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DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
005	memo	**HAK to the President** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12446 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1); HR. 1/11/05	9/28/1970	B
011	memo	**Situation Report: Jordan** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12447 Pages: 3 SANITIZED per 3.4(b)(1)(6); HR. 2/7/03	9/26/1970	B
015	memo w/attach	**Kissinger to Nixon** MR Case ; Doc. ID 15139 Pages: 6 DECLASSIFIED per HR 4/10/2014	9/25/1970	B
017	memo	**Situation Report: Jordan** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12448 Pages: 3 SANITIZED per PAC Review 6/12/08	9/24/1970	B
~~018~~	~~memo~~	~~**Situation Report: Jordan -- Supplement**~~ MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12449 Pages: 1 DECLASSIFIED per PAC 6/12/08	~~9/24/1970~~	~~B~~
019	memo	**Prospects for Hussein and Jordan** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12450 Pages: 10	9/24/1970	B
020a	cable	**Jordan/Iraq/Syria** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12451 Pages: 2 Exempted per 3.4(b)(1)(6); HR. 2/7/03	9/23/1970	B
021f	memo	**Situation Report: Jordan** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12452 Pages: 4	9/23/1970	B
022	memo	**Kissinger to Nixon** MR Case ; Doc. ID 15168 Pages: 6 SANITIZED per 3.4(b)(1); HR. 2/24/2016	9/22/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East** — **Box 0615**

FOLDER TITLE: **[01] JORDAN, Vol. V, July 1- September 30, 1970 [1 of 2]**

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026	memo	**Situation Report: Jordan** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12453 Pages: 3	9/22/1970	B
~~027~~	memo	~~Kissinger to Nixon~~ DECLASSIFIED MR Case ; Doc. ID 15140 per Hr. 12/10/2014 Pages: 2	~~9/21/1970~~	~~B~~
~~029~~	memo w/attach	~~Kissinger to Nixon~~ DECLASSIFIED MR Case ; Doc. ID 15141 per Hr. 12/10/2014 Pages: 4	~~9/20/1970~~	~~B~~
~~031~~	~~memo~~	~~Saunders to Kissinger~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15142 DECLASSIFIED per Hr. 12/10/2014 Pages: 3	~~9/19/1970~~	~~B~~
032	memo	**Kissinger to the President** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12454 Pages: 5 SANITIZED per 3.4(b)(1); Hr. 10/15/01	9/19/1970	B
037	memo	**Fazio to Haig** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12455 Pages: 1	9/17/1970	B
038	memo	**Haig to Kissinger** MR Case NLN 11-77; Doc. ID 12456 Pages: 3 SANITIZED per 3.4(b)(1); Hr. 2/7/03	9/17/1970	B
042	report	**Middle East Sitrep. No. 31** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12457 Pages: 2	9/17/1970	B
043	report	**Situation Report (12 00 EDT)** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12458 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per 3.4(b)(1)(6); Hr. 2/7/03	9/16/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

Box 0615

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DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
044	report	**Middle East Sitrep. No. 30** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12459 Pages: 1	9/16/1970	B
045	report	**Middle East Sitrep. No. 29** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12460 Pages: 2	9/16/1970	B
047	memo	**Sitation Report (0800 EDT)** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12461 Pages: 2	9/16/1970	B
049	report	**Middle East Sitrep. No. 27** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12462 Pages: 2	9/15/1970	B
050	report	**Middle East Sitrep. No. 26** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12463 Pages: 1	9/15/1970	B
052	memo	**Situation Report (2100 EDT)** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12464 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per RAC 9/8/08	9/15/1970	B
053	report	**Middle East Sitrep. No. 25** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12465 Pages: 2	9/14/1970	B
055	memo	**Situation Report (1300 EDT)** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12466 Pages: 2	9/8/1970	B
057	memo	**Haig to HAK** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12467 Pages: 7 SANITIZED per RAC Review 9/8/08	9/8/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

BOX 0615

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061	memo	**Kissinger to Nixon** MR Case ; Doc. ID 15143 Pages: 2 SANITIZED per 3.3(b)(1)(3); ltr 6/19/2014	9/2/1970	B
~~063~~	~~memo~~ w/attach	~~**Saunders to Kissinger**~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15144 Pages: 8 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~7/8/1970~~	~~B~~
064	letter	**Saunders to Greiner** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12468 Pages: 3 SANITIZED per PAC Review 12/29/08	7/6/1970	B
~~065~~	~~memo~~ w/attach	~~**Saunders to Kissinger**~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15145 Pages: 17 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 9/29/2016	~~7/2/1970~~	~~B~~
~~066~~	~~note~~	~~**Note Verbal**~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15146 Pages: 1 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/21~~	~~B~~
067	memo	**Kennedy and Saunders to HAK** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12469 Pages: 8 SANITIZED per PAC Review 6/13/08	9/22/1970	B
067a	cable	**From: USDAO** MR Case NLN 11-78; Doc. ID 12470 Pages: 6	9/22/1970	B
068	index w/attach	**Requests for Aid** SANITIZED per ltr. 12/10/14 3.3(h)(1)(6) MR Case ; Doc. ID 15147 Pages: 42	9/21/1970	B
~~070~~	~~note~~	~~**Note Verbal**~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15148 Pages: 1 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/21/1970~~	~~B~~

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East** — **Box 0615**

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~~072~~	~~note~~	~~Note Verbal~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15149 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/1971~~	~~B~~
~~075~~	~~note~~ w/attach	~~"Dear Al"~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15150 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/21/1970~~	~~B~~
~~077~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #5424~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15151 Pages: 3 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/29/1970~~	~~B~~
~~078~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #5423~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15152 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/29/1970~~	~~B~~
~~079~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #5421~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15153 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/29/1970~~	~~B~~
~~109~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #4810~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15154 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 12/10/2014	~~9/15/1970~~	~~B~~
~~110~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #4808~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15155 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016	~~9/15/1970~~	~~B~~
~~134~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #3620~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15156 Pages: 2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016	~~7/29/1970~~	~~B~~
~~135~~	~~airgram~~ w/attach	~~Amman to Sec. State #3533~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15157 Pages: 8 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016	~~7/28/1970~~	~~B~~

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

Box 0615

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~~161~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #5150~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15158 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 1	~~9/24/1970~~	~~B~~
~~163~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #5139~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15159 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 1	~~9/24/1970~~	~~B~~
164	telegram	American Embassy to Sec. State MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12471 Pages: 1 SANITIZED per ltr. 7/18/2012 3.3(b)(1)	9/23/1970	B
~~165~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #5065~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15160 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/16 Pages: 1	~~9/22/1970~~	~~B~~
167	telegram	American Embassy to Sec. State MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12472 Pages: 1 SANITIZED per ltr. 7/18/2012 3.3(b)(1)	9/22/1970	B
~~180~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #4216~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15161 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/16 Pages: 2	~~9/1/1970~~	~~B~~
~~187~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #3533~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15162 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 3	~~7/26/1970~~	~~B~~
~~193~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Sec. State #3385~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15163 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 1	~~7/18/1970~~	~~B~~
~~205~~	~~telegram~~	~~State to Amman #154587~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15164 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 2	~~9/22/1970~~	~~B~~

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~~206~~	~~telegram~~	~~State to Amman #152449~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15165 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 3	~~9/17/1970~~	~~B~~
~~207~~	~~telegram~~ w/attach	~~State to Amman~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15166 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 5	~~9/17/1970~~	~~B~~
~~208~~	~~telegram~~ w/attach	~~State to Amman~~ MR Case ; Doc. ID 15167 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 2/24/2016 Pages: 2	~~9/1/1970~~	~~B~~
218	telegram	**CIA to White House Situation Room (21:14)** MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12473 SANITIZED per ltr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) Pages: 2	9/30/1970	B
219	telegram	**CIA to White House Situation Room (2:27)** MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12474 SANITIZED per ltr. 7/12/12 3.3(b)(1) Pages: 1	9/30/1970	B
220	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12475 per ltr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) Pages: 2	9/19/1970	B
221	telegram	**CIA to the White House** MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12476 SANITIZED per ltr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) Pages: 1	9/18/1970	B
223	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12477 per ltr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) Pages: 10	9/15/1970	B
224	cable	**CIA to White House Situation Room** MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12478 EXEMPTED per ltr. 7/12/12 3.5(d) Pages: 2	9/8/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East** — **Box 0615**

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225	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12479 Pages: 2	9/3/1970	B
226	cable	**CIA to Western White House** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12480 Pages: 2	9/1970	B
227	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/12 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12481 Pages: 3	8/26/1970	B
228	memo	**Meyer to DCI** EXEMPTED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12482 Pages: 4	8/25/1970	B
229	report	**Information Report** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12483 Pages: 2	8/14/1970	B
230	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12484 Pages: 1	8/10/1970	B
231	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12485 Pages: 2	8/6/1970	B
232	memo	**Karamessines to DCI** SANITIZED per Htr. 7/12/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-79; Doc. ID 12486 Pages: 5	7/28/1970	B
233	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED per Htr. 4/30/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12487 Pages: 2	7/27/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

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234	memo	**Karamessines to DCI** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12488 Pages: 7	7/23/1970	B
235	cable	**Information Cable** SANITIZED per Hr. 4/30/2012 3.3(b)(1) MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12489 Pages: 3	7/21/1970	B
236	cable	**Information Cable (21:21)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12490 Pages: 3	7/21/1970	B
237	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12491 Pages: 1	9/17/1970	B
238	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12492 Pages: 1	n.d.	B
239	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12493 Pages: 1	9/11/1970	B
240	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12494 Pages: 1	9/20/1970	B
241	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12495 Pages: 1	9/9/1970	B
242	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12496 Pages: 1	9/9/1970	B

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243	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (3:05)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12497 Pages: 1	9/8/1970	B
244	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (2:51)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12498 Pages: 1	9/8/1970	B
245	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (4:55)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12499 Pages: 1	9/8/1970	B
246	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (1:17)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12500 Pages: 1	9/8/1970	B
247	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (14:29)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12501 Pages: 1	9/7/1970	B
248	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (12:33)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12502 Pages: 1	9/7/1970	B
249	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (00:14)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12503 Pages: 2	9/5/1970	B
250	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (7:07)** MR Case NLN 11-80; Doc. ID 12504 Pages: 2	9/5/1970	B
251	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (6:56)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12542 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B

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252	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (4:34)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12543 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
253	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (00:51)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12544 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
254	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (6:15)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12545 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
255	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (6:16)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12546 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
256	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (2:06)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12547 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
257	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (1:22)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12548 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
258	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (2:55)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12549 Pages: 2	9/5/1970	B
259	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (00:10)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12550 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
260	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (23:49)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12551 Pages: 1	9/4/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

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261	cable	**White House Situation Room** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12552 Pages: 8	9/17/1970	B
262	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (2:59)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12553 Pages: 1	9/16/1970	B
263	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (6:53)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12554 Pages: 1	9/9/1970	B
265	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (16:07)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12555 Pages: 1	9/1970	B
266	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (9:08)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12556 Pages: 1	9/17/1970	B
267	cable	**White House Situation Room** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12557 Pages: 2	9/15/1970	B
268	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (19:16)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12558 Pages: 1	9/4/1970	B
269	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (21:12)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12559 Pages: 1	9/4/1970	B
270	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (7:08)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12560 Pages: 1	9/9/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

Box 0615

FOLDER TITLE: **[01] JORDAN, Vol. V, July 1- September 30, 1970 [1 of 2]**

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy
B. National security classified information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD - RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
271	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (1:07)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12561 Pages: 1	9/30/1970	B
272	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (23:58)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12562 Pages: 4	9/29/1970	B
274	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (11:51)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12563 Pages: 1	9/29/1970	B
275	cable	**Section One of Two** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12564 Pages: 4	9/28/1970	B
276	cable	**DIRNSA to White House** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12565 Pages: 2	9/23/1970	B
277	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (10:02)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12566 Pages: 1	9/5/1970	B
278	cable	**DIRNSA to White House (19:06)** MR Case NLN 11-81; Doc. ID 12567 Pages: 1	9/4/1970	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: **National Security Council Files, Country Files - Middle East**

Box 0615

FOLDER TITLE: **[01] JORDAN, Vol. V, July 1- September 30, 1970 [1 of 2]**

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SECRET HCE875 SECRET LIMDIS

PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø534Ø 281634Z

RECEIVED
WHCA

47 4Ø
ACTION NEA-Ø8

1970 SEP 28 17 07

INFO OCT-Ø1 SS-2Ø NSC-1Ø NSCE-ØØ INR-Ø7 CIAE-ØØ NSAE-ØØ

DODE-ØØ SSO-ØØ CCO-ØØ O-Ø3 SY-Ø1 OC-Ø1 OPR-Ø1 RSR-Ø1

RSC-Ø1 /Ø54 W

---------- Ø87126

O 281615Z SEP 7Ø
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1683

S E C R E T AMMAN 534Ø

LIMDIS

1. TIME HAS NOW COME FOR ME TO GET OUT OF THIS EMBASSY AND INTO THE ACTION. IT IS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THIS AREA WILL NOT BE CLEARED OF FEDAYEEN FOR LONG TIME TO COME. THAT MEANS THAT EACH TIME GOG TRIES TO RESUPPLY US OR WE TRY TO MOVE PEOPLE A TANK CONVOY IS REQUIRED.

2. I PLAN TO LEAVE TOMORROW MORNING FOR JEBEL AMMAN WHERE I WILL ESTABLISH BRANCH EMBASSY, TAKING WITH ME SEVERAL OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN TRAPPED HERE FOR PAST TWO WEEKS AND REPLACING THEM WITH OTHERS WHO HAVE BEEN ON OUTSIDE. OF INTEREST TO DOD WILL BE EXCHANGE OF DE ATKINE FOR STUART.

3. I AM COUNTING ON DEPARTMENT COMMITMENT TO SUPPLY US WITH SCRAMBLERS. THIS WILL MAKE COMMUNICATION MUCH EASIER. BROWN

SECRET LIMDIS

SECRET

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SEND

1970 SEP 28 21 13Z

00 WTE30
DE WTE 3645 2711952

0 281937Z SEP 70
FM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO ROBERT HOUDEK (ROME)
ZEM
C O N F I D E N T I A L WH01886
0 281525Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1678
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'70 SEP 28 PM 5:16

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5334

DEPT PASS TO OTHER INTERESTED POSTS

1. WE HAVE NOT HAD OPPORTUNITY YET TO REVIEW CAIRO AGREEMENT WITH PALACE OR GOJ. OUR FIRST REACTION THOUGH IS TO REGARD IT AT BEST AS MIXED BAG FOR HUSSEIN, AND CERTAINLY NO DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH. HUSSEIN PERHAPS ACCEPTED AGREEMENT WHILE IN CAIRO BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURES; IT MAY BE UNDONE UPON HIS RETURN BECAUSE OF OPPOSITION BY JAA, FEDAYEEN AND NONSIGNATORIES AMONG ARAB RADICALS. EFFORTS OF HIGHER COMMITTEE AND ARAB OBSERVERS MAY GIVE JORDANIANS A BREATHING SPELL, BUT WE DOUBT IF THEY CAN FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME BANK FIRES OF GOJ-FEDAYEEN CONFLICT.

2. LATEST AGREEMENT WITH KING AND ARAFAT AS CO-SIGNATORIES-- RESTATES PARITY IMPLIED BETWEEN GOJ AND FEDAYEEN IN NUMEROUS PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS. THIS IS HARDLY AN IMPRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENT FOR HUSSEIN AFTER TWO WEEKS OF CIVIL WAR. IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, FOLLOWING REFERRAL OF CONFLICT TO ARAB MINISUMMIT, NEW LEVEL OF AUTHORITY CREATED IN APPOINTMENT TUNISIAN PM LADGHAM AS HEAD OF CEASE-FIRE IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE. LADGHAM PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE TO KING BECAUSE OF TUNISIA'S POLITICAL MODERATION. ON OTHER HAND, HE MAY NOT BRING MUCH POLITICAL STRENGTH TO KING'S SIDE. SHOULD FEDAYEEN AND ARAB RADICALS FEEL THEY LOSING TOO MANY CLOSE VOTES, THEY MAY DENOUNCE CHAIRMAN AND COMMITTEE. (IN VIEW CONTEMPORARY ARAB HISTORY, WE DOUBT FEDAYEEN WILL LOSE TOO MUCH SLEEP OVER THREAT OF "COLLECTIVE AND UNIFIED MEASURES" TO BE TAKEN BY ARAB STATES AGAINST THOSE WHO VIOLATE AGREEMENT.) FACT SYRIA AND IRAQ HAVE NOT SIGNED, LEAVES OPENING SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN BARN DOOR.

3. A NUMBER OF AGREEMENT'S PROVISIONS WOULD SEEM UNACCEPTABLE TO ARMY AND KING ALIKE: (FOLLOWING COMMENTS KEYED TO AGREEMENT'S TEXT WHICH PRESUMABLY AVAILABLE DEPARTMENT VIA FBIS.
A. PARA 3 MIGHT PERMIT CONTINUED STRONG FEDAYEEN PRESENCE IN IRBID, PERHAPS WITH CONTINUED COVERT SYRIAN SUPPORT. THIS WOULD BE POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR REGIME IN NORTH JORDAN. ARMY MOREOVER, WOULD OBJECT TO AGREEMENT'S SILENCE ON DISPOSITION OF SUCH OTHER FEDAYEEN INFILTRATED TOWNS AS RAMTHA, JERASH AND AJLUN.
B. PARA 5. GIVEN JAA CLAIMS OF 13000 FEDAYEEN IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS, AND ITS DESIRE CRIPPLE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, WE CAN ALMOST WITH CERTAINTY PREDICT THAT JAA WILL NOT IMMEDIATELY DISGORGE ANY "BLU-CHIP" FEDAYEEN IT HOLDS.

4. NOR IS ALL OF AGREEMENT TO FEDAYEEN TASTE EITHER. WE CAN EXPECT ELABORATE GAME OF ALPHONSE GASTON TO BE PLAYED OU BETWEEN JAA AND FEDAYEEN AS TO WHO LEAVES TOWN FIRST. WE OURSELVES CANNOT CONCEIVE FEDAYEEN WOULD EVER EVACUATE AMM OF THEIR OWN WILL. AT BEST SOME TOKEN WITHDRAWALS MIGHT

PAGE ONE

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PLACE, WITH BULK OF REMAINING FEDAYEEN DOFFING THEIR TIGER SUITS AND MERGING WITH CIVIL POPULATION. (IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT JORDANIANS PASSING NEARBY SAA'IQAH HEADQUARTERS NOTED FEDAYEEN IN PLACE BUT NOW ALL WEARING MUFTI.)

5. EMBASSY ASKED ITSELF ALSO, FOR WHOM DOES ARAFAT SPEAK? IN QUIETER TIMES ARAFAT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONTROL HIS SUPPOSEDLY SATELLITE ORGANIZATIONS. THE IRGUN AND STERN GANGS OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT CONSISTENTLY OUTFLANKED FATAH'S HAGANA. IN AFTERMATH OF CIVIL WAR WITH MILITANTS FURTHER EMBITTERED AND PERHAPS FEED THEY HAVE IN CAIRO AGREEMENT--WON SOME SORT OF POLITICAL VICTORY OVER KING HUSSEIN AND JAA. AS A RESULT WE THINK HOLD OF ARAFAT AND HIS DISPERSED CENTRAL COMMITTEE OVER EXTREMISTS AMONG FEDAYEEN WILL BE MORE TENOUS THAN EVER BEFORE.
6. A FINAL POINT OF FUNCTIONAL WEAKNESS IN AGREEMENT IS PROVISION FOR SETTING UP COMMITTEES ON MILITARY, NONMILITARY AND RELIEF MATTERS. IN A COUNTRY WHICH AT TIMES SEEMS TOO SMALL FOR BOTH A PALACE AND A CABINET, TO SAY NOTHING OF A FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, WE DOUBT IF FIAT OF THESE COMMITTEES WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD UP FOR LONG AGAINST STIFF COMPETITION FROM ALL SIDES.
BROWN
980

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S/S Send Room

CONFIDENTIAL HCE872 RECEIVED WHCA

PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø5334 281626Z

45 1970 SEP 28 17 02

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-Ø1 SSO-ØØ NSCE-ØØ CCO-ØØ USIE-ØØ CIAE-ØØ DODE-ØØ

PM-Ø5 H-Ø2 INR-Ø3 L-Ø4 NSAE-ØØ NSC-1Ø P-Ø3 RSC-Ø1

PRS-Ø1 SS-2Ø EUR-2Ø IO-13 O-Ø3 OC-Ø6 SY-Ø3 RSR-Ø1

/116 W

Ø87Ø34

O 281525Z SEP 7Ø
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1673
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5334

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B. PARA 5. GIVEN JAA CLAIMS OF 18000 FEDAYEEN IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS, AND ITS DESIRE CRIPPLE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, WE CAN ALMOST WITH CERTAINTY PREDICT THAT JAA WILL NOT IMMEDIATELY DISGORGE ANY "BLU-CHIP" FEDAYEEN IT HOLDS.

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6. A FINAL POINT OF FUNCTIONAL WEAKNESS IN AGREEMENT IS PROVISION FOR SETTING UP COMMITTEES ON MILITARY, NONMILITARY AND RELIEF MATTERS. IN A COUNTRY WHICH AT TIMES SEEMS TOO SMALL FOR BOTH A PALACE AND A CABINET, TO SAY NOTHING OF A FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, WE DOUBT IF FIAT OF THESE COMMITTEES WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD UP FOR LONG AGAINST STIFF COMPETITION FROM ALL SIDES.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 216

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05232 262012Z 2

85
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
076749

O 261915Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1590
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

S E C R E T AMMAN 5232

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA, CINCSTRIKE, CINCEUR, NICOSIA, IMMEDIATE FOR INFO BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV ALSO FOR DAO

1. I. I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH BRITISH MILITARY AND AIR ATTACHES ON SCRAMBLER ABOUT H-5. THEY TELL ME THAT FIELD IS SECURE.

2. COMMANDER OF JAA AI
FORCE STATES TO RU AIRA IRAQIS WERE QTE
EMBARRASSED UNQTE MY JAA AIR OPERATIONS FROM MAFRAQ AND
ASKED FOR CHANGE TO H-5. I HAVE REPORTED THIS EARLIER.

3. UK AIRA REPORTS THAT SOME REAR ALEMENTS OF IRAQI
FORCES ARE WITHIN AREA H-5 BUT THESE ARE DISCOUNTED
AS HAVING NO POTENTIAL OR REASON FOR MAKING TROUBLE.
ACCORDING SAME SOURCE, THERE ARE NO PALESTINIAN UNITS
IN AREA.

4. HOPE ABOVE, PLUS EARLIER STATEMENTS FROM JORDANIANS
GIVES ASSURANCE AS TO SECURITY IN AREA. GP-3
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 591

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SEP 25 AM 8:11
060649

2/3

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05152 242139Z

85
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O 241903Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1525
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
JCS
USCINCEUR
CSAF

S E C R E T AMMAN 5152

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CAPTION)X

SUBJECT: AMB-KING CONVERSATION - MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. KING WILL NEED SUBSTANTIAL RESUPPLY PER OUR EARLIER OFFER. BELIEVES DELIVERY AT H-5 DESIRABLE TO AVOID HIGH VISABILITY DELIVERY AMMAN.

2. HAWKER HUNTERS HAVE MADE HEAVY EXPENDITURE MACHINE GUN AMMO AND ROCKETS. NEED RESUPPLY URGENTLY BUT UNDERSTAND OUR CAPACITY TO SUPPLY COMPARABLE ITEMS MAY BE LIMITED. DEPT COORDINATE WITH BRITS TO MEET THIS REQUEST.

3. JAA HAS GENERAL SERIOUS PROBLEM REPLENISHMENT AMMO, PARTICULARLY FOR 50 CAL GER.

4. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR JAA WILL BE FURNISHED AS SOON AS THEY ARE RECEIVED.ARE AWAITINGSPECIFICS BUT TRUST YOU APPRECIATE OTHER IMMEDIATE PREOCCUPATION JAA, LIMITED CURRENT LIAISON CAPABILITY AND EXTREMELY LIMITED STAFF HEREM GP-3.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05107 231830Z

51
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

049391

'70 SEP 23 PM 9:23
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Z 0 231741Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1495
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NY 1872
USINT CAIRO
CINCEUR
CINCSTRIKE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
RUFLFAA/CINCUSAFE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USNATO 12
USIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 5107
EXDIS
SUBJ: EVACUATION

REF: AMMAN 5090

1. I HAVE JUST DISCUSSED TOPIC OF EVACUATION AMCITS ONCE AGAIN WITH GOJ. COMMUNICATIONS INDIRECT, BUT FOLLOWING DECISION TAKEN. WE NOW WILL PLAN ON FIRST EVACUEES DEPARTING AMMAN AFTERNOON SEPT 24 VIA CHARTERED FLIGHT. REQUEST EMBASSY BEIRUT MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SINGLE MEA PLANE TO TOUCH DOWN AT AMMAN CA 1500 HRS LOCAL.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05107 231830Z

2. REQUEST LONDON/WASHINGTON MAKE IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FOLLOWING
MESSAGE TO BE BROADCAST VOA/BBC ASAP AND AT FREQUENT INTERVALS UNTIL 1300 HRS LOCAL SEPT 24: QTE DUE TO PRESENT UNSETTLED SITUATION IN JORDAN, ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS BY AIR BEGINNING SEPT 24. FLIGHTS WILL BE ARRANGED IN COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS USING COMMERICAL AIRCRAFT CHARTERED FROM MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES. THE GOVERNMENTS OF CHINA, GERMANY, HOLLAND, ITALY, AND THE UNITED STATES URGE THEIR CITIZENS WHOSE PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO LEAVE AT THIS TIME. FOREIGN NATIONALS WISHING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS PROGRAM SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT THE JORDAN INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL PRIOR TO TWO P.M. LOCAL TIME ON THURSDAY, SEP 24. THEY SHOULD HAVE IN THEIR POSSESSION THEIR PASSPORTS AND INTERNATIONAL IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATES. IN ADDITION, PERSONS SHOULD BRING ONE DAY'S SUPPLY OF FOOD AND WATER. TWO PIECES OF PERSONAL LUGGAGE, WEIGHT NOT TO EXCEED 50 LBS, CAN BE HAND CARRIED BY EACH PERSON, INTENDING TO DEPART. UNQTE

3. FYI: GOJ HAS REFUSED TO PASS ABOVE MESSAGE ON HBS. HOWEVER, ABOVE MESSAGE CLEARED WITH GOJ. FURTHER CABLES FOLLOWS.
BROWN

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. RILEY.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 362

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05103 231757Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

049149

'70 SEP 23 PM 9:23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

O 231620Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1491
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
RUCKAAA/CINCSTRIKE
CINCEUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSAFE
USIA WASHDC
USMISSION USNAT

S E C R E T AMMAN 5103
EXDIS
SUBJ AMMAN EVACUATION

1. STILL NO WORD FROM JAA ON ARRAGNEMENTS FOR EVACUATION.

2. WE THEREFORE REULCTANTLY GIVING UP OUR ORIGINAL TIME SCHEDULE PLAN. STILL REMOTE POSSIBILITY WE COULD START TOMORROW AFTERNOON IF JAA CAME THROUGH IN NEXT HOUR OR SO. (LIMITING FACTOR IS TIME NEEDED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE RADIO ALERT TO AMCITS IN ORDER PERMIT THEM REACH COLLECTION POINTS IN TIME FOR FLIGHTS.)

3. WE WILL NOTIFY SOONEST AFTER JAA CONTACTS US OF REVISED TIME

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05103 231757Z

SCHEDULE.
MEANWHILE REQUEST BEIRUT HOLD MEA ON
STANDBY IN ORDER BE ABLE MOVE ON SHORT NOTICE.
REQUEST BEIRUT REPORT ALSO ON MEA ICRC AND FEDAYEEN CLEARANCE
PROBLEMS. SAME REQUEST TO DEPT RE BBC AND VOA BROADCASTS.
GP3
BROWN

NOTE: EXDIS ADDED PER S/S-O.

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S80/10/5177

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 128

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05097 231617Z

47
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
048321

O P 231500Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1489
AMEMBASSY ROME
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
CINCEUR
CINCSTRIKE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSAFE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 636
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USNATO
DIA
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5097
EXDIS
SUBJ: EVACUATION

REF: AMMAN 5090

1. EMBASSY AMMAN RECEIVEDNOTE FROM ITALIAN EMBASSY 1600 LOCAL SEPT 23 INDICATING THAT THERE ARE SIX ITALIANS AT EMBASSY WHO DESIRE TO DEPART AMMAN. EMBASSY OUT OF CONTACT WITH OTHER ITALIANS IN JORDAN.

2. REQUEST EMBASSY ROME OBTAIN VIEWS ITALIAN GOVT RE PARTICIPATION EVACUATION NOW BEING PLANNED AND WILLINGNESS TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH TEXT REFTEL (DEPT PLS REPEAT TO ROME).

3. ITALIANS AT EMBASSY SAFE, WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT CONTACT EMBASSY

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '70 SEP 23 PM 9:23

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05097 231617Z

HAS WITH ROME.
BROWN

NOTE: EXDIS ADDED PER MR. RILEY S/S-O.

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SECRET 127

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05093 231510Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

048503

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'70 SEP 23 PM 5:03
002

O 231445Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1485

S E C R E T AMMAN 5093

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

REF: STATE 156092

IN VIEW INABILITY HAVE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH GOJ I HAVE NOT DELIVERED MESSAGE. I HAVE INFORMED PALACE ON TWO OCCASIONS THAT I HAVE MESSAGE FOR KING FROM PRESIDENT WHICH CANNOT BE DELIVERED OVER PHONE.
BROWN
BT

NNN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 983

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05090 231430Z

50
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
047336

'70 SEP 23 PM 5:03
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O P 231350Z SER 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1482
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
USINT CAIRO
CINCEUR
CINCSTRIKE
CINCUSNAVEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSAFE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 633
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION NATO
USIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5090
EXDIS
REF: AMMAN 5031

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR BBC AND VOA TRANSMISSION WHEN WE GIVE GO AHEAD (WE MAY MAKE FURTHER AMENDMENTS). REQUEST TRANSMISSION BE GIVEN SOONEST AFTER GO AHEAD AND CONTINUE AT FREQUENT INTERVALS UNTIL WE GIVE SIGN OFF.

2. QTE DUE TO PRESENT UNSETTLED SITUATION IN JORDAN, ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS BY AIR ON SEPTEMBER 24. FLIGHTS WILL BE ARRANGED THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS USING COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT CHARTERED FROM MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND (BLANK), (BLANK),

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05090 231430Z

STRONGLY ADVISE THEIR CITIZENS WHOSE PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO LEAVE AT THIS TIME. FOREIGN NATIONALS WISHING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS PROGRAM SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT (BLANK) PRIOR TO 8:00 A.M. LOCAL TIME ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24. THEY SHOULD HAVE IN THEIR POSSESSION THEIR PASSPORTS AND INTERNATIONAL IMMUNIZATION CERTIFICATES. IN ADDITION, PERSONS SHOULD BRING ONE DAYS SUPPLY OF FEED AND WATER. ONE PICE OF PERSONAL LUGGAGE, WEIGHT NOT TO EXCEED (BLANK), CAN BE CARRIED BY EACH PERSON INTENDING TO DEPART. UNQTE.

3. FOR BEIRUT: PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER ICRC PREPARED PROVIDE COVER AND/OR INSIGNA FOR PROPOSED FLIGHTS AND, IF SO, ORGANIZATIONS AGREEMENT TO RELEVANT PARTS OF TEXT ABOVE. GP-3.
BROWN

NOTE: EXDIS ADDED PER SSO - JOHN RILEY, 9/23/70.

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880/10/5170

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 608

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05037 220907Z

12
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

035872

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 22 AM 11:34

2

O 220835Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1439
INFO AMEMBASAM BEIRUT IMMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 5037

EXDIS

SUBJ: SYRIAN THREAT

REF: ROME 5262

1. WHILE I DO NOT WANT TO STICK MY NOSE INTO OTHER PEOPLE'S BUSINESS, I CANNOT HELP BUT BE APPALLED AT "GRATIFICATION AND RELIEF" WITH WHICH ITALIANS GREETED SYRIAN DENIAL. IF THIS IS ITALIAN ATTITUDE, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TROUBLE WITH ONE STAUNCH ALLY.

2. I AM SURE DEPARTMENT HAS THOUGHT OF IT BUT I WOULD LIKE TO SECOND THE IDEA OF GIVING ITALIANS A REALISTIC PICTURE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN THIS PART OF WORLD. THEY MIGHT BE ASKED WHERE THEY THINK PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY PROCURED 300 TANKS SO QUICKLY AND SO QUIETLY.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 553

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05034 220807Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
035505

O 220750Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1437
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5034

EXDIS

1. ARE LARGE-SCALE ISRAELI TROOP MOVEMENTS TO BET SHEAN AREA, WHICH ONLY ABOUT 25 MILES FROM IRBID, RECEIVING LARGE-SCALE INTERNATIONAL PRESS ATTENTION? DO WE BELIEVE SYRIANS ARE AWARE OF MOVEMENTS?

2. QUESTION IN MY MIND IS WHETHER SYRIANS CONSIDER THIS CREDIBLE THREAT. IT MIGHT MAKE THEM PAUSE.
BROWN

'70 SEP 22 AM 8:13
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 552

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05033 220806Z

18
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

035508

'70 SEP 22 AM 8:13
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Z O 220750Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1436

S E C R E T AMMAN 5033

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SYRIAN THREAT

WOULD APPRECIATE SOONEST RESULTS LATEST RECON FLIGHTS AND IDF INTERPRETATION THEREOF. GP-3.
BROWN

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Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 864

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05031 212259Z

85
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O P 212215Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1434
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN
USINT CAIRO

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5031

EXDIS

DEPT PASS PRIORITY TO BERN, GENEVA, CINCSTRIKE, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, MOSCOW AND PARIS FOR INFO.

REF STATE 154587 AND AMMAN 5030

1. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT OF STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE MADE OVER VOA, BBC, AND HBS IN CONNECTION WITH EVACUATION US AND UK NATIONS FROM JORDAN SHOULD THIS BE DECIDED UPON, QTE DUE TO PRESENT UNSETTLED SITUTATION IN JORDAN, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM STRONGLY ADVISE THEIR CITIZENS WHOSE PRESENCE IN COUNTRY IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO LEAVE. PERSONS DESIRING TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ORGANIZED EVACUATION SHOULD ASSEMBLE AT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS PRIOR TO (TIME) ON (DATE): JORDAN INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, MUASHIR HOSPITAL, AMERICAN EMBASSY ON JEBEL LUWEIBDEH, UK EMBASSY ON THIRD CIRCLE JEBEL AMMAN. PERSONS SHOULD BRING ONE DAY'S SUPPLY OF FOOD AND WATER AND MAXIMUM ONE OVER NIGHT BAG PER PERSON. THEY SHOULD ALSO CARRY THEIR PASSPORTS AND INTERNATIONAL SHOT CARDS. UNQTE.
BROWN

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES BY OCT.

'70 SEP 22 AM 8:13
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
032299

2/3

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 883

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05030 212309Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
032358

O 212201Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1433
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USUN NY 1845
USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T AMMAN 5030

EXDIS

DEPT PASS INFO IMMEDIATE TO LONDON BERN MOSCOW PARIS CINCSTRIKE CINCUSNAVEUR COMSIXTHFLEET

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE EVACUATION AMERICAN CITIZENS

REF: AMMAN 5004, STATE 154587

1. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT DEPARTMENT AND AMMAN THINKING ALONG SAME LINES: THAT EVACUATION OF NONESSENTIAL AMERICANS FROM JORDAN IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE. AT TIME OF RECEIPT OF REFTEL B, EMBASSY WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING RECOMMENDATION FOR MULTINATIONAL EFFORT AIMED AT VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE OF FOREIGNERS.

2. WHILE EMBASSY HAD BEEN CONTEMPLATING MUCH BROADER INTERNATIONAL COVER, WE AGREE THAT TIMELINESS ARGUES FOR JOINT US/UK OR POSSIBLY US/UK/FRENCH EFFORT. WE AGREE WITH DEPARTMENT THAN UNSC RESOLUTION ON EVACUATION (PARA 3 REFTEL B) IMPRACTICAL. AT SAME TIME PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT FROM SYGHE THANT MIGHT BE VALUABLE ASSIST IN MAKING DEPARTURE OF OUR NATIONAL MORE PALATABLE TO JORDANIANS AND ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE.

3. EMBASSY NOTES THAT ICRC HAS THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO RE-ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS WITH ANY OF PARTIES IN AMMAN--GOJ, FEDAYEEN, OR FOREIGN EMBASSIES. IN ADDITION,

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ICRC'S VERY THIN STAFF ALREADY OVERTAXED WITH BURDEN OF MASSIVE MEDICAL RELIEF PROGRAM AND CONTINUING PROGRAM OF NEGOTIATING FOR RELEASE OF HOSTAGES. ACCORDINGLY, WHILE ANY SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION FROM ICRC WOULD BE WELCOME, EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT ICRC SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR EITHER ORGANIZATION OR EXECUTION OF ANTICIPATED EVACUATION. IN THIS RESPECT, WE NOT THAT ACCORDING TO INFORMATION GIVEN UK AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS BY KING, GOJ CAPABLE AND WILLING TO GUARANTEE SAFETY OF FOREIGN EVACUEES TO POINT OF DEPARTURE.

4. ROLE OF GOJ MUST GO BEYOND ARRANGING FOR CONVOY. WITH COLLAPSE OF NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS, NOTICE OF PENDING EVACUATION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE VIA RADIO. AS STATED REFTEL A, THIS SHOULD BE DONE OVER VOA, BBC AND HBS (SEPTEL FOLLOWS.) COOPERATION OF GOJ ESSENTIAL, BUT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN GIVEN FACT THAT JORDANIANS HAVE LONG REGARDED PRESENCE OR DEPARTURE OF WESTERNERS AS BELLWETHER OF THINGS TO COME. BLOW CAN BE PERHAPS BE SOFTENED BY ASSURANCE TO GOJ THAT WE NOT PROPOSING OFFICIAL EVAC.

5. EMBASSY CONCURS WITH BRITISH REPORTING TO EFFECT THAT AMMAN SOMEWHAT QUIETER TODAY. HOWEVER, SYRIAN INVASION (AND POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER INTERVENTION FROM OTHER QUARTERS) RAISES SPECTER THAT WE MAY BE PASSING THROUGH EYE OF HURRICANE. IN ADDITION, DISRUPTION OF NORMAL SERVICES (E.G., WATER, FOOD SUPPLY, MEDICAL CARE) AND PROBABILITY OF CONTINUING SPORADIC VIOLENCE APPEAR TO US TO BE SO BROAD IN SCOPE AND LONG LASTING IN EFFECT THAT THERE ISLITTLE ARGUMENT TO BE MADE AGAINST URGING EVACUATION OF NONESSENTIAL AMERICANS. AS EMBASSY HAS REPORTED, (AMMAN 5027) ZAID RIFAI HAS WARNED US TO EXPECT AT LEAST ONE MONTH PERIMO OF CHAOTIC AND INSECURE CONDITIONS.

6. EMBASSY ALSO NOTES THAT THERE ARE LARGE NUMBERS OF MEMBERS OF PRESS WHO HAVE BEEN TRAPPED IN AMMAN HOTELS FOR SEVERAL DAYS. UNLESS EFFORTS MADE TO GET THESE PEOPLE OUT ASAP, PRESS ACCOUNTS OF USG ACTIVITIES LIKELY TO BE UNHELPFUL TO SAY THE LEAST.

7 AS OUTLINED REFTEL A EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT CHOICE BETWEEN USE OF AMMAN AIRPORT VERSUS AQABA ROUTE STILL OPEN IF AMMAN AIRPORT CAN BE USED, AND THERE MIGHT BE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 05030 212309Z

POSSIBILITY OF UTILIZING ICRC AIRCRAFT EVEN THOUGH THAT ORGANIZATION WOULD
NOT BE IN CHARGE OF OPERATION. WE ENVISION
POSYBBLE UTILIZATION OF ICRC AIRCRAFT WHICH BRING IN
RELIEF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

8. EMBASSY WOULD PLAN ON REDUCING MISSION PERSONNEL AS ADJUNCT TO ANTICIPATED EVACUATION. PERSONS TO BE EVACUATED WILL BE SELECTED AT LATER POINT IN EXERCISE.

9. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT WE MOVE FORWARD WITH EVACUATION ON THIS BASIS ASAP AND THAT DEPARTMENT MAKE CONTACTS AND ARRANGEMENTS AS NECESSARY.
BROWN

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 855

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04918 182105Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

Z 182000Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1333

S E C R E T AMMAN 4918

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA AND CINCSTRIKE FLASH FOR INFO

SUMMARY: AFTER TWO DAYS OF FIGHTING, JAA STILL FAR FROM SECURING AMMAN. KING'S RESTRAINT, AIMED AT PREVENTING UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION AND CASUALTIES, IS PLACING HIM UNDER INCREASING POLITICAL PRESSURE FROM OTHER ARAB STATES TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE SOLUTION. FEDAYEEN, ALSO, ARE IMPROVING THEIR PRESTIGE THE LONGER THEY HOLD OFF JAA. HUSSEIN MUST MAKE HIS OWN DECISIONS AND THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO AT THIS JUNCTURE. IF FINAL RESULT IS COMPROMISE, FEDAYEEN WILL BE ABLE TO POINT TO ANY US MOVES AS EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO CONFRONT NOT ONLY HUSSEIN'S ARMY BUT ALSO USG.

1. WITH LAST HOURS OF DAYLIGHT HAVING RUN OUT IN SECOND DAY OF FIGHTING, JAA STILL ENGAGED AROUND FIRST CIRCLE, AND DESPITE YESTERDAY'S OCCUPATION OF JEBEL ASHRAFIYYAH, FEDAYEEN ARE STILL RESISTING IN THESE AND OTHER AREAS. AT AROUND 1400 MOREOVER, FIELD MARSHALL MAJALI ANNOUNCED THAT GOVERNMENT WAS TEMPORARILY HALTING ITS ADVANCE IN ORDER TO PERMIT FEDAYEEN TO RALLY TO SIDE OF GOJ. PROSPECT FURTHER ADVANCE GOJ FORCES AT NIGHT NOT GOOD; IN FACT THEY WILL PROBABLY PULL BACK SOMEWHAT TO MORE SECURE POSITIONS AS THEY DID LAST NIGHT IN ORDER PRESERVE THEIR ARMOR AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK. NIGHT IS USED BY FEDAYEEN TO REINFILTRATE.

2. IT LOOKS TO US THAT KING AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT WANTED TO APPLY MAXIMUM FORCE AVAILABLE FOR FEAR OF CAUSING NUMEROUS CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND REDUCING DOWNTOWN PTA

'70 SEP 19 AM 8:55
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
013252

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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TO SHAMBLES. THIS RESTRAINT COULD PRESENT HUSSEIN WITH DIFFICULT POLITICAL PROBLEMS. AMOUNT OF TIME HE HAS TO REASSERT GOJ'S AUTHORITY BY PURELY MILITARY MEANS IS LIMITED WHEN ONE CONSIDERS SURROUNDING POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THE LONGER STREET FIGHTING IN AMMAN CONTINUES THE MORE LOUDLY WILL OTHER ARAB STATES CALL FOR END TO INTERNECINE FIGHTING AND DEMAND HUSSEIN CEASE "ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE A UNILATERAL SOLUTION BY FORCE." WE ALREADY SEE SIGNS OF THIS FROM CAIRO AND TRIPOLI AND ALGERIA, NOT TO MENTION BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS. FURTHERMORE, GUERRILLAS WILL SOON HAVE BENEFIT OF STUFF OF WHICH MYTHS ARE MADE IN ARAB WORLD. UNLESS GOVERNMENT QUICKLY ASSERTS UPPER HAND IN NEXT 24-36 HOURS GUERRILLAS WILL TRUMPET NEWS THAT THEIR SMALL NUMBERS HAVE FOR 48 HOURS OR MORE FOUGHT TO A STANDSTILL WELL-TRAINED ARAB ARMY EQUIPPED WITH LATEST QTE AMERICAN UNQTE WEAPONS. ARAB PUBLIC OPINION WILL NOT MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR GOVERNMENT'S RELUCTANCE TO CAUSE UNNECESSARY CASUALTIES. NOR WILL IT BE AWARE OF PROBLEM THAT AN ARMY, OPERATING UNDER THESE LIMITATIONS, FACES IN DEALING WITH INSURGENTS WHO HAVE ADVANTAGE OF BASES IN JUMBLED MESS OF STONE HOUSES ALONG HILLY WINDING STREETS.

3. IF FIGHTING GOES ON FOR MORE THAN 48 HOURS, HUSSEIN COULD SUFFER A POLITICAL REVERSE REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME OF FIGHTING. HE COULD ISOLATE HIMSELF POLITICALLY BY PERSISTING IN AN MILITARY CAMPAIGN DESPITE RISING PROTESTS FROM HIS NEIGHBORS, AND PERHAPS FROM ELSEWHERE. ARAB MEDIA WOULD EXTOL PERFORMANCE OF FEDAYEEN AS LATTER-DAY BATTLE OF KARAMEH AND CAST HUSSEIN IN ROLE OF SANGUINARY SUCCESSOR TO NURI AL-SA'ID.

4. NEXT 24-36 HOURS, WHICH IS PERIOD WE THINK HUSSEIN STILL HAS FOR ACTION BEFORE ARAB PRESSURES WILL BECOME DANGEROUSLY GREAT, SHOULD GIVE US INSIGHT INTO PROBABLY COURSE OF EVENTS. BUT IF HUSSEIN CANNOT BRING SITUTATION UNDER CONTROL SOON BY MILITARY MEANS, HIS PERSISTING IN THIS EFFORT COULD PRODUCE SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE WOULD FACE PROBLEMS OF SIMILAR NATURE, MOREOVER, IF HE WERE TO ACCEPT A SOLUTION TO GOJ-FEDAYEEN RELATIONS THAT SUGGESTED THE MILITARY OPTION HAD FAILED.

5. I REALIZE THAT AMMAN IS NOT ALL JORDAN AND THAT KING HAS PROBLEMS ELSEWHERE. HE SIMPLY CANNOT ALLOW SO-CALLED

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

LIBERATED NORTH TO EVOLVE INTO INDEPENDENT STATE WHICH MIGHT RECEIVE QUICK RECOGNITION FROM SEVERAL NATIONS PERHAPS OVER-EAGER TO CONFOUND PROBLEMS OF MIDDLE EAST. THIS IS NOT A WIN-OR-LOSE SITUATION. HUSSEIN CANNOT LOSE MILITARILY- AT LEAST IN SHORT RUN. IT IS WIN OR COMPROMISE AND THE PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE ELEMENTS--AND SOME INSIDE--WILL BE FOR LATTER. AS IT IS NOT A QTE LOST UNQTE WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY REQUIREMENTS FOR EVACUATION AT THIS TIME.

6. IT IS KING AND HIS MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHO WILL MAKE FINAL DECISION WHICH PATH TO PURSUE WUD THERE IS VIRTUALLY NOTHING WE CAN DO AT THIS TIME--OTHER THAN EXPRESSIONS OF SYMPATHY AND WILLINGNESS TO HELP--WHICH CAN AFFECT THIS DECISION.

6. VISIBLE US ACTIVITY, AIR AND SEA, WHICH IS BEING INCREASINGLY REPORTED THROUGHOUT ME AND CONSIDERABLY EXAGGERATED BY THOSE WHO HAVE NEITHER OUR OR JORDAN'S INTERESTS AT HEART, HAS LITTLE REAL REPERCUSSION HERE. IT GIVES KING A BIT OF HEART BUT FEDAYEEN ARE PROBABLY NOT TOO IMPRESSED AS THEY ARE TOO BUSY FIGHTING. IF THEY LOSE, THEY CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY LOSS NOT AS ONE SUFFERED AT HANDS OF KING BUT ONE CASUED BY QTE ZIONISTS UNQTE. ELSEWHERE, AND I AM NO EXPERT, IT MAY HAVE BEEN USEFUL. CAUTION OF IRAQ AND SYRIA TO DATE UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED IN PART BY CONFUSION AS TO AMERICAN MOTIVES. THESE, OF COURSE, ARE SOMEWHAT OF LESS CONCERN TO ALGERIANS, LIBYANS ET AL, SAFELY AT DISTANCE.

7. IN SHORT, I HOPE WE CAN COOL IT A BIT ABOUT WHAT WE CAN OR WILL DO. I UNDERSTAND PRESSURES WHICH EXIST IN WASHINGTON BUT TO EXTENT WE BECOME PUBLICLY ASSOCIATED- IF IN END COMPROMISE WITH FEDAYEEN IS RESULT--WE CAN COUNT ON ITS BEING RECORDED BY ARABS AS EPIC IN WHICH FEDAYEEN HELD OFF BOTH HUSSEIN AND USG.

8. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 690

WH

'70 SEP 17 PM 5:42

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

003422

2/3

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04887 171824Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

Z 171820Z SEP 70 ZFF 4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1307

S E C R E T AMMAN 4887

EXDIS

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

KING BEEN TRYING REACH AMBASSADOR BY HAM RADIO BUT UNABLE CONTACT. ZAID RIFAI FINALLY GOT THROUGH BY PHONE AT 2015 LOCAL TO SAY FOLLOWING: ARMY HAS SITUATION AMMAN UNDER CONTROL. POCKETS OF RESISTANCE WILL BE WIPED OUT BY TOMORROW P.M. SAID WOULD TRY CONTACT AGAIN DURING NIGHT IF FURTHER MESSAGES TO PASS.
BROWN

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 672

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04884 171815Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

O 171737Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1305

S E C R E T AMMAN 4884

EXDIS

REF STATE 152504

1. EMBASSY HAS NOT HAD CONTACT WITH ANY SOURCE IN VICINITY AMMAN AIRPORT SINCE LATE MORNING. NO INFO ON CONTROL OF ACCESS. HEAVY FIGHTING TOOK PLACE IN THAT VICINITY, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT AIRPORT WAS HIT. NO INFORMATION CONCERNING H-5, ALTHOUGH MOVEMENT FROM AMMAN TO THAT STRIP MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE INTERDICTION BY IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN MAFRAK AREA.

2. IF KING MAKES RADIO CONTACT WITH EMBASSY, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION. GP3 BROWN

003342
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'70 SEP 17 PM 5:41

2/3

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04880 171541Z

46
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CCO-00 SCS-04 AID-28 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02

INR-08 L-04 NIC-01 NSC-10 O-03 OC-06 OPR-02 P-03

PER-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SCA-01 SS-20 SY-03 CIAE-00

DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 IO-13 RSR-01

/155 W

---------- 002081

Z O 171530Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1301
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERN
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
CINCEUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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AREA OF ASHRAFIYEH WHERE EMBOFFS OBSERVED TANK ACTION
SEVERAL HOURS AGO NOW SHOWS DOZENS OF CIVILIANS IN
STREETS, WITH NO APPARENT
FEAR. UNTIL LESS THAN HOUR AGO
NOTHING VISIBLE REF AREA EXCEPT FEW FEDAYEEN STAYING WELL UNDER
COVER. CIVILIANS VISIBLE ALSO ON MAIN STREET WADI SEHR TO
WEST OF EMBASSY.
BROWN

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PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø4871 171306Z

53
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-Ø1 EUR-2Ø IO-13 SCS-Ø4 AID-28 CCO-ØØ FBO-Ø1 PM-Ø5
H-Ø2 INR-Ø8 L-Ø4 NIC-Ø1 NSC-1Ø O-Ø3 OC-Ø6 OPR-Ø2
P-Ø3 PER-Ø2 RSC-Ø1 PRS-Ø1 SCA-Ø1 SS-2Ø SY-Ø3 SSO-ØØ
CIAE-ØØ DODE-ØØ DOT-12 E-15 NSAE-ØØ NSCE-ØØ USIE-ØØ
USSS-ØØ RSR-Ø1 /182 W
---------- ØØØ87Ø

Z O 171240Z SEP 7Ø
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1293
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
CINCSTRIKE
CINCEUR
DIA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 4871

SUBJ: SITREP 1420 LOCAL

1. AT 1415 HOURS LOCAL SMALL ARMS FIRE BY EMBASSY GUARDS CONTINUES TO BE HEARD AS WELL AS SOUND OF ARTILLERY AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN AREA FIRST AND SECOND CIRCLES (IT IS LUCKY WE DID NOT HAVE USIS REPAIRED). SAA'IQA RADIO COMMUNIQUES CONTINUE TO BE MORE OF INSPIRATIONAL SORT, ALTHOUGH ONE BROADCAST HEARD THAT RAMTHA NOW IN FEDAYEEN HANDS.

2. SAA'IQA RADIO BROADCAST APPEAL FROM GENERAL ASSOCIATION

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OF JORDANIAN STUDENTS TO WORLD STUDENTS ASSOCIATION THAT STUDENTS AROUND THE WORLD SHOULD REGISTER OPPOSITION TO GOJ'S QTE LIQUIDATORY EFFORT UNQTE AT JORDANIAN EMBASSIES ABROAD. COMMENT: INFO PARA 2 MIGHT JUSTIFY SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS JORDANIAN EMBASSY DC.

3. AS RESULT TELEPHONE BREAKDOWN ARE PROCEEDING TO CALL AMCITS BY RADIO. DECON UPON RECEIPT.
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PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø4835 161602Z

51
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-Ø1 EUR-2Ø SSO-ØØ CCO-ØØ CIAE-ØØ DOT-12 E-15 H-Ø2
INR-Ø8 IO-13 L-Ø4 NSAE-ØØ NSC-1Ø NSCE-ØØ O-Ø3 OC-Ø6
PM-Ø5 PRS-Ø1 RSC-Ø1 SS-2Ø USIE-ØØ USSS-ØØ SY-Ø3 P-Ø3
SCS-Ø4 SCA-Ø1 PPT-Ø2 RSR-Ø1 /15Ø W
124733

O P 161540Z SEP 7Ø
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1262
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4835

SUBJ: SECURITY SITUATION IN JORDAN

1. TWO AMERICAN NEWSMEN TOLD EMBOFF AFTERNOON SEPT 16 ON RETURN FROM TRIP TO NORTHER JORDAN THAT IRBID APPEARED TO BE COMPLETELY IN HANDS OF FEDAYEEN EXCEPT FOR ONE POLICE POST, AND FEDAYEEN ALSO APPEARED TO BE CONTROLLING ZARQA. ANOTHER NEWSMAN SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT IRBID BEING ADMINISTERED FEDAYEEN COMMISSAR.

2. AMMAN, AS OF 17ØØ LOCAL, CONTINUES CALM BUT TENSE AS DEADLINE SPECIFIED IN SEPT 15 GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES APPROACHES.

3. EMBASSY HAS SKELETON WORKING STAFF ON BOARD WITH OTHER AMERICAN PERSONNEL STANDING FAST AND REGROUPED IN SEVEN HOUSES.
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04832 161703Z

47
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-02

INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20

USIA-12 IO-13 O-03 SY-03 OPR-02 OC-06 CCO-00 PER-02

SCS-04 SCA-01 E-15 DOT-12 USSS-00 RSR-01 /164 W
125180

P R 161430Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
O RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1259
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
CINCEUR
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4832

SUBJECT: AMMAN SECURITY SITREP

1. EMBOFF TRAVELED AROUND AMMAN AND GAINED FOLLOWING GENERAL IMPRESSIONS AS OF MIDDAY SEPT 16:

A. FOOD SHOPS IN CENTER OF TOWN ALL OPEN, AND REASONABLY CROWDED. PERHAPS 30/40 PERCENT OF OTHER STORES OPEN OR HALF-SHUTTERED. PEDESTRIAN AND VEHICULAR TRAFFIC GENERALLY BELOW NORMAL, BUT MOVING IN ALL DIRECTIONS, INDICATING THAT PATTERN OF FLOW HAD NOT CHANGED MATERIALLY. (REUTERS REPORTED AT NOON THAT SHOPS CLOSED.)

B. NO ARMY FORCES EVIDENT IN DOWNTOWN AREA. NUMBER OF UNIFORMED, ARMED FEDAYEEN NOTICEABLY LESS THAN DURING RECENT DAYS. FEW MEN INCIVILIAN CLOTHES SEEN CARRYING ARMS.
USUAL FEDAYEEN GUARD (PASC) IN FRONT OF CENTRAL POST OFFICE;

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NO PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES IN DOWNTOWN AREA OTHER THAN NORMAL TRAFFIC POLICEMAN.

C. ROADBLOCKS TO WEST AND NORTH OF TOWN MANNED AT NORMAL LEVELS. NO EVIDENCE OF UNUSUAL MILITARY FORCES IN VICINITY. ONLY ONE ROADBLOCK JOINTLY MANNED BY FEDAYEEN AND MILITARY.

D. JUDGING FROM NUMBER OF VEHICLES AT FILLING STATIONS, IT IS APPARENT THAT GASOLINE SHORTAGE CONTINUES TO EXIST.

E. SCHOOLS WERE OPEN TODAY, AT LEAST DURING MORNING. (REUTERS REPORTED THEM CLOSED.)

2. REACTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES TO LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION STILL TENTATIVE AND MIXED. BRITISH LAST NIGHT EVIDENTLY FELT REAL SHOWDOWN MIGHT BE IN TRAIN, BUT MORNING'S EVENTS PLUS JRE CAREFUL LOOK AT NEW GOVT HAS LED TO SOME THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS COMPROMISE BETWEEN GOJ AND FEDAYEEN STILL A POSSIBILITY. GERMANS CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT SITUATION EXTREMELY PERILOUS, AND THAT EVENTS OF LAST 24 HOURS HAVE FURTHER ENDANGERED SAFETY OF HIJACKED HOSTAGES.

4. VARIOUS PEOPLE REPORT HAVING HEARD ARTILLERY SHELLING IN GENERAL DIRECTION OF ZERKA. ARMY DENIES THAT ANY CLASH TOOK PLACE. AMERICAN CITIZEN RESIDING IN GENERAL VICINITY OF AIRPORT REPORTED THAT AREA QUIET AS OF 1500L.

5. AT 1515L EMBASSY COMMUNICATOR'S CAR "BORROWED" BY PFLP. FEDYEEN WHO TOOK CAR SAID THAT THEY WOULD RETURN IT WITHIN THE HOUR.

6. AS OF 1530L TRAFFIC HAS DIMINISHED FURTHER, BUT STILL SOME MOVEMENT ON STREETS. GP-3.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 401

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04831 161501Z

45
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

124057

'70 SEP 16 PM 8:09

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Z 161405Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1258J
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

S E C R E T AMMAN 4831

EXDIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO BERN BONN LONDON

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR PHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE HAD CERTAINLY AROUSED WHITEHALL WHEN HE HAD SENT INFO SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED OUR 4808 AND WHICH CAME FROM SAME SOURCE. ADDED THAT CALMNESS IN AMMAN UP TO PRESENT PUT HIM IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AS HE HAD ANTICIPATED ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASH IN HIS REPORTING CABLE. RUEFULLY, HE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE CALLED ON FOR DPLANATION.

2. AMBASSADOR SAID HE UNDERDSTOOD THERE HAD BEEN EXCHANGE OF PHONE CALLS BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT (#)H

1. AT 0600 HOURS LOCAL RADIO AMMAN ANNOUNCED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ACCEPTED RESIGNATION AADUL MUN'IM RIFAI AND HIS CABINET AND HAD APPOINTED 12 MAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT
(#)

. IN ACCOMPANYING MESSAGE, KING STATED THAT CONTINUING CHAOS IN COUNTRY HAD REQUIRED HIM TO TAKE THIS MEASURE IN ORDER TO PRESERVE PUBLIC ORDER AND PROTECT BOTH THE LIVES OF HIS CITIZENS AND THE "NOBLE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT." DAUD, VGG BRIEF REPLY TO ENTRUSTMENT MESSAGE, ACCEPTED TASK OF RESTORING

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PEACE AND ORDER, IMPLEMENTING JORDANIAN-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENTS OF JULY 10 AND SEPT 15, AND "SAFEGUARDING PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE TO ENABLE IT TO PERFORM ITS HOLY DUTY."

2. BRIG. MUHAMMAD DAUD BECOMES PRIMIN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE. HE IS WELL-RESPECTED, WESTER ORIENTED
PALESTINE
GUVWITHNRONG EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH ARAB-ISRAELI MATTERS AS JORDAN' :LIAISON OFFICER (#)
8

MINISTER OF
STATE FOR PRIME MINISTRY AFFAIRS. SACKED FOLLOWING HIS IN-VOLVEMENT IN 1957 FREE OFFICERS' MOVEMENT, HE WAS RECENTLY RESTORED TO RANK AND POWER IFBPUBGETSECURITY FORCES. HIS FATHER IS RESPECTED MEMBER OF SENATE AND FAMILY HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN STRONG SUPPORTER OF HASHEMITE THRONE.J

4. MAJOR GENERAL MUTLAQ:ID BECOMES MINISTER OF DEFENSE.UA CRUSTY BEDUIN OF THE POWERFUL HOWEITAT TRIBE, HE HAS BEEN SERVING AS HEAD OF JORDANIAN MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN BAHRAIN. IN 1964, HE ATTENDED US ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL AT FORT KNOX.

5. STAFF BRIG. SALIH AL-SHARA BECOMES MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND AND MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AND HOLD PLACES. FROM SALT, HE IS BROTHER OF FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF SADIQ AL-SHARA.

6. STAFF BRIG. IBRAHIM AYYUB BECOMES MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT. COMMANDER OF ROYAL SIGNAL CORPS, HE WAS PREVIOUSLY DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. ATTENDED US ARMY STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH IN 1960.

7. STAFF BRIG. FAHD JARRADAT BECOMES MINISTER OF FINANCE. ALTHOUGH MOST RECENTLY DIRECTOR OF POPULAR MILITIA, HE HAS PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS ADJUTANT GENERAL AND IN OTHERPPOSITIONS REQUIRING FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 04831 161501Z

8. STAFF BRIG. AWAD AL-KHALDI BECOMES MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURE. A BEDUIN OF BENI KHALID TRIBE NEAR IRBID, HE IS GRADUATE OF SANDHURST AND HAS ATTENDED BOTH US ARMY STAFF COLLEGE AT FORT LEAVENWORTHWND US INFANTRY SCHOOL AT FORT BENNING; REGARDED AS PRO-WEST.

AND CABLE; HE HAS BEEN SERVING AS THE
ARMY'S DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION.

9. COLONEL (OR BRIG.) DR. YA'QUB ABU GHOSH BECOMES MINISTER OF HEALTH, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND LABOR, AND RECONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT (REFUGEE AFFAIRS). THE ONLY PALESTINIAN IN CABINET BESIDES PRIMINFDAUD, HE RECENTLY RETIRED AS DIRECTOR OF ROYAL MEDICAL SERVICES TO OPEN PRIVATE MEDICAL CLINIC IN AMMAN.

10. LT.COL. ABDULLAH SAYIL SALIH BECOMES MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS. HE HAS BEEN COMMANDING 36TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

11. MAJOR MUFLEH AL-AUDATALLAH, OF MADABA, BBECOMES MINISTER OF INTERIOR FOR MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS.J

12. MAJOR IBRAHIM SAYIL BECOMES MINIEEER OF NATIONAL EDUCATION.

13. MAJOR ADNAN ABU AUDEH BECOMES MINISTER OF CULTURE, INFOR-
MATION, TOURISM AND ANTIQUITIES. HE WILL ALSO BE GOVT'S
OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN.

14. AMONG FIRST ACTS OF NEW CABINET WAS TO APPOINT REP
ESENT-
ATIVES TO CONTINUE TALKS WITH FEDAYEEN UNDER AUSPICES OF FIVE
NATION ARAB COMMITTEE. THEY ARE: BRIG.SALIH AL-SHARA; BRIG#)
UQAD ALAKHALDI; MAJOR AD VAN ABU AKREH; MAJBV GENERAL ZUHAYR
MATAR (WHO REMAINS AS DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC
SECURITY
LV AN XWJMO
GSTNJSL MUHAMMAD KHALUJ 'ABD AL-DAYIM
(WHO REMAINS AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF TTV ARMQEL.#
W15. ALTHOUGH
(#)

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04831 161501Z

CABINET. SWING HAS MADE
CLEAR IN NUMBER OF WAYS THAT HE DID NOT

WISH TO ALIENATE PALESTINIANS. PERSONALITY OF PRIMIN,/ (#)
ORIGIN AND HAS
REPUTATION AS A MODERATE AND NEGOTIATOR ARE
(#)

OF KNOWN H-RD-LINERS SUCH AS SHARIF Z
VID BEN SHAKER OR
FORMER PRIMIN WASFI TELL FROM NEW GOVT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT.
THIRDLY, APPOINTMENS OF KING'S CAPABLE BUT CONTROVERSIAL CONFI-
DANT ZAID RIFAI
GS AMBASSADOR TOGREAT BRITAIN AND HIS REPLACE-

(#)
F BY PROMINENT PALESTINIANAND FORMER
DEPUTY PRIMIN AHMAD TUQAN IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO ASSURE
PALESTINIANS THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO ENJOY STRONG
INFLUENCE IN THE NATION'S GOVERNING COUNCILS. THUS, WHILE
STRENGTHENING HIS HAND VIS-A-VIS
LOJ GN#KING HAS INDICATED HIS
CONTINUING PREFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATED, COMPROMISE SOLUTION OF INTER-
NAL DISSENSION RATHER THAN ALL-OUT SHOWDOWN.

16. DETAILS ON OTHER CHANGES BY SEPTEL.
BROWN

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES BY OC/T.
NOTE: AMMAN 4831. MESSAGE RECEIVED BADLY GARBLED.
CORRECTIONS TO FOLLOW.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04831 161522Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
124448

Z 161405Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1258J
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

S E C R E T AMMAN 4831

EXDIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO BERN BONN LONDON

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR PHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE HAD CERTAINLY AROUSED WHITEHALL WHEN HE HAD SENT INFO SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED OUR 4808 AND WHICH CAME FROM SAME SOURCE. ADDED THAT CALMNESS IN AMMAN UP TO PRESENT PUT HIM IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AS HE HAD ANTICIPATED ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASH IN HIS REPORTING CABLE. RUEFULLY, HE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE CALLED ON FOR EXPLANATION.

2. AMBASSADOR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THERE HAD BEEN EXCHANGE OF PHONE CALLS BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN OFFICE ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. WE SPECULATE HIS REPORTING MAY HAVE STIMULATED BRITISH TO DEMAND URGENT BERN GROUP MEETING (BERN 3899). BROWN

NOTE: NOT PASSED ADDRESSEES BY OCT.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '70 SEP 16 PM 8:09

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04830 161546Z

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54
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 DOT-12 E-15 H-02
INR-08 IO-13 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 NSCE-00 O-03 OC-06
PM-05 PRS-01 RSC-01 SS-20 USIE-00 USSS-00 SY-03 SSO-00
RSR-01 /140 W

---------- 124561

O P 161400Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1257
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
USINT CAIRO
CINCEUR
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4830

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJ: KING HUSSEIN APPOINTS
MILITARY GOVERNORS IN JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 4827

1. IN COMPLEMENTARY MOVE TO APPOINTMENT OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT (REFTEL), KING HUSSEIN HAS APPOINTED FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF JORDAN ARMED FORCES AND CONCURRENTLY AS MILITARY GOVERNOR GENERAL OF JORDAN EFFECTIVE SEPT 16, BORN IN 1914, AL-MAJALI HEADS PROMINENT MAJALI TRIBE OF KERAK AREA IN SOUTH JORDAN AND HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED SPOKESMAN OF CONSERVATIVE, BEDUIN ELEMENTS IN ARMY. WHILE NOT A STUDENT OF MODERN MILITARY

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TECHNOLOGY, AL-MAJALI IS A FIRM COMMANDER WHO IS TOTALLY LOYAL TO THE HASHEMITE THRONE. AL-MAJALI HAS APPOINTED BRIG. MAZIN AL-AJLUNI (WHO IS ALSO DEPUTY PRIMIN) AS DEPUTY MILITARY GOVERNOR GENERAL AND HAS NAMED FOLLOWING OFFICERS AS DISTRICT MILITARY GOVERNORS:

(A) MAJOR GENERAL QASIM AL-MA'AYTAH, COMMANDER OF FIRST DIVISION, AS GOVERNOR OF KERAK AND BALQA. A NATIVE OF KERUEZN HE IS REPUTED TO BE A BOLD AND ENERGETIC OFFICER. STORY CURRENTLY CIRCULATING THAT HIS SON WAS KILLED YESTERDAY IN CLASH WITH FEDAYEEN IN ZARQA.

(B) MAJOR GENERAL QASIB AL-SFUQ AS GOVERNOR OF AMMAN. A CIRCASSIAN WITH REPUTATION FOR TOUGHNESS, AL-SFUQ BECAME ACTING COMMANDER OF THIRD DIVISION WHEN SHARIF ZAID BEN SHAKER WAS REMOVED LAST JUNE. HE IS A PROTEGEE OF BEN SHAKER.

(C) BRIG. BAHJAT MUHAYSEN, COMMANDER OF SECOND DIVISION, AS GOVERNOR OF IRBID. FROM TAFILAH IN SOUTH JORDAN, MUHAYSEN HAS RECENTLY BEEN TARGET OF VIOLENT FEDAYEEN CRITICISM AS "INSTIGATOR" OF ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASHES IN IRBID AREA.

(D) BRIG. MUHAMMAD IDRIS AS GOVERNOR OF ZARQA. A CIRCASSIAN FROM NA'UR, IDRIS HAS REPUTATION AS STRICT DISCIPLINARIAN. HE IS COMMANDER OF ROYAL ARTILLERY CORPS.

(E) BRIG. SALIM INJADAT AS GOVERNOR OF MA'AN. HE IS COMMANDER OF THIRD BRIGADE.

2. HUSSEIN ALSO ACCEPTED RESIGNATION OF LT. GENERAL MASHUR HADITHA AL-JAZI AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND APPOINTED HIM AS SPECIAL MILITARY ADVISOR AT PALACE. NEW CHIEF OF STAFF NOT YET DESIGNATED. AL-JAZI HAS BEEN UP TO THIS POINT ONE OF REGIME'S PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATORS WITH FEDAYEEN. A LEADING PROPONENT OF CONCILIATORY LINE AND REPORTEDLY POPULAR WITH ARMY, AL-JAZI HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AMONG MOST POWERFUL MEN IN JORDAN A FEW WEEKS AGO. HIS REMOVAL WILL BE WIDELY INTERPRETED AS ANTI-FEDAYEEN MEASURE BY KING, THE HARBINGER OF LESS CONCILIATORY ROYAL TACTICS.

3. WITH EXCEPTION OF MUHAMMAD IDRIS, ALL MILITARY GOVERNORS ARE COMMANDERS OF UNITS BASED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL RETAIN COMMAND OF THEIR UNITS.

4. BRIG. ANWAR MUHAMMAD WAS APPOINTED KING HUSSEIN'S CHIEF

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MILITARY AIDE EFFECTIVE SEY 16. AS COMMANDER OF SPECIAL ROYAL GUARD BATTALION, MUHAMMAD HAS ALWAYS BEEN HELD IN SPECIAL REGARD BY HUSSEIN.

5. HUSSEIN ALSO ORDERED FORMATION OF MILITARY ADVISORY COUNCIL TO INCLUDE ALL OFFICERS WHO HAVE HELD SENIOR ARMY POSTS SINCE ARABIZATION OF JORDAN ARMED FORCES (1956). A COUNCIL OF THIS NATURE HAS LONG BEEN ADVOCATED BY THE OVER 700 RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS IN JORDAN, MOST OF WHOM ARE LOYAL TO HUSSEIN AND WISH TO PLAY SOME SORT OF ACTIVE ROLE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE NATION. LARGELY AS RESULT OF PALACE NEGLECT AND UNCONCERN, FEDAYEEN WERE BEGINNING TO SHOW SOME SUCCESS IN RECRUITING THESE RETIRED OFFICERS TO THEIR RANKS.
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VAGE 01 AMMAN 04827 161526Z

47
ACTION NEA-15

1970 SEP 16 16 13

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00 PM-05

NSC-10 SS-20 RSC-01 L-04 H-02 P-03 PRS-01 CIAE-00

INR-08 NSAE-00 IO-13 SSC-01 ACDA-19 AF-12 RSR-01 /136 W
124399

O P 161255Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WWSHDC IMMEDIATE 1255
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BERN
USINT CAIRO
CINCEUC
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TZL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4827

SUBJ KING HUSSEIN FORMS MIPITARY GOVT

JOINT EMBASS/DATT MESSAGE

1. AT 0600 HOURS LOCAL RADIO AMMAN ANNOUNCED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ACCEPTED RESIGNATION AADUL MUN'IM RIFAI AND HIS CABINET AND HAD APPOINTED 12 MAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT HEADED BY BRIG. MUHAMMAD DAUD. IN ACCOMPANYING MESSAGE, KING STATED THAT CONTINUING CHAOS IN COUNTRY HAD REQUIRED HIM TO TAKE HHIS MEASURE IN ORDER TO PRESERVE PUBLIC ORDER AND PROTECT BOTH THE LIVES OF HIS CITIZENS AND THE "NOBLE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT." DAUD, IN BRIEF REPLY TO ENTRUSTMENT MESSAGE, ACCEPTED TASK OF RESTORCNG PEACE AND ORDER, IMPLEMENTING JORDANIAN-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENTS OF JULY 10 AND SEPT 15, ANDZSAFEGUARDING PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE TO ENABLE IT TO PERFORM ITS HOLY DUTY."

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2. BRIG. MUHAMMAD DAUD BECOMES SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. PALESTINIAN WITH LONG EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH ARAB-ISRAELI MATTERS AS JORDAN'S LIAISON OFFICER WITH MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION.

3. BRIG. MAZIN AL-AJLUNI BECOMES DEPUTY PRIMIN AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRIME MINISTRY AFFAIRS. SACKED FOLLOWING HIS INVOLVEMENT IN 1967 FREE OFFICERS' MOVEMENT, HE WAS RECENTLY RESTORED TO RANK AND POWER IN PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES. HIS FATHER IS RESPECTED MEMBER OF SUIATE AND FAMILY HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN STRONG SUPPORTER OF HASHEMITE THRONE.

(# OMISSION.

JORDANIAN MILITARY TRAINING MISSION IN BAHRAIN IN 1964, HE ATTENDED US ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL AT FORT KNOX.

5. STAFF BRIG. SALIH AL-SHARA BECOMES MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AND HOLD PLACES. FROM SALT,
GROTHDNYSVODCTM#
ZIQHLSRJLZPQGOYD#
EEPEOB#
5
ARA. #

6. BRIG. IBRAHIM AL-YOUB BECOMES TRANSPORT. COMMANDANT OF ROYAL SCORPS, COMMANDED PREVIOUSLY DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCK. ATTENDED US ARMY STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH IN 1960.

7. STAFF BRIG. FAHD JARRADAT XECOMES MINISTER OF FINANCE. ALTHOUGH MOST RECENTLY DIRECTOR OF POPULAR MILITIA, HE HAS PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS ADJUTANT GENERAL AND IN OTHER POSITIONS REQUIRING FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE.

8. STAFF BRIG. AWAD AL-KHALDI BECOMES MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURE. A BEDUIN OF BENI KHALPD TRIBE NEAR IRBID, HE IS GRADUATE OF SANDHURST AND HAS ATTENDED BOTH US ARMY STAFF COLLEGE AT FOGT LEAVENWORTH AND US INFANTRY SCHOOL AT FORT BENNING.

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REGARDED AS PRO-WESTERN AND CABLE; HE HAS BEEN SERVING AS THE ARMY'S DIRECTOR OF PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION.

9. COLONEL (OR BRIG.) DR YA'QUB ABU GHOSH BECOMES MINISTER OF HEALTH, SOCIAL AFFUVRS AND LABOR, ANDSTECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (REFUGEE AFFAIRS). THE ONLY PALESTINIAN IN CABINET BESIDES PRIMINFDAUD, HE RECENTLY RETIRED AS DIRECTOR OF ROYAL MEDICAL SERVICES TO OPEN PRIVATE MEDICAL CLINIC IN AMMAN.

1Ø. LT.COL. ABDULLAH SAYIL SALIH BECOMES MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS. HE HAS BEEN COMMANDING 36TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

RFWE1. MAJOR MUFLEH J#
-AUDATALLAH, OF MADABA, BECOMES MINISTER OF
INTZRIOR FOR MUNICIPALCAAD RURAL AFFAIRS.J

12. MAJOR IBRAHIM SAYIL BECOMES MINISTER OF NATIONAL EDKCATION.

13. MAJOR ADNAN ABU AKIEH BECOMES MPZISTDP OF CUVTKME:W I#

(OMISSION) HE WILL ALSO BE GOVT'S
OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN.

14. AMONG FIRST ACTS OF NEW CABINET WWS TO APPOINT REPRESENTATIVES TO CONTINUE TALKF WITH FEDAYEEN UNDER AUSPICES OF FIVE NATION ARAB COMMITTEE.
THEY ARE: BRIG.SALIH AL-SHARA; BRIG.
AWAD AL-KHALDI; MAJOR ADNAN ABU AUDEH; MAJOR GENERAL ZUHAYR MATAR (WHO REMAINS AASFIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SECURITY); AN MAJOR GENERAL MUHAMMAD KHALIL 'ABD AL-DAYIM
(WHO REMAINS AS FEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY).

15. ALTHOUGH EAST BANK BEDUIN OFFICERS CONSTITUTE MAJORITY MF CABINET, KING HAS MADE CLEAR IN NUMBER OF WAYS THAT HE DOES NOT WISH TO ALIENATE PALESTINIANS.PERSONALITY OF PRIMIN, HIS PALESTINIAN ORIGIN AND HIS REPUTATION AS A MODERATE AND NEGOTIATOR ARE RE ASSURING.

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EXCLUSION OF KNOWN HARD-LINERS SUKH AS SHARIF ZAID BEN SHAKER OR FORMER PRIMIN WASFI TELL FROM NEW GOVT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT. THIRDLYN APPOINTMENT OF KING'S CAPABLE BUT CONTROVERSIAL CONFIDANT ZAID RIFAI AS AMBASSADOR TO GREAT XRITAIN AND HIS REPLACEMENT AS CHIEF OF ROYAL CURT BY PROMINENT PALESTINIAN AND FORMER DEPUTY PRIVIN AHMAD TUQAN IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO ASSURE PALESTINIAN SUPPORT FOR THE KING IN GOVERNING COUNCILS. STRONG WHILE STRNEGTHENING HIS HAND VIS-A-VIS FFDAYEEN KING HAS INDICATED HIS CONTINUING PREFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATED, COMPROMISE SOLUTION OF INTERNAL DISSENSION RATHER THAN ALLA-OUT SHOW
IWN.

16. DETAILS ON OTHER CHANGES BY SEPTEL.
BROWN

NOTE: MESSAGE BADLY GARBLED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04821 161101Z

22
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 CCO-00 IO-13 SCS-04 AID-28 FBO-01 PM-05 H-02

INR-08 L-04 NIC-01 NSC-10 O-03 OC-06 OPR-02 P-03

PER-02 RSC-01 PRS-01 SCA-01 SS-20 SY-03 RSR-01 /155 W

122711

Z O 161045Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TORUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1252
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BERN
USINT CAIRO
CINCSTRIKE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 1767

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4821

1. AT 12 NOON LOCAL, SECURITYSITUATION IN AMMAN UNCHANGED. FEDAYEEN AND GOVT REPS ARE TALKING. SHOPS AND SCHOOLS IN AMMAN OPENED NORMALLY SEPT 16, BUT TOWN HAS BEEN GETTING PROGRESSIVELY QUIETER. FEDAYEEN HAVE SET UP SOME ROAD BLOCKS IN JABAL ASHRAF-FIYYEH AREA AND REINFORCED SOME OF THEIR STRONGHOLDS WITH ADDITIONAL SANDBAGGING. EMBASSY OFFICERS ARE MONITORING SITUATION CLOSELY AND WILL REPORT DEVELOPMENTS DURING AFTERNOON. BROWN

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PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø4818 16Ø629Z

18
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-Ø1 EUR-2Ø IO-13 CCO-ØØ CIAE-ØØ NSAE-ØØ NSCE-ØØ

SSO-ØØ USIE-ØØ SSC-Ø1 PM-Ø5 H-Ø2 INR-Ø8 L-Ø4 NSC-1Ø

P-Ø3 RSC-Ø1 PRS-Ø1 SS-2Ø AID-28 RSR-Ø1 /133 W
---------- 121Ø32

Z 16Ø6Ø9Z SEP 7Ø ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1249
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN FLASH
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
CINCSTRIKE
DOD
USINT CAIRO
USUN NY 1766
DIA

UNCLAS AMMAN 4818

1. IN ROYAL DECREE THAT WAS READ OVER RADIO AT Ø7ØØ LOCAL KING HUSSEIN ANNOUNCED FORMATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT, DESIGNED TO IMPLEMENT JULY 1Ø AND SUCCEEDING AGREEMENTS. TONE MODERATE AND SPECIFIC AND MEASURES SAID TO BE TAKEN TO ASSURE PUBLIC SECURITY AND ENABLE ALL CITIZENS--ARMY AND FEDAYEEN ALIKE--PREFFER SERVICE ON BEHALF OF NATION.

