



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 585

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09670 01 OF 02 221515Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

051886

R 211745Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9140
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

69 NOV 22 PM 1:09
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 9670

EXDIS

SUBJ: RACHID KARAME'S VIEWS ON ME SETTLEMENT

1) FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 2-6, LEBANESE INTERNAL SITUATION (SEPTEL-NOTAL), PRIMIN-DESIGNATE KARAME SAID IT WAS IMPERATIVE - IF LEBANON IS TO BE PRESERVED - THAT DRAMATIC AND RAPID PROGRESS BE MADE TOWARDS A ME SETTLEMENT IN PRECISE APPLICATION OF THE TERMS OF NOVEMBER 1967 UN RESOLUTION. WE WERE WRONG IF WE THOUGHT THAT MUCH TIME REMAINED. HE BELIEVED A WAR COULD BREAK OUT AS EARLY AS NEXT YEAR. THIS WOULD BE A WAR THAT THE ARAB LEADERS MIGHT NOT WANT AND KNEW THEY WOULD LOSE, BUT WOULD BE UNABLE TO STOP.

2) IMMEDIATELY AFTER JUNE 1967 WAR, AND EVEN AFTER NOVEMBER UN RESOLUTION, ISRAEL, THROUGH UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL, COULD HAVE SECURED HER PERMANENT NEGOTIATED SECURITY. NOW THAT OPPORTUNITY WAS LOST FOREVER, AND SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE IMPOSED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF UN RESOLUTION.

3) A NEW GENERATION OF ARABS HAD ARISEN - ONE THAT WAS PREPARED TO DIE. THIS WAS A SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT WHICH ISRAEL SURELY MUST HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERSTAND. ARAB PSYCHOLOGY WAS BECOMING TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE LONG WAR AND, AS HE HAD WARNED ME IN PAST, ALL ARAB STATES WERE BEING DRAWN IN. WHILE

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NASSER AND HUSSEIN CLEARLY WANTED PEACE ("ANY ARAB LEADER STILL PREFERS PEACE IF HE COULD JUSTIFY IT TO HIS PEOPLE"), THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF EITHER OF THEM SUING FOR PEACE.

4) ISRAEL, UNLESS SHE SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES TO HERSELF OF NOT RETURNING TO HER FORMER TERRITORY, NOW FACED AN ARAB PEOPLE IMBUED WITH THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LONG-TERM ATTRITION AND COMBAT. ISRAEL WOULD FACE CONSTANT HARASSMENT AND ULTIMATELY THE DEMOGRAPHIC EQUATION WOULD BE BOUND TO GO AGAINST HER. "EVEN IF 95 MILLION ARABS WERE LOST, THERE STILL WOULD BE TWO ARABS FOR EVERY ISRAELI." THE US MUST RECOGNIZE THESE NEW DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM IN THE ME AND CONVINCE ISRAEL OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ATTEMPTING TO RETAIN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN TEN YEARS ISRAEL WOULD BE ON HER KNEES. I DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ARABS SURELY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MUST GIVE ASSURANCES OF PEACE TO EXPECT ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW AND THAT HE WAS DEMANDING THAT US EXERT MORE INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL THAN WAS PERHAPS POSSIBLE. REFERRING TO THE MANY FRANCO-GERMAN WARS, KARAME SAID IT WAS RIDICULOUS TO ASSUME THAT PEACE IN ME COULD COME FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A PEACE TREATY. PEACE COULD ONLY COME WHEN ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THOSE CONDITIONS WHICH COULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS TO COEXIST WITH HER. AS FOR US INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL, KARAME SAID HE UNDERSTOOD IT WOULD NOT BE EASY - BUT THE US AND ONLY THE US HAD THE NECESSARY LEVERAGE, IF IT DESIRED TO USE IT.

5) I ASKED KARAME IF HIS RECENT CONTACTS WITH SOVS LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT SOVS WANTED PEACE. HE RESPONDED OBLIQUELY BY SAYING THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TEST THEM. FIRST WE SHOULD START DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE ARABS. IF WE COULD ESTABLISH WITH NASSER AND HUSSEIN A BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, SOVS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT. IF THEY DID NOT, PRESENT FAVORABLE BALANCE OF POWER FOR SOVS IN ME WOULD BE REVERSED. SYRIA WAS NOT IMPORTANT, SAID KARAME. IF HUSSEIN AND NASSER CAME TO AGREEMENT, SYRIAN REGIME WOULD HAVE TO GO ALONG. AT MOMENT OF COURSE SYRIANS WERE ABLE TO CREATE MISCHIEF BECAUSE ARABS COULD SEE NO HOPE FOR AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT AND NASSER WAS FORCED TO ASSUME A PUBLIC MILITANCY, AS CONTRASTED TO HIS PRIVATE HOPES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. NASSER, SAID KARAME, IS THE KEY. OTHER RADICAL ARAB LEADERS WERE SMALL POTATOES WITH NUISANCE VALUE ONLY, AND WE SHOULD NOT WORRY ABOUT THEM.

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6) I SAID I FOUND HIS REMARKS VERY DISTURBING. USG WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN ME. WE WERE EXERTING TREMENDOUS EFFORT TO START THE MOMENTUM FOR A SETTLEMENT AND OUR POSITION RE THE UAR-ISRAELI AGREEMENT WOULD RETURN TO NASSER SOVEREIGNTY OVER HIS FORMER TERRITORY. ALL WE ASKED IN RETURN WAS RHODES-STYLE TALKS AND AN ARAB COMMITMENT OF PEACE, IN EXCHANGE FOR WHICH WE WOULD EXERT OUR INFLUENCE TO GET ISRAEL (AND THERE NO ASSURANCE WE COULD) TO GO ALONG. KARAME SAID IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION THAT HE HAD STUDIED US-USSR DRAFT WHICH PRES. HELOU HAD SHOWN HIM. IN HIS VIEW WE HAD MADE A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE IN APPEARING TO SEPARATE UAR ASPECT OF THE SETTLEMENT FROM THE TOTAL PACKAGE. REGARDLESS OF OUR MOTIVES (WHICH I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL), THIS WAS SOMETHING NASSER COULD NOT ACCEPT. KARAME URGED THAT WE DRAW UP A TOTAL PACKAGE AND THEN PRESENT IT TO NASSER AND HUSSEIN SIMULTANEOUSLY. ALSO, HE SAID, WE WERE MAKING A GRAVE MISTAKE IN SUGGESTING THAT NASSER WOULD HAVE TO BARGAIN WITH ISRAEL OVER QUESTION OF UAR SOVEREIGNTY AT SHARM ASH SHAYKH. NEITHER COULD WE ASK NASSER TO NEGOTIATE ON QUESTION OF GAZA STRIP. NASSER WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO GET RID OF GAZA PROBLEM, BUT HE COULD NEVER ADMIT TO BARGAINING AWAY RIGHTS OF PALESTINIANS. GAZA QUESTION, TOO, COULD NEVER BE SETTLED EXCEPT IN OVER-ALL UAR-JORDAN PACKAGE.
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ACTION SS=45

INFO OCT*01 /046 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9141
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9670

EXDIS:

SUBJ: RACHID KARAME'S VIEWS ON THE SETTLEMENT

7) KARAME, IN CLOSING, URGED ME REQUEST WASHINGTON TAKE THIS "PERHAPS LAST CHANCE" TO MOVE OFF OUR PRESENT POSITION. HE FELT PRES. NIXON SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS AT STAKE IN TERMS US SELF-INTEREST IN AREA. US WAS PUTTING ITSELF (OR BEING PUSHED) INTO POSITION OF TOTAL EXCLUSION FROM ARAB WORLD, WITH RESULTING TOTAL IDENTIFICATION WITH ISRAELI POLICY OF RETENTION OF CONQUERED ARAB TERRITORY. DEMANDS ON US FROM ISRAEL WOULD GROW AS ARAB CONTINUED BATTLE. HE WONDERED HOW LONG US PEOPLE, AFTER VIET NAM EXPERIENCE, WOULD BE ABLE ACCEPT SUCH A DANGEROUS INVOLVEMENT. HE SAID HE AWARE HE HAD TOLD ME OFTEN BEFORE THAT TIME WAS AGAINST A SETTLEMENT. HE HAD BEEN RIGHT, HE REGRETTED, AND NOW THERE WAS VERY LITTLE TIME INDEED. IF A SOLUTION COULD NOT BE IMPOSED, TIME HAD ALREADY RUN OUT.
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09635 201731Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

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O 201635Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9129

SECRET BEIRUT 9635

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: STATE 194183

1. OUR DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN DAMASCUS REPORT FOLLOWING FROM ICRC DELEGATE ON PROPOSED EXCHANGE: A) ORIGINAL INITIATIVE ON EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS CAME FROM THE GOI SO AS TO RECOVER THEIR TWO PILOTS NOW IN UAR; B) IN RESPONSE UAR REQUESTED THAT ALL EGYPTIANS NOW IN ISRAELI HANDS, BE FREED, THAT IS ABOUT 50 PERSONS. GOI ACCEPTED UAR REQUEST; C) WHEN SARG LEARNED OF THIS (METHOD UNKNOWN) ATTASI REPORTEDLY TELEPHONED NASSER TO ASK TWO SYRIAN MIG PILOTS NOW HELD BY ISRAEL BE INCLUDED IN PACKAGE; D) GOI AGREED TO RELEASE OF SYRIAN PILOTS ON CONDITION THAT 48 HOURS BEFOREHAND TWO TWA PASSENGERS WERE AUTHORIZED TO LEAVE SYRIA; AND E) AT THIS POINT SARG THEN ASKED ICRC FOR RELEASE OF ALL SYRIAN PRISONERS IN ISRAEL, ABOUT 10, AND FURTHER REQUESTED SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE. ACCORDING TO ICRC REP GOI PROBABLY WILL NOT ACCEPT THESE DEMANDS ON GROUNDS TWO ISRAELIS IN SYRIA WERE AIRCRAFT PASSENGERS NOT PRISONERS OF WAR.

2. WILSON OF TWA IS AWARE OF PLANS FOR THESE EXCHANGES AND OF ICRC INVOLVEMENT, HAVING LEARNED OF IT FIRST THROUGH ALKHANI SYRIAN DCGA. HE ALSO REALIZES POSSIBILITY UNILATERAL SYRIAN RELEASE OF PASSENGERS NO LONGER EXISTS. PLANE WAS TESTED NOV. 19 AND FOUND SATISFACTORY. THERE REMAIN IN DAMASCUS 13 TWA PERSONNEL 4 CREW, 7 TECHNICIANS, PROJECT MANAGER GEIZER AND WILSON.

3. COMMENT: SYRIAN DECISION TO RAISE DEMANDS IS TYPICALLY

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SYRIAN BAZZAR HAGGLE. ICRC DELEGATE REPORTEDLY HAS DISCUSSED LATEST SYRIAN POSITION WITH GOI (AN ASSISTANT OF GEN. DAYAN) TODAY NOV. 20 RETURNING TO DAMASCUS SAME DAY FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH SARG.

4. IN VIEW OF STRONG EGYPTIAN INTEREST IN SEEING THIS EXCHANGE GO AHEAD WE THINK THAT UAR PRESSURES MIGHT WELL BE INVOKED TO CONVINCE SYRIANS THAT THE HAVE SUDDENLY RAISED THEIR PRICE ABOVE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL IN TERMS PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND ESPECIALLY SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE.

5. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT COMPROMISE HAS BEEN PROPOSED WHEREBY EXCHANGE OF ISRAELIS FOR SYRIANS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN SOME THIRD COUNTRY WITH SYRIAN AMBASSADOR THERE VERIFYING PRESENCE SYRIAN EXCHANGEES. THEIR ACTUAL RELEASE WOULD THEN FOLLOW 48 HOURS AFTER ISRAELI PASSENGERS LEFT SYRIA. PORTER

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 191509Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9112
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 9582

EXDIS:

SUBJ: GOL-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT

REF: JERUSALEM 758

1. WE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY UNTSO REPORT OF LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN

AGREEMENT DESCRIBED REFTEL. SEC GEN FONOFF SADAQA INFORMED DCM NOVEMBER 18 THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT WAS "VERY SHORT," CONCERNED ONLY PRINCIPLES AND CONTAINED NO DETAILS. HE SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT AGREEMENT DID NOT DECIDE SUCH MATTERS AS THE NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN WHO WOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENTER LEBANON, THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REMAIN HERE AND WHERE THEY WOULD BE STATIONED. HE MAINTAINED THAT LEBANESE MILITARY HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING SINCE THE CAIRO AGREEMENT WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVES IN LEBANON TO WORK OUT SUCH DETAILS AND THAT WHEN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETED YASIR ARAFAT WOULD PROBABLY COME TO LEBANON TO RATIFY FINAL ARRANGEMENTS.

2. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE SADAQA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CAIRO, IS ONE OF THE FEW LEBANESE OFFICIALS WHO REALLY KNOWS THE PRECISE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO.
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69 NOV 19 PM 4:21
WHITE HOUSE
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NOV 19 AM 8:14
WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS ROOM

SECRET 285

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09561 182248Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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O R 182238Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9104
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9561

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: STATE 193557

1. WE HAVE OPEN CODE WITH USINT DAMASCUS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM NOTIFY US BY TELEPHONE OF ANY PLANE DEPARTURE PLANS.
2. SO FAR WE HAVE RECEIVED NOTHING THIS CHANNEL ON NOVEMBER NINETEEN AS "MAGIC DATE".
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O R 181700Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9097
INFO USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 9553

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 9540

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRETARY GENERAL SADAKA HAS JUST CALLED US EVENING NOVEMBER 18 TO REPORT THAT GENERAL BOUSTANY IS MEETING WITHIN THE NEXT TWO DAYS IN BEIRUT WITH THE NUMBER TWO IN THE PLO. HE HOPES THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO SETTLE THE UNRWA PROBLEM. MEANTIME, HE EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF NGC PUBLICITY CONCERNING POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT AS SUCH COULD DESTROY CHANCE OF SUCCESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS.
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SITUATION ROOM
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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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O 181506Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9093
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 9540

EXDIS

SUBJ: UNRWA

REF: USUN 4220 AND BEIRUT 9512

1. DCM PRESENTED PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO BLOCK US FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF UNRWA TO SEC GEN FONOFF SADAQA THIS MORNING. SADAQA RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY THAT ACTION SUCH AS THAT CONTEMPLATED WOULD BE "EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING" TO THE GOL BOTH INTERNALLY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND EXTERNALLY IN ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB STATES. HE STATED THAT BOTH PALESTINIANS AND HOSTILE ARAB STATES WOULD VIEW SUCH ACTION AS CONFIRMING ALLEGATIONS THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO'S STATEMENT LAST MONTH INDICATED THE GOL WAS CONNIVING WITH THE USG TO SUPPRESS THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. HE PREDICTED THAT THE PLO, WITH WHICH GENERAL BOUSTANY WAS NOW NEGOTIATING, WOULD ATTACH SAME INTERPRETATION TO SUCH ACTION, WITH POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE BEING ABROGATION OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. THE END RESULT COULD BE EVEN MORE SERIOUS THREAT TO COUNTRY'S INTERNAL STABILITY THAN RECENT TROUBLES.

2. SADAQA DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL FACT THAT SECURITY IN MOST OF THE UNRWA CAMPS IS NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE PALESTINIANS, ALTHOUGH HE CONFIRMED THAT UNRWA OPERATIONS NONETHELESS PROCEEDING NORMALLY. HE, BOUSTANY, AND PRES HELOU WERE ALL TREATING PROBLEM AS TOP PRIORITY AND WERE ALL CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN SEEKING A WAY TO RESTORE FULL LEBANESE AUTHORITY OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS. BOUSTANY AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS AND OTHER MATTERS WITH PLO OFFICIALS HERE, AND, WHEN DETAILS HAD BEEN WORKED OUT,

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YASIR ARAFAT WAS EXPECTED TO COME TO LEBANON TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT ON MODUS VIVENDI. THE GOL WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT TIME AND CALM WERE NEEDED TO WORK OUT DETAILS FOR THE RETURN OF THE CAMPS TO GOL AUTHORITY. HE NOTED ALMOST PARENTHETICALLY, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NATURAL THAT HENCEFORTH THE REFUGEES WOULD WANT A ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR CAMPS. SADAQA PROMISED TO CONVEY OUR APPROACH TO PRESIDENT HELOU TODAY AND TO INFORM US IF THERE WAS ANYTHING FURTHER TO ADD ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. SADAQA HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO CONFIRM THE FOREGOING. HE ADDED THAT, AS LONG AS US ACTION TO CUT OFF FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF UNRWA REMAINED A HYPOTHETICAL THREAT RATHER THAN A FACT, IT COULD BE USEFUL TO THE GOL IN ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS. HOWEVER, ANY PUBLICITY THAT SUCH ACTION WAS BEING CONSIDERED BY CONGRESS WOULD UNDERMINE THE GOL POSITION. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT IT WAS THE OIL PRODUCING STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WERE GIVING THE MOST AID TO THE FEDAYEEN.
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WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09512 181117Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

023532

O 181045Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9086
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
COMSIXTHFLEET
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 9512

EXDIS

SUBJ: UNRWA

REF: USUN 4220 (NOTAL)

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF A DRAFT AMENDMENT TO SUSPEND AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA WOULD DO THE AMERICAN POSITION HERE GRAVE DAMAGE AND FUEL THE CURRENT RADICAL PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO REPRESENT THE USG AS PRO-ZIONIST AND IRREVOCABLY HOSTILE TO THE ARABS.

2. SUSPENSION OF US CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD HAVE A DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT HERE. QUITE APART FROM DISRUPTING GOL'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER, IT WOULD EXPOSE AMERICAN PROPERTY AND LIVES IN LEBANON TO THE GRAVEST THREAT SINCE JUNE 1967. REACTION IN LEBANON WOULD I BELIEVE CAUSE MORE DAMAGE THAN DID PHANTOM DELIVERIES. THE ARMED MEN IN REFUGEE CAMPS ARE AT MOMENT MUCH LESS A THREAT TO ISRAEL THAN TO LEBANON. ALSO, IT IS ALMOST INCONCEIVABLE CONTEMPLATE THAT THEY WOULD NOT REACT TO A US CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION OF THIS NATURE. WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD STRIKE BACK AT AMERICAN TARGETS HERE.

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3. IF SPONSORS OF REPORTED AMENDMENT INTEND TO PROCEED, I REQUEST WARNING SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO PERMIT EMBASSY TAKE STEPS TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY HERE, AND TO ALERT AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON TO A PROSPECTIVE EMERGENCY.

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INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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O R 171719Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9081
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 9505

EXDIS

SUBJ: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 191882

SUMMARY. ALL LEBANESE SECURITY AND OTHER OFFICIALS WERE WITHDRAWN FROM UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS OCT 23. UNRWA SERVICES WERE INTERRUPTED FOR FEW DAYS DURING HEIGHT OF RECENT CRISIS, BUT ARE NOW OPERATING NORMALLY. UNITS FROM VARIOUS FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOW PRESENT IN MOST CAMPS AND HAVE ASSUMED LIMITED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY. GOL CLAIMS CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES ITS INTENTION TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER CAMPS, THOUGH IN FUTURE THERE WILL BE REPRESENTATIVES OF PALESTINIAN ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND (PASC) IN CAMPS WHO WILL COOPERATE WITH LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IN MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS ONE WHICH UNRWA, GOL, AND PALESTINIANS WILL HAVE TO WORK OUT FOR THEMSELVES. ANY INTERVENTION BY USG WILL LIKELY TRIGGER IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT RESPONSE AGAINST US INTERESTS. AT THIS JUNCTURE ANY CUTBACK OF SUPPORT FOR UNRWA ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON WOULD ABET THOSE ELEMENTS SUCH AS EXTREME RADICAL REGIME IN SYRIA WHO WOULD LIKE TO DESTROY LEBANON. WE ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED, AS IS PRES HELOU, BY TREND TOWARDS CREATION STATE WITHIN STATE AMONG PALESTINIAN POPULATION, BUT IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HELOU AT THIS POINT TO REFER MATTER TO UN. END SUMMARY.

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1. EXTENT OF FEDAYEEN PRESENCE. SINCE WITHDRAWAL OF LEBANESE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES FROM UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS OCT 23, VARIOUS FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAVE ASSUMED DE FACTO CONTROL OVER SECURITY AND RELATED MATTERS WITHIN THE CAMPS. THEY ARE CONTROLLING ACCESS TO CAMPS, AND RECENT VISITORS REPORT SEEING ARMED FEDAYEEN PATROLLING INSIDE. WHILE RELIABLE DETAILED INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE, UNRWA SOURCES TELL US THAT PLF AND GEORGE HABASH'S PFLP NOW PRESENT IN ALMOST ALL CAMPS. IN AYN AL HILWAH CAMP NEAR SIDON, ELEMENTS OF EIGHT DIFFERENT FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. EACH HAS ESTABLISHED ITS OWN COMMAND POST TO DIRECT RECRUITMENT AND OTHER ACTIVITIES. IN NAHR AL BARID CAMP NEAR TRIPOLI, SEVEN ORGANIZATIONS ARE PRESENT, WITH SYRIAN-CONTROLLED SAIQA DOMINANT.

2. SIZE AND PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THESE FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE. IN MOST INSTANCES THEY CONSIST OF CAMP RESIDENTS RECRUITED AND SENT TO SYRIA, JORDAN OR IRAQ FOR TWO-THREE MONTHS OF COMMANDO TRAINING AND RETURNED TO FORM FEDAYEEN CADRES WITHIN THE CAMP. A FEW FEDAYEEN "OFFICERS" OR "INSTRUCTORS" HAVE RETURNED WITH THESE MEN TO SUPERVISE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. IN OTHER INSTANCES CAMP RESIDENTS HAVE VOLUNTARILY AFFILIATED WITH PLO OR FATAH WITHOUT BENEFIT OF FORMAL TRAINING OUTSIDE CAMP. MOST OF THE FEDAYEEN IN THE LEBANESE CAMPS ARE ORIGINAL RESIDENTS OF THOSE CAMPS.

3. FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN CAMPS. IN ABSENCE OF GOL REPRESENTATIVES, FEDAYEEN HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR PATROLLING, MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER, AND CONTROLLING ACCESS TO CAMPS. THEY HAVE ESTABLISHED RECRUITMENT CENTERS AND DIRECT SOME BASIC MILITARY-TYPE TRAINING, INCLUDING SMALL-AMRS HANDLING, WITHIN THE CAMPS. A SPOKESMAN OF THE PLO OFFICE IN BEIRUT HAS DELCARED THAT ARMED FEDAYEEN IN THE UNRWA CAMPS ARE NECESSARY TO PROTECT RESIDENTS FROM POSSIBLE ISRAELI PARATROOPER ATTACK, SINCE CAMP RESIDENTS ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT GOL CAPABILITY TO REPEL IDF ATTACK, AND SINCE THEY ENVISAGE POSSIBLE CLASH BETWEEN GOL AND PALESTINIANS FOR CONTROL OF CAMPS, THEY WELCOME PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN.

4. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNRWA ACTIVITIES. EXCEPT FOR BRIEF PERIOD DURING HEIGHT OF OCT CRISIS, UNRWA HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONTINUE ITS PROGRAM OF WELFARE ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES IN ALL 15 CAMPS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVES FROM CAMPS HAS AFFORDED RESIDENTS OPPORTUNITIES

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TO CONSTRUCT NEW HUTS NAD UNDERTAKE "IMPROVEMENTS" HERETOFORE FORBIDDEN. ALSO, DEPARTURE OF LEBANESE REPRESENTATIVES REMOVED THE AUTHORITY MOST INTERESTED IN PREVENTING "OUTSIDERS" FROM MOVING INTO CAMPS OR RESIDENTS FROM SELLING "OCCUPANCY RIGHTS" TO REFUGEE QUARTERS. CLASHES OCCURRING IN SOME CAMPS BETWEEN RIVAL FEDAYEEN GROUPS SUGGEST OLD SCORES ARE BEING SETTLED. A FEW KNOWN G-2 INFORMANTS HAVE ALSO BEEN ELIMINATED. PORTER

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INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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O R 171719Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9082
USMISSION USUN

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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EXDIS

SUBJ: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 191882

5. UNRWA HAS COME UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM PALESTINIAN EMPLOYEES EMBOLDENED BY SUPPORT THEY NOW RECEIVE FROM FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. DIRECTOR OF UNRWA AFFAIRS FOR LEBANON WAS INFORMED RECENTLY THAT THE AGENCY'S "TEACHERS' STAFF ASSOCIATION" HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A NEW PLO-SPONSORED "ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINIAN TEACHERS." THE LATTER GROUP HAS ALREADY ADOPTED MORE BELLIGERENT POSITION IN DEMANDING CHANGES IN EDUCATION PROGRAM, SUCH AS NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND SMALLER CLASSES, FOR WHICH ADEQUATE FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. THE NEW ASSOCIATION HAS ESPOUSED CAUSE OF TEACHER APPLICATIONS FOR WHOM UNRWA/UNESCO HAD NOT FOUND JOBS. IMPLIED THREATS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST UNRWA'S PALESTINIAN EMPLOYEES WHO RESIST FEDAYEEN "DIRECTIVES." AGENCY OFFICIALS FEAR ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS MAY ENSUE IF GOL DOES NOT REGAIN SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER CAMPS FROM FEDAYEEN.

6. GOL POSITION. FONOFF SEC GEN SADAGA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN CAIRO GOL-PLO TALKS, HAS ADVISED UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES GOL'S INTENTION TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THERE ARE ALSO TO BE PASC REPRESENTATIVES IN EACH CAMP TO COORDINATE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE WITH GOL IN MAINTAINING

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ORDER. SADAQA STRESSED THAT UNRWA WILL CONTINUE DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE GOL, AS PROVIDED BY GOL/UN AGREEMENT RELATING TO UNRWA, AND GOL WILL RETAIN EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY UDDL#WITH ALL PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. SADAQA ALSO ASSERTED TO UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES GOL BAN ON ARMED FEDAYEEN IN UNIFORM IN CAMPS. HE STRESSED IT WILL TAKE GOL TIME TO WORK OUT DETAILS AND COUNSELED PATIENCE.

7. GOL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER CAMPS, IN COOPERATION WITH PASC, ARE HAMPERED BY DEFIANT POSITION TAKEN BY PFLP, WHOSE SPOKESMAN HAVE DECLARED PFLP, ACTING INDEPENDENT OF PLO, IS NOT BOUND BY CAIRO AGREEMENT. SINCE PFLP IS WELL INSTALLED IN SOUTH LEBANESE CITIES, SUCH AS RASHIDIYYAH, REESTABLISHMENT OF GOL SOVEREIGNTY WILL RISK FURTHER CLASHES WITH FEDAYEEN.

8. COMMENT. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT MAY ULTIMATELY MEAN FOR GOL POSITION IN UNRWA CAMPS. SPECIFIC NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP WILL HAVE TO BE HAMMERED OUT IN ACTUAL SITUATIONS. DESPITE SADAQA'S ASSURANCES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT GOL WILL AT BEST BE CONSTRAINED TO SHARE SUPERVISION OVER CAMPS WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES. IMPRESSIVE QUANTITY OF ARMS IN REFUGEE HANDS PLUS RECOGNITION GOL ACCORDED PALESTINIAN CAUSE THROUGH CAIRO AGREEMENT HAVE ENHANCED PALESTINIANS' ABILITY TO RETAIN SOME OF THEIR RECENTLY ACQUIRED AUTONOMY.

9. THESE QUESTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN GOL AND PALESTINIANS. ANY ATTEMPT BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT, EVEN INCLUDING THE MAJOR DONOR, THE US, TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS WOULD PROVOKE A

VIOLENT PALESTINIAN REACTION THAT COULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE GOL. IF UNRWA IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ITS WELFARE PROGRAM WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, WE BELIEVE THE FEDAYEEN WILL BE MORE LIKLY TOO TEMPER THEIR DEMANDS ON UNRWA AND GOL SO

AS NOT TO PROVIDE CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF UN AID. BELIEVE AGENCY IS IN BEST POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER IT CAN CONTINUE TO FUNCTION, AND IF NOT, WHAT ACTION UN MIGHT PROBABLY TAKE.

10. IF, AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE US WERE TO CUT OFF AID OR IN ANY OTHER WAY ACT AGAINST REFUGEES LIVING ON LEBANESE SOIL, WE WOULD BE PENALIZING GOL AND AIDING RADICAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS BAATH WHICH

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SEEK TO DESTROY LEBANON. THERE WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE AN IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT ANTI-US RESPONSE TO ANY SUCH ACTION. IN ANY EVENT, UNLESS OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON SHOULD FURTHER DETERIORATE, WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT UNRWA'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE ALL WELFARE SERVICES TO NEEDY REFUGEES AS IN

THE PAST, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RELATIONSHIP ULTIMATELY ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE FEDAYEEN. FROM US POINT OF VIEW, ONE OF THE WORST ASPECTS OF PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT SOME RECIPIENTS OF UN RATIONS ARE TRAINING AS FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, UNRWA HAS INFORMED US FLATLY THAT THEY HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DIVERSION OF UN RATIONS TO ANY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION PER SE. IF DONOR STATES WERE TO SUSPEND CONTRIBUTIONS ON THIS POINT OF PRINCIPLE, RESULT

COULD BE DELETERIOUS TO THE EFFORT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND DESTRUCTIVE TO LEBANON.

11. WE ARE OF COURSE DEEPLY DISTURBED, BY THE PRESENT TREND IN LEBANON. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT HELOU HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN OUR ATTENTION TO THE MENACE TO LEBANON OF THE PALESTINIAN "FIFTH COLUMN." IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAS LONG SOUGHT A MORE EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE TO HELP PRESERVE LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY. HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HELOU TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE UN HIMSELF; HE IS CONSTRAINED BY THE TERMS OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT, AND SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE AN ACT OF POLITICAL SUICIDE.

12. AS LONG AS US POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT IS BASED UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE US TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UNRWA. THE ARGUMENT THAT UNRWA SHOULD SEVER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE REJECTED THE UN RESOLUTION, CAN BE MET BY THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL, HAVING FAILED TO ACCEPT PREVIOUS UN REFUGEE RESOLUTIONS, IS EQUALLY AT FAULT. IF DEPARTMENT MUST COMMENT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON, WE BELIEVE THAT COMMENT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ASKING THE UNSYG TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS. PORTER

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O 171040Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9072

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9480

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

FOR DELIVERY ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS NOV 17.

1. MSG CONTAINED DEPTEL 192904 PASSED WILSON VIA SAFE HAND NOV 16 AT 1430Z. AT THAT TIME WE WERE INFORMED WILSON HAD MET SARG AIR FORCE G-2 MAJOR KHOULY AND THAT WILSON REGARDED CALL AS SUCCESSFUL IN THAT KHOULY "UNDERSTANDING" AND WILLING ARRANGE APPOINTMENT FOR WILSON WITH HAFEX ASSAD. WILSON LATER INFORMED BY DR. ZAYYAT THIS WOULD BE NOT LATER THAN MONDAY (NOV 17). WILSON STILL PURSUING LINE OF HAVING TWO PASSENGERS FLY OUT WITH BOEING.

2. IN PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT ICRC DELEGATE DAMASCUS INFORMED AMB RICCARDI NOV 16 THAT ISRAELIS HAD NOW AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE TWO SYRIAN MIG VI95S#AGAINST ISRAELI PRISONERS BEING

HELD BY UAR, POSSIBLY INCLUDING TWO ISRAELI PILOTS RECENTLY CAPTURED. ICRC DELEGATE IS NOW APPROACHING SARG TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES. STILL UNCLEAR IF ICRC OR SARG WILL THEN TAKE INITIATIVE WITH UAR. THEREAFTER SARG WOULD LET TWO ISRAELIS LEAVE WITH TWA PLANE, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT FORMALLY FIGURE IN EXCHANGE.

3. BOEING NOW REPAIRED AND READY TO DEPART ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. WILSON WILL ACCOMPANY TWO ISRAELIS OUT ON PLANE IF RELEASED. OTHERWISE HE WILL STAY. PLANE CREW OF FOUR AND SIX TECHNICIANS WILL BE ABOARD, LEAVING FIVE OTHER TECHNICIANS AND TWA PROJECT MANAGER JOHN GAIGER# TO FOLLOW.

69 NOV 17 AM 10:11
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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4. WE ARE MAKING NO LATERAL DISTRIBUTION THIS MESSAGE AT SPECIFIC REQUEST OUR SOURCES WHO WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS IN EMPHASIZING TO US THAT ICRC DISCUSSIONS NOW AT EXTREMELY SENSITIVE STAGE. WE NOTED TO OUR SOURCE SUBSTANCE OF TEL AVIV'S 4290 WHO COMMENTED THAT IN VIEW ISRAELI RESPONSE TO ICRC (PARA 3 ABOVE) THAT HE SAW NO PRESENT LIKLIHOOD OF ANY HASTY ACTION BY ISRAELIS. HE DID ACCEPT SUGGESTION THAT DEPT MIGHT NOTE BRIEFLY TO TEL AVIV ONLY THAT ICRC CONTINUES ACTIVE AND TO STRESS DEEP CONCERN FOR NEED OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY AND FOR AVOIDANCE HASTY ACTION BY GOI. AT SAME TIME HE THOUGHT ANY INFO TEL AVIV HAS ON ICRC ACTIVITIES WOULD BE HELPFUL.

5. COMMENT: WITH RESPECT TO TEL AVIV'S REQUEST FOR LATERAL DISTRIBUTION ON MSGS ON TWA HIJACKING, WE CAN UNDERSTAND DESIRE TO KEEP GOI FULL INFORMED OF PROGRESS BEING MADE TOWARD RELEASE ISRAELI PASSENGERS. ON OTHER HAND, NEGS FOR RELEASE APPEAR REACHING ENCOURAGING BUT SENSITIVE STAGE. ANY ISRAELI LEAK TO PRESS WOULD KILL CURRENT NEGS. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT INFORM GOI ANY MORE THAN ICRC AND TWA ACTIVELY PURSUING PROBLEM AND THAT AT THIS STAGE ABSOLUTE SECRECY BY GOI IMPREATIVE IF ANY CHANCE SUCCESS.
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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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P R 171220Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9075
INFO RYAQBWB/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3551
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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9. I THEN ASKED HELOU WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WOULD GO ALONG WITH HIS PLAN AND WHAT HE CONSIDERED THEIR PRESENT AIMS. HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AGREEABLE. HE IS CONVINCED THEY DO NOT WANT WAR IN THE MIDEAST. SOVIET POLICY AT PRESENT HAS THREE AIMS: 1) TO CHANNEL THE ARABS TO THE BRINK OF WAR BUT STOP THEM THERE; 2) TO SUBSTITUTE SOVIET INFLUENCE FOR THAT OF THE US AND THE WEST; AND 3) TO FORESTALL THE GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. ELABORATING ON THIS LAST POINT, AND REVERTING TO AN EARLIER THEME, HELOU SAID UNLESS THE PRESENT TREND IS ARRESTED, THE ARAB WORLD IS HEADED TOWARD TOTAL RADICALIZATION. HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WILL SEE US AND WESTERN INFLUENCE TOTALLY SUPERSEDED BY THAT OF THE USSR, AND THE SUBSEQUENT FEW YEARS WILL SEE THE SOVIETS ECLIPSED BY COMMUNIST CHINA. THE PRESENT TREND IN THE AREA IS AGAINST ALL ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS BE THEY CAPITALIST, SOCIALIST, OR COMMUNIST AND IN FAVOR OF PEOPLES' REVOLUTIONS.

10. COMMENT: WHILE HELOU'S CURRENT STATE OF MIND MAY HAVE INDUCED AN OCCASIONAL EXAGGERATION, I FIND HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TREND OF EVENTS VERY SIMILAR TO MY OWN. IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS HE HAS SEEN HIS EARLIER DIRE PREDICTIONS COME TO PASS. HE HAS ALSO SEEN HOW POWERLESS HE WAS TO ALTER THE COURSE OF EVENTS - AND HOW AT THAT

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TIME USG AND WEST IN GENERAL WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE AID AND SUPPORT. HE IS MOST GRATEFUL FOR WHAT WE HAVE DONE BUT KEENLY AWARE LIMITATIONS ON OUR CAPACITY TO ASSIST IN LIGHT OUR OVERALL AREA POSTURE.

11. HELOU HAS BEEN PROPOSING UN INTERVENTION TO SEPARATE THE COMBATANTS IN HIS TALKS WITH ME DURING THE LAST YEAR. THIS IN HIS VIEW IS ONLY POSSIBLE FIRST STEP TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE HAS NEVER BELIEVED THAT UN RESOLUTION COULD BE OTHERWISE

IMPLEMENTED SO AS TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH ISRAEL AND ARABS. WHETHER OR NOT WE CONCUR WITH HIS PROPOSAL, IT IS HARD TO QUARREL WITH HIS PREMISE THAT SOME NEW APPROACH IS NOW REQUIRED, AND THAT IT MUST INCLUDE MEASURES TO STOP THE FIGHTING BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.
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8. IN SUPPORTING HIS ARGUMENT, HELOU CLAIMED NOT HAVE ALL WISDOM BUT SAID, THOUGH HE IS WESTERN-EDUCATED, HE IS ENOUGH OF AN ARAB TO APPRECIATE THE ARAB MENTALITY. I INTERJECTED THAT ISRAELI LEADERS ARE ALSO WESTERN-MINDED. WHAT THEY WILL ACCEPT IS GOVERNED BY THIS FACT. HELOU OBJECTED THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE FOR A FEW ISRAELI LEADERS SUCH AS GOLDA MEIR, BUT NOT FOR MOST, AND CERTAINLY NOT FOR THE YOUNG. HE IS CONVINCED THE ISRAELIS ARE SUFFICIENTLY "ORIENTAL" TO APPRECIATE HIS PROPOSAL AND PERHAPS ACCEPT IT. I ASKED WHETHER HELOU HAD BROADENED HIS IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE FRENCH. HE SAID THAT HE HAD, BUT THAT THE PREVIOUS FRENCH AMBASSADOR HERE HAD NOT SEEMED TOO ENTHUSIASTIC. HELOU ADDED THAT, THOUGH HE IS CONVINCED HIS PROPOSAL IS THE ONLY REALISTIC ONE, HIS OWN DELICATE POSITION WITHIN LEBANON AND THE ARAB WORLD DOES NOT PERMIT HIM TO ESPOUSE IT PUBLICLY.
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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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P R 171220Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9074
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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4. TURNING FINALLY TO THE US PEACE PROPOSAL, HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD RECEIVE A BLUNT REJECTION FROM CAIRO. AN OBVIOUS OBJECTION TO IT IS THAT IT DOES NOT GUARANTEE TOTAL ISRAELI WITH-

DRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE FATAL FLAW AS HE SEES IT, HOWEVER, IS THAT, DESPITE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL, IT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS AN ATTEMPT TO DIVIDE THE ARABS. BY REJECTING THE PROPOSAL ON THIS GROUND, IN SPITE OF WHAT MIGHT SEEM TO BE BENEFITS FOR THE UAR, NASSER WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY PUBLICLY TO REAFFIRM HIS DEDICATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LIBERATION OF ALL THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND TO ENHANCE HIS CLAIM TO BE SPOKESMAN OF ALL THE ARABS.

5. ELABORATING ON THIS POINT, HELOU SAID THAT NASSER PROBABLY WANTS PEACE BUT FINDS IT EASIER TO OPT FOR WAR. PEACE WOULD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE DECISIVE ACTION WITH UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES. CHOOSING WAR DOES NOT INVOLVE MAKING HARD DECISIONS AND ANY ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS CHOICE MIGHT BE YEARS IN COMING.

6. I THEN ASKED HELOU IF HE THOUGHT SOME SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS TO THE US PROPOSAL WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE USSR MIGHT INFLUENCE

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NASSER'S ATTITUDE. HELOU WAS EXTREMELY DUBIOUS. HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT MAKE A DIFFERENCE IF THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN WORKING PAPERS WERE BOTH AVAILABLE TO JORDAN AND EGYPT AT THE SAME TIME. HELOU WAS SIMILARLY PESSIMISTIC THAT A MEETING OF THE FOUR POWERS WOULD HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF IMPROVING THE SITUATION, THOUGH HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT PROVIDE A FORMULA FOR INTRODUCING SOME HELPFUL AMENDMENTS. A WEAKNESS OF THE FOUR-POWER TALKS, AS HE SEES IT, IS THAT FRANCE IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY IMPORTANT INITIATIVE FOR FEAR OF DAMAGING ITS PROFITABLE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST.

7. HELOU THEN TURNED TO WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE ONLY REALISTIC HOPE FOR A SOLUTION, I.E., THE PRIOR SEPARATION OF THE COMBATANTS BY STATIONING OF UN TROOPS. I INTERPOSED THAT IT WAS HARDLY REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE UN TO USE FORCE TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION. HELOU REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE USE OF FORCE (NOR OF TROOPS FROM THE GREAT POWERS) BUT THAT SOME CLEVER PSYCHOLOGY WOULD BE NECESSARY. IF THE REASON FOR STATIONING TROOPS WAS STATED AS SIMPLY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, HELOU WAS SURE THE ARABS WOULD ACCEPT IT. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED NEED NOT BE SPECIFIED. FROM THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW, THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ISRAEL FOR ITS PART "MIGHT TAKE SOME CONSOLATION" FROM THE FACT THAT THE TERRITORY FROM WHICH IT WITHDREW WOULD NOT REVERT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ARABS. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BUY TIME. ARAB PASSIONS WOULD COOL AND INTEREST WANE. BLOOD WOULD STOP FLOWING. WITH TIME, THE ARABS WOULD FIND IT EASY TO ACCEPT SOLUTIONS THEY NOW REJECT -- PERHAPS EVEN LESS THEY NOW DEMAND. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, HELOU CITED THE PROVISION IN THE US WORKING PAPER FOR NEUTRALIZING SHARM ASH SHAYKH AND TIRAN. IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT THE ARABS WILL VIEW THIS AS A POSITIVE US-SPONSORED ACT LIMITING ARAB SOVEREIGNTY. BUT KEEPING US FORCES IN THESE AREAS AFTER A GENERAL UN WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. "WHEN THE TIDE RECEDES, WHO IS BOTHERED IF IT LEAVES A FEW ROCKS BEHIND?" HELOU SAID SEPARATING THE COMBATANTS WOULD ALSO FACILITATE SETTLING OTHER ASPECTS OF THE MIDEAST PROBLEM. IT IS TRUE, HE SAID, THAT ARAB LANDS MUST BE RETURNED TO ARABS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO THE SAME ARABS WHO GOVERNED THEM BEFORE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE UN HELD A PLEBISCITE IN GAZA AND THE PEOPLE OPTED TO BECOME PART OF JORDAN, WHO COULD OBJECT?

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STOP A REVOLUTION AT KERENSKY. EITHER KERENSKY BECOMES LENIN OR A LENIN ARISES." HELOU FELT THAT THIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST PRO-WESTERN ARAB STATES, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY AGAINST THE US ITSELF, WOULD GREATLY ACCELERATE IN THE FIRST PART OF NEXT YEAR.

3. HELOU SAID THAT THE DECEMBER 20 ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT RABAT WILL BE A WATERSHED AND THAT HE IS NOT AT ALL OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME. THE "NOT VERY INTELLIGENT" GENERAL BUSTANY, WHO HAD REPRESENTED LEBANON AT THE ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING IN CAIRO WHICH ARRANGED THE SUMMIT, HAD FAILED TO SEE SEVERAL TRAPS WHICH HAD BEEN LAID FOR LEBANON, AND APPARENTLY CERTAIN DECISIONS WERE NOT DISCUSSED WITH HIM. HELOU SAID THAT DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN AT RABAT WHICH MIGHT NOT AT FIRST SEEM DECISIVE BUT WHICH WOULD BE NONETHELESS IRREVERSIBLE. HE FEARED THAT THE SUMMIT WOULD ADOPT A DECISION SPECIFYING THAT ALL ARAB COUNTRIES PROVIDE A MILITARY CONTINGENT TO BE PUT UNDER ARAB JOINT COMMAND. EVEN MORE GRAVE, HE FEARED A DECISION CALLING FOR THE STATIONING OF ARAB FORCES WHEREVER THE JOINT COMMAND THOUGHT NECESSARY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL. THIS WOULD BE A DEMAND THAT LEBANON COULD NOT EASILY REFUSE. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES, IT IS NOW NATURAL THAT LEBANON SHOULD ACCEPT THE STATIONING OF ARAB TROOPS ON ITS SOIL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL ARAB PREPARATION FOR WAR. ACCORDING TO THIS REASONING, THE SUEZ, GOLAN AND JORDANIAN FRONTS ARE NOT SUITABLE FOR ATTACK ON ISRAEL. WHY SHOULD THE MORE SUITABLE LEBANESE FRONT BE EXEMPTED?
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 391

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09484 01 OF 03 171547Z

47
ACTION SS-45

2

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

018385

P R 171220Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9073
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 BEIRUT 9484

EXDIS:

BEGIN SUMMARY. NOVEMBER 14 I SAW PRES HELOU WHO DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT TREND OF EVENTS IN ME. HE CONVINCED PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION IN THE REGION PROCEEDING UNCHECKED AND THAT THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST US INTERESTS AND STATES FRIENDLY TO US WILL ACCELERATE GREATLY IN MONTHS JUST AHEAD. HE PARTICULARLY MENTIONED CONCERTYB CAMPAIGN AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA OF LAST FEW WEEKS. HELOU WORRIED ABOUT FORTHCOMING RABAT SUMMIT WHICH HE THINKS WILL BE WATERSPLD FOR LEBANON AND ARAB WORLD. HE FEARS DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AT MEETING THAT ALL ARAB STATES CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO JOINT ARAB COMMAND AND ACCEPT STATIONING OF TROOPS ON THEIR TERRITORY IF DEEMED NECESSARY BY ARAB COMMAND. LEBANON WOULD FIND SUCH A DEMAND DIFFICULT TO REFUSE. TURNING TO US PEACE PROPOSAL, HELOU SAID HE THOUGHT CAIRO WOULD BLUNTLY REJECT IT. OBVIOUS OBJECTION IS THAT IT DOES NOT SPECIFY TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, BUT FATAL FLAW IS THAT IT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS ATTEMPT DIVIDE THE ARABS. BY REJECTING IT ON THIS BASIS AND IN SPITE OF APPARENT BENEFITS TO THE UAR, NASSER WILL BE ABLE TO REAFFIRM HIS DEVOTION TO FREEING ALL

OCCUPIED LANDS AND ENHANCE HIS CLAIM TO BE THE SPOKESMAN FOR ALL THE ARABS. HELOU DID

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NOT THINK ANY MINOR MODIFICATIONS LIKELY MAKE PROPOSAL MORE PALATABLE TO NASSER. HELOU CONVINCED THAT ONLY REALISTIC WAY TO PEACE IS TO FIRST SEPARATE THE COMBATANTS WITH UN TROOPS. ARABS WOULD ACCEPT THIS IF IT IN CONTEXT IMPLEMENTING NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION.

SPECIFICS NEED NOT BE SPELLED OUT. IMPORTANT THING IS THAT IT WOULD STOP FLOW OF BLOOD AND BUY TIME FOR PASSIONS TO COOL. HELOU BELIEVES ARABS WOULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT SOLUTIONS THEY NOW REJECT AND THAT PRESENTLY THORNY PROBLEMS SUCH AS SHARM ASH SHAYKH, TIRAN, AND GAZA WOULD BECOME MUCH MORE TRACTABLE. HE BELIEVES SOVIETS WOULD GO ALONG WITH SUCH A PLAN BECAUSE THEY DON'T WANT WAR IN ME THOUGH THEY CHALLENGING THE ARABS TO

THE BRINK OF WAR, SEEKING THEREBY TO SUBSTITUTE OWN INFLUENCE FOR THAT OF US AND WEST AND FORESTALL GROWTH CHINESE INFLUENCE. CONCLUDING ON PESSIMISTIC NOTE, HELOU SAID HE BELIEVES UNLESS PRESENT TREND ARRESTED, NEXT SEVERAL YEARS WILL SEE US COMPLETELY SUPERSEDED IN THE REGION BY USSR AND IN SUBSEQUENT FEW YEARS USSR WILL IN TURN BE ECLIPSED BY COMMUNIST CHINA. END SUMMARY.

1. PRES HELOU RECEIVED ME AT 11:00 A.M. NOV 14 TO GIVE ME HIS VIEWS ON THE US PEACE PROPOSALS, A COPY OF WHICH I HAD SENT HIM THE DAY BEFORE. HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS ON THE PROPOSALS WITH HIS VIEW OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST.

2. HE SAID THAT THE BASIC FACTOR IS THAT 80 MILLION ARABS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ACCEPT THE REALITY OF DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF TWO MILLION JEWS AND THEY THEREFORE CONSOLE THEMSELVES WITH THE FIRM BELIEF THAT IT WAS REALLY THE US WHICH DEFEATED THEM. STARTING FROM THIS PREMISE, AND GIVEN THE PREMISE THAT THE ARABS CANNOT WAGE WAR ON THE US OR WIN A WAR WITH ISRAEL, THE PROCESS OF REHABILITATING ARAB MORALE DICTATES AN ATTACK ON US INTERESTS IN THE AREA AND ON THOSE GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO THE US. THIS IS ALREADY TAKING PLACE, AS WITNESS LEBANON'S TROUBLES, DEMANDS ON KUWAIT FOR MORE ASSISTANCE, AND THE STRONG CAMPAIGN AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THE LIBYAN MONARCHY WAS THE FIRST VICTIM OF THIS TREND, AND THE US IS DELUDING ITSELF IF IT THINKS THAT THE REVOLUTION THERE WILL STOP SHORT OF COMPLETE REJECTION OF THE WEST. "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 441

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09501 171642Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

018719

R 171604Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9080

SECRET BEIRUT 9501

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 9480

1. ONE OF THE CONTINUING SYRIAN INTERESTS HAS BEEN TO SEEK FROM USG EXPORT LICENSE 1000 RCA TRANSCEIVERS. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS QUESTION WERE CONTAINED IN AN OFFICIAL-INFORMAL FROM PRATT TO BAAS/NEA/ARN DATED NOV 4.

2. RCA AGENT DAMASCUS EL YUSSEF AGAIN RAISED QUESTION NOV 17 DURING VISIT BEIRUT WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AGAINST BACKGROUND DETENTION ISRAELI PASSENGERS. EL YUSSEF REITERATED HOW DIFFICULT ANY DECISION FOR RELEASE WAS FOR ANY SYRIAN HEAD OF GOVT TO MAKE BECAUSE IF HE DECIDED FOR RELEASE HE FACED RISK BEING OVERTHROWN. OBVIOUS CONCLUSION WAS HE HAD TO DEFEND HIMSELF BY HAVING SOMETHING IN HAND TO SHOW AS PRICE FOR RELEASE.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE POT COULD BE SWEETENED FOR SARG DECISION MAKERS BY USG DECISION TO LICENSE THIS EXPORT AND TO COMMUNICATE THIS DECISION TO SYRIANS WHILE DISCUSSIONS MENTIONED REFTEL ARE STILL UNDERWAY. THIS GESTURE WOULD COST US NOTHING AND YIELD TWO MILLION DOLLARS IN EXPORTS AND MIGHT POSSIBLY TIP SCALES FAR ENOUGH FOR SARG TO DECIDE FAVORABLY ON RELEASE TWO ISRAELIS. LICENSE COULD ALWAYS BE RECONSIDERED IF SITUATION TURNED SERIOUSLY SOUR LATER ON.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 666

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09505 02 OF 02 172009Z

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47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 NSCE-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /046 W

019814

O R 171719Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9082
USMISSION USUN
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 9505

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

SUBJ: FEDAYEEN AND UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 191882

5. UNRWA HAS COME UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM PALESTINIAN EMPLOYEES EMBOLDENED BY SUPPORT THEY NOW RECEIVE FROM FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. DIRECTOR OF UNRWA AFFAIRS FOR LEBANON WAS INFORMED RECENTLY THAT THE AGENCY'S "TEACHERS' STAFF ASSOCIATION" HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A NEW PLO-SPONSORED "ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINIAN TEACHERS." THE LATTER GROUP HAS ALREADY ADOPTED MORE BELLIGERENT POSITION IN DEMANDING CHANGES IN EDUCATION PROGRAM, SUCH AS NEW SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND SMALLER CLASSES, FOR WHICH ADEQUATE FUNDS ARE NOT AVAILABLE. THE NEW ASSOCIATION HAS ESPOUSED CAUSE OF TEACHER APPLICATNS FOR WHOM UNRWA/UNESCO HAD NOT FOUND JOBS. IMPLIED THREATS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST UNRWA'S PALESTINIAN EMPLOYEES WHO RESIST FEDAYEEN "DIRECTIVES." AGENCY OFFICIALS FEAR ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS MAY ENSUE IF GOL DOES NOT REGAIN SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER CAMPS FROM FEDAYEEN.

6. GOL POSITION. FONOFF SEC GEN SADAQA, WHO PARTICIPATED IN CAIRO GOL-PLO TALKS, HAS ADVISED UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES GOL'S INTENTION TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE REFUGEE CAMPS. THERE ARE ALSO TO BE PASC REPRESENTATIVES IN EACH CAMP TO CO-

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ORDINATE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE WITH GOL IN MAINTAINING ORDER. SADAGA STRESSED THAT UNRWA WILL CONTINUE DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE GOL, AS PROVIDED BY GOL/UN AGREEMENT RELATING TO UNRWA, AND GOL WILL RETAIN EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY DEAL WITH ALL PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS. SADAGA ALSO ASSERTED TO UNRWA THAT CAIRO AGREEMENT ENDORSES GOL BAN ON ARMED FEDAYEEN IN UNIFORM IN CAMPS. HE STRESSED IT WILL TAKE GOL TIME TO WORK OUT DETAILS AND COUNSELED PATIENCE.

7. GOL EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH CONTROL OVER CAMPS, IN COOPERATION WITH PASC, ARE HAMPERED BY DEFIANT POSITION TAKEN BY PFLP, WHOSE SPOKESMAN HAVE DECLARED PFLP, BEING INDEPENDENT OF PLO, IS NOT BOUND BY CAIRO AGREEMENT. SINCE PFLP IS WELL INSTALLED IN SOME LEBANESE CAMPS, SUCH AS RASHIDIYYAH, REESTABLISHMENT OF GOL SOVEREIGNTY WILL RISK FURTHER CLASHES WITH FEDAYEEN.

8. COMMENT. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT MAY ULTIMATELY MEAN FOR GOL POSITION IN UNRWA CAMPS. SPECIFIC NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP WILL HAVE TO BE HAMMERED OUT IN ACTUAL SITUATIONS. DESPITE SADAGA'S ASSURANCES, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT GOL WILL AT BEST BE CONSTRAINED TO SHARE SUPERVISION OVER CAMPS WITH PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES. IMPRESSIVE QUANTITY OF ARMS IN REFUGEE HANDS PLUS RECOGNITION GOL ACCORDED PALESTINIAN CAUSE THROUGH CARIO AGREEMENT HAVE ENHANCED PALESTINIANS' ABILITY TO RETAIN SOME OF THEIR RECENTLY ACQUIRED AUTONOMY.

9. THESE QUESTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN GOL AND PALESTINIANS. ANY ATTEMPT BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT, EVEN INCLUDING THE MAJOR DONOR, THE US, TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS WOULD PROVOKE A VIOLENT PALESTINIAN REACTION THAT COULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE POSITION OF THE GOL. IF UNRWA IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE ITS WELFARE PROGRAM WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERVENTION, WE BELIEVE THE FEDAYEEN WILL BE MORE LIKELY TO TEMPER THEIR DEMANDS ON UNRWA AND GOL SO AS NOT TO PROVIDE CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF UN AID. BELIEVE AGENCY IS IN BEST POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER IT CAN CONTINUE TO FUNCTION, AND IF NOT, WHAT ACTION UN MIGHT PROFITABLY TAKE.

10. IF, AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE US WERE TO CUT OFF AID OR IN ANY OTHER WAY ACT AGAINST REFUGEES LIVING ON LEBANESE SOIL, WE WOULD BE PENALIZING GOL AND AIDING RADICAL ELEMENTS SUCH AS BAATH WHICH SEEK TO DESTROY LEBANON. THERE WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, BE AN IMMEDIATE AND VIOLENT ANTI-US RESPONSE TO ANY SUCH ACTION. IN ANY EVENT, UNLESS OVERALL SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON SHOULD

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FURTHER DETERIORATE, WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT UNRWA'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL WELFARE SERVICES TO NEEDY REFUGEES AS IN THE PAST, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RELATIONSHIP ULTIMATELY ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE FEDAYEEN. FROM US POINT OF VIEW, ONE OF THE OWRST ASPECTS OF PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT SOME RECIPIENTS OF UN RATIONS ARE TRAINING AS FEDAYEEN. HOWEVER, UNRWA HAS INFORMED US FLATLY THAT THEY HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DIVERSION OF UN RATIONS TO ANY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION PER SE. IF DONOR STATES WERE TO SUSPEND CONTRIBUTIONS ON THIS POINT OF PRINCIPLE, RESULT COULD BE DELETERIOUS TO THE EFFORT OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND DESTRUCTIVE TO LEBANON.

11. WE ARE OF COURSE DEEPLY DISTRUBED, BY THE PRESENT TREND IN LEBANON. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT HELOU HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN OUR ATTENTION TO THE MENACE TO LEBANON OF THE PALESTINIAN "FIFTH COLUMN." IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAS LONG SOUGHT A MORE EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE TO HELP PRESERVE LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY. HOWEVER, IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HELOU TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE UN HIMSELF; HE IS CONSTRAINED BY THE TERMS OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT, AND SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE AN ACT OF POLITICAL SUICIDE.

12. AS LONG AS US POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT IS BASED UPON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNSC RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE US TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT UNRWA. THE ARGUMENT THAT UNRWA SHOULD SEVER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE REJECTED THE UN RESOLUTION, CAN BE MET BY THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT THAT ISRAEL, HAVING FAILED TO ACCEPT PREVIOUS UN REFUGEE RESOLUTIONS, IS EQUALLY AT FAULT. IF DEPARTMENT MUST COMMENT ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON, WE BELIEVE THAT COMMENT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO ASKING THE UNSYG TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION AND TO MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 429

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09461 150557Z

19
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

009856

R 141734Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9066
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

SECRET BEIRUT 9461

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (P A R A . 1 .)

1. IN THE COURSE OF MY NOVEMBER 14 INTERVIEW WITH PRES-
IDENT HELOU, HE VOLUNTEERED THAT GENERAL BUSTANI HAD
DONE A POOR JOB NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO IN CAIRO.
SAYING THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO PASS JUDGMENT ON
BUSTANI'S MOTIVES, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT THE VERY
LEAST BUSTANI HAD FALLEN FOR THE FLATTERY OF HIS
ADVERSARIES AT CAIRO. PERHAPS HE HAD BEEN PROMISED
ARAB SUPPORT FOR HIS POLITICAL AMBITIONS IN LEBANON.
IN ANY CASE, THE RESULT WAS THE INCLUSION IN THE
AGREEMENT OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN
DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON IN BEIRUT PRIOR TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EXCLUSION OF ONE (UNSPECIFIED)
PROVISION WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN INCLUDED. HELOU
SAID THAT THE MOST DANGEROUS OF THE INCLUDED PRO-
VISIONS CONCERNED THE STATUS OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS.
HE DID NOT ELABORATE. HELOU SAID HE WAS NOT SURE
THE GOL COULD HAVE RESISTED THE PRESSURES AT CAIRO
IN ANY CASE, BUT BUSTANI, ACTING ON HIS OWN WITHOUT
SECURING INSTRUCTIONS FROM HELOU, CERTAINLY HAD NOT
BEEN THE BEST MAN TO SAFEGUARD LEBANON'S INTERESTS.

2. HELOU OBVIOUSLY HAS DOUBTS ABOUT HOW EFFECTIVE IS
CONTROL HE NOW EXERTS OVER THE MILITARY. AT ONE
POINT HE POSED THE QUESTION "WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO
LEBANON IF TOMORROW WE HAVE A PRIME MINISTER

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1969 NOV 15 AM 7:59
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09461 150557Z

WHO IS UNWILLING TO USE FORCE TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN AND
AN ARMY WHOSE LEADERSHIP MAY BE SIMILARLY UNWILLING
OR UNABLE?
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 098

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09444 141443Z

50
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /046 W

004860

Z 141425Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9061

SECRET BEIRUT 9444

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 9442

IN PASSAGE OF WILSON MESSAGE TO WISER TWA PRESIDENT PLEASE
INFORM WISER HE SHOULD DELAY MEETING WITH SYRIAN AMBASSADOR
UNTIL REFTEL RECEIVED. MEETING THOUGHT SCHEDULED 10 AM NY TIME.
PORTER

1969 NOV 15 AM 8:00
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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SECRET 150

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09411 132233Z

82
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, /046 W

000391

R 131646Z NOV 69 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9052
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 9411

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 2)

DEPARTMENT PASS INFO USINT CAIRO

REF: STATE 191141

SUBJ: JOINT US-USSR WORKING PAPER

ON RECEIPT REFTEL NOV 13 WE HANDED TEXT DRAFT US-USSR WORKING PAPER TO MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT), WITH FIRM STRICTURES TO HOLD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. EXPLAINED THAT TEXT ALREADY GIVEN TO AMMAN AND CAIRO, AND AS WELL TO AMB KABBANI IN WASHINGTON. WE REVIEWED SALIENT FEATURES OF DRAFT WITH KHOURY WHO DELIVERING TO PRES HELOU THIS EVENING.

2) KHOURY TOOK CAREFUL NOTES. HE WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE BY PROBLEM CREATED BY NEGOTIATING UAR-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT APART FROM JORDAN-ISRAELI ASPECTS. HE WAS SOMEWHAT REASSURED BY SECOND PAR POINT 7 AND ADMITTED NEGOTIATIONS HAD TO START SOMEWHERE. HE OBVIOUSLY FEARS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS MAY BE WEAK POINT IN TERMS OF SECURING UAR ACCEPTANCE, PARTICULARLY IF NASSER WANTS EXCUSE FOR REJECTING PROPOSAL.

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3) KHOURY SAID LEBANON OF COURSE GRATEFUL FOR ANY STEPS WHICH MIGHT PRODUCE QUICK ME SETTLEMENT, BUT HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN (WHICH WE NOW HEAR FOR MANY LEBANESE) THAT EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD PRODUCE VIOLENT REACTION FROM FEDAYEEN AND IN TURN CAUSE THEM CREATE NEW INTERNAL TROUBLES IN LEBANON. HE THOUGHT PERIOD AHEAD WOULD BE ONE OF MAXIMUM DANGER FOR LEBANON. WHEN WE SUGGESTED DANGER MIGHT BE SHORT-TERM AND CONTROLLABLE IF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS IN OFFING, HE RESPONDED THAT HE HOPED LEBANON WOULD NOT BECOME A FATALITY IN THE PROCESS.
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NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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SECRET 145

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09366 121726Z

47

ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

122564

PI R 121537Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9036
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY RABAT

2
NOV 12 PM 7:34
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 9366

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 9244 (NOTAL)

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOVEMBER 12 MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT (PROTECT) GAVE FOLLOWING INSIGHTS INTO THE RECENT ARAB LEAGUE MEETING IN CAIRO. KHOURY SAID THAT HE HAD READ REPORTS ON THE MEETING AND TALKED WITH SEVERAL OF THE LEBANESE DELEGATES.

2. HE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF US GUARANTEES TO LEBANON DID NOT ARISE. THE SYRIANS, HOWEVER, DID SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL A VIOLENT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US BY ALL ARAB COUNTRIES. KHOURY SAID THAT THE LANGUAGE WAS SO VIOLENT THAT IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THE SYRIANS WERE SERIOUS. APPARENTLY THE SYRIAN RESOLUTION WAS NEVER DISCUSSED AS THE SUDANESE DELEGATION HAD SUBMITTED A RESOLUTION EARLIER AND THE CHAIRMAN GAVE IT PRECEDENCE. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE SUDANESE RESOLUTION DESCRIBED THE US AS NUMBER ONE ENEMY OF THE ARABS BUT RECOMMENDED SOMETHING LESS THAN A BREAK IN RELATIONS. THE LEBANESE AND KUWAITI DELEGATIONS SECRETLY DRAFTED AN AMENDED SUDANESE RESOLUTION WHICH MODERATED ITS TONE AND WHICH WAS APPARENTLY ADOPTED.

3. BY AND LARGE KHOURY FELT THE LEAGUE MEETING CAME OUT SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN THE LEBANESE HAD EXPECTED AND PERHAPS LESSENER A

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09366 121726Z

BIT THE CHANCES FOR EXTREME ACTION IN THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING DECEMBER 20. THE DCM MENTIONED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SAUDIS AND MOROCCANS HAD BEEN HELPFUL AS A MODERATING INFLUENCE AT THE CONFERENCE. KHOURY AGREED BUT WAS QUICK TO ADD THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO BEEN BOTH MODERATE AND HELPFUL.

4. MAKING CLEAR THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF AND NOT FOR PRESIDENT HELOU, KHOURY STATED THAT THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOW AND THE SUMMIT MEETING WAS CRUCIAL. THE FUTURE OF MODERATE REGIMES IN THE AREA WAS VERY MUCH IN BALANCE. IN THE INTEREST OF THE SURVIVAL OF SUCH REGIMES, IT WAS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE US MAKE SOME KIND OF A PRO- NOUNCEMENT OR TAKE SOME KIND OF ACTION WHICH WOULD PUBLICLY INDICATE SOME US DISENGAGEMENT FROM ITS APPARENT ALIGNMENT WITH ISRAEL. HE QUOTED PRESIDENT HELOU AS DESCRIBING NASSER'S LAST SPEECH AS "THIS DECLARATION OF WAR IS THE LAST ATTEMPT FOR PEACE". HE APPRECIATED FULLY THAT US POLICY AND THAT OF ISRAEL WERE NOT THE SAME BUT THE USG HAD TO DISPEL PUBLICLY THIS IMPRESSION WHICH WAS NOW FIRMLY HELD IN THE ARAB WORLD.
PORTER

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. POSZ S/S-O.

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0620/03/067

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 115

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09293 091006Z

10
ACTION SS 45

2

INFO OCT 01,CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00, /046 W

105787

O 090945Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9024
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9293

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 9244

DELIVER DEPARTMENT ACTION OFFICER 0800 NOV 9.

AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT, NOV 8, MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL
CONFIDANT (PROTECT) TOLD DCM LEBANON HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED
BY ARAB LEAGUE THAT SERVICE BY US CITIZENS IN ISRAELI ARMY WILL
BE AGENDA ITEM CURRENT MEETING ARAB DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS'
MEETING CAIRO. HE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT EXTREMISTS WOULD MAKE
US POLICIES AND RELATIONS WITH US MAJOR TOPIC AT LEAGUE MEETING.
KHOURY ADDED LEBANESE DELEGATION WOULD DO ITS BEST TWARD SUCH
EVENTUALITY BUT MAINTAINED UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES LEBANESE

IN NO POSITION EXERT MUCH INFLUENCE. KHOURY EXPLAINED NAJIB SADAQA,
SECRETARY GENERAL FOREIGN OFFICE, HAD BEEN ASSIGNED DELEGATION
STRENGTHEN BACK BONE LEADER LEBANESE DELEGATION, GENERAL BOUSTANI
IN WHOM KHOURY HAD NO CONFIDENCE.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 056

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09178 042231Z

85
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01/046 W

R 041746Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8997
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

072475

SECRET BEIRUT 9178

EXDIS

DEPT PASS INFO USINT CAIRO

1. DCM DISCUSSED CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS ON LEBANESE CRISIS NOON NOVEMBER 4 WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT). KHOURY WAS CAUTIOUS ABOUT DETAILS OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT INDICATED HE WOULD PERHAPS HAVE MORE INFORMATION TOMORROW.

2. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE LEBANESE ACHIEVED MORE OR LESS WHAT THEY EXPECTED IN CAIRO. THEY COMPROMISED BUT DID NOT CAPITULATE. ALTHOUGH VAGUE AS TO DETAILS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT BOUSTANY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ARAFAT FOR THE PLO "AGREED" TO A DOCUMENT APPARENTLY CONTAINED GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCLOSE THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT IT OBVIOUSLY GAVE THE FEDAYEEN MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION THAN PREVIOUSLY. GENERAL BOUSTANY RETURNED FROM CAIRO THIS NOON AND HAS BEEN CONFERRING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE TO BE WORKED OUT IN LEBANON BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ARAFAT OR SOMEONE ELSE IN THE PLO ORGANIZATION WOULD REPRESENT THE FEDAYEEN.

3. KHOURY FELT THAT NASSER HAD BEEN HELPFUL WITHIN LIMITS. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT WILLING TO SACRIFICE ANY PRESTIGE ON LEBANON'S BEHALF. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LEBANESE TRIED TO CHANGE THE COMMUNIQUE WHERE IT REFERRED TO THE ARAB NATION. PREVIOUS COMMUNIQUES HAVE ALWAYS REFERRED TO THE ARAB PEOPLES PERMITTING INDIVIDUALITY TO EACH ARAB COUNTRY. NASSER REFUSED TO MAKE THIS ADJUSTMENT. KHOURY ALSO MENTIONED THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AMMASH OF IRAQ (BEIRUT 9069) WHO

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09178 042231Z

REMAINED HERE FOR SEVERAL DAYS, HAD OFFERED TO MEDIATE BUT THE LEBANESE INTERPRETED THE PRICE TO BE MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR THE PRO-IRAQI BAAATH PARTY IN LEBANON. FURTHERMORE, AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE GOL WAS COMMITTED TO UAR MEDIATION AND DID NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE UAR EFFORTS. AMMASH HAD TWO LONG CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT HELOU.

4. KHOURY JUDGED THAT ARAFAT WENT TO CAIRO FROM DAMASCUS FOR THREE PRINCIPAL REASONS: (A) COMMANDOS WERE SUFFERING SIGNIFICANT LOSSES, (B) ARAFAT WAS SENSITIVE TO POSSIBLE CHANGES OF SUBSERVIENCE TO THE SYRIAN REGIME, AND (C) HE COULD SEE ADVANTAGES IN LEGALIZING PRESENCE OF THE FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON AND ALSO IN HAVING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOL. CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE FATAH AND LEBANESE AUTHORITIES HAD ALMOST CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT AT THE TIME THE TROUBLE BEGAN.

5. KHOURY CONSIDERED THAT ALL THE DISADVANTAGES ANTICIPATED BY HELOU IN COMING TO TERMS WITH THE FEDAYEEN PERSIST. THE FEDAYEEN NOW HAVE THEIR "NOSE IN THE TENT". THEY CAN USE THE AGREEMENT TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE AT SUCH A TIME AS THE LEBANESE ARMY HAS TO TAKE ACTION IN THE FACE OF A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGHT ARAFAT AGREED FOR THE PLO, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS NOT SURE WHETHER ALL THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS AND PARTICULARLY THE SA'IGA (EVEN THOUGH NOMINALLY IN PLO) WILL UPHOLD THE AGREEMENT. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN ONE VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN THE SOUTH WHICH BOTH THE PLO AND THE GOL HAVE TRIED TO CONCEAL. KHOURY FEELS THAT THE AGREEMENT HAS STRENGTHENED THE LEFT AND ENHANCED THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN LEBANON. HE NOTED THAT TWO PROMINENT LEBANESE POLITICIANS, ROYMOND EDDE AND HENRI PHARAON, HAD, SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT, ALREADY CALLED ON THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR. HE ALSO BELIEVED IT WOULD STRENGTHEN NASSER'S POSITION IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH THE MODERATE CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS APPEAR TO GO ALONG WITH WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DID IN CAIRO, KHOURY ANTICIPATES TROUBLE FROM THE EXTREME RIGHT. THE CHAMOUNISTS ARE ANGRY THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS COMPROMISED AND MAINTAIN THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE A COMPROMISE, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE SIX MONTHS AGO. LAST BUT PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, THE AGREEMENT WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE RISK OF ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST LEBANON AND CONSEQUENT FURTHER WEAKENING OF MODERATE REGIME HERE.

6. AGREEMENT APPARENTLY HAS NOT MADE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09178 042231Z

GOVERNMENT ANY EASIER. KHOURY BELIEVES THAT THE POLITICAL CRISIS COULD WELL CONTINUE ALTHOUGH HE INDICATES THAT "SOMETHING" MIGHT HAPPEN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE EXPLAINED THAT KARAMI WAS STILL SITTING ON THE FENCE AND INSISTED THAT ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH HE FORMED MUST INCLUDE KAMAL JUMBLATT. THE PRESIDENT REMAINS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT JUMBLATT BECAUSE THIS WOULD INCUR THE WRATH OF THE CHAMOUNISTS. FORMER PRESIDENT, GENERAL FUAD CHEHAB WANTS KARAMI BUT THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, GENERAL SHUMAYYET FEELS THAT A KARAMI GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE WISE AT THE PRESENT TIME. PRESIDENT HELOU IS NOW CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN APOLITICAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD OFFEND NOBODY. THE FORMATION OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT.

7. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, KHOURY MAINTAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO DO AS WELL AS IT DID IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THE COUNTRY WAS UNIFIED AND THE ARMY WAS STRONG. THEY DEALT FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. HE DESCRIBED ARMY MORALE AS HIGH BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE ARMY OFFICERS ATTRIBUTED THEIR STAUNCH EFFORT AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN TO THE EFFORTS OF GENERAL SHUMAYYET, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND NOT TO EITHER BOUSTANY, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, OR TO GENERAL CHEHAB.

8. COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE LEBANESE CAME OUT OF THE CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS PRETTY MUCH AS THEY HAD EXPECTED. KHOURY WAS PESSIMISTIC NOT BECAUSE OF THE RESULTS OF THE CAIRO NEGOTIATION BUT BECAUSE HE KNEW BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED THAT THE RESULTS COULD NOT BE FAVORABLE TO LEBANON. IT IS OBVIOUS FROM THE CONVERSATION THAT THE TALKS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETED. KHOURY APOLOGIZED FOR HIS CAUTION BUT INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE TO PASS ON TOMORROW.

9. WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, THE EMBASSY WILL SUBMIT ITS OWN ASSESSMENT OF LEBANON'S POSITION AS A RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THERE ARE TOO MANY LOOSE ENDS AT THE MOMENT TO MAKE A VALID ASSESSMENT.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED
CAIRO BY OCT.

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file

SECRET 191

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09138 041343Z

44
ACTION SS: 45

2

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

068806

R 041103Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8989

SECRET BEIRUT 9138

State Dept. review completed


EXDIS:

REF: STATE 184502

SUBJ: BUSTANI-PLO AGREEMENT

69 NOV 4 PM 3:03
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. YASIR ARAFAT AND HASSAN SABRY AL KHOLI, ARRIVED IN BEIRUT ON OR ABOUT MAY 8, 1969, AND WENT INTO A SERIES OF MEETINGS ON THE FEDAYEEN-GOL DISPUTE -- FIRST ARAFAT WITH KHOLI, THEN ARAFAT WITH KHOLI, HELOU AND KARAMI, THEN ARAFAT AND PARTY WITH KHOLI AND LEBANESE ARMY OFFICIALS.



25X1

3. SUBSEQUENTLY (BEIRUT 3936, 4162, ETC.) WE LEARNED THAT BUSTANI, UNDOUBTEDLY MOVED BY HIS PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS, HAD REACHED WITH ARAFAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH ACCORDED THE FEDAYEEN CONSIDERABLE FREEDOM OF ACTION AND MAY HAVE BEEN PUT INTO WRITING. SOME OF THE ALLEGED ELEMENTS OF THIS AGREEMENT WERE COMMUNICATED TO US BY YUSUF SAYIGH, WHO SAYS HE ATTENDED SOME OF THE MEETINGS (BEIRUT A-257). WE ASSUME THAT THIS BUSTANI-ARAFAT COMPACT IS THE ABORTIVE "15- POINT AGREEMENT" LATELY CITED BY THE PLO.

4. WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS, THIS COMPACT WAS REPUDIATED BY C/S SHUMAYYIT, WHO IS ALL SOLDIER, AND WHO HAD THE FULL BACKING OF HELOU. AFTER ARAFAT HAD LEFT TOWN IN DISGUST (AROUND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09138 041343Z

MAY 12), CHEHAB CORROBORATED FOR THE AMBASSADOR THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS (BEIRUT 4162). MOREOVER, THE EMBASSY LEARNED THAT HELOU DISCIPLINED BUSTANI BY SENDING HIM TO COVENTRY FOR SEVERAL WEEKS AND DEALING DIRECTLY WITH SHUMAYYIT INSTEAD (BEIRUT 4275).

5. CONSEQUENTLY, AS FAR AS THE GOL (I.E., HELOU) IS CONCERNED, THERE WAS NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN (BEIRUT 4035). EVEN CHEHAB, WHO HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED KARAMI'S CALL FOR "TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS" WITH THE FEDAYEEN, CONFIRMED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE GOL WILL NEVER MAKE THE MISTAKE OF GIVING THE PLO ANY CONCESSIONS IN WRITING.

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT AT SOME POINT THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE ARMY CAME TO SOME ORAL UNDERSTANDING, POSSIBLY UNDER CHEHAB'S AUSPICES (NAJA-MCANDREW MEMCON 10/27/69). OUR PRIMARY AUTHORITY FOR THIS CONCLUSION IS THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY ON OCTOBER 28. THE COMMUNIQUE TAKES THE FEDAYEEN TO TASK FOR ATTEMPTING TO FORTIFY A POSITION IN A POPULATED AREA (MAJDAL SILIM), CONTRARY TO "AN UNDERSTANDING REACHED WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS". CLEARLY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE PLO IS A SUBTLE ONE. IN FACT, IN HIS LATEST MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, CHEHAB WENT SO FAR AS TO ALLEGE THAT THE SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN THE BUSTANI AND SHUMAYYIT POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN LAST MAY WAS ORCHESTRATED BY CHEHAB, PRESUMABLY WITHOUT HELOU'S KNOWLEDGE, AND APPARENTLY AS A MEANS OF THROWING THE PLO OFF-BALANCE.

7. CHEHAB'S COMMENT TO THE AMBASSADOR IMPLYING THAT BUSTANI IS EXPENDABLE COULD ALSO REFLECT CHEHAB'S SIDE INTEREST IN REDUCING BUSTANI'S PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS. OF COURSE, SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CURRENT BUSTANI-ARAFAT TALKS IN CAIRO MAY IN THE EYES OF MANY VINDICATE THE POSITION BUSTANI TOOK LAST MAY.
PORTER

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0620/03/0790

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 048

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09069 010128Z

81
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, /046 W

050704

P 311600Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8960
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBSSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO

69 NOV 1 AM 9:50

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2

SECRET BEIRUT 9069

EXDIS:

1. NOON OCT 31 PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY, GAVE US FOLLOWING REPORT ON COURSE CAIRO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN LEBANESE DELEGATION AND EGYPTIANS ON LEBANESE CRISIS.
2. LEBANESE DELEGATION BRIEFED EGYPTIANS THOROUGHLY ON LEBANESE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION AND GOL POSITION FOR A SOLUTION. THE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE WAS "VERY COLD" AND UNCOMMUNICATIVE. ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT YET INDICATED WHAT THEY WANTED THE LEBANESE TO DO. THE LEBANESE WERE UPSET BY THE ALMOST 100 PERCENT FEDAYEEN POINT OF VIEW EXPRESSED BY EGYPT'S PUBLIC MEDIA AND REQUESTED EGHPTIANS TO BE MORE OBJECTIVE AND CHANGE THEIR PUBLIC LINE. THE EGYPTIANS REFUSED. AT THE PRESENT TIME NEITHER SIDE WANTS A COMMUNIQUE WHEN BOUSTANY RETURNS TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING AS THERE IS REALLY NOTHING TO SAY.
3. GEN BOUSTANY HAS AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRES NASSER THIS EVENING. THE LEBANESE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER NASSER HAS ANYTHING PARTICULAR TO TELL BOUSTANY OR NOT. AFTER THE LEBANESE DELEGATION LEAVES CAIRO THE SCENARIO CALLS FOR THE EGYPTIANS TO TALK TO THE FEDAYEEN. DEPENDING ON THE RESULTS OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, THE PALESTINIANS WOULD COME TO LEBANON AND TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.
4. TO ADD TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS, DEPUTY PRIMIN AMMASH OF IRAQ SAW PRES NASSER LAST NIGHT. HE ARRIVED IN

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09069 010128Z

LEBANON TODAY AND, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, MADE A HELPFUL STATEMENT UPON HIS ARRIVAL. HE ASKED TO SEE PRES HELOU AND AN APPOINTMENT HAS BEEN MADE FOR HIM THIS EVENING. MEANWHILE A MESSAGE CAME FROM NASSER THAT THE LEBANESE SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH AMMASH. THE LEBANESE ARE MYSTIFIED AS TO WHAT NASSER'S PROBLEM IS BUT ARE ANXIOUS TO HEAR WHAT AMMASH HAS TO SAY ALTHOUGH THEY WILL OF COURSE BE CAREFUL NOT TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE EGYPT'S MEDIATORY EFFORT.

5. KHOURY ALSO MENTIONED THAT CARETAKER PRIMIN KARAMI WILL PROBABLY NOT GO TO CAIRO UNLESS PLO LEADER ARAFAT GOES. KARAMI FEELS, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN TALKING TO ANYBODY BUT ARAFAT AS IT IS ONLY WITH HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY CHANCE OF WORKING OUT A SOLUTION. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT KARAMI AGREES IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION, AS LONG AS THE PALESTINIANS ACCEPT IT. WHERE HE DIFFERS IS THAT HE IS PREPARED TO CONCEDE MORE TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN.

6. COMMENT. WHILE THE LEBANESE INTEND TO CONTINUE THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY MYSTIFIED AS TO WHAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE IN MIND. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT THE MASS OF CONFLICTING INFORMATION GOL RECEIVES ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM IS STAGGERING. HE FEELS THAT THE PARTICIPANTS -- SYRIANS, ARAFAT, EGYPTIANS -- ARE ALL FIGHTING TO BUILD UP THEIR OWN PRESTIGE AT THE EXPENSE OF LEBANON. NEEDLESS TO SAY, AT THIS POINT HE IS PESSIMISTIC.
PORTER

EXDIS ADDED PER ORIGINATOR

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

O R 301513Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8948
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9041

6949Q
1969 OCT 30 AM 10:36

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS AMMAN, JIDDA, TEL AVIV, USUN

REFERENCE: STATE 182922

1. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PASS TO PRES HELOU GIST INFORMATION PARA 5 REFTEL. HELOU IS SO SORELY PRESSED AT MOMENT THAT A MORE DETAILED BRIEFING WOULD NOT SINK IN. IN ANY CASE HE HAS NOT BEEN KEPT ABREAST OF DETAILS US-SOV NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE.
2. I AM SEEING HELOU TOMORROW (OCT 31) 0900 LOCAL WILQ DAVID ROCKEFELLER. AFTER ROCKEFELLER, I PROPOSE TAKE OPPORTUNITY BRIEF HELOU PRIVATELY, UNLESS DEPT ADVISES CONTRARY.

PORTER

BT
NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN, TEL AVIV, JIDDA, USUN BY OC/T

SECRET



Department of State

W H
TELEGRAM

SECRET

12

P 301145Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8940
BT
S E C R E T BEIRUT 9027

6 9 2 4 0
1969 OCT 30 AM 8:07

NODIS

1. MICHEL KHOURY, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT, TOLD DCM OCTOBER 30 THAT GOL HAD A RELIABLE REPORT THROUGH THE VATICAN THAT THE ISRAELI PRESS ATTACHE IN PARIS WAS TELLING MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH THAT THERE WAS AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT HELOU AND THE ISRAELIS.
2. NATURALLY DISTURBED BY THE CRITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS REPORT, KHOURY WONDERED IF THE US COULD DO ANYTHING TO SILENCE THE PRESS ATTACHE. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER THE GOL NOR HE BE MENTIONED TO THE ISRAELIS AS THE SOURCE. IF THE ONLY WAY THE USG COULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS WAS TO MENTION THE GOL AS THE SOURCE, KHOURY WOULD NOT WANT IT RAISED AT ALL, DESPITE THE DISASTROUS EFFECT OF SUCH REVELATIONS ON HELOU'S POSITION IN LEBANON.
3. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT RAISE THE ISSUE WITH ISRAELI EMBASSY WASHINGTON. WITHOUT MENTIONING THE LEBANESE AT ALL WE COULD POINT OUT THAT WE HAD RELIABLE INFORMATION THE ISRAELI PRESS ATTACHE IN PARIS WAS TELLING MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH PRESS THAT THERE WAS AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT HELOU AND THE ISRAELIS.

PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 440

SUMMARY 42

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08981 281819Z

50
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, /046 W

024543

P R 281708Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO ECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8925
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T BEIRUT 8981

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: BEIRUT 8922

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOON OCT 28, MICHEL KHOURY DESCRIBED STATUS UAR MEDIATION EFFORT AS CONFUSED AND INVOLVED.

2. GOL WAS EXTREMELY UPSET BY ALLEGED DAMASCUS STATEMENT OCT 27 OF LIBYAN, PALESTINIAN, SYRIAN AND UAR REPRESENTATIVES (EMBTTEL 8947, PARA 6). GOL FELT THAT IF EGYPT GOING TO MEDIATE IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR IT ASSUME POSITION BEFORE MEDIATION PROCESS COMMENCED. CONSEQUENTLY IF STATEMENT REPRESENTED OFFICIAL UAR POSITION, GOL DECIDED, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, NOT TO DISPATCH DELEGATION TO CAIRO. THIS MORNING UAR AMBASSADOR ASSURED GOL THAT STATEMENT DID NOT IN FACT REPRESENT OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN POSITION.

3. CONSEQUENTLY EMILE BOUSTANY (COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL STAFF OFFICERS LEAVING FOR CAIRO THIS EVENING. ACCORDING KHOURY, PRES HELOU NOT HAPPY OVER CHOICE OF BOUSTANY AS HE FEARS GENERAL WILL GIVE THE BALL GAME AWAY. GOL PREFERRED SEND CHIEF OF STAFF SHYMAYYIT BUT APPARENTLY EGYPTIANS AND PALESTINIANS INSISTED ON BOUSTANY. KHOURY DID NOT DESCRIBE IN DETAIL BOUSTANY'S INSTRUCTIONS EXCEPT TO EXPLAIN THAT BOUSTANY NOT AUTHORIZED ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF "FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR THE FEDAYEEN". IF GOL WERE WILLING MAKE THAT CONCESSION THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE BE-

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08981 281819Z

CAUSE IT WOULD REPRESENT COMPLETE CAPITULATION. KHOURY MAINTAINED GOL WOULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDAYEEN ACTION IN COORDINATION WITH LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE COMPROMISE WOULD HAVE

TO BE ON MILITARY TERMS AND NOT POLITICAL. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MUST RETAIN THE RIGHT TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY. IF THE FEDAYEEN WANT TO OPERATE IN THE SOUTH, THEY MUST OPERATE WITHIN CERTAIN LIMITS AND WITHIN CERTAIN AREAS DEFINED BY THE LEBANESE ARMY. THE INSTRUCTIONS, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, WERE ENDORSED BY FORMER PRES FUAD CHEHAB.

5. THE EGYPTIANS WANTED BOUSTANY TO HAVE PLENIPOTENTIARY POWERS. THE LEBANESE REFUSED. THEY AUTHORIZED BOUSTANY TO AGREE TO PRINCIPLES CONSISTENT WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS BUT DETAILS HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED IN LEBANON WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IN CAIRO BOUSTANY WAS TO MEET WITH BOTH THE PALESTINIANS AND EGYPTIANS BUT KHOURY DID NOT DESCRIBE THE PROCEDURES FOR THE NEGOTIATION.

6. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT PRIMIN KARAME'S PARTICIPATION IN THE DELEGATION WAS BEING DISCUSSED AT THAT MOMENT. KARAME HAD SEEN HELOU TWICE THE DAY BEFORE. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT KARAME WANTED TO BRING BACK A POLITICAL VICTORY FROM CAIRO AND APPARENTLY DID NOT WANT TO BE HEMMED IN BY BOUSTANY'S INSTRUCTIONS. HIS PARTICIPATION WAS SUGGESTED BY CHEHAB AS A MEANS APPARENTLY OF STRENGTHENING KARAME'S POLITICAL BASE IN TRIPOLI. PRES HELOU ALSO WANTS KARAME TO PARTICIPATE BUT ONLY IF HE IS WILLING TO ABIDE BY THE AGREED INSTRUCTIONS. AS OF THE WRITING OF THIS CABLE WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER KARAME IS GOING OR NOT.

7. KHOURY DESCRIBED SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION WITH PRES HELOU OCT 27 AS CONTAINING NO PARTICULAR SURPRISES. AMBASSADOR ASSURED HELOU THAT SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT THE DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE DEMARCHES TO THE SYRIANS ALTHOUGH THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT REVEAL THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DEMARCHES. THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AS PART OF THE ARAB PROBLEM AND COULD NOT DISASSOCIATE LEBANON FROM THE ARAB WORLD. THE SOVIET UNION OPPOSED ANY EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF LEBANON.

8. ACCORDING KHOURY, HELOU RESPONDED IN GENERAL TERMS STATING THAT AS LONG AS HE WAS PRES AND IS IN CONTROL, THERE WOULD

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08981 281819Z

BE NO REQUEST FOR EXTERNAL INTERVENTION. HE IMPLIED THAT HE
COULD NOT PRECLUDE ANY COURSE OF ACTION IF SITUATION WERE OUT
OF CONTROL.

9. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE ABOVE IN-
FORMATION, WE HAVE RESTRICTED ITS DISTRIBUTION. NEEDLESS TO SAY,
A LEAK WOULD BE EXTREMELY EMBARRASSING AND END THE DIALOGUE
WITH KHOURY.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

file

2

SECRET 445

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08977 281731Z

47
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01/046 W

024272

R 281605Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8923

S E C R E T BEIRUT 8977

REF: STATE 182026; BEIRUT 8967

EXDIS

1969 OCT 29 AM 8:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. BEIRUT'S 8967 EXPRESSES EMB'S REACTION STATE 182026. I AM REFLECTING MORE PERSONAL COMMENTS IN THIS MESSAGE. FIRST I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT I AM NOT "AVOIDING" DIRECT CONTACTS WITH HELOU, KARAME, OR ANY OTHER PRINCIPAL LEBANESE LEADER. IT IS RATHER THAT SOME OF THEM AT THIS POINT SEE NO VALUE IN HAVING PUBLICIZED CONTACTS WITH ME AND ARE UNABLE ARRANGE MEET ME IN PRIVATE. OUR OTHER MANY CONTACTS ARE WE BELIEVE ADEQUATE TO KEEP US WELL-INFORMED AND IN TOUCH WITH THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN THE LEBANESE DRAMA.

2. HELOU HAS KNOWN SINCE CRISIS COMMENCED OF MY DESIRE TO SEE HIM AND HE HAS SENT WORD THAT HE WILL DO SO WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE. AS FOR KAREMI I HAVE SENT WORD TO HIM THROUGH SEVERAL CHANNELS OF USG CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION, OUR DESIRE TO HELP, AND MY WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH HIM. I DID THIS AS RECENTLY AS YESTERDAY (10/27) WITH HIS OLD MENTOR, FUAD CHEHAB. KARAME OF COURSE HAS BEEN IN TRIPOLI DURING ALMOST ENTIRE CRISIS DOING HIS BEST TO RESTORE ORDER AND TO GIVE MORAL BACKING TO THE MORE MODERATE TRIPOLITANIANS WHO SUPPORT HIM. SINCE MUCH OF THE TROUBLE IN TRIPOLI WAS BAATHIST AND COMMUNIST-INSPIRED, IT QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT KARAME WOULD TRY TO TAKE PERSONAL PROFIT FROM WELL-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH SOV AMB. THERE NO INDICATION AS YET THAT SOVS WERE ENGAGED IN PEACE-MAKING, AND IF THEY WERE, KARAME WAS USING THEM FOR LOCAL EFFECT, RATHER THAN BEING USED.

3. WE MAINTAIN GOOD INDIRECT CONTACTS WITH BOTH HELOU AND KARAME, AND UNTIL EITHER OR BOTH OF THEM CAN ACCEPT THE VALUE OF A PUB-

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08977 281731Z

LICIZED MEETING WITH AMERICAN AMB I AM AFRAID THIS MUST CONTINUE TO BE OUR MODUS OPERANDI. THE PROBLEM IS THEREFORE NOT THAT WE HAVE ADOPTED A POLICY OF MAINTAINING LOW PROFILE BUT THAT WE HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO IT BY CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS HAS BEEN A VERY SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT AND I REGRET AS MUCH AS DEPT THAT IT HAS INTERFERED WITH MY FREQUENT AND CLOSE CONTACT WITH THESE TWO POLITICAL LEADERS, BOTH OF WHOM ARE CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS. THE SITUATION WILL CHANGE, AND IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RESUME A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP, I HOPE RATHER SOON.

4. THE SOV ATTEMPT TO TAKE CREDIT FOR PEACE-MAKING IN LEBANON WILL NOT FOOL THE CLEVER LEBANESE, BUT AT THIS POINT LEBANESE READY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY STABILIZING ELEMENT. SINCE THEY ASSUME SOV UNION HAS INFLUENCE IN DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD AND CAIRO (AND USG DOES NOT) THEY WILL WELCOME WHATEVER RESTRAINT SOVS ARE ABLE TO APPLY TO THE RADICAL ARABS. WHEN THEY THINK US CAN DO THE SAME, OBVIOUSLY THEY WILL TURN TO US, AND EAGERLY.

5. IN ADDITION, DEPT SURELY UNDERSTANDS THAT HELOU IS BEING LABELLED AMERICAN STOOGES WHOSE ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION (WHILE WE KNOW DIFFERENTLY) STEMS FROM AMERICAN PRESSURE AND AMERICAN ASSURANCES OF INTERVENTION. ALL FEDAYEEN AND MOST OTHER ARABS BELIEVE THIS

CANARD. ANY FIRM POSITION HELOU TAKES IN FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIRECTLY LAID AT OUR DOORSTEP IF HE HAD PUBLICIZED DIRECT CONTACTS WITH US AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT AS NEGOTIATIONS ARE ABOUT TO START. KARAME TOO IS STILL A MODERATE IN HIS THINKING EVEN IF HE MUST NOW APPEAR A RADICAL IN HIS WORDS. HE WOULD FIND HIMSELF UNDER SUFFOCATING PRESSURES IF ANYTHING HE DID AT THIS POINT OPENED HIM TO ATTACK AS BEING AN AMERICAN AGENT. HIS ONLY HOPE NOW, IF HE IS TO RETAIN HIS EFFECTIVENESS, IS TO SECURE THE EMBRACE OF NASSER.

6. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING ALL OF THE ABOVE MUST BE VIEWED IN CONTEXT OF (A) AN UNPARALLELED WAVE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH IS SWEEPING ARAB WORLD, (B) AN EXTREMELY DELICATE LEBANESE INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION WHICH COULD AT THIS POINT BLOW UP AT ANY EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN "INTERVENTION", AND (C) MY CONCERN NOT TO PRECIPITATE ATTACKS ON AMERICANS OR AMERICAN INTERESTS.

7. ONLY ONE MORE COMMENT. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO VISUALIZE WHAT

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08977 281731Z

NEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS IN US POSITION VIS-A-VIS LEBANON OR THE ME WE CAN FIND TO DISCUSS WITH HELOU OR KARAME IN ANY NEW ATTEMPT AT DIRECT CONTACT. IF EITHER LEADER THOUGHT I HAD SOMETHING TO SAY WHICH COULD BE TURNED TO ADVANTAGE HE WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE EAGER RECEIVE ME. IT IS ALSO HARD TO KNOW WHAT REASSURANCES I CAN GIVE HELOU (WHO WISHES TO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN) WITHOUT CLEAR-CUT COMMITMENTS OF US SUPPORT WHICH WE ARE UNABLE TO GIVE. KARAME OF COURSE WOULD HAVE TO REACT DEFENSIVELY TO ANY ALLEGATION OF USG "MEDDLING" IN LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF HELOU AND KARAME AGREEING BETWEEN THEMSELVES ON A COMPROMISE, AND THEN NEGOTIATING IT WITH FEDAYEEN, WOULD BE FURTHER REDUCED. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT NOT ONE SINGLE RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE IN OUR CONTACTS OF RECENT DAYS HAS SUGGESTED THERE ANYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE USG CAN DO IN LEBANON AT MOMENT, EXCEPT TO KEEP QUIET AND CONTINUE URGE RESTRAINT AND MODERATION.
PORTER

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SECRET 284

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08969 281621Z

50
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

023829

R 281422Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8921
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

1969 OCT 28 PM 4:21
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 8969

EXDIS

1. IN CONVERSATION THIS MORNING (10/28) WITH FRENCH AMB DUFOURNIER HE GENERALLY REFLECTED OUR ANALYSIS CURRENT SITUATION LEBANON. ARMY DOING SURPRISINGLY WELL AND MAINTAINING MORALE. CONFIDENTIAL DIVISIONS HAVE NOT GOTTEN OUT OF HAND AND LEBANESE PEOPLE ARE SHOWING RESTRAINT. THERE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INCIDENTS BUT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD NOT GET OUT OF HAND DURING PERIOD NEGOTIATIONS UNDER WAY.
2. ON LONG TERM, HE WAS PESSIMISTIC, FEELING THAT CONCESSIONS TO FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE UNSETTLING EFFECT INTERNALLY AND CAUSE GREAT NERVOUSNESS IN ISRAEL. NEXT CRUNCH WOULD COME WHEN LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE DECISION WHETHER TO ACCEPT NEGOTIATED AND AGREED FEDAYEEN PRESENCE.
3. FRENCH ARE NOT DOING MUCH HERE EXCEPT TO URGE CALMNESS AND PREACH REASON TO BOTH SIDES. THEY OBVIOUSLY HAVE NO INFLUENCE ON FEDAYEEN BUT UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, AND ALSO IN RESPONSE TO HELOU'S REQUEST, FRENCH AMBS IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS ARE URGING RESTRAINT AND EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER LEBANESE SITUATION. IT SEEMED RATHER CLEAR THAT FRENCH DEMARCHES NOT BEING PUSHED WITH GREAT VIGOR NOR WAS MUCH EXPECTED OF THEM. AS DUFOURNIER

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08969 281621Z

REMARKED, FRANCE HAS GOOD BUSINESS GOING WITH SYRIA AT THIS POINT. IT OBVIOUS THAT FRENCH ARE NOT GOING TO POUND THE TABLE HARD ENOUGH TO DAMAGE THEIR ECONOMIC POSITION. DUFOURNIER ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REPORTS OF OUTCOME OF DEMARCHE FROM OTHER ARAB POSTS.

4. HE WAS AWARE OF US ATTEMPTS SECURE FOUR-POWER STATEMENT ON LEBANON AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED (WITHOUT BEING GIVEN REASONS) THAT GOF HAD REJECTED US PROPOSAL. HE GAVE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LITTLE MORE GOF INTEREST IN LEBANON AT MOMENT BUT HE GOT OPTIMISTIC IT WOULD HAPPEN.

5. HE MILDLY CRITICAL OF WHAT HE CONSIDERED GOL'S FAILURE TO HAVE LAID BETTER DIPLOMATIC GROUNDWORK IN ADVANCE OF INEVITABLE CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN, EVEN THOUGH HE ADMITTED THIS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF 6-MONTH NO-GOVERNMENT PERIOD. FOR EXAMPLE HE INDICATED THAT LEBANESE AMB TO FRANCE TAKLA WHO IS NOW HEADING LEBANESE UN DEL HAD HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM DEFEND GOL POSITION. TAKLA OPERATING IN EFFECT WITHOUT GUIDANCE. NONETHELESS, HE THOUGHT HELOU HAD BOUGHT SOME TIME BY HIS NO-GOVERNMENT POLICY, ALTHOUGH CRUNCH WAS NOW AT HAND. ONLY THE ARMY HAD BEEN READY FOR IT.
PORTER

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SECRET 373

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08922 271310Z

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ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /046 W

015645

O P 271225Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8900
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN

69 OCT 27 AM 11:35

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 8922

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 8904

1. DCM FOUND PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY ON OCT 27 IN MUCH MORE FATALISTIC AND RESIGNED MOOD THAN HERETOFORE EXPERIENCED. IT SEEMED CLEAR FROM CONVERSATION THAT UAR HAD TAKEN THE BALL AWAY FROM GOL IN ITS MEDIATORY ROLE IN LEBANON AND GOL NOW TRYING TO KEEP UP WITH UAR ACTIVITIES. KHOURY REPORTED SABRI HASSAN AL-KHOLY MISSION JORDAN AND SYRIA WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED BY GOL NOR HAD KHOLY BEEN INVITED TO LEBANON ALTHOUGH GOL OBVIOUSLY NOT IN POSITION REFUSE VISIT. GOL WANTS UAR ASSISTANCE BUT IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT BASIC INTERESTS OF LEBANON WILL BE UPPERMOST IN NASSER'S MIND IN MEDIATORY EFFORT. KHOURY EXPLAINED THAT GOL RECOGNIZED THAT ARAB SOLUTION NOT IDEAL FOR LEBANON BUT ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT ARAB SOLUTION THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY OUT. GOL HAD NOT ASKED MAJOR POWERS FOR ANY SPECIFIC ASSISTANCE BECAUSE IT COULD NOT SEE WHAT SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION SUCH POWERS COULD MAKE. DCM GAINED IMPRESSION THAT ALTHOUGH GOL STILL DOES NOT WANT TO CAPITULATE IT COMING TO CONCLUSION IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY REACHED IT THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS THERE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO SOME DEGREE OF CAPITULATION UNLESS IT WISHES FACE CIVIL WAR.

2. TWO LEBANESE OFFICERS MENTIONED PARA 1 REFTEL DID NOT GO TO CAIRO YESTERDAY. PLAN NOW WHICH KHOURY DESCRIBES AS 90 PERCENT CERTAIN IS FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EMILE BOUSTANY AND POSSIBLY

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08922 271310Z

RASHID KARAME TO FLY TO CAIRO TODAY. (FROM OTHER SOURCES, WE UNDERSTAND G-2 CAPTAIN SAMI KHATIB MAY ACCOMPANY BOUSTANY.) KHOURY INDICATED THAT KARAME MAY BE GOING AS A RESULT URGING BY BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND FORMER PRES FOUAD CHEHAB. KHOURY FELT THAT KARAME'S INCLUSION MIGHT BE AN ADVANTAGE AS IT COULD STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION IN TRIPOLI WHICH WOULD HEIGHTEN HIS POTENTIALITY AS NEXT PRIMIN. KARAME WAS NOT ABLE TO COME TO BEIRUT BEFORE LAST EVENING. CONSEQUENTLY HE DID NOT SEE PRES HELOU ALTHOUGH KHOURY THOUGHT HE MIGHT THIS MORNING.

3. SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT HIS OWN REQUEST WENT TO TRIPOLI YESTERDAY TO TALK WITH KARAME. KHOURY HAD NO REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BUT STATED THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AGAIN AT HIS REQUEST WAS SEEING PRES HELOU THIS MORNING. FORMER PRES CHEHAB HAS JUST INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR APPEARS TO BE TAKING CONCILIATORY LINE DESIGNED TO REDUCE TENSION. CHEHAB ADDED HE HAD HEARD SOVIET WORDS BEFORE AND HE WAS WAITING PROOF OF SOVIET GOOD INTENTIONS IN TERMS OF BEHAVIOR LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY.

4. CHEHAB ALSO INFORMED AMB THAT GEN BOUSTANY IS DEFINITELY GOING CAIRO, BUT HE GAVE NO CLEAR INDICATION KARAME GOING AT THIS TIME. HE INDICATED BOUSTANY WOULD BE SEEING FEDAYEEN AS WELL AS UAR OFFICIALS. HE WILL PRESUMABLY BEGIN FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH FEDAYEEN.
PORTER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 381

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08921 271322Z

2

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ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, /046 W

015729

P R 271217Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8899
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

69 OCT 27 AM 11:35

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T BEIRUT 8921

EXDIS

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM OCT 26, PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY NOTED AMBIVALENCE OF UAR'S ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, HE EXPLAINED THAT BARRICADES IN STREETS IN LEBANON CONSTRUCTED BY NASSERIST ELEMENTS. GOL HAD FOUND OUT THEY BEING USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON GOL TO ACCEPT NASSER AS MEDIATOR OF CURRENT CRISIS. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, UAR AMBASSADOR ALLEGEDLY UNDERTAKING TO TRY ELIMINATE BARRICADES. UAR AMBASSADOR ALSO, ACCORDING TO KHOURY, STILL EXERCISING MODERATING INFLUENCE AMONG MOSLEM ELEMENTS. IN BALANCE, KHOURY AND PRESUMABLY HELOU, STILL CONSIDER THAT UAR TRYING TO MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO SOLUTION CRISIS BUT UAR STYLE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY AREA CURRENTS AND PRESSURES.

2. IN CONVERSATION, KHOURY MOST INTERESTED IN STATUS USG PEACEMAKING EFFORTS AND WONDERED IF CRISIS MIGHT NOT IN SENSE CONTRIBUTE TO FOUR-POWER EFFORTS. DCM OUTLINED IN GENERAL TERMS STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH USSR. IN REPLY TO SECOND POINT OF KHOURY'S, DCM EXPLAINED THAT CRISIS HAD BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS TO IT. ONE COULD ARGUE THAT CRISIS MIGHT MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION IN SENSE THAT IT WOULD ACCENTUATE URGENCY OF EFFORTS, ALTHOUGH HE FELT MAJOR POWERS ALREADY MUCH AWARE TIME OF ESSENCE. DCM EMPHASIZED "NO FOOT DRAGGING INVOLVED" AND SLOWNESS PROGRESS IN PEACEMAKING EFFORT RESULTED FROM COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED. ON NEGATIVE SIDE, DCM EXPLAINED THAT IF CRISIS CONTINUED AND FEDAYEEN PERSISTED IN THEIR COMMANDO OPERATIONS, EMOTIONAL LEVEL IN AREA WOULD BE HEIGHTENED EVEN FURTHER AND ABILITY OF

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08921 271322Z

PARTIES CONCERNED TO EXERCISE FLEXIBILITY WHICH SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED. KHOURY'S INTEREST IN THIS REGARD REFLECTS PRES HELOU'S REALIZATION THAT ONLY PERMANENT RESOLUTION OF FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON IS AN OVERALL ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. HELOU'S OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO PLAY FOR TIME IN HOPES THAT SETTLEMENT WOULD BE REACHED BEFORE LEBANON DIS-INTEGRATED OR SUCCUMBED TO CONTROL OF EITHER THE FEDAYEEN AND/OR LEFTIST ELEMENTS.

3. ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR MET WITH EX-PRES FUAD CHEHAB THIS MORNING (SEE SEPTTEL) STATE OF USG POSITION HERE SUCH THAT IT BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AMBASSADOR TO MEET WITH INFLUENTIAL LEBANESE LEADERS, CHRISTIAN OR MUSLIM, WITHOUT SUBJECTING THEM TO PROPAGANDA ATTACKS. WE ARE, NONETHELESS, MAINTAINING AS WIDE A CIRCLE OF CONTACTS AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH IT IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT FOR ANY OFFICER TO MEET WITH IMPORTANT MUSLIMS.
PORTER

26 OCT 11 11:32
STATE DEPT

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1969 OCT 26 14 27

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08907 261345Z

51
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01,SS0 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,/046 W

012310

P 261314Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8894
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

S E C R E T BEIRUT 8907

EXDIS

REF: DHAHRAN 928

CHANDLER INFORMED SUBSTANCE REFTEL AND HE IS TAKING
NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES. HE WOULD APPRECIATE
DEPT NOTIFYING PARENT COMPANIES,
PORTER

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SECRET EXDIS

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SECRET 815

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z

2

51
ACTION SS: 45

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /046 W

010010

O R 251645Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8887
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 8896

EXDIS:

1. SITUATION IN LEBANON MOVING VERY FAST AND IT IS HARD TO GET FACTS. IT CLEAR SYRIANS ARE NOT YET BACKING OFF AND THEY, TOGETHER WITH FEDAYEEN, ARE PRODUCING MAJOR CHALLENGE TO GOL. AS A RESULT OF PRESSURE ON ALMOST ALL GEOGRAPHIC FRONTS ON LEBANESE PERIMETER, LEBANESE FORCES HAVE LOST EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF CERTAIN AREAS. SYRIAN AND FEDAYEEN CONTINUE WAR OF NERVES THROUGH MILITARY PROBING ACTIONS INTO LEBANON.
2. BULK OF LEBANESE ARMY STILL REMAINS ON SOUTHERN BORDER BUT WILL INEVITABLY BE FORCED WITHDRAW TO OTHER SECTIONS IN ORDER BOLSTER HARD-PRESSED SECURITY FORCES. THIS WILL OF COURSE LEAVE FEDAYEEN OTHER OPTIONS FAZ EXPANDING THEIR HOLD IN SOUTH.
3. IT IS CLEAR, ALTHOUGH HARD TO PROVE, THAT SOME SYRIAN FORCES ARE FIGHTING ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. THE PRETEXT OF COURSE IS THAT FEDAYEEN ARE DOING THE FIGHTING, BUT PRESENCE OF MILITARY TRANSPORT AND ARMORED CARS CLEARLY ESTABLISH SYRIAN ARMY COMPLICITY, AND WE BELIEVE SYRIAN ARMY PERSONNEL HAVE ALSO BEEN ENGAGED.
4. WE CANNOT ASSESS HOW FAR SYRIANS WILL CARRY THINGS. SO FAR THEY WOULD APPEAR TO BE UNRESTRAINED BY SOVS OR ANY OTHER EXTERNAL FORCE AND THEY MUST BE FLUSHED WITH THEIR EARLY SUCCESSES,

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PARTICULARLY IN TRIPOLI. ALSO, FEDAYEEN AND LEBANESE LEFTISTS DO NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS. IF THEY SUFFER MORE LOSSES PERHAPS AN OPPORTUNITY CAN BE FOUND FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS. FEDAYEEN ATTITUDES ARE HARDENED BY FIRM BELIEF HELOU IS ACTING WITH US BACKING TO DESTROY THEM IN A MAJOR CONFRONTATION. THIS COMPLICATES HELOU'S ATTEMPTS TO REACH EFFECTIVE COMPROMISE.

5. HELOU IS PREPARED FOR COMPROMISE BUT NOT FOR CAPITULATION. HE IS DESPERATELY SEEKING TO FORM A REPRESENTATIVE GOVT BUT MAY FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE SECURE MUSLIM COOPERATION. IF SUCCESSFUL HE WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO SOFT LINE POSITIONS RE FEDAYEEN WHICH UNTIL NOW HE HAS FOUND UNACCEPTABLE. HE IS NOW BUYING TIME WHICH HE MEASURES IN DAYS OR WEEKS RATHER THAN MONTHS. IN EFFECT, HE HAS HAD TO MAKE DECISION THAT ISRAELI THREAT TO SOUTH LEBANON IS LESS IMMINENT ONE TO EXISTENCE OF COUNTRY THAN ARE FEDAYEEN.

6. A FEAR OF CIVIL WAR IS UNDERSTANDABLY GROWING. EACH DAY MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES TO RESTRAIN HOOTHEADS, ALTHOUGH BEIRUT DID REMAIN CALM DURING THE DAY.

7. ARMY MORALE SEEMS TO CONTINUE HIGH ALTHOUGH THERE IS ISOLATED INSTANCES INDICATING OTHERWISE. THE DEEPLY FELT LEBANESE CONTEMPT FOR SYRIANS AND SYRIAN REGIME (FELT MUCH LESS IN TRIPOLI AND THE MUSLIM NORTH) WILL CONTINUE HAVE POSITIVE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR PUBLIC OPINION TO EXPRESS ITSELF NOW EXCEPT THROUGH PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS.

8. BEST HOPE FOR SAVING SITUATION STILL LIES IN ARAB MEDIATION. UAR SEEMS TO WISH TAKE ON THIS ROLE AND HELOU IS WORKING WITH THEM. KUWAITIS AND LIBYANS WANT TO HELP BUT SEEM TO BE ELBOWED OUT BY UAR.

9. WE ARE NOT YET ALERTING AMERICAN COMMUNITY. THERE NO INDICATION YET THAT US OR WESTERN INTERESTS UNDER IMMINENT THREAT, AND ANY INDICATION THAT US WAS PACKING UP TO LEAVE WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY UNSETTLING EFFECT. IT WOULD SEND HELOU INTO DESPAIR AND LOWER THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE TO RESIST FEDAYEEN-SYRIAN TAKE-OVER ATTEMPT. WE HAVE OF COURSE GONE INTO ALERT PHASE AT EMBASSY AND WILL BE READY MOVE QUICKLY IN E & E MATTERS. THERE

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z

YET NO INDICATION OF PANIC AMONG WESTERN COMMUNITY IN BEIRUT.

10. AS HELOU INFORMED US TODAY, THIS AFFAIR CAN ONLY BE SETTLED BY ARABS. IT SEEMS TO US USG CAN EXERCISE WHAT INFLUENCE IT HAS BY EXERTING ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON ARAB WORLD THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. I WOULD HOPE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NATO POWERS COULD BE MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED TO PUT MAXIMUM INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND IRAQ. PERHAPS WE CAN HAVE SOME DIRECT INFLUENCE ON UAR ALTHOUGH DEPT IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS WHETHER THIS CAN BE DONE. HELOU SEES NO WAY TO TAKE PROBLEM TO UN NOW, WITHOUT EARNING ALL-OUT ENMITY OF REST OF ARABS. OF COURSE, HE WOULD WELCOME ANY EFFORTS BY EXTERNAL POWERS (RULING OUT USG AT MOMENT) TO SEIZE THE UN WITH THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AS A THREAT TO THE PEACE.

11. ISRAEL MUST OF COURSE BE WATCHING EVENTS IN LEBANON VERY CLOSELY. ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIA TO DIVERT SYRIA'S ATTENTION WOULD NOT IN OUR OPINION WORK. EVEN IF IT (DOUBTFULLY) GAVE HELOU A FEW WEEKS GRACE IT WOULD TOTALLY ISOLATE HIM FROM REST OF ARAB WORLD AND HE WOULD BE UNABLE HOLD COUNTRY TOGETHER. ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BE EVEN WORSE. IT WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DESTROY LEBANESE ARMY, OR IMMOBILIZE IT IN THE SOUTH, AND COUNTRY WOULD BE OPEN FOR SUBVERSION AND CIVIL WAR.

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SECRET 734

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08846 241337Z

52
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /046 W

002144

O P 241245Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8861
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
MEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1968
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

69 OCT 24 PM 12:27
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET BEIRUT 8846

EXDIS

REF: STATE 180291

TO BE DELIVERED TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OSWBUSINESS OCT 24.

1. WE HAVE BEEN ENDEAVORING COME UP WITH IDEAS TO AMELIORATE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND SHORE UP US POSITION IN AREA. SSO FAR OUR SEARCH HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN FRUITFUL AND ACCORDINGLY WE RELUCTANT REACT NEGATIVELY TO DEPT'S POSITIVE APPROACH OUTLINED REFTEL. NONETHELESS WE DO HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS WITH REGARD DEPT'S INITIATIVE.
2. FIRST OF ALL WE MUST ASSUME THAT FEDAYEEN AND PROBABLY SYRIANS WILL BE UNMOVED BY FACT DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LEBANON WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT PEACEMAKING EFFORTS. CONSEQUENTLY FEDAYEEN AND SYRIANS LIKELY BE MOVED ONLY AS RESULT OF PRESSURE BY FRENCH OR SOVS AND PRIMARILY BY LATTER.
3. CONSEQUENTLY OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT IF A STATEMENT IS TO HAVE CHANCE FULFILLING ITS OBJECTIVE, UPARTICIPANTS IN ISSUANCE STATEMENT MUST INCLUDE SOVIET UNION. WORSE COMBINATION OF POWERS WOULD

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BE US, FRENCH AND UK WHICH WOULD OF COURSE BE REMINISCENT OF OLD TRIPARTITE DECLARATION POWERS AND WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE ATTACKED AS IMPERIALIST SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. US ROLE WOULD BE HELPFUL ONLY IN CONCERT WITH SOVS. SHOULD SOVS REFUSE PARTICIPATE, OTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH HAS SOME CHANCE OF BEING HELPFUL WOULD BE FOR FRENCH ALONE TO ISSUE STATEMENT.

4. WE ALSO URGE USG ASK ISRAEL TO AVOID ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON LEBANESE SITUATION, IF THIS IS POSSIBLE. EACH GOI COMMENTARY NOW IS SIMPLY ATTRIBUTED BY ARABS TO WASHINGTON, AND TENDS TO INFLAME SITUATION. NO MATTER WHAT IS SAID, HELOU AND MODERATES ARE INDIRECTLY IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI EMBRACE, THROUGH ASSOCIATION WITH US.

5. SUGGEST USG OFFICIAL COMMENTARY ON LEBANESE DEVELOPMENTS TRY AVOID ANY IMPLICATION WE COORDINATING OUR ACTIONS WITH HELOU, AND POINT OUT USG BELIEVES LEBANESE SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. ALSO WOULD BE HELPFUL IF BACKGROUNDER COULD LEAK FACT THAT PURPOSE OF SISCO STATEMENT WAS INTENDED RESTRAIN POSSIBLE ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST SOUTH LEBANON, AND NOT TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL LEBANESE AFFAIRS. IN ANY CASE, THIS LAST POINT MIGHT BE PASSED TO UAR IN WASHINGTON OR CAIRO. PORTER

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180/40/0290



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SECRET 701

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08845 241259Z

43
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /046 W

001917

O P 241220Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8860
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T BEIRUT 8845

EXDIS:

NOFORN

REF: BEIRUT 8844

1. MICHEL KHOURY OCT 24 WAS MUCH MORE ENCOURAGED BY ROLE THE UAR WAS PLAYING IN LEBANON (REFTEL). KHOURY NOW FEELS THAT NASSER SENT HIS MESSAGE TO HELOU (EMBTel 8790) ONLY BECAUSE LIBYA WAS SENDING ONE AND NASSER DID NOT WANT TO BE ANY LESS ARAB THAN ANYBODY ELSE. THE GOL NOW KNOWS THAT THE UAR AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN ACTIVELY COUNSELLING MODERATION AMONG INFLUENTIAL LEBANESE SUNNIS AND ACCORDING TO KHOURY, HAS MADE CLEAR NASSER DID NOT WANT TROUBLE IN LEBANON. KHOURY FELT THE UAR MAY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN BRINGING ABOUT RELATIVELY MODERATE COMMUNIQUE WHICH SUNNI MOSLEON ISSUED ON OCT 22.

2. IN ADDITION TO THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REFTEL ON PRES HELOU'S EFFORTS TO FORM CABINET, KHOURY INDICATED PRES HOPED KARAME WOULD AGAIN AGREE BECOME PM. WITH THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT, THE STRATEGY OF PRES HELOU WAS TO HAVE LEBANON'S CASE PRESENTED AT THE NOV 8 MEETING OF ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE MINISTERS. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO HAVE NASSER MEDIATE

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN LEBANON AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES AND GROUNDWORK FOR SUCH MEDIATION WOULD BE LAID BEFORE THE CAIRO MEETING. KHOURY SPECIFICALLY ASKED THAT HELOU'S STRATEGY BE MOST CLOSELY HELD BECAUSE WHATEVER CHANCE IT HAS OF SUCCESS WOULD BE DESTROYED

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IF SUBSTANCE LEAKED.

3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH KHOURY HAS REPORTED ARE ENCOURAGING THE LEBANESE SITUATION REMAINS GRAVE. IT, OF COURSE, WOULD HELP SITUATION CONSIDERABLY IF HELOU WERE ABLE TO FORM A CABINET. BUT BASIC PROBLEM OF THE FEDAYEEN WOULD STILL REMAIN. IT SEEMS FAIRLY CLEAR FROM RECENT EVENTS THAT AN ARAB GOVERNMENT CANNOT MAKE A FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE FEDAYEEN AND SURVIVE. CONSEQUENTLY IF A GOVERNMENT IS FORMED, IT WILL HAVE TO BE BASED ON SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH FEDAYEEN AND OF NECESSITY WILL REPRESENT A CONSIDERABLE BACKTRACKING BY THE PRES FROM HIS FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT OF MAY 31, 1969. ALSO, IF SITUATION IN LEBANON BECOMES MORE UNSETTLED, WITH RIOTING AND MORE BLOODSHED (AND THIS IS IN HANDS OF FEDAYEEN AND LEFTISTS), NASSER WILL BE FORCED ASSUME MORE EXTREMIST AND LESS HELPFUL POSITION.
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SECRET 918

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88
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

121676

R 221926Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8843J
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 8792/1

EXDIS:

REF: BEIRUT 8790

1) THE INEVITABLE CRISIS IN LEBANON HAS COME EARLIER THAN WE THOUGHT. IN LARGE MEASURE THE CHALLENGE CREATED BY THE FEDAYEEN WITH SYRIAN BACKING, AND NOW SECONDED BY ALL OF THE RADICAL ARAB STATES, IS A CHALLENGE TO THE US AS MUCH AS TO LEBANON. NASSER'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION SHOWS (A) THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE IS CAPTIVE TO THE EMOTIONAL WAVE OF PUBLIC OPINION STIRRED UP BY PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND (B) HIS VINDICTIVE DESIRE TO HURT THE US BY HURTING A COUNTRY WHICH HAS ONLY RECENTLY RECEIVED A SPECIAL INDICATION OF US SUPPORT.

2) PRES. HELOU HAS FEW ASSETS AT THIS POINT. HIS PRINCIPAL INTERNAL ASSET - THE LEBANESE CHRISTIANS - CANNOT BE USED WITHOUT TEARING THE COUNTRY APART. INDEED, ONE OF HIS GREATEST CONCERNS IS TO AVOID MILITANT ACTION ON PART OF THE CHRISTIANS ALTHOUGH HE UNDERSTANDS THAT SOME OF THEM MAY BE UNCONTROLLABLE.

3) LEBANON HAS SHOWN GREAT RESILIENCE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL CAPACITY IN THE PAST. IT COULD HAPPEN ONCE AGAIN, ALTHOUGH IN THE PROCESS HELOU WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE TO BACK DOWN ON THE FEDAYEEN ISSUE, TRYING TO STRIKE A TOLERABLE BARGAIN IN THE PROCESS. BUT THE EXTERNAL OPPOSITION TO HIM IS SO FORMIDABLE AND OVERWHELMING THAT HE WILL BE LUCKY TO COME

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OUT OF IT WITH ANYTHING SHORT OF AN IGNOMINIOUS CAVE-IN. IN THE PROCESS, HIS FRUSTRATED ARMY WILL LOSE EFFECTIVENESS TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, THE LEFTISTS AND THE FEDAYEEN WILL BE EMBOLDENED, AND THE SUPPORT THEY RECEIVE FROM THE RADICAL ARAB WORLD WILL INTENSIFY AFTER THEIR INITIAL SUCCESS. LEBANON HAS IN EFFECT LOST ITS CAREFULLY PRESERVED INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION. IT CAN NO LONGER MAINTAIN THE FICTION THAT ITS WESTERN TIES ARE STRONGER THAN THE FACT OF ITS GEOGRAPHY.

4) HELOU IN HIS ISOLATION FEELS THAT HIS ONLY EXTERNAL HELP CAN COME FROM THE US AND HE HAS TURNED TO US FOR SUGGESTIONS AND HOPE. GIVEN THE MARKED DETERIORATION OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN ANY ARAB COUNTRY, IT SEEMS TO US THAT OUR OPTIONS ARE VERY LIMITED INDEED. HELOU STILL HOPES THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO MUSTER INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON THROUGH THE UN OR OTHERWISE, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS BEEN INFORMED OF OUR POSITION (STATE 168780) THAT WE CAN ONLY SUPPORT HIS INITIATIVES RATHER THAN TAKING INITIATIVES ON OUR OWN. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT WE ARE NOT OFFERING OR CONSIDERING MILITARY ASSISTANCE ALTHOUGH I AM SURE DEPT UNDERSTANDS THAT HE WILL ASK FOR IT IN DESPERATION IF THE COUNTRY TURNS TO CIVIL WAR.

5) I AM SURE DEPT IS CONSIDERING POSSIBLE OVERTURES TO SOVIETS AS WELL AS FRENCH AND BRITISH. WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS WILL BE OF MUCH HELP, BUT NEITHER DO WE WISH TO SECOND GUESS ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAVE VALUE. SOVS, SMARTING FROM THE RECENT MIRAGE INCIDENT, MUST BE RUBBING THEIR HANDS WITH GLEE OVER CURRENT DETERIORATION IN LEBANON WHICH IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO DEMORALIZE MODERATE FORCES AND BRING LEBANON NEARER TO A RADICALLY-ORIENTED SOCIETY. IF IN FACT FABRIC OF PRESENT SOCIETY IS NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED, FRENCH WILL MAKE SYMPATHETIC NOISES BUT WE (AND HELOU) SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE EXERCISE REAL INFLUENCE.

6) I KNOW DEPT ALSO AGREES WITH ME THAT SIXTH FLEET OR EVEN AN ALLIED FLEET PRESENCE NEAR LEBANON WOULD NOT HELP. IN FACT IT PROBABLY WOULD AGGRAVATE SITUATION AND I WOULD NOT PROPOSE CONSIDERING USE OF FLEET UNLESS REQUIRED FOR EVACUATION OF AMERICANS FOLLOWING A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL SECURITY.

7) WHETHER OR NOT A DRAMATIC STATEMENT OR ACTION BY USG

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WHICH WOULD PROVIDE ARABS REAL HOPE FOR A REALISTIC PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD IMPROVE SITUATION IS NOT EASY TO ESTIMATE. THERE WOULD BE INHERENT RISKS THAT WE WERE KNUCKLING UNDER TO ARAB BLACKMAIL (AND NASSER WOULD OF COURSE TAKE FULL CREDIT) AND FEDAYEEN MIGHT REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS IN FACE OF AN IMPENDING SETTLEMENT THE NATURE OF WHICH THEY OPPOSE. ISRAELI ACTION WOULD ALSO BE UNPREDICTABLE. IN FACE OF INEVITABLE INCREASE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY FROM LEBANON ISRAELIS MIGHT SOONER OR LATER INCLINE TO A MAJOR RETALIATION WHICH WOULD END ANY HOPES HELOU MIGHT HAVE OF KEEPING THE SITUATION IN BALANCE FOR A WHILE LONGER.

8) ON OTHER HAND, MODERATES IN LEBANON (INCLUDING MANY FRIGHTENED MUSLIM LEADERS) WOULD GAIN STRENGTH TO HOLD OUT AGAINST BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PRESSURES IF A FIRM AND ACCEPTABLE US POSITION ON THE SETTLEMENT WAS CLEARLY SET FORTH. I THINK HELOU WOULD CONSIDER THIS THE ONE IMPORTANT WEAPON WHICH WE COULD HAD HIM AT THIS TIME.
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91
ACTION SS 45

INFO OCT 01, /046 W

121649

R 221726Z OCT 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8844
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 8792/2

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 8790

9) EMB EXPECTS BE SWAMPED WITH RENEWED AND MORE DESPERATE PLEAS FOR HELP FROM CHRISTIAN GROUPS DEMANDING ARMS AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR WHAT MANY OF THEM BELIEVE TO BE UNAVOIDABLE IMPENDING SHOWDOWN IN THE STREETS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST THESE REQUESTS AND TO CAUTION RESTRAINT. WHETHER WE CAN ACHIEVE RESTRAINT WITHOUT GIVING THE MODERATES ANY NEW HOPE FOR THE FUTURE IS MOOT. FORTUNATELY, WE DO NOT YET SEE A GREAT RISE IN MILITANCY ON PART OF EITHER CHRISTIAN OR MUSLIM LEBANESE LEADERS BUT MATTER TRAGICALLY IS PARTLY OUT OF THEIR HANDS AND IN THE HANDS OF THE SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN.

10) WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME POINT CHRISTIANS, FACED WITH A CIVIL WAR, MAY IN DESPERATION BELIEVE ISRAEL TO BE THEIR ONLY SALVATION. THIS WOULD HAVE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AREA AND FOR THE US.

11) FINALLY, I REGRET TO SAY THAT DECLINE IN US PRESTIGE IN LAST FEW MONTHS MAKES IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO EXERCIS A PERSONAL INFLUENCE ON THE TURN OF EVENTS. THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP IS EITHER AFRADI TO TALK TO US OR NO LONGER ACCEPTS THAT THE DIALOGUE IS WORTHWHILE. THE CHRISTIANS WILL OF COURSE TURN TO US FOR SUPPORT BUT THEY MAY NOT BE AMENABLE TO OUR PERSUASION. I WILL

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CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE PERSONAL SUPPORT TO
HELOU, WHOSE TENURE AS PRESIDENT IS OBVIOUSLY IN ITSELF
VERY MUCH AT STAKE.
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 08009 261943Z

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82
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

095727

R 261725Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8669
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET BEIRUT 8009

EXDIS

SUBJ: INCREASED PROTECTION OF US PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY

REF: STATE 151166 AND 160291

1. THE PROTECTION OF US PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY FROM ATTACK HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH GOL SECURITY OFFICERS BY THE POST'S SY OFFICER AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM. IT WAS FELT THAT APART FROM ISOLATED ACTION ON PART OF INDIVIDUAL CRANKS OR FANATICS, PRIMARY THREAT AT PRESENT EMANATES FROM PALESTINE COMMANDO ORGANIZATION CALLED POPULAR FRONT FOR LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), WHICH HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR INTER ALIA SUCH ACTS AS HIJACKING TWA BOEING TO DAMASCUS AND BLOWING UP TAPLINE WITHIN ISRAEL-OCCUPIED SYRIA. WE CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY PFLP CONSIDERING KIDNAPPING OR SIMILAR ACTION HERE.

2. TO PROVIDE THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATEST POSSIBLE SECURITY AT HIS RESIDENCE WHICH IS LOCATED IN A RELATIVELY SECLUDED WOODED AREA, AND ALSO WHEN BEING TRANSPORTED, THE FOLLOWING MEASURES HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING TAKEN--SOME IN CONJUNCTION WITH GOL SY FORCES.

A. RESIDENCE

- 1. GOL GENDARME DETACHMENT OF TEN MEN IS BIVOUACKED AT THE RESIDENCE WITH THREE MEN OF FOOT PATROL AROUND THE CLOCK;
- 2. POLICE MOTOR PATROLS IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN INCREASED;
- 3. WHERE NECESSARY, WE HAVE INSTALLED CURVED SPIKES AND

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RAISED LEVEL OF FENCE SURROUNDING RESIDENCE:

4. AN ALARM SYSTEM BETWEEN MAIN GATE GUARD POST AND GOL GUARD DETACHMENT HAS BEEN INSTALLED;
5. WE ARE INSTALLING ALARM FROM MAIN GATE TO AMBASSADOR'S QTRS TO ALERT HIM OF ANY DISTURBANCES;
6. WE PLAN TO INSTALL ALARM SYSTEM ALONG FENCE TO ALERT MAIN GATE GUARD POST OF ANY ATTEMPT TO ENTER PREMISES SURREPTITIOUSLY (THIS WILL SUPPLEMENT FOOT PATROL COVERAGE).

B. PERSON OF AMBASSADOR

1. ROUTE TO OFFICE AND TIME SCHEDULES WILL BE ALTERED AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS;
2. UNMARKED VEHICLE WILL BE USED FREQUENTLY AS SUBSTITUTE FOR COM VEHICLE;
3. VEHICLE USED BY COM WILL NOT BE LEFT UNATTENDED AT ANY TIME;
4. WE PLAN TO INSTALL ALARM SYSTEM IN VEHICLES (SIREN) TO BE ACTIVATED IF ATTEMPT IS MADE TO BLOCK THEM;
5. WE ARE CONSIDERING AND DISCUSSING WITH GOL DESIRABILITY OF EITHER GOL SY OFFICER RIDING IN CAR WITH AMBASSADOR OR UNMARKED SY CAR FOLLOWING COM VEHICLE, OR BOTH.

C. OTHER US PERSONNEL

WE ARE NOT RESTRICTING MOVEMENTS OF EMBASSY EMPLOYEES OR TAKING ANY NEW MEASURES FOR TIME BEING. WE HAVE CAUTIONED COUNTRY TEAM NEED EXERCISE MAXIMUM PRUDENCE BUT WE MAKING EVERY EFFORT AVOID ACTIONS WHICH WOULD UNDULY ALARM AMERICAN COMMUNITY.

D. CHANCERY

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF CHANCERY ENHANCED BY INCREASE IN GOL SY FORCES FROM EIGHT TO TWENTY-SEVEN MEN INCLUDING ONE LIEUTENANT. WE ARE MAINTAINING PACKAGE CONTROLS; ESCORT PROCEDURES, LIMITED ACCESS AREAS AND STRICT SY REGARDING GATES, DOORS, SHUTTERS, ETC. TO REDUCE NUMBER LEBANESE ENTERING CHANCERY LOBBY WE ARE CONSTRUCTING OUTSIDE STAIRWAY LEADING DIRECTLY TO CONSULAR SECTION. CHANCERY BY NO MEANS INACCESSIBLE TO HOSTILE GROUPS AS EVIDENCED BY DAMAGE INFLICTED DURING 1967 CRISIS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE SINCE THAT TIME EVERYTHING POSSIBLE HAS BEEN DONE TO DENY ACCESS. BECAUSE OF LOCATION, STRUCTURE ETC, IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE GUARANTEE ABSOLUTELY SECURITY OF PREMISES. ONLY SOLUTION TO THIS SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEM IS A NEW CHANCERY, WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE MADE MATTER OF TOP PRIORITY BY DEPT.

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3. KEY POST PERSONNEL AND GOL OFFICIALS KEENLY AWARE POTENTIAL HAZARDS TO US PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS. COMMITTEE FORMED TO REGULARLY REVIEW SY MEASURES AND DISCUSS IMPROVEMENTS WITH GOL OFFICIALS.
PORTER

NOTE: SY CHANNEL CAPTION REMOVED PER INSTRUCTIONS S/S-O, MISS MUENCH.

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42
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /031 W

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O R 251747Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8661
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 7966

EXDIS

1. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR RICCARDI CALLED ON ME TODAY, SEP 25 TO REVIEW PRESENT SITUATION OF TWA PASSENGERS AND EFFORTS FOR THEIR RELEASE. HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY FROM HIS VANTAGE POINT IN SYRIAND NOT OFFICIALLY FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE HIS VIEWS MUST BE PROTECTED.

2. WHEN THE TWA FLIGHT LANDED IN DAMASCUS AUG 29 HE BELIEVED THAT THE SYRIANS WERE BADLY EMBARRASSED. DURING HIS INITIAL TALKS HE HAD POINTED OUT TO SYRIANS THAT THEY WOULD GAIN MORE FROM WORLD OPINION BY IMMEDIATE RELEASE THAN BY RETAINING THE ISRAELI PASSENGERS. MOREOVER WHILE ORIGINALLY BA'ATH PARTY COUNSELS WERE DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE, THE SITUATION HAD NOW DEVELOPED TO THE STAGE WHERE THE SYRIANS NO LONGER FEEL EMBARRASSED NOR, RICCARDI EMPHASIZED, ARE THEY FRIGHTENED BY FEAR OF ANY ISRAELI REPRISAL. THE SYRIANS REASON THAT IF THE REPRISALS WERE MINOR, SYRIA COULD ABSORB THE DAMAGE AND LIVE WITH IT. HOWEVER IF SUCH A REPRISAL WERE MAJOR IT WOULD BE SO DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE DETENTION OF TWO PASSENGERS THAT SYRIA WOULD GAIN RATHER THAN LOSE IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD. ADDITIONALLY, THE SYRIANS BELIEVED THAT ANY MAJOR ATTACK WOULD HAVE TO BE AGAINST MAJOR INSTALLATION SUCH AS THE SYRIAN PIPELINE, THE HOMS REFINERY, OR THE DAMASCUS AIRPORT. ALL HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF FOREIGN ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS. THUS ANY SUCH ISRAELI REPRISAL WOULD RISK THE KILLING OR WOUNDING OF SOVIET ADVISORS, AND IF THE DAMASCUS AIRPORT WERE HIT, EVEN THE AMERICAN TECHNICIANS REPAIRING THE BOEING 707. FINALLY THE

69 SEP 25 PM 8:38

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 07966 251917Z

SYRIANS CONSIDER THAT THE RISK OF SOME ISRAELI REPRISAL IS ALWAYS EXISTENT AND IS SOMETHING THAT THEY, THE SYRIANS, HAVE TO LIVE WITH. THESE CONSIDERATIONS HAVE HARDENED SYRIAN ATTITUDES TO THE POINT WHERE THEY NO LONGER FEEL UNDER ANY PRESSURE TO LET THE TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS GO.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF THE TWO SYRIAN POLOTS, RICCARDI FEARED THAT THE SITUATION HAD EVOLVED TO THE STAGE WHERE THE SYRIANS MIGHT EVEN SAY THIS WAS YOUR IDEA AND NOT OURS AND WE ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED. RICCARDI ALSO WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SYRIANS MIGHT SUDDENLY ANNOUNCE THAT THEIR INQUIRY INTO THE BACKGROUND OF THE TWO PASSENGERS HAD BEEN TERMINATED; THAT IT HAD BEEN "DISCOVERED" THEY WERE ISRAELI AGENTS AND COULD FACE THE 10-15 YEARS PRISON SENTENCES.

4. HE THEN ASKED THE RHETORICAL QUESTION WHO WOULD PROTECT THE ISRAELIS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE RECOGNIZED FULLY THE POINT OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVED IN RELEASING THESE PASSENGERS BUT SAID THAT THIS PRINCIPLE LOOKS QUITE DIFFERENT IN SYRIAN EYES. HE QUOTED ONE SYRIAN OFFICIAL WHO HAD POINTED OUT THE KIDNAPPING OF AN AFRICAN MINISTER FROM A PANAM PLANE HAD NOT RAISED ANY COMPARABLE OUTCRY FROM THE US. THE SYRIANS BELIEVE THAT THIS US PRESSURE MERELY REFLECTS THE IDENTITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE SU WHICH IS CAUSED BY PRESSURES GENERATED BY ISRAEL AND INTERNAL POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE US.

5. RICCARDI EMPHASIZED THAT THERE MUST BE A FACADE, OR SCREEN, BEHIND WHICH THE BARGAINING AND MANEUVERS COULD TAKE PLACE. IF THE SYRIANS WERE PUT UNDER OVERT PRESSURES THEY WOULD NOT MOVE. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH NUMEROUS OTHER FOREIGN AMBASSADORS IN DAMASCUS, INCLUDING THE CZECH, FRENCH, SOVIET, JAP AND PAKISTANI. ALTHOUGH THEY HAD MADE DEMARCHES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, RICCARDI SAID IN FACT SUCH DEMARCHES WERE CARRIED OUT IN ONLY A PRO-FORMA MANNER REFLECTING THEIR BELIEF THAT UNDER THE PRESENT SYRIAN CIRCUMSTANCES LITTLE MORE COULD BE DONE.

6. RICCARDI RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLE BUT THEN WENT ON TO COMPARE THIS EPISODE WITH THAT OF THE ITALIAN PRISONERS IN BIAFRA AND THE PUEBLO INCIDENT WHERE

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IN THE LAST ANALYSIS COMPROMISES HAD TO BE MADE TO SAVE THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. HE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE CHESS GAME BEING PLAYED BY THE GOI "ON THE SKIN OF TWO INNOCENT MEN", ONE OF WHOM, MUALLEM, RICCARDI SAID, WAS LIVING IN A STATE OF PATHETIC FEAR. THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR MANEUVERINGS WERE IN HIS OPINION JEOPARDIZING THESE MEN.

7. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE BEST APPROACH FOR HANDLING ANY EXCHANGE OF PILOTS VERSUS PASSENGERS, RICCARDI THOUGHT MANY DIFFERENT WAYS COULD BE ARRANGED EITHER THROUGH THE ITAL EMBASSY OR THE ICRC. HOWEVER, HE HINTED AT A PREFERENCE FOR THE ICRC BY NOTING THAT THE ICRC DELS HAD BEEN GRANTED PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW THE PASSENGERS WHEN THEY CITED THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION GOVERNING PRISONERS OF WAR. RICCARDI SAID HIS APPEALS BASED ON THE TOKYO CONVENTION, ETC. HAD FAILED.

8. IN BRIEF, RICCARDI SEES ONLY LONG CAREFUL NEGOTIATION WITH SYRIANS IF RELEASE IS TO BE OBTAINED AND ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW COULD WE DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT OTHER THAN BY SENDING IN THE SIXTH FLEET. HE REITERATED THE NEED FOR SECRECY ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. COMMENT: WE CAN ONLY NOTE THAT SHOULD AN EXCHANGE BE PROPOSED TO THE SYRIANS AND THEN REJECTED BY THEM THE ISRAELIS WOULD GAIN THE UPPER HAND BY EXPOSING WHAT HAD GONE ON.

PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07955 251649Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

087168

P R 251449Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8658
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ROME

SECRET BEIRUT 7955

EXDIS

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV 3588 RPTD BEIRUT AS DEPTTEL 159345

1. WE HAVE NOTED ARGUMENTATION IN REFTEL THAT USG MUST BE PREPARED TO MOUNT A "NEW HARD HITTING CAMPAIGN AIMED AT GETTING ISRAELIS OUT OF DAMASCUS BY SOME SPECIFIC DATE" (A) TO FORCE RELEASE TWO REMAINING PASSENGERS, AND (B) TO PROTECT PRINCIPLE THAT USG WILL NOT STAND FOR KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF PASSENGERS ON US FLAG AIRCRAFT. WE NOTE ALSO TEL AVIV'S FEARS EXPRESSED IN REFTEL THAT SHOULD GOI CONCLUDE THAT USG EFFORTS UNAVAILING THEM VIOLENT ISRAELI ACTION DISTINCT POSSIBILITY.
2. THE ARGUMENTATION RESTS ON TWO ASSUMPTIONS (A) THAT THE USG DOES IN FACT HAVE MEANS OF EXERTING GENUINE PRESSURE ON SYRIA, AND (B) THAT SYRIA WILL REACT POSITIVELY TO THIS PRESSURE.
3. THE FIRST ASSUMPTION RESTS ON THE USG'S ABILITY TO EXERCISE STRONG OVERT PRESSURE ON ITS OWN ON SYRIA AND TO MOBILIZE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SYRIA. ACTUALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY POLITICAL OR SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC TIES WITH SYRIA, WE HAVE HARDLY ANY CAPACITY TO EXERT STRONG PRESSURE ON SYRIA. OIL TRANSIT RIGHTS, OVERFLIGHTS AND LANDINGS ARE ALL THINGS THE USG WANTS MORE THAN THE SYRIANS. WHILE SYRIA MAY FEEL SOMEWHAT RESTIVE ABOUT THE CLOSENESS OF ITS SOVIET RELATIONS (WHICH ACCOUNTS TO SOME EXTENT FOR ITS RECENT RELAXATION OF ANTI-US MEASURES) THIS CLOSENESS IS MOST USEFUL BULWARK ESPECIALLY AGAINST STRONG OVERT

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PRESSURE BY US. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MOBILIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPLEMENT OUR BILATERAL EFFORTS HAS NOT AS YET ENJOYED MUCH SUCCESS.

4. THE SECOND ASSUMPTION IS THAT SYRIA WILL CAVE UNDER STRONG PUBLIC US "PRESSURE". UNFORTUNATELY THE SYRIAN MENTALITY JUST DOES NOT WORK THIS WAY. AS WE HAVE OBSERVED BEFORE, PRESSURE WILL ONLY STIFFEN SYRIAN RESISTANCE TO RELEASING PASSENGERS. THEIR LIKELY REACTION TO OVERT PRESSURES WILL BE TO INDULGE IN HEROIC POSES AND THE MORE PRESSURE, THE GREATER THE "HEROISM". THIS REACTION IS IN FACT NOT UNTYPICAL OF ANY PROUD, IF CANTANKEROUS, PEOPLE. STRONG ACTION BY ISRAELIS SUCH AS REPRISAL RAID LIKELY HAVE EFFECT, AS DEPT POINTED OUT TO ARGOV, OF JEOPARDIZING SERIOUSLY LIVES OF TWO MEN. IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY THE USG LIKELY HAVE HARD TIME DISENTANGLING ITSELF FROM ARAB ACCUSATIONS THAT IT MASTERMINDED THE ISRAELI ATTACK.

5. THUS BECAUSE NEITHER OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS APPEAR VALID TO US, WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY A CAMPAIGN SUCH AS RECOMMENDED IN THE REFTEL WOULD PROLONG THE PERIOD OF DETENTION RATHER THAN EFFECT THE RELEASE OF THE PASSENGERS.

6. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT HAVE STRONG LEVERAGE ON THE SYRIANS, WE DO HAVE ASSETS WHICH CAN BE USED. FOREMOST IS SYRIAN EMBARRASSMENT WITH HIJACKING AND DETENTION TWO MEN. MOST INDIVIDUALS INTIMATELY INVOLVED WITH PROBLEM, AGREE SYRIA WOULD LIKE PROBLEM "GO AWAY". IN ADDITION, SYRIA IS INTERESTED PANAM USE OF NEW AIRPORT, DOES WANT EQUIPMENT FROM US SUCH AS RCA TRANSCEIVERS AND DOES WANT INTERNATIONAL RESPECTABILITY. WE ALSO HAVE CARD WHICH WE HAVE WISELY BEEN HOLDING I.E., THREAT TO PERMIT OTHERS TO RAISE PROBLEM IN UN FORUM WHICH COULD EMBARRASS SYRIA'S CANDIDACY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS NOT TO MENTION SYRIAN POLOTS HELD BY ISRAELIS.

7. THE ISSUE IS ALMOST AS MUCH HOW YOU DO IT AS WHAT YOU DO AND WE FIRMLY BELIEVE A CAMPAIGN SUCH AS TEL AVIV SUGGESTS WOULD BE SELF DEFEATING. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT SLOW PATIENT PROBINGS ARE IN ORDER SUCH AS THE DEPARTMENT AND THE ITALIANS ARE NOW DOING. THE SARG APPEARS NOT TO HAVE ABANDONED HOPE OF CONCLUDING THIS AFFAIR ON A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY BASIS BUT TO ACHIEVE THIS END WE WILL HAVE TO WORK IN THE SLOW UNHURRIED ATMOSPHERE OF CAREFUL NEGOTIATION TYPICAL OF THE ORIENTAL

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BAZZAR RATHER THAN IN THE BELLIGERENT ATMOSPHERE OF DRAMATIC HEADLINES. MAARIV ARTICLE SEPT 21 (TEL AVIV 3629 IS TYPE OF PUBLICITY WHICH IS NOT HELPFUL. IF ISRAELIS CANNOT OR WILL NOT GRASP THIS POINT AND GUIDE THEIR ACTIONS ACCORDINGLY WE CANNOT HAVE MUCH HOPE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE TWO PASSENGERS. PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07808 191704Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 W

051938

O R 191639Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8630
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7808

EXDIS

1. AT MAIOLINI'S URGENT REQUEST, EMBOFF PRATT MET HIM AT CHTAURA SEP 19 REGARDING TWA ISRAELI PASSENGERS. MAIOLINI WAS WORRIED BY INCREASED TENSION AND THREATS OF REPRISALS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE BASED ON REPORTS HE WAS RECEIVING FROM ITALIAN POSTS AT JERUSALEM AND TEL AVIV. HE HAD BEEN EXPLORING FURTHER MEANS OF RESOLVING SITUATION AND THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES HE HAD LEARNED THAT TWO HIGH BAAATH PARTY OFFICIALS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SITUATION FURTHER PROVIDED STRICT SECRECY MAINTAINED. MAIOLINI NOTED THAT OUR CONTACTS SO FAR HAD BEEN (A) WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO WAS NOT, HE SAID, A PARTY MEMBER AND (B) WITH GENERAL DAKAR, WHO AS A CHRISTIAN, WAS INHIBITED FROM TAKING UNPOPULAR STAND WITHIN THE PARTY. HE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN (A) THE SYRIANS WOULD WANT SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE FOR PASSENGERS' RELEASE, AND (B) EFFORTS TO FORCE SYRIANS TO GIVE IN BY THREAT LIKELY BE USELESS, EVEN THOUGH THREATS WERE CARRIED OUT, BECAUSE OF INNATE SYRIAN STUBBORNNESS.

2. MAIOLINI WANTED OUR CLEARANCE BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER. PRATT AGREED THAT HE SHOULD CONTACT BAAATH OFFICIALS IN EFFORT DETERMINE WHAT IF ANYTHING THEY HAD IN MIND AND THEN REPORT BACK.

3. PRATT AND MAIOLINI REVIEWED QUESTION ADVISABILITY INFORMING ISRAELIS ON MOST CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONTINUING WITH SYRIANS WITH IDEA OF FORESTALLING ANY HASTY ISRAELI ACTIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD AWAIT THE RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY MEETING BEFORE ADVISING THE ISRAELIS. PRATT UNDERSTOOD THAT MAIOLINI WOULD BE SEEING THE INTERMEDIARIES SOONEST.

4. IN CLOSING MAIOLINI ONCE AGAIN STRESSED CONCERN THAT ISRAELIS

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WOULD TAKE PRECIPITOUS ACTION AND CONSEQUENT URGENCY FOR U.S. AND SARG TO TALK. HE FURTHER EMPHASIZED NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECRECY BECAUSE THE TWO SYRIANS WERE DEATHLY AFRAID OF LEAKS. MAIOLINI BELIEVES SYRIANS IN QUESTION HAVE SUFFICIENT STATURE TO TALK FOR BAATH PARTY.

5. COMMENT: THIS HIGHLY CLANDESTINE METHOD OF OPERATION IS REMINISCENT OF BAATHI HANDLING OF THE CRITICAL STAGES OF THE IPC/SARG NEGOTIATIONS IN JANUARY 1967. NOTHING MAY RESULT FROM MAIOLINI'S EXPLORATIONS BUT WE SEE NO HARM IN TRYING.
HOUGHTON

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SECRET 843

69 SEP 12 PM 2:44

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07577 121311Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /031 W

003553

O P 121203Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8570
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 7577

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 7563

SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON

1. EVENING SEPT 11 MICHEL KHOURY GAVE ME PRES HELOU'S RESPONSE TO DEPARTMNET'S PROPOSALS TRANSMITTED STATE 152733. KHOURY SAID PRESIDENT WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP APPRECIATION TO USG FOR ITS PROMPT AND COMPLETE RESPONSE TO HIS REQUESTS. HE WAS REASSURED AND DEEPLY GRATEFUL.

2. WITH RESPECT TO RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, SHAIKH MICHEL SAID WITHIN THE LAST TWO DAYS PRES HELOU HAD SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS AMBASSADOR IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE HEAD OF THE LEBANESE INTERESTS SECTION IN THE MOROCCAN EMBASSY TEHRAN TO MAKE VIGOROUS EFFORTS CONVINCING THOSE TWO GOVERNMENTS OF THE NECESSITY OF ALL MODERATES SETTLING THEIR DIFFERENCES AND MAINTAINING A UNITED FRONT. THE SHAH (PRESUMABLY RECENTLY) HAD INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH LEBANON PROVIDED THE LEBANESE WOULD SEND A DELEGATION OR AN EMISSARY TO "MAKE EXCUSES". KHOURY SAID THAT THESE WERE SORT OF CONDITIONS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT FOUND HUMILIATING (BEIRUT 7419). NONETHELESS GOL WAS STUDYING THE MATTER AND ALSO THE QUESTION OF WHOM WOULD BE A SUITABLE EMISSARY FOR SUCH A DELICATE MISSION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE CONFES- SIONAL PROBLEM HERE MADE COMPOSITION OF SUCH A MISSION MORE DIF-

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FICULT THAN IN MOST COUNTRIES. PRES HELOU HAD EXPECTED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER PERSONALLY WITH THE SHAH AT THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT MEETING SEPT 22 BUT WE GATHER MEETING NOW POSTPONED. SAUDI ARAIBA, HE SAID, WAS LESS AGGRESSIVE THAN IRAN BUT HAD NEGATIVE POSTURE. HE EXPLAINED THAT LEBANON COULD LIVE WITH POSTPONEMENT OF RENEWAL OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE REFINERY ISSUE PROVIDED THE SAUDI ATTITUDE WAS LESS HOSTILE AND PROVIDED SAG DID NOT CARRY OUT THE MYRIAD OF THREATS WHICH THEY HAD MADE WITH RESPECT TO LEBANESE WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA, FREIGHT TRANSPORTING BEIRUT PORT, ETC. PRES HELOU FELT THAT DEMARCHES WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF OUR MISSIONS IN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA DID NOT APPEAR TO BE COORDINATING THEIR APPROACHES WITH LEBANESE MISSIONS THERE.

3. PRES HELOU WAS PLEASED WITH THE STATEMENT RE SECURITY AND WELL-BEING OF LEBANON. HE CAUTIONED THAT ALTHOUGH RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE ELEMENTS WOULD BE REASSURED BY STATEMENT, THERE WOULD BE SOME WHO WOULD CRITICIZE US FOR MAKING REMARKS. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT DISTURB US.

4. KHOURY REPORTED THAT THE PRES REGRETTED THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE EITHER TO OUR USING HIS NAME AS REQUESTING THE MORATORIUM OR TO OUR STATING THAT HE INTENDED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT DURING THIS PERIOD. THE PRES MAINTAINED THAT HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND THAT OF SOME OF HIS FELLOW CHIEFS OF STATE SUCH AS KING HUSSEIN (WHO NOW VISITING LEBANON) WITH ISRAELI DISCRETION AND SECURITY HAD BEEN TOO BITTER FOR HIM TO RISK USING HIS NAME FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE WOULD PREFER THAT A MORATORIUM NOT BE REQUESTED RATHER THAN USE HIS NAME. IF THE DEPARTMENT FELT THAT IT COULD NOT MAKE SUCH A REQUEST WITHOUT USING HIS NAME HE WOULD UNDERSTAND.

5. I EXPLAINED TO KHOURY THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT FOR US TO TRY TO OBTAIN A MORATORIUM UNLESS THE ISRAELIS COULD SEE THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST SOME PROSPECT OF AN IMPROVED SITUATION AT THE END. AS A CONSEQUENCE WE WORKED OUT THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTED GENERAL LINES OF AN APPROACH TO THE ISRAELIS TO WHICH KHOURY SAID THE PRES WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS RAPIDLY DETERIORATING. MODERATE FORCES WITHIN THE COUNTRY NEED A PERIOD OF CALM IN WHICH TO TRY AND RESTORE STABILITY. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THEY WANT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT BUT CANNOT FORM AT LEAST A MODERATE GOVERNMENT WHILE THE COUNTRY IS BEING FREQUENTLY SUBJECTED TO ISRAELI ATTACKS. WE HAVE ASSURANCES FROM THE GOVERNMENT

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THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO CONTAIN THE FEDAYEEN.
(FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFO ONLY. KHOURY INFORMED ME THAT PRES WAS CURRENTLY ENDEAVORING TO FORM A CABINET).

6. PRES HELOU WAS ALSO PLEASED WITH THE ASSURANCES WE GAVE HIM WITH RESPECT TO OUR POSITION TOWARDS LEBANON'S SOUTHERN BORDER.
HOUGHTON

NOTE: SYSTEMS FOR CCO.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07563 111717Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

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P R 111529Z SEP 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8566
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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69 SEP 11 PM 8:34
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T BEIRUT 7563

EXDIS

REF: STATE 152733

SUBJ: CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON

1. I INFORMED MICHEL KHOURY THIS MORNING (SEPTEMBER 11) INFORMATION CONTAINED STATE 152733 WHICH I HAD JUST RECEIVED. KHOURY WAS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR PROMPT, POSITIVE REPLY TO GOL'S REQUEST AND SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT WHEN HE SAW HIM THIS AFTERNOON.

2. HE WAS CONCERNED HOWEVER BY SUGGESTION THAT USG TELL ISRAELIS THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HAD REQUESTED MORATORIUM. HE, OF COURSE, WAS NOT ARGUING THAT HELOU HAD NOT MADE REQUEST BUT ON THE BAIIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE HE FEARED THAT WHEN IT SUITED THEIR PURPOSES ISRAELIS WOULD LEAK THE INFORMATION TO HELOU'S GREAT HARM. IT IS ALSO FOR THIS REASON THAT HE PREFERS NOT TO HAVE MENTION MADE OF HELOU'S PLAN TO FORM CABINET. I ARGUED THAT I WAS SURE DEPARTMENT HAD HIS POINT IN MIND BUT WAS ENDEAVORING TO MAKE AS STRONG AND AS EFFECTIVE AN APPROACH AS IT COULD TO ISRAELIS. THE PROBLEM WAS TO CONVINCCE ISRAEL TO FORSWEAR ACTION IN AN AREA IN WHICH IT CONSIDERED ITS SECURITY WAS INVOLVED. IN THIS CONTEXT, ISRAEL MUST BE ABLE TO SEE ADVANTAGE TO HER OF MORATORIUM. HE NOTED THAT IN RECENT WEEKS SOME NEWSPAPERS IN ISRAEL HAD DEPICTED HELOU AS FRIEND OF

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ISRAEL BECAUSE OF HIS MODERATE POLICY AND EFFORTS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN. THIS, OF COURSE, NOT HELPFUL TO HELOU'S POSITION LEBANON. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT DEPT'S REQUEST AND WOULD GIVE ME A REPLY SOONEST.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH KHOURY APPRECIATED, WE HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL NOT DILUTE THE REMARKS REPORTED PARA 3 REFTEL. WE FEEL THAT A STATEMENT BASED ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN REASSURING LEBANESE OUR INTEREST AND CONCERN THEIR COUNTRY.
HOUGHTON

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 07201 301107Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, SSO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, PI 03, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, CAB 09, COM 08, DOT 12,
E 15, IO 13, EUR 17, ACDA 16, MC 02, RSR 01, /172 W
..... 056199

P 301010Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8464
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BEIRUT 7201

SUBJECT: PFLP ON TWA HIJACKING

1. PFLP WEEKLY AL HADAF, PUBLISHED SATURDAY MORNING BEIRUT, CARRIED LONG POLITICAL DECLARATION STATING PFLP WAS INTENSIFYING CAMPAIGN OF STRIKING AGAINST US INTERESTS IN AREA AND CONCENTRATING ON US SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS AS LATEST US MOVE TO TURN ISRAEL INTO ARSENAL TO PROTECT US INTERESTS. DERIDED THOSE ARABS WHO CONTINUED BELIEVE IN US FRIENDSHIP AND CALLED ARAB MASSES TO DECLARE WAR OF POPULAR LIBERATION AGAINST IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM AND FORCES WHICH SUPPORT COUNTER-REVOLUTION.
2. PFLP AMMAN COMMUNIQUE WAS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC IN LABELLING HIJACKING AS RETALIATION FOR PHANTOM DELIVERY.
3. COMMENT: PFLP LINE NOT NEW EXCEPT IN LINKING HIJACKING DIRECTLY TO PHANTOMS. INTERESTINGLY BEIRUT RUMOR MILL FRIDAY NIGHT HAD SIX NEWLY TRAINED ISRAELI PHANTOM PILOTS ABOARD. HOUGHTON

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45
ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, AF 12, EUR 17, IO 13, AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12,
ACDA 16, NIC 01, RSR 01, /168 W

093746

R 151515Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8387
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHDTMGUSMISSION USUN 1006

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 6806

SUBJECT: AFTERMATH OF THE 'ARQUB RAID

1. LEBANESE AND FEDAYEEN ALIKE MUST HAVE BEEN SOBERED BY THE AUG 11 'ARQUB RAID. SINCE THE FEDAYEEN HAVE APPARENTLY DENIED THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ACCESS TO THE AFFECTED AREAS, THE EXTENT OF THEIR LOSSES IN UNKNOWN. HOWEVER, WELL-PLACED DEPUTIES LIKE KHALIL KHOURY AND KAMIL AL AS'AD TELL US THEY UNDERSTAND A SAIQA GROUP LUNCHING IN THE OLD FRENCH FORT IN SHUWAYYAH SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. ACCORDING TO NAHAR, FATAH HAD ALREADY EVACUATED ITS POSITIONS IN 'AYN QINYAH, AND ALF UNITS IN RASHAYYA AND PFLP UNITS IN SEVERAL 'ARQUB VILLAGES WERE NOT BADLY HURT.

2. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED THAT SO VIOLENT A RAID WOULD ACT AS A CATALYST IN UNITING THE VARIOUS SHADES OF LEBANESE OPINION BEHIND SOME COMMON POLICY. T SUCH LINK. IN BEIRUT, AT AT LEAST, MOST CHRISTIANS ARE CITING THE RAID AS VINDICATION OF HELOU'S ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSTURE, WHILE MOST MUSLIMS ARE CITING IT AS PROOF OF ISRAEL'S FUNDAMENTAL MALEVOLENCE TOWARD LEBANON. SPEAKING FOR THE LATTER ELEMENT, DEPUTY JUMBLATT TOLD THE PRESS AUG 14 THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH LEBANON ARE DISGUSTED WITH THE GOL FAILURE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH ARMS OR EVEN PERMIT THEM TO AC-

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CEPT FEDAYEEN OFFERS TO HELP BUILD SHELTERS. JUMBLATT SAID HE TOLD THEM: "WHEN THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON HAVE THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT, THEN THE RULERS WILL BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND YOU." HE WAS ASHAMED TO CALL HIMSELF LEBANESE.

3. WHILE MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS GLARE AT EACH OTHER ACROSS THE CONFESSIONAL FENCE, THE GOL HAS ALREADY MOVED LEB MON A BIT CLOSER TO THE MUSLIM POSITION BY TELLING THE SECURITY COUNCIL IT CANNOT ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF PALESTINIANS RESIDENT ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. AS A LEBANESE OFFICER TOLD ARMA, THE GOL HAD TO SHOW SOME DEFERENCE TO ARAB NATIONALIST OPINION HERE AND ABROAD. MOREOVER, THE GOL WAS ON ITS METTLE TO REFUTE THE SUGGESTION BY SOME ILL-ADVISED ISRAELI SPOKESMAN THAT THE GOL WAS SECRETLY PLEASED BY THE RAID. IT IS TRUE THA MANY INDIVIDUAL LEBANESE WERE PLEASED, BUT THE GOL HAS TO EXPLAIN THE FAILURE OF A THEORETICALLY SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO REPEL AN ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.

4. MANY LEBANESE COMMENTATORS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PLACE THE BLAME ON THE USG. SAWT AL 'URUBAH'S AUG 13 HEADLINE WAS "US ROLE IN THE AGGRESSION ON LEBANON; WASHINGTON ENCOURAGES TEL AVIV TO CONTINUE LARGE-SCALE AGGRESSION AND SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH NEW ARMS." ALL RADICAL PAPERS ADVANCED THE ARGUMENT THAT THE US SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL IS TANTAMOUNT TO US APPROVAL OF ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION AND REPRISAL POLICIES. SIMILAR SENTIMENTS WERE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL DEPUTIES, NOTABLY SAMIH OSSEIRAN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF KARAME'S PDF, AND HABIB MITRAN, MAINSTAY OF CHAMOUN'S NLP. MOST LEBANESE BLITHELY ASCRIBE TO THE USG THE CAPABILITY OF OUSTING ISRAEL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AT WILL. A CARTOON IN THE AUG 14 SHA'B SHOWS AN ARMED ARAB COMMANDO EYEING AN AMERICAN PIPE-LINE CROSSING GROUND LABELED "ARAB REACTION" AND SPEWING OUT AMERICAN ARMS FOR ISRAEL.

5. THE RECENT REMARKS BY KARAME (BEIRUT 6624), WHO HAS A KEEN NOSE FOR POLITICAL CURRENTS, POINTS UP THE TREND AMONG MUSLIMS TOWARD GREATER HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR CHRISTIANS TO OPPOSE THIS TREND WITHOUT LOOKING LIKE PRO-ZIONIST QUISSLINGS. IN FACT, THE RECENT PRO-SUMMIT STATEMENT BY THE LEADING LEBANESE CHRISTIAN, CAMILLE CHAMOUN, WAS RECEIVED BY THE MUSLIMS AT LEAST AS FAVORABLY AS BY THE CHRISTIANS. IN THIS SAME VEIN, WE NOTE THAT CHAMOUN'S ASSOCIATE, JOSEPH MUGHABGHAB, HAS NOT ACTED ON HIS PRIVATELY DISCLOSED INTENTION TO ISSUE A REBUTTAL

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TO KARAME'S REMARKS. ON THE POLITICAL SCENE, WE HEAR JUMBLATT IS PLANNING TO BUILD A PRO-FEDAYEEN RALLY ON A CEREMONY IN MEMORY OF A LEBANESE DRUZE WHO DIED WITH THE FEDAYEEN. ON THE MILITARY SCENE, WE HOPE THAT THE IDF WILL STEER CLEAR OF ANY CLASH WITH LEBANESE ARMY FORCES (AS OPPOSED TO THE FEDAYEEN), SINCE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, IN TPS JUDGMENT OF ARMA'S SOURCE, WOULD COMPEL LEBANON TO RETALIATE AND TEND TO UNITE THE LEBANESE AGAINST THE THESIS THAT LEBANON CAN AND MUST AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO OPEN CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL.

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TELEGRAM

'69 JUL 11 PM 4:29

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05818 111612Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

061737

R 111445Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8160
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

SECRET BEIRUT 5818

EXDIS

REF: STATE 114029

1. WE HAVE ALWAYS TOLD INTERESTED LEBANESE: A) USG OPPOSES BY ALL APPROPRIATE MEANS SARG DESIGNS ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY; B) USG DOES NOT INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF POLITICAL FACTIONS IN LEBANON, SYRIA, OR ANY OTHER STATE OF THE AREA.
2. UNFORTUNATELY, EACH LEBANESE OFFICIAL SERVES TWO LOYALTIES -- GOL AND HIS OWN RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY -- AND INTERPRETS USG POLICY FROM THIS PAROCHIAL VIEWPOINT. PHARAON HAS NOTED THE CONSERVATIVE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN LEBANESE CHRISTIANS AND RIYADH (JIDDA 2317). SAUDIS MAY HAVE MISINTERPRETED THE TENUOUS ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN JADID AND THE LEBANESE PRO-US RIGHT AS REPRESENTED BY CHAMOUN AND BOULOS, AS EVIDENCE OF A US-LEBANESE ALLIANCE AGAINST ASAD.
3. FACT IS, OF COURSE, THAT EVERY SYRIAN REGIME IS BOUND TO SALIVATE AT THE SIGHT OF FAT, VULNERABLE LEBANON. SAIQA, THE CURRENT SPEARHEAD OF SYRIAN SUBVERSION, IS REPORTEDLY DIRECTED BY BAATHIST WHEELHOURS ZU'AYYIN, WHO IS CLOSER TO JADID THAN TO ASAD. ANY LEBANESE TALK OF CONSTRUCTIVE COLLABORATION WITH EITHER MUST BE DISMISSED AS SELF-DELUSION.
4. WE SHARE DEPARTMENT'S IMPRESSION THAT, FOR PRAGMATIC MILITARY-MINDED REASONS, ASAD IS ONE OF THE MORE APPROACHABLE ELEMENTS IN THE SYRIAN POWER STRUCTURE. DURING COURTESY CALL TODAY, GREEK AMBASSADOR KALAMIDAS, WHO APPEARS TO BE A STAUNCH ANTI-CGNMUNIST AND A GREAT ADMIRER OF THE US, REPORTED A STRONG DESIRE AMONG THE

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 05818 111612Z

PEOPLE OF

SYRIA AND IRAQ FOR RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US. KALAMIDAS REINFORCED OUR READING THAT ASAD'S EFFORT TO DEVELOP AN OPENING TO THE WEST WAS BLOCKED BY BLATANT ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, KALAMIDAS AGREES WITH US THAT ASAD AND JADID ARE WELL AWARE THEY WILL SINK OR SWIM TOGETHER, AND THAT THE ASAD-JADID COMBINE IS FIRMLY IN THE SYRIAN SADDLE. THEIR MINORITY BASE OF POWER MAKES THEM ALL THE MORE RESPONSIVE TO MAJORITY OPINION. SINCE THE SYRIAN PUBLIC IS OBSESSED BY THE THEMES OF SOCIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALISM, WE EXPECT THAT MODERATION WILL BE IN SHORT SUPPLY IN SYRIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER, EXCESSES OF DOCTRINARIRE SOCIALISM HAVE ALREADY PRODUCED THE PRAGMATIC REACTION WHICH ASAD SYMBOLIZES AND WHICH THE USG COULD EXPLOIT IN THE INTEREST OF DETENTE WITH SYRIA -- PROVIDED THE USG DESIRES AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT PERMITS.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 06524 051445Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

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R 051320Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8318
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMENIASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 6524

EXDIS

BELGRADE FOR SISCO

SUBJECT: SISCO VISIT TO MIDDLE EAST

REF: STATE 129609

1. SUGGESTED VISIT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO TO ME IN EARLY SEPTEMBER IS AN EXCELLENT IDEA. ASIDE FROM PRESENTING OPPORTUNITY FOR USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN SISCO, HELOU AND PERHAPS PRIMIN KARADJ, SUCH VISIT WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT AT THIS TIME WHEN ARABS ARE BEGINNING BELIEVE THAT USG IS HOPELESSLY COMMITTED TO ISRAELIS AND DISINTERESTED IN ARAB "RIGHTS" AND POINT OF VIEW.

2. IN PLANNING ITINERARY WESVSEE SOME VALUE IN MAKING ISRAEL EITHER FIRST OR INTERMEDIARY STOP RATHER THAN LAST AS IS CUSTOMARY. WE HAVE DETECTED SOME IRRITATION AMONG ARABS, WHO CLAIM THAT MOST US OFFICIALS AND OTHER IMPORTANT US PERSONALITIES MAKE ISRAEL THEIR FINAL STOP AND RETURN TO US WITH ISRAELI PROPAGANDA "RINGING IN THEIR EARS".

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20,

IO 13, ACDA 16, RSR 01, / 115 W

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O R 121345Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8360
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 6708

REF: BEIRUT 6688

1. FONMIN YUSEF SALEM SUMMONED CHARGE TO FONOFF MORNING AUGUST 12 TO "PROTEST" ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT, INCLUDING USE OF NAPALM, OF LEBANESE VILLAGES IN VICINITY HASBAAYA ON WESTERN SLOPES MT HERMON EVENING AUG 11. HONMIN, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SECRETARY GENERAL SADAKA, HANDED CHARGE COPY OF AIDE MEMOIRE WHICH HE SAID WAS BEING DELIVERED TO REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH OF "BIG FOUR" EMBASSIES BEIRUT (SUMMARY BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL).

2. AFTER EXPRESSING GOL'S OUTRAGE OVER ISRAELI ATTACK, WHICH HE TERMED AS UNPROVOKED, ILLEGAL BREACH OF CEASEFIRE AND BARBARIC BY REASON USE OF "ILLEGAL" NAPALM, SALEM SAID GOL SOUGHT ON URGENT BASIS USG'S ADVICE AS TO HOW GOL PROTEST SHOULD BE HANDLED IN SECURITY COUNCIL AND INFO AS TO WHAT USG WOULD BE WILLING DO TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST LEBANON. CABINET HAD MET LAST EVENING. SALEM SAID, TO DISCUSS HOW MATTER SHOULD BE HANDLED, AND IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT FOR TIME BEING GOL WOULD PROTEST IN LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ISRAELI

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ATTACK AND SEEK ADVICE OF BIG FOUR AS TO WHAT FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PREVENT FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS.

3. SALEM ASKED FOR CHARGE'S PERSONAL OPINION ON WHAT USG RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE. CHARGE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MISTAKE TO REQUEST MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL ON THIS ATTACK. WHILE EVERYONE WOULD DEPLORE THIS ATTACK AND RESULTANT LOSS OF LIFE, IT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT ALL WOULD AGREE THAT ATTACK WAS UNPROVOKED. ISRAELIS HAD RECENTLY CLAIMED 21 COMMANDO ATTACKS ON ISRAEL EMANATING FROM LEBANON WITHIN PAST THIRTY DAYS INVOLVING NUMEROUS INJURIES AND SEVERAL DEATHS. HE FEARED THAT TO TAKE ATTACK TO SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD ONLY RESULT IN DRAWN OUT INDECISIVE DEBATE. CHARGE SAID HE FELT SURE USG WOULD RECOMMEND CONFINE ACTION TO PROTESTING ISRAELI ATTACK VIA LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS. THERE SHOULD BE NO MISTAKE, HOWEVER, RE USG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SUCH ATTACKS. USG DEPLORED ANY HOSTILE ACTIONS ALONG ARAB/ISRAELI FRONTIER AND PARTICULARLY IF THEY RESULTED IN INJURIES OR DEATHS. FURTHERMORE, AS GOL KNOWS, USG HAS CONSTANTLY DEPLORED HEATING UP OF THE HERETOFORE RELATIVELY QUIET LEBANON/ISRAEL BORDER.

4. FONMIN SAID HE EXPECTED THIS WOULD BE USG'S ADVICE, BUT HE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING OFFICIAL USG RECOMMENDATION QUICKLY, HOPEFULLY BY 10 AM (LOCAL) AUG 13 WHEN CHARGE HAD APPOINTMENT TO PAY FAREWELL CALL ON FONMIN. JUST AS IMPORTANT HE SAID WAS SOME INDICATION OF WHAT USG WOULD BE WILLING TO DO VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL TO PREVENT FURTHER ISRAELI ATTACKS. ANY FURTHER ESCALATION OF BORDER ACTIVITY COULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON'S INTERNAL SITUATION WHICH WAS ALREADY HIGHLY UNSTABLE. CHARGE REPLIED HE WOULD SOLICIT DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS VIA PRIORITY CABLE.

5. COMMENT: CHARGE GATHERED IMPRESSION FROM MEETING AND FROM SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH THE FONOFF UN AFFAIRS OFFICER SUHAIL CHAMAS THAT GOL WAS NOT, REPEAT NOT, INCLINED TO REQUEST EMERGENCY SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AND WOULD NOT DO SO IF USG AND OTHER BIG FOUR POWERS ISSUED STATEMENTS CONDEMNING ISRAELI RAID AND WERE WILLING TO PUT SOME HEAT ON ISRAELIS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE SUCH ATTACKS. THIS WOULD RELIEVE PRESSURE ON GOL TO "DO SOMETHING", WHICH USUALLY MEANS ASK FOR EMERGENCY SESSION OF SECURITY COUNCIL. USG STATEMENT CONDEMNING THIS RETALIATORY RAID WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE USEFUL IF DONE QUICKLY. IT WOULD ALSO BE

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USEFUL IF CHARGE COULD TELL FONMIN AUG 13 THAT USG WAS MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO ISREAL. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY IF POSSIBLE BY EARLY AM AUG 13.

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SUMMARY

SECRET 900

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

058144

R 301705Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8065
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 5470

REF: BEIRUT 5469 (NOTAL)

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT HELOU'S DEMARCHE RE POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE

1. DURING CONVERSATION WITH HELOU JUNE 28, IN WHICH HE GAVE ME DETAILS PRESENTATION HIS ANALYSIS LEBANON'S POLITICAL SITUATION (SEE REFTEL) HELOU MADE FORMAL DEMARCHE CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE AND HANDED ME FOLLOWING INFORMAL SET OF QUESTIONS.

2. BEGIN TEXT - WHAT WOULD BE POSITION OF USG IF (A) THERE WAS AN ISRAELI ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON; (B) LEBANON WAS THE VICTIM OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION (I.E., SARG), EITHER OVERT OR COVERT; (C) INTERNAL UNREST AND DISORDER ERUPTED IN LEBANON. END TEXT

3. HELOU POINTED OUT HE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING USG'S VIEWS RE POINT C. I REITERATED POINTS MADE IN PAST CONVERSATIONS AND PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RE POSSIBLE UN INTERVENTION AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF LEBANON. IN RESPONSE HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION I DID NOT RULE OUT USE OF UNEF FORCES ALTHOUGH I REMINDED HIM OF INHERENT DIFFICULTIES THIS APPROACH. I MADE NO COMMENT WITH REGARD POSSIBLE USE US FORCES ALTHOUGH THIS OF COURSE WAS POINT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS. IN COURSE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION CURRENT ATTITUDES AMERICAN PUBLIC AND PROBLEMS CREATED BY VIET NAM, I POINTED OUT NEED FOR REALISTIC ACCEPTANCE USG UNWILLINGNESS ENTER INTO PRIOR MILITARY COM-

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MITMENTS. I ASSURED HIM OF OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS WELFARE, AND EMPHASIZED THAT USG WOULD NOT IGNORE LEBANON'S FATE. I SHARED HIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION THAT THERE WERE PRACTICAL LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP HIM, AND I FELT SURE WASHINGTON MIRRORED MY PERSONAL CONCERN. NEITHER, OF COURSE, DO WE WISH TO AGGRAVATE CONFESSIONAL PROBLEM BY TAKING STRONG POSITIONS WHICH MIGHT INFLAME RATHER THAN STABILIZE INTERNAL SITUATION.

4. I REITERATED THAT USG CONTINUES PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN URGING ISRAELI RESTRAINT ON LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER. ALSO THERE ARE SIGNS OF LIMITED BUT TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON ME SETTLEMENT. ALTHOUGH MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS ARE APPARENT BETWEEN US AND USSR POSITIONS RE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT SOVS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TALKS, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP TRYING. IN DIRECT RESPONSE HIS PLEA FOR URGENT PROGRESS, I CONFESSED I HAD NO INDICATION THAT AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH WAS LIKELY.

5. HELOU'S REACTION WAS THAT TIME HAD PROBABLY ALREADY PASSED US BY. HE SAID POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MILITARY ESCALATION IN ME HAVE GAINED SUCH MOMENTUM THAT, BARRING STRONG AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACTION AND PRESSURE BY USSR AND US ON THEIR RESPECTIVE "CLIENTS", ME WAS DOOMED TO FURTHER RADICALIZATION. NOT ONLY WILL MODERATE STATES BE SWEEPED ALONG BY TIDE, BUT BOTH USSR AND US WILL LOSE. SOVS WILL LOSE BECAUSE THEY ALREADY BOGGED DOWN WITH COMMITMENTS TO CERTAIN ARAB STATES AND CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AT PLAY AS REPRESENTED BY FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND EXTREMIST RADICAL PARTIES WHICH SUBSCRIBE MORE TO PEKING THAN TO MOSCOW. COMMUNIST CHINA MAY INDEED BE WAVE OF FUTURE IN ARAB WORLD, HELOA SIA. AS FOR US, ITS FALTERING ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE BALANCE IN ITS ME POLICY SINCE INCEPTION ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT HAVE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED AMERICA'S CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL INTERESTS IN AREA.

6. I TOLD HELOU HE SHOULD NOT DISMISS, OUT OF HAND, US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS AND PRESSURES UPON SOVS TO REACH POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. SOVS SEEM GENUINELY NOT TO WANT WAR IN ME. THEY MAY CONCLUDE (OR BE FORCED BY PRESSURE OF EVENTS) TO BRING MORE REALISM INTO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ONLY US-USSR UNDERSTANDING COULD FACILITATE ESTABLISHMENT DURABLE PEACE IN ME, GIVEN INCAPACITY OF ARABS OR ISRAELI TO FIND DIRECT BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT. HELOU SAID HE COULD NOT SHARE MY OPTIMISM.

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7. AS FOR LEBANON, HELOU SAID IN LONG RUN HE MUST ADMIT THAT HE HAS ALREADY LOST GROUND IN HIS PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS MAINTAIN LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN FACE OF DANGERS POSED BY FEDAYEEN. HE WILL LOSE MORE. IF SITUATION DETERIORATED SHARPLY, BEST HE COULD HOPE FOR WULD BE SOME SORT OF CYPRUS TYPE SOLUTION, PRESUMABLY WITH CONFSSIONAL ENCLAVES. IT WAS NO HONOR, HE COMMENTED, TO BE CHIEF OF A UN-PROTECTED STATE. THE VERY PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN A COUNTRY COMPROMISES THAT COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE, AND DESTROYS ITS FIBRE. NEVERTHELESS, THIS WOULD BE THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, GIVEN THE DISMAL ALTERNATIVES, TO INCLUDE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, SYRIAN SUBVERSION, OR DISINTEGRATION LEBANESE STATE ALONG CONFSSIONAL LINES.

8. COMMENT: IT IS DIFFUCULT NOT TO SHARE HELOU'S PESSIMISM RE LEBANON'S FUTURE, ALTHOUGH THE STRAIN HE IS UNDER, AND HIS ISOLATION, TEND TO DARKEN HIS VISION. HE FORESEES THE SAME PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING FOR MANY MONTHS. NONETHELESS, HE IS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT BLINDED BY HIS CURRENT ANXIETIES TO THE POINT THAT HE OVERLOOKS THE RESILIENCE OF THE LEBANESE, AND THEIR CAPACITY TO FIND A WAY OUT. HE STILL HAS MANY ASSETS, AND THERE IS AS YET NO INDICATION THAT THE LEBANESE ARE EAGER TO TAKE THEIR DISAGREEMENT (FUNDAMENTAL AS IT IS) TO THE BARRICADES. WE INCLINE TO THE VIEW THAT ANY SHOWDOWN IS STILL SOME TIME OFF, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR WELL-ORCHES-TRATED EXTERNAL ATTEMPT AT SUBVERSION (E.G., FROM SYRIA). PORTER

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SECRET 900

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 05470 301843Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

058144

R 301705Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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REF: BEIRUT 5469 (NOTAL)

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3. HELOU POINTED OUT HE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN LEARNING USG'S VIEWS RE POINT C. I REITERATED POINTS MADE IN PAST CONVERSATIONS AND PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RE POSSIBLE UN INTERVENTION AND DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN COOPERATION WITH FRANCE AND OTHER FRIENDS OF LEBANON. IN RESPONSE HIS SPECIFIC QUESTION I DID NOT RULE OUT USE OF UNEF FORCES ALTHOUGH I REMINDED HIM OF INHERENT DIFFICULTIES THIS APPROACH. I MADE NO COMMENT WITH REGARD POSSIBLE USE US FORCES ALTHOUGH THIS OF COURSE WAS POINT HE WISHED TO DISCUSS. IN COURSE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION CURRENT ATTITUDES AMERICAN PUBLIC AND PROBLEMS CREATED BY VIET NAM, I POINTED OUT NEED FOR REALISTIC ACCEPTANCE USG UNWILLINGNESS ENTER INTO PRIOR MILITARY COM.

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MITMENTS. I ASSURED HIM OF OUR CONCERN FOR LEBANON, ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS WELFARE, AND EMPHASIZED THAT USG WOULD NOT IGNORE LEBANON'S FATE. I SHARED HIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION THAT THERE WERE PRACTICAL LIMITS TO OUR ABILITY TO HELP HIM, AND I FELT SURE WASHINGTON MIRRORED MY PERSONAL CONCERN. NEITHER, OF COURSE, DO WE WISH TO AGGRAVATE CONFESSIONAL PROBLEM BY TAKING STRONG POSITIONS WHICH MIGHT INFLAME RATHER THAN STABILIZE INTERNAL SITUATION.

4. I REITERATED THAT USG CONTINUES PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE IN URGING ISRAELI RESTRAINT ON LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER. ALSO THERE ARE SIGNS OF LIMITED BUT TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS ON ME SETTLEMENT. ALTHOUGH MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS ARE APPARENT BETWEEN US AND USSR POSITIONS RE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT SOVS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING TALKS, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP TRYING. IN DIRECT RESPONSE HIS PLEA FOR URGENT PROGRESS, I CONFESSED I HAD NO INDICATION THAT AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH WAS LIKELY.

5. HELOU'S REACTION WAS THAT TIME HAD PROBABLY ALREADY PASSED US BY. HE SAID POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND MILITARY ESCALATION IN ME HAVE GAINED SUCH MOMENTUM THAT, BARRING STRONG AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACTION AND PRESSURE BY USSR AND US ON THEIR RESPECTIVE "CLIENTS", ME WAS DOOMED TO FURTHER RADICALIZATION. NOT ONLY WILL MODERATE STATES BE SWEEPED ALONG BY TIDE, BUT BOTH USSR AND US WILL LOSE. SOVS WILL LOSE BECAUSE THEY ALREADY BOGGED DOWN WITH COMMITMENTS TO CERTAIN ARAB STATES AND CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AT PLAY AS REPRESENTED BY FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND EXTREMIST RADICAL PARTIES WHICH SUBSCRIBE MORE TO PEKING THAN TO MOSCOW. COMMUNIST CHINA MAY INDEED BE WAVE OF FUTURE IN ARAB WORLD, HELOA SIA. AS FOR US, ITS FALTERING ATTEMPTS TO STRIKE BALANCE IN ITS ME POLICY SINCE INCEPTION ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT HAVE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED AMERICA'S CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL INTERESTS IN AREA.

6. I TOLD HELOU HE SHOULD NOT DISMISS, OUT OF HAND, US-USSR BILATERAL TALKS AND PRESSURES UPON SOVS TO REACH POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. SOVS SEEM GENUINELY NOT TO WANT WAR IN ME. THEY MAY CONCLUDE (OR BE FORCED BY PRESSURE OF EVENTS) TO BRING MORE REALISM INTO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ONLY US-USSR UNDERSTANDING COULD FACILITATE ESTABLISHMENT DURABLE PEACE IN ME, GIVEN INCAPACITY OF ARABS OR ISRAELI TO FIND DIRECT BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT. HELOU SAID HE COULD NOT SHARE MY OPTIMISM.

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7. AS FOR LEBANON, HELOU SAID IN LONG RUN HE MUST ADMIT THAT HE HAS ALREADY LOST GROUND IN HIS PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS MAINTAIN LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE IN FACE OF DANGERS POSED BY FEDAYEEN. HE WILL LOSE MORE. IF SITUATION DETERIORATED SHARPLY, BEST HE COULD HOPE FOR WULD BE SOME SORT OF CYPRUS-TYPE SOLUTION, PRESUMABLY WITH CONFSSIONAL ENCLAVES. IT WAS NO HONOR, HE COMMENTED, TO BE CHIEF OF A UN-PROTECTED STATE. THE VERY PRESENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES IN A COUNTRY COMPROMISES THAT COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE, AND DESTROYS ITS FIBRE. NEVERTHELESS, THIS WOULD BE THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, GIVEN THE DISMAL ALTERNATIVES, TO INCLUDE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, SYRIAN SUBVERSION, OR DISINTEGRATION LEBANESE STATE ALONG CONFSSIONAL LINES.

8. COMMENT: IT IS DIFFUCULT NOT TO SHARE HELOU'S PESSIMISM RE LEBANON'S FUTURE, ALTHOUGH THE STRAIN HE IS UNDER, AND HIS ISOLATION, TEND TO DARKEN HIS VISION. HE FORESEES THE SAME PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN REPORTING FOR MANY MONTHS. NONETHELESS, HE IS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT BLINDED BY HIS CURRENT ANXIETIES TO THE POINT THAT HE OVERLOOKS THE RESILIENCE OF THE LEBANESE, AND THEIR CAPACITY TO FIND A WAY OUT. HE STILL HAS MANY ASSETS, AND THERE IS AS YET NO INDICATION THAT THE LEBANESE ARE EAGER TO TAKE THEIR DISAGREEMENT (FUNDAMENTAL AS IT IS) TO THE BARRICADES. WE INCLINE TO THE VIEW THAT ANY SHOWDOWN IS STILL SOME TIME OFF, UNLESS THERE IS A MAJOR WELL-ORCHES-TRATED EXTERNAL ATTEMPT AT SUBVERSION (E.G., FROM SYRIA). PORTER

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1969 W

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R 301700Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8063
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 5469

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU'S POLICY RE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM

1. I PAID CALL ON PRES HELOU JUNE 28 TO OBTAIN HIS VIEWS ON PRESENT SITUATION BEFORE MY DEPARTURE ON HOME LEAVE. HELOU GAVE ME CAREFULLY PREPARED PRESENTATION OF HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND HIS ANALYSIS OF WHAT PROBABLE COURSE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD TAKE. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC, FATALISTIC, AND OBVIOUSLY HAS ASSUMED ATTITUDE OF ALMOST OLYMPIAN DETACHMENT IN REFUSING TO LISTEN TO THE VOICES OF COMPROMISE WHICH HE HEARS FROM ALL SIDES. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF COMPROMISING ON THE PUBLIC POSITION HE HAS ADOPTED, I.E., CATEGORICAL REFUSAL OF FEDAYEEN FAIT ACCOMPLI AND REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE AWAY LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY BY BITS AND PIECES. AT FIRST HE SAID HE WOULD RATHER RESIGN AS CHIEF OF STATE THAN PRESIDE OVER A "POLICY OF CAPITULATION." BUT HE LATER TOOK A MORE RIGID STAND AND SAID HE WAS NOT GOING TO "ABDICATE" WHATEVER THE CONSEQUENCES AND EVEN IF THIS MEANT "NEVER LEAVING BAA'DA (THE PRESIDENCY) ALIVE". HE WAS QUICK TO ASSURE ME THAT HE WAS NOT THE CAPTIVE OF HIS OWN PUBLIC STANCE, BUT RATHER, THAT HE WAS THE CAPTIVE OF A FIRM CONVICTION OF WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS THE RIGHT AND HONORABLE COURSE FOR LEBANON TO TAKE. I EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR HELOU'S COURAGE IN MAKING THIS HARD AND LONELY DECISION. I TOLD HIM THAT USG SHARED MY ADMIRATION AND ENDORSED HIS JUDGMENT RE FEDAYEEN. HELOU REITERATED HIS THESIS THAT ANY NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD, BY NECESSITY, BE A

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"GOVERNMENT OF CAPITULATION" SINCE NO SUNNI PRIME MINISTER COULD WITHSTAND PRESSURE OVER THE LONG RUN TO COME TO TERMS WITH FED-
DAYEEN. FEDAYEEN, HE SAID, WOULD VIEW FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT
AS JUST ANOTHER STAGE IN THEIR ANTI-REGIME CAMPAIGN. NEW GOVERN-
MENT WOULD BECOME VIRTUAL "HOSTAGE" OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT.

2. HELOU ADMITTED THAT HIS POLICY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SOLUTION
TO LEBANESE DILEMMA. HE WAS ONLY BUYING TIME. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH
HIS APPROACH HAS TO DATE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AS A PLAY FOR TIME, HE
MADE IT CLEAR HE THOUGHT SHARP DETERIORATION IN SITUATION COULD
OCCUR WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS. IT COULD COME MUCH SOONER, IF HE
LOST CONTROL OF EVENTS. HE SAID HIS POLICY COULD BE SERIOUSLY
JEOPARDIZED BY ANY ONE OF FOLLOWING FOUR FACTORS: A) ISRAELI RE-
PRISAL ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON, EITHER DIRECTED AGAINST FEDAYEEN
OR AGAINST LEBANESE ARMY; B) FEDAYEEN CLASHES WITH LEBANESE ARMY
RESULTING IN BLOODSHED; C) SYRIAN-INSPIRED SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN
AGAINST LEBANESE REGIME IN COLLUSION WITH LEFT-WING RADICAL
GROUPS; AND D) POLITICAL MACHINATIONS OF OPPORTUNIST POLITICIANS
WHO SEEK TO PROTECT THEIR POLITICAL POSITIONS BY URGING COM-
PROMISE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD PROLONG THEIR SURVIVAL IN THE SHORT
RUN, BUT WHOSE TEMPORIZING WOULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO DISINTEGRATION
OF LEBANON AS A MODERATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REGIME. HE HAD
NO INTENTION, HELOU SAID, OF "PRESIDING OVER THE DEMISE OF LEBANON"
AND SEEING PALESTINAINS AND BAATHISTS TAKE OVER REINS OF POWER.

3. HELOU, IN WHAT WAS OBVIOUSLY A PRACTICE FORENSIC SESSION,
READ TO ME FROM AN INFORMAL PAPER OUTLINING SUBSTANCE OF HIS PO-
SITION AND ARGUMENTATION. HIS PRESENTATION WAS CHARGED WITH
EMOTION. HE STARTS SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS JUNE 30 WITH ALL PO-
LITICAL LEADERS AND GROUPS, AND WILL REITERATE HIS POSITION AS
STATED TO ME. AFTER EXPOSING HIS THESIS TO LEBANESE LEADERS,
HE WILL ASK THEM PRIVATELY TO STATE THEIR POSITION CONCERNING
HIS POLICY IN WRITING, THE ANSWERS TO BE HELD ONLY BY HIM. INTER
ALIA HELOU WILL ASK THE LEADERS TWO QUESTIONS: A) DO THEY AC-
CEPT HIS POLICY RE FEDAYEEN, AND B) IF SO, DO THEY AGREE TO CON-
CEPT THAT LEBANESE MILITARY BE AUTHORIZED USE FORCE IF NECESSARY
TO CONTROL FEDEYEEN ACTIVITIES.

4. THE TEXT OF THE INFORMAL PAPER HANDED TO ME BY HELOU FOLLOWS:
BEGIN TEXT

THE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM.

A. 1. THE FEDAYEEN CONSTITUTE A MILITARY VANGUARD WHICH ASSUMES

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

058105

R 301700Z JUN 69

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8064

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 5469

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT HELOU'S POLICY RE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM

B. WHEN SKIRMISHES OCCUR WITH THE ENEMY (I.E., ISRAEL):

1. IF EITHER VICTORS OR VANQUISHED, THE FEDAYEEN WOULD CAUSE HARM TO THE ARMY'S REPUTATION IN THE EYES OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE (I.E., IF FEDAYEEN CARRIED OUT SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, THEY WILL HAVE DONE WHAT LEBANESE ARMY NEVER COULD DO AGAINST ISRAEL; ON OTHER HAND, IF FEDAYEEN FAILED, THEY COULD ALWAYS BLAME LEBANESE ARMY AS SCAPEGOAT).

2. THE FEDAYEEN DESTROY THE ARMY'S MORALE AND STRENGTH.

3. THEY FORCE THE STATE TO TAKE DEMOGOGIC MEASURES AND TO CONFRONT BA'ATH-INSPIRED PROPAGANDA.

C. WHATEVER OUR PERSONAL OPINION, THESE ARE THE OBJECTIVE FACTS WHICH WILL GOVERN EVENTS IN THE FUTURE. LEBANON WILL FIND ITSELF ENGAGED IN WAR WITHOUT CLEARLY DEFINED MILITARY OBJECTIVES, ONE WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY BE FORCED ON THE ENTIRE POPULATION AND WHICH WOULD LEAD TO MILITARY AND CIVIL DISINTEGRATION. OUR ECONOMY COULD NOT SURVIVE SUCH A WAR AND LEBANON'S UNITY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED.

D. ALL THE DANGERS INHERENT IN TAKING A POSITION TO STEM THIS TIDE ARE LESS THAN THE DANGERS OUTLINED ABOVE (I.E., ECONOMIC DETERIORATION CAUSED BY THE STALEMATE IS LESS DAMAGING THAN A POTENTIAL POLITICAL EXPLOSION.) END TEXT.

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5. HELOU CONFIDED THAT WHAT HE FOUND PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT, DESPITE HIS STRONG CONVICTION, WAS HIS ISOLATION. HE VOICED HIS SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING OF POTENTIALLY TRAGIC PREDICAMENT OF CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON WHICH ITSELF BEGINNING TO FEEL ISOLATED IN ARAB MUSLIM WORLD. IF IT CAME TO CONFESSIONAL STRIFE,

HE SAID, LEBANON'S VIOLENT CHRISTIAN GROUPINGS, EVEN PARAMILITARY PHALANGE, WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHANCE IN FACE OF OVERWHELMING NUMBERS OF MUSLIMS, ESPECIALLY IN LIKELY CONTINGENCY OF SYRIAN INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, HELOU WAS CRITICAL OF LEBANON'S CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP. EX-PRESIDENT FUAD CHEHAB, FOR EXAMPLE, HELOU SAID, IS A MAN OF PRINCIPLE WHOM HE RESPECTED, BUT HE FEELS THAT CHEHAB, IN SEEKING ACCOMMODATION WITH THE FEDAYEEN IS A CAPTIVE OF HIS "SENSE OF REALISM", WHICH LEADS HIM TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE FOR SAKE OF SHORT-TERM AND TRANSIENT STABILITY. CHEHAB, HELOU SAID, FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE WITH FEDAYEEN WHICH WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A SELL-OUT. AS FOR PIERRE GEMAYEL, LEADER OF CHRISTIAN PARAMILITARY PHALANGE PARTY, HE IS ADVOCATING FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL ON FEDAYEEN POLICY AND CREATION OF AN "INNER-CABINET" WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN SECRET. THIS APPROACH, HELOU SAID, WAS ONE OF PURE FORM AND NO SUBSTANCE. EX-PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN, AMONG ALL THE OTHER CHRISTIAN LEADERS (WHOM HELOU DISMISSED AS NOTHING MORE THAN "PITIFUL BASTARDS") FINALLY NOW UNDERSTOOD COUNTRY'S DILEMMA AND AGREED WITH HELOU'S POLICY. AS FOR REYMOND EDDE, LEADER OF NATIONAL BLOC, HE WAS ACTING LIKE A REAL "MORON". HE WAS ADVOCATING RECOURSE TO THE STREETS WHILE AT SAME TIME PRESSURING HELOU TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT IN ORDER STABILIZE FALTERING ECONOMY. HELOU COULD NOT UNDERSTAND CONTRADICTION IN EDDE'S APPROACH. AS FOR MUSLIM LEADERS, HELOU GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE HAD FOUND A SUBSTITUTE FOR KARAME AS PRIMIN. ALL THE MUSLIMS, WHATEVER THEIR PRIVATE AGREEMENT WITH HELOU'S VIEWS, COULD NOT ACCEPT A PUBLIC ESPOUSAL OF HIS ANTI-FEDAYEEN LINE. AS FOR KARAME, HELOU SHOWED NO OPTIMISM THAT THEY WERE ANY CLOSER TO COMING TO TERMS. PORTER

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NO LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

2. THE FEDAYEEN CRYSTALIZE THE STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIANS OF WHOM LEBANON SHELTERS APPROXIMATELY 300,000. (OBVIOUSLY A REFERENCE TO LATENT THREAT TO INTERNAL ORDER IF REFUGEES ARE MANIPULATED BY FEDAYEEN).

3. THERE IS AN INHERENT DANGER TO LEBANON IN BECOMING ACCUSTOMED TO THE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. WHATEVER THE STAGE OF THEIR OPERATIONS, THEY WOULD CONSTANTLY EXERCISE THE RIGHT TO INCREASE THEIR NUMBERS, EXPAND THEIR TERRITORIAL PRESENCE, AND EXPAND THEIR DIRECT OR INDIRECT POLITICAL POWER.

4. TROUBLEMAKERS (I.E., SARG AND RADICAL LEFT) ALSO MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. THEY MAY JOIN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY OR AID IT FROM WITHOUT.

5. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE TACIT APPROVAL TO CARRY ARMS AND PRACTICE VIOLENCE WHENEVER THE HOLY CAUSE OF PALESTINE IS INVOKED (I.E., FEDAYEEN ARE EXEMPT FROM THE LAWS WHICH GOVERN ALL OTHER LEBANESE CITIZENS). PORTER

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

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R 241508Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8015

SECRET BEIRUT 5255

EXDIS:

1) NOW THAT JORDANIANS AND EGYPTIANS ARE WELL BRIEFED ON SUBSTANCE OF CONCRETE POINTS WHICH USR SUBMITTED IN WRITING TO SOVS, I CAN EXPECT THAT PRES HELOU WILL BE GETTING REPORTS ON NATURE OF USG PROPOSALS. THE REPORTS MAY OR MAY NOT BE ACCURATE.

2) HELOU'S STRONG ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION WHICH HAS LED TO CURRENT POLITICAL STALEMATE IN LEBANON IS ABOVE ALL AN ATTEMPT TO PLAY FOR TIME IN HOPE THAT 2-POWER AND 4-POWER TALKS WILL MAKE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS OR SHOW HOPE PROGRESS SO THAT HELOU CAN CONTINUE SECURE MAJOR PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HIS CURRENT TOUGH STAND.

3) I WILL BE PAYING FAREWELL CALL ON HELOU IN NEXT WEEK PRIOR MY DEPARTURE HOME LEAVE/CONSULTATION AND HE WILL BE PRIMARILY QUESTIONING ME ON SUBSTANCE US POSITION AND OUR FORECAST ON PROGRESS. I HAVE GENERALLY ADEQUATE GUIDANCE FROM FREQUENT EXCELLENT REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, I HAVE NOT RECEIVED SPECIFIC US PROPOSALS AND WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT RELEASING THEM TO ME WITH AUTHORITY DISCUSS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH HELOU. I THINK IT NOW IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO BE ACCURATELY INFORMED OF US POSITION.

4) ANY OTHER GENERAL GUIDANCE FROM DEPT WTULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED.
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SUMMARY²⁷

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

121026

R 300830Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7824
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 4411

EXDIS:

REF: PARIS 7905

1. DESPITE HINTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, INCLUDING PRESIDENT HELOU, THAT FRENCH HAD BACKED AWAY FROM THEIR INITIAL ENTHUSIASM TO ASSIST LEBANON AFTER DEC 28 BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID, WE HAD NO INKLING THAT FRENCH HAD RENEGED ON THEIR AGREEMENT TO SUPPLY ARMS TO GOL. THIS LEAVES HELOU AND LEBANESE ARMY IN DIFFICULT POSITION VIS-A-VIS THEIR ARMS REQUIREMENTS AND IS PROBABLY A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO HELOU'S LOW SPIRITS.

2. I DISCUSSED WITH PRES HELOU MAY 7 IDEA OF USG'S ISSUING PUBLIC STATEMENT IN SUPPORT LEBANON'S INTEGRITY. HELOU HAS NEVER PRESSED THE POINT, HOWEVER, POSSIBLY BECAUSE HE UNCERTAIN THAT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL AT TIME WHEN FEDAYEEN ISSUE TENDED TO HAVE CONFSSIONAL CONNOTATIONS. ALSO, HELOU, AWARE THAT THIS EMBASSY AND USG BEING BRANDED LATELY IN LEFTIST PRESS AS BEING THE AUTHOR OF HIS ANTI-FEDAYEEN POLICY, UNDERSTANDABLY WOULD PREFER A MULTILATERAL RATHER THAN A U.S. UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE REQUEST HELOU MADE TO ME MAY 26 (BEIRUT 4375) RE POSSIBLE 4-POWER STATEMENT EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER ACTIONS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, AND HIS RELATED REQUESTS FOR U.S. HELP IN SECURING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. WE GUESS HE MADE SIMILAR POINTS TO FRENCH, AND

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LEBEL'S APPROACH TO EMB PARIS IS GOI ATTEMPT TO GROPE FOR RESPONSE WHICH WOULD CAUSE MINIMUM DIFFICULTIES FOR FRENCH IN THEIR ARAB RELATIONS.

3. AT MEETING MAY 26, HELOU RESPONDED NEGATIVELY (AND DESPONDENTLY) WHEN I ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER HIS TALKS WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH HAD PRODUCED ANY RESULTS. UKI AMB KING TOLD US TWO WEEKS AGO THAT HELOU HAD SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF HMG'S ISSUING SUCH STATEMENT. HOWEVER, HELOU RAISED MATTER IN SUCH AN OFFHAND MANNER THAT KING DID NOT CONSIDER IT AS FIRM REQUEST ON HELOU'S PART. WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER HELOU HAS SUGGESTED SUCH STATEMENT TO SOVIET OR FRENCH AMBASSADORS HERE. LATTER DID NOT RAISE SUBJECT RECENT MEETING WITH ME.

4. IT SOUNDS TO US AS THOUGH FRENCH IDEA OF FOUR-POWER STATEMENT, WHILE CERTAINLY DESIRABLE FROM LEBANON'S POINT OF VIEW IF SOVIETS CAN INDEED BE PERSUADED TO PARTICIPATE, IS A CONVENIENT MEANS TO GET FRENCH OUT OF ARMS DEAL WITHOUT LOSING TOO MUCH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CREDIT WITH HELOU AND GOL.

5. WE BELIEVE SUGGESTED FOUR-POWER STATEMENT WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HELOU, GOL AND PARTICULARLY TO FALTERING LEBANESE ECONOMY. SINCE LEFTISTS, SOVIETS' CLIENT STATE SYRIA AND ITS BAATHI-SPONSORED AS SAIGA ARE THE ELEMENTS POSING THE GREATEST IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LEBANON'S SECURITY, SOVIET PARTICIPATION WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL ALTHOUGH DEPT WILL HAVE TO JUDGE WHETHER IT MIGHT BE OBTAINED. WE HOPE DEPT WILL GIVE FRENCH SUGGESTION SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. ALSO, DESPITE FRENCH RELUCTANCE KEEP PROPOSED STATEMENT SEPARATE FROM FOUR-POWER TALKS, WE WONDER WHETHER IT MIGHT BETTER BE INCLUDED IN ANY FOUR-POWER COMMUNIQUE WHICH MIGHT BE ISSUED IN NEW YORK, PARTICULARLY IF SUCH COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS OF OTHER THREATS TO PEACE IN ME, I.E., VIOLATIONS OF CEASE FIRE. PORTER

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ACTION SS 30

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INFO OCT 01, /031 W

107167

R 281233Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7814
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4375

EXDIS

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: A. STATE 75037 AND 75214; B. BEIRUT 4270

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MAY 26, HE RAISED PROSPECTS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, BOTH IN CONTEXT OF AVOIDING FURTHER DETERIORATION NOW AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF CONTINGENCY ACTION IF LEBANON GETS INTO REAL TROUBLE IN FUTURE. HELOU PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY STATING HE WELL UNDERSTOOD WASHINGTON'S POSITION TOWARD REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND ITS RELUCTANCE INTERVENE. AS PRESIDENT OF A FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT WHICH MIGHT NEED U.S. HELP, HE WOULD WISH THINGS WERE OTHERWISE, BUT ONE MUST ACCEPT ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FORMED BY USG'S INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. THIS ATTITUDE UNDERSTANDABLY AFFECTS USG IN CONSIDERING WHAT IT CAN DO FOR ITS FRIENDS, AND IN SUPPORT ITS OWN INTERESTS IN ME.

2. WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING HE ASKED WHAT WASHINGTON'S REACTION WAS TO HIS SUGGESTIONS (SEE BEIRUT 3868 AND 3881) CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES OF EXPANDED UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, IF SITUATION DETERIORATES FURTHER. I REPLIED ALONG LINES REFTEL A, AND EXPLAINED THAT GOL ITSELF MUST APPROACH UNSYG OR SC DIRECTLY AND OBTAIN SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCENCE OF OTHER ARAB STATES FOR SUCH A MOVE. I INFORMED HIM IN RATHER UNHAPPY EXCHANGE THAT DEPT FEELS

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POSSIBILITY OF LEBANON OBTAINING SIGNIFICANT OUTSIDE HELP IN COPING WITH ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS IS SLIGHT. ONE COULD ENVISAGE POSSIBLE UN ROLE AT SOME FUTURE TIME, DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT INSTALLATION OF UNEF WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND DIRECT US MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN A UNEF DOES NOT APPEAR POSSIBLE.

3. AS FOR DISPATCH SPECIAL UN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT LEBANON AND REPORT ON REFUGEE INVOLVEMENT IN PRESENT SITUATION, ROLE OF SYG REPRESENTATIVE WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH U THANT AND APPROVED BY UNSC, AND WOULD CLEARLY BE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE SITUATION IN CAMPS AS HELOU ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED. I TOLD HIM WE SEE NO WAY THAT PRESENCE CIVILIAN OBSERVERS COULD BECOME BASIS FOR INTRODUCING UN POLICE TEAMS AND EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT UN MILITARY PRESENCE IN LEBANON. INFORMED HELOU OF REPLY UNRWA DIRECTOR MICHELMORE RECEIVED FROM BUNCHE RE SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS AND MADE POINTS CONTAINED IN REFTEL B, AND STRESSED THERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON COULD BE AUGMENTED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF UNSC. HELOU ASKED IF UNSC DECISION NECESSARY FOR INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF UNMOS/ILMAC. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT THINK UNSC DECISION WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR SLIGHT INCREASE OF UNMOS'S, AS LONG AS THERE NO OBJECTION FROM INTERESTED PARTIES, BUT THAT DISPATCH OF NEW TYPE OF OBSERVERS AS VISUALIZED BY HELOU WOULD REQUIRE UNSC APPROVAL. ALSO, ATTACHMENT CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO UNRWA TO MONITOR SECURITY SITUATION IN CAMPS UNACCEPTABLE TO SYG, SINCE WOULD CHANGE UNRWA'S ROLE BY GIVING IT RESPONSIBILITIES IN FIELD OF SECURITY WHICH HAS BEEN EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF HOST GOVERNMENTS. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING USG HOPEFUL NOTHING WOULD ARISE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE UNSC DEBATE AT MOMENT ON ANY ME PROBLEM. THIS COULD SERIOUSLY DETRACT FROM PROGRESS OF BIG FOUR TALKS.

4. HELOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD (ALTHOUGH HIS OPTIONS WERE OF COURSE ADVERSELY AFFECTED) BOTH OUR POSITION AND UN POSITION AS TRANSMITTED TO MICHELMORE. HE THEN POSED QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT CONCRETE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON WOULD BE POSSIBLE ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, IF SITUATION SO DETERIORATED THAT THERE WAS PILLAGE, BLOODSHED AND MAJOR BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL ORDER IN LEBANON. I SAID THAT IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT TO SPECULATE ON WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIONS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MIGHT TAKE, AND THAT A GREAT DEAL DEPENDED UPON ACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. HELOU REFERRED TO HIS SUGGESTION OF DISPATCHING US CONTINGENTS AS ADVANCE ELEMENTS IF UNEF AUTHORIZED BY SC. I STATED USG HAS NOT ENVISAGED BIG POWER PARTICIPATION WITH MILITARY FORCES. SG THINKING MORE

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IN TERMS OF POSSIBILITIES ECONOMIC AID TO GOL AND ASSISTANCE TO LEBANESE ARMY, RATHER THAN UNREALISTIC MILITARY INTERVENTION. IN CRISIS SITUATION, I SUGGESTED ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE DE- TAIL ELEMENTS UNFICYP FORCES AS STOP-GAP MEASURE PROVIDED AGREE- MENT COULD BE REACHED. AN INTERNATIONAL FLEET PRESENCE WAS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE, IF IT WOULD REALLY HELP RESTORE STABILITY. HOWEVER, NO PRIOR COMMITMENTS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN CONSIDERING HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS. MEANTIME, U.S. WOULD CONTINUE SUPPORT LEBANON IN ALL POSSIBLE WAY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS. PORTER

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ACTION SS 30

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INFO OCT 01, /031 W

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R 281233Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7815
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4375

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

5. HELOU THEN ASKED THAT WE CONSIDER THREE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH COULD HELP HIM RESIST FEDAYEEN PRESSURES. FIRST HE ASKED USG GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO DEMARCHE TO USSR CONCERNING NASSER'S POSITION ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, ESPECIALLY AS IT AFFECTS LEBANON. IN HELOU'S VIEW, NASSER NOT BEING AS HELPFUL TO LEBANON ON FEDAYEEN ISSUE AS IS COMMONLY BELIEVED. UAR PLAYING DOUBLE-FACED GAME IN ITS PRESENT EFFORTS TO "MEDIATE" BETWEEN GOL AND FEDAYEEN. ALTHOUGH UARG VOICED SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, NASSER ALSO HAS A REAL INTEREST IN SEEING LEBANON BECOME "HOSTAGE" OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT BECAUSE FEDAYEEN THREAT TO MODERATE PRO-WEST LEBANESE REGIME COULD ENCOURAGE US, UK AND FRANCE TO PUSH HARDER FOR EARLY PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. NASSER, HELOU SAID, WANTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT FIRMLY BELIEVES BIG-FOUR WOULD ONLY "IMPOSE" SETTLEMENT, IF THEY FEAR SHARP DE-TERIORATION ME SITUATION. IF SOVIETS CAN MAKE EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION TO NASSER TO HAVE UAR EXERT ITS INFLUENCE OVER COMMANDO ORGANIZATION CONCERNING GOL/FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION, THIS WOULD CLEARLY ASSIST LEBANON IN SOLVING ITS POLITICAL CRISIS.

6. HELOU ALSO SUGGESTED CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO "INTERNATIONAL DECLARATION" ON PART OF MAJOR POWERS THAT TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN ME, WHICH DIRECTED NOT ONLY AGAINST ISRAEL BUT ALSO AGAINST ARAB

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GOVERNMENTS, POSE SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND AREA STABILITY. HELOU COMMENTED THAT FEDAYEEN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY AND PUBLIC OPINION, THEREFORE, SUCH A DECLARATION MIGHT HELP TO INHIBIT THEIR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN JORDAN AND LEBANON. I RESPONDED THAT THIS EASIER SAID THAN DONE. EFFECT OF SUCH ACTION MIGHT BE OPPOSITE, CAUSING FEDAYEEN TO INCREASE THEIR PRESSURES ON MODERATE ARAB STATES.

7. AS THIRD SUGGESTION, HELOU MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF HAVING COUNTRIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO UNRWA MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO UNSYG THAT THEY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN UNRWA CAMPS MIGHT JEOPARDIZE STATUS PALESTINE REFUGEES. HELOU SAID THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE IMPLICIT THREAT THAT CONTINUATION UNRWA ACTIVITIES COULD BE BROUGHT INTO QUESTION BY FEDAYEEN EXPLOITATION OF PALESTINIAN CAMPS. (COMMENT: IT DIFFICULT FOR US SEE HOW THIS COULD BE HELPFUL.) I TOLD HELOU THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPARTMENT FOR CONSIDERATION, AND REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAVE ALREADY RAISED SUBJECT OF GOL/FEDAYEEN CRISIS WITH SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH I NOT AWARE WHETHER SOVS HAVE SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED WITH NASSER.

8. ON SOVIET POSITION TOWARD FEDAYEEN, HELOU SAID HE WAS CONFUSED BY WHAT SEEMED TO BE DUALISTIC APPROACH BY SOVIETS. ON ONE HAND SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS TO GOL INDICATE THAT SOVIETS OPPOSED TO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. BUT, ON OTHER HAND, CPL PARTICIPATED IN PRO-FEDAYEEN DEMONSTRATIONS IN BEIRUT APRIL 23-24 WHICH SPARKED OFF PRESENT CRISIS. I TOLD HELOU IT OUR ESTIMATE THAT SOVIETS ARE IN FACT OPPOSED TO FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT BECAUSE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES INHIBIT PROGRESS TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH SOVIETS NOW SEEM SUPPORT. ALSO, SINCE SOVIETS DO NOT CONTROL FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, THEY OBVIOUSLY OPPOSE IT. AS FOR CPL, THERE INDICATIONS IT DECIDED PARTICIPATE IN BEIRUT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT CONCURRENCY USSR. THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN AN INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT TAKEN LOCALLY BY CPL.

9. HELOU EXPRESSED CONCERN RE ISRAELI PRESENT POSITION TOWARD LEBANON AND ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED ANY INDICATIONS OF WHAT ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE IF GOL CONCLUDED SOME SORT OF AGREEMENT WITH FEDAYEEN. SPECIFICALLY, HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT GOL'S POLICY OF REPRISALS. I REFERRED TO SUBSTANCE TEL AVIV'S 1961 AND STATED I UNABLE PREDICT CLEARLY ISRAELI POLICIES OR INTENTIONS, BUT DO UNDERSTAND ISRAEL WOULD TAKE VERY DIM VIEW OF GOL/FEDAYEEN

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AGREEMENT, WHICH IN ISRAELI EYES WOULD AMOUNT TO SERIOUS INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN PRESTIGE. HELOU WISHED THERE WERE SOME WAY ISRAELIS WOULD RE-THINK THEIR REPRISAL POLICY, AND INSTEAD OF HITTING LEBANESE TARGETS IN RETALIATION FOR ISOLATED FEDAYEEN ENCROACHMENTS, THEY WOULD HIT SOURCES OF FEDAYEEN PENETRATION ACROSS THE LEBANESE-ISRAEL BORDER IN SYRIA. AS AN EXAMPLE HE STATED THAT ALL FEDAYEEN NOW LOCATED IN SHIBA'A COME FROM AND ARE SUPPLIED BY FEDAYEEN BASES LOCATED IN SYRIAN VILLAGE OF AARNE ACROSS LEBANESE/SYRIAN BORDER.

10. I COMMENTED TO HELOU THAT CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, HIS DIPLOMATIC POSITION WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN PROPORTION TO THE STAND HE ADOPTS IN DEFENDING LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE. IF LEBANON GAVE IN TO FEDAYEEN, OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR LEBANON'S FRIENDS TO FIND SUBSEQUENT BASIS FOR DEFINING AND SUPPORTING A POSITION IN UN WHICH WOULD SERVE PROTECT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY. PORTER

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INFO OCT 01/031 W

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R 231639Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7792
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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SECRET BEIRUT 4270

EXDIS:

SUBJ: UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON

REF: STATE 75037

1. UNRWA DIRECTOR MICHELMORE TELLS US THAT IN REPLY TO HIS LETTER RE SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS (BEIRUT 3868) BUNCHE STATED THERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON COULD BE AUGMENTED WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY IF MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE INVOLVED. SINCE ILMAC CURRENTLY OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF FRONTIER, ANY CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ITS FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS EXPANSION OF KITS ACTIVITIES, WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. BUNCHE ALSO COMMENTED THAT ATTACHING "CIVILIAN OBSERVER PERSONNEL" TO UNRWA TO MONITOR SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS WOULD CHANGE UNRWA'S ROLE, GIVING IT RESPONSIBILITIES IN FIELD OF SECURITY WHICH HERETOFORE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF HOST GOVERNMENT". HE BELIEVES THIS ACTION WOULD BE BOTH UNDESIRABLE AND "TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE" AND WOULD RISK JEOPARDIZING THE AGENCY'S RELATIONS WITH THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES. BUNCHE'S LETTER WAS CLEARED WITH SYG.

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3. MICHELMORE ADVISES THAT AS OF MAY 22 SECURITY SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON GRADUALLY RETURNING TO NORMAL. ALL UNRWA SERVICES NOW FUNCTIONING THOUGH SCHOOL ATTENDANCE STILL DOWN FROM LEVEL BEFORE APRIL 23 DISTURBANCES. SIBLIN VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL PARTICULARLY HARD HIT SINCE MEASURES TAKEN BY LEBANESE MILITARY TO CONTROL MOVEMENT OF PALESTINIANS HAVE PREVENTED MANY YOUNG MEN FROM RETURNING TO CLASS. UNRWA HAS RAISED THIS PROBLEM WITH ARMY AND BELIEVES IT WILL BE RESOLVED SHORTLY. AS RESULT RECENT ABSENCES AND UNRWA TEACHERS' STRIKE EARLIER IN YEAR, AGENCY NOW CONSIDERING EXTENDING SCHOOL YEAR UNTIL MID OR LATE JULY.

4. I PASSED THE SUBSTANCE OF BUNCHE'S REPLY TO PRES HELOU THROUGH INTERMEDIARY TODAY. HE WAS, OF COURSE, DISAPPOINTED THAT U THANT UNWILLING ACT WITHOUT SC ACTION. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS THAT US DOES NOT WANT ANYTHING TO COME UP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS TIME SINCE SUCH ACTION WOULD ONLY DETRACT FROM EFFORTS ALREADY BEING MADE TO FIND A WAY TO EASE ME CRISIS. IN ANY SC DEBATE, THE MAJOR POWERS WOULD REPEAT WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME TO BRING UP FEDAYEEN ISSUE, OR ANY OTHER ASPECT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, IN SC FORUM. I REITERATED THAT HELOU OF COURSE ALWAYS HAD RECOURSE TO SYG IF SITUATION DETERIORATED, AND IF HE COULD VISUALIZE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION WHICH SYG MIGHT INITIATE.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 04268 232151Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, 1963 W

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R 231555Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7790
INFO AMEMBAECL AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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SECRET BEIRUT 4268

EXDIS

REF: STATE 82597

1. IN ELABORATION REPORT REFTEL SAMIR SOUKI INFORMED ME RECENTLY ON HIS RETURN FROM US THAT INFORMATION RE SYG'S PROPOSAL RE JARRING "SOLUTION" WAS IMPARTED TO HIM BY RALCA BUNCHE. PRESUMABLY KERN WAS PRESENT OR WAS INFORMED BY SOUKI.

2. BUNCH REFLECTED U THANT'S CONCERN THAT US AND USSR MIGHT NOT REACH AGREEMENT WITHING SHORT TIME FRAME WHICH U THANT THINKS REMAINS. JARRING PROPOSALS PRESUMABLY MIGHT BREAK BIG FOUR DEADLOCK BY ALLOWING SECURITY COUNCIL ACCEPTANCE JARRING REPORT WHICH WOULD THEN SERVE AS BASIS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL SOLUTION. NO INDICATION WHETHER JARRING HAD AGREED TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7743
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 4088

EXDIS

SUBJECT: LEBANON, THE FEDAYEEN AND DP RETURN

1. THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE WHICH PREVAILED IN LEBANON FOLLOWING RIOTS ON APRIL 23-24 HAS ABATED SOMEWHAT AND THE SPORADIC CLASHES BETWEEN ARMY AND FEDAYEEN IN SOUTH LEBANON EARLY THIS MONTH HAVE NOT REOCCURRED. WHILE TALKS BETWEEN PLO LEADER YASIR ARAFAT AND LEB AUTHORITIES WERE INCONCLUSIVE AS NO "AGREEMENT" WAS CONCLUDED, A "STANDOFF" SITUATION HAS BEEN ACHIEVED WHICH HOPEFULLY MAY AVOID FURTHER CONFRONTATION FOR THE TIME BEING.

2. DESPITE THESE MILDLY ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE THE ROAD AHEAD FOR LEBANON IS DOWNHILL. THE MOMENTUM ACHIEVED BY THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDO MOVEMENT DURING THE PAST 18 MONTHS APPEARS IRREVERSIBLE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. WHILE THE VAST MAJORITY OF LEBANESE OPPOSE "UNCONTROLLED" FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AGAINST ISRAEL FROM LEBANON, MOST LEBANESE SUPPORT EMOTIONALLY (OR FEAR TO OPPOSE) THE DECLARED OBJECTIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY IT UNLIKELY THAT POPULAR OPINION WOULD APPROVE ANY AGGRESSIVE MOVE BY PRESIDENT HELOU AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE PRESENT "TRUCE" IN THE SOUTH SEEMS TO HOLD, AND IF THE STARK ALTERNATIVE IS VIEWED AS IMMINENT CIVIL WAR.

3. PRESIDENT HELOU'S ABILITY TO ACT DECISIVELY AGAINST FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE FACT THAT THE

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LEBANESE-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION IS BUT ONE MANIFESTATION OF THE BROADER ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. WHILE A BROAD SPECTRUM OF THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC HAS LONG SUPPORTED A POLICY OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, IT IS PROBABLY UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT THIS SENTIMENT COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO A SHOWDOWN WITH THE FEDAYEEN, PARTICULARLY WHEN MOST LEBANESE DO NOT PERCEIVE HOW SUCH A SHOWDOWN COULD SUCCEED.

4. ONE OTHER IMPORTANT STATE OF MIND BEARS ON THE LEBANESE ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE FEDAYEEN. MOST LEBANESE ARE NOW DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL INTENDS, AT TIME OF HER CHOOSING, TO SEIZE A PORTION OF SOUTH LEBANON. THE BEIRUT AIRPORT RAID DESTROYED ANY PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PREMISE THAT, IF LEBANON'S BEHAVIOR GAVE ISRAEL NO PRETEXT TO ATTACK, LEBANON COULD STAY OUT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. THE RESULT, HAS BEEN TO REDUCE LEBANON'S CAPACITY TO MAKE A CLEAR CHOICE BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN OR ISRAEL AS THE GREATER AND MORE IMMEDIATE DANGER. THE STEADY ESCALATION OF FIGHTING ON THE CEASE-FIRE LINES, AND THE INCREASINGLY MILITANT STATEMENTS OF ISRAELI LEADERS (AS INTERPRETED HERE), ADD TO LEBANESE SUSPICIONS RE ISRAEL'S LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES. CLIMATE IN ARAB MIDDLE EAST, IN SHORT, IS NOT ONE WHICH ENCOURAGES LEBANESE TO EXPECT PEACE.

5. THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO FIND SOME NEW ELEMENT WHICH CAN BE INTERJECTED INTO THE OVERALL AREA PICTURE IN AN ATTEMPT TO REVERSE OR AT LEAST STEM THE DOWNHILL DRIFT. THIS MUST BE ABOVE ALL SOMETHING WHICH WILL PRODUCE HOPE THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS STILL POSSIBLE, AND ENABLE THE ESTABLISHED AREA REGIMES TO COMBAT THE FEDAYEEN PROPAGANDA LINE THAT WAR AND ONLY WAR IS THE SOLUTION AND SUCH HOPE CAN ONLY BE NURTURED AND SUSTAINED BY A POSITIVE AND DRAMATIC ACTION WHICH WILL CONVINCING THE ARABS THAT ISRAEL IS ALSO PREPARED TO DO ITS SHARE TO FIND PEACE.

6. WE HAVE NOTED AMBASSADOR YOST'S STATEMENT ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM PRESENTED AT THE FOUR-POWER TALKS MAY 6 (STATE 71739) AND BELIEVE A REVIVED AND MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE NEWLY "DISPLACED PERSONS" TO THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MIGHT OFFER A WAY TO REVIVE WANING HOPES IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND TO BUY ESSENTIAL TIME.

7. WE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS FAVOR SUCH A MOVE:

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A) BOTH THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO TAKE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE

STEPS TO ALLOW THE DPS TO RETURN;

B) RETURN OF THE DPS IS AN OBVIOUS AND ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP OF ANY SETTLEMENT SCHEME WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY EMERGE FROM THE FOUR-POWER TALKS;

C) ACTIVATION OF A LARGE-SCALE DP RETURN SCHEME NOW WOULD IN NO WAY PREJUDICE EITHER THE PROCEEDINGS OR FINAL OUTCOME OF THE FOUR-POWER TALKS. NOR WOULD IT COMPROMISE THE ISRAELI POSITION RE THE NECESSITY OF DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ARABS TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV. 22 RESOLUTION. RATHER IT WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PROSPECTS OF AN AGREEMENT SINCE IT WOULD BE A GENUINE INDICATION THAT ISRAEL IS WILLING TO MOVE TOWARD A REALISTIC SETTLEMENT;

D) ANNOUNCEMENT THAT ALL THOSE WHO FLED THEIR HOMES ON THE WEST BANK IN SUMMER 1967 COULD NOT BEGIN TO RETURN, WOULD GIVE THE DPS A FEELING OF HOPE, AND A SENSE OF A PURPOSEFUL FUTURE;

E) SINCE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF THE COMMANDOS HAVE BEEN RECRUITED FROM THE FRUSTRATED AND DISILLUSIONED DP POPULATION, IF THEY WERE NOW GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FORMER JOBS, SOME OF THE STRENGTH AND APPEAL OF THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS WOULD BE SAPPED. THOSE WHO RETURNED WOULD AGAIN BE LIVING IN PALESTINE AND WOULD HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES TO WHICH THEY COULD DEVOTE THEIR ENERGIES;

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4088

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SUBJECT: LEBANON, THE FEDAYEEN AND DP RETURN

7. AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE EAST AND WEST BANKS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE DPS. THIS COULD BE A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ITS OWN RIGHT.

8. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DP'S PROBABLY DOES NOT EXCEED 250,000. ISRAELI DEF MIN DAYAN USED FIGURE OF 226,000 IN NOV. 68 (TEL AVIV

6117). IF THE GOI COULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO ALLOW THE DPS TO BEGIN RETURNING, EVEN AT A RELATIVELY SLOW RATE OF 10,000 PER MONTH, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A RETURN TO NORMALCY WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE SIGNIFICANT. THERE WOULD BE NO INSUPERABLE LOGISTICS PROBLEM. UNRWA OFFICIALS WORKING WITH THE GOJ, WHICH WE ARE ASSUMING WOULD SUPPORT ANY VIABLE DP RETURN PROGRAM, COULD QUICKLY IDENTIFY THE DP'S WHETHER OR NOT REGISTERED WITH UNRWA. FURTHERMORE, THE HOMES OF MOST OF THE DPS REMAIN VACANT.

9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOI, AS IN THE PAST, WILL RESIST ON FAMILIAR (AND TO THEM CONVINCING) GROUNDS. FRANKLY, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THESE REASONS CONVINCING, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF REPEATED ASSERTIONS BY ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THE GOI'S OCCUPATION POLICY HAS BOTH DISSUADED WEST BANK RESIDENTS FROM COOPERATING WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND RAISED THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE AREA. WE WOULD

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ARGUE, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOI TO HAVE AS MANY PALESTINIANS AS POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION, AND TO BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO ISRAELI-

ARAB ECONOMIC COOPERATION. FRUTHERMORE, WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE CAPABILITY OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO INSTITUTE WHATEVER SECURITY MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE DPS FROM BECOMING A MAJOR DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF A FINAL AGREEMENT. RATHER, THE THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY SHOULD BE REDUCED, ONCE THE FEDAYEEN SPAWNING GROUND AMONG THE DPS ON THE EAST BANK HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

10. WE CAN'T, OF COURSE, PREDICT HOW LONG THE PRESENT DRIFT CAN CONTINUE BEFORE THE MODERATE REGIMES IN LEBANON, JORDAN AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE ME ARE BROUGHT DOWN OR RENDERED IMPOTENT BY MOUNTING LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN PRESSURES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THESE REGIMES CAN LONG SURVIVE THE COMBINED THREAT POSED BY THE FEDAYEEN, PAN-ARABISTS AND OTHER LEFTIST POLITICAL ELEMENTS. ON OTHER HAND, HUSSEIN WOULD CERTAINLY GET MORE BREATHING ROOM IF HIS REFUGEE POPULATION CAN BE REDUCED. LEBANON WOULD BENEFIT ACCORDINGLY, AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCCE ITS PEOPLE THAT PEACE IS WORTH FIGHTING FOR.

11. IF ISRAEL WISHES TO MAINTAIN MODERATE ARAB REGIMES WITH WHOM SHE MIGHT MAKE PEACE, SHE MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE SOME RISK AND PAY A PRICE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT HER ACCEPTANCE OF A DP RETURN

SCHEME MIGHT ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO SERVE HER INTERESTS AT MINIMUM RISK. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED, AND WE SUGGEST (WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PAST FAILURE) THAT IT IS WORTH ANOTHER TRY. WE FRANKLY DON'T SEE ANYTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT WORK, IN THE SHRINKING TIME FRAME WHICH FACES US.

12. WHILE BOTH ARABS AND JEWS ARE DOUBTLESS SINCERE IN THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE, THEY BOTH APPEAR INCAPABLE OF EITHER CORRECTLY ASSESSING THE OTHERS DESIRES OR MOTIVES OR TAKING ANY POSITIVE STEPS TOWARD CONVINCING THE OTHER OF THEIR GENUINE DESIRE AND READINESS FOR PEACE. IT IS APPARENT THAT ISRAEL FAILS TO CONSIDER A RETURN OF THE DPS AS BEING IN ITS GENUINE INTEREST. WE CONTEND THAT IT IS VERY MUCH SO AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER GO AT CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS THAT IT IS. PORTER

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 4088
EXDIS

SUBJECT: LEBANON, THE FEDAYEEN AND DP RETURN

F) AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE MIGHT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE EAST AND WEST BANKS TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THE DPS. THIS COULD BE A CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT IN ITS OWN RIGHT.

8. (#) TOTAL NUMBER OF DP'S PROBABLY DOES NOT EXCEED 250,000. ISRAELI DEF MIN DAYAN USED FIGURE OF 226,000 IN NOV. 68 (TEL AVIV 6117). IF THE GOI COULD BE PREVAILED UPON TO ALLOW THE DPS TO BEGIN RETURNING, EVEN AT A RELATIVELY SLOW RATE OF 10,000 PER MONTH, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD A RETURN TO NORMALCY WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE SIGNIFICANT. THERE WOULD BE NO INSUPERABLE LOGISTICS PROBLEM. UNRWA OFFICIALS

WORKING WITH THE GOJ, WHICH WE ARE ASSUMING WOULD SUPPORT ANY (#) DP RETURN PROGRAM, COULD QUICKLY IDENTIFY THE DP'S WHETHER OR NOT REGISTERED WITH UNRWA. FURTHERMORE, THE HOMES OF MOST OF THE DPS REMAIN VACANT.

9. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE GOI, AS IN THE PAST, WILL RESIST ON FAMILIAR (AND TO THEM CONVINCING) GROUNDS. FRANKLY, WE DO NOT CONSIDER THESE REASONS CONVINCING, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF REPEATED ASSERTIONS BY ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THE GOI'S OCCUPATION POLICY HAS BOTH DISSUADED WEST BANK RESIDENTS FROM COOPERATING WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND RAISED THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE AREA. WE WOULD ARGUE, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOI TO HAVE AS MANY PALESTINIANS AS POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE THE POSITIVE ASPECTS

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OF ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION, AND TO BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO ISRAELI-ARAB ECONOMIC COOPERATION. FURTHERMORE, WE SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE CAPABILITY OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO INSTITUTE WHATEVER SECURITY MEASURES MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT THE DPS FROM BECOMING A MAJOR DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF A FINAL AGREEMENT. RATHER, THE THREAT TO ISRAELI SECURITY SHOULD BE REDUCED, ONCE THE FEDAYEEN SPAWNING GROUND AMONG THE DPS ON THE EAST BANK HAS BEEN ELIMINATED.

10. WE CAN'T, OF COURSE, PREDICT HOW LONG THE PRESENT DRIFT CAN CONTINUE BEFORE THE MODERATE REGIMES IN LEBANON, JORDAN AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE ME ARE BROUGHT DOWN OR RENDERED IMPOTENT BY MOUNTING LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN PRESSURES. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THESE REGIMES CAN LONG SURVIVE THE COMBINED THREAT POSED BY THE FEDAYEEN, PAN-ARABISTS AND OTHER LEFTIST POLITICAL ELEMENTS. ON OTHER HAND, HUSSEIN WOULD (#)

ROOM IF HIS REFUGEE POPULATION CAN BE REDUCED. LEBANON WOULD BENEFIT ACCORDINGLY AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCCE ITS PEOPLE THAT PEACE IS WORTH FIGHTING FOR.

11. IF ISRAEL WISHES TO MAINTAIN MODERATE ARAB REGIMES WITH WHOM SHE MIGHT MAKE PEACE, SHE MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE SOME RISK AND PAY A PRICE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT HER ACCEPTANCE OF A DP RETURN SCHEME MIGHT ACCOMPLISH MUCH TO SERVE HER INTERESTS AT MINIMUM RISK. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED, AND WE SUGGEST (WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF PAST FAILURE) THAT IT IS WORTH ANOTHER TRY. WE FRANKLY DON'T SEE ANYTHING ELSE THAT MIGHT WORK, IN THE SHRINKING TIME FRAME WHICH FACES US.

12. WHILE BOTH ARABS AND JEWS ARE DOUBTLESS SINCERE IN THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE, THEY BOTH APPEAR INCAPABLE OF EITHER CORRECTLY ASSESSING THE OTHERS DESIRES OR MOTIVES OR TAKING ANY POSITIVE STEPS TOWARD CONVINCING THE OTHER OF THEIR GENUINE DESIRE AND READINESS FOR PEACE. IT IS APPARENT THAT ISRAEL FAILS TO CONSIDER A RETURN OF THE DPS AS BEING IN ITS GENUINE INTEREST. WE CONTEND THAT IT IS VERY MUCH SO AND BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER GO AT CONVINCING THE ISRAELIS THAT IT IS.
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NOTE: (#) OMISSIONS. CORRECTIONS TO FOLLOW.

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Lebanon

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SECRET BEIRUT 4078
EXDIS
SUBJECT: LEBANESE CRISIS

REF: STATE 76791

1. APPRECIATE SUGGESTION RE CHEHAB. WE OF COURSE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CHEHAB'S ROLE CLOSELY AND I HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT DIRECT AND INDIRECT TOUCH WITH HIM. I HAVE ANOTHER APPOINTMENT ON MAY 19. CHEHAB IS SUPPORTING HELOU. HE SEES CLEARLY THE FEDAYEEN DANGER TO LEBANON AND HIS VIEWS HAVE BEEN MADE KNOWN, PARTICULARLY TO ARMY. INDEED, THIS SUPPORT HAS BEEN ONE OF HELOU'S MAIN ASSETS AND HAS ALSO SERVED MAINTAIN COHESIVENESS OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

2. CHEHAB, HOWEVER, PREFERS TO WORK BEHIND THE SCENES. HE IS NOT A PARTICULARLY COURAGEOUS OR BOLD MAN. HE ABHORS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND HAS NOT MADE ONE FOR YEARS. ALSO HE WOULD FEEL PARTICULARLY INHIBITED IN MAKING A CLEAR-CUT PUBLIC STATEMENT BECAUSE OF HIS DESIRE NOT TO EMBARRASS HIS OLD FRIEND AND PROTEGE, RASHID KARAME. KARAME IS AT THIS POINT FACING MOST DIFFICULT DECISION OF HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND WE BELIEVE CHEHAB IS QUIETLY ADVISING HIM TO FORM A GOVT WHICH WOULD BE ABLE HANDLE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM. COROLLARY OF THIS WOULD BE THAT KARAME WOULD NOT HAVE TO TAKE PUBLIC ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSTURE WHICH WOULD DESTROY HIM WITH

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HIS MUSLIM CONSTITUENCY. CHEHAB THEREFORE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SHY AWAY FROM ANY STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD EMBARRASS HIS LONGTIME COLLEAGUE AND PERHAPS DESTROY HIS OWN EFFECTIVENESS IN EXERTING QUIET PRESSURE ON HIS MANY MUSLIM FRIENDS.

3. I AM AFRAID THAT CHEHAB WOULD BELIEVE THAT IN ORDER FOR HIS INFLUENCE TO BE SIGNIFICANT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE EXERCISED QUIETLY. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD ONLY SHARPEN THE CONFESSIONAL DIVISION, LUMPING HIM IN THE PUBLIC EYE WITH THE "MILITANT" CHRISTIANS FOR WHOM HE HAS GREAT CONTEMPT.

4. WHEN I SEE CHEHAB I WILL OF COURSE SEE HOW FAR HE WILL GO AND EXPLORE WITH HIM ALL POSSIBILITIES OF SUPPORT FOR HELOU. HELOU (WHO INCIDENTALLY IS NO CHEHAB-LOVER) HAS LEFT NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT HE IS SATISFIED WITH THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF CHEHAB'S CURRENT SUPPORT. PORTER

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S E C R E T BEIRUT 4035

EXDIS:

SUBJ: CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON

1) PRES HELOU REPORTED TO ME LAST NIGHT (MAY 14) THROUGH MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) WHERE THINGS NOW STAND.

2) REFORMATION NEW GOVT, HELOU HAS BEEN RELUCTANT CHARGE KARAME TO DO SO UNTIL KARAME FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT WEIGHT OF PUBLIC OPINION TOGETHER WITH STRONG VIEWS OF CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP DEMANDED SOMETHING MORE FROM HIM THAN EQUIVOCATION ON FEDAYEEN ISSUE. HOWEVER, AS ALL LEBANESE POLITICIANS WERE PRESURRING HELOU ESTABLISH CIVILIAN GOVT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, HE NOW PLANS DISCUSS MATTER WITH KARAME TODAY (MAY 15) HOPING REACH RAPID AGREEMENT.

3) HELOU CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS IT NOT POSSIBLE ENTICE SUNNI MUSLIMS INTO GOVT ON PUBLICLY-ANNOUNCED ANTI-FEDAYEEN PLATFORM CONFIDENTIAL DEAL HE HOPES STRIKE WITH KARAME WOULD BE:
(A) GOVT TO ISSUE POLICY STATEMENT STATING THAT LEBANON SUPPORTS FEDAYEEN TO SULLEST EXTENT THAT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL SECURITY PERMIT. (B) FEDAYEEN PRESENCE TO BE TOLERATED IN RELATIVELY SMALL AREA SOUTHEAST LEBANON UNDER UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT FEDAYEEN WILL NOT ENGAGE IN OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, WILL NOT EXPAND OUTSIDE AGREED AREA, WILL NOT INCREASE NUMBERS IN LEBANON, AND WILL NOT ENGAGE IN SUBERSION IN LEBANON. (C) IN EVENT FEDAYEEN VIOLATE TERMS OF AGREEMENT,

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6) HELOU MADE IT CLEAR TO ME THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS FEDAYEEN WILL BREAK THE UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT WHEN IT SUITS THEM TO DO SO. HE MUST BE SURE THAT IN SUCH EVENT KARAME WILL AT LEAST ACQUIESCE TO A QUICK RESPONSE BY THE LEBANESE MILITARY. IF KARAME CANNOT ACCEPT THESE CONDITIONS, HELOU PROBABLY WILL NOT RUN RISK OF ATTEMPTING FORM GOVT AT THIS TIME. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IF KARAME SHOULD RESIGN AGAIN IN FUTURE IN OPPOSITION OF GOVT'S FEDAYEEN POLICIES, THERE WOULD BE SLIM CHANCE FORMING ANOTHER CIVILIAN GOVT, AS BREAK WITH MUSLIMS WOULD THEN BE ALMOST INEVITABLE.

7) HELOU FULLY EXPECTS STEP-UP IN FEDAYEEN-INSPIRED PROGAGANDA AGAINST LEBANON, AND AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY, WILL BEGIN WHEN IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT HE HAS NOT CAVED IN TO THEIR DEMANDS. HE IS NOT PERSONALLY CONCERNED, BUT IS DEEPLY APPREHENSIVE WHETHER HE CAN WORK OUT A LASTING MODUS OPERANDI WITH KARAME AND THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY, WHOSE COURAGE LIKELY TO EVAPORATE IN FACE PREDICTABLE THREATS AND CHARGES OF TREASON. IN MEANTIME, WE DOUBT THAT HELOU HAS ANY REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE TO HIS PRESENT COURSE OF ACTION.

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EXDIS:

1) ONE AFTERMATH UNSUCCESSFUL FEDAYEEN-GOL NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN GROWING GROUNDSWELL OPINION AMONG FEDAYEEN AND THEIR SUPPORTERS THAT USG (SPECIFICALLY AMEMBASSY BEIRUT) HAD EXERCISED DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON PRES HELOU TAKE FIRM POSITION AGAINST CONCESSIONS FEDAYEEN.

2) WE KNOW THAT ARAFAT PERSONALLY SAID THIS IN SPEAKING OF "US SCENARIO" WHICH HELOU FOLLOWED, AND WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL PLAYBACKS THIS THEME. DETAILED REPORT ON NEGOTIATIONS CONTAINED NLB-9477 OF MAY 12 DESCRIBES ALLEGED STATEMENT OF HELOU TO ARAFAT TO EFFECT THAT HELOU MENTIONED ASSURANCES US INTERVENTION IN ANY EVENT FEDAYEEN CONTINUED ATTEMPTS SUBVERT LEBANON. I FEEL CERTAIN HELOU MADE NO SUCH STATEMENT BUT IT IS SORT OF ACCUSATION WHICH WE WILL CERTAINLY HEAR MORE OF IN FUTURE.

3) OF COURSE ONE CAN AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME FEDAYEEN WOULD BELIEVE IN "FACT" OF US INTERVENTION AND WOULD SPREAD STORY TO DISCREDIT HELOU (AND OTHER LEBANESE LEADERS WHO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN) AS AMERICAN LACKEYS. WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN TO COUNTER WHISPERING CAMPAIGN, BUT ONE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THAT FEDAYEEN HOSTILITY MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST US IN SOME WAY. PERHAPS IN FIRST INSTANCE THROUGH TIRADES THROUGH CAIRO VOICE OF ASIFA.

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3. FOL OBSERVATIONS ALSO SEEM RELEVANT:

(A) RE HELOU'S SUGGESTION US CONTINGENTS MIGHT BE DISPATCHED AS ADVANCE ELEMENTS AS SOON AS UNEF AUTHORIZED, WE HERE HAVE NOT ENVISAGED GREAT POWER PARTICIPATION WITH FORCES, WHICH WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED IN ME. (HOWEVER, MAJOR POWERS MIGHT PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT.)

(B) IF AND WHEN HELOU DECIDES TO APPROACH OTHER ARABS ON THIS MATTER, WE BELIEVE LEBANON SHOULD ALSO ENGAGE IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH SYG. HE WLD NEED TO CONSIDER WHICH COUNTRIES TO APPROACH FOR FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND HOW FINANCING COULD BE MANAGED. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO TEMPORARILY TAKE SOME UNFICYP FORCES AS STOP-GAP MEASURE PROVIDED CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES, GOC, TURKEY, AND GREECE AGREED.

GP-3.

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 070266

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MAY 7, HELOU REITERATED HIS QUESTION CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES OF US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. I RELAYED SUBSTANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL RECAPITULATING WHAT WE HAVE DONE, EMPHASIZING USG SUPPORT FOR GOL'S POLICY OF FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION AND OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, TO INCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD AT APPROPRIATE TIME. I INFORMED HIM THAT WASHINGTON GIVING ATTENTION AS TO WHAT ELSE WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO FOR LEBANON AND THAT WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM FURTHER.

2. HELOU EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR US SUPPORT AND FOR OUR SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON IN THIS CRISIS. HE PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CONTINUING US REPRESENTATIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA CONCERNING THEIR FINANCING OF FEDAYEEN, AND URGED WE CONTINUE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL, FULLY

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COGNIZANT THAT HE WAS EXPOSING HIMSELF DANGEROUSLY IF
GOT LEAKED FACT THAT HE ASKING FOR ISRAELI COOPERATION
RE BORDER AND FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION. HIS COMMENTS ON
PARAGRAPH D, REFTEL, RE SELECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS AND
PARAGRAPH E, RE POSSIBLE ROLE OF UN ARE REPORTED SEPTELS.

3. RE WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE, HELOU STRESSED ESTABLISH
WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE IF SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY
AND SECURITY SITUATION BECOMES UNCONTROLLABLE.
HELOU EMPHASIZED HE THINKING OF ULTIMATE STEPS HE MAY
HAVE TO RESORT TO. IN PROBING POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE
HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS USG RELUCTANCE SERVE AS
WORLD'S POLICEMAN IN INTERVENING IN LOCAL OR REGIONAL
CONFLICTS, PARTICULARLY AS RESULT US EXPERIENCE IN VIET-
NAM. HOWEVER, AS CHIEF OF STATE, HE HAD TO STUDY WHAT
OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE TO HIM IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE
THREATS TO HIS COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
SOVEREIGNTY. HE STATED HE WOULD MAKE WHATEVER DECISIONS
HE THOUGHT NECESSARY WITH OR WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF US
ASSISTANCE, BUT THAT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AVAILABILITY SOME SORT
OF US ASSISTANCE WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN MAKING THE
HARD DECISIONS REQUIRED. AT THIS POINT I URGED THAT HE
AND GOL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID DETERIORATION IN
SITUATION WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE APPEALS FOR EXTERNAL
ASSISTANCE. I FELT A FIRM STAND ON HIS PART NOW
HAD BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN CONTINUED POLICY OF
DRIFT, AND EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT CLIMATE OF
PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT WAS MORE FAVORABLE AT THIS MOMENT THAN
IT WOULD BE IN FUTURE. WE, ON OUR PART, I SAID, WOULD
CONTINUE OUR PRESENT EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON.

4. IN HELOU'S ANALYSIS, THERE ARE TWO BASIC CONTINGENCIES
WHICH CAN LEAD TO DOWNFALL LEBANESE REGIME AND
COMPROMISE, IF NOT DESTROY, LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
AND SOVEREIGNTY. THESE ARE: 1) INTERNAL SUBVERSION
(I.E. MOUNTING PRESURE ON GOL AGAINST ITS POLICY OF
FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION, EMANATING FROM SARG MACHINATIONS
IN LEBANON, AS-SAIQAH AND OTHER
FEDAYEEN GROUPS, DEMONSTRATIONS ECGINEERED BY PALESTINIAN
AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON, AND CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES
OF RADICAL LEFT ORGANIZATIONS); 2) COLLAPSE
OF SECURITY ON LEBA ON-ISRAEL BORDER (I.E. ISRAELI

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RETALIATION AND POSSIBLE OCCUPATION LEBANESE TERRITORY AS RESULT ESCALATION CONFLICT BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN WITH CONSEQUENT LOSS OF ARMY'S BORDER CONTROL AND INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY). IN EITHER OF THESE TWO CONTINGENCIES HELOU ENVISAGES POSSIBILITY RAPID SPLIT LEBANON ALONG MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN LINES AND SPECTER OF BLOOD BATH IN ENSUING CIVIL WAR. IN THIS RESPECT, I AM CONVINCED HE IS THINKING AS A CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT WHO FEELS HE WILL BE COMPELLED TO CALL FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PROTECT A THREAT TO CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS COUNTERBALANCE THE FORCES AT PLAY AND RE-ESTABLISH SECURITY IN COUNTRY. HELOU EMPHASIZED MUTUAL US-LEBANESE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AND REPEATED THIS THESIS THAT FALL OF LEBANON WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE HASHEMITE REGIME IN JORDAN AND WEAKEN OTHER MODERATE ARAB REGIMES, THEREBY LEADING TO RADICALIZATION OF ARAB MIDDLE EAST. AS HE PUT IT, "IF NOT TROSTKYITES, WE WILL SEE THE RISE OF KERENSYS IN THE ARAB WORLD".

5. HELOU THEN ASKED THAT WASHINGTON GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING SO THAT BOTH USG AND GOL COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE IN CRISIS SITUATION. SPECIFICALLY, HE RECOMMENDED CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO HOW USG COULD HELP IN CONTEXT OF GOL REQUEST FOR DISPATCH OF UNEF TO LEBANON. HELOU SAID HE PREPARED TO APPEAL TO UN FOR EMERGENCY FORCES IF SITUATION IN LEBANON DETERIORATED TO POINT WHERE IN HIS OPINION SUCH TROOPS NEEDED TO STABILIZE SITUATION IN LEBANON. TIMING WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, AS PREMATURE CALL FOR UNEF COULD AGGRAVATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

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INFO AMEMBAUSY AMMAN
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881

EXDIS DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 070266

6. HELOU REALIZED INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING UN APPROVAL DISPATCH UNEF TO CRISIS AREA. HE CITED THESE AS: 1) EXERCISE OF VETO, ESPECIALLY BY SOVIETS, WHO MAY NOT WISH TO PRESERVE MODERATE LEBANESE REGIME; 2) RELUCTANCE SOME STATES FINANCE PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS; 3) DIFFICULTY GAIN NECESSARY MAJORITY IN UNGA UNDER UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION; AND 4) POSSIBLE OPPOSITION OF ARAB STATES THEMSELVES TO DISPATCH UN TROOPS TO LEBANON. THEREFORE, THERE MIGHT WELL BE DELAY IN OBTAINING A UN DECISION TO DISPATCH UNEF TO LEBANON. BY TIME FORCE DID FINALLY ARRIVE, IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE; CONSEQUENTLY, HELOU ASKED, ON BASIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND IF UN ACTION POSSIBLE, WOULD WE CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF DISPATCHING AMERICAN TROOPS AS A FIRST CONTINGENT TO UNEF TO LEBANON? HE EXPLAINED THIS WOULD BE OF IMMEDIATE HELP IN RESTORING ORDER IN LEBANON AND PUTTING FEDAYEEN, SYRIA AND EVEN ISRAEL ON NOTICE THAT US AND UN SUPPORT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL

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INTEGRITY. IF THIS COURSE OF ACTION NOT POSSIBLE, HELOU ASKED WHAT OTHER FORMS OF US ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE.

7. AFTER TELLING HELOU I WELL UNDERSTOOD WHY HE, AS CHIEF OF STATE, FELT IT NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHAT OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE CONCERNING EXTERNAL AND SPECIFICALLY US ASSISTANCE, I STATED IT IMPERATIVE THAT HE UNDERSTAND THE GROWING OPPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESS TO ANY UNIATERAL US MILITARY INTERVENTION ABROAD. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON AND USG HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY TODAY. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND UNDERLINING I WAS NOT SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, I TOLD HELOU IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT FOR USG TO CONTEMPLATE POSSIBILITIES OF US ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IN ADVANCE AND UNDER HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. GOL MUST UNDERSTAND THE REALITY OF THIS POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, I WAS CERTAIN USG, IF IT DID CONTEMPLATE ASSISTING LEBANON UNDER CONTINGENCIES HELOU OUTLINED, WOULD BE ABLE DO SO ONLY IN CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, E.G. UNDER UN AEGIS. IN SHORT, US WOULD BE LOOKING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION AND HELOU SHOULD NOT RELY ON US ALONE BUT SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR EXAMPLE WITH FRANCE AND UK.

8. IN TERMS OF CRITICAL DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN LEBANON IN WHICH THERE IS CIVIL WAR, CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF LIFE AND ONE IN WHICH US LIVES AND PROPERTY WERE IN GRAVE DANGER, I VOLUNTEERED THAT USG WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE ITS POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, NO PRIOR COMMITMENT COULD BE MADE BASED ON SUCH A CONTINGENCY.

9. COMMENT: I LEFT IT WITH HELOU THAT WE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE AND CONSTANT TOUCH. AT EACH MEETING, I CONTINUE TRY INJECT REALISM INTO HIS THINKING RE LIMITATIONS ON US CAPABILITIES TO ASSIST, AND ABOVE ALL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. SINCE HE HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN EXTERNAL HELP FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE THAN USG, IT UNDERSTANDABLE THAT HE RETURNS TO THE SUBJECT OF WHAT HELP WE MIGH OFFER IF SITUATION BECOMES DESPERATE. I THINK OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO REPEAT WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TELLING HIM, WITHOUT COMMITTING OURSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION EXCEPT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SECURE UN INTERVENTION ON ONE HAND, AND RESTRAIN ISRAEL

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ON THE OTHER.

10. THE CHANCES OF SECURING A LEBANESE-TYPE COMPROMISE THAT WILL FOR LONG ENDURE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY REMOTE IN MY OPINION. HELOU IS CORRECT IN FOCUSING ON THE NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO BE READY FOR THE WORST. REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE ARE ABLE TO TELL HIM, USG MUST ALSO NOW ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT SITUATION COULD (AND PERHAPS RAPIDLY) DETERIORATE AS HE SUGGESTS.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03606 011603Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO OCT 01, CIAE 00, /071 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7615
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 3606

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF EX-PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN

1. CAMILLE CHAMOUN CALLED ON ME APRIL 29 AT HIS REQUEST. I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS NOT PRESSING FOR INCLUSION OF HIS PARTY IN NEW GOVERNMENT. HE PROFESSES BE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO REASSURE AND MOLLIFY LEBANESE MUSLIMS, BUT BELIEVES MUSLIMS BASICALLY INCAPABLE OF ACTING TO PROTECT LEBANON AGAINST FEDAYEEN EVEN THOUGH THEY FULLY AWARE OF AND CONCERNED BY CONSEQUENCES CONTINUED FEDAYEEN ACTION. HE IS NOT OPPOSED TO RETURN OF RACHID KARAME AS PRIMIN AND SAYS MOST IMPORTANT CHRISTIAN LEADERS AGREE. HIS VIEW IS THAT LEBANESE ARMY MUST BE GRADUALLY STRENGTHENED IN ORDER BE ABLE BOTH TO CONTINUE CONTROL FEDAYEEN AND TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL ORDER. ARMY CAN CONTROL FEDAYEEN TODAY IF GOVERNMENT WILL SO ORDER BUT HE FEELS FEDAYEEN WOULD HOLD DECISIVE UPPER HAND IN SIX MONTHS IF FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE NOT MET BEFORE.

2. BASED ON PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS FROM HIS EMISSARIES, I EXPECTED THAT CHAMOUN WOULD REQUEST USG ASSISTANCE TO CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN FORM ARMS OR PERHAPS FINANCES. PERHAPS ANTICIPATING MY NEGATIVE RESPONSE, HE REFRAINED AND INSTEAD URGED THAT BUILD-UP OF LEBANESE ARMY AS RAPIDLY AS FEASIBLE OVER NEXT THREE TO FIVE YEARS WAS PROBABLY ONLY WAY TO ASSURE LEBANON WOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO MEET INTERNAL THREAT AND DETER SYRIAN AGRSSION. AS FOR FEDAYEEN, I SAID EMBASSY SOMEWHAT SURPRISED AT HIS SEEMINGLY PRO-FEDAYEEN PUBLIC COMMENTS. HE ASSURED ME THESE DESIGNED ONLY AS SOP TO MUSLIM PUBLIC OPINION IN HOPES OF DAMPENING CONFSSIONAL

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CONFLICTS. HE DOUBTED THAT HIS ATTEMPTS HAD HAD MUCH SUCCESS AND SAID LEBANESE MUSLIMS, AS IN 1958, WERE AGAIN SUBMERGING THEIR LEBANESE PERSONALITIES AND ALLOWING THEIR PRO-ARABI INSTINCTS TO TAKE OVER. HE ADMITTED THAT MOST LEBANESE MUSLIM LEADERS KNEW THEY WERE ACTING IRRATIONALLY BUT THEY WERE UNABLE AVOID IT, BOTH BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN OVER PRO-FEDAYEEN SENTIMENTS OF MUSLIM PUBLIC OPINION AS WELL AS THEIR PERSONAL FEAR OF ASSASSINATION.

3. LEBANESE CHRISTIANS BY AND LARGE, SAID CHAMOUN, WERE GETTING FED UP AND THERE WAS INCREASING TALK ABOUT CREATION OF SMALLER LEBANESE CHRISTIAN STATE (THE OLD MOUNT LEBANON) IF CONFESSIONAL SPLIT OCCURRED. HE CAREFULLY AVOIDED ENDORSING SUCH A SOLUTION HIMSELF, PARTICULARLY AFTER MY STRONG REMONSTRANCES THAT SUCH A STATE COULD NOT BE VIABLE OR LONG-ENDURING.

4. CHAMOUN WAS NOT SANGUINE ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS OF POSSIBLE UN INTERVENTION IN A LEBANON TORN BY POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL CIVIL WAR. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE AND PROBABLY SUBJECT TO SOVIET VETO. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT FRENCH WOULD NOT UNILATERALLY INTERVENE AND ACCERTED MY EXPLANATION THAT ANY US INTERVENTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE AND WOULD CLEARLY AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IF ATTEMPTED.

5. ONLY HOPE HE COULD SEE WAS ATTEMPT TO GRADUALLY BUILD UP ARMY, QUIETLY ASSURING CONFESSIONAL BALANCE IN PROCESS SO THAT LEBANON COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY COPE WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS. HE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION RELUCTANTLY, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE HAD BEEN OUTSPOKENLY OPPOSED TO ARMY AND ITS RECENT INTERVENTION IN LEBANESE POLITICS. (CHAMOUN OF COURSE MADE CLEAR THAT IN PROCESS OF EXPANDING ARMY, CERTAIN OF HIS PARTICULAR ENEMIES IN ARMY SHOULD BE QUIETLY DROPPED.) HE HAD CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL BOUSTANY AS A SOLDIER AND PATRIOT WHO WOULD DO HIS JOB AND WOULD PROTECT LEBANON IF HE RECEIVED CLEAR ORDERS FROM POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. ARMY BUILD-UP, CHAMOUN CONTINUED, COULD ONLY OCCUR WITH FULL SUPPORT AND FINANCIAL HELP OF US. USG SHOULD PLEDGE ITSELF TO ASSURE THAT BUILD-UP WOULD NOT FAIL BECAUSE OF GOLI'S LACK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES. I REMINDED CHAMOUN THAT MUCH HAS CHANGED SINCE THE DAYS OF HIS PRESIDENCY IN MID-FIFTIES, AND THERE WAS NO LIKELIHOOD AT MOMENT OF GRANT MILITARY AID TO LEBANON. CREDITS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE, BUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL CREDITS WOULD REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY WHICH MIGHT TAKE SOME TIME. CHAMOUN ADMITTED THAT HE WAS ACCUSTOMED DURING HIS PRESIDENTIAL TERM TO RECEIVING US GRANT

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MILITARY AID AND PERHAPS WAS A LITTLE OUT OF DATE. NONETHELESS, HE URGED USG SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AND STRESSED THAT NO OTHER SOLUTION OCCURRED TO HIM WHICH MIGHT HAVE CHANCE OF PRESERVING LEBANON.

6. ON INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE CHAMOUN GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE WAS PRESSING FOR REPRESENTATION OF HIS NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY IN THE NEW CABINET. PERHAPS HE IS GRATEFUL, AS I SUGGESTED SOME TIME AGO HE MIGHT BE, THAT IS OFFICIALLY EXCLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE ONEROUS DECISIONS OF THE MOMENT ON THE FEDAYEEN. HE FELT THAT SHOWDOWN WITH FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO COME BUT HAD NO CLEAR IDEAS AS TO EXACTLY WHEN OR HOW. HE SAID ALL CHRISTIANS SEEMED IN AGREEMENT THAT RACHID KARAME WAS LOGICAL PRIMIN CANDIDATE AND THAT NO OTHER SUNNI MUSLIM COULD QUALIFY EXCEPT POSSIBLY SAEB SALAAM. (COMMENT: EMBASSY STRONGLY DOUBTS THAT SAEB SALAAM COULD EVER COMMAND ENOUGH SUPPORT.) CHAMOUN FELT THE RIOTING WAS NOT OVER. SOME OF THE VICTIMS OF LAST WEEK'S RIOTS WERE STILL NOT BURIED AND THEIR FUNERALS WOULD PROBABLY BE USED TO STIR UR THE STREET.

7. I URGED CHAMOUN, AS I HAVE ALL OTHER CHRISTIAN LEADERS, TO CLOSE RANKS WITH PRESIDENT HELOU AND GIVE HIM ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT. CHAMOUN WAS LESS CONTEMPTUOUS OF HELOU THAN USUAL, AND ASSURED ME HE HAD NO INTENTION OF ADDING TO PRESIDENT'S DIFFICULTIES. HE QUITE AWARE OF NATURE OF CURRENT THREAT TO LEBANON WHICH HE TERMED AN INDIRECT INVASION FROM SYRIA IN ALLIANCE WITH LEBANESE RADICAL LEFT. PORTER

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ACTION SS 30

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INFO OCT 01/031 W

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R 091526Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7684
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 070266

1. DURING MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU MAY 7, HELOU REITERATED HIS QUESTION CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES OF US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. I RELAYED SUBSTANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTEL RECAPITULATING WHAT WE HAVE DONE, EMPHASIZING USG SUPPORT FOR GOL'S POLICY OF FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION AND OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, TO INCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD AT APPROPRIATE TIME. I INFORMED HIM THAT WASHINGTON GIVING ATTENTION AS TO WHAT ELSE WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO FOR LEBANON AND THAT WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM FURTHER.

2. HELOU EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR US SUPPORT AND FOR OUR SPECIAL EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON IN THIS CRISIS. HE PLACED SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON CONTINUING US REPRESENTATIONS TO SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA CONCERNING THEIR FINANCING OF FEDAYEEN, AND URGED WE CONTINUE OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAEL, FULLY

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COGNIZANT THAT HE WAS EXPOSING HIMSELF DANGEROUSLY IF GOI LEAKED FACT THAT HE ASKING FOR ISRAELI COOPERATION RE BORDER AND FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION. HIS COMMENTS ON PARAGRAPH D, REFTEL, RE SELECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS AND PARAGRAPH E, RE POSSIBLE ROLE OF UN ARE REPORTED SEPTELS.

3. RE WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE, HELOU STRESSED ESTABLISH WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE IF SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY AND SECURITY SITUATION BECOMES UNCONTROLLABLE. HELOU EMPHASIZED HE THINKING OF ULTIMATE STEPS HE MAY HAVE TO RESORT TO. IN PROBING POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE HE SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS USG RELUCTANCE SERVE AS WORLD'S POLICEMAN IN INTERVENING IN LOCAL OR REGIONAL CONFLICTS, PARTICULARLY AS RESULT US EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM. HOWEVER, AS CHIEF OF STATE, HE HAD TO STUDY WHAT OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE TO HIM IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE THREATS TO HIS COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. HE STATED HE WOULD MAKE WHATEVER DECISIONS HE THOUGHT NECESSARY WITH OR WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF US ASSISTANCE, BUT THAT PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AVAILABILITY SOME SORT OF US ASSISTANCE WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND IN MAKING THE HARD DECISIONS REQUIRED. AT THIS POINT I URGED THAT HE AND GOI DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID DETERIORATION IN SITUATION WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE APPEALS FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. I FELT A FIRM STAND ON HIS PART NOW HAD BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS THAN CONTINUED POLICY OF DRIFT, AND EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT CLIMATE OF PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORT WAS MORE FAVORABLE AT THIS MOMENT THAN IT WOULD BE IN FUTURE. WE, ON OUR PART, I SAID, WOULD CONTINUE OUR PRESENT EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON.

4. IN HELOU'S ANALYSIS, THERE ARE TWO BASIC CONTINGENCIES WHICH CAN LEAD TO DOWNFALL LEBANESE REGIME AND COMPROMISE, IF NOT DESTROY, LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. THESE ARE: 1) INTERNAL SUBVERSION (I.E. MOUNTING PRESURE ON GOI AGAINST ITS POLICY OF FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION, EMANATING FROM SARG MACHINATIONS IN LEBANON, AS-SAIQAH AND OTHER FEDAYEEN GROUPS, DEMONSTRATIONS ENGINEERED BY PALESTINIAN AND SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON, AND CONSPIRATORIAL ACTIVITIES OF RADICAL LEFT ORGANIZATIONS); 2) COLLAPSE OF SECURITY ON LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER (I.E. ISRAELI

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RETALIATION AND POSSIBLE OCCUPATION LEBANESE TERRITORY AS RESULT ESCALATION CONFLICT BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN WITH CONSEQUENT LOSS OF ARMY'S BORDER CONTROL AND INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY). IN EITHER OF THESE TWO CONTINGENCIES HELOU ENVISAGES POSSIBILITY RAPID SPLIT LEBANON ALONG MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN LINES AND SPECTER OF BLOOD BATH IN ENSUING CIVIL WAR. IN THIS RESPECT, I AM CONVINCED HE IS THINKING AS A CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT WHO FEELS HE WILL BE COMPELLED TO CALL FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO PROTECT A THREAT TO CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY, AS WELL AS COUNTERBALANCE THE FORCES AT PLAY AND RE-ESTABLISH SECURITY IN COUNTRY. HELOU EMPHASIZED MUTUAL US-LEBANESE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, AND REPEATED THIS THESIS THAT FALL OF LEBANON WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE HASHEMITE REGIME IN JORDAN AND WEAKEN OTHER MODERATE ARAB REGIMES, THEREBY LEADING TO RADICALIZATION OF ARAB MIDDLE EAST. AS HE PUT IT, "IF NOT TROSTKYITES, WE WILL SEE THE RISE OF KERENSYS IN THE ARAB WORLD".

5. HELOU THEN ASKED THAT WASHINGTON GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING SO THAT BOTH USG AND GOL COULD BETTER DETERMINE WHAT OPTIONS AVAILABLE IN CRISIS SITUATION. SPECIFICALLY, HE RECOMMENDED CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO HOW USG COULD HELP IN CONTEXT OF GOL REQUEST FOR DISPATCH OF UNEF TO LEBANON. HELOU SAID HE PREPARED TO APPEAL TO UN FOR EMERGENCY FORCES IF SITUATION IN LEBANON DETERIORATED TO POINT WHERE IN HIS OPINION SUCH TROOPS NEEDED TO STABILIZE SITUATION IN LEBANON. TIMING WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, AS PREMATURE CALL FOR UNEF COULD AGGRAVATE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AND DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

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FM AMEMBAUSY BEIRUT
TO ROEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7685
INFO AMEMBAUSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3881

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: REPRESENTATION TO PRESIDENT HELOU CONCERNING US SUPPORT FOR LEBANON

REF: STATE 070266

6. HELOU REALIZED INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING UN APPROVAL DISPATCH UNEF TO CRISIS AREA. HE CITED THESE AS: 1) EXERCISE OF VETO, ESPECIALLY BY SOVIETS, WHO MAY NOT WISH TO PRESERVE MODERATE LEBANESE REGIME; 2) RELUCTANCE SOME STATES FINANCE PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS; 3) DIFFICULTY GAIN NECESSARY MAJORITY IN UNGA UNDER UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION; AND 4) POSSIBLE OPPOSITION OF ARAB STATES THEMSELVES TO DISPATCH UN TROOPS TO LEBANON. THEREFORE, THERE MIGHT WELL BE DELAY IN OBTAINING A UN DECISION TO DISPATCH UNEF TO LEBANON. BY TIME FORCE DID FINALLY ARRIVE, IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE; CONSEQUENTLY, HELOU ASKED, ON BASIS CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND IF UN ACTION POSSIBLE, WOULD WE CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF DISPATCHING AMERICAN TROOPS AS A FIRST CONTINGENT TO UNEF TO LEBANON? HE EXPLAINED THIS WOULD BE OF IMMEDIATE HELP IN RESTORING ORDER IN LEBANON AND PUTTING FEDAYEEN, SYRIA AND EVEN ISRAEL ON NOTICE THAT US AND UN SUPPORT LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL

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INTEGRITY. IF THIS COURSE OF ACTION NOT POSSIBLE, HELOU ASKED WHAT OTHER FORMS OF US ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE.

7. AFTER TELLING HELOU I WELL UNDERSTOOD WHY HE, AS CHIEF OF STATE, FELT IT NECESSARY TO DETERMINE WHAT OPTIONS HE HAD AVAILABLE CONCERNING EXTERNAL AND SPECIFICALLY US ASSISTANCE, I STATED IT IMPERATIVE THAT HE UNDERSTAND THE GROWING OPPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESS TO ANY UNIATERAL US MILITARY INTERVENTION ABROAD. THIS WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON AND USG HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN FORMULATING ITS FOREIGN POLICY TODAY. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND UNDERLINING I WAS NOT SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, I TOLD HELOU IT WAS MOST DIFFICULT FOR USG TO CONTEMPLATE POSSIBILITIES OF US ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IN ADVANCE AND UNDER HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES GOL MUST UNDERSTAND THE REALITY OF THIS POSITION. NEVERTHELESS, I WAS CERTAIN USG, IF IT DID CONTEMPLATE ASSISTING LEBANON UNDER CONTINGENCIES HELOU OUTLINED, WOULD BE ABLE DO SO ONLY IN CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT, E.G. UNDER UN AEGIS. IN SHORT, US WOULD BE LOOKING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION AND HELOU SHOULD NOT RELY ON US ALONE BUT SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER OPTIONS FOR EXAMPLE WITH FRANCE AND UK.

8. IN TERMS OF CRITICAL DETERIORATION OF SITUATION IN LEBANON IN WHICH THERE IS CIVIL WAR, CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF LIFE AND ONE IN WHICH US LIVES AND PROPERTY WERE IN GRAVE DANGER, I VOLUNTEERED THAT USG WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE ITS POLICIES IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, NO PRIOR COMMITMENT COULD BE MADE BASED ON SUCH A CONTINGENCY.

9. COMMENT: I LEFT IT WITH HELOU THAT WE WOULD STAY IN CLOSE AND CONSTANT TOUCH. AT EACH MEETING, I CONTINUE TRY INJECT REALISM INTO HIS THINKING RE LIMITATIONS ON US CAPABILITIES TO ASSIST, AND ABOVE ALL TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. SINCE HE HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN EXTERNAL HELP FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE THAN USG, IT UNDERSTANDABLE THAT HE RETURNS TO THE SUBJECT OF WHAT HELP WE MIGH OFFER IF SITUATION BECOMES DESPERATE. I THINK OUR BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS TO REPEAT WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TELLING HIM, WITHOUT COMMITTING OURSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION EXCEPT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SECURE UN INTERVENTION ON ONE HAND, AND RESTRAIN ISRAEL

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ON THE OTHER:

10. THE CHANCES OF SECURING A LEBANESE-TYPE COMPROMISE THAT WILL FOR LONG ENDURE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY REMOTE IN MY OPINION. HELOU IS CORRECT IN FOCUSING ON THE NEED FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING TO BE READY FOR THE WORST. REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE ARE ABLE TO TELL HIM, USG MUST ALSO NOW ACCEPT THE REALITY THAT SITUATION COULD (AND PERHAPS RAPIDLY) DETERIORATE AS HE SUGGESTS.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 03868 091537Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01, /031 W

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R 091431Z MAY 69

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7679
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 3868

EXDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE UN ROLE IN LEBANESE CRISIS

ON MAY 5 I DISCUSSED WITH MICHELMORE PRESIDENT HELOU'S APPREHENSIONS RE POSSIBLE DETERIORATION INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN LEBANON AND HIS DESIRE FIND POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY INCREASE STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON. IN VIEW PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PARTICIPATION IN APRIL 23 RIOTING IN SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN ACTION, HELOU THINKS IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE CONSIDER USING UNRWA OBSERVERS AS MEANS AUGMENT SIZE UN PRESENCE SINCE UNRWA ALREADY INVOLVED WITH REFUGEES AND AT SAME TIME IS UN AGENCY WITH "LEAST POLITICAL OVERTONES". HELOU HOPES WAY CAN BE FOUND TO PERSUADE UNSYG SEND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE CONDITIONS IN REFUGEE CAMPS AS INITIAL STEP TO STABILIZE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND LAY GROUNDWORK FOR FUTURE, MORE SUBSTANTIAL, UN PRESENCE.

2. MICHELMORE OBSERVED THAT UNRWA HAS ALWAYS CONFINED ITS ACTIVITIES TO PROVIDING WELFARE SERVICES TO REFUGEES, LEAVING ALL POLICE AND SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. HE NOTED THERE NOTHING IN UNRWA'S MANDATE WHICH WOULD ALLOW HIM ASSUME ANY RESPONSIBILITIES THIS DOMAIN AND THAT SYG RETAINS AUTHORITY IN HIS HANDS TO CONTACT GOVERNMENTS ON MATTERS CONCERNING PROTECTION OF UN PERSONNEL. MICHELMORE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CONCENTRATIONS

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OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES MIGHT BECOME SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEM FOR GOL IN EVENT ESCALATION OF CLASHES BETWEEN LEBANESE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN AND INDICATED HE WOULD COMMUNICATE PRIVATELY WITH SYG, POSSIBLY THROUGH BUNCHE, HIS CONCERN RE POSSIBLE EFFECT UPON FUTURE UNRWA OPERATIONS.

3. I CONVEYED MICHELMORE'S VIEWS TO HELOU DURING MEETING MAY 7. CONCERNING EXISTING OPTIONS FOR UN ACTION IN NEAR FUTURE (PARA 2E OF STATE 70266), HELOU BELIEVES AUGMENTATION OF UN OBSERVER FORCE ON BORDERS NOT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE. REQUEST FOR MORE UNMOS WOULD PUT GOL IN DIFFICULT POSITION BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO REPORT ON GOL EFFORTS TO INTERDICT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST ISRAEL. UNMOS COULD HARDLY AVOID REPORTING ON INCREASED NUMBER OF LEBANESE ARMY/FEDAYEEN CLASHES. SUCH REPORTS WOULD BE SOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO GOL AND UNACCEPTABLE TO LEBANESE PUBLIC OPINION.

4. HELOU BELIEVES, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE TO BRING IN CIVILIAN UN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE CONDITIONS IN UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS. HE SEES NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES FROM SUCH COURSE OF ACTION: 1) OBSERVERS COULD BELIEVE FEDAYEEN CLAIMS THAT GOL IS OPPRESSING PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON; 2) THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO INVESTIGATE ARMS SITUATION IN CAMPS; 3) THEIR PRESENCE MIGHT INHIBIT FEDAYEEN FROM USING REFUGEE CAMPS AS VIRTUAL BASES FOR COMMANDO OPERATIONS; 4) THEY COULD HELP SUPPRESS PALESTINIAN PROPAGANDA EMANATING FROM CAMPS. HELOU ENVISAGES ARRIVAL THESE OBSERVERS AS OPENING STEP TO BRING IN LARGER AND MORE EFFECTIVE UN PRESENCE IN LEBANON, PERHAPS, AT FIRST IN FORM OF "UN POLICE TEAM" TO "PROTECT" THE CIVILIAN OBSERVERS. HE REGARDS CIVILIAN OBSERVERS AS ACCEPTABLE FIRST MOVE WHICH MIGHT FACILITATE ULTIMATE CREATION OF A UNEF IN LEBANON, IF NEEDED.

5. I TOLD HELOU THAT ANY INITIATIVE SEND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO UNRWA CAMPS IN LEBANON WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM SYG RATHER THAN MICHELMORE, ON BASIS MY TALKS WITH LATTER. I ASKED IF HE HAD CONSIDERED SENDING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH SYG. HELOU BELIEVES TIME NOT RIGHT TO SEND SPECIAL REP SINCE

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SUCH A STEP WOULD TEND TO SOUND THE ALARM OVER HIS FEAR OF EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, THEREBY AGGRAVATING INTERNAL SITUATION. FOR TIME BEING, HELOU WISHES KEEP PROPOSAL WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF HIS CONFIDENTIAL CONTACTS WITH ME TO AVOID PREMATURE ADVERSE REACTION FROM OTHER ARAB STATES AND FROM SOME LEBANESE.

6. I PROMISED HELOU I WOULD REPORT HIS INTEREST IN CIVILIAN OBSERVERS AND HIS PRESENT NEGATIVE REACTION TO PROPOSAL STRENGTHEN UN OBSERVER FORCE. I OBSERVED THAT, WHILE IF WAY COULD BE FOUND TO SEND OBSERVERS TO LEBANON, IT WOULD NOT BE REALISTIC AT THIS TIME TO CONSIDER THEM A FIRST STEP TOWARD CREATION OF A UNEF.

7. COMMENT: FRANKLY WE ARE NOT SANGUINE OVER FEASIBILITY HELOU'S IDEA OF SENDING CIVILIAN OBSERVERS TO INVESTIGATE CONDITIONS IN UNRWA REFUGEE CAMPS. EEN IKTSYG COULD FIND WAY ACCEDE TO SUCH A REQUEST FROM GOL, WE SERIOUSLY QUESTION WHETHER OBSERVERS WOULD BE ABLE TO RENDER THE SERVICES ENVISAGED BY HELOU. HOWEVER, AS HE IS UNDERSTANDABLY LOOKING INTO EVERY CONCEIVABLE WAY TO SAFEGUARD THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF LEBANON FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FEDAYEEN THREAT, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT SUMMARILY DISMISS CIVILIAN OBSERVER SCHEME AS UNWORKABLE IF, IN FACT, THERE MIGHT BE SOME WAY WHEREBY SYG COULD ACT UNDER THE UN CHARTER. I TOLD HELOU I WOULD SEEK DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS AS TO WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE FEASIBLE APPROACH HE COULD TAKE TO INDUCE SYG TO SEND OBSERVERS TO UNRWA WITHOUT REQUIRING SC OK UNGA ACTION WHICH WOULD ATTRACT UNACCEPTABLE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO MOVE.

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T BEIRUT 3824

EXDIS

1. MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) INFORMED ME PRES HELOU PERSUADED EX-PRIMIN QUEINI TO COMMUNICATE WITH KING FEISAL ON FEDAYEEN THREAT. QUEINI FINALLY AGREED DO SO AFTER RECENT LEFTIST AND FEDAYEEN-INSPIRED RIOTING IN LEBANON. QUEINI WISHES REMAIN ANONYMOUS BUT MERE FACT THAT HE HAS COMMUNICATED HIS VIEWS TO HIS OLD FRIEND FEISAL INDICATES INCREASED CONCERN OVER TREND FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES ON PART MODERATE MUSLIM LEADERS LEBANON.

2. LEBANESE HAVE NOT YET CONTACTED LIBYANS AND KUWAITIS SPECIFICALLY ON QUESTION FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO FEDAYEEN BUT HAVE KEPT BOTH GOVERNMENTS FULLY INFORMED OF CONNECTION BETWEEN RECENT LEFTIST-INSPIRED RIOTS AND FEDAYEEN. ARE ALSO PLAYING UP SUBVERSIVE ROLE OF SYRIANS IN MANIPULATING COMMANDOS TO ATTACK LEBANON. KUWAITI AMB JAFAR TOOK VERY STRONG ANTI-FEDAYEEN POSITION IN CONVERSATION WITH ME RECENTLY. I DOUBT HE REPORTING AS STRONGLY TO KUWAIT BUT HE HAS MADE NO ATTEMPT HIDE HIS FEELINGS HERE.

3. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PRES HELOU MAY 7, I REPORTED ON US EFFORTS INFLUENCE OIL-RICH ARAB STATES REDUCE FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT RESULTS BUT THOUGHT WE HAD AT LEAST INJECTED SOME REALITY INTO THEIR THINKING WHICH MIGHT HAVE SUBSEQUENT EFFECT THEIR ACTIONS. URGED HELOU CONTINUE MAKE COMPARABLE APPROACHES. HELOU SAID GOL WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE IN KUWAIT, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA. LEBANESE REPRESENTATIONS BRING

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GESTURES OF SUPPORT BUT THERE IS LITTLE FOLLOW-THROUGH FROM OIL-RICH REGIMES. HE FELT US WITH ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THESE REGIMES WAS IN BETTER POSITION EMPHASIZE REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER FEDAYEEN THREAT WHICH, IF IT SUCCEEDED IN LEBANON, WOULD CONTINUE ATTACK AGAINST ALL MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. HE URGED US MAINTAIN ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE REDUCE FEDAYEEN FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HELOU ADDED THAT THE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES DID REACT TO FEAR. THEREFORE, ONCE THEY BECOME AWARE OF MOTIVES AND LONG-TERM THREAT FEDAYEEN POSE TO THEIR OWN REGIMES, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. HE FELT THIS WAS GOOD TIME (USING LEBANON AS OBJECT LESSON) TO MAKE THEM LISTEN TO REASON. PORTER

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S E C R E T BEIRUT 3824

EXDIS

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3. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH PRES HELOU MAY 7, I REPORTED ON US EFFORTS INFLUENCE OIL-RICH ARAB STATES REDUCE FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT RESULTS BUT THOUGHT WE HAD AT LEAST INJECTED SOME REALITY INTO THEIR THINKING WHICH MIGHT HAVE SUBSEQUENT EFFECT THEIR ACTIONS. URGED HELOU CONTINUE MAKE COMPARABLE APPROACHES. HELOU SAID GOL WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE IN KUWAIT, LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA. LEBANESE REPRESENTATIONS BRING

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GESTURES OF SUPPORT BUT THERE IS LITTLE FOLLOW-THROUGH FROM OIL-RICH REGIMES. HE FELT US WITH ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THESE REGIMES WAS IN BETTER POSITION EMPHASIZE REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER FEDAYEEN THREAT WHICH, IF IT SUCCEEDED IN LEBANON, WOULD CONTINUE ATTACK AGAINST ALL MODERATE ARAB REGIMES. HE URGED US MAINTAIN ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE REDUCE FEDAYEEN FINANCIAL SUPPORT. HE ADDED THAT THE CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES DID REACT TO FEAR. THEREFORE, ONCE THEY BECOME AWARE OF MOTIVES AND LONG-TERM THREAT FEDAYEEN POSE TO THEIR OWN REGIMES, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. HE FELT THIS WAS GOOD TIME (USING LEBANON AS OBJECT LESSON) TO MAKE THEM LISTEN TO REASON. PORTER

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S E C R E T BEIRUT 3659

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1) MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) JUST REPORTED TO ME (MAY 2) THAT PRESIDENT HELOU HAD YESTERDAY ISSUED ORDERS TO LEBANESE ARMY (THROUGH CIC GEN BOUSTANY) TO USE ANY MEASURES INCLUDING SHOOTING TO CONTAIN FEDAYEEN WITHIN AREAS THEY NOW OCCUPY IN SOUTHEAST LEBANON, AND TO ASSURE NO ISRAELI BORDER CROSSINGS. HELOU OFFERED PROVIDE ORDERS IN WRITING BUT BOUSTANY ACCEPTED VERBAL ORDERS AND SAID WOULD CARRY THEM OUT.

2) THIS DECISION HAS NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO PRIMIN KARAMCE OR OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS IN LEBANON. HELOU NONETHELESS FELT HE COULD NO LONGER WAIT TO TRY TO ACHIEVE (PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE) NATIONAL CONSENSUS TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN, NOR DID HE WISH EMBARRASS KARAME. AS KHOURY SAYS, REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF BOUSTANY'S PATRIOTISM WILL OUTWEIGH HIS DESIRES CURRY FAVOR WITH MUSLIMS TO FURTHER HIS PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS, BUT BOUSTANY ASSURED HELOU THAT HE WOULD PASS THE ORDERS TO APPROPRIATE SOUTHERN LEBANON MILITARY COMMANDERS.

3) KHOURY REFERRED TO MAY 1 ISRAELI HELICOPTER TRANSPORTED MILITARY BUILD-UP IN OCCUPIED SYRIA OPPOSITE LEBANESE

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VILLAGE OF CHEBAA WHICH CONTAINS LARGE CONCENTRATION FEDAYEEN. HE WONDERED WHETHER ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS WERE RESPONSE TO CHEHAB'S REQUEST TO ME FOR INCREASED ISRAELI DEFENSE MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS (PARA 8, BEIRUT 3609). I GAVE HIM SUBSTANCE STATE 68528 WHICH INDICATED OUR APPROACH TO ISRAELIS WOULD BE MADE TODAY (MAY 2), AND SAID WE HAD NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF OR EXPLANATION FOR NEW ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. HE HOPED ISRAELIS WERE NOT PLANNING MASSIVE RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN IN CHEBAA. THIS WOULD PUT LEBANESE MILITARY IN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION. THEY WOULD HAVE EITHER TO (A) COOPERATE WITH FEDAYEEN AND RESIST ISRAELI ATTACK, OR (B) STAND ASIDE WHILE ISRAELIS TOOK CARE OF FEDAYEEN, EARNING IN PROCESS DERISION OF ALL LEBANON, OR (C) FEDAYEEN WOULD WITHDRAW DEEPER INTO LEBANESE HINTERLAND, REPEATING PROCESS WHICH OCCURRED IN JORDAN AFTER KARAME RAID. NONE OF THESE CONTINGENCIES WOULD SERVE ISRAELI INTERESTS AND ALL WOULD EFFECTIVELY DESTROY LEBANON'S ABILITY COPE WITH FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN FUTURE. KHOURY URGED THAT WE IMPRESS UPON GOI NECESSITY FOR HOLDING OFF ON A CHEBAA RAID PARTICULARLY SINCE THERE HAD BEEN NO PROVOCATIONS ACROSS BORDER. IF ON OTHER HAND ISRAELIS WERE INTENDING TO INTERDICT FEDAYEEN BEFORE THEY INFILTRATE INTO LEBANON, GOI COULD ONLY WELCOME PROSPECT. WOULD APPRECIATE IF DAVIS COULD RAISE THIS SPECIFIC POINT WITH BITAN.

4) KHOURY CONJECTURED POLITICAL IMPASSE IN LEBANON WILL LAST AT LEAST ANOTHER TEN DAYS. HELOU, DURING THIS PERIOD, WILL TRY TO ACHIEVE EITHER CONTROL OF OR EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT WITH FEDAYEEN AND WILL DO HIS BEST REDUCE ACTIVITY OF LEFTIST GROUPS WITHIN COUNTRY, IN ORDER EASE KARAME'S DECISION FORM GOVT. IF, DESPITE HIS EFFORTS, HELOU UNABLE ENTICE KARAME INTO NEW GOVT, HE MAY THEN TRY FORM GOVT WITH SAEB SALAAM. SALAAM HAS INDICATED WILLINGNESS SERVE AS PRIMIN BUT HELOU DOUBTS WHETHER SALAAM CAN RESIST CAVING IN TO PRO-FEDAYEEN MUSLIM OPINION. (COMMENT: EMBASSY SHARES HELOU'S DOUBT). IF HELOU DECIDES SALAAM UNSATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR KARAME, HE WILL THEN FORM MILITARY GOVT POSSIBLY WITH A FIGUREHEAD MUSLIM PRIMIN (IF ONE CAN BE FOUND), BUT WITH MILITARY OCCUPYING MANY KEY MINISTERIAL PORTFOLIOS. HE BELIEVES IF ALL ELSE FAILS, THIS ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY AVOID TURNING LEBANON OVER TO FEDAYEEN. IN ANY CASE, HELOU DETERMINED STAY ON AS PRESIDENT.

5) COMMENT: SUGGEST WE NOT RPT NOT YET COMMUNICATE SUBSTANCE

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3678

EXDIS:

1) PRESIDENT HELOU APPEARS TO HAVE MADE CRUNCH DECISION CONFRONT FEDAYEEN. CONSEQUENCES OF DECISION ARE CLEAR TO HIM AND HE REALIZES SITUATION IN LEBANON COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL. QUESTION HELOU POSED TO ME IN LONG INTENSE SESSION LAST NIGHT (MAY 2) WAS WHAT ASSISTANCE HE COULD EXPECT FROM USG IS SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY.

2) SEPTTEL GIVES HELOU'S ANALYSIS CURRENT SITUATION AND HIS EFFORTS FIND SOLUTION SHORT OF CAPITULATION TO FEDAYEEN. HIS DECISION ORDER ARMY TO SHOOT IF NECESSARY AMOUNTS TO WATERSHED DECISION AND RUNS RISK OF DIVIDING COUNTRY. HELOU APPEARS TO HAVE REJECTED ANY COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY CEDE LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY OR TERRITORY TO FEDAYEEN. HE IS CALM SELF-ASSURED AND NOT INDULGING IN SELF-DOUBT. I BELIEVE HIS DECISION IS FIRM; THAT (AS HE HIMSELF PUT IT) IT WAS NOT MADE IN PANIC. HE HAS DECIDED HE NOW HAS NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO MEET PRESENT CHALLENGE TO LEBANON'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. HE KNOWS EFFECTS DECISION MAY HAVE IN BREAKING COUNTRY APART ON CONFESSIONAL LINES, OR IN AGGRAVATING FEDAYEEN AND LEFTIST PRESSURES, BUT HE ALSO AWARE THAT HE CANNOT DELAY MUCH LONGER.

3) IN RAISING QUESTION OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON, HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR ACTION NOW BEYOND DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS USG ALREADY TAKING. HE EMPHASIZED HE WOULD NEVER RESORT TO REQUESTING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE UNTIL HE HAD EXHAUSTED AND EXPLOITED ALL COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO HIM AT DOMESTIC AND

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REGIONAL LEVELS. HOPEFULLY RECOURSE TO EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE CAN BE AVOIDED BUT POTENTIAL DANGERS IN SITUATION WERE SUCH THAT HE HAD TO HAVE BEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT USG MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO IF HE HAD TO RESORT TO THE "ULTIMATE RECOURSE" OF ASKING US.

4) BOTH US AND LEBANON HAD LEARNED MUCH SINCE US INTERVENTION IN 1958, SAID HELOU. HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR UNREALISTIC HELP OR HELP WHICH IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR USG TO GRANT. HE HOPED US WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE NOT ENGAGING IN BLACKMAIL, BUT IT WOULD ENABLE HIM ACT MORE DECISIVELY IN HANDLING INTERNAL SITUATION IF HE FELT HIS HAND WAS STRENGTHENED BY ASSURANCES US SUPPORT "AS A LAST RESORT". OUR REASSURANCES WOULD EMBOLDEN HIM TO RESIST TREMENDOUS PRESSURES UPON HIM TO "STRIKE A BARGAIN" WITH FEDAYEEN - A STEP WHICH HE DOES NOT WISH TO TAKE, KNOWING IT WOULD BE BEGINNING OF LOSS OF LEBANON'S SOVEREIGN CONTROL OVER ITS OWN POLICIES AND DESTINY.

5) HELOU REJECTED PROSPECT EFFECTIVE EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER NON-AREA POWERS. FRENCH COULD AND WOULD DO NOTHING. UK CAN NO LONGER PLAY EFFECTIVE ROLE AND ITS INFLUENCE LIMITED IN ME. AS FOR SOVIET UNION, HELOU WAS DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF SOV INTENTIONS TOWARD LEBANON DESPITE LIP SERVICE GIVEN BY SOV AMBASSADOR DURING PRESENT CRISIS. SOVS COULD NOT RECONCILE THEIR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES IN ARAB WORLD WITH A POSITION OF SUPPORT OF MODERATE FREE-ENTERPRISE LEBANON AGAINST RADICAL SYRIA. SOVS HAVE THE POWER AND THE INFLUENCE IN SYRIA TO REDUCE SYRIAN INTERVENTION IN LEBANON'S AFFAIRS BUT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL EXERCISE IT.

6) HELOU FELT THERE WAS STRONG COMMON IDENTITY BETWEEN HIS DUTY TO SAFEGUARD LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY IN FACE PRESENT THREAT AND US INTERESTS IN ME. IF HE SHOULD FAIL, RESULT WOULD BE "JORDANIZATION" OF LEBANON WITH FEDAYEEN (AND SYRIA) ULTIMATELY CONTROLLING LEBANON'S FATE. IF FEDAYEEN WIN THE STRUGGLE, LEBANESE REGIME COULD NOT ENDURE. HUSSEIN, IN HELOU'S OPINION, COULD NOT LONG OUTLAST COLLAPSE LEBANESE REGIME. REPERCUSSIONS ON OTHER MODERATE ARAB STATES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT WOULD BE LESS DRAMATIC BUT PERHAPS AS SERIOUS IN LONG RUN. KUWAIT WOULD BE PUT IN A BLACKMAIL SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO BECOME PRIMARY FINANCIAL ANGEL OF FEDAYEEN. ALSO ANY CHANCE FOR RESTORATION MORE MODERATION IN IRAQ WOULD BE TOTALLY DESTROYED.

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7) IN HELOU'S VIEW, EFFECTS OF "JORDANIZATION" OF LEBANON WOULD LEAD TO "VIETNAMIZATION" OF ARAB WORLD WITH THE INEVITABLY RADICALLY-ORIENTED PALESTINIAN COMMANDO GROUPS BECOMING INSTRUMENTS AND SPEARHEADS OF RADICAL REGIMES THROUGHOUT AREA. A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ME PROBLEM UNDER THESE CONDITIONS SIMPLY COULD NOT HAPPEN. IT WAS IN THIS PERSPECTIVE OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT HELOU EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES US ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON IN INTEREST BOTH COUNTRIES.

8) I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCUSS REALISTIC POSSIBILITIES OF US ASSISTANCE IN HYPOTHETICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. ON MANY OPTIONS AVAILABLE, HELOU SURELY WOULD AGREE THAT SOME WERE IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT WORK. BOTH PRESIDENT HELOU AND USG WOULD HAVE TO STUDY WHAT WAS FEASIBLE, AND AGREE ON WHAT WAS NOT. SIXTH FLEET OBVIOUSLY COULD MAKE ITS PRESENCE FELT, BUT WOULD THIS ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES? USG IN ADDITION WOULD HAVE TO ASSESS REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ANY ACTION WE MIGHT TAKE. WE WERE FOR INSTANCE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET UNION ON PEACEFUL SOLUTION ME CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS OUT DIVERSE RELATIONS WITH SOVS AS WELL AS OTHER POWERS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED.

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9) I REMINDED HELOU THAT HE SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBTS OF USG'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. I ENUMERATED OUR RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS DESIGNED TO ASSIST LEBANON, EMPHASIZING OUR APPROACHES TO BOTH SOVIET UNION AND ISRAEL. I POINTED OUT EFFORTS THIS EMBASSY TO UNITE CHRISTIAN LEADERS OF LEBANON BEHIND HELOU AT THIS CRITICAL TIME AND DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL OUR RECENT EXPLORATIONS OF POSSIBLE UN ACTION IN LEBANON. THERE NO QUESTION RE IMPORTANCE WHICH USG PLACED ON PRESERVATION OF LEBANON WITHING ITS PRESENT BORDERS AND IN ITS PRESENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FORM, AND HE HAD MY SOLEMN ASSURANCES ON THIS POINT. QUESTION WAS NOT ONE OF OUR DESIRE TO HELP, BUT HOW WE COULD.

10) HELOU EXPRESSED HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR USG EFFORTS IN RECENT DAYS. HE WAS WELL AWARE, HE SAID, THAT ONLY USG HAD BEEN WORKING IN LEBANON'S INTERESTS AND IT HAD BEEN A SOURCE OF DEEP SATISFACTION AND REASSURANCE TO HIM. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AND OUR NEXT MEETING WILL BE 1700 LOCAL MAY 6. HELOU STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SHARING SUBSTANCE OUR TALK (AS IT RELATED TO POSSIBLE US ASSISTANCE) WITH EVEN MOST INTIMATE COLLEAGUES.

11) IN COURSE CONVERSATION HELOU EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CONCEPT FO SYG SENDING UN OBSERVERS WHO MIGHT PLAY HELPFUL ROLE IN PREVENTING ESCALATION PALESTINIAN DEMONSTRATIONS AND INCIDENTS IN THE COUNTRY. HE ALSO FAVORABLE TO GRADUAL INCREASE IN STRENGTH UNMO'S WHICH MIGHT HELP STABLIZE BORDER AND

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BOLSTER LEBANESE ARMY'S EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN. HE WISHED, HOWEVER, REFLECT FURTHER AND DID NOT REQUEST USG REACTION AT THIS TIME. I HAD ALREADY INFORMED HIM THROUGH INTERMEDIARY OF MAY PROBLEMS RAISED IN CONSIDERING SENDING POSSIBLE UNEF TO LEBANON.

12) COMMENT: HELOU WAS NOT DRAMATIZING SITUATION. HIS PRESENTATION WAS REASONED AND CALM AND IN MY OPINION LOGICAL.

13) I FIND IT DIFFICULT ASSESS WHAT HE REALLY WANTS FROM USG. ABOVE ALL, HE NEEDED PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST, WHICH I TRIED PROVIDE. HE FEELS ALMOST TOTALLY ISOLATED, AND IS UNABLE SHARE WITH ANY POLITICAL LEADERS HIS ANXIETIES OR THE HEAVY BURDEN OF HIS DECISION MEET FEDAYEEN THREAT.

14) HIS REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE OF US ASSISTANCE DOES NOT, AT LEAST AT PRESENT, REFER TO URGENT ECONOMIC OR MILITARY AID. IT RELATES ONLY TO GETTING OUR IDEAS AS TO WHAT MIGHT FEASIBLY BE DONE IF LEBANON IS THREATENED WITH AN INTERNAL CHAOS WHICH HIS SECURITY FORCES CAN NO LONGER CONTROL. IN EFFECT, HE IS SAYING - "IF I LOSE MY GAMBLE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO SAVE LEBANON, ONLY USG CAN BE COUNTED ON TO TRY TO HELP. LET'S BE SURE IN ADVANCE THAT WE KNOW WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS AND LIMITS. ON BASIS OUT JOINT STUDY OF ALTERNATIVES, I MAY HAVE TO REASSESS MY TACTICS, THOUGH I DO NOT INTEND CHANGE MY MIND ABOUT NOT CAVING IN TO FEDAYEEN."

15) IN FACT, HELOU KNOWS USG MILITARY INTERVENTION NOT THE ANSWER UNLESS THERE NO OTHER ANSWER TO STOPPING A BLOOD BATH, PARTICULARLY ONE IN WHICH LEBANESE CHRISTIANS WOULD BE GETTING WORST OF IT. HE MUST ABOVE ALL BE CONTEMPLATING US SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZING AN ADEQUATE UN FORCE WHICH COULD RESTORE STABILITY AND KEEP FEDAYEEN AWAY FROM ISRAEL BORDER. IF SUCH A FORCE, WHICH MIGHT HAVE TO BE DISPATCHED QUICKLY, NEEDED TO INCLUDE READILY AVAILABLE US FORCES, HE WOULD HOPE USG WOULD BE PREPARED PROVIDE THEM - PERHAPS WITH SIMILAR PARTICIPATION BY OTHER WESTERN POWERS, ABOVE ALL FRENCH.

16) OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT ODDS SLIGHTLY IN HELOU'S FAVOR THAT HE WILL WIN THIS ROUND AND PRESERVE INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY. BUT HE CANNOT WIN A DRAMATIC VICTORY; THE FEDAYEEN PRESSURES WILL REMAIN AND IT HARD TO CONCEIVE THAT EITHER THE

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INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL RADICAL THREATS WILL BE MORE THAN TEMPORARILY SUPPRESSED. THE KEY AT MOMENT IS THE ARMY. IF IT FALTERS, WE CAN LOOK FORWARD TO AT BEST AN UNEASY STALEMATE WHICH CAN ONLY WORK AGAINST HELOU. WE INCLINED BELIEVE ARMY WILL SUPPORT HIM, AND THAT IT CAN AS WELL CONTINUE FOR TIME BEING TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY. BUT ANY LONG-TERM PREDICTIONS ARE HAZARDOUS. THE TREND IN THE AREA IS AGAINST PEACE, AND PEACE-LOVING LEBANOFRIS DANGEROUSLY NEAR TO SUCCUMBING TO THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES WHICH IT HAS SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED FOR 20 YEARS.

17) HELOU'S DECISION RE FEDAYEEN IS NONETHELESS INFINITELY BETTER THAN POLICY OF COMPROMISE AND DRIFT, WHICH WOULD BE FATAL. HE IS SHOWING GREAT COURAGE AND AN UNSUSPECTED STRENGTH OF SPIRIT. THIS WILL IN ITSELF BE A MAJOR ASSET IN RALLYING SUPPORT FOR HIM IN A COUNTRY WHICH IS NOT ACCUSTOMED TO DECISIVE JUDGEMENTS FROM ITS POLITICAL LEADERS.

18) WHEN I SEE HELOU AGAIN ON MAY 6, I ASSUME HE MAY HAVE IN MEANTIME CLARIFIED HIS THINKING. MEANWHILE, I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING BEFORE THAT MEETING DEPT'S PRELIMINARY REACTION THIS MESSAGE.

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INFO: OCT 01/031 W

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RI 011239Z MAY 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7613
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 3601

EXDIS:

1. WHEN I SAW EX-PRESIDENT CAMILLE CHAMOUN APRIL 29, HE SUGGESTED THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY ISRAELI OFFICIAL WARNING LEBANESE THAT ANY COMMANDO ACTIVITY ACROSS LEBANESE BORDER INTO ISRAEL WOULD BE MET BY PROMPT ISRAELI REACTION MIGHT HAVE EFFECT OF BRINGING TO THEIR SENSES THOSE MUSLIM EXTREMISTS WHO ADVOCATE COMPLETE FREEDOM FOR FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. FURTHERMORE, SUCH STATEMENT MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL IN GAINING GREATER SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE ARMY ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN.

2. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO CHAMOUN, I ASKED EX-PRESIDENT FAUD CHEHAB APRIL 30 WHETHER HE THOUGHT SUCH ISRAELI STATEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL. AFTER REFLECTION, CHEHAB TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING INDICATING HE THOUGHT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW, IMPLICATION BEING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED IT WITH ON ONE.

3. COMMENT: DESPITE VIEWS OF CHAMOUN AND CHEHAB I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD ASK ISRAELIS TO MAKE SUCH STATEMENT AT THIS TIME. THEY HAVE MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS OFTEN ENOUGH AND WILL PRESUMABLY DO SO AGAIN. ALSO I BELIEVE LEBANESE PUBLIC WELL AWARE OF DANGERS FEDAYEEN POSE FOR LEBANON VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. FURTHERMORE, I WOULD PRESUME THAT ISRAELIS WOULD CONSIDER OUR REQUEST PECULIAR IN VIEW OUR RECENT REQUESTS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND RESTRAINT DURING PRESENT

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ACTION SS 30

INFO OCT 01/031 W

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R 291511Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7601

S: EIC R EIT BEIRUT 3545

EXDIS:

1. AS LEBANESE POLITICAL CRISIS DEEPENS, LARGELY AS RESULT INABILITY CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM LEADERS TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY POLICY VIS-A-VIS CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND "INVASION" SYRIAN BATH-SPONSORED ES SAIGA FEDAYEEN, SPECTRE OF CONFSSIONAL CIVIL WAR LOOMS MORE AND MORE IN THINKING OF BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS. THIS INEVITABLY BRINGS CHRISTIAN LEADERS, PRIMARILY PHALANGISTS, CHAMOUNISTS AND EDDEISTS TO POINT OF TAKING STOCK THEIR WEAPONRY IN RELATION TO THAT WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS AVAILABLE TO THE MOSLEMS. THIS IS, AS DEPT AWARE, AN EXERCISE WHICH CHRISTIAN LEADERS GO THROUGH EACH TIME LEBANON IS PLUNGED INTO POLITICAL CIRISI THREATENING CONFSSIONAL STRIFE.

2. SINCE JUNE 1967 WAR, BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS HAVE PAID MUCH MORE ATTENTION TO MATTER OF WEAPONRY AVAILABLE TO THEM, AND BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS HAVE MADE CONCERTED BUT QUIET EFFORTS TO BUILD UP MAXIMUM RESERVE SUPPLY ARMS AND AMMUNITION IN EVENT TROUBLE. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT CHRISTIANS, PRIMARILY PHALANGISTS AND CHAMOUNISTS, HAVE STEADILY PURCHASED SMALL ARMS AND AMMUNITION, UTILIZING VARIOUS SOURCES INCLUDING LEBANESE ARMY, SYRIA AND EVEN FEDAYEEN STOCKS, WHICH THEY ABLE TO PURCHASE IN SMALL QUANTITIES AT HIGH PRICES. AT SAME TIME, THERE EQUALLY FIRM EVIDENCE THAT MOSLEM GROUPS (PARTICULARLY SUNNI) HAVE ALSO MANAGED BUILD UP SUBSTANTIAL ARSENAL OF WEAPONS. ADDITIONALLY, PALES-TINIAN REFUGEES IN UNRWA CAMPS HAVE THEMSELVES ACCUMULATED SUPPLY OF ARMS. AND THE SOME 1,500 FEDAYEEN NOW OCCUPYING PARTS OF SOUTH LEBANON ARE VERY WELL EQUIPPED WITH ARMS.

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3. THIS IMPRESSIVE ARSENAL OF WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO MOSLEMS IS SOURCE OF REAL CONCERN TO SUCH CHRISTIAN LEADERS AS GEMAYEL, CHAMOUN AND EDDE. FEELING RESPONSIBLE TO THEIR FOLLOWERS, THEY FEEL OBLIGED TO INSURE THAT ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SUPPLY OF ARMS AVAILABLE TO CHRISTIANS ARE TAPPED. THIS OF COURSE INCLUDES UNITED STATES.

4. YESTERDAY PHALANGIST LEADER PIERRE GEMAYEL ASKED IF US COULD ARRANGE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO PHALANGISTS IF SITUATION DETERIORATED TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT CONFESSIONAL FIGHTING RESULTED. THIS IN EFFECT A REPEAT OF A PHALANGIST REQUEST FOR ARMS MADE JAN 1969. I AM SEEING CAMILLE CHAMOUN THIS AFTERNOON (29TH) AND I EXPECT HE WILL MAKE SIMILAR REQUEST.

5. OBVIOUSLY, THE CAMPAIGN ON PART OF CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO OBTAIN ARMS FROM US IF POSSIBLE HAS BEGUN. IF SITUATION SHOULD CONTINUE DETERIORATE, THESE CALLS FOR HELP WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BECOME LOUDER AND MORE INSISTENT. I WILL, OF COURSE, PARRY THESE REQUESTS, COUNSELING THESE CHRISTIAN LEADERS TO BEND THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD RESOLVING POLITICAL AND FEDAYEEN DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO AVOID THE CONFESSIONAL STRIFE THEY FEAR, AND TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO PRES HELOU IN HIS EFFORTS TO RESOLVE POLITICAL IMPASSE WITHOUT CAVING IN TO FEDAYEEN.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7576
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 3465

EXDIS

REF: PARIS 6026

1. APPRECIATE CHARGE'S INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING LEBANESE SITUATION WITH QUAI.

2. IT CLEAR THAT GOF'S PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL MATTERS HAS ALSO LEFT FRENCH EMBASSY HERE WITHOUT GUIDANCE. DIFFICULTY IS AGGRAVATED BY NEWNESS ON LEBANESE SCENE OF AMBASSADOR DUFOURNIER WHO SEEMS PUZZLED BY EVENTS AND HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH NONE OF THE LEBANESE LEADERS WHOM THE FRENCH MIGHT BE INFLUENCING. HE HAS NOT SEEN HELOU, FOR INSTANCE.

3. I WILL SEE DUFOURNIER EARLY NEXT WEEK AND URGE HIM TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE. WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH HIS DCM AND FIND FRENCH EMBASSY GENERALLY IN ACCORD WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS EVENTS IN LEBANON.

4. I HAVE TWICE SUGGESTED PRESIDENT HELOU TALK TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR WITH PURPOSE GETTING FRENCH MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED FEDAYEEN PROBLEM, BUT HE HAS NOT DONE SO EXPRESSING VIEW THAT FRENCH CAN HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE ON EVENTS. I THINK HIS VIEWS HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY INFLUENCED BY THE NEWNESS OF DUFOURNIER, HIS UNDERSTANDING OF QUAI'S PREOCCUPATION WITH THE REFERENDUM, AND HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT WIDE GAP BETWEEN FRENCH KIND WORDS FOR LEBANON, AS CONTRASTED TO MODICUM OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, SINCE AIRPORT RAID. PORTER

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R 231645Z APR 69
M AMEMKASSY BEIRUT
O SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7550
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

Troops open fire on pro-fedayeen demonstrators. Could get strategy lead to where tomorrow. P

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SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS SPREAD TO BEIRUT

INFO: BEIRUT 3353

FOLLOWING MORNING INCIDENT IN SIDON, VIOLENCE ERUPTED IN BEIRUT, AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 LOCAL TIME, BETWEEN LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES AND LEFTIST PRO-FEDAYEEN, ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATORS. CROWD OF SEVERAL THOUSAND INCLUDING SEVERAL HUNDRED ACTIVISTS, TRIED STAGE MARCH FROM VICINITY OF MAQASED SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL IN WESTERN QUARTER BEIRUT TO CITY CENTER. DEMONSTRATORS WERE BLOCKED BY TROOPS AND CLASH BROKE OUT. TROOPS OPENED FIRE WITH LIGHT AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND TEAR GAS. EMBOFFS ON SCENE REPORT SEEING NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, THOUGH UNABLE DETERMINE WHETHER THESE GUN SHOT CASES OR VICTIMS OF FLYING ROCKS. SECURITY FORCES THUS FAR HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONTAINING DEMONSTRATIONS.

HARD CORE OF DEMONSTRATORS THOUGHT TO BE ANM, LEBANESE COMMUNISTS (BOTH CPL AND DISSIDENT GROUP) AND BA'ATH PARTY. IT UNCLEAR WHETHER KAMAL JUMBLATT'S PSP PARTICIPATED. THESE FOUR GROUPS, ALONG WITH OTHER "PROGRESSIVES" (ALL BUT PSP ILLEGAL) ISSUED APPEAL FOR DEMONSTRATION TODAY (ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE DAY). LEAFLETS DISTRIBUTED APRIL 21-22 BY THESE GROUPS. PLAN FOR RALLY TO PROTEST GOL ACTIVITIES AGAINST FEDAYEEN.

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3. GOL REACTED BY ATTEMPTING DISSUADE CONSTITUENT GROUPS FROM DEMONSTRATING, CONCENTRATING EFFORTS ON JUMBLATT. THERE HAVE BEEN CONFLICTING REPORTS ON WHETHER JUMBLATT AGREED COMPLY. NON-PSP MILITANTS, HOWEVER, THOUGHT COMMITTED TO DEMONSTRATION REGARDLESS OF JUMBLATT'S POSITION. WORD OF SIDON VIOLENCE EARLIER IN DAY PROBABLY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO BEIRUT OUTBREAK.

4. BEIRUT FOR MOMENT CALM. CITY FULL OF RUMORS THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL FATALITIES IN SIDON FRACAS THIS AM, WHICH COULD INCITE HOTHEADS TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS TOMORROW.

5. AUB STUDENTS TODAY DECLARED 24 HOUR PRO-FEDAYEEN, ANTI-GOVERNMENT STRIKE WITH RESULT VERY SPARSE ATTENDANCE AT CLASSES CAMPUS IS QUIET, HOWEVER, AND THERE APPEARS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM AMONG STUDENTS FOR VIOLENT ACTION.

6. AT 1830 LOCAL TIME, AS THIS CABLE WAS BEING TRANSMITTED, LEBANESE RADIO ANNOUNCED CURFEW IN BEIRUT AND SUBURBS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE FOR ALL EXCEPT DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND ESSENTIAL OCCUPATIONS. RADIO ALSO ANNOUNCED TODAY'S CASUALTIES IN SIDON AS FIVE SECURITY PERSONNEL WOUNDED, ONE SERIOUSLY (NO WORD ON DEMONSTRATORS) IN BEIRUT FIVE SECURITY PERSONNEL WOUNDED AND ONE DEMONSTRATOR KILLED, SEVERAL WOUNDED. PORTER

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 17, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, AID 28, RSR 01,

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R 231420Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7547
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 3366

DEPT PASS CAIRO FOR INFO

SUBJ: LEBANON'S RESPONSE TO JARRING QUESTIONNAIRE

REF: BEIRUT 3114

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. SUBSTANCE OF GOL'S RESPONSE TO JARRING QUESTIONNAIRE IS THAT LEBANON CONSIDERS 1949 GAA WITH ISRAEL TO BE STILL IN EFFECT, AND THAT PRESENT LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER CONSTITUTES LEGAL AND SECURE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER WHICH SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED IN ANY FUTURE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. LEBANON DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE IS ANY OUTSTANDING ISSUE TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH ISRAEL, SINCE SHE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN 1967 WAR. HOWEVER, LEBANON SUPPORTS NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION AS A GESTURE OF "SOLIDARITY" WITH ARAB STATES DIRECTLY INVOLVED ON 1967 WAR (I.E. JORDAN AND UAR) AND WILL AGREE TO WHATEVER THESE STATES ACCEPT IN ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS END SUMMARY.

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2. DURING MY MEETING WITH FONMIN JOSEPH SALAM APRIL 22, WE DISCUSSED GOL'S RESPONSE TO JARRING QUESTIONNAIRE AND LEBANON'S POSITION ON NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION. SALAM MADE THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION:
3. PLEBANON HAS SUBMITTED ITS RESPONSE TO JARRING THROUGH ITS EMBASSY IN MOSCOW. ESSENTIAL ASPECT WHICH AFFECTS SUBSTANCE OF GOL'S RESPONSE AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION IS THAT LEBANON DID NOT ENTER INTO HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 AS DID OTHER ARAB STATES. GOL FULLY SUPPORTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION AS A GESTURE OF SOLIDARITY WITH "INTERESTED ARAB STATES" WHICH FOUGHT ISRAEL IN JUNE 1967 WAR AND LOST TERRITORY. SALAM SPECIFIED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO UAR AND JORDAN, AND NOT AT PRESENT TO SYRIAN WHICH HE CONSIDERES HOSTILE TO LEBANON'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE. HOWEVER, GOL DOES NOT INTERPRET NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION TO MEAN LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER IS SUBJECT FOR ANY FUTURE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
4. SPECIFICALLY, PARAGRAPH ONE OF NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION WHICH REFERS TO "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE" CANNOT IN LEBANON'S VIEW, BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ALTER THE EXISTING BORDER BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL. THIS BORDER IS LEGALLY BASED ON THE 1949 GAA SIGNED BY ISRAEL AND LEBANON. LEBANON HAS NEVER RENOUNCED THE GAA AND DOES NOT CONSIDER IT ABROGATED. ISRAEL'S DECEMBER 28, 1968 ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE GAA, BUT DOES NOT ABROGATE IT AND NO UNILATERAL ISRAELI RENUNCIATION CAN SERVE TO MAKE THE GAA NULL AND VOID. IN SUM, LEBANON CONSIDERS THE PRESENT BORDER AS THE LEGAL AND "RECOGNIZED" INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.
5. I RESPONDED THAT USG HAS ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE LEGITIMACY OF PRESENT LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER AND THAT WE HAVE OFTEN REITERATED THIS POSITION TO ISRAEL.
6. REFERRING TO LOCAL POLITICAL CRITICISM HE RECEIVED FOR PUBLICLY SUPPORTING "HUSSEIN PEACE PLAN", I ASKED SALAM WHAT EFFECT THIS HAD ON GOL'S POSITION (SEE REFTEL). SALAM SAID OPPOSITION POLITCOS WERE USING HIS STATEMENT

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AS A BASIS FOR ATTACK ON PRESENT GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE USING THE "SPECIOUS" LEGAL ARGUMENT THAT HE, AS FONMIN, SHOULD HAVE FIRST SOUGHT PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL BEFORE MAKING SUCH A STATEMENT OF POLICY. THIS WAS NONSENSE IN SALAM'S VIEW SINCE WHAT HE SAID WAS APPROVED GOL POLICY. HE ASSURED ME GOL'S POSITION ON NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION WAS EXACTLY AS HE OUTLINED ABOVE.

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R 230958Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASFNY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7544
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONU L JERKTALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 3345

SUBJECT: SOVIET REPRESENTATIONS TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. GOL HAS AGREED TO SOVIET INITIATIVE TO HAVE FONMIN GROMYKO VISIT LEBANON. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON TOLD LEBANESE FONMIN THAT USSR SUPPORTS LATTER'S STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF HUSSEIN PEACE PLAN AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION. SOVIETS REPORTEDLY HAVE ALSO URGED IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND RESOLVE KURDISH PROBLEM. ON WARSAW PACT CALL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, SOVIETS TOLD GOL THEY HAVE NO OBJECTION TO US PARTICIPATION, AND URGED GOL SUPPORT FOR CONFERENCE.
END SUMMARY

2. DURING COURSE OF MY CALL ON FONMIN JOSEPH SALAM APRIL 22, HE REPORTED FOLLOWING DETAILS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR PETRE DEDUSHKIN'S LATEST REPRESENTATIONS TO GOL:

3. GROMYKO VISIT. DEDUSHKIN ASKED GOL IF THERE WOULD BE ANY OBJECTION TO OFFICIAL VISIT BY FONMIN GROMYKO TO LEBANON IN CONNECTION WITH GROMYKO'S UPCOMING OFFICIAL VISITS AT INVITATION IRAQ AND SYRIA. SALAM SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED PRESIDENT HELOU'S

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RELUCTANT APPROVAL AND INFORMED DEDUSHKIN GOL AGREES TO GROMYKO VISIT AND THAT SOVIET FONMIN WILL BE GOL'S OFFICIAL GUEST DURING HIS TWO TO THREE DAY STAY SCHEDULED SOMETIME WITHIN NEXT TWO MONTHS. HELOU'S POSITION WAS THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS GOL COULD NOT REFUSE SUCH VISIT.

4. REFERRING TO SALAM'S STATEMENT UPON HIS RETURN FROM WASHINGTON IN SUPPORT OF "HUSSEIN PEACE PLAN" AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION, DEDUSHKIN SAID USSR FULLY SUPPORTS UN RESOLUTION AND AGREES WITH SALAM'S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF HUSSEIN PLAN. DEDUSHKIN EMPHASIZED USSR DOES NOT WANT ANOTHER WAR IN ME AREA AND SUPPORTS EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

5. SHAYKHLY'S MOSCOW VISIT. DEDUSHKIN GAVE SALEM A RUNDOWN ON IRAQI FONMIN SHAYKHLY'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW. REPORTEDLY, SOVIETS TOLD SHAYKHLY IRAQ SHOULD SUPPORT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND NOVEMBER 22 UN RESOLUTION SINCE ANOTHER MILITARY ROUND WOULD NOT BE IN ANYONE'S INTEREST. SOVIETS WOULD SUPPORT ARAB POSITION TO REGAIN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967 WAR, BUT WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ARAB POLICY WHICH ADVOCATES ELIMINATION OF ISRAELI STATE. ALSO, SOVIETS ADVISED IRAQIS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE KURDISH PROBLEM. ONE ARGUMENT GIVEN WAS THAT IRAQ COULD NOT FIGHT ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM EFFECTIVELY, IF IT ALSO HAD TO FIGHT THE KURDS WITHIN ITS OWN BORDERS.

6. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. DEDUSHKIN ASKED GOL'S SUPPORT FOR WARSAW PACT'S CALL IN RECENT BUDAPEST MEETING FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE TO INCLUDE WARSAW PACT AND NATO MEMBERS. DEDUSHKIN EMPHASIZED SOVIETS WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN LESSENING EAST-WEST TENSIONS AND HAD NO OBJECTION TO US PARTICIPATION IN SUCH A CONFERENCE, IF SUCH PARTICIPATION AGREED UPON BY WARSAW PACT AND NATO MEMBERS. ADDED THAT BOTH FRG AND GDR WOULD PARTICIPATE. PORTER

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R 181624Z APR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7526
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECRET BEIRUT 3253

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 1325 AND 1632

1. WITH THE CONTINUED INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN STRENGTH IN LEBANON I HAVE QUERIED MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RE LEBANESE EFFORTS GET OIL-RICH STATES TO URGE FEDAYEEN NOT TO CAUSE TROUBLE FOR LEBANON.

2. KHOURY TELLS ME PRES HELOU AND PRIMIN KARAME HAVE HAD SECRET DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT, AND KARAME HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO APPROACH TO STATES WHICH ARE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL BACKERS FE-DAYEEN. PROBLEM, AS YET UNSOLVED, IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION WITHOUT RISK DISCLOSURE WHICH WOULD CAUSE MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS IN LEBANON. LEBANESE SENT AMB SULEIMAN ZEIN ON A PROBING MISSION TO KUWAIT. ZEIN TOOK A LOOK AT THE SITUATION, AND APPARENTLY DECIDED NOT TO BROACH SUBJECT TO GOK. HE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE WITHDRAWN HIMSELF FROM ATTEMPTING ANY SUCH MISSIONS IN EITHER SAUDI ARABIA OR LIBYA.

3. I DOUBT THAT GOK CAN FIND ANY TRUSTED AND EFFECTIVE MUSLIM EMISSARY WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE A MISSION WHICH OBVIOUSLY WOULD BRING GREAT RISK TO HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. JUDGING FROM TENOR

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7526
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
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AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
WRCONSUL JERUSALEM 0942

SECRET BEIRUT 3253

EXDIS

C O R R I E C T I D I C O P Y (TEXT)

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 1325 AND 1632

1. WITH THE CONTINUED INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN STRENGTH IN LEBANON I HAVE QUERIED MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS RE LEBANESE EFFORTS GET OIL-RICH STATES TO URGE FEDAYEEN NOT TO CAUSE TROUBLE FOR LEBANON.

2. KHOURY TELLS ME PRES HELOU AND PRIMINI KARAME HAVE HAD SECRET DISCUSSIONS ON SUBJECT, AND KARAME HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO APPROACHES TO STATES WHICH ARE PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL BACKERS FE-DAYEEN. PROBLEM, AS YET UNSOLVED, IS HOW TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION WITHOUT RISK DISCLOSURE WHICH WOULD CAUSE MAJOR POLITICAL CRISIS IN LEBANON. LEBANESE SENT AMB SULEIMAN ZEIN ON A PROBING MISSION TO KUWAIT. ZEIN TOOK A LOOK AT THE SITUATION, AND APPARENTLY DECIDED NOT TO BROACH SUBJECT TO GOK. HE NOW SEEMS TO HAVE WITHDRAWN HIMSELF FROM ATTEMPTING ANY SUCH MISSIONS IN EITHER SAUDI ARABIA OR LIBYA.

3. I DOUBT THAT GOLI CAN FIND ANY TRUSTED AND EFFECTIVE MUSLIM

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EMISSARY WHO WOULD UNDERTAKE A MISSION WHICH OBVIOUSLY WOULD BRING GREAT RISK TO HIS POLITICAL FUTURE. JUDGING FROM TENOR KHOURY'S REMARKS, I EXPECT GOLI IS DROPPING THE IDEA. CHOICE OF ZEIN, A SHIA WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR CREDENTIALS, INDICATED HOW HARD PUT GOLI WAS TO FIND AN EMISSARY WHO WOULD COMTEMPLATED TAKING THE JOB.

4. KHOURY HAS NOT ASKED FOR USG HELP IN THIS MATTER SINCE HIS INITIAL APPROACH AND I HAVE VOLUNTEERED NONE. PORTER

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF LEVYAEEN, UCLIAIA IN GEBNION

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SECRET 375

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7503
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 3178

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: GOL'S POLICY ON FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION

REF: A. BEIRUT 3149; B) BEIRUT 2931

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. GOL HAS MADE MAJOR DECISION TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN GROUPS BY FORCE IF FEDAYEEN ATTEMPT TO CROSS LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER. THIS POSITION, WHICH ADOPTED BY PRESIDENT HELOU AND APPROVED BY SUNNI PRIMIN KARAME, HAS NOT YET CAUSED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITHIN LEBANESE ARMY. GOL MAKING DISTINCTION BETWEEN AL FATAH ON ONE HAND, AND RADICAL BASED FEDAYEEN GROUPS SUCH AS AS SA'IGAH ON THE OTHER, WHICH POSE IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LEBANON'S POLITICAL REGIME. HOWEVER, HELOU CONVINCED THAT, IN LAST ANALYSIS, ALL FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE BASICALLY REVOLUTIONARY IN THEIR THINKING AND IN THEIR MODUS OPERANDI AND WILL BECOME THE CAPTIVE OF EITHER MOSCOW OR PEKING IN FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU APRIL 15, WE HAD TIMELY OPPORTUNITY, IN WAKE OF LEBANESE ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASH (REPORTED REFTEL A), TO HAVE FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON. HELOU MADE CLEAR THAT FEDAYEEN HAD BECOME LEBANON'S MAJOR NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM.

3. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY ON ANY POSSIBLE CHANGES IN GOL'S ATTITUDE:

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TOWARD FEDAYEEN, HELOU INFORMED ME GOL RECENTLY MADE DECISION WHICH GOES ONE STEP FURTHER THAN GOVERNMENT'S PREVIOUS POLICY ON CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON. SPECIFICALLY, ON APRIL 6, HELOU CONVENED MEETING WHICH INCLUDED PRIMIN RASHID KARAME, LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER BOUSTANY AND COS SHMAYT (SEE REFTEL B). FEDAYEEN SITUATION REVIEWED AND DECISION TAKEN TO ORDER LEBANESE ARMY TO CONFRONT FEDAYEEN GROUPS BY FORCE, AS A LAST RESORT, IF THESE GROUPS DISOBEY GOL PROHIBITION ON CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS INTO ISRAEL. THIS DECISION HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN TO FEDAYEEN AND IS DESIGNED TO BE ULTIMATE DETERRENT TO KEEP FEDAYEEN FROM CREATING INCIDENTS ON THE LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER. AS HELOU PUT IT, "IF THEY ATTEMPT TO CROSS, TOO BAD FOR THEM". HELOU ASSURED ME THIS DECISION HAS PERSONAL APPROVAL OF PRIMIN RASHID KARAME WHO, OF COURSE, REPRESENTS LEBANON'S SUNNI MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. HELOU ADDED GOL WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO TRY PERSUADE FEDAYEEN BY ALL OTHER MEANS SHORT OF FORCE TO LIMIT THEIR ACTIVITIES ON LEBANESE SOIL. NATURALLY, GOL WANTED TO AVOID ARMED CONFRONTATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS ON LEBANON'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL SECURITY.

4. I ASKED HELOU WHETHER OR NOT GOL'S POLICY IS CAUSING ANY PROBLEMS WITHIN ARMY, SPECIFICALLY BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN OFFICERS. HELOU SAID HE ASSURED BY ARMY LEADERSHIP THERE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN OFFICERS ON THIS ISSUE. OF COURSE, GENERAL MUSLIM SYMPATHY FOR FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AFFECTS MUSLIM OFFICERS MORE THAN IT DOES CHRISTIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL, BUT THIS WAS A "NUANCE" AND NOT A CAUSE OF CONCERN AT THIS TIME. HELOU WAS ASSURED MUSLIM MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD FOLLOW THEIR ORDERS WITHOUT FAIL. ONE DANGER WHICH DOES EXIST, HE CAUTIONED, WAS CONTINUING PRESSURES EXERTED BY MUSLIMS IN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CIRCLES WHO TRY TO IMPOSE THEIR PRO-FEDAYEEN VIEWS ON THE MILITARY AND THE LEBANESE BODY POLITIC IN GENERAL.

5. AS FOR THE DIFFERENT FEDAYEEN GROUPS GOL HAD TO CONTEND WITH, I INQUIRED WHETHER OR NOT GOL WAS MAKING A DISTINCTION IN ITS APPROACH TOWARD AL FATAH ON THE ONE HAND, WHICH SO FAR HAS NO MOTIVATING IDEOLOGICAL BASE, AND AS SA'IQAH AND THE PFLP ON THE OTHER HAND, WHICH ARE RADICALLY BASED COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS SEEKING OVERTHROW OF ARAB MODERATE REGIMES. HELOU STATED GOL INDEED MAKING SUCH A DISTINCTION IN EXECUTING GOVERNMENT POLICY. THIS COURSE OF ACTION HAS PRIMIN KARAME'S APPROVAL AND TACIT

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APPROVAL OF OTHER MUSLIM LEADERS, TO INCLUDE MUFTI OF THE REPUBLIC. ONE SIGNIFICANT DANGER, HELOU STRESSED, IS THAT IF GOLI FORCIBLY CONTROLS AND ATTACKS ONE SPECIFIC RADICAL GROUP, OTHER COMMANDO ORGANIZATIONS MAY FEEL COMPELLED CLOSE RANKS WITH ORGANIZATION UNDER ATTACK. THEREFORE, FIRM BUT SUBTLE MEASURES MUST BE APPLIED. HELOU ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH AL FATAH WAS LARGELY A POLITICAL IT TOO WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ATTEMPT DESTROY LEBANESE REGIME, IF IT THOUGHT THIS WAS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE GOAL OF LIBERATING PALESTINE. HOWEVER, DESTRUCTION OF LEBANON WAS NOT AL FATAH'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. THIS, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE RADICAL COMMANDO GROUPS.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7504
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 3178

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: GOL'S POLICY ON FEDAYEEN INTERDICTION

6. HELOU VOLUNTEERED THAT GOL HAS NOT YET DECIDED HOW OR AT WHAT LEVEL TO APPROACH PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN. SHOULD GOL CONSIDER PROBLEM WITHIN ITS LEBANESE CONTEXT ALONE, OR IN RELATION TO SYRIA, OR ON INTER-ARAB LEVEL? I REFERRED TO FEDAYEEN SITUATION IN JORDAN AND STATED THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS IN THAT COUNTRY WOULD STRONGLY AFFECT LEBANON. THERE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT GOJ REALIZES THAT IT MADE SERIOUS MISTAKE IN NOT CONFRONTING FEDAYEEN SOONER, AND THAT CONSIDERABLE ANARCHY REIGNS IN JORDAN TODAY AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT'S EARLIER AND MORE PERMISSIVE POLICY TOWARD FEDAYEEN. HELOU AGREED AND SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING FROM HIS JORDANIAN CONTACTS THAT A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOJ AND FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE IN NEAR FUTURE. HE WAS ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF JORDAN EXAMPLE AS HE VIEWED FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN LEBANON.

7. DESPITE DISTINCTIONS ONE MIGHT MAKE BETWEEN VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS TODAY, HELOU STATED HIS CONVICTION THAT, IN ULTIMATE ANALYSIS, ALL FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE BASICALLY REVOLUTIONARY IN THEIR THINKING AND IN THEIR MODUS OPERANDI. THEY OPERATE OUTSIDE THE ESTABLISHED POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES IN THE ARAB WORLD, AND HAVE LITTLE OR NO RESPECT FOR ARAB STATES OR THEIR LEADERSHIP. EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE LARGELY FINANCED BY CONSERVATIVE

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ARAB STATES SUCH AS KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AN LIBYA, THESE STATES HAVE NO MODERATING INFLUENCE ON FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. IN THE LONG RUN, FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT WILL BE PREY TO THE IDEOLOGICAL MACHINATIONS OF EITHER MOSCOW OR PEKING.

8. I CONGRATULATED HELOU ON THE WISE AND COURAGEOUS DECISION THE GOL HAS TAKEN TO INTERDICT FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS AND SAID I WOULD INFORM WASHINGTON. I GET CLEAR MESSAGE THAT HELOU HAS MADE FIRM DECISION THAT FEDAYEEN ISSUE MUST NOW BE FACED, AS YESTERDAY'S CLASH BEARS OUT. HE KNOWS THAT LEBANON'S POLITICAL UNITY MAY BE THREATENED BY RESULTING CONFSSIONAL SPLIT, BUT FEELS THIS IS LESSER DANGER THAN PROVOKING ISRAELI RETALIATION WHICH WOULD HAVE ALMOST SURE EFFECT OF DESTROYING LEBANON'S CONTROL OVER FEDAYEEN. PORTER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7433
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 2931

EXDIS

SUBJECT: INCREASED FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN LEBANON

1) (BEGIN SUMMARY) PRESIDENT HELOU, THROUGH INTERMEDIARY MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT), INFORMED ME APRIL 7 OF VERY RECENT MARKED INCREASE FEDAYEEN PRESENCE SOUTH LEBANON. LEBANESE ARMY CONTINUED OPERATE UNDER CLEAR ORDERS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN BUT ARMY BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED RE ITS CAPACITY HANDLE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED NUMBERS, PARTICULARLY AS SNOW MELTS OPENING UP MORE TERRAIN. GOL UNABLE RISK ALL-OUT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN BECAUSE OF ADVERSE REACTION LEBANESE MUSLIMS. AS A RESULT, WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED NEW FEDAYEEN RAIDS MAY BE MOUNTED FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY PRIMARILY INTO ISRAELI-OCCUPIED SYRIA. URGED USG CONTINUE EFFORTS RESTRAIN ISRAEL FROM REPRISALS WHICH WOULD ONLY WORSEN SITUATION. (END SUMMARY)

2) KHOURY POINTED OUT FEDAYEEN INCREASE OF PERHAPS 300-PLUS HAD BEEN VERY SUDDEN, OCCURRING LARGELY IN LAST WEEK. THERE NOW WERE AT LEAST 800 FEDAYEEN IN THE SOUTH, LARGELY IN MT. HERMON AREA. (COMMENT: HE HAD INFORMED US MIDDLE LAST WEEK ALL SEEMED UNDER CONTROL.) FATAH HAD INCREASED ITS STRENGTH SLIGHTLY BUT MAIN INCREASE HAD BEEN IN SYRIAN-SUPPORTED AL-SA'IQAH UNITS WHO WERE ABLE INFILTRATE MORE EASILY AS SNOWS MELTED AND TERRAIN BECAME MORE ACCESSIBLE. GOL FELT SA'IQAH INCREASE PROBABLY RESULT DECISION TAKEN RECENT BAATH PARTY CONGRESS. LEBANESE ARMY

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DOING ITS BEST CONTAIN INCREASED NUMBERS IN AREA OF PREVIOUS CONCENTRATION ON NORTH SLOPES MT. HERMON BUT FINDING JOB DIFFICULT. ARMY CONSIDERING MOVING SOME UNITS FROM POSITIONS FURTHER WEST ON LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER INTO HERMON AREA IN ORDER TO PUSH FEDAYEEN BACK TOWARDS SYRIA. THERE SERIOUS LIMITS, HOWEVER, TO ARMY'S EFFECTIVENESS, BOTH IN TERMS INADEQUATE TROOP STRENGTH AS WELL AS RESISTANCE FROM LEBANESE PUBLIC OPINION. IF ARMY APPEARS BE WITHDRAWING FROM ISRAELI BORDER IN ORDER MEET FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE.

3) PRES. HELOU, PRIMIN KARAME AND CIC GEN. BOUSTANY HAD DAY-LONG DISCUSSIONS APRIL 6 ON LEBANESE REACTION NEW FEDAYEEN THREAT. POLICY DECISION WAS TO CONTINUE AS IN PAST - TRY TO REASON WITH FEDAYEEN, CONTINUE PROVIDE CORDON AROUND FEDAYEEN POCKETS, AT SAME TIME AVOIDING MILITARY CONFRONTATION WHICH MIGHT SET OFF MAJOR CONFESSIONAL CRISIS IN LEBANON. KARAME, REPRESENTING SUNNI MUSLIMS, PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT LEBANESE MILITARY AVOID SHOOTING INCIDENTS AGAINST FEDAYEEN, ALTHOUGH HE FULLY SUPPORTS CONTINUED EFFORTS DENY FEDAYEEN ACCESS LEBANESE BORDER.

4) LEBANESE PARLEYING WITH BOTH SYRIAN MILITARY AND FATAH LEADERSHIP IN EFFORT REASON WITH FEDAYEEN THAT LEBANON MUST REMAIN APART FROM MILITARY INVOLVEMENT WITH ISRAEL. GOL FRANKLY NOT OPTIMISTIC OF SUCCESS IN LONG RUN. INCLINED BELIEVE TO CONTRARY THAT SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP DELIBERATELY MOUNTING SERIOUS EFFORT INVOLVE LEBANON AS COMBATANT IN CONFLICT. ALSO, GOL HAS INDICATIONS SA'IDAH PLANNING INFILTRATE INTO LEBANESE AREAS WHERE SUNNI MUSLIMS IN MAJORITY, TO ESTABLISH CELLS AMONG SYMPATHETIC LOCAL POPULACE. KING HUSSEIN, AT GOL REQUEST, HAD URGED ARAFAT REDUCE FATAH ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. HUSSEIN REPORTED TO HELOU ON BEIRUT STOPOVER APRIL 1 THAT HE BELIEVED HIS ENGORTS HAD FAILED.

5) GOL HAD CONSIDERED VARIOUS ALTERNATE PLANS OF ACTION, SUCH AS POSSIBILITY INVOKING 1950 TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, REQUESTING UN PROVIDE INCREASED PRESENCE ON LEBANESE BORDER OR ASKING UNILATERAL MILITARY SUPPORT FROM FRANCE OR US. ALL THESE ALTERNATE COURSES OF ACTION HAD BEEN REJECTED AS BEING UNREALISTIC OR IMPRACTICAL. (I ASSURED HIM DECISION WAS CORRECT IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.) FRANCE, FOR INSTANCE, SAID KHOURY, HAD QUITE CLEARLY INDICATED FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT NOT AVAILABLE. SINCE AGGRESSIVE LEBANESE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN ALSO IMPOSSIBLE FOR

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MANY REASON, GOL HAS MADE DECISION CONTINUE ITS PRESENT TACTICS -- PERSUASION AND CORDONING EFFORTS TO KEEP FEDAYEEN OFF BALANCE AND AWAY FROM BORDER. WHILE THIS HAS WORKED QUITE EFFECTIVELY LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, THERE NOW INCREASING RISK FEDAYEEN WILL BREAK THROUGH INTO ISRAEL.

6) PURPOSE HELOU'S MESSAGE TO ME WAS TO INFORM USG OF NEW SITUATION AND REQUEST OUR CONTINUED INTERCESSION WITH ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IF ISOLATED INCIDENTS DO OCCUR. STRONG ISRAELI REPRISALS AGAINST LEBANON WOULD, AS IN JORDAN, ONLY STRENGTHEN FEDAYEEN AND NEUTRALIZE LEBANESE ATTEMPTS CONTAIN SITUATION. HELOU SENT SOLEMN ASSURANCES GOL WILL CONTINUE DO ALL IN ITS POWER CONTROL ITS OWN BORDER AND STOP FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS.

7) KHOURY ALSO POINTED OUT GOL WOULD PREFER USG NOT RPT NOT INFORM ISRAELIS OF INCREASED STRENGTH FEDAYEEN HE ASSUMES ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ALREADY AWARE BUT WORRIED ABOUT GOI LEAKS WHICH MIGHT EMBARRASS EITHER USG OR GOL. HE EXPRESSED HELOU'S THANKS FOR PAST USG EFFORTS RESTRAIN ISRAEL, AND ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT USG TAKE APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY PASS TO GOI THAT LEBANESE POLICY CONTROL FEDAYEEN IS UNCHANGED AND LEBANESE ARMY OPERATING UNDER CONTINUING AND CLEAR ORDERS SUPPRESS FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ALONG BORDER.
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ACTION SS 30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7417
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 2854

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SUBJ: USG WORKING PAPER ON MIDDLE EAST

REF: BEIRUT 2597

1. DCM MET WITH LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL INTERMEDIARY KHOURY (PROTECT) EVENING APRIL 3 AT LATTER'S REQUEST TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF MATTERS INCLUDING USG WORKING PAPER ON ME. KHOURY SAID GOL HAD NOT PREPARED ANY WRITTEN COMMENTS ON USG WORKING PAPER AND HE DOUBTED ANY WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT PRES HELOU AND GOL CONSIDERED WORKING PAPER AS STARTING POINT FOR BIG FOUR DISCUSSIONS AND DID NOT REPRESENT DEFINITIVE EXPOSITION OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WOULD BE UNFAIR FOR GOL TO CRITICIZE INDIVIDUAL POINTS IN WORKING PAPER. GOL UNDERSTOOD THAT UAR AND JORDANI HAD LEFT LITTLE UNSAID IN EXPRESSING "ARAB" CRITICISMS OF WORKING PAPER AND AS LEBANON WAS IN REALITY ON SIDELINES OF NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN ARAB-ISRAEL PEACE SETTLEMENT, IT DID NOT SEEM NECESSARY FOR LEBANON TO COMMENT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO DCM'S REMARK THAT JORDAN AND UAR'S REACTIONS TO WORKING PAPER WERE DECIDEDLY DISAPPOINTING, KHOURY REMARKED THAT, IN KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS WITH PRES HELOU AND PRIMIN KARAME IN BEIRUT FEW DAYS AGO, HUSSEIN HAD APPEARED NOT PARTICULARLY UPSET BY USG WORKING PAPER. AND SIGNIFICANTLY HUSSEIN HAD SAID THAT, WHILE HE HOPED TO RETAIN CONTROL OF WEST BANK AND JERU

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SALEM IN ANY ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, IF PALESTINIANS THEMSELVES PREFERRED SOMETHING ELSE, HE WOULD NOT STAND IN THEIR WAY.

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PERMISSION PERM
UNEMBASSY TEL AVIA
UNEMBASSY 7100V
INFO UNEMBASSY UNMAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1411
FM UNEMBASSY BEIRUT
041525Z FEB 83

INFO 02854

ACTION 02 30

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02684 311038Z

18
ACTION SS 30

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P 311025Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7377
INFO USMISSION USUN PRIORITY

SECRET BEIRUT 2684

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US PEACE PLAN

1. WE ARE SENDING SEPTEL TEXT OF MARCH 31 NAHAR STORY PURPORTING TO CONTAIN DETAILS OF NINE-POINT WORKING PAPER RECENTLY SUBMITTED BY USG TO OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS. STORY IS ATTRIBUTED TO REUTERS/UPI FROM UN AND IS VERY CLOSE TO THE MARK PORTER

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TELEGRAM

Lebanon

SECRET 841

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02585 271152Z

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ACTION SS-30

INFO /030 W

P R 270845Z MAR 69

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7339

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T BEIRUT 2585

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DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: LEBANON'S POSITION ON JARRING'S QUESTIONNAIRE AND
ON RECENT US DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

REF: STATE 41270

1. I MET FONMIN JOSEPH SALEM MARCH 26 TO DISCUSS JARRING
MISSION AND BIG FOUR CONCERTATION. SALEM REFERRED TO
QUESTIONNAIRE JARRING RECENTLY SUBMITTED TO GOL AND
SAID GOL'S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE HAD BEEN DRAFTED AND NOW
BEING COORDINATED WITH UAR. DRAFT WILL ALSO BE
DISCUSSED WITH GOJ SHORTLY, PROBABLY DURING KING
HUSSEIN'S BRIEF STOP-OVER IN BEIRUT ENROUTE TO PARIS,
LONDON AND WASHINGTON IN EARLY APRIL. SALEM STRESSED
GOL NOT SEEKING UAR OR JORDANIAN "APPROVAL", BUT MERELY
ATTEMPTING ASSURE THAT ESSENCE OF GOL'S REPLY IN
ACCORD WITH UAR AND JORDANINA POSITIONS. (COMMENT:
LEBANON WILL IN FACT BE SURE ITS REPLY IS CAREFULLY
ALIGNED WITH THAT OF CAIRO).

2. SALEM SAID HE WILLING AND AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT

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HELOU TO GIVE ME COPY OF GOL'S DRAFT WHEN READY. I URGED GOL'S RESPONSE TO JARRING'S QUESTIONS BE AS POSITIVE AND SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE, AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT RATHER LONG DELAY IN SUBMITTING ARAB REPLIES. TIMING IMPORTANT AND PROMPT REPLY WOULD BE HELPFUL DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTENSIFIED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY RE ME. REFERRED TO EBAN'S TALKS IN US AND MADR REPRESENTATION ALONG LINES GUIDANCE CONTAINED REFTEL. IN RESPONSE SALEM'S QUESTION WHETHER US POSITION ON NOV 22 UN RES HAS CHANGED IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE BIG FOUR CONCERTATION, I EMPHASIZED US CONTINUES FULLY SUPPORT UN RES AND JARRING MISSION. US APPROACHES WITH OTHER POWERS SHOULD IN NO WAY IMPLY THAT WE SEEKING TO SUPPLANT JARRING MISSION. OUR PURPOSE IS TO HELP MOVE PARTIES TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS. IN OUR VIEW, PART OF ANY SUCH SETTLEMENT MUST BE RECIPROCAL CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL SATISFY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF INTERESTED PARTIES. ARABS MUST FACE UP TO THIS REALITY AND MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY SEEK MORE STABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE THAN HAVE EXISTED PREVIOUSLY. IN THIS CONTEXT, TONE AND NATURE THEIR REPLIES TO JARRING COULD IMPORTANTLY AFFECT PROGRESS ON SETTLEMENT. EXPRESSION OF ARAB WINNINGNESS ACCEPT CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE MAJOR BREAK-THROUGH. ARABS SHOULD NOT ENGAGE WISHFUL THINKING RE US SUPPORT OF AN IMPOSED SETTLEMENT.

3. SALEM APPRECIATED BEING INFORMED US POSITION AND ASSURED ME GOL'S DRAFT RESPONSE TO JARRING "VERY POSITIVE". HE EXPLAINED GOL FULLY SUPPORTS NOV 22 RES AS BASIS FOR ARRIVING AT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE. HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS, AND SAID HE SAW NO REAL SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTY IN REACHING SUCH AGREEMENTS, IF MADE BY BOTH PARTIES TO THE UN. HE IMPLIED THAT ARAB STATES WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE DISPOSED TO SIGN JOINT ARAB-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS BUT RATHER WOULD PREFER TO SIGN SEPARATE DOCUMENTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON BY BOTH SIDES, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED TO UN WITH SOME PROVISION FOR UNSC GUARANTEES. LEBANON, EVIDENTLY, WOULD GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER WAS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH JORDAN AND UAR. HE COMMENTED THAT ARAB STATES PROBABLY COULD BECOME PARTY TO WRITTEN AGREEMENTS INCORPORATING CONCEPT OF NON-

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BELLIGERENCY BUT NOT INCORPORATING THE TERM "PACE", SINCE THIS COULD IMPLY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ECONOMIC TIES, ETC. I SAID THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION WHICH BOTH JARRING AND THE INTERESTED PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT, ONCE PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. MORE IMPORTANT, ARABS SHOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAELI REQUIREMENT FOR BINDING RECIPROCAL CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION.

4. AS FOR LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER, SALEM SAID GOL SEES NO DIFFICULTIES IN FORMAL RECOGNITION, WITHIN CONTEXT OF OVER-ALL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, OF PRESENT STATUS OF THE BORDER. HE REITERATED THAT LEBANON DID NOT ENTER HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN 1967. CONSEQUENTLY, LEBANON-ISRAEL BORDER, WHICH INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED UNDER GAA'S, REMAINS UNCHANGED AS OF 1949. IN SHORT, PRESENT FRONTIER COULD EASILY BECOME SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BORDER BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

5. SALEM ALLUDED TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS RE US POSITION, WHICH WAS BEING CIRCULATED TO OTHER POWERS AND CERTAIN ARAB STATES. I REFERRED TO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN WASHINGTON, NEW YORK AND INTERESTED CAPITALS, AND SAID US EXPECTED THESE TO LEAD TO FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE. SALEM SAID HE HOPED GOL WOULD BE INFORMED IN GREATER DETAIL, WHEN APPROPRIATE.

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NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02547 251725Z

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ACTION SS 30

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R 251518Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7332
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T BEIRUT 2547

EXDIS

REF: STATE 44798, 45491

1. AGREE APPROPRIATE I HOLD OFF FOR NOW APPROACHING GOL ON USG WORKING PAPER. HOWEVER, I FEEL SURE LEBANESE WILL BEGIN GET GARBLED VERSIONS SOON AND I WOULD PREFER MAINTAIN CLOSE RAPPORT WITH PRES HELOU NOT ONLY TO INSURE HE GETS ACCURATE REPORTS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE SUBSEQUENT RECIPROCAL RELEASE OF INFORMATION FROM HIM.
2. THEREFORE, UNLESS INTERVENING DEVELOPMENTS DICTATE OTHERWISE, I REQUEST I BE AUTHORIZED GIVE HIM USG WORKING PAPER NO LATER THAN FRIDAY, MARCH 28. I WILL NOT NEED USE MOST OF TALKING POINTS SET FORTH STATE 44730, BUT CAN LIMIT MYSELF LARGELY TO COMMENT ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS AND TIME TABLE.
3. I BELIEVE HELOU CAN ASSURE MATTER WILL BE TIGHTLY HELD WITHIN GOL. ALSO I THINK WE CAN ASSUME FRENCH WILL BE BRIEFING HIM ON PROGRESS FOUR POWER TALKS. I WOULD LIKE BE SURE US VIEWS ALSO HEARD. PORTER

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02460 231913Z

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PI R 231725Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7310
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USINT CAIRO
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1281
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

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SECRET BEIRUT 2460

EXDIS

FROM DAVIES

REF: STATE 044783; STATE 044729; STATE 044730

1. FOLLOWING CONSENSUS EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION OF REFTELS WITH AMBASSADORS PORTER, EILTS, AND SYMMES AND MINISTER BERGUS.
2. ACTION VIS-A-VIS ARAB GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE FIELD, ALLOWING TIME FOR AMBASSADOR YOST TO HAVE PRIOR MEETINGS WITH BRITISH, FRENCH, AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.
3. IN VIEW ONGOING AND ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT HKJ AND UARG IN THIS MATTER AND IMPENDING U.S. VISIT OF HUSSEIN, BELIEVE SYMMES AND BERGUS SHOULD TAKE EARLY OPPORTUNITY, PREFERABLY TUESDAY, MARCH 25, TO ACT ON STATE 044729 AND STATE 044730.
4. VIEW POSSIBILITY OF INACCURATE LEAK FROM OTHER GOVERNMENTS, BELIEVE SAG AND GOL SHOULD ALSO BE APPROACHED. HOWEVER, IN RECOGNITION OF CONSIDERATIONS CITED STATE 044783 AND OF LESS

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02451 221214Z

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ACTION SS 30

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P R 221145Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 7309

S E C R E T BEIRUT 2451

EXDIS

FROM BERGUS FOR MARTHINSEN

RE STATE 044730 PLEASE INFORM MOHAMED RIAD I WILL HAVE
IMPORTANT USG COMMUNICATION TO GIVE HIM EARLY TUESDAY 25TH.
YOU MIGHT SUGGEST TO MOHAMED THAT FONMIN MAY WISH PER-
SONALLY RECEIVE ME FOR THIS IMPORTANT PRESENTATION.

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 02425 211523Z

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ACTION SS 30

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PI R 211222Z MAR 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7298
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 2425

EXDIS

REF STATE 041480

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY JARRING TO GOL WHICH WERE PROVIDED US BY PRESIDENT HELOU:

" SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (1967) SETS OUT PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION SHOULD BE ACHIEVED. SOME OF THESE PROVISIONS WOULD IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES, SOME ON ONE SIDE, AND SOME ON THE OTHER. IT HAS GENERALLY BEEN ACCEPTED THAT THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A WHOLE. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES TOWARDS THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ARE BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION AND ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT THAT EACH PROVISION IS REGARDED AS PART OF A 'PACKAGE DEAL'.

1. DOES LEBANON ACCEPT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (1967) FOR IMPLEMENTATION FOR ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTION?

2. DOES LEBANON AGREE TO PLEDGE TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL?

3. DOES LEBANON AGREE TO PLEDGE RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ISRAEL?

4. DOES LEBANON ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE?

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- 5. IF SO, WHAT IS THE CONCEPTION OF SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES HELD BY LEBANON?
- 6. DOES LEBANON AGREE THAT, IF A PLAN FOR THE JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS WORKED OUT AND PRESENTED TO THE PARTIES FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION, THE ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF SUCH A PLAN BY THE PARTIES AND THE DECLARATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT IT IN GOOD FAITH CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROVISION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO JUSTIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OTHER PROVISIONS?
- 7. DOES LEBANON AGREE THAT THE TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE GUARANTEED:
 - (A) BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES;
 - (B) THROUGH ADDITIONAL MEASURES?
- 8. DOES LEBANON AGREE THAT DEMILITARIZATION OF SUCH ZONES SHOULD BE SUPERVISED AND MAINTAINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS?
- 9. WOULD LEBANON ACCEPT AS A FINAL ACT OF AGREEMENT ON ALL PROVISIONS A MUTUALLY SIGNED MULTILATERAL DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE THE AGREED CONDITIONS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE."

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EITHER TO CONCERNED HOST GOVERNMENTS OR TO LEBANESE EMBASSIES.

4) GOL WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY CONTINUING EFFORTS USG CAN EXERT WHICH WILL HAVE EFFECT CURBING FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. THEY URGE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE BE NO INDICATION OF A CONCERTED US-LEBANESE EFFORT ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE. THIS, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, MIGHT BE SELF-DEFEATING.

5) IF THIS INTERNAL CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM CONFLICT WITHIN GOL CAN BE RESOLVED, I EXPECT GOL WILL MAKE SOME DISCREET APPROACHES AND ADVISE ME OF OUTCOME ONLY AFTER THE FACT. I WILL THEN DECIDE WHETHER TO INFORM PRESIDENT HELOU IN VERY GENERAL TERMS WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THROUGH OUR OWN EFFORTS.

6) IN CLARIFICATION ONE OTHER POINT, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR GOL HAS NEVER ASKED USG TO DO MORE THAN ASK IMPORTANT FINANCIAL SUPPORTERS OF FEDAYEEN TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO KEEP LEBANESE-ISRAELI BORDER QUIET. THIS WILL BE MAIN BURDEN OF LEBANESE ARGUMENT, AS WELL, IF THEY DECIDE TO TAKE INITIATIVE. LEBANESE UNDERSTAND THAT ANY ATTEMPTS ON THEIR PART TO DRY UP FINANCIAL AID FROM OIL STATES TO PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL, BUT WOULD BRING FEDAYEEN REPRISALS ON LEBANON.

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SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 12, EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, IO 13, ACDA 16,
AID 28, RSR 01, /167 W

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R 111535Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7045
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T BEIRUT 1325

SUBJECT: CONTROL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN LEBANON.

1. PRESIDENT HELOU'S CONFIDEANT MICHEL KHOURY ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM AT HIS HOME EVENING FEB 10. KHOURY SAID THAT HELOU WANTED USG TO KNOW THAT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS HE WAS SENDING SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO JIDDA, KUWAIT AND TRIPOLI TO URGE RULERS THESE THREE COUNTRIES TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH FEDAYEEN GROUPS, ESPECIALLY EL FATEH, TO LIMIT THEIR ACTIVITIES ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. AS MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS OF FUNDS TO FEDAYEEN, THEY WERE IN GOOD POSITION EXERT SUCH PRESSURE. THESE SPECIAL EMISSARIES, WHOSE MISSIONS WOULD BE PARALLELED BY ACTION LEBANESE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THE THREE ARAB CAPITALS, WOULD EXPLAIN DANGERS POSED TO LEBANON'S STABILITY BY FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ON LEBANESE TERRITORY, AS WELL AS THREAT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS IN RETALIATION FOR FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS MOUNTED IN LEBANON AGAINST ISRAEL.

2. HELOU ASKED IF USG WOULD BE WILLING ASSIST GOL IN JIDDA, TRIPOLI AND KUWAIT BY MAKING SIMILAR DEMARCHES TO THE THREE RULERS AND/OR THEIR GOVERNMENTS. I TOLD KHOURY THAT US AMBASSADORS THESE THREE CAPITALS HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS

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POINTED OUT TO RULERS AND OFFICIALS DANGERS INHERENT THEIR FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON AND JORDAN, EMPHASIZING THREAT POSED TO THE MODERATE ARAB RE-ACTIVITIES THERE. I TOLD KHOURY I WOULD OF COURSE INFORM OUR AMBASSADORS TO THE THREE COUNTRIES OF LEBANON'S CURRENT EFFORTS AND ASSURED HIM THAT OUR AMBASSADORS COULD BE RELIED UPON TO CONTINUE POINTING OUT DANGERS INVOLVED IN CONTINUED FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO FEDAYEEN

3. LEBANESE BELIEVE SITUATION NOW GETTING CRITICAL AND MAY SOON GET OUT OF CONTROL. THEREFORE, LEBANESE LOOKING FOR ASSISTANCE FROM EVERY POSSIBLE QUARTER. WE REALIZE THAT LEBANESE REQUEST CREATES PROBLEM FOR USG BY ENGAGING IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE ANTI-FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. BUT TO KEEP LEBANON FROM BEING PLUNGED ACTIVELY INTO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AT TIME OF NEW INITIATIVES ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, DEPT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER FEASIBILITY OF ENGAGING IN CONCERTED EFFORT WITH LEBANON VISA - VIS SAG, KUWAIT AND LIBYA.
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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00888 281822Z

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ACTION SS 30

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R 281716Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6953

S E C R E T BEIRUT 0888

EXDIS

SUBJEC: LEBANON'S POLITICAL CRISIS.

1. LEBANON'S POLITICAL CRISIS HAS CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS NOW AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT IT COULD TAKE AN UGLY TURN IN COURSE NEXT FEW DAYS. CHAMOUN-LED TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE HAS SHOWN SURPRISING SOLIDARITY AND APPEARS DETERMINED CAUSE FALL OF PRESENT KARAME GOVT, FROM WHICH PHALANGISTS AND FOLLOWERS OF RAYMOND EDDE HAVE WITHDRAWN IN PROTEST AT CONTINUED EXCLUSION MEMBER OF CHAMOUN'S LIBERAL PARTY FROM CABINET. ALLIANCE IS NOT AGAINST KARAME, WHO IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS BEST PRIMIN CHOICE AVAILABLE, BUT AGAINST CONTINUED VETO ON CHAUMOUN, WHICH THEY VIEW AS LAST STRAW IN LONG SERIES OF BLOWS TO FORMER CHRISTIAN POLITICAL DOMINANCE

2. EARLIER WE HAD THOUGHT THAT RAYMOND EDDE'S VIEW THAT ALLIANCE SHOULD REMAIN AS PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION WOULD PREVAIL AND THAT CHAMOUNIST AND PHALANGISTS WOULD PERMIT CHEHABIST GOVERNMENT BEAR UNPLEASANT TASK OF DEALING WITH FEDAYEEN, CONSCRIPTION ISSSUE AND OTHER DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS AT LEAST, HAVE DUG IN THEIR HEELS AND INTEND MAKE FRONTAL ASSAULT ON KARAME GOVERNMENT.

3. CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS HAVE BOTH LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THEY INTEND FIGHT KARAME GOVT FIRST BY CALLING GENERAL STRIKE (KARGELY OF CHRISTIAN MERCHANTS, ET.) FOLLOWED IF NECESSARY BY DEMONSTRATIONS, MASS MEETINGS AND, AS LAST RESORT, "STREET ACTION" TO BRING DOWNFALL OF KARAME'S CHEHABIST GOVT. THIS COULD, OF COURSE, LEAD TO STREET CLASHES, WHICH PROBABLY

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WOULD BE BASICALLY CHRISTIANS AGAINST MOSLEMS.

4. EMBASSY HAS CONSISTENTLY AND EMPHATICALLY WARNED OUR FRIENDS IN TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE THAT WORST THING THAT COULD HAPPEN AT THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD FOR LEBANON IS CONFESSIONAL STRIFE, WHICH WOULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR LEBANON AND PARTICULARLY FOR CHRISTIAN ELEMENT. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT USG WOULD DEPLORE ANY SUCH MOSLEM/CHRISTIAN CONFRONTATION AND COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CHRISTIANS IN SUCH EVENT. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL PROBES FROM CHRISTIAN GROUPS IN LAST SEVERAL WEEKS FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE WHICH EMBASSY HAS REJECTED.

5. TODAY (28TH) CHAMOUN SENT EMISSARY TO EMBASSY TO SEEK US SUPPORT IN PRESENT POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND SPECIFICALLY TO REQUEST ARMS FOR PHALANGISTS AND CHAMOUNISTS TO BOLSTER CHRISTIANS IN ANY MOSLEM/CHRISTIAN STRUGGLE IF SUCH SHOULD EVOLVE. EMBOFF, SPEAKING DIRECTLY FOR AMBASSADOR, TOLD EMISSARY IN FLAT TERMS THAT US WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN PRESENT INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN CHEHAB AND ALLIANCE, USG WOULD CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTE NO REPEAT NO ARMS TO ANYONE FOR USE IN SUCH CONFLICT IN LEBANON, NO US ASSISTANCE COULD BE RELIED UPON TO ASSIST CHRISTIANS IN ANY BATTLE WITH MOSLEMS HERE, AND USG DISAGREED COMPLETELY WITH ALLIANCE'S IDEA OF TRYING BRING DOWN PRESENT KARAME GOVT VIA STRIKES, DEMONSTRATIONS, STREET ACTION, ETC. CHAMOUN'S EMISSARY WAS PROPERLY INDIGNANT (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT SURPRISED) AT US POSITION, WHICH HE RELUCTANTLY UNDERTOOK CONVEY TO CHAMOUN AND HIS LIEUTENANTS, WHO WERE TO MEET LATER IN MAY TO DECIDE COURSE OF ACTION THEY WOULD TAKE. WE LATER CONDUCTED SIMILAR EXERCISE WITH PHALANGIST REP, WHO INDICATED THAT PHALANGE LEADERSHIP COOLING DOWN AND WERE NOT ADVOCATING MUCH MORE MODERATE LINE THAN ORIGINALLY.

6. WE TRUST THAT RAYMOND EDDE'S EARLIER IDEA OF ALLIANCE'S CONFINING ITS POLITICAL ACTION TO SERVING AS OPPOSITION IN PARLIAMENT WILL PREVAIL. WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT TODAY OF THIS BEING SO, HOWEVERN, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW EDDE'S YESTERDAY'S BITTER ATTACK AGAINST CHEHAB, WHICH HAS STIRRED EMOTIONS CONSIDERABLY. WE ARE MAKING CONCERTED EFFORT TO TRY TO COOL OFF STRONG MINDED CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS AND DISSUADE THEM FROM ANY ACTS WHICH COULD LEAD TO STRIFE. WHILE WE INCLINED BELIEVE REASON WILL PREVAIL, EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING HIGH

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PARTICULARLY AMONG ANTI-CHEHABISTS, WHO APPEAR DETERMINED TO TOPPLE PRESENT GOVT AND ACHIEVE BY-PRODUCT OF REMOVING ARMY G-2 FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

7 AMB HAS SENT WORD TO PRESIDENT HELOU TODAY IN RESPONSE HIS QUERY THAT US NOT INTERVENING IN THIS LEBANESE INTERNAL STRUGGLE, AND THAT USG HAS MADE NO COMMITMENTS OR PROMISES OF ASSISTANCE TO ANY POLITICAL GROUPS. HELOU ASKED OUR SUPPORT TO CONVINC MILITANT CHRISTIANS THEY WERE RUNNING RISK OF PRECIPITATING A BATTLE, WHICH THEY COULD NOT WIN AND WHICH WOULD IN LONG RUN DESTROY THEM AND CONCEPT OF A CONFES- SIONALLY BALANCED LEBANON. THIS WE HAVE DONE. PORTER

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