

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
29	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State DECLASSIFIED PER EAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	12/8/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East

BOX NUMBER

620

FOLDER TITLE

Lebanon
[4] ~~Kuwait~~ Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970 [1 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information. | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA 14021 (4-85)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
70	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State SANITIZED PUT KAC REVIEW 8/28/2008	11/4/69	B
92	Telegram	Beirut to DIA	8/15/69	B
126	Telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State	4/15/69	B
135	Telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State	3/14/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East

BOX NUMBER

620

FOLDER TITLE

[5] Kuwait Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970 [2 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA 14021 (4-85)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
145	telegram	Amemb Beirut to CN MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/1 1p.	1/6/69	B
199	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/2 3pgs	10/28/69	B
200	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/3 3pgs	10/25/69	B
201	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/4 2pgs.	10/25/69	B
202	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/5 3pgs	10/25/69	B
203	cable	CIA to White House Situation Room MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/6 2pgs	11/20/69	B
204	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/7 3pgs	10/28/69	B
205	Report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/8 3pgs	10/28/69	B
206	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/9 4pgs	10/28/69	B
207	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/10 2pgs.	10/26/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East

BOX NUMBER

620

FOLDER TITLE

[6] Lebanon Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31,1970 [3 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA 14021 (4-85)

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NIXON PROJECT)

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
208	report	Intelligence Information Cable MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/11 14pgs	9/29/69	B
209	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/12 3pgs	1/28/70	B
212	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/13 1pg.	12/29/69	B
214	telegram	Amemb Beirut to Sec. State MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/14 5pgs.	12/10/69	B
248	cable	DIRNSA to White House MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 09-11/15 1pg.	8/15/69	B
249	cable	CIA to White House Situation Room	11/20/69	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC Files-Country Files-Middle East

BOX NUMBER

620

FOLDER TITLE

[6] ~~Lebanon~~ Vol. 1 Jan. 1969-31, 1970 [3 of 3]

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA 14021 (4-85)

MEMORANDUM

122
DEC 15 1969

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LEB

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/
SENSITIVE

INFORMATION 4551
December 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Analysis of Differences Between the 1958 and 1969
Lebanese Crises

Secretary Laird has sent an analysis (attached) comparing the 1958 and 1969 Lebanese crises. The paper itself is rather complicated but I thought you might be interested in its conclusions. Briefly, it cites the principal differences in the 1969 crisis as follows:

1. Presence of an organized Palestinian fedayeen movement.
2. Israeli occupation with little hope that the territory will be returned on terms acceptable to the Arabs as well as Israeli pressure on the fedayeen in southern Lebanon.
3. A lowered U. S. prestige in the Arab Middle East, coupled with restraints on U. S. presence in the area because of events in Southeast Asia and on our domestic scene.
4. Qualitative and quantitative increase in Soviet presence in the Middle East on both the political-military and economic fronts.
5. Poor diplomatic relations between the United States and the Arab Middle East coupled with the view that the U. S. is the exclusive supporter of Israel.
6. Limited military options for the U. S. in the Middle East and without the support of healthy diplomatic channels to the area. Limited military supply of the Lebanese army is seen as the only attractive option remaining to the U. S.

It is these limitations that we have had to deal with in the Lebanese contingency planning exercise that I shall report on at the NSC.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

1349

January 27, 1970

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Lebanese Request for PL-480 Assistance

The purpose of this memorandum is to keep you posted regarding a Lebanese Government request for PL-480 assistance in view of the earlier interest which you expressed in such a program.

You will recall that during the October 1969 crisis in Lebanon the Washington Special Action Group met to consider how we might help the Lebanese Government hold its own in the face of serious internal and external threats. Among the proposals seriously considered was economic assistance, and the Action Group concluded that a PL-480 program would be the only feasible approach. You indicated your approval of such a program should the Lebanese request it and you offered to be of assistance should this be required.


On January 10 Lebanese President Helou made an official request for a PL-480 program which would primarily involve wheat and feed grains valued at up to \$12 million. Ambassador Porter has strongly recommended that this request be approved, and he has asked for negotiating instructions at the earliest possible date. On the basis of the Action Group's recommendations we have started the bureaucratic ball rolling.

SECRET/EXDIS

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

AID has contacted the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of the Budget regarding this program. The commodities requested under the proposed program are now under review by the Department of Agriculture. BOB has already been alerted to White House interest in the matter and is sympathetic. The main problem is that PL-480 funds for this fiscal year have already been earmarked. Implementation of a Lebanese program would mean either a reallocation of existing funds or an increase of funds available. We are currently trying to sort out the problems involved. I will keep you informed.



Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

4551

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 NOV 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

SUBJECT: Comparative Analysis of Lebanon Situation

Attached is a copy of a report prepared by Warren Nutter
on the Lebanon situation. I think you will find the comparison
of the 1958 and 1969 situations both interesting and valuable.



Attachment

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Page 1 of 1 Pages

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 4551
December 5, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Defense Paper Analyzing Differences Between 1958
and 1969 Lebanese Crises

You asked that my original memo to you on this subject -- summarizing the paper sent to you by Secretary Laird -- be converted into a memorandum for the President. Attached hereto is that memorandum.

Recommendation: That you send the attached package to the President for his information.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE WASHINGTON

INFORMATION 4551
November 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Analysis of Differences Between the 1958 and 1969
Lebanese Crises

*Can you make
summary for
President for*

DEC 3 1969

Secretary Laird has sent you an analysis (attached) prepared for him by Warren Nutter comparing the 1958 and 1969 Lebanese crises. *The paper itself is rather complicated but I thought you might be interested in the conclusions of this paper.* Since this is the subject of today's WSAG meeting, you might be interested in the conclusions of this paper.

Briefly, it cites the principal differences in the 1969 crisis as follows:

1. Presence of an organized Palestinian fedayeen movement.
2. Israeli occupation with little hope that the territory will be returned on terms acceptable to the Arabs as well as Israeli pressure on the fedayeen in southern Lebanon.
3. A lowered US prestige in the Arab Middle East coupled with restraints on US presence in the area because of events in Southeast Asia and on our domestic scene.
4. Qualitative and quantitative increase in Soviet presence in the Middle East on both the political-military and economic fronts.
5. Poor diplomatic relations between the United States and the Arab Middle East coupled with the view that the US is the exclusive supporter of Israel.
6. Limited military options for the US in the Middle East and without the support of healthy diplomatic channels to the area. Limited military supply of the Lebanese army is seen as the only attractive option remaining to the US.

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It is these limitations that we have had to deal with in the Lebanese contingency planning exercise that I shall report on at the NSC.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

4 NOV 1969

In reply refer to: I-36109/69

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Lebanon

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E.O. 12058, Sect. 3.6

DIA Renew

By KAB NARA, Date 7-19-00

Attached is a comparative analysis of the Lebanon situation today vis-a-vis that in 1958, prepared in accordance with your request of 28 October 1969. Since the analysis is not quite as brief as might be desirable, we have summarized the analysis below and have attached the analysis as tabs. Relevant maps are at Tab E. Please note, especially, the Soviet and Sixth Fleet maps, which show that both the Sixth and Soviet Fleets have clustered their attack elements around Crete since 26 October, when decision was first made to move the US Fleet.

I. Underlying Causes of the 1958 and 1969 Crises in Lebanon.

Underlying Lebanon's difficulties are the following basic and intermediate factors: (a) the two basic socio-political factors of sectarianism and narrow oligarchic politics; (b) the twentieth-century expansionist nationalisms represented by Israel's statehood and Arab unity; and (c) the struggle between communism and capitalism as it takes place in the contest for influence in the Middle East between the USSR and US. (See Tab A for more complete discussion.)

II. Immediate Causes of the 1958 and 1969 Crises in Lebanon.

The immediate causes of the 1958 and 1969 crises are similar in terms of exacerbated relations between moderate Lebanese leaders and pro-Nasserist Lebanese, American concern for Lebanon's territorial integrity, Soviet efforts to capitalize on the situation, and Israel's successful warfare against the Arabs. But in 1969, four new immediate factors must be added in the current crisis: (a) an organized Palestinian fedayeen movement; (b) an expanded Israel exerting pressure against southern Lebanon; (c) a curtailed US political-military presence in the Arab Middle East; and (d) a significantly improved Soviet political-military position in the region. (See Tab B.)

III. US Goals and Interests in the Area.

America's policy toward Lebanon in both 1958 and 1969 has for its goals the following considerations: (a) concern for US citizens; (b) a moderate regime in Beirut; and (c) Lebanon's territorial integrity. American concern about these matters, in both 1958 and 1969, has been framed against the background of successful Israeli actions in full-scale war with the Arabs.

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

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2.

Beyond Lebanon, American interests remain much the same in 1958 and 1969: (a) competition with the USSR without being dragged into a major war; and (b) economic, cultural and strategic interests relating to indigenous powers in the Middle East. But between 1958 and 1969, the following crucial changes should be injected into American Middle East policy, though so far a new policy has not emerged: (a) the central role of the fedayeen as representatives of Palestinian nationalism; (b) Israel's newly expanded frontiers with little evidence that anything will be given back to the Arabs on terms acceptable to the Arabs; (c) an improved Soviet strength in the Middle East on both political-military and economic fronts; and (d) a diminished American prestige in the Arab Middle East accompanied by contracted American capabilities to intervene in Lebanon. (See Tab C.)

IV. Options, Costs and Risks for the United States in 1958 and 1969.

Politically, normal diplomatic channels between the Arabs and the US are very restricted today. Given strained relations between the US and the Arabs, the United Nations is also less attractive for developing American Middle East policy, since the Arabs are mounting an unprecedented attack on the United States in this world organization. Negotiations on the Middle East are now taking place between the US and the USSR, but to introduce Lebanon into these talks would give American legitimacy to Soviet influence in the moderate Arab states (already a de facto influence in Soviet Embassy efforts in Beirut and in recent word that Jordan will negotiate for artillery with the USSR). Militarily, limited supply for the Lebanese Army is still an option, perhaps the most attractive military option. Open, armed intervention can be attempted by the US, but the costs and risks of intervention by military means today would be borne almost wholly by the military, given the absence of normal political relations with the Arab world and given the superb propaganda platform provided by the UN for Arab and Soviet attacks on this intervention. In a political vacuum, military force becomes sheer force, with further costs to American prestige (particularly to military prestige) and consequent risk that the Soviets would meet such force with unpredictable military gestures of their own. Covert supply of arms by the CIA, in support of the Phalanges Libanaises (Falange), is attractive to some, but is symptomatic of the failure of normal foreign policy: the benefits of this support -- ostensibly to maintain internal order and to protect Christians against Muslims -- should be weighed against the costs of heightened communal tensions and further Arab Muslim alienation from the US. A last military option would be to permit Israel to intervene for the internal stability of Lebanon, but a chain reaction of interventions could occur between Arab-Soviet and American forces, which might lead, in turn, to a major war involving the big powers. (See Tab D.)

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Page.....2.....of.....2.....Pages

Robert T. ...

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UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE 1958 AND 1969 CRISES IN LEBANON

The underlying causes of instability in Lebanon in 1958 and 1969, just as in the bloodless revolution or Inkilab (overturn) of 1952, stem from the nature of Middle Eastern and Lebanese society, complicated but not determined by the intermediate factors of Israel's existence, Arab nationalism, and the rivalry between Soviet communism and American democratic capitalism. Although Lebanon is, in some ways, unique in the Middle East because of its mixed religious culture, traditional merchant's role, and democratic constitution, Lebanese democracy has suffered from sectarianism and narrow oligarchic power. Presumably, both sectarianism and oligarchy would create problems for Lebanese politics in the late twentieth century, even without the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Although Lebanon's sectarianism differs from that of other Arab states, in that there is a fairly even mix of Christian and Muslim populations, it is still sectarian. All politics in the Middle East, including Israel's politics, have strong sectarian overtones. But Lebanon's political situation is more sect-ridden than anywhere else in the region: Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox Christians maintain a shaky balance with Sunni, Shi'ia and Druze Muslims. Ecclesiastical leaders and confessional jealousies are in over-abundant supply. In turn, outside powers who have sought influence in Lebanon, including the US whose CIA is proposing to arm the rightist Phalanges Libanaises Christian party, have used these confessional troubles to their own purposes. For a true national viability, Lebanon needs a nationalist rather than confessional leadership. Except for the 1952 executive coup d'etat by the National Socialist Front led by Kamal Jumblatt and Camille Chamoun, which looked for the abolition of confessionalism only to drown in the intricacies of Lebanon's religious balance, most nationalist energies have been led by radical, Nasserist Muslim elements: the latter more often look to Arab unity than Lebanese integrity.

Confessionalism is, in turn, connected with the narrow limits of Lebanon's ruling political class. Since its full independence from France in 1946, Lebanese politics has been virtually a game of musical chairs with but a few leading politicians monopolizing the central stage. Most Lebanese are expected to mind their own business, and pay subservience to various feudal lords, party chieftains and ecclesiastical leaders. Even the socialist, Jumblatt, owed his political career to his leadership of one of the two leading Druze families in Lebanon; his electoral strength was based on the sectarianism of his tenants, whose feudal loyalties have always dictated support of the Jumblatt family.

South of Lebanon lies the State of Israel, whose existence has proved a fine platform for the careers of those challenging traditional, sectarian

(Tab A)

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and oligarchic politics everywhere in the Middle East. Lebanese politics has been no exception, with, ironically, left-wing Arab elites mounting the most virulent attacks against the most socialistic state in the Middle East: Israel. But without Israel, one can only assume that traditional politics would still be challenged in Lebanon. Hence, Israel's existence stands somewhere between a basic cause and an immediate cause for Lebanon's difficulties, responsible in part for the immediate events of 1958 and even more responsible for those of 1969, but in no way the ultimate root of Lebanon's political problems.

Also midway between underlying cause and immediate cause is the march of Arab nationalism in the Middle East. This march goes hand-in-hand with the Arab struggle against Israel, but like the existence of Israel, Arab nationalism goes back into the early twentieth century (if not before). This urge for Arab unity arose out of the Ottoman Empire and European machinations in the Middle East, just as Zionism arose in nineteenth-century Europe, and looked to a Palestine then under Ottoman jurisdiction. Thus, Arab nationalism would still be a factor in Lebanon's history even if Israel did not exist. But Arab unity has achieved a special urgency in the battle with Israel, a battle that sums up in Arab minds the long history of Arab warfare against Western invasions dating back to the Crusades.

Finally, lying somewhere between most basic and most immediate factors for Lebanon's difficulties, is the ubiquitous rivalry between communism and democratic capitalism, chiefly represented in the Middle East by the USSR and US. Russia's traditional aspirations for influence -- even dominance -- in the Middle East and east of Suez, have been countered since 1947 by the United States. Beginning in 1955 with the first arms deal between Egypt and the Soviets, and expanding through Russia's stand with the Arabs in the Suez War of 1956 and June War of 1967, the two big powers have been engaged in moves and countermoves throughout the region.

In summary, underlying Lebanon's difficulties are the following basic and intermediate factors: (a) the two basic socio-political factors of sectarianism and narrow oligarchy; (b) the twentieth-century, expansionist nationalisms represented by Israel's statehood and Arab unity; and (c) the struggle between communism and capitalism.

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IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE 1958 AND 1969 CRISES IN LEBANON

A. 1958

The underlying and intermediate factors behind Lebanon's political difficulties manifested themselves in 1958 in the form of a violent clash between the policies of President Camille Chamoun (who favored his own sect for offices and even wished to succeed himself, contrary to Art. 49 of the Constitution of the Lebanese Republic, 1926, as amended) and the well-organized demands of pro-Nasserist Lebanese Arabs (largely Muslim) for control. The latter were assisted by the Lebanese Army Commander, General Fuad Chehab (a Christian), who chose not to suppress the rebels. This struggle was set against the backdrop of President Eisenhower's Middle East Doctrine, passed by Congressional Joint Resolution in 1957, in response to disturbing developments during the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Great Britain's diminished influence, Soviet intervention). And the struggle also came on the heels of the formation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria on 1 February 1958.

Chamoun and his Foreign Minister, Charles Malik, welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, while pro-Nasserist Arabs in Lebanon hailed the UAR. The USSR encouraged both the UAR and the rebellious Lebanese. The new UAR (Syria, particularly) set to work fanning Lebanese discontent, while the United States, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, speeded planned deliveries of arms to Lebanon, ordered movements of the Sixth Fleet and augmented Marine units in the Mediterranean (steps similar to US moves relating to Jordan and Syria in 1957).

The Lebanese civil war was taken to the United Nations for an airing of Arab differences and then a proposed compromise between Lebanon and the UAR. But events in Iraq changed the picture drastically. The formerly loyal Baghdad Pact power, Iraq, experienced a violent, bloody coup d'etat in mid-1958 which destroyed the Hashemite monarchy. Sensing that Iraq's new radicalism would only intensify pressure against Lebanon from Egypt and Syria, President Eisenhower moved United States Marines into Lebanon in response to a call for assistance from the Lebanese Government. British paratroops landed in Jordan two days later. Amidst familiar war scares from the USSR, the UAR's President Nasser displayed unusual caution, and the crisis faded after bitter US-Soviet debates and lengthy negotiations which finally ended in an American-sponsored Arab compromise whereby General Chehab became the next President of the Republic, succeeding Chamoun.

B. 1969

Just as the 1958 Lebanese crisis occurred against the backdrop of the 1956 Suez crisis, a war won in startling fashion by Israel only to be forced by the pressure of world opinion (chiefly the US) to withdraw, so the 1969 Lebanese crisis occurs against the 1967 June War with another smashing Israeli

(Tab B)

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victory, only this time without being forced back from its occupied territories. The 1967 war brought to life, from what previously was only sporadic, disorganized activity, the Arab Palestinian liberation or fedayeen organizations. The new manifestations of Palestinian anger go back to the founding of Israel in 1948, but recent Israeli successes have demonstrated to those guerrilla leaders interested in establishing a genuine Palestinian state, the necessity of mounting their own warfare against Israel. Hence, the fedayeen constitute a new element in Lebanon's 1969 crisis, with all the old 1958 elements still present as well. In varying degrees, the fedayeen are supported by all Arab states, the USSR and Communist China.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the agency responsible for the refugees, registered a total of 1,364,294 refugees as of 30 June 1968 in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. The largest number (494,000) are in the East Bank of Jordan. About 175,000 have been twice displaced. In addition to the UNRWA-registered refugees, there are about 246,000 displaced persons cared for by the Government of Jordan, and about 100,000 by the Government of Syria. Israel has made modest efforts since 1967 to return some Arabs from the East Bank to the West Bank. Arab states have generally opposed absorption of these refugees into their national citizenships. The approximately 100,000 refugees living in Lebanon have no national citizenship, their only visible representatives being the estimated 2,000 fedayeen commandos in Lebanon (there is movement of fedayeen combatants back-and-forth between Lebanon, Syria and Jordan). In moving forcefully against these commandos, President Helou has stirred up all the pressures of the 1958 crisis, plus having to deal with the insurgents themselves. In the absence of some compromise with pro-Nasserist Muslim Arabs and fedayeen representatives, Helou must rule by sheer force. A fragile compromise which will probably allow the fedayeen greater freedom of operation in southern Lebanon, has been negotiated in Cairo.

Aside from the new fedayeen presence, three other new elements exist in the 1969 Lebanese crisis: (a) a newly expanded Israel confidently exerting pressure on fedayeen groups in southern Lebanon; (b) a US presence, now very much maligned by the Arabs for America's alleged pro-Israel policies, and a presence restrained by the Vietnam War; and (c) an expanded Soviet military and political presence which qualitatively as well as quantitatively exceeds its 1958 position in the Middle East.

In summary, the immediate causes of the 1958 and 1969 crises in Lebanon are similar in terms of exacerbated relations between moderate Lebanese leaders and pro-Nasserist Lebanese, American concern for Lebanon's territorial integrity, Soviet efforts to capitalize on the situation, and Israel's successful warfare against the Arabs. But in 1969, four new immediate factors must be added to explain the current crisis: (a) an organized Palestinian fedayeen movement; (b) an expanded Israel exerting pressure against southern Lebanon; (c) a drastically curtailed US political-military presence in the Arab Middle East; and (d) a significantly improved Soviet political-military position in the region.

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US GOALS AND INTERESTS IN THE AREA

US goals and interests in the Middle East remain substantially the same in 1969 as they were in 1958. This static quality of American foreign policy in this region runs the risk of losing contact with the new realities of an expanded Israel, an organized fedayeen movement, the increased physical presence of the USSR, and America's own diminishing military and political capabilities in the Arab Middle East.

As in 1958, America's policy toward Lebanon is built around the following considerations: (a) concern for US citizens; (b) a moderate regime in Beirut; and (c) Lebanon's territorial integrity. American concern about these matters today is again framed against the backdrop of a successful Israeli action in a full-scale war with the Arabs, with accompanying Arab xenophobia, Soviet machination, and Israeli militancy.

Beyond Lebanon, American interests remain much the same in the Middle East: (a) competition with the USSR without being dragged into a major war; and (b) economic, cultural and strategic interests relating to indigenous powers in the Middle East.

But times have changed. Israel has kept its occupied territories after the 1967 war, and gives few signs of giving anything back to the Arabs on terms acceptable to the Arabs.

Israeli occupation has, in turn, unleashed a new wave of bitterness, demonstrated in the fedayeen attacks and unprecedented Arab assaults on the United States. The Palestinian refugees have now found their own vehicle for expressing their despair -- the fedayeen -- whereas before 1967, they relied chiefly on self-styled spokesmen from various Arab nations, spokesmen of high moral resolve who were, nevertheless, unwilling to allow the refugees a national home in one of their own states. Realizing the danger of becoming pawns in the hands of inter-Arab rivalries and possible Arab accommodations with Israel, every fedayeen spokesman has rejected the idea of any territorial "settlement" in which the Palestinian masses will not be allowed to form their own state in old Palestine. (Most also add that this state will be an Arab-Jewish federation, but the destruction of Israel as an exclusively Jewish state is mandatory from the fedayeen point of view.)

Meanwhile, the USSR has increased its physical presence in the Middle East in military and economic terms.

American prestige in the area has hit an all-time low. United States military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is curtailed from much expansion beyond present Sixth Fleet levels by events in Southeast Asia, while America's resolve for world leadership is now tempered by second thoughts at home.

(Tab C)

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In summary, America's policy toward Lebanon in both 1958 and 1969 has as its goals the following considerations: (a) concern for US citizens; (b) a moderate regime in Beirut; and (c) Lebanon's territorial integrity. American concern about these matters, in both 1958 and 1969, has been framed against the background of a successful Israeli action in a full-scale war with the Arabs. Beyond Lebanon, American interests remain much the same in 1958 and 1969: (a) competition with the USSR without being dragged into a major war; and (b) economic, cultural and strategic interests relating to indigenous powers in the Middle East. But between 1958 and 1969, the following crucial changes should be injected into American Middle East policy, though so far a new policy has not emerged: (a) the central role of the fedayeen as representatives of Palestinian nationalism; (b) Israel's newly expanded frontiers with little evidence that anything will be given back to the Arabs on terms acceptable to the Arabs; (c) an improved Soviet strength in the Middle East on both political-military and economic fronts; and (d) a diminished American prestige in the Arab Middle East accompanied by decreased American capability to intervene in Lebanon.

