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TELEGRAM

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19
ACTION NEA 15

INFO OCT 01, AF 12, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, PRS 01, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, AID 28,
EUR 17, RSR 01, /167 W

043449

R 071435Z AUG 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8461
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 3740

SUBJ: JORDANIAN VIEWS RE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCES

REF: AMMAN 3684 (NOTAL)

1. IN STATEMENT SUPPLIED MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY AUGUST 6,
KING HUSSEIN HAS CONFIRMED THAT IN AUGUST HE WILL BE MAKING AN EXTEN-
SIVE TOUR TO CERTAIN ARAB CAPITALS. HE SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS WITH ARAB
LEADERS THE PROSPECTS OF AN ARAB SUMMIT

CONFERENCE. POLITICAL EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE MIDDLE EAST
PROBLEM, HE SAID, HAVE BROUGHT NO RESULTS SO FAR. HE
DECLARED IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO CONVENE AN ARAB
SUMMIT MEETING TO DECIDE ON SOME OTHER COURSE OF ACTION.

2. BEHIND THIS PUBLIC ORATORY, HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE
JORDANIAN ENTHUSIASM FOR AN EARLY ARAB SUMMIT. THE CONSENSUS OF

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JORDANIAN THINKING, BASED ON OUR SOUNDINGS OF PALACE AND GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES, INCLUDING FORMIN ON 7TH, IS THAT:

(A) A SUMMIT NOW IS UNLIKELY IN ANY EVENT BECAUSE FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA REMAINS OPPOSED; (B) A SUMMIT IN THE AUTUMN WOULD, HOWEVER, BE ALMOST INEVITABLE IF THE EXPECTED MAJOR PEACE-MAKING EFFORT BY THE GREAT POWERS DURING THE FORTHCOMING UNGA FAILED TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS; (C) KING HUSSEIN IS OPPOSED TO A MINI-SUMMIT OF THE FOUR ARAB STATES ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE STRUGGLE WITH ISRAEL, WHICH REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE UAR, ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD RESTRICT STILL FURTHER JORDAN'S SHRINKING FIELD OF MANEUVER YET FAIL TO GUARANTEE THE ADDITIONAL MATERIEL HELP WHICH HUSSEIN BELIEVES HE NEEDS (AND WHICH HE WILL BE SEEKING ON HIS TRIP).

3. IN THIS CONNECTION PRIME MINISTER RIFAI ON AUGUST 6 SAID PUBLICLY THAT JORDAN DID NOT OBJECT TO A SMALL SUMMIT CONFERENCE BUT THOUGHT THAT BETTER RESULTS WOULD BE ACHIEVED IF ALL ARAB STATES WERE REPRESENTED. THIS APPEARS TO US AS JORDANIAN PLOY TO ENSURE THAT NO SUMMIT, OF ANY DIMENSION, OCCURS PREMATURELY, I.E., BEFORE JORDAN IS READY TO ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MUCH HARDER ARAB POSITION. GP-3.

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 O-03
OPR-02 SY-03 OC-06 CCO-00 SSO-00 EUR-20 RSR-01 /130 W
039701

O R 041525Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 924

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4333

SUBJECT: JORDAN SITUATION

REF: GENEVA 3032; STATE 145223

1. FOLLOWING DISTURBANCES OF PAST WEEK IN AMMAN, KING, GOJ, POLITICIANS AND RESPONSIBLE FEDAYEEN SEEM TO REALIZE THE NEED TO SEEK - AT LEAST EMPORARILY - PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS A CONSIDERABLE NEGOTIATING EFFORT WILL BE MADE BOTH IN CAIRO AND AMMAN. PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT DISTRUST BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN INCREASING; LINES BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN HAVE BECOME MORE SHARPLY DRAWN, AND BOTH SIDES LIABLE TO PRESSURES AND PROVOCATIONS STEMMING FROM RESPECTIVE EXTREME FACTIONS. DIFFICULTIES IN THE PEACE TALKS, FINALLY, COULD RAISE FEDAYEEN THREAT TO GOJ TO NEW LEVELS OF SERIOUSNESS.

2. FOR THE TIME BEING, HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT - ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS MAY CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE - LIKELIHOOD OF OUT-BREAK OF VIOLENCE ON A LARGE SCALE IS DIMINISHING. GP-3.
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84
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05
H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01
SS-20 IO-13 ACDA-19 USIE-00 EUR-20 AID-28 SY-03 OPR-02
RSR-01 /156 W

O R 032040Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 914
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

034032

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4300

SUBJECT: KING HUSAIN ADDRESSES NATION

REF: AMMAN 3245

AT 2100 LOCAL KING HUSAIN DELIVERED 15 MINUTE ADDRESS TO NATION ON SUBJECT RECENT DISTURBANCES IN AMMAN. ASSUME TEXT AVAILABLE FBIS. SYNOPSIS AND COMMENTS FOLLOW:

I. SPEECH MARKED BY POPULAR TOUCH WITH KING EXPRESSING HIS PARTICULAR UNDERSTANDING AND SORROW FOR HARDSHIPS AND DANGERS ORDINARY PEOPLE OF AMMAN HAVE ENDURED THESE PAST FEW DAYS. ESPECIALLY INTOLERABLE HE INDICATED, MUST BE SIGHT OF ARMED MEN WANDERING THROUGH STREETS WITHOUT PRETEXT OR JUSTIFICATION. KING THEREAFTER INVITED COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO TAKE ALL MEASURES SITUATION REQUIRED TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER AND AFFIRMED HIS GREAT CONFIDENCE IN IT. THIS PARAGRAPH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY EQUALLY GREAT EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN CHIEF OF STAFF. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS THEN ADJOURNED TO WORK WITH CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT OF JULY 10.

IT APPEARS KING HAS SOUGHT TO PLACE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

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RESTORING LAW AND ORDER SQUARELY ON COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. (AN EARLIER DIFFICULT DECISION FACING IM-ACCEPTANCE OF ROGERS PROPOSAL WAS DEALT WITH SAME WAY.)

3. MINISTERS NOW HAVE UNENVIABLE TASK OF IMPLEMENTING JUNE 70 AGREEMENT, AMONG THOSE CHIEF PROVISIONS WAS PROHIBITION OF ARMED FEYDAYEEN, DEMONSTRATIONS, PRESENCE OF ARMED FEDAYEEN IN PUBLIC PLACES AND PRESENCE OF FEDAYEEN ZDSES#IN CITIES. GIVEN INENSE#FEDAYEEN-GOU DISRUS#IT SEEMS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME THAT FEDAYEEN COULD BE PERSUADED TO ABANDON ETRREE CANOPYE#OF URBAN SETTINGS.

4. IF CABINET HOWEVER CANNOT DO THE JOB, THERE MAY BE IMPLICATION IN HM'S PRAISE OF ARMY AND CHIEF OF STAFF THAT MORE DIRECT PRESSURES COULD THEN BE RESORTED TO (WITH POPULAR JUSTIFICATION) GP-3.

ODELL

NOTE: AMMAN 4300 AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04205 311513Z

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13
ACDA-19 RSR-01 /135 W

006460

R 311445Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 873
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 759

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4205

SUBJECT: ISRAELI CHANGES TO CHARACTER OF JERUSALEM

REF: STATE 140593; AMMAN A-118, AUG 19

POINT MADE BY AMB SHARAF IN DEPT'S REFTEL MADE ALSO TO EMBOFF
(HORAN) AUG 27 BY AM AL-FARRA. CLAIMING THAT GOI WAS IN PROCESS
OF MAKING A NUMBER OF

UNILATERAL CHANGES IN THE STATUS OF EAST
JERUSALEM, FARRA SAID HE BELIEVED THESE REPRESENTED ISRAELI
VIOLATIONS OF THE SPIRIT OF THE CEASEFIRE. HE ADDED THAT SUCH
ACTIONS BY GOI COULD ONLY MAKE ALREADY DIFFICULT PROBLEM MORE
COMPLEX. GP-3.
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W.P. Paul

SECRET 499

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04145 271609Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 271502Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 844
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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S E C R E T AMMAN 4145

EXDIS

DEPT PASS JERUSALEM

SUBJECT: RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

1. DURING CALL AUG 27 BY EMBOFF (HORAN) ON MFA DIRECTOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WALEED SADI, BOTH LATTER AND AMB AL-FARRA EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS ON ME (EMBOFF LEFT WITH SADI COPY OF DAVID BRASHEARS' ARTICLE THAT APPEARED IN USIA WIRELESS FILE AUG 26, 1970).

2. BOTH SADI AND AL-FARRA APPEARED TO BELIEVE THAT SENATOR FULBRIGHT SPEECH AND RECENT BRIEFINGS BY "ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS" LINKED TOGETHER. AL-FARRA POINTED OUT THAT WHEREAS FULBRIGHT SPOKE OF NECESSITY THAT GREAT POWERS IMROSE A PEACE SETTLEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, "ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS" WERE SPEAKING OF NECESSITY THAT GREAT POWERS ACT TO PRESERVE IT. SADI HAD NO OBJECTION TO CONTENTS OF FULBRIGHT SPEECH AND THOUGHT THAT SENATOR'S PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE ARABS EVERYTHING THEY REALLY NEEDED. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DIDNOT BELIEVE THAT US-GOI BILATERAL TREATY, WHICH ALSO MENTIONED BY FULBRIGHT, WOULD REALLY GIVE ISRAEL ANYTHING IT DID NOT ALREADY HAVE.

3. SPEAKING AS AN ARAB AND AS A POLITICAL SCIENTIST, SADI WENT ON TO WONDER IF RECENT AMERICAN STATEMENTS WOULD RROMOTE MAXIMUM NEGOTIATING RESOLUTION ON PART OF ARABS. SADI SAID THAT ANY

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OPERATION ROOM

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PEACE SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE THAT ARAB STATESMEN MAKE SOME POLITICALLY DIFFICULT AND POTENTIALLY EMBARRASSING DECISIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT IF ARABS PRESENTED WITH ALTERNATIVE TO SUCH DECISIONS - SUCH AS POSSIBILITY OF IMPOSED SOLUTION - ARABS MIGHT BE INCLINED TO TAKE IT. AL-FARRA EXPRESSED HIS AGREEMENT WITH SADI AND BELIEVED THAT PROSPECTS GREAT POWERS' APPLYING AND POLICING A SETTLEMENT MIGHT FURTHER REDUCE MOMENTUM JARRING TALKS. (SADI HAS JD FROM UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AND HAS SERVED IN JORDANIAN MISSION TO UN).

4. AL-FARRA EMPHASIZED HIS FEELING OF FRUSTRATION THAT SO LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN ALMOST THREE WEEKS THAT HAVE PASSED SINCE BEGINNING OF CEASEFIRE. HE THOUGHT THAT CHANCES WOULD BE GOOD FOR EXTENSION OF CEASEFIRE AT END OF 90 DAYS ONLY IF GOJ COULD AT THAT TIME POINT TO RECORD OF SOLID ALBEIT PARTIAL ACHIEVEMENTS. HE CRITICIZED AMB TEKOA'S DEPARTURE FOR TEL AVIV.

5. REPORTING OFFICER ASSURED SADI AND AL-FARRA THAT US DID NOT BY ITS EFFORTS ENVISAGE PROFERING ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BOTH SIDES. INSTEAD WE HOPED TO USE OUR GOOD OFFICES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE OF OTHER MEMBERS OF BIG FOUR TO BE OF MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO AMB JARRING. TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE AS WELL SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S SPEECH NOT CONNECTED WITH MOST RECENT ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS. TO THIS AL-FARRA REPLIED THAT HE WASN'T SURE BUT IT SOUNDED TO HIM AS IF US MIGHT BE LOOKING BEYOND PRESENT TALKS TO THE SITUATION IT WOULD FACE IF JARRING MISSION UNSUCCESSFUL. GP-3, ODELL

NOTE: NOT PASSED JERUSALEM BY OC/T.

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00
NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 ACDA-19
AID-28 RSR-01 /142 W

103592

P R 261045Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 830
INFTNRUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3146
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4114

SUBJECT: AMMAN ON EVE OF PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS

1. THERE IS AN AIR OF EXPECTANCY AND SOME TENSION IN AMMAN ON EVE OF 8TH MEETING OF PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS. WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS TODAY OF SOME SHOOTING DOWNTOWN NEAR AL-HUSSEIN MOSQUE AND TRAFFIC IN THAT PART OF CITY MUCH LESS THAN NORMAL. IN PAST FEW DAYS AS WELL, SHOOTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING FEDAYEEN IN OUTLYING AREAS SUCH AS AIRPORT AND TOWNSHIP OF NAUR HAVE OCCURRED. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT RIFA'I TOLD EMBOFF (AUG 25 (HORAN) THAT GOJ WAS WATCHING SITUATION WARILY AND THAT IT HAD TAKEN NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO DEAL WITH ANY CONTINGENCY. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT GOJ WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ALL IT COULD TO AVOID CLASH WITH FEDAYEEN. HE ADMITTED HE WAS DISTURBED BY INDICATIONS THAT FEDAYEEN WERE PRESSURING JORDANIAN CIVILIANS TO OPPOSE ROGERS PLAN THROUGH SETTING UP "PEOPLES' COURT" AND REQUESTING SIGNATURES TO PETITIONS. BUT HE FELT THAT FOR MOMENT AT LEAST GOJ HAD TO LIVE WITH THE SITUATION AND AVOID GIVING FEDAYEEN THE PROVOCATION THEY MIGHT BE SEEKING. RIFA'I THOUGHT, MOREOVER, THESE FEDAYEEN ACTIONS WERE AN INDICATION THAT FEDAYEEN STRENGTH ON THE WANE AND THAT TIME WAS CONTINUING TO PLAY IN HANDS OF GOJ.

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WM RIFA'I WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD BE WON OVER TO CAUSE OF GREATER MODERATION FOLLOWING MEETINGS WITH NASSER IN CAIRO. SIMILAR PESSIMISM WAS EXPRESSED TO EMBOFF AUGUST 26 BY JORDANIAN AMB AL-FARRA.

3. GOJ, HOWEVER, STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO MODALITIES OF PALESTINE CONFERENCE. RIFA'I BELIEVED CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE ONLY SINGLE SESSION IN WHICH DELEGATES WOULD BE ASKED TO EXPRESS THEIR OPPOSITION TO ROGERS PROPOSAL. IT WAS HIS BELIEF THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD WISH TO AVOID ADDITIONAL SESSIONS SINCE THESE APT TO MAKE LATENT DIVISIONS IN PALESTINIAN RANKS APPARENT. ON OTHER HAND, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY MAJOR GENERAL MATAR NOT CONVINCED THAT CONFERENCE WOULD BE HELD AT ALL. HE POINTED OUT THAT 'ARAFAT AND COMPANY STILL IN CAIRO AND STATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPENING OF CONFERENCE STILL NOT FIRM. IF CONFERENCE DID MEET HE, TOO, THOUGHT DELEGATES WOULD SKATE OVER THIN ICE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. GP-3. ODELL

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VIO-58 824-01 10-13 YCDV-12
INFO OCT-01 CIVL-00 DODE-00 BR-02 H-05 INB-01 F-07 NYE-00
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70 AUG 13 PM 4:25

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

020705

R 131515Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 761
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T AMMAN 3887

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR JORDANIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE-FIRE

REF: (A) AMMAN 3816; (B) AMMAN 3604

SUMMARY: EXTENT TO WHICH HUSSEIN WILL BE ABLE TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN VIOLATIONS OF CEASE-FIRE WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS OF PEACE INITIATIVE AND REASONABLE DEGREE OF ISRAELI TOLERANCE AS WELL AS INTERNAL FACTORS. FEDAYEEN ARE STILL OFF BALANCE AND MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF INCREASING OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL TO EXTENT THREATENED. AT PRESENT WE SHOULD RE-EMPHASIZE PRIVATELY TO KING AND PRIMIN IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING CEASE-FIRE LINES REASONABLY QUIET, KEEPING OUR FOCUS ON WHAT GOJ AND FEDAYEEN ACTUALLY DO, NOT WHAT THEY SAY. FEDAYEEN WILL NATURALLY EXAGGERATE THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING HUSSEIN'S STATEMENTS OF INTENT (AMMAN 3816), A CRUCIAL ISSUE IN NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH JORDAN REALLY IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. FACTORS OUTSIDE JORDAN, OF COURSE, CAN HELP THUS, THE MORE PROGRESS IS ACHIEVED IN PEACE TALKS, THE MORE ACTIVELY WE CAN EXPECT THE JORDANIANS TO ENFORCE THE CEASE-FIRE. WE SHOULD BE AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT GOJ ENFORCEMENT WILL NEVER BE TOTALLY PROPHYLACTIC; ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE PREPARED FOR SOME LEAKAGE, BUT WE BELIEVE IT CAN BE KEPT WITHIN THEIR LIMITS OF TOLERANCE.

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WM ALTHOUGH LOGICAL PURSUIT OF FEDAYEEN OBJECTIVES WOULD DICTATE INCREASED ACTIVITY ACROSS CEASE-FIRE LINES IN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE MULLITY OF CEASE-FIRE AND PROVOKE HARSH ISRAELI REACTIONS, WE ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT SUCH AN INCREASE WILL IN FACT OCCUR TO ANYWHERE NEAR THE DEGREE THREATENED. BASIC REASON FOR THIS IS THE IMPROVED TACTICAL POSITION OF KING - AS REPORTED AMMAN 3604 - WITH RELATION TO FEDAYEEN ISSUE. AS RESULT, FEDAYEEN WILL PROBABLY FEEL IT NECESSARY TO "DEFEND THE BACK OF THE REVOLUTION" BY KEEPING A PORTION OF THEIR ARAMAMENT AND FORCES IN AMMAN, ZARQA AND IRBID, THE EAST BANK TOWNS WITH SOLID PALESTINIAN MAJORITIES WHICH ARE THEIR ONLY REAL SANCTUARIES. THEY FEAR BEING LURED INTO THE OPEN AND RISKING A CONFRONTATION WITH THE ARMY ON ITS TERMS RATHER THAN THEIRS. MOREOVER, SOME GROUPS WERE RECENTLY INVOLVED IN INTERNECINE FIGHTING WHICH DEFLECTED THEIR ATTENTION FROM CEASE-FIRE LINES. (WE DO NOT CONSIDER DIVISIONS WITHIN FEDAYEEN CAMP CLOSED DESPITE SUPERFICIAL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED FRONT IN PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE RELEASE OF AUGUST 10. WE ASSUME TEXT AVAILABLE TO DEPT VIA FBIS). MANY FEDAYEEN MAY BE RELUCTANT TO FACE THE INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE ISRAELI DEFENSE MEASURES WHICH, COUPLED WITH THE PROSPECT OF NO JORDANIAN COVER FIRE, WILL MAKE CROSS-RIVER OPERATIONS LESS AND LESS ATTRACTIVE. SOME FEDAYEEN GROUPS, FINALLY ARE REPORTED STILL TO BE SHORT OF AMMUNITION AS RESULT OF JUNE CONFRONTATION.

3. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THRUST OF FEDAYEEN ACTION NORMALLY WOULD TAKE FORM OF MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON BEISAN TARGETS FROM EAST BANK SITES USING BOTH MANUAL AND MECHANICAL-TIMED FIRING SYSTEMS. WHILE LESS ACCURATE AND DESTRUCTIVE THAN CROSS-RIVER OPERATIONS, LONG-RANGE ROCKET ATTACKS OFFER GREATER MARGIN OF SAFETY TO ATTACKING FORCES. MOREOVER, FEDAYEEN STOCKS OF KATIUSHA ROCKETS WERE NOT DEPLETED DURING JUNE CRISIS IN AMMAN. FORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THIS IS PRECISELY THE SORT OF OPERATION HUSSEIN STATES HE INTENDS TO RESTRICT.

4. BELIEVE OUR MOST EFFECTIVE COURSE WITH THE JORDANIANS AT THIS POINT WOULD BE TO RE-EMPHASIZE IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH PRIMIN AND KING HUSSEIN (AND THROUGH HIM TO ARMED FORCES) IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO GOJ LIVING UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS. SO LONG, THOUGH, AS GOJ IN PRACTICE SEEMS TO BE DOING WHAT WE WANT, WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO CONCERNED THAT IT DOES NOT IN ITS STATMENTS PUBLICLY CONTRADICT POPULAR BELIEF THAT FEDAYEEN ARE SUBSTANTIALLY EXEMPTED FROM CEASE-FIRE OPERATION. OUR FOCUS SHOULD BE ON WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IN NORTH JORDAN VALLEY AND OTHER PRESSURE POINTS AND NOT WHAT

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FEDAYEEN MAY CLAIM IS HAPPENING.

5. IF IT APPEARS THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IS TRULY INCREASING, OR THAT US GENERAL REPRESENTATIONS ON THIS ISSUE ARE REACHING POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS, EMBASSY MAY SUGGEST TO DEPT CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WE COULD MAKE TO HUSSEIN TO TIGHTEN UP CEASE-FIRE.

6. WE MUST EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN CONSIDERING THE ABILITY OF GOJ OVER LONG LANE TO ENFORCE MEASURES OUTLINED AMMAN 3816. CING WAS ABLE TO PROFER THIS POSITION BECAUSE INITIATIVE HAD PASSED TO HIS SIDE AND PUBLIC OPINION WAS SHIFTING TOWARD HIM. HOPES IN AMMAN NOL#ARE HIGH - PERHAPS TOO HIGH - THAT JUST CONCLUSION TO 20 YEAR STRUGGLE MAY BE IN SIGHT. IF AT THE END OF 90-DAY CEASE-FIRE (EVEN THOUGH THIS PERIOD APPLIES SPECIFICALLY ONLY TO UAR AND NOT JORDAN) THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING TO SUSTAIN EARLIER MOMENTUM, THE FEDAYEEN WILL FIND AN INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE FOR THEIR CLAIMS THAT ARAB PEOPLES BEING LED DOWN GARDEN PATH BY PEACE INITIA-TIVE.
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03821 091135Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

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O R 091101Z AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 746
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET AMMAN 3821

EXDIS

SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS UNDER AUSPICES AMBASSADOR JARRING

DURING CALL BY CHARGE ON PM RIFA'I AUGUST 9, PM STATED THAT HE
HAD RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR JARRING ABOUT FORTHCOMING
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. JARRING, HE SAID, SEEMED INCLINED TO HAVE
TALKS START IN NEW YORK, AND SUBSEQUENTLY SHIFT TO CYPRUS. HE
ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT JARRING NOT YET CERTAIN WHEN EXACTLY TALKS
SHOULD START OR LEVEL AT WHICH PARTIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED.
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INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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R 041100Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 712
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

70 AUG 4 AM 11:40

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET AMMAN 3710

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SAUDI ROLE WITH FEDAYEEN

REF: BEIRUT 6382

1. FONMIN MAJDALANI'S COMMENTS TO AMB PORTER ABOUT SAUDI SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN (REFTELI) WERE INTRIGUING. IT HAS OCCURRED TO US IN AMMAN THAT SAUDIS COULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE AT THIS TIME. EVEN IF THEY DID NOT ACTUALLY CUT SUBSIDIES TO FEDAYEEN, THEY COULD PERHAPS DELAY PAYMENTS AND INDICATE IN VARIOUS OTHER WAYS THAT THEY WOULD STRONGLY OBJECT TO ANY FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE TO JORDANIAN REGIME.

2. SAUDI AMB ON AUGUST 2 TOLD US THAT 90 PERCENT OF PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN WANTED TO GIVE PEACE PROPOSALS A CHANCE TO WORK. HE SAID THAT HE WAS REPORTING IN THIS VEIN TO JIDDA. GP-3.
ODELL

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 913

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03690 021655Z

02

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

074195

O P 021430Z AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 703
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
E/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 393
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET AMMAN 3690

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT)

DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS

SUBJECT: ARAB COMMENTS ON ISRAELI REPLY

REF: STATE 124298

1. HAD OPPORTUNITY AUGUST 2 TO ASK CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI ABOUT FORMIN 'ATTALLAH'S COMMENTS RE ISRAELI REPLY TO USG INITIATIVE. (FORMIN 'ATTALLAH HAD LEFT AUG 1 FOR LIBYAN MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN AND DEFMIN).

2. RIFAI SAID THAT HE TOO HAD INITIALLY HAD BEEN PUZZLED BY FORMIN'S REMARKS TO EFFECT USG INITIATIVE HAD BEEN STILLBORN. HE SUBSEQUENTLY HAD BEEN ABLE TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT FORMIN HAD ONLY INTENDED TO EXPRESS HIS WORRIES THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE, NOT BEING AS SIMPLE AND AS FREE OF CONDITIONS AS HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED, MIGHT SLOW THE CURRENT MOMENTUM. FORMIN DID NOT THINK IT HAD BEEN STOPPED, BUT HE WAS SUSPICIOUS AND FEARFUL. ZAID EXPLAINED THAT FORMIN WAS DOING NO MORE THAN EXPRESSING A MODEST CONCERN THAT ISRAELI REPLY "MIGHT HAVE LEFT THE USG INITIATIVE STILLBORN", NOT THAT IT ACTUALLY HAD BEEN STILLBORN. ZAID FELT USG SHOULD NOT BECOME TOO CONCERNED OVER THESE COMMENTS.

70 AUG 3 AM 10:13

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03690 02165Z

3. RIFAI RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY TO QUESTION; DID FORMIN AND GOVT NOW RPT NOW AGREE THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED USG INITIATIVE. ZAID SAID, HOWEVER, THAT GOVT HAD GOOD IDEA OF KIND OF FORMULATIONS ISRAELI WOULD PUT IN THEIR DETAILED REPLY. DECLARING THAT JORDAN IN ANY EVENT INTENDED TO PUBLISH TEXT OF ITS REPLY TO SECRETARY ROGERS WITHIN A FEW DAYS, HE ASKED WHETHER WE COULD PROVIDE TEXT OF ISRAELI FORMULATIONS BEFORE THEN. CHARGE ANSWERED BY EXPLAINING THAT HE AUTHORIZED TO SAY WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH UAR AND JORDAN WHEN DETAILED ISRAELI REPLY WAS RECEIVED. HE REMINDED RIFAI AT THIS JUNCTURE OF PRESIDENT'S JULY 31 STATEMENT TO EFFECT MODERATION, FLEXIBILITY, AND WILLINGNESS BY BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT SOMETHING LESS THAN THEIR MAXIMUM POSITIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY. HE DREW ON STATE 124298 TO STRESS OUR STRONGLY-HELD VIEW THAT THIS WAS TIME FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY AND THAT PARTIES SHOULD WITHHOLD JUDGMENTS AND AVOID PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT WOULD MAKE PRESENT DELICATE PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT.

4. ZAID SAID HE APPRECIATED THE POINT. PUBLIC STATEMENTS SHOULD BE AVOIDED, HE AGREED; HOWEVER, THERE WERE MANY COMPLICATIONS TO BE FACED. HE ONLY HOPED THAT THE EXPECTED ISRAELI RESERVATIONS AND CONDITIONS WOULD NOT BECOME TOO PROMINENT TO OVERCOME. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID, IN JORDAN THERE WAS MUCH REAL HOPE AND EVEN FAITH THAT MOMENTUM WOULD CONTINUE FORWARD UNDER THE URGINGS OF THE US AND THAT US WOULD PRESS ISRAEL TO GO IN RIGHT DIRECTION. FOR ITS PART, JORDAN WAS TAKING STEPS TO CARRY OUT ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITIES AS REGARDS CEASE-FIRE (SEE SEPTEL), GP=3.
DRAPER

06/10/1990

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 810

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03624 300817Z

19
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

053009

O P 300800Z JUL 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 677

SECRET AMMAN 3624

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI AIR ACTIVITY OVER JORDAN IN COMING DAYS

REF: TEL AVIV 4014; AMMAN 3620

1. WE NOTE THAT ISRAELIS HAVE ASSURED EMBASSY TEL AVIV (TEL AVIV 4014)

THAT THERE WILL BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH "TRANSFER" OF HAWKER HUNTERS
JULY 30-31.

2. THIS ASSURANCE IS NOT RPT NOT AS COMPREHENSIVE AS KING HUSSEIN HAD
DESIRED. HE WOULD LIKE ISRAELIS TO KEEP THEIR AIRCRAFT CLEAR OF
GENERAL AMMAN AREA THROUGH AT LEAST AUGUST 1, AFTER TIME HAWKER
HUNTERS PRESUMABLY WILL HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED.
ODELL

70 JUL 30 AM 8:21
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 120

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03620 292056Z

83/41
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

049967

O 291610Z JUL 70 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 675
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

12/11-86/15156 Per ltr. 2/24/2016
By RS/WJH NARA, Date 10/19/2016

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3620

EXDIS:

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TO TEXT PARAS ONE, TWO, THREE AND FIVE)

SUBJECT: HUSSEIN'S PREPARATIONS FOR JULY 30 - AUGUST 1 PERIOD

1. KING HUSSEIN ADVISED EMBASSY ON JULY 29 THAT COMBINATION OF FACTORS COMING TO HEAD ON JULY 31 AND AUG 1 WERE CAUSING HIM SOME CONCERN, OF WHICH HE WISHED TO APPRISE THE USG. HE EXPLAINED THAT SOME TIME AGO THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN HAD SCHEDULED MANEUVERS IN THE DESERT EAST OF AMMAN. THESE HAD COMMENCED ON JULY 28 AND WERE PRESENTLY UNDERWAY. THE MANEUVERS INVOLVED ONE IRAQI ARMORED BRIGADE. THE EXERCISE IS TO BE JOINED BY IRAQI AIR FORCE PLANES FLYING MOCK COVER ON JULY 31 AND AUG 1 FROM H-3. COINCIDENTALLY, FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS HAD ANNOUNCED THEY PLANNED PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS IN CITY OF AMMAN ON JULY 31.

2. AS A PRECAUTION THE KING HAD DECIDED TO TRANSFER MOST OF JORDAN'S HAWKER HUNTERS FROM MAFRAQ AND H-5 ON JULY 29 TO AMMAN AIRPORT. HE DECIDED TO DO THIS FOR TWO REASONS; FIRST, MAFRAQ AND H-5 ARE SURROUNDED BY IRAQI TROOPS AND HE FELT THE PLANES WOULD BE SAFER IN AMMAN; SECONDLY, HE INTENDED TO USE SOME OF HIS AIRCRAFT TO OVERFLY THE AMMAN AREA IN A MINOR SHOW OF FORCE ON THE 31ST AND 1ST IF THE SITUATION SEEMED TO WARRANT IT. AT THE TIME WHICH THE HAWKER HUNTERS WERE SCHEDULED TO MOVE FROM MAFRAQ AND H-5 TO AMMAN ON JULY 29, ISRAELI AIR FORCE ATTACKED SEVERAL FEDAYEEN BASES NEAR ZERKA OUTSIDE AMMAN. (PROBABLY ATTACKS DESCRIBED USDAO TEL AVIV 1502). AS A RESULT HE HAD TO CALL OFN THE TRANSFER OF THE HAWKER HUNTERS TO AMMAN FOR FEAR OF A CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAELIS. HE FELT THER WAS LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03620 292056Z

ISRAELI ATTACK THIS DEEP INTO JORDAN TERRITORY AT THIS TIME AND COULD NOT HELP BUT FEEL THE ISRAELIS MIGHT HAVE KNOWN OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE JORDAN AIR FORCE AND INTENDED TO INTERRUPT IT.

3. THE KING STILL WISHES TO BRING THE HAWKER HUNTERS TO AMMAN IN THE NEXT TWO DAYS (JULY 30-31). HE WOULD LIKE USG TO OBTAIN ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY WILL KEEP THEIR AIRCRAFT CLEAR OF THIS AREA IN THE COMING DAYS IN ORDER TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH JORDAN PLANES.

4. KING CLEARLY IS CONCERNED THAT IRAQIS AND FEDAYEEN WHO ARE OUTSPOKENLY AGAINST CURRENT PEACE MOVES MAY ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT THIS COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN SOME MOVE AGAINST THE REGIME. HE FURTHER CONCERNED THAT PRESENCE IDF AIRCRAFT DEEP INSIDE JORDAN COULD AGGRAVATE AND COMPLICATE THIS SITUATION.

5. WE ADVISED THE KING WE WOULD TRANSMIT HIS REQUEST TO WASHINGTON. WE RECOMMEND THAT ISRAELI COOPERATION BE SOUGHT IN THIS INSTANCE. ANY RESPONSE SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE.

6. ADDENDUM TO FOREGOING RECOMMENDATION: WE EXPECT TWO MAC C-141 ACFT JULY 30, ONE BEING REGULAR WEEKLY FLT CARRYING 25 TONS 7.62 AMMO. RJAF ALSO HAS ON PARKING RAMP 25 TONS MUNITIONS (AERIAL BOMBS) FOR BACKHAUL TO RAMSTEIN AFB. WE TRIED TO GET THESE OUT ON TODAY'S FLT BUT AIRCRAFT

COMMANDER REFUSED TO OUTLOAD. HAVE SENT MESSAGES TO LINDSAY AS AND INCIRLIK REQUESTING THESE MUNITIONS BE BACKHAULED ON SAAM 3865/05 ON 30 JULY AS MATTER OF URGENCY. GP-3. ODELL

70 JUL 29 PM 7:17
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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FOR RM USE ONLY

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TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-111
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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 8 3 26 PM 1970

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: July 28, 1970

SUBJECT : U.S. Peace Proposals: Government of Jordan Response

REF : Amman 3533

1. Enclosed are the following documents:

A) Original English language letter from Foreign Minister Atallah to Secretary of State Rogers dated July 26, 1970;

B) Original Arabic language letter from Foreign Minister Atallah to Secretary of State Rogers dated July 26, 1970.

2. Foreign Minister Atallah has stated that the Arabic language version of his letter should be considered the authentic version.

ODELL

(Handwritten signature)

Enclosures as stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

DLW11-86/15157 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS/MAH NARA, Date 10/19/2016

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ GROUP 3

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

In Out

Drafted by: Charge: HIOdell:bp 7/27/70 Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:



~~Confidential~~

Amman

26 July, 1970


Dear Mr. Secretary of State,

On 20th of June 1970, the American Charge d'Affaires at Amman handed His Excellency Abdul Monem Rifa'i, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and now Prime Minister, your letter containing your new initiative for a peaceful settlement to the Middle East Crisis.

The present impasse in the way of the peaceful settlement to which you refer, and, which we are glad to note you are endeavoring to overcome, would not have arisen had it not been for Israel's intransigence, militant attitude induced by the military superiority it commands, its continued rejection of implementing the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967, and its refusal to accept withdrawal from all the Arab territories which it occupied since June, 1967.

I feel I must point out also, that it is the continued United States support, in various forms, which secures to Israel its present military superiority, that renders it intransigent in its attitude. Furthermore, Israel's territorial expansionist policy at the cost of the surrounding Arab Countries is at the root of its refusal to implement the Security Council Resolution, thus raising obstacles in the way of Ambassador Jarring and preventing him from carrying

.../2




- 2 -

out his mission i.e. the implementation of the said Resolution.

My Government has considered your new proposal with special care and it is clear to it that this proposal does not vary in substance from that of the Security Council Resolution 242, except that it calls for some procedural measures calculated to implement the Resolution.

The Jordan Government has always proclaimed its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution and called for its implementation. Furthermore, it demonstrated its full sincerity in dealing with the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, in pursuing a positive and constructive course in the discussions with him. As regards these aspects, therefore, my Government finds nothing new in your letter to preclude it from accepting your proposal, its object being the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and the resumption by Ambassador Jarring of his mission to contact the parties with a view to implementing the aforementioned Resolution.

Nevertheless, my Government in considering the Resolution of the Security Council and the discussions with Ambassador Jarring regarding its implementation has always proceeded from two basic starting points:



-3-


First : The Necessity of Israel's acceptance of the principle of withdrawal from all the Arab territories which it occupied since the fifth of June 1967 without exception , in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242 which affirms the inadmissibility of aquisition of territory by war.

Second : The Necessity to recognise the Palestinian people's full and lawful rights, which have been repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed by resolutions of the United Nations, and the imperative necessity for the exercise of their rights to ensure peace based on justice and stability in the area.

Accordingly , it is natural for my Government to continue to maintain its position regarding these two basic principles, in the firm belief that no progress towards a peaceful settlement is possible if these two sound principles are not fully respected .

As regards acceptance of the ceasefire for a period of three months, this is in line with what my Government has always observed and still continues to observe scrupulously. However my country throughout the period following the Israeli aggression of June,1967, has been the object of armed aggression, attacks and raids by Israel. The numerous Resolutions that the Security

.../4



-4-

Council has repeatedly passed condemning Israel for these aggressions stand as vivid testimony that it is Israel that has repeatedly violated the ceasefire. Furthermore, escalation in the military activities on the Jordan Israeli front is in truth due to the Israeli continued military occupation of the Arab areas, the oppressive measures it perpetrated against the Arab population, their persecution, ill-treatment and expulsion from their own homeland; in addition to arson, destruction of villages, cities, plantations and other damage to our national economy as well as the killing of civilians and military personnel on the East Bank of Jordan resulting from air raids, bombing and shelling by Israel. It is these acts of aggression and oppression that have led the Palestine Resistance movement to resort to their lawful and acknowledged right of self defence and resistance against the occupation.

Accordingly my Government, in its keen desire to maintain peace, based on justice, agrees to the proposal contained in your letter of 20th June, 1970.


With the expression of my highest consideration and respect.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Amrallah'.

Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Honourable
Mr. William Rogers
U.S. Secretary of State,
Washington D.C.



عمان
٢٦ تموز ١٩٧٠

المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية
وزارة الخارجية


عزيزي السيد وزير الخارجية

في يوم ٢٠ الفائت سلم القائم باعمال السفارة الاميركيه
بعمان الى دولة السيد عبدالمنعم الرفاعي وزير الخارجية
اذ ذاك ورئيس الوزراء الحالي كتابكم المتضمن مبادرتكم الجديده
من اجل التسوية السلميه لازمة الشرق الاوسط.

ان المأزق الحاضر في طريق التسوية السلميه
الذي اشترتم اليه والذي يسرنا ان نعلم انكم تعملون على التغلب
عليه ما كان لينشأ لولا تعنت اسرائيل في موقفها الحاضر
المستند الى تفوقها العسكري ولولا رفضها المستمر
لتنفيذ قرار مجلس الامن الصادر في ٢٢ نوفمبر ١٩٦٧، ورفضها
قبول الانسحاب من جميع المناطق العربيه التي احتلتها
منذ الخامس من حزيران ١٩٦٧، وعلي ان اقول ان الدعم الاميركي
المتواصل لاسرائيل بشتى اوجهه هو الذي يؤمن له
تفوقها العسكري الحاضر ويجعلها تتعنت في موقفها
السلبى. كما وان سياستها التوسعيه الاقليميّه على
حساب البلاد العربيه حولها هي التي تجعلها ترفض
قبول تنفيذ قرار مجلس الامن وتخلق الصعوبات امام السفيري
يارنغ فلا يستطيع السير في مهمته نحو تنفيذ
القرار.