2. DECREE APPOINTED 12-MAN CABINET HEADED BY BRIGADIER MOHAMED DAUD. DAUD HOLDS OFFICES OF PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINSTER OF JUSTICE. REMAINDER OF CABINET OF MILITARY RANK FROM MAJOR TO BRIGADIER.

3. FIELD MARSHALL HABIS AL MAJALI APPOINTED COMMANDER IN CHIEF ARMED FORCES WITH RADIO BROADCASTING
ALSO GRACEFUL FAREWELL REMARKS BY PRESENT
INCUMBENT ALJAZI.

4. GOVERNATES NOW ALL HEADED BY MILITARY MEN WITH DEPUTY

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PRIME MINISTER BRIGADIER MAZIN 'AJLUUNI RESPONSIBLE FOR GOVERNATE OF CAPITAL REGION.

5. FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AHMED TOUQAN APPOINTED AS CHIEF ROYAL DIWAN.

6. AMMAN QUIET WITH FAIR AMOUNT OF PEOPLE AND TRAFFICE MOVING ABOUT.
BROWN

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04814 152359Z

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ACTION NEA-15

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05

H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

SS-20 AID-28 E-15 DOT-12 SCS-04 SCA-01 SY-03 USSS-00

O-03 OC-06 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 FBO-01 OPR-02 PER-02

RSR-01 /181 W

118922

Z O 152330Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1245
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4814

1. IN EVALUATING POSSIBLE FEDAYEEN REACTION TO KING'S MOVE WE JUDGE THAT ITS CONSEQUENCES MAY NOT BE SATISFACTORY OR CLEAR CUT AS HE WISHES.

2. ALTHOUGH AT FIRST GLANCE KING MAY HAVE APPEARED TO HAVE RESOLVED ONCE AND FOR ALL TO DEAL WITH ANOMALOUS FEDAYEEN "STATE WITHIN A STATE" THERE ARE STILL ASPECTS TO KING'S MOVE WITH WHICH FEDAYEEN HAVE LONG BEEN FAMILIAR. ARMY, FOR INSTANCE, IS NOT ACTUALLY IN CITY AND KING MERELY DRAWS FEDAYEEN ATTENTION TO THEIR ENCIRCLING PRESENCE. THIS WOULD HARDLY BE NEWS TO FEDAYEEN WHO HAVE LONG CONTENDED THAT CITY WAS BEING ENCIRCLED FOR QTE LIQUIDATORY MOVE UNQTE.

3. FEDAYEEN WILL ALSO NOTE THAT WHILE MATTERS MAY REALLY BE CLOSER TO SHOW-DOWN THAN BEFORE KING HAS STILL STOPPED SHORT OF ULTIMATE HAWK SOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR SUDDEN INVESTITURE

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OF AMMAN BY OVERWHELMING ROYAL FORCES. KING INSTEAD GIVING THEM ADVANCE NOTICE OF WHAT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES HE MIGHT DO.

4. WE BELIEVE FEDAYEEN RESPONSE TO ROYAL ULTIMATUM MIGHT BE TO SIT TIGHT, APPEAL TO ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND LEAVE NEXT MOVE TO KING. FEDAYEEN WOULD MEANWHILE WORK FEVERISHLY AT PERFECTING THEIR DEFENSE POSITIONS IN STREETS AND BUILDINGS OF AMMAN. THREAT OF VIOLENCE TO HOSTAGES MIGHT ALSO BE USED TO TRY TO GET WESTERN POWERS TO DISSUADE HUSSEIN FROM ANY INTERVENTION.

5. SO LONG, MOREOVER, AS INNER CITY REMAINS IN FEDAYEEN HANDS POLICY OF PASSIVE RESISTENCE WOULD SEEM TO THEM PREFEREABLE TO ACCEPTANCE OF KING'S TERMS. SUCH ACCEPTANCE COULD SIGNIFY END OF FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT AS MAJOR FORCE IN JORDAN POLITICS. IT COULD SET PALESTINIAN CLOCK BACK TO PRE-1967 TIMES. FURTHERMORE, ONCE FEDAYEEN OUT OF TOWN (AS DEMANDED BY KING) AND DEPRIVED QTE URBAN TREE CANOPY UNQTE THEY WOULD BE EASY PREY TO ISRAELI AIR FORCE OR JAA. ISSUE BEFORE THEM IN SHORT IS OF SUCH OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE THAT THEY WOULD BE STRONGLY TEMPTED TO ACT ON THEIR HOPE THAT AT MOMENT OF CRISIS KING WOULD-- AS HE HAS IN PAST--AGAIN BACK DOWN.

6. WE ARE CONCERNED ALSO THAT KING'S MOVE MAY BRING UNITY TO DIVIDED GUERILLA MOVEMENT AND BY PREYING ON THEIR PARANOIA ENCOURAGE MENTALITY OF LAST DITCH STAND. FEDAYEEN COULD WITH ACCURACY REASSURE THEMSELVES THAT IF ARMY ENTERED CITY THEY COULD ONLY BE WINKLED OUT OF THEIR VARIOUS REDOUBTS BY INDISCRIMINATE MOPPING OPERATION WHOSE EFFECTS UPON MORAL STANDING OF KING'S REGIME WOULD BE MOST HARMFUL.

7. IF PALACE-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION NOT SOON RESOLVED CLEARLY IN RESPONSE TO KING'S ACTIONS--AND WE DOUBT IT WILL-- IT COULD LEAD EVENTUALLY TO VIOLENCE OR TEMPORIZING, EITHER OF WHICH COULD BE SETBACK FOR GOJ.

8. FINALLY, EMBASSY DOES NOT THINK POSSIBILITY GREAT THAT OTHER ARAB STATES WILL EITHER SIGNIFICANTLY HELP OR HINDER HUSSEIN'S OPERATION. ALGERIA MAY BE HIGHLY VOCAL BUT REMOTE; WE ANTICIPATE SYRIA AND IRAQ WOULD BE MORE SUBDUED AND UNLIKELY TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. LIKEWISE WE DO NOT EXPECT HUSSEIN TO RECEIVE PUBLIC SUPPORT EITHER FROM NASSER OR KING FAISAL

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HOWEVER MUCH THESE RULERS MIGHT PRIVATELY APPROVE OF HIS ACTION
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 253

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04812 152307Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
118755

Z O 152255Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1244
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN NY 1764

S E C R E T AMMAN 4812

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4808

1. RADIO AMMAN MIDNIGHT NEWS CARRIED ITEM THAT CHAIRMAN OF FIVE NATION ARAB COMMITTEE HAD ANNOUNCED REACHING OF AGREEMENT BY GOJ AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO REMOVE ALL APPEARANCES OF TENSION IN AMMAN AND OTHER CITIES EFFECTIVE MORNING SEPT 16. BROADCAST STATED THAT JOINT COMMITTEE HAD BEEN FORMED TO IMPLEMENT AGREEMENT.

2. EMBOFF CHECKED WITH PALACE AND WAS INFORMED THAT, DESPITE BROADCAST, PLANS WERE MOVING FORWARD AS REPORTED AMMAN 4808.

BROWN

'70 SEP 16 AM 8:17
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04810 152150Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

118345

Z 152122Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1242
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN NY 763

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
DLD 11-85/15154 Per ltr. 12/10/2014
By RJ NARA, Date 10/18/2016

~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4810

EXDIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO TO BONN, LONDON, DOD AND CINCSTRIKE

REF: AMMAN 4808

1. FURTHER DETAIL ON REFTEL. KING MAINTAINING TIGHTEST EFFORT AT SECURITY ON OPERATION. HOWEVER SILENCE OF CITY AND EMPTY STREETS SHOW PEOPLE AWARE SOMETHING AFOOT. PRIMIN RIFAI HAS TENDERED RESIGNATION BUT KING WILL DELAY ACCEPTANCE TILL LATEST MOMENT AND WILL INFORM PRESENT CHIEF OF STAFF HADIITHA OF REPLACEMENT ALSO AT LAST MOEMENT. GOVERNMENT WILL BE COMPOSED MAINLY OF MILITARY COMMANDERS.

2. KING DID NOT SAY WHAT, IF ANY, SPECIAL MOVES HE PLANS MAKE DURING NIGHT PRIOR TO 0700 ANNOUNCEMENT. SAYS HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN OR HOW IT WILL GO. WILL REACT TO EVENTS AS THEY DEVELOP. BY SAME TOKEN DOES NOT YET KNOW WHAT OUTSIDE (E.G. U.S. OR ISRAELI) HELP HE MAY NEED. BUT MAKES CLEAR HE BELIEVES HE IS BETTING ALL HIS CHIPS AND DETERMINED NOT TO LOSE. HE AND HIS ASSONBATES EEM RELAXED AND CONFIDENT. IF KING THIS TIME PREPARED TO CARRY THROUGH TO MILITARY SHOWDOWN, IT WOULD BE VICTORY OF HAWKS.

3. WE HAVE KNOWN KING AND MANY KEY ASSOCIATES WERE AT AL-HUMMAR FOR LAST SEVERAL DAYS AND DIFFICULT TO REACH THEM. THAT EVIDENCE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SEP 15 PM 9:37

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04810 152150Z

AND EVIDENCE OF MUCH STAFF WORK GOING ON SHOWS INTENSIVE PLANNING OF ENTERPRISE. KING DOUBTS IRAQIS WILL POSE ANY PROBLEM.

4. PRIMIN DESIGANTE DAUD IS CAREER ARMY OFFICER OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN WHO FOR PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS BEEN JORDAN'S REP ON MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION. EMBASSY RELATIONS WITH HIM IN THIS CAPACITY HAVE BEEN EXCELLENT. CHIEF OF STAFF DESIGNATE FIELD MARSHAL HABIS AL-MAJALI SERVED PREVIOUSLY AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF PRIOR TO JUNE 67 WAR. HE IS CONSERVATIVE AND TRADITIONAL IN OUTLOOK, LEADER OF IMPORTANT TRIBAL GROUP OF SOUTHERN JORDAN, AND TOTALLY DEVOTED TO KING.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04808 152057Z

82
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W
118012

Z 152040Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1240
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN NY 762

~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4808

EXDIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO TO BONN, LONDON, DOD AND CINCSTRIKE

1. KING HAS ADVISED EMBASSY HE IS MOVING TONIGHT TO ALL OR NOTHING SHOWDOWN IN ORDER QTE TO ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER UNQTE IN JORDAN. DURING EARLY HOURS 16 SEPT HE WILL ESTABLISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITH BRIGADIER MOHAMMAD DAUD AS MILITARY GOVERNOR, HABIS MAJALI AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND MAZAN AJLUNI AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. MESSAGE WILL BE ANNOUNCED ON RADIO 0700 HOURS LOCAL SEPT 16 WITH ARMY UNITS PRE-POSITIONED AROUND CITY. KING WILL NOT FORCE ISSUE BUT IF FEDAYEEN REACT PREPARED TO USE ANY FORCE NECESSARY. HAVEING WAITED THREE DAYS, HE DETERMINED NOW COMPEL FEDAYEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND REMOVAL THEIR FORCES FROM AMMAN.

ARMY WILL ONLY ENTER CITY AGAINST FEDAYEEN IF NECESSARY. MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE OVER COMMUNICATIONS AND IF NECESSARY DECLARE CURFEW.

3. KING URGENTLY REQUESTS U.S. TAKE STEPS TO ASSURE ISRAELIS DO NOTHING THAT WOULD PREJUDICE OR AGGRAVATE SITUATION. HE ALSO EMPHASISES THAT, DEPENDING ON FEDAYEEN REACTIONS, HE MAY NEED CALL FOR USG AND ISRAELI ASSISTANCE; HE WILL ADVISE IF NEEDED. FURTHER DETAILS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '70 SEP 16 AM 8:17

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04808 152057Z

FOLLOW SEPTEL.

4. EMBASSY HAS MADE URGENT APPROACH TO KING WHO HAS AGREED TO INCLUDE IN 0700 ANNOUNCEMENT WARNING OF MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES SHOULD FEDAYEEN INJURE ANY HOSTAGES THAT MAY NOW BE IN OR MAY FALL INTO THEIR HANDS.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04794 151730Z

45
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
116615

P 151645Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1228
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4794

EXDIS

DEPT PASS BERN, BONN, GENEVA, AND LONDON PRIORITY FOR INFO.

REF: (A) BONN 10573; (B) LONDON 7374

1. IN EVALUATING STATEMENT IN BONN REFTEL ABOUT INTENSE BRITISH/GERMAN CONCERN RE SECURITY IN JORDAN, WE THINK FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE:

A. BOTH OF THESE EMBASSIES HAVE SHOWN EAGERNESS IN PAST TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF A LOCAL PROBLEM BY CONCLUDING SEPARATE BILATERAL DEALS WITH PFLP OVER HOSTAGES. THEREFORE WHILE WE DO NOT AT ALL DISCOUNT GRAVITY OF SECURITY SITUATION, WE BELIEVE THAT REPORTAGE OF BRITISH AND GERMANS ON THIS MATTER MAY BE COLORED BY THEIR DESIRE ELIMINATE VEXATIOUS PROBLEM.

B. EVEN THOUGH SECURITY SITUATION MAY BE AS REPORTED BY BRITISH AND GERMANS, WE SHOULD STILL ATTEMPT COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS IN MULTILATERAL CHANNEL BECAUSE CONVENIENT ALTERNATIVE THEIR LOCAL EMBASSIES ENVISAGE NOT REALLY OPEN TO US.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE THROUGH THE RED CROSS AND WITH BRITISH AND GERMANS TO SHORE UP MULTI-LATERAL EFFORTS:

A. WE THINK IT COULD BE IMPORTANT IN ORDER TO SILENCE CRITICISM OVER ICRC INACTIVITY FOR RED CROSS TO STATE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PUBLICLY THAT IT IS BY NO MEANS DISENGAGING FROM HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE POSED BY HOSTAGES IN FEDAYEEN HANDS.

B. IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL WHEN FACT OF NO ISRAELI NATIONALS BECOME TO POINT OUT TO OUR ALLIES THAT INFORMATION ON PASSENGER LISTS (STATE 150659) SOMEWHAT CHANGES SIGNIFICANCE OF HIJACKING OPERATION. BECAUSE THERE ARE NO SINGLE PASSPORT ISRAELIS ON LIST OF HOSTAGES AND AT MOST ONLY A FEW DUAL NATIONALS, WE HAVE SPECIAL PROBLEM RE BRITISH AND GERMANS INCLINATION TO REGARD STATUS AMCITS TO BE RELATED TO ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE AND SEPARATE FROM THAT OF THEIR OWN NATIONALS. THE CLAIM OF ALMOST ALL HOSTAGES TO NON-ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP RAISES ISSUE TO NEW LEVEL OF PRINCIPLE. ALL BERN POWERS SHOULD NOW BE EQUALLY CONCERNED LEST BY GIVING IN TO PFLP BILATERAL DEMANDS THEY ESTABLISH PRECEDENT IN WHICH THEIR CITIZENS AT SOME FUTURE TIME MIGHT BE USED BY FEDAYEEN GROUPS TO SEEK CONCESSIONS FROM GOI. GP-3.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 379

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04766 151300Z

46
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 W

O 151211Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1217
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 4766

EXDIS

1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI INFORMED EMBASSY 1100Z THAT ON 13 AND 14 SEPTEMBER ISRAELI AIR FORCE HAD ENGAGED IN EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OVER JORDANIAN TERRITORY IN SOUTHERN VALLEY OF JORDAN RIVER. ON 15 SEPTEMBER THESE MISSIONS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY AND INVOLVED HELICOPTERS. JORDAN ARMY ALSO REPORTED SEVERAL ISRAELI SCOUTING EXPEDITIONS ALONG JORDAN RIVER. SCOUTS WERE USING MAPS WHICH IMPLIED TO JORDANIANS THAT EXERCISE WAS POSSIBLE PRELUDE TO MILITARY INVASION OF THIS AREA. RIFAI ASKED WHETHER USG HAD ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THESE ACTIVITIES, POINTING OUT THAT ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY BY ISRAELIS AT THIS TIME WOULD SEVERELY COMPLICATE JORDAN'S PRESENT PROBLEMS AND URGED USG TAKE WHATEVER ACTION IT FELT APPROPRIATE TO INSURE THAT ISRAELIS UNDERTOOK NO MILITARY ACTIONS. JORDANIANS HAVE ASKED FOR REPLY.

2. COMMENT: EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT DEPARTMENT AND TEL AVIV RELAY JORDANIAN CONCERN TO GOI AND ATTEMPT DETERMINE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY. STRONGLY URGE THEM KEEP AREA QUIET. REQUEST THIS BE DONE URGENTLY SO THAT WE CAN GET BACK TO JORDANIANS.
BROWN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'70 SEP 15 PM 4:21
14522

2

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 855

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04733 141618Z

42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

107639

O 141555Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1194

S E C R E T AMMAN 4733

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM BRUBECK

REF: BEIRUT 7697

1. WE ARE MAKING URGENT APPROACH TO PALACE ON SUBJECT AMBASSADOR BROWN'S PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS. ALL RESPONSIBLE PALACE OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN ABSENT FROM DIWAN TODAY-- PROBABLY AT KING'S PALACE (AL-HUMMAR) SOME 20 KMS OUT OF AMMAN. WE WILL APPROACH THEM NO LATER THAN EVENING OF SEPT 14, BUT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT SURE WHETHER PRESENTATION CEREMONY MIGHT NOT HAVE TO TAKE PLACE SOMEWHAT LATER THAN ANTICIPATED BY REFTEL. GOVERNMENT AND PALACE OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, CLEARLY LOOKING FORWARD EAGERLY TO YOUR ARRIVAL AND I BELIEVE PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS CAN BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ARRANGED.
BRUBECK

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM '70 SEP 15 AM 9:33

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 182

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04686 132125Z

81
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W
103209

O 131900Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1170
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 4686

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 2.

DEPT PASS BERN, BONN, LONDON, GENEVA

1. IT OCCURS TO US THAT WITH ICRC ROLE NOW VERY DOUBTFUL IN EYES OF PFLP, THEY MAY BE IN GENUINE DOUBT HOW PROCEED. WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY TRYING TO DEVELOP BILATERAL DEALS TO ISOLATE US AND ISRAEL, AND APPARENTLY LATE ENTRY INSERT PALESTINE RED CRESCENT IN MEDIATOR ROLE VICE ICRC, ANY REMAINING ICLINATION THEY MAY HAVE FOR MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE DISCOURAGED BY ICRC INACTIVITY AND LACK APPARENT ROLE.

2. AT SAME TIME, GIVE VARIETY OF PRESS REPORTS, E.G. NYT TEL AVIV REPORT OF ISRAELI WILLINGNESS "IN PRINCIPLE" TO JOIN DEAL, THEY MAY BE WAITING FOR SOME FURTHER OFFER FROM FIVE POWERS OF POSSIBLE DEAL.

3. THIS SEEMS TO US TO UNDERLINE IMPORTANCE OF EITHER GETTING ICRC BACK INTO ACTIVE MEDIATOR ROLE OR FINDING SOME ALTERNATIVE WAY OF STIMULATING DIALOGUE WITH PFLP. IN VIEW RED CRESCENT OVERTURES, COULD FIVE NOT PERSUADE ICRC, FOR EXAMPLE, TO PROPOSE TO RED CRESCENT FURTHER EXPLORATION ON BEHALF OF FIVE? ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN AT RISK OF ERODING COLLECTIVE FRONT (WHICH MAY COLLAPSE ANYHOW IF THERE NO MOVEMENT) IF ICRC UNWILLING ACT, SHOULD FIVE FIND ALTERNATIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH RED CRESCENT?

BRUBECK

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SUMMARY

Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø4513 Ø91836Z

53 41
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-Ø1 AF-12 SSO-ØØ CCO-ØØ NSCE-ØØ O-Ø3 OPR-Ø2 PER-Ø2
SS-2Ø L-Ø4 CIAE-ØØ DODE-ØØ INR-Ø8 NSAE-ØØ P-Ø3 RSC-Ø1
USIA-12 PRS-Ø1 NSC-1Ø RSR-Ø1 /Ø95 W
---------- Ø71665

Z Ø91816Z SEP 7Ø ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1Ø37
USIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL TANGIER
CINCSTRIKE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 4513

1. AT 2ØØØ HOURS LOCAL EMBASSY INFORMED BY IMPECCABLE SOURCE THAT ACTING PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER, FSIO-5, JON STEWART, PRESENTLY BEING HELD IN CUSTODY BY PLO. STEWART IS UNHARMED.

2. EMBASSY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN STEWART'S EARLY RELEASE.

3. CONSULATE TANGIER PLEASE INFORM MRS. STEWART.
ODELL

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00
1970 SEP 9 14 02
USIE-00 AID-26 CCO-00 FBO-01 PM-05 R-02 INR-08 L-04

NIC-01 NSC-10 O-03 OC-06 OPR-02 P-03 PER-02 RSC-01

PRS-01 SCA-01 SCSE-00 SS-20 SY-03 USSS-00 VOL-00

PPIE-00 RSR-01 E-15 DOT-12 /178 W

091330

Z 091352Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1025
DIA
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY ZURICH
CINCSTRIKE

UNCLAS AMMAN 4498

1. EXTREMELY HEAVY FIRING HAS AGIN BROKEN OUT IN AMMAN STARTING APPROXIMATELY 1800Z 9 SEPT. WE HAVE IDENTIFIED MUCH SMALL ARMS FIRE AND IN THE LAST 15 MINUTES CONSIDERABLE MORTAR ROUNDS. SEVERAL MORTAR ROUNDS HAVE LANDED BETWEEN JEBEL LUWEIBDEH AND JEBEL HUSSEIN. ASST ARMY ATTACHE ON ROOF OF DAO BUILDING REPORTSARMY GHQ BUILDING AS BEING HIT. ONE MORTAR ROUND OBSERVED TO LAND 100 METERS EAST U.S. EMBASSY.

2. ALL JORDAN INTERCONTINENTAL OCCUPEES ARE IN BASEMENT AT PRESENT.

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3. ZAID RIFAI SAID CONTACT PALACE AGAIN IN HALF HOUR BECAUSE PICTUREAT PRESENT UNCLEAR.

QUAIL

HOSKINSON

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1970 SEP 7 12 19

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04372 071204Z

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10

P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 OPR-02 O-03 SY-03 USSS-00

SCS-04 SCA-01 E-15 DOT-12 RSR-01 PPT-02 /146 W
---------- 054840

Z 071125Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 950
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERNE
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T AMMAN 4372

1. EMBOFF (ZWEIFEL) MET WITH PFLP SPOKESMAN ABU OMAR WHO MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) PFLP IS NOT OPERATING AGAINST AMERICAN PEOPLE IN ANY WAY BUT RATHER AGAINST POLICY OF USG. QTE WE ARE A HOMELESS PEOPLE AND WE HAVE A RIGHT TO TAKE OUR OWN DECISIONS FOR BENEFIT OF RECAPTURING OUR LAND. US AIDS ISRAEL TO CONTINUE ITS OCCUPATION AND WORKS AGAINST PROGRESS OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THEREFORE WE WILL DEFEND OURSELVES. OUR ACTION AGAINST PLANES IS TO DRAMATIZE THIS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. I ASSURE YOU ONE THOUSAND TIMES THAT WE ARE NOT AGAINST YOU AS A PEOPLE. BECAUSE OF THIS ATTITUDE WE ARE PROTECTING PASSENGERS. UNQTE

(B) DUAL CITIZENS WILL BE TREATED AS ISRAELIS. (IT IS APPARENT THAT DUAL CITIZENSHIP WILL BE BASED ON PSSESSION OF TWO PASSPORTS. HOWEVER, IF SINGLE PASSPORT LEADS TO SUSPICION THAT POSSESSOR WAS BORN IN ISRAEL, THAT PERSON ALSO WILL BE TREATED AS ISRAELI.)

2. FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE OF PASSENGERS AND AIRCRAFT:

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(A) SWISS NATIONALS WILL BE RELEASED WHEN THREE PRISONERS HELD BY SWISS ARE RELEASED.

(B) BRITISH NATIONALS WILL BE RELEASED WHEN LEILA KHALED IS RELEASED. (ABU OMAR AFFIRMED THAT LEILA KHALED IS SAME INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS INVOLVED IN EARLIER HIJACKING OF TWA PLANE TO DAMASCUS.

(C) WEST GERMAN NATIONALS WILL BE RELEASED WHEN THREE FEDAYEEN HELD IN GERMAN PRISONS ARE RELEASED.

(D) AMERICANS (OTHER THAN DUAL NATIONALS) WILL BE RELEASED WHEN ALL DEMANDS MET. (I.E. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC RANSOM DEMAND FOR RELEASE OF THOSE PASSENGERS.)

(E) ISRAELI NATIONS AND DUAL NATIONALS (NUMBERING ABOUT 50 ACCORDING TO ABU OMAR) WILL BE HELD AGAINST RELEASE OF FEDAYEEN PRESENTLY IN ISRAELI PRISONS. IF ISRAELIS AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO "PRISONER EXCHANGE" THE PFLP WILL THEN ANNOUNCE NAMES OF FEDAYEEN TO BE RELEASED.

3. TIME PERIOD FOR MEETING ALL OF THE DEMANDS OUTLINED ABOVE IS 72 HOURS STARTING FROM SIX A.M. LOCAL TIME SEPTEMBER 7.

4. IF DEMANDS ARE NOT MET WITHIN THIS TIME, PLANES WITH ALL PASSENGERS WILL BE BLOWN UP.

5. CONSUL BROACHED SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE VISIT TO PLANES BY REPRESENTATIVES OF CONSUL OR CORPS. ABU OMAR STATED THAT QTE THIS IS NOT IN MY HANDS UNQTE BUT SUCH A VISIT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. PFLP ARE IN TOTAL CONTROL OF AREA SURROUNDING PLANES. THEIR FORCES IN TURN ARE ENCIRCLED BY JORDAN ARAB ARMY TROOPS.
ABU OMAR STATED THAT ANY ATTEMPT AT INTERVENTION ON PART OF JAA OR IDF WOULD RESULT IN IMMEDIATE DESTUCTION OF AIRCRAFT.

6. MEMBERS OF THE JORDAN ARAB ARMY, INCLUDING CHIEF OF STAFF MASHUR HADIITHA, HAVE BEEN TAKEN PERSONNALLY TO EXAMINE THE PLANES AND TO SEE THE FACT THAT EXPLOSIVES ARE IN PLACE.

7. ABU OMAR WAS QUIET AND UNEMOTIONAL IN PRESENTATION. CONSUL

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GAINED IMPRESSION THAT SOME OF NEGOTIATING POINTS ARE NOT COMPLETELY FIRM OR AGREED UPON AT THIS STAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS CLEAR ONLY AFTER DISCUSSION THAT THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN AMERICANS HOLDING DUAL NATIONALITY AND OTHER UNITED STATES CITIZENS. LIKEWISE AFTER BEING PRESSED ON SUBJECT, ABU OMAR CONCEDED THAT HE DOES NOT ANTICIPATE RELEASE OF FEDAYEEN IN ISRAELI PRISONS DURING 72 HOUR PERIOD. RATHER, THE TIME LIMIT WOULD APPLY TO ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATION FOR EXCHANGE.

8. ABU OMAR REQUESTED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE PASSED TO HIGHEST LEVELS OF ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED AND THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO IMPRESS ON THOSE GOVERNMENTS SERIOUSNESS OF PFLP DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT THREAT OF DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT AND PASSENGERS.

ODELL

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PAGE Ø1 AMMAN Ø4477 Ø9Ø5ØØZ

19
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-Ø1 CIAE-ØØ DODE-ØØ NSAE-ØØ NSCE-ØØ SSO-ØØ USIE-ØØ

CCO-ØØ PM-Ø5 H-Ø2 INR-Ø8 L-Ø4 NSC-1Ø P-Ø3 RSC-Ø1

PRS-Ø1 SS-2Ø IO-13 ACDA-19 EUR-2Ø RSR-Ø1 /123 W
---------- Ø66Ø77

O P Ø9Ø42ØZ SEP 7Ø ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 1Ø12
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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SUBJ: SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN

REF: STATE 147ØØ7

1. IN TWELVE HOURS SINCE LATEST GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED, CITY HAS BEEN QUIETER THAN ON ANY NIGHT IN PAST TEN DAYS. (SOME SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS HEARD, AND ABOUT ØØ45 SEP 9 FOUR OR FIVE REPORTS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN ARTILLERY). ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD OF GOJ-FEDAYEEN CLASHES NEAR IRBID, FEDAYEEN IN AMMAN HAVE NOT MOVED TO CHALLENGE CEASE-FIRE.

2. WE ARE SCEPTICAL, HOWEVER, WHETHER SEP 8 AGREEMENT WILL WEAR ANY BETTER OR LONGER THAN ITS PREDECESSORS. LANGUAGE OF AGREEMENT SEEMS TO PLACE AUTHORITY OF GOJ AND FEDAYEEN ON EQUAL FOOTING, AND PROVISIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT ASSUME BOTH PARTIES WILL CONTINUE PULL IN TANDEM. IN PAST THIS ASSUMPTION HAS PROVED UNWARRANTED AND UNLESS FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT IS PREPARED TO CURB ITS EXTREMIST FACTIONS (UNLIKELY AFTER PFLP HIJACKINGS) WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE SO IN THIS INSTANCE AS WELL.

3. ASSUME TEXT AGREEMENT AVAILABLE FBIS.
ODELL

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04457 081600Z

1970 SEP 8 16 16

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ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCI-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 USIE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05
H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01
SS-20 SY-03 O-03 SCS-04 SCA-01 RSR-01 /032 W
---------- 061594

Z 081600Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 997
INFO DIA
CINCSTRIKE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AMMAN 4457

REF: AMMAN 4450

SUBJ: KIDNAPPING OF SSGT GRAHAM USDAO/MAP

1. MAJOR GEORGE HANNAH, LIAISON OFFICER WITH JAA, PHONED EMBASSY AT 1720 LOCAL TIME TO REPORT THAT HE HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT SSGT GRAHAM IS NOW AT PFLP HEADQUARTERS AND THAT HE WILL BE RELEASED "IN VICINITY OF EMBASSY" SOMETIME TONIGHT. GRAHAM REPORTED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH.

2. EMBASSY ASSUMES THIS IS REFLECTION OF GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT ANNOUNCED EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON.
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MEMOS &
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Pro & Con Paper

TOP SECRET

Air Strikes Against Syrian Forces in Jordan

I. Timing of Decision

Given the seriousness of a decision to intervene, there will be an argument for waiting to see whether outside intervention is necessary. Against that natural tendency to hold off must be weighed the advantages of early decision.

A. An early decision could have these advantages:

-- The earlier the Syrians are turned back, the less likely are the Fedayeen to consolidate their position in northern Jordan and the more likely is the King to strengthen his position.

-- An early threat to the Syrians could encourage them to decide to treat this as an in-and-out incursion, saving face in a way that they could not if they established a foothold in Jordan.

-- An early decision even if not immediately executed could be communicated to the Israelis and perhaps forestall a move on their part.

-- An early decision, if in favor of U.S. intervention, would permit the implied threat that could be made by flying aerial reconnaissance from the Sixth Fleet.

B. Holding a decision would have these advantages:

-- The best possible outcome would be for Hussein to stave off the Syrians on his own. Although his forces are taking losses, a premature move from outside would deprive him of the advantages of proving his ability to defend Jordan.

-- A premature move could cut short the time in which our approach to the USSR might have some effect.

TOP SECRET

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II. Are there actions yet to be tried before armed outside intervention?

If a Syrian armored force appears to be moving south into northern Jordan, there will be a limited amount of time for any but decisive military moves. However, it is necessary to canvass all alternatives.

A. Israeli show of force. It is possible that a massing of some Israeli forces on the Golan Heights or the appearance of Israeli air action toward the Syrian rear might cause the Syrians to pause.

B. U.S. tactical air reconnaissance over the battle area could serve as a warning of impending U.S. air attack. This would require overflight of Israel.

C. UN Security Council. Although this is unlikely to prove a decisive deterrent to the Syrians, the Jordanians may well feel compelled to call the Council into session.

III. Whether to encourage or try to prevent Israeli air intervention?

The basic question is whether the U.S. should move quickly to deter Israeli air intervention. The question of whether or not there should be any intervention at all may be academic unless the situation in Jordan quiets quickly because Israel may be tempted to move if the Syrians seem on their way to gaining a foothold in northern Jordan.

A. The arguments that U.S. intervention is preferable to Israeli are:

-- There is a general argument that perhaps the time has come in the broader Mid-East context to show a capacity for decisive U.S. action. If we stand back, we may well find that we have lost much of whatever U.S. capacity to influence events that may remain. The Soviets and others may already doubt that the U.S. in its present mood will not undertake action that could bring it face to face with the USSR.

-- In the context of our peace initiative, it could be argued that the Arabs in the end do respect force. U.S. demonstration of air power and willingness to use it could have

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a useful effect in reasserting U.S. determination (within the limits of its power) to see a responsible settlement.

-- If either of the above arguments has merit, it can be argued that air strikes in Jordan may be the best means available for such a demonstration. They could be reasonably effective since Syrian armored units will present a well-defined target while at the same time setting limits to U.S. involement. Congressional support might be more likely.

-- One school of thought holds that the Soviets would probably conclude that they had little choice but to let the U.S. get away with a limited intervention as long as Israeli forces were not involved. If the Israelis became involved, the Soviets are likely to be swept up in a broad Arab reaction.

-- For the U.S. to stand back would be read as a sign that the U.S. had finally written Hussein off. Failure to come to his aid would be the last in a long series of blows to his confidence in us. In this vein, it would also be a blow to the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia and other moderate countries which have in a general way depended on U.S. power.

-- The U.S. would be maintaining an independent policy in the Middle East. Israeli involvement has the dimension of renewing general hostilities, although even Israeli air strikes could be limited. The U.S. could make a better case for a limited operation. This could be presented to the Arab world as a U.S. move to pre-empt further Israeli forward movement and to limit spread of hostilities.

-- U.S. action would preserve U.S. control and set limits. Israeli air action could be a first step to ground intervention, and the U.S. would have little ability to prevent such escalation.

-- In relation to either of the last two points, the breakdown of the cease-fire seems more likely if Israel intervenes than if the U.S. does.

-- U.S. intervention, even on a "quick-strike" basis would be a rallying point in the Arab world for those who charge that Hussein is a "Western lackey." But in this context

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Israeli intervention could have an even worse effect. It could - especially if it expanded to ground action -- give anti-government forces a rallying point.

B. The arguments that Israeli intervention is preferable are:

-- The Israelis are operationally in a much better position to mount such an operation. They have the reconnaissance capability and, by being on the ground, they have much greater logistical capability. They also have the freedom to bomb the Fedayeen. If the U.S. did so, that would do great damage to the U.S. position in the Arab world.

-- The Israelis have a clear-cut national interest which, while the Arabs will not like it, they will understand.

-- Air strikes seem likely to be indecisive in a contest of this kind. They might disrupt a tank column, but if the Syrians pour in manpower to reinforce Fedayeen units, air strikes are not likely to present clear targets decisively defeated from the air.

-- If the U.S. intervened and then found that its air attacks were indecisive, pressure would then mount to make good via ground intervention. The U.S. would then be on the way to another land war, probably more difficult to sustain than that in Southeast Asia.

-- Following up the previous point, if the U.S. intervened in the air and then backed off, it would look as if Israel had to bail the U.S. out if Israel moved. This would be a damaging sign of U.S. weakness.

-- U.S. air intervention could be the first step to further involvement. Given Congressional views and the difficulty of supporting a sustained ground operation, it would be better not to take the first step.

-- Another way of putting these points is that this is a Middle Eastern war which outsiders cannot settle. It is likely to go on for some time. The U.S. has carefully avoid involvement of combat forces to date. It is of paramount importance to avoid any provocation to further Soviet

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involvement; neither of us has an interest in confronting the other directly in a war neither of us can finish. Whatever the disadvantages of Israeli involvement, they are outweighed by the importance of keeping this a cool conflict if we can.

-- A quick U.S. move before full Congressional consultation could create a "Vietnam syndrome" on the Mid-East and tie the President's hands in the future. It is important for the future Presidential strategy to establish a basis for Presidential Congressional cooperation.

-- Israeli action reduces the possibility of Soviet reaction and preserves future U.S. flexibility. Instead of being directly involved, the U.S. can contribute to the operation by sustaining Israeli operations.

-- Any U.S. intervention will provoke a sharp reaction from the Arab radicals. This could cause harm to the hostages in Amman; turn the PFLP to a round of attacks and kidnappings against U.S. personnel and installations throughout the Arab world; provoke retaliation against U.S. oil properties, especially in Iraq. If the Israelis move, the U.S. will share some of the blame but probably it would not be as immediately directed at the U.S.

-- Despite a predictably strong Arab reaction to Israeli attacks, these would be understood in terms of known Israeli interests. U.S. attacks -- especially if Fedayeen became the targets -- would be seen principally as attacks against the Arab cause, i.e. on Israel's behalf.

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September 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: Jordan Relief

This will confirm Colonel Kennedy's telephone conversation with you on Monday, 28 September. The President, on 26 September 1970, announced that he was making $5 million available for U.S. relief efforts in Jordan. Your assistance in assuring that these funds are made available is requested.

RTH for
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

RTH:ms:9/30/70

cc: Hal Saunders

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER 22403 | MO 09 | DA 29 | HR 17

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
HAK

FROM: ELIOT
ROGERS
LAIRD

DOC DATE: 09/29/70

HAK

CLASSIF: U C LOU S X TS

EXDIS
NODIS
EYES ONLY
RES DATA
CODEWORD
SENSITIVE
PARIS MTG
NO FORN

SUBJECT: Sit Rep on Jordan 0700 GMT 09/29/70

ENCLOSURES: ( ) ( ) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME:

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY FOR:
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STAFF SECRETARY			
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO TO PRESIDENT ..... ( )
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ..... ( )
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ..... ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

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INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
9/29	HAK	Pres	info

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OCT 05 1970
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22403

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan -- 0200 GMT, September 29, 1970

The tenuous cease-fire is still holding up in both Amman and in northern Jordan. Virtually no observers expect that this situation will continue for very long. There is little new to report on the six remaining hostages although we do have a fairly good report that they are safe. Our relief effort is continuing although some bottlenecks have been encountered in Amman and a temporary halt in the supply of foodstuffs may be necessary.

It is difficult to determine at this point what will be the effect of Nasser's death on the Jordan crisis other than to say that it may bring a few days of relative quiet. It is worth noting, however, that Nasser played a generally moderating role, although he tried to straddle the fence between Hussein and the fedayeen.

The Cease-Fire

The cease-fire remains generally effective in Amman. There were some reports of limited clashes Monday morning but nothing serious. There are so far no indications, however, that either the army or the fedayeen are withdrawing yet from the city. There are reports that things are beginning to return to normal, although it will be some time before utilities and sanitation services are restored. Ambassador Brown reports that since it is obvious that the embassy area will not be cleared of fedayeen for a long time, he and several embassy officers will soon establish a "branch embassy" in a more secure area.