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OPTIONS, COSTS AND RISKS FACING THE UNITED STATES
IN 1958 AND 1969

Diplomatic Options.

American foreign policy was in much better shape in the Middle East in 1958 than in 1969, because in the earlier period the US had diplomatic options as well as military ones. Under such circumstances, military intervention could be accompanied by the necessary political activity, on a bilateral level with the relevant Arab countries, to make such intervention something more than pure force.

During the crises of 1955 and 1956 in the Middle East, President Eisenhower refused to sell arms to Israel, even though Egypt had by then entered arms agreements with the USSR. Although there has never been a great reservoir of good feeling in Arab nationalist circles for the United States, American foreign policy under John Foster Dulles strove to balance American interests in the Middle East with particular emphasis on encouraging Arab states, in spite of our interventions, to compromise issues among themselves. Using direct political relations with states like Egypt -- relations unavailable today -- US diplomats took a leading role in the eventual Lebanese compromise during 1958.

In the 1960s, the American position among the Arabs has deteriorated, as US policy seems to be backing into Israel's corner. Since June, 1967, seven Arab states have broken diplomatic relations with the US. Perhaps this trend toward exclusive support of Israel is inevitable, given increased Soviet military assistance to the Arabs; perhaps not. But the results have tended in the same direction, whatever the reasons: Soviet influence has grown among the Arabs, and American options have become restricted to keeping hands off or to intervening in some military way, such as the sale of arms or direct use of force.

The United Nations -- in 1958 a dependable forum for articulating American interests and airing Arab differences -- has now become a superb platform for both Soviet and Arab attacks on the United States. Not since the days of Andrei Vishinsky has the US been charged with so much imperialistic mischief as present Arab spokesmen claim against American Middle East policy. Whereas in 1958 Arab disunity was much in evidence, today the watchword is Arab unity against Israel and the US -- a unity and an animosity supported by other nations in the Afro-Asian bloc.

American diplomatic channels remain open with the USSR, UK, and France. Present US efforts are directed toward achieving a common four-power position on settlement in the Middle East which will form the framework for Gunnar Jarring to carry out his work of peacemaking between the Arabs and Israelis.

(Tab D)

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While there might be some limited results toward a temporary armistice between Israel and the UAR, US efforts will not touch the Lebanese crisis unless decisions are made to bring the Soviets into Lebanon as peacemakers. In point of fact, the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut is already scoring propaganda points for his work on bringing peace between warring factions, but formal US acknowledgment of Soviet influence in Lebanon would run counter to the American interest in maintaining a moderate Lebanon. In neighboring Jordan, the Soviets will soon have a military attache at Amman, and the Jordanians will negotiate with the USSR for long-range artillery and anti-aircraft weapons. The Soviets have virtually assumed the role of the leading third-party peacemaker in Arab disputes -- a role held by the United States in 1958.

Military Options.

Military supply in response to requests from the present Lebanese Government is still a possibility. Such supplies could be used to combat internal insurgency or to inhibit outside aggression. Aside from the unpopular nature of counterinsurgency in the Arab world, and in a vocal segment of American public opinion, this is a matter of "too little, too late." For several years, the US and Lebanon have been negotiating arms packages of this sort, and just recently Lebanon finally agreed to buy 40 jeeps cleared long ago for sale by the US. But there has not been a systematic supply of Lebanon's defense needs -- either internal or external defense. The Lebanese Army, which fully mobilized would amount to 18,000 troops, is capable of maintaining internal security assuming no interference by outside powers and the absence of a sectarian issue which would split the army. Neither assumption is very realistic. Personnel and units are well trained by Middle East standards, but training is no substitute for capacity: the Lebanese Army could not stave off a Syrian or Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and it is likely that sectarian issues would soon surface if the army kept up its pressure on the fedayeen. Costs and risks accruing to the United States from any accelerated and determined military supply program to the Lebanese Army are the familiar ones of being branded as pro-Israeli and imperialistic. On the other hand, the United States already endures such epithets in the Middle East, so an increase in regular military supply to Lebanon might be the best military option under circumstances of the lesser evil.

The United States could use the Sixth Fleet in more or less the same fashion as in 1958. But in 1969, this military option has shrunk in its capabilities, and expanded in its costs and risks. Today's Sixth Fleet has only one Marine amphibious battalion (approximately 1600 men) with little prospect for the same augmentation of this amphibious force as was achieved in 1958. Further, anti-submarine protection (vital, given the eleven Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean [as of 3 November]) would require ASW units from the Atlantic defense of CONUS. United States relations with Turkey, and perhaps with Greece, are such in 1969 that the Sixth Fleet does not have a freedom of action in the Eastern Mediterranean necessary for continued

(Tab D)

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support and augmentation of air or land elements, to say nothing of trying to use facilities in either country for the USAF. Cyprus is now an independent state, with its own reservations about supporting American intervention in the Middle East. Spain, Italy, Corsica and North Africa are out of the question as staging areas for any Middle East intervention by the US.

Without an adequate political justification for employing the Sixth Fleet (putting to one side the issue of evacuating American citizens), this option might also lead to unpredictable Soviet military gestures through their Mediterranean fleet and/or air-land intervention. The seriousness of such a confrontation is made all the worse by the fact that the Sixth Fleet is armed with conventional and nuclear weapons, and the Soviets could choose a nuclear counterthreat to American intervention, instead of a conventional military response in the Middle East. This would be even more probable if, as some Soviet analysts argue, the USSR is verging on a new adventuristic doctrine which argues that it can win a nuclear war. Aside from the risks of such a confrontation, US intervention would conjure up even more extreme Arab reactions than we have yet experienced, if that is possible.

Now, perhaps more than in 1958, undercover supply of arms by the CIA has become an attractive option for some. But this support to the Christian Phalanges (Falange), justified to maintain internal order and to protect Christians against Muslims, is no solution to Lebanon's internal problems, any more than it is a boost to US influence in the Middle East. On the contrary, such a form of "military" intervention (actually paramilitary intervention) is only a symptom of the impotence of America's more established political and military options in the Middle East. Such assistance might encourage covertly that violent form of communal sectarianism we have discouraged officially in Lebanon.

A last military option would be to permit Israel to intervene for the internal stability of Lebanon. On the surface, the US position would be one of "concern" and "regret" that Israel had done this, but we would make no moves to stop this intervention. Again, there are some half-cynical proponents of this option. While this option would probably release the United States from immediate intervention in Lebanon, a chain of events could develop which would pull American military forces into a much larger war in the Middle East. Israeli movement into either Lebanon or Syria almost certainly would be countered by Arab-Soviet military measures, which in turn would raise new military issues in the United States. It is just this sort of chain reaction -- somewhat similar to the uncontrolled events of 1914 -- which could bring the big powers into a head-on war.

In summary, America's standard political and military options are more severely limited in 1969 than in 1958. Politically, normal diplomatic

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
channels between the Arabs and the US are very restricted today. Negotiations on the Middle East are now taking place between the US and the USSR, but to introduce Lebanon into these talks would give American legitimacy to Soviet influence in the moderate Arab states (already a de facto influence in Soviet Embassy efforts in Beirut and in recent word that Jordan is negotiating for artillery with the USSR). Militarily, limited military supply of the Lebanese Government is still an option, perhaps the most attractive military option. Open armed intervention can be attempted by the US, but the costs and risks of intervention by military means today would be borne almost wholly by the military, given the absence of normal diplomatic relations with the Arab world. In this political vacuum, military force would become sheer force, with further costs to American prestige (particularly to our military prestige) and consequent risk that the Soviets would meet such force with unpredictable military gestures of their own. Covert supply of arms by the CIA in support of the Phalanges Libanaises (Falange) is attractive to some, but it is symptomatic of the failure of normal foreign policy: the benefits of this support (ostensibly to maintain internal order and to protect Christians against Muslims) should be weighed against the costs of heightened communal tensions and further Arab Muslim alienation from the US. A last military option would be to permit Israel to intervene for the internal stability of Lebanon, but a chain reaction of interventions might occur between Soviet-Arab and American forces, which could lead, in turn, to a major war. Before either of the last two options are chosen, another Middle East policy might be considered -- one that takes into account new realities.

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LATEST SIXTH FLEET LOCATIONS AS OF 031200 EST SOURCE :CINCUSNAVEUR



TG 60.2
 COLUMBUS CG-12
 (COMCRUDESFLT 2)
 SARATOGA CVA-60
 MACDONOUGH DLG-8
 N. K. PERRY DD-883
 NORRIS DD-859
 C. H. ROWAN DD-853
 SELLERS DDG-II
 AULT (DD-698)

TG 61.1
 FRANCIS MARION LPA-249
 (COMPHIBRON 4)
 (CO BLT 1/6)
 RANKIN LKA-103
 DONNER LSD-20
 FORT SNELLING LSD-30
 YORK COUNTY LST-1175

TG 60.1
 LITTLE ROCK CLG-4
 (COMSIXTHFLT)
 J. F. KENNEDY CVA-67
 (COMCARDIV 2)
 SEMMES DDG-18
 STICKELL DD-888
 SAMPSON DDG-10
 JOHNSTON DD-821
 CONE DD-866
 MCCARD DD-822
 GEARING DD-710

ESTIMATED LOCATION OF
 TG 60.2 AT 031600 EST
 ENROUTE TO RELIEVE TG 60.1

USS GAINARD (DD 706)
 ENROUTE TO JOIN TG 60.2
 TG 61.1
 AT SOUDA BAY ON 4 HOUR NOTICE
 TG 60.1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LEB
ACTION 4912
November 28, 1969

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *K*
SUBJECT: Arms for the Lebanese Government

President Helou has asked whether the US could help re-equip his armed forces with modern rifles in order to provide them with firepower equal to the Soviet weapons used by the fedayeen.

This would involve about 10,000 M-14 rifles and a subsidy of up to \$1 million, perhaps diverting from US Army reserves. Nevertheless, the consensus at my meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group was to provide these weapons if we could.

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your agreement in principle to this action.

The argument for doing this is that the Lebanese army has handled itself creditably against the fedayeen and is the government's main support. Rather than wait until Lebanon is in chaos and the US is faced with the very difficult question of intervention, it makes sense to provide all the help possible now to keep the government in control. Even the Israelis would like to see the US help Helou.

The arguments against are that it does not help the Lebanese government to be over-identified with the US and that, if the breakdown of the Lebanese government is a strong likelihood, we would be arming a hopeless cause.

However, Helou has asked for the equipment and should be the best judge of whether he can stand the identification. As long as the moderate government can hold its own, it seems sensible to do what we can to help.

Recommendation: That you agree in principle that we should offer to help if it is technically feasible.

Agree *[Signature]*

Disagree _____

SECRET/NODIS *DEC 6 1969*

Historical File

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

4912

SECRET/NODIS

November 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *HS*

SUBJECT: Rifles for Lebanon

You promised the WSAG to seek the President's agreement in principle Tuesday for providing M-14 rifles to Lebanon.

Recommendation: That you use the attached memo for this purpose.

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

3931
3945

3931
ALSO 3945

*Return to
Saunders*

November 26, 1969

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Paper on Lebanon

You asked me to revise the attached memo on Lebanon and I have done so.

However, in view of the fact that this will be in the NSC next week, I wonder whether you might not wish to let this die.

Yes

NOV 28 1969

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3945
3931

Saunders
ACTION

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

October 28, 1969

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal* 

*for retype
& review*

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on Lebanon

You asked for a memo to send the President on Lebanon. He had asked what our policy options are in a note on the daily brief over the weekend. The attached (Tab A) is written to lay out the elements of the problem in a broad way prior to a more detailed look at the options in the WSAG.

I am also attaching for you (Tab B) a summary of Secretary Rogers' first three situation reports for the President on Lebanon. As I mentioned to you, they bunched up over the weekend because they backed up on his desk. We had covered the same ground in the daily brief. Monday's memo came through on Monday and we used it as a backup item for the brief. Although it was about eight hours behind by the time we got it, it provided a reasonable overview of the situation. I shall continue to handle those memos that way.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATIONSECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Reflections on Lebanon

I shall be reporting to you later in greater detail on our options should the Lebanese crisis worsen. However, in response to your query penned on the daily intelligence brief, I owe you some preliminary views on the main elements in the situation and the contingencies likely to arise from it.

As it says in the last para

The root of the Lebanese problem lies in broadening support for the fedayeen as Arab frustration over the Arab-Israeli impasse has deepened. The fedayeen movement has two objectives--first, recovery of conquered territory and re-establishment of Palestine; second, for at least some of the fedayeen groups, eventual overthrow of moderate governments. ~~The alarming aspect of the current crisis is that it gives~~ the leftist Syrian government the opportunity to use the fedayeen to mobilize sentiment against the moderate Lebanese government under cover of pressing the Arab cause against Israel.

The US is handicapped by being regarded as the prime supper of Israeli expansion. President Helou has declared, at least for public consumption, that he is not thinking of inviting outside intervention; he would regard that as "high treason". Given the way the issues are framed, US intervention on behalf of the Helou government would--in Arab eyes--be the intervention of Israel's supporter to save a traitor president from the champions of the Arab cause. This framing of the issues partly determines the latitude of our options.

Likely Outcomes

The most likely outcome of this situation is a negotiated settlement between Helou and the fedayeen. Helou will have to compromise. This will give the Fedayeen greater freedom to operate against Israel from southern Lebanon. That will add a third active front for the Israelis to cope with and bring Lebanon into the cycle of guerilla attack and Israeli retaliation.

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The next step back from a negotiated settlement would be military rule. This could work for a time, but the army over time might begin to split along Christian-Moslem lines.

In either of these cases, the Lebanese establishment would be preserved for a time. But mounting violence on the Israeli border would soon face the government with new policy decisions that would put it on the spot again.

Should Helou be unable to go on or the army split on religious grounds, the door would be open to a takeover by leftist parties bent on upsetting the present delicate Christian-Moslem constitutional balance. This could even lead to Christian-Moslem civil war.

Finally, there is the possibility of overt invasion by Syria. The Syrians have played an active role in backing the fedayeen infiltrators, but irregulars in large numbers or even regular units could create a new situation. Lebanese security forces probably cannot fight an invasion and maintain control of the cities at the same time. A Syrian invasion could be complicated by either an Israeli move into southern Lebanon or an Israeli drive on Damascus to divert Syria.

US Intervention

My contingency planning group, therefore, is working out illustrative plans to show the feasibility and costs of US intervention for three purposes:

1. evacuating Americans;
2. preserving the moderate government or protecting the Christian community;
3. reacting to foreign invasion.

I shall report to you later in the week the judgments which come out of their exercise. What is most striking so far to all involved is the extent to which today's situation differs from 1958:

--Then, we were riding a crest of Arab approbation, having denounced Israeli aggression in 1956 and arranged Israeli withdrawal in 1957. Today we remain in Arab eyes not only supporters of Israel's security but backers of Israel's expansion.

--The President of Lebanon in 1958 requested intervention. While Helou has asked what we might do, he hesitates even to ask for UN action. Any intervention would be read as pro-Zionist.

--In 1958, the operation was militarily feasible. Today, initial airlifted landings would probably still be possible, but sustaining them logistically over time or reinforcing them would require diversion of support or even units from Vietnam. *The only secret claim staying area is Athens*

--In 1958, US intervention could be justified by our friends as being on the side of moderation against Nasserism. Today it would be viewed as on the side of Zionism and against justice for the Palestinian and Arab peoples.

Conclusion

One tentative conclusion which I shall be testing throughout this exercise is the thought that we have now reached a point in the Middle East where our ability to influence major developments is severely limited as long as we seem to be the backers of Israeli expansion.

As the Arabs see us--regardless of our intent--the US has made a major shift in Mid-East policy. After twenty years of a policy designed to build a broadly based position in the area that encompassed all our interests including Israel's survival, they see us now as writing off the Arab world and building our Mid-East strategy exclusively around Israel. They have read Mrs. Meir's satisfaction in her visit here--among other things--as a US commitment of full economic and military aid (despite our background statements that no decisions have been made). As a result, the US is the enemy regardless of the issue at hand.

If this thought proves to have merit, then the main problem for us in approaching the Lebanese crisis would be to re-position ourselves in the Mid-East so that we are seen more broadly as supporting Israel's security along with our other interests in the area--and not Israel's expansion. I recognize that this is politically complex and difficult, but if it is correct to view the problem in these terms, there may be ways to manage it.

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Main Points in Secretary Rogers' Reports on Lebanon
October 23 - 25, 1969

1. Direct involvement by the Syrian Government is evident. Syrian forces or Syrian backed guerrillas control two border areas in northern Lebanon, two border villages in the southeast and an administrative center in southern Lebanon. Guerrillas also control about half of Tripoli.
2. President Helou has decided that he will have to compromise with the fedayeen. In trying to form a government to cope with the crisis, however, he appears to be trying to avoid capitulation. His efforts in taking the crisis to the Arab League Council might be the face-saving course of action in making concessions to the fedayeen. It is expected that Helou will be reprimanded for his actions. The Arab League could provide a later forum for mediation should the present intra-Lebanese efforts fail.
3. We believe that the Lebanese security forces can keep control of the situation, and that the government of Lebanon could cope with the crisis were external pressures on it removed. Breakdown of civil order would be the cause for serious actions against American interests and individuals -- orchestrated by the fedayeen -- as well as confessional in-fighting. As yet, there is no indication of the need to evacuate Americans. Additionally, responsible Christian and Moslem leaders are meeting together to find a way out.
4. US options are limited to intensive diplomatic activity: the US is viewed as being "in Israel's pocket" and over-seeing efforts to roll back the fedayeen; anti-American sentiment is running at an all-time high; intervention would be inflammatory at this time and would weaken the position of the moderates in Lebanon; a show of force (via the Sixth Fleet) is senseless if we are not planning to intervene militarily; premature moves through the UN Security Council or General Assembly would weaken President Helou's internal efforts to solve the crisis.

SECRET/EXDIS

5. Our option of diplomatic activity to encourage a Four Power Call for restraint would have a calming effect. Such a call would be to all parties concerned (Arab states, fedayeen, Israelis) to refrain from actions which exacerbate the present crisis. Given the image of the French in the Arab world, we are endeavoring to have the French initiate this action.

been

Supplementing the above, we have/diplomatically active as regards individual parties. We have asked the British and French to use their goodwill in the radical capitals of Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo to take the heat off Lebanon. We have asked the Egyptians to cease trouble-making in Lebanon. We have asked the Israelis to cooperate in restraint and to end unhelpful statements.

7. The Arabs are working on solutions on several fronts: (1) intra-Lebanese efforts between President Helou and Lebanese political leaders; (2) inter-Arab efforts by Kuwait and through the Arab League. These are complicated by the radical pressure by Syria.
8. [State's judgment on British and French reactions to our activity ("reserved") and Soviet attitudes toward the crisis (sitting this one out) has been overtaken by events since the weekend Rogers' report. The British are making their own representations; the French have rejected the Four Power concept and are acting unilaterally. The Tass statement has appeared and according to latest intelligence reports (October 28) the Soviets have officially asked the Syrian Government not to take any action in Lebanon.]

SECRET/EXDIS



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

16428

October 23, 1969

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon

Lebanon is faced with the worst threat to its independence and integrity since the crisis of 1958 that brought the nation to the verge of civil war. Since the June 1967 war, tensions have been building up in all the Arab nations as a result of frustration over their defeat and their inability to regain lost territory. A direct product of this was the emergence of Arab guerrillas (fedayeen) determined to regain their lost land. These groups appeared more recently in Lebanon, and, despite the efforts of the Lebanese Government, the fedayeen have firmly entrenched themselves in the southern part of the country.

The mere presence of fedayeen in Lebanon has constituted a threat to the country's stability. Most importantly, their forays into Israel occasion Israeli military retaliation, which weakens the hold of the moderates in Lebanon and makes the fedayeen more popular. Other factors in addition have exacerbated the situation. Among them were the recent widespread reports of U.S. personnel serving in the Israeli Army and delivery of Phantom aircraft to the already superior Israeli Air Force. Then, on

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October 15 a group of fedayeen attempted to move out of the area in which they had been confined by the Lebanese Army. The confrontation was perhaps inevitable, but the Lebanese Government was determined not to relinquish its sovereignty and a clash occurred in which a number of fedayeen and Lebanese soldiers were killed. This instantly inflamed emotions both in Lebanon and in the other Arab countries. Although radical Arab governments, such as those of Syria and the UAR, immediately began adding fuel to the fire, the popular Arab reaction to the Lebanese Government's confrontation with the fedayeen was spontaneous, and we have no reason to believe it was orchestrated. Syrian forces have actually attacked three Lebanese border posts, and the Iraqi, UAR, Libyan and Algerian Governments have verbally attacked the Lebanese Government for its actions in suppressing the fedayeen.

The Lebanese Government has announced that it will take the crisis to the Arab League Council. It is possible that the Government will use this course of action as a face-saving means of making concessions to the fedayeen and thereby removing the pressures being placed on it. The fact that Nasser sent a letter to President Helou urging that he refrain from attacks against the fedayeen is a key indication that the Arab League Council will reprimand Helou for his actions.

If Lebanese security forces are unable to control the domestic situation, there may be a breakdown of public order. This could lead quickly to widespread fighting between Christian and Muslim groups. Given the Syrian Government's performance to date, we cannot rule out a Syrian invasion. This in turn might alarm the Israelis sufficiently to cause them to seize southern Lebanon.

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It is possible that President Helou will manage somehow to keep things under reasonably good control, perhaps by inviting the Lebanese Army to take over and impose martial law. This, however, would only be a short-term expedient. It is more likely that he will be forced by events to make major concessions to the fedayeen in order to call them off and that in the process make Lebanon into another Jordan. This would involve rising and continued border tensions with Israel and mounting internal extremist influence.



William P. Rogers

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

3945

S/S 16469

October 24, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon

The situation in Lebanon is somewhat less alarming today than it was when I reported to you yesterday. President Helou is now trying to form a small cabinet, and Lebanese Army morale remains high. Nevertheless, we still regard the situation as serious and potentially dangerous to western interests as well as to the prospects of an Arab-Israeli settlement. While Syrian pressures remain, reports of Syrian military concentrations on the Lebanese border are exaggerated.

The Lebanese Government has imposed a curfew on all major cities beginning 6:00 a.m. this morning Beirut time. There had been threats of demonstrations in defiance of the curfew, but the only ones that have taken place were in the northern town of Tripoli. These were quickly quelled. There have been no further reports of clashes between Lebanese forces and Arab guerrillas in the south nor have there been further clashes on the Lebanese-Syrian border. In spite of the curfew and tension, we have been advised that international airlines are continuing normal services to Beirut.

Our Embassy in Beirut reports that anti-American feeling in Lebanon is running at an all time high. Fortunately, it has not yet focused on individual

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Americans or American installations. At the moment the Embassy does not recommend evacuation of Americans, nor do we think it is indicated at this time. The only incident reported to date was the explosion of a bomb some 100 yards from the Embassy. Lebanese security authorities in Beirut have a tight grip on the situation, and we believe they will continue to do so.