وقد نظرت حكومتى في مقترحكم الجديد واولته اهتماما
خاصا، فتبين لها ان هذا المقترح لا يخرج في مادته عن مضمون
قرار مجلس الامن رقم ٢٤٢ وبالاضافة الى ذلك فانه يدعو الى
اتخاذ بعض الاجراءات بغية تنفيذ هذا القرار.

لقد كانت الحكومة الاردنيه على الدوام تنادى بقبول قرار
مجلس الامن هذا وتدعو الى تنفيذه. كما انها اخلصت
في تعاملها مع ممثل السكرتير العام للامم المتحدة الدكتور غونر
يارنغ وسلكت في المباحثات معه مسلكا ايجابيا وبناء.



المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية
وزارة الخارجية

- ٢ -

ولهذا فمن النواحي لا تجد حكومتني شيئا جديدا
يحول دون قبول حكومتني اقتراحكم الرامي الى الالتزام بتنفيذ
قرار مجلس الامن ٢٤٢ واستئناف السفير يارنسخ مهمته
بالاتصال مع الفرقاء من اجل تنفيذ القرار موضوع
البحث.


غير ان حكومتني في نظرتها الى قرار مجلس الامن وبحثها
مع السفير يارنسخ في امر تنفيذه كانت دائما تنطلق
من منطلقين اساسيين :-

الاول وجوب قبول اسرائيل بمبدأ الانسحاب من كافة
الاراضي العربية التي احتلتها منذ الخامس
من حزيران ١٩٦٧ دون اي استثناء ، وذلك تأكيدا
لما جاء في قرار مجلس الامن ٢٤٢ الذي نص
على عدم جواز اكتساب الاراضي بقوة السلاح .

والثاني الاعتراف للشعب الفلسطيني بكامل حقوقه
المشروعة التي اقرتها واكدها قرارات الامم
المتحدة . وضرورة ممارسته لهذه الحقوق ضمانا
للسلام القائم على العدل والاستقرار في المنطقة .

ولهذا فمن الطبيعي ان تظل حكومتني متمسكة في موقفها
بهذين المبدأين ونعتقد جازمين بانه لن يتحقق تقدم نحو التسوية
السلمية اذا لم تحترم احترامنا كاملا سلامة هذين المبدأين .

واما بالنسبة للالتزام بوقف اطلاق النار لمدة ثلاثة شهور فينجم
مع ما كانت حكومتني قد التزمت وما زالت تلتزم بكل دقة بقرار وقف
اطلاق النار . وكانت بلادى طيلة الفترة التي مضت في اعقاب
العدوان الاسرائيلي في حزيران ١٩٦٧ هدفا للاعتداءات والهجمات
والغارات الاسرائيلية المسلحة . وان القرارات التي اصدرها مجلس
الامن مرارا وتكرارا بادانة اسرائيل على هذه الاعتداءات شواهد
صادقة على ان اسرائيل هي التي خرقت وقف اطلاق النار . وفوق هذا



المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية
وزارة الخارجية

— ٣ —

فان توتر الوضع العسكري على الجبهة الاردنية الاسرائيلية
مردّه في الحقيقة الى استمرار اسرائيل في احتلالها العسكري
للمناطق العربية وتغييرها لمعالم بعض اجزاء هذه المناطق
واجراءاتها التحسفيه ضد سكانها العرب واضطهادها لهم
وتكليفها بهم وطردهم من ديارهم • هذا فوق ما انزلته وما تنزله
غاراتها الجوية وقذائفها على الجانب الشرقي من نهر الاردن من
حرائق وتدمير للقري والمدن والمزارع وضرب لاقتصادنا وتقتير
للمواطنين المدنيين والعسكريين على حد سواء • وقد اقتضى
هذا الوضع ان تقوم المقاومة الفلسطينية بحقها المشروع والمحتسب
به في الدفاع عن النفس ومقاومة الاحتلال •

وبناء على ما تقدم فان حكومتني رغبة منها في اقرار السلام
القائم على العدل توافق على اقتراحكم الذي اشتملت عليه
رسالتكم بتاريخ ١٩٧٠/٦/٢٠

وتفضلوا بقبول وافر التقدير والاحترام •

وزير الخارجية

الى سيادة المستر وليام روجرز
وزير الخارجية الاميركي
واشنطن / الولايات المتحدة الاميركية

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 130

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04107 251829Z

43
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

P R 251430Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 824
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 754

S E C R E T AMMAN 4107

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CAIRO CONFERENCE

REF: CAIRO 1904

1. CHIEF
MRTWAL DIWAN ZAID RIFA'I INFORMED EMBOFF
(HORAN) AUG 25 THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH RESULTS OF KING
HUSSEIN'S CONSULTATIONS IN CAIRO. HE SAID THE DISCUSSIONS
HAD BEEN OF A GENERAL NATURE AND THAT BOTH SIDES NOW IN
GOOD POSITION CLOSELY TO COORDINATE COMMON VIEW ON
NEGOTIATING ISSUES AS THEY ARISE.

2. HE AFFIRMED THAT STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN "AL-AHRAM (REFTEL)
GNERALLY ACCURATE EXCEPT WITH REGARD TO IRAQI TROOPS IN
JORDAN. STATUS OF IRAQI TROOPS, HE SAID, WAS STILL ANOMALOUS
AND WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED SOONER OR LATER. DESPITE RECENT
ACTION BY UAR GENERAL FAWZI, IRAQIS WERE MAINTAINING THAT
EASTERN FRONT STILL EXTANT AND THEIR GENERAL IN COMMAND.
RIFA'I STATED THAT GOJ AND GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ INVOLVED
IN A WAITING GAME. GOJ WAS HOPING FOR IRAQIS TO WITHDRAW
THEIR TROOPS AND IRAQIS WERE WAITING DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL
FROM GOJ. RIFA'I SAW ONLY TWO POSSIBLE CONCLUSIONS: EITHER
IRAQIS WOULD ACCEPT JORDANIAN COMMAND OR THEY WOULD BE FORCED

02

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70 AUG 25 PM 6:24

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM JORDAN. ON WHOLE, HE THOUGHT
SECOND CONTINGENCY MORE PROBABLE. GP-3.
ODELL

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 975

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03384 190835Z

22
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

112140

P R 181520Z JUL 70 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 585
SECDEF
INFO CSAF
CINCSTRIKE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3384

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MSG

SUBJ: F-104 AIRCRAFT

REF: STATE 112920

1. ON 18 JULY ZAID RIFAI INFORMED CHARGE IN PRESENCE OF BRIGADIER SALAH KURDI COMMANDER RJAF, THAT GOJ ACCEPTS PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED IN PARA 2 REF MSG. THAT IS, THEY DESIRE SHORTER DELIVERY SCHEDULE WITH CONCOMITANT ADDITIONAL COST.

2. REQUEST LETTER OF OFFER BE DISPATCHED AT EARLY DATE. IT OCCURS TO DATT THAT PERHAPS THIS LVO COULD BE HAND CARRIED TO AMMAN BY LTC STUART USAF WHO IS LEAVING CONUS 21/22 JULY. STUART IS NEW CHIEF MAP AUGMENTATION TEAM AND DUE AMMAN 25 JULY. HE PROBABLY ON LEAVE NOW BUT STRIKE MAY BE ABLE CONTACT HIM.

3. RIFAI AND KURDI QUERIED CHARGE ON TYPE ENGINE. DATT WILL INFORM GHQ ON MONDAY 20 JULY THAT ENGINE IS J-79-11 SIMILAR THAT NOW IN INVENTORY (REFER PARA 5 REF MSG). POINTS MENTIONED SECDEF MSG 5257 WILL ALSO BE ADDRESSED AT THAT TIME.
ODELL

NOTE: LIMDIS CAPTION DELETED, EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-0
MR. MCGAFFEY.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03594 281249Z

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 PM-05 NSC-10 RSR-01 IO-13 EUR-20 L-04

OPR-02 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 USIA-12

PRS-01 CIA-04 /119 W

039005

R 281225Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 663
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 3594

SUBJECT: FATAH PUBLICATION OF AMERICAN "PEACE PLANS"

REF: STATE 120026

1. DAILY PAPER FATAH IN ISSUE JULY 26 PRINTS TEXTS ARABIC VERSIONS OF SECRETARY'S OCT 28 AND DEC 19 PROPOSALS TO UAR AND JORDAN RESPECTIVELY. PROPOSALS APPEAR UNDER HEADLINE "DOCUMENTS OF SOLUTION BY SURRENDER."
2. COMPARISON WITH ORIGINAL ENGLISH TEXTS REVEALS TRANSLATIONS TO BE ACCURATE. EMBASSY NOTED ONLY ONE SUBSTANTIVE DEPARTURE FROM TEXTS: IN PURPORTING TO GIVE TEXT OF PARA TWO US-UAR PROPOSAL, PAPER PRINTS INSTEAD SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT LANGUAGE WHICH IDENTICAL WITH PARA 2 US-GOJ PROPOSAL.
3. TWO DIFFERENT ARABIC TRANSLATIONS INVOLVED - WHERE ENGLISH TEXT OF TWO PROPOSALS IDENTICAL, ARABIC TRANSLATORS RENDERED IT IN DIFFERENT THOUGH IN EACH CASE ACCURATE TERMS.
4. ARABIC TEXTS BEING TOUCHED DEPARTMENT. EXEMPT ODELL



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SECRET 344

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03494 241044Z

16

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00

NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 AID-28

ACDA-19 RSR-01 /142 W

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R 241000Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 624
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 1737

SECRET AMMAN 3494

SUBJECT: INCREASED FEDAYEEN-JAA COOPERATION

REF: TEL AVIV 3744; STATE 116105

1. MAJOR ZU'BI'S COMMENTS STRIKE US SIMPLY AS EDUCATED GUESS. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY USEFUL INFORMATION ON THE KING OF UNDERSTANDING RE FEDAYEEN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ALONG BOUNDARIES AND CEASE-FIRE LINES, TACIT OR OTHERWISE, THAT MAY HAVE EMERGED FROM GOVT-FEDAYEEN DISCUSSIONS. NATURE OF RESPONSE TO OUR INQUIRIES ON SUBJECT SUGGESTS NO DETAILED UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN CONCLUDED BUT, RATHER, ONLY GENERAL ONE OF GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION. PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER JAFAR AL-SHAMI INCIDENTALLY DENIED ON JULY 16 THAT HE HAD EVER CLAIMED EXISTENCE OF SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARMY AND FEDAYEEN DIVIDING FRONT LINES BETWEEN THE. (#)

2. WE STRONGLY DISCOUNT THE SPECULATION REPORTED BY MAJOR ZU'BI THAT KING MIGHT HAVE DECIDED ALLOW FEDAYEEN TO OPERATE AGAINST FLASH POINTS OF EILAT OR SDOM. ON OTHER HAND, ONE COULD INFER FROM ACCELERATED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN BEISAN AREA THAT JORDAN ARMY UNITS THERE ARE PREPARED TO BE MORE TOLERANT OF SUCH ADVENTURES. FATAH NEWSPAPER ON ONE OCCASION CLAIMED THAT JORDAN ARMY IN THIS AREA HAD ASSISTED FEDAYEEN IN REPULSING ISRAELI ATTACK. IN ABSENCE



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03494 241044Z

FORMAL GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT. THIS SEEMING COOPERATION COULD BE EXPLAINED BY TWO FACTORS: (A) SECOND DIVISION WHICH COVERS NORTHERN JORDAN VALLEY FRONT REPORTEDLY IS LESS RELIABLE FROM VIEWPOINT LOYALTY THAN OTHER ARMY ELEMENTS; AND (B) KING HIMSELF HAS INDICATED IN PAST THAT DEFENSE AGAINST POTENTIAL IDF ATTACK IS PRIMARY CONCERN OF JAA UNITS IN THAT AREA AND THAT, THEREFORE, NO EXTRAORDINARY TROOP DISPOSITIONS WOULD BE MADE TO POLICE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAS BEEN SOME JAA-FEDAYEEN COOPERATION IN PAST FEW WEEKS MAY SOON BE LESS IMPORTANT QUESTION, ESPECIALLY NOW THAT NASSER HAS PUBLICLY ACCEPTED USG PROPOSALS. PERHAPS ANTICIPATING THAT JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO USG PEACE INITIATIVE WOULD BE POSITIVE, JULY 23 ISSUE OF FATAH NEWSPAPER CARRIED STRONG ATTACK AGAINST USG INITIATIVE, PINPOINTING CONCEPT OF CEASE-FIRE. A POSITIVE JORDANIAN RESPONSE INEVITABLY WILL TRANSFER ALWAYS-UNCERTAIN GOVERNMENT-FEDAYEEN RELATIONSHIP INTO FAR MORE DELICATE ARENA. GP-3. ODELL

NOTE: (#) SENTENCE AS RECEIVED. VERIFICATION TO FOLLOW.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 806

PAGE 01 STATE 160674

87
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/UAR:GSBROWN
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGERP.DAVIES
S/S-ELIOT
EUR/BMI-INFO

R 292352Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 160674

EXDIS

1. UK MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS GODBER CALLED ON DEP ASST SECY DAVIES SEPT 28 (BEFORE NEWS OF NASSER DEATH) TO REVIEW MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE. DAVIES SAID MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FOR USG IN AFTERMATH JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR WAS TO HELP HUSSEIN MAINTAIN HIS POSITION AND AT SAME TIME RETAIN HIS CREDENTIALS IN ARAB WORLD. WORLD ATTENTION HAD FOCUSED ON REPRESSIVE NATURE JAA ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS IN RECENT DAYS, BUT FACTS WERE THAT GOJ HAD BEEN OBLIGED RESPOND TO CONTINUING CHALLENGES AND FLOUTING OF JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY BY LEFT WING EXTREMISTS WITHIN PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT. USG CONCERNED TO PUT PICTURE IN PERSPECTIVE, AND TO ASSIST KING WITHOUT WEAKENING HIM. US WOULD THEREFORE FOCUS WORK ON HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AMMAN, THOUGH WE ALSO PLANNED SOME AID TO JAA AS IT REMAINED KEY TO STABILIZATION OF SITUATION.

2. GODBER SAID UK AGREED WITH US ESTIMATE OF JORDANIAN SITUATION BUT FELT THAT HUSSEIN HAD MADE MISTAKE OF LYING PASSIVE

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TOO LONG BEFORE MOVING AGAINST PALESTINIANS. HE HAD NOW AS CONSEQUENCE OPENED HIMSELF TO BEING WHIPPING BOY FOR OTHER ARABS. UK CONCERNED THAT CHANCES OF ASSASSINATION HUSSEIN GREATLY INCREASED. DAVIES SAID USG EQUALLY CONCERNED AND NOT SANGUINE THAT ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT--WHETHER RADICAL PALESTINIAN OR MILITARY--WOULD HAVE STABILITY ENOUGH TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST. FOR PRESENT HOWEVER, HUSSEIN'S POLITICAL BASE NOT NECESSARILY WEAKER AS RESULT RECENT FIGHTING, EVEN THOUGH IT NARROWED CONSIDERABLY. HUSSEIN OBLIGED AT THIS POINT TO PROVE TO PALESTINIANS THAT THEIR AIMS COULD BE OBTAINED BY MEANS OTHER THAN ARMED STRUGGLE CALLED FOR BY FEDAYEEN. THIS MADE ALL THE MORE ESSENTIAL RENEWED EFFORTS TO RESTART US PEACE INITIATIVE.

3. IN RESPONSE GODBER'S QUESTIONS, DAVIES SAID THAT USG NOW CONSIDERING STEPS WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF US INITIATIVE AFTER JORDANIAN SITUATION SETTLED DOWN. USG HAS SOME OPTIMISM, BASED ON HINTS IN RECENT UAR UNOFFICIAL STATEMENTS, THAT FORMULA CAN BE FOUND WHICH SATISFACTORY TO BOTH UAR AND ISRAELIS ON RECTIFICATION. IN RESPONSE GODBER'S QUESTION DAVIES SAID THAT UAR/SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS NEVERTHELESS CONTINUING AT ACCELERATED PACE, AND ISRAELI LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN UAR INTENTIONS JUSTIFIED TO LARGE EXTENT. GODBER SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO SHARE USG OPTIMISM IN VIEW OF CONTINUED UAR/SOVIET ACTIVITY, BUT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IMMENSELY PLEASED IF INITIATIVE COULD BE RESTARTED.

4. GODBER ASKED HOW LONG US EXPECTED ISRAELIS TO ALLOW CURRENT SITUATION ON CANAL TO CONTINUE WITHOUT TAKING ACTION. DAVIES SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE ISRAELIS WOULD BE FIRST TO BREAK CEASEFIRE. USG HAS TAKEN ACTION IN SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL WHICH WOULD COMPENSATE FOR UAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, BUT WAS NOT MAKING ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. US RETAINS COMMITMENT TO POLICY ARMS RESTRAINT HOWEVER.

GP-1 IRWIN

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PAGE 01 STATE 159075

1970 SEP 26 22 35

80
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 DOT-12
E-15 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 O-03
OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00 USSS-00 SY-03
SSO-00 SCA-01 /140 R

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DRAFTED BY: NEA ALATHERTON JR
APPROVED BY: NEA ALFRED L ATHERTON JR
NEA/ARN TWSEELYE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159075

1. UK MINISTER MILLARD HAS JUST PASSED FOLLOWING INFO TO DEPT: IN NAME OF NASSER, MINISTER OF INFORMATION HEYKAL APPROACHED BRITISH EMBASSY CAIRO EARLIER TODAY TO SAY THAT UAR BELIEVED IT COULD SECURE RELEASE OF ALL REMAINING HIJACK HOSTAGES IF BRITISH, SWISS AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS GAVE UNDERTAKING THEY WOULD RELEASE 7 FEDAYEEN PRISONERS THEY HOLD. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY WHETHER EXCHANGE CONDITIONAL ON ANY ACTION BY ISRAEL, HEYKAL REPLIED THAT OFFER WAS TO EXCHANGE ALL HOSTAGES FOR ALL FEDAYEEN PRISONERS HELD BY THE THREE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.
2. MILLARD SAID UK WANTS TO GIVE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO UARG, IS NOW CONSULTING SWISS AND GERMANS TO THIS END AND URGENTLY SEEKING USG'S VIEWS.

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PAGE 02 STATE 159075

3. AFTER INFORMING MILLARD OF LATEST INFO FROM AMMAN RE REPORTED RELEASE OF 32 OF 38 HOSTAGES, WE TOLD HIM WE PREFERRED THAT UK HOLD OFF FOR COUPLE OF HOURS ON REPLYING TO UARG UNTIL SITUATION CLARIFIED IN AMMAN; IT POSSIBLE THAT JORDANIANS COULD EFFECT RELEASE OF ALL 38 WITHOUT ANY EXCHANGE DEAL.

4. MILLARD SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS TO LONDON AND ALSO ASCERTAIN WHAT REACTIONS HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM SWISS AND GERMANS. IN HIS VIEW, LONDON WOULD WANT TO CLINCH DEAL QUICKLY AND WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO DELAY REPLY TO NASSER. BRITISH APPEAR CONCERNED THAT FAILURE TO MAKE DEAL AND RETENTION OF LELIA KHALED WOULD EXPOSE BRITISH TO PFLP REPRISAL ACTIONS.

5. WE EMPHASIZED TO MILLARD THAT WE ARE SIMPLY ASKING THAT THEY HOLD OFF FOR COUPLE OF HOURS UNTIL SITUATION CLARIFIED AND AGREED TO CONVEY IMMEDIATELY TO BRITISH ANY FURTHER INFO RECEIVED FROM AMMAN RE STATUS OF HOSTAGES.

6. ASSUMING JAA HAS IN FACT SECURED CUSTODY OF 32 HOSTAGES, WHAT IS AMMAN'S BEST JUDGMENT THAT REMAINING HOSTAGES CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT EXCHANGE DEAL BRITISH ARE PRESSING FOR?

7. MILLARD SAID THAT, IF DECISION IS TO CONVEY POSITIVE RESPONSE TO DEAL OFFERED BY UARG, BRITISH WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT ALL HOSTAGES MUST BE DELIVERED TO SAFE PLACE BEFORE FEDAYEEN PRISONERS ARE TURNED OVER. BRITISH WOULD PROBABLY SUGGEST THAT EXCHANGE TAKE PLACE IN NEUTRAL CITY SUCH AS GENEVA OR POSSIBLY AT BRITISH BASE ON CYPRUS, THOUGH THEY PROBABLY NOT OPPOSE TO CAIRO IF UARG SO SUGGESTED. ROGERS

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SECRET 135

PAGE 01 STATE 156092

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

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DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY: NEA: ALATHERTON
S/S-MR. MALONE

70 SEP 23 AM 8:30
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
3

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0 230251Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 156092

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING

1. YOU SHOULD AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY CONVEY
FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN
THROUGH SECURE-NOT OPEN- CHANNEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT. AMBASSADOR BROWN WILL HAVE ALREADY
TOLD YOU THAT YOUR REQUESTS ARE BEING URGENTLY AND
SYMPATHETICALLY DISCUSSED.

• MEANWHILE, I WANT YOU TO HAVE THIS PERSONAL WORD
SAYING HOW MUCH I ADMIRE WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO PRESERVE
JORDAN'S INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF BOTH INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL THREATS. YOUR COURAGEOUS STAND HAS IMPRESSED
THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL NOT WAVER IN YOUR
DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY
TO YOUR KINGDOM.

RICHARD M. NIXON END TEXT

3. THE FOREGOING PERSONAL MESSAGE IS OF COURSE
CONFIDENTIAL AND WE DO NOT INTEND EITHER TO PUBLISH ITS

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TEXT OR ACKNOWLEDGE ITS EXISTENCE. HOWEVER, IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE COMING DAYS TO DO SO, WE ARE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER OUR POSITION. ROGERS

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FM WASHINGTON
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03691 021619Z

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ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

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P 021431Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 704
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO

SECRET AMMAN 3691

EXDIS

DEPT PASS KUWAIT, JIDDA, TRIPOLI, LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW

SUBJ: CEASE-FIRE; IRAQI FORCES

1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI ON AUGUST 2 EXPLAINED TO CHARGE THAT NINETY PERCENT OF JORDAN'S CONCERNS COULD BE ELIMINATED THROUGH WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES. IRAQIS POSED POTENTIAL THREAT TO REGIME'S SECURITY IN SENSE THAT THEY MIGHT ALLY THEMSELVES WITH EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS IN COUP EFFORT. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, THESE FORCES COULD JEOPARDIZE MAINTENANCE OF CEASE FIRE, SINCE IRAQ HAD REFUSED TO ACQUIESCE IN ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF USG PEACE INITIATIVE.

2. ZAID WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT LIBYAN MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS, SCHEDULED BEGIN AUGUST 3, OFFERED OPPORTUNITY TO INDUCE IRAQI WITHDRAWAL. JORDAN INTENDED TO SEIZE IT. ALGERIA AND IRAQ HAD DECIDED BOYCOTT CONFERENCE, HE OBSERVED. IRAQ WAS DOING THIS BECAUSE IT SENSED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS WOULD ENDORSE THE UAR/JORDAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE USG PEACE INITIATIVE, AND AT IRAQ'S EXPENSE. IRAQ HAD IN FACT LEARNED OF THE SCHEME, PROMOTED BY THE "NASSER-HUSSEIN AXIS" AND SUPPORTED BY SYRIA FOR ITS OWN REASONS, WHEREBY THE IRAQIS WOULD BE FROZEN OUT OF THE AUTHORITY THEY NOW ENJOY IN THE EASTERN FRONT COMMAND.

3. THE MINIMUM JORDANIAN OBJECTIVE, WHETHER ACHIEVED THROUGH

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THIS CONFERENCE OR ELSEWHERE, WAS TO REMOVE THE TWO IRAQI ARTILLERY BATTERIES STATIONED NEAR THE FRONTLINES IN THE NORTHERN JORDAN VALLEY. THESE BATTERIES, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR LOCATION, WERE ABLE TO COMPROMISE JORDANIAN COMMITMENTS RE CEASE-FIRE AT ANY TIME. ZAID SAID ARMY WAS CONFIDENT THAT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES COULD BE KEPT DOWN TO TOLERABLE LEVELS, BUT THE TASK WOULD BE MADE EASIER IF ARMY DID NOT HAVE TO LOOK OVER ITS SHOULDER AT IRAQI FORCES IN ITS REAR.


4. ZAID SAID EVERYONE IN JORDAN HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH NASSER'S DETERMINATION TO ISOLATE THOSE IN THE ARAB WORLD OPPOSED TO HIS STAND. HE HAD STAKED HIS PRESTIGE ON THIS STAND. THE RESULT HAD BEEN THE BEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE UAR. ZAID WAS HOPEFUL THAT IRAQI PROBLEM COULD BE CONTAINED THROUGH THIS COOPERATION.

DRAPER

NOTE: NOT PASSED LISTED ADDRESSEES BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 154300

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66633
DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI: HHSTACKHOUSE
APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSPH J. SISCO
NEA: ALFRED L. ATHERTON JR.
TASK FORCE: TWSEELYE
S/S=0: BRIMS

P 190311Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T STATE 154300

EXDIS

SUBJ: PM MEIR DISCUSSION OF HOSTAGES SEPT. 18

FOLLOWING EXCERPTED FROM MEMCON SECRETARY-MRS. MEIR MEETING MORNING SEPT. 18. IT IS UNCLEARED, NOFORN AND FYI ONLY, SUBJECT TO REVEISION ON REVIEW.

1. TURNING TO HOSTAGE PROBLEM, SECRETARY SAID WE WERE TRYING TO KEEP OUR BRITISH, SWISS AND GERMAN COLLEAGUES TOGETHER. WE DID NOT KNOW WHY THEY WERE SO FRENETIC AT TIMES. SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE AND OTHER DEPT. OFFICERS HAS BEEN RECIPIENTS OF MIDDLE-OF-NIGHT CALLS FROM CONVERNED DIPLOMATS. MRS. MEIR SAID US POSITION HAD BEEN VERY GOOD, THAT WE HAD HELD OUT BEAUTIFULLY. ISRAELI HAD BEEN ASKED WHAT ITS CONTRIBUTION WAS. SHE SAID OTHERS SEEMED READY TO CONTRIBUTE PEOPLE WHO HAD TRIED TO KILL ISRAELIS. MRS. MEIR DESCRIBED CRIMES AGAINST ISRAELIS COMMITTED BY FEDAYEENI IN BRITISH, GERMAN AND SWISS HANDS. SHE SAID SWISS WERE GOOD IN THIS AFFAIR BUT GERMANS AND BRITISH WERE AWFUL.

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70 SEP 19 AM 8:54
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
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2. SISCO SAID PREVIOUS NIGHT THERE HAD BEEN MEETING IN BERN AND BRITISH HAD PUT FORWARD DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PARTIAL DEALS. OUR CONCERN IS GREATER THAT OTHERS MAY EVENTUALLY WANT TO GO OWN WAY. BRITISH WOULD HAVE FIVE COUNTRIES INCLUDING ISRAEL SAY STRONGLY IT WAS QUESTION OF TOTAL DEAL AND THAT WE AS A GROUP WOULD CONSIDER WHAT PFLP PUT FORWARD PROVIDED IT WAS A TOTAL DEAL. ISRAELIS WERE FAMILAR WITH FEDAYEEN POSITION THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD HAND OVER TWO ALGERIANS AND MIXED BUNCH INCLUDING LEBANESE AND AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO RELEASE IMPRISONED FEDAYEEN BEFORE FEDAYEEN WOULD GIVE LIST THOSE THEY WANTED. THIS WAS PIG IN A POKE. BRITISH COMMUNIQUE WOULD LAY DOWN POSITION REGARDING TOTAL EXCHANGE. SISCO SAID HE HOPED MRS. MEIR WOULD LOOK AT THIS PROPOSAL. OUR CONCERN WAS THAT IF WE COULD NOT PROCEED ON UNIFIED BASIS THERE WOULD BE TENDENCY TOWARD SEPARATE DEALS.

3. SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED STATE OUR POSITION IN DETAIL. FIRST, THERE WOULD BE NO DEAL WITH FEDAYEEN UNLESS ALL HOSTAGES WERE GIVEN OVER. SECOND, WE DID NOT LIKE IDEA OF DEMAND ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE EXCHANGE OF ITS PASSENGERS AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. THIRD, WE WERE URGING THAT ISRAEL DO NOTHING UNDER PRESSURE.

4. MRS. MEIR SAID BRITISH COULD NOT SEND OUT THE GIRL (LELIA KHALED) WITHOUT ISRAELI CONSENT. ISRAELI HAD TREATY OF EXTRADITION. IT WAS QUESTION WHETHER WHEN HIJACKED, EL AL PLANE WAS LEGALLY IN BRITISH TERRITORY OR ISRAELI TERRITORY. SISCO COMMENTED BRITISH COMMUNIQUE WOULD HELP AVOID BUSINESS OF ISRAEL COMMITTING ITSELF TO PRINCIPLE OF EXCHANGE.

5. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE DID NOT LIKE MAKE PROMISES ISRAELI DID NOT INTEND TO KEEP. ISRAELI WOULD NOT RELEASE THESE PEOPLE. THEY ARE IN JAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE MURDERERS WHO HAD BLOWN UP CAFETERIA AND DONE OTHER THINGS. ISRAELI WOULD NOT BE TOLD LATER BY WORLD OPINION THAT IT HAD AGREED TO FREE THESE PEOPLE. SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS. NOW WE ARE TRYING TO AVOID SPLIT IN FIVE. MRS. MEIR SAID SHE WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THE BRITISH BUT SHE WAS SURE THAT THE GERMANS WOULD NEVER AGREE TO A SEPARATE EXCHANGE FOR THEIR PEOPLE.

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WHICH LEFT JEWS STILL AS HOSTAGES. THIS WOULD BE TOO MUCH AND THEY WOULD NOT DO IT.

6. SECRETARY ASKED IF ISRAELIS HAD ANY INFORMATION ON WHERE HOSTAGES WERE. RABIN SAID GOI DID NOT. MRS. MEIR COMMENTED THAT SHE THOUGHT ISRAEL AGREED TO THE RELEASE OF THE TEN LEBANESE. POLITICAL SECRETARY DINITZ SAID GOI HAD ANNOUNCED THE TWO ALGERIANS WOULD NOT BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK. THERE WAS UNCERTAINTY AMONG ISRAELIS IN ROOM THAT GOI ACTUALLY HAD SAID IT READY TO GIVE UP TEN LEBANESE. SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL NOT SAY ANYTHING REGARDING LEBANESE UNTIL IT WAS SURE OF GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN. SECRETARY AGAIN EMPHASIZED GETTING TOGETHER ON SOME LANGUAGE TO KEEP BRITISH AND GERMANS CALM.

GP-3. ROGERS:

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PAGE 01 STATE 152504

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: S/S THEODORE L. ELIOT, JR.
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FOR PURPOSES OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING, WE REQUEST, WHEN-
EVER SITUATION PERMITS, REPORTS ON STATUS OF AMMAN AIRPORT
AND H-5. ANY INFORMATION ON GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF ROUTES
OF ACCESS WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL.

GP-3. ROGERS

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PAGE 01 STATE 148939

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ORIGIN PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 NEA-13 IO-13 NSC-10 SS-20 SSO-00
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DRAFTED BY: S/PRS: RWBECKER
APPROVED BY: S/PRS: RJMCCLOSKEY
CLEARANCES: NEA/P: GSMITH
WHITE HOUSE: RHOUDEK (BY PHONE)
NEA/TF: TWSEELYE
S/S: MR LEVITSKY

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REF: BEIRUT 7617

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON 6TH FLEET MOVEMENT

1. FOLLOWING STATEMENT ISSUED BY ZIEGLER AT WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING 12:30 LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER 11:

2. QUOTE THE PREPOSITIONING OF THE SIX 130'S AND THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET ARE ONLY NORMAL ROUTINE PRECAUTIONS IN SUCH SITUATIONS FOR EVACUATION PURPOSES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION THE SWISS GOVT STATEMENT JUST PUT OUT ON BEHALF OF THE FIVE (WEST GERMANY, SWISS, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL) THAT THEY HAVE AUTHORIZED MR. ROCHAT TO INFORM THE FEDAYEEN INNER QUOTE THAT NO ARMED INTERVENTION IS CONTEMPLATED UNQUOTE INNER QUOTE. THE U.S. JOINED IN THIS STATEMENT WITH THE OTHERS. UNQUOTE.

3. FYI: IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ZIEGLER REFUSED TO GO BEYOND STATEMENT. ROGERS

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APPROVED BY NEA/RODGER P. DAVIES
S/S-O: B.A. FLATIN

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SUBJECT: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR'S CALL SEPTEMBER 21

1. AMBASSADOR SHARAF CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DAVIES AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 21 TO INQUIRE RE U.S. THINKING
ON PRESENT SITUATION IN JORDAN AND SPECIFICALLY WHAT CAN BE
DONE TO OBTAIN SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. SHARAF AND DAVIES EX-
CHANGED INFORMATION ON CURRENT SITUATION JORDAN.

2. SHARAF STRESSED MAIN GOV. PROBLEM IS THAT SYRIAN FORCES
ARE IN CONTROL IRBID AND OUTSIDE PRESSURE NECESSARY TO GET
THEM OUT. SHARAF STATED AMMAN HAD URGED HIM INQUIRE WHAT USG

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IS DOING AND WHAT MORE MAY BE DONE TOWARD THIS END.

3. DAVIES REPLIED USG FROM PRESIDENT DOWN CONCERNED RE SITUATION IN KINGDOM AND FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE CLOCK. SECRETARY ROGERS HAS ISSUED PUBLIC WARNING TO SYRIANS TO END INTERVENTION. WE DOING WHATEVER POSSIBLE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO BRING PRESSURE ON SYRIA. DIFFICULTY IS THAT USG HAS LITTLE INFLUENCE ON SYRIAN REGIME AND THAT INFLUENCE OTHER GREAT POWERS, POSSIBLY EVEN SOVIETS, IN DAMASCUS PROBLEMATIC. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOVIETS AND OTHERS AND, AS KING HUSSEIN HAD REQUESTED, ARE ENGAGING IN FOUR-POWER TALKS IN NEW YORK IN EFFORT OBTAIN STATEMENT CALLING FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

4. IN RESPONSE SHARAF'S QUERY RE PROSPECTS FOUR-POWER STATEMENT, DAVIES SAID PATTERN WAS OF LONG DISCUSSION BEFORE AGREEMENT REACHED. DAVIES NOTED FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE STATEMENT AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN AND CALLED FOR FOUR-POWER SETTLEMENT CURRENT PROBLEM. SOVIET CHARGE SEPTEMBER 19 PRESENTED NOTE WARNING AGAINST OUTSIDE INTERVENTION AND INDICATED USSR HAD URGED UAR, IRAQ, AND SYRIA TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS TO END FIGHTING. WE HAVE NOW CALLED ON SOVIETS TO INFLUENCE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW.

5. DAVIES, NOTING WE ALSO IN TOUCH WITH UAR, ASKED SHARAF'S VIEW LIKELY RESULTS OF ARAB LEAGUE MEETING CALLED FOR SEPTEMBER 22. SHARAF REPLIED HE NOT OPTIMISTIC ANYTHING HELPFUL COULD COME FROM ARAB MEETING. GADHAFI AND ATASI APPLYING PRESSURE ON NASSER TO TAKE STRONGER PRO-FEDAYEEN STAND. SHARAF EXPLAINED THAT JORDAN HESITATION APPEAL TO SECURITY COUNCIL WAS BASED ON INABILITY TO ASSURE RESULTS. FOR INSTANCE, SYRIA ON SECURITY COUNCIL AT MOMENT AND STILL DENYING OFFICIALLY THAT SYRIAN TROOPS PRESENT IN JORDAN. ALSO, SECURITY COUNCIL APPROACH RAISED POSSIBILITIES SOVIETS MIGHT TAKE OBSTRUCTIVE STAND OR THAT ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE MIGHT MAKE REMARKS UNHELPFUL TO GOJ.

6. SHARAF SAID IRAQI POSITION UNCERTAIN. DAVIES QUERIED WHETHER IRAQI CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS MIGHT PROMPT IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN TO BLOCK SYRIAN ADVANCE. SHARAF NOTED IRAQIS UNPREDICTABLE BUT DOUBTED THEY WILL TAKE ACTION PLACING THEM EVEN INDIRECTLY ON SIDE OF GOJ IN CONFLICT.

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7. CONJECTURED THEY WOULD MOVE TO PREEMPT SYRIA IN SOUTH BY THROWING SUPPORT TO PALESTINIANS THERE. SHARAF AGREED SYRIAN OBJECTIVE UNCERTAIN AT THIS TIME. DOES SYRIA INTERVENTION AIM AT OVERTHROWING GOJ OR IS IT LIMITED TO SECURING POSITION IN NORTH AROUND IRBID? ADDITIONAL IMponderable IS ISRAELI REACTION SYRIAN PRESENCE. SHARAF SAID POSSIBILITY ISRAELI INTERVENTION WORRIES GOJ AND ARABS DEEPLY.

8. DAVIES NOTED PRESS REPORTS OF U.S. CONTINGENCY MOVES WHICH SEEM TO CONCERN UAR AND SOVIETS GREATLY MAY HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON SYRIANS. SHARAF AGREED THAT REPORTS THAT USG MIGHT INTERVENE ARE NOT UNHELPFUL, BUT COMMITTED THAT SYRIANS CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO BE "REASONABLE" IN THEIR REACTION.

9. DAVIES ADDED THAT USG IS READY RESPOND KING HUSSEIN'S REQUEST FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. ROGERS

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APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P DAVIES
CLEARANCES: S/S-MR CURRAN

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SUBJECT: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT AUGUST 21-28.

1. ARAB-ISRAEL: JARRING OPENS TALKS; TEKOAH LEAVES FOR CONSULTATIONS. JARRING MOVED WITH DISPATCH TO BEGIN TALKS ON AUGUST 25. AT FIRST DAY'S SESSIONS, JARRING TOLD TEKOAH (AND PRESUMABLY ARAB REPRESENTATIVES) THAT HE INTENDED TO TAKE UP ONE BY ONE POINTS IN RESOLUTION 242 AND THAT HE WOULD FROM TIME TO TIME PUT FORWARD HIS "THOUGHTS." WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THERE MAY HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIABLE REASONS FOR ISRAEL'S RECALL OF TEKOAH

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FOR CONSULTATIONS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING FIRST SESSION, WE HAVE EXPRESSED TO GOI OUR CONCERN AND HAVE STRONGLY URGED THAT HE RETURN TO NEW YORK IN VERY FEW DAYS.