Attempts to enforce the cease-fire in northern Jordan appear to be running into more difficulty. Intercepted fedayeen messages indicate an intention to break the cease-fire and considerable bitterness. There are no reports of actual cease-fire violations however, although it is quite possible that there have been some.

Commenting on the Cairo agreement, our embassy in Amman states that the efforts of the special committee headed by Tunisia's Premier Bahi Ladgam and the observers sent to Amman may give the country a breathing spell, but that it is doubtful if they can keep the fedayeen and the army apart for any length of time.

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The embassy thinks that while Ladgam may be acceptable to the government because of Tunisia's moderate stand, the fedayeen may denounce the chairman and the committee if they think it is favoring the government. The fact that the Syrians and Iraqis have also not supported the agreement could also encourage the fedayeen to resist the committee's decisions. Finally, the embassy seriously doubts that the fedayeen will ever leave Amman of their own free will or that the army can agree to continued fedayeen presence in Irbid since this amounts to a political defeat.

The Hostages

The remaining six hostages are still in fedayeen hands, probably in Irbid, and negotiations for their release are continuing. A responsible Red Cross official reports that they are safe and there have been several reports that they may be released soon.

Relief Program

The following is the current status of our relief efforts:
-- The Defense Department has announced in a press briefing that American relief aircraft have been using the Sinai-Aqaba route to Amman. Our embassy in Amman has stressed that, to placate the military in Jordan, King Hussein wants American relief planes to come in from Saudi Arabia. We have sought and received Saudi permission for these overflights and although we may only use Saudi air space minimally the relief flights will be publicly billed as coming from Saudi Arabia. State is also asking through the Italian embassy in Damascus for Syrian overflight rights.

-- Some difficulty has arisen with respect to moving from Amman airport the general purpose mobile hospital and the food and medical supplies that were brought into Amman airport on Monday, the 28th. Because of these difficulties and uncertainty as to the extent of further needs, Amman Embassy has recommended a 24-hour pause in further relief flights from Turkey.

-- Ambassador Brown thinks that the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital will be extremely useful and that it has been ordered from its base in Germany and is due in Amman at dawn on the 29th.
-- A civilian aircraft has been chartered to fly from Beirut to Amman on the 29th with relief supplies (about 10 tons of food).

-- Other major sources of relief supplies for Jordan have been the International Red Cross relief flights from Beirut (four per day) and shipments of food overland from Israel. A British medical unit is scheduled to arrive in Amman on September 29 and 30.

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Military Aid

The Jordanians have sent us a long military aid shopping list. Defense estimates that to deliver all that the Jordanians have requested would cost at least $10 million and that supplementary legislation would therefore be necessary after the election. Ambassador Brown is urging prompt delivery of the most urgently required items in order to maintain Jordanian morale and as a follow-on to your personal message to King Hussein. A sum for Jordan is tentatively included in the plans for the supplemental budget request.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan -- 1800 GMT

The situation in Jordan remains about the same, although Nasser's death could ultimately remove one of the principal building blocks of the fragile cease-fire. Amman remains relatively calm but the fedayeen are not withdrawing and the situation in the north may be shaping up along classic guerrilla warfare lines. The international relief effort is continuing without any major problems but we may be approaching the point now that we have met the most urgent needs -- to pause momentarily to take stock. Initial U.S. military resupply shipments to Jordan will begin in about three days.

The Cease-fire

Nasser's death may further undermine the shakey cease-fire agreement reached in Cairo. Our embassy in Amman thinks that for a short time it is likely that the hostility between the government and the fedayeen will be muted as the Arab world mourns Nasser's death, but that in the near future Nasser's passing may act as a solvent of the agreements reached in Cairo. Arab radicals such as Syria and Iraq might feel that with Nasser's moderating influence removed, there will be new opportunities for their leadership and the turmoil in Jordan could provide them with an ideal arena. Nasser, moreover, was probably the only Arab leader who might have marshaled Arab public opinion to restrain the fedayeen.

Amman is relatively calm, although the fedayeen remain in semi-official and almost uncontested control of some areas. The city is taking on a more normal appearance, however, with considerable civilian foot traffic and firing diminished to occasional intense but brief exchanges. The embassy

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speculates that the slowdown may have resulted from fatigue on both sides, shortages of ammunition and the desire of both the King and the fedayeen not to weaken their case in the eyes of Arab public opinion. King Hussein, however, has told an embassy officer that the army will not leave Amman and the other cities until the fedayeen depart first.

The situation is still very fragile in northern Jordan. The British see the situation there developing along classic guerrilla lines. The army holds the center of most of the smaller towns in the north -- although not the important towns of Irbid, Ramtha and Mafraq which they have surrounded but not entered -- and are able to use most of the roads. The fedayeen, however, seem able to move with considerable freedom across the countryside, to harass army lines of communication, to re-infiltrate after they have been expelled from an area, and to launch attacks on army posts.

Hostages

A spokesman at the International Red Cross Headquarters in Geneva announced at 1715 GMT that the 6 remaining hostages have been turned over to delegates of the ICRC in Amman today.

Relief Program

The following is the current status of our relief efforts:

-- The general purpose mobile hospital is now in position and has received its first patients.

-- The eighteen aircraft bringing in the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) have all arrived at Amman Airport and have departed without incident. The MASH unit is now being moved into position at the site of the general purpose mobile hospital.

-- The two U.S.-supplied hospitals will be supported by one C-130 supply flight per day from Germany.

-- In addition to the two hospitals supplied by the United States and the British medical unit scheduled to arrive on September 29 and 30, a German 50-bed hospital (with a 12-man staff, including two surgeons) is scheduled to arrive by September 30. A French mobile hospital has already been moved into Jordan and has been operating since about September 26.

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-- The chartered food flight from Beirut to Amman on Tuesday, the 29th, has been cancelled because trucks carrying food were unable to reach the Beirut airport in time.

Military Aid

Preparations are being made to ship ammunition to Jordan as soon as possible. The first military flights will begin from Turkey in about three days. The initial 20 flights will enter Jordan from Saudi Arabia, where we already have the necessary clearance, and land at a military airfield in Jordan.

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~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ September 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Jordan Situation Report

A new cease-fire agreement was announced Sunday night in Cairo. While it appears from the ambiguous language that Hussein may have made some concessions to Arafat, the test will be in the implementation.

Meanwhile, arrangements for the initial phase of the relief effort were completed Sunday, and planes were scheduled to begin arriving in Amman at daybreak today.

Cease-Fire Agreement

The Agreement to end the fighting in Jordan emerged from a meeting of Arab leaders attended by Hussein and Arafat [redacted]

SANITIZED

The test of the agreement seems to represent some concessions to Arafat's demands, but the Jordanians seem pleased. The terms include withdrawal of both army and Fedayeen forces from Amman, release of detainees, return of military and civilian conditions in other towns to what they were before the crisis, restoration of security responsibility to the police and an end to the military government. A follow-up committee headed by the Tunisian Premier with one government and one Fedayeen representative has been appointed.

Ambassador Brown in Amman reports his assumption that both Hussein and Arafat were under heavy pressure in Cairo to accept a cease-fire. He expresses reservations about the staying power of any agreement reached under this kind of duress.

Hussein remains under heavy pressure from his own army to eradicate the last major elements of the guerrillas, and the Jordanian government is having difficulty holding back the army from continuing its attacks. The cease-fire held generally through Sunday in Amman, but Israeli sources reported fighting in the northern towns of Jerash,

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.3
per 3.3 (b)(1) per ltr 1-11-05
By KMB NARA, Date 1-11-05

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Ajlun and Ramtha. Irbid remained quiet with the Fedayeen controlling the city and the army surrounding.

Relief Effort

Four C-130s with food supplies and the first mobile hospital unit will arrive in Amman beginning at daybreak Monday. The second hospital will follow Tuesday.

Hostages

The 32 hostages released Saturday were flown to Cyprus Sunday. The remaining six are reported to be in the UAR Embassy in Amman. The UK informed the UAR Government that it is prepared to release the girl hijacker if the remaining hostages are turned over safely.

U.S. Forces

The one 250-man infantry company in Germany that has been on alert since the beginning of the Jordan crisis was taken off alert Saturday as part of the general relaxation of alert status and then was returned to nine-hour alert for contingency use for protection of the hospital units.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

September 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

Colonel Richard T. Kennedy
Harold H. Saunders

FROM: Lt. Col. Loeffke

SUBJECT: Relief Operation in Amman

As of 1130 hours Washington time, one aircraft with the mobile hospital unit has landed in Amman. The seven remaining aircraft with the rest of the hospital should be offloaded by 1730 hours Washington time.

At the conclusion of the offloading of the hospital unit, 4 USAF C-130s from Turkey with food, tents, and fuel will start landing in Amman.

There is a possibility that the second hospital unit may not be needed as there is already a French hospital unit in Amman and a British unit is expected to arrive on the 30th.

The above information was received from Bill Contos, State Department.

John
Bill Glancey just called concerning two chartered flights from Beirut to Jordan sponsored by the U.S. Embassy:

-- 1 yesterday = 12 tons fresh fruits and canned goods

-- 1 scheduled today = 10 tons, same as above.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET/NODIS

September 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan--1700 GMT, September 28

There are no new specific developments to report on the situation within Jordan. The cease-fire appears to be still generally holding up; there apparently has been no change in the situation in northern Jordan; there is nothing new on the remaining hostages; and Arab efforts to forge a more permanent settlement between King Hussein and the fedayeen continue. You may, however, be interested in some of the Israeli reflections on the current situation and our latest moves in mounting the relief effort.

The Director of the Research Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry believes that the Cairo agreement signed yesterday by King Hussein simply brings the situation back to what it was prior to the outbreak of fighting. He believes that Hussein's agreement to mutual withdrawal of the army and the fedayeen from Amman gives the fedayeen a clear advantage since they will re-enter the city clandestinely and rebuild their bases. Because of this he expects the army to resist the Cairo agreement and continue on its own way. CIA analysts are also not very optimistic that the Cairo agreement will prove to be anything more than a "stopgap".

The following are some of the more important measures we are taking on the relief effort:

--All eight aircraft with the general purpose mobile hospital and four with food and medical supplies from Turkey have landed in Amman and unloaded. The hospital unit is awaiting arrival of Jordanian forces for escort to the hospital site. The aircraft have left Amman.

--Under Secretary Irwin held a special meeting this morning to coordinate our official relief efforts with those of private U.S. agencies.

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--There is a possibility that the second hospital unit may not be needed. Embassy Amman will make clear that it is ready to come but that Jordanian needs govern.

--Apart from the above flights, one has flown from Beirut each day Sunday and Monday with a total of 22 tons of perishable foods and canned goods.

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MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT Jordan Disaster Relief

Under Secretary of State John Irwin has forwarded to you a memorandum enumerating the steps which have been taken to initiate relief operations in Jordan. Mr. Irwin's memo is attached. Relief operations include:

-- Immediate allocation of $750,000 of the $5 million total approved by you yesterday

-- VOA broadcasts in English and Arabic carrying your statement of Saturday morning

-- American Red Cross sponsorship of mobile hospitals to Amman in the event the International Red Cross is unwilling to provide the umbrella. Secretary Laird confirmed this morning that the hospitals had been ordered to move. It is estimated that the first mobile hospital can arrive in Amman early tomorrow morning local time and that the second, larger hospital will arrive the following day.

-- Four emergency C-130 loads of foodstuff will be shipped immediately

-- United States Embassies in Amman, Beirut and Tel Aviv have been authorized to draw on PL480, Title II foodstocks in the area for immediate use in Jordan

-- The British have mobilized an emergency medical team for airlift from Cyprus to Amman; the Turks, Saudis, and French have already flown in food and medical supplies and the French have landed a mobile medical unit

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-- Catholic Relief Services in New York has chartered a flight for emergency supplies

-- Representatives of all U.S. voluntary agencies with interests in the Middle East will meet on Monday to coordinate private activities

-- Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish Committee will issue an appeal to Jewish Americans to contribute to Jordan relief through voluntary agencies currently operating in Jordan.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1970

13086 SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Jordan Disaster Relief

There is attached a status report of actions we have taken pursuant to your instructions with respect to providing emergency relief assistance to Jordan.

John N. Irwin II

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JORDAN RELIEF OPERATIONS STATUS REPORT

1. Seven hundred and fifty-thousand ($750,000) dollars has been allocated out of the $5 million you approved from AID Contingency Disaster Relief funds for expenditure in the United States and abroad for meeting emergency needs.

2. Your announcement of this morning was immediately put on Voice of America worldwide English and has since been put on Arabic language broadcasts. Voice of America is preparing a background story on the humanitarian aspects of the operation. USIA Press Services is carrying a wrap-up story on the relief operations as the lead article in the wireless file tonight. Secretary Rogers's statement of this evening will also be prominently played by the USIA media.

3. I spoke to George Elsey, President-elect of the American Red Cross, and he agreed that the ARC would sponsor the emergency flights of United States military transportable hospitals to Amman should the ICRC be unwilling to provide the umbrella. These hospital units, complete with medical staff, will be flown into Amman on USAF C-130s now in the process of being loaded in England and Germany. Each aircraft will carry Red Cross markings. The Red Cross has offered to send a representative with each flight. All personnel on these aircraft will be in civilian clothes. Secretary Laird called me today to express his full support for expeditious and effective cooperation between State and Defense in our relief effort.

4. We have similarly arranged American Red Cross sponsorship for four C-130s now located at Incirlik Air Force Base near Adana, Turkey, to transport C-rations and locally procured foodstuffs to Amman.

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5. Embassy Beirut believes it would be useless to request the Syrian Government for permission to overfly Syrian territory. Therefore, for purposes of fastest possible delivery of the military hospital units, we hope to route the flight from Germany and England over Austria, Italy, Greece and Israel. King Hussein has concurred in the routing over Israel provided that this will be considered a highly confidential matter by all the parties concerned. If for some reason this routing is not possible, we will have to route the flights through Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia - a longer and much more time consuming trip.

6. Our embassies in Amman, Beirut and Tel Aviv have been authorized to draw on PL 480 Title II food stocks in the area, with guaranties of replenishment, for immediate use in Jordan. Moreover, Ankara and Beirut have been authorized to charter aircraft to fly foods procured locally to Amman. Beirut has been in direct touch with Amman regarding the immediate shipment of bread, cheese and other commodities.

7. The British Government has also mobilized an emergency medical team, which is ready in Cyprus, for airlift into Amman. We understand the British are also considering how best to meet the severe food shortage.

8. Amman has reported that the Turks, the Saudis and the French have already flown in food and medical supplies and the French have landed a mobile medical unit.

9. Catholic Relief Services (New York) has arranged a charter flight of needed food and supplies which is presently scheduled for the middle of next week.

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Representatives of all United States voluntary agencies which have operations and interests in the Middle East will be meeting on Monday in Washington to coordinate their relief activities with those of the United States Government.

10. On the basis of visits to local hospitals, Embassy Amman has given us lists of the most urgently needed drugs and hospital equipment (such as suction pumps and portable x-ray machines). We have contacted the Public Health Service which is now in the process of locating and assembling these supplies which will be shipped to Jordan on the CRS charter or by other charter flight next week.

11. We have been advised that the Jordan Government has designated a former Deputy Prime Minister (Ahmed Touqan) as overall relief coordinator. We assume that the Jordan Army and UNRWA will play a major part in the distribution of the commodities since they alone have the logistic capability. However, it is important that voluntary agencies also play a part in order to ensure an American person-to-person involvement.

12. The Jordan Government and the Jordan Arab Army have given assurances that relief supplies arriving from the Israeli-occupied West Bank will be welcomed and allowed to proceed to the Sports City area of Amman which has been designated the Center for Relief Operations.

13. After a conversation with Pat Moynihan, I spoke to Mr. Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish Committee. Mr. Bookbinder commended the President and Administration for its humanitarian initiative. He said his organization would issue an appeal to Jewish Americans to contribute to Jordan relief through the voluntary agencies (i.e.,

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non-Jewish) currently operating in Jordan. He stated that there was a high level meeting of several major Jewish organizations in New York City this evening on another matter. Through the representative of the American Jewish Committee attending the meeting, the Committee would request cooperation of the other organizations in this important humanitarian endeavor.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Under Secretary Irwin on Jordan Relief--11:30 a.m. Saturday, September 26

Background

Since the Jordan civil conflict sharpened two weeks ago, the Washington Special Actions Group has developed plans for assistance in three areas: (1) emergency civilian food and medical relief, (2) immediate replenishment of military stocks and (3) longer term financial assistance.

Secretary Rogers has now asked Under Secretary John Irwin to take over responsibility for the disaster relief effort. AID has made available a senior officer (Bill Kontos, former mission director in Pakistan with experience in the Nigerian relief program) who will head the operational task force.

Overnight, our diplomatic and military posts in the Near East and Europe were instructed to take immediate steps to obtain and transport foodstuffs to Amman. Military airlift is available in Turkey. Ambassador Brown has been authorized $100,000 for emergency food procurement and delivery and has asked Ankara and Tehran to see what can be bought immediately there. The U. S. military hospital units are on call, awaiting word from the Red Cross.

On the military side, a separate group has already prepared contingency packages for re-supply. The Jordanians have promised a list of their specific needs. This will be handled through the NSC Interdepartmental Group.

Talking Points

1. Our first interest is humanitarian.

2. Our fundamental political objective is to support King Hussein in re-establishing governmental authority in Jordan. His ability to meet the emergency needs of his people effectively will be one important element in this effort, although he obviously also has a difficult job ahead in bringing the guerrillas under control and restoring--if possible--some relationship with the Palestinians.

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3. Events of the past two weeks have given us a new opportunity in Jordan. The outcome is still far from certain. The King still has to establish some political base from which to negotiate with Israel, and that will have to include some expression of Palestinian interests. The point with regard to the relief operation is that the fluidity in the situation gives us an opportunity to help that we did not have several weeks ago. We want to make the most of it.

4. This operation may fall into two phases: (1) It will probably be very important to move some food and medical supplies very quickly. (2) Then there will be the longer range effort. In this latter connection, Mr. Irwin should consider the fact that Jordan in the next few weeks may enjoy an increase in popularity in the U. S. Congress. Would he please consider what advantage can be taken of that fact so that we will have the funds we need for longer term rehabilitative programs if the political situation does stabilize and we want to move further in that direction.

5. Dr. Kissinger's staff is ready to be helpful in any way possible and will stay in close touch with the operation to keep the President informed. However, Mr. Irwin should call direct if he runs into problems.

Photo Opportunity

There will be a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.

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(9/25)

Saunders memo
Haig - President

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

S/S 13046

September 25, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assistance for Jordan

Now that the situation in Jordan has improved we have turned our attention on an urgent basis to the question of immediate disaster relief for Jordan. I have asked Under Secretary Irwin to take over responsibility for this matter in the Department of State. AID has made available to us an outstanding officer in the economic assistance field, William Kontos, who will be working with the Department of State's Jordan Working Group on the question of providing immediate disaster relief.

We are also examining King Hussein's request for immediate military assistance to replenish certain supplies and this matter will be coordinated in the usual way under the Interdepartmental Group for NEA and through the NSC mechanism as appropriate. The Interdepartmental Group for NEA will also give its immediate attention to longer range economic help for Jordan.

We hope to have for you a number of recommendations on the above matters at an early date.

William P. Rogers

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22345

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

S/S 13046

September 25, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assistance for Jordan

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER 22340 | MO 9 | DA 26 | HR 9

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
HAK

FROM: ELIOT
ROGERS X
LAIRD

CLASSIF: U X C X LOU S TS
EXDIS NODIS EYES ONLY RES DATA CODEWORD SENSITIVE PARIS MTG NO FORN

DOC DATE: 09 25 70

SUBJECT: Assistance for Jordan – Shelling + Disaster Relief S/S 13046

ENCLOSURES: ( ) ( ) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Dore

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY FOR:
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG		X	
STAFF SECRETARY			
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO TO PRESIDENT (X)
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ( )
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ( )
CONCURRENCE ( )
DUE DATE: 9/30

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
9/26	Saunders	Secretariat	No further action. Note Haig-President memo of 9/26 (enclosed). This was written from an advanced copy of this Rogers memo + incorporated everything in the Rogers memo. HTS

MICROFILM DATA DO ✓ INIT DATE 9/30
ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF X
WHC
SUBF

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
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★ GPO: 1970–385-803

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MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

September 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Under Secretary Irwin on Jordan Relief--
11:30 a.m. Saturday, September 26

Background

Since the Jordan civil conflict sharpened two weeks ago, the Washington Special Actions Group has developed plans for assistance in three areas: (1) emergency civilian food and medical relief, (2) immediate replenishment of military stocks and (3) longer term financial assistance.

Secretary Rogers has now asked Under Secretary John Irwin to take over responsibility for the disaster relief effort. AID has made available a senior officer (Bill Kontos, former mission director in Pakistan with experience in the Nigerian relief program) who will head the operational task force.

Overnight, our diplomatic and military posts in the Near East and Europe were instructed to take immediate steps to obtain and transport foodstuffs to Amman. Military airlift is available in Turkey. Ambassador Brown has been authorized $100,000 for emergency food procurement and delivery and has asked Ankara and Tehran to see what can be bought immediately there. The U. S. military hospital units are on call, awaiting word from the Red Cross.

On the military side, a separate group has already prepared contingency packages for re-supply. The Jordanians have promised a list of their specific needs. This will be handled through the NSC Interdepartmental Group.

Talking Points

1. Our first interest is humanitarian.

2. Our fundamental political objective is to support King Hussein in re-establishing governmental authority in Jordan. His ability to meet the emergency needs of his people effectively will be one important element in this effort, although he obviously also has a difficult job ahead in bringing the guerrillas under control and restoring--if possible--some relationship with the Palestinians.

* An additional $750,000 has just been added.

3. Events of the past two weeks have given us a new opportunity in Jordan. The outcome is still far from certain. The King still has to establish some political base from which to negotiate with Israel, and that will have to include some expression of Palestinian interests. The point with regard to the relief operation is that the fluidity in the situation gives us an opportunity to help that we did not have several weeks ago. We want to make the most of it.

4. This operation may fall into two phases: (1) It will probably be very important to move some food and medical supplies very quickly. (2) Then there will be the longer range effort. In this latter connection, Mr. Irwin should consider the fact that Jordan in the next few weeks may enjoy an increase in popularity in the U. S. Congress. Would he please consider what advantage can be taken of that fact so that we will have the funds we need for longer term rehabilitative programs if the political situation does stabilize and we want to move further in that direction.

5. Dr. Kissinger's staff is ready to be helpful in any way possible and will stay in close touch with the operation to keep the President informed. However, Mr. Irwin should call direct if he runs into problems.

Photo Opportunity

There will be a brief photo opportunity at the beginning of the meeting.

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MEMORANDUM

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

23416

9 A.M.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT September 26, 1970

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

The situation appears to have stabilized this morning. The cease-fire is holding up in both Amman and in the north. There has still, however, been no authorative fedayeen agreement to King Hussein's terms and the other Arab leaders, especially Nasser, are growing increasingly impatient to end the conflict. Hussein appears to be holding out for a settlement on his terms and could decide to move again against the remaining fedayeen strongholds in the Irbid area if the commandos do not soon capitulate. Meanwhile, efforts are underway to mount an international medical and food relief effort to cope with the critical situation that has developed, especially in Amman.

The Military Situation

The latest cease-fire seems to have taken hold, at least for the time being. The Jordanian forces appear to be in effective control of most of Amman with the possible exceptions of the area where our Embassy is located and at least one of the refugee camps on the edge of the city. The fighting has apparently all but ceased in the north also. A newspaper man who toured the key northern towns of Ramtha, Irbid and Jarash yesterday with the permission of the commandos reported that all was quiet in these locations, with the fedayeen still in control. The towns, however, were all ringed by Jordanian troops and armor.

Despite the cease-fire, Sudanese President Numayri, accompanied by PLO leader Yasir Arafat, went back to Cairo with the rest of the Arab mediation delegation and charged the Jordanian army with violations. This news apparently then prompted Nasser to fire off a harsh cable to King Hussein alleging that "all the promises made to us have been completely ignored" and claiming that "there is a plan to liquidate the Palestinian resistance." Nasser further complained that the Arab mediating

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committee had been "unjustifiably subjected to evasiveness." Hussein responded this morning by denying that his forces had not broken the cease-fire and asserting that they would observe it in the face of "unceasing and unbearable provocations." He also said that a new cabinet will be announced shortly.

King Hussein is coming under fire from other Arab states as well. In addition to the usual verbal blasts emanating from Baghdad and Damascus, Libya has broken relations with Jordan.

The Hostages

There is no further word on the remaining hostages. As you know, the Jordanian army yesterday freed 16 of the 54 hostages held by the querrillas -- two Germans, 6 Swiss and eight British. (One more hostage turned up in the course of the day after the original group of 15 was found.) The whereabouts of the remaining 38 American and dual American-Israeli nationals is still unknown, although there are unconfirmed reports that they were moved out of Amman to the Irbid area when the fighting broke out. If the remaining hostages are being held in Irbid it may be some time before the army is able to free them and they could still be used as bargaining counters by the fedayeen.

The Relief Problem

The Embassy reports that the food situation in Amman is critical. Those who can are leaving the city for surrounding villages but most of the people are pinned down by curfews and continuing skirmishes. What food stocks people had are now exhausted and the stores for the most part have been looted and will require a considerable period to be replenished. The army's food supply is also dangerously low.

Following up on the contingency plans developed in the WSAG, State has set up a new task force to report to Under Secretary Irwin to oversee the disaster relief effort. This is an interagency group. Most of our diplomatic and military posts in the area and in Europe have been instructed to take immediate action to obtain foodstuffs to be sent by air freight to Amman, drawing from PL-480 stocks as necessary. Defense has also tentatively authorized the use of the C-130's at Incirlik in Turkey for airlifting food into Amman, including C-rations. Plans with the International Red Cross to move U.S. army field hospitals from Europe into Jordan are on standby to be implemented when the Red Cross feels it is safe to do so.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER 22416 | MO 09 | DA 30 | HR 11

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
HAK ____

FROM: ELIOT ____
ROGERS ____
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Haig

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____ PARIS MTG
____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 09/26/70

SUBJECT: Morning Sit Rep on Jordan

ENCLOSURES: (____) (____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE ____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

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PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (____)
MEMO TO PRESIDENT ..... (____)
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ..... (____)
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ..... (____)
MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... (____)
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (____)
JOINT MEMO ..... (____)
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... (____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... (____)
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COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

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INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED

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EO, 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

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70 SEP 26 PM 5:32

TOP SECRET

SITUATION ROOM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2003

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 September 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Jordan

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

(Situation as of 1600 EDT)

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1. Mohammed Riad of the Egyptian foreign ministry told [redacted] that the remaining hostages have been turned over to the UAR Embassy in Amman. The UAR, Riad said, was making arrangements to deliver the hostages to the International Red Cross "soonest." Riad claimed that the source of this information was "the highest authority;" and he thinks that all the remaining hostages are now in Egyptian hands.

2. [redacted] that the earlier release of the 16 hostages--for which it takes credit--in no way absolves the Western countries of releasing "our people" and does not mean that the PLFP has changed its original position.

SANITIZED

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
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3. King Husayn today named Ahmad Tuqan, a Palestinian, to head a new 13-man mixed civilian-military cabinet. In calling upon Tuqan to form a new government, Husayn instructed him to do everything possible to return life in the country to normal and to heal the differences between Palestinians and Jordanians. Though including seven civilians--six of them Palestinians--the cabinet retains five military men from the previous all military government. Their retention

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [2 pgs]
NLN01-19/21 per 3.4(b)(1)(6)
By KNB NARA, Date 2-7-03
5-10-04

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of the key ministerial portfolios indicates the army continues to exert the strongest influence in the country. Tugan in the past has been sympathetic to the fedayeen; his appointment could be a gesture to appease pro-Palestinian opinion in the Arab world. He is not a strong personality, however, and the fedayeen central committee in Damascus already has declared that the change of government does "not change our attitude in the least nor will it make any change in the situation."

4. Sudanese Premier Numayri, head of the Arab delegation seeking to work out a Jordanian-fedayeen cease-fire, charged today in a Cairo press conference that King Husayn and other Jordanian officials not only obstructed the peace mission but that the Jordanian forces fired on the group. The Jordanians, Numayri said, were bent on "an organized plot and premeditated plan to crush the Palestinian people." He also said the Jordanian authorities were persisting in their efforts to annihilate the fedayeen despite "all promises and agreements." Numayri's criticism is probably a reflection of the Arab delegation's inability to wield much influence on the situation in Jordan, and a measure of the wide gap between the Palestinians and the Jordan government. King Husayn, clearly stung, denied Numayri's charges and accused him of "serious distortions and defamations" which he said would aggravate the situation. Husayn claimed that his forces had observed the cease-fire despite endless provocations, and stressed that the need was to implement the recently accepted government-fedayeen agreement. Cairo radio reports that Husayn is expected to arrive in Cairo tomorrow morning, apparently to ask for support from the Arab leaders gathered there.

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SANITIZED

5. [redacted] that fighting was going on in the Wahdat and Ashrafiyah refugee camps at [redacted] security in most areas of Amman is good. Water service has been restored and electric service is expected to resume within the next few days. Radio Amman, meanwhile, has announced that the curfew will be lifted for five hours daily. [redacted] the critical problem in the city now is the health and food situation..

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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SANITIZED

6. Outside of Amman, fighting continued today, although it was sporadic and scattered. A sizeable clash occured at Rusafayah southeast of Zarqa when, [redacted] a Jordanian army force attempted to advance on Zarqa. The guerrillas claimed to have forced an army withdrawal. [redacted] the guerrillas also claimed to be in control of Zarqa "with the exception of the main streets." There was also some limited military action in around Irbid and Ramtha in northern Jordan. [redacted] reported 20 Jordan army tanks going after two "Liberation Army" tanks in the Irbid area. Previous reports have indicated that all the Syrian tanks had withdrawn; these presumably are stragglers. An exodus of civilians is taking place in the north; [redacted] gave orders to attempt to halt civilians from Irbid and Ramtha from entering Syria. Elsewhere, guerrillas claimed to have destroyed two Jordan army tanks near Ramtha, and Egyptian officials in Amman reported to Cairo that fedayeen had attacked a village near Ajlun.

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LATE ITEM: Jordanian officials have informed [redacted] that the Jordanian army has gone to pick up 32 hostages. This latest release brings the total of hostages set free to 48, indicating that six people are still apparently in the hands of the fedayeen.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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8:15 A.M.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 25, 1970

K - we must step up our aid to Hussein particularly now when he does not appear to be in deep trouble —

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Morning Situation Report on Jordan

Military progress in Amman and in the north continues to come slowly, and it is still uncertain what kind of political balance will emerge. For instance, there are reports from the West Bank that even the moderate Palestinians have been deeply embittered by Hussein's crackdown. That balance between the traditional Arab King and the Palestinian third of his population --both militant and moderate -- will largely determine whether the showdown of the last two weeks will give Hussein a reasonably firm base from which to negotiate.

Keep pouring in aid

However, Hussein showed in his first talk with Ambassador Brown yesterday that he feels he has made substantial progress and is now thinking about how to draw the country together again. This means that our effort -- in addition to consolidating our contingency plans -- must now turn to putting into operation some of the plans that have been drawn up for food, economic and military resupply assistance.

A late piece of very good news is that the Jordanian army reportedly has freed a number of the hijacking hostages. The palace "expects" the remainder to be released shortly, but we have no evidence that this has happened yet.

The Military Situation

Amman radio about 7:00 a.m. EDT carried an announcement of a new agreement on a cease-fire. There is no evidence yet, however, that this will be any more successful than previous efforts. It will be some hours before this can be known, and perhaps days before any fedayeen withdrawal from the cities -- which Hussein would presumably insist on -- is being carried out.

In Amman, the army remains engaged in the difficult task of eliminating still active pockets of fedayeen resistance. Some 20,000 Jordanian troops are engaged in this operation. Their plan is to move down from the heights of the various hills (jebels) which they control in Amman and force the fedayeen into the center of town.

Historical File

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [7 pages]
NLN01-19/22 per 3.4(b)(1) 8-8-02 letter
By KBW NARA, Date 5-11-04

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The Israelis report that in the north the Jordanian forces surrounded Irbid yesterday and began closing in on the city and that there was fighting on the outskirts. The Israelis are not sure whether the Jordanian army is now inside Irbid or still on the outskirts, but they do report that government forces now control two other crucial towns in the north, Ramtha and Jerash.

Ambassador Brown's Talk with King Hussein

Ambassador Brown was finally able to get to the palace yesterday with the help of a Jordanian armored escort with "all guns firing." He was unable, however, to return to the embassy -- presumably because of heavy fighting in the neighborhood -- and is staying temporarily near the British embassy.

The following are the more important points that came out of Ambassador Brown's three hour conversation with King Hussein over "19 cups of coffee, and five cups of tea":

--The King expressed his appreciation for U.S. support and sent a response to your message expressing his "deepest appreciation" for your "friendship and sympathy and general concern," his hope "to rebuild Jordan on a dynamic solid basis" and his conviction that his forces will continue to be "a very hard nut to crack" (text attached). The King said he plans to "communicate" with you and Mrs. Meir today.

--Hussein said he was grateful to you and to Mrs. Meir for the effective "spooking operation" which he feels was a major contribution to the Syrian withdrawal. He asked that we pass this word along to Mrs. Meir and add that he does not now need the assistance that the Israelis offered.

--The King said he needs substantial resupply of ammunition. His Hawker Hunters have made a heavy expenditure of maching gun ammo and rockets and the army also needs to replenish its ammo. [The WSAG developed standby plans for this, and a cable has already been sent saying the U.S. is prepared to respond expeditiously as soon as we get their list.] The palace has also submitted a list of urgently needed supplies to feed the Amman civilian population for one week to us and other potential donors. [State yesterday appointed an officer to coordinate the relief effort within our government and with other governments.]

--Hussein said that military government will be continued for at least another few months. [After the Ambassador's talk, reports have come in saying that the military government has resigned but is staying on in a caretaker status. It is not clear yet what this means.]

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--Hussein seems to think he has broken the back of the fedayeen resistance. He said that the central committee of the Palestin Liberation Organization no longer exists since the significant people are either dead, captured or out of business. He believes that Yasir Arafat is finished but does not know who will replace him. [redacted] this morning said the fedayeen are in real trouble but did not think Arafat was finished yet. They felt Nasser would feel obliged to save him.]

--He said he does not intend to make a big issue of the Syrian involvement, since he believes the failure of the Syrian intervention will generate internal pressures on the regime in Damascus. He believes his silence will be more helpful in bringing about changes.

One gets the impression from this conversation or another between Hussein and the British ambassador, that the King has regained his nerve, is in good spirits and unwilling to settle for less than that very favorable settlement with the fedayeen at this point. We have, of course, experienced his ups and downs before; yesterday he was clearly encouraged.

The Hostages

Jordan's Military Governor announced this morning that the Jordanian army has liberated a number of the hostages. King Hussein's confidant, Zaid Rifai, has informed the embassy that "about half" of the hostages have been released. and are in the governments' hands. He expects the remainder to be released shortly He reports that they are in "good condition." The embassy is attempting to evacuate the released hostages as soon as possible, although there may be some delay as the Jordanians debrief them.

This development -- provided all the hostages are released -- may have come just in time to save our diplomatic effort in Bern. Our representative to the Bern Group felt that the Swiss, Germans and British were on the verge of going the way of releasing the fedayeen in their countries in exchange for (a) the European and American hostages who are not dual nationals and (b) the remaining hostages being taken to a safe location. He felt that while they may give lip service to the "non-discriminatory" solution, they could slip over the edge at any moment, especially since the three could maintain solidarity and this sharply limit the damage to them.

Soviet Reaction

Our embassy in Moscow reports that the latest Soviet press comment on the Jordan crisis seems to reflect dismay over splits in the Arab world and uncertainty over how the situation will develop. The embassy reports that the Soviets are finding it increasingly difficult to continue to straddle the fence between the fedayeen

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and Hussein and to separate the "good" fedayeen from the "bad." In these circumstances, the Soviets are finding it more expedient to concentrate their propaganda fire on the "forces of imperialism," with the Sixth Fleet a ready target which can be presented as a real threat in the area.

The Soviets also seem to be trying to grab some of the credit for the cooling of the situation in Jordan. The Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Septembe 23 attempting to convey the impression that cool but concerted Soviet statesmanship is due the lion's share of the credit, now that the crisis in Jordan has subsided somewhat. The statement set forth Moscow's account of Soviet moves to end the fighting, including demarches in Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Washington, London and Paris as well as efforts at the UN.'

The Soviets are scheduled to transit into the eastern Mediterranean from the Black Sea another eight naval units over the next three days (2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 1 submarine and 1 intelligence collector). Some or all of these units could augment the Soviet Mediterranean squadron in reaction to the arrival of the carriers Kennedy and Guam. Another cruiser, destroyer and merchant tanker left the Caribbean on September 20 and are holding on a course that could take them to the Mediterranean. If they continue on their present course and speed they would arrive at Gibraltar on October 2.

Evacuation

An aircraft chartered from Middle East Airlines flew 74 evacuees, including 18 official and 16 private Americans, from Amman to Beirut yesterday. The flight was uneventful despite mortar fire within 200 yards of the aircraft prior to takeoff. A further U.S. evacuation flight is planned for today.

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SECRET

TO PRESIDENT NIXON FROM KING HUSSEIN

Sir:

May I express my deepest appreciation for your friendship and sympathy and general concern over the problems and difficulties which my country faces. Our only consolation lies in any determination to make of these tragic efforts a turning point that will enable us to rebuild Jordan on a dynamic solid basis. We are and have been fully aware of our responsibilities not only to defend with our lives our sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and also our responsibilities in the area, and towards its future as well as the cause of justice and peace, here and in the world.

We appreciate above all your help and support during the very crucial, anxious moments when the odds appeared to grow too numerous against us. We felt in our struggle of life and death that we were not alone. We continue to need help and support to rebuild and face the multitude of human demands and requirements, and to replenish our losses on the military level. Believe me, Sir, I have a strong conviction that this country, its people, and its armed forces will continue to be a very hard nut to crack. This may have begun to dawn on many around us and the world.

God bless you. With all my respect. Best wishes and regards.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bohlen
Back from Paris

RC

Will you follow up?

Have Saunders ____

Have Kennedy ____

WRS

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

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INFORMATION

22057

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Options in Jordan

As you continue to think about the decisions we may face in Jordan, you may wish to consider some of the broader issues raised.

The Broader Situation and U.S. Interests

Two issues are now being contested in Jordan: (1) Who is to control the Palestinian movement? (2) What balance of political forces is to control Jordan?

The two are related. Whereas the less ideological groups focus on Israel and could make common cause with the government, the radicals are at least as dedicated to the overthrow of traditional regimes as to the destruction of the Zionist state. Although it is difficult to know exactly what the balance within the collection of fedayeen movements is, it seems relatively clear that the most active challenge to Hussein's regime comes from the radical fringe--the elements, for instance, responsible for the hijacking.

The outcome will determine whether there is a stable base for peace negotiations. The future political nature of Jordan will determine whether a Palestine settlement is possible or continuing war is inevitable. There seem to be several ways in which Jordan's political base could evolve:

--Hussein and the army could suppress the fedayeen and bring the non-fedayeen Palestinians into a settlement. This would ideally provide the most solid base, but it is doubtful whether there will be an outcome this decisive.

--Elements of the army, the King and the less militant Palestinians could make common cause. This would make for a less orderly negotiation but might make for a more enforceable peace if there is one.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLN 01-19/36 8-8-02
By ltr NARA, Date 5-12-04

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--Some combination of fedayeen elements could demonstrate the King's impotence and force on him a weak civilian government that would do its bidding. Negotiations would be out of the question.

It is the last outcome which seems most immediately at stake in the current crisis. Either of the first two could conceivably produce stability. The consequences of the third could include the following:

--Prospects for a Palestine settlement soon on terms Israel could consider would drop to almost zero. Attacks across Israel's eastern border would increase.

--Chances that Israel would at some point feel compelled to seize more territory in Jordan would increase sharply.

--Nasser's ability to negotiate a settlement with Israel and Soviet ability to support a negotiated settlement would be diminished sharply.

--There would be one more radical state in the Middle East where the U.S. is barred. A radical fedayeen base there would strengthen the movement against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states.

