICULARLY NOT WITH FRENCH EMBASSY IN BEIRUT, WHICH WAS NOT CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THIS REQUEST RECEIVED.

5. COMMENT: ASIDE FROM FACT THAT GOF HAS PREVIOUSLY COORDINATED AND DISCUSSED WITH USG LEBANESE ARMS PROBLEM, I THINK THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF GUILT REPRESENTED HERE OVER FRENCH FAILURE TO DISCUSS LIBYAN ARMS DEAL AS FRANKLY AND IN AS TIMELY A FASHION AS WOULD HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE. THERE MAY ALSO BE AN ELEMENT OF WANTING TO BE ABLE TO SAY, IF SALE MADE, THAT USG HAD BEEN CONSULTED. PLEASE INSTRUCT.

BLAKE

BT

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Department of State

WS 9
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

DEPT PASS TEHRAN INFO ROUTINE

5 0 2 9 Q
1969 DEC 29 AM 9 13

R 291039Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9352
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 10447

NODIS

SUBJ: IRAQ -- COUP D'ETAT PLANS

REF: STATE 204979

EMBASSY APPRECIATES GUIDANCE FOR USE IN REPLYING TO SAAD JABR. JABR DID NOT RPT NOT CONTACT EMBASSY DEC 12 AS HE HAD PLANNED, AND WE HAVE HAD NO WORD FROM HIM SINCE. IF HE RETURNS BEIRUT, WE WILL CONVEY SUBSTANCE PARA 3 REFTEL TO HIM.

PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED TEHRAN BY OC/T

DEC 29 1 30 PM '69
M2C
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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

By AM NARA, Date 11/15/2010



Department of State

W H #10
TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 111504Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9275
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 10151

CONTROL: 2 3 8 8 Q

DECEMBER 11, 1969

2:10 P.M.

NODIS

REF: STATE 205505

1) I APPRECIATE EFFORTS OF PENTAGON AND DEPT IN MAKING M-14'S AVAILABLE. IF APPOINTMENT CAN BE ARRANGED DURING LOCAL HOLIDAY, WE WILL PRESENT M-14 AND HELICOPTER PROPOSAL TO LEBANESE ARMY TOMORROW (DEC 12), AND I WILL ALSO MENTION TO PRES HELOU.

2) I HOPE I AM WRONG, BUT I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT OUR OFFERS WILL BE ACCEPTED. FROM LEBANESE POINT OF VIEW THERE IS OF COURSE NO ELEMENT OF AID OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN US PROPOSAL. WHILE I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM USG HAD IN FREEING UP M-14 RIFLES FOR DELIVERY TO LEBANON, LEBANESE OF COURSE WILL BE LOOKING AT THE PRICE AND TERMS. THEY ALREADY HAVE OFFERS FOR NEW KALASHNIKOV'S FROM THE CZECHS AT \$90 UNIT PRICE. I AM NOT SURE THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER M-14'S SUFFICIENTLY SUPERIOR WEAPON TO WARRANT THE PRICE DIFFERENTIAL.

3) LEBANESE WERE LOOKING FOR A TANGIBLE GESTURE OF AID AND SUPPORT FROM THE US. WHAT WE ARE OFFERING IS A STRAIGHT SALE AT GOING PRICES. OUR OFFER GIVES NO POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL ADVANTAGE TO LEBANON (PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ARE NOT YET ABLE TO OFFER CREDIT). NEITHER DOES THE US GET ANY POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OUT OF THIS PROPOSED SALE. LEBANESE, WHO ARE FACING SERIOUS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND HAVE NO SUBSIDIES FROM OTHER ARAB STATES, WILL UNDERSTANDABLY MAKE COMPARISON BETWEEN US 'BUSINESS-AS-USUAL' APPROACH AND THE LENIENT TERMS WHICH SOVS HAVE ARRANGED IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO OTHER ARAB STATES.

4) THE FACT IS OF COURSE THAT LEBANESE HAVE EXPECTED THAT US WOULD BE GENEROUS IN ITS ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTING THE LEBANESE MILITARY IN THIS CURRENT CRISIS. THEY WILL BE DISAPPOINTED WHEN THEY LEARN NATURE OF OUR OFFER, AND WILL READ INTO IT ANOTHER INDICATION THAT US INTEREST IN LEBANON'S SECURITY IS NOT A FIRM ASSET WHICH MIGHT SUSTAIN THEM IN RESISTING THE INEVITABLE PRESSURES ON THEM IN THE UPCOMING RABAT SUMMIT.

PORTER

SECRET



SECRET
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

204979

10

Wif

10 DEC 69 16 15z

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

INFO: Amembassy TEHRAN

STATE

SUBJECT: Iraq - Coup d'Etat Plans

REF: BEIRUT 10069

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ NODIS NODIS

1. Department notes contradiction between Saab Jabr's expression of need for assurances from USG and reports from intelligence sources that he has already assured his fellow conspirators that he has USG backing. Jabr's assertion in paragraph 3 reftel that he would advise his group abandon effort overthrow regime lacks credibility inasmuch as this group's coup plans were never dependent on expression of support from USG. It apparent that cohesion among conspirators has broken down, and it also apparent that group's cooperation with Iranian Government and with Kurds leaves much to be desired. Jabr gives impression of desperately casting about to gain support to put coup d'etat back on track.

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BHbaas:dmg	DRAFTING DATE 12/9/69	TEL. EXT. 20695	APPROVED BY: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
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CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye	NEA - Mr. Davies
INR/DDC - Mr. Gardner	S/S - Mr. XXXXX Eliot

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By AM NARA Date 11/15/2010



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- 2 -

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

FYI. Jabr intimated to Department Officer in September 1969 that he expects be Foreign Minister if new government formed. END FYI.

2. In any event, Jabr has already been informed in Washington that any new moderate government in Baghdad could expect the same consideration that USG would show to any other friendly government. Jabr was also informed, as example, of routine, non-political economic assistance available, such as Commodity Credit Corporation and Export-Import Bank credits. He was given no assurances in this respect but merely reminded of existence such programs and of possible availability upon application after new government formed.

3. Upon Jabr's return to Beirut December 12, Embassy Officer McAndrew may reply to his specific questions

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-3-

INDICATE:

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

as follows:

(a) We would assume that if a change of government were to take place in Baghdad, IPC would disburse quarterly payment check to appropriate, new beneficiary. In the meantime, Department does not propose suggest IPC make payment to anyone other than existing Iraqi Government, since IPC has contractual obligation make payment to Government. FYI. We have already received threat to pipeline directly from Barzani headquarters. Pipeline extremely vulnerable and there little preventive action that can be taken should Kurds find it in their interest to stop oil flow. END FYI.

(b) We cannot consider provision of emergency supplies to coup plotters, nor can we make advance commitment. As Jabr knows, we have had relief programs

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-4-

INDICATE:

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

in Iraq in past, but until new government formed and until new circumstances assessed, it premature consider such program.

(c) Department unable provide Jabr with names of individuals with whom his group might cooperate in staging coup d'etat or with whom they might deal after successful coup. We assume Jabr's group has capability of obtaining and evaluating such information.

(d) In summary, USG unable to become involved in plotting against current Iraqi regime nor in making advance commitments. Should new government prove to be moderate and friendly, however, we would be prepared to consider prompt resumption of diplomatic relations and would certainly be disposed to cooperate within the limits of existing legislation and our overall policy.

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-5-

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

In this connection, you may wish to review types of limited economic assistance which might be made available (see para 2 above).

GP-3

END

ROGERS

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MN 09-11/14 P 50F5



Department of State

WH
TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 091753Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1868Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9268 1969 DEC 9 PM 2:12
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 10122

NODIS

FOR DAVIES (NEA)

AM SEEING PRES HELOU AFTERNOON FRIDAY, DEC 12. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING LATEST FACTS ON OUR AID AND ARMS PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION WITH HIM. INCLUDE INFO ON MAGNITUDE AND TERMS OF MILITARY SALES CREDITS. I HOPE GET HELOU'S APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE OF BOTH PACKAGES, SO WE CAN CREATE MOMENTUM FOR SOME DECISIVE ACTION ON PART GOL.

PORTER

BT



Department of State
SECRET

13
TELEGRAM

W/H

1703Q
12-8-69
12:31AM

R 081535Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9127
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5809

NODIS

REF: STATE 203702

ASSUME FROM PARA ONE REFTEL SEELYE WILL VISIT AMMAN AND OF COURSE WILL WELCOME OPPORTUNITY DISCUSSION OF CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH HIM. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED DETAILS OF HIS ITINERARY. SINCE I WILL BE ON LONG-PLANNED FIELD TRIP DEC 11 THROUGH 14, I HOPE SEELYE'S ITINERARY WILL NOT PUT HIM IN AMMAN BEFORE 14TH. O'DELL HOPES SEELYE WILL STAY WITH HIM.

SYMMES

BT

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194183

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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35-B

19 Nov 69 00 43z

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

7

STATE 194183

SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking

REF: BEIRUT 9501

N O D I S

1. For some time Israeli Government has been discussing with ICRC possibility of exchange of personnel to secure release two Israeli passengers detained Damascus. UARG in late October or early November proposed three-cornered scheme through ICRC, which GOI accepted. Under this scheme UARG would release two Israeli pilots. Israel would release to UAR one UAR pilot, 17 Egyptian POWs from 1967 war, crews of two fishing vessels captured in Israeli waters, 11 Egyptian civilians kidnapped in recent raids and the two Syrian pilots held by Israel. Condition sine qua non would be release two Israeli

1

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg	DRAFTING DATE 11/18/69	TEL. EXT. 20695	APPROVED BY: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
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CLEARANCES:
 NEA/ARN - Mr. Seal *(initials)*
 NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton *(initials)*
 S/S - Mr. Brown *(initials)*

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-2-

INDICATE:

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

passengers held Damascus. Presumably TWA passengers would be released first, and swap between Israel and UAR would take place about 40 hours later. This permits both Syrians and Israelis face saving way out of dilemma.

2. ICRC aware of impending departure TWA aircraft from Damascus and, we understand, has called SARG attention to this as opportunity release two Israeli passengers with minimum fanfare. We not aware SARG reaction.

3. TWA not rpt not aware proposed exchange of personnel, but TWA deeply worried about repercussions if aircraft departs without passengers and will not permit aircraft depart without first consulting with Department. While Syrian intentions as yet unclear, we are informed that UAR has indicated it prepared make proposed exchange of personnel at Qantara. Israelis have agreed.

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

4. Foregoing extremely delicate and should be held very closely.

5. Regarding proposal contained Beirut 9501, we do not believe granting license for export transceivers should be tied to release Israeli passengers. We planning review licensing situation but do not feel it appropriate do so at this time, in view SARG's intransigent position on passengers.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

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DRAFTING DATE

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APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

Message recalled
by State.