2. UAR: ARAFAT IN CAIRO. ARAFAT HAS BEEN MEETING WITH NASSER IN EFFORT TO SORT OUT DIFFERENCES CAUSED BY UAR ACCEPTANCE OF US PROPOSAL. ACCORDING TO ONE INTELLIGENCE REPORT, NASSER NOT ONLY DEPRIVED AL-FATAH OF USE OF UAR RADIO FACILITIES, BUT ALSO SUSPENDED ARMS AND FINANCIAL AID.

3. UAR: UAR-IRANIAN RELATIONS RESUMED. AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED BETWEEN UAR AND IRAN FOR RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (SEVERED IN 1960). ACCORDING TO IRANIANS, THE IMPETUS COMES MAINLY FROM UAR AND IS DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH UAR'S RIFT WITH BAGHDAD OVER US PEACE INITIATIVE.

4. LEBANON: FEDAYEEN-LEBANESE CLASH. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL INCIDENTS IN LEBANON IN PAST WEEK INVOLVING COMMANDO ELEMENTS AND NASSER SUPPORTERS.

5. MUSCAT AND OMAN: U.S. RECOGNITION. WHITE HOUSE APPROVED AND CONSUL GENERAL IN DHAHRAN FORWARDED TO NEW SULTAN QABUS AUGUST 26 THE ACTING SECRETARY'S MESSAGE WELCOMING HIS ACCESSION TO POWER AND INDICATING U.S. DESIRE TO CONTINUE EXISTING U.S. TREATY RELATIONSHIPS AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH SULTANATE.

6. GULF: CRUDE OIL SHORTAGE. DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY SAMUELS MET AUGUST 26 WITH ESSO'S EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND WILL MEET AUGUST 28 WITH VICE PRESIDENTS OF FOUR ARAMCO OWNERS TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE WAYS OF RELIEVING CURRENT OIL SHORTAGE IN MEDITERRANEAN. FIRST MEETING FOCUSED MAINLY ON POSSIBILITY OF REOPENING SUEZ CANAL; SECOND WILL DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF REOPENING TAPLINE.

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1970 AUG 28 01 27

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WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO

SUBJ: ISRAELI POWS IN UAR AND TWO ALGERIAN PRISONERS

1. IN COURSE CONVERSATION WITH ATHERTON (SEPTEL) AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR STACKHOUSE AUGUST 27, ARGOV REFERRED TO TWO MATTER AND TO CONVERSATION PREVIOUS DAY WITH STACKHOUSE WHEN LATTER DESCRIBED BERGUS DEMARCHE RE POWS. ARGOV SAID HE SUSPECTED IF BERGUS HAD SPOKEN TO UARG WITH AS MUCH THRUST AS DCM ZURHELLEN HAD WITH GOI RE TO TWO ALGERIAN DETAINEES HE WOULD HAVE COVERED MORE POINTS AT ISSUE THAN SIMPLY VISITS TO POWS. STACKHOUSE REMINDED ARGOV THAT HE HAD TOLD HIM THAT BERGUS COVERED VISIT TO PRISONERS ISSUE AND ALL OTHER POINTS WHICH ISRAELIS HAD RAISED. ATHERTON EMPHASIZED THAT OUR INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN TO COVER ALL POINTS; BERGUS HAD DONE SO AND WE EXPECT AN ANSWER FROM UARG.
2. ATHERTON NOTED THAT HE HAD IMPRESSION FROM ARGOV MENTION OF OUR APPROACH RE TWO ALGERIAN DETAINEES THAT THIS DID NOT GO DOWN WELL IN GERUSALEM. HE REMINDED ARGOV THAT USG MERELY SUGGESTED THAT GOI WEIGH CAREFULLY POINT WE HAD RAISED.
3. ARGOV COMMENTED THAT IN WAR ONE SOMETIMES HAS TO RESORT TO TACTICS USED BY OTHER SIDE. HE NOTED THAT ARABS STILL HLD SERIOUSLY WOUNDED PRISONERS AND INNOCENT BORDER GUARD GOLDWASSER. IF GOI CANNOT GET THEM BACK ONE WAY, MAYBE ANOTHER WAY WILL WORK. IF ISRAEL'S GOOD NAME IS AT STAKE, PERHAPS WE SHALL HAVE TO RISK IT. ATHERTON OBSERVED THAT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS CLOSE TO BREAKDOWN OF STANDARDS OF CONDUCT IN CIVIL AVIATION FIELD. USG IS CONCERNED AND IS TRYING TO SUPPORT MAINTENANCE OF SOME STANDARDS. WE RECOGNIZE DILEMMA ISRAELIS FACE AND THAT GOI HAS TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISION. WE MERELY HAVE POINTED OUT AND URGED CONSIDERATION OF LONGER RUN FACTORS.

GP-3 JOHNSON

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RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9707
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 140594

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO

SUBJ: JOINT US-SOVIET OBSERVER FORCE

1. IN COURSE CONVERSATION WITH ATHERTON (SEPTEL) AUGUST 27 ARGOV INQUIRED ABOUT PRESS REPORTS FROM BACKGROUNDER BY US OFFICIALS AT SAN CLEMENTE AND ASKED IF ATHERTON COULD THROW ANY LIGHT ON REPORT CONCERNING ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT US-SOVIET OBSERVER FORCE IN MIDEAST.
2. ATHERTON SHOWED ARGOV TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTION OF BACKGROUNDER AND OBSERVED THAT PRESS HAD PLAYED UP ONE SMALL PART OF LENGTHY EXCHANGE. HE NOTED THAT CONTEXT RELATED TO US RETAINING SOME ROLE IN THE AREA AFTER A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. WHILE USG DOES NOT HAVE FORMULATED PROPOSALS AND HAS REACHED NO JUDGMENTS ON THIS POINT, AT THIS STAGE WE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE USG PARTICIPATION AS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESS. ARGOV OBSERVED THAT THIS REPORT HAS CREATED QUITE A STIR IN JERUSALEM AND NOTED ATHERTON'S ASSERTION THAT USG HAS NOT BEGUN FORMULATING PEACEKEEPING PROPOSALS. ATHERTON ADVISED THAT ARGOV KEEP IN MIND THAT JOINT OBSERVER FORCE IS ONLY ONE OF MANY POSSIBILITIES.
3. ARGOV NOTED THAT ISRAELI EMBASSY IS TELLING PRESS THAT ISRAEL HOPES THIS REPORT IS NOT AN INDICATION THAT USG IS WILLING TO ACCEPT SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT SHORT OF PEACE. ATHERTON SAID SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT BE MADE SHORT OF PEACE, BUT IN SUPPORT OF PEACE. ARGOV OBSERVED THAT IF ISRAEL OBTAINS KIND OF PEACE WHICH IT HAS IN MIND SUCH OBSERVER ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY. JOHNSON
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RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 5477
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4826
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 2366
RDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9706
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1709
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 140593

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO

1 DURING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DEPT OFFICER ON AUGUST
2 JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF STATED THAT ON
PREVIOUS DAY, AUGUST 26, HE HAD, AMONG OTHER THINGS,
PASSED MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO JARRING WHICH
EXPRESSED IN STRONG TERMS GOJ'S GRAVE CONCERN ABOUT
CONTINUING, ACTIVE, LARGE-SCALE ISRAELI CHANGES TO
SHARACTER OF JERUSALEM. ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR, THESE
INCLUDE EXPROPRIATION AND DEMOLITION OF ARAB PROPERTIES
AS WELL AS DEMOGRAPHIC DISPLACEMENTS. AMBASSADOR
CONTINUED THAT OBVIOUS ISRAELI PURPOSE THESE CHANGES IS
ACHIEVEMENT FAITS ACCOMPLIS AS BASIS ON WHICH ADVANCE
UNWARRANTED ISRAELI CLAIMS TO OLD CITY AND OTHER OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES.

2. AMBASSADOR SHARAF STATED GOJ REGARDS THIS DEVELOPMENT
IN JERUSALEM AS WELL AS OTHER ISRAELI CHANGES IN OCCUPIED
ARAB TERRITORIES AS DANGEROUS AND VERY SERIOUS WHICH, IF
PERMITTED TO CONTINUE, WILL HINDER CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS
AND HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON PEACE INITIATIVE. SHARAF
INDICATED HE INTENDS BRING THIS SUBJECT TO ATTENTION USG
IN NEAR FUTURE AND ALSO THAT GOJ WILL VERY SHORTLY PROPOSE
TO JARRING THAT STANDSTILL BE EFFECTED NOT ONLY ALONG
CEASEFIRE LINES BUT ALSO WITHIN ISRAELI OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS ACTION ADDRESSEES. JOHNSON
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APPROVED BY: NEA- ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR
NEA-UAR- MR STERNER
S/S MR CURRAN

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T STATE 140255

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASST SECY SISCO

1. UAR MINISTER GHORBAL CALLED ON DEPT ASSIST SECCY ATHERTON AUG 26 FOR REVIEW MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. BURDEN GHORBAL'S PRESENTATION WAS ON NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM OF US INITIATIVE AND NECESSITY THAT US CONTINUE IN GUAR EYES TO PLAY NEUTRAL ROLE RATHER THAN ACT AS ADVOCATE OR ARSENAL FOR ISRAEL.

2. GHORBAL SAID HE DID NOT YET HAVE REPORT ON AUG 26 JARRING-ZAYYAT MEETING. HE SAID GUAR WORRIED ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND CONCERNED THAT RECALL OF TEKOAH INDICATED GOI UNWILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD OR CREATE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE TO KEEP UP WHAT MOMENTUM EXISTED. ISRAELI TACTICS WERE EATING INTO CEASEFIRE PERIOD, OF WHICH ONLY 70 DAYS REMAINING. ATHERTON SAID YOST HAD SPOKEN TO TEKOAH AUG 24, STRESSING USG CONVERN THAT ISRAEL NOT APPEAR TO BE CAUSING A PAUSE IN PEACEMAKING EFFORT. NONETHELESS USG CONSIDERED TEKOAH'S RETURN TO TEL AVIV TO RECEIVE NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS AS LEGITIMATE, AND FELT THAT EACH SIDE

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SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE BENEFIT OF DOUBT TO OTHER. GHORBAL EXPRESSED PLEASURE THAT YOST HAD SPOKEN TO TEKOOAH, AND SAID GUAR HAD ACCEPTED US INITIATIVE IN EFFORT SEEK IMPLEMENTATION SCRES 242 AND WOULD WORK TOWARD THAT END.

3. GHORBAL, IN ELABORATING ON NEED FOR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND COMMITMENTS, REMARKED THAT US HAD NOT YET ANSWERED LATEST SOVIET FORMULATIONS ON NATURE OF PEACE. ATHERTON SAID WE CONSIDERED SOVIET FORMULATIONS HAD BEEN DELAYED RESPONSE TO OUR OCTOBER AND DECEMBER FORMULATIONS ON TERRITORIAL ASPECTS. IN ANY EVENT, MORE IMPORTANT POINT NOW THAN US- USSR EXCHANGES IS ENUNCIATION OF RESPECTIVE POSITIONS BY PARTIES THEMSELVES.

4. ATHERTON SAID USG INTERESTED IN RESOLUTION OF PRESENT UNCERTAINTIES CONCERNING TERMS OF STANDSTILL. WE GRATIFIED THERE HAD BEEN NO SHOOTING ON SUEZ FRONT AND HOPED THAT VARYING INTERPRETATIONS AND SUSPICIONS OVER TERMS OF STANDSTILL COULD BE WORKED OUT SATISFACTORILY IN COURSE OF PRESENT EXCHANGES IN CAIRO AND TEL AVIV. WE BELIEVED GOI CONCERN WAS JUSTIFIED OVER UAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY SURROUNDING INCEPTION CEASEFIRE. ALTHOUGH THIS INCIDENT NOW PAST HISTORY, IT NOT HELPFUL IN CREATING FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT.

5. GHORBAL RAISED US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL, POINTING TO PRESS INDICATIONS THAT US INTENDED SUPPLY MORE SOPHISTICATED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS SUCH AS SHRIKE AND WALLEYE. HE OWED IT TO US, GHORBAL SAID, TO POINT OUT THAT SUPPLY OF SUCH WEAPONRY WOULD NOT HELP US PEACESEEKING EFFORTS AND WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE ISRAELI OBSTINACY, AS WELL AS REINFORCE GUAR SUSPICIONS ABOUT USG ROLE AS ISRAEL'S ADVOCATE. ATHERTON SAID THAT USG CONTINUING TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN ARMS SUPPLY, BUT HAD PLACED NO EMBARGO ON ARMS TO ISRAEL AND WAS CONTINUING NORMAL SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP IN LIGHT OF US APPRAISAL GOI NEEDS. RESTRAINT COULD NOT BE ONE-SIDED, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO RESPONSIVENESS FROM THE OTHER SIDE ON ARMS LIMITATION IDEA. GP-3. JOHNSON

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SUMMARY

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02

INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20

USIA-12 RSR-01 AID-28 /155 W

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R 040945Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 487
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3130

DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT JORDANIAN SITUATION;
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE

SUMMARY COMMENT: WITHIN NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS, THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE REGIME AND THE FEDAYEEN WILL PROBABLY BE DETERMINED, HOWEVER UNTIDILY, IN SOME INTERIM FORMULA. ALL OTHER ISSUES STILL AT QUESTION (E.G., NATURE OF KING'S AUTHORITY, JORDAN'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY, TEMPO OF NATIONAL MOBILIZATION, ETC.) ARE SUBORDINATE TO AND DEPENDENT ON FINDING THIS FORMULA AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IMPLEMENTING IT. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FAVORS FINDING COMPROMISE SOLUTION OR FORMULA. RISKS OF FURTHER CONFRONTATION ARE HIGH, OF COURSE, BUT IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE TOUCHED OFF ACCIDENTALLY THAN DELIBERATELY. ASSUMING RELATIONSHIP IS AGREED UPON, TIME OF TESTING WILL TAKE PLACE, DURING WHICH FEDAYEEN WILL ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE (AND PERHAPS EVEN INSTITUTIONALIZE) SHARED CONTROL OVER COUNTRY. SHORT-TERM RESULT COULD BE SUPERFICIAL STABILITY (WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR USG TO OPEN DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP OF ALL COLORS), BUT LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR JORDAN BECOMING MAJOR BATTLEGROUND IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT WOULD BE ENHANCED, WITH DREARY IMPLICATIONS FOR AREA PEACE AND FOR JORDANIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. END

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SUMMARY COMMENT.

1. QUIET COMPROMISE LIKELY - SIFTING THROUGH ELEMENTS IN CURRENT PICTURE, PATTERN SEEMS TO BE FORMING WHICH FAVORS FINDING A COMPROMISE FORMULA FOR FEDAYEEN-REGIME RELATIONSHIP RATHER THAN ANOTHER AND, THIS TIME, FULL-SCALE CONFRONTATION. FACTORS FRIENDLY TO QUIETLY-NEGOTIATED INTERIM SOLUTION INCLUDE: (A) INTRODUCTION OF QUADRIPARTITE MEDIATING COMMITTEE, REPRESENTING GOVERNMENTS (UAR, ALGERIA, SUDAN, LIBYA) WHICH FOR MOST PART HAVE NO IMMEDIATE VESTED INTEREST IN FURTHER UNDERMINING A LEGITIMATE ARAB GOVERNMENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTIVES PROBABLY PARALLEL THOSE OF KING HUSSEIN IN MAJOR RESPECTS (E.G., UNIFYING FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, PRESERVING INTERNAL LAW AND ORDER); (B) THE NEW JORDANIAN CABINET WHICH, BECAUSE IT INCORPORATES STRONGLY PRO-FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS, HAS ALREADY INSPIRED GREATER FEDAYEEN (FATAH) CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION; (C) PUBLIC WEARINESS OR FEAR OF THE ENDLESS INTERNAL TURMOIL, COUPLED WITH WILLINGNESS OF MANY ORDINARY CITIZENS TO ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO SHARED SOVEREIGNTY; AND (D) THE DETERMINATION OF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL MASHUR HADIITHA AL-JAZI TO HEAD OFF FURTHER CONFRONTATIONS AND PROVOCATIONS BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND ARMY, PAYING INEVITABLE PRICE OF LOWERED AUTHORITY FOR REGIME.
2. EMERGENCE OF THIRD PARTY? MASHUR HADIITHA'S ROLE IS POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT; THERE ARE SIGNS HE ENVISAGES HIMSELF BECOMING A DOMINANT POLITICAL POWER IN THE COUNTRY, TAKING INITIATIVE WHENEVER VACUUMS APPEAR AND EXPLOITING APPARENT FEDAYEEN CONFIDENCE IN HIM. HUSSEIN REPORTEDLY HAS CALLED HIM AN ASPIRING DICTATOR; AND PAKISTANI AMB, WHO HAS KNOWN HIM FOR MANY YEARS, CONSIDERS HIM EXTREMELY AMBITIOUS AND QUIETLY AGGRESSIVE. TO DEGREE HE TAKES REAL AS OPPOSED TO NOMINAL CONTROL OF ARMY, HE MAY INDEED BE FORCE TO RECKON WITH. BUT HUSSEIN STILL CLEARLY CONTROLS ARMY.
3. POSSIBLE ALL-OUT CONFRONTATION NOT REMOTE - THE KING, STILL SMARTING FROM THE SUCCESSIVE HUMILIATIONS METED OUT TO HIS AUTHORITY THIS YEAR, AND REALIZING THAT LATENT ANIMOSITIES BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND SOME TRANS-JORDANIANS HAVE AGAIN SURFACED, IS BIDDING HIS TIME. HE HAS TOLD CHARGE AND OTHERS THAT HE WILL STRIKE FEDAYEEN HARD AND SEND ARMY INTO AMMAN IF SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED. WE STRONGLY DOUBT THIS WILL OCCUR, BUT IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. TEMPERS AMONG CERTAIN ARMY OFFICERS AND TRANS-JORDANIANS ARE



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IMPRESSIVELY HIGH, AND COULD GET OUT OF HAND. MEANWHILE, MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN STATIONED AT ENTRY POINTS INTO AMMAN, ALTHOUGH WE DOUBT THAT TOTAL FORCE SURROUNDING CITY IS AS LARGE AS FEDAYEEN PROPAGANDISTS ALLEGE. HIGH VISIBILITY THESE FORCES AT CHECK POINTS MAY SERVE AS PRESSURE TACTIC IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. THERE IS, HOWEVER, REAL DANGER IN ACCIDENTAL PROVOCATIONS OF EITHER FEDAYEEN OR ARMY; AND EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN GROUPS, KNOWING FLASH POINTS, COULD EASILY IGNITE A AFIRE.

4. IRAQI ROLE A MYSTERY - PROBABLY IRAQI ROLE IN PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS OR IN FUTURE CRISIS IS AMONG MOST DIFFICULT QUESTIONS TO ANSWER. IF, INDEED, THREAT OF IRAQI ARMY INTERVENTION WAS ONE REASON THAT JORDAN ARMY DID NOT ENTER AMMAN LAST TIME, SAME CONSIDERATION PRESUMABLY WOULD APPLY IN FUTURE. IT IS NOW RPT NOW OUR JUDGMENT THAT IRAQIS DID NOT MASTERMIND PLOT AGAINST REGIME BUT, RATHER, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF CONFUSION TO REAP ADVANTAGES FOR THEMSELVES AND FEDAYEEN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO POSITION IN JORDAN OF SYRIA AND SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AS-SA'IQAH. IRAQI AMB HERE INDICATED JUNE 20 TO FRENCH AMB THAT IRAQIS WERE PREPARED TO INTERVENE IF TROUBLES BROKE OUT AGAIN. YET HIS REMARK FAILED TO MAKE CLEAR WHETHER IRAQI INTERVENTION WOULD ASSIST REGIME IN KEEPING ORDER OR WHETHER THEY WOULD BE SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN CAUSE. ALLEGATIONS THAT IRAQIS MAY BE PRESSURING PFLP BY WITHHOLDING ITS MONTHLY SUBSIDY, IF TRUE, MAY BE SIGNIFICANT CLUE TO FUTURE IRAQI BEHAVIOR.

5. POSITION OF FEDAYEEN EXTREMISTS - BOTH REGIME AND SO-CALLED MODERATE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS RECOGNIZE THE SPOILER'S ROLE THAT PFLP OR OTHER EXTREMISTS MIGHT PLAY BEFORE JUNE CRISIS, A WORKING RELATIONSHIP OF SORTS BETWEEN PLO/FATAH AND GOVT SEEMED TO BE DEVELOPING, WITH REPORTED ENCOURAGEMENT OF UAR EMBASSY. HOPES ARE STILL VOICED BY SOME THAT PLO/FATAH WOULD STAND BY QUIETLY WHILE ARMY MOPPED UP PFLP, OR EVEN ASSIST OPERATION. WE CONTINUE, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER THIS AMONG THE REMOTEST OF POSSIBILITIES.



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INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00

NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 EUR-20

AF-12 AID-28 RSR-01 /155 W

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R 040945Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 488
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 3130

6. GOALS OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES - REGIME EASILY SHOULD BE ABLE TO AVOID FURTHER MAJOR SURRENDERS OF AUTHORITY DURING NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL SEEK UNIFICATION OF THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT UNDER PRIME LEADERSHIP OF PLO/FATAH, BELIEVING THAT FUTURE FEDAYEEN-GOVT PROBLEMS COULD THEREBY BE IRONED OUT MORE EASILY AND THAT LAW AND ORDER COULD BE PRESERVED MORE SATISFACTORILY. MOST THAT REALISTICALLY COULD BE EXPECTED FROM FEDAYEEN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE A COLLECTIVE KIND OF FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP - A COORDINATING BODY - SIMILAR TO BUT MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN THE PLETHORA OF COMMITTEES ALREADY FORMED.

7. REGIME ALSO SEEKS WITHDRAWAL OF FEDAYEEN CONCENTRATIONS FROM AMMAN AND MAJOR TOWNS. THESE URBAN AREAS ARE ARMED CAMPS, WHICH ARE AT MERCY OF FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS ACCUSTOMED TO TAKING QUICKER INITIATIVES THAN ARMY OR GOVT. AGAIN WE THINK LIKELIHOOD IS REMOTE THAT ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, BUT PARTICULARLY THE PFLP, WOULD WILLINGLY LIVE UP TO PROMISE TO EVACUATE, YET THIS ISSUE WILL PROBABLY BE QUESTION ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOUNDER OR SUCCEED, AND SOME TOKEN EVACUATION BY FATAH MAY THEREFORE BE POSSIBLE, EVEN LIKELY.

8. HUSSEIN REPORTEDLY WANTS REMOVAL FROM JORDAN OF FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS UNDER EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS (I.E.,



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SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AS-SA'IQAH). THIS MAY NOT, HOWEVER, BE MAJOR OBJECTIVE.

9. MOST FEDAYEEN SHORT-TERM DEMANDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MET IN SOME FORM OR ANOTHER. JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF AL-JAZI HAS DONE MUCH TO CONCILIATE THEM, AND MAY HAVE ABOLISHED COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE "SPECIAL BRANCH" WITHIN ARMY. DESPITE CURRENT RHETORIC CALLING FOR ASSUMPTION INTO POWER OF "PATRIOTIC ELEMENTS EMPOWERED TO MAKE DECISIONS," PRESENT CABINET'S MILITANT POLICY AND CALL FOR NATIONAL MOBILIZATION PRESUMABLY WILL BE TO FEDAYEEN LIKING, ALONG WITH WHAT PRESAGES WARMER APPROACH TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THE MAJOR SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVE OF FEDAYEEN WILL BE ADEQUATE GUARANTEES THAT FEDAYEEN FREEDOM OF ACTION IN JORDAN VALLEY AND SECURITY OF THEIR BASE AREAS OUTSIDE AMMAN WILL BE PRESERVED, WITHOUT FEAR OF CONTROL OR INTERDICTION BY ARMY.

10. COMPROMISE MEANS SHARED AUTHORITY OVER COUNTRY - ASSUMING AS WE DO THAT SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE WORKING ARRANGEMENT WILL BE HASHED OUT, IT IS LIKELY TO HOLD TOGETHER FOR AT LEAST A FEW MONTHS, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE BLESSING THAT PRESUMABLY WOULD BE GIVEN TO IT THROUGH THE FOUR-POWER MEDIATING COMMITTEE. DURING SUBSEQUENT TIME OF TESTING, FEDAYEEN WILL SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR SHARED DE FACTO CONTROL OF COUNTRY, AND SOME KIND OF INFORMAL COORDINATING MACHINERY MAY DEVELOP THAT WOULD INSTITUTIONALIZE IT. MANY SUCH IDEAS ARE NOW BEING EXAMINED. EVEN THOUGH THIS PROMISES AN UNEASY AND SUPERFICIAL STABILITY WITHIN COUNTRY, CERTAIN OTHER IMPLICATIONS CAN BE FORESEEN, AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE AUTHORITY AND PRESTIGE OF HASHEMITE REGIME WILL CONTINUE TO DECLINE, BUT KING STILL HAS CONSIDERABLE RESIDUE. ARMY SEEMS TO HAVE REMAINED SOLIDLY BEHIND HIM, WITH ONLY ONE EXAMPLE OF TEMPORARY DISOBEDIENCE IN WHICH TANK COMMANDER SOUGHT TO GO AFTER FEDAYEEN AGAINST ORDERS. IT MAY BE REVEALING, HOWEVER, THAT DURING CRISIS HE REPORTEDLY THREATENED TO LEAVE COUNTRY, SOMETHING HE HAS DONE ONLY RARELY. IN ADDITION, ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON HUSSEIN SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS ROUTINE; WHILE LIVING WITH EVER PRESENT THREAT OF ASSASSINATION, THERE ACTUALLY HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY FEW ATTEMPTS ON HIS LIFE IN RECENT YEARS.

(B) JUNE CRISIS ALREADY HAS UNLEASHED NATIONALIST FORCES (OTHER THAN FEDAYEEN) WHO WANT BASIC CHANGES IN JORDAN'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND SHIFT OF POLITICAL POWER ELSEWHERE (NOT NECESSARILY TO FEDAYEEN). THEY MIGHT BE CONTENT WITH MONARCHY, BUT NOT AB-



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SOLUTE MONARCHY OPERATING UNDER GUISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ONE. NEW CABINET, IF IT LASTS, MAY PROMOTE THIS TREND; AND WE MAY SEE MORE REAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THAN GOVT'S POLICY THEMES SUGGEST.

(C) DURING TIME OF TESTING, INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY OF JORDAN WILL BE FURTHER COMPROMISED. JORDAN EVEN NOW CAN ONLY FOLLOW THE UAR'S LEAD AS REGARDS ANY NEW PEACE INITIATIVES. MEANWHILE, FEDAYEEN WILL SEEK FOR LONG-TERM NOTHING SHORT OF PUTTING JORDAN ON FULL WARTIME FOOTING - ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY AS WELL AS MILITARILY - CLEARLY REJECTING ALL ROUTES TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

(D) IN THIS SITUATION, THE US WILL BE MORE AND MORE A SCAPEGOAT, AND PUBLIC WILL BE FURTHER CONDITIONED TO FOCUSING WRATH ON US. SAFETY OF INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS OCCASIONALLY WILL BE IN JEOPARDY. CONTINUING PUBLIC AND PERHAPS CABINET PRESSURES TO ACCEPT SOVIET ARMS MUST BE EXPECTED. MOST EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION TO GOING SOVIET MAY IN THEEND BE CONCENTRATED AMONG KEY ARMY COMMANDERS. MEANWHILE, SUCH GESTURES AS RECOGNIZING EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED. WHETHER SOVIETS WILL BE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING CLOSER TIES WITH WHAT MAY APPEAR TO THEM TO BE A BANKRUPT MONARCHY IS AN INTERESTING QUESTION. YET, IRONICALLY, USG MAY FIND IT EASIER AND ALMOST ROUTINE TO OPEN UP DIALOGUE WITH MORE MILITANT AMONG PALESTINIAN NATIONALISTS. OPPORTUNITIES ARE ALSO PRESENT FOR USG, THROUGH CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, REINVIGORATED CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION, AS WELL AS TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC MEANS, TO RETARD AND OFFSET THESE ANTI-AMERICAN TRENDS.

(E) ENDORSING GREATER FEDAYEEN FREEDOM OF ACTION WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN MORE SERIOUS BREACHES OF CEASE-FIRE IN JORDAN VALLEY. MORE FORCEFUL ISRAELI RETALIATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXPECTED. THEY MAY, HOWEVER, HAVE RESULT OF UNITING COUNTRY BEHIND TRUE MOBILIZATION EFFORT. IF ISRAELIS DID NOT INVADE COUNTRY IN MEAN-TIME, WE VISUALIZE A DAY COMING WHEN JORDAN MIGHT BECOME LITTLE MORE THAN A CONVENIENT BATTLEGROUND INTO WHICH VARIOUS FEDAYEEN AND ARAB FORCES, BUT ESPECIALLY IRAQI, WOULD MOVE FROM TIME TO TIME.

(F) FURTHER LEAKAGE OF PEOPLE AND CAPITAL FROM JORDAN MUST BE EXPECTED. FIRST FRIGHTENED FLIGHT OUT OF COUNTRY MAY HAVE SLOWED; HOWEVER, SOME SERIOUS DAMAGE ALREADY HAS BEEN DONE. SOME OF JORDAN'S MOST SOLID CITIZENS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING MOVING OUT.

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ORIGIN SS-45

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DRAFTED BY: AF/N: CWBRAY
APPROVED BY: AF/N: CHARLES W. BRAY
E/FSE: MR. AKINS
AF: AMB. PALMER
S/S: MR. BREWSTER

R 201606Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
INFO AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI

SECRET STATE 135488

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: LIBYAN INTENTION TO JOINT VENTURE WITH AMERICAN OIL SERVICE COMPANIES

REF: TRIPOLI 1945

1. WE SEE LARGE OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO OIL TO BE THE FOLLOWING:

(A) IN SHORT TERM, TO GAIN AT LEAST LIMITED ACCESS TO ITS OWN CRUDE SUPPLIES IN ORDER TO START LNOC IN BUSINESS ON THE ALGERIAN PATTERN;

(B) TO DETERMINE RATES OF OIL PRODUCTION YIELDING MAXIMUM ECONOMIC BENEFITS LIBYA CAN ABSORB OVER TIME. BEYOND SUCH RATES, LIBYANS MAY BELIEVE OIL IS WORTH MORE TO THEM IN THE GROUND THAN IN THE PIPELINE. GIVEN LIBYA'S VERY LARGE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES, IT HAS AN INTEREST IN CONSERVATION AS A POSITIVE, NOT NEGATIVE GOAL.

(C) OVER LONGER TERM, TO GAIN NATIONAL CONTROL OVER OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS OF LESSEN-

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ING FOREIGN VISIBILITY AND LIBYAN DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGNERS.
IN ACHIEVING THIS, LARG WILL PROBABLY MOVE TOWARDS SOME
DEGREE OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN PRODUCING COMPANIES.

2. WE WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY COMMENTS ON FOREGOING.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION WE SEE PRESENT POSTED PRICE NEGOTIA-
TIONS NOT AS THE ULTIMATE ISSUE AND BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICI-
PATE FURTHER LIBYAN MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF ITS OBJECT-
IVES OUTLINED ABOVE. QUESTION OF JOINT VENTURES HAS ALREADY
ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH SERVICE COMPANIES. WE TEND
TO AGREE WITH BECHTEL MANAGEMENT'S ASSESSMENT THAT LEAST
UNSATISFACTORY COURSE IS TO AGREE TO JOINT VENTURES WHERE
ECONOMIC COUNTER-ARGUMENTS ARE NOT OVERWHELMING. IT WILL
BE IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS IN
LIBYA, AS WELL AS TO BROADER STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN-
CLUDING THE POSITION OF US OIL COMPANIES IN MARKETING AND
DISTRIBUTION PATTERNS IN EUROPE AND EUROPE'S OWN NEED FOR
SECURE SOURCES OF CRUDE, THAT AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES AND
LARG ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS WHERE THEY
REASONABLY CAN.

4. WE WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF WHAT SPECIFIC
MOVES THE LIBYANS MAY TAKE IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WITH RESPECT
TO AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS (E.G. PIPELINES, PORTS, NATIONALIZA-
TION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES, ETC.) AND ANY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS EMBASSY MAY HAVE AS TO HOW WE DEAL WITH LIBYAN MOVES
AND AMERICAN OIL COMPANY REACTIONS.

JOHNSON

05/10/90



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INFO OCT-01 /046 R

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APPROVED BY S/S:RCBREWSTER
OC/T:WNAEHER

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WHITE HOUSE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 128252

EXDIS


SUBJECT: LATERAL TRANSMISSION OF NODIS TELEGRAMS

REF: STATE'S 127226, TEL AVIV'S 4207, AND STATE'S 127434

1. DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH TEL AVIV'S REFTEL THAT ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD HAVE CAPACITY TO TRANSMIT LATERALLY NODIS MESSAGES AMONG THEMSELVES WITHOUT NEED FOR WASHINGTON RE-ENCRYPTION.
2. DEPARTMENT IS SENDING NECESSARY CRYPTO MATERIALS TO AMMAN, CAIRO, AND TEL AVIV TO PROVIDE NODIS CAPABILITY. THESE CRYPTO MATERIALS SHOULD BE RECEIVED AT LATTER THREE POSTS BY TUESDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST 11. MOSCOW AND USUN WILL RECEIVE NODIS CABLES VIA DEPARTMENT RELAY WITHOUT SUPER-ENCRYPTION. ROGERS

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DRAFTED BY: EUR:SOV: A DUBS
APPROVED BY: NEA: JOSEPH: J. SISCO
S/S: MR. CURRAN
EUR: MR. DAVIES

R 101752Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 148073

EXDIS

REF: STATE 143328

SUBJECT: SOVIET APPROACHES TO IRAQ AND JORDAN

1. SOVIET CHARGE VORONTSOV CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO SEPTEMBER 9 TO REPORT THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD MADE APPROACHES IN AMMAN AND BAGHDAD REGARDING SITUATION IN JORDAN. (THESE APPROACHES PRESUMABLY MADE IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST THAT SOVIETS INTERCEDE WITH IRAQIS -- REFTEL.)

2. READING FROM RUSSIAN NOTES, VORONTSOV SAID FOLLOWING REPRESENTATIONS HAD BEEN MADE IN AMMAN AND BAGHDAD BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TODAY: QUOTE CONCERN HAS BEEN CREATED IN MOSCOW BY INFORMATION THAT THE SITUATION IN JORDAN HAS BECOME AGGRAVATED IN RECENT DAYS. THIS CONCERN IS CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT A FRATRICIDAL FIGHT AMONG ARABS COULD CAUSE HEAVY DAMAGE

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'70 SEP 10 PM 9:36

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 148073

TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS, FIRST OF ALL, AND, SECONDLY, TO THE CAUSE OF ESTABLISHING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THIS CASE, ADVANTAGES COULD ONLY ACCRUE TO THE ENEMIES OF THE ARAB NATIONS, THE ISRAELI AGGRESSORS AND THE IMPERIALIST FORCES BEHIND THEM. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT APPEALS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAQ AND JORDAN TO DEMONSTRATE FARSIGHTEDNESS AND REASONABLE RESTRAINT SO THAT AN END CAN BE BROUGHT TO THE DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDAN. A FURTHER AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY WORSEN THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH IS ALREADY COMPLICATED ENOUGH. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT WAYS WILL BE FOUND TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN BY PEACEFUL MEANS. THIS WILL BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE ARAB NATIONS AND CAUSE NO DAMAGE TO THE UNIFICATION OF ARAB STATES, THE FIGHT FOR LIQUIDATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND THE SECURING OF THE NATIONAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL PROGRESS BY THE ARAB NATIONS. END QUOTE

3. SISCO REPLIED THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED BY THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. WE ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED BY IRAQI SUPPORT OF THE FEDAYEEN. THE PRESENCE OF IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN POSES SPECTER OF THEIR DIRECT INTERVENTION IN THAT COUNTRY. U.S. HOPES THAT THIS PRIVATE SOVIET MESSAGE TO IRAQIS WILL HELP TO UNDERSCORE DESIRABILITY OF RESOLVING SITUATION IN JORDAN PEACEFULLY. WE HOPE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL WILL BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION, DESPITE USE OF SOME QUESTIONABLE LANGUAGE.

GP-3. ROGERS

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6/11/10 5190

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 124298

47
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66609
DRAFTED BY: NEA:AL ATHERTON
APPROVED BY: NEA:AL ATHERTON
NEA:MR. SISCO (DRAFT)
S/S: M LEVITSKY

2/3

072089

70 AUG 3 AM 8:32

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

0 011904Z AUG 70 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET STATE 124298

EXDIS

1. WE NOTE ARAB PUBLIC COMMENT (E.G., FON MIN ATALLAH'S STATEMENT ABOUT U. S. INITIATIVE BEING STILLBORN) TO EFFECT THAT ISRAELI REPLY IS CONDITIONAL, GOES BEYOND TERMS OF OUR PROPOSAL AND RESOLUTION 242, ETC.

2. WE RECOGNIZE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PUBLIC POSTURING AND BELITTILING OF EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS BY BOTH SIDES IS INEVITABLE AT THIS TIME. YOU SHOULD, HOWEVER, GET FOLLOWING POINTS ACROSS TO HOST GOVTS IN MANNER AND AT LEVEL YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE: (A) WHATEVER ISRAELIS MAY SAY PUBLICLY, FACT IS THAT GOI CABINET VOTED TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL, AT COST OF SPLIT WITHIN GOVT. (B) ON BASIS INFO RECEIVED SO FAR, WE INTERPRET THIS AS AGREEMENT TO OBSERVE CEASEFIRE AND ENTER DISCUSSIONS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES ON BASIS OF LANGUAGE IN REPORT

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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 124298

FROM JARRING TO SYG WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED, SO LONG AS UAR AND GOJ DO LIKEWISE. IT NOT SURPRISING THAT ISRAELIS SHOULD AT SAME TIME RESERVE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS JUST AS EGYPTIANS AND JORDANIANS HAVE DONE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS MOMENT TO PRESS FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS AND HAVE, FOR EXAMPLE, REFRAINED FROM PRESSING GOJ FOR GREATER PRECISION RE APPLICABILITY OF CEASEFIRE TO FEDAYEEN DESPITE FACT MANY HAVE INTERPRETED JORDANIAN REPLY AS CONDITIONAL IN THIS RESPECT. (C) WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH UAR AND GOJ WHEN DETAILED ISRAELI REPLY RECEIVED, PROBABLY EARLY NEXT WEEK. MEANWHILE WE URGE ALL CONCERNED TO RESERVE JUDGMENTS AND AVOID STATEMENTS OR POSITIONS THAT COULD MAKE PRESENT DELICATE PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THIS IS TIME FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY.