Our estimate of the situation is that if external pressures can be removed the Lebanese Government has a good chance of coping with the situation and bringing rebellious elements under control. We think the pressures are being reduced, and we note that the UAR Ambassador in Lebanon is counselling moderation among the Moslems. Otherwise, there is a distinct danger that continued pressures could produce civil strife. This in turn could present a danger of direct intervention by Syria or Israel or both. In the meantime, Lebanon has taken its complaint over the situation to the Arab League. Hopefully, this will provide a forum wherein the issue can be worked out in an inter-Arab context.

While the political realities of the area sharply limit what we can do to defuse the Lebanese situation, we have nevertheless embarked on a round of intensive diplomatic activity. We have called in the British Ambassador and the French Chargé to ask that their governments use their goodwill in the radical capitals of Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo to take the heat off Lebanon. We also called in Egyptian Minister Ghorbal and asked that the Egyptians cease their troublemaking in Lebanon. At the same time, we urged the Israeli Minister that any action on the part of the Israelis would further exacerbate the situation. Instructions were sent to our Embassy in Tel Aviv to make a parallel demarche there. Also, we have made representations to the Israeli Government over Deputy Prime Minister Allon's unhelpful public statement that Israel cannot stand idle if there is a change for the worse in Lebanon. While we

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understand the pressures on Israeli leaders in an election campaign to speak out, such statements become new lightening rods for the fedayeen. There is evidence that some resentment among all Lebanese nationalists is mounting over indirect and potentially direct Syrian involvement, and Israeli statements only tend to make such feeling more diffuse.

We believe that a Four-Power call for all concerned in the current tense situation -- both governments and guerrillas -- to exercise maximum restraint would be helpful. Such a statement, if we can get it, would have a calming effect on the area. Because of the anti-American sentiment in the area, we think that the initiative for such a Four-Power call might better be undertaken by the French. Accordingly, instructions were cabled to our Embassy in Paris; we are awaiting Pompidou's reaction. We have not yet approached the Soviets directly nor are we certain at this point that it would be productive to do so. Soviet willingness or unwillingness to join in such a Four-Power statement will provide a test of its present intentions.



William P. Rogers



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 16547

October 25, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon

The situation in Lebanon as of Saturday noon (Washington time) has not improved and in many ways it is worse. Guerrilla forces control approximately half of the northern city of Tripoli. Syrian forces or Syrian-backed guerrillas or both have occupied two border areas in northern Lebanon and two border villages in the southeast. Guerrillas have seized the gendarmerie post in an administrative center in southern Lebanon. The guerrillas have Syrian backing and there is direct Syrian Government involvement.

The Lebanese Government is trying to maintain control of the situation and evidently still imposes a curfew on major cities. President Helou is trying to form a government to cope with the crisis. He has decided that it is necessary for him to compromise with the guerrillas, but he apparently is trying to avoid capitulation. Responsible Lebanese leaders, both Christian and Muslim, are obviously alarmed at the magnitude of the crisis and have met together to try to find a way out.

There are three principal areas in which a solution is being sought:

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(a) Internal Lebanese efforts. President Helou and the Lebanese political leaders are trying to work out the difficulties themselves primarily within a Lebanese context, though the increasing pressure from radical Arab states, and particularly from the Syrians, is making this extremely difficult.

(b) Area efforts. Lebanon has brought its case to the attention of the Arab League which may at a later stage provide a forum for mediation if present intra-Lebanese efforts fail. Also, Kuwait has been active in seeking a solution.

(c) Four-Power effort. We sought agreement of the French to take the lead on a Four-Power statement calling on all concerned (Arab states, fedayeen, and Israelis) to refrain from actions which would deepen the crisis. Both the French and the British have been very reserved, being satisfied to let us take the heat in the area. The French also found the Soviets cool, which means the latter are not ready to join in any public quadripartite effort which would help cool off the situation.

Our options are quite limited in the present situation. We have given consideration to whether any moves by the Sixth Fleet as a show of force might be helpful; we do not believe so, particularly since we have no intention of intervening militarily. Furthermore, the fleet would be an inflammatory element which would not be helpful politically. As for action in the UN Security Council or the General Assembly, we believe that premature moves would only undermine President Helou's internal efforts.

As for Israel, we have advised the Israeli Government to avoid any action that might exacerbate the situation as well as unhelpful statements. The UAR, we understand, is preparing to intensify its press

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campaign against Lebanon. Helou has received a second letter from Nasser and Helou's present judgment is that Nasser could be helpful. We are not sure that he is right.

Soviet press reaction to developments in Lebanon gives the impression that, while there are possibilities for anti-American propaganda gains, the Soviets would prefer to avoid a situation which would develop into a US-USSR confrontation. As indicated above, they apparently prefer to let present currents evolve in the area.

There does not appear to be any immediate danger to United States citizens at this particular time. We have a report of a threat to attack the American Cultural Center in Beirut, but we believe that the Lebanese security forces can control the situation.

WPR

William P. Rogers

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

3931

3945

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT: Reflections on Lebanon

We shall be discussing in the NSC in greater detail our options should the Lebanese crisis worsen again. However, you might wish to consider some preliminary views on the main elements in the situation and the contingencies likely to arise from it.

The root of the Lebanese problem lies in broadening support for the fedayeen as Arab frustration over the Arab-Israeli impasse has deepened. The fedayeen movement has two objectives--first, recovery of conquered territory and re-establishment of Palestine; second, for at least some of the fedayeen groups, eventual overthrow of moderate governments. The current crisis has its immediate origin in the fact that the leftist Syrian government has the opportunity to use the fedayeen to mobilize sentiment against the moderate Lebanese government under cover of pressing the Arab cause against Israel.

The US is handicapped by being regarded as the prime supporter of Israel expansion. President Helou has declared, at least for public consumption, that he is not thinking of inviting outside intervention; he would regard that as "high treason." Given the way the issues are framed, US intervention on behalf of the Helou government would--in Arab eyes--be the intervention of Israel's supporter to save a traitor president from the champions of the Arab cause. This framing of the issues partly determines the latitude of our options.

Likely Outcomes

The most likely outcome of this situation is a series of negotiated settlements between Helou and the fedayeen. Helou will have to continue to compromise. This will continue to give the fedayeen greater freedom to operate against Israel from southern Lebanon. That will add a third active front for the Israelis to cope with and bring Lebanon into the cycle of guerilla attack and Israeli retaliation.

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- 2 -

The next step back from a negotiated settlement would be military rule. This could work for a time, but the army over time might begin to split along Christian-Moslem lines.

In either of these cases, the Lebanese establishment would be preserved for a time. But mounting violence on the Israeli border would soon face the government with new policy decisions that would put it on the spot again.

Should Helou be unable to go on or the army split on religious grounds, the door would be open to a takeover by leftist parties bent on upsetting the present delicate Christian-Moslem constitutional balance. This could even lead to Christian-Moslem civil war.

Finally, there is the possibility of overt invasion by Syria. The Syrians have played an active role in backing the fedayeen infiltrators, but irregulars in large numbers or even regular units could create a new situation. Lebanese security forces probably cannot fight an invasion and maintain control of the cities at the same time. A Syrian invasion could be complicated by either an Israeli move into southern Lebanon or an Israeli drive on Damascus to divert Syria.

US Intervention

My contingency planning group, therefore, is working out illustrative plans to show the feasibility and costs of US intervention for three purposes:

1. evacuating Americans;
2. preserving the moderate government or protecting the Christian community;
3. reacting to foreign invasion.

I shall report to you later in the week the judgments which come out of their exercise. What is most striking so far to all involved is the extent to which today's situation differs from 1958:

--Then, we were riding a crest of Arab approbation, having denounced Israeli aggression in 1956 and arranged Israeli withdrawal in 1957. Today we remain in Arab eyes not only supporters of Israel's security but backers of Israel's expansion.

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- 3 -

--The President of Lebanon in 1958 requested intervention. While Helou has asked what we might do, he hesitates even to ask for UN action. Any intervention would be read as pro-Zionist.

--In 1958, the operation was militarily feasible. Today, initial airlifted landings would probably still be possible, but sustaining them logistically over time or reinforcing them would require diversion of support or even units from Vietnam. We are not certain of having the necessary staging bases in the Mediterranean area.

--In 1958, US intervention could be justified by our friends as being on the side of moderation against Nasserism. Today it would be viewed as on the side of Zionism and against justice for the Palestinian and Arab peoples.

In short, the Lebanon problem must be seen in the broader context of the Mid-East which we shall be discussing in the NSC.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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16867

October 31, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Renewed Clashes in Lebanon
But Mediation Continues

The uneasy calm in Lebanon was disturbed yesterday by renewed clashes in the southeastern part of the country between Lebanese Army units and fedayeen forces. Lebanese Government sources have also reported a fedayeen attack with rockets and artillery on a Lebanese Air Force base north of Tripoli. There were minor clashes at the American University of Beirut between pro and anti-fedayeen student factions. Nevertheless, the University has reportedly resumed classes. In other parts of the country the situation remained under control, and limited curfew hours remain only in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli.

General Emil Boustani, Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Armed Forces, has been negotiating with UAR officials in Cairo for two days. An Egyptian spokesman has announced an ambiguous formula that the Lebanese have agreed to freedom of fedayeen activity on Lebanese territory, providing it does not threaten Lebanese security or territorial integrity. This has not been confirmed, and the precise state of the negotiations remains unclear. Fedayeen leader Arafat and the Syrian Government continue to take a hard line toward the Lebanese.

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We fully expect the fedayeen, Syrian and other radicals will continue to exert heavy pressure on the Lebanese in order to extract maximum concessions from the Lebanese Government. Since Boustani's instructions leave him with little scope to compromise, the negotiations may be protracted. The end result, however, will probably be an uneasy accommodation with the fedayeen.



William P. Rogers

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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'69 OCT 29 PM 7:24

October 29, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon

The situation has reverted to an uneasy and very fragile calm in Lebanon. One minor clash between Lebanese security forces and fedayeen was reported in southeastern Lebanon yesterday, but otherwise there appears to be a standoff between opposing forces. The Government has reduced curfew hours in both Beirut and Tripoli. Army morale remains good and the officer corps continues to support the Government and maintain control of the situation.

The Commander in Chief of Lebanese Armed Forces, General Boustani, has gone to Cairo to negotiate the fedayeen issue. We are told by a confidential source close to the President that Boustani is specifically not authorized to accept the principle of complete freedom of action for the fedayeen. He is authorized only to accept fedayeen action on Lebanese territory in "coordination" with the Government. The Lebanese at this point seem prepared to make compromises on military but not political matters. The next issue to be faced will be the reaction of Lebanon's Christians to any settlement that might give a degree of freedom to the fedayeen.

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Fedayeen leader Arafat has publicly announced that freedom of action for the fedayeen is not negotiable, but he has reportedly cabled to Nasser his willingness to go to Cairo to meet with Boustani. The situation has been confused somewhat by an unconfirmed Egyptian press report that the UAR will not undertake mediation efforts unless the Lebanese grant the fedayeen full freedom of action.

Assistant Secretary Sisco informed Dobrynin on October 28 that we find unhelpful the Soviet propaganda campaign in connection with the Lebanese crisis. He pointed out that Syrian involvement could lead to Israeli intervention, which could confront both the US and USSR with difficult choices. Sisco underscored the importance of counseling restraint in Damascus. Dobrynin undertook to report this to Moscow.

The French Government has made démarches in Arab capitals in support of the Lebanese Government. Press reports state that President Pompidou has sent a letter to Nasser, but the contents have not been disclosed.


We anticipate a period of protracted negotiations and tensions. Some added freedom of movement for the fedayeen seems a likely result; in other words, the opening of a new, active front against the Israelis. We have neither encouraged nor discouraged Helou to stand fast; we have been neither positive nor negative and have avoided direct comment on the Arab mediation efforts, because we are convinced that its likely outcome will be to force major concessions to the fedayeen. Freedom of action to the fedayeen --

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in short, a Jordanization of Lebanon -- is likely in time to result in provocations which will cause the Israelis to react. This highlights the urgency of reaching an overall settlement of the basic problems of the area.



William P. Rogers

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S-16739

October 29, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS

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*original attached to Saunders - Kissinger
memo 10/30/69, Subj: President's Friday Briefing*

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William P. Rogers

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

69 OCT 28 PM 3:30
69 OCT 28 PM 3:30

SECRET/EXDIS ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Report on the Situation
in Lebanon

Enclosed is a report, as of this morning,
on the situation in Lebanon.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

SECRET/EXDIS ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/EXDIS

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon Abates

The Lebanese crisis appears to have moved into the inter-Arab negotiating stage. Lebanese Commander in Chief General Boustani has reportedly gone to Cairo where he will negotiate with guerrilla leaders. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has reportedly carried a special message from King Hussein to President Helou. Nasser's special emissary is remaining in Damascus, pending developments in Cairo. Since the Arab mediators lean toward the guerrillas, it is likely that the result of any mediation effort will be compromised with the guerrillas.

President Helou has consulted with Muslim Prime Minister-designate Karami whose cooperation is essential in bringing about an end to the crisis. Karami may go to Cairo to participate in the negotiations. In the meantime, the mood of Christian leaders in Lebanon seems to be in favor of compromise with the guerrillas rather than running the risk of plunging the nation into civil war. Muslim leaders tend to favor "coordination" with the guerrillas, which means they would be permitted some freedom of action under Lebanese Government control. For the moment, the guerrillas seem disposed to talk and avoid military confrontation, while the Lebanese Army is standing firm but not taking any initiatives.

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In the meantime, fighting has abated in the country. There have been a few shooting incidents in Beirut and Tripoli, but the Government feels the situation is well enough in hand to lift the curfew in Tripoli for a few hours today. Curfew hours in Beirut have been reduced to only five hours during the night. In spite of the lull, guerrillas slightly damaged a storage tank of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company in Sidon with bazooka fire. In addition, a guerrilla radio has called for attacks on all American installations.

In response to the Tass statement on October 25 that "No interference by a big power into the events in Lebanon can be justified", a Department spokesman replied that, inter alia, "We regret that the statement seeks to make propaganda from the difficulties facing the people of Lebanon." The Department statement goes on to note that the situation requires quiet diplomacy and affirms that we do not intend to modify our previous statements on our support for the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. The Soviet Ambassador in Lebanon reportedly spent four and one-half hours with Prime Minister-designate Karami on October 27. Since the Soviets already enjoy a pro-Arab, pro-guerrilla image, they are in a position to gain some propaganda capital from this situation. However, the Arab press is not giving the Soviets any substantial play in this respect, but rather is highlighting Arab mediation efforts particularly those of the UAR. Nasser is undoubtedly using the present crisis to assert his leadership.

William P. Rogers.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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4045
October 28, 1969

SECRET/EXDIS ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Report on the Situation
in Lebanon

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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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SECRET/EXDIS ENCLOSURE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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William P. Rogers

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

3986

S/S-16565

October 27, 1969

Lebanon

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon

The crisis in Lebanon has eased to the extent that the Government has felt confident enough to lift the curfew entirely in three towns and to lift it for eight hours in Beirut and Sidon. The curfew remains in effect in Tripoli, where guerrillas and their sympathizers still control roughly half the town and where there are still occasional clashes. Nevertheless, the situation in general is still extremely tense and potentially explosive. Any incidents, such as demonstrations that have been threatened, could easily tip the balance.

On October 26 there were clashes between the army and guerrillas in the southern part of the country but there are none reported today. Morale in the army remains high and all officers, Christian and Muslim alike, seem to be determined to confront the guerrillas. In general the confrontation has not taken on a religious character, and the alignment has been leftist versus conservative, rather than Christian versus Muslim.

President Helou has informed us that he sees a need to compromise with the guerrillas, but he is determined not to capitulate. Former Prime Minister-designate Karame,

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an important Muslim leader, has reportedly met with Helou. This may open the way to forming a cabinet which could deal with the current crisis. In the meantime, the Israelis, at our urging and in response to a Lebanese request, have agreed not to take any military action against southern Lebanon regardless of provocation. This has permitted the Lebanese Army to withdraw three battalions from border areas and redeploy them in more critical locations.

Nasser has sent a personal emissary to Damascus and Amman reportedly to defuse the situation. Following the emissary's meeting in Damascus, a statement was issued which pledged the support of the UAR, Syria and Libya for freedom of action on the part of the guerrillas. This is hardly helpful, but may be the price for Syria's reducing direct military pressure on Lebanon. At the same time we have a report that Nasser sent word to Helou that the UAR understood and was sympathetic to Lebanon's current position and indicated that he intended to help Lebanon overcome the crisis. The Jordanian Foreign Minister has gone to Baghdad to persuade the Iraqis to reduce pressure on Lebanon. Both the British and French have responded negatively to our suggestion that we seek a Four-Power statement to calm the situation in Lebanon.

Soviet News Agency Tass on October 25 released a statement which, inter alia, stated "No outside interference by a big power into the events in Lebanon can be justified." This statement is unhelpful and provocative. We are considering whether, and how, to respond publicly; however, we want to be sure that anything we say will be helpful to Helou, and we have queried Middle East posts on this matter.

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Finally, we authorized movement of Sixth Fleet units, which we expect the Soviets to pick up, to a point about 450 miles from the Lebanese coast. Such a move will bring units closer to Lebanon without exacerbating the political situation in Lebanon.



William P. Rogers

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Intelligence
Note* - 763

October 27, 1969

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *G.C.D.*

Subject: Lebanon: Acceptance of a Fedayeen Presence May Be Only Way
Out of Current Crisis

Tensions remain high in Lebanon, and there is still danger that a miscalculation or some minor incident may lead to new widespread violence. The military situation has improved, however, and attention has begun to focus on how Lebanon can crawl out from under its latest fedayeen crisis. The internal and external pressures growing out of the past week's events are so great that acceptance of a fedayeen presence in Lebanon is probably the minimum price for the re-establishment of even a modicum of stability. The present situation lends no encouragement to those Lebanese who continue to hope for a typical "Lebanese solution" - "do nothing and the problem will go away." Most responsible leaders realistically see the crisis as requiring an Arab, or inter-Arab, solution, and efforts toward that end are underway, aiming at third-party mediation and formation of a normally functioning cabinet, which is essential to those efforts. If negotiations begin, agreement is not likely to be swiftly forthcoming. Nor should it be concluded that an agreed settlement would end Lebanon's crisis with the fedayeen, for, as in Jordan, a "legitimized" fedayeen presence is likely to create more problems than it solves.

Arab Mediation Is the Most Practical Course. Offers of mediation were quickly made by Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, and the UAR. Lebanese officials appear

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convinced that, on balance, Nasser has been helpful in the early stages of the current crisis. President Hilu himself prefers to have the UAR perform a mediating role because he believes that Nasser, more than any of the others, holds out a reasonable prospect of success. His conclusion is probably valid, but the UAR as arbiter would place Lebanon at an initial disadvantage. Nasser, suggesting that Hilu act to end the Army-fedayeen confrontation on the basis of the fedayeen's "inherent right" to operate in Lebanon, has in effect prejudged the case and has gone beyond Hilu's hope that he would have to accord the fedayeen no more than a "presence" in Lebanon. "Legitimized" acceptance would represent a major concession on the part of Hilu, whose insistence last April on expelling the fedayeen precipitated the governmental crisis, now six months old. There is little doubt that Hilu would not wish to accept a fedayeen presence without some safeguards against the fedayeen forming a state within the state. The fedayeen organizations, for their part, have already stated their demands, which the Lebanese Government cannot accept: they are 1) freedom of action for fedayeen within Lebanon; 2) removal of restrictions from refugee camps; and 3) punishment of the Army officers "responsible for the massacre" that sparked the recent confrontation in southern Lebanon.

The Lost Chord: A Cabinet. Failure to develop a fedayeen policy commanding public support prior to the current crisis prevented the formation of a regular cabinet. No political leader, Muslim or Christian, dared associate himself with Hilu's tough stand against fedayeen operations from Lebanese territory. Many privately agreed with it, but no suitable candidate would accept the premiership. The weakness of the interim

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caretaker government enabled Hilu to implement his policy, but at the same time exposed him directly to the pressures generated by the fedayeen issue. At this juncture, a viable cabinet is virtually essential in the quest for a solution. Rashid Karami, who resigned as Premier last April in opposition to Hilu's stand on the fedayeen and again resigned, as Premier-Designate, on October 22, remains Hilu's preferred choice to head a new cabinet. Karami appears to have responded favorably to Hilu's overtures, and the prospects of his acceptance are better today than they were last week. He almost certainly will exact from Hilu a promise of a more permissive attitude toward the fedayeen. Beyond that, however, there is scant basis for an accurate forecast of the shape of an eventual compromise. Indeed, Lebanon may be forced to accept, perhaps in a face-saving disguise, something more than a mere fedayeen "presence."

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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CONFIDENTIAL

October 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Statement on Lebanon

After your talk on the phone with Joe Sisco Sunday about the President's desire to have our position on Lebanon reaffirmed, Sisco has come up with the following formulation for McCloskey to use:

"We have noted the Soviet statement. We have made our position clear and have said all that needs to be said. We would regret any Soviet exploitation of the Lebanese crisis for propaganda purposes.

"For its part, the US continues to support efforts under the UN Security Council resolution of November 1967 to restore peace in the Middle East."

I urged him to include the words "have made our position clear" so that in good conscience we can tell the President we have carried out his instruction, having done so in a way calculated not to further inflame the situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 1969 25 OCT 1969 PM 2:51

SECRET/EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Crisis in Lebanon

The situation in Lebanon as of Saturday noon (Washington time) has not improved and in many ways it is worse. Guerrilla forces control approximately half of the northern city of Tripoli. Syrian forces or Syrian-backed guerrillas or both have occupied two border areas in northern Lebanon and two border villages in the southeast. Guerrillas have seized the gendarmerie post in an administrative center in southern Lebanon. The guerrillas have Syrian backing and there is direct Syrian Government involvement.

The Lebanese Government is trying to maintain control of the situation and evidently still imposes a curfew on major cities. President Helou is trying to form a government to cope with the crisis. He has decided that it is necessary for him to compromise with the guerrillas, but he apparently is trying to avoid capitulation. Responsible Lebanese leaders, both Christian and Muslim, are obviously alarmed at the magnitude of the crisis and have met together to try to find a way out.

There are three principal areas in which a solution is being sought:

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(a) Internal Lebanese efforts. President Helou and the Lebanese political leaders are trying to work out the difficulties themselves primarily within a Lebanese context, though the increasing pressure from radical Arab states, and particularly from the Syrians, is making this extremely difficult.

(b) Area efforts. Lebanon has brought its case to the attention of the Arab League which may at a later stage provide a forum for mediation if present intra-Lebanese efforts fail. Also, Kuwait has been active in seeking a solution.

(c) Four-Power effort. We sought agreement of the French to take the lead on a Four-Power statement calling on all concerned (Arab states, fedayeen, and Israelis) to refrain from actions which would deepen the crisis. Both the French and the British have been very reserved, being satisfied to let us take the heat in the area. The French also found the Soviets cool, which means the latter are not ready to join in any public quadripartite effort which would help cool off the situation.

Our options are quite limited in the present situation. We have given consideration to whether any moves by the Sixth Fleet as a show of force might be helpful; we do not believe so, particularly since we have no intention of intervening militarily. Furthermore, the fleet would be an inflammatory element which would not be helpful politically. As for action in the UN Security Council or the General Assembly, we believe that premature moves would only undermine President Helou's internal efforts.

As for Israel, we have advised the Israeli Government to avoid any action that might exacerbate the situation as well as unhelpful statements. The UAR, we understand, is preparing to intensify its press

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campaign against Lebanon. Helou has received a second letter from Nasser and Helou's present judgment is that Nasser could be helpful. We are not sure that he is right.

Soviet press reaction to developments in Lebanon gives the impression that, while there are possibilities for anti-American propaganda gains, the Soviets would prefer to avoid a situation which would develop into a US-USSR confrontation. As indicated above, they apparently prefer to let present currents evolve in the area.

There does not appear to be any immediate danger to United States citizens at this particular time. We have a report of a threat to attack the American Cultural Center in Beirut, but we believe that the Lebanese security forces can control the situation.

WPR

William P. Rogers

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM Tab B
WAK - CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERS REMIDDLE EAST

CONFIDENTIAL

February 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Congressman Cellar The President
 Congressman Rooney Henry Kissinger
 Congressman Farbstein Harold Saunders
 Congressman Ford
 Congressman H. R. Gross
 Congressman Halpern

The Congressmen came in on February 13, first for a review of the Middle East Situation with Dr. Kissinger and then for a short session with the President. They presented themselves as "representing the leadership on both sides of the aisle in the House of Representatives." They presented a paper (attached) which they said they felt represented the sense of the majority of the Congress.

After Dr. Kissinger had glanced over the paper, the Congressmen stressed the following points:

1. They feared that we were headed toward an imposed settlement and felt this was wrong.
2. They were afraid of full-fledged four-power talks because they might lead to imposing settlement and because they might lead toward a settlement that was closer to the Arab-Soviet-French line than to ours and Israel's.
3. Any settlement must be based on the agreement of the parties themselves.
4. They felt that, while we should resume relations with the UAR, we should not pay any price for this.
5. The criterion for terms of a settlement should be boundaries which provide security.

Dr. Kissinger responded along the following lines:

1. Be very clear--we are not going to impose a settlement on anyone. We do not believe it is possible. We know it would not stick.

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2. To explain how thinking is going in the White House: The President feels the US has an interest in a settlement. What we are trying to do is to "position" the issue so that the American people can understand it. In Vietnam we have put ourselves in a position where our involvement is explained in terms of issues which the American people do not support. In the Middle East, if it ever comes to involvement, we must be able to explain our involvement in terms of what the American people will support. For instance, we can not be in a position of justifying intervention to preserve Israel's conquests. We want to be in a position to explain our policy in terms of preserving world peace and, if necessary, working in the area to preserve the peace, not to support conquest.

3. In response to a question about whether the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 is still relevant, Dr. Kissinger said one problem is that under current circumstances it is difficult for us to know what constitutes aggression. Is an attack on Israel's present boundaries Arab aggression? Do we step in to protect Israel's present boundaries?

4. As for the four-power talks, the President is proceeding in a careful measured way. The talks that are now going on are bilateral and exploratory. The President will review the results of these explorations before authorizing a full four-power meeting. There may be such a meeting for purely procedural purposes, but we are carefully controlling this and going a step at a time, relating our decision to what we think we can get out of the meeting.

5. We are also doing staff work to see where we want to come out in terms of a settlement. This is not because we want to press our terms on any one but simply because we need some way of keeping our negotiators within proper bounds.

6. When the group moved into the President's office, he had already read the Congressmen's paper and heard a brief rundown of the discussion with Dr. Kissinger. After welcoming the opportunity to hear the Congressmen's views, he made the following points:

1. His approach is a measured one. His approach to the four-power talks, for instance, is not what it has been described in the press. He has authorized exploratory talks and no more for the time being.

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2. When Congressman Cellar spoke of Soviet objectives as "keeping the pot boiling", the President pointed out that this is the reason he keeps talking about relating all major issues to each other in our talks with the USSR. For instance, he sees no reason why the USSR should be able to keep the pot boiling in the Middle East and at the same time get something such as a strategic arms freeze that it wants for itself. These things will not be formally related but everybody can see the relationship.

3. When one of the Congressmen asked whether the Phantom aircraft would be delivered, the President said quickly that he assumed preparations for delivery were going ahead. He said that the issue had not even been raised directly with him and he assumed from what Secretary Laird had told him that everything was in order.

The President asked the Congressmen not to believe everything they read in the press about US policy. If they are concerned about something they read, would they please call Dr. Kissinger and find out what the policy really is. The Congressmen left saying that they had been reassured by the President's remarks.

Harold H. Saunders

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HHSaunders:trnt 5/13/69

We believe that we voice the opinion of a majority of the Members of Congress. We believe that the expression of our opinion could prove useful in any discussion on an Arab-Israel peace. There is, as we know, widespread concern that pending Four Power talks may prejudice such a peace. This concern, as we also know, arises because the initiators of the talks, the Soviet Union and France, are outspoken partisans of the Arab cause and, thus, there is further concern that Middle East interests may be sacrificed as part of bargaining in global settlements. We are aware, as you are, that the United States will be under strong pressure to agree to impose a face-saving and stop-gap compromise.

After three Arab-Israel wars, we believe that the American people want us to use our moral pressure and good offices to bring about genuine Arab-Israel peace treaties, signed by the Arabs and Israelis themselves. We submit that it would not be in the best interests of the United States that Israel be requested to withdraw from the territory she occupies, leaving her with the old vulnerable armistice lines and leaving her with no bargaining position whatsoever.

We likewise submit that the United Nations apparatus in the last twenty years has been used to freeze positions. It finally collapsed at President Nasser's command. A serious

question then arises whether anything at all can be gained by reviving same old mechanisms which failed to achieve peace in the last twenty years.

We believe that both the Russians and the French have tried to create an atmosphere of crisis. But the real Middle East crisis is in Cairo, where President Nasser has lost popular support and faces rising revolt. After a disastrous setback in 1967, Moscow has been able to do more than rebuild Nasser's war machine, but it now fears that it may lose its principal base in the Middle East. Should we cooperate with the Soviet Union to rehabilitate Nasser? We fear a political and diplomatic victory for Nasser would strengthen Soviet prestige and power and weaken every pro-Western Arab state which is menaced by an expansionist Egypt.

Another concern shared by the Members of Congress is that if we resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, we do not appear to pay a price that would have the semblance of a surrender to Nasser's demands at the expense of the interests of the United States, Israel and pro-Western Arab states.

Terrorism has grown on Israel's borders and in Arab refugee centers. We believe this is a threat, not only to the people of Israel, but to the Arab governments which have permitted their financing, recruitment, training and operations. The Arab

governments may be placing themselves in a position of being captive to the terrorists, and thus add to internal instability of their own governments.

We recognize that Israel has been at a critical disadvantage at the UN, where the Soviet veto and some Afro-Asian states have protected Arab belligerence. We submit that it may at some points be efficacious for us to use other methods and as a last resort, even the veto to secure the ends of justice. In this respect, we are encouraged by the Administration's swift condemnation of the barbarous hangings in Iraq.

We trust that our Government will carry out the agreement to sell Israel Phantom Jet planes for, among other reasons, deterrent purposes. Pressures to cancel have encouraged the Arab states to believe that they may ultimately renew their war and that they need not enter into peace negotiations.

We are certain that a review of all these points has already been made by the Administration. The concern of Congress, as it has been voiced in its legislation and on the floor, could be made a part of fruitful international discussions to insure an Arab-Israel peace. From our observation post we conclude that it could be significantly useful to emphasize again publicly that a settlement not be imposed and that the parties to the conflict will be parties to the peace.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 824

2

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00863 301940Z

41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

025763

R 301630Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9603
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET BEIRUT 863

EXDIS

PASS CAIRO

1) IN A CONVERSATION LAST WEEKEND, MICHEL KHOURY CONFIDED TO ME THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO CAIRO IN MID-FEBRUARY, TO TEST THE ATMOSPHERE AND DO WHAT HE COULD TO GET NASSER TO BE FORTHCOMING TOWARD US PEACE PROPOSALS.

2) I DISCUSSED WITH HIM RECENT CONVERSATION I HAD WITH FUAD CHEHAB ON QUESTION OF GETTING UAR TAKE SOME INITIATIVE (BEIRUT 628). KHOURY PLEASSED THAT CHEHAB ALSO INVOLVING HIMSELF IN THE MATTER. I EXPLAINED THAT USG UNDERSTOOD INHIBITIONS WHICH LEBANESE WOULD HAVE IN INVOLVING THEMSELVES DIRECTLY, AS INTERMEDIARIES, IN A POSSIBLE US-UAR DIALOGUE. WE WERE NOT ASKING THIS. WHAT LEBANESE MIGHT DO (AND KHOURY PARTICULARLY, BECAUSE OF HIS RECENT WASHINGTON VISIT) WOULD BE TO STRESS US SINCERITY, AND IMPORTANCE OF CREATING MOMENTUM WHICH MIGHT ALLOW JARRING TO RESUME. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT, I SAID, FOR UAR TO KNOW THAT US POSITION NOT SUBJECT TO CHANGE IN IMPORTANT POINTS, AND THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO NIBBLING PROCESS. WE DID NOT EXPECT NASSER TO AGREE WITH ALL OF OUR CONCEPTS AND LANGUAGE BUT ONLY TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE TRYING CREATE FAIR AND REALISTIC BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN. RE SYRIA, I SPELLED OUT US POSITION (WHICH LEBANESE PRIVATELY ENDORSE). KHOURY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THESE POINTS AND THEY WOULD BE BASIS FOR HIS CONVERSATIONS IN CAIRO.

3) HE REFERRED TO HEAVY INTERNAL PRESSURES ON NASSER, AND NASSER'S UNHAPPINESS WITH SOV RELATIONSHIP. THOUGHT NASSER STILL TRYING TO

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70 JAN 30 PM 4:28

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SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00863 301940Z

FIND A WAY OUT OF HIS TRAP. INTERESTINGLY, KHOURY THOUGHT ISRAELI DEEP PENETRATION TACTICS MIGHT HAVE A GOOD EFFECT IN GETTING NASSER TO OPT FOR PEACE, SO LONG AS THEY NOT OVERDONE AND AVOIDED CIVILIAN TARGETS. MORE IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL TO SHOW WHAT ITS PLANES COULD DO, THAN TO DO IT.

4) COMMENT: CONVERSATION OCCURRED BEFORE RELEASE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS AND KHOURY MAY BE FORCED TAKE A NEW LOOK AT PURPOSE AND TIMING TRIP IN LIGHT NEW DEVELOPMENTS. IF HE GOES, HE WILL FIND CAIRO FAMILIAR GROUND. HE HAS MADE SIMILAR TRIPS ON HELOU'S BEHALF IN PAST AND HAS SEEN NASSER SEVERAL TIMES.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 518

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00802 291115Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

015244

R 291020Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9588
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET BEIRUT 802

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS INFO CINCSTRIKE/USCINCPAC

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REF: STATE 4280

SUBJ: ARMS SALES TO LEBANON

1) DATT AND ARMA HAD FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING JAN 28 WITH NEW LEBANESE CIC GEN NOUJAIM. NOUJAIM'S GENERAL COMMENTS ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS AND HIS FUTURE PLANS FOR LEBANESE ARMY REPORTED SEPARATELY.

2) NOUJAIM MADE CLEAR DIFFICULTIES HE HAS HAD IN ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ARMY, AND TIME-CONSUMING EFFORT REQUIRED TO BRIEF HIMSELF THOROUGHLY BEFORE MAKING DECISIONS ON FUTURE PROCUREMENT. HE ALSO FORCED TO WAIT FOR ACTION BY GOVT AND PARLIAMENT ON BUDGET AND NEW REVENUE MEASURES BEFORE COMMITTING HIMSELF TO NEW EXPENDITURE.

3) NOUJAIM EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR US OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE, BUT SAID HE SIMPLY NOT YET READY TALK SPECIFICS. HE WAS ALREADY AWARE OUR M-14 RIFLE OFFER (WHICH WE HAD MADE EARLIER TO G-4) BUT SAID HE HAD MADE NO DECISION. WE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT HE NOT YET CONVINCED OF NEED TO RE-EQUIP ARMY WITH MODERN AUTOMATIC RIFLES.

4) COMMENT: WE ARE PLEASED TO FIND THIS NEW REFLECTIVE

70 JAN 29 AM 11:41
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SITUATION ROOM

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APPROACH IN LEBANESE ARMY. MOUJAIM SEEMS TO WANT TO BE SURE WHERE HE IS GOING INSTEAD OF MAKING SNAP JUDGMENTS. IN MEANTIME HE IS AWARE OF AND GRATEFUL FOR US CONCERN AND DESIRE TO HELP. HE IS PROBABLY ALSO MAKING SURE WHAT HIS PROCUREMENT OPTIONS ARE IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HE WILL INFORM US AS SOON AS DECISIONS MADE ON WHAT HE HOPES BUY FROM USG.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 282

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00497 171410Z

53
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 171308Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9509
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

079440

SECRET BEIRUT 497

EXDIS

SUBJECT: KIDNAPPED ISRAELI

REF: AMMAN 233

AMBASSADOR IN COURSE CONVERSATION JAN 17 ON OTHER MATTERS WITH
PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT MICHEL KHOURY (PROTECT) RAISED QUESTION
ROSENWASSER KIDNAPPING. KHOURY EXPRESSED GOL'S DEEP CONCERN RE
MOST RECENT ISRAELI THREAT (PRIMIN GOLDA MEIR'S "RECENT ULTIMATUM").
KHOURY EXPLAINED GOL HAD BEEN ENERGETICALLY PURSUING PROBLEM
BUT FRANKLY BEEN UNABLE DETERMINE ROSENWASSER'S WHEREABOUT.
AMBASSADOR COMMENTED WE HAD REPORTS HE WAS NO LONGER IN JORDAN.
KHOURY MAINTAINED THAT GOL WERE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO PER-
SUADE FEDAYEEN RELEASE ROSENWASSER BUT WERE FRANKLY LIMITED
TO REASONING WITH THEM. GOL WAS AT A LOSS AS TO WHAT ELSE THEY
COULD DO. AS PERSONAL SUGGESTION AMBASSADOR WONDERED IF JOINT EF-
FORT BY LEBANESE AND JORDANIAN GOVERNMENTS TO SECURE RETURN OF
ROSENWASSER WOULD BE HELPFUL.
PORTER

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SITUATION ROOM
170 JAN 17 PM 12:18

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SECRET 055

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42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046

060259

P R 141710Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9472
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

SECRET BEIRUT 397

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCSTRIKE

REF: STATE 4280

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MSG

SUBJECT: ARMS SALES TO LEBANON

1. RE PARA 4 REFTEL, LEBANESE MILITARY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO US IN PAST THAT THEIR NUMBER ONE CHOICE IS M-16 RIFLE. I CAN UNDERSTAND POLICY PROBLEMS RAISED FOR USG IN CONSIDERING INTRODUCING M-16 INTO ME. ALL I CAN SUGGEST IS THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO DO SO WE SHOULD IN THE CASE OF LEBANON DO SO NOW. I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT ADVISING BY WHAT APPROXIMATE DATE WE WILL BE ABLE TO INFORM LEBANESE WHETHER OR NOT M-16 IS AVAILABLE.

2. IF USG IS TO HAVE CONSISTENT AND LONG-TERM POLICY OF EXCLUDING M-16 FROM FOREIGN ARMIES THEN WE WOULD LIKE TO PUSH M-14 SALES TO LEBANESE. IN THIS CASE I WOULD LIKE AUTHORITY TO TELL LEBANESE, WHEN THEY ASK, THAT WE ARE PREPARED SELL THEM MORE THAN THE

SIX THOUSAND THAT REFTEL AUTHORIZES FOR EARLY DELIVERY. WE WILL OF COURSE EXPLAIN TO THEM THAT SUBSEQUENT DELIVERY DATES WILL BE DEPENDENT ON AVAILABILITIES BUT I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE THEM SPECIFIC

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ASSURANCES SO THEY WILL KNOW WHERE THEY STAND. I ASSUME THEY WILL WANT MORE THAN SIX THOUSAND, BASED ON OUR PAST CONVERSATIONS.

3. PRES HELOU STRESSED TO ME ON JAN 10 THAT HE HAD TO MOVE AHEAD IMMEDIATELY ON A PROGRAM OF ARMS PURCHASES IN ORDER TO (A) BOOST ARMY MORALE BY SHOWING GOVT RESPONSIVE TO ARMY'S NEEDS; (B) BOOST PRESTIGE OF GEN NOUJAIM, IN CONTRAST TO BOUSTANY WHO HAD NOT MOVED TO OBTAIN ARMS; AND (C) REASSURE POPULACE, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH, THAT GOVT IS DOING SOMETHING ABOUT DEFENDING THE COUNTRY.

4. READING FROM A LIST WHICH APPEARED TO CONTAIN SIX OR SEVEN ITEMS, HELOU SAID MAJOR PRIORITIES WERE RIFLES AND ANTI-AIR-CRAFT WEAPONS. ON THE LATTER, HE SAID ONLY LIMITED NUMBER WERE NEEDED (MENTIONING SPECIFIC FIGURE OF \$1.25 MILLION), BUT HE MUST HAVE THEM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE HOPED, IF US CAN PROVIDE AA WEAPONS, THAT SOME AT LEAST COULD BE DELIVERED TO LEBANON BY AIR.

5. BOTH ARMY AND LEBANESE POPULACE IN SOUTH WERE ESSENTIALLY DEFENSELESS AND OPEN TO AIR ATTACK, AND ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ATTACKING WITH IMPUNITY, HE SAID. HELOU DID NOT EXPECT A FEW SMALL AA WEAPONS TO CHANGE THE MILITARY BALANCE, OR TO BE A SERIOUS THREAT TO ISRAELI PLANES, BUT AT LEAST HE COULD BOLSTER MORALE OF ARMY AND PEOPLE BY GIVING THEM A FEELING THAT THE LEBANESE COULD SHOOT BACK. THEY HAD TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A BANG.

6. WE DID NOT GET INTO DETAILS, ALTHOUGH HELOU AT ONE POINT DID MENTION 12/7MM AA GUNS. I ASSUME HE MEANS THE OLD 50-CALIBRE QUADS WHICH WE HAVE DISCUSSED IN PAST. HE SAID HE HAD HAD DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN NOUJAIM ON NECESSITY FOR PROCURING ARMS AND AFTER THE CABINET MEETINGS EARLIER THIS WEEK, NOUJAIM WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS WITH US. I REMINDED HELOU HE SHOULD USE WHAT CASH HE HAS AVAILABLE TO MAKE HIS MOST URGENT PURCHASES. HE SAID HE WOULD NEED CREDITS AND I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING CREDITS BUT THIS WOULD TAKE TIME. HE POINTED OUT BUDGET WAS NOT YET APPROVED AND LEBANESE ARMY AS RESULT HAD NO CURRENT AUTHORIZATION FOR PURCHASES. HE THOUGHT THIS MATTER WOULD BE RESOLVED SOON, BUT ASKED IF WE COULD EXTEND SHORT-TERM CREDITS UNTIL BUDGET PROBLEM WAS RESOLVED. I SAID I FELT SURE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO COMPLETE TRANSACTIONS AND EF-

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FEET DELIVERY.

7. WE HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH NOUJAIM AND BELIEVE IT WILL OCCUR BEFORE END OF THIS WEEK. IF DEPT COULD RESPOND QUICKLY TO QUESTIONS IN PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE, IT WOULD HELP TO GET THINGS MOVING.
PORTER

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02

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00358 141807Z

45

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

060261

R 141246Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9467
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 358

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: STATE 464 (NOTAL)

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SOVIET-UAR CONSULTATIONS IN CAIRO IN MID-JANUARY

1. FONMIN MAJDALANI UNAWARE OF ANY PROMINENT SOV VISITORS SCHEDULED TO GO TO CAIRO OR ELSEWHERE IN ME IN NEAR FUTURE.

2. WITH RESPECT TO A GROMYKO TRIP TO LEBANON, MAJDALANI REMINDED ME THAT THE THEN FONMIN FUAD BOUTROS HAD EXTENDED A ROUTINE INVITATION TO GROMYKO WHEN BOUTROS VISITED MOSCOW IN LATE SPRING 1968. (BOUTROS ALSO VISITED WASHINGTON ON SAME TRIP) INVITATION CASUALLY REPEATED TO SOV AMB TO LEBANON BY FORMER FONMIN YUSUF SALEM SOME TIME LAST YEAR.

3. SOVS DID NOT SPECIFICALLY RESPOND TO EITHER INVITATION, BUT PRESENT SOV AMB TO LEBANON AZIMOV RECENTLY REOPENED QUESTION GROMYKO TRIP WITH MAJDALANI. MAJDALANI RESPONSE WAS THAT OF

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The seal of the United States Department of State is centered at the top of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a shield on its chest. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it, separated by two small stars.

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COURSE LEBANESE INVITATION STILL STANDS, BUT HE ASKED FOR TIME TO CONSIDER QUESTION AND HAS NOT YET RESPONDED TO SOVS. AZIMOV INDICATED NO SPECIFIC DATES FOR A GROMYKO TRIP, AND MAJDALANI EXPECTS TO STALL UNTIL HE HEARS FURTHER FROM SOVS. PORTER

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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

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ACTION SS-45

041288

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 261/1

DEPARTMENT PASS: CAIRO

1. PRESIDENT HELOU SUMMONED ME TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE SATURDAY EVENING JANUARY 10 TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER DETERIORATING SITUATION. I FOUND HIM INTENSE AND WORRIED. POINTING TO CONTINUATION OF ISRAELI AIR RAIDS INTO LEBANON EVEN IN ABSENCE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OVER LAST FEW DAYS, HELOU SAID HE NOW FOUND INESCAPABLE THE CONCLUSION THAT ISRAELI POLICY IS TO FORCE THE CIVILIAN EVACUATION OF THE BORDER AREA, COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE FEDAYEEN THERE, AND THEN OCCUPY LEBANESE TERRITORY.
2. HELOU SAID THIS CONVICTION HAD BEEN REINFORCED BY A WARNING JUST RECEIVED FROM GENERAL DAYAN THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF A BISHOP FROM JERUSALEM OF LEBANESE ORIGIN. ACCORDING TO HELOU, BISHOP HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY SASSON, WHO HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE SITUATION THEN TAKEN HIM TO GENERAL DAYAN. DAYAN HAD ASKED BISHOP TO PASS ON WARNING THAT IF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS CONTINUED, ISRAEL WOULD TAKE MEASURES SUCH AS AT IRBID AND OTHER AREAS IN JORDAN, REDUCING LEBANON'S BORDER AREAS TO UNPOPULATED DESERT. IF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS STILL CONTINUED, ISRAEL WOULD MODIFY THE BORDER.
3. NOTING MY PAST ASSURANCES THAT THE USG DID NOT THINK OCCUPATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY AN ISRAELI AIM, HELOU

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Department of State

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SAID HE WOULD NOT DEBATE THE MATTER EVEN THOUGH HE COULD NOT RECONCILE ISRAELI CURRENT ACTIONS AND SPECIFIC THREATS WITH US REASSURANCES. IN ANY CASE, HE POINTED OUT THAT UNRESTRAINED MEASURES BEING USED BY ISRAEL AT PRESENT ARE HAVING EFFECT OF DESTROYING LEBANESE STATE. ISRAELIS CLEARLY KNOW WHAT THEY ARE DOING. THEIR ACTIONS ARE BREAKING ARMY MORALE AND THUS REDUCING ARMY CAPACITY DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN OR WITH ANTI-REGIME ACTIVITY. PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN LEBANESE GOVT SIMILARLY SHAKEN. PLANNED PANIC BEING CREATED AMONG RESIDENTS OF THE SOUTH, CAUSING THEM TO FLEE THEIR HOMES AND CREATE UNREST IN OTHER AREAS. THIS LEADS IN TURN TO RADICALIZATION OF LEBANON BY EXACERBATING EXISTING SOCIAL TENSIONS WHILE MAKING GOL SPEND ITS DWINDLING RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE AND OTHER UNPRODUCTIVE ENDS RATHER THAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL IMPROVEMENTS. SYRIAN BAATHIS IN PARTICULAR APPEAR BE GAINING STRENGTH THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF DISSATISFACTION. HELOU SAID THAT, AS HE HAD NOTED DURING SENATOR HATFIELDS VISIT, ONE OF MOST SERIOUS RESULTS OF ISRAELI ATTACKS COULD BE TO FORCE LEBANON TO JOIN THE "FRONT LINE" ARAB STATES. HELOU SAID HE HAD WORKED WITH NASSER AT RABAT TO AVOID THIS, AND NASSER HAD RECENTLY TOLD A VISITING LEBANESE SUNNI POLITICIAN THAT HE DIDN'T THINK IT IN THE ARABS' INTEREST FOR LEBANON TO BECOME A CONFRONTATION STATE.

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4. IN REPLYING TO GENERAL DAYAN THROUGH THE BISHOP FROM JERUSALEM, HELOU SAID HE WOULD MAKE THREE POINTS (HE SAID HE WAS INHIBITED FROM MAKING THEM TOO STRONGLY FOR FEAR THE ISRAELIS WOULD MAKE THEM PUBLIC TO EMBARRASS HIM). FIRSTLY, LEBANON IS AND HAS BEEN ISRAEL'S POLICEMAN EVEN THOUGH IT CAN'T ADMIT IT, AND DESPITE THE IMPERFECT WAY IT SOMETIMES PERFORMS THAT FUNCTION. TO DESTROY LEBANON FOR ITS SHORTCOMINGS IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE LIKE ELIMI-

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TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

SECRET 280

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42

46

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

041364

P 111209Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9444
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 261/2

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

5. HELOU SAID THERE IS A FOURTH POINT HE WILL PROBABLY NOT MAKE AT THIS TIME, I.E., A THREATENED LEBANON HAS THE POWER TO HURT ISRAEL MORE THAN ANY ARAB STATE HAS DONE TO DATE. MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY THERE SEEMS BE NOTHING LEBANON CAN DO TO KEEP ISRAEL FROM HAVING ITS WILL. BUT, HELOU SAID, IF ISRAEL SHOULD DECIDE DESTROY LEBANON HE WOULD CONVOKE LEADERS ALL LEBANON'S CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND HAVE THEM USE THEIR MAXIMUM INFLUENCE IN ALL THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALS OF THE WORLD TO TURN SENTIMENT AGAINST ISRAEL. HELOU SURE THE EFFECT WOULD BE GREAT. (COMMENT: SO ARE WE. FOR EXAMPLE, FRENCH EMBARGO ACTION AFTER ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT WAS NOT EVEN REQUESTED BY LEBANESE.)

6. HELOU SAID HE IS NOW CONCERNED WHETHER EVEN US CAN STOP ISRAEL. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED REPORT SEVERAL DAYS AGO OF AMBASSADOR RABIN BEING CALLED IN BY STATE DEPT. AND INFORMED OF US CONCERN FOR LEBANON. STILL, HE NOTED, FIERCE AND INDISCRIMINATE AIR ATTACKS CONTINUED. I CONFIRMED SISCO-RABIN EXCHANGE, AND I THEN GAVE HELOU MAIN POINTS OF DEMARCHE TO BE MADE TO GOI CONCERNING LEBANON (STATE 004031). I SAID WE COULD NOT BE SURE THE DEMARCHE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE BUT I WANTED ASSURE HELOU IT WAS A SINCERE ATTEMPT BY WASHINGTON HELP

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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LEBANON AND AN APPROACH I FELT GOI COULD NOT LIGHTLY DISREGARD. HELOU GRATEFUL AND SEEMED HEARTENED BY THIS NEW EVIDENCE WE AWARE SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND REALITY OF LEBANON'S DILEMMA.

7. HELOU SAID HE COULD SEE NO CLEAR WAY OUT FOR LEBANON BARRING A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. HE COULD ONLY ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE DETERIORATION GRADUAL RATHER THAN PRECIPITOUS. HE REDUCED TO HOPING FOR A RESPITE OF SEVERAL MONTHS AND IS THEREFORE PRAYING FOR RAIN AND SNOW (WINTER HAS BEEN UNUSUALLY DRY AND MILD TO DATE). RAIN WOULD INHIBIT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE WEAKEN ISRAELI PRETEXT FOR ATTACKS INTO LEBANON. A RESPITE FROM CYCLE OF ATTACK AND REPRISAL WILL ENABLE HIM TAKE STEPS TO SHORE UP SAGGING ARMY MORALE. (HE DESCRIBED REPLACEMENT OF CINC BOUSTANY AS POSITIVE FIRST STEP.) ARMY WOULD THEN BE BETTER ABLE DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN AND ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS. RESPITE WOULD ALSO GIVE TIME FOR GOVERNMENT TO TAKE SOME MEASURES IN THE SOUTH--MEDICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY--WHICH WOULD REASSURE THE POPULACE AND DIMINISH PRESENT TENDENCY LOOK TO OTHER ARAB STATES FOR HELP. HELOU SAID HE WAS HOLDING A SERIES OF MEETINGS MONDAY WITH HIS ADVISERS, AND LATER THE CABINET, TO DECIDE ON STEPS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH AND ESPECIALLY TO STEM THE FLOOD OF PANICKED CIVILIANS LEAVING THE AREA.
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TELEGRAM

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ACTION SS-45

041288

P 111209Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9443
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 261/1

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS: CAIRO

1. PRESIDENT HELOU SUMMONED ME TO PRESIDENTIAL PALACE SATURDAY EVENING JANUARY 10 TO EXPRESS HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER DETERIORATING SITUATION. I FOUND HIM INTENSE AND WORRIED. POINTING TO CONTINUATION OF ISRAELI AIR RAIDS INTO LEBANON EVEN IN ABSENCE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OVER LAST FEW DAYS, HELOU SAID HE NOW FOUND INESCAPABLE THE CONCLUSION THAT ISRAELI POLICY IS TO FORCE THE CIVILIAN EVACUATION OF THE BORDER AREA, COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE FEDAYEEN THERE, AND THEN OCCUPY LEBANESE TERRITORY.
2. HELOU SAID THIS CONVICTION HAD BEEN REINFORCED BY A WARNING JUST RECEIVED FROM GENERAL DAYAN THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF A BISHOP FROM JERUSALEM OF LEBANESE ORIGIN. ACCORDING TO HELOU, BISHOP HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY SASSON, WHO HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE SITUATION THEN TAKEN HIM TO GENERAL DAYAN. DAYAN HAD ASKED BISHOP TO PASS ON WARNING THAT IF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS CONTINUED, ISRAEL WOULD TAKE MEASURES SUCH AS AT IRBID AND OTHER AREAS IN JORDAN, REDUCING LEBANON'S BORDER AREAS TO UNPOPULATED DESERT. IF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS STILL CONTINUED, ISRAEL WOULD MODIFY THE BORDER.
3. NOTING MY PAST ASSURANCES THAT THE USG DID NOT THINK OCCUPATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY AN ISRAELI AIM, HELOU

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TELEGRAM

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NATING HAIFA POLICE DEPARTMENT FOR ITS INABILITY STOP SABOTAGE ACTS THERE. LEBANON HAS BEEN TRYING CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AND WITHIN LIMITS ITS CAPABILITIES WILL MAKE EVEN GREATER EFFORTS IN FUTURE, SECONDLY, CONTINUATION OF UNPROVOKED RAIDS INTO LEBANON WILL SET IN TRAIN A SERIES OF EVENTS WHICH WILL INCLUDE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS, PERHAPS SYRIAN, PERHAPS IRAQI, ON LEBANESE TERRITORY. WHILE ADMITTEDLY THESE TROOPS WOULD CAUSE GREAT TROUBLE FOR LEBANESE REGIME, THEY WILL ALSO BE PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL. HELOU'S THIRD POINT IS THAT IT NOT IN ISRAEL'S INTEREST DESTROY THE ONLY OTHER DEMOCRATIC, NON-MUSLIM, RELIGIOUSLY MIXED STATE IN THE AREA. HOWEVER FLAWED THEIR COMPREHENSION, THE LEBANESE AT LEAST HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S PROBLEMS. THIS COULD BE A VALUABLE ASSET FOR ISRAEL SHOULD IT EVER DECIDE TO BE PART OF AS WELL AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT HAS SERVED IN THE PAST TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE ON AT LEAST ONE SEGMENT ISRAELI BORDER.

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TELEGRAM

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46

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

041364

P 111209Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9444
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 261/2

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

5. HELOU SAID THERE IS A FOURTH POINT HE WILL PROBABLY NOT MAKE AT THIS TIME, I.E., A THREATENED LEBANON HAS THE POWER TO HURT ISRAEL MORE THAN ANY ARAB STATE HAS DONE TO DATE. MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY THERE SEEMS BE NOTHING LEBANON CAN DO TO KEEP ISRAEL FROM HAVING ITS WILL. BUT, HELOU SAID, IF ISRAEL SHOULD DECIDE DESTROY LEBANON HE WOULD CONVOKE LEADERS ALL LEBANON'S CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND HAVE THEM USE THEIR MAXIMUM INFLUENCE IN ALL THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALS OF THE WORLD TO TURN SENTIMENT AGAINST ISRAEL. HELOU SURE THE EFFECT WOULD BE GREAT. (COMMENT: SO ARE WE. FOR EXAMPLE, FRENCH EMBARGO ACTION AFTER ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT WAS NOT EVEN REQUESTED BY LEBANESE.)

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00261 02 OF 02 111326Z

7. HELOU SAID HE COULD SEE NO CLEAR WAY OUT FOR LEBANON BARRING A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT. HE COULD ONLY ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE DETERIORATION GRADUAL RATHER THAN PRECIPITOUS. HE REDUCED TO HOPING FOR A RESPITE OF SEVERAL MONTHS AND IS THEREFORE PRAYING FOR RAIN AND SNOW (WINTER HAS BEEN UNUSUALLY DRY AND MILD TO DATE). RAIN WOULD INHIBIT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE WEAKEN ISRAELI PRETEXT FOR ATTACKS INTO LEBANON. A RESPITE FROM CYCLE OF ATTACK AND REPRISAL WILL ENABLE HIM TAKE STEPS TO SHORE UP SAGGING ARMY MORALE. (HE DESCRIBED REPLACEMENT OF CINC BOUSTANY AS POSITIVE FIRST STEP.) ARMY WOULD THEN BE BETTER ABLE DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN AND ANTI-REGIME ELEMENTS. RESPITE WOULD ALSO GIVE TIME FOR GOVERNMENT TO TAKE SOME MEASURES IN THE SOUTH--MEDICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY--WHICH WOULD REASSURE THE POPULACE AND DIMINISH PRESENT TENDENCY LOOK TO OTHER ARAB STATES FOR HELP. HELOU SAID HE WAS HOLDING A SERIES OF MEETINGS MONDAY WITH HIS ADVISERS, AND LATER THE CABINET, TO DECIDE ON STEPS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH AND ESPECIALLY TO STEM THE FLOOD OF PANICKED CIVILIANS LEAVING THE AREA.

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70 JAN 12 AM 8:22

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 IO-13 USIE-00 CIAE-00 17 52Z
DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03
RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 SR-01 ORM-03 EUR-20 ACDA-18 RSR-01
/124 W

O P 101600Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9439
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIRUT 258/1

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: DEPTTEL 4031

1. FONMIN MAJDALANI SUMMONED ME AND OTHER BIG-FOUR AMBS SEPARATELY TO FONMINISTRY TODAY JANUARY 10 TO PRESENT AID MEMOIRE ON RECENT BORDER INCIDENTS. AS MAJDALANI POINTED OUT, AIDE MEMOIRE LARGELY BOILER PLATE DESIGNED SHOW LEBANESE POPULACE THAT GOL IS DOING SOMETHING ABOUT CONTINUOUS ISRAELI ATTACKS AGAINST LEBANESE SOUTH. (AIDE MEMOIRE AIRPOUCHED)

2. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, MAJDALANI MADE CLEAR THAT LEBANESE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT ISRAELI THREAT. HE SAID THERE HAVE BEEN NO FEDAYEEN ATTACKS FROM LEBANON IN FOUR DAYS. YET INDISCRIMINATE ISRAELI AIR ATTACK CONTINUES. TARGETS SEEM TO BE LEBANESE VILLAGES AND ROAD TRAFFIC WITH NO PARTICULAR ATTEMPT TO SINGLE OUT FEDAYEEN. LEBANESE CAN NO LONGER ASSUME THAT CURRENT ISRAELI RAIDS ARE JUST IN REPRISAL AGAINST FEDAYEEN ACTIONS. THEY NOW BELIEVE ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED ON POLICY OF TERROR AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DESIGNED TO

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AGE 02 BEIRUT 00258 01 OF 02 101722Z

BRING ABOUT EVACUATION OF SOUTH LEBANON, AND ULTIMATELY INVASION.

3. A LEBANESE PRIEST WHO TRAVELS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL HAS INFORMED GOL THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY MOSHE DAYAN YESTERDAY AND INSTRUCTED TO TELL GOL THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT STOP ITS ATTACKS ON LEBANON UNLESS LEBANESE BROUGHT FEDAYEEN UNDER CONTROL. DAYAN HAD ADDED DIRECT THREAT THAT ISRAEL MIGHT BE FORCED TO TAKE AND HOLD LEBANESE TERRITORY IN NEAR FUTURE. MAJDALANI STRESSED THIS INFO MUST BE CLOSELY HELD. HE DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY FROM HELOU IMPART IT TO ME BUT FELT OBLIGATED DO SO.

4. I EXPLAINED USG CONCERN OVER ISRAELI ATTACKS AND DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON. I ALSO ASSURED FONMIN THAT WE WOULD SHORTLY MAKE STRONG REPRESENTATIONS IN JERUSALEM. SPECIFICALLY, I SAID WE AGREED THAT ISRAELI RAIDS WERE DISPROPORTIONATE TO PROVOCATION, THAT WE WOULD IMPRESS ON ISRAEL THAT HER TACTICS WERE WRONG AND WOULD RESULT IN DRIVING LEBANON TO A MORE HAWKISH POSITION, AND THAT OUR ADVICE TO ISRAEL WAS TO AVOID INDISCRIMINATE ATTACK ON LEBANESE VILLAGES. I SAID OF COURSE ISRAELIS WOULD RESPOND TO FEDAYEEN ATTACKS, BUT WE URGING THAT RESPONSE BE AGAINST FEDAYEEN TARGETS.

5. MAJDALANI SAID THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI ATTACKS, DESPITE TOTAL ABSENCE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN AST SEVERAL DAYS, SIMPLY LED GOL TO SENSE OF DESPAIR. MININT JUMBLATT AT MAJDALANI'S URGING HAD DEMANDED THAT FEDAYEEN STOP SHOOTING AT ISRAEL FROM LEBANESE TERRITORY. FEDAYEEN HAD AGREED AND SHOOTING HAD STOPPED. JUMBLATT HAD TAKEN THIS ACTION, SAID MAJDALANI, ON BASIS OF BELIEF IN ISRAELI ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD CEASE REPRISALS IF FEDAYEEN SHOOTING WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND THAT ISRAELIS WOULD THEN TAKE CARE OF FEDAYEEN INFILTRATION THEMSELVES. IF ISRAELIS FAILED TO KEEP THIS BARGAIN, HOW COULD THEY EXPECT LEBANESE TO SECURE COOPERATION FROM THE FEDAYEEN? JUMBLATT, SAID MAJDALANI, HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A TOUR OF THE SOUTH. HE REPORTED THAT FEDAYEEN WERE MUCH MORE COOPERATIVE AT THE MOMENT.

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AND HE HAD SECURED READY ACCEPTANCE OF HIS ORDER THAT FIRING ACROSS THE BORDER SHOULD CEASE. MAJDALANI ADDED THAT FEDAYEEN BEGINNING UNDERSTAND THAT LEBANESE, INCLUDING MUSLIM SEGMENT POPULATION, BECOMING INCREASINGLY FED UP WITH FEDAYEEN IRRESPONSIBILITY. JUMBLATT, AS CONTRASTED TO HIS PESSIMISTIC ATTITUDE OF A FEW DAYS AGO, NOW FELT THAT IT POSSIBLE TO ENFORCE TERMS OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT, BUT ONLY IF ISRAEL WOULD UNDERSTAND AND COOPERATE.

6. I SUGGESTED THAT CURRENT ISRAELI ATTACKS MIGHT BE DESIGNED SECURE RETURN OF KIDNAPPED ISRAELI WATCHMAN. MAJDALANI SAID WATCHMAN HAD BEEN IN JORDAN SINCE TWO DAYS AFTER KIDNAPPING AND THERE NO WAY LEBANESE COULD GET FEDAYEEN TO RETURN HIM. FEDAYEEN WERE DEMANDING DIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAELIS AND HAD NO INTEREST IN THE WELFARE OR RETURN OF LEBANESE HOSTAGES WHO HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED BY ISRAEL. HE COULD SEE NO WAY LEBANON COULD PRESSURE FEDAYEEN ON THIS ISSUE.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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51
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03
RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 EUR-20 ACDA-13 SR-01 ORM-03 RSR-01
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O P 101600Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9440
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
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USMISSION USUN

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 258/2

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: DEPTTEL 4031

7. IN CONCLUSION, MAJDALANI SAID LEBANON COULD NOT CONTINUE ENDURE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL. ALREADY AT LEAST 20,000 CIVILIANS HAD FLED FROM THE SOUTH, BULK OF THEM MOVING INTO BEIRUT. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PREVAIL ON THEM TO RETURN WOULD BE OF NO AVAIL SO LONG AS ISRAELI AIR RAIDS CONTINUE. THEY WOULD RETURN IF RAIDS CEASED. HE ADDED THAT SITUATION COULD GET INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT SINCE ECONOMY OF THE SOUTH IS BASED ON TOBACCO AND PLANTING SEASON BEGINS IN FEBRUARY. GOL, HE SAID, COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT ISRAELIS WERE TRYING TO CREATE ANOTHER EAST GHOR IN SOUTH LEBANON.

8. COMMENT. MAJDALANI DID NOT MENTION TAKING MATTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS POINT, BUT IMPLIED THAT IT MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE CONTINUE RESIST PRESSURES TO DO SO. HE DID URGE STRONGEST POSSIBLE US ACTION TO RESTRAIN ISRAEL. REALISTICALLY, HE SAID, GOL UNDERSTANDS THAT

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THIS IS ONLY POSSIBLE LEVERAGE THAT CAN HAVE EFFECT ON ISRAELI ACTIONS.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00239 091831Z

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42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 091750Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9429

SECRET BEIRUT 239

EXDIS

REF: STATE 211998 AND 212132

1. IN CONVERSATION TODAY WITH DCM, SUHAIL CHAMMAS, HEAD FOREIGN OFFICE'S UN SECTION, STATED THAT NEGIB SADAKA, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOREIGN OFFICE, WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EMBASSY TO SHOW HIM COPY OF SOVIET REPLY TO OCTOBER 28 US PROPOSALS TO UAR. CHAMMAS EXPLAINED THAT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH UAR ON US PEACEMAKING WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO KNOW WITH SOME PRECISION SOVIET RESPONSE. SADAKA IMPRESSED WITH US

POSITION AS OUTLINED SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 9 SPEECH AND BELIEVES ARABS SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY THERETO.

2. WE BELIEVE WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SELECTED NUMBER LEBANESE OFFICIALS WERE PRIVY TO SOVIET RESPONSE. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO PASS COPY OF RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT HELOU OR TO GIVE ORAL BRIEFING EITHER DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT OR THROUGH SADAKA, WHO IS EXTREMELY DISCREET.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 00048 021933Z

THEY EXPECT THAT THEIR INVOLVEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE KEPT SECRET AND THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE MORE PROVIDING QUIET CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION THAN MEDIATION. THEY ALSO ASSUME THAT THEY CAN ACCOMPLISH NOTHING WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH, AND APPROVAL OF, NASSER AND HUSSEIN. PURPOSE OF LEBANESE INVOLVEMENT COULD ONLY BE, AS THEY SEE IT, TO FACILITATE US-ARAB DIALOGUE. THEY ARE CERTAINLY NOT CONTEMPLATING ANY SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR TALKS WITH ISRAELIS.

5. AS KHOURY POINTED OUT, HELOU'S TENURE AS PRES ENDS THIS SUMMER. HELOU HAS NO AMBITIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND THEREFORE NOTHING PERSONALLY TO LOSE. HE WOULD BE PREPARED INVOLVE HIMSELF IF USG AND OTHER ARAB STATES FELT HE COULD ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING. IN FIRST INSTANCE HELOU ALSO HAS IN MIND POSSIBILITY OF SENDING TRUSTED EMISSARY SUCH AS AMB NADIM DIMESHKIE TO CAIRO AND AMMAN ON EXPLORATORY MISSION. HE WOULD OF COURSE NOT DO THIS WITHOUT CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF US ENDORSEMENT AND SUPPORT, AND HE MAY GET COLD FEET REGARDLESS OF OUR RESPONSE.

6. COMMENT: MICHEL KHOURY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RAISE THIS QUESTION DURING WASHINGTON VISIT. I HAVE BEEN PLEASED THAT HELOU WANTS TO HELP, BUT HAVE BEEN LARGELY NON-COMMITTAL BECAUSE I FRANKLY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SEE A PRODUCTIVE ROLE FOR HIM TO PLAY. I OF COURSE ASSURED KHOURY THAT I WOULD REPORT OUR DISCUSSIONS TO WASHINGTON, AND THAT HE MIGHT EXPECT A PRELIMINARY REACTION IN HIS CONVERSATIONS THERE.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 173

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 00047 021901Z

41

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

130369

R 021745Z JAN 70
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9376
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USMISSION USUN

SECRET BEIRUT 047

EXDIS:

1. MICHEL KHOURY INFORMED ME BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE TO THE US THAT ABDUL MONEIM RIFAI HAD, IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PRES HELOU ON DEC 29, EXUDED SOME OPTIMISM TO HELOU ON NASSER'S DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. RIFAI ALSO REFLECTED TO HELOU BELIEF THAT US PROPOSALS RE JORDAN/ISRAELI SETTLEMENT REPRESENTED PROGRESS AND WERE RECEIVING SERIOUS STUDY BY JORDANIANS.

2. ON DEC 31, JORDAN'S AMBASSADOR ZURAIKAT WAS EVEN MORE OPTIMISTIC (PERHAPS CHARACTERISTICALLY SO) IN REPORTING RIFAI'S COMMENTS TO HIM REGARDING THE US PROPOSALS AS A BASIS FOR ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT. HE ALSO REAFFIRMED RIFAI'S VIEW REPORTED AMMAN'S 003 THAT NOTHING HAPPENED IN RABAT WHICH HAD REDUCED CHANCES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT - PERHAPS THE CONTRARY.

3. HELOU WAS SURPRISED AT RIFAI'S OPTIMISM WHICH CONFLICTED WITH NEGATIVE REPORTS LEBANESE HAVE BEEN GETTING RE NASSER'S CURRENT INTEREST IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. AS RESULT RIFAI'S COMMENTS AS WELL AS HELOU'S OWN POST-RABAT REFLECTIONS, KHOURY SAID THAT HELOU FOR "FIRST TIME" IS BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT MAY BE POSSIBLE. HELOU ADDED THAT U.S. MUST NOW SEIZE INITIATIVE TO OVERCOME DEEPLY ROOTED ARAB MISTRUST AND ESTABLISH GENUINENESS OF US PROPOSALS AS WELL AS AFFIRM US DETERMINATION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SECURE ISRAELI AGREEMENT.
PORTER

70 JAN 2 PM 4:32
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10251 161607Z

4. EMBASSY REQUESTS PRIORITY REPLY TO BEIRUT'S 9983.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM



2

47
ACTION SS-45

034509

R 131300Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9288
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT

EXDIS

1. I MET WITH PRESIDENT HELOU DECEMBER 14 AND FOUND HIM DEEPLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT OUTCOME OF RABAT CONFERENCE. HE NOT DESPONDENT, HOWEVER, AND IS DETERMINED DO ALL HE CAN SAFEGUARD LEBANON'S INTERESTS. HE SEEMED EVEN BE TAKING GRIM PLEASURE IN PREPARING FOR THE FORTHCOMING TEST OF INTELLECT AND WILLS.

2. HELOU SAID THERE WAS MUCH MORE AT STAKE AT RABAT THAN JUST GETTING MORE MONEY OUT OF THE SAUDIS. HE THINKS IT LIKELY THAT A DECISION WILL BE TAKEN AT CHABAT EITHER TO WAGE WAR AGAINST ISRAEL OR TO "PLAY AT WAR." IN EITHER CASE, RESULT WILL BE EQUALLY BAD FOR LEBANON. IN PARTICULAR, HELOU FEARS ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURE ON LEBANON TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF OTHER ARAB TROOPS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY EITHER TO REALLY FIGHT OR AS PART OF THE CHARADE. THIS HAS A CERTAIN LOGIC TO OTHER ARABS, HELOU CONCEDED. FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT THE LEBANESE FRONT IS ABOUT THE BEST FOR ATTACKS INTO ISRAEL. IF THE SYRIANS AGREE AT RABAT TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE MILITARY ROLE, THEY WILL NOT CHOOSE TO OPERATE ACROSS GOLAN BUT RATHER FROM LEBANON AND JORDAN. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO OTHER ARAB STATES SUCH AS ALGERIA.

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3. HELOU SAID HIS REASONS FOR ANXIETY ABOUT RABAT WERE SUPPORTED BY THE MOROCCAN EMISSARY GUEDIRA WHO, AFTER VISITING DAMASCUS, CAIRO, AND RIYAD, HAD FORMED THE OPINION THAT LEBANON, OF ALL THE ARAB STATES, WOULD BE LIKELY TO LOSE THE MOST AT THE CONFERENCE. HELOU SAID HIS POSITION AT RABAT WILL BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT AS HE WILL BE FACING NOT JUST FOURTEEN ADVERSARIES ACROSS THE TABLE BUT FOURTEEN AND A HALF -- THE HALF BEING PM RASHID KARAMI WHO, DESPITE HIS UNQUESTIONED LEBANESE PATRIOTISM, WILL BE HALF WITH HELOU AND HALF WITH THE OTHERS.

4. A FURTHER COMPLICATING FACTOR IS THAT GENERAL BOUSTANY, WHO HAD BUNGLED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO AT CAIRO, HAD ALSO AT SUBSEQUENT ARAB LEAGUE DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING FAILED OPPOSE CONCEPT OF SENDING LEBANESE TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING MIRAGES, TO FIGHT ON OTHER FRONTS IF DEEMED NECESSARY. HELOU FEARS THAT A PRECEDENT OF SORTS MAY HAVE BEEN SET, AND IT IS BUT A COROLLARY TO THIS AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT FOREIGN TROOPS ON LEBANESE TERRITORY -- THE THING HELOU IS MOST ANXIOUS TO AVOID.

5. AFTER THIS GLOOMY RECITAL, HELOU SAID THAT WORKING FOR LEBANON ARE THE EFFORTS WHICH HE HIMSELF IS MAKING. TO DATE, THESE HAVE INCLUDED CONTACTS WITH THE JORDANIANS AND THE SAUDIS AS WELL AS REQUESTING THE CURRENT VISIT OF NASSER'S EMISSARY SABRI AL KHOLI. LEBANON WILL HAVE SOME FRIENDS AT THE CONFERENCE, BUT THEY WILL BE TOO CONCERNED WITH THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO CARE MUCH FOR LEBANON. IN FACT, THEY WILL SACRIFICE LEBANESE INTERESTS IF IT IS TO THEIR BENEFIT TO DO SO. HELOU SAID HE COULD NOT CONDEMN THIS ATTITUDE AS HE WOULD BE ONLY TOO HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO DO THE SAME IN THE INTEREST OF HIS OWN COUNTRY.

6. IN ADDITION TO HIS CONTACTS, HELOU SAID HE HAD BEEN PERSONALLY PREPARING ARGUMENTS TO BE USED IN EVERY CONCEIVABLE SITUATION WHICH MIGHT ARISE. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS IS THAT LEBANON IS A PARLIAMENTARY REGIME AND THEREFORE ANYTHING AGREED TO AT RABAT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT. HE IS ALSO PREPARED TO ARGUE MILITARILY AGAINST THE STATIONING OF TROOPS IN LEBANON BY SAYING THAT THE LEBANESE FRONT IS A NARROW ONE AND PUTTING MANY TROOPS INTO IT WOULD PROVIDE A VULNERABLE TARGET FOR ISRAEL, AND ONE WHICH COULD BE EASILY OUTFLANKED. STATIONING JUST A FEW TROOPS WOULD NOT SERVE TO PROTECT LEBANON BUT WOULD ONLY BRING DOWN THE FIRE OF THE ENEMY AND CAUSE NEEDLESS SUFFERING TO THE PEOPLE.

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7. I SUGGESTED AT THIS POINT THAT THERE ARE VERY COGENT ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS WHICH COULD BE USED. HELOU AGREED, BUT BEMOANED THE FACT THAT NOT ONLY MUST HE SPEAK TO THE OTHERS AT THE CONFERENCE ACROSS A "GAP OF EIGHT CENTURIES," BUT HE MUST PHRASE EVERY ARGUMENT IN TERMS OF THE INTEREST OF THE "NOBLE PALESTINE OR ARAB CAUSE." UNFORTUNATELY THE OTHERS DO NOT CARE ABOUT LEBANON'S ECONOMIC PLIGHT. I ALSO REMINDED HELOU, IN DISCUSSING POTENTIAL US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THAT USG'S CONCERN FOR LEBANON IS GENUINE. HE SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT HE GOES TO RABAT WITH NO FRIENDS. ONE OF MAIN REASONS FOR URGENCY IN OUR SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND FOR SECRETARY'S PUBLIC ENUNCIATION OF US POLICY IS USG KNOWLEDGE THAT SOLUTION CAN REMOVE CURRENT PRESSURES ON LEBANON. HELOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND WAS APPRECIATIVE, BUT HIS IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO ASSURE THAT RABAT DECISIONS DID NOT DESTROY LEBANON NOW. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10209 02 OF 02 131514Z

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

034547

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIRUT 10209

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HELOU

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IF THEY DID NOT COME TO THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE OF THE ARABS IF NEEDED, THEY WOULD LOSE ALL THEIR STOCK IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CHINESE. A DECISION TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE ARABS WOULD BE TO RISK A WORLD WAR. HELOU DID NOT RECOUNT AZIMOV'S REACTION, EXCEPT HIS CLEAR AGREEMENT RE THE ULTIMATE CHINESE THREAT.

9. HELOU SAID THAT NASSER IS THE PRIME INTERLOCUTOR OF THE USSR IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT IT IS HE, EVEN MORE THAN THE BATH, WHO IS THE PRIME PEDDLER OF THE SOVIET LINE IN THE AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING TO GAIN WHAT GROUND THEY CAN IN ALGERIA, SYRIA, AND IRAQ. SOVIETS DO NOT, HELOU ADDED, HAVE AS MUCH INFLUENCE ON ARAB POLICIES AND ACTIONS AS PERHAPS US THINKS -- JUST AS ARABS AND SOVIETS MISJUDGE US CAPACITY TO CONTROL AND INFLUENCE ISRAEL. HELOU PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW WHETHER NASSER REALLY WANTS WAR OR NOT -- HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK NOT. BUT HELOU FEARED THAT THE MERE PREPARATION FOR WAR TO WHICH NASSER SEEMS COMMITTED COULD HAVE A MOMENTUM OF ITS OWN WHICH COULD RESULT IN WAR. "DID NASSER WANT WAR IN JUNE 1967 OR EVEN HITLER IN SEPTEMBER 1939?"

10. HELOU SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT ON THE SECRETARY'S DECEMBER 9 MIDDLE EAST SPEECH BECAUSE HE HAD ONLY HAD TIME TO GIVE IT A CURSORY READING AND IT WAS OBVIOUSLY FAR TOO IMPORTANT A DOCUMENT ON WHICH TO PASS QUICK JUDGMENT. HE PROMISED TO STUDY IT THOROUGHLY. IN CONNECTION WITH SECRETARY'S SPEECH, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE AWARE THAT EGYPTIANS ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT THIS AND OTHER RECENT ACTIONS (PRANGER VISIT, FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS, ETC.) WERE A BIG FOUR AND US REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RABAT SUMMIT. HELOU SAID HE REALIZED WE AND OTHERS WERE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A MORE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE BEFORE RABAT -- AND THIS WORTH THE EFFORT -- BUT THIS EFFORT BEING EXPLOITED BY EGYPTIANS. HELOU SAID HE HOPED ARAB NATIONS AT RABAT WOULD BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT TAKING A DECISION SUCH AS APPEARING TO OPT FOR WAR COULD NOT BE USED SUCCESSFULLY TO BLACKMAIL THE GREAT POWERS, INCLUDING THE USSR, INTO CHANGING THEIR POSITIONS RE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WERE THE ARABS TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH A TACTIC WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY ENHANCE THE CHANCES FOR THE ADOPTION OF EXTREME POSITIONS WHICH WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO LEBANON'S INTERESTS AND INTERESTS OF PEACE. HE THOUGHT BOTH US AND SOVIETS WERE POTENTIALLY IN EQUAL JEOPARDY IF ARAB SUMMIT, WHETHER THROUGH CONVICTION OR IN ATTEMPT TO USE BLACKMAIL TO

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 10209 02 OF 02 131514Z

IMPROVE ARAB POSITION, ADOPTED RADICAL LINE.
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CONFIDENTIAL 333

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10100 091836Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P 091520Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9259

009894

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 10100

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 9983

SUBJECT: VISA APPLICATION - SOVIET COMPOSER OGAN DOURIAN

1. SUBSEQUENT TO SUBMISSION ADVISORY OPINION REQUESTED REFTEL, LESLIE GOODYEAR, LOCAL DIRECTOR UN HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES, ADVISED AMCONSUL THAT APPLICANT, THROUGH LOCAL ARMENIAN ACTIVE IN REFUGEE AFFAIRS, HAD INQUIRED INTO POSSIBLE REFUGEE STATUS IN US. AFTER LEARNING DETAILS (NORMAL DELAY, NECESSITY TO BE PROCESSED THROUGH LOCAL OFFICE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, ETC.) SUBJECT THOUGHT THIS RISKY SINCE DID NOT WISH ALERT SOVIETS TO POSSIBLE DEFECTION. DOURIAN ADDED TO ARMENIAN SOURCE THAT HE HAD NOT DECIDED TO REMAIN US BUT HAD DECIDED NOT REPEAT NOT RETURN USSR.

2. AMCONSUL SUGGESTED GOODYEAR INFORM DOURIAN (WHICH HE HAS DONE) THAT BEST COURSE WOULD BE TO LEVEL WITH AMCONSUL. GOODYEAR'S SOURCE MAINTAINS SUBJECT NOT CP MEMBER. CAS HAS NO RECORD HERE.

3. ORIGINAL CONTACT WITH EMBASSY MADE THROUGH EMBASSY USIS LOCAL EMPLOYEE WHO INTERVIEWED HIM FOR VOA. DOURIAN ASKED LOCAL IF THERE WERE ANY PROBLEMS FOR SOVIET PASSPORT HOLDER TO OBTAIN VISITOR'S VISA TO US.

4. WHILE CONCEIVABLE VISA APPLICATION IS SOVIET PLANT, WE PROPOSE PROCESS CASE NORMALLY. IF DOURIAN MAINTAINS IN THE FORMAL INTERVIEW HE PLANS RETURN USSR OR AT LEAST DEPART US AT END OF VISIT, WOULD ISSUE VISITOR'S VISA (UPON RECEIPT AFFIRMATIVE REPLY FROM DEPT TO REFTEL). IF DOURIAN DOES WISH REMAIN US WOULD

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10100 091836Z

SUGGEST SIXTH-PREFERENCE IMMIGRANT VISA WITH OUR EXPEDITING AND HIS OBTAINING US JOB OFFER. UNDERSTAND DOURIAN SCHEDULED REMAIN LEBANON APPROXIMATELY ONE MORE MONTH TO CONTINUE WITH LOCAL PERFORMANCES AND CONTACT WIRL WITH ARMENIAN COMMUNITY. PORTER

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SECRET 088

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 10069 081925Z

47

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

003683

R 081749Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9252
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 10069

EXDIS

SUBJ: IRAQ - POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT

REF: JABR/MCANDREW MEMCON, 4 NOV 69

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PCR RAC REVIEW 2/28/2008

By JHS NARA, Date 4/25/2012

1. SAAD JABR CONTACTED MCANDREW DECEMBER 8 TO REPORT HIS "GROUP" PLANNING ESTABLISH "IRAQI GOVERNMENT" IN NORTHERN IRAQ AND FOMENT REBELLION IN SOUTH WITHIN NEXT SIX WEEKS. AFTER OUR REITERATION OF USG INABILITY GET INVOLVED IN A COUP, JABR SAID HIS GROUP ABLE CARRY OUT COUP WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT, BUT NEEDS USG COMMITMENT TO TAKE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ONCE "IRAQI GOVERNMENT" ESTABLISHED:
- A. PUT PRESSURE UPON PARENT COMPANIES TO HAVE IPC EITHER WITHOLD ALL PAYMENTS TO "ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD" OR PREFERABLY TO MAKE PAYMENTS UNDER CONCESSION TO "NEW GOVERNMENT". IF IPC REFUSED, HIS "GOVERNMENT" WOULD PERMIT BARZANI'S FOLLOWERS BY SABOTAGE TO CUT OFF FLOW OF OIL TO REFINERY AND THROUGH PIPELINE.
 - B. URGENT PROVISION OF MEDICINES, FOOD, AND CLOTHING FOR DISTRIBUTION BY NEW "GOVERNMENT", WHICH MIGHT ALSO REQUIRE CREDIT FACILITIES.
 - C. PROVISION OF NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE IRAQ WITH WHOM NEW "GOVERNMENT" COULD SAFELY COOPERATE.
2. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE VARIATION BETWEEN THIS AND PAST PLANS OF JABR COUP. JABR INDICATED CHANGE DICTATED BY REALIZATION THAT HIS FORMER ASSOCIATE, EX-PRIMIN NAYIF, DOES NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT IN THE ARMED FORCES HE CLAIMS TO HAVE.

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 10069 081925Z

3. EMBOFF TOLD JABR USG COULD NOT MAKE SUCH COMMITMENTS. JABR INSISTED HIS THREE QUESTIONS BE REFERRED TO WASHINGTON. HE WILL RETURN BEIRUT FROM IRAN DECEMBER 12 FOR DEFINITIVE REPLY. FAILING SATISFACTORY RESPONSE FROM USG, HE SAID HE WILL ADVISE HIS FOLLOWERS TO ABANDON THE EFFORT TO OVERTHROW THE IRAQI REGIME.

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
[pp. 2 of 2.]

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SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09993 041921Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 041800Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9229
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION GENEVA

114618

SECRET BEIRUT 9993

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS USINT CAIRO

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

1. ARTICLE APPEARING IN BEIRUT DAILY STAR TODAY, DEC 4, QUOTED INFORMED SOURCES IN BEIRUT AS REPORTING THAT HIJACKED TWA PLANE IN DAMASCUS HAS BEEN COMPLETELY REPAIRED, TEST FLOWN AND IS READY TO LEAVE; HOWEVER TWA UNWILLING GIVE DEPARTURE ORDER UNLESS THE TWO DETAINED ISRAELI PASSENGERS PERMITTED TO DEPART ABOARD PLANE. WLHR REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE FARID ALONZO IN BEIRUT WAS QUOTED AS NOT KNOWING IF REPAIRS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BUT STATING THAT THE PLANE'S ENGINES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TESTED; HOWEVER PLANE'S CONDITION CHANGES FROM DAY TO DAY SO HE UNABLE STATE ANYTHING AS TO WHEN IT WOULD LEAVE. ARTICLE ALSO QUOTED INFORMED NON-OFFICIAL SOURCES IN DAMASCUS AS HAVING NO NEW INFORMATION ON PLANE'S CONDITION.

2. ARTICLE FURTHER NOTED THAT TWA PRESIDENT WISER HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED TWA FELT "A TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY" TOWARD THE TWO REMAINING PASSENGERS AND WOULD DO ITS UTMOST TO HAVE THEM FREED. IT NOTED CAPTAIN CARTER HAD BEEN REPLACED IN DAMASCUS BY TWA REGIONAL VP WILSON. ARTICLE ALSO REPORTED SOME PRESS COMMENTS WHICH COMPARED ROLE OF AIRLINE PILOT TO THAT OF SHIP CAPTAIN THUS BEARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSENGERS AND AIRCRAFT. BUT, TWA SOURCES WERE SAID TO HAVE FOUND NO BASIS FOR THAT ANALOGY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09993 041921Z

3. COMMENT: THIS STORY, WHICH COMES AT SAME TIME ASSIT IN AT SYRIAN UN MISSION OVER SAME ISSUE, PROVIDES JUST ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF INCREASING DIFFICULTY KEEPING LID ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ON NEED FOR ALL CONCERNED TO SPEED UP EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS. PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

10 2 10 2:01

WHILE HOUSE

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09936 031026Z

10

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

105277

O P 031021Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC 9215
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9936

EXDIS

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

REF: GENEVA 4301

WOULD APPRECIATE ANYTHING YOU HAVE FROM BOISARD RE
STATUS UAR RESPONSE TO HIM ASAP.
PORTER

69 DEC 3 PM 2:36

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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EXDISDepartment of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 869

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09923 030009Z

02

83

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

102672

O 022304Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9213
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 9923

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF : BEIRUT 9922

FOR CARLIN TO PASS PAYOT FROM REYNARD

1. BITAR CONTACTED ME AT 19:15 HRS. HE WONDERS WHY THE UAR IS DELAYING OPERATIONS AND PROPOSES QUOTE ASK BOISARD TO RELATE TO EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES PRESENT SITUATION OF THE DEAL BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL BY INTERMEDIARY OF ICRC NAMELY:

A. SYRIA RELEASES SAMUELOFF AND MOULLEM ACCORDING CONDITIONS AS FORESEEN

B. RIGHT AFTER LANDING, ISRAEL RELEASES SYRIAN POW'S IN FOLLOWING WAY- TWO PILOTS FORMALLY INCLUDED IN DEAL WITH EGYPT AND ELEVEN OTHERS SEPARATELY. UNQUOTE PRACTICALLY TWO PILOTS ARE GOING TO BE HANDED OVER TO EGRIA IN KUNEITRA WITH ELEVEN OTHERS.

2. BITAR ADDED QUOTE IF EGYPTIANS THINK POSSIBLE TO EXCLUDE TWO SYRIAN PILOTS FROM THEIR DEAL LITH ISRAEL AND TO PUT THEM INTO THE DEAL BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, SYRIAN AUTHORITIES AGREE. THAT WAY THE DATE OF THE TWO OPERATIONS COULD BE ADVANCED UNQUOTE.

3. I, REYNARD, ANSWERED TO BITAR THAT I WOULD LEAVE UP TO THE ICRC TGKJUJUE WHETHER THIS COMMUNICATION COULD BE MADE OR NOT. SYRIAN AUTHORITIES PREFER THAT THE ICRC TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO THE EGYPTIANS.

4. I, REYNARD, ASK ICRC NOT TO MENTION BITAR'S STATEMENT IN PARA TWO ABOVE IF THIS COULD JEOPARDIZE DEAL AND SET BACK NEGOTIATIONS.

69 DEC 3 AM 8:16
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09923 030009Z

SYRIANS SEEM ANXIOUS TO SPEED UP ABOVE MENTIONED OPERATIONS AND
AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH EGYPTIANS.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

01:0 M E 300 82
MUCH INFORMATION

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 767

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09922 022240Z

92
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

102205

O R 022246Z DEC 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9212

SECRET BEIRUT 9922

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 9900

FOR CARLIN

REYNARD ICRC DAMASCUS NOW AT EMBASSY BEIRUT
AND DESIRES URGENT EXCHANGE MESSAGES WITH PAYOT
WHOSE HOME TELEPHONE IS 56-14-41 RPT 56-14-41. REYNARD
ASKS IF PAYOT MIGHT COME TO MISSION OFFICE TO FACILITATE
THIS EXCHANGE.
PORTER

02
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
3 AM 8:19
DEC 3 1969

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 341

2

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09921 030629Z

22

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

104384

O 021950Z DEC 69 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA
SECSTATE WASHDC 9211

SECRET BEIRUT 9921

EXDIS

DEPT PASS US INT CAIRO

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV 4443

1. RE PARA 2 REFTEL ON COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATHENS AND ISRAEL, TWA INTENDS USE BOTH VOICE AND TELEX CHANNELS TO NOTIFY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATELY ON LANDING. WHILE PLANE AIRBORNE, IT WILL

ALSO BE IN TOUCH ATHENS CONTROL.

2. RE PARA 3 WE WILL INFORM DAMASCUS ON PROBLEMS OF 0900 EXCHANGE. AS WE NOTED IN OUR 9900 THIS TIME FLEXIBLE. PORTER

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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The seal of the United States Department of State is located in the top left corner. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by small stars.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09900 021628Z

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2
69 DEC 2 PM 5:09

SECRET BEIRUT 9900

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y F O R T E X T .

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

REF: CAIRO 2843 NOTAL

1. IN VIEW ANTICIPATED VISIT RAFAEL TO CARLIN OF US MISSION AND TO PAYOT OF ICRC TODAY, DECEMBER 2 WE NOTE FROM REFTEL THAT BOISARD HAS BEEN PROMISED BY UAR ANSWER ON EXCHANGE BY DECEMBER 3 OR 4 AND THAT HE ANTICIPATES IT WILL BE FAVORABLE BECAUSE ALL UAR CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN MET.

2. OUR SOURCES IN DAMASCUS STATE SARG HAS ACCEPTED TERMS ICRC LETTER OF GOI AS BASIS FOR EXCHANGE AND SARG PREPARED AND ANXIOUS TO CONSUMMATE DEAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SARG HAS AGREED FORMALLY FOR TWO SYRIAN PILOTS TO BE HANDLED UNDER TERMS UAR-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AS ORIGINALLY REQUESTED ALTHOUGH ACTUALLY THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER WITH OTHER SYRIAN PRISONERS BY ISRAELIS AT KUNITRA.

3. WE HAVE NOTED FROM REFTEL ACCORDING BOISARD UAR
AUTHORITIES BLAMING SARG FOR DELAY WHILE REYNARD OF ICRC
DAMASCUS BELIEVES UAR DELAY RESPONSIBLE. WE UNDERSTAND PAYOT
HAS RAISED WITH UAR AMBASSADOR BERN NEED FOR UAR RESPONSE.

4. IN GETTING HIS EXCHANGE OFF DEAD CENTER, ONE OF THE

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09900 021628Z

PROBLEMS SEEMS TO BE SLOWNESS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PAYOT AND ICRC REPRESENTATIVES IN FIELD, BOISARD IN CAIRO, REYNARD IN DAMASCUS AND MOREILLON IN ISRAEL. WE HOPE US MISSION GENEVA WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO TRANSMIT ANY EXCHANGE URGENT MESSAGES BETWEEN PAYOT AND ICRC REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIELD THAT CANNOT BE SENT IN CLEAR.

5. WE NOTE FROM REFTEL 24 HOURS NEEDED FOR UAR TO TRANSPORT PRISONERS TO BORDER AFTER AGREEMENT REACHED. SCHEDULE ON DAY OF RELEASE NOW ENVISAGED AS FOLLOWS: (A) 0800 (0600 ZULU) TWA PLANE DEPARTS DAMASCUS FOR ATHENS (NOT ROME AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED). (B) ONE HOUR BEFORE LANDING, THAT IS ABOUT 0900, (0700 ZULU) EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI EXCHANGE WOULD GET UNDER WAY AT CANAL. (C) ONE HOUR AFTER PLANE LANDS, THAT IS 1100 (0900 ZULU) SYRIAN PRISONERS WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO SARG BY GOI. FOREGOING SCHEDULE WORKED OUT BY REYNARD IN COOPERATION WITH WILSON OF TWA. FOREGOING SCHEDULE IS FLEXIBLE BUT CONTROLLED BY FIXED CLOSING SYRIAN FRONTIER CONTROL POSTS AT 1630 HOURS (1430 ZULU) (I.E., SHORTLY BEFORE SUNSET).

6. COMMUNICATION GAPS NOW APPEAR TO BE: (A) SARG ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE THROUGH ICRC CHANNELS TO GOI OF GOI LETTER GUARANTEE. (B) SARG INFORMING UAR THROUGH ICRC CHANNELS IT IS PREPARED PROCEED WITH EXCHANGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (C) ASSURANCE MOREILLON AND BOISARD UNDERSTAND TERMS AGREED UPON BETWEEN SARG AND REYNARD. WE UNDERSTAND AT LEAST TWO US CORRESPONDENTS HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF DEAL. THUS WE SEE SPEED IN CONCLUDING DEAL IMPERATIVE.

8. FOR US MISSION GENEVA. OUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH REYNARD IN DAMASCUS ARE BY OPEN PHONE OR THREE HOURS ROAD TRIP. THEREFORE WE ARE ASKING HIM COME TO BEIRUT TO SPEED UP COMMUNICATIONS WITH PAYOT. ROUGEMENT REMAINS DAMASCUS. ALL OF FOREGOING SHOULD OF COURSE BE BROUGHT TO PAYOT'S ATTENTION ASAP.

9. TEL AVIV AND CAIRO. PLEASE PASS FOREGOING TO MOREILLON AND BOISARD.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 293

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09899 021414Z

42

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

O P 021325Z DEC 69

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9201

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY

099787

SECRET BEIRUT 9899

EXDIS

1. JESSE LEWIS, MIDDLE EAST WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT RESIDENT BEIRUT, OBTAINED FROM RECENT VISIT ISRAEL GENERAL IDEA OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR RELEASE ISRAELI PASSENGERS DAMASCUS. DCM SAW HIM DECEMBER 2 AND WARNED THAT PUBLICITY COULD DESTROY CURRENT CHANCE OF RELEASING THE PASSENGERS. LEWIS, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE CORRESPONDENT, SAID HE HAD NO INTENTION PUBLISHING ANYTHING AT MOMENT BUT WAS INTERESTED IN WRITING ARTICLE ONCE PASSENGERS HAD BEEN RELEASED.

2. WE FULLY CONFIDENT LEWIS WILL NOT PUBLISH STORY BUT THIS FURTHER EVIDENCE EXCHANGE DETAILS LEAKING OUT. PORTER

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
69 DEC 2 PM 5:09

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09889 020754Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

098029

0 020730Z DEC 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9198
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9889

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: CAIRO 2832

1. OUR SOURCES IN DAMASCUS HAVE TELEPHONED TO REQUEST URGENTLY
ANY INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM CAIRO ON DEVELOPMENTS UAR-
ISRAELI PRISONER EXCHANGE.
PORTER

SECRET EXDIS

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 420

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09832 291511Z

53

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 291444Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9190
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

087386

SECRET BEIRUT 9832

DEPT PASS CAIRO

EXDIS

SUBJECT: IRAQI BRIGADE IN SYRIA

1. DURING VISIT DIPLOMATIC REP STATIONED DAMASCUS TO BEIRUT NOV 29 HE HAS TOLD US OF HEAVY ALL NIGHT ACTIVITY AT SARG GENERAL STAFF BLDG.

2. HE BELIEVES THIS ACTIVITY STEMS FROM PRESENCE IRAQI BRIGADE CLOSE OUTSIDE DAMASCUS AT ATA WHICH REPORTEDLY ENTERED SYRIA FROM IRAQ WITHOUT PERMISSION AND IS TECHNICALLY RESTING NEAR DAMASCUS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO JORDAN. OUR SOURCE ALSO UNDERSTANDS SARG AS ORDERED CALL UP OF 75 PERCENT OF RESERVES.

3. IT APPEARS OBVIOUS THAT SARG FEARS IRAQI BRIGADE MAY HAVE IDEAS OF SUPPORTING ATTEMPT AT COUP.
PORTER

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69 NOV 29 PM 12:29

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 299

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09827 291057Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

086549

Z 0 291043Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
USINT CAIRO
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9188

SECRET BEIRUT 9827

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: BEIRUT 9826

1. FOR TEL AVIV: WE NEED URGENTLY RESULTS MOREILLON CONVERSATION SCHEDULED FOR 0900 TODAY PER REFTEL.
2. FOR CAIRO: SIMILARLY RESULTS BOISARD DISCUSSIONS ARE NEEDED.
3. REPS ICRC, TWA AND ITAL EMB RETURNING ABOUT 1530 LOCAL TO DAMASCUS AND HAVE NEED FOR SOME POSITIVE NEWS TO PASS CHIEF SARG NEGOTIATOR.
PORTER

69 NOV 29 PM 12:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2

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SECRET 915

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09826 290157Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

084662

O 290052Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9186
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T BEIRUT 09826

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS CAIRO

TWA HIJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV 4413 AND 4414 (LATTER NOTAL)
1. AFTER RECEIPT REFTELS REYNARD TELEPHONED
PAYOT OF ICRC GENEVA AT 23000 HOURS ZULU NOVEMBER 28 FROM EMBASSY.
PAYOT UNDERSTOOD FULLY URGENCY OF SITUATION IN DAMASCUS
AND HAD ALREADY CONTACTED "HIGH ISRAELI PERSONALITY".
LATTER WILL SEE MOREILLON AT 0900 ISRAELI TIME NOV 69.

2. PAYOT ALSO SAID ICRC REP IN CAIRO, BOISARD,
ALSO AWARE OF URGENCY OF SITUATION AND WILL ACT QUICKLY TO
SPEED UP DEAL. WE THINK THAT BY 1300 HOURS NOV 29 GENEVA
WILL BE INFORMED ON SUBSTANCE AND MODALITIES THAT ARE
GOING TO BE FIXED BETWEEN GOI AND UAR.

3. AFTER CAIRO AGREEMENT, ICRC WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO
EXTEND GUARANTY OF UAR TO GOI. ON SYRIAN SIDE WE NOTE THAT
THERE IS A BUILD IN GUARANTY BECAUSE ISRAELI PASSENGERS WILL BE
RELEASED FIRST.

4. REYNARD ENVISAGES THAT ACTUAL EXCHANGE COULD THEN
TAKE PLACE ON SUNDAY NOVEMBER 30 ON FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

AJSZ 0800 HOURS LOCAL (ZULU PLUS TWO) ISREALI
PASSENGERS LEAVE DAMASCUS ABOARD TWO PLANE ENROUTE FOR ROME
(NOT ATHENS AS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED)

B. 1100 HOURS: ISRAELI - UAR EXCHANGE TAKES PLACE ACROSS CANAL

C. 1200 HOURS: ISRAELI PASSENGERS ARRIVE RNTS. FACT OF

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69 NOV 29 AM 9:27
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09826 290157Z

THEIR ARRIVAL NOTIFIED TO TEL AVIV IMMEDIATELY

D. 13000 HOURS: SYRIAN PRISOFFRS MOVE ACROSS CEASE-FIRE
LINE TO SYRIA.

5. WE HOPE THAT ALL POSSIBLE WILL BE DONE TO SEE THAT
GUARANTY BE DELIVERED TO DAMASCUS SATURDAY NIGHT (NOV 29)
AND TO GET AGREEMENT TO ABOVE MENTIONED TIMING. MOREILLON
SHOULD GET AGREEMENT TO ABOVE MENTIONED TIMING. MOREILLON
SHOULD GET AGREEMENT FOR DE ROUGEMONT TO CROSS CEASE-FIRE
LINE. REYNARD ALSO ASKS THAT MOREILLION BE INFORMED URGENTLY
OF FOREGOING AND ALSO BOISARD BY UNINT CAIRO PROVIDED
HE CAN BE INFORMED WITHOUT INFO PASSING THROUGH EGYPTIAN MGGPS.
BOISARD OFFICE IS IN SEMIRAMIS HOTEL.

FOR TEL AVIV: WE CONCUR LAST PARA YOUR 4414 ON DESIRABILITY
PASSING TO DEPT THIS ECXCHANGE FOR RECORD. WE WILL REPEAT OUR SIDE
LATER THIS MORNING.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 500

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09824 281919Z

52
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

O 281754Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC 9185
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

082717

SECRET BEIRUT 9824
EXDIS
SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV 4402

1. EMBASSY PLEASED TO NOTE PARA 1 REFTEL THAT ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY HOPED TO SATISFY ICRC REQUIREMENTS THIS AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 28. ITALIAN EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE, TWA'S WILSON, AND ICRC RENARDS HAVE JUST ARRIVED FROM DAMASCUS TO EMPHASIZE THEIR BELIEF AND THAT OF ITALIAN AMBASSADOR DAMASCUS, THAT IF DEAL IS TO BE CONSUMMATED IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SYRIANS RECEIVE THE ISRAELI GUARANTEE BY TOMORROW NOVEMBER 29. THE SYRIANS HAVE ASSUMED THAT THEY HAVE MADE A DEAL BY AGREEING TO THE WRITTEN GUARANTEE AND HAVE MADE ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE TWA AIRCRAFT. THE ICRC HAS, OF COURSE, INFORMED SARG THAT THE ISRAELIS AGREED TO WRITTEN GUARANTEE IN PRINCIPLE. SARG IS NOW PRESSING THE ICRC FOR THE ISRAELI GUARANTEE. THE CHIEF SYRIAN NEGOTIATOR, WHO ENGINEERED DEAL IN FACE STRONG OPPOSITION, IS UNDER EXTREME PERSONAL PRESSURE TO PRODUCE RESULTS BY NOVEMBER 29. IF ISRAELI GUARANTEE IS NOT AVAILABLE BY THEN GENERAL BITAL YOLD ICRC REPRESENTATIVE TODAY THAT HE NO LONGER COULD GUARANTEE THAT THE DEAL WOULD GO THROUGH AND THAT THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE TO REQUEST DEPARTURE OF TWA PLANE FROM SYRIA WITHOUT THE PASSENGERS.

2. ACCORDING TO THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE, THE ISRAELIS TODAY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE EXCHANGE WITH THE UAR ALTHOUGH AS IN THE CASE WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV, THEY DID NOT EXPLICITLY MAKE IT A CONDITION FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE SYRIAN/ISRAELI EXCHANGE. WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISRAELI

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PILOTS IN THE UAR TO THE GOI. AT SAME TIME, IT SEEMS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT THE SYRIANS RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY ARE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE CONCLUDING A BILATERAL DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. IF THE ISRAELIS DO NOT MOVE QUICKLY THE SYRIANS, GIVEN THEIR ALMOST NEUROTIC, SUSPICIOUS NATURE, ARE APT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT SERIOUS AND CANCEL THE WHOLE DEAL DESPITE THE FACT DAMASCUS REPRESENTATIVES HERE BELIEVE THAT SYRIANS MOST ANXIOUS RELEASE THE PASSENGERS AND PLANE. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE EMBASSY URGE THE ISRAELIS, IF THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, TO TRANSMIT THE GUARANTEE TO THE ICRC AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME TOMORROW, NOVEMBER 29.

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING, IF POSSIBLE, WHETHER GOI ACTUALLY GAVE ISRAELI ICRC REPRESENTATIVE THE GUARANTEE THIS AFTERNOON. IF SO, ICRC REPRESENTATIVE REYNARD COULD PASS THAT FACT TO SARG THIS EVENING.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 893

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09789 280957Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

079775

O 280915Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9175

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9789

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV 4390, 4391 (NOTAL)

1. WE HAVE PASSED SUBSTANCE REFTELS TO DAMASCUS.

2. FOR SAKE OF PRECISION, WE ASSUME GOI KNOWS EXACT FORM GUARANTEE ICRC DESIRES, AS WE WERE INFORMED ICRC HAD ALREADY TOLD GOI WHAT WAS NEEDED. ONLY POINT STILL OPEN THEREFORE WAS THAT ICRC HAD NOT TOLD GOI ABOUT DELIVERY GUARANTEE TO ICRC REP. WE ASSUME IT IS "THIS DETAIL" ON WHICH GOI NOT INFORMED. (PARA ONE TEL AVIV 4391).

3. WE HAVE USED OUR CHANNELS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE RAPID COMMUNICATON. HOWEVER ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WE FACE IS LINK BETWEEN BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS. WE HAVE TO RELY ON PUBLIC TELEPHONE AND HAND EXCHANGE AT HALF WAY POINT (CHTOURA IN LEBANON). TELEPHONE DELAYS, EVEN ON "URGENT" BASIS CAN RUN FROM ONE-HALF HOUR TO TWO HOURS OR LONGER WHILE HAND TRANSMISSION REQUIRES ANOTHER THREE HOURS AFTER MEETING ARRANGED BY PHONE.

4. FOR USINT CAIRO: TEL AVIV 4391 EXPRESSED GOI FONOFF CONCERN THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN HEARD FROM ICRC ABOUT UAR END OF EXCHANGE. GOI STILL WANTS THIS WITH UAR FOR TWO ISRAELI PILOTS. ICRC DELEGATE ISRAEL AT EXCHANGE OF BODIES AT KANTARA ON NOV 26 WHEN HE QUERIED HIS UAR COLLEAGUES WAS TOLD THERE WAS NO INFO. DURING DCM HOUGHTON'S VISIT DAMASCUS NOV 26 (BEIRUT 9777) HE RAISED ALSO QUESTION OF UAR EXCHANGE AND WAS ASSURED THAT THIS WAS NO PROBLEM.

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69 NOV 28 PM 12:21
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09789 280957Z

ANY LIGHT USINT COULD SHED ON CURRENT STATUS EXCHANGE WOULD BE
HELPFUL. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANSWER TODAY.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09781 281011Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

079899

O 280951Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9176
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 9781

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWO HIJACKING

DELIVER DUTY OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS WASH NOV 28

1. OUR DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN DAMASCUS HAVE INFORMED US (NOV 28 0630Z) THAT FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF ATTACK ON EL AL OFFICE IN ATHENS SYRIAN AUTHORITIES INFORMED WILSON OF TWA THAT PLANE HAD TO BE MOVED FROM PRESENT PROTECTED STORAGE TO MAIN AIRPORT TERMINAL AND THAT ARMED GUARD WOULD BE REMOVED. HOWEVER DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO SYRIAN FONOFF HAVE RESULTED IN SYRIAN ASSURANCE PLANE WILL CONTINUE BE GUARDED. SYRIANS THEN SAID THEY WANT PLANE TO LEAVE SOON. OUR SOURCES INTERPRET THIS AS INDICATION SYRIANS WANT TO COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS FOR TWO ISRAELIS THEIR CUSTODY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO PERMIT TWA PLANE DEPART.

2. WE ALSO WERE INFORMED ICRC DEL PROBABLY WAS GOING AGAIN TO SYRIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE LINEHRROM DAMASCUS TODAY.
PORTER

SECRET

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69 NOV 28 PM 12:21
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 673

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09777 262127Z

92

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

073288

O P 260707Z NOV 69 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9170
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 9777

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TWA HYJACKING

REF: TEL AVIV'S 4373

1. DCM DISCUSSED TWA PROBLEM NOVEMBER 26 IN DAMASCUS WITH ITALIAN EMBASSY AND TWA'S WILSON. CURRENT SITUATION APPEARS AS FOLLOWS:

2. ACCORDING ICRC REPRESENTATIVE ISRAELIS AGREED TO BILATERAL EXCHANGE WITH SYRIANS (APPARENTLY UAR EXCHANGE HAS SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT) ON BASIS RELEASE TWO TWA PASSENGERS IN RETURN FOR 13 SYRIANS. ISRAELIS STIPULATED PASSENGERS SHOULD BE FLOWN TO ATHENS AND AS SOON AS ISRAELIS SO INFORMED, SYRIAN PRISONERS WOULD BE RELEASED PRESUMABLY ACROSS GOLAN HEIGHTS.

3. SYRIANS, HOWEVER, STILL INSISTING ON SOME SORT OF GUARANTEE OF ISREALI GOOD INTENTIONS. SARG SUGGESTED TO ICRC THAT PASSENGERS COULD BE RELEASED BUT THE PLANE WOULD REMAIN IN SYRIAN AIRSPACE UNDER SYRIAN FIGHTER ESCORT UNTIL SYRIANS RELEASED. ALTERNATIVE SARG SUGGESTION WAS THAT PASSENGERS BE GRANTED ASYLUM IN ITALIAN EMBASSY. WHEN SYRIANS RELEASED, ITALIAN AMBASSADOR COULD DRIVE THEM IN HIS CAR TO TWA PLANE.

4. ICRC REPRESENTATIVE REFUSED TO COUNTENANCE FIRST

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69 NOV 27 AM 8:47

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09777 262127Z

SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTED THAT SYRIANS ACCEPT IN LIEU THEREOF, WRITTEN UNDERTAKING BY THE ISRAELIS THAT GOI WOULD RELEASE SYRIANS AS SOON AS TWA PLANE WITH TWO ISRAELI PASSENGERS ARRIVED IN ATHENS. SARG HAS PRESUMABLY BEEN MULLING THIS ONE OVER ALL DAY AND HAD NOT AS OF 4:00 P.M. (DAMASCUS TIME) NOVEMBER 26, RESPONDED.

5. TO INFORM ISREALIS OF STATE OF PLAY, ICRC REPRESENTATIVE LEFT DAMASCUS FOR BORDER AT 1:15 P. M. PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE, HE RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM THE ICRC IN GENEVA INSTRUCTING HIM REFUSE FIGHTER ESCORT PLOY BUT AUTHORIZING HIM ACCEPT WRITTEN GUARANTEE, ISRAELI ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, OR ASYLUM SUGGESTION. GENEVA ALSO INFORMED HIM ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO WRITTEN GUARANTEE. IN MEANTIME ITALIAN AMBASSADOR HAS URGENTLY REQUESTED ROME FOR INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING ASYLUM PROPOSAL.

6. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WAS TO CALL A SARG CONTACT AT 5:00 P.M. TO DETERMINE IF SYRIANS WOULD AGREE TO WRITTEN GUARANTEE.

7. WILSON INFORMED DCM THAT SYRIAN DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION HAD REQUESTED 12 HOURS WRITTEN ADVANCED NOTICE OF TWA PLANE'S DEPARTURE. WILSON CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, THAT REQUEST WAS TO SOME EXTENT PRO FORMA AND THAT DIRECTOR WOULD NOT CAUSE TROUBLE IF PLANE OTHERWISE READY TO GO. DCM STRONGLY ADVISED THAT PLANE SHOULD DEPART WITH PASSENGERS JUST AS SOON AS GREEN LIGHT WAS GIVEN. PLANE IS READY TO GO ANY TIME SITUATION PERMITS.

8. ICRC REPRESENTATIVE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED THAT WE PERSUADE RUSSIANS EXERT PRESSURE ON SYRIANS AT THIS POINT.

COMMENT: SYRIANS CONTINUING MADDENING ROLE OF RUG MERCHANT BUT ITALIAN EMBASSY BELIEVES SARG WANTS RELEASE PASSENGERS AND DOES NOT WANT PLANE TO LEAVE WITHOUT THEM. ACCORDING EMBASSY, FAMILIES OF SYRIAN PRISONERS EXERTING PRESSURE ON SARG. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ICRC REPRESENTATIVE AND BOTH ARE DOING UTMOST CONCLULDE DEAL. WE ARE HOPEFUL.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09777 262127Z

9. WILSON WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT KEEPING TWA INFORMED
CURRENT STATUS PROBLEM.
PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 975

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09738 252033Z

45

ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 251616Z NOV 69
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9155

S E C R E T BEIRUT 9738

EXDIS

SUBJ: ARMS ESCALATION IN LEBANON

1) AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, WE HAVE BEEN UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FOR MANY MONTHS FROM CHRISTIAN AND CERTAIN OTHER PRO-WESTERN GROUPS TO SUPPLY THEM ARMS (OR MONEY TO BUY ARMS) FOR THEIR PROTECTION IN EVENT OF ALL OUT CONFRONTATION WITH PALESTINIANS. IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS THIS PRESSURE HAS INCREASED AND WE NOW HAVE INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT CHRISTIANS, IN ABSENCE ANY KIND ASSISTANCE, ARE BEGINNING TO SCRAPE TOGETHER THE MONEY TO ARM THEMSELVES. THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUY BOTH FROM FOREIGN SOURCES AND THE LOCAL BLACK MARKET.

2) WITHOUT DOUBT THIS NEW TREND STEMS FROM INCREASED UNEASINESS OVER THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY AND FROM THE BELIEF EITHER THAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN HAS ALREADY GIVEN AWAY LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, OR THAT THE FEDAYEEN WILL GRADUALLY IMPOSE THEIR CONDITIONS ON LEBANON IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

3) WE HAVE RECENTLY RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE PHALANGE IS TRYING TO CONCLUDE A SUBSTANTIAL ARMS DEAL FOR 500 RIFLES. OTHER SOURCES TELL US THAT THEY HAVE SCRAPED TOGETHER THE MONEY, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO GET THE ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY. WE KNOW THAT THE ZGHORTA CHRISTIANS UNDER FRANGIEH HAVE BEEN BUYING EXTENSIVELY, AS HAVE BOTH RAYMOND EDDE'S SUPPORTERS AND CAMILLE CHAMOUNS. WHILE ALLOWING FOR SOME EXAGGERATION, IT IS NONETHELESS CLEAR THAT A FAIR AMOUNT OF MODERN WEAPONRY, MOSTLY AUTOMATIC RIFLES, IS COMING INTO THE HANDS OF THE LEBANESE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09738 252033Z

IT PROBABLY IS AS YET ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE NEW WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE FEDAYEEN AND THEIR SUPPORTERS. INTERESTINGLY, MANY OF THESE WEAPONS ARE KALASHNIKOV RIFLES BOUGHT FROM THE FEDAYEEN THEMSELVES, OR FROM SMUGGLERS WHOSE SOURCE SEEMS PRIMARILY TO BE SYRIA.

4) SYMPTOMATIC OF THE CONCERN THE CHRISTIANS NOW FEEL WAS A CONVERSATION I HAD NOVEMBER 20 WITH HENRI PHARAON, RESPECTED GREEK CATHOLIC LAY LEADER WHO WAS INDEPENDENT LEBANON'S FIRST FOREIGN MINISTER AND WHO HAS PLAYED A CONSISTENTLY MODERATE ROLE IN THE NATION'S HISTORY. PHARAON WAS, FOR EXAMPLE, A LEADING FIGURE IN THE "THIRD FORCE" IN THE 58 WAR, WHEN HE REFUSED TO TAKE A PARTISAN STAND ON THE SIDE OF CHAMOUN. PHARAON SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE USG NOW TO QUICKLY ARM THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. HE SPOKE OF THE BREAKDOWN OF ORDER THAT WAS DEVELOPING THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE AS FEDAYEEN AND REFUGEES BEGAN TO EXERT THEIR INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION AND CONTEMPT FOR LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. HE MENTIONED ONE LEBANESE VILLAGE NEAR THE LARGE SIDON REFUGEE CAMP WHICH IS ALREADY UNDER SIEGE AND FROM WHICH THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN HAVE ALREADY BEEN EVACUATED. I EXPLAINED TO HIM OUR POLICY OF NOT ARMING PRIVATE PARA-MILITARY GROUPS, AS WE ATTEMPTED PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT AND ARMY. HE AGREED THAT US POLICY HAD BEEN CORRECT UNTIL NOW, BUT FELT THAT SITUATION COULD DEVELOP QUICKLY WHERE ARMY COULD NO LONGER BE ABLE PROVIDE INTERNAL SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND WOULD THEN REQUIRE HELP FROM ANY "LOYAL" PARA-MILITARY GROUPS WHICH HAD THE MEANS TO ASSIST.

5) I SAID THE USG BELIEVED THAT ATTEMPTS BY US TO ARM PRIVATE LEBANESE CITIZENS NOW COULD BE INFLAMMATORY AND COULD PRODUCE THE VERY INTERNAL CONFLAGRATION WE TRYING AVOID. CHRISTIANS MIGHT DECIDE PREEMPT SITUATION AND MOVE AGAINST THE REFUGEE CAMPS. HE FINALLY ADMITTED THAT MY POINT HAD SOME VALIDITY BUT SAID QUESTION WAS MORE ONE OF HELPING CHRISTIANS FROM BEING MASSACRED. HE THEN INSISTED THAT THE USG SHOULD AS MINIMUM HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS STORED BOTH IN LEBANON AND IN AREAS NEAR TO LEBANON SO THAT WE COULD MAKE DELIVERIES VERY QUICKLY WHEN THE SITUATION REQUIRED IT.

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 09738 252033Z

6) I AM NOT PROPOSING AT THIS POINT ANY NEW COURSE OF ACTION FOR US. I THINK IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ARM ANY PRIVATE GROUPS NOW, PARTICULARLY SINCE THEY SEEM TO BE GETTING SOME WEAPONS ON THEIR OWN (FOR WHICH USG MAY INCIDENTALLY BE BLAMED). NONETHELESS, I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE STEADY INFLUX OF ARMS INTO THE COUNTRY, LARGELY IN THE HANDS OF ENEMIES OF THE LEBANESE STATE. THIS PRODUCES TREMENDOUS STRAIN AND A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE NATIONALISTS, AND THE DANGER OF LOCAL INCIDENTS IS BOUND TO ESCALATE. THE FEELING OF FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY WHICH IS PERVADING THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY HAS REACHED A NEW HIGH IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS. THIS IS, OF COURSE, A BY-PRODUCT OF THE SIGNIFICANT ARMING OF THE REFUGEES AND THE NEW AWARENESS THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE ESTABLISHED EXTRA-TERRITORIAL MILITARY BASES WITHIN LEBANON -- A SITUATION WHICH MOST LEBANESE BELIEVE CAN NOT BE BROUGHT UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL.

7) I STILL BELIEVE OUR BESTCOURSE OF ACTION IS TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN LEBANESE ARMY IS EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. THIS WILL NOT ONLY SERVE DETER THE FEDAYEEN AND THE REFUGEES FROM CHALLENGING THE AUTHORITY OF THE GOL, BUT IT WILL PROVIDE SOME PEACE OF MIND TO THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND PERHAPS KEEP THEM FROM TAKING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND ORDER INTO THEIR OWN HANDS.

8) WE BELIEVE LID WILL PROBABLY STAY ON FOR A FEW WEEKS AT LEAST, AND UNEASY (AND OCCASIONALLY BROKEN) TRUCE WILL PREVAIL WITHIN LEBANON. HOWEVER, THE NERVOUSNESS OF THE CHRISTIANS (AND MANY NON-CHRISTIANS) WILL NOT SUBSIDE, AND WE CAN EXPECT MORE AND INCREASINGLY URGENT PLEAS FOR HELP. PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 807

SUMMARY

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09676 240228Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

055423

Z 0 240143Z ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9142 FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET BEIRUT 9676

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING

1. WILSON AND DIPLOMATIC REP FROM DAMASCUS HAVE VISITED
US URGENTLY ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN EXCHANGE
NEGOTIATIONS.

2. ICRC DEL AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH BOTH SARG AND GOI - NOV 22,
REPORT SARG NOW PREPARED TO LET TWA PASSENGERS LEAVE 48
HOURS IN ADVANCE OF SYRIANS NOW HELD BY GOI UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, SARG CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN GOI
RELEASE ALL SYRIANS THEY NOW HOLD TOTALLING 13 PERSONS
INCLUDING 2 SYRIAN MIG PILOTS. BASIC STICKING POINT FOR
SARG IS NEUROTIC SUSPICION THAT GOI WILL NOT RELEASE
SYRIANS AFTER SARG RELEASES PASSENGERS. HENCE THE
CLEAR NEED FOR SOME SORT OF GUARANTEE.

3. ICRC DELEGATE IS NOW SUGGESTING TO OVERCOME THIS SUSPICION
THAT HE GIVE ICRC GUARANTY BACKED BY USG ASSURANCE TO
ICRC THAT USG WILL UNDERTAKE TO ENFORCE ICRC GUARANTEE
SHOULD GOI RENEGE.

4. ICRC DEL WOULD LIKE TO ADVANCE THIS PROPOSAL AT
MEETING 0600Z NOVEMBER 24 WITH SARG IN DAMASCUS
WHICH WILL BE FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS SAME
MORNING BY MEETING WITH ISRAELIS AT FRONTIER.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 09676 240228Z

5. ON GOI SIDE ICRC DELEGATE BELIEVES THAT THERE MAY BE SOME ISRAELI RELUCTANCE (A) TO IDEA OF SEEING ORIGINAL TRILATERAL ISRAELI - EGYPTIAN - SYRIAN PACKAGE BEING TURNED INTO TWO SEPARATE BILATERAL SWAPS. AND (B) TO RELEASE 13 SYRIANS IN LIEU ONLY TWO SYRIAN PILOTS. ACCORDING ICRC REP, ISRAELIS WHEN PRESENTED PROPOSAL, SAID SYRIANS WERE ADVANCING NEW CONCEPT WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH. MAJOR STEP FORWARD, AS WE SEE IT, IS SYRIAN AGREEMENT TO 48 HOURS ADVANCE RELEASE OF PASSENGERS.

6. WILSON CONVINCED SYRIANS WANT PASSENGERS TO LEAVE WITH TWA PLANE AS THEY ARE FULLY AWARE ALL IMPLICATIONS PLANE LEAVING WITHOUT THEM.

7. EMBASSY BELIEVES THERE ARE NOW TWO SPECIFIC STEPS FOR DEPT TO TAKE: (A) EXTENSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE USG ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL UNDERWRITE ICRC GUARANTEE TO SYRIANS THAT ISRAELIS WILL NOT RENEGE ON PROPOSAL WHEN AND IF AGREEMENT REACHED. (B) REQUESTING EMBASSY TEL AVIV TO URGE GOI TO ACCEPT PROPOSAL. IF UNWILLING TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ASSENT, IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT GOI AT LEAST NOT RPT NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND NEW SYRIAN PROPOSALS. TIME IS OF ESSENCE, AS WILSON MAINTAINS PLANE CANNOT REMAIN MUCH LONGER DAMASCUS.

8. DEPT RESPONSE BY FLASH PRECEDENCE REQUESTED.
PORTER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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44/40/0290

AIRGRAM

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USIA	NSA	CIA	

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FILE DESIGNATION

SECRET/EXDIS

A-501

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

NOV 24 1 36 PM '69

COPY SERIES B

FROM : American Embassy, BEIRUT

DATE: November 20, 1969

SUBJECT : Request for Arms by Druze Deputy of Aley, Sheikh Fadlallah Talhouk

REF :

EXDIS

Fadlallah Talhouk called on me November 18 to express his great concern at the deteriorating situation in Lebanon. He was particularly concerned with the arming of the refugee camps and the greater freedom being demanded and secured by the Fedayeen. He said the situation, as far as his Druze faction is concerned, is almost out of control and his people are becoming frightened.

Talhouk heads a minority faction of the Druze in the Aley area. He and his group have always been pro-Western and conservative. They are strongly opposed to Kamal Jumblatt. Until a year and a half ago, Talhouk's group was closely associated with Emir Majid Arslan, but this alignment has now broken up. Arslan, according to Talhouk, has become nothing more than a figurehead who refuses to resist the leadership and "Socialist-Communist" ideologies of Kamal Jumblatt and is a complete opportunist. (I concur.)

Talhouk has become a firm ally of several conservative Christian groups and he works closely with the Phalangists and Chamounists. He is genuinely pro-American and his outlook is politically conservative. He said that his people were losing their will to resist. They had no arms and were watching the

FORM 10-64 DS-323

SECRET/EXDIS

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Drafted by:

AMB:DJPorter:ks

Drafting Date:

11/20/69

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

massive influx of arms being put in the hands of their political enemies and the Palestinians. He urged that we provide him with up to a thousand small arms - effective automatic rifles, plus a few machine guns. He pointed out several recent instances where the Fedayeen had created incidents in Aley with his Druzes, who felt themselves powerless to resist.

He had asked his Christian friends for arms. The response was that they were unable to get enough for themselves. He also had tried to get assistance from the Army, but without success. The Army had made vague promises for the future, but he doubted whether they could or would be kept. He mentioned a recent instance where he had offered to guard the Gendarmerie station in Aley against threatened Fedayeen attack, thereby relieving the Army for other duties. The Army was grateful for his gesture but was unable to provide weapons for Talhouk's followers so that they could do the job. Also, the Army, trying to conserve a Confessional balance, has refused to accept more Druze into the ranks.

I explained to Talhouk that we were not giving arms to individual factions in Lebanon. I said I could not anticipate that we would be changing our policy, but of course we would keep his request in mind. I reminded him of USG support of Lebanon, and said we were providing our support and assistance to the Government and the Army. This was not enough, he responded. The Army wasn't large enough to handle a major internal explosion, and the Lebanese would have to protect themselves. Talhouk said he could assure me that if the USG could help, all of the arms would be returned to the US when they no longer were needed for the defense of Lebanon. He did not want them to remain in the hands of his hot-headed Druzes except for use in the present emergency. As for purchasing weapons in the local black-market, this required more than his poor Druzes could handle. A Kalashnikov rifle or other good weapons cost between 600 and 1000 Lebanese pounds (\$200 to \$300 plus). This was one of the reasons his Christian political allies couldn't help him - they were unable to raise sufficient funds for their own weapons requirements.

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AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

A-502

SECRET/EXDIS

AMB-PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

COPY 2 SERIES B

NOV 24 1 34 PM '69

FROM : American Embassy, BEIRUT

DATE: November 20, 1969

SUBJECT: Uneasiness Among Armenian Community in Lebanon
(Need for Arms)

REF :

EXDIS

In the course of a tour d'horizon on November 19, Andre Tabourian, one of the four Armenian (Tashnag) Deputies in Lebanon, expressed the uneasiness felt by the Armenian community at the influx of the Fedayeen into Lebanon and the arming of the refugee camps. The minority Armenians, who are always somewhat in the underdog position in Lebanon, were particularly concerned that events were unfolding which would create new and serious pressures on them.

The Armenians, as Tabourian said, are not involved in the political aspects of the matter, and have avoided participation in the national Fedayeen debate. But they are concerned about their own security, and as well the economic situation in Lebanon which of course directly affects their well-being. They have been discussing the matter with the Lebanese Army (with whom they have always worked closely in the past), but the Army seems to be powerless to provide weapons for them. The Armenians have of course always maintained a paramilitary capacity, as a result of their history, and they will protect themselves. But they also want to protect the status quo in Lebanon.

They are doing some buying in the local arms market, but this is extremely expensive and they are aware of the fact that there are a great number of weapons pouring in for the

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

AMB:DJPorter/mm

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

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Beirut's A-502

2

Palestinians and the Lebanese leftists. They feel that the balance of paramilitary power is shifting very rapidly against them, and against the "good" Lebanese.

Tabourian did not ask for any specific US help, although he of course broadly hinted that he hoped it might be forthcoming if needed. I said my best advice to the Armenians is to continue to work closely with the Army and to provide whatever support the Army requested of them, in terms of internal security.

Tabourian said that as usual the Armenians were determined to take care of themselves. The problem was that they could not procure weapons abroad and safely import them, and locally-procured weapons were extremely expensive. He said the Kalashnikov rifle cost at least \$300. (He had just bought five of them in the black market to pass out to nervous supporters.)

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649/40/0290

AIRGRAM

POL 12 LEB

5/5-26

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USIA	NSA	CIA	

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FILE DESIGNATION

SECRET/EXDIS

A-514

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

EXDIS

DEC 2 8 20 AM '69

COPY 02 SERIES B

FROM : American Embassy, BEIRUT

DATE: November 26, 1969

SUBJECT : Phalange Request for Arms

REF : A-301, July 15

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Date:

Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

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Drafted by:

AMB:DJPorter:ks

Drafting Date:

11/26/69

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

Nabil Harfouche, a frequent contact of this Embassy, together with Robert Ghorayeb, a member of the Phalange Central Committee, called on me November 24 with a strong appeal for immediate arms aid to the Phalange. They stressed the increasing gravity of the situation in Lebanon -- what they consider to be the imminent threat of an uprising of the refugees throughout the country. They talked of the fear psychology which was infesting the Christians, and the bodily threats which the Christian leadership was experiencing. They frankly doubted that the Army would - or could - be able to contain the Palestinian and Syrian challenge to governmental authority. This left it up to Lebanese groups like the Phalange who are determined to defend the country, and who feel that their own existence is ultimately at stake.

The Phalange members, they said, had tightened their belts and raised a substantial amount of money ("this wasn't easy - we are not wealthy people"). They had established successful contact with foreign arms dealers, but had been unable to get the Army's permission to import the arms. I pursued this point carefully and they insisted they had asked the Army but had been rejected. They said their "friends" in G-2 would have been glad to arrange for a covert arms delivery, but

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-2-

it was impossible in view of the many other members of G-2 (I presume Muslims) who opposed it. The Phalange had to have modern weapons. They said the present arsenal was grossly inadequate and out of date. They cited as an example of their inability to import weapons the attitude of Joseph Salameh, Chief of the Surete General. Salameh had told him he would be delighted to help, but said he could not trust his own men to safely arrange for delivery of new weapons into the country.

It became clear to me during the conversation, although they did not expressly say so, that they were representing perhaps a militant faction of the Phalange, and possibly were not speaking for the entire organization, including Pierre Gemayel (not, of course, that Gemayel would reject USG support). I reiterated at several points in the conversation that the Embassy admired Gemayel's present posture of moderation, and his continuing attempts to maintain close contact with Lebanese Muslim leaders and party organizations. They admitted that these activities were important but implied that they felt the showdown was imminent and there was more urgency to receiving arms than was felt by some of their older leaders, like Gemayel. They did agree, however, that it was important to continue a public position of moderation, even while planning for the worst, and assured me they would continue to maintain the Muslim-Christian dialogue.

I said that the USG still held to the decision not to supply arms to any private groups in Lebanon. I went extensively into the reasons for this decision, obviously without convincing them that I was right. I explained that our policy was one of supporting and strengthening the Army and the government (they asked: "what government?"), and that if we did anything else at this moment it would be incendiary rather than helpful. They would accept my reasoning, they said, if I could assure that the Sixth Fleet was prepared to intervene if the country were forced into civil war through Palestinian or Syrian Fifth Column activity and subversion. I said the US had no intention of using the Sixth Fleet to destroy Lebanon, but I could assure them that the US was deeply concerned about the independence and the territorial integrity of Lebanon and that we had not, and would not, be idle. The Phalange simply would have to accept the mutuality of our objectives, while at the same time disagreeing with us on tactics. I assured them that we were equally concerned about the internal security problem in Lebanon and were watching developments very closely. Our major concern was to get a

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peaceful settlement of the ME problem. Internal conflict in Lebanon would represent a major setback to this objective, and the Christians must continue their restraint.

In discussing their planning, they pointed out that the Phalange had laid on detailed plans to protect three landing sites on the Lebanese coast - Batrun and Jbeil (north of Beirut) and Damour (south of Beirut). The plans called for cordoning off the selected area with a thousand Phalangists who could effectively control the local situation during an arms smuggling attempt.

In parting, I said I thought they were perhaps too concerned about present dangers. I believed that things could be kept under control for a while and that the Army might succeed in assuming increasing authority over the camps. Their response was that I might be right in the short term - six months or even a year - but they were convinced that the confrontation was bound to occur and they had to get ready now. It was impossible to wait until the crisis was at hand. They also believed that a strong and well-armed Phalange would exercise more influence in maintaining internal stability and avoiding a confrontation. A weak Christian side would only entice the Palestinians to action.

PORTER

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TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

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4. WE CANNOT ASSESS HOW FAR SYRIANS WILL CARRY THINGS. SO FAR THEY WOULD APPEAR TO BE UNRESTRAINED BY SOVS OR ANY OTHER EXTERNAL FORCE AND THEY MUST BE FLUSHED WITH THEIR EARLY SUCCESSES.

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The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. The eagle holds an olive branch in its right talon and arrows in its left.

TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z

WILL OF THE MAJORITY OF LEBANESE TO RESIST FEDAYEEN-SYRIAN
TAKE-OVER ATTEMPT. WE HAVE OF COURSE GONE INTO ALERT PHASE AT
EMBASSY AND WILL BE READY MOVE QUICKLY IN E & E MATTERS. THERE

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 08896 251754Z

YET NO INDICATION OF PANIC AMONG WESTERN COMMUNITY IN BEIRUT.

10. AS HELOU INFORMED US TODAY, THIS AFFAIR CAN ONLY BE SETTLED BY ARABS. IT SEEMS TO US USG CAN EXERCISE WHAT INFLUENCE IT HAS BY EXERTING ALL POSSIBLE PRESSURE ON ARAB WORLD THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES. I WOULD HOPE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NATO POWERS COULD BE MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED TO PUT MAXIMUM INFLUENCE ON SYRIA AND IRAQ. PERHAPS WE CAN HAVE SOME DIRECT INFLUENCE ON UAR ALTHOUGH DEPT IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS WHETHER THIS CAN BE DONE. HELOU SEES NO WAY TO TAKE PROBLEM TO UN NOW, WITHOUT EARNING ALL-OUT ENMITY OF REST OF ARABS. OF COURSE, HE WOULD WELCOME ANY EFFORTS BY EXTERNAL POWERS (RULING OUT USG AT MOMENT) TO SEIZE THE UN WITH THE LEBANESE PROBLEM AS A THREAT TO THE PEACE.

11. ISRAEL MUST OF COURSE BE WATCHING EVENTS IN LEBANON VERY CLOSELY. ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIA TO DIVERT SYRIA'S ATTENTION WOULD NOT IN OUR OPINION WORK. EVEN IF IT (DOUBTFULLY) GAVE HELOU A FEW WEEKS GRACE IT WOULD TOTALLY ISOLATE HIM FROM REST OF ARAB WORLD AND HE WOULD BE UNABLE HOLD COUNTRY TOGETHER. ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST SOUTH LEBANON WOULD BE EVEN WORSE. IT WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DESTROY LEBANESE ARMY, OR IMMOBILIZE IT IN THE SOUTH, AND COUNTRY WOULD BE OPEN FOR SUBVERSION AND CIVIL WAR.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 09678 240857Z

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

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S E C R E T BEIRUT 9678

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 4363

SUBJ: TWA HIJACKING

DELIVER DEPT OPENING BUSINESS 11/24

1. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION PARA 3 (A) REFTEL, OUR IMPRESSION LATEST SYRIAN PROPOSAL IS OUTGROWTH ORIGINALLY PROPOSED THREE-CORNERED DEAL. OUR SOURCES WERE NOT CLEAR ON THIS POINT. TEL AVIV WILL RECALL THAT FIRST TWO SYRIAN PILOTS ADDED TO UAR PACKAGE SUBJECT TO GOI CONDITION TWO PASSENGERS BE RELEASED 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE. SYRIANS THEN RAISED ANTE TO 13 SYRIANS WITH SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE PROVISION. NOW THEY HAVE BACKED OFF FROM SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE TO 48 HOUR ADVANCE RELEASE POSSIBLY UNDER CONDITIONS OUTLINED BEIRUT9676 BUT HOLD TO NEW NUMBER.

2. WITH REGARD TO PARA 3 (B) WE DO NOT HAVE LIST OF 11 SYRIANS BY NAME BUT ICRC DEL DOES HAVE SUCH LIST AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT IT TO GOI DURING MEETING LATER TODAY NOV 24.

3. REF PARA 3 (C) REFTEL, NO SPECIFIC POINT OF DELIVERY FOR

SYRIANS HAS BEEN NAMED IN ANY OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR DAMASCUS
SOURCES. ICRC DEL NO DOUBT PREPARED TO TALK TO THIS POINT.
PORTER

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