They use Back-
Channel also.

JF.

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198158

Department of State
TELEGRAM

14 W H
100 0058
26 Dec 69 J. 50z

INDICATE:
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 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

7

STATE

SUBJECT: Internal Security Assistance for Lebanon

REF: STATE 197340, BEIRUT 9630

N O D I S

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT

1. As indicated to you in message transmitted through special channel earlier this month, we wish know whether lately GOL has approached or whether GOL is contemplating approaching any other governments, particularly Italian, for assistance in equipping and training its military and internal security forces. We recalled in this message that Italians had reportedly procured some internal security assistance in past. We also recollect that several months ago French were considering supplying Lebanese Army with light military equipment.

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg

DRAFTING DATE

11/25/69

TEL. EXT.

20695

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye

NEA/RA - Col. Bunte

S/S - Mr. Brown



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-2-

INDICATE:

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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

7

2. If GOL not actively pursuing these avenues, would appreciate your evaluation of GOL receptivity to our suggesting at some point/^{that}they do so in connection with certain items which we may have difficulty in supplying. For example, French might be better source for anti-aircraft weapons, which are hard to obtain here.
3. Another consideration is that supply of part of equipment from other Western sources would make GOL less vulnerable to charge of over-identification with U.S. as exclusive source.
4. Regarding paragraph one Beirut 9630 we awaiting DATT's list of equipment requirements in order obtain price and availability date.

GP-3

END

[ROGERS]

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4-68

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Department of State

W H
TELEGRAM

SECRET

12

DEPT PASS INFO ROUTINE TO AMMAN JIDDA LONDON PARIS MOSCOW TEL
AVIV USUN

O 311238Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8952
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9054

Control: 7241Q
Recd : 31 Oct 69
7:47 a.m.

NODIS

REF: STATE 182922, BEIRUT 9041 (NOTAL); STATE 183682 (NOTAL)

1. AFTER ROCKEFELLER MEETING WITH PRES HELOU I STAYED ON WITH PRES FOR PRIVATE TALK AND PASSED TO HIM SUBSTANCE PARA 5 STATE 182922. HELOU THANKED ME FOR INFORMATION BUT NATURE HIS RESPONSE MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP HIM IN HIS CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.
2. FEDAYEEN, HE SAID, WILL CONTINUE ATTACK LEBANON UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. INDEED PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WHICH THEY OPPOSE, MAY CAUSE THEM TO REACT MORE SHARPLY. NONETHELESS HELOU OBVIOUSLY GRATEFUL FOR ANY SIGN US REEMERGENCE AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANT ME PROBLEM.
3. HELOU'S ATTITUDE, WHICH HAD BEEN REASONABLY CHEERFUL AND RATIONAL WITH ROCKEFELLER, CHANGED TO ONE OF ALMOST UNMITIGATED GLOOM DURING OUR MEETING. HE SAID HE WAS CONSIDERING ANOTHER PUBLIC APPEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD ASK LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CLOSE RANKS AND RESIST INSURRECTION WHICH WAS BEING IMPOSED ON COUNTRY. HE THOUGHT SITUATION SO URGENT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS TO HAVE EFFECT. HE REALIZED DECLARATION COULD CAUSE INTERNAL EXPLOSION BUT THOUGHT IT ALSO HAD GOOD CHANCE OF RALLYING LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CONTINUE RESIST THE MILITARY AND PROPAGANDA PRESSURES NOW IMPOSED ON THEM. I RESPONDED THAT I WONDERED WHETHER MATTER INDEED REQUIRED SUCH URGENT ACTION. HE ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TAKE SUCH ACTION.
4. HE REPEATED THEME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS ONLY REAL FRIEND WAS US. HE EQUALLY UNDERSTOOD LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON HIM AND ON US IN USING THAT FRIENDSHIP. AS HE HAD SAID TO ROCKEFELLER, HE DID NOT EXPECT US MILITARY INTERVENTION. HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED NONETHELESS TO READ LE MONDE REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO US OFFICIAL SOURCES IN UN THAT US HAD NO INTENTION INTERVENING IN LEBANON. I RESPONDED I WAS CERTAIN THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE REPORT AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SAID BY ANY RESPONSIBLE US OFFICIAL. MORE LIKELY IT WAS CLEVER STORY BY REPORTER WHO WAS INTERPRETING US PUBLIC OPINION (AS HAD HELOU HIMSELF) AS BEING OPPOSED MILITARY INTERVENTION ALMOST ANYWHERE.

SECRET

SECRET

-2- Beirut 9054, 31 October 1969

Control: 7241Q

5. HELOU THEN INQUIRED WHAT WOULD BE US POLICY IN TERMS POSSIBLE MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY IN LEBANON. I SAID THERE WAS NO YES OR NO ANSWER TO SUCH A QUESTION. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN IMPORTANT DECISION COULD NOT BE MADE IN ADVANCE AND WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. I ASKED HELOU IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE WE COULD DO AT THIS TIME TO HELP HIM. HE SAID IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON RADICAL ARAB STATES - ABOVE ALL SYRIA - AND HAD WE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH SOVS? I SAID WE HAD AND SOVS HAD INDICATED THEY WISHED RESTRAIN SITUATION AND WERE DISCUSSING MATTER WITH DAMASCUS. HE SAID SOV AMB HAD TOLD HIM SAME THING BUT HE COULD SEE NO RESULTS. IT WAS URGENT THAT SOVS APPLY MORE PRESSURE IN A HURRY. THE SAME HELD FOR ANY OTHER WESTERN STATES THAT COULD HAVE ANY INFLUENCE IN RADICAL ARAB CAPITALS. THE FRENCH, HE ADMITTED, WOULD NOT DO MUCH. THEY WERE TOO INTRIGUED WITH THEIR NEW BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN ARAB WORLD.

7. IN CONTEXT MY PROGRESS REPORT ON SISCO-DOBRYNIN TALKS, HELOU WONDERED WHETHER, IN VIEW PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD NOT BE MOVED TO ANOTHER LEVEL, I.E., US-SOV CONCERTATION TO PRESERVE THE LEBANESE STATE. HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS ANY FURTHER.

8. I ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP THE ARMY IN ANY WAY. HE FIRST RESPONDED THAT THEY MIGHT NEED ARMAMENTS, BUT THEN REVERSED HIMSELF AND SAID THERE WAS NOTHING WE COULD DO AT MOMENT. ECONOMIC AID WOULD BE NEEDED LATER, HE SAID, BUT THERE WAS NO POINT DISCUSSING THIS NOW.

PORTER

BT

Note: Not relayed Amman, Jidda, London, Paris, Moscow, Tel Aviv or USUN by OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

Lebanon
181399

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INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

25 OCT 69 21 48z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

STATE 181399

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 8893

Sixth Fleet

1. We are watching/~~xxxxxxx~~ dispositions closely but in absence ~~xxxx~~ compelling circumstances are reluctant to alter schedules since this would become known and have adverse repercussions, as you recognize. Your Naval Attache can obtain details on fleet disposition.
2. We would be prepared to support any Lebanese requests to the UN should in fact Syrian intrusion take place.

ROGERS

END

DRAFTED BY

NEA:RPDavies:las

DRAFTING DATE

10/25/69

TEL. EXT.

20324

APPROVED BY:

NEA:RPDavies

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN:TWSeelye

S/S - WLloyd



Department of State

Lebanon
TELEGRAM

SECRET

7

O 251555Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8885
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8893

Control: 5941Q
Recd : 25 Oct 69
1:14 p.m.

NODIS

1. I WOULD LIKE TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF SIXTH FLEET DISPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES IN EVENT IT IS NEEDED PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES IN LEBANON. THIS IS ONLY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. I AM NOT SUGGESTING SIXTH FLEET PRESENCE IN THIS AREA AT THIS POINT WOULD DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN AGGRAVATE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON.
 2. I THINK EVENTS ARE DETERIORATING TO POINT THAT WE MUST SERIOUSLY CONSIDER OUR REACTION IN EVENT CIVIL WAR. CIVIL WAR COULD PRODUCE REAL BLOODBATH WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO IGNORE. I WOULD HOPE WE CONSIDERING WHAT QUICK ACTION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN THROUGH UN TO INTRODUCE INTERNATIONAL FORCES WHICH COULD ASSIST IN RESTORING LAW AND ORDER, AND POSSIBLY AS WELL TO DETER SYRIAN TAKE-OVER.
 3. AS HELOU'S EMISSARY, MICHEL KHOURY, SAID TODAY, HELOU WILL TRY TO BE PRESIDENT OF ALL OF LEBANON AS LONG AS HE CAN. WHEN THIS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE HE MUST CONCERN HIMSELF WITH FATE OF HIS FELLOW CHRISTIANS. HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION WAS "WHAT CONCRETE FORM OF US ACTION COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THOSE WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES FRIENDS OF THE US AND THE WEST (I.E. "CHRISTIANS"). I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT SITUATION HAS YET REACHED THIS POINT OF DESPERATION. BUT IT CAN, AND POSSIBLY VERY SOON. ALMOST NO CHRISTIAN WANTS TO SEE IT HAPPEN BUT IT MAY DEVELOP DESPITE ALL RESTRAINT WHICH IS BEING EXERCISED ON PART LEBANESE LEADERSHIP.
- PORTER
BT

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

4 3 3 8 Q
1969 NOV 19 AM 9 39

R 191315Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9111
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9578

NODIS

REFERENCE BEIRUT 9568

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM SARKIS SOGHANALIAN THAT DECISION PURCHASE TEAR GAS IS VERY CLOSELY HELD IN LEBANESE ARMY AND HAS BEEN APPROVED BY GEN BOUSTANY. ACQUISITION OF TEAR GAS SPECIFICALLY INTEFYED GIMT ARMY CAPABILITY FOR CONTROL REFUGEE CAMPS. LEBANESE CONTEMPLATING THAT GAS AGENT WOULD BE USED AGAINST CAMPS BY HELICOPTERS, 105MM HOWITZERS OR 120MM MORTARS. PRESUMABLY LAKE ERIE CHEMICAL CAN SUPPLY THESE VARIOUS MEANS OF DELIVERY.
2. LEBANESE ANXIOUS GET THIS EQUIPMENT SOON AS POSSIBLE, PER SOGHANALIAN. CONTEMPLATING AIR FREIGHT DELIVERY BY AUSTRIAN AIRLINES.
3. WE HAD HOPED LEBANESE MIGHT LOOK TO NON-US SOURCES FOR THIS MATERIAL. HOWEVER, SINCE THEY NOW APPEAR HAVE OPTED FOR PURCHAF ICIAX, WE FEEL USG SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE EXPEDITE ISSUANCE EXPORT LICENSES, ETC., WITHOI REVEALING ANY OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH PURCHASE. WANT RE-EMPHASIZE THAT EMBASSY HAS NOT DISCUSSED MATTER IN ANY WAY WITH GOL OR LEBANESE ARMY, ALTHOUGH ARMA HAS IN RECENT PAST BEEN ASKED FOR INFO ON COMMERCIAL AVAILABILITY OF TEAR GAS.

PORTER

BT

SECRET



Department of State

14
TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 181830Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9102
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 9560

CONTROL: 4223Q
RECD: NOV 18, 1969
5:30 P.M.

NODIS

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT

REF: STATE 192884; BEIRUT 9485

1) BEFORE RECEIPT STATE 192884 I SPENT MUCH OF WEEKEND DISCUSSING ARMS ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON WITH G-2 HEAD COLONEL LAHOUD AND PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY. IN BEIRUT'S 9485 I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED ON MY CONVERSATION OF NOV 14 ON SAME SUBJECT WITH PRES. HELOU.

2) I AM CONCERNED THAT HELOU, IN VIEW OF HIS MANY OTHER PRE-OCCUPATIONS, MAY NOT TAKE DECISIVE ACTION OR EVEN FOCUS ON QUESTION OF ARMS ASSISTANCE. I THEREFORE DECIDED REVIEW PROBLEM IN DEPTH WITH BOTH LAHOUD (ASKING HIM TO GET THE LEBANESE ARMY COORDINATED IN ITS APPROACH) AND WITH KHOURY(SO THAT HE WOULD KEEP THE PRESSURE ON HELOU).

3) I EMPHASIZED ABOVE ALL NECESSITY FOR CAREFULLY COORDINATED ACTION ON PART OF GOL WITH DECISION-MAKING IN AS FEW HANDS AS POSSIBLE. I ALSO URGED APPOINTMENT OF ONE INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD TALK TO THE USG WITH AUTHORITY ON ALL ASPECTS. THIS POINT SEEMED TO BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED.

4) BOTH LAHOUD AND KHOURY REEMPHASIZED POINT THAT IT WAS CURRENTLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE AN OVERT INVOLVEMENT WITH USG ON INTERNAL SECURITY PLANNING. THIS WAS POLITICAL DYNAMITE. GOL WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE TECHNICAL AND PERHAPS MATERIEL ASSISTANCE IN IMPROVING ITS INTERNAL SECURITY BUT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE IN CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL MILITARY SALES AGREEMENT WITH USG, THE OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEBANESE ARMY TO RESIST ISRAELI AGGRESSION. LAHOUD PARTICULARLY STRESSED POINT THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT ARMY COULD SHOW THAT IT WAS IMPROVING ITS DEFENSIVE CAPACITY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FORESTALL ATTEMPTS TO PLACE OTHER ARAB ARMIES IN LEBANON. LAHOUD ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN WORKING QUIETLY ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATING FOR OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS. I EXPLAINED USG CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM AND WAS NOT GOING TO UNDERTAKE ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE TO THE GOAL OF IMPROVING INTERNAL SECURITY.

~~SECRET~~

-2- BEIRUT 9560, SECTION 1 OF 2, NOV 18

5) I DID URGE LAHOUD TO GET THE ARMY INTERESTED IN IMPROVING ITS INTERNAL SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IF WE WAITED UNTIL WE HAD CONCLUDED DETAILED OVERALL AGREEMENT, IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE. I MENTIONED AS EXAMPLE ACQUISITION OF TEAR GAS CAPABILITY, AND SAID THIS WAS SOMETHING GOL COULD DO NOW, IN OPEN MARKET, AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO USG. LAHOUD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD BE CONSIDERING WHAT LEBANESE COULD DO THEMSELVES, AND ALSO IF IT POSSIBLE WORK OUT SOME QUIET MEANS OF COOPERATING ON INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEM IN INTERIM.

6) LAHOUD ALSO SPOKE OF IMPORTANCE TO ARMY'S MORALE OF SOME QUICK GESTURE ON PART USG. HE MENTIONED THAT EFFECTIVENESS OF KALASHNIKOV RIFLE WHICH NOW INCREASINGLY STANDARD EQUIPMENT OF FEDAYEEN HAD HAD BAD IMPACT ON ARMY MORALE. ARMY WAS OUTGUNNED AND KNEW IT. HE WONDERED IF USG COULDN'T QUICKLY SUPPLY ABOUT 300 M-16 RIFLES WHICH COULD BE PLACED AT LEAST IN THE HANDS OF THE COMBAT OFFICER CORPS. THIS WOULD SHOW THAT LEBANESE ARMY ALSO HAD FRIENDS WHICH COULD PROVIDE IT WITH MODERN WEAPONS. THE IDEAL OF COURSE WOULD BE TO PROVIDE ABOUT 10,000 M-16'S TO SUPPLY WHOLE ARMY. WHEN I DOUBTED THIS WAS POSSIBLE, HE ASKED WHAT WAS BEST ALTERNATE WEAPON THAT COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. I SUGGESTED PERHAPS NATO RIFLE AND PROMISED TO INQUIRE. IN FOLLOW-UP EARLIER CONVERSATION, I SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE PROVIDE FAVORABLE FINANCIAL TERMS IF DEAL WERE CONCLUDED ON GOVT-TO-GOVT BASIS.

7) WE ARE ALREADY GETTING SOME RATHER SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR AVAILABILITY OF HELICOPTERS, INFANTRY AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS FROM THE LEBANESE ARMY. SOME OF THESE REQUESTS SEEM TO HAVE AUTHENTICITY -- OTHERS PROBABLY ARE FEELERS ON PART OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS. DATT WILL REPORT BY SEPARATE MESSAGE ON REQUESTS RECEIVED TO DATE, ALL OF WHICH INDICATE LEBANESE ARE CONSIDERING RATHER SIZEABLE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING EARLY RESPONSE RE AVAILABILITY AND PRICING. TIME IS OF ESSENCE, AS I KNOW DEPT UNDERSTANDS.

8) I THINK THAT AT MOMENT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE, AS STATE 192884 SUGGESTS, ON TRYING TO FULFILL BASIC NEEDS OF LEBANESE ARMY, IN PROCESS TRYING ACCOMPLISH OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES RE INTERNAL SECURITY, ETC. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN, EXCEPT FOR FEW MINOR PROCUREMENT ITEMS, THAT ARMY WILL REQUIRE LONG-TERM CREDITS AND WILL HOPE AND EXPECT TO GET FAVORABLE PRICES. AS WE DISCUSS THIS PROCUREMENT PROGRAM WITH LEBANESE, WE CAN ALSO BEGIN DEVELOP MORE SPECIFICALLY HOW WE HANDLE MATTERS OF ASSISTANCE IN INTERNAL SECURITY.

PORTER

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Department of State

14
TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 4222Q
RECD: NOV 18, 1969
5:29 P.M.

R 181830Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9103
BT
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9560

NODIS

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT

REF: STATE 192884; BEIRUT 9485

9) BOTH LAHOUD AND KHOURY REFLECTED, AS DID HELOU, ON THE DILEMMA CREATED BY GEN BOUSTANY'S CURRENT POSITION. BOUSTANY STILL IS C-IN-C AND IT OBVIOUS THAT NO ONE KNOWS HOW TO DEAL WITH HIM AND WHETKFER HE CAN BE TRUSTED. THERE IS AT MOMENT A BREAKDOWN IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, WHICH AGGRAVATES MY PROBLEM IN GETTING SOME PROGRESS.

10) LAHOUD IS OF COURSE NOT INVOLVED IN ARMY PROCUREMENT. I RAISED THIS GENERAL SUBJECT WITH HIM, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OUR EARLIER CONVERSATION, BUT BECAUSE HE HAS THE FINESS TO KNOW HOW TO GET THINGS DONE AND CAN ALSO BRING CHEHAB'S INFLUENCE TO BEAR TO GET DECISIONS. HE OF COURSE ALSO HAS SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY IN INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY. UNTIL 'GOL CAN DECIDE WHAT IT WANTS TO DO IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO GET SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO DEPT'S QUESTIONS ALTHOUGH PERHAPS LAHOUD CAN COME UP WITH SOME OF THE ANSWERS SHORTLY. MY MAJOR CONCERN AT MOMENT IS THERE IS SUCH A MALAISE AFFECTING WHOLE LEBANESE POLICY-MAKING STRUCTURE THAT WE WILL PERHAPS BE CHASING WILL-O-THE-WISP IN TRYING GET CLEAR-CUT DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO OUR QUESTIONS. IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME EVEN BE ABLE FIND RIGHT PERSON TO ASK.

11) IN THAT CASE WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE OUR OWN JUDGMENTS AS TO WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE, AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, WORKING WITH SELECTED TRUSTED INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS LAHOUD. THE NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD BEGIN GIVE US CLEARER PICTURE. IN MEANTIME, I THINK WE MAY WANT CONSIDER MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO LEBANESE, PARTICULARLY RE RIFLES, WHICH CAN SERVE AS A CATALYST TO SHAKE THEM OUT OF THEIR CURRENT INDECISIVENESS. I HOPE TO SEND DEPT A PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION SHORTLY.

PORTER

BT

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Department of State

WHS 14

TELEGRAM

SECRET

8 8 3 Q
1969 NOV 5 AM 9 28

R 051333Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9001
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9199

NODIS

1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOVEMBER 4 SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE PROGRESS OF THE US/SOVIET TALKS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE IS PESSIMISTIC AS TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN LEBANON AS A RESULT OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS IN CAIRO. HE EXPECTS TO BE MADE THE SCAPEGOAT AND, OF COURSE, BY THE FACT OF AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FEDAYEEN, HAS TO SOME EXTENT HAD TO SWALLOW HIS MAY 31 STATEMENT. THE POINT IS, HOWEVER, THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS PERHAPS BOUGHT TIME IN CAIRO. HE CONTINUES FIRM IN HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH NOW BESET LEBANON IS A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PASS ON TO HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE COURSE OF THE TWO-POWER AND FOUR-POWER TALKS.

2. KHOURY ALSO SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH THE USG HAD EXTENDED LEBANON IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL THAT THE USG HAD BEEN FRANK WITH HIM AS TO THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION. HE WAS CONSEQUENTLY ABLE TO FORMULATE HIS STRATEGY ON THIS CLEAR PREMISE.

PORTER

BT

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SECRET

Classification

194183

Department of State

TELEGRAM

35-3

19 Nov 69 00 43z

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

STATE 194183

SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking

REF: BEIRUT 9501

N O D I S

1. For some time Israeli Government has been discussing with ICRC possibility of exchange of personnel to secure release two Israeli passengers detained Damascus. UARG in late October or early November proposed three-cornered scheme through ICRC, which GOI accepted. Under this scheme UARG would release two Israeli pilots. Israel would release to UAR one UAR pilot, 17 Egyptian POWs from 1967 war, crews of two fishing vessels captured in Israeli waters, 11 Egyptian civilians kidnapped in recent raids and the two Syrian pilots held by Israel. Condition sine qua non would be release two Israeli

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/ARN:BHBaas:dmg

DRAFTING DATE

11/18/69

TEL. EXT.

20695

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye

S/S - Mr. Brown

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-2-

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

passengers held Damascus. Presumably TWA passengers would be released first, and swap between Israel and UAR would take place about 40 hours later. This permits both Syrians and Israelis face saving way out of dilemma.

2. ICRC aware of impending departure TWA aircraft from Damascus and, we understand, has called SARG attention to this as opportunity release two Israeli passengers with minimum fanfare. We not aware SARG reaction.

3. TWA not rpt not aware proposed exchange of personnel, but TWA deeply worried about repercussions if aircraft departs without passengers and will not permit aircraft depart without first consulting with Department. While Syrian intentions as yet unclear, we are informed that UAR has indicated it prepared make proposed exchange of personnel at Qantara. Israelis have agreed.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

-3-

INDICATE:

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ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

7

4. Foregoing extremely delicate and should be held very closely.

5. Regarding proposal contained Beirut 9501, we do not believe granting license for export transceivers should be tied to release Israeli passengers. We planning review licensing situation but do not feel it appropriate do so. at this time, in view SARG's intransigent position on passengers.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

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
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CLEARANCES:



SECRET
Classification

181428

Department of State
TELEGRAM

wid 6

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

26 OCT 69 18 13z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY 7

STATE 181428

REF: BEIRUT ~~8890~~^{XXXX} 8902

N O D I S

Saf havens for planning purposes are Athens and Rome with allowance for other possibilities depending on transportation arrangements.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:dmg	DRAFTING DATE 10/26/69	TEL. EXT. 22670	APPROVED BY: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
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CLEARANCES:

S/S - Mr. Lloyd *ML*
 NEA - Mr. Davies *MD*
 WLG - Mr. McDonnell *W*

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Department of State

WHS 14
TELEGRAM

SECRET

8 8 3 Q

1969 NOV 5 AM 9 28

R 051333Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9001
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9199

NODIS

1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOVEMBER 4 SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE PROGRESS OF THE US/SOVIET TALKS ON A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE IS PESSIMISTIC AS TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN LEBANON AS A RESULT OF THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS IN CAIRO. HE EXPECTS TO BE MADE THE SCAPEGOAT AND, OF COURSE, BY THE FACT OF AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FEDAYEEN, HAS TO SOME EXTENT HAD TO SWALLOW HIS MAY 31 STATEMENT. THE POINT IS, HOWEVER, THAT HE FEELS THAT HE HAS PERHAPS BOUGHT TIME IN CAIRO. HE CONTINUES FIRM IN HIS CONVICTION THAT THE ONLY PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH NOW BESET LEBANON IS A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. HE WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION WE CAN PASS ON TO HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE COURSE OF THE TWO-POWER AND FOUR-POWER TALKS.
2. KHOURY ALSO SAID THAT PRESIDENT HELOU WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH THE USG HAD EXTENDED LEBANON IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL THAT THE USG HAD BEEN FRANK WITH HIM AS TO THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION. HE WAS CONSEQUENTLY ABLE TO FORMULATE HIS STRATEGY ON THIS CLEAR PREMISE.

PORTER

BT

SECRET



Department of State

#12
TELEGRAM

SECRET

011105Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8965
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9081

CONTROL: 0055
NOVEMBER 1, 1969
7:42 A.M.

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 9054

- 1) REFTEL REPORTS INTER ALIA THAT PRES. HELOU IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH AMB OCT 31 INDICATED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE HE WAS CONSIDERING ANOTHER PUBLIC APPEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD ASK LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CLOSE RANKS AND RESIST INSURRECTION WHICH WAS BEING IMPOSED UPON COUNTRY.
- 2) AMB TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF DCM'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY LATER IN DAY TO CONVEY AMB'S REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S CONTEMPLATED ACTION. DCM TOLD KHOURY THAT WE WONDERED IF NOW WAS TIME FOR SUCH AN APPEAL AND IF AN APPEAL MIGHT STIR UP EMOTIONS RATHER THAN CALM THEM. IT ALSO SEEMED TO US THAT SUCH AN APPEAL SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER CONSULATION WITH PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF LEBANESE COMMUNITY. EVEN IF PUBLIC SUPPORT BY SUCH REPRESENTATIVES COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AT LEAST AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MAKE AN APPEAL WHICH WOULD NOT INCUR THEIR OPPOSITION. IN MAKING THESE REMARKS DCM MADE CLEAR THAT AMB WAS CONVEYING ONLY HIS IMPRESSIONS AND NOT SUBMITTING ADVICE TO PRESIDENT. DECISION WAS OBVIOUSLY PRESIDENT'S HE WAS IN POSSESSION GREAT DEAL MORE FACTS THAN WE.
- 3) KHOURY INDICATED HE AGREED WITH OUR REMARKS AND HIMSELF HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT UTILITY OF SUCH AN APPEAL AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE. HE SAID HE WOULD PASS AMB'S IMPRESSIONS ON TO HELOU.
- 4) COMMENT: ON BASIS OUR UNDERSTANDING CURRENT LEBANESE SITUATION WE FEEL SUCH AN APPEAL WOULD BE PREMATURE AS WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE SITUATION HAS DEGENERATED TO POINT WHERE SUCH AN APPEAL MIGHT BE USEFUL, WE FEEL HELOU IS FRUSTRATED AND UNDERSTANDABLY CONFUSED BY MYRIAD OF CONFLICTING FORCES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS OVER PRESENT CRISIS. HE OBVIOUSLY WONDERING IF THERE ISN'T SOMETHING THAT HE HIMSELF SHOULD DO. IN OUR JUDGMENT, BEST POLICY FOR GOL IN PRESENT COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS TO CONTINUE MAINTAIN ITS COOL, HOLD FIRM TO ITS POSITION, AND BE PREPARED TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHICH CONFLICTING FORCES MAY PROVIDE.

PORTER

SECRET



Department of State

W 15
TELEGRAM

SECRET

Control: 1340Q
Recd : 6 Nov 69
2:04 p.m.

DEPARTMENT PASS INFO ROUTINE AMEMBASSY AMMAN.

P 061630Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9011
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9245

NODIS

1. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATIONS DCM HAS HAD WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) ON NOVEMBER 5 AND 6. AS RESULT CONVERSATIONS GOL HAS HAD WITH LEBANON'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN CAIRO, GENERAL BOUSTANY, KHOURY STATED THAT BOUSTANY EXCEEDED HIS INSTRUCTIONS IN THE AGREEMENT HE CONCLUDED IN CAIRO. HE NOTED THAT PRIME MINISTER KARAME HIMSELF FELT THAT BOUSTANY HAD GONE TOO FAR. KHOURY STILL HAS NOT REVEALED CONTENTS OF AGREEMENT AND WE FRANKLY DOUBT THAT HE WILL AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING AS WE BELIEVE HE FEARS POSSIBLE LEAKS TO THE ISRAELIS. GOL SO FAR HAS MAINTAINED TIGHT SECURITY OVER CONTENTS AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH KHOURY SOMEWHAT WRYLY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP A SECRET IN LEBANON. HE INDICATED THAT THE GOL WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO MAKE THE AGREEMENT PUBLIC BUT FEARED THE REACTION OF VARIOUS GROUPS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. HE STOUTLY MAINTAINED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF A STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

2. KARAME MORNING NOVEMBER 6 AGREED TO TRY AND FORM A GOVERNMENT. HE WANTS A LARGE CABINET WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC. ALTHOUGH KARAME MUST HAVE SOME HOPES OF SUCCEEDING, KHOURY MAINTAINED THAT THE PROBLEM OF INCLUSION OF JUMBLATT AND THE CHAMMOUNISTS IN THE CABINET PERSISTED. KHOURY ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE FOCUS OF POWER IN LEBANON WAS NOW THE ARMY.

3. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY THE GOL DOES NOT KNOW THE DATE, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PLO ARE STILL COMING TO LEBANON TO NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS. IN REPLY TO THE DCM'S QUERY,

SECRET

-2- Beirut 9245

6 Nov 69

Control: 1340Q

KHOURY CONFIRMED THAT THE FATEH AND THE LEBANESE
AUTHORITIES HAD MORE OR LESS REACHED AN AGREEMENT (PRESUMABLY
IN DRAFT FORM) AT THE TIME THE RECENT TROUBLES BEGAN (EMBTTEL 9178).
THIS CAUSED THE GOL GREAT CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE. THOSE WHO
INSTIGATED MOST RECENT CRISIS IN LEBANON (HE MENTIONED SYRIA AS
ONE OF THE PRINCIPALS) HAD APPARENTLY PICKED THEIR MOMENT SO THAT
FEDAYEEN-LEB AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CONSUMMATED. PRESUMABLY THEY
WOULD HAVE A COMPARABLE REACTION TO THE AGREEMENT NOW BEING
NEGOTIATED.

PORTER

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Note: NOT passed Amman by OC/T.

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W/S
TELEGRAM

SECRET

14

O 061625Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9010
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 9244

Control: 1341Q
Recd : 6 Nov 69
2:04 p.m.

NODIS

1. MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) CALLED DCM TO HIS HOUSE NOVEMBER 6. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT A MATTER HAD RISEN ABOUT WHICH HELOU HOPED USG MIGHT BE HELPFUL.
2. HE MAINTAINED GOL HAD BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE OF LATE FROM VARIOUS SOURCES TO DISAVOW ANY POSSIBILITY OF USG INTERVENTION IN LEBANON. HE WAS AFRAID HELOU COULD NOT RESIST GROWING PRESSURES TO THIS EFFECT, PARTICULARLY DURING PROCESS OF FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT. NOW ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE MINISTERS WOULD BE MEETING NOVEMBER 8 IN CAIRO AND HE EXPECTED PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE RASHID KARAMI AND ARMY CHEIF OF STAFF GENERAL SHEMAYYIT WOULD BE LEBANON'S REPRESENTATIVES AT MEETING. HE THOUGHT IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT SOME ARAB DELEGATIONS WOULD TRY TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION TO INSURE THAT NO ARAB STATE WOULD ACCEPT ANY EXTERNAL SECURITY GUARANTEES OTHER THAN FROM AN ARAB STATE OR INSTRUMENTALITY. GOL WOULD BE MOST RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT SUCH A RESOLUTION BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES, WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEDE. GOL REALIZED IT HAD NO SECURITY GUARANTEE FROM USG AND THE LIKELIHOOD US INTERVENTION IN LEBANON ALMOST NIL. NONETHELESS DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF SUCH STATES AS SYRIA AS TO THE USG'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS WAS USEFUL DETERRENT AGAINST AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ON LEBANON.
3. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, KHOURY WONDERED IF THE USG MIGHT NOT TALK WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD SUCH AS MOROCCO. OBJECTIVE WOULD BE FOR SUCH STATES TO ENDEAVOR TO TRY TO PREVENT SUCH A CONCEPT FROM BEING INTRODUCED AT LEAGUE MEETING AND IF IT WERE INTRODUCED, TO PREVENT IT FROM BEING ACCEPTED BY THE COUNCIL. DCM MADE NO COMMITMENT BUT SAID WE WOULD SEE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE COULD DO.
4. COMMENT: WHILE HELOU CAME UNDER SHARP ATTACK ON SUSPICION OF COMPLICITY WITH USG RE POSSIBLE INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, HE (AND MANY LEBANESE) NONETHELESS RECEIVED SOME SOLACE AND A GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT AS RESULT INABILITY SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN TO FATHOM US INTENTIONS. WE ALSO KNOW THAT SOVS AND CAIRO WERE PEDDLING STORY THAT US INTENDED INTERVENE IN LEBANON AGAINST

FEDAYEEN OR SYRIAN AGGRESSION. WHETHER THEY BELIEVED IT OR NOT WE CAN ASSUME THAT THEY USED THAT ARGUMENT IN DAMASCUS TO ASK SYRIA TO BACK DOWN. THIS THEN IS ONE RARE SITUATION WHERE ARAB PROCLIVITY TO BELIEVE THE WORST ABOUT US MAY ACTUALLY HAVE HAD STABILIZING EFFECT ON LEBANESE SITUATION.

5. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT HELOU WANTS TO LEAVE HIS APPARENT OPTIONS OPEN EVEN THOUGH HE HIMSELF IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF US INTERVENTION UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. ON OTHER HAND WE DOUBT THAT WE COULD HELP HIM MUCH BY REQUESTING MOROCCO OR SAUDI ARABIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BLOCK OR OPPOSE A PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN CAIRO DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING. INDEED OUR INTERCESSION ON THIS SUBJECT WITH ANY OTHER ARAB GOVT WOULD RAISE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF WHEN AND HOW WE MIGHT INTERVENE IN ME, OR WHAT OUR RECENT INTENTIONS REALLY WERE.

6. THE ONLY THING THAT MIGHT WORK WOULD BE DIRECT APPROACH TO EGYPTIANS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE RISKS WHICH DEPT MAY DECIDE ARE TOO GREAT. IF APPROACH WERE MADE WE SUGGEST IT BE DONE IN CONTEXT OF REVIEWING ORIGINAL INTENTION OF SISCO OCT 12 STATEMENT, THE UNFORTUNATE TWISTING OF THIS STATEMENT BY ARAB PROPAGANDISTS (WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SYRIANS), TO IMPLY EXISTENCE SINISTER IMPERIALIST ANTI-FEDAYEEN PLOT, AND HARMFUL EFFECT PROPAGANDA HAD IN ALREADY TENSE LEBANESE SITUATION. RESULT COULD HAVE BEEN ESCALATION INTO CIVIL WAR (WHICH USG HAS CONSISTENTLY TRIED TO AVOID) OR ATTACKS ON US CITIZENS. EITHER ACTION WOULD HAVE HAD PROFOUND EFFECT ON US-ARAB RELATIONS AND ON ATTEMPTS TO REACH PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

7. WE COULD FURTHER POINT OUT SEEMINGLY DELIBERATE EFFORTS OF CAIRO AND MOST OTHER ARAB STATES TO IGNORE THE SEVERAL STATEMENTS WE HAVE MADE RECENTLY TO SHOW BALANCED POSITION, SUCH AS THOSE OPPOSING EXPANSIONISM IN ME (E.G. THE SECRETARY AND AMB YOST), AND AS WELL REITERATE THAT OUR CURRENT ATTEMPTS CREATE BREAKTHROUGH IN US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON SETTLEMENT ARE BOUND TO BE DAMAGED BY CONTINUATION HOSTILE ARAB PROPAGANDA AND ACTIONS.

8. WE COULD ADD THAT THE FACTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. WE HAVE CAREFULLY KEPT HANDS-OFF IN LEBANESE SITUATION, LEAVING THE MATTER FOR ARAB NEGOTIATIONS, DESPITE PROVOCATIVE ARAB-SOV PROPAGANDA IMPLYING WE WERE THREATENING INTERVENTION. FINALLY, WE WOULD HOPE DELIBERATIONS AT DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING WOULD NOT CONTINUE AGGRAVATE TENSE LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH, IN LARGE MEASURE THROUGH UAR EFFORTS, HAS HOPEFULLY BEGUN TO IMPROVE.

9. IT IS HARD TO BE SANGUINE THAT WE COULD ACCOMPLISH HELOU'S OBJECTIVE THROUGH THIS APPROACH, BUT IT MIGHT BE A MEANS TO CREATE A MORE MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH UAR AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND TO REDUCE SOME OF THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE AT THIS IMPORTANT DEFENSE MINISTERS MEETING.

PORTER

BT



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

6 0 Q

1969 NOV 1 AM 9 32

DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO AMMAN LONDON JIDDA PARIS TEL AVIV CAIRO USUN

R 011225Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8967
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9083

NODIS

REF: STATE 183593

1. WE HAVE MADE MANIFESTLY CLEAR TO PRES HELOU AND CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP OF LEBANON THAT US PLANNING NEITHER MILITARY INTERVENTION NOR SABRE-RATTLING IN LEBANESE SITUATION. WE HAVE ALSO MADE POINT TO BOTH CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM LEADERSHIP THAT WE SUPPORTING HELOU AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT OF ALL LEBANON AND NOT OF ANY PARTICULAR COMMUNITY.
2. AT SAME TIME, AS SISCO POINTED OUT TO RABIN (PARA A REFTTEL), IT IS IMPORTANT TO LEAVE LEGITIMATE DOUBTS AS TO US INTENTIONS SHOULD SITUATION GET OUT OF CONTROL. IT CERTAINLY IMPORTANT THAT SARG AND FEDAYEEN BE KEPT GUESSING AND BE SUBJECT TO SOME DETERRENCE BY THEIR INABILITY TO ASSURE A US HANDS-OFF POLICY. THIS INDEED MAY BE ONE REASON WHY US PRESENCE HERE HAS NOT BEEN UNDER MORE DIRECT PHYSICAL ATTACK IN LAST TEN DAYS.
3. I REALIZE THIS IS DIFFICULT TIGHTROPE TO WALK BUT THINK SISCO'S LINE WITH DOBRYNIN ABSOLUTELY CORRECT. SOVS MUST BE MADE AWARE THAT LEBANESE SITUATION CANNOT BE ALLOWED DETERIORATE TO POINT WHERE US MIGHT HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS POLICIES OR IR FUTURE ACTIONS.
4. WHEN CHRISTIAN LEADERS TRY PIN US DOWN ON QUESTION US INTERVENTION IN EVENT CIVIL WAR WE RESPOND THAT OUR RECOURSE AND THEIRS AS WELL SHOULD IN FIRST INSTANCE BE TO SECURE AS PROMPT UN ACTION AS POSSIBLE AND THAT SUCH INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION REPRESENTS ONLY PRACTICAL WAY TO REESTABLISH AN INTERNAL TRUCE. WE TRY TO CONVINCHE THEM THAT US INTERVENTION WOULD IN ITSELF INFLAME SITUATION AND CREATE POSSIBILITY OF ESCALATION. THEY FIND IT HARD ACCEPT THIS ANALYSIS, GIVEN THEIR PRESENT DESPAIRING MOOD, AND THEIR ISOLATION IN RELATION REST OF ARAB WORLD, BUT WE FEEL IT ESSENTIAL THEY NOT BE EMBOLDENED TAKE ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION. SO FAR TACTIC HAS WORKED, AND WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP TRYING AGGRAVATE INTERNAL SITUATION.

SECRET

-2- BEIRUT 9083, NODIS

5. WE ARE OF COURSE RECEIVING MANY REQUESTS FOR ARMS AND MONEY. WE ARE TURNING THEM AWAY WITH REASONING THAT SUCH SUPPORT COULD NOT LONG BE KEPT SECRET AND WOULD WHEN KNOWN HAVE EXPLOSIVE EFFECT ON SITUATION. WE POINT OUT THAT ONLY MEANINGFUL SECURITY OF CHRISTIANS AND OTHER COMMUNITIES LIES IN LEBANESE AND NOT COMMUNITY CONTEXT.

6. IN SUMMARY, WE RECOMMEND CONTINUANCE OF POLICY OF MINIMAL COMMENTARY AND IN GENERAL A LOW KEY, CALM APPROACH TO CURRENT LEBANESE CRISIS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO LEAVE DOUBTS IN MINDS OF ARAB WORLD AND SOVIETS WHAT OUR ULTIMATE COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT BE. THIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DONE BY QUIET DIPLOMACY RATHER THAN BY PUBLICIZED COMMENTARY.

7. ABOVE MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED PRIOR RECEIPT CHAFEE LONDON PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT RE POSSIBLE 6TH FLEET INTERVENTION IN LEBANON. WHAT CHAFEE SAID WAS GOOD IN TONE AND SUBSTANCE; IT REMAINS BE SEEN WHETHER IN LONG TERM IT WILL BE A PLUS OR MINUS TO US AT THIS SENSITIVE MOMENT IN THE LEBANESE CRISIS. UNTIL ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AS TO IMPACT CHAFEE STATEMENT, WE HOPE USG WOULD AVOID ADDITIONAL PUBLIC COMMENTARY THIS THEME.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN LONDON JIDDA PARIS TEL AVIV CAIRO
USUN BY OC/T

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Department of State

W H
TELEGRAM

SECRET

12

DEPT PASS INFO ROUTINE TO AMMAN JIDDA LONDON PARIS MOSCOW TEL
AVIV USUN

O 311238Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8952
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9054

Control: 7241Q
Recd : 31 Oct 69
7:47 a.m.

NODIS

REF: STATE 182922, BEIRUT 9041 (NOTAL); STATE 183682 (NOTAL)

1. AFTER ROCKEFELLER MEETING WITH PRES HELOU I STAYED ON WITH PRES FOR PRIVATE TALK AND PASSED TO HIM SUBSTANCE PARA 5 STATE 182922. HELOU THANKED ME FOR INFORMATION BUT NATURE HIS RESPONSE MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD HELP HIM IN HIS CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.
2. FEDAYEEN, HE SAID, WILL CONTINUE ATTACK LEBANON UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. INDEED PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WHICH THEY OPPOSE, MAY CAUSE THEM TO REACT MORE SHARPLY. NONETHELESS HELOU OBVIOUSLY GRATEFUL FOR ANY SIGN US REEMERGENCE AS ACTIVE PARTICIPANT ME PROBLEM.
3. HELOU'S ATTITUDE, WHICH HAD BEEN REASONABLY CHEERFUL AND RATIONAL WITH ROCKEFELLER, CHANGED TO ONE OF ALMOST UNMITIGATED GLOOM DURING OUR MEETING. HE SAID HE WAS CONSIDERING ANOTHER PUBLIC APPEAL IN WHICH HE WOULD ASK LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CLOSE RANKS AND RESIST INSURRECTION WHICH WAS BEING IMPOSED ON COUNTRY. HE THOUGHT SITUATION SO URGENT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS TO HAVE EFFECT. HE REALIZED DECLARATION COULD CAUSE INTERNAL EXPLOSION BUT THOUGHT IT ALSO HAD GOOD CHANCE OF RALLYING LEBANESE PEOPLE TO CONTINUE RESIST THE MILITARY AND PROPAGANDA PRESSURES NOW IMPOSED ON THEM. I RESPONDED THAT I WONDERED WHETHER MATTER INDEED REQUIRED SUCH URGENT ACTION. HE ANSWERED THAT HE HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO TAKE SUCH ACTION.
4. HE REPEATED THEME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS ONLY REAL FRIEND WAS US. HE EQUALLY UNDERSTOOD LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON HIM AND ON US IN USING THAT FRIENDSHIP. AS HE HAD SAID TO ROCKEFELLER, HE DID NOT EXPECT US MILITARY INTERVENTION. HE HAD BEEN SHOCKED NONETHELESS TO READ LE MONDE REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO US OFFICIAL SOURCES IN UN THAT US HAD NO INTENTION INTERVENING IN LEBANON. I RESPONDED I WAS CERTAIN THIS WAS NOT AN ACCURATE REPORT AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SAID BY ANY RESPONSIBLE US OFFICIAL. MORE LIKELY IT WAS CLEVER STORY BY REPORTER WHO WAS INTERPRETING US PUBLIC OPINION (AS HAD HELOU HIMSELF) AS BEING OPPOSED MILITARY INTERVENTION ALMOST ANYWHERE.

SECRET

-2- Beirut 9054, 31 October 1969

Control: 7241Q

5. HELOU THEN INQUIRED WHAT WOULD BE US POLICY IN TERMS POSSIBLE MILITARY INTERVENTION IF NECESSARY PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY IN LEBANON. I SAID THERE WAS NO YES OR NO ANSWER TO SUCH A QUESTION. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN IMPORTANT DECISION COULD NOT BE MADE IN ADVANCE AND WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. I ASKED HELOU IF THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE WE COULD DO AT THIS TIME TO HELP HIM. HE SAID IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON RADICAL ARAB STATES - ABOVE ALL SYRIA - AND HAD WE DISCUSSED MATTER WITH SOVS? I SAID WE HAD AND SOVS HAD INDICATED THEY WISHED RESTRAIN SITUATION AND WERE DISCUSSING MATTER WITH DAMASCUS. HE SAID SOV AMB HAD TOLD HIM SAME THING BUT HE COULD SEE NO RESULTS. IT WAS URGENT THAT SOVS APPLY MORE PRESSURE IN A HURRY. THE SAME HELD FOR ANY OTHER WESTERN STATES THAT COULD HAVE ANY INFLUENCE IN RADICAL ARAB CAPITALS. THE FRENCH, HE ADMITTED, WOULD NOT DO MUCH. THEY WERE TOO INTRIGUED WITH THEIR NEW BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES IN ARAB WORLD.

7. IN CONTEXT MY PROGRESS REPORT ON SISCO-DOBRYNIN TALKS, HELOU WONDERED WHETHER, IN VIEW PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD NOT BE MOVED TO ANOTHER LEVEL, I.E., US-SOV CONCERTATION TO PRESERVE THE LEBANESE STATE. HE DID NOT PURSUE THIS ANY FURTHER.

8. I ASKED WHETHER WE COULD HELP THE ARMY IN ANY WAY. HE FIRST RESPONDED THAT THEY MIGHT NEED ARMAMENTS, BUT THEN REVERSED HIMSELF AND SAID THERE WAS NOTHING WE COULD DO AT MOMENT. ECONOMIC AID WOULD BE NEEDED LATER, HE SAID, BUT THERE WAS NO POINT DISCUSSING THIS NOW.

PORTER

BT

Note: Not relayed Amman, Jidda, London, Paris, Moscow, Tel Aviv or USUN by OC/T.

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SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

183705 ¹²

WS

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

30 OCT 69 19 42z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY 7

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 183705

NODIS

REF: Beirut 9027

1. Asst Sec Sisco told Israel Ambassador Rabin that we had report, which not confirmed and we hope not true, that Israeli Press Attache Paris was telling French press that there existed some kind of an arrangement between Israel and Lebanese President Helou. If true, this would be disastrous for Helou at this particular juncture. Sisco asked Rabin to cable to ascertain facts, and if true, to call off Press attache.

2. Rabin expressed doubt that report is true and said he would have seen copy any instruction from Jerusalem to Paris. He agreed to find out the facts.

3. Sisco said in conclusion that US attaches some importance to this matter. J

DRAFTED BY *M*

GP-3

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

END

APPROVED BY:

ROGERS

NEA/IAI:MCLissfelt:slb

10/30/69

22294

NEA - Joseph J. Sisco *[Signature]*

CLEARANCES:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton *[Signature]*

S/S - Mr. Claysteon *[Signature]*

Brown

NEA/ARN:TWSealye *[Signature]*

SECRET/NODIS

Classification

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FORM 4-68 DS-322

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

183682

W 10

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

30 OCT 69 18-12z 12

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
 Amembassy JIDDA
 Amembassy TEL AVIV
 USUN NEW YORK

STATE 183682

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 9041, STATE 182922

You authorized pass to President Helou gist information
 paragraph 5 reftel.

GP-3.

END

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/ARN:TWSeelye/mc

DRAFTING DATE

10/30/69

TEL. EXT.

22670

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

NEA:RPDavies

S/S - Mr. Brown

SECRET/NODIS

Classification

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FORM 4-68 DS-322



740/50/2526
6
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

P 261123Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8890
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 8902

5 9 8 8 Q
RECVD: 26 OCT 69
7:07AM

NODIS

ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE EVACUATION OF US CITIZENS AT THIS TIME, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES PLEASE ADVISE US THE NAMES OF THE SAFEHAVENS. WE ESTIMATE THAT APPROXIMATELY 3500 OUT OF A TOTAL 5,000-6,000 US CITIZENS IN LEBANON WOULD DESIRE EVACUATION. WE WOULD PLAN AND ASSUME IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO USE COMMERCIAL AIR. IMPERATIVE SECURITY THIS REQUEST BE MAINTAINED.

PORTER

BT

NNNN



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

7

O 251555Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8885
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8893

Control: 5941Q
Recd : 25 Oct 69
1:14 p.m.

NODIS

1. I WOULD LIKE TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF SIXTH FLEET DISPOSITION AND CAPABILITIES IN EVENT IT IS NEEDED PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES IN LEBANON. THIS IS ONLY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. I AM NOT SUGGESTING SIXTH FLEET PRESENCE IN THIS AREA AT THIS POINT WOULD DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN AGGRAVATE PRESENT SITUATION IN LEBANON.

2. I THINK EVENTS ARE DETERIORATING TO POINT THAT WE MUST SERIOUSLY CONSIDER OUR REACTION IN EVENT CIVIL WAR. CIVIL WAR COULD PRODUCE REAL BLOODBATH WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO IGNORE. I WOULD HOPE WE CONSIDERING WHAT QUICK ACTION COULD BE UNDERTAKEN THROUGH UN TO INTRODUCE INTERNATIONAL FORCES WHICH COULD ASSIST IN RESTORING LAW AND ORDER, AND POSSIBLY AS WELL TO DETER SYRIAN TAKE-OVER.

3. AS HELOU'S EMISSARY, MICHEL KHOURY, SAID TODAY, HELOU WILL TRY TO BE PRESIDENT OF ALL OF LEBANON AS LONG AS HE CAN. WHEN THIS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE HE MUST CONCERN HIMSELF WITH FATE OF HIS FELLOW CHRISTIANS. HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION WAS "WHAT CONCRETE FORM OF US ACTION COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THOSE WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES FRIENDS OF THE US AND THE WEST (I.E. "CHRISTIANS"). I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT SITUATION HAS YET REACHED THIS POINT OF DESPERATION. BUT IT CAN, AND POSSIBLY VERY SOON. ALMOST NO CHRISTIAN WANTS TO SEE IT HAPPEN BUT IT MAY DEVELOP DESPITE ALL RESTRAINT WHICH IS BEING EXERCISED ON PART LEBANESE LEADERSHIP.

PORTER
BT

SECRET



Department of State

7
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 5150Q
RECD: OCT 22, 1969
3:46 P.M.

R 221431Z
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY ROME
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8779

NODIS

FOR STABLER FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 8778

1. DURING PRATT'S DISCUSSION WITH MAIOLINE OCT 21 LATTER WAS GREATLY CONCERNED THAT THERE WOULD BE A LEAK OF HIS PROBING EFFORTS WITH SYRIAN OFFICIALS. HE HAS ASKED THAT WE FORWARD TO YOU HIS REQUEST THAT ANY INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT PASSED TO THE FONOFF BE GIVEN TO PERRONE CAPANO ALONE FOR HIS OWN PERSONAL INFORMATION. HE WAS ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS THAT AMBASSADOR RICCARDI NOT LEARN ABOUT HIS EXPLORATORY TALKS UNTIL SOMETHING CONCRETE HAD EMERGED FROM THEM. HE BELIEVED PERRONE CAPANO COULD UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR HIS REQUEST.

2. FYI. WE KNOW RICCARDI CAN BE AN ENERGETIC CONVERSATIONALIST. WE SUSPECT THIS IS THE REASON FOR MAIOLINI'S REQUEST.

PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~

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W H (10)
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 7791Q
RECD: SEP 30, 1969
3:58 P.M.

R 301447Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8687
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1910
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8074

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 8008 AND 7933; STATE 160382

1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) INFORMED ME EVENING SEP 29 THAT HELOU HAD JUST RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM EBAN VIA VATICAN. KHOURY SAID CONTENT AND WORDING FOLLOWED VERY CLOSELY ORAL PRESENTATION I HAD GIVEN HELOU OF THE EBAN/SECRETARY CONVERSATION RE LEBANON.
2. KHOURY RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO MY QUERY WHETHER ISRAELIS HAD APPROACHED GOL THROUGH ANY OTHER CHANNELS, E.G., CONTACTS WITH LEBANESE MILITARY AT SOUTHERN BORDER. I WOULD ASSUME HELOU DIRECTED HIS QUERIES TO ISRAEL THROUGH VATICAN THEREBY RECEIVING RESPONSE IN SAME CHANNELS, ALTHOUGH KHOURY DID NOT MENTION LEBANESE INITIATIVE. AS DEPT AWARE HELOU IS FORMER LEBANESE AMB TO VATICAN AND PERSONAL FRIEND POPE PAUL. HELOU IS USING VATICAN FORUM IN MANY WAYS TO SECURE WESTERN SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, AS NEW PAPAL NUNCIO BRUNEIRO INFORMED ME YESTERDAY. HELOU CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE ASK VATICAN TO INTERCEDE WITH USG (AND FRANCE) ON BEHALF LEBANON.

PORTER

BT



Department of State
SECRET

WA 9

TELEGRAM

R 261734Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8668
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1906
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 8008

7015Q

SEP 26 3:46 PM 69

REF: BEIRUT 7933, STATE 160382

NODIS

- 1) IN COURSE LONG TOUR D'HORIZON WITH PRES HELOU EVENING SEP 25, I CAREFULLY PARAPHRASED EBAN'S COMMENTS PARA 3 STATE 160382. HELOU WAS ABOVE ALL PLEASED AT FACT THAT SECRETARY CONTINUING MAKE REPRESENTATION TO ISRAELIS SHOWING US CONCERN FOR LEBANON.
- 2) AS FOR EBAN'S COMMENTS, HELOU NOTED PARTICULARLY REFERENCE TO "LIMITED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS" IN PARA 3C AND ISRAELI INTENTION TAKE "MINIMUM ACTIONS NECESSARY TO DEFEND ITS CITIZENS IN PARA 3D. HE FELT THIS SHOWED FAVORABLE NAUNCE IN ISRAELI POSITION WHICH NOT PREVIOUSLY EVIDENT.
- 3) IN CONTEXT HELOU'S RATHER DEPRESSING VIEW CURRENT TREND OF EVENTS IN LEBANON (SEPTTEL) IT APPARENT HE NOT SANGUINE HE CAN CONTINUE EFFECTIVELY CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. HE WILL CONTINUE DO ALL HE CAN AND HOPES BORDERS WILL REMAIN AS QUIESCENT AS IN RECENT PAST. HE HOPED THAT IF FUTURE FEDAYEEN ACTIONS BROUGHT ISRAELI RETALIATION ISRAELIS WOULD NOT OVERREACT. HE CITED RECENT ISRAELI RETALIATION WHERE 30 PLANES AVENGED DEATH OF ONE ISRAELI AS EXAMPLE OF OVERKILL WHICH ONLY INFLAMES LEBANESE AND GIVES FEDAYEEN GREATER SUPPORT AND ACCEPTABILITY. HELOU POINTED OUT, PERHAPS MORE FOR US EARS THAN ISRAELI, THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO CONTINUE PROTEST (PRESUMABLY IN SC) ANY ISRAELI ATTACKS ON LEBANON, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING LEBANESE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.
- 4) HELOU VOLUNTEERED THAT HE COULD NOT TAKE COGNIZANCE OF EBAN'S MESSAGE AS DIRECT COMMUNICATION TO GOL, BUT HE VIEWED Y REPORT RATHER AS A FRIENDLY MESSAGE FROM USG INDICATING ITS CONCERN FOR LEBANON AND REPORTING ISRAELI REACTION TO OUR INTERVENTION. I DID NOT TELL HIM EBAN HAD ASKED USG TO CONVEY MESSAGE (BEIRUT 7922), NOR DID HE SUGGEST ISRAEL HAD MADE DIRECT CONTACT WITH GOL.

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-2- BEIRUT 8008, SEP 26

5) HELOU EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT EBAN WAS SERIOUS IN HIS COMMITMENT TO USG RE LEBANON BUT BELIEVED ISRAEL WOULD SOONER OR LATER IGNORE EBAN'S ASSURANCES IF SITUATION WORSENS AND FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY GIVES ISRAELIS REASON TO ATTACK AND SEIZE TERRITORY IN SOUTH LEBANON. AT THAT POINT, ISRAEL WOULD REVERT TO LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES AND FIND EXPANSION MORE ACCEPTABLE THAN RESTRAINT. I ASSURED HELOU AGAIN THAT USG WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH QUESTION OF LEBANESE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND THAT I WAS SURE OUR REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF THIS CONCERN HAD HAD EFFECT ON ISRAEL WHICH WOULD NOT LIGHTLY BE FORGOTTEN. QUESTION OF REPRISALS, OF COURSE, MUCH AS WE DEPLOYED THEM, WAS DEPENDENT ON RESTRAINT OF FEDAYEEN ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

PORTER

BT

NOTE: PASSED TO TEL AVIV BY OC/T

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 241708Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8650
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1900
BT
SECRET BEIRUT 7922

6 2 8 4 Q
1969 SEP 24 PM 2 14

NODIS

REF: USUN 3124, SECTO 005, RPTD BEIRUT AS STATE 160382

1) I SUMMARIZED EBAN'S RESPONSE TO SECRETARY SET FORTH
PARA 3 REFTTEL IN CONVERSATION SEP 23 WITH PRESIDENT HELOU'S
CONFIDANT, MICHEL KHOURY. KHOURY SAID HE WOULD BRIEF HELOU
SAME DAY. I WILL FOLLOW UP WHEN I SEE HELOU SEP 25.

2) I DID NOT MENTION (AND NEITHER DID KHOURY) FACT THAT
HELOU AND ISRAELIS WERE IN DIRECT CONTACT. NEITHER
DID I REFER TO EBAN'S REQUEST THAT USG CONVEY REPLY TO
HELOU. WE HAVE HAD UNFORTUNATE EXPERIENCES IN PAST WHERE
US ROLE AS LETTERDROP HAS BEEN MISINTERPRETED AFTER
SUBSEQUENT LEAKS. IN THIS INSTANCE THOUGHT IT BETTER PASS
ON GIST EBAN'S REMARKS AS THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN MADE
IN RESPONSE SECRETARY'S EXPRESSION USG CONCERN OVER LEBANESE
SITUATION.

PORTER

BT

SECRET



SECRET
Classification

13

Department of State
TELEGRAM

189505

Handwritten initials/signature

8 Nov 69 02 04Z

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

7

STATE 189505

REF: BEIRUT 9244

NODIS

1. We appreciate Helou's concern over possible resolution that might be introduced at November 8 meeting in Cairo. We agree with your analysis that it understandable that Helou wants to keep his options open. We share your skepticism re our ability to block or oppose Arab resolution on external intervention, ^{and} we agree that our intercession would raise a question about our real intentions.

2. In light of Nasser's November 6 speech, we believe that a direct approach to Egyptians, in particular, likely to be counterproductive. Under circumstances, we believe USG should take no action in this respect.

GP-3

END

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:BH Baas:dmg	DRAFTING DATE 11/7/69	TEL. EXT. 20695	APPROVED BY: NEA - Joseph J Sisco	JOHNSON
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CLEARANCES:

NEA - Mr. Davies *END*
 NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye *TWS*
 NEA/UAR - Mr. Parker (draft), *2*

s/s - Mr. Hawley *ph*

SECRET/NODIS

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SECRET
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

31-B WA
8

180289

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

24 OCT 69 0131z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV Amembassy LONDON
 USUN NEW YORK " PARIS
 USINT CAIRO " MOSCOW

STATE 180289

SUBJECT: Lebanese-Israeli Border

REF: USUN 3124

NODIS

In telephone conversation told
1. /Morning October 23 Israeli Minister Argov/~~phoned~~
Assistant Secretary Sisco, ~~and~~ with reference to Eban's
statements regarding Lebanese-Israeli border (USUN 3124),
that if it would help
~~we~~ we are authorized to reassure GOL that Israel has
no territorial designs on southern Lebanon.

2. You should convey to Helou, through his intermediary
Michel Khoury, this reiteration of Israeli reassurances
regarding Lebanon's territorial integrity.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY:
NEA/ARN:BHbaas:dmg

DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.
10/23/69 20695

APPROVED BY: J. Sisco
NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

S/S - MLevitsky



SECRET/NOD
Classification

18139

Department of State
TELEGRAM

(7)

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

25 Oct 69 21

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

STATE 181399

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 8893

Sixth Fleet

1. We are watching/~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ dispositions closely but in absence ~~xxxxx~~ compelling circumstances are reluctant to alter schedules since this would become known and have adverse repercussions, as you recognize. Your Naval Attache can obtain details on fleet disposition.
2. We would be prepared to support any Lebanese requests to the UN should in fact Syrian intrusion take place.

ROGERS

END

DRAFTED BY: *RPD*
NEA:RPDavies:las

DRAFTING DATE: 10/25/69
TEL. EXT.: 20324

APPROVED BY: *RPD*
NEA:RPDavies

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN:TWSeelye

S/S - WLloyd

"CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS COPY MUST BE MADE ON COPIES"



SECRET

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

160383

Handwritten initials and signature

21 SEP 69 01 54z

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

78

STATE 160383

NODIS

SECTO 5 FROM USUN BEING REPEATED TO YOU ^{BY} ~~BE~~ SEPTTEL
IN THIS CHANNEL. EMBASSY BEIRUT IS AUTHORIZED TO
CONVEY INFO IN PARAGRAPH THREE THEREOF TO PRESIDENT
HELOW.

END

RICHARDSON

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/MR. DAVIES

DRAFTING DATE

9/20/69

TEL. EXT.

21512

APPROVED BY:

S/S-O R.G. Rich

CLEARANCES:

WH

②

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET/NODIS

Classification

120387

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

19 JUL 69 20 187

Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY
CAIRO PRIORITY
JIDDA PRIORITY
KUWAIT PRIORITY

INFO: AMMAN
TEL AVIV
USUN, NEW YORK
LONDON
PARIS
MOSCOW

STATE 120387
NODIS

1. GOJ and GOI have already pressed for fill-in on Sisco's Moscow talks, and we expect other action addressees may similarly be approached.

2. You should know that Soviets have asked us not to make text of our counterproposal to Soviet June 17 document, which Sisco gave Soviets July 15, available to Arabs until they have made some soundings in Cairo. To test seriousness of Soviet intentions, about which we remain skeptical, we have agreed go along with this Soviet request for time being. Meanwhile, we made our text available to British, French and Israelis in their capitals July 17. Jordanian Foreign Minister Touqan told Embassy Amman that Jerusalem Arabic language broadcast evening July 17 and Amman broadcast following day reported Ambassador Barbour had briefed FonOff Director General Rafael on Sisco Moscow talks. FBIS has so far been unable find any record of alleged Jerusalem and Amman broadcasts, which in any case ~~do not so far appear to~~ ^{not} have/made much of a splash, and so far there have apparently been no leaks about our having given

Drafted by: NEA/LAI:ALAtherton:av 7/19/69 Tel. Ext. 2942 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances: *JPW*
S/S - Mr. Walsh

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET/NODIS
Classification

Origin

~~XXXXXXXX~~

- 2 -

Info:

text of our counterproposal to Israelis.

and our agreement to it,
3. Soviet request that we withhold text from Arabs, nevertheless puts us
in something of a bind, especially if there has been publicity in Israel re
Barbour-Rafael meeting, and we may not want to withhold text for long from
UAR and GOJ. We have in fact already authorized Embassy Amman give general
oral briefing to GOJ FonMin Touqan who was agitated by alleged reports from
Israel of Barbour briefing of GOI.

4. We are repeating to addressees of this message instructions on basis
of which Embassy Amman briefed GOJ (STATE 120068). We want limit discussion
of Sisco Moscow talks and our counterproposal to generalities at this time,
emphasizing following themes:

a) Moscow talks were serious and businesslike, and US-Soviet dialogue
will continue in effort narrow gaps between us and produce common document
which two and ultimately four powers can recommend to Jarring as basis for
renewed effort by him with parties.

b) We expected no dramatic results in Moscow and there was in fact no
breakthrough. Neither was there breakdown, however, and we think each side
now better understands views of other.

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET/NODIS
Classification

- 3 -

Origin
Info

~~XXXXXXXX~~

5. Action addressees should take no initiatives but if pressed by host governments for fill-in on Moscow talks may make points in 4 a) and b) above and in addition may draw on paras 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 (but not repeat not para of STATE 120068. In doing so, you should change phrase "U.S. commentary" in para 2 to read "U.S. counterproposal". If asked whether we have given text to other than Soviet Government, you should plead ignorance.

6. Sisco will be briefing Egyptians and Jordanians here along similar lines next week, beginning with Ghorbal Wednesday afternoon, July 23. He will also see Israelis Wednesday morning.

GP-3

END

ROGERS

Drafted by:	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
Clearances:		

6 043816 W H

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET-XXXXXX~~ NODIS

Classification

MAR 69 15 37 Z

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Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy Beirut
Jidda
Tel Aviv
Amman

USINT CAIRO 2

STATE 43816
~~XXXXXX~~ NODIS

FOR AMBASSADORS AND BERGUS FROM ASST. SECY. SISCO

You will note we have made attempt to report very fully on all of our talks here. This is my intention throughout this exercise because I feel that all of you must be as fully informed as possible. I want ~~you~~ to express my appreciation to each of you for the careful manner in which delicate material is being handled in the field, and in particular distinguishing between that material to be presented to governments to which you are represented and those marked ~~XX~~ NOFORN. I am very anxious to continue this practice of fullest possible reporting to you and I just wanted to express my appreciation to each of you for the highly professional manner in which sensitive information is being handled. Thank you very much.

END

ROGERS

GP-3

Drafted by: NEA:JJ <i>JJS</i> Sisco:mtb	Tel. No. 4263	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Joseph J. Sisco <i>JJS</i>
Clearances:		

S/S - Mr. Brown *RWB*

~~SECRET-XXXXXX~~ NODIS

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO *A*

SECRET

Classification

066691

WH

29 APR 69 22 22Z

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

Info:

STATE 066691

REF: STATE 65333, BEIRUT 3506 and 3511

N O D I S

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SISCO

1. While, in response to Lebanese expression of interest, we considering possible UN presence Lebanon should situation deteriorate further, we would hope that any presence would be no more than that contemplated by paragraphs C and D State 65333. Since there are many major obstacles to positive UN action on UN force, we prefer that you not ^{further details} get/into/this question with Lebanese leaders and that you leave initiative with Helou. Moreover, any future discussions ^{should} on UN presence/be limited to possibility special representative SYG or expansion observer operation. END

~~2. We appreciate your initiative in approaching tripartite alliance leadership to counsel on best route. Having made this~~

[ROGERS]

Drafted by:

NEA/ARN:BHbaas:dmg 4/29/69

Tel/Ext. 2700

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye *MS*

IO/UNP - Mr. Day *Day*

NEA - Mr. Davies *RMD*

S/S - Mr. Brown *WB*

IO - Mr. Popper *WAP*

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CODEWORD

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EXEMPTED per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
ltr. 9/29/2010**

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**MLH
6/21/2011**

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LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

Lebanon

Msg. No.

Sent by:

2. TO:

WH

412

3. Transmitted by:

[Signature]

Date & Time:

21/2/77

4. Received by:

WNSR

Date & Time

22/7

5. Description

Telegram to Beirut (Info Paris) re Inauguration Lebanese Earth-Satellite Station

6. Classification & Controls:

CONFIDENTIAL

7. No. of Pgs.

3

8. Precedence

IMM

9. Validated by

RLBrown
RLBrown (RL)

10. Deliver to:

Mr. Henry Kissinger

For: Clearance

XXXXX

The White House

Information

ATTENTION:

Mr. Foster

Per Request

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

300 AUG 21 PM 9:48

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Anembassy BEIRUT ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

INFO Anembassy PARIS

STATE

SUBJECT Inauguration Lebanese Earth Satellite Station

REF Beirut 6815; Beirut 6228

1. Neither President nor Vice President available August 31 for telecon with President Helou on occasion inauguration Lebanese earth station.
2. On basis Embassy recommendation of acceptable alternates, we contacted Governor Scranton who readily agreed receive Helou call at 11:00 am EDT at home in Dalton, Pa. August 31
3. Scranton plans speak in English with interpreter present to handle translation. To maximize psychological value of occasion in context US-Arab relations, we believe it preferable for Helou conduct conversation in Arabic rather than in French. While we will be guided, of course, by Embassy's views this subject, you may wish relay our suggestion through Ghazel to Helou citing following: a) Extensive publicity

Drafted by

NEA/ARN: P [Signature] Affin: gvl 8/21/69 21018

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by

NEA - Rodger P. Davies [Signature]

Clearances

NEA/ARN - Mr. Baas [Signature]
USIA/IAN - Mr. Kennedy [Signature]
XMB - Mr. Welk (info) [Signature]

White House - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
E/TT - Mr. Loy [Signature]
S/S - Mr. Brown

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: collect
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

- 3 -

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Origin

ACTION:

Info

7. Embassy requested cable soonest GOL confirmation these arrangements, especially language Helou will use, and any additional pertinent details re Lebanese preparations for telecon.

END

Drafted by

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

Clearances

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM 8-69 DS-322

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

Referral

#380

LOG # ASS 16
1450
A

NMCC

- 1. Sent by: Department of State
- 2. Receiver(s) (Msg. Nos. to): _____
- 3. Transmitted by: *[Signature]*
Date and time: _____
- 4. Received by: _____
Date and time: '69 MAY 8 PM 12:03
- 5. Description: Tel to BEIRUT, AMMAN, JIDDA, USINT CAIRO, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV, USIN, MOSCOW. Precedence: IMMEDIATE
- 7. Class & Control: SECRETZNO DIS
- 8. Kbr of Pgs. 6
- 9. Validated by: *[Signature]* JPWalsh
- 10. Deliver to: Robert Murray
OASD/ISA/NEA
Room 4D765, Pentagon
Hq Saunders
White House
- For: Clearance
Information _____
For request _____

IMPORTANT

*Haig says this
is taken care of
5/8/69
mlh*

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
189 MAY 6 PM 12:46

SECRET

ACTION: Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy AMMAN
Amembassy JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
Amembassy KUWAIT
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK
AmEmbassy Moscow

STATE

NODIS/NOFORN

1. Department remains deeply concerned re GOL-fedayeen confrontation and its implications for internal stability of Lebanon. President Helou has asked what USG assistance he can expect if situation sharply deteriorates. It clear that Helou believes that he can turn only to USG if Lebanon's survival at stake.

2. We are considering strictly on contingency basis options open to us to shore up GOL. One option which might be considered is move of unit of Sixth Fleet into Eastern

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GROUP 3

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Mediterranean, accompanied by public announcement to this effect. Such an announcement would presumably specify that action being taken in response to GOL request and that action indicative of continuing US support for GOL. We would not rpt nor wish to imply that fleet move also connected with present tension on cease-fire lines on Suez Canal and in Jordan Valley.

3. We see following possible advantages in movement of Sixth Fleet unit to Eastern Mediterranean:

a. Reinforcing President Helou's apparent determination to confront the fedayeen and their radical supporters in Lebanon. We would expect that Lebanese Christians, traditional Muslim leaders, as well as Druze and Shia minorities, would also take encouragement from such USG action.

b. Detering fedayeen and their radical support^{ers} in Lebanon from forcing all out confrontation with GOL in face of Sixth Fleet move. . These elements would recall USG intervention in 1958 and perhaps would not wish to risk at this time the setback of their goals and aspirations that threat of such USG intervention would imply.

c. In possibly deterring a GOL-fedayeen' confrontation, Sixth Fleet move might buy time for further forward movement towards an area peace settlement which hopefully would effectively defuse GOL-fedayeen problem and threat to viability of Lebanese state.

4. We see following possible disadvantages of Sixth Fleet move:

a. Vociferous vocal reaction from Arab radical states,

i.e., UAR, Syria and Iraq, as well as pro-fedayeen elements within Lebanon. In this regard we could probably expect at minimum that Arab moderates, i.e., Saudis, Jordanians and Kuwaitis, as well as Lebanese Christians and other moderate Lebanese elements, would not rpt not dare to support publicly USG action.

b. Sixth Fleet move could give Helou label of US puppet and destroy what influence he presently retains in Lebanon.

c. Sixth Fleet move could be interpreted as direct USG-fedayeen confrontation.

d. Soviet reaction, particularly in light of Soviet fleet presence in Mediterranean, would be uncertain and might be in form of Soviet fleet countermove.

e. Since Sixth Fleet move would be only a posturing

operation, possibility exists of our bluff being called.

This in turn would cast doubt on credibility US actions.

5. In contemplating movement of Sixth Fleet to shore up GOL, we would probably wish to consult in advance with Faisal, Hussein and Israelis. We would probably also wish to inform Nasser and Soviets of limited purpose of our action. But question arises as to whether such anticipatory action would be instrumental in tempering predictable Arab outcry. In order to assist Department in evaluating this option, request addressees' assessment of probable host government reactions to such move. While their reactions to great extent would be determined by circumstances existing at time, perhaps a pattern of behavior can be predicted under any circumstances.

It should be stressed that any Sixth Fleet move would presumably occur only if moderate Lebanese regime in danger of imminent collapse and likely successor regime is immoderate and fedayeen-oriented. We emphasize that, at least for moment, this is a purely theoretical exercise which has not rpt not been fully staffed out and under no circumstances should be discussed with non-US officials.

GP-3

END

NEA/ARN:RPPaganelli:dmg 5/5/69

NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

Clearances: NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
NEA/ARP - Mr. Brewer
NEA/UAR - Mr. Parker
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
UNP - Mr. Day
NEA/RA - Mr. Sober
NEA - Mr. Handley
DOD/ISA - Mr. Murray