GP3.
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NO VMC 3 VM 8:35
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TELEGRAM

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TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

SECRET 400

PAGE 01 STATE 116105

81

ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 AID-28
ACDA-19 /141 R

66645

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN PJGRIFFIN
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN TALCOTT W SEELYE
NEA/IAI MR MUNN
NEA/UAR MR STERNER

119758

R 202154Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK


S E C R E T STATE 116105

SUBJECT: INCREASED FEDAYEEN-JAA COOPERATION

REFERENCE: TEL AVIV 3744

1. MAJOR ZU'BI (PROTECT) MEMBER OF VISITING JAA ARMS
NEGOTIATING TEAM, COMMENTED TO DEPTOFF THAT, WHILE HE
NOT CONVERSANT WITH FULL DETAILS OF RECENTLY CONCLUDED
GOJ-FEDAYEEN COEXISTENCE AGREEMENT, HE ASSUMES PACT WILL
ALLOW COMMANDOS GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION IN CONDUCTING
OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. SPECIFICALLY, HE THOUGH
THAT AS RESULT OF AGREEMENT WE WILL NOW WITNESS MUCH
CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN COMMANDOS AND FRONT-LINE
JORDANIAN UNITS, ESPECIALLY IN NORTHERN JORDAN VALLEY.
ALTHOUGH GOJ REALIZES THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENT CAN ONLY
LEAD TO INCREASE IN FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF IDF
ATTACKS WITH RESULTANT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES,

SECRET
48



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 116105

GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THIS PHILOSOPHICALLY AS PRICE THAT MUST BE PAID FOR EFFECTING REMOVAL OF ARMED FEDAYEEN FROM CITIES AND FOR REDIRECTING FEDAYEEN ENERGIES AWAY FROM UNDERMINING GOJ AND TOWARD FIGHTING ISRAEL. FROM WHAT ZU'BI SAID IT ALSO IMPLICIT GOJ EXPECTS THAT FEDAYEEN WILL SUFFER GREATER PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES AS RESULT IDF ATTACKS. ZU'BI SUGGESTED THAT GOJ ALSO HOPES DERIVE EXTRA BENEFIT FROM JAA-FEDAYEEN OPERATIONAL COOPERATION BY BEING IN POSITION CITE THIS AS PROOF GOVERNMENT FULLY HONORING ITS COMMITMENT OF SUPPORT FOR COMMANDO MOVEMENT.

2. IN REPLY DEPTOFF'S QUESTION, ZU'BI STATED HE UNCERTAIN WHETHER NEW AGREEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES SOUTH OF DEAD SEA AND IN AQABA REGION. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THERE CONSIDERABLE SEPCULATION IN AMMAN THROUGH JULY 12 (DATE HIS DEPARTURE) THAT KING PURPOSELY DID NOT RESTRICT FEDAYEEN FROM OPERATING IN THESE TWO SENSITIVE AREAS, AS HE HAD IN PAST, IN HOPE OF GIVING THEM ENOUGH ROPE LITERALLY TO HANG THEMSELVES. THUS, ATTACKS ON SDOM AND EILAT AREAS BY FEDAYEEN WOULD INVITE CERTAIN DESTRUCTIVE ISRAELI REPRISALS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SEIZURE OF AQABA, WHICH KING COULD THEN CITE TO ARAB LEADERS AS PROOF FEDAYEEN DOING MORE HARM THAN GOOD TO ARAB CAUSE. KING WOULD THEN SEEK PAN-ARAB SUPPORT FOR LONG AWAITED CRACKDOWN.

3. REQUEST EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF FOREGOING.

GP-3.
ROGERS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 706

PAGE 01 STATE 112920

42
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66605
DRAFTED BY: AFSMA; HAVILLAND; L/C: BOZEMAN
APPROVED BY: NEA; ALATHERTON
MA AND S: FTHEIBERGER
IDA/NESA: MR BILLINGS
SAFUSI: MR HILBERT
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
WHITE HOUSE: MR SAUNDERS
PM: CCHAPMAN
S/S: MR. BROWN

70 JUL 15 PM 11:32
2/3
SITTING ROOM

088424

P R 151827Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO CINCSTRIKE

S E C R E T STATE 112920

EXDIS

SUBJ: AVAILABILITY OF F-104 AIRCRAFT

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. YOU AUTHORIZED SUBMIT TO GOJ PROPOSAL FOR LETTER OF OFFER AS FOLLOWS: NINE (9) F-104A AIRCRAFT AT DOLS 786,672 EACH, TOTAL DOLS 7,080,048; ONE (1) F-104B AT DOLS 837,789, TOTAL MATERIEL COST DOLS 7,917,837. FIRST AIRCRAFT DELIVERY IN 15 TO 18 MONTHS FROM START OF USAF CONTRACT WITH FOLLOW ON DELIVERY OF ONE AIRCRAFT EVERY THREE WEEKS WITH FINAL DELIVERY IN APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS. THESE DELIVERY TIMES DO NOT INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION TIME.

2. YOU ARE ALSO AUTHORIZED TO INFORM GOJ THAT AT ADDITIONAL COST AND AT ITS OPTION DELIVERY TIME CAN BE REDUCED TO 12 MONTHS. LETTER OF OFFER IN THIS INSTANCE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 112920

AS FOLLOWS: NINE (9) F-104A AIRCRAFT AT DOLS 806,672 EACH, TOTAL DOLS 7,260,048; ONE (1) F-104B AT DOLS 857,789, TOTAL MATERIEL COST DOLS 8,117,837. FIRST AIRCRAFT DELIVERY IN 12 MONTHS FROM START OF USAF CONTRACT WITH FOLLOW ON DELIVERY OF ONE AIRCRAFT EVERY 3 WEEKS WITH FINAL DELIVERY IN APPROXIMATELY THE 19TH MONTH. THESE DELIVERY TIMES DO NOT INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION TIME. INCREASED COSTS PER PLANE ARE FOR OVERTIME WORK TO ACCELERATE DELIVERY.

3. IN ADDITION TO MATERIEL COST, THERE WILL BE A CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION CHARGE OF DOLS 158,356.74 FOR THE NORMAL SCHEDULE (PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE) AND DOLS 167,157 FOR THE ACCELERATED SCHEDULE (PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE). AIRCRAFT TRANSPORTATION COSTS ARE ESTIMATED AT DOLS 350,000. TOTAL IN ADDITION TO ABOVE.

4. THE ABOVE QUOTED PRICES ARE VALID ONLY THROUGH 1 AUGUST 1970. STANDARD CONDITIONS ON REVERSE SIDE OF LETTER OF OFFER (FORM DD1513) SHALL APPLY.

5. ALTHOUGH ORIGINAL LETTER OF OFFER INCLUDED ONE SPARE ENGINE TO SUPPORT THE ASSEMBLY LINE, THIS IS NO LONGER REQUIRED BECAUSE USAF INVENTORY OF J-79-11 ENGINES NOW ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT.

6. THE USAF WILL PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE LETTER OF OFFER UPON BEING ADVISED OF WHICH SCHEDULE IS REQUIRED BY GOJ. PLEASE NOTE PARAGRAPH 4.


7. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE FOREGOING WITH THE JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS TEAM DUE TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON 14 JULY IF THE JORDANIANS SO DESIRE.

GP-3.
ROGERS

28 JUL 70 01 30 PM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 324

PAGE 01 STATE 109620

84
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66644
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: SEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA: SISCO
NEA/RA: BUNTE
PM/MAS: SPIERS
OSD/ISA: PRANGER SUBS
WHITEHOUSE: KISSINGER
S/S: BROWN
NEA: ATHERTON
THE ACTING SECRETARY

170 JUL 10 AM 8:00
02/3

053756

P R 100014Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO CINCSTRIKE

S E C R E T STATE 109620

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDANIAN ARMS PACKAGE

1. YOU AUTHORIZED INFORM JORDANIANS THAT WE PREPARED RECEIVE JORDANIAN MILITARY TEAM JULY 13 OR ANYTIME THEREAFTER FOR PURPOSE COMPLETING FORMALITIES RELATING TO 1970 ARMS PACKAGE.

2. FYI. YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND, WITHOUT INFORMING GOJ, THAT WE ARE AGREEING TO MOVE AHEAD ON ARMS PACKAGE ON CONDITIONAL BASIS. WE ARE DOING SO MAINLY IN ORDER AVOID ANY ACTIONS WHICH COULD PREJUDICE ARAB REACTIONS TO OUR CURRENT POLITICAL INITIATIVE. ALSO WE DO NOT WISH TO ADD TO KING'S PROBLEMS IN HOLDING HIS OWN IN FACE OF MOUNTING PRESSURES, AND WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR FAILURE FULFILL OUR COMMITMENT MIGHT INDUCE HIM TO TURN TO SOVIETS. HOWEVER, WE SHALL MONITOR DELIVERY SCHEDULES CLOSELY AND IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE, WILL RETAIN OPTION TO CUT OFF

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PAGE 02 STATE 109620

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TELEGRAM

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1970 SEP 24 PM 3 07

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
170 SEP 24 PM 5:04

O 241830Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1521
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3497
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5150

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

SUBJ AMB-KING MEETING

1. IN AMB'S CONVERSATION WITH KING THIS MORNING, KING EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT FOR SUPPORT. HE, GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT AND TO PM GOLDA MEIR FOR EFFECTIVE SPOOKING OPERATION AS EFFECTIVE AND MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

2. WISHES TO PASS THIS TO ISRAELIS AND SAY TO MRS. MEIR HE VERY GRATEFUL BUT DOES NOT NOW NEED ASSISTANCE OFFERED. PLANS COMMUNICATE WITH PRESIDENT AND WITH HER TOMORROW.
GP3

BROWN

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NND 11-86/15158 Per Ltr. 2/24/2016
By RJW/H NARA, Date 10/19/2016



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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WH

SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
SEP 24 AM 11:30

Control: 6176Q
Recd: 24Sep70
9:07 a.m.

Z 241250Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1516
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5140

LIMDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

REF: AMMAN 5132

1. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DELIVERED BY ME TO KING. HM'S
REPLY BEING TRANSMITTED VIA BRITISH CHANNELS.
BROWN
BT

Note: Relayed White House by OC/T.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 24 AM 11:38

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1970 SEP 24 AM 8 49

Z 241230Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1515
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5139

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

REF: STATE 154482; AMMAN REPLY - REF NO. NOT AVAILABLE HERE

1. FOLLOWING PASSED OPEN RADIO CONVERSATION BETWEEN AMB AND DCM AND COMMUNICATION SOMEWHAT INHABITED BY THIS. HOWEVER, QUITE CONFIDENT WILL REPRESENT ACCURATELY MESSAGE AMB WISHES CONVEYED.
2. AMB DISCUSSED SUBJECT REFTELS WITH HM THIS MORNING. KING WOULD PREFER A DIFFERENT SOLUTION NOT RPT NOT INVOLVING STATIONING OF US SPECIALISTS AT HIS END. UK PRESENTLY HAS COMMO LINK TO KING PROVIDING SOME SECURITY VIA MECHANICAL DEVICE BOTH ENDS. KING WOULD PREFER SIMILAR LINK TO US EVEN IF LESS SECURE AND LIMITED TO LINE OF SIGHT.
3. KING SEES MANY PROBLEMS OUR PROPOSAL, INCLUDING POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT IF ARRANGEMENTS BECAME KNOWN. HE WOULD FEEL OBLIGED KEEP AMERICAN OPERATOR IN EXTREMELY CONFINED CIRCUMSTANCES WITH VIRTUALLY NO CONTACT LOCAL COMMUNITY OR EVEN WITHIN PALACE. HE CONCLUDES THAT IF A LESS SECURE MECHANICAL SYSTEM AS ABOVE NOT AVAILABLE WOULD LIKE SYSTEM OFFERED REFTEL ON STRICTLY SHORT RPT SHORT TERM BASIS AND UNDER ABOVE RESTRICTIONS.
4. AMB RECOMMENDS THAT IF AVAILABLE WE PROVIDE LESS SECURE SYSTEM NOT INVOLVING US OPERATOR JORDANIAN END, ON ASSURANCE KING WOULD PROVIDE THOROUGHLY RELIABLE MAN ON HIS END OF LINK. AMB RECOGNIZES THAT WHILE PROVIDING SOME SECURITY AGAINST LOCAL LISTENERS, SUCH SYSTEM UNDOUBTEDLY NOT SECURE AGAINST SOVIETS AND SIMILAR LISTENERS. BRIS OPERATING THIS ASSUMPTION NOW. IF NOT SUCH ALTERNATIVE AVAILABLE AND WE PROCEED SHORT-TERM WITH SYSTEM REFTEL. AMB REPEATS REQUEST THAT OPERATOR OUR END BE DUAL CAPABLE, I.E., ALSO ABLE SHARE WORK OF TELECOMM.

BORWN

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NW11-86/15159 Per Hqs 2/24/2016
By R. W. MATH NARA, Date 10/19/2016



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TELEGRAM

68080
SEP 23 5:09 PM 1970
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
70 SEP 23 PM 9:24

Z 232145Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1501
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5114

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

REF STATE 156384

SUBJ SYRIAN THREAT

25X1

1. HAVE TALKED TO RIFAI COUPLY OF TIMES DURING DAY. HE HAS NOT MENTIONED SUBJECT. IN MID-AFTERNOON HE TOLD EMBOFF [] THAT SYRIANS RETREATING TO NORTH. WHEN I LAST TALKED TO HIM LATE IN AFTERNOON, WE DISCUSSED ONLY EVA-CUATIONKKF AMCITS.

25X1

2. COMBINATION OF JORDANIAN GUTS WHEN FACED WITH HEAVY ODDS AND SYRIAN HESITATION WHEN FACED WITH DETERMINED FOE, OBJECTION OF SOVIETS, THREATS OF INTERVENTION HAVE CHANGED SITUATION. UNLESS SYRIANS RE-GROUP AND RETURN TO ATTACK OR SOME OTHER UNFORESEEN EVENT HAPPENS, I THINK WE ARE OFF HOOK AND WOULD RECOMMEND THAT UP REST ON LAURELS. AS I SAID EARLIER TODAY TO RIFAI, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SEEMS TO HAVE SPOOKED SYRIANS. HE AGREED.

BROWN

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9/23/70

State Dept. review completed

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W 12
TELEGRAM

Z 221840Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1462
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3464
BT

Control: 5581Q
Recd 22Sep70
3:31 p.m.

70 SEP 22 PM 6:54
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5065

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

1. RIFAI CALLED ME AT 2015. WE DOUBLE-TALKED AGAIN BUT JUST TO MAKE SURE THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS WHAT DOUBLE-TALK MEANS I AM QUOTING EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID.
2. REFERRING TO KING HE SAID, "HE PREFERS ACTION FROM UP HIGH. IF ANYTHING IS TO BE DONE DOWN LOW IT SHOULD NOT BE HERE BUT AWAY. WE AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS DETAILS. WE WILL DISCUSS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL BE."
3. DISCUSSION OF DETAILS MEANS TALK WITH ABOUT ISRAELIS.
4. RIFAI SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT OF SUDAN, THE PRIME MINISTER OF TUNISIA, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT AND THE UAR CHIEF OF STAFF HAD ARRIVED BY AIR AT MAFRAK. THEY ARE ON THEIR WAY BY CAR TO SEE OHE KING.
5. RIFAI WAID IT IS IMPORTANT FOR USG TO KEEP UP PRESSURES IT HAS ALREADY ASSERTED. I REPLIED THAT I WAS GRATIFIED TO LEARN THAT JORDAN UNDERSTOOD WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THIS PART OF WORLD.
6. RIFAI SAID PRINCIPAL AIM MUST BE TO GET THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. IF THEY STAY, IT WILL COMPLICATE EVEN FURTHER THE JOB THAT GOVERNMENT HAS IN AMMAN. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, HE CONCLUDED IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WILL GIVE IRAQIS IDEA THAT THEY TOO CAN GET AWAY WITH SOMETHING IN JORDAN.

BROWN

BT

Note: Relayed White House by CC/T.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

DLV 11-86/15160 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS/WLL NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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Z 221710Z SEP 70

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE FLASH

Z 221620Z SEP 70

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1458

INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3462

BT

S E C R E T AMMAN 5061

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

SUBJ: SYRIAN THREAT

1. UNABLE TO ARRANGE PRIVATE MEETING. IN TELCON USING DOUBLE TALK ALL THE WAY I TOLD RIFAI THAT I NEEDED ANSWER TO URGENT QUESTION AND THAT I WANTED HIM TO REFER IT TO KING IMMEDI

TELY

AND GET BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME. I SAID IT WAS ISRAELI BELIEF THAT AIR ATTACK ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO DO THE JOB. I ALSO SAID THAT ISRAELIS STILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE MATTER WITH JORDANIANS.

2. HE SAID HE AGREED THAT SUBJECT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN A DIRECT MEETING. (THIS IS HIS OPINION.)

3. I SAID THTE OTHER DAY WE HAD DISCUSSED GROUND AND AIR ATTACK. HE HAD SAID THAT ISRAELI AIR ATTACK WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT GROUND ATTACK SHOULD BE ELSEWHERE THAN JORDAN. HE SAID THIS WAS STILL CASE. I REPLIED THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION TO FIND OUT WHAT HM THOUGHT ABOUT THIS PROBEEM, THAT I WOULD LIKE HIM TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND THEN TO GET BACK TO ME.

4. HE SAID HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH KING SOONEST. ALSO SAID HE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING WITH MILITARY HOW TO GET SAFE TRANSPORT IN TO AND BACK TO EMBASSY.

5. I DID NOT BELABOR HIM WITH OTHER MATTERS OTHER THAN TO SAY (A) THANKS FOR GETTING JOURNALISTS OUT SAFELY, (B) WE HAVE TWO DAYS OF FUEL AND THEN WE ARE OUT OF COMMISSION. WHEN HE SAID GOJ COULD NOT LET LATTER HAPPEN, I SAID IT WAS UP TO HIM TO HELP US.

BROWN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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12

O 221438Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1452
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5052

5 5 0 7 Q
1970 SEP 22 AM 11 04

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

REF: STATE 154482

1. NSA OFFER IS VERY TEMPTING AFTER FRUSTRATIONS OF THIS PAST WEEK. RIGHT NOW WE ARE TRYING TO SLIM DOWN STAFF TO BARE MINIMUM.

2. YOU WILL NOTE I AM REQUESTING EXTRAS [REDACTED] COULD ONE OF PROPOSED OPERATORS BE EMPLOYED AS FULL-TIME [REDACTED] IS SO, PROPOSITION IS MORE THAN ATTRACTIVE.

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BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

State Dept. review completed

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WTS 10
TELEGRAM

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SECRET

Z 221205Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1446
RUQMV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3457

5 4 5 6 Q
1970 SEP 22 AM 8 22

BT
SECRET AMMAN 5045

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

SUBJ: SYRIAN THREAT

1. GOT THROUGH TO RIFAI AT 1355 LOCAL. SAID WE HAD TO GET TOGETHER AS I DID NOT THINK WE COULD DOUBLE-TALK SUBJECT.

2. HE WILL TRY TO ARRANGE TRANSPORT.

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NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9/22/70.

70 SEP 22 AM 9:43
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM



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TELEGRAM

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0 220722Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1435
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3449
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5032

CN-5405
Sept. 22, 1970
4:10 a.m.

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

REF STATE 155202

1. BEFORE I APPROACH KING, WHICH I WILL TRY TO DO THIS MORNING, WOULD LIKE TO KNOW STATE PLAY WITH BRITISH. HOW FAR ALONG HAVE THEY BEEN BROUGHT?
2. IN MY MIND OF COURSE, IS THOUGHT THAT JOINT US/UK APPROACH TO KING WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE.
3. NOTE THAT I HAVE NOT INCLUDED LONDON AS ADDRESSEE.

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BROWN
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

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70 SEP 22 AM 8:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET



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SECRET

70 SEP 22 AM 8:55
TELEGRAM
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Z 210850Z SEP 70 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1407
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3424
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4997

CN-5386
Sept 22, 1970
12:55 a.m.

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

DEPT PASS LONDON FLASH

REF: STATE 154448

SUBJECT: SYRIAN THREAT

1. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT BEST CHANNEL FOR GETTING CONTINUOUS AND UP-TO-DATE INFO ON GROUND SITUATION WOULD BE THROUGH BRITISH. I HAVE ONLY TWO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION:

A. RADIO-PHONES FROM HOUSES. HERE PALACE CAN SEND MESSENGER. MESSENGER GOES TO HOUSE. HOUSE PHONES ME. BUT THIS MORNING FEDAYEEN WERE AGAIN ON LINE SAYING IN ENGLISH, "HELLO, HELLO KING HUSSEIN. THIS IS AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HOW IS PRINCE MOHAMMAD?" THIS NOT VERY GOOD.

B. TELEPHONE AT OTHER END OF COMPOUND. THIS PHONE CAN GET ME THROUGH TO PALACE. IT'S A CERTAIN DISTANCE AWAY OVER SOMEWHAT OPEN SPACE. I DO NOT MIND RUNNING BACK AND FORTH BUT, OF COURSE, PHONE IS PROBABLY AS INSECURE AS RADIO-PHONE. CONNECTION IS NOT TOO GOOD ANYWAY.

2. BRITISH HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET BACK AND FORTH TO KING WITH SOME DIFFICULTY ALTHOUGH AT TIMES PALACE CANNOT REACH THEM.

3. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT BRITISH AMBASSADOR BE DESIGNATED AS JOINT COLLECTOR AND THIS FACT BE MADE KNOWN TO KING SOONEST. IT WILL PREVENT DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS AND POSSIBLE CONFUSION.

4. I AM AWAITING CALL FROM RIFAI. IF HE DOES NOT PHONE SOON I WILL TRY TO RAISE HIM. HOPE TO HAVE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT TO SAY ABOUT PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE.

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NOTE: NOT PASSED LONDON BY OC/T.

NOTE: DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION.

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O 170615Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1275
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4852

INCN: 4 0 8 2Q
SEPTEMBER 17, 1970
2:31 A.M.

NODIS

REF STATE 152449

DEEPLY APPRECIATE REFTTEL AND WILL CARRY OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
AT THIS MOMENT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE ANYWHERE IN TOWN
BECAUSE OF CONSTANT AND HEAVY FIRING.


BROWN

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70 SEP 17 AM 8:50
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 751

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84
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66645
DRAFTED BY:NEA:RALONG
APPROVED BY:NEA RODGER P DAVIES
NEA ALATHERTON
S/S W.LLOYD

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R 140009Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT ALGIERS
USINT KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

S E C R E T STATE 111811

EXDIS

SUBJECT: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT, JULY 3-10

1. ARAB-ISRAEL: UAR IMPROVIES AIR DEFENSE IN CANAL ZONE

ISRAEL CLAIMS SOVIET AIR DEFENSE MISSILES HAVE BEEN
EMPLACED WITHIN RANGE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND ALLEGES
THAT SOVIET PERSONNEL ARE PROBABLY GIVING DIRECT GUIDANCE
IF NOT OPERATIONAL SUPPORT TO THE SYSTEMS. WITHOUT

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COMMENTING IN DETAIL, THE DEPARTMENT'S SPOKESMAN HAS SAID WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISRAELI INFORMATION. WE ARE RAISING THIS QUESTION AGAIN WITH THE SOVIETS IN STRONG TERMS. A MAJOR ISRAELI PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE SOVIET THREAT. AN ISRAELI EMBASSY "POLICY BACKGROUND" PAPER WARNED THAT A CONTINUING "PASSIVE" RESPONSE TO SOVIET MOVES MIGHT BRING SOVIET PILOTS TO "THE CANAL ZONE PROPER AND BEYOND." AN EARLY DETERMINED ISRAELI MOVE TO NEUTRALIZE THE NEW MISSILE COMPLEX CANNOT BE RULED OUT. (SECRET)

2. PRESIDENT NIXON'S JULY 1 TV APPEARANCE

PUBLIC REACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT HAVE BEEN STRONG. THE ISRAELI REACTION HAS BEEN ONE OF NEAR EUPHORIA, COMPENSATING SOMEWHAT FOR THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGING MILITARY PICTURE ALONG THE CANAL. ARAB REACTIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE BEEN CRITICAL, REFLECTING A FEAR THAT U.S. POLICY HAS TAKEN A MAJOR SHIFT TOWARD ISRAEL. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. ARAB-ISRAEL: MAJOR POWER SETTLEMENT EFFORTS

AT THE DEPUTIES' MEETINGS THIS WEEK, THE U.S. MADE CLEAR WE HOLD TO THE DEPUTIES' MANDATE NOT TO NEGOTIATE NEW POSITIONS. IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL OMITTING REFERENCE TO "MINOR RECTIFICATIONS", WE WOULD HAVE TO CALL FOR AGREEMENT ON THE EXISTING U.S. BOUNDARIES LANGUAGE RATHER THAN CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO COOPERATE IN FINDING "COMMON DENOMINATOR" FORMULATIONS. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE BACKED OFF, SAYING "MINOR RECTIFICATIONS" MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE, SEEKING A DEFINITION OF THE TERM, AND REQUESTING WRITTEN COMMENTS ABOUT SHARM AL-SHAYKH AND SYRIA. (SECRET/EXDIS)

4. ARAB-ISRAEL: U.S. INITIATIVE

THERE HAVE BEEN NO OFFICIAL RESPONSES SO FAR TO OUR INITIATIVE, WHICH HAS CLEARLY BEEN A MAJOR SUBJECT FOR

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DISCUSSION DURING NASSER'S MOSCOW VISIT. MEANWHILE, WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REASSURE THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND SOVIETS THAT WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO SIDETRACK THE MAJOR POWER TALKS OR THE LATEST SOVIET PEACE LANGUAGE, BUT RATHER SEE OUR INITIATIVE AS SUPPORTIVE OF THOSE TALKS. WE ATTACH PRIORITY AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, TO GETTING POSITIVE RESPONSES TO OUR INITIATIVE, SINCE WE BELIEVE THE MAJOR POWER EFFORTS CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND RELEVANT IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE IS A CEASEFIRE AND THE PARTIES HAVE BEGUN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. (SECRET/EXDIS)

5. PERSIAN GULF: IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF

DURING FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI'S VISIT TO KUWAIT (JULY 6-8), HE IMPRESSED UPON HIS HOSTS IRAN'S OPINION THAT THE BRITISH MUST NOT REVERSE THEIR DECISION TO LEAVE THE PERSIAN GULF, INFORMING THEM AT THE SAME TIME THAT IRAN "WOULD HELP ALL ITS FRIENDS BY COOPERATING WITH THEM ON MATTERS OF DEFENSE". THE COMMUNIQUE, HOWEVER, FAILED TO MENTION THEIR POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH IN THE GULF. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. FOR TEHRAN AND ADDIS ABABA: NE HIGHLIGHTS REPORT HAS BEEN SENT ON WEEKLY BASIS TO OTHER ADDRESSEES. DEPT. WELCOMES YOUR COMMENTS ON USEFULNESS THIS REPORT FOR YOUR PURPOSES.
ROGERS

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ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66632
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES
APPROVED BY: NEA JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN MR. KILLGORE
NEA/UAR MR. STERNER
NEA/MR. ATHERTON
S/S - O MR. EMMONS

70 AUG 20 AM 8:22
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

061810

R 200207Z AUG 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 135423

EXDIS

BU: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT SITUATION
IN JORDAN AND STATUS PEACE INITIATIVE

SUMMARY: DURING AUGUST 19 CALL JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF
TOLD ASST. SECTY. SISCO THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL

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ATMOSPHERE IN AMMAN OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORABLE TO KING'S ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE PROPOSALS. KING AND NASSER ALSO BEING SUPPORTED BY VAST MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK, GAZA AND WITHIN JORDAN. FEDAYEEN IN DISARRAY WITH NO LEADER INCLUDING ARAFAT IN POSITION PUBLICLY ACCEPT PEACE INITIATIVES. IN SHORT, MOST PALESTINIANS WISH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND JUSTICE FOR REFUGEES. ON THIS BASIS THEY AND OTHER ARABS WILLING WORK FOR PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH ISRAELIS ENVISAGING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ISRAELI-ARAB COEXISTENCE. SHARAF STATED FOR FIRST TIME ARABS BEGINNING BELIEVE US AT LAST PURSUING EVEN-HANDED POLICY IN AREA. ISRAELIS MUST NOW CLEARLY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAWAL IF PRESENT MOMENTUM IS TO BE MAINTAINED. SISCO POINTED OUT THIS ISRAELI COMMITMENT WAS GIVEN UPON THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE PROPOSAL, AT SAME TIME AS ARABS COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO RECOGNITION AND COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL. REALIZING PAINFUL DECISIONS LIE AHEAD FOR BOTH SIDES, US WILL PRESS FOR SOLUTION WHICH MEETS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. SISCO EMPHASIZED NEED FOR COMPLETE OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL AS WELL AS NEED FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY TO HANDLE ALLEGATIONS OF ANY VIOLATIONS. SHARAF INFORMED SISCO HE WOULD BE TEMPORARILY GO TO N.Y. WHILE FARRA ON TWO WEEKS' LEAVE. IN AUGUST 18 TALKS SHARAF SAID JARRING STATED HE INTENDS START TALKS USING PARAGRAPH B FROM PROPOSALS AND ON THAT BASIS MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DERIVED FROM VARIOUS PERTINENT UN RESOLUTIONS. SISCO AGREED THIS WISE APPROACH. SHARAF COMMENDED USG FOR ITS EFFORTS IN PRESENTING AND GAINING ACCEPTANCE OF ITS PEACE PROPOSALS WHICH MARK IMPORTANT TURNING POINT IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. END SUMMARY.

10 AUG 50 PM 8:55
STATE DEPT

1. ON AUGUST 19 JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR ABDUL HAMID SHARAF CALLED AT HIS REQUEST ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM VACATION AND CONSULTATIONS IN AMMAN.

2. IN RESPONSE TO MR. SISCO'S QUESTION CONCERNING MOOD AT HOME, SHARAF INDICATED THAT DECIDED IMPROVEMENT IN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN AMMAN IS NOW NOTICEABLE. THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT CASE, HOWEVER, WHEN HE RETURNED TO AMMAN IN LATE JUNE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING JUNE CRISIS. AT THAT TIME TENSION WAS STILL HIGH DESPITE

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FORMATION OF NEW CABINET WHICH WAS BROADLY BASED, REPRESENTATIVE AND WIDELY SUPPORTED AND WHOSE PURPOSE WAS TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL UNITY AT CRITICAL TIME IN JORDAN'S HISTORY. WHILE ALL AGREED IN AMMAN THAT KING HAD BEEN WISE IN NOT RPT NOT ALLOWING ARMY TO MOVE IN DURING CRISIS, IT WAS GENERALLY APPRECIATED THAT ARMY COULD HAVE EASILY CRUSHED FEDAYEEN. EVEN PALESTINIANS LIVING IN AMMAN TOLD HIM THAT ARMY SHOULD HAVE ENTERED CITY AND PUT END TO TERROR AND ANARCHY WHICH UNDISCIPLINED FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS WERE PERPETRATING. IN ANY EVENT THIS WAS TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE FOR PEOPLE OF AMMAN WHO AS RESULT RALLIED TO SUPPORT OF NEW GOVERNMENT AND KING.

3. SHARAF CONTINUED THAT NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE OF US PEACE PROPOSALS AS WELL AS THAT OF JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT CAME AT RIGHT MOMENT AND HAD IMMEDIATELY CALMING EFFECT ON THIS HIGHLY CHARGED ATMOSPHERE. WITH REGARD TO JORDANIAN ACCEPTANCE, SHARAF STATED THAT KING VERY ASTUTELY DID NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE FOUR CABINET DEBATES ON PEACE PROPOSALS. THUS, IT WAS CABINET DECISION INDEPENDENTLY AND UNANIMOUSLY ARRIVED AT INVOLVING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, EVENTUAL AGREEMENT BY SEVERAL MEMBERS OF CABINET WHO INITIALLY HAD BEEN STRONGLY OPPOSED. ONE NOW SENSES IN AMMAN FEELING OF REAL MOMENTUM AND DESIRE ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SOLUTION THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS. VAST MAJORITY AGREES THIS IS GENUINE OPPORTUNITY WHICH MUST BE SEIZED.

4. SHARAF NOTED THAT MANY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME THAT ALL PALESTINIANS OPPOSE PEACE INITIATIVES. THIS NOT RPT NOT CASE. RELIABLE REPORTS INDICATE THAT OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP AND IN JORDAN SUPPORT JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT'S ACCEPTANCE OF PEACE PROPOSALS ON UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WILL LEAD TO RETURN OF OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY AS WELL AS JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIANS ALONG LINES OF PERTINENT UN RESOLUTIONS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO SISCO'S QUESTION ABOUT ARAFAT'S EVENTUAL POSITION ON PEACE PROPOSALS, SHARAF EMPHASIZED THAT NEITHER ARAFAT NOR ANY LEADER OF EXISTING PALESTINIAN/FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS CAN SUPPORT CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVE AND SURVIVE. SHARAF ALSO EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IN

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HIS VIEW THESE ORGANIZATIONS NOT RPT NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, DESPITE WHAT WORLD PRESS SAYS TO CONTRARY. SHARAF OBSERVED THAT WHILE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT IS LEGITIMATE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, IT NOW FINDS ITSELF IN INHERENTLY TRAGIC SITUATION. IN EFFECT, IT CANNOT RPT NOT BE REALISTIC ABOUT PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WITHOUT LIQUIDATING ITS RAISON D'ETRE. FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP FULLY REALIZES, THEREFORE, THAT IF THE US PEACE PROPOSALS HAVE POSITIVE RESULTS, FEDAYEEN WILL EVENTUALLY FACE CONFLICT WITH OVERWHELMING FORCES OF UAR, JORDAN, US, USSR, AND ISRAEL. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THAT THEY ARE NOW CONFUSED, PANICKY, AND FEVERISHLY TRYING TO GAIN SUPPORT BOTH FROM AMONG PALESTINIANS AND FROM OTHER ARABS.

6. SHARAF CONTINUED THAT PALESTINIANS PARTICULARLY THOSE LIVING ON OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE MUCH MORE REALISTIC THAN FEDAYEEN. THEY REALIZE THAT WHILE LIBERATION OF THEIR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IS POSSIBLE, LIBERATION OF ALL OF "PALESTINE" HIGHLY UNLIKELY. THEREFORE, FOR THESE PALESTINIANS LIBERATION FROM ISRAELIS AND JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES CAN BE ACCEPTABLE BASIS UPON WHICH BUILD PEACEFUL SOLUTION INCLUDING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAELIS.

7. ARABS OUTSIDE OF JORDAN AND PARTICULARLY THOSE IN OUTLYING ARAB COUNTRIES DO NOT RPT NOT REALIZE DEPTH OF FEELING ON WEST BANK, GAZA AND AMONG PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN. IN THIS REGARD SHARAF REPORTED THAT PETITIONS HAVE COME TO KING FROM WEST BANK SUPPORTING HIM FOR HAVING ACCEPTED CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS. GOJ HAS NOW CONTACTED VARIOUS PEOPLE ON WEST BANK AND ASKED THEM TO WRITE DOWN WHAT THEY WISH. JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT INTENDS STUDY THESE AND AT APPROPRIATE TIME PUBLISH AND ACT ON THEM. OF COURSE, REFUGEES IN CAMPS ARE RAW MATERIAL FROM WHICH FEDAYEEN DERIVE THEIR STRENGTH. BUT NASSER HAS MORE STRENGTH AMONG THESE PEOPLE THAN DO FEDAYEEN, SYRIA OR IRAQ. FOR THIS REASON FEDAYEEN FEAR NASSER BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT EVEN MAJORITY REFUGEES SUPPORTS NASSER AND KING'S CURRENT EFFORTS. OBVIOUSLY, THERE IS HARD CORE WHICH WILL NEVER ACCEPT PEACEFUL SOLUTION. UNFORTUNATELY, UNTIL RECENTLY IT IS THIS HARD CORE WHICH HAS SET

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PACE, SHOUTED SLOGANS, AND ATTEMPTED SPEAK FOR PALESTINIANS. THIS GROUP, HOWEVER, CANNOT NOW OR EVER TAKE REASONABLE POSITION BECAUSE OF NEED TO OUTBID OTHERS WITHIN THEIR RANKS. IF CURRENT MOMENTUM GENERATED BY PEACE INITIATIVE CONTINUES, POPULAR SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO DIMINISH.

8. SISCO NOTED RECENT STATEMENT BY KING HUSSEIN REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN ENTITY. SHARAF CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAS BEEN TALK ALONG GENERAL LINES WITHIN GOJ ABOUT SUCH ENTITY AND CERTAINLY IN SHARAF'S VIEW THERE IS ADVANTAGE TO MAKING PUBLIC THESE KINDS OF PROPOSALS IN ORDER INDICATE TO PALESTINIANS THAT THERE ARE OPTIONS OPEN TO THEM OTHER THAN THOSE PROPOUNDED BY FEDAYEEN. SHARAF ADDED HE DOUBTED, HOWEVER, THAT IF GIVEN CHANCE PALESTINIANS ON WEST BANK AND GAZA WOULD OPT FOR SEPARATE ENTITY.

9. SHARAF CONTINUED THAT GOJ HAS BEEN REACTING IN LOW-KEY FASHION TO FEDAYEEN CHARGES OF GOJ COLLUSION WITH US FOR EVENTUAL LIQUIDATION OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. MEANWHILE THERE NOW MORE OPEN DEBATE IN AMMAN ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND INDICATIONS THAT MOST JORDANIANS FULLY APPRECIATE WHAT POLITICAL SOLUTION WILL EVENTUALLY MEAN, PARTICULARLY WITH REFERENCE TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL.

10. SHARAF NOTED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT WHICH HE OBSERVED DURING HIS STAY IN AMMAN WAS THAT FOR FIRST TIME US NOT RPT NOT BEING THOUGHT OF AS ENTIRELY IN ISRAELI CAMP. DESPITE DISCLAIMERS BY US OFFICIALS THAT US POLICY HAS NOT RPT NOT CHANGED, FOR ARABS AT LEAST IT NOW EVIDENT THAT US HAS BEGUN PURSUING MORE EVEN-HANDED POLICY. THUS, THERE IS MORE HOPE ABOUT AMERICA IN AREA. THIS HOPE GIVE MORE CREDIBILITY TO GOJ EFFORTS WHICH HAVE LONG TRIED TO COMBAT WHAT IS BASICALLY MARXIAN MYTH BEING PROPAGATED IN AREA THAT US IS AGAINST LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND OTHER PROGRESSIVE FORCES. IN THIS REGARD SHARAF MENTIONED THAT OVER PAST THREE YEARS IN ADDITION TO TRADITIONAL ARABIC WORD FOR COLONIALISM (ISTI'MAR) FOREIGN WORD IMPERIALISM (IMPERIALIYA) HAS ALSO INCREASINGLY BECOME IN VOGUE. THIS OBVIOUSLY RESULT OF MARXIST INFLUENCE WHICH HAS TRIED WITH SOME SUCCESS

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TO IDENTIFY US WITH BOTH OF THESE TWIN EVILS IN MINDS OF ARABS.

11. REAL PROBLEM NOW FACING UAR AND GOJ IS LINGERING SUSPICION ABOUT REAL CHANCES FOR PEACE. ALTHOUGH CURRENT MOMENTUM IN AMMAN AND ELSEWHERE IN ARAB WORLD HAS HELPED BOTH UAR AND GOJ, NASSER AND KING CANNOT COMMIT THEMSELVES FULLY TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION UNTIL THEY CERTAIN WHAT ISRAELIS WILL DO OR AT LEAST WHAT US WILL MAKE ISRAELIS DO. SHARAF SAID THAT WHILE MANY WITHIN GOJ BELIEVES US WANTS FAIR SOLUTION THEY MUST CONVINCE MANY MORE THAT THIS IS SO. MUCH WILL DEPEND, THEREFORE, ON DEVELOPMENTS OVER NEXT WEEKS AS TO ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL AND RIGHTS OF REFUGEES. EVEN REASONABLE ASSURANCES BY US ON THESE ISSUES WILL GO LONG WAY TO STRENGTHEN HAND OF KING AND NASSER. IF THESE ASSURANCES FORTHCOMING, THEN BOTH KING AND NASSER CAN COME OUT EVEN MORE CLEARLY AND STRONGLY AND THEREBY FURTHER UNDERCUT EXTREMIST APPEAL. ALREADY BOTH JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND NASSER HAVE SPOKEN OUT IN SURPRISINGLY STRONG TERMS, GIVEN STILL UNCLEAR PICTURE AS TO WHAT ISRAELI POSITIONS WILL BE.

12. SHARAF CONTINUED THAT IF ISRAELIS, HOWEVER, TRY TO BARGAIN IN THEIR USUAL COMMERCIAL WAY BY HOLDING THEIR CARDS CLOSELY, THIS WILL BE BAD TACTIC WITH ARABS WHO NURSE WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE REAL SENSE OF GRIVEVANCE. ISRAELI MUST INITIALLY MAKE CLEAR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW EITHER DIRECTLY OR AT LEAST INDIRECTLY THROUGH US.

13. SISCO POINTED OUT THAT ARABS ALREADY HAVE CLEAR COMMITMENT BY ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW SPELLED OUT IN US PEACE PROPOSALS. THOUGH, OF COURSE, FINAL BORDERS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED. THIS IS IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT IN HISTORY OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, FOR FIRST TIME ARAB SIDE HAS GIVEN AN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND ISRAELI SIDE HAS GIVEN EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF NEED TO WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. IN ADDITION ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO AGREED TO GET ON WITH INDIRECT TALKS AT OUTSET. THIS TOO, VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. US REALIZES PAINFUL DECISIONS NOW FACE BOTH SIDES IF PEACE IS TO BE ACHIEVED. NEITHER SIDE CAN EXPECT TO REALIZE THEIR RESPECTIVE MAXIMUM POSITIONS. ARABS KNOW WHAT

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OUR POSITION IS. PRESIDENT NIXON HAS PUBLICLY INDICATED THAT SOLUTION MUST RESULT IN MAP NOT RPT NOT TOO DIFFERENT THAN THAT EXISTING BEFORE JUNE WAR, IN OTHER WORDS, MAP BASED ON INSUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. US APPRECIATES DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE BRIDGED. US INTENDS, HOWEVER, PRESS AHEAD TO REACH SOLUTION WHICH MEETS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

14. SISCO INDICATED HE DEEPLY ENCOURAGED BY WHAT SHARAF TOLD HIM ABOUT CURRENT MOOD IN AREA. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT THIS IS OPPORTUNITY IN HISTORY OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES WHICH HAS BEEN GRASPED AND THAT ACCEPTANCE BY PARTIES CONCERNED OF US PEACE PROPOSAL HAS UNLEASED POSITIVE FORCES IN AREA, WHOSE MOMENTUM CAN NOW LEAD TO PEACE IF ALL PARTIES DO THEIR SHARE.

15. SHARAF AGREED THAT US PRESENTATION OF US PEACE PROPOSAL MARKED TURNING POINT IN HISTORY OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND COMMENDED USG AND SPECIFICALLY PRESIDENT, SECRETARY, AND SISCO FOR THEIR PERSONAL EFFORTS TO DEVELOP US PEACE PROPOSAL, TO NEGOTIATE SKILLFULLY ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND THEREBY TO HALT DANGEROUS DETERIORATION WHICH HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE IN AREA EARLIER THIS YEAR.

16. SISCO STATED THAT ENTIRE US CREDIBILITY NOW INVOLVED IN CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL. US REALIZES THERE HAVE BEEN SOME MINOR VIOLATIONS ON JORDAN-ISRAELI BORDER. WITHOUT GO'S FORMAL REQUEST WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD ISRAELIS THAT KING WILL DO WHAT HE CAN TO KEEP BORDER QUIET BUT THAT ISRAELIS MUST ALSO APPROACH SITUATION ON THAT BORDER IN SENSIBLE MANNER AND IN SPIRIT WHICH RECOGNIZES THAT BOTH SIDES WISH MAINTAIN CEASEFIRE. FOR ISRAELIS, OF COURSE, PRINCIPAL BELLWETHER OF GOU INTENTIONS WILL BE WHETHER (A) JAA JOINS IN ANY ATTACKS AND (B) REASONABLE EFFORT IS MADE TO INTERDICT ATTACKS.

17. SISCO CONTINUED THAT SITUATION ON UAR-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE LINE IS MUCH MORE CRITICAL AND DEEPLY DISTURBS USG. SISCO INFORMED SHARAF THAT USG INTENDED MAKE STATEMENT DURING AUGUST 19 NOON BRIEFINGS (COPY PASSED TO SHARAF; SEE SEPTELI FOR TEXT). SISCO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

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EMPHASIZED USG BELIEVES THERE MUST BE STRICT OBSERVATION OF STANDSTILL BY BOTH SIDES. ANYTHING GOV. COULD DO IN ITS TALKS WITH UAR TO EMPHASIZE NEED FOR SCRUPULOUS OBSERVATION OF STANDSTILL WOULD BE HELPFUL BECAUSE OTHERWISE ALL WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT UP COULD BE DESTROYED IN ONE FELL SWOOP. IN MEANTIME, IMPORTANT NOW IS TO GET TALKS STARTED.

18. CONCERNING STANDSTILL, SISCO ALSO INDICATED THAT USG DISTURBED SO MUCH PUBLICITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS. USG FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT BEST WAY FOR THIS MATTER TO BE ADMINISTERED IS THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS PERMITTING CALM STUDY AND EVALUATION BEFORE DECISIONS ARE MADE AS TO HOW THEY SHOULD BE HANDLED.

19. SISCO CITED HANDLING OF RECENT CHARGE MADE BY UAR THAT ISRAELI PLANES HAD VIOLATED UAR SPACE OVER SUEZ, AS EXAMPLE OF BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM OF VIOLATION. THIS CHARGE TRANSMITTED BY DIRECT PHONE CALL FROM USINT CAIRO TO WASHINGTON. WHILE USG WAS IN PROCESS OF STUDYING CHARGE, UAR INFORMED USG MISTAKE HAD BEEN MADE AND MAYOR OF SUEZ PUT OUT RETRACTION. INCIDENT RECEIVED LITTLE COVERAGE IN PRESS AND MATTER CLOSED TO SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED.

20. SISCO INDICATED USG DOES NOT RELISH MIDDLEMAN'S ROLE. IT UNDERSTANDS, HOWEVER, IT HAS INTEREST IN SEEING THAT CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE USG ONLY GOVERNMENT WHICH DRAFTED AND NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT AND WHICH KNOWS ALL ITS DETAILS. IN PLAYING THIS ROLE, QUIET DIPLOMACY IS VITAL. MOMENT CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS RELEASED TO PRESS ATTENDANT PUBLICITY RESTRICTS OPTIONS OPEN TO DIPLOMACY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON USG FELT THAT REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS TO UN SHOULD BE PERMISSIVE RATHER THAN MANDATORY IN HOPE THAT MOST OF THEM CAN BE HANDLED QUIETLY. THIS IS NEW APPROACH WHICH USG SINCERELY HOPES WILL BE GIVEN CHANCE TO WORK.

21. SHARAF INFORMED SISCO THAT IN ABSENCE OF JORDAN'S PERMANENT UN REPRESENTATIVE FARRA, HE WOULD BE GOING TO NEW YORK OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS, ALTHOUGH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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HE EXPECTS TO BE IN WASHINGTON MOST OF TIME. WHILE IN NEW YORK ON AUGUST 18, JARRING TOLD FARRA AND SHARAF THAT HE IS STILL AWAITING ISRAELI REPLY GIVING ISRAELI POSITION ON LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION, TIME, AND PLACE FOR TALKS. IN ABSENCE OF THIS REPLY JARRING SAID HE CAN DO NOTHING. JARRING DID NOT RPT NOT PRESS NEED FOR PRESENCE FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH HE OBVIOUSLY FAVORS IT. SHARAF SAID THAT FARRA AND HE INFORMED JARRING THAT GOU HAS NOTHING AGAINST EVENTUAL AND EARLY PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN TALKS, BUT BELIEVE CERTAIN PREPARATIONS MUST BE MADE PRIOR TO TALKS AT THAT LEVEL. ALTHOUGH GOU HAS SOME IDEAS, IT WAITING FOR JARRING. PRESENT HIS VIEWS INASMUCH AS JARRING ALREADY KNOWS GOU'S VIEWS.

2. SISCO INQUIRED IF JARRING INDICATED HOW HE INTENDED TO PROCEED. SHARAF SAID THAT JARRING APPARENTLY INTENDS START WITH PARAGRAPH B FROM PROPOSALS AND ON THAT BASIS MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DERIVED FROM VARIOUS PERTINENT UN RESOLUTIONS. SHARAF THOUGHT THIS WAS WISE APPROACH AND SISCO AGREED.

23. SHARAF CONTINUED THAT GOU WISHES GET DOWN TO CONCRETE PROPOSALS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. THESE PROPOSALS MUST FOCUS ON ISRAELIS WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AS WELL AS JUSTICE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES. IF TALKS ARE SUBJECTED TO EBAN'S RHETORIC AND SEMANTICS, NO PROGRESS WILL BE ACHIEVED. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAELIS WISH COEXISTENCE AND PEACE WITH ARABS THEY MUST BE CLEAR ON WITHDRAWAL AND ON REFUGEES. IN EXCHANGE, NASSER AND HUSSEIN ARE PREPARED WORK OUT TERMS OF COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL ON THESE TERMS. ISRAEL MUST UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT BEST GUARANTEE FOR COEXISTENCE WOULD BE IMPROVED PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN AREA. IF, HOWEVER, ISRAELIS INSIST ON PHYSICAL SECURITY OR ABSTRACT CONCEPT OF PEACE OR ABSOLUTE GUARANTEES, THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED. ISRAELIS CAN ONLY ASSURE INVIOABILITY OF THEIR BORDERS BY SATISFYING ARAB GRIEVANCES. IN ADDITION, NASSER AND HUSSEIN MUST HAVE A CLEAR ALTERNATIVE QUICKLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN PRESENT MOMENTUM IN AREA AND PERMIT DECISIVE ACTION AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 135423

24. IN CONCLUSION SHARAF AGAIN COMMENDED PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY AND SISCO FOR THEIR ROLE IN CURRENT PEACE INITIATIVE AND STATED THAT BASED ON RELIABLE INFORMATION SISCO'S VISIT TO CAIRO HAD BEEN IMPORTANT TURNING POINT WHICH HAD STARTED BALL ROLLING TO WHAT HOPEFULLY WILL RESULT IN A PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION. GP-3
ROGERS:

0215/10/5100



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

70 SEP 3 PM 1970
9:39
881Q
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

P 031855Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 913
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4299

NODIS

SUBJ: FRENCH INTEREST IN WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY
INTERVENTION IN JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 4241

1. COUNSELOR FRENCH EMBASSY BERNARD (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBOFF THAT GOF HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN POSSIBLE BIG FOUR COMMUNIQUE WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. GOF HE SAID WAS INSTRUCTING ITS UN REP (KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET) TO RAISE MATTER WITH OTHER REPS BIG FOUR IN NEW YORK.

2. BERNARD HAD HEARD FROM FRENCH EMBASSY MOSCOW THAT US HAD REQUESTED USSR TO WEIGH IN WITH IRAQIS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD, HE SAID, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO THE SAME.

BT

ODELL

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9/3/70

SECRET



Department of State

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

HAIG 7
TELEGRAM

SECRET 70 SEP 16 PM 7 13

CONTROL: 3992Q
RECD: SEP 16, 1970
6:29 P.M.

Z 162205Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO ECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1266
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4844

MODIS

1. RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT GOJ CABINET PRESENTLY IN SESSION TO DEBATE CURRENT CRISIS. KING'S INCLINATION IS TO MOVE VIGOROUSLY AGAINST FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT; CABINET'S IS LESS SO. TIMING BEING DISCUSSED AS EITHER DAYBREAK SEPT 17 OR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS LATER.
2. KING'S CONCERN CENTERS ON POSSIBLE INTERVENTION BY SYRIA ON SIDE OF FEDAYEEN. MORE REMOTE CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY IRAQI FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, CONTINGENCY PLANS BEING DISCUSSED. QUESTION BROACHED CONCERNING POSSIBLE AIR STRIKE SUPPORT FROM EITHER USG OR ISRAELIS SHOULD ARAB NEIGHBORS INTERVENE.
3. I REPLIED THROUGH SAME CHANNEL TO EFFECT THAT I HAVE BEEN IN COUNTRY ONLY THIRTY-SIX HOURS, BUT SINCE I HAVE JUST COME FROM WASHINGTON AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHERS. I DESIRE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KING TO DISCUSS PROBLEM POSED FOR GOJ BY FEDAYEEN. I ALSO SAID KING SHOULD BE MADE WELL AWARE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF REACHING DECISION ON QUESTION OF SUCH GRAVITY (COMMITMENT OF US FORCES) ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. MY MEETING WITH KING TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR MORNING SEPTEMBER 17.
4. I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THIS TO CONSTITUTE FORMAL REQUEST FOR US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AT THIS TIME.
5. EMBASSY COMMENTS FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

BROWN

BT



Department of State

WH

TELEGRAM

SECRET

12

O 221325Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1450
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3459
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5049

Control: 5505Q
Recd : 22Sep70
10:54 a.m.

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

SUBJ: ISRAELI AIR/LAND STRIKE

REF: STATE 155166

I NOTE FROM REFTTEL THAT USG RESPONSE TO FIVE OF SEVEN ISRAELI QUESTIONS HAS BEEN AFFIRMATIVE. THESE RESPONSES, MOREOVER, ARE PROBABLY THOSE IN WHICH GOI IS MOST INTERESTED. I WILL SEEK AN ANSWER TO REMAINING QUESTION - KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, I THINK IT USEFUL TO PROFER FOLLOWING VIEWS ON POSSIBLE IDF STRIKE AGAINST SYRIANS:

1. AT THIS POINT A MAJOR ATTACK BY IDF INTO JORDAN SEEMS LESS IMPERATIVE FROM STANDPOINT JORDAN'S SECURITY NEEDS. JAA IS NOW DOING BETTER AND I SUSPECT THAT GOVT INCREASINGLY OPTIMISTIC THAT SYRIAN THREAT CAN BE DISPOSED OF WITHOUT RESORT TO DRASTIC ISRAELI PURGE. JORDAN DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AIR STRIKE IS VITAL.
2. IF OPERATION CARRIED OUT, WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW SOME UNITS OF JAA IN AREA WOULD RESPOND TO MAJOR ISRAELI LAND INVASION. (AFTER ALL THESE YEARS, HOWEVER, JORDAN TOLERANCE TO AIRSTRIKES FAIRLY HIGH). SOME UNITS, AT LEAST, MIGHT DECIDE IDF THE GREATER THREAT; PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT IN NORTH JORDAN, THEREFORE, BETWEEN ISRAELIS ON ONE HAND AND JORDANIANS, SYRIANS (AND IRAQI SALAH AL-DIN DIVISION) CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED.
3. IF FIGHTING BECAME MORE GENERAL IN AREA, ISRAELIS MIGHT FEEL NEED TO EXPAND AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR FRONT. WHERE WE COULD GO AT THIS POINT IN TERMS OF REACTIONS OF UAR AND OTHER ARABS IS ANYONE'S GUESS. AT LEAST US ALLIES SUCH AS TUNIS, LEBANON AND MOROCCO WOULD COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. THE RESPONSE FROM RADICALS COULD BE HYSTERIA OR WAR, OR BOTH.
4. EVEN IF ISRAELI MOVE PROVES LIMITED IN SCOPE AND SUCCESSFUL, ITS AFTERMATH WOULD STRAIN KING'S PERSONAL STANDING WITH SUBJECTS AND FELLOW ARABS. ISRAEL'S ACTION WOULD CONFIRM IN

SECRET

-2- Amman 5049 dtd 22 Sep 70

Control: 5505Q

ARAB EYES LIBEL SPREAD BY RADICALS FOR TWENTY YEARS THAT JORDANIAN MONARCHY CRYPTO ZIONIST AT HEART. KING'S POSITION WITH ARMY WOULD BE WEAKENED AND HE WOULD BE MORE VULNERABLE TO CAMPAIGN OF VILIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM EVERY RADICAL QUARTER IN ARAB WORLD. FEW ARABS, FURTHERMORE, WOULD RALLY TO HIS SIDE.

5. I AM NOT SAYING THAT PLANNING FOR ISRAELI OPERATION TOWARD JORDAN SHOULD STOP, BUT THAT IDF SHOULD ONLY BE UNLEASHED AT TIME AND IN MANNER THAT SUITS OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IF IT APPEARS THAT COMBINED THREAT FROM SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN MAY BE TOO MUCH FOR HUSSEIN, THEN I WOULD SAY GIVE ISRAELIS THEIR HEAD. BUT IF HUSSEIN - BASICALLY ON HIS OWN - CAN MAKE HIS WAY TO SHORE, I THINK THIS WOULD BE THE MOST DESIRABLE RESULT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. OUTCOME OF HUSSEIN'S CURRENT CRISIS, I AM AFRAID, IS NOT AS CLEAR AS I WOULD WISH. BUT I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD ELIMINATE MOST PROMISING ALTERNATIVE BY A PREMATURE ISRAELI INTERVENTION.

6. I AM SKEPTICAL OVER REASONS GIVEN BY GOI FOR PREFERRING STRIKE INTO JORDAN RATHER THAN SYRIA. FROM STANDPOINT OUR OWN INTERESTS AND PROBABLE REACTIONS IN ARAB WORLD, I BELIEVE BASH AGAINST SYRIA WOULD HAVE FEWER REPERCUSSIONS THAN ONE TOWARDS IRBID. ISRAELIS MAY HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS FOR PREFERRING A JORDAN TARGET TO A SYRIAN ONE, BUT I HOPE AMMAN'S VIEWS WILL BE CONSIDERED BEFORE ANY DECISION ON VENUE IS REACHED.


7. FINALLY, AND I AM WRITING FROM PAROCHIAL VIEW OF AMMAN, KING'S DESIRE IS TO SEE SYRIANS SO HURT THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW. ISRAEL'S DESIRE MAY BE BROADER: TO SO SMASH SYRIANS THAT THEY WONT RISE AGAIN FOR LONG TIME. IF THIS IS INDEED ISRAELI AIM I CAN SEE SHY THEY ARE MASSING FOR GRAND ATTACK AT IRBID WHERE SYRIANS ARE STUPIDLY OPEN TO REAL DEFEAT. IF AIM, ON OTHER HAND, IS TO GIVE HELP TO HUSSEIN, THEN EITHER FEINT OR SHORT ATTACK INTO MUCH EASIER COUNTRY NORTH OF TIBERIAS WOULD HAVE SAME EFFECT WITHOUT SIDE DANGERS HERE.

BROWN

BT

Note: Relayed White House by OC/T.

SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY
SEP 25 15 38 PM '70
RECEIVED



Department of State

11
TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 1 5 3 4Q
RECD: SEP 5, 240PM '70

R 051552Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 931
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4342

NODIS

SUBJECT: GOJ REQUEST FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT REGARDING IRAQIS

REF: AMMAN 4241

1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI TOLD CHARGE SEPT 5 THAT GOJ WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED USG HAD NOT ENDORSED IDEA OF BIG FOUR POWER STATEMENT OPPOSING IDEA OF IRAQI INTERVENTION IN JORDAN.

2. CHARGE DREW ON STATE 143328 AND EXPLAINED THAT US AMB IN MOSCOW AND US MINISTER IN CAIRO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOST GOVERNMENTS.

3. RIFAI SAID GOJ POINT WAS THAT S.C. RESOLUTION 242 AND JARRING MISSION WERE AT STAKE. USG AND OTHER BIG POWERS HAD ENDORSED THESE PROPOSITIONS WHICH NOW, AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED, WERE IMPERILLED BY IRAQI THREATS. GOJ THEREFORE THOUGHT BIG FOUR SHOULD TAKE FIRM STAND. HE WELCOMED FRENCH INITIATIVE (AMMAN 4299). GP-3.

ODELL

BT

Passed W/House by OC/T

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HK

September 22, 1970

Henry:

You should focus on the attached
cable from Brown if you have
not done so.

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LDX'D AT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'70 SEP 22 PM 9:34

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Department of State

SECRET

(9)

TELEGRAM

Z 162315Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1269
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4845

4008Q
SEP 16, 7:57 PM 1970

NODIS

1. I AM NOT SURE JUST HOW SERIOUS KING'S REQUEST IS. I CAN'T SEE ANY REAL THREAT FROM SYRIA. IT HAS VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS (ABOUT 600 MEN IN AA UNITS) IN JORDAN PLUS A SYRIAN-DIRECTED FEDAYEEN GROUP. KING IS, OF COURSE, CONCERNED BY RADIO REPORTS THAT SYRIA IS VOCALLY ATTACKING HIS GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE AND IS VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN.
2. WE HAVE ALREADY GONE THROUGH AN EXERCISE CONCERNING POSSIBLE IRAQI INTERVENTION ABOUT TEN DAYS AGAO.
3. I THINK KING WANTS HIS HAND HELD. THIS I PROPOSE TO DO, SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL. I'LL TELL HIM
A) THAT WE WANT A STRONG, STABLE JORDAN CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND TAKING A LEADING PART IN JARRING TALKS AS PRESIDENT TOLD ME IN SAN CLEMENTE,
B) THAT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY HOSTAGE PROBLE,
C) THAT IS IS BASICLY JORDANIAN DECISION AS TO HOW IT WILL RESTORE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, D) THAT I WANT HIS VIEWS ON OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM WHICH I WILL PROMPTLY REPORT TO USG, AND E) THAT I WANT TO ASSURE HIM AGAIN OF OUR DESIRE BE HELPFUL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND PLITICAL MEANS. IF NECESSARY, I WILL DISABUSE HIM OF POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT IN INTERDICTING SYRIANS AND IRAQUIS.
4. FRANKLY, AND DESPITE ALL THE IMPLICIT DANGERS TO HOSTAGES, I HOPE I WILL NOT BE TOLD TO DISCOURAGE HIM FROM TAKING STERN MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN. IF HE DOES NOT, AFTER PUTTING IN OFFICE HIS OWN MILITARY, HIS REGIME AND MODERATION WE HOPE FOR FROM JORDAN WILL BE WEAKER THAN EVER BEFORE.
5. WE'VE TURNED OVER QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANYONE ELSE-- ESPECIALLY IN ARAB WORLD--CAN BE OF ANY HELP. IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE IT. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK I SHOULD URGE HIM TO PROTECT HIS FLANKS BY ENLISTING WHATEVER SUPPORT HE CAN FROM OTHER ARABS. I ALSO HOPE I CAN TELL HIM THAT WE WILL BE USEFUL WITH SAUDIS, MOROCCANS, TUNISIANS, AND LEBANESE. FURTHERMORE, WE COULD ASK OTHER EUROPEAN STATES AND PERHAPS USSR TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. DEPARTMENT'S ADVISE REQUESTED ON THIS PARAGRAPH.

SEP 16 PM 10:30

BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

10

O 141530Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1193
BT
CONFIDENTIAL AMMAN 4731

Control: 3266Q
Recd : 14 Sep 70
12:06 p.m.

NODIS

REF: AMMAN 4691, STATE 149965

1. EMBASSY AMMAN'S CROSS REFERENCING OF REFEELS LEADS US TO DISTURBING CONCLUSION THAT THERE ARE NO RPT NO HOSTAGES WHO HOLD EXCLUSIVELY ISRAELI NATIONALITY. DIRE CONSEQUENCES RE NEGOTIATING THEIR RELEASE ARE OBVIOUS.

2. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S CONFIRMATION OF THIS INFORMATION. EMBASSY ALSO NEEDS GUIDANCE ON HOW TO HANDLE PROBLEM ONCE THIS BECOMES PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

BRUBECK

BT

70 SEP 14 PM 4:40
WHITEHOUSE
STUART ROOM

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

RECEIVED SAN CLEMENTE COMMCEN
6:30 A. M. PDT 2 SEPTEMBER 70

EIA163
OO WTE12
DE WTE 050 2451250

O 021239Z SEP 70
FM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO WINSTON LORD FOR DR. KISSINGER
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ NODIS WHO1662

P 020940Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 895
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4257

NODIS

SANDSTORM

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ISRAELI ROLE IF IRAQIS INTERVENE IN JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 4248, 4245, 3:07; STATE 144329

1. AS NOTED AMMAN 4248, IT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT I WILL HAVE AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN TODAY. MOREOVER, URGENCY ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR, AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE, SUBJECT APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSIDED AGAIN AND WE THINK IT BEST TO LEAVE THINGS WHERE THEY ARE FOR TIME BEING.

2. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT KING HUSSEIN MAY OR MAY NOT WAY WHEN HE DOES RECEIVE ME, I WISH RECORD THAT I AM VERY BEARISH ABOUT THE WHOLE IDEA OF GETTING USG INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE IDF ASSISTANCE TO JAA AGAINST IRAQIS. SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE REASONS FOR THIS VIEW ARE SET FORTH IN AMMAN 4245. ANOTHER REASON INVOLVES ROLE PLAYED BY CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT, ZAID RIFAI.

3. I HAVE COME TO REALIZE OVER PAST MONTHS THAT ALTHOUGH ZAID IS CERTAINLY A POWERFUL FIGURE, AND OUR CLOSE CONTACTS WITH HIM VERY VALUABLE, THE MESSAGES HE TRANSMITS ON HIS MAJESTY'S BEHALF ARE FREQUENTLY NOT EXACTLY THE SAME IN EITHER CONTENT OR MOOD AS THE MESSAGES ON SAME SUBJECT I GET DIRECTLY FROM THE KING. TWO EXAMPLES COME TO MIND:

(A) JUST BEFORE JUNE TROUBLES, THIS EMBASSY AND TEL AVIV WERE INVOLVED IN TRANSMITTING MESSAGES RELATING TO HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN ATTACKS ON BEISAN VALLEY. A KEY MESSAGE INCLUDED ZAID'S ASSURANCE TO ME THAT JAA HAD BEEN GIVEN ORDERS TO "SHOOT TO KILL" FEDAYEEN WHO DISOBEYED KING'S ORDERS. THIS "ROBUST LANGUAGE" (TEL AVIV' PHRASE) APPARENTLY WENT FAR IN ASSUAGING THE ISRAELIS FOR THE TIME BEING. WHEN THE ATTACKS WERE RESUMED, I WENT TO SEE KING, WHO HAD ZAID AND FONMIN RIFAI PRESENT. KING WAS FORTHRIGHT, AND I BELIEVE HONEST, IN HIS DECLARATION OF INTENT TO MONTROL FEDAYEEN WITHIN LIMITS HIS ABILITY. BUT HE DID NOT USE SUCH "ROBUST LANGUAGE" AND LEFT SITUATION LESS CLEAR-CUT THAN ZAID'S VERSION HAD INDICATED WAS THE CASE.

(B) IN OUR ARMS RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, ZAID HAS TAKEN SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO COMPLAIN STRONGLY (IN KING'S NAME) ABOUT QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT, DELIVERY SCHEDULES, QUANTITIES AVAILABLE, LACK OF ADEQUATE CREDIT, ETC. INVARIABLY, WHEN I SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED THESE POINTS DIRECTLY WITH KING HE APPEARED MUCH MORE RELAXED, UNDERSTANDING, AND WILLING TO ACCEPT OUR ASSURANCES, THAN DID ZAID.

END PAGE ONE

This being so - why did we have to precipitate? Did it even occur that there was an alternative?
JK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [2 pages]
NAN 01-19/32 LIT 5-8-02
By *SKW* NARA, Date 5-17-04

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NODIS

8/11/10/2100

4. THERE COULD BE A NUMBER OF REASONS FOR THIS AMBIGUITY IN OUR RELATIONS WITH PALACE. "LIFE STYLES" OF ZAID AND KING ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. ZAID MAY FEEL NEED, IS KING'S FRONT MAN, TO BE MORE CATHOLIC THAN THE POPE. ALSO HUSSEIN MAY DELIBERATELY USE HIM ON OCCASION AS STALKING HORSE. WHATEVER THE REASON OR REASONS, HOWEVER, IT LEADS ME TO ADVISE CONSIDERABLE CAUTION IN HANDLING MESSAGES DELIVERED BY ZAID ON BEHALF OF KING, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY DEAL WITH A SUBJECT CARRYING SUCH FORMIDABLE IMPLICATIONS IS IDF INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAQIS.

5. AS CHARGE, I WOULD RE RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND DELIVERING SUCH A MESSAGE UNLESS I HAD DISCUSSED IT DIRECTLY WITH KING.

6. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER PASSING THIS TELEGRAM TO TEL AVIV.

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NODIS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH (11)

CONTROL: 253Q
RECD: SEP 1, 1970
6:27 P.M.

Z 012130Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 887
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4241

MODIS

SUBJ HUSSEIN REQUESTS BIG FOUR COMMUNIQUE IN VIEW
POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION

REF A) AMMAN 4216 B) DEPT 142836

1. AT 2140 LOCAL CHIEF OF ROYAL DIWAN ZAID AL-RIFA'I PASSED FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO EMBOFF (HORAN): RIFA'I STATED THAT GOJ HAD DETERMINED THAT PDFLP BEHIND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON KING. ATTACK FORTUNATELY UNSUCCESSFUL AND KING HAS RETURNED HOME.
2. RIFA'I SAID GOJ HAS SINCE THEN RECEIVED ULTIMATUM FROM IRQIS DEMANDING THAT THE GOVT STOP FIRING AT COMMANDOS AND STOP ANY PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST THEM. OTHERWISE THE GOVT OF IRAQ AND THE IRAQI ARMY IN JORDAN WILL HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR PREVIOUS ATTITUDE AND TAKE ACTION.
3. RIFA'I STATED THAT JORDAN HAD REJECTED THE ULTIMATUM AND INFORMED THE GOI THAT THEY CONSIDERED IT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY SITUATION THAT MIGHT ARISE AS A RESULT OF THE CONTENTS OF ITS MESSAGE.
4. GOJ, MOREOVER, IS NOW MEETING WITH FEDAYEEN TO ADVISE THEM THAT THEY HAVE TO GET OUT OF AMMAN IMMEDIATELY OR SUFFER CONSEQUENCES.
5. RIFA'I ARRIRMED HE HAD INFORMED THE ARAB GOVTS OF THIS MEETING AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADORS OF THE BIG FOUR. HIS MAJESTY BELIEVES THAT JOINT COMMUNIQUE FROM BIG FOUR, OR AT LEAST US-USSR, WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION IMPORTANT AND IT APPROPRIATE THAT ACTION BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY. RIFA'I SAID HE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH IF THERE WERE ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND CLOSED BY SAYING THAT "WE ARE QUITE PREPARED TO TAKE ON THE WHOLE LOT IF REQUIRED." WHEN ASKED IF ANY PARTICULAR TIME FRAMEWORK IN MIND FOR FOUR POWER ACTION, RIFA'I REPLIED THAT IT SHOULD BE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SEP 1 PM 8:05

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J.C.
JAN 41.
Has
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-2- AMMAN 4241, SEP 1

6. COMMENT: FRENCH AMB HAS SPOKEN WITH US ON THIS MATTER AND IT APPEARS THAT WHILE RIFA'I MESSAGE TO US IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT WHICH HE RECEIVED, BRITISH VERSION SPEAKS RATHER OF "THREATENED" ULTIMATUM FROM IRAQIS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THIS SLIGHT DISCREPANCY WITH BRITISH. FRENCH AMB ADDED HE BEMUSED BY SOVIET AMB'S STATEMENT - DESPITE RIFA'IS CLAIM HE HAD SPOKEN TO BIG FOUR REPS - TO HAVE HEARD NOTHING ON THIS MATTER FROM PALACE. FRENCH AMB CONJECTURED "BUT, THEN, HE MIGHT BE LYING."

7. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED ALONG LINES REQUESTED BY RIFA'I. SUCH EARLY ACTION MIGHT SUFFICIENTLY STRENGTHEN GOJ'S POLITICAL STANCE VIS-A-VIS ITS OPPOSITION AS TO CAUSE LATTER TO BACK DOWN AND NOT RISK ARMED CONFRONTATION.

8. WITH REFERENCE TO STATE 142836 JUST RECEIVED, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR ANY COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF BIG FOUR. SUCH MEASURE WOULD TEND TO KEEP EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL NATURE OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT WHICH IS WHERE EMPHASIS - PUBLICLY - FOR THE TIME BEING SHOULD REMAIN. GP3

ODELL

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

WH

0.010945Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 878
BT

5 7 Q

1970 SEPT 1 AM 7 30

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4216

NODIS

SUBJ: HUSSEIN SEEKS SUPPORT IN EVENT OF CONFRONTATION

1. KING HUSSEIN INFORMED EMBOFF EVENING AUG 31 THAT WHILE HE WOULD TRY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN, FURTHER INCIDENTS SUCH AS THOSE THAT TROUBLED CAPITAL ON AUG 29 WOULD MAKE THIS DIFFICULT. KING HAD FOUND HE COULD NOT PLACE TRUST IN COMMITMENTS OF FEDAYEEN BECAUSE THESE TENDED TO BECOME UNDONE BY THEIR UNDISCIPLINED SUBORDINATES. HE INDICATED HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM ARMY TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY TO RECENT FEDAYEEN PROVOCATIONS AND REMARKED FRANKLY THAT CONTINUED DISORDER IN AMMAN, TOGETHER WITH THE HARDSHIP THIS WOULD INFLICT ON CIVIL POPULATION, MIGHT AT SOME POINT FORCE HIS HAND.

70 SEP 1 AM 9:45
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

2. KING WAS AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT A CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN MIGHT RAISE POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION BY SYRIA OR IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN JORDAN. KING SAW THIS AS THREAT NOT ONLY TO HIMSELF OR TO HIS REGIME BUT ALSO TO PROSPECTS US PEACE INITIATIVE IN MIDDLE EAST. AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY KING HOPED HE COULD RELY ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT. EXPANDING ON THIS STATEMENT, KING SAID WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS US MAKING STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT, IF NECESSARY, WARNING AGAINST ANY HOSTILE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. HE THOUGHT, ALSO, THAT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR BENEFIT IF ISSUED JOINTLY WITH USSR AND, IN FACT, WOULD PREFER JOIN STATEMENT.

3. KING HAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS HIS CONCERNS ABOUT HOSTILE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. SOVIETS ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THEY ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT GOJ ANY WAY THEN CAN SHOULD IT ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES. (HUSSEIN DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK USSR'S VIEWS ON PUBLIC STATEMENT). HE WOULD LIKE US, HOWEVER, TO GO TO RUSSIANS AND INQUIRE IF THEY PREPARED TO JOIN US IN GNERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT OF GOJ REGIME IF SITUATION WARRANTS. HUSSEIN ASSUMES WE WOULD INFORM SOVIETS THAT IN THIS MATTER WE RESPONDING TO PROPOSAL PUT TO US BY GOJ.

4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION KING WAS NOT PREPARED COMPLETELY TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME POINT HE MIGHT BE DRIVEN TO REQUEST AMERICAN MILITARY ACTION IN HIS BEHALF. HOWEVER,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
BY 11-85/15161 Per Hrc 2/24/2016
By TRS / MJA NARA, Date 10/19/2016

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4216 NODIS


HE SEES THIS AS ONLY A "REMOTE POSSIBILITY." KING FELT THAT JORDAN ARMY COULD COPE WITH DOMESTIC SITUATION THREATS - AS THEY PRESENTLY STOOD. HE INDICATED ALSO THAT UAR PROMISE OF SUPPORT COULD BE USEFUL IN MAINTAINING HIS ASCENDANCY OVER POTENTIAL OPPONENTS, ALTHOUGH IN MATERIAL TERMS HE WAS AWARE SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NECESSARILY BE LIMITED.

6. KING URGED THAT THIS APPROACH TO US BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. GP3

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288 1 2 PM '50
COUNCIL
NATIONAL SECURITY

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T



Department of State

WH

TELEGRAM

SECRET

(10)

5995Q

AUG 25, 4:12 PM 1970

R 251440Z AUG 80
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 880
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3118
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4101

WODIS

SANDSTORM

REF STATE 137360

1. EMBASSY CONCURS WITH DEPT VIEW THAT HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE NOW NOT BE PASSED TO GOI. MOREOVER, WE SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN OURSELVES REOPENING WITH HM A SUBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY PASSAGE TIME AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. IF EITHER KING OR CHIEF OF DIWAN RIFA'I RAISE QUESTION AGAIN WITH US WE WILL DRAW ON GUIDANCE PARA 2 DEPT'S REFTL. AT THAT TIME - OR SOME OTHER MOMENT THAT SEEMS APPROPRIATE - WE MAY SUGGEST TO ZAID RIFA'I OR HM THAT THEY CONSIDER REESTABLISHING DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAEL THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.

BT

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NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 8/25/70

70 AUG 25 PM 4:04

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

MA

12

P 081005Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 743
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3817

CN: 1874Q
Rec'd: August 8, 1970
6:34 a.m.

70 AUG 8 PM 12:28

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

SUBJ ARAB-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS UNDER JARRING AUSPICES

REF STATE 128249

1. GOJ PRIMIN RIFAI TOLD CHARGE AUGUST 7 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT NOW FAVORED NEW YORK AS VENUE FOR DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID GOJ THOUGHT JARRING WOULD QTE NEED A GREAT DEAL OF PRODDING UNQTE AND THIS COULD BE BEST DONE IN NEW YORK BY BIG POWERS AND UNSYG.
2. RIFAI SAID THAT IF DISCUSSIONS WERE TO BE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL (WHICH GOJ HOPED WOULD BE THE CASE) HE EXPECTED TO BE RELIEVED OF ALL OTHER DUTIES TO DEVOTE HIS FULL TIME TO DISCUSSIONS.

ODELL

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SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W 18

SECRET

R 061020Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 725
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3768

1 1 0 9 Q

RECVD: 06 AUG 70
7:31AM

NODIS

SUBJECT: UAR-ISRAEL PRISONER EXCHANGE

REF: STATE 125459

1. A SWAP OF ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN POW'S AT THIS TIME MIGHT PROVOKE CRITICAL RESPONSE IN AMMAN AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD. ONLY A MONTH OR SO HAS PASSED SINCE A NUMBER OF ISRAELI PILOTS FELL INTO UAR HANDS. THEIR CAPTURE WAS GIVEN MAXIMUM PUBLICITY AT TIME AND MEMORIES THESE EVENTS STILL FRESH. ONLY YESTERDAY JORDANIAN PAPERS SPOKE OF DOWNED PILOTS AS INDICATION INCREASING ARAB ANTI-AIRCRAFT PROWESS. THUS, FOR NASSER TO RETURN IDF PERSONNEL (ESPECIALLY PILOTS) WOULD MAKE HIM NO FRIENDS AMONG BROADER ARAB PUELIC WITH WHOM WELFARE OF EGYPTIAN POW'S IS NOT SIGNIFICANT ISSUE.

2. ON OTHER HAND, IF NASSER COULD BE PERSUADED TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE, IT WOULD HAVE USEFUL EFFECT LOCALLY OF CONDITIONING OPINION TO PROSPECT OF GENUINE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. GP-3.

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

W 8

13

70 AUG 5 AM 9:55

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

809Q

O 050940Z AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM ANEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 719
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3735

AUG 5 6:28 AM 1970

NODIS

SUBJ: JORDANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF "JARRING STATEMENT"

REF: STATE 125536

1. CHARGE TALKED WITH PRIME MINISTER RIFAI MORNING AUGUST 5. PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD SEND IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR AL-FARRAH IN NEW YORK INSTRUCTING HIM TO CONFIRM TO JARRING THAT GOJ HAS ACCEPTED JARRING'S STATEMENT CONTAINED IN U.S. PROPOSAL AND IS AGREEABLE FOR SYG TO ISSUE JARRING STATEMENT.

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Department of State

12

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET

CN: 6313Q
RECD: 27 JUL 70
448 AM
Page 1 of 2 Pages

P 270745Z JUL 70
FM ANEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 648
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3534

70 JUL 27 AM 10:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS.

SUBJECT: U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS, GOJ POSITIVE RESPONSE

REF: AMMAN 3532, 3533

AT 2030 (LOCAL) JULY 26 CHARGE WAS ASKED TO COME TO FONMINISTRY
AT 2100 (LOCAL) TO RECEIVE JORDAN REPLY TO U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS.
AFTER CHARGE (ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF HORAN) RECEIVED WRITTEN RES-
PONSE FROM FONMIN ATALLAH, FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE BY FONMIN
IN BRIEF DISCUSSION:

1. FONMIN STATED THAT AFTER LONG DISCUSSIONS IN COUNCIL OF MIN-
ISTERS HE PLEASD TO SAY THAT GOJ HAD RESOLVED ON POSITIVE REPLY
TO U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS (REPORTED AMMAN 3532). THIS REPLY, HE
ADDED, WAS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO BY ALL MEMBERS OF COUNCIL,
DESPITE WISH OF SOME TO DELAY JORDAN'S REPLY UNTIL POSITIVE
REPLY FORTHCOMING FROM GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.
2. BEFORE TAKING THIS DECISION ATALLAH EXPLAINED GOVERNMENT HAD
CONSULTED WITH ELEMENTS REPRESENTATIVE OF POPULATION OF AMMAN
(EXCLUDING FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS.) CONSENSUS WAS FOR PEACE,
WITH SOME STATING THAT IN THEIR OPINION GOJ WAS BEST INFORMED TO
MAKE DECISION IN POPULAR INTEREST.
3. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUESTION ATALLAH ADMITTED THAT FED-
AYEEN GROUPS DISPLEASED WITH GOJ DECISION BUT DID NOT BELIEVE
THEY WOULD MAKE TROUBLE. HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, HE MIGHT BE WRONG,
AND FELT THAT NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS WOULD TELL STORY. (DURING
PHONE CONVERSATION EVENING 26TH WITH CHARGE, CHIEF ROYAL DIWAN
RIFA'I MADE SIMILAR REMARK AND SUGGESTED AMERICANS SHOULD
MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE FOR NEXT FEW DAYS).

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CN: 6313Q AMMAN 3534 NODIS Page 2 of 2 Pages

4. HAD PREVIOUS CABINET TAKEN THIS DECISION ATALLAH REMARKED, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT OF ARAB CAUSE. SAME MIGHT HAPPEN TO PRESENT CABINET BUT ATALLAH CLEARLY SUPPOSED ITS PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS WOULD MAKE IT LESS VULNERABLE TO THIS SORT OF ATTACK.

5. ATALLAH STATED THAT AMBASSADORS OF UK, FRANCE AND USSR WOULD BE SUMMONED TO FONMINISTRY JULY 27 TO RECEIVE SAME REPLY AS PRESENTED TO EMBASSY EVENING JULY 26. WORD OF POSITIVE GOJ RESPONSE CARRIED LOCAL NEWS BROADCAST NINE AND ELEVEN P.M. JULY 26.

6. ENGLISH AND ARABIC TEXTS OF JORDANIAN REPLY WILL BE POUCH-ED. GP-3.

ODELL

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITEHOUSE BY OC/T

SECRET

Given to John Mitchell

Special Personnel Recommendations
by PMF

WINTON M. BLOUNT

President and Founder of Blount Brothers Construction Company; current Chairman of United States Chamber of Commerce; age - 48; home - Montgomery, Alabama; Republican; active in Eisenhower 1952 and 1956 campaigns and organizer for the South in 1960 Nixon campaign.

Recommended positions: Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Transportation.

Availability - unknown.

JAMES W. HARGROVE

Senior Vice President Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation; age - 46; home - Houston, Texas; Republican; very able organizer with substantial background in the field of education;

Recommended positions: Assistant Under Secretary
of Health, Education & Welfare

Available.

RITA HAUSER

Partner of own New York Law firm; past lawyer in Justice Department with outstanding record; member of New York, Washington, and French Bar; Doctorate in International Economics from University of Strasbourg; Nixon staff in 1960 campaign and from February 1968 in the 1968 campaign; must remain in New York.

Recommended positions: Deputy Ambassador to U.N.
Ambassador for Economic and
Social Committee (UNESCO)

Available.



Department of State

12
TELEGRAM

SECRET

W H

P 291840Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 676
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3621

7 1 3 9 Q

1970 JULY 29 PM 3 15

MODIS

SUBJECT: U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS: VIEWS OF GOJ PRIMIN RIFAI

REF: STATE 120680

1. CHARGE CALLED ON PRIMIN RIFAI AT HIS HOME EVENING OF JULY 29. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION PRIMIN, WHO WAS VERY RELAXED AND PLEASANT, MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A) IT WAS TOO SOON FOR GOJ TO MAKE KNOWN ITS INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO ENFORCING CEASEFIRE INsofar AS FEDAYEEN WERE CONCERNED. AFTER ISRAELI RESPONSE HAD BEEN MADE AND STUDIED, HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS POINT AGAIN WITH CHARGE.

B) HE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAELI GOVT WAS FACING DIFFICULT DECISION. NEVERTHELESS HE WAS "QUITE HOPEFUL" THAT ULTIMATE GOI RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE.

C) HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SOVIETS HAD INVITED IRAQI DELEGATION TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS U.S. PROPOSALS. HE HOPED SOVIETS WOULD "PUT MUCH PRESSURE" ON IRAQIS TO ADOPT REASONABLE POSTURE.

D) SYRIANS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ENDORSE PROPOSALS DESIGNED IMPLEMENT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THEY HAD NOT ACCEPTED. THEY WERE NOT, HOWEVER "BEING TOO NAUGHTY", AND GOJ ANTICIPATED NO PARTICULAR TROUBLE FROM THIS QUARTER.

E) HE PREFERRED CYPRUS, SWITZERLAND OR AUSTRIA AS VENUE FOR DISCUSSIONS UNDER JARRING AUSPICES. NEW YORK OFFERED CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, CHIEFLY PROXIMITY TO BIG FOUR, BUT THESE ADVANTAGES WERE OUTWEIGHED BY CONCENTRATION OF PRESS, PRESSURE FROM ZIONIST GROUPS AND OTHER ARAB UN DELEGATIONS AND "GENERAL EXCITEMENT". ALSO NEW YORK WAS TOO FAR FROM THE PARTIES' CAPITALS FOR CONVENIENCE. GOJ WOULD, HOWEVER, NOT BAULK AT ANY VENUE AGREEABLE TO THE OTHERS. AS FOR THE NEGOTIATING LEVEL, GOJ HOPED IT WOULD BE NO LOWER THAN FOREIGN MINISTERS.

F) HE WAS CONVINCED THAT "NINETY PERCENT" OF JORDANIAN PEOPLE APPROVED OF GOJ POSITIVE RESPONSE TO USG.

2. DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY SC/T

70 JUL 29 PM 4:51
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM



Department of State

(12)

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

0 262100Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 647
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3533

CONTROL: 6 2 8 3Q
RECD: Jul 26, 6 22PM '70

70 JUL 27 AM 9:14
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

SUBJECT: US PEACE PROPOSALS: POSITIVE GOJ RESPONSE

REF: AMMAN 3532

1. FULL ENGLISH TEXT OF LETTER DATED JULY 26, 1970 FROM
GOJ FONMIN ATALLAH TO SECSTATE FOLLOWS:

QTE CONFIDENTIAL, AMMAN 26 JULY 1970,

DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE,

ON 20TH OF JUNE 1970, THE AMERICAN CHARGE D' AFFAIRES AT
AMMAN HANDED HIS EXCELLENCY ABDUL MONEM RIFA'I, THEN
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NOW PRIME MINISTER, YOUR
LETTER CONTAINING YOUR NEW INITIATIVE FOR A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

THE PRESENT IMPASSE IN THE WAY OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
TO WHICH YOU REFER, AND, WHICH WE ARE GLAD TO NOTE YOU
ARE ENDEAVORING TO OVERCOME, WOULD NOT HAVE ARISEN HAD IT
NOT BEEN FOR ISRAEL'S INTRASINGENCE, MILITANT ATTITUDE
INDUCED BY THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY IT COMMANDS, ITS
CONTINUED REJECTION OF IMPLEMENTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION OF 22 NOVEMBER 1967, AND ITS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT
WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH IT OCCUPIED
SINCE JUNE, 1967.

I FEEL I MUST POINT OUT ALSO, THAT IT IS THE CONTINUED
UNITED STATES SUPPORT, IN VARIOUS FORMS, WHICH SECURES TO
ISRAEL ITS PRESENT MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THAT RENDERS IT
INTRANSIGENT IN ITS ATTITUDE. FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL
EXPANSIONIST POLICY AT THE COST OF THE SURROUNDING ARAB
COUNTRIES IS AT THE ROOT OF ITS REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THUS RAISING OBSTACLES IN THE
WAY OF AMBASSADOR JARRING AND PREVENTING HIM FROM CARRYING
OUT HIS MISSION I.E. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAID RESOLUTION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

DLW 11-86/15162 Per Hr. 2/24/2016

By RJ WJA NARA, Date 10/19/2016

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-3533 FROM AMMAN, JUL 26, 1970 (NODIS)

MY GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERED YOUR NEW PROPOSAL WITH SPECIAL CARE AND IT IS CLEAR TO IT THAT THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT VARY IN SUBSTANCE FROM THAT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, EXCEPT THAT IT CALLS FOR SOME PROCEDURAL MEASURES CALCULATED TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION.

THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS PROCLAIMED ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND CALLED FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION. FURTHERMORE, IT DEMONSTRATED ITS FULL SINCERITY IN DEALING WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DR. GUNNAR JARRING, IN PURSUING A POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. AS REGARDS THESE ASPECTS, THEREFORE, MY GOVERNMENT FINDS NOTHING NEW IN YOUR LETTER TO PRECLUDE IT FROM ACCEPTING YOUR PROPOSAL, ITS OBJECT BEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND THE RESUMPTION BY AMBASSADOR JARRING OF HIS MISSION TO CONTACT THE PARTIES WITH A VIEW TO IMPLEMENTING THE AFOREMENTIONED RESOLUTION.

NEVERTHELESS, MY GOVERNMENT IN CONSIDERING THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING REGARDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION HAS ALWAYS PROCEEDED FROM TWO BASIC STARTING POINTS:

FIRST: THE NECESSITY OF ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH IT OCCUPIED SINCE THE FIFTH OF JUNE 1967 WITHOUT EXCEPTION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 WHICH AFFIRMS THE INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR.

SECOND: THE NECESSITY TO RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S FULL AND LAWFUL RIGHTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY AFFIRMED AND REAFFIRMED BY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE IMPERATIVE NECESSITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS TO ENSURE PEACE BASED ON JUSTICE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NATURAL FOR MY GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION REGARDING THESE TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES, IN THE FIRM BELIEF THAT NO PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE IF THESE TWO SOUND PRINCIPLES ARE NOT FULLY RESPECTED.

AS REGARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE FOR A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS, THIS IS IN LINE WITH WHAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS OBSERVED AND STILL CONTINUES TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY. HOWEVER MY COUNTRY THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION OF JUNE, 1967, HAS BEEN THE OBJECT OF ARMED AGGRESSION, ATTACKS AND RAIDS BY ISRAEL. THE NUMEROUS RESOLUTIONS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS REPEATEDLY PASSED CONDEMNING ISRAEL FOR THESE AGGRESSIONS STAND AS VIVID TESTIMONY THAT IT IS ISRAEL THAT HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED THE CEASEFIRE. FURTHERMORE, ESCALATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

~~SECRET~~

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified

~~SECRET~~

-3-3533 FROM AMMAN, JUL 26, 1970 (NODIS)

ON THE JORDAN ISRAELI FRONT IS IN TRUTH DUE TO THE ISRAELI CONTINUED MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE ARAB AREAS, THE OPPRESSIVE MEASURES IT PERPETRATED AGAINST THE ARAB POPULATION, THEIR PERSECUTION, ILL-TREATMENT AND EXPULSION FROM THEIR OWN HOMELAND; IN ADDITION TO ARSON, DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES, CITIES, PLANTATIONS AND OTHER DAMAGE TO OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY AS WELL AS THE KILLING OF CIVILIANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL ON THE EAST BANK OF JORDAN RESULTING FROM AIR RAIDS, BOMBING AND SHELLING BY ISRAEL. IT IS THESE ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND OPPRESSION THAT HAVE LED THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT TO RESORT TO THEIR LAWFUL AND ACKNOWLEDGED RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE AND RESISTANCE AGAINST THE OCCUPATION.

ACCORDINGLY MY GOVERNMENT, IN ITS KEEN DESIRE TO MAINTAIN PEACE, BASED ON JUSTICE, AGREES TO THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN YOUR LETTER OF 20TH JUNE, 1970.

WITH THE EXPRESSION OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND RESPECT.

YOURS SINCERELY,
ANTONE ATALLAH/S/
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE HONOURABLE
MR. WILLIAM ROGERS
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C. UNQTE

2. FONMIN SAID EMBASSY WOULD RECEIVE ARABIC TEXT IN A FEW DAYS AND THIS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AUTHENTIC. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD PREPARED ENGLISH TEXT AND BELIEVED IT FULLY REFLECTED SUBSTANCE OF MESSAGE GOJ WISHED TO CONVEY. HE DREW CHARGE'S ATTENIION TO THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA (5) AND SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WORDS "ITS OBJECT" REFERRED TO IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING WORD "PROPOSAL" AND NOT RPT NOT TO WORDS "MY GOVERNMENT".

ODELL

BT

PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

(12)

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 6 2 7 8Q

RECD: JUL 26, 3 51PM '70

Z 261935Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE ~~WASHDC~~ FLASH
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3532

NODIS

SUBJECT: US PEACE PROPOSALS: POSITIVE RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM GOJ

REF: AMMAN 3530

1. AT 2100 LOCAL TIME FONMIN ATALLA HANDED CHARGE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO US PEACE PROPOSALS. LENGTHY TEXT FOLLOWS IN SEPTEL.
2. FONMIN SAID CABINET DECISION TO MAKE POSITIVE RESPONSE WAS UNANIMOUS.
3. DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER POSTS.

ODELL

BT

PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T

SECRET

NNNNVV EHA251
PP RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 6202Q 2061325
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251310Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
P 251205Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 642
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3528

SECRET

RECEIVED
WHICA

NODIS

1970 JUL 25 13 28Z

NODIS

SUBJ: GOJ RESPONSE TO US PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: AMMAN 3527

CHARGE INFORMED BY FONMINISTRY AT 1340 LOCAL THAT TONIGHT'S
MEETING WITH FONMIN SCHEDULED FOR 1800 LOCAL CANCELLED. FONMIN
OFFICIAL EXPRESSED HOPE THAT MEETING TO TRANSMIT GOJ REPLY COULD
BE RESCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW MORNING.

ODELL

BT

NNNN

NODIS

SECRET

NNNNVV EHA244
PP RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 6178Q 2061125
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251041Z JUL 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
P 250930Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 639
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 3524

~~SECRET~~

~~NODIS~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1970 JUL 25 11 32Z

NODIS

SUBJ: SOVIET ALLEGATION GOJ HAS ACCEPTED OUR POLITICAL INITIATIVE


REF: STATE 118965

1. WE TOO WERE BEMUSED BY DOBRYNINS FLAT ASSERTION THAT GOJ HAD ACCEPTED US POLITICAL INITIATIVE. ALTHOUGH ZAID RIFAI TOLD EMBOFF JULY 23 (AMMAN 3480) THAT HE BELIEVED GOJ RESPONSE WOULD BE POSITIVE, WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER.
2. WE CONSIDERED CALLING ZAID ABOUT THIS, BUT KNOWING THAT GOJ WAS IN CONSTANT SESSION CONSIDERING REPLY TO OUR PROPOSALS, DECIDED TO WAIT.
3. IF WE DO NOT GET CALL FROM GOJ IN NEXT FEW HOURS, CHARGE WILL SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH ZAID RIFAI.

ODELL

BT

NNNN



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH

13

O 231020Z JUL 70 ZFFS
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 617
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3086
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3480

CN-5504
July 23, 1970
7:21 a.m.

JUL 23 AM 11:42

SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USUN, USINT CAIRO

SUBJ JORDANIAN POSITION ON US PEACE INITIATIVE

REF CAIRO 1614

1. EMBOFF (HORAN) JULY 23 CALLED ON CHIEF ROYAL DIWAN ZAID RIFAI TO REVIEW LATEST ROUND OF ACTIVITY ON US PEACE PROPOSALS. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY ABOUT RECENT VISIT UAR REP GOWHAR AND EGYPTIAN REPLY TO US PEACE PROPOSALS, RIFAI REMARKED HE HAD SPOKEN TO GOWHAR YESTERDAY, JULY 22, AND THAT LATTER HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SEEN KING, PRIMIN AND FONMIN ATALLAH. RIFAI STATED HE WAS NOW WORKING ON JORDANIAN REPLY AND WOULD PROBABLY CONTINUE WORK ON IT THROUGH TOMORROW. HE HOPED USG WOULD RECEIVE OFFICIAL JORDANIAN REPLY BY SATURDAY OR SUNDAY. HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVED JORDANIAN REPLY WOULD BE FAVORABLE.

2. RIFAI ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT PROVISION FOR CEASE-FIRE IN US PROPOSAL WOULD BE HARDER PROBLEM FOR GOJ THAN UAR. THERE WERE TWO PARTIES, HE OBSERVED, THAT HAD NO INTEREST IN A CEASE-FIRE. ONE WAS THE FEDAYEEN AND THE OTHER, GOI (HE MENTIONED HAVING HEARD OF ISRAELI PRESS REPORT ISSUED DAY BEFORE STATING THAT GOI WOULD REJECT AMERICAN PROPOSALS). GOJ, HE REMARKED, WAS GIVING CAREFUL ATTENTION TO ISSUE POSED BY FEDAYEEN. HE REALIZED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT FEDAYEEN WOULD REGARD OBLIGATION TO ESTABLISH CEASE-FIRE AS RUNNING CONTRARY TO AGREEMENT CONCLUDED THROUGH AUSPICES OF FOUR-POWER COMMITTEE. HE AFFIRMED THAT IF GOJ AGREES TO CEASE-FIRE IN VALLEY, IT MUST DO SO IN A SERIGSS MANNER AND SEE THAT IT STICKS. (IN THIS REGARD SEE ALSO REFTTEL, TEL AVIV 3744 AND STATE 116105.) GP3

ODELL

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED USUN AND USINT CAIRO BY OC/T.

WH



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

12

Z 211855Z JUL 70 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 604
INFO RUHQCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3082
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 745
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3433


Control: 5010Q
Recd : 21 July 70
3:13 p.m.

70 JUL 21 PM 6:19
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

REF STATE 116437

1. WE NOTE REFTTEL SENT TO AMMAN AS WELL AS OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR ACTION. EMBASSY AMMAN CANNOT CONFIRM QUESTION POSSIBLE U.S. CITIZENSHIP OF ISRAELI PILOT MENAHIM. MEANWHILE WE THINK IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL OURSELVES TO RAISE ISSUE WITH GOJ IN ABSENCE FURTHER DETAILS OF CASE.
 2. MENAHIM PICTURE PROMINENTLY DISCLAYED LAST-PAGE SEMI-OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER AL-DUSTUUR JULY 21 BUT NO MENTION OF HIS CITIZENSHIP.
 3. IF RUETERS DESPATCH OF HAYICAL ARTICLE CORRECT WE CAN EXPECT PRESS TO GIVE STORY FULL TREATMENT IN A.M. IMPACT COULD BE HARMFUL TO GOJ'S POSITION ON (A) UAR'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE WHICH CARRIED BY UAR REP GOWHAR TO AMMAN TODAY; AND (B) JORDANIAN-FEDAYEEN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH NOW IN PROGRESS. FATEH FOR INSTANCE HAS BEEN PRESSING GOJ TO DICAVOW UN RES 242 AND POSSIBILITIES PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
 4. FOR THESE REASONS REQUEST INFORMATION REFUTING HAYICAL ACCOUNT (IF APPROPRIATE) OR OTHER INSTRUCTIONS BE FURNISHED AMMAN ASAP.
- ODELL
BT



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

12

P 181535Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 586
BT

0 0 4 4 7 7

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3385

1970 JUL 18 PM 12 20

MODIS

SUBJECT U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 113298

1. CHARGE CALLED ON KING TODAY TO PASS ON CONTENTS REFTTEL. KING DID NOT SEEM CHEERFUL AND LISTENED WITHOUT POSITIVE RESPONSE. AFTERWARDS ASKED IF HE COULD BE PROVIDED WITH TEXT OF MESSAGE WHICH HE BELIEVED WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN HIS DISCUSSIONS.

2. EMBASSY BELIEVES WE SHOULD ACCEDE TO KING'S REQUEST AND UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE WILL PROVIDE KING WITH MEMORANDUM RE TODAY'S MEETING.

3. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE QUESTION KING SAID HE HAD NO IDEA YET OF WHAT POSITION HAD BEEN REACHED ON PEACE SETTLEMENT BY NASSER AND SOVIET LEADERSHIP DURING NASSER'S WEEKS IN MOSCOW. (LOCAL PRESS REPORTS STATE MAHMUD RIYADH TO VISIT AMMAN "SOON" TO BRIEF JORDANIANS.)

4. ON JULY 17 FOMMIN ATALLAH COMMENTED TO CORRESPONDENT OF BEIRUT DAILY AL-JARIDA ON UAR-USSR COMMUNIQUE. WHILE REPEATING DEMAND FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY, HE ALSO APPEARED TO STRESS THAT UAR-USSR HAVE AGREED TO CONCERT EFFORTS TO REACH PEACEFUL SOLUTION WITHIN UN FRAMEWORK.

BT

ODELL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

UNCLASSIFIED Per Htr. 2/24/2016
By RJ [initials] NARA, Date 10/19/2016

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

WH 12

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 161144Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 571
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3344

CONTROL: 3 7 8 0 Q
JULY 16, 1970
8:44 AM

10 JUL 16 AM 11:30
STATION ROOM

NODIS

REF: STATE 113298

APPRECIATE HELPFUL GUIDANCE SUPPLIED REFTEL. WE ASKED FOR APPOINTMENT FOR CHARGE TO SEE KING BUT, BECAUSE LATTER WILL BE UNAVAILABLE JULY 16-17, EARLIEST TIME FOR SUCH MEETING WILL OCCUR SATURDAY, JULY 18. GP-3

ODELL

BT

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

70 JUL 15 AM 10:23

34350

INFORMATION ROOM

9

P 150830Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 552
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3307

JUL 15 5:17 AM 1970

NODIS

DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS

SUBJ: USG PEACE INITIATIVES

REF: AMMAN 3291

1. WHEN CHARGE SAW KING HUSSEIN JULY 14 ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, LATTER ASKED ABOUT STATUS RECENT US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS. CHARGE RESPONDED IN GENERAL TERMS, STATING THAT SOVIETS APPEARED INTERESTED IN KEEPING DIALOGUE GOING AND WE SAW SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR ATTITUDE. AT SAME TIME WE WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN UAR, AND HAD SO INFORMED SOVIETS.

2. CHARGE SAID MUCH DEPENDED ON WHAT NASSER BROUGHT BACK FROM MOSCOW. DID KING HUSSEIN HAVE ANY IDEA OF WHAT THAT MIGHT BE? KING SAID HE HAD "NOT A CLUE" REGARDING TENOR OF NASSER TALKS WITH SOVIETS. HE WAS ANXIOUSLY AWAITING WORD FROM NASSER, WHICH HAD BEEN PROMISED, AS SOON AS LATTER RETURNED TO CAIRO.

3. KING SAID HE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE DETAILED BRIEFING FROM CHARGE AS SOON AS CONVENIENT ABOUT US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS. CHARGE PROMISED TO DO SO AND WE ARE SEEKING APPOINTMENT JULY 16 FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. CHARGE PROPOSES TO DRAW DISCREETLY ON RECENT DEPT AND MOSCOW TELEGRAMS IN BRIEFING KING, AND TRUSTS THIS IS AGREEABLE WITH DEPT. IS THERE ANYTHING IN PARTICULAR WE SHOULD STRESS? KING IS OBVIOUSLY EAGER FOR INFORMATION AND EMBASSY BELIEVES WE SHOULD BE FORTHCOMING, ESPECIALLY IF WE CAN GET IN OUR WORD JUST PRIOR TO AMMAN VISIT OF UAR FONMIN RIAD. RIAD IS EXPECTED ARRIVE ANY DAY.

ODELL

BT

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET

9

R 141400Z JUL 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 548
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3291

Control: 3225Q
Recd : 14 July 70
10:58 a.m.

MODIS

DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS

REF AMMAN 2984

SUBJ SLIGHT CHANGE IN JORDANIAN ATTITUDES RE USG PEACE INITIATIVE

1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI ON JULY 14 EXHIBITED QUIET CONFIDENCE TO EMBOFF (DRAPER) THAT REGIME WAS NOW RPT NOW IN MORE ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION VIS-A-VIS FEDAYEEN AS RESULT RECENT NEGOTIATIONS. FACT THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT UNDERESTIMATE SERIOUSNESS OF PROBLEMS REMAINING, OR THE DANGEROUS FACTIONALISM WITHIN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, LENT AUTHORITY TO HIS WORDS. IN SHORT, HE DID NOT RPT NOT CLAUT VICTORY, RATHER ONLY A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT FROM WHICH THE REGIME EVENTUALLY SHOULD EMERGE STRONGER.
2. EMBOFF ASKED WHETHER THIS MORE CONFIDENT APPRAISAL OF SITUATION MIGHT AFFECT JORDANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS USG PEACE INITIATIVES. ZAID INDICATED THAT HE PERSONALLY SENSED THAT JORDAN COULD NOW RPT NOW AFFORD TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT JORDAN WOULD NOT RPT NOT DETERMINE ITS POSITION UNTIL FAR FONMIN RIAD ARRIVED IN AMMAN TO CONSULT WITH THE JORDANIANS ABOUT DECISIONS REACHED IN MOSCOW BETWEEN NASSER AND THE RUSSIANS. HE ADDED HE FELT ONE COULD TAKE SOME MODEST ENCOURAGEMENT FROM FACT THAT NO RPT NO CLEAR-CUT STATEMENTS HAD YET COME FROM NASSER WHILE HE WAS IN MOSCOW; AND WITHOUT MAKING CLEAR HIS REASONS, ZAID REFLECTED THAT NASSER STAYING AS LONG AS HE HAD IN MOSCOW WAS POSSIBLY A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT DOORS HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED.
3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THESE COMMENTS FROM ZAID RIFAI INDICATE THERE MAY BE SOME LIGHT ON THE HORIZON, NOT TOO MUCH SHOULD BE READ INTO THEM. IT WAS EVIDENT FROM HIS REMARKS THAT JORDAN WOULD ALIGN ITSELF WITH WHATEVER FONMIN RIAD MIGHT PROPOSE. GPs

70 JUL 14 PM 4:01
SITUATION ROOM

BT

ODELL

JUL 14 3 27 PM '70
RECEIVED



SECRET

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

162383

3713

(10)

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

TO
2 OCT 1970
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
PM 11:20

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN ~~FLASH~~ IMMEDIATE

STATE: 162383

MODIS

REF: Amman 5511; State 161845

1. Ambassador will wish to draw on material contained in State REFTEL in his conversation with King. Unfortunately, we cannot as yet give King any satisfaction re possibility of USG grant aid. We can only tell him that we are studying his financial problems and will try to be as responsive as possible.
2. Re helping King understand USG problems with regard to military aid, we believe that King is fully conversant with basic difficulties in locating and delivering equipment to him, ~~overnight~~. In this instance, you can assure him that we are stretching ourselves to limit in effort to respond to his urgent needs expeditiously. As we have informed you, 20 sorties are scheduled in next couple of days and surface shipments are being arranged. Top levels of USG are

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ARN:TWSeelye:jfc	DRAFTING DATE: 10-1-70	TEL. EXT.: 22670	APPROVED BY: The Acting Secretary
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CLEARANCES: NEA: Mr. Davis
Atherly
P/M - Mr. Chapman
S/S - Mr. Elliot
DOD - Gen. Brett

SECRET


Classification

focusing on this matter and we are doing best we can.

3) While stressing that we are responding as rapidly as possible to King's request, we wish to draw Embassy's attention to GOJ propensity to make excessive military/demands in unreasonable time frame.

ACTING SECRETARY

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OCT 10/1/70



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

161845

Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

10 OCT
10:20 PM
19 18
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amambassy AMMAN

STATE 161845

NODIS

SUBJECT: Assistance for Jordan

REF: Amman 5497

1. We can appreciate King's continued preoccupation with threat from Iraq and Syria. You may inform Rifai that we will remain alert to the need for "psychological measures."
2. Re King's expression of need for financial assistance, you should know that in connection with special request for supplemental appropriation we are proposing \$30 million of MAP Grant assistance to Jordan. This should not rpt not be communicated to GOJ as yet since this is still only in form of request. However, you may inform

DRAFTED BY: TASK FORCE:TWSeelye:dmk	DRAFTING DATE 10/1/70	TEL. EXT. 21035	APPROVED BY: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
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CLEARANCES:
 NEA/P - Mr. Smith
 NEA/P - Mr. King (info)
 PM/MAS - Mr. Chapman
 NEA/ARP - Mr. Murphy
 S/S - Mr. Eliot

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

PAGE 2

7

Rifai that we are studying King's financial needs.

3. You may also inform Rifai that our Ambassador in

Kuwait has weighed in with Kuwait ~~xxxxx~~ Government

we have been assured that

re resumption subsidy to Jordan and ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~

GOK has no intention of permanently terminating aid.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ We are also considering

what we might do further in nudging Saudi Arabia to
make further contribution.

4. We fully concur that we should endeavor minimize

publicity re our military airlift, particularly during

period of relief assistance. We will do our best from

this end.

END

ERWIN

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 10/1/70

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.


APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

156384

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

9

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 23 19 51
23 SEP 70 19 51
7:24 PM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY AMMAN - FLASH

STATE 156384

~~EXDISX~~ NODIS

In view of statement by Field Marshall Majalani today with regard to improved situation in the North, please ascertain by most expeditious means status of King's request for Israeli air strikes against Syrian forces in Jordan.

END

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9/23/70

[ROGERS]

RECEIVED

SECURITY COUNCIL
1 SEP 24 10

DRAFTED BY:

NEA:JJSisco:bg

DRAFTING DATE

9/23/70

TEL. EXT.

29464

APPROVED BY:

The Secretary

CLEARANCES:

S/S - Mr. Eliot

The White House



SECRET/EXDIS
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

155251
10
[Signature]

22 SEP 70 14 15z

RE:
LECT
ARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
TEL AVIV

IMMEDIATE

STATE 155251
EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

REF: State 155203

Argov delivered questions and answers at 10:30 p.m. EDT
September 21 (correcting omission in State 155203.

GP-3

END

70 SEP 22 PM 12:09
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
ROGERS

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9/22/70.

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
NEA:RALong:mob	9/22/70	22120	NEA - Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.

CLEARANCES:
S/S - Mr. Curran



SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

155211

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

22 SEP 70 00 44z

SEP 22 AM 8:56

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: - Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

STATE 155211

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

REF: AMMAN 5032

1. British have not been brought ~~fully~~ into the picture at this juncture.
2. Accordingly you should ~~attempt to~~ put question through to King/as secure means as may be available.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

[ROGERS]

DRAFTED BY:

NEA:RPDavies:wjv

DRAFTING DATE

9/22/70

TEL. EXT.


23172

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

CLEARANCES:

S/S-O: B. Flatin



SECRET/EXDIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

155208

12

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN FLASH

22 SEP 70 05-55z

INFO: Amembassy LONDON FLASH
Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 155208
EXDIS TREAT AS NODIS

REF: Amman 4997

Appreciate your problems in communicating with Palace
We have no rpt no objection to designation of British
Ambassador as joint collector and you may so inform
King Hussein.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

SEP 22 AM 8:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/EX:RPaganelli:wjv

DRAFTING DATE

9/22/70

TEL. EXT.

23172

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

CLEARANCES:


S/S-O: B.A. Flatin

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FORM 3-222
2-67



SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

170 55202

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
22 SEP 70 08:37z
7

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY, AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO: AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

STATE 155202

EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

1. As you have been previously ~~inform~~ informed the Israelis have under active consideration the question of air and ground action in Jordan (repeat in Jordan). We have informed them, as previously reported to you, that the US agrees in principle to an Israeli operation by air and land in Jordan, subject to continuing review of this matter in ~~xxxx~~ ^{light} of the evolving situation. Israelis have not taken any decision and are awaiting reply to seven questions put to us reported SEPTTEL. One question is as follows: Will the King agree to ~~re~~ request our assistance and undertake to institute methods of communication and coordination between us?

2. We are responding to Israelis we do not know GOJ views on this point, having as only guide exchange of messages between Allon and Hussein and Rifai's statement to you that ground operations are ~~x~~ fine in the area as long as they

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSisco:mtb	DRAFTING DATE 9/21/70	TEL. EXT. 29588	APPROVED BY: Joseph J. Sisco
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REFERENCES:


S/S-O *SNOLY

White House - Kissinger
White House - Br. Kissinger (per
Davies/MLA

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: PAGE 2 of TEL to Amman and Tel Aviv

are not here in Jordan.

Please ascertain King's views on ^{question} ~~questions~~ posed by
GOI.

NOTE: Passed White House by OC/T 9-22-70

ROGERS


DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:



~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ NODIS

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

155499

(12)

37B

22 SEP 70 20 25z

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN

INFO: AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy MOSCOW
AmEmbassy TEL AVIV
USUN STATE 155499

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ NODIS

REF: State 154587

N O D I S

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
22 SEP 22 PM 10:33

1. UK Counsellor Millard, in follow up on Secretary - Freeman conversation reported reftel, briefed Dep Asst Secy Davies on latest report (0630 Z 22 Sept) from UK Ambassador Amman re King Hussein's mood and plans. UK Ambassador reported that King more relaxed and appeared understand nonintervention US, UK, but was still thinking in terms of Israeli strike based on "Israeli security considerations". King had informed British that he would see Soviet Ambassador morning 22 Sept.
2. King had at same time informed UK that Iraqis had told him movement of 24 Iraqi tanks toward Jerash had been made "to secure own flank" (against whom apparently not

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
By: [Signature] NARA, Date 10/9/2016

DRAFTED BY: JORDAN TASK FORCE:GBrownthz	DRAFTING DATE: 9/22/70	TEL. EXT.: 23172	APPROVED BY: NEA - Mr. Davies
--	---------------------------	---------------------	----------------------------------

CLEARANCES:

JORDAN TASK FORCE: TWSeelye

S/S - Mr. Curran



~~SECRET~~ / ~~EXXX~~ NODIS

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

-2-

7

specified). King said Iraqis were still within their regular operating area but GOJ was watching situation carefully.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

END.


RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAN 22 1970

ROGERS

1

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CLEARANCES:



~~SECRET~~

Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

152449 ⁹

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

17 SEP 70 05 23z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

STATE 152449

NODIS

REF: Amman ~~4854~~ 4845

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 17 AM 8:50

1. We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely, our judgment continues to be that active Iraqi military intervention against King ~~is improbable~~ ^{questionable.}

2. Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What you propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely appropriate. ~~While you should of course not~~ ^{You should not rpt not altogether preclude the}

~~encourage~~ possibility of direct USG involvement in form of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis, ~~you should not~~ ^{and you can be encouraging} about the prospects for material assistance. ~~XXXXXX leave the impression that the~~

~~being left in the dark.~~ You may inform King that Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention.


DRAFTED BY: *[Signature]* DRAFTING DATE: 9/17/70 TEL. EXT.: 23172 APPROVED BY: *[Signature]* Seelye
NEA:TASK FORCE:TWSeelye: bdf NEA/TASK FORCE - Talcott W. /

CLEARANCES:
NEA - Mr. Sisco *[Signature]*
NEA - Mr. Atherton *[Signature]*
White House - Dr. Kissinger *[Signature]*
S/S - O - ~~Genex Malonex~~ GMalon *[Signature]*

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PLU 11-86/15165 Per H.R. 2/24/2016
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

PAGE 2 7

3. ~~RM~~ Re para 4 reftel, you should not rpt not discourage King from taking stern measures against fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him ~~an~~ alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen.

4. We agree that you should urge King to enlist all possible support from ~~XXXXXX~~ other Arab states. We recall Nasser's reported offer of assistance to King, made during latter's last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with critical internal situation. We take Nasser's assurances of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King should at this juncture at least test Nasser's earlier undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
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CLEARANCES:



~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

PAGE 3

7

current situation and their moral support would be of marginal value. ~~XXXX~~ Soviets cannot be expected to play useful role although it is our guess Soviets probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.

5. We wish you the best of luck in your first meeting ~~with~~ with King and believe your talk with him will be ~~useful~~ useful at this juncture. King, as you know, tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be important at this point.

END

ROGERS

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Jim Middleton
This should
be filed in your
files downstairs
mth*

~~Hand/HAK~~

Attached is the
outgoing cable I cleared
the morning that
prompted it,

W

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

DLW11-86/15/66 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS/WH NARA, Date 10/19/2016

Lord phoned Malone

in 5/5-0 1:00 AM

9/17 gave changes as Dr. King's personal instructions.

Malone assumed Lord that cable will go like this unless he calls back.



SECRET

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

TELETYPE UNIT TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

7

STATE

NODIS

REF: Amman ~~4854~~ 4845

not not
You should not altogether preclude the

1. We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely, our judgment continues to be that active Iraqi military intervention against King is ~~improbable~~ questionable.

2. Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What you propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely appropriate. ~~While you should of course not rpt not encourage~~ possibility of direct USG involvement in form of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis, ~~and you can be~~ you should not ~~cover~~ ~~encouraging about the prospects for~~ material assistance. ~~leave the impression that he is~~ being left out in the cold. You may inform King that Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention.

SEES BY: *Seelye* DRAFTING DATE: 9/17/70 TEL. EXT.: 23172 APPROVED BY: *Seelye* NEA/TASK FORCE - Talcott W. /

- NEA - Mr. Sisco *SW*
- NEA - Mr. Atherton *SW*
- White House -
- S/S -

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Classification

Department of State

~~TELEGRAM~~

TELETYPE
SUBJECT
URGENT TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

PAGE 2

7

3. ~~RH~~ Re para 4 reftel, you should not rpt not discourage King from taking stern measures against fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him as alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen.

Lord told Malone that this didn't make sense & should be fixed if possible - though this not essential as the point is clear

4. We agree that you should urge King to enlist all possible support from ~~XXXXXX~~ other Arab states. We recall Nasser's reported offer of assistance to King, made during latter's last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with critical internal situation. We take Nasser's assurances of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King should at this juncture at least test Nasser's earlier undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in

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REFERENCES:

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- 68



~~SECRET/NO DIS~~
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

TELETYPE
LECT
PAGE TO

REVISION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH PAGE 3 7

current situation and their moral support would be of marginal value. ~~XXXX~~ Soviets cannot be expected to play useful role although it is our guess Soviets probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.

5. We wish you the best of luck in your first meeting ~~F~~ with King and believe your talk with him will be ~~useful~~ useful at this juncture. King, as you know, tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be important at this point.

END

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Department of State

⑨ 2-14-14

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

Z 162315Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1269
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4845

4008Q

SEP 16, 7:57 PM 1970

NODIS

1. I AM NOT SURE JUST HOW SERIOUS KING'S REQUEST IS. I CAN'T SEE ANY REAL THREAT FROM SYRIA. IT HAS VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS (ABOUT 600 MEN IN AA UNITS) IN JORDAN PLUS A SYRIAN-DIRECTED FEDAYEEN GROUP. KING IS, OF COURSE, CONCERNED BY RADIO REPORTS THAT SYRIA IS VOCALLY ATTACKING HIS GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE AND IS VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN.

2. WE HAVE ALREADY GONE THROUGH AN EXERCISE CONCERNING POSSIBLE IRAQI INTERVENTION ABOUT TEN DAYS AGAO.

3. I THINK KING WANTS HIS HAND HELD. THIS I PROPOSE TO DO, SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL. I'LL TELL HIM
A) THAT WE WANT A STRONG, STABLE JORDAN CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND TAKING A LEADING PART IN JARRING TALKS AS PRESIDENT TOLD ME IN SAN CLEMENTE,
B) THAT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY HOSTAGE PROBLE,
C) THAT IS IS BASICLY JORDANIAN DECISION AS TO HOW IT WILL RESTORE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, D) THAT I WANT HIS VIEWS ON OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM WHICH I WILL PROMPTLY REPORT TO USG, AND E) THAT I WANT TO ASSURE HIM AGAIN OF OUR DESIRE BE HELPFUL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND PLITICAL MEANS. IF NECESSARY, I WILL DISABUSE HIM OF POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT IN INTERDICTING SYRIANS AND IRAQUIS.

4. FRANKLY, AND DESPITE ALL THE IMPLICIT DANGERS TO HOSTAGES, I HOPE I WILL NOT BE TOLD TO DISCOURAGE HIM FROM TAKING STERN MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN. IF HE DOES NOT, AFTER PUTTING IN OFFICE HIS OWN MILITARY, HIS REGIME AND MODERATION WE HOPE FOR FROM JORDAN WILL BE WEAKER THAN EVER BEFORE.

5. WE'VE TURNED OVER QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANYONE ELSE-- ESPECIALLY IN ARAB WORLD--CAN BE OF ANY HELP. IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE IT. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK I SHOULD URGE HIM TO PROTECT HIS FLANKS BY ENLISTING WHATEVER SUPPORT HE CAN FROM OTHER ARABS. I ALSO HOPE I CAN TELL HIM THAT WE WILL BE USEFUL WITH SAUDIS, MOROCCANS, TUNISIANS, AND LEBANESE. FURTHERMORE, WE COULD ASK OTHER EUROPEAN STATES AND PERHAPS USSR TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. DEPARTMENT'S ADVISE REQUESTED ON THIS PARAGRAPH.

BT

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Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

WH
142836

(11)

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 20 02z
1 PM 8:05
Sent

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO: The White House
STATE 142836

NOTES

PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

SUBJ: Possible Support for King Hussein in Event of
Confrontation with Fedayeen

REF: Amman 4216

- Embassy should inform King Hussein that his views and concerns contained in ref tel have been received in Dept and are under urgent consideration within USG. Strong public warning by US has many implications which must be carefully weighed, whether issued separately or jointly with USSR.
- We note King's statement that UAR has promised support against potential opponents. Hussein may wish alert Nasser to seriousness current situation in Jordan and urge Nasser

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/ARN:AIKillgore:bdf

DRAFTING DATE

9/1/70

TEL. EXT.

20695

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies


CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
EUR/SOV - Mr. Dubs
S/S - Mr. Brewster

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

ND 11-86/15167 Per Hr. 2/24/2016
By RS/WH NARA, Date 10/17/2016

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Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN

IMMEDIATE

PAGE 2

7

do what he can to restrain Palestinian and fedayeen leaders with whom he has influence. Less extreme fedayeen leaders such as Arafat might try harder to control their more undisciplined followers if encouraged to do so by Nasser.

3. Dept also notes King's statement that Soviets have offered to help him should he encounter difficulties. King may wish to propose to Soviets that they make clear in Damascus and Baghdad that Soviets would disapprove of any possible action on part of Iraqi and Syrian troops stationed in Jordan to make trouble for Hussein. Given leading Soviet role in military supply picture for both countries, Soviet word of caution might have some deterrent effect.

4. In weighing King's request, it would be useful to have Embassy's assessment of possible effect on situation of unilateral rpt unilateral public statement by USG.

END


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TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:



SECRET/NODIS

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

147107

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

5 70 SEP 9 15 44
PM 1:56

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY, AMMAN IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV
USINT, CAIRO

STATE 147107

NODIS

1. While principal focus of world attention is on hijacking, we are deeply concerned over continuing deterioration of the situation in Jordan as a whole and in particular in Amman. Based on your reporting it certainly appears that King's position has been considerably weakened and that Army on verge of taking matters in its own hands. Up to now, we have been most reluctant to advise Hussein to take more vigorous measures with the fedayeen. We are struck with the fact that each crisis that has occurred has brought Hussein's with it a further weakening of ~~Hussein's~~ position. Without going to Jordanians we wish your judgment on following: If we were to press Hussein to provoke major confrontation at this time, what is your assessment as to his willingness to do this. Secondly, what would the outcome be in your judgment, and

DRAFTED BY:

NEA:JJSisco:mtb

DRAFTING DATE

9/9/70

TEL. EXT.

29588

APPROVED BY:

William P. Rogers
Joseph J. Sisco


CLEARANCES:

The Secretary

S/S - Mr. F. Eliot

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Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: PAGE 2 of TEL to AMMAN

7

could this be done in a way in which we would avoid any Hussein request for direct military intervention?

2. We want Embassy's judgment immediately. Under no circumstances discuss this matter with either Jordan or any other government.

END

GP-3

[ROGERS]

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

12

144458

WH

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

30 SEP 1970

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

30 SEP 3 PM 9:39

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

INFO: Amembassy BEIRUT
 Amembassy JIDDA
 Amembassy KUWAIT
 Amembassy LONDON
 Amembassy MOSCOW
 Amembassy PARIS
 Amembassy TEL AVIV
 USUN
 USINT CAIRO
 WHITE HOUSE

STATE 144458

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR SECRETARY ROGERS
NODIS

SUBJ: Missile Sites in Suez Canal Zone

REF: STATE 144257

1. You are authorized to draw on paras 15 thru 24 in reftel
 (i.e. our representations to UAR) in acquainting King Hussein
 or Zaid Rifai with our conclusions regarding Soviet-UAR
 missile movements to Suez standstill zone in violation stand-
 still agreement. You may inform King that we have also made
 representations in Moscow. You should state that we are
 providing this information merely to keep King informed, but
 if he feels that he can be helpful in supporting our representations

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:wjv

DRAFTING DATE

9/3/70

TEL. EXT.

22670

APPROVED BY:


NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

NEA/LAI - Mr. Wahl

NEA - Mr. Davies

S/S - Mr. Elliot



SECRET
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN - page 2

7

in Cairo, we would welcome his efforts.

2. You might wish ascertain Jordanian views as to why UAR and USSR have undertaken this activity, which is at such variance with roles that UAR and Soviet Governments have played in our joint effort to help Ambassador Jarring promote agreement between the parties on the terms of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.


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DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:



SECRET

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

125536

13

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

4 AUG 70 23 15 z
70 AUG

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

INFO: USINT CAIRO

NODIS

STATE 125536

1. Jarring has asked al Farrah to confirm to him Jordanian acceptance of Jarring statement contained in U.S. proposal which Secretary General planning to issue, perhaps on Wednesday. When Jarring raised this with al Farrah he said he ^{instructions by} expecting/pouch ~~of material~~ and hoped to be in a position to do so at that time. Suggest you talk to Zaid Rifai or Prime Minister promptly and tell him al Farrah needs, if pouched material does not already authorize him to do so, to be instructed to inform Jarring orally of the acceptance which the Jordanian Government has conveyed to the U.S. and that GOJ is agreeable for the Secretary General to issue the Jarring statement to which both the UAR and GOJ have subscribed.

CP-3

END

J

DRAFTED BY:

NEA:JJSisco:bg

DRAFTING DATE

8/4/70

TEL. EXT.

29588

APPROVED BY:

NEA:JJSisco

CLEARANCES:

S/S - Mr. Eliot

ROGERS

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(12)

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

45

[Handwritten mark]

30 Jul 70 23 51z

INDICATE:
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 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

7

STATE 123134

NODIS

SUBJECT: Jordanian Letter Containing Positive
Response to Peace Initiative


REF: Amman 3642

1. We reluctant show to others text of private GOJ
communication to us without first obtaining GOJ approval.
This should be left to GOJ for time being.

END

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:dmk	DRAFTING DATE 7/30/70	TEL. EXT. 22670	APPROVED BY: NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
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CLEARANCES:
NEA - Mr. Atherton *[initials]*
[signature] S/S - Mr. Levitsky



SECRET/EXDIS (Treat NODIS)

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

155203

70 SEP 22 AM 03 30z
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
8:55

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

STATE ~~155166~~ 155203

EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

REF: STATE 155166

Following is text of questions and answers delivered to Israeli Minister Argov at 10:30 EDT September 21:

QUOTE:

Q. Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?

A. We have indicated in our conversations our agreement in principle to the operation under discussion. If decisions are taken to conduct such an operation, they should be on the basis of those conversations and the fact that our common interests would be served.

Q. Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and

DRAFTED BY:

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TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

NEA/ADatherton/hlk

9/21/70

29588

NEA - Rodger P. Davies

NEA: JIS/iseo/
CLEARANCES:

The Secretary


S/S-O Sholly

White House - Dr. Kissinger

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

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ACTION:

coordination between us?

A. We do not know the answer to this question. Israel is aware of the informal exchange of messages between Deputy Prime Minister Allon and the King which we conveyed. With respect to ground operations, the only indication we have of the Jordan attitude on this question was a statement by Zaid Rifai to our Ambassador that Israeli QUOTE ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan. UNQUOTE. We are seeking clarification on this question from the King. Israeli air strikes have been requested or approved on several occasions by the King.

Q. How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

A. On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan.


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CLEARANCES:



Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

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ACTION:

Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this effect on September 20. We have and will continue to make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel's security and integrity and its right to live within defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for specific measures the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists at the time. We have contingency plans for these eventualities.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the


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CLEARANCES:



Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

7

Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defense?

A. We would be prepared to take the position publicly, including in the Security Council, that such action by Israel represented legitimate self-defense since the Syrian invasion of Jordan threatened Israel's security.

While we cannot state precisely how we would vote in the Security Council on any particular resolution in the absence of precise knowledge of terms of that resolution, we would be prepared to veto a resolution which condemned Israel for this act of self-defense.

Q. Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

A. The U.S. shall not hold Israel responsible for the fate of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against

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
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APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)



SECRET/EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

-5-

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION:

Syrian forces in Jordan.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

A. We agree that major U.S. policy statements on this matter would be made at the highest levels.

Q. Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

A. We believe that the oral answers to the above questions are clear and should not be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

END

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

[ROGERS]

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

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
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123393

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31 JUL 70 17 21z

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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
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Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE 123393

N O D I S

SUBJECT: US Middle East Initiative

REF: Paris 10046 (NOTAL)

1. We note expression concern by Pompidou to Ambassador Watson that failure our initiative could produce worse situation than before. Pompidou evoked specters of breakdown ceasefire, military escalation in spite of on-going political discussions, uncertainty about Soviet good faith, trouble from Nasser and demise for Hussein if Jerusalem problem not settled to their satisfaction, etc.

70 JUL 31 PM 4:28

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

APPROVED BY:

NEA/IAI:PHStackhouse:jm

7/31/70

20840

NEA:AIAtherton, Jr.

CLEARANCES:

E.J. Beigel

NEA:JJSisco (draft)

EUR/FRX:GORDON

S/S: Mr. Brewster

83



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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN et al

2 7

2. In further response to Pompidou's remarks Embassy Paris should speak along following lines at appropriate GOF level. Other addressee posts may draw on these points if faced by similar hand wringing.

3. US initiative has come at point in evolution Arab-Israel conflict when deterioration situation reaching landslide proportions. Intensity of military conflict had mounted steadily with new and most ominous note struck by introduction of Soviet combat forces into theater of Arab-Israel struggle this spring, with all this implied for Western interests in the area and in Europe itself. Tide of radicalism in Arab World had risen, threatening vitiate ability of Arab governments to settle on peaceful terms. Progress on diplomatic front was barely perceptible. Jarring's first mission had failed and Two and Four Power efforts--while hopefully they may yet contribute to success


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ACTION:

Amembassy AMMAN et al

3 7

of Jarring's ~~XX~~ second mission--were clearly inadequate to stem political and military devolution.

4. In short, US initiative has come at critical juncture. It is risky to make move; it is riskier to stand pat. Obstacles ahead are formidable and there are risks in failure. We do not believe, however, these risks are greater than if the deterioration had been permitted to go on without effective effort to break vicious circle of events in area by getting parties engaged in ceasefire and negotiations under Jarring's auspices. Now there just may be a way out of the vortex of the Arab-Israel conflict. We will be approaching our efforts to make Arab-Israel peace a reality with full awareness of the dangers of failure but also an overriding appreciation of the possibilities of success.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T
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
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70 JUL 28 AM 9:30

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INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN

STATE 120680

NODIS

SUBJECT: Positive GOJ Response to U.S. Peace Proposals

REF: Amman 3533 and 3534

1. In your further talks with GOJ officials on subject GOJ acceptance our peace proposals, you should ascertain what measures Jordanians plan to adopt re fedayeen in connection ceasefire undertaking. We note that Al-Ahram out of Cairo contends on July 27 that fact GOJ, unlike UARG, has never annulled original ceasefire undertaking makes it unnecessary for GOJ take any action at this time re ceasefire. While this no doubt intended to get GOJ off the hook view delicate relations with fedayeen, fact remains that 3-month ceasefire commitment applies to Jordanian-Israeli as well as UAR-Israeli frontier.

DRAFTED BY:

NEA/ARN:TWSeelye:mo

DRAFTING DATE

7/27/70

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22670

APPROVED BY:

NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

NEA/IAI - Mr. Stackhouse

NEA - Mr. Atherton

NEA/UAR - Mr. Smith

S/S - MR. BREWSTER



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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN - Page 2

2. We encouraged by FonMin Atallah's view that fedayeen unlikely make trouble (Amman 3534) but wonder whether reason for this judgment may be that GOJ has agreed, despite its acceptance our proposals, not RPT not to interfere with Palestinian "resistance" activities along border. Whatever you can uncover in this regard would be helpful. FYI. Realistically, we must recognize that Jordan's ability to ~~en~~ enforce ceasefire strictly is limited ~~and~~ ~~the xxx will have to be degree of tolerance.~~ END FYI.

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
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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN - PRIORITY

STATE 118965

NODIS

SUBJECT: Soviet Allegations That GOJ Has Accepted Our
Political Initiative

RF: State 118624

We are frankly puzzled by Dobrynin's contention that Jordan
Government, like UAR, has accepted our political initiative.
Accordingly, Charge' should contact Zaid Rifa'i and call this to his
attention. Charge' should ask Zaid whether Jordanians have indeed
privately communicated their position to Soviets without informing
us or whether Soviets have merely assumed Jordanian acceptance.

END

(ROGERS)

GP-3

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NEA/ARN:TWSeelye mo

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
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NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

NEA - Mr. Atherton *AS* S/S = Mr. Brown *WJH*



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	MOSCOW+	"
	PARIS	"
	USUN, NEW YORK	"

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STATE 118624

NODIS

1. Secretary, with Sisco and Dubs present, saw Dobrynin at latter's initiative to receive following oral statement, text of which left in writing by Dobrynin. Statement is Soviet acceptance of US peace proposal.

QTE The Soviet Union, as the Government of the United States is well aware, from the very start of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East has consistently sought a settlement of this conflict through political means on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. With this aim in mind the Soviet Union repeatedly introduced proposals directed towards practical implementation of this Resolution.

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NEA:JJSisco:mtb

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
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APPROVED BY:

Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:

S/S - Mr. ~~Vickroy~~ ^{NB} Brown



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~~QK~~ QTE The U.S. Government declares now that it agrees to a resumption of the mission of Ambassador Jarring, Special Representative of the UN ~~xxxxx~~ Secretary General in the Middle East. It is well known that the Soviet Government has always insisted on the necessity of carrying out the mission entrusted with Ambassador Jarring, that it put forward appropriate proposals to this end and made efforts so that his mission be effective enough.

QTE That is why the Soviet side not only holds no objections to this effect but, on the contrary, it ~~re~~ reiterates its position with regard to the necessity of resumption by Ambassador Jarring of his mission. Positively evaluating the possibilities in Ambassador Jarring's mission, we are ready to go on making our contribution in the future as well so that contacts between the sides through Jarring which could be resumed in the nearest future could produce positive results

QTE As we know, the Governments of the UAR and Jordan have expressed their readiness to cease fire for a definite

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
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period of time if Israel also takes upon herself the same obligation. The Soviet Government's attitude to this is positive.

QTE Undoubtedly, the success of Ambassador Jarring's activities requires that both sides unequivocally declare their readiness to implement the above mentioned ~~Resolution~~ Resolution of the Security Council in all its parts. The Soviet side hopes that the American side is being guided by the same motivations. The Governments of the UAR and Jordan have repeatedly stated and are confirming now that they are ready to implement the Resolution in all its parts. Therefore it is necessary that Israel should also clearly state her readiness to implement this Resolution. Otherwise the sides would find themselves in an unequal position: one of them does recognize the November Resolution of the Security Council and expresses its readiness to implement it while the other side ignores it.

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
QTE ~~xxx~~ At the same time in the interests of success of Jarring's mission it is important that he should have a definite enough understanding as to the basis upon which contacts should take place ~~bx~~ between the sides in search of ways to implement the Resolution of the Security Council. For the success of Jarring's mission first of all a direction is required on the main questions of settlement -- the withdrawal by Israel from the Arab territories occupied during the conflict of 1967, including ~~xxxx~~ the ~~question~~ ^{question} of secure and recognized boundaries along the lines which existed prior to the conflict in June 1967, and the simultaneous establishment of a just and stable peace in the Middle East. The U.S. Government, on its part, has also repeatedly emphasized the utmost importance of the above-mentioned questions. Both of these questions are organically connected with each other and should be considered jointly. Appropriate proposals to this effect have been put forward by the Soviet Government in the course

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of Soviet-American exchange of opinion on June 2 and also at the four-sided consultations in New York. The ~~XXXX~~ ~~XXX~~ American side has not given so far its reply to the above mentioned proposals --- neither in the course of bilateral exchange of opinion nor at the four-sided consultations. Yet these proposals are in complete conformity with the Security Council Resolution and the Soviet Government is expecting a reply from the U.S. Government.

QTE Parallel to the resumption of activities by Jarring and the initiation through him of contacts between the parties the four-sided consultations in New York should be made more active to work out agreed guidelines for Jarring. The Soviet Government on its part will be doing its best to facilitate it. END ~~XXX~~ QTE.

2. After reading above QTE Oral Statement UNQTE Dobrynin made following additional points:

1. USSR statement has been made in expectation US will make necessary efforts towards achieving a just political

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
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settlement of Middle East ~~and~~ problem and will exert its influence upon Israel.

B.X. Soviets have taken into consideration US clarifications that with Jarring's activities resumed, US-USSR bilateral consultations on Middle East will continue and US will show active and constructive approach both in Four and Two Power ~~talk~~ talks.

2. After thanking Dobrynin, Secretary recalled one of important considerations in our proposal regarding ceasefire was that each side would commit itself not to improve its military position. Secretary said we assume that a military standstill as part of the ceasefire is also acceptable to the Soviet Union. Dobrynin responded affirmatively adding QTE Yes, of course UNQTE; it was his understanding that Foreign Minister Riad's statement to the Secretary covered this point.

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
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3. Secretary asked whether Soviet side saw any objections to releasing Arab response to our initiative. Dobrynin replied it was his understanding that UAR did not intend to publicize its response; in any event, he suggested this matter be raised with the Egyptians. Secretary said it would be ~~xxx~~ helpful from our standpoint to make public simple acceptance UAR/~~acceptance~~ of our proposal. He understood Dobrynin's remarks to mean that ~~publicizing~~ publicizing response would be acceptable to the USSR if this matter could be worked out with the UAR. Dobrynin said that he did not anticipate any objections from the Soviet side. Secretary added that US would do its part in support of Jarring to bring about a settlement, and he indicated our willingness to continue Two and Four Power talks. Secretary said that he viewed Soviet's response as indication USSR was interested in a peaceful settlement; such a settlement would be in mutual US-USSR interest and in interest of world community.

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4. Dobrynin stressed USSR has no objections whatsoever to having Jarring resume his mission in few days. He wanted to be sure that US understood that comment in Oral Statement referring to absence of US reply to Soviet June 2nd proposals was not meant to be a Soviet precondition for resumption of Jarring's Mission. Dobrynin asked whether US Government had had any reply from Israel; Secretary indicated we would inform Dobrynin as soon as we could regarding this question.

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JUL 15 PM 11:43

CLASSIFICATION

ACTION: Embassy AMMAN PRIORITY

STATE 113298

NODIS

SUBJECT: Charge's Meeting with King

REF: Amman 3307

We detect from your reporting that the King's tone and mood and that of Zaid Rifai seem to be a bit better than they have been during the recent weeks of crises. Your next conversation, therefore, will afford an opportunity to bring them back to focussing once again on efforts to achieve a political settlement. We would suggest that you make the following points:

A. The U.S. initiative represents a new opportunity based on commitments of the parties. Our "stop-shooting and start-talking" proposal would require Israelis to make three concessions: limited rather than openhanded ceasefire, indirect negotiations at outset, and explicit commitment to principle of withdrawal from territories occupied during 1967 conflict, as expressed in UN Security Council resolution of November, 1967.

DRAFTED BY: NEA, Joseph J. Sisco:mhb:mhb /15/70 29588 NEA - Joseph J. Sisco
REFERENCES: LBT/lerton E NEA/ADN - M. ...



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In return, UAR and Jordan would be expected to reaffirm what they have already told us many times -- i.e., their commitment to establish peace with Israel based on the recognition of its right to exist within secure and recognized borders, as also expressed in SC resolution.


B. We do not claim this proposal is the final answer. Its purpose is to get the shooting stopped now and start the talking now which would help to energize the major power talks which over the past months have been proceeding more and more in vacuo and less relevant to the views of the parties. King therefore should understand that not only is our proposal aimed at getting parties started on an indirect dialogue under Jarring's auspices but he should bear in mind that we have always said that U.S. will be in a better position to develop more flexibility on Israeli side and to get them to take hard and ~~NECESSARY~~ necessary decisions in context of actual ongoing talks under Jarring's auspices. We make this promise to King: that if these talks get started US will be even more active

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diplomatically than it has in past in trying to achieve requisite flexibility in the positions of both sides.

Therefore, he should view our proposal as one which is also intended to breathe new life into major power talks, particularly those between US and Soviet Union.


C. In last few weeks Sisco-Dobrynin talks have largely focussed on full explanation of American initiative and its relationship to future ongoing bilateral talks. Formulations on peace given to us in June by Soviets and recently submitted to Four Power talks represent an advance on part of USSR, even though a very belated one. It was formulations along these lines that we were looking for and were led to believe would be forthcoming which led to our attempt to reflect common US-USSR positions in October 28 document and subsequently in closely related December 18th document dealing with Jordanian aspect of settlement. Had these formulations come in October, we might be in a much better position today than we are in terms of our objective of a political settlement.

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Nevertheless, we took this Soviet formulation into account in American initiative and if there is a positive reaction to our initiative from UAR and Jordan, King should be assured that we will try to build on these latest formulations in regard ongoing talks with USSR.

D. You should be equally candid with King regarding possible repercussions of a negative reaction. Regardless of all of the speculative stories that he has read, we are still awaiting a reply to our political initiative while continuing our restraint with respect to military assistance for Israel. What you conveyed to him regarding aircraft (notice we say aircraft, do not elaborate) still stands, even in face of increasing Soviet direct involvement and encroachments which we do not consider purely defensive. We have also gone ahead on Jordanian arms deal, and in this connection, you might reflect to King our continuing confidence in him and in his leadership. If the reaction is negative, the options for all concerned -- the parties in the area as well as the major


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powers -- will become increasingly more circumscribed.

F. You should try to convey as best you can the firm resolve which is reflected in this government in two ways: our intention to exhaust all possible ways to achieve a political solution; and our intention to remain engaged in the area to cope with both the Soviet political and military strategy in the area. We see a political solution as the only sensible answer and we wish to avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, it is well to remind all concerned, that while we continue to consider the Arab-Israeli dispute as the fundamental ~~difficulty~~ ^{difficulty} and the principal handle which the Soviet Union has utilized to derive unilateral advantage from turmoil in the area, we nevertheless continue to have both substantial political and military assets in the area. We intend to continue to pursue a policy of non-provocative firmness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as well as flexibility in our approach to a political settlement.

END

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(ADVANCE)

COUNTRY: JORDAN

- SUBJECT:
1. GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN PLANS FOR CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN.
 2. EVIDENCE THAT FEDAYEEN INTENDED TO OVERTHROW THE JORDANIAN REGIME.

1. HENCEFORTH THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ) WILL DEAL WITH ONLY ONE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION. ALL SYRIAN AND IRAQI FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING THOSE NOW BEING HELD BY THE JORDAN ARMY, WILL BE DEPORTED FROM JORDAN ON THE GROUNDS THEY ARE IN THE COUNTRY ILLEGALLY. IN THE FUTURE THERE WILL BE RIGID CONTROLS ON THE BORDERS AND NO ONE WILL BE ALLOWED INTO THE COUNTRY WITHOUT PASSING THROUGH NORMAL PROCEDURES. THE FEDAYEEN MILITIA PRESENT SOMETHING OF A SPECIAL PROBLEM IN THAT THEY ARE NOT FULL-FLEDGED MEMBERS OF THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS. THEY WILL BE ALLOWED TO REMAIN IN THE CITIES BUT THEIR ARMS ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED TO THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA BASES OUTSIDE THE CITIES. IN THE EVENT OF A SERIOUS ISRAELI ATTACK, THE MILITIA WILL GO TO THE BASES TO COLLECT THEIR ARMS. THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO RETAIN THEM IN THE CITIES.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
DLN 11-79/12473 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Hx: 7/12/2012
By RJ/MLA NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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#12473

00321130 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MORE RADICAL FEEDBACK ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE SEVERELY CURTAILED IN THE FUTURE. GEORGE HABBASH AND OTHERS LIKE HIM WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN JORDAN.

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3. GOJ OFFICIALS WERE ASTONISHED AT THE EXTENT OF THE PREPARATIONS THE FEDAYEEN HAD MADE PRIOR TO THE RECENT CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN. THE NETWORK OF DEFENSES WITH CONCRETE BUNKERS AND UNDERGROUND HEADQUARTERS, PARTICULARLY ON JEBAL HUSAYN, FOUND BY THE JORDAN ARMY, PLUS THE VERY DETAILED PLANS AND REPORTS THE FEDAYEEN HAD ON EVERY ARMY AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCE INSTALLATION IN AMMAN, CONVINCED GOJ OFFICIALS THAT THE FEDAYEEN WERE BENT ON OVERTHROWING THE REGIME. ONE MAP WHICH WAS CAPTURED DURING THE BATTLE SHOWED THE LOCATION OF EVERY GUARD POST AND EVERY DEFENSIVE WEAPON DEPLOYED AROUND THE JORDANIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS. IN THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, THE FEDAYEEN WERE PARTICULARLY ACTIVE IN TAKING UP POSITIONS IN STRATEGIC LOCATIONS IN THE CITY OF AMMAN. AMONG THE PHOTOS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY WERE VERY DETAILED AND PROFESSIONALLY PREPARED DAILY SITUATION REPORTS SHOWING THE STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF ARMY FORCES IN AND AROUND AMMAN. ([REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT SHOW INFORMATION INDICATING THE FEDAYEEN INTENDED TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON THE GOJ AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME, GIVEN THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE THIS WAS CERTAINLY THEIR LONG-RANGE INTENTION.)

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4. CASUALTIES, INCLUDING BOTH DEAD AND WOUNDED, DURING THE RECENT CRISIS PROBABLY TOTAL LESS THAN 2,000. AS OF 27 SEPTEMBER THE CIVIL DEFENSE AUTHORITIES HAD RECORDED SOME 476 DEAD AND 360 WOUNDED. THESE CASUALTIES CAME FROM ONLY THE JEBAL HUSAYN AND JEBAL LUWEBDAH AREAS. [REDACTED] A ROUGH ESTIMATE OF TOTAL CASUALTIES MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BY DOUBLING THESE FIGURES.)

5. [REDACTED] STATE ARMY CINCMEAFSA [REDACTED]

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COUNTRY: JORDAN/CHINA

SUBJECT: INDICATION OF COMMUNIST CHINESE PRESENCE IN JORDAN TO
SUPPORT COMMANDOS

1. IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1970, THE JORDANIAN ARMY CAPTURED TWO
COMMUNIST CHINESE AND THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT THREE OR FOUR MORE
CHINESE WERE "ON THE RUN." THE ARMY IS CURRENTLY SEARCHING FOR
THE ESCAPEES. [redacted] ALTHOUGH OTHER DETAILS OF THE
CAPTURE WERE NOT SPECIFIED, THE JORDANIAN ARMY PRESUMABLY
ARRESTED THE CHINESE BECAUSE OF THEIR ASSISTANCE TO THE COMMANDOS
IN JORDAN.)

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: IN MID-MAY 1970, [redacted])

WAS TOLD BY AN UNIDENTIFIED PALESTINIAN COMMANDO LEADER THAT THE CHIN-
ESE COMMUNISTS WERE ASSISTING THE PALESTINIAN COMMANDOS. THE COMMANDO
LEADER CLAIMED THAT COMMUNIST CHINESE PERSONNEL WERE LOCATED IN JORDAN
VALLEY WITH COMMANDO UNITS. [redacted] THE CHINESE
INFILTRATED JORDAN FROM "THE MUSCAT AREA" AND CAME DISGUISED AS TRADERS
AND BUSINESSMEN. THE COMMANDO LEADER CLAIMED TO HAVE SEEN SEVEN CHIN-
ESE IN THE JORDAN VALLEY AREA, AND INFERRED THAT THE CHINESE WERE SERV-
ING AS INSTRUCTORS TO THE COMMANDOS.)

3. [redacted]

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
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DIST 19 SEPTEMBER 1970

COUNTRY JORDAN

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJECT SUSPICION OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN SENIOR JORDANIAN OFFICIALS
AND FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN

1. RESPONSIBLE JORDANIAN LEADERS, INCLUDING KING HUSAYN, ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT SEVERAL SENIOR JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICERS AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONSPIRING WITH THE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP TO BRING ABOUT THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ). ONE OF THE SUSPECTS IS FORMER PRIME MINISTER 'ABD AL-MUNIM RIFA'I, MAINLY BECAUSE HE PERMITTED THE SITUATION TO DRIFT INTO CHAOS RATHER THAN TAKE FIRM MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN LAWLESSNESS EARLIER.

2. ANOTHER HIGH OFFICIAL WHO IS UNDER SUSPICION IS

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JORDANIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL MASHUR HADITHA AL-JAZI. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN, IT APPEARED THAT THE FEDAYEEN KNEW THE ARMY'S MILITARY PLANS AND THUS WERE ABLE TO COUNTER SUCCESSFULLY ANY ARMY EFFORT. BECAUSE OF THIS, ALL ARMY PLANS WERE SCRAPPED AND NEW ONES WERE DEVISED AND PUT INTO EFFECT.

3. A BORAD OF INQUIRY WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE THESE MATTERS AND SHOULD FACTS INDICATING A CONSPIRACY COME TO LIGHT, ARRESTS WILL BE MADE AND THOSE SUSPECTED WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL.

4. [Redacted]

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Palestinians sending representative to West Germany to work out separate deal on release of hostages.

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THE WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: SECRET SERVICE/ ID; TREASURY/ SAE)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE RCI
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (SY)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY (SE-1)
DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AOC/GRID SQUARE STAFF
COUNTRY: JORDAN/ UNITED KINGDOM/ WEST GERMANY

SUBJECT : PLANS OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT LONDON AND BONN TO DISCUSS THE RELEASE OF ARAB PRISONERS

1.

GAZI SAUDI OF

THE PALESTINIAN RED HALF MOON ORGANIZATION GOT IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY TO SAY THAT HE WAS LEAVING FOR LONDON ON 17 SEPTEMBER. HIS PURPOSE WAS TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL DETAILS CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF TWO ARABS UNDER ARREST THERE. HE INQUIRED WHETHER HE COULD GO TO BONN ON 18 OR 19 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS THE RELEASE OF THE ARABS IMPRISONED IN WEST GERMANY. HE PROPOSED THAT HE SHOULD TALK WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. SPD GENERAL MANAGER HANS JUERGEN WISCHNEWSKI IS IN AMMAN AS AN UNOFFICIAL EMISSARY.)

2.

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By [signature] NARA, Date 10/19/2016*

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In Deptel 152449 we asked you to indicate general sympathetic approach to possible requests from King for materiel aid. Now that he has moved you can be more explicit. Indicate we viewing his efforts sympathetically and would be prepared to be responsive to if he sees need to/~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ requests for resupply or any special equipment needed.

GP--3

END

ROGERS

Note: Passed White House by OG/T.

WHITE HOUSE
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Theodore L. Elliot Jr.

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
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151634Z

DIST 15 SEPTEMBER 1970

COUNTRY JORDAN

SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER ABD-AL-MUNIM RIFA'I'S VIEWS AND ACTIONS REGARDING
KING HUSAYN'S INTENTION TO BRING JORDAN ARMY INTO AMMAN

- TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. CLINE
- TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BENNETT
- TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFNIN, GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU
- TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER

(ADVANCE COPIES TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE ADDRESSEES SPECIFIED ABOVE.)

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(classification)

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COUNTRY: JORDAN

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER ABD-AL-MUNIM RIFA'I'S VIEWS AND ACTIONS REGARDING KING HUSAYN'S INTENTION TO BRING JORDAN ARMY INTO AMMAN.


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KING HUSAYN'S


JUDGMENT AS OF 12 SEPTEMBER THAT THE JORDAN ARMY WOULD TAKE MATTERS INTO ITS OWN HANDS IF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDAYEEN RESTRICTING FEDAYEEN PRESENCE AND BEHAVIOR IN URBAN CENTERS WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY IMPLEMENTED. IT ALSO REPORTED THE KING'S BELIEF THAT THE FEDAYEEN WERE PROBABLY INCAPABLE OR UNWILLING TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT IN A SATISFACTORY FASHION.

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
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AS A RESULT, THE KING PLANNED TO BRING THE ARMY INTO AMMAN ON A STRICTLY LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIS TO INSURE THAT LAW AND ORDER WERE MAINTAINED AND TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS THE KING PLANNED TO MAKE WHATEVER SHIFTS IN THE CABINET WHICH PRIME MINISTER ABD-AL-MUNIM RIFA'I THOUGHT WERE NECESSARY TO INSURE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THIS MOVE, INCLUDING THE ADDITION OF EX-PRIME MINISTER WASFI TAL, A KNOWN HARD-LINER REGARDING THE FEDAYEEN, IN SOME MINISTERIAL POST.)

2. THE KING'S PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED TO PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I THE EVENING OF 12 SEPTEMBER. RIFA'I DID NOT DISAGREE THAT FIRMER MEASURES, INCLUDING THE USE OF FORCE, MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND THAT CERTAIN CABINET CHANGES, INCLUDING THE ADDITION OF TAL, MIGHT BE NECESSARY. HE ADMITTED THAT FEDAYEEN PROMISES HAD FREQUENTLY PROVED HOLLOW AND THAT THE DIALOGUE WITH THE FEDAYEEN HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY STERILE. HE CITED, AS A RECENT EXAMPLE OF THIS, GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE FEDAYEEN TO EVACUATE CERTAIN BUILDINGS THEY OCCUPIED IN AMMAN WHICH WERE ADJACENT TO GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS. THE FEDAYEEN HAD REPLIED THEY WOULD EVACUATE THEIR BASES IF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD EVACUATE THE ADJACENT OFFICES. ON ANOTHER POINT THE FEDAYEEN



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REGULARLY REQUESTED THE FIRING OF A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT AND
MILITARY OFFICIALS WHOM THEY CONSIDERED OPPOSED TO THE FEDAYEEN
MOVEMENT. AS A TACTICAL RESPONSE TO THESE REQUESTS, RIFA'I HAD
ASKED FOR THE REMOVAL OF A NUMBER OF EXTREMIST FEDAYEEN LEADERS
AND ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS GEORGE HABBASH AND THE POPULAR FRONT
FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) AND NA'IF HAWATHMAH AND
THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE
(PDFLP). THE FEDAYEEN REPLIED THAT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE; THE
FORMER WERE TRAITORS AND THE LATTER WERE PATRIOTS. AS ANOTHER
EXAMPLE OF THE STERILITY OF THE DIALOGUE, RIFA'I SAID THAT HE
HAD WARNED THE FEDAYEEN THAT IF THEY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
AGREEMENT WHICH THEY HAD SIGNED, THE KING WOULD BE COMPLETELY
JUSTIFIED IN USING FORCE AGAINST THEM. THE FEDAYEEN RESPONSE
TO THIS HAD BEEN THAT IF THEY WERE NOT KILLED TODAY, THEY WOULD
BE KILLED TOMORROW, AND IF THEY WERE NOT KILLED BY THE JORDANIANS,
THEY WOULD BE KILLED BY THE ISRAELIS, AND IT MADE LITTLE DIFFERENCE
TO THEM WHICH OF THESE ALTERNATIVES OCCURRED. DESPITE THE
DIFFICULTIES IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE FEDAYEEN, RIFA'I TOLD THE
KING THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE FEDAYEEN WANTED A CONFRONTATION,
WHICH WOULD PROBABLY DESTROY THEM AND THAT HE WOULD, THEREFORE,

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LIKE ONE MORE CHANCE TO MEET WITH THEM TO SEE IF HE COULD NOT OBTAIN THEIR AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE RECENT AGREEMENT. RIFA'I SAID ANOTHER REASON HE WANTED ONE MORE CHANCE AT THIS WAS THAT HE BELIEVED THE UTILIZATION OF MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES AGAINST THE FEDAYEEN HAD MORE CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF IT OCCURRED AFTER THE PRESENT CRISIS HAD ABATED AND MUTUAL TENSIONS HAD DIMINISHED. THE KING AGREED BUT TOLD RIFA'I THAT THIS WOULD BE THE LAST CHANCE.

3. RIFA'I, A FEW MINISTERS, AND CHIEF OF PUBLIC SECURITY MET WITH THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS ON 13 SEPTEMBER. RIFA'I TOLD THE FEDAYEEN THAT UNLESS IMMEDIATE STEPS WERE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT, HE WOULD STEP DOWN FROM THE PREMIERSHIP AND OTHERS WHO WOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM MORE EFFECTIVELY WOULD REPLACE HIM. HE WARNED THAT THIS WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE. THE FEDAYEEN REPLIED WITH THEIR USUAL COUNTER-ARGUMENTS. WHEN RIFA'I THREATENED TO CLOSE THE MEETING AND REPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE KING, THEY BACKED DOWN A BIT AND ASKED WHAT PRECISELY IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT WANTED THEM TO DO AS OF THAT MOMENT. RIFA'I LISTED THE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH HE WANTED IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY:

- A. THE EVACUATION OF FIVE FEDAYEEN BASES ON JEBAL AMMAN

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LOCATED NEAR GOVERNMENT OFFICES.

B. THE CESSATION OF FEDAYEEN PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIME.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF ALL ARMED FEDAYEEN ON THE STREETS OF AMMAN AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL ROAD BLOCKS IN THE AREA.

D. THE CONVENING OF THE JOINT GOVERNMENT-FEDAYEEN COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE SYSTEMATIC ELIMINATION OF ALL FEDAYEEN BASES IN AMMAN.

THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS AGREED. IN THE PRESENCE OF THOSE ASSEMBLED THE FEDAYEEN SUMMONED THE EDITOR OF THE AL-FATAH NEWSPAPER AND THE DIRECTOR OF BROADCASTING FOR THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO CEASE ALL PROPAGANDA AND OTHER ATTACKS AGAINST JORDANIA' AUTHORITIES. THEY ALSO FORMED A JOINT CONTINGENT OF FEDAYEEN AND SECURITY OFFICIALS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY WHICH PROCEEDED TO THE FIVE FEDAYEEN BASES CITED BY RIFA'I AND EVACUATED ALL PERSONNEL. THEY THEN TELEPHONED THE PALESTINE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND AND ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM ALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS TO REMOVE ROAD BLOCKS AND THE PRESENCE OF ARMED FEDAYEEN ON THE STREETS. FINALLY, THEY ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE

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FEDAYEEN AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES LATER IN THE DAY TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTING THE REMAINING PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT.

4. THE EVENING OF 13 SEPTEMBER, RIFA'I RETURNED TO THE KING TO REPORT THE DAY'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE FOLLOWING ROYAL ADVISORS ATTENDED THE MEETING: PRINCE MUHAMMAD, CHIEF OF THE ROYAL DIWAN ZAYD RIFA'I, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE KING FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI, EX-PRIME MINISTER WASFI TAL, AND A MEMBER OF THE NEWLY-FORMED PRIVY COUNCIL, AHMAD TARAWANAH. RIFA'I DELIVERED HIS REPORT, BUT ALL OF THE ADVISORS CONSIDERED IT INSUFFICIENT IN TERMS OF FEDAYEEN PERFORMANCE TO WARRANT ANY ALTERATION IN THE KING'S ORIGINAL PLAN TO BRING IN THE ARMY. TAL WAS PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL IN INSISTING THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ADOPTING IMMEDIATELY A "RED EYE" POLICY UNDER A "RED EYE" GOVERNMENT. THE MAJOR ARGUMENT OF THE ADVISORS WAS THAT PAST EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT FEDAYEEN PROMISES WERE MEANINGLESS, THAT THEIR GESTURES AT IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS WERE SUPERFICIAL AND THAT THIS WOULD PROVE NO DIFFERENT. THEY, THEREFORE, URGED THAT THE KING PROCEED WITH HIS ORIGINAL PLAN. RIFA'I REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT DEFEND

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FEDAYEEN PROMISES OR PERFORMANCE AND THAT HE WAS NOT OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE KING'S PLAN; HE COULD ONLY ARGUE THE WISDOM OF THE TIMING. HE SAID HE FELT THAT HE COULD PROBABLY NEGOTIATE A TEMPORARY RETURN TO NORMALCY WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE KING AND OTHERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK THROUGH THEIR PLANS AND THEIR MOVES IN A NON-CRISIS ATMOSPHERE AND IMPLEMENT THEM, IF NECESSARY, UNDER MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS. AFTER MUCH DEBATE BETWEEN RIFA'I AND THE KING'S ADVISORS, THE KING AGREED TO GIVE RIFA'I "A FEW MORE DAYS" TO SEE IF FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED.

5. IN THE MIDST OF THIS RECONCILIATION EFFORT, ARMY UNITS IN THE IRBID AREA ATTACKED AND KILLED A NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN. THE FEDAYEEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, YASIR ARAFAT, IMMEDIATELY PROTESTED TO RIFA'I, PLACING THE BLAME FOR THE FAILURE OF ANY RECONCILIATION ON ANTI-FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS IN THE ARMY. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, RIFA'I AND ARAFAT AGREED THAT THE INCIDENT SHOULD BE CONTAINED. RIFA'I AGREED TO ISSUE A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT REGRETTING THE INCIDENT AND PROMISING AN INVESTIGATION. ARAFAT EXPLAINED THAT THESE INCIDENTS UNDERMINED HIM WITHIN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AND SEVERELY RESTRICTED HIS ABILITY TO

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COME TO ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND STILL RETAIN ANY INFLUENCE WITH THE OTHER FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. HOWEVER, HE AGREED TO CONTINUE WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FURTHER COMMITTEE MEETINGS TO IMPLEMENT THE BASIC AGREEMENT. A FEW SUBSEQUENT CLASHES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN HAVE SPOILED THE ATMOSPHERE SOMEWHAT, BUT RIFA'I AND ARAFAT ARE STILL IN AGREEMENT THAT THESE INCIDENTS SHOULD BE CONTAINED AND THAT THE ACCORD TO PURSUE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASIC AGREEMENT CONTINUE. RIFA'I IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS POLICY WILL RESULT IN MAINTENANCE OF THE OVER-ALL CEASE-FIRE AND ACHIEVE A TEMPORARY NORMALIZATION OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE IS WORRIED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MORE HAWKISH OF THE KING'S ADVISORS COULD STILL INDUCE THE KING TO BRING IN THE ARMY ON SHORT NOTICE.

6. [REDACTED] WHILE RIFA'I WAS WILLING TO FAVORABLY CONSIDER A SHUFFLE IN THE CABINET WHICH WOULD INCLUDE WASFI TAL, PRIOR TO RIFA'I'S MEETING WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND LATER WITH THE KING AND HIS ADVISORS ON 13 SEPTEMBER, HE IS LESS INCLINED TO DO SO FOLLOWING THESE MEETINGS. HIS REASONS ARE TWO-FOLD: FIRST, HE FELT THAT THE FEDAYEEN DID MAKE SOME TANGIBLE CONCESSIONS IN HIS 13 SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH THEM.

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(classification) (dissem. controls)

SECONDLY, HE WAS QUITE SHOCKED BY TAL'S AGGRESSIVENESS ON THE SUBJECT OF A HARD-LINE POLICY WHICH GAVE RIFA'I SECOND THOUGHTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE COULD COOPERATE WITH TAL IN THE SAME CABINET. RIFA'I FEARS THAT TAL'S REPUTATION AS AN ANTI-FEDAYEEN POLITICIAN AND THE POOR FAVOR IN WHICH HE IS HELD IN CAIRO, DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD COULD TRIGGER A CONFRONTATION BY THE MERE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS APPOINTMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY WHEN TENSIONS AND SUSPICIONS ARE ALREADY SO HIGH. ONE REASON FOR THE KING'S DESIRE TO INCLUDE TAL IN A CABINET IS TO PLACATE THE ARMY. TAL IS POPULAR WITH THE ARMY AND THE KING FEELS THAT HIS PRESENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT COULD PROVIDE THE ARMY WITH SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES TO CALM THEM. RIFA'I BELIEVES THAT IF THE KING GOES AHEAD WITH HIS PLAN, HE WOULD REPLACE CHIEF OF STAFF MASHUR HADITHA AL-JAZI WITH FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI, A LOYAL BUT RELATIVELY INCOMPETENT OLD-LINE BEDOUIN OFFICER. MAJALI WOULD SERVE MAINLY AS A FRONT MAN AND THE ARMY WOULD PROBABLY BE RUN BY THE PRESENT DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS SHARIF ZAYD BIN SHAKIR.)

7. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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see 10/5190

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
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11/7/2014



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DIST 3 SEPTEMBER 1970

COUNTRY JORDAN/IRAQ/ARAB STATES

03 17 17z SEP 70

SUBJECT ORDERS FROM BAGHDAD PLACING IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN UNDER THE
COMMAND OF FATAH LEADER YASIR ARAFAT

1. ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1970, THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN, COLONEL FARUQ AL- H A R I R I, SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED ORDERS FROM BAGHDAD STATING THAT IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN AND FATAH LEADER YASIR A R A F A T AND THAT HARIRI SHOULD ACCEPT NO ORDERS FOR WITHDRAWAL OR ENGAGEMENT, EXCEPT FROM BAGHDAD OR ARAFAT.

2. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT): THE ABOVE ORDERS ARE A FURTHER REFLECTION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

ND 11-79/12479 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) 4/7/12/2012
By RS/WML NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

[Redacted]

OF IRAQ'S REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT THE DECISION OF THE 5-6 AUGUST TRIPOLI CONFERENCE AT WHICH THE UNIFIED ARAB COMMAND WAS DISSOLVED AND ALL FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE THREE FRONTS (SYRIA, JORDAN AND UAR) WERE PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE HOST COUNTRY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONLY THE PLA FORCES ATTACHED TO THE IRAQI ARMY WERE COVERED BY THIS ORDER SINCE THE PLA FORCES ARE TECHNICALLY UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE PLO.)

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SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO RICHARD HELMS AND DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE MARKED EYES ONLY.

MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

~~SECRET~~

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1970

COUNTRY: JORDAN UAR/ USSR

SUBJECT: KING HUSAYN'S INTENTION TO INTERVENE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON ON BEHALF OF UAR PRESIDENT NASIR AT NASIR'S REQUEST

- TO DCI: EXCLUSIVE FOR RICHARD HELMS
- WHITE HOUSE: ATTENTION DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
- TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. RAY S. CLINE
- TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BENNETT
- TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCCHRISTIAN; NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER; AIR FORCE AFNIN, GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU
- TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER

1. DURING KING HUSAYN'S VISIT TO CAIRO 20-23 AUGUST 1970, UAR PRESIDENT

JAMAL 'ABD-AL-NASIR ASKED THE KING TO INTERCEDE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON ON NASIR'S BEHALF TO REASSURE PRESIDENT NIXON THAT NASIR WAS PREPARED TO COMMIT HIMSELF COMPLETELY TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. NASIR TOLD THE KING TO

TELL PRESIDENT NIXON THAT IN NASIR'S OPINION, IF A MIDDLE EAST PEACE SETTLEMENT WERE NOT ACHIEVED THE AREA WOULD INEVITABLY TURN INTO CHAOS WITH EVERY BREED OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ALIEN POWER, INCLUDING THE COMMUNIST CHINESE, INTERVENING AND COMPETING TO SERVE ITS OWN INTERESTS

NASIR SAID THIS EVENTUALLY WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR EVERYONE. NASIR ADDED THAT THE KING COULD TELL PRESIDENT NIXON THAT THE DAY AFTER A PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, THE UAR WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE THE SOVIET PRESENCE FROM THE UAR SINCE THERE WOULD NO LONGER BE ANY NEED FOR THEM AND HE WAS NOT THAT HAPPY ABOUT HAVING THE SOVIETS IN THE UAR EVEN UNDER THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SITUATION.

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By RJ/WIA NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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#12450

JORDAN'S. THE KING PLANS TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FORTH-
COMING UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING. THE KING DOES NOT WISH TO BE IN
THE UNITED STATES AT THE SAME TIME ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER GOLDA MEIR
IS THERE,

SO HE PLANS TO ARRIVE IMMEDIATELY AFTER HER DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED
STATES, THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER 1970. THE KING EXPECTS TO MAKE AN
APPEARANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS BUT WILL NOT BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED
IN THE JARRING NEGOTIATIONS. THE KING HOPES TO SEE PRESIDENT NIXON AT
HIS CONVENIENCE AFTER THE KING'S APPEARANCE AT THE UN. THE VISIT
WOULD BE STRICTLY UNOFFICIAL. THE KING IS CONVINCED, AFTER SEVERAL
HOURS OF RENEWED TALKS WITH NASIR, THAT HE IS COMPLETELY SINCERE IN HIS

DESIRE FOR PEACE AND HE WILL GO TO EVERY REASONABLE LENGTH TO COOPERATE

IN ACHIEVING IT.

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
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
DIST 26 AUGUST 1970

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

COUNTRY: OCCUPIED JORDAN

SUBJECT: ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) BUILD-UP IN THE
SOUTHERN JORDAN VALLEY



1. THERE HAS BEEN LARGE BUILD-UP OF IDF IN SOUTHERN JORDAN VALLEY FROM DEAD SEA TO DAMIYA BRIDGE BEGINNING 20 AUGUST 1970 CONSISTING OF TROOPS, TANKS, HALF-TRACKS, PERSONNEL CARRIERS, AMMUNITION, LAND ROVERS AND COMMUNICATIONS VEHICLES.

THIS IS THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF IDF IN THE AREA SINCE THE 21 MARCH 1968 STRIKE AGAINST KARAMAH.) IDF/PRESENTLY CONDUCTING MANEUVERS IN AREA NABI MUSA (3147N-3526E) SOUTH TO DEAD SEA BUT BUILD-UP/NOT RELATED TO THESE MANEUVERS.

EXPLOSIONS FROM NIGHT TRAINING EXERCISES HAVE BEEN HEARD NIGHTLY

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PLN/1-79/12-48/PLC/SEC. 3.3(b)(1) Hr: 7/12/2012
By RS/WMH/NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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OF
SINCE 23 AUGUST IN OUTER LIMITS (EAST JERUSALEM.)

2. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF JERICHO HAS BEEN MAKING DAILY TRIPS THROUGHOUT THE VALLEY AND RECENTLY INFORMED JERICHO RESIDENTS HE HAD NO TIME FOR SOCIAL AMENITIES. THE OTHER MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN JERICHO HAVE ALSO BEEN BUSIER THAN USUAL. THE MORNING OF 25 AUGUST 1970 A HIGH-RANKING IDF GENERAL WITH AN ESCORT OF TEN VEHICLES, INCLUDING A COMMUNICATION VEHICLE, MADE AN INSPECTION IN THE ALLENBY BRIDGE AREA. HELICOPTERS FLY OVER THE AREA SEVERAL TIMES EACH DAY. TEN MOBILE BRIDGES FOR CROSSING THE RIVER JORDAN ARE LOCATED IN THE VALLEY BETWEEN THE DEAD SEA AND THE DAMIYA BRIDGE. THE AREA FROM JERICHO TO WADI AL AWJA WAS BRISTLING WITH IDF ACTIVITY ON 24 AUGUST.

3. [Redacted] AS THE SOUTHERN JORDAN VALLEY HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET FOR THE PAST TEN DAYS EXCEPT FOR KATYUSHA FIRE ON NAHAL KALIA AT THE NORTH END OF THE DEAD SEA THE MORNING OF 22 AUGUST, THE BUILD-UP MUST BE RELATED TO THE SITUATION IN JORDAN. THE IDF WOULD PROBABLY MOVE ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER IF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AND THE FEDAYEEN RESULTED IN IRAQI

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SUPPORT TO THE FEDAYEEN AND IT APPEARED THAT KING HUSAYN
WOULD LOSE.)

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
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DATE DISTR. 14 August 1970

COUNTRY Jordan/UAR

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJECT King Husayn's Scheduled Meeting With UAR President Jamal Abd-al-Nasir in Cairo on 20 August 1970

HX

1. King Husayn intends to visit Cairo on 20 August for discussions with UAR President Jamal Abd-al-Nasir before moving ahead with rigid implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the related issues connected with fedayeen behavior in Jordan. The King realizes that Nasir would not have accepted the American peace proposal and the cease-fire agreement had he not had some assurances of a favorable outcome. The King is confident that Nasir has made some agreement or reached some understanding with the Soviets about the specifics of a settlement which, obviously, concern Jordan as much as anyone else. The details of this, plus Jordan's future policy regarding fedayeen and Iraqi forces in Jordan, will be the main topics for discussion during the Husayn/Nasir meeting.

2.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

NOV 11-79/12483 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) tr. 7/12/2012
By RS/WJH NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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
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DATE DISTR. 14 August 1970

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DIST 10 AUGUST 1970

COUNTRY: JORDAN/UAR/SYRIA/IRAQ/ARAB STATES

AK

- SUBJECT:
1. UAR WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT TO JORDAN AGAINST IRAQI OR PALESTINIAN COMMANDO AGGRESSION
 2. ACTIVE UAR EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW THE IRAQI REGIME
 3. COVERT SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS

1. IN A PRIVATE MEETING ATTENDED BY UAR MINISTER OF WAR MUHAMMAD F A W Z I, JORDANIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE 'ABD AL-WAHHAB

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(classification) (dissem controls)

AL- M A J A L L I, AND JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANTUN A T A L L A H, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING A RECESS IN THE CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS OF ARAB STATES CONFRONTING ISRAEL HELD IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA, 5-6 AUGUST 1970, FAWZI PRESENTED ATALLAH WITH A WRITTEN GUARANTEE OF UAR MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE EVENT OF IRAQI OR COMBINED IRAQI-PALESTINIAN COMMANDO AGGRESSION AGAINST JORDAN OR ISRAEL. THE DOCUMENT URGED JORDAN TO CONFRONT, WITH ALL ITS FORCE, ANY IRAQI OR JOINT IRAQI-COMMANDO AGGRESSION FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY AGAINST ISRAEL. IT PLEDGED THAT THE UAR WOULD PROVIDE SUCH LAND OR AIR FORCES REQUIRED BY JORDAN TO HALT THE AGGRESSION. THE UAR GUARANTEE ALSO COVERED ANY AGGRESSION BY IRAQI OR COMBINED IRAQI-COMMANDO FORCES AGAINST JORDAN.

FAWZI INTIMATED TO ATALLAH THAT THE UAR BELIEVED IRAQ WOULD TRY TO WRECK THE CURRENT PEACE TALKS THROUGH SOME ACT OF AGGRESSION.)

2. IN THE COURSE OF THE FAWZI-ATALLAH DISCUSSIONS ON THE UAR GUARANTEE, FAWZI SAID THE UAR WAS NOW WORKING WITH ANTI-REGIME FORCES INSIDE IRAQ FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME. IN THIS CONNECTION,


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
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

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
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FAWZI ADMITTED

THAT THE UAR DID NOT HAVE MANY ASSETS IN IRAQ AND ASKED ATALLAH AND AL-MAJALLI TO USE THEIR RESOURCES TO SUBVERT IRAQI OFFICERS STATIONED IN JORDAN. FAWZI SAID HIS INFORMATION INDICATED THAT THERE WAS DISSENSION WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE IRAQI OFFICERS STATIONED IN JORDAN AND SYRIA BECAUSE, IN FACT, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT INSISTED ON IRAQI FORCES BEING HELD IN RESERVE STATUS RATHER THAN ON THE FRONT LINE, AND UAR RADIO ATTACKS ON IRAQI RELUCTANCE TO FIGHT ISRAEL HAD STRUCK HOME. FAWZI SAID A COMBINED EFFORT OF UAR ASSETS INSIDE IRAQ, AND JORDANIAN SUBVERSION OF IRAQI TROOPS, WOULD AT BEST TOPPLE THE IRAQI REGIME, OR AT LEAST PREVENT IRAQ FROM ATTEMPTING TO WRECK THE PEACE TALKS. FAWZI PROMISED THAT THE UAR WOULD PROVIDE ANY MEANS JORDAN MIGHT NEED FOR SUBVERSION.

3. DURING THE 5-6 AUGUST TRIPOLI CONFERENCE OF ARAB CONFRONTATION STATES, SYRIA ANNOUNCED /ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES



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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

PEACE PROPOSALS. [Redacted] DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER AND
 CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL MUSTAFA T A L A S HEADED THE SYRIAN
 DELEGATION TO THE TRIPOLI CONFERENCE.) THE SYRIANS SAID SYRIA COULD
 NOT ANNOUNCE THIS PUBLICLY, FOR TWO REASONS, AND ASKED THE DELEGATES
 TO REFRAIN FROM OVERT ANNOUNCEMENT OF SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE. THE SYRIANS
 SAID THE BASIS OF THEIR POLICY HAS BEEN HATRED OF ANYTHING AND
 EVERYTHING AMERICAN. THE SYRIAN MASSES AND THE MILITARY WERE
 COMPLETELY BRAINWASHED IN THIS CONNECTION. THEREFORE, ACCEPTANCE OF
 THE PROPOSAL, PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WAS A U.S. PROPOSAL, AND NOT A JOINT
 SOVIET-U.S. PROPOSAL, WOULD CAUSE TURMOIL IN THE COUNTRY. SECONDLY,
 THE SYRIAN DELEGATION SAID IRAQ WAS ACTIVELY PLANNING A COUP IN
 SYRIA. THE SYRIANS PRESENTED CAPTURED DOCUMENTS SHOWING A TWO-
 PRONGED IRAQI EFFORT. ONE DOCUMENT SHOWED EVIDENCE OF CONTACTS
 BETWEEN SYRIAN BA'TH PARTY DISSIDENTS AND DAMASCUS AND EX-SYRIAN
 BA'THI LEADER MICHEL 'A F L A Q, AND ANOTHER SHOWED EVIDENCE OF
 ATTEMPTS BY IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN SYRIA TO SUBVERT SYRIAN ARMY
 OFFICERS. THE SYRIANS STATED THAT THEIR OVERT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRO-
 POSAL MIGHT AID IRAQI PLOTS.

4. [Redacted]


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
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
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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJECT: DISORGANIZATION WITHIN THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS
AS A RESULT OF JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. PEACE
PROPOSAL.



1. AT THE MOMENT MANY FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN ARE DISORGANIZED AND UNSURE OF WHAT COURSE OF ACTION THEY SHOULD TAKE. JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF SECRETARY ROGERS' PEACE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY LEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALITIES ON THE WEST BANK AS WELL AS IN JORDAN ITSELF. THIS WIDE ACCEPTANCE IS HAVING ITS EFFECT, AND ALREADY SOME FEDAYEEN ARE LEAVING THE FEDAYEEN RANKS IN SEARCH OF OTHER EMPLOYMENT. THEY REALIZE THAT AS A POLITICAL SOLUTION IS PURSUED IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO WAGE AN ARMED STRUGGLE AGAINST



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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NW11-79/12485 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Hr: 7/12/2012
By RJ WALT NARA, Date 10/19/2016

#12485

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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(classification)

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BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND OTHER ARABS. AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR GENERAL DISARRAY, ON 4 AUGUST ELEMENTS OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE WERE FIGHTING IN IRBID WITH MEMBERS OF AHMAD ZARUR'S PRO-NASIR ARAB PALESTINE ORGANIZATION AND ISSAM SARTAWI'S ACTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. THESE SAME FEDAYEEN WERE FIGHTING ONE ANOTHER AGAIN ON 5 AUGUST IN THE AJLUN AREA.

2. THE CONSENSUS OF GOJ OPINION IS THAT THE NEXT THIRTY DAYS WILL BE CRUCIAL FOR JORDAN IN TERMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE FEDAYEEN. IT IS EXPECTED THAT AS THE PEACE TALKS GET UNDERWAY FURTHER CRACKS WILL APPEAR IN THE FEDAYEEN RANKS. THIS WILL MARK THE BEGINNING OF A SLOW BUT STEADY DISINTEGRATION PROCESS WHICH WILL REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GOJ AND THE FEDAYEEN.

3. [Redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

28 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Further Jordanian-UAR Discussions on the American Peace Initiative

The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report describes the 25-26 July visit of UAR Presidential envoy Hasan Sabri al-Khuli to Jordan during which al-Khuli relayed a personal message from UAR President Nasir to King Husayn regarding the UAR response to the recent American peace initiative.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Enclosure:

[Redacted]


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NND 11-79/12486 per sec. 3.3(b)(1) Pr: 7/12/2012
By [Signature] NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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Distribution: The Director of Central Intelligence
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Jordan/UAR/USSR

DATE 28 July 1970

SUBJECT

Further Jordanian-UAR
Discussions on the American Peace Initiative

1. UAR Presidential advisor Hasan Sabri al-Khuli arrived in Amman on 25 July with a message from UAR President Jamal Abd-al-Nasir to King Husayn. The message was Nasir's response to questions and comments which had arisen during discussions between King Husayn and UAR Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Salah Gohar (Jawhar) on 22 July when the UAR response to the American peace initiative was presented to the King. The points which arose during the meeting with Gohar, to which Nasir's message was directed, were the following:

- a. Jordanian displeasure over Nasir's failure to consult with Jordan in advance regarding the UAR reply to the United States.
- b. The relative roles of the UAR and the USSR in framing the UAR response to the Americans.
- c. Jordan's request for the UAR's support in the event of a confrontation between Jordanian authorities and the fedayeen over Jordan's positive response to the American proposals.

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2. On behalf of Nasir, al-Khuli explained that there were two reasons why the UAR did not consult with Jordan before giving the UAR response to the United States. First, as Gohar had explained, there was no time for consultation between Nasir's return from Moscow and his 23 July speech at which he intended to announce his decision. Second, Nasir had felt quite sincerely that the King would be in a better position if Nasir made a unilateral declaration of acceptance without consulting the Jordanians, since this would permit the King to blame everything on Nasir. Nasir said he was quite willing to let the King do this if it would help his position with the fedayeen or with the other Arab states.

3. Regarding the relative roles of the Soviets and the UAR in framing the UAR unconditional response, al-Khuli said Gohar had described his discussions with the King on this subject to Nasir. Gohar admitted to Nasir he had been evasive but had left the Jordanians with the impression that the Soviets had exerted pressure on the UAR to give an unconditional acceptance to the Americans. Al-Khuli told the King that Nasir wanted Jordan to know that he had criticized Gohar for giving evasive answers on this subject since this was no way to behave with the King. Al-Khuli went on to tell the King that Nasir wanted him to know that actually the Soviets had recommended amendments in the text of the American proposal but that he, Nasir, had argued that the proposal should either be accepted in toto or not at all. Nasir had argued that if the UAR made amendments Israel would certainly do the same, and this process could go on indefinitely until the proposal no longer had American support. Nasir had, therefore, recommended that the proposal be accepted unconditionally on the ground that this was the only way the United States and Israel could be put to the test. According to al-Khuli, the Soviets finally agreed. [redacted] At this point the Jordanians are not sure whether the UAR's unconditional acceptance of the American proposal was at Nasir's or at the Soviet's initiative. In any event the Jordanians do not care that much and they have the distinct impression that regardless of whose initiative was involved, the Soviets and Nasir were not that far apart to begin with. Whether the Gohar version that Soviet pressure was exerted is true or not, it is obvious that Nasir wants the Jordanians to believe that the decision was his.)

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4. Finally, al-Khuli said he wanted to give the Jordanians Nasir's assurance that he would support Jordan publicly and in any other way he could if a confrontation developed between the fedayeen and Jordanian authorities. Al-Khuli stressed again that the Jordanians had Nasir's approval to blame him for accepting the American proposal, thereby leaving Jordan with the excuse it had no choice but to follow suit. [redacted] The King and Prime Minister Abd-al-Munim Rifa'i have, in fact, used this argument with the cabinet and the fedayeen leaders with whom it has proved to be quite an effective and protective ploy.

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
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DIST 27 JULY 1970

COUNTRY: JORDAN

SUBJECT: AL FATAH'S VIEWS ON JORDAN'S POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES' PEACE PROPOSALS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST.



1. IF AL FATAH IS LEFT ALONE AND PERMITTED TO CONTINUE GUERRILLA RAIDS INTO ISRAEL, THERE WILL BE NO CLASH WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ) EVEN SHOULD IT ACCEPT SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS' PEACE PROPOSALS. IF THE GOJ ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT RAIDS INTO ISRAEL, IN ORDER TO EFFECT A CEASE FIRE, THERE WILL BE A WAR BETWEEN ALL THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FORCES OF THE GOJ. THE FEDAYEEN WOULD NOT WAIT FOR THE GOJ TO MOVE AGAINST THEM, BUT WOULD STRIKE FIRST.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526, Section 3.5 12/11/80 12487 per Sec. 3.3(b)(1) Rev. 4/30/2012 By RST/WHH NARA, Date 10/17/2016

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
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10/21/2014

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DIST 21 JULY 1970

COUNTRY JORDAN/UAR/ARAB STATES

SUBJECT FAILURE OF THE UAR TO CONSULT WITH JORDAN REGARDING REPLY TO RECENT UNITED STATES PEACE INITIATIVE

- TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO DR. RAY S. CLINE
- TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL BENNETT
- TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL MCCHRISTIAN;
NAVY ACNO (INTEL), ADMIRAL HARLFINGER;
AIR FORCE AFNIN, GENERAL TRIANTAFELLU
- TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL GAYLER

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NND 8012499, per sec. 3.3(b)(1) fr. 4/30/2012
By TSWIN/NARA, Date 12/19/2016

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(classification)

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(dissem controls)

1. THE UAR HAS JUST INFORMED JORDAN THAT UAR FOREIGN MINISTER MAHMUD R I A D WILL NOT BE MAKING HIS EXPECTED VISIT TO AMMAN TO CONSULT ON A JOINT UAR/JORDAN REPLY TO THE UNITED STATES RECENT PEACE INITIATIVE. INSTEAD SALAH G O H A R WILL COME TO AMMAN ON 22 JULY TO PRESENT TO THE JORDANIANS THE UAR'S UNILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE, WHICH THE UAR INTENDS TO DELIVER TO THE UNITED STATES THE SAME DAY (22 JULY).

2. THIS SWITCH IN TACTICS AND PROCEDURE BY THE UAR, FROM PLANNED CONSULTATIONS AND ISSUANCE OF A JOINT RESPONSE TO AN UNCOORDINATED UNILATERAL UAR RESPONSE, HAS PERPLEXED AND SERIOUSLY ANNOYED KING H U S A Y N AND OTHER JORDANIAN OFFICIALS. THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY OFFENDED AT BEING TAKEN FOR GRANTED ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER. ALTHOUGH THE JORDANIANS AS YET HAVE NO SPECIFICS ON UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL 'ABD AL-N A S I R 'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW, THE FEW GENERAL REPORTS THEY HAVE RECEIVED LEAD THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THE UAR REPLY TO THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE UNFAVORABLE. THE JORDANIANS ARE SORELY TEMPTED TO BE AS UNCOOPERATIVE IN ENDORSING THE UAR REPLY AS THE UAR WAS IN PREPARING IT, JUST TO TEACH NASIR A LESSON. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE NASIR CAN GO IT ALONE, ON A CONCILIATORY COURSE, ANY MORE THAN THE JORDANIANS CAN,

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PARTICULARLY IF THE JORDANIANS CRITICIZE HIM FOR IT. HOWEVER, WHILE THE JORDANIANS WILL MAKE THESE VIEWS KNOWN TO THE UAR IN PRIVATE THEY WILL MAINTAIN A PUBLIC IMAGE OF UNITY AND REACT AS POSITIVELY AS THEY CAN TO THE AMERICAN INITIATIVES.

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ING OFFICER ONLY) []

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12547]

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EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 256 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mjh
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12548]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 257 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM / *mlh*
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12549]

(2 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 258 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM *lmlh*
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12550]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 259 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mlh
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12551]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 260 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mH
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12552]

(8 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 261 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mjh
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12553]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 262 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM/mjh
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12554]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 263 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mjh
10/8/2014

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 TO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 6461
 INFO RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9384
 RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
 RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1097
 RUQMVV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 7182
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 9935
 RUEAXBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN 2569
 RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9725
 RUEIVC/USINT CAIRO 5895
 RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 7299
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 159169

TOSEC 1

SUBJECT: HIJACKING HOSTAGES

1. UK AMBASSADOR FREEMAN INFORMED DEPARTMENT 1530 WASHINGTON-
 TIME THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FOLLOWING INFO FROM LONDON WHICH
 HE INSTRUCTED PASS USG:

A. HMG PREPARED RELEASE LEILA KHALED TO UAR CUSTODY ONCE SIX
 REMAINING HOSTAGES ARE SAFELY OUT OF JORDAY. THIS DECISION TAKEN
 BECAUSE OF LEGAL COMPLICATIONS FOR UK IF SHE RETAINED IN BRITISH
 CUSTODY, BECAUSE OF EARLIER PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF BRITISH WILL-
 INGNESS TO EXCHANGE HER AND BECAUSE OF ROLE PLAYED BY UARG IN
 HELPING OBTAIN RELEASE OF REMAINING HOSTAGES.

B. UK AMBASSADOR CAIRO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PASS FOREGOING
 TO UARG.

C. BRITISH WILL MAKE NO REPEAT NO PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF DECISION
 RELEASE LEILA KHALED UNTIL SIX REMAINING HOSTAGES ARE SAFELY
 OUT OF JORDAN.

2. AMBASSADOR FREEMAN SAID HE HOPED USG WOULD UNDERSTAND REASONS
 FOR THIS DECISION. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S URGING DURING THEIR
 CONVERSATION EVENING SEPTEMBER 26 THAT THEY SHOULD HOLD OUT
 TO SEE WHETHER UNCONDITNONAL RELEASE POSSIBLE, FREEMAN HAD WITH
 SOME SUCCESS DONE WHAT HE COULD TO URGE DELAY ON LONDON AND
 TO DISSUADE HMG FROM PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

3. AMBASSADOR FREEMAN ADDED THAT HMG CONSULTING SWISS AND GERMAN
 GOVERNMENTS WITH SUGGESTION THAT THEY MAY SIMILARLY WISH TO
 DISPOSE OF FEDAYEEN PRISONERS THEY HOLD. IRWIN
 BT

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12555]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 265 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM/wjh
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12556]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 266 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM/mjh
10/8/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12557]

(2 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 267 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DM /mit
10/8/2014

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12558]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 268 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mih
10/17/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12559]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 269 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB / WMLH
10/17/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12560]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 270 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB/wlh
10/17/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12561]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 271 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mjh
10/17/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12562]

(4 pp.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 272 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB *myA*
10/17/2014

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 SCA-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00
 DODE-00 DOT-12 E-15 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10
 NSCE-00 O-03 OC-06 PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00
 USSS-00 SY-03 SCS-04 P-03 RSR-01 /148 W

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P 301430Z SEP 70
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1801
 INFO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMEMBASSY BERN
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5475

SUBJECT: HOSTAGES

DURING AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH LAST SIX HOSTAGES OF
 SEPTEMBER 29, VARIOUS DETAILS OF THEIR CAPTIVITY EMERGED. UNDER
 CIRCUMSTANCES, OBVIOUSLY, NO SYSTEMATIC ATTEMPT TO DEBRIEF
 WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE, BUT FOLLOWING GLEANINGS PASSED
 ON FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFO:

1. SIX SEPARATED FROM REST OF PASSENGERS MONDAY EVENING, ON
 DAY AFTER HIJACKING. THEY TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO IRBID WHERE ON
 WAY THEIR CAPTORS MANAGED SUCCESSFULLY TO GET THEM PAST ARMY
 CHECKPOINT. REMAINED IN IRBID UNTIL LAST DAY OF CAPTIVITY,
 ALTHOUGH FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY THEY WERE AFTER 3-4 DAYS
 CAPTIVITY MOVED TO MORE SECURE AND PARTLY UNDERGROUND STRUCTURE.
 SEVERAL TIMES THEY MENTIONED JAA ARTILLERY STRIKES AS FALLING
 NEAR THEM.
2. PERSON IN COMMAND THEIR UNIT - AAACH IN IRBID APPEARED
 TO NUMBER 100 - WAS REGULAR OFFICER SECONDED FROM IRAQI
 ARMY. ALL CAPTIVES APPEARED IMPRESSED BY HIS LEADERSHIP

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12563]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 274 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB/wll
10/17/2014

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**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12564]
(4 pp.)**

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 275 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB/wlt
10/17/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12565]

(2 pp.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 276 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB JMH
10/17/2014

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ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12566]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 277 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mjh
10/17/2014

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-81 [ID: 12567]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(3), 3.5(f), ltr. 6/8/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 278 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mjh
10/17/2014