In short, while it is not clear how the main political elements in Jordan will sort themselves out, it does not seem in the U.S. interest that a fedayeen movement urged on by radicals be permitted to impose its will on the government. It could not produce the stability that is necessary for peace.

The Three Principal Contingencies

A situation now exists in Jordan which may cause King Hussein to seek U.S. or other assistance in an all-out showdown with the fedayeen. These seem to be the main contingencies that will be faced:

1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone.
It seems generally agreed in the intelligence community and in the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen--and not outside troops--are ranged against the regime. It is possible in this situation that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support. It has been our assumption that there would be no strong argument against supplying any reasonable support. Such assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration and for prompt delivery.

The main issue to be considered in connection with this contingency is: If the regime unexpectedly turns out to be too weak to win this battle with its own forces, should there be intervention to support it?

A key judgment to be made is how much difference outside intervention might make in such a situation.

The principal arguments for such intervention are: It would prevent--at least as long as U.S. troops are present--dominance by a group that would offer almost no hope of a Palestine settlement. It might still be possible that stability could be rescued with the help of the army. It is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate its support for responsible regimes. In short, a risky intervention would be preferable to the certainty of radical control over the situation.

The argument against such intervention is that if Hussein is too weak to stand up against domestic opposition, outside intervention can only save his regime for a limited period of time. Attempting to bolster it in the absence of sufficient internal strength could put whoever intervenes into a position of supporting a minority cause against effective majority guerrilla opposition in a country without access to the Mediterranean where the U.S. would have a difficult time supporting sustained military operations. Intervention could cause a fedayeen reaction against U.S. installations elsewhere in the Mid-East.

In any case, there may not be much of a real choice since if the King appears about to fall, the Israelis may very well intervene on their own or at least seize the heights from which the fedayeen have been shelling Israeli settlements.

2. The second contingency: King Hussein and the army vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops. Even if one judged that Hussein should not be supported if he cannot control the fedayeen alone, one might judge intervention quite justified if the 17,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan stepped in. Before considering the question of armed intervention, it would be prudent to look at the possibilities for non-military action that might precede armed intervention or perhaps even make it unnecessary. A request from Hussein for Soviet restraint on Iraq might help. Intelligence indicates that Nasser is prepared to give diplomatic and possibly military support

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in the event of Iraqi intervention. The Shah might mount a show of force on Iraq's border. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might threaten to cut off financial support for the fedayeen. Finally, the greatest political assist to Hussein might well be the capacity to demonstrate hope for progress in peace negotiations..

If political actions fail, then a judgment must be made whether armed intervention seems in the U.S. interest.

The argument for is that--in addition to the basic objective of trying to save a regime that offers some hope of the stability necessary for peace--the U.S. would be supporting a responsible government against a threat from foreign forces. Such a stand is a necessary part of the U.S. posture. It would be possible to justify this as an in-and-out operation.

The main arguments against are the operational difficulty of sustaining such an operation and the possibility of a general Arab reaction. This operation would have to be sustained entirely by air (unless we used an overland route across Israel). It would require dipping into the reserve of strategic forces in the U.S. --leaving us little for other contingencies. Sustaining such an operation by air would be extremely difficult without a staging base in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is good reason to doubt their availability under these circumstances.

If political actions fail and if armed intervention of some sort in support of Hussein seems desirable, then there are two related questions:

a. Would air attacks against Iraqi forces be sufficient?

Pro. Iraqi forces are 60 miles northeast of Amman and, to be militarily effective would have to travel on an open road and would be vulnerable to air attacks which could presumably prevent their arrival in Amman. Also, air strikes are not likely to produce the same reactions either by other Arabs or by the Soviets as a major ground action would. Even Israeli air strikes would avoid the connotation of invasion and takeover.

Con. Air strikes are not operationally useful against the fedayeen. They are dispersed among the population and their concentrations and the fighting around them will be in such small areas as to make air targeting very difficult. If intervention had to reach beyond the Iraqis, air strikes would probably be inadequate.

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b. Should the U.S. or Israel intervene? The minimal operational form which this question might take is: If the Israelis seem about to move, should the U.S. make a special effort to head them off by moving first? Or should they be encouraged?

In answering this question, a distinction must be made between the ground and air attacks. Air attacks are likely to provoke less reaction because they do not have the connotation of invasion.

The arguments for U.S, as contrasted to Israeli, intervention are: While Israeli air attacks could probably be brought off with a minimum of sustained Arab reaction, Israeli ground action in Jordan would be taken as an invasion of Jordan and would tend to reunify the Arabs. The U.S. would be held responsible anyway. An Israeli ground action would almost inescapably be seen as a concerted U.S.-Israeli effort to put Israel in control of Jordan. It might even serve to unify forces in Jordan so that army and fedayeen alike would feel that they had to turn together against Israeli troops. A Hussein who had been saved by an Israeli invasion would probably not last long in Jordan.

The arguments for Israeli intervention are: It may be difficult to stop. Some believe the King already has clandestinely reached a tacit understanding with the Israelis that if the Iraqis intervene Israel will attack. If the U.S. were to intervene, the USSR would almost have to react in some way, even if not definitively. The USSR has no incentive to defend Jordan against Israeli attack. The Israelis have a great logistical advantage over the U.S. If we intervened and then had to bring supplies across Israel, we could have the worst of two worlds. Introduction of U.S. forces would put the U.S. in the middle of an intra-Arab war and we would still be viewed as collaborating with Israel.

If Israel intervened in Jordan, the U.S. would have to consider two kinds of support:

--It would be necessary to assure that Israel has the munitions and other supplies required to sustain the attack. It is the judgment of the group that Israel's war reserves would be sufficient to carry their operations through a prolonged operation. U.S. resupply could be provided within ample time.

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--The more serious contingency would come about if the Soviets or Egyptians decided to take advantage of the situation by heating up the Suez front. The judgment was that their capability would be limited to re-opening artillery attacks, small harrassing raids across the Canal and some air attacks. Support for Israel in this contingency would be developed from the same kinds of packages that have been worked out in the event the ceasefire breaks down.

3. The third contingency: armed intervention for evacuation.

If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages.

If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved.

There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein's regime. It could, if well timed, amount to a U.S. show of force without the political onus of sustained intervention. It seems most likely that if intervention comes it would come this way.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER 22057 MO 09 DA 17 HR 09

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ HAK X

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS ____ LAIRD ____ SAUNDERS

CLASSIF: U ____ C ____ LOU ____ S ____ TS ____ EXDIS ____ NODIS ____ EYES ONLY ____ RES DATA ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ PARIS MTG ____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 09/16

SUBJECT: Political/Military Options in Jordan

ENCLOSURES: ( ) ( ) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

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PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

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MEMO TO PRESIDENT . . . . . ( )
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE . . . . . ( )
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE . . . . . ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ . . . . . ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . ( )
JOINT MEMO . . . . . ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY . . . . . ( )
CONCURRENCE . . . . . ( )
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COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Assistant to the
President

Attached per your request are talking points on aid for Jordan.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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We are turning our attention on an urgent basis to providing immediate emergency disaster relief for Jordan. The Under Secretary of State, John Irwin, has been asked to assume the responsibility for the U.S. Government's response to the needs of Jordan Disaster Relief. Assisting the Under Secretary will be the special Department of State Jordan Working Group which, in addition to its other duties, will act as the overall coordinating body for disaster relief action.

According to reports from our Embassy in Amman the situation is critical and food stocks and water are very low. There is a possibility of epidemics. We have asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to take ~~our~~ OVER immediate overall responsibility for coordinating and directing the offers of assistance from other countries as well as our own. We have offered the ICRC U.S. Army and Air Force hospital units which can arrive promptly. U.S. aircraft are available for use in supplying food and medicine. We have made an initial allocation of three-quarters million dollars for immediate emergency relief, and more will be provided in the days ahead.

The U.S. Embassy in Beirut is now taking immediate action to obtain food stuffs in Lebanon for the population in Jordan and to air freight these food supplies under civilian charter

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into Amman. We have authorized the diversion into Jordan of P.L. 480 food stocks on hand in the Middle East and such food supplies already stocked on the West Bank of Jordan may be trucked across the Jordan River into the emergency area as soon as the security situation permits.

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22417

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9-30-70

INFORMATION

SECRET/NODIS

September 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Afternoon Situation Report on Jordan

There is not much to add to the situation report I gave you this morning. It is not clear whether this morning's ceasefire is holding up and, in any event, it appears to be only intended to be of limited duration. Considerably fewer hostages have been actually released than appeared would be the case this morning and no progress seems to have been made on the remainder, which include all the Americans. Meanwhile, efforts are underway to mount a relief operation to Jordan.

The following are the major items of interest received since my report to you this morning:

1. Zaid Rifai has confirmed press reports that only 15 of the hostages from the hijacked aircraft have been released rather than "about half" as he said this morning. He also confirms that there are no Americans among the released hostages. Rifai did say the Jordanians have some information on the whereabouts of the remaining some 39 hostages, almost all of whom are U.S. citizens, and are still working on the problem. The embassy apparently has not yet actually seen any of the released hostages as none were on the first evacuation flight of 70 persons (including about 25 Americans) out of Amman to Beirut today. The embassy has no further information and no basis for predicting when the remaining hostages might be released, if at all.

2. The ceasefire concluded this morning between the government and Yasir Arafat (about noon Amman time) is only a temporary arrangement to allow the dead and wounded to be tended too, and is not yet, as the press has interpreted it, a more general agreement to King Hussein's terms. In fact, the bitterness engendered on both sides by the fighting could make implementation of any ceasefire very difficult. Sudanese Prime Minister Mumayri, the head of the five-nation Arab mediation delegation, is back in Amman to see King Hussein and the fedayeen leaders again.

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The Israelis report that the fighting apparently was continuing around Irbid this morning. The Jordanians had surrounded the town and were shelling it. We do not know, yet, however, what happened this afternoon at either Irbid or Amman.

3. King Hussein has sent the same request for military supplies and emergency civil food relief to the British. The British have suggested that coordination of a multinational food relief effort be done in Washington and feel that because of the large quantities involved in all except possibly the initial shipment will have to go by sea unless a large-scale military airlift is used. In contrast to the urgent desire to respond to the plea for food, the British Foreign Office--at least at the working level--is taking a very cool view of the military request. The airlift of U.S., British and French field hospital units under the auspices of the International Red Cross is being held up by Red Cross reluctance to introduce outside military presence of any kind while the fighting continues for fear that it would jeopardize the hostages.

Following up the contingency plans developed in the WSAG, State has set up a new task force to report to Under Secretary Irwin to oversee the disaster relief effort. This will be an interagency group. Consideration is also being given to including in the supplemental request to Congress some grant military assistance to Jordan. Meanwhile, Jordan's immediate requests can be met promptly.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER 22417 | MO 09 | DA 30 | HR 11

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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FROM: ELIOT ____
ROGERS ____
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HAK

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DOC DATE: 09/25/20

SUBJECT: Noon Sit Rep on Jordan

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ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... (____)
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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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September 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Jordan

The WSAG met late last night to think through further the situations we may face in Jordan. In the early morning hours, King Hussein announced formation of a military government. He told our embassy his intent was to tighten the army ring around Amman and demand that the fedayeen pull out of the city.

Judgments about the Situation

1. It is not clear whether there will be a full-scale confrontation. It is possible the king will announce a military government but not move the army into Amman. In that case, the fedayeen would have no interest in challenging him; they could sit tight.

2. If the king does decide to suppress the fedayeen, then there will be some violence, at least in Amman. It is impossible to judge now whether it would die out or flare into a major battle for the city. That would depend in part on whether the fedayeen are united or the radicals are left isolated.

3. A short decisive battle should not be expected. This, like most guerrilla wars, can be expected to drag on.

Three Principal Contingencies

1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone.

It is the judgment of the WSAG and of the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen -- and not outside troops -- are ranged against it.

It is possible that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support.

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Assuming this were mainly munitions and expendable supplies, this assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration of support and for prompt delivery.

It is the further judgment of the group that the U.S. should not intervene if the King is too weak to win this battle with the fedayeen with his own forces. In that situation, however, Israel would probably move. If so, the group felt the U.S. should stand aside.

2. King Hussein vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops.

There are 17,000 Iraqi troops 60 miles northeast of Amman. It would probably take the best part of a day to get a large effective force down to Amman.

It has been the U.S. Embassy assessment that the Jordanian army could handle both the fedayeen and Iraqi forces. However, it is conceivable that eruption of fedayeen violence in other cities could spread Jordanian forces thin.

Whereas it was the judgment of the group that the U.S. should not try to prop up Hussein if he cannot hold his own against the fedayeen, it was the group's judgment that an effort should be made to save him if he proves unable to handle the Iraqis.

There are two related questions:

-- Would air attacks against the Iraqis be sufficient assistance, or would intervention by ground forces be required?

-- Should the U.S. or Israel intervene?

On the first issue, the judgment on narrow balance was that it would be preferable for Israel to begin any air attacks necessary. These are the arguments:

-- Assistant Secretary Sisco believes that the King has already clandestinely reached a tacit understanding with the Israelis that if the Iraqis intervene, Israel will attack.

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-- If the U.S. were to intervene, the USSR would almost have to react in some way even if not definitively. The USSR has no incentive to defend Jordan against Israeli attack.

-- The Israelis maintain steady reconnaissance and would be able to spot their targets quickly, whereas planes from a Sixth Fleet carrier would have to depend on the Jordanians to pass target information through liaison channels in Amman.

-- The U.S. would be better off coming in after Israel if necessary than appearing to pave the way for Israel.

The above arguments lead to the initial judgment that Israeli air strikes are preferable to U.S. The following additional comments were made about the problems that would be raised if air attacks were insufficient and ground intervention appeared necessary:

NO (without my approval at the time)

-- If the combined Iraqi and fedayeen forces appeared about to topple the King, introduction of U.S. forces would put the U.S. in the middle of an intra-Arab war.

-- If Hussein appeared about to fall, the Israelis would probably move quickly and the U.S. might well not have a real choice.

-- Sustaining armed intervention in Jordan would be operationally difficult without direct access to sea lines of communication.

It is recognized that an Israeli ground intervention would probably not save Hussein's regime even though it might administer a temporary defeat on his nearest external enemy.

If Israel intervened in Jordan, the U.S. would have to consider two kinds of support:

-- It would be necessary to assure that Israel has the munitions and other supplies required to sustain the attack. It is the judgment of the group that Israel's war reserves would be sufficient to carry their operations through a prolonged operation. U.S. resupply could be provided within ample time.

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We shall not support Israel in any way if they attack Jordan on their own.

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-- The more serious contingency would come about if the Soviets or Egyptians decided to take advantage of the situation by heating up the Suez front. The judgment was that their capability would be limited to re-opening artillery attacks, small harrassing raids across the Canal and some air attacks. Support for Israel in this contingency would be developed from the same kinds of packages that have been worked out in the event the ceasefire breaks down.

3. Armed intervention for evacuation.

If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages.

If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved.

There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein's regime.

U. S. Military Posture in this Situation

The carrier, the U.S.S. Independence, remains 100 miles off the Lebanese coast. The second carrier is within about 30 hours of it and moving closer. Both will be held in the same operational area for the next few days.

Evacuation aircraft remain in Turkey.

One company of paratroopers is on 4 hour alert and one battalion on 8 hour alert in Europe as the beginning of an evacuation force.

Diplomatic Posture

Here's The most important diplomatic task would be to deter Soviet intervention. It would also be important to minimize Nasser's reaction.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8:15 A.M.

Ed — File Here

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Morning Situation Report on Jordan

K - We must step up our aid to Hussein particularly now when he does not appear to ~~be~~ in deep trouble —

Military progress in Amman and in the north continues to come slowly, and it is still uncertain what kind of political balance will emerge. For instance, there are reports from the West Bank that even the moderate Palestinians have been deeply embittered by Hussein's crackdown. That ~~balance between~~ the traditional Arab King and the Palestinian third ~~of his~~ population --both militant and moderate -- will largely determine whether the showdown of the last two weeks will give Hussein a reasonably firm base from which to negotiate.

Keep pouring in aid

However, Hussein showed in his first talk with Ambassador Brown yesterday that he feels he has made substantial progress and is now thinking about how to draw the country together again. This means that our effort -- in addition to consolidating our contingency plans -- must now turn to putting into operation some of the plans that have been drawn up for food, economic and military resupply assistance.

A late piece of very good news is that the Jordanian army reportedly has freed a number of the hijacking hostages. The palace "expects" the remainder to be released shortly, but we have no evidence that this has happened yet.

The Military Situation

Amman radio about 7:00 a.m. EDT carried an announcement of a new agreement on a cease-fire. There is no evidence yet, however, that this will be any more successful than previous efforts. It will be some hours before this can be known, and perhaps days before any fedayeen withdrawal from the cities -- which Hussein would presumably insist on -- is being carried out.

In Amman, the army remains engaged in the difficult task of eliminating still active pockets of fedayeen resistance. Some 20,000 Jordanian troops are engaged in this operation. Their plan is to move down from the heights of the various hills (jebels) which they control in Amman and force the fedayeen into the center of town.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NSC HR 12/10/19
By RSMH NARA, Date 10/18/16

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The Israelis report that in the north the Jordanian forces surrounded Irbid yesterday and began closing in on the city and that there was fighting on the outskirts. The Israelis are not sure whether the Jordanian army is now inside Irbid or still on the outskirts, but they do report that government forces now control two other crucial towns in the north, Ramtha and Jerash.

Ambassador Brown's Talk with King Hussein

Ambassador Brown was finally able to get to the palace yesterday with the help of a Jordanian armored escort with "all guns firing." He was unable, however, to return to the embassy -- presumably because of heavy fighting in the neighborhood -- and is staying temporarily near the British embassy.

The following are the more important points that came out of Ambassador Brown's three hour conversation with King Hussein over "19 cups of coffee, and five cups of tea":

--The King expressed his appreciation for U. S. support and sent a response to your message expressing his "deepest appreciation" for your "friendship and sympathy and general concern," his hope "to rebuild Jordan on a dynamic solid basis" and his conviction that his forces will continue to be "a very hard nut to crack" (text attached). The King said he plans to "communicate" with you and Mrs. Meir today.

--Hussein said he was grateful to you and to Mrs. Meir for the effective "spooking operation" which he feels was a major contribution to the Syrian withdrawal. He asked that we pass this word along to Mrs. Meir and add that he does not now need the assistance that the Israelis offered.

--The King said he needs substantial resupply of ammunition. His Hawker Hunters have made a heavy expenditure of maching gun ammo and rockets and the army also needs to replenish its ammo. [The WSAG developed standby plans for this, and a cable has already been sent saying the U. S. is prepared to respond expeditiously as soon as we get their list.] The palace has also submitted a list of urgently needed supplies to feed the Amman civilian population for one week to us and other potential donors. [State yesterday appointed an officer to coordinate the relief effort within our government and with other governments.]

--Hussein said that military government will be continued for at least another few months. [After the Ambassador's talk, reports have come in saying that the military government has resigned but is staying on in a caretaker status. It is not clear yet what this means.]

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--Hussein seems to think he has broken the back of the fedayeen resistance. He said that the central committee of the Palestin Liberation Organization no longer exists since the significant people are either dead, captured or out of business. He believes that Yasir Arafat is finished but does not know who will replace him. [Israeli intelligence this morning said the fedayeen are in real trouble but did not think Arafat was finished yet. They felt Nasser would feel obliged to save him.]

--He said he does not intend to make a big issue of the Syrian involvement, since he believes the failure of the Syrian intervention will generate internal pressures on the regime in Damascus. He believes his silence will be more helpful in bringing about changes.

One gets the impression from this conversation or another between Hussein and the British ambassador, that the King has regained his nerve, is in good spirits and unwilling to settle for less than that very favorable settlement with the fedayeen at this point. We have, of course, experienced his ups and downs before; yesterday he was clearly encouraged.

The Hostages

Jordan's Military Governor announced this morning that the Jordanian army has liberated a number of the hostages. King Hussein's confidant, Zaid Rifai, has informed the embassy that "about half" of the hostages have been released and are in the governments' hands. He expects the remainder to be released shortly. He reports that they are in "good condition." The embassy is attempting to evacuate the released hostages as soon as possible, although there may be some delay as the Jordanians debrief them.

This development -- provided all the hostages are released -- may have come just in time to save our diplomatic effort in Bern. Our representative to the Bern Group felt that the Swiss, Germans and British were on the verge of going the way of releasing the fedayeen in their countries in exchange for (a) the European and American hostages who are not dual nationals and (b) the remaining hostages being taken to a safe location. He felt that while they may give lip service to the "non-discriminatory" solution, they could slip over the edge at any moment, especially since the three could maintain solidarity and this sharply limit the damage to them.

Soviet Reaction

Our embassy in Moscow reports that the latest Soviet press comment on the Jordan crisis seems to reflect dismay over splits in the Arab world and uncertainty over how the situation will develop. The embassy reports that the Soviets are finding it increasingly difficult to continue to straddle the fence between the fedayeen

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and Hussein and to separate the "good" fedayeen from the "bad." In these circumstances, the Soviets are finding it more expedient to concentrate their propaganda fire on the "forces of imperialism," with the Sixth Fleet a ready target which can be presented as a real threat in the area.

The Soviets also seem to be trying to grab some of the credit for the cooling of the situation in Jordan. The Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Septeml 23 attempting to convey the impression that cool but concerted Soviet statesmanship is due the lion's share of the credit, now that the crisis in Jordan has subsided somewhat. The statement set forth Moscow's account of Soviet moves to end the fighting, including demarches in Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Washington, London and Paris as well as efforts at the UN.'

The Soviets are scheduled to transit into the eastern Mediterranean from the Black Sea another eight naval units over the next three days (2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 1 submarine and 1 intelligence collector). Some or all of these units could augment the Soviet Mediterranean squadron in reaction to the arrival of the carriers Kennedy and Guam. Another cruiser, destroyer and merchant tanker left the Caribbean on September 20 and are holding on a course that could take them to the Mediterranean. If they continue on their present course and speed they would arrive at Gibraltar on October 2.

Evacuation

An aircraft chartered from Middle East Airlines flew 74 evacuees, including 18 official and 16 private Americans, from Amman to Beirut yesterday. The flight was uneventful despite mortar fire within 200 yards of the aircraft prior to takeoff. A further U.S. evacuation flight is planned for today.

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SECRET

TO PRESIDENT NIXON FROM KING HUSSEIN

Sir:

May I express my deepest appreciation for your friendship and sympathy and general concern over the problems and difficulties which my country faces. Our only consolation lies in any determination to make of these tragic efforts a turning point that will enable us to rebuild Jordan on a dynamic solid basis. We are and have been fully aware of our responsibilities not only to defend with our lives our sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and also our responsibilities in the area, and towards its future as well as the cause of justice and peace, here and in the world.

We appreciate above all your help and support during the very crucial, anxious moments when the odds appeared to grow too numerous against us. We felt in our struggle of life and death that we were not alone. We continue to need help and support to rebuild and face the multitude of human demands and requirements, and to replenish our losses on the military level. Believe me, Sir, I have a strong conviction that this country, its people, and its armed forces will continue to be a very hard nut to crack. This may have begun to dawn on many around us and the world.

God bless you. With all my respect, Best wishes and regards.

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Dulles

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Back from Paris

RC

Will you followup?

Have Saunders ____

Have Kennedy ____

DRE

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

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 September 1970

70 SEP 24 PM 12:29

WH SITUATION ROOM

Israel has reiterated its refusal to exchange its Arab guerrilla prisoners for the hostage

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Jordan

(Situation as of 1200 EDT)

25X1

2/ An official of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs who deals with intelligence matters informed the embassy this morning that the Syrians seem to be leaving themselves the option to return to Jordan, but that the Israelis think this is probably not their intention. The Israelis believe that the Syrians may have left some personnel in fedayeen uniforms behind. Another Israeli Foreign Ministry official said that the King could retain his strong position provided Nasir remains reasonably neutral and provided that a financial crisis does not develop as a result of Kuwait's decision to cut off its aid to Jordan. He speculated that the King might be inclined to get back to civilian government as soon as possible,

State Dept. review completed

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3. The US Embassy in Amman reported that at 1230 local time (0630 EDT), [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] the army was still engaged in "a difficult effort" to eliminate the remaining pockets of fedayeen resistance in Amman. Some 20,000 Jordanian troops, including infantry, were engaged in this operation. The army's plan was to move from the various heights and force the fedayeen into the center of town. The government's major concern now was reportedly to reestablish public services, i.e., electricity, water, and sanitation services. The embassy reported that it was still hearing a substantial amount of sporadic firing and frequent and repeated explosions in

25X1 Wahdat camp.

[redacted] the army was using artillery and starvation to bring Jabal Luwebdeh under control. He also reported that the army was taking men from the area and comparing their faces against a large collection of fedayeen photographs. The army was uncertain when it would be able to guarantee movement to and from the embassy. The embassy reports that it has procured additional kerosene for the communications generator and that it now has four-five days of communications capability and adequate drinking water with strict rationing. 25X1

[redacted]

5. The evacuation of Americans and other foreign nationals is proceeding at the Amman airport. The embassy reports that at 1545 (0945 EDT) the chartered Middle East Airlines plane from Beirut had been unloaded and the evacuees were boarding. There was mortar fire in the vicinity of the airport, but officials there did not expect it to hinder the departure of the flight. An earlier British flight had been limited to 4,000 feet of runway because guerrillas were

[redacted] 25X1

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firing at one end of the strip, but the plane otherwise departed without incident. The US chartered flight will carry 33 Americans; the rest of the 73 passengers are dependents from other embassies. Another flight is tentatively scheduled for tomorrow. The US Embassy reports the main problem is getting word of the flights to people wanting to depart and getting them to the airport on time; there is no difficulty getting planes in or out.

6. Israel has reiterated its refusal to exchange any imprisoned Arab guerrillas for the hijacked airline hostages. The Israeli parliamentary Foreign Affairs and Security Committee said that Israel would have no part in the release of Arab terrorists "whose sole purpose is to harm the state of Israel."

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2 pages

[NLN 01-19/23A pages 2+3 per letter 2-7-03]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Morning Situation Report on Jordan

The Syrian armored forces remain on the Syrian side of the border this morning after yesterday's withdrawal, but the battle between Jordanian government forces and the Palestinian guerrillas goes on. The fedayeen position in the north -- in terms of manpower at least -- has been strengthened by units of the Palestine Liberation Army which were formerly based in Syria but have moved in behind the withdrawing Syrians.

King Hussein's problem remains -- as it was before the Syrian invasion -- that of re-establishing his authority throughout Jordan. While he has made steady progress since the army first marched into Amman, the basic problem of restoring order and finding some sort of viable relationship with the fedayeen remains. They may still have the capacity to consolidate a "liberated area" in the north with a supply line across the border from Syria. This could make Hussein's problem throughout the country more difficult by giving the fedayeen a safe base from which to operate. It could also increase activity along Israel's cease-fire line because Jordanian forces could not limit firing on Israeli settlements in the northern Jordan Valley.

The Military Situation

The Syrain troops and armor have pulled out of northern Jordan, but Syrian-backed fedayeen units continue to battle Jordanian forces in the Irbid area. According to the Israelis, who continue to fly extensive reconnaissance flights over the area, all of the regular Syrian forces have withdrawn across the border, although they are regrouping inside Syria near the border and appear to be leaving open their option to return to Jordan. The Syrian-backed Hittin Brigade of the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) -- a unit of the Syrian army that has for some time been seconded to this military arm of the fedayeen Palestine Liberation Organization -- has replaced some of the Syrian regulars and the Israelis say that some Syrian regulars have been left behind in fedayeen garb. The Israelis also say that some PLA units in Egypt and a Libyan unit are being sent to Syria as are PLA trainees from Iraq.

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The Jordanians apparently did not assault the Syrian positions in the Irbid-Ramtha area yesterday, but rather hit them hard with artillery and tank fire as well as air strikes. Intercepted communications indicate that in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal the Jordanians have launched a heavy attack on Irbid. Fedayeen intercepts indicate that yesterday afternoon the Jordanians were employing an armored brigade and two infantry battalions and have been bombarding the town with artillery and rockets. The Israelis say, however, that the Jordanians have not yet entered the city. The Jordanians have publicly claimed to have captured the Ramtha-Irbid-Mafrag crossroads -- the key to the fedayeen supply route from Syria -- and were in control of Zarka. The city of Mafrag, however, apparently was also still in fedayeen hands.

In Amman, the army continues to conduct clearing operations. Jordanian army operations yesterday concentrated on a large refugee camp north of the city and on an area near the U. S. embassy.

The Diplomatic Front

King Hussein may have gained some important Arab support for a very favorable settlement with the fedayeen, but this is yet to have an visible effect on conditions in Jordan. President Numayri of Sudan, the chairman of the four-man mediating committee sent to Amman from the Arab summit in Cairo, says his delegation "blessed" the agreement Hussein reached yesterday with several captured fedayeen leaders and appealed to both sides to end the conflict. This was done despite the fact that other PLO officials, including Yasir Arafat, have strongly repudiated the agreement. The delegation, accompanied by four PLO leaders released by King Hussein, returned to Cairo last night after stopping off in Damascus last night to talk with Syrian President Atassi. The Cairo press has reported that the summit meeting resumed last night and that there are plans for further discussions today.

The Hostages

There has been no official word on the hostages, but the French embassy in Amman was informed on September 22 by a "good source" that all were safe. The source said tha the hostages had been removed from Amman before the outbreak of fighting and were being held elsehwere in Jordan in groups of about six, apparently under close guard by the PFLP. According to press reports, the fedayeen have announced that the hostages are being held in the "liberated zone" in north Jordan. The source said that all of the hostages were "believed" to be safe.

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The Bern group met on September 23 to discuss the Red Cross negotiator's latest proposal that the four governments accept in principle an "exchange of hostages for the release of Europeans and Americans who are not dual nationals." This proposal came from conversations with a PFLP representative in Beirut. The proposal would be made conditional on PFLP agreement to evacuate at the same time Israeli and dual citizens to a safe place - perhaps Beirut - from which point negotiation for their release would continue. The Swiss, Germans and British indicated their readiness to accept the substance of the ICRC negotiator's proposal. We and the Israelis opposed on the basis the proposal is discriminatory. The Bern group agreed to consult their governments on the possibility of adding a convering text to the ICRC 's proposed instruction specifying all hostages must be brought to a safe place before negotiations for their release are initiated. Our Ambassador fears that the solid front maintained so far will crumble unless we are prepared to accept the basic Red Cross proposal with the addition.

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We have just learned that Israeli armed forces have commenced action against Syrian military forces which had invaded Jordan. This invasion by Syria, we were aware, would be considered by Israel as a threat to Israel's security, and we have been working and will continue to work intensively in diplomatic channels to bring about Syrian withdrawal.

We wish to note that Syria has long rejected a just settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute on the basis supported by the overwhelming majority of the world community, the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967. More recently Syria, unlike the UAR, Jordan and Israel rejected our peace initiative based on that resolution. The military action of Syria has not only posed a threat to the security of both Jordan and Israel, but has placed in further jeopardy the slender hopes the people of the area and men of good will everywhere had placed in the initiative based on the November 1967 resolution. We look to the early withdrawal of all troops from Jordan not there at the request of the Jordan government so that those countries of the area which want peace can press ahead in their efforts to make it. We have no intention of embarking on other than diplomatic steps in order to end the fighting unless powers outside the area become involved.

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TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING SELECTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

-- Since our peace initiative was launched in June, the Palestinian guerrillas and those Arab Governments, including Syria, opposed to a settlement with Israel have sought to destroy our initiative.

-- The situation came to a head in Jordan when King Hussein, who along with Nasser had accepted the US initiative, sought to assert control over the fedayeen "state within a state" in Jordan.

-- By September 19 the King was slowly gaining the upper hand. Iraq, although it has a large number of troops in Jordan and is pro-fedayeen, has remained passive; the UAR has avoided choosing sides; and the Soviets have limited themselves to exhortations for an end to the civil strife and against outside intervention.

-- Beginning late September 19 a new situation has been created by a massive invasion of Jordan from Syria (300 tanks plus artillery and infantry). The invading forces have established themselves in northern Jordan where the fedayeen have been strong.

-- At stake is the regime of King Hussein, a moderate Arab leader friendly to the United States and prepared if he can to make peace with Israel. If he falls, the prospects are for radicalization and possible partition of Jordan among elements hostile to Israel and the United States. If Hussein falls,

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there will remain little hope for an Arab/Israeli settlement in the foreseeable future.

-- On September 20 we urged the Soviets to prevail upon the Syrians to withdraw from Jordan, warning that if they did not there was danger that the conflict would be broadened. and affirming our own decision to avoid this. The Soviets have been totally unresponsive.

-- In these circumstances we have been consulting with other governments, including the British, the French and the Israelis.

-- We have been informed that Israel has decided to move militarily against the Syrian forces in northern Jordan in view of the threat which would be posed to its security by a radical regime and a large Syrian military force on its eastern border.

-- We view sympathetically this Israeli position to defend its national interests. We will be helpful in quietly providing Israel materiel assistance, while seeking minimal public association with this Israeli action in order to protect to the extent possible our interests in the Arab world.

-- We see our principal responsibility as keeping the Soviets from intervening. We are informing the Soviets that we have no plans or our own to intervene, and are warning them against intervening. We are making clear that the problem results

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from Syrian aggression and that the solution lies in Syrian withdrawal from Jordan. We will of course also support withdrawal of Israeli troops once the military ~~occupation~~ operation is completed should the Israelis feel that they must go in on the ground as well as in the air.

-- As for possible actions we might take, we are making contingency plans should it become necessary to evacuate US nationals from Jordan. If, contrary to our expectations, the situation should require a larger direct US role, we will consult the Congress in advance.

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Department of State

WH B

TELEGRAM

SECRET 113

PAGE 01 STATE 155169

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NEA- MR. ATHERTON
EUR/SOV-MR. DUBS
S/S-O:SHOLLY

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S E C R E T STATE 155169

EXDIS

SUBJ: SOVIET REPLY TO US DEMARCHE ON SYRIA

REF: DEPTEL 154421 AND 154417

1. SOVIET CHARGE VORONTSOV CALLED ON ASST. SECY. SISCO SEPTEMBER 21 TO PRESENT SOVIET REPLY TO US REQUEST THAT SOVIET UNION

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 155169

PRESS SYRIANS TO PULL BACK FROM JORDAN (REFTELS). FOLLOWING IS INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF SOVIET REPLY.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NOTES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE CONCERN IN CONNECTION WITH THE SHARP AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND THAT IT (THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES) ALSO CONSIDERS UNACCEPTABLE INTERVENTION IN THE EVENTS IN JORDAN BY OTHER STATES -- BOTH THOSE BELONGING AND NOT BELONGING TO THIS REGION.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE GUIDED BY SUCH A LINE ALSO WITH RESPECT TO THAT WHICH CONCERNS THE PREVENTION OF POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS BY ISRAEL TO USE THE GIVEN SITUATION.

ON ITS SIDE, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO TAKE STEPS DIRECTED TOWARD FACILITATING THE STOPPING OF FRATRICIDAL CLASHES IN JORDAN. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ADHERES TO THE SAME LINE IN ITS CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT BUT HAVE A QUESTION AS TO WHAT AIMS ARE SOUGHT BY THE INCREASED CONCENTRATION OF THE FORCES OF THE SIXTH FLEET OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND ALSO OTHER MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THAT REGION.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM ONCE AGAIN THAT ANY INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE INTO THE EVENTS OCCURRING IN JORDAN COULD EVEN FURTHER COMPLICATE THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE.
END TEXT.

3. SISCO ASKED VORONTSOV WHETHER WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS STATEMENT TO MEAN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS TAKING STEPS TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDAN. VORONTSOV SAID HE DID NOT HAVE INFORMATION REGARDING THE EXACT NATURE OF THE CONTACTS TAKING PLACE BUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS USING ALL ITS INFLUENCE IN CONTACTS WITH SYRIA. THE USSR WAS IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH BOTH SYRIA AND JORDAN.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 155169

4. VORONTSOV ASKED WHETHER HUSSEIN HAD REQUESTED US ASSISTANCE. SISCO REPLIED THE COULD NOT GET INTO DETAILS OF ANY DISCUSSION WITH GOJ.

5. VORONTSOV THEN SOUGHT CLARIFICATION REGARDING THE MOVEMENTS OF THE SIXTH FLEET. SISCO SAID VORONTSOV COULD REPORT WE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THIS QUESTION. SISCO CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE SOONER WE SAW PRACTICAL RESULTS COMING OUT OF DAMASCUS, THE SOONER THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD BE DEFUSED. ROGERS

SECRET

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Classification

155203

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Department of State

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STATE [redacted] 155203

EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

REF: STATE 155166

Following is text of questions and answers delivered to Israeli Minister Argov at 10:30 EDT September 21:

QUOTE:

Q. Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?

A. We have indicated in our conversations our agreement in principle to the operation under discussion. If decisions are taken to conduct such an operation, they should be on the basis of those conversations and the fact that our common interests would be served.

Q. Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and

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NEA:ALAtherton/hlk	9/21/70	29588	NEA - Rodger P. Davies

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The Secretary

S/S-O Sh[illegible]lly

White House - Dr. Kissinger

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ACTION:

coordination between us?

A. We do not know the answer to this question. Israel is aware of the informal exchange of messages between Deputy Prime Minister Allon and the King which we conveyed. With respect to ground operations, the only indication we have of the Jordan attitude on this question was a statement by Zaid Rifai to our Ambassador that Israeli QUOTE ground operations are fine in the area as long as they are not here in Jordan. UNQUOTE. We are seeking clarification on this question from the King. Israeli air strikes have been requested or approved on several occasions by the King.

Q. How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

A. On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan.

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ACTION:

Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this effect on September 20. We have and will continue to make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel's security and integrity and its right to live within defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for specific measures the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists at the time. We have contingency plans for these eventualities.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the

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Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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ACTION:

Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defense?

A. We would be prepared to take the position publicly, including in the Security Council, that such action by Israel represented legitimate self-defense since the Syrian invasion of Jordan threatened Israel's security. While we cannot state precisely how we would vote in the Security Council on any particular resolution in the absence of precise knowledge of terms of that resolution, we would be prepared to veto a resolution which condemned Israel for this act of self-defense.

Q. Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

A. The U.S. shall not hold Israel responsible for the fate of the hostages resulting from Israeli action against

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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ACTION:

Syrian forces in Jordan.

Q. Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

A. We agree that major U.S. policy statements on this matter would be made at the highest levels.

Q. Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

A. We believe that the oral answers to the above questions are clear and should not be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

END

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

[ROGERS]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT September 22, 1970

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Meeting on Jordan

The Situation

1. This morning's reports indicate that the military situation for the moment seems to have stabilized. The Jordanians have turned back a southern Syrian thrust and inflicted losses.

2. Following last night's meeting, our replies to the Israeli questions were given to the Israeli minister here. [Text at Tab A.] In two related further moves:

-- We asked the Israelis for their view of an attack on the Syrian rear from the Golan Heights.

-- We asked Ambassador Brown for direct clarification of King Hussein's personal view on an Israeli ground attack in Jordan as contrasted to an attack in Syria. We have no reply yet.

3. The Soviet Charge yesterday delivered a note to Assistant Secretary Sisco replying to the U.S. request Sunday that the USSR press the Syrians to pull back from Jordan. It is non-polemical, urges prevention of Israeli attack and asks about concentration of U.S. Forces. [Text at Tab B.]

4. There are some straws in the wind this morning that suggest discussing the possibility that the Jordan problem may be resolved in an Arab context. The Israeli military believe Syria will have serious logistical difficulty within 3-4 days. The Arab summit could -- although we should not count on it -- produce a face-saving compromise under which the Syrians would withdraw.

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Public and Diplomatic Posture in the Event of Israeli Intervention

1. Congressional Briefings - We have drafted talking points for briefings which include background on the situation and notes (1) that we are informing the Soviets that we have no plans to intervene and warning them not to do so, (2) that we are doing contingency planning for evacuation, and (3) that, if contrary to our expectations, the situation should require a larger direct role we will consult Congress in advance. (Tab C)

2. Public Statements - We have drafted a public statement which reviews the background of the situation and notes (1) that Syria's invasion of Jordan is understandably considered by Israel as a threat to Israel's security and (2) that we have no intention of embarking on other than diplomatic steps in order to end the fighting unless powers outside the area become involved. (Tab D)

3. United Nations - We are drafting a contingency statement supporting a veto of any motion condemning Israel. This supports our agreement with Israel.

4. Diplomatic Scenario - Messages for our approaches to the USSR, Middle East Nations and our NATO allies have been drafted for this contingency.

Military Readiness

1. Navy - Two Carrier Task Groups (Saratoga and Independence with Cruiser Springfield, 14 destroyers, and 140 aircraft remain off the coast of Lebanon.

An amphibious task force with 1,200 Marines is ready and in position 35 hours off the coast.

A third Carrier Task Group (JOHN F. KENNEDY with two guided missile frigates) will enter the Mediterranean early Friday morning, September 25.

A second amphibious task force (GUAM, additional ships, 17 helos, and a reinforced battalion of 2,814 Marines) has split into fast and slow groups. Will enter Mediterranean on September 27 and 30.

Five Navy P-3 ASW-patrol aircraft are now at Rota.

Two additional attack submarines will enter Mediterranean on September 25 and September 29.

Four additional destroyers will depart the US tomorrow for the Mediterranean.

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2. Army

One Airborne battalion and one Infantry battalion ready in Europe. Another airborne battalion will be ready at noon today. Transit and load time is 4 hours for first rifle company, 8 hours for the rest. Total force is 1,600 troops. Initial company and battalion air drop; other battalions airland.

82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg has the initial ready force of one airborne company rigged for drop on 6-hour alert. One battalion also is ready on 6-hour alert; an additional battalion will be on same alert by 2:00 p.m. today. Remainder of division on 84-hour alert.

3. Air Force

18 F-4s and 4 C-130s are at Incirlik, Turkey. (Turkey has not authorized us to use the base to launch these aircraft in strikes over Jordan.)

3. Medical Assistance Units

Two hospital units (one in the UK and one in Germany) are loaded and ready to move in one hour. First elements can arrive Amman in 10-11 hours, closing entire unit in 18 hours.

The situation in Amman is such that a medical effort (under the umbrella of the ICRC) may become the most urgent action as soon as the security situation will permit entry of the medical units.

The foregoing military measures will put us in a position to conduct evacuation or intervention operations. They also have a deterrent effect on Soviet intervention.

Military Equipment Packages for Israel and Jordan

-- A package is ready to replace materiel expended by Jordan. Transport plans are complete.

-- Packages of equipment for Israel, in the event of an Israeli move, to (1) replace that expended in the attack and (2) improve defensive posture in the Suez area will be completed today.

Actions to Deter or Counter Soviet Intervention

In addition to the military measures already taken, scenarios of additional military and diplomatic steps to deter or, if necessary, counter Soviet intervention are being refined by the WSAG.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.

Ed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Use of U.S. Land-based Air Over Jordan

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed our options for the use of U.S. land-based air over Jordan as a show-of-force, to provide tactical air support for Jordanian forces, or to cover evacuation or resupply operations.

The critical factors in employing land-based air in this situation would be the availability of basing, staging and overflight rights and the availability at operating bases of fuel, ammunition and support for the operational aircraft.

-- All possible bases in the area were examined and five were selected as acceptable for contingency operations -- two in Turkey, and one each in Cyprus, Greece and Crete.

-- The bases in Turkey (Incirlik and Cigli) would be the most advantageous. Fuel, ammunition and other support for F-4 aircraft are available and in the case of Incirlik, where 19 F-4s currently are in position, target areas could be reached without air-to-air refueling enroute. But there is little chance that Turkey would permit our launching operations over Jordan from its territory.

-- The bases in Crete and Greece lack some of the required munitions, fuel and support equipment and operations from them would require air-to-air refueling enroute. To bring necessary supplies and equipment in by air would require about seven days before operations could begin. There is serious doubt that we could get political clearance for the use of these bases for operations over Jordan.

-- Operations from the Cyprus base would not require air-to-air refueling but supplies and equipment would have to be moved in before operations could begin -- again this would

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take about seven days. There is some possibility that we could get agreement to use the base from the Cypriot Government. The U.K. could give us permission unilaterally, but probably would prefer to have Cypriot agreement.

Only one base - Cyprus - seems a real possibility. This would permit us to conduct about 50 tactical air sorties daily over Jordan, or a 25 percent increase over the approximately 200 sorties we can operate from the carriers INDEPENDENCE and SARATOGA now on-station in the Eastern Mediterranean.

-- Operations could not commence, however, for about seven days.

-- If 200 sorties daily for seven days have not turned the tide, the addition of 50 more sorties alone would be unlikely to provide the measure of additional response needed to weight the balance in Hussein's favor.

The carrier KENNEDY is enroute to the Mediterranean now and will pass through Gibraltar on September 25th. Its aircraft can add 100 sorties daily to our capability.

-- Given the seven day make-ready period for the Cyprus base, by September 21st, the KENNEDY will give us the capability to increase the sortie rate by 50% at an earlier date than we could produce a 25 percent increase using land-based air.

In view of the foregoing, the WSAG believes we should not plan on using land-based air for intervention in Jordan.

I recommend that we rely upon carrier-based air for our planning, including the added capability which the carrier KENNEDY will provide.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

September 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard Kennedy

SUBJECT: Use of U.S. Land-based Air over Jordan

At the WSAG meeting on Saturday, Admiral Moorer presented the results of the study of the use of U.S. land-based air over Jordan. All agreed that since the most likely additional capability which could be brought to bear would be about 25% of existing daily sortie rate from the carriers and that the KENNEDY would add an additional 50% sooner than land-based air could be employed (seven days base preparation time), we should continue to rely on carrier-based air.

You asked that the facts be laid out in a memo to the President. A memo for this purpose is at Tab A.

Recommendation:

That you forward the memo at Tab A to the President.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

NUMBER 22186 MO 09 DA 21 HR 15

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X
HAK ____

FROM: ELIOT ____
ROGERS ____
LAIRD ____

DOC DATE: 09/20/70

HAK

CLASSIF: U ____ C ____ LOU ____ S ____ TS X

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SUBJECT: Jordan Sit Rep 6:30 PM Sunday 09/20/70

ENCLOSURES: (____) (____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE ____

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LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
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SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . ( )
MEMO TO PRESIDENT . . . . . ( )
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE . . . . . ( )
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE . . . . . ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ . . . . . ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . ( )
JOINT MEMO . . . . . ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY . . . . . ( )
CONCURRENCE . . . . . ( )

DUE DATE: ____

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

~~Eyes Only~~

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
09/20/70	Sanders	Pres	info (hand carried)
			Note by Pres also for ORE - Action not clear

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MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Nancy OBE

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: The Jordan Situation -- 6:30 P.M. Sunday, September 20

The Military Situation

After armored engagements last night, Syrian and Jordanian tanks have been fighting again since late morning (Jordan time) in an area apparently about 8 km. inside northern Jordan. According to the Israelis, the Syrians have about 150 tanks and artillery in the area -- about 70 tanks in Jordanian territory. There were reports that Jordanian aircraft were used this afternoon. As of now, the status of the fight was not clear; both sides had taken losses, but nightfall may have brought a temporary pause. It is still not known whether the Syrians will limit their action or press ahead to occupy an area in northern Jordan.

In Amman, the army continues mopping up, but it still has not secured the area around the U.S. embassy -- a fact that limits U.S. diplomatic activity. Most of our communications from King Hussein come through an aide. Ambassador Brown is unable to either assess the King's real state of mind -- his aide may have a greater tendency to panic -- or by face-to-face contact take maximum advantage of some of the steps taken today to reassure him of U.S. support.

The King's Requests

Earlier in the day, the King through a messenger asked whether we could help. At that time, he sent a specific request for:

-- a statement condemning invasion from Syria;

-- a declaration that the intrusion of an outside power into Jordan cannot be tolerated and will necessitate international action.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [4 pages]
NLN 01-19/35A per 3.4(b)(1) letter 5-14-03
By KMR NARA, Date 5-25-04

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At the end of the afternoon (6:15 P. M. Amman time), Hussein's aide phoned Ambassador Brown to say that the Syrians were attacking on a broad front and the Jordanians believed their objective was Irbid, Jordan's second largest city located about 20 km. from the Syrian border. The Jordanian air force had attacked but was grounded by nightfall. He said the King requested the USG to take action.

The implication is that perhaps the King is hoping for U.S. (or Israeli) air attacks against the Syrian armor, but that has not been precisely specified. The Jordanians have, however, asked for aerial reconnaissance over the area which Syrian tanks have invaded. Arrangements have been made to pass the results of Israeli reconnaissance.

What the U.S. Has Done Today

1. The statement requested by the King was issued by Secretary Rogers at mid-day (text sent you earlier) -- but without the mention of "international action."

2. Assistant Secretary Sisco at 1:00 P. M. transmitted the oral note to the Soviet Charge.

3. A U.S. brigade on maneuvers in Germany has been returned to base and put on full alert. There has been no alert yet of forces at Fort Bragg.

4. The Defense Department has been ordered to accelerate collection of target information through the Israelis and to prepare (a) a plan for U.S. aerial reconnaissance and (b) a plan for U.S. air strikes against Syrian forces in Jordan.

5. The U.S. Command in Europe is prepared to send to U.S. military field hospitals to Jordan under a Red Cross umbrella. The British are also prepared to send a medical team. The order to move, however, will not be given until the Jordanian government can assure adequate security.

Other Developments

1. The UAR Foreign Ministry has told Minister Bergus in Cairo that the UAR told President Atassi of Syria it "does not agree with"

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Syrian intervention. Atassi answered that there is no intervention on the part of Syria. The Ministry official said the UAR wants to end the crisis as soon as possible and not extend it.

2. Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Kuwait and Tunisia have come out in favor of an Arab summit meeting originally proposed by Libya. Hussein has agreed to attend. Jordan has also requested an urgent meeting of the Arab League Council to debate its complaints of armed intervention by Syria.

3. Libya's Qaddafi warned Jordan today that Libya would assist the Fedayeen. Nasser has advised him to hold off flying Libyan forces to Jordan.

4. Three Soviet missile ships entered the Mediterranean from the Black Sea early on 20 September. The addition of these missile ships to the Soviet Mediterranean squadron may be in response to the deployment of additional U.S. forces to the Mediterranean, but the Soviet squadron remains at average strength for this time of year. Soviet warships have thusfar not gone beyond non-aggressive operations such as surveillance of U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean.

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9:30 A.M.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~TOP SECRET~~

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

The military situation appears to have stabilized for the moment this morning, although King Hussein's struggle with the fedayeen is far from ended and there could be new developments during the day which would change this impression. The Jordanians this morning held their own against the Syrians in a pitched armored battle in the north near Irbid and turned back a thrust south from the main battle zone of the past two days.

Although it is too soon to predict and there is as yet no indication of Syrian intent to withdraw, there are some straws in the wind this morning that raise the question of whether the Syrian intervention might be resolved in an Arab context. Israeli officers are questioning the Syrian logistical ability to sustain the attack more than a few days. Also, while Arab summits do not often produce constructive solutions to hard problems, it is still possible that some arrangement may come out of today's summit, although at the outset the cards seem stacked against Hussein.

General fighting has died down in Amman, [redacted] it may be several weeks before the city is secure. Our ambassador is still not able to get out.

The Military Situation

The Israelis report that the Syrian armored attack southward toward Amman from the Irbid-Ramtha area was thrown back by the Jordanians last night with heavy Syrian losses. An essentially static battle is continuing this morning with the Jordanians employing tanks, artillery and air strikes. There are about 170 Syrian and 200 Jordanian tanks in the area. The Israeli military believe that the Syrians are experiencing logistical problems in supporting their forces and that if the action continues for another 3-4 days they will in "in real trouble." Fedayeen communications indicate that the Israelis may be helping things along a bit by shelling the Irbid area from their positions on the Golan Heights. There have been extensive Israeli

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By KSC, NARA, Date 10/31/2016

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reconnaissance flights over northern Jordan.

The unilateral cease-fire -- at least in Amman -- called by Jordanians yesterday evening, apparently was at least in part in response to a rather harsh message from Nasser to Hussein. Nasser said that the fighting "must cease" since it was not in the Arab interest to liquidate the fedayeen. Nasser stressed the legitimate role of the fedayeen in the struggle against Israel and said that this was his "last plea." The message ended with Nasser saying "we cannot accept a worsening of the situation...and cannot allow the liquidation of the Palestinian resistance." The Egyptians also sought out fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat yesterday to seek his agreement to a cease-fire, but he later repudiated it.

Amman awoke this morning to scattered gunfire indicating -- along with the fact that the area around the U.S. embassy is still not secure -- that the fedayeen are still not completely subdued in the city. The curfew has been reimposed throughout the city because of looting and non-observance of the cease-fire. During the night there was heavy artillery concentration on one of the refugee camps and some artillery is still being heard in that area,

SANITIZED 3.3(b)(1)

[redacted] thinks that it will be a month or so before the security situation in Amman stabilizes and that special precautions will continue to be necessary. The Jordanians claim to have destroyed over 200 fedayeen bases in Amman and to have arrested several top fedayeen leaders.

Arab Diplomacy

The emergency Arab summit meeting has been postponed until noon today. Several of the Arab leaders, including Syrian President Atassi and Jordanian Prime Minister Doud, have already arrived in Cairo.

Soviet Reaction

CIA has not taken a formal position, but an informal reading indicates that analysts believe the evidence so far suggests that the Soviets are genuinely concerned about localizing the conflict and limiting any outside interference -- including Syrian and Iraqi. There is, for instance, a report that the Soviets made a demarche on the Syrians yesterday conveying their desire that they remove their troops from Jordan.

These analysts also believe that the Soviets do not at this time contemplate

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direct military involvement should Western intervention occur. CIA reads their admonitions as being temperate. So far, there is a lack of suggestive military movements. They conclude that the Soviets would instead probably confine themselves to some demonstrative move, such as repositioning elements in the Mediterranean Squadron, as well as undertaking a massive diplomatic offensive against the intervention. Presumably Israeli intervention would provoke a Soviet reaction no greater than this, although we cannot be sure until we see the related developments such an Israeli move might cause.

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3.3(b)(1)

Soviet Charge Vorontsov yesterday presented to Assistant Secretary Sisco the Soviet reply to our request that they press the Syrians to pull back from Jordan. The note says that the Soviets continue to take steps "directed toward facilitating the stopping of fratricidal clashes in Jordan" and continue to adhere "to the same line" in contacts with Syria. The Soviets also call attention to the "increased concentration" of the Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and "other" military preparations. Finally, the Soviets "confirm once again that any intervention from outside into the events occurring in Jordan could even further complicate the situation in the Middle East and the international situation as a whole."

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~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Israeli Note Verbale of Sept. 22 --
Comments and Suggested Reply

Our exchanges with the GOI on the question of Israeli military action in response to the Syrian invasion of Jordan suggest the following:

1. If the Israelis decide to strike against the Syrians in Jordan, they will not do this because we want them to, but because they have concluded their security requires that the establishment of a Syrian/Fedayeen base in the Irbid Heights must be prevented at all costs and that neither Hussein nor the Soviets nor the other Arabs nor the U.S. can get the Syrians and the Fedayeen out.

2. If and when they reach this decision, they will seek to accomplish this objective at the least military and political cost.

-- Militarily, if a combination of Israeli air power and Jordanian action on the ground can do the trick, this will be their preferred option. If air strikes alone are not sufficient, they want to retain the option of going in on the ground and of remaining there until it is clear that Hussein will not fall and can reestablish his authority in the country.

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-- Politically, they want to associate both the U.S. and Hussein with any action they take to the maximum extent possible, as protection both against international pressure to withdraw prematurely if ground action becomes necessary and against military counter-action, particularly by the Soviets.

3. While they want prior direct coordination with Hussein for both military and political reasons, this will not in the end be a decisive factor in what they do.

4. They would like more concrete U.S. assurances about what we will do to stand off the Soviets and to augment our military supplies to them. These are unlikely to be sticking points, however, if they conclude their interests require them to move, nor are more concrete assurances likely to persuade them to move if they do not conclude their security requires it. We are already sufficiently associated with any military action they may decide to take, through our initiative in encouraging them to consider a strike against the Syrians and our subsequent exchanges, for them to be reasonably certain we would stand by them politically, would continue to keep the military supply line open, and would not turn our backs if the Soviets moved against them..

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From the foregoing, the conclusion seems clear that we do not need to make any further commitments or more specific assurances to Israel to persuade them to move against the Syrians if we conclude this is necessary to save Hussein, which is both his and our overriding objective in the present situation. As it is, our problem will be to persuade them not to move if they conclude they should, given the fact that their objectives are basically different from Hussein's and ours -- namely to safeguard their security situation, to which Hussein's survival is at best subsidiary if not irrelevant.

On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the following are proposed comments on and replies to the points in the Israeli Note Verbale of September 22:

1 and 2. Our approach to Israel and our exchanges of views in this matter are in the context of a mutuality of interests. The understandings developed between us in these exchanges are predicated on the assumptions (a) that Israel will not initiate military action against the Syrians in Jordan unilaterally, and (b) that such action if decided upon will be limited to the air in the first instance and will not involve ground operations without prior consultation between us.

3. We accept Israel's judgment that any military action decided upon should not be directed against the Syrians in Syria.

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4. We will convey this proposal to King Hussein at the appropriate time.

5. (a) We have nothing to add to the assurances in this respect conveyed to the GOI in our answers of September 21, from which it is clear that our intention is to prevent the Soviets from placing Israel's security in jeopardy as a consequence of any military action that may be decided upon against the Syrians in Jordan.

(b) We shall give prompt and sympathetic consideration to any additional requests for military equipment which Israel may wish to submit as a consequence of possible military action against the Syrians in Jordan.

[redacted]

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a) With regard to the containment of Soviet intervention as it appears in your answer to our question 3, we want you to approve to us our interpretation of your position as follows:

"With reference to the answer to question three, we wish to observe that we understand the term "Soviet intervention" as covering Soviet military action and measures undertaken on any of the fronts, including the Suez Canal front and the sea. Furthermore, we understand that the U.S. decision to prevent Soviet intervention would not be restricted to the time of operations undertaken by us with reference to the Jordan-Syrian situation, bearing in mind the possibility that Soviet reaction may be a delayed reaction."

b) With regard to equipment, the operation may lead to resumption of hostilities in the Suez Canal in addition to the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. We shall therefore want to approach you on a number of concrete items of equipment and shall expect to get better treatment than we have been getting these past months.

6. It is our intention to send a message to the King through you after we have had your answer.

22 September, 1970

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RPD

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

Note Verbale

After discussion in the cabinet, following is a summing up that the Ambassador of Israel has been instructed to convey:

1. Your answers in your oral paper of September 21, 1970 have been brought to the information of the Government of Israel and the Government considers them to be authoritative answers to our questions which we interpret as a formal U.S. approach. We are ready to operate against the Syrians in Jordan. Our intention in to act by air, but if the situation should require, we shall also operate on the ground.

2. Our intention is to succeed and therefore in the event our air action shall not lead to Syrian withdrawal, we shall operate also on the ground.

3. In either case our action shall be directed against the Syrians in Jordan. We are not ready to act against Syria in order to cause withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan. We oppose this course of action on both military and political grounds.

4. We consider it essential to arrange a meeting with the King's representative for coordination purposes. Such meeting must take place prior to action, and as soon as possible.

5. We require additional clarification of your oral paper as follows:

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-77 [ID: 12452]

(4 pp.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1)(6),3.5(c); ltr. 8/31/2012

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CB MH
3/16/2015

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per sec 3.4 (b)(1)(6) E012958

NLN 01-19/24F

pages 12-15

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PAGE 02 TEL AV 05288 - 2307562

GP-3.
ZURRELLEN

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PAGE 01 TEL AV 05283 2307562

12 /

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 AF-12 EUR-20 CCO-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10

P-03 NSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 O-03 OPR-02 SY-03

OC-06 RSR-01 /150 W

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O 230725Z SEP 72 ZFF TRIPOLI
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9750
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ TEL AVIV 5283

SUBJ: JORDAN SITUATION

1. HADASS, DIRECTOR RESEARCH DEPT FONMIN, TELLS US THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN MILITARY SITUATION IN JORDAN MORNING SEPT 23. FIGHTING IS GOING ON BETWEEN SYRIANS AND JORDANIAN ARMY ALONG LINE ESTABLISHED SEPT 21, BUT IT IS "NOT A BIG BATTLE." JAA IS IN DEFENSIVE POSITION WITH SYRIANS ATTACKING THOUGH APPARENTLY NOT IN VERY DETERMINED WAY. HADASS SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION ON SIZE OF LIBYAN FORCE WHICH HAD ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS OR WHAT IT WOULD DO. SAID IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN HAD MADE SOME SMALL MOVES IN LAST 24 HOURS BUT NOT CLEAR WHAT THEIR INTENTION WAS.

2. HADASS REVIEWED KING HUSSEIN'S SPEECH MORNING SEPT 23 WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS INTENDED MAINLY FOR EARS OF ARAB SUMMIT PEACE MISSION. HE SPECULATED THAT HUSSEIN WOULD OFFER SUMMIT MISSION SOME SORT OF DEAL BETWEEN JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AND FEDAYEEN, WHICH WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO GOVERNMENT, IN EXCHANGE FOR EVACUATION OF SYRIANS FROM NORTH JORDAN.

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16
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
CCO-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-05 L-04 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
PRS-01 SS-20 OPR-02 IC-15 AID-28 C-00 CC-06 SUR-20
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O 230945Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1477
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 5083

1. EMBOFF RECEIVED FOLLOWING SITREP FROM ZAID RIFAI EARLY SEPTEMBER 23: SYRIAN ATTEMPTS TO MOVE SOUTH OF IRBID/IRBID JUNCTION/RAMTHA LINE HAVE BEEN REPULSED BY JAA USING TANKS, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT. JAA HAS KNOCKED OUT 70-75 SYRIAN TANKS AND NOW HAS ACHIEVED TANK PARITY. REPORTS RECEIVED THAT SYRIANS ARE WITHDRAWING.

2. RIFAI ALSO REPORTED THAT IRAQ HAD PROMISED NOT TO LET SYRIANS THROUGH THE MAFRAK AREA. HE SAID THAT IF SYRIA DID NOT MOVE UP REINFORCEMENTS AND IF IRAQ DID NOT INTERVENE HE THOUGHT JORDAN COULD HANDLE SITUATION.

3. ON AMMAN SITUATION, RIFAI SAID THAT JAA HAD DISCOVERED 600 FEDAYEEN BASES OF VARIOUS SORTS AND SIZES. JORDANIANS TOOK THIS AS PROOF OF PLOT TO OVERTHROW REGIME. MOVEMENT FROM NORTH, HE SAID, WAS PART OF PLOT, BUT TIMING HAD BEEN THROWN OFF BECAUSE JAA HAD MOVED FIRST. THIS HAD PUT HUSSEIN IN FIGHTING MOOD, HE SAID.

4. RIFAI SAID THAT LAST NIGHT JAA HAD TAKEN 400 PRISONERS ON ASHRAFIYEH. IT NOW HAD TOTAL OF 3000 PRISONERS. TODAY, HE SAID, JAA WAS CONCENTRATING ON JEBAL LUWEIBDEH AND COMPLETING ITS HOUSE-TO-HOUSE CLEARING OPERATION IN HUSSAYN CAMP. IN CONCLUSION, RIFAI REPORTED THAT NUMBER OF CASUALTIES APPEARED TO BE MUCH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ DECONTROLLED

LOWER THAN WAS BEING ADVERTISED

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PAGE 01 STATE 156092

85
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

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DRAFTED BY:TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY:NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S-MR. MALONE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 156092

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING

1. YOU SHOULD AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY CONVEY FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN THROUGH SECURE-NOT OPEN- CHANNEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT. AMBASSADOR BROWN WILL HAVE ALREADY TOLD YOU THAT YOUR REQUESTS ARE BEING URGENTLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY DISCUSSED.

MEANWHILE, I WANT YOU TO HAVE THIS PERSONAL WORD SAYING HOW MUCH I ADMIRE WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO PRESERVE JORDAN'S INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS. YOUR COURAGEOUS STAND HAS IMPRESSED THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL NOT WAVER IN YOUR DETERMINED EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY TO YOUR KINGDOM.

RICHARD M. NIXON END TEXT

3. THE FOREGOING PERSONAL MESSAGE IS OFCOURSE CONFIDENTIAL AND WE DO NOT INTEND EITHER TO PUBLISH ITS

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 STATE 156892

TEXT OR ACKNOWLEDGE ITS EXISTENCE. HOWEVER, IF IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THE COMING DAYS TO DO SO, WE ARE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER OUR POSITION. ROGERS

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

Note Verbale

After discussion in the cabinet, following is a summing up that the Ambassador of Israel has been instructed to convey:

1. Your answers in your oral paper of September 21, 1970 have been brought to the information of the Government of Israel and the Government considers them to be authoritative answers to our questions which we interpret as a formal U.S. approach. We are ready to operate against the Syrians in Jordan. Our intention in to act by air, but if the situation should require, we shall also operate on the ground.

2. Our intention is to succeed and therefore in the event our air action shall not lead to Syrian withdrawal, we shall operate also on the ground.

3. In either case our action shall be directed against the Syrians in Jordan. We are not ready to act against Syria in order to cause withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan. We oppose this course of action on both military and political grounds.

4. We consider it essential to arrange a meeting with the King's representative for coordination purposes. Such meeting must take place prior to action, and as soon as possible.

5. We require additional clarification of your oral paper as follows:

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

a) With regard to the containment of Soviet intervention as it appears in your answer to our question 3, we want you to approve to us our interpretation of your position as follows:

"With reference to the answer to question three, we wish to observe that we understand the term "Soviet intervention" as covering Soviet military action and measures undertaken on any of the fronts, including the Suez Canal front and the sea. Furthermore, we understand that the U.S. decision to prevent Soviet intervention would not be restricted to the time of operations undertaken by us with reference to the Jordan-Syrian situation, bearing in mind the possibility that Soviet reaction may be a delayed reaction."

b) With regard to equipment, the operation may lead to resumption of hostilities in the Suez Canal in addition to the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. We shall therefore want to approach you on a number of concrete items of equipment and shall expect to get better treatment than we have been getting these past months.

6. It is our intention to send a message to the King through you after we have had your answer.

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1462
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3464
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 5065

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

1. RIFAI CALLED ME AT 2015. WE DOUBLE-TALKED AGAIN BUT JUST TO MAKE SURE THE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS WHAT DOUBLE-TALK MEANS I AM QUOTING EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID.

2. REFERRING TO KING HE SAID, "HE PREFERS ACTION FROM UP HIGH. IF ANYTHING IS TO BE DONE DOWN LOW IT SHOULD NOT BE HERE BUT AWAY. WE AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS DETAILS. WE WILL DISCUSS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW LONG IT WILL BE."

3. DISCUSSION OF DETAILS MEANS TALK WITH ABOUT ISRAELIS.

4. RIFAI SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT OF SUDAN, THE PRIME MINISTER OF TUNISIA, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT AND THE UAR CHIEF OF STAFF HAD ARRIVED BY AIR AT MAFRAK. THEY ARE ON THEIR WAY BY CAR TO SEE OHE KING.

5. RIFAI WAID IT IS IMPORTANT FOR USG TO KEEP UP PRESSURES IT HAS ALREADY ASSERTED. I REPLIED THAT I WAS GRATIFIED TO LEARN THAT JORDAN UNDERSTOOD WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO PSY-CHOLOGICALLY IN THIS PART OF WORLD.

6. RIFAI SAID PRINCIPAL AIM MUST BE TO GET THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. IF THEY STAY, IT WILL COMPLICATE EVEN FURTHER THE JOB THAT GOVERNMENT HAS IN AMMAN. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, HE CONCLUDED IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WILL GIVE IRAQIS IDEA THAT THEY TOO CAN GET AWAY WITH SOME-THING IN JORDAN.

BROWN

BT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Attached is an approved alternate text to State to White House message 988. Please ensure that the attached text is sent as a Presidential message to the King of Jordan via Embassy Amman tonight.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

Ambassador Brown will have already told you that your requests are being urgently and sympathetically discussed.

Meanwhile, I want to have this personal word saying how much I admire what you are doing to preserve Jordan's integrity in the face of both internal and external threats. Your courageous stand has impressed the entire free world.

I am confident that you will not waver in your determined effort to restore peace and stability to your kingdom.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

MSG. NO. 188

TRANSMITTED BY: [illegible]
DATE & TIME:

ACTION
2. AGENCY White House

ORIGINATING OFFICE: S/S

4. RECEIVED BY: WHSR
DATE & TIME: 22/1920EDT

DESCRIPTION: Tel to Amman re Presidential Message to King

CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS: SECRET/EXDIS

NO. OF PGS: 3 8. PRECEDENCE: ASAP 9. VALIDATED BY: TLEliot

DELIVER TO: White House - Mr. Kissinger FOR: CLEARANCE XXX

INFORMATION

PER REQUEST

REV 8/21/70

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SECRET
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

7

STATE
EXDIS
SUBJECT: Presidential Message to King

1. You should at earliest possible opportunity convey following oral message from President to King Hussein through secure--not ~~RXXXX~~ open" channel.

2. "I want to tell you how much I admire what you are doing to preserve Jordan's integrity in the face of both internal and external threats. Your determined and courageous stand has impressed the entire free world as it has impressed me and my countrymen.

3. "I am confident that you will not ~~waiver~~ waver in carrying out the very difficult and dangerous task which confronts you. I believe that over the coming days you will succeed

TED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
A/TSeelye;TScotes:dw	9/22	23172	The Secretary WPR

RANCES:
hite House NEA - Mr. Sisco S/S

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SECRET
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: endeavors 2 7
in your ~~endeavors~~ and that once again peace and stability will be restored to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

4. "I have asked my Ambassador to reiterate to you our willingness to provide you with material assistance should this be helpful to you at this difficult time.

5. "In this regard, I am very aware that in the aftermath of the conflict you will face the monumental task of rehabilitation. Your economy will need emergency assistance and your military equipment will no doubt require replenishment. I would like you to know that the United States stands ready to assist in all possible ways. I assure you that my Government and people are prepared to consider how this country can be responsive to your needs at that time. Please accept my warmest wishes.

Richard M. Nixon"

TED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:

RANCES:

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Classification

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☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970—389-839

SECRET
Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

TE:
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ACTION:

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6. The foregoing personal message is of course confidential and we do not intend either to publish its text or acknowledge its existence. However, if it would be helpful in the coming days to do so, we are prepared to reconsider our position.

End

FTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:

ARANCES:

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-68

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September 22, 1970

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Mr. Theodore L. Eliot
Executive Secretary
Department of State

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Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

AMH:feg:9/22/70

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260/10/7140

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

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Meanwhile, I want to have this personal word saying how much I admire what you are doing to preserve Jordan's integrity in the face of both internal and external threats. Your courageous stand has impressed the entire free world.

I am confident that you will not waver in your determined effort to restore peace and stability to your kingdom.

HHS:wgh:22 Sep 1970

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Interesting comment by Eban to effect that Israel could live with Palestinian regime in Jordan if Hussein were toppled.

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SC No. 02452/70

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 September 1970

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Jordan

(Supplement to 1200 Situation Report)

ACCORDING TO A SENSITIVE STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE, FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN TOLD AMBASSADOR YOST AT THE UN ON 23 SEPTEMBER THAT WHILE ISRAEL, ON BALANCE, FAVORED HUSAYN AS OF THIS TIME, 'THE WORLD WOULD NOT COME TO AN END IF HE DEPARTED THE SCENE.' EBAN SAID THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BECOME MORE RESPONSIBLE WHEN SADDLED WITH THE DAY-TO-DAY BURDENS OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE LONG-TERM TREND IN JORDAN WAS TOWARD GREATER RECOGNITION OF THE FACT THAT JORDAN WAS 70 PERCENT PALESTINIAN. YOST ADDED THAT EBAN SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT, SOONER OR LATER, ISRAEL HAD TO FIND AN ACCOMODATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS AND THAT IT MIGHT IN THE LONG RUN BE EASIER IF THEY DOMINATED THE STATE OF JORDAN.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER RAC REVIEW 6/12/2008
SMS NARA, Date 4/25/2012
NLN 11-77/12449

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

September 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

The military situation remains about the same this morning with sporadic fighting continuing in Amman and the Jordanians beating back repeated attempts by the Syrians to drive south from the Irbid area. In short, the Jordanians are holding their own against both the fedayeen and the Syrian tanks. It could be that -- as long as the Iraqis continue to stay out -- a stand-off is developing around present positions at the present level of hostilities. If this is true, and if Hussein has little hope of driving the Syrians out with his own forces, then his choice is among (a) risking the disadvantages of outside intervention, (b) continuing the war with the added disadvantage of a consolidating Syrian-fedayeen position in the north and (c) some sort of compromise settlement, which -- given the above -- would probably further reduce his authority.

An Israeli note responding to our answer to their questions was delivered to State last night. The text is at Tab A and a fuller analysis is being provided for the 9:30 a.m. meeting.

Israeli Reaction

The Israelis have responded to our answers to their questions concerning intervention in Jordan with a request for more assurances and clarifications of our position. Text at Tab A [Analysis is included in your book for this morning's meeting.] Meanwhile, they are apparently continuing to mobilize their armed forces for possible actions.

According to our Defense Attache in Tel Aviv there is a continuing state of high military alert in the Israeli Bet Shean region opposite the Irbid Heights, a substandial reserve mobilization is in process and there is considerable military movement on the roads including troops in battle gear. The Defense attache believes that the present positioning of Israeli forces would permit military intervention at almost any point in the Jordan Valley or even from the Golan Heights area.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 letter 5-23-02
NLN 01-19/24 pt 3.4(b)(1)(4)
By KWB NARA, Date 5-17-04
SANITIZED COPY

King Hussein's Position

Ambassador Brown finally was able to get in touch with the palace last night concerning our request for a clarification of King Hussein's thoughts on Israeli ground intervention in Jordan and coordination directly with the Israelis. He had to double talk again with Zaid Rifai who said that the King "prefers action from up high" and that "if anything is to be done low it should not be here but away." Rifai added that "we agree it is important to discuss details" and will do so "as soon as possible but do not know how long it will be." Rifai also said that it is important for the U.S. to keep up the pressures it has already asserted and that the principal aim must be to get the Syrians withdrawn so that the Iraqi do not also get the idea they can get away with something. [Tab B]

Your personal message to King Hussein has been calbed to our embassy in Amman but because of the continued fighting it apparently has not yet been delivered. [Tab C]

The Military Situation

There is no significant change in the military situation this morning. Zaid Rifai, the King's confidant, does, however, report that if the Syrians do not move up reinforcements and if Iraq does not intervene, he thinks that the Jordanians can handle the situation. Rifai may be right but it should be noted that in the past there have been sharp ups and downs in his assessment. His comment is noted so you will be aware of it -- not because it is worthy of confidence. [Cable at Tab D]

The Israelis report [Tab E] that the fighting between the Jordanians and Syrians in the Irbid area continues along the same lines but that it is "not a big battle." The Jordanians remain in defensive positions with the Syrians attacking though apparently not in a very determined way. According to Zaid Rifai, the Jordanians now have tank parity with the Syrian --resulting from t he number of Syrian tanks they have knocked out and, according to the Israelis, from logistical problems.

The Iraqi forces have made some small moves in the last 24 hours, but the Israelis still are not clear about their intentions. Zaid Rifai, howeaver, says that the Iraqis have promised not to let the Syrians through the Mafrak area -- are on the main invasion routes to Amman and where most of the Iraqi forces are no located. It is hard to say at this point how much faith can be placed in Iraqi promises.

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The Israelis report that a Libyan force has arrived in Damascus but they have not information on its size or what it will do.

The War with the Fedayeen

King Hussein and the number two man of the Palestine Liberation Organization announced this morning an agreement providing for the movement of the fedayeen out of the cities and back to the borders with Israel. This was then followed up by an order from the military governor lifting the curfew in some parts of Amman for several hours and providing that military units cease firing during this period. It seems doubtful, however, that these moves really signal the end of the fighting, since the PLO leader involved was captured several days ago and the organization's leader, Yasir Arafat, is still at large and calling for continuation of the fighting. It is more likely that this is simply a tactical response by Hussein to increasing pressure from the other Arab states that he stop the fighting. In any case, heavy artillery started at dawn in Amman and lasted for about a half hour and considerable machine gun and small arms fire continues in the streets.

The CIA morning Situation Report is at Tab F.

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MEMORANDUM

9:20 AM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

September 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: A Late Development in Jordan

We have a preliminary report on this morning's briefing by the Israeli Defense Ministry which, if confirmed, signifies a major change in the situation in northern Jordan. Our source says the Israelis now believe that one of the Syrian armored brigades has withdrawn from Jordan into Syria and that others are in the process of doing so. The Israelis believe the Syrian tank units are being replaced by Palestinian infantry. They think the Iraqis who moved out of Mafraq yesterday may have moved up toward Ramtha, although this still seems doubtful.

It is too soon to confirm this information, but it should be taken into account at this morning's meeting. On the one hand, this would -- if true -- seem to be an improvement in the military situation. On the other hand, it would leave a strengthened guerrilla force in place and Hussein's long-range problem would have become more difficult. In the new situation, outside intervention would be harder to justify.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLN 01-19/33 (page 2-7-03 letter)
By [illegible] NARA, Date 5-11-04

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MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 11-77 [ID: 12453]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~ September 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

According to the Israelis, the Syrians took Irbid without a fight and are digging in. It is not clear whether they intend now to advance on Amman. There are indications of Iraqi involvement in the conflict and they could well cast their lot with whatever side seems to have the upper hand during the day. Meanwhile, King Hussein has clarified his earlier message to include the landing of troops if he loses control. It is premature to predict where this situation is heading. However, it seems possible to say that, on the basis of this morning's report, it appears from the massing of Syrian equipment around Irbid that the immediate Syrian interest may be to consolidate a position in the north. If they continue to dig in, it will be understandable that the Israelis feel that air strikes may not be decisive.

Message From King Hussein

King Hussein has sent this follow-up message to you via his close confidant Zaid Refai:

> "The King believes that (an) air strike will tip the balance but if communications between us break as a result of a complete breakdown of authority in Amman then you have my advice and authority to land."

Ambassador Brown says that he does not know what the King means when he talks about a breakdown. He imagines, however, that going through Hussein's mind is the possibility that defeat of his northern army by an overwhelming Syrian force would so demoralize his tired and confused troops in Amman that they would cease to function as an effective force.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-85/15/40 Per Hrd 10/14
By RS NARA, Date 10/19/2016

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The Military Situation

We do not yet have the full results of the most recent Israeli reconnaissance of northern Jordan. The Israelis, however, are able to confirm that Irbid fell to the Syrians last night without a fight as the Jordanians withdrew. The Israelis also report that the Syrians have reinforced their strength in the Ramtha-Irbid area to about 300 tanks and appear to be digging in. They caution that they have no way of knowing the Syrian intentions but that for the time being at least they are standing still in Irbid.

The Israelis report that the Iraqis are ready to intervene or have already intervened on the side of the fedayeen. They are reportedly deploying tanks moved in from Syria and, according to the Israelis have already taken a Jordanian radar station.

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Ed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~ACTION~~ Info for HAK

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM : Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Assistance

Situation

The government position in Amman improved markedly as a result of yesterday's intensified operations. However, some areas are still not secure, and the embassy reports that "another day of sharp fighting appears to be in prospect." The curfew is being lifted for a few hours this morning in secured areas. The palace official closest to the King describes Amman as "almost under control."

The same official, however, described the situation in the north as "very serious." The principal reason for this is the introduction of Syrian tanks into the battle for a town just south of the Syrian border astride the main road the guerrillas have used for getting supplies from Syria.

King Hussein has sent a messenger to an embassy officer saying that the Syrians attacked twice during the night. They sent 50 tanks to a road junction just south of the contested town of Ramtha. They were repulsed but now are regrouping and appear prepared to attack again in greater force with an armored brigade. Our reports indicate that the first Syrian brigade was severely mauled, losing up to 30 tanks. The Syrians have now moved up a second brigade and this is apparently the reason for increasing Jordanian concern. Since two brigades are now being deployed, it is probable that the Syrian army is directly involved and that this is not an action limited to Fedayeen forces.

The King has asked whether we could help. Specifically, he has sent a request for:

-- a statement condemning invasion from Syria;

-- a declaration that the intrusion of an outside power into Jordan cannot be tolerated and will necessitate international action.

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The same message has been passed to the British and French.

Options

In light of King Hussein's request, it would appear that we have three feasible options at this point for expressing U.S. concern:

Option 1

-- A strong public statement condemning invasion from Syria.

Pros

-- Can be done quickly.

-- Bolster Jordanian morale by immediate response.

-- Could deter further Syrian involvement because of fear of U.S. or Israeli intervention.

Cons

-- This would be condemned as saber rattling by our enemies.

-- Stir up domestic criticism in the United States questioning U.S. intervention.

-- Might appear alarmist and premature and signal stronger action than we may intend to take.

Option 2

-- Call the U.N. Security Council into emergency session.

Pros

-- Would express U.S. concern in an international context.

-- Is the traditional forum for registering concern over incursions and could provide an international umbrella for possible later action.

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Cons

-- Would probably be too slow to affect today's actions.

-- Might result in unfavorable resolution. A resolution might call for all powers to keep out including U.S. or call for a ceasefire which would make it more difficult for Jordanians to continue fighting against the Guerrillas.

-- Would force the Soviet Union to make a public response and lock them into a less flexible position. (The Soviets have already indicated that they have approached Damascus.)

-- Would deflate all the measures we have taken so far in this situation and call our credibility into question.

Option 3

-- Make a strong reply by note to the Soviet note we received several days ago from Vorontsov. There is the added option of releasing it publicly.

Pros

-- This would be a stronger action than going to the UN.

-- It would offer more hope of effective pressure on the Syrians than anything the UN could do. The Soviets have already said they are doing this.

-- By publicizing this statement we would indicate to Damascus as well as Moscow our serious concern.

-- This would provide an immediate morale boost for the Jordanians.

Cons

-- A public release of statement might be interpreted as an escalation of the crisis by deeper superpower involvement.

-- Might cause some public alarm.

-- Is dangerous when we still have not made the decision that we would intervene.

On balance, I believe our best alternative is to make a strong, in diplomatic terms, reply to the Soviets condemning the Syrian action and requesting that they use their influence to prevent a Syrian invasion. At the same

time, we should carefully watch the developing military situation and assess whether stronger U.S. measures are required.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the United States make a strong statement of concern about the Syrian incursion to the Soviet Union and that this response to the earlier Soviet demarche be made public.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Prefer: Option 1 _____

Option 2 _____

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3:30 pm Ed

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Situation in Jordan

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLN 01-19/25 #3.4(b)(1) 8-8-02 letter
By Kmb NARA, Date 5-17-04
[4 pages]

Military Situation

After repulsing two earlier Syrian tank attacks and reportedly inflicting heavy losses on a Syrian armored brigade, the Jordanians have been attacked by two Syrian armored brigades along a broad front in northern Jordan. According to information provided by the Israelis on the progress of the battle after more than five hours of fighting (11:00 a.m. EDT), both sides have suffered casualties. The Syrians reportedly have artillery and about 150 tanks in the area, some 70 of which are actually in Jordan. The Jordanians consider the situation serious due to the Syrian numerical advantage. Some Jordanian aircraft were used in the fighting but have ceased operations because of darkness.

An
/Iraqi armored brigade has reportedly begun moving from Syria into Jordan, but appears to be avoiding involvement in the fighting.

Actions Taken

On three occasions today King Hussein has asked our Ambassador for U.S. assistance. In response to his request we have thus far:

-- made a public statement of concern over the Syrian actions (Tab A).

-- Given the Soviet Charge a strong de marche (Tab B).

-- Taken further steps to determine whether we can safely provide medical assistance to Amman.

-- Called for an updating of contingency plans in light of the new situation.

-- Called a WSAG meeting for 7:00 p.m. this evening to review the situation.

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-- Authorized the increased alert of our Army Brigade in Europe.

-- Directed Defense to prepare, on a contingency basis, a plan for a punitive retaliatory air strike against the Fedayeen should they harm U.S. hostages.

-- Stepped-up efforts to enhance the acquisition of intelligence from the Israeli armed forces on the military situation in Jordan.

-- Asked our Ambassador in Amman to reassure King Hussein without making any commitments.

I will be sending you a more detailed assessment of the situation around 6:00 p.m. this evening.

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A

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STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS

We have been informed by the Government of Jordan that tank forces have invaded Jordan from Syria during the night and have moved toward Ramtha. We have also been informed that Jordanian armor is resisting this invasion.

We condemn this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan. This action carries with it the danger of a broadened conflict. We call upon the Syrian Government to end immediately this intervention in Jordan, and we urge all other concerned governments to impress upon the Government of Syria the necessity of withdrawing the forces which have invaded Jordan.

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B

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VERBAL NOTE TO BE HANDED TO SOVIET CHARGE

The Government of the U.S. notes that the Soviet Government expressed concern over the sharp aggravation of the situation in Jordan on the message delivered by Mr. Vorontsov on September 19.

At this moment, the situation is being further and dangerously aggravated by the intervention into Jordanian territory of armored forces from Syria and the concentration of further offensive forces in Syria along the Jordanian border.

The U.S. Government has condemned this intervention in Jordan and has called for the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. This intolerable and irresponsible action from Syria, if not immediately halted and reversed, could lead to the broadening of the present conflict.

The U.S. Government calls upon the Soviet Government to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present course of action and the need both to withdraw these forces without delay from Jordanian territory and to desist from any further intervention in Jordan. The Soviet Government cannot be unaware of the serious consequences which could ensue from a broadening of the conflict. For its part, the U.S. Government is urging restraint by all other parties in the area.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

At Tab A is the statement cleared by Dr. Kissinger on the Syrian invasion of Jordan. It is understood that the statement is to be read by the Secretary of State on Sunday, September 20, 1970.

At Tab B is the approved text of the Note to be given by Joe Sisco to Soviet Charge Vorontsov on the afternoon of Sunday, September 20. In addition to the changes shown on the text, the following insert was included at the end of the Verbal Note:

> "The Soviet Government cannot be unaware of the serious consequences which could ensue from a broadening of the conflict. For its part, the United States Government is urging restraint by all other parties in the area."

The texts of both Tabs A and B were cleared by General Haig to Assistant Secretary Sisco at 1:00 p.m., September 20.

Alexander M. Haig
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

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A

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STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS

We have been informed that a number of tanks have invaded Jordan from Syria during the night and have moved toward Ramtha. We have also been informed that Jordanian armor has engaged this force.

We condemn this irresponsible and imprudent intervention from Syria into Jordan. This action carries with it the danger of a broadened conflict. We call upon the Syrian Government to end immediately this intervention in Jordan, and we urge all other concerned governments to impress upon the Government of Syria the necessity of withdrawing the forces which have invaded Jordan.

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VERBAL NOTE TO BE HANDED TO SOVIET CHARGÉ

The Government of the U.S. notes that ~~shares the concern of the~~ Soviet Government, expressed concern ~~in the message delivered by Mr. Vorontsov on September 19,~~ over the sharp aggravation of the situation in Jordan, in the message delivered by Mr. V. in It is evident that responsibility for this aggravation rests with those opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

At this moment, the situation is being further and dangerously aggravated by the intervention into Jordanian territory of armored forces from Syria and the concentration of further offensive forces in Syria along the Jordanian border.

The U.S. Government has condemned this intervention in Jordan and has called for the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. This intolerable and irresponsible action from Syria, if not immediately halted and reversed, could lead to the broadening of the present conflict.

The U.S. Government calls upon the Soviet Government to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present course of action and the need both to withdraw these forces without delay from Jordanian territory and to desist from any further intervention in Jordan. clearly has a great If the USSR ~~does not~~ take effective action in this matter, it will bear great Obligation to take effective action in this matter responsibility for serious consequences which could ensue from a broadening of the conflict. so as to avoid the

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VERBAL NOTE TO BE HANDED TO SOVIET CHARGE

The Government of the U.S. notes that the Soviet Government expressed concern over the sharp aggravation of the situation in Jordan on the message delivered by Mr. Vorontsov on September 19.

At this moment, the situation is being further and dangerously aggravated by the intervention into Jordanian territory of armored forces from Syria and the concentration of further offensive forces in Syria along the Jordanian border.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

September 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan--Late Saturday Afternoon

King Hussein claims to have the situation well under control and has proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire. He may be overly optimistic, but he does appear to have made progress today.

The Military Situation

Military Governor General Al-Majali at noon EDT broadcast an announcement to all military units, public security units and popular militia calling for a cease-fire to begin immediately. The cease-fire is not to apply to sources of fire which stand in the way of the above units performing their "military and humane" duties. Earlier in the day King Hussein told the embassy that the army has broken the back of the resistance and would announce the unilateral cease-fire. In fact, however, the army is prepared to carry on further mopping up actions in key areas of the city and elsewhere. The King reports that there still remain a "small problem" in Madaba and in Irbid where the fedayeen still remain in town. In Irbid, the Army is telling the fedayeen to vacate the city or the Army will come in.

The King says that the Jordanians have been staggered by the size of the fedayeen arms, explosives and ammo caches turned up and seized during the drive. The fedayeen were "ten times stronger" than the army had estimated and they are sobered by the realization that their move against the fedayeen came before all these weapons were able to be deployed against them. These weapons, the Jordanians firmly believe, were being accumulated in preparation for a fedayeen attack against the government and the ultimate formation of a fedayeen government.

King Hussein confirms our earlier reports of a Jordanian clash with the Syrians along the border. He reports that a Jordanian army brigade forcing Syrian forces along the northern border engaged the Syrians in fighting this morning. The Jordanians feel that the Syrians will not pursue the matter further. Hussein says that the Iraqi troops are still standing by taking no offensive action.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLJ 11-85/15/142 Per Hx 12/10/2014
By RS NARA, Date 10/18/2016

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The King says that none of the PFLP airline hostages have yet been discovered. He reports that the Army's action against the Windat refugee camp, which was recovered today, was undertaken with the safety of the hostages in mind.

Hussein may at this point be a bit too optimistic about the situation. The cease-fire comes at the end of the third day of heavy fighting and, if the experience of the last two nights holds up, the fedayeen will reinfiltrate during the night many of the positions they gave up during the day. The Jordanians are, however, clearly making progress. We are yet to hear from the fedayeen on the cease-fire.

Negotiations for Hostages

The new Red Cross representatives in Amman, Boissier and Boisard this morning said they are not empowered to discuss the case of the hostages and that their task was solely to facilitate the entry of Red Cross medical teams in Jordan. They subsequently informed an embassy officer, however, that they hope to evacuate all the hostages on the second flight of a Red Cross relief plane from Amman tomorrow.

This would seem to be wishful thinking. It comes out of the blue. As far as we know, not even the Red Cross knows where the hostages, who are split into several groups, are located and there does remain the hurdle of the PFLP demands. The Red Cross representatives are in fact concerned over the possibility that the PFLP might present only some hostages for evacuation and insist on the release of those fedayeen held in Europe in exchange. Such a proposition would be difficult to resist especially if some of the hostages--as apparently is the case--need medical attention. Meanwhile, the Bern Group is meeting again this afternoon to consider again a new mandate for the Red Cross.

U.S. Actions

Soviet surveillance of the Sixth Fleet's two carrier task groups and the amphibious task force continues in the eastern Mediterranean. Fourteen of the 16 Soviet surface combatants and two intelligence collectors are concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean in reaction to the fleet's movements. At least two submarines are also involved in the surveillance effort, one of which is probably nuclear-powered.

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As you know, King Hussein has asked urgently that we send complete surgical field hospitals, including surgeons, nurses and related equipment. He has made similar requests to the British and French. He is also anxious that the U.S. continue to be on the alert to provide other assistance should unexpected developments occur. We have responded that we want to be helpful and are consulting urgently with the Red Cross, British and French on exactly how best to organize the effort.

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SE

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE September 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

After two days of fighting, the Jordanian army is still far from securing Amman. Although the army continues to have the upper hand, King Hussein apparently has been reluctant to apply the maximum force available to him for fear of causing numerous civilian casualties and reducing the city to a shambles. Some of his military strength is also being drawn off to cope with the stiff fedayeen resistance in the cities to the north. Hussein's problem now is that the longer the fighting drags on the greater will be the pressure from the other Arab states to accept a compromise solution.

Our Embassy in Amman comments that this is not a win-or-lose situation for Hussein. The question is what kind of compromise Hussein will settle for. He appears to view his objective as restoring his authority in urban centers while not putting himself completely at odds with the Palestinians who form a large part of his population. Put another way, he seems to be seeking a solution which will still leave him with the support of the "silent majority" of moderate Palestinians. This objective and the pressures of other Arabs may cause him to stop short of completely suppressing the guerrillas, but our Embassy last night felt that unless the pace of his movement increased today he would not be in a strong position to force compromise on his terms.

The Military Situation

After another day of heavy fighting in Amman in which the army continued to make gradual progress in rooting out the fedayeen, the fighting slacked off again last night. The army opened up again, however, at dawn and may be pressing its attack more intensively then in the past two days. The embassy was repeatedly attacked last night by a small group of fedayeen who were finally driven off by the Beduin guard with the help of a tank. All embassy personnel are reported safe.

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [5 pages]
NLN 01-19/26 per 3.4(b)(1) 10-15-01 letter
By KMB NARA Date 5-17-04
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There are indications that the army is making some progress in the north, although it seems to be meeting fairly stiff resistance. Yesterday army troops were encircling Ramtha (see attached map), just south of the Syrian border. Ramtha is a key town, since Jordanian control there would cut off movement of fedayeen reinforcements and supplies coming in from Syria. According to the Israelis, the army is on the outskirts of Irbid, Jordan's second largest city and a fedayeen stronghold. The government, at least for now, seems to be in control of Zarka, just north of Amman. There are reports of fighting this morning in parts of the "liberated area".

The Syrians appear to have become at least marginally involved in the fighting near their border with Jordan. The Israelis yesterday spotted unidentified tanks moving in the area of the Syrian border in the direction of Ramtha and, according to the Jordanians, some Syrian tanks actually crossed the frontier near Dar'a and shelled Jordanian positions. The Jordanians say that, unopposed by Iraqi troops in the area, they have interposed a tank force to block further Syrian movement. It is by no means clear that the tanks in question belong to the regular Syrian army; they could well belong to a fedayeen organization, Saiqah.

The Iraqis from all indications continue to stand aside from the fighting. According to the israelis, the Iraqi forces in Jordan continue to concentrate around Mafraq and the headquarters of the Iraqi First Division in Zarka is withdrawing to Iraq.

Arab Mediation

King Hussein met for three hours yesterday with Egyptian Chief of Staff Sadiq, the special envoy of the three Arab presidents -- Numayri of Sudan, Qaddafi of Libya, and Nasser of Egypt -- sent to discuss the situation. Sadiq, according to a message he sent back to Cairo on his talk with Hussein, expressed sympathy for Hussein's position but urged that "the time had come to stop the bloodshed." Hussein replied by stating the strict conditions he insists that the fedayeen must operate under in the future. Sadiq was unable to Yasir Arafat.

The Hostages

A spokesman for the PFLP said yesterday that the 54 hostages from the hijacked aircraft are "in good condition". A senior PFLP official in Beirut, told our Embassy there that despite its

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previous statement, the PFLP is now prepared to negotiate the release of the hostages through the Red Cross. They insist, however, that these negotiations be held in Beirut and quickly, today if possible. The spokesman claimed that this proposal was made not from weakness but for humanitarian reasons. He said that as of yesterday afternoon a number of the hostages required medical attention -- not because they had been injured in the fighting, but because of their general health. He added that the hostages were housed in areas where there had been no fighting, but that there were no doctors available to treat them.

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According to a [redacted] report, the hostages have been split into at least eight groups. Five of these are being held in Zarka near the refugee camp there; the others are reportedly in the Wahdat refugee camp in Amman and in other camps outside the city. The Wahdat camp has been and probably will continue to be the scene of some of the heaviest fighting between the army and fedayeen.

Reaction to U.S. Actions

The Soviets are apparently increasingly concerned at the possibility of U.S., British or Israeli intervention in Jordan. Soviet charge Vorontsov yesterday called "urgently" on Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies to ask that Secretary Rogers be informed of the following:

-- The Soviets are concerned about the situation in Jordan which "complicates" the entire situation in the Middle East and may "adversely affect" attempts to achieve a peace settlement.

-- The Soviets "hope" that the U.S. agrees that it is necessary for "all states, including those not belonging to this region," to "exercise prudence" in their steps concerning the Middle East situation. They draw "special attention" to Israel and "hope" that the U.S. will use its influence to preclude the possility of Israel's exploiting the situation. The Soviets, for their part, have already urged the leaders of Jordan, Iraq, Syria and the UAR to take measures to put an end to the fighting in Jordan.

-- The Soviet Government "as before, stands for a settlement of the Middle East crisis based on the November 1967 U.N. Security Council resolution."

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Ambassador Beam also reports that he met last evening with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov at a diplomatic reception who said that he hoped the U.S. had no intention of intervening in Jordan. Such an action, Kuznetsov said, would make a bad situation worse, would risk widening hostilities, and would create serious difficulties for all nations with interests in Jordan.

Soviet propaganda is also reflecting the apparent concern over possible outside intervention in Jordan. Tass, for instance, yesterday warned that any attempt at intervention in Jordan would "entail a new worsening of the conflict" which could "overstep the borders of that country."

The Egyptians are also alarmed and apparently are trying to discourage U.S. intervention. An official UAR spokesman this morning issued a statement which makes the following points: --

-- The movement of U.S. forces and fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and statements from the White House and State Department not ruling out intervention "constitute a grave dimension...that would escalate and expand the conflict to engulf the whole area."

-- These movements "harm the whole Arab nation" because they exploit the situation in Jordan to create an opportunity fo foreign intervention and for Israeli aggression.

-- Any "implicit or explicit U.S. pressure is a threat to the security and peace of the Middle East", results in further military ventures and encourages Israeli aggression. "The UAR warns against the consequences of such movements and holds the U.S. responsible for the serious consequences that would result from them."

The Soviet and Egyptian diplomatic efforts seem directed at achieving a cease-fire in Jordan. This would work to the fedayeen advantage if it took place before Hussein is in a strong position to enforce his terms.

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JORDAN: Current Situation



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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
LDX'D
'70 SEP 16 PM 5:04

Ed/Jim

I closed this file out. Copy of memo from HAK to Laird, A. Johnson, & Helms dispatched 9/16 is attached.

nancy

9-18

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copy sent to Sonnenfeldt 9-22 Ed

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
(Outside System)

URGENT INFORMATION
September 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt HS

HK

SUBJECT: Additional Comments on the Soviet Position on Jordan

The approach made by Vorontsov to Davies bears out the main point in my earlier memo on Soviet reactions; namely, that the Sovietsvastly prefer to insulate the Jordanian crisis, even if the fedayeen are defeated, but are especially worried over Israeli intervention. Indeed, if Vorontsov's statement can be accepted at face value the Soviets are at least using some of their political capital to restrain Syria and Iraq and the UAR, and in effect are virtually appealing for us to restraint.

Israel

As to the prospect of our involvement, the Soviet approach in Washington as well as the remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to Beam in Moscow and public output also tend to bear out what we said in yesterday's memo; that is, that the Soviets would not intervene militarily but would not stand by without raising a major campaign against us. As Beam pointed out the Soviets probably feel that Kuznetsov has passed a warning to reinforce the more formal diplomatic demands of Vorontsov, who really did not touch directly on our possible intervention.

Again, there are two aspects that deeply concern the Soviets as Kuznetsov mentio mentioned. First, outside intervention risks "widening hostilities." Second, it creates difficulties for all nations which have "interests in the area." The Soviet interests are plain. They want to forestall situations which could force them into the unpalatable decision of going to the defense of the Arab states with their own personnel. This means primarily to avoid Israeli involvement, and a resumption of fighting along the canal (at least until they are ready for it). Second, they want to demonstrate to us, to the Arabs, and to the world at large that the Middle East is a Soviet preserve where the US can no longer act with impunity. But the situation in Jordan and our possible intervention might force the Russians to choose between protecting their clients at considerable new risks to themselves and accepting the fact that they cannot yet dictate American policy in the area.

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I understand that at the WSAG the consensus was if any intervention is necessary, it should be done by Israel rather than the US. While not arguing the relative effectiveness of Israeli vs. US intervention, I want to stress that from the Soviet viewpoint American intervention is more tolerable than Israeli. American intervention could be dealt with in the Great Power context, and, from the Sovet viewpoint, somehow managed. But Israel intervention raises new questions and above all, the risks that the whole area will lapse into unrestrained warfare, bringing into play Soviet commitments and the probably involvement of Soviet personnel in the UAR.

One further aspect of this crisis is that it may be bringing home to the Soviets the risks they have run lately in upsetting the ceasefire standstill. As I noted in my memo of a few days ago, there was some sign of Soviet apprehension in the Vinogradov-Beam talk, and a hint of willingness to talk about rectification. The latest demarche on Jordan suggests that the Soviets may believe that some gesture on the UAR-Israeli front may be necessary to limit the chances of our or Israeli intervention in Jordan.

In sum: the type of intervention that might be most dramatic but least effective in terms of controlling the situation on the ground in Jordan may be least likely to produce direct Soviet intervention; whereas the intervention most likely in the short run, at least, to be effective in controlling the situation on the ground (Israeli) may be most likely to produce Soviet intervention because it is most likely to reopen general Arab- Israeli hostilities and hence involve Soviet commitments and personnel.

The Soviets clearly prefer neither form of intervention even though, on balance, they would probably prefer to see the King remain in power.

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22061

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~ September 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on Jordan Contingency

1. Attached is a memo for the President which would permit him to work his way through the problem in the same way you did at last night's WSAG.

2. A directive will be put out this morning for consolidating into a single scenario the plans now available.

Attachment

HHS:mlc 9-15-70

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLN 01-19/33 letter 8-8-02
By KMP NARA, Date 5-17-2004
[9 pages]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL FILE

NUMBER	MO	DA	HR
22061	09	16	20

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ HAK X

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS ____ LAIRD ____ SAUNDERS

CLASSIF: U ____ C ____ LOU ____ S ____ TS X

____ EXDIS ____ NODIS ____ EYES ONLY ____ RES DATA ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ PARIS MTG ____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 09/15

SUBJECT: Jordanian And related Middle East Contingencies

ENCLOSURES: (____) (____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE ____

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ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . (____)
MEMO TO PRESIDENT . . . . . (____)
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE . . . . . (____)
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE . . . . . (____)
MEMO ____ TO ____ . . . . . (____)
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . (____)
JOINT MEMO . . . . . (____)
APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . (____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY . . . . . (____)
CONCURRENCE . . . . . (____)
DUE DATE: ____

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
9/15	Saunders	HAK	Sgn Directive / Pres for Info.
			HAK sgns directive & dispatched via Haig/Kissinger
		Pres	For info (split package)

ORIGINAL W/NOTES RETAINED BY WHITE HOUSE. CLOSE FILE.
D.M. 9-18
init. & date

MICROFILM DATA
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DATE SEP 23 1970
(SUBJ) NSC ✓
(TO) PAF
WHC
SUBF

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/18/70
7:30 p.m.

General Haig:

I hope this is responsive to what you said this morning HAK wanted me to do

K.

Ltd

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

URGENT

INFORMATION

(Outside System)

September 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Soviet Reaction to US Involvement in Jordan

The Soviet attitude toward the latest round between the King and the Army and the Fedayeen is probably mixed.

On the one hand, the King appears to be the preferable alternative to a radical guerrilla regime, which the Soviets have treated with some disdain, which could turn out to be sympathetic to the Maoist brand of revolution and more "spontaneous" than the Soviets like. The probable chaos resulting from the King's overthrow and the psychological impetus that would give to the Iraqui and Syrian regimes cannot be something the Soviets would watch with much satisfaction or equanimity.

On the other hand, Jordan has never been of special concern to the Soviets except in that it reflected the basic policy toward the UAR. The disappearance of a regime influenced by, and sympathetic toward the US would also represent a gain of sorts for the USSR. In the end if faced with the new situation, the Soviets might convince themselves that they could work with Arafat, who, of course, has been in Moscow, and that the new pressures on Israel would strengthen the Soviet hand and weaken ours.

Whatever their theoretical ruminations, the practical matter is that the Soviets will not be happy to see US military power usedin the area in any way. They will have to denounce it, harass us (including by horse play and close UAR-based reconnaissance against the 6th Fleet), and generally oppose us. The precedent is what will worry them most of all, and the demonstration that we could and will use our air power and naval presence will cast a shadow over their calculations about how far we might go in support of Israel at a later date in a new crisis, and our international posture generally. (This may be all to the good if our operations are, and are perceived to be successful.)

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Israel and Iraq

1. Air strikes in support of Jordan against the fedayeen alone; this would be the least complicated for the Soviets and call for the least physical riposte; mostly propaganda and agitation, as long as the Arab states stood by.

2. Huessin vs. the fedayeen and Iraqui troops; if the conflict remains limited to these participants, no Soviet military action would be likely, especially if the US intervention was quick and effective; a more prolonged US air intervention, however, might produce some Soviet diplomatic actions, say in the UN, to castigate and condemn, to force the US to desist.

-- If the Israelis became involved against the Iraqui troops, Soviet reaction could become more problematical and dangerous for two reasons: first, the Israelis might feel compelled to launch preemptive strikes against the air defense build-up along the canal, and second, the UAR might feel it had to activate that front.

-- If this occurred, then the Soviets would be involved, and might shift to an entirely different diplomatic position and military calculation.

-- It would be a situation in which the June war would be reopening piecemeal; the Soviets would be concerned that the Israelis would launch a massive attack on the new air defense complex; in which case, the UAR would almost certainly want to begin using the TU-16s against the Bar-Lev line; Soviet pilots would probably be flying missions, etc.

-- In this contingency the Soviets would still want to avoid a confrontation with the US, but might engage in a greater show of force in the Mediterranean.

-- The main danger would be a de facto Soviet-American air battle in the entire area, with Soviet pilots flying out of the UAR, and Syria and perhaps Iraq.

3. Armed Intervention for evacuation: Soviet calculations might be similar to the first case; i. e., that our action could be tolerated, but they would be concerned that we leave the area; and permanent entrenchment of American forces in Jordan would be a radical change in the situation and might lead the Soviets into a tough threatening stand.

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-- One danger would be that the Soviets would begin putting in organized ground units in the UAR, if it looked as if the American forces were in to stay for some time to come.

-- Again, the total Soviet reaction would also be affected by Israeli involvement; Israeli intervention, plus US landings of ground troops would look to the Soviets like a power play changing the ball game in a major way in Israel's favor.

-- The Soviets and the UAR would then have to consider whether to put pressure on the canal front, ranging from raids to a full scale attack; the Soviets would probably not encourage such a course, but they also could not afford to veto such a decision; thus the Soviets themselves could become involved at this point.

* * * *

In sum, the Soviets want, first of all, to protect their stake in the UAR. Their decisions and actions will be influenced by Nassir, and, in turn, the Soviets will be counseling him to think of his own security first and his prestige as an Arab leader second.

The secondary, but still important Soviet aim will be to limit and prevent American intrusion with any military action or presence. They are probably not prepared to take much of a risk to do this in the situation in Jordan but the critical factor is whether Israel becomes involved and the fighting erupts along the canal. Should it do so, a proxy war would be underway, and the Soviets might just figure that decisive action along the canal would be preferable to a war of attrition. This is the main danger.

One important area of uncertainty is that the impact of a crisis on the top Soviet leadership, which was sharply criticized after the June war, for being too soft, and for mismanaging the entire affair. In another major crisis, particularly one in which the US demonstrated it was free to act militarily, the Soviets might feel they had to justify themselves. On the other hand, they could not afford to open up charges of mismanaging a risky affair by imprudent actions.

On balance, it seems that the Soviets would probably conclude they had little choice but to let the US get away with a limited intervention, as long as Israeli forces were not involved in attacks against the forces of Arab governments.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/18

Muriel---

Gen Haig has been briefed on the attached orally by Hal Saunders but Saunders wanted him to read the cable when it came in from State.

Dave Clark

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Department of State
TELEGRAM

HA16

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'70 SEP 18 PM 7:21

CATE:
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ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
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STATE

SUBJECT: Soviet Demarche re Jordan

1. Soviet Charge Vorontsov called urgently Sept 18 on Dep Asst Secy Davies (NEA) to present following Soviet Govt message to USG.

2. BEGIN TEXT. The Soviet Government is concerned over the information coming in about the sharp aggravation of the situation in Jordan which has led to fierce and bloody clashes; the country stands on the precipice of a civil war. This turn of events complicates the entire situation in the Middle East and may adversely affect the continuing attempts to find ways of achieving a political settlement of the Middle East conflict.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of

FTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
A/UAR:WBSmith,II:dd	9/18/70	22660	NEA - Rodger P. Davies

ARANCES:
EUR/SOV - Mr. Dubs

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ORM DS-322
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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ACTION: MOSCOW -2-

the United States will agree with the Soviet Government's view that it is necessary for all states, including those not belonging to this region, to exercise prudence in their steps in connection with the prevailing complex situation in the Middle East.

We would like to draw special attention to the possible position of Israel in connection with the current events in Jordan, and hope that the US Govt will use its influence with the Govt of Israel in order to preclude the possibility of Israel's exploiting this situation for a still greater aggravation of the situation in the Middle East as a whole.

The Soviet Government for its part has deemed it necessary to urge the leaders of Jordan, Iraq, Syria and the United Arab Republic to take measures dictated by the situation in order at the earliest point to put an end to the fratricidal clashes in Jordan and to prevent the outbreak of civil war. We are searching for ways of bringing our viewpoint also to the attention of the leadership of the Palestine movement.

The Soviet Government as before stands for a settlement of the

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ACTION: MOSCOW -3-

Middle East crisis by political means on the basis of the implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967 in all its parts, and is prepared to continue efforts together with other states toward the earliest attainment of this aim. END TEXT

3. At Davies' request Vorontsov confirmed USSR has already made demarches in Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, and Cairo. He added Soviets now seeking to contact Palestinians.

4. Davies said US is too anxious for ME settlement along lines SC Nov resolution. We are concerned about fate of hostages held in Jordan by PFLP and grave danger of situation in Amman. Situation in Jordan caused in part by GOJ acceptance of proposal for negotiations. Movement against GOJ is one of opposition to peaceful ME settlement.

5. Davies pointed out we would be particularly concerned if Syria or Iraq were to intervene in Jordan. There have been unconfirmed reports of Syrian involvement, which would only aggravate picture and make it more difficult to stabilize situation and get on with main objective of ME settlement.

6. Vorontsov said Gromyko wanted message brought to Secretary as

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Department of State

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ACTION: MOSCOW "4"

soon as possible. Davies undertook to do so.

GP-3

END

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22061

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

September 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Jordan - Contingency Planning

It was agreed at the WSAG meeting of September 16 that fully integrated scenarios of diplomatic and military actions should now be consolidated for the following contingencies:

1. Materiel supply for Jordanian forces in the event of a continuing clash with the fedayeen.

2. U.S. armed intervention for the purpose of evacuation.

3. U.S. armed intervention (a) by air strikes and (b) by ground forces in support of King Hussein in the event of Iraqi intervention against Hussein.

4. Israeli armed intervention (a) by air strikes and (b) by ground forces in the event Iraqi intervention threatens Hussein's regime (to include provision for U.S. resupply of Israeli forces).

Along with the above, the "Scenario of U.S. Military Actions for Deterring Soviet Intervention" already provided for the WSAG should be refined into a scenario in which several stages of escalation are identified and points of decision are noted. These actions should also be reflected in the integrated scenarios described above.

The listing of contingencies and options above is not intended to suggest priority for implementation.

The foregoing plans and scenarios should be submitted not later than 1200 hours 18 September 1970 for further review by the WSAG.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE September 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

The major change in the situation from yesterday seems to be that while the army still has the upper hand, it is proceeding methodically in Amman and is meeting fairly stiff resistence from the fedayeen. It also appears that the problem outside of Amman will require some time to resolve. This confirms that the struggle may turn out to be more protracted and the results less clear-cut than may have appeared from reporting yesterday afternoon. It is even possible that Hussein could decide on some compromise settlement with the fedayeen when he feels that he has regained much of his status and authority and before he gets bogged down in a longer term campaign that could sap his army's strength and determination. He may, of course, opt to try to completely crush the fedayeen.

The following are the major developments since yesterday afternoon.

The Military Situation

During most of yesterday it appeared that the Jordanian army was gradually expanding its control of Amman in the face of stiff resistance from the fedayeen. The fighting fell off to occasional outbursts of small arms fire and artillery during the night but intensified again at dawn when the army went back on the offensive.

The situation is less clear outside of Amman, although apparently there has been some heavy fighting in some of the cities to the north. The central committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization has announced the creation of a "liberated area" in northern Jordan where it

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claims to be taking over the government of three districts. Northern Jordan has a history of separatism going back to the late 1950's, although, as the embassy comments, the liberated area may have come too late to help the fedayeen cause. The Israelis say that fedayeen forces from Syria and Lebanon are moving into the "liberated area" presumably to strengthen the fedayeen forces already there. The Israelis also report having seen some movement of Jordanian armor and infantry northward but are not sure how much progress has been made in this direction so far.

So far the Syrian and Iraqi forces have stayed out of the fighting. Units of the Iraqi expeditionary force in Jordan, however, have been put on full alert and are being centralized. Some move by the Jordanians, such as the surrounding of an Iraqi camp, could trigger Iraqi involvement in the fighting, if only in a limited way to demonstrate solidarity with the fedayeen. The Israelis, who are watching this situation very closely, believe that for the present there will be no Iraqi intervention nor do they think there will be intervention by Egypt and Syria, barring unexpected moves.

Arab mediation efforts are underway. Nasser and the leaders of Libya and Sudan have sent a carefully worded and balanced message to both King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat. They call on both sides to stop the fighting and provide a chance for fresh talks or consultations. The Arab League Council also met yesterday and called for an end to the senseless fighting, so that the recently established four-nation conciliation committee -- composed of Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Algeria -- could undertake new efforts to achieve a settlement.

The Negotiations for Hostages

The Bern Group is continuing its efforts to come up with an agreed mandate for the Red Cross to continue its negotiations with the PFLP for the release of the remaining hostages. We are pushing -- so far without much apparent success -- a formula whereby the five powers would authorize the Red Cross negotiators to say they will agree to consider the most recent PFLP proposals at such time as the PFLP provides its total demands, including a specific list of the fedayeen they want from the Israelis.

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The Bern Group last night met to consider an acceptable British redraft of the language of our formula but no progress was made. The Israeli said that he thought his government would also find the British draft unacceptable and would prefer to wait for another report from the Red Cross representative in Amman, for further information on the general situation in Jordan and for the results of Mrs. Meir's trip to the U.S. The Germans were also opposed to the British draft saying that it did not meet German demands specifically emphasizing an Israeli contribution to a package settlement.

It has become increasingly clear at recent sessions of the Bern Group that unless the Israelis soon join into the multilateral package approach there is a good chance that the British and Germans will break ranks and conclude unilateral deals with the PFLP. Our Charge in Tel Aviv talked to Eban just before he left for the U.S. to urge favorable Israeli consideration of the formula being discussed in Bern. Eban again refused to go along with our approach on the grounds that Israel was being asked to write a blank check. The Charge concludes that it will not be easy to bring Israel along and suggests that pressure be applied at as many points as possible -- including with Mrs. Meir -- to achieve the maximum impact.

The issue here, of course, is that the fedayeen are conditioning the release of our citizens on the performance of a third country -- Israel. Israel is in fact being asked to ransom the nationals of third countries -- although the situation is complicated by the fact that the fedayeen classify some of the American Jews as Israelis which raises another problem of discrimination on the basis of religion.

According to a spokesman for King Hussein the Jordanian army commanders have been given orders to look for and liberate the hostages as quickly as possible. We have no further information on the safety of the hostages although there are some indications that at least some of them may be held at locations where they could be exposed to the fighting.

U.S. Actions

The decisions taken at yesterday's WSAG meetings are being implemented. The WSAG is meeting again this morning.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE September 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Jordanian Situation Report

Current Situation

The Jordanian army with armored cars, tanks, and at least one company of infantry moved into Amman early this morning in what has been described by DAO personnel as a picture book pincer movement. Fighting is reported to be heavy within the city and there have been mortar attacks in the area of the American and British Embassies and the Intercontinental Hotel. Although the Embassy has been hit with several rounds, as of 0400 EDT all official personnel are accounted for and well. There have been no injuries reported to private American citizens in the Jordan Hotel or elsewhere. (The Ambassador and his staff have locked themselves in the code room and other safe areas of the Chancery.) The Ambassador talked to the Jordanian Prime Minister shortly after the fighting began and found the Prime Minister optimistic and more self-assured than when he talked with him yesterday. The Prime Minister added that the security situation is improving.

Military Situation

We have received recent reports that there is Israeli air activity over Jordan and along the UAR border. These flights have not become actively involved in the situation as of yet. There are also reports that a meeting of senior Iraqi officials will take place shortly to decide on a course of action for the Saladin units. (The Saladin is the Iraqi guerrilla force equivalent to the Fedayeen.) Three days ago the Iraqis transferred motor units to Fateh and there is a concentration of Syrian troops reported at Derra (located on the Syrian side of the border, northeast of Irbid).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLN 01-19/27 [2 pages] 2-7-03 letter
By KMB NARA, Date 5-17-04

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

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Americans in Jordan

The Jordan Task Force at State reports that there are approximately 50 official Americans in Amman. All official U. S. dependents have been evacuated. However there are approximately 250-300 American citizens scattered throughout the country. These would include American nationals married to Jordanians, missionaries, etc. Thus far the Ambassador has been unsuccessful in his attempts to contact the ICRC representative.

All agencies have been instructed to keep us informed as soon as they develop any information in addition to formal Embassy reporting.

Third Country Reaction

Damascus Radio called on Jordanian troops to revolt and fight with the Fedayeen. The Jordanian Ambassador was reportedly called in by the Syrian Foreign Office and informed that the Syrians would not stand idly by while the Fedayeen was "massacred." A similar warning was made last night by the international leadership of the ruling Baath party in Baghdad.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 17, 1970

HAIG

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: Jim Fazio

SUBJECT: Jordanian Situation

The Jordanian Army, with armored cars, tanks, and at least one company of infantry, moved into Amman early this morning in their awaited move against the fedayeen. Fighting is reported to be heavy within the city with such known places of interest as the American and British Embassies and the Intercontinental Hotel having been hit with mortar fire but not seriously damaged. As of 0300 EDT the Ambassador reports that all official Americans are safe (the Ambassador and his staff have locked themselves in the code room and other safe areas of the Chancery).

The only indication thus far of third country involvement is a Reuters report from Beirut indicating that the Jordanian Ambassador was called in by the Syrians Foreign Office and informed that the Syrians would not stand idly by while the fedayeen were being "massacred."

Thus far, the ICRC Representative has not been reached and the status of the hostages is not known. The Ambassador has talked with the Jordanian Prime Minister by telephone and found the Prime Minister optimistic and more self-assured than when he talked with him yesterday. The Prime Minister added that the security situation is improving.

Tom Scoates, the Jordanian Desk Officer in State, reports that there are approximately 50 official Americans in Amman. However, all official U.S. dependents have been evacuated. In addition, there are perhaps 250-300 American citizens scattered throughout the country. These would include American nationals married to Jordanians, missionaries, etc. State, NMCC, NSA [redacted] have all been contacted and asked to telephone any report they may have that is not covered in official Embassy reporting.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yr (C)

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E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 letter 2-7-03
NLN 01-19/27A [1 page] per 3.4(b)(6)
By KMB NARA, Date 5-17-04

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
16 September 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

Jordan

(Situation as of 1200 EDT)

1. As of 0600 EDT the security situation in Amman was unchanged, and shops and schools opened as usual. The fedayeen have set up road blocks in the Jabal Ashraf area, site of a refugee camp, and are reinforcing some of their strongholds. The fedayeen have said the cease-fire reached with former prime minister Rifai is "stillborn and will not be honored." The US Embassy reports that representatives of the fedayeen and government are meeting today to arrange a new cease-fire. clashes have been reported in and around Zarqa.

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2.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

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SANITIZED

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 [2 pgs]
NLN01-19/28 per 3.4(b)(6)(6)
2-7-03
By Kab NARA, Date 5-10-04

TOP SECRET

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EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

SANITIZED

3. The British appear to be on the verge of breaking the multinational approach to the hijacking negotiations. They have asked for a meeting of the Bern group today, now scheduled for 1600 local time (1100 EDT). They have received instructions, in light of their assessment of the deteriorating security situation in Amman and the consequent danger to the life of the hostages, to seek an agreement on the Israeli contribution. If no agreement on the Israeli contribution is reached at this meeting, they have said they will be forced to "seek other solutions,"

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
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4. The fedayeen have reacted to the formation of the military cabinet in Jordan by closing ranks. Meeting in an emergency session, the fedayeen central committee decided upon the immediate unification of all guerrilla organizations and the naming of Yasir Arafat as the commander-in-chief of the combined fedayeen forces. In an effort to keep in contact with all fedayeen units, the committee has apparently

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Arafat and the committee have been meeting in the General Command's offices. Anxious to prevent the

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

situation from escalating, Arafat has ordered the fedayeen not to fire upon the army unless they are fired on first.

SANITIZED

that further efforts are being made to prevent provoking the military. Fedayeen units are ordered to wear civilian clothing, to use civilian vehicles, and to stay off public roads. The Damascus radio, however, has been broadcasting a statement attributed to Arafat in which the fedayeen leader allegedly labeled the new cabinet a "fascist regime" aimed at "striking at the resistance."

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jordan

9/16/70

Kissinger instruction to Howe:

I would like Hal Saunders to redo the memorandum:

1. I want a section of what our interests in Jordan are. (To begin with)

2. Why Fedayeen victory would be a disaster.

3. Would push (drive) Nasser and Soviet in to more radical direction.

4. Guarantee an Israeli move (Make peace initiative abortive)

I would like it tonight when I get back.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION
22065

SECRET/NODIS

September 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Samuel M. Hoskinson

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

The situation in Jordan is still very uncertain. Amman was calm during the day but King Hussein may soon move against the fedayeen with full force and request our help. The negotiations for the release of the remaining hostages are still stalled but the hostages are safe.

Security Situation in Jordan

Amman was calm but tense during the day. The fedayeen made no apparent attempt to comply with the cease-fire agreement and talked big but they seemed eager not to directly provoke the army. There was even some speculation that they may be prepared to sit it out for now, or at least until such time as the army begins to physically enforce the agreement. By evening, however, there were press reports of fighting in Amman.

Today's situation may only be the calm before the storm. The embassy has learned that the Jordanian Cabinet is meeting tonight and that King Hussein is inclined to move vigorously against the fedayeen either at daybreak or twenty-four hours later. The King's concern centers on possible intervention by Syria and the more remote possibility of intervention by the Iraqi forces. In this regard, the Jordanians are considering their contingency plans and wonder about possible air support from either the U. S. or the Israelis if their Arab neighbors intervene. Ambassador Brown does not consider this to be a formal request for U. S. military involvement at this time and will be meeting with King Hussein tomorrow morning. Such a formal request could, however, come out of his meeting with King Hussein.

The Hostages

The embassy in Amman believes that the danger to the hostages has not been appreciably increased by the present political crisis, but will be if an armed showdown between the army and the fedayeen occurs and

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widespread fighting breaks out. The embassy further believes that the hostages may be more valuable to the PFLP as an insurance policy against the government threat than as a bargaining counter for a prisoner exchange and that therefore the PFLP may have an incentive to assure their safety. On the other hand, the PFLP may not be able to ensure the safety of the hostages even if it wishes to do so if heavy fighting breaks out.

One of the remaining Red Cross representatives reports that he has good information that the hostages are safe. Some, however, may have been taken out of Amman. The Red Cross is still trying to get visitation rights as a first step toward a protective role.

The Negotiations

The Bern Group met again this afternoon for another difficult session. The British took the lead in pressing the Israelis by insisting that the group agree to a mandate which included a contribution by the Israelis going beyond the release of the two Algerian officials they are holding. The British representative went so far as to threaten that if no such agreement were reached the UK would be taking a ministerial decision and "we all know what that means." The Germans then joined the British in demanding an immediate response from the Israelis. Finally, our representative was able to save the situation securing agreement to consider a formula whereby the five powers would say they agree to consider the PFLP proposals at such time as the PFLP provides its total demands, including a specific list of the fedayeen it wants.

Once again we have bought some time within the Bern Group. If the Israelis buy our latest formula it may calm down the British some, although there are continuing indications from London that they are still very close to breaking away from the united front. The German attitude is even more problematical. At this point, it may be that only an unequivocal Israeli acceptance of the formula will hold the group together. The Israeli Ambassador has become increasingly engaged in the Bern discussions and it has seemed increasingly clear from the last several sessions that the element of solidarity has become a thing of value to Israel.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL FILE

72065 09 17 09

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ HAK X

FROM: ELIOT ____ ROGERS ____ LAIRD ____ Hoskinson (Saunders)

CLASSIF: U ____ C ____ LOU X S ____ TS ____

____ EXDIS X NODIS ____ EYES ONLY ____ RES DATA ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ PARIS MTG ____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 09/16

SUBJECT: Sit Rep on Jordanian Situation

ENCLOSURES: (____) (____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE ____

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LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . (____)
MEMO TO PRESIDENT . . . . . (____)
REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE . . . . . (____)
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE . . . . . (____)
MEMO ____ TO ____ . . . . . (____)
RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . (____)
JOINT MEMO . . . . . (____)
APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . (____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY . . . . . (____)
CONCURRENCE . . . . . (____)

DUE DATE: ____

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
9/16	Saunders	HAK	Info
9/23			Note 6 By HAK

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DATE SEP 25 1970
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TO) PAF ✓
WHC ____
SUBF ____

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INFORMATION

22057

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Options in Jordan

As you continue to think about the decisions we may face in Jordan, you may wish to consider some of the broader issues raised.

The Broader Situation and U.S. Interests

Two issues are now being contested in Jordan: (1) Who is to control the Palestinian movement? (2) What balance of political forces is to control Jordan?

The two are related. Whereas the less ideological groups focus on Israel and could make common cause with the government, the radicals are at least as dedicated to the overthrow of traditional regimes as to the destruction of the Zionist state. Although it is difficult to know exactly what the balance within the collection of fedayeen movements is, it seems relatively clear that the most active challenge to Hussein's regime comes from the radical fringe--the elements, for instance, responsible for the hijacking.

The outcome will determine whether there is a stable base for peace negotiations. The future political nature of Jordan will determine whether a Palestine settlement is possible or continuing war is inevitable. There seem to be several ways in which Jordan's political base could evolve:

--Hussein and the army could suppress the fedayeen and bring the non-fedayeen Palestinians into a settlement. This would ideally provide the most solid base, but it is doubtful whether there will be an outcome this decisive.

--Elements of the army, the King and the less militant Palestinians could make common cause. This would make for a less orderly negotiation but might make for a more enforceable peace if there is one.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLN01-9/34 8-8-02 letter
By kwb NARA, Date 5-17-04

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--Some combination of fedayeen elements could demonstrate the King's impotence and force on him a weak civilian government that would do its bidding. Negotiations would be out of the question.

It is the last outcome which seems most immediately at stake in the current crisis. Either of the first two could conceivably produce stability. The consequences of the third could include the following:

--Prospects for a Palestine settlement soon on terms Israel could consider would drop to almost zero. Attacks across Israel's eastern border would increase.

--Chances that Israel would at some point feel compelled to seize more territory in Jordan would increase sharply.

--Nasser's ability to negotiate a settlement with Israel and Soviet ability to support a negotiated settlement would be diminished sharply.

--There would be one more radical state in the Middle East where the U.S. is barred. A radical fedayeen base there would strengthen the movement against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states.

In short, while it is not clear how the main political elements in Jordan will sort themselves out, it does not seem in the U.S. interest that a fedayeen movement urged on by radicals be permitted to impose its will on the government. It could not produce the stability that is necessary for peace.

The Three Principal Contingencies

A situation now exists in Jordan which may cause King Hussein to seek U.S. or other assistance in an all-out showdown with the fedayeen. These seem to be the main contingencies that will be faced:

1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone.

It seems generally agreed in the intelligence community and in the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen--and not outside troops--are ranged against the regime. It is possible in this situation that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support. It has been our assumption that there would be no strong argument against supplying any reasonable support. Such assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration and for prompt delivery.

The main issue to be considered in connection with this contingency is: If the regime unexpectedly turns out to be too weak to win this battle with its own forces, should there be intervention to support it?

A key judgment to be made is how much difference outside intervention might make in such a situation.

The principal arguments for such intervention are: It would prevent--at least as long as U.S. troops are present--dominance by a group that would offer almost no hope of a Palestine settlement. It might still be possible that stability could be rescued with the help of the army. It is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate its support for responsible regimes. In short, a risky intervention would be preferable to the certainty of radical control over the situation.

The argument against such intervention is that if Hussein is too weak to stand up against domestic opposition, outside intervention can only save his regime for a limited period of time. Attempting to bolster it in the absence of sufficient internal strength could put whoever intervenes into a position of supporting a minority cause against effective majority guerrilla opposition in a country without access to the Mediterranean where the U.S. would have a difficult time supporting sustained military operations. Intervention could cause a fedayeen reaction against U.S. installations elsewhere in the Mid-East.

In any case, there may not be much of a real choice since if the King appears about to fall, the Israelis may very well intervene on their own or at least seize the heights from which the fedayeen have been shelling Israeli settlements.

2. The second contingency: King Hussein and the army vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops. Even if one judged that Hussein should not be supported if he cannot control the fedayeen alone, one might judge intervention quite justified if the 17,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan stepped in. Before considering the question of armed intervention, it would be prudent to look at the possibilities for non-military action that might precede armed intervention or perhaps even make it unnecessary. A request from Hussein for Soviet restraint on Iraq might help. Intelligence indicates that Nasser is prepared to give diplomatic and possibly military support

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in the event of Iraqi intervention. The Shah might mount a show of force on Iraq's border. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might threaten to cut off financial support for the fedayeen. Finally, the greatest political assist to Hussein might well be the capacity to demonstrate hope for progress in peace negotiations..

If political actions fail, then a judgment must be made whether armed intervention seems in the U.S. interest.

The argument for is that--in addition to the basic objective of trying to save a regime that offers some hope of the stability necessary for peace--the U.S. would be supporting a responsible government against a threat from foreign forces. Such a stand is a necessary part of the U.S. posture. It would be possible to justify this as an in-and-out operation.

The main arguments against are the operational difficulty of sustaining such an operation and the possibility of a general Arab reaction. This operation would have to be sustained entirely by air (unless we used an overland route across Israel). It would require dipping into the reserve of strategic forces in the U.S.--leaving us little for other contingencies. Sustaining such an operation by air would be extremely difficult without a staging base in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is good reason to doubt their availability under these circumstances.

If political actions fail and if armed intervention of some sort in support of Hussein seems desirable, then there are two related questions:

a. Would air attacks against Iraqi forces be sufficient?

Pro. Iraqi forces are 60 miles northeast of Amman and, to be militarily effective would have to travel on an open road and would be vulnerable to air attacks which could presumably prevent their arrival in Amman. Also, air strikes are not likely to produce the same reactions either by other Arabs or by the Soviets as a major ground action would. Even Israeli air strikes would avoid the connotation of invasion and takeover.

Con. Air strikes are not operationally useful against the fedayeen. They are dispersed among the population and their concentrations and the fighting around them will be in such small areas as to make air targeting very difficult. If intervention had to reach beyond the Iraqis, air strikes would probably be inadequate.

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b. Should the U.S. or Israel intervene? The minimal operational form which this question might take is: If the Israelis seem about to move, should the U.S. make a special effort to head them off by moving first? Or should they be encouraged?

In answering this question, a distinction must be made between the ground and air attacks. Air attacks are likely to provoke less reaction because they do not have the connotation of invasion.

The arguments for U.S., as contrasted to Israeli, intervention are: While Israeli air attacks could probably be brought off with a minimum of sustained Arab reaction, Israeli ground action in Jordan would be taken as an invasion of Jordan and would tend to reunify the Arabs. The U.S. would be held responsible anyway. An Israeli ground action would almost inescapably be seen as a concerted U.S.-Israeli effort to put Israel in control of Jordan. It might even serve to unify forces in Jordan so that army and fedayeen alike would feel that they had to turn together against Israeli troops. A Hussein who had been saved by an Israeli invasion would probably not last long in Jordan.

The arguments for Israeli intervention are: It may be difficult to stop. Some believe the King already has clandestinely reached a tacit understanding with the Israelis that if the Iraqis intervene Israel will attack. If the U.S. were to intervene, the USSR would almost have to react in some way, even if not definitively. The USSR has no incentive to defend Jordan against Israeli attack. The Israelis have a great logistical advantage over the U.S. If we intervened and then had to bring supplies across Israel, we could have the worst of two worlds. Introduction of U.S. forces would put the U.S. in the middle of an intra-Arab war and we would still be viewed as collaborating with Israel.

If Israel intervened in Jordan, the U.S. would have to consider two kinds of support:

--It would be necessary to assure that Israel has the munitions and other supplies required to sustain the attack. It is the judgment of the group that Israel's war reserves would be sufficient to carry their operations through a prolonged operation. U.S. resupply could be provided within ample time.

--The more serious contingency would come about if the Soviets or Egyptians decided to take advantage of the situation by heating up the Suez front. The judgment was that their capability would be limited to re-opening artillery attacks, small harrassing raids across the Canal and some air attacks. Support for Israel in this contingency would be developed from the same kinds of packages that have been worked out in the event the ceasefire breaks down.

3. The third contingency: armed intervention for evacuation.

If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages.

If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved.

There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein's regime. It could, if well timed, amount to a U. S. show of force without the political onus of sustained intervention. It seems most likely that if intervention comes it would come this way.

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
'70 SEP 16 AM 6:15

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

SITUATION REPORT NO. 21

NEA Working Group

Situation Report as of 0600 hours EDT, September 16, 1970

New Government in Jordan. King Hussein accepted the resignations of Prime Minister Rifai and Chief of Staff Major General Mashur Hadithah. (Hadithah was appointed Special Royal Military Advisor.)

The King appointed an all military government in which the key figures are: Marshall Habis Al MAJALI, Military Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces; Brigadier General Muhammad DAUD, Prime Minister; and Brigadier General Mazin Al AJLUNI, Deputy Military Governor General, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Prime Ministry Affairs.

Former Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Touqan was appointed Chief of the Royal Diwan.

Situation in Jordan. Press reports indicate that Amman was quiet the morning of September 16 although there had been heavy Government-fedayeen fighting in Zarka the previous evening. King Hussein broadcast to the nation after announcement of the new government, describing his action as taken "to restore security and order" and "preserve our people's national unity and safeguard the dignity of the noble fedayeen action." The new government proclaimed its primary objective to be ending the fighting inside Jordan. While pledging to assist the Palestine resistance movement and to implement all Government-fedayeen cease fire agreements, it declared it "will strike with an iron fist against all who create disorder."

Germans Confront Bern Group with Ultimatum. The Germans convoked a midnight meeting of the Bern Group September 15-16. Operating under urgent Fonoff instructions, they presented the following demands:

1. That the ICRC negotiating team in Amman be strengthened and enlarged;

2. That a "new clear mandate" be drawn up, with "participation" of all Governments concerned. This must be accomplished by "midday" (7 a.m. EDT) today, or the Germans will seek a bilateral solution to their hostage problem.

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ICRC's announcement yesterday of the despatch to Amman of a new, high-level negotiating team has apparently satisfied the first demand. Regarding the latter, the German rep was unable to clarify beyond indicating that his Government sought an increased "contribution" -- i.e., concessions, specifically from the Israelis.

The Israeli rep suggested that FRG negotiate the point directly with Tel Aviv. All representatives termed unreasonable the short German deadline. Bern comments that a new, written formulation of the ICRC mandate specifically including Israel in its terms might satisfy the Germans. A further Israeli agreement to "examine the situation" upon ICRC receipt of the PFLP demands should satisfy the Germans as well as the equally-restive British.

According to unconfirmed Reuters reports from Bern, PFLP demands include release of the two Algerians, plus a Swiss citizen and ten Lebanese in addition to an undisclosed number of captured Palestinian commandos.

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INFORMATION
22065

SECRET/NODIS

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders HHS

SUBJECT: Memo for the President on Jordan Contingency

1. Attached is a memo for the President which would permit him to work his way through the problem in the same way you did at last night's WSAG.

2. A directive will be put out this morning for consolidating into a single scenario the plans now available.

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
NLN 01-19/34 duplicate 8-8-02
By KMB NARA, Date 5-17-04

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Jordan

The WSAG met late last night to think through further the situations we may face in Jordan. In the early morning hours, King Hussein announced formation of a military government. He told our embassy his intent was to tighten the army ring around Amman and demand that the fedayeen pull out of the city.

Judgments about the Situation

1. It is not clear whether there will be a full-scale confrontation. It is possible the king will announce a military government but not move the army into Amman. In that case, the fedayeen would have no interest in challenging him; they could sit tight.

2. If the king does decide to suppress the fedayeen, then there will be some violence, at least in Amman. It is impossible to judge now whether it would die out or flare into a major battle for the city. That would depend in part on whether the fedayeen are united or the radicals are left isolated.

3. A short decisive battle should not be expected. This, like most guerrilla wars, can be expected to drag on.

Three Principal Contingencies

1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone.

It is the judgment of the WSAG and of the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen -- and not outside troops -- are ranged against it.

It is possible that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support.

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Assuming this were mainly munitions and expendable supplies, this assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration of support and for prompt delivery.

It is the further judgment of the group that the U.S. should not intervene if the King is too weak to win this battle with the fedayeen with his own forces. In that situation, however, Israel would probably move. If so, the group felt the U.S. should stand aside.

2. King Hussein vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops.

There are 17,000 Iraqi troops 60 miles northeast of Amman. It would probably take the best part of a day to get a large effective force down to Amman.

It has been the U.S. Embassy assessment that the Jordanian army could handle both the fedayeen and Iraqi forces. However, it is conceivable that eruption of fedayeen violence in other cities could spread Jordanian forces thin.

Whereas it was the judgment of the group that the U.S. should not try to prop up Hussein if he cannot hold his own against the fedayeen, it was the group's judgment that an effort should be made to save him if he proves unable to handle the Iraqis.

There are two related questions:

-- Would air attacks against the Iraqis be sufficient assistance, or would intervention by ground forces be required?

-- Should the U.S. or Israel intervene?

On the first issue, the judgment on narrow balance was that it would be preferable for Israel to begin any air attacks necessary. These are the arguments:

-- Assistant Secretary Sisco believes that the King has already clandestinely reached a tacit understanding with the Israelis that if the Iraqis intervene, Israel will attack.

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-- If the U.S. were to intervene, the USSR would almost have to react in some way even if not definitively. The USSR has no incentive to defend Jordan against Israeli attack.

-- The Israelis maintain steady reconnaissance and would be able to spot their targets quickly, whereas planes from a Sixth Fleet carrier would have to depend on the Jordanians to pass target information through liaison channels in Amman.

-- The U.S. would be better off coming in after Israel if necessary than appearing to pave the way for Israel.

The above arguments lead to the initial judgment that Israeli air strikes are preferable to U.S. The following additional comments were made about the problems that would be raised if air attacks were insufficient and ground intervention appeared necessary:

-- If the combined Iraqi and fedayeen forces appeared about to topple the King, introduction of U.S. forces would put the U.S. in the middle of an intra-Arab war.

-- If Hussein appeared about to fall, the Israelis would probably move quickly and the U.S. might well not have a real choice.

-- Sustaining armed intervention in Jordan would be operationally difficult without direct access to sea lines of communication.

It is recognized that an Israeli ground intervention would probably not save Hussein's regime even though it might administer a temporary defeat on his nearest external enemy.

If Israel intervened in Jordan, the U.S. would have to consider two kinds of support:

-- It would be necessary to assure that Israel has the munitions and other supplies required to sustain the attack. It is the judgment of the group that Israel's war reserves would be sufficient to carry their operations through a prolonged operation. U.S. resupply could be provided within ample time.

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-- The more serious contingency would come about if the Soviets or Egyptians decided to take advantage of the situation by heating up the Suez front. The judgment was that their capability would be limited to re-opening artillery attacks, small harrassing raids across the Canal and some air attacks. Support for Israel in this contingency would be developed from the same kinds of packages that have been worked out in the event the ceasefire breaks down.

3. Armed intervention for evacuation.

If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages.

If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved.

There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein's regime.

U. S. Military Posture in this Situation

The carrier, the U.S.S. Independence, remains 100 miles off the Lebanese coast. The second carrier is within about 30 hours of it and moving closer. Both will be held in the same operational area for the next few days.

Evacuation aircraft remain in Turkey.

One company of paratroopers is on 4 hour alert and one battalion on 8 hour alert in Europe as the beginning of an evacuation force.

Diplomatic Posture

The most important diplomatic task would be to deter Soviet intervention. It would also be important to minimize Nasser's reaction.

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[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 September 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

State Dept. review completed

Jordan

(Situation as of 2100 EDT)

1. King Husayn has advised the US Embassy that he is moving tonight in a showdown with the Fedayeen to "establish law and order." He plans to establish a military government, headed by Brigadier Muhammad Daud, in the early hours of 16 September and will make a radio announcement of his action at 0700 local time (0100 EDT) after army units have been prepositioned around Amman. The King said that he does not know what will happen or how it will go, but he will react to events as they develop. The army will only enter Amman against the Fedayeen if necessary.

2. At about the same time the press announced that Premier Rifai has resigned, less than one hour after the announcement that still another cease-fire agreement had been negotiated with the fedayeen. According to an Associated Press story from Amman, the new agreement calls for a disengagement of the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen forces by 1800 local time on 16 September (16 September, 1200, EDT) and included the following points: the strength of army guard units in Amman will be reduced; army units surrounding Amman are to be withdrawn; the fedayeen are to evacuate their strongpoints in Amman and remove roadblocks; fedayeen military police are to guard key public installations; the fedayeen are to refrain from making arbitrary searches while the armed forces cease interfering with the fedayeen; and finally, a joint team of army and fedayeen officers will enforce the agreement.

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[redacted]

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

4. If the King moves, it will not catch the fedayeen by surprise.

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The city is silent, the streets are empty, and the US Embassy has gone on full alert.

5. After hearing an Amman radio report of the agreement between the government and the fedayeen a US Embassy officer in Amman checked with the Palace. He was informed that, despite the broadcast, plans for the showdown were moving forward.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

SEPTEMBER 10, 1970 NO. 263

L. DEAN BROWN SWORN IN AS U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

L. Dean Brown, of Washington, D.C., was sworn in September 9 as United States Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

A career Foreign Service Officer of Class 1, Ambassador Brown has served since November 1967 as Ambassador to Senegal and also The Gambia. In Amman he will succeed Ambassador Harrison M. Symmes, who has been appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Born on August 21, 1920 in New York, New York, Ambassador Brown is a graduate of Wesleyan University (B.A. 1942). He served in the United States Army in the rank of Second Lieutenant during 1942-46.

Ambassador Brown has previously served in Leopoldville (1946-47), in St. John (1948-49), Ottawa (1949-52), Paris (1955-58) and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Rabat (1962-65). Among home assignments have been Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs (1958-61), Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs (1961), Director, Office of Central African Affairs (1965-66) and Country Director for Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Burundi, Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius (1966-67). Ambassador Brown attended the Imperial Defense College in London (1961-62).

Ambassador Brown is married to the former June Vereker Farquhar and they have one son.

* * *

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OPSCEN: THIS UNNUMBERED ITEM IS TRANSMITTED TO YOU SEPARATELY FROM THE REGULAR FBIS WIRE.

MOSCOW RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ENGLISH TO AFRICA 1430 GMT 8 SEP 70 L

(TEXT) NEW FACTS HAVE COME TO LIGHT ON THE UNDERMINING ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN SECRET SERVICE IN JORDAN. MANY EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN THAT COUNTRY ARE ACTUALLY MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ARE CONDUCTING UNDERMINING ACTIVITIES IN FAVOR OF WORLD ZIONISM AND ISRAEL. THE AIMS OF THEIR ACTIVITIES CONSIST OF HAMPERING ANY SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLES. THE AMERICAN SECRET SERVICE IS (?WORKING TIRELESSLY) TO INCREASE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JORDAN, SYRIA, AND IRAQ SO THAT THEIR EAST ARAB FRONT WOULD BE WEAKENED AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY FROM THE EAST WOULD BE GUARANTEED.

HIDING BEHIND THEIR DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS IN JORDAN ARE SUCH MEN FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, JOHN O'CONNELL, AND LEADERS OF THE AMERICAN SPY SERVICE IN AMMAN SUCH AS (?HERMANN) FERNALD, JON STEWART, AND (CHRISTOPHER PICKARD). (?THEY) ARE SPYING AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN ORGANIATIONS AND MAINTAIN TIES WITH THE BANNED PARTY CALLED ISLAMIC LIBERATION.

THE AMRICAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN AMMAN, COL GERARD COSGROVA, HEADS THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCES SERVICE WHICH IS UNDER THE PENTAGON.

THE OPINION IS EXPRESSED IN INFORMED CIRCLES THAT THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JORDAN, LEWIS BROWN, IS ALSO CONNECTED WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. HE IS A GRADUATE OF THE ROYAL JORDANIAN COLLEGE, WHICH IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH THE ZIONIST CIRCLES. PREVIOUSLY HE WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN DEPARTMENT IN THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AND DID HIS BEST TO STRENGTHEN TIES BETWEEN THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL.

OBSERVERS POINT OUT THAT CIA AGENTS, DISGUISED AS AMERICAN DIPLOMATS, HAVE DIRECT CONNECTIONS WITH THE SANGUINARY EVENTS IN JORDAN.

8 SEP 2244Z AO'D/CAT

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Files Jordan

INFORMATION

SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM September 8, 1970

no notes

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

Attached at Tab A is an important intelligence report on the situation in Jordan which you should read carefully. At Tab B is a further elaboration on the deteriorating situation in Jordan which, in my view, has already approached crises proportions. These two reports combined with the ultimatum message given by the Israelis to King Hussein which you read earlier all suggest that the time has come for a coordinated interdepartmental crisis management initiative. I do not believe we can afford to continue to mush along leaving this critical set of circumstances in the hands of the Department of State which is just about totally engulfed in manipulating -- and not very well at that -- the hijacking situation.

At Tab C is the latest Beam message on the Soviet problem which also reflects the lack of finesse which is characterized in our dealings with them on the missile issue. This problem also must be worked into a carefully coordinated Middle East policy control mechanism. As you know, contrary to the State line, USIA, for example, has been strongly pushing the theme of Soviet culpability for the turn of events. I understand that Shakespeare left a meeting at State this morning totally disillusioned and dismayed at the Secretary's inference that the cheating which has taken place thus far is minor and of no consequence. This kind of self-delusion cannot but culminate in disaster.

HK

Attachments

~~Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required~~ JHS 4/23/2012

State Dept. review completed

SECRET/NOFORN/CONTROLLED DISSEM

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[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 September 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Jordan

(Situation Report as of 1300 EDT).

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[redacted]

3. This information pre-dates the cease-fire agreement which, according to Amman radio, was reached between the government and the Palestine Liberation Organization central committee at 0800 EDT. In return for a pull-back of troops from around Amman, the fedayeen are to remove all armed men and members of fedayeen organizations from Amman streets and entrances to the city; all military demonstrations are banned; no one is to molest either army or fedayeen personnel; and no citizen or his property is to be molested. A joint committee set up by the government and the fedayeen central committee is to oversee the agreement.

4. It is too early to tell whether this agreement will prove any more successful than the short-lived agreement which collapsed last Saturday. The agreement may have been a response to the government's ultimatum, however, and would seem to indicate that an all-out confrontation need not be expected tomorrow morning--if, in fact, the King's position had ever been more than a bluff. The King is almost certainly under considerable pressure from the army to take a firm stand; but judging by his handling of the crisis so far--and of previous crises--he will permit considerable erosion of his power and prestige rather than allow the army to undertake the bloody, destructive fighting necessary to root the fedayeen out of Amman. Husayn has been able to restrain the army in similar circumstances in the past, but the provocations of the fedayeen may by now have pushed individual commanders beyond the bounds of their personal loyalty to the King.

5. The situation of the hijacked aircraft and hostages is essentially as reported in press and radio dispatches.

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

13

WH

1751Q

1970 September 8 AM 7:13

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

70 SEP 8 PM 1:34

P R 081016Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8625
INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1300
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 344
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 559
BT
S E C R E T MOSCOW 5145

NODIS

SUBJ: ME FUTURE MOVES.

REF: MOSCOW 5129

1. FROM HIS SOMEWHAT EASIER MANNER I GOT THE IMPRESSION FROM MY SUNDAY TALK WITH VINOGRADOV THAT SOVIETS MAY HAVE THOUGHT THEY WITH UAR WERE ON THE POINT OF GETTING AWAY WITH THEIR PLOY WITH MISSILES IN THE STANDSTILL AREA. THIS WAS BEFORE ISRAELI CABINET ANNOUNCEMENT WITHHOLDING TEKOAH FROM JARRING TALKS.

2. SOVIETS AND UAR ARE OF COURSE COUNTING ON ISRAELI ABSTENTION FROM NEGOTIATIONS AND ISRAELI REFUSAL TO REPLY TO CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS TO SUPPORT THEIR CASE. IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, THIS MANEUVER CONTINUES TO BE OVERSHADOWED BY CRISIS IN JARRING TALKS PROVOKED BY UAR VIOLATIONS WITH WHICH MAJORITY WOURLD OPINION ASSOICIATES USSR. IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THE SOVIETS SO FAR HAVE NOT VENTURED TO DECLARE PUBLICLY THIER LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR UAR ACTIONS AS THEY DID IN THEIR PRIVATE DISCLAIMER TO US. IN THAT RESPECT, THEY HAVE NOT YET PAINTED THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RETREAT FROM THE UAR CONTENTION THAT NO VIOLATIONS HAVE OCCURRED.

3. PRVIATELY IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ACTING DCM, SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE VIRTUALLY ACKNOWLEDGED EXISTENCE OF VIOLATIONS WHICH THEY LAMELY SEEK TO JUSTIFY AS REFLECTING DIFFERENT UAR INTERPRETATION OF CEASEFIRE. SOVIETS ALSO TACITLY ADMITTED THAT INSTALLATION OF ROCKETS IS ELEMENT IN PRESSURE TACTICS TO MAKE ISRAEL NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN NY; IN THIS REGARD THEY EXPRESS STRONG DOUBTS THAT ISRAEL IS REALLY PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM ARAB TERRITORY.

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4. I THINK OUR BEST TACTIC IS TO GO AHEAD WITH STRESSING SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY WHILE TURNING THE LINE MORE IN THE DIRECTION OF CASTING DOUBTS ON THEIR PEACE POSTURE (I.E., UN SECURITY PROPOSALS) AND ON THE MERITS THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO ACQUIRE FROM THE FRG TREATY, THEIR ATTITUDE IN SALT, AND, UNTIL JUST RECENTLY, THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ME. SUCH A LINE, REENFORCED POSSIBLY BY A MORE-IN-SORROW-THAN-IN-ANGER NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY TO GROMYKO, MIGHT EXPLOIT SOVIET SENSITIVITY ON THIS SCORE EVEN THOUGH IT MAY NOT PRODUCE A MISSILE WITHDRAWAL.

5. WITHOUT INTENDING TO INTERVENE GRATUITOUSLY, IT OCCURS TO US THT JARRING MIGHT BE CHARGED WITH ELABORATING A NEW CEASEFIRE ARRANGEMENT ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN TEL AVIV 4875. ALTHOUGH QUITE PROPERLY THIS HAS NOT BEEN HIS PREVIOUS CONCERN, HE IS NOW COMPLETELY STALLED. THE OPENING OF POLITICAL TALKS COULD PERHAPS BEGIN SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE CEASEFIRE MODALITIES, INITIALLY UNDER JARRING'S DIRECTION. FOR THIS PURPOSE HE COULD BE FURNISHED WITH A SMALL UN MILITARY EXPERT STAFF AND PLEDGES OF FOUR-POWER SUPPORT. GP-3

BEAM

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador L. Dean Brown (Jordan)
10:30 a.m., Friday, September 4, 1970

Purpose of the Meeting

Your meeting with Ambassador Brown is designed primarily to provide a photo opportunity which will demonstrate publically the importance which you attribute to his new post in Jordan. The meeting should be very brief.

Background

Ambassador Brown has just returned from being U. S. Ambassador to Senegal. Before that he was one of the outstanding younger country directors in the African Bureau. He had previously been our Deputy Chief of Mission in Morocco from 1962-1965. In addition to his recent tour as Ambassador, he has in the past year chaired one State Department task force on the role and function of the diplomatic mission and worked on another dealing with reducing U. S. personnel overseas, with particular attention to intelligence activities under diplomatic cover.

Talking Points

During your meeting you may wish to draw upon the following talking points:

-- Comment to Ambassador Brown that you are keenly aware of the difficult and challenging post to which he is moving.

-- Emphasize that the U. S. has embarked upon a complex peace initiative which will demand the best talents of our most reliable and experienced diplomats. You expect him to meet this challenge and be cognizant that he is serving as your personal representative in one of our most sensitive posts.

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-- In relation to Jordan, ask him how he views the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians. How does he plan to open enough of a door to the moderate Palestinians to make them feel that we are concerned without undercutting the efforts of the Jordanian Government to bring them along in a Jordanian negotiation?

-- Tell Ambassador Brown that you have long understood the need somehow to meet the sense of injustice of those Palestinians who have now spent much of their lives in the refugee camps.

-- Send your best wishes to King Hussein. We will continue to do all we can to help achieve an honorable peace settlement.

Additional Information

Photo opportunity.

Dr. Kissinger will sit in.

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DE WTE 3126 2462343

RECEIVED SAN CLEMENTE COMMCEN
6:22 P.M. PDT 3 SEPTEMBER 1970

O 032335Z SEP 70
FM COL. KENNEDY
TO WINSTON LORD FOR GENERAL HAIG
ZEM
S E C R E T NODIS WH01722

S E C R E T

TO: GENERAL HAIG

FROM: COLONEL KENNEDY

FOLLOWING ARE TALKERS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS BROWN AND SWANK PREPARED BY SAUNDERS AND HOLDRIDGE. BIO DATA ON SWANK WHILE IN TAB A TO MEMO IS BEING DEXED SEPARATELY. RECOMMEND YOU SIGN OFF FOR HAK.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN (JORDAN)

BACKGROUND

AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST RETURNED FROM BEING U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SENEGAL. BEFORE THAT HE WAS ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING YOUNGER COUNTRY DIRECTORS IN THE AFRICAN BUREAU. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN OUR DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION IN MOROCCO FROM 1962-1965. IN ADDITION TO HIS RECENT TOUR AS AMBASSADOR, HE HAS IN THE PAST YEAR CHAIRED ONE STATE DEPARTMENT TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND WORKED ON ANOTHER DEALING WITH REDUCING U.S. PERSONNEL OVERSEAS, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER.

TALKING POINTS

1. YOU MIGHT WANT TO ASK HIM ABOUT HIS PAST EXPERIENCE WITH MODERATE AFRICANS. FOR INSTANCE, HOW DOES A MODERATE LEADER LIKE SENGHOR SEE THE U.S. AT THIS TIME?

3. IN RELATION TO ~~HIS NEXT POST~~, HOW DOES HE VIEW THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PALESTINIANS? HOW DOES HE PLAN TO OPEN ENOUGH OF A DOOR TO THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS TO MAKE THEM FEEL THAT WE ARE CONCERNED WITHOUT UNDERCUTTING THE EFFORTS OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO BRING THEM ALONG IN A JORDANIAN NEGOTIATION? ~~(~~ YOU HAVE LONG UNDERSTOOD THE NEED SOMEHOW TO MEET THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE OF THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO HAVE NOW SPENT MUCH OF THEIR LIVES IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. ~~(AMBASSADOR BROWN, LIKE MOST OF US, RECOGNIZES THE PROBLEM BUT REALIZES THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING A HANDLE ON IT WITHOUT DISRUPTING ON-GOING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS CONCLUSION SEEMS TO BE THE RIGHT ONE: THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT HAS A MOMENTUM THAT WE ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE BUT WHICH WE MUST BE SENSITIVE TO.)~~

5. YOU SEND YOUR BEST WISHES TO KING HUSSEIN. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP ACHIEVE AN HONORABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

END PAGE ONE

SECRET NODIS

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SECRET

TO: General Haig

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

Following are talkers for President's meetings with Ambassadors Brown and Swank prepared by Saunders and Holdridge. Recommend you sign off for HAK.

Bris data on Swank which is not A & memo is being DEXED separately

SECRET

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: ~~YOUR MEETING WITH~~ AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN (JORDAN)
~~Ambassador to Jordan~~

Background

Ambassador Brown has just returned from being U.S. Ambassador to Senegal. Before that he was one of the outstanding younger country directors in the African Bureau. He had previously been our Deputy Chief of Mission in Morocco from 1962-1965. In addition to his recent tour as Ambassador, he has in the past year chaired one State Department task force on the role and function of the diplomatic mission and worked on another dealing with reducing U.S. personnel overseas, with particular attention to intelligence activities under diplomatic cover.

Talking Points

1. You might want to ask him about his past experience with moderate Africans. For instance, how does a moderate leader like Senghor see the U.S. at this time?

2. In relation to his next post, how does he view the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians? How does he plan to open enough of a door to the moderate Palestinians to make them feel that we are concerned without undercutting the efforts of the Jordanian government to bring them along in a Jordanian negotiation? You have long understood the need somehow to meet the sense of injustice of those Palestinians who have now spent much of their lives in the refugee camps. [Ambassador Brown, like most of us, recognizes the problem but realizes the difficulty of getting a handle on it without disrupting on-going relationships with the Jordanian government. His conclusion seems to be the right one: The Palestinian movement has a momentum that we are not likely to change but which we must be sensitive to.]

3. You send your best wishes to King Hussein. We will continue to do all we can to help achieve an honorable peace settlement.

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SECRET/NODIS INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Talking Points - September 15 Appointment with Emory C. Swank, Ambassador to Cambodia

Background: Although Ambassador Swank has never visited Cambodia, he served as DCM in adjoining Laos from 1964-67 and is familiar with regional problems. Since his designation some six weeks ago he has had the opportunity to read-in comprehensively on current Cambodian problems and U. S. policy positions, consult with the appropriate U. S. officials in Washington, and to discuss Cambodian sentiments and problems with the resident Cambodian Ambassador and those few Cambodian officials who have visited Washington. Biographic information is at TAB (A)

Your meeting with Mr. Swank will be an opportunity to give him a clear impression of your policy toward Cambodia. A firm statement by you will arm him for his difficult task and help him to overcome the attitude of reticence which has characterized our Embassy in Phnom Penh under Charge Rives up to now.

Talking Points: You may wish to make the following points:

-- You do not want to see a Communist government in Cambodia and want to do everything we can to prevent this.

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-- Lon Nol should be given no reason to question the firmness of your intent to support Cambodia in its effort to protect its neutrality.

-- You are going to continue to seek maximum possible help for Cambodia from its Asian neighbors.

-- The flow of U. S. military aid and economic assistance will continue; our air interdiction program will be broadly interpreted.

-- You want to stress the importance of the psychological benefits to Lon Nol and Cambodia which our aid can have.

-- Every effort should be made to get more balanced and objective reporting of the situation in Cambodia by the press. This is vital to our securing the understanding and support needed in the U. S. as basis for Congressional support of increased MAP and economic assistance to Cambodia.

-- The Lon Nol Government should be encouraged to make a greater effort to visit the countryside in order to rally popular support and counter the effects of enemy propaganda and organizational efforts.

-- You consider Ambassador Swank as your personal representative and the head of the Country Team. You will back him to the hilt and look forward to hearing from him directly on his impressions and any recommendations he may have on ways to strengthen our mission and to make our effort more effective.

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-- Ask Ambassador Swank to convey your personal warm best wishes to Lon Nol and your admiration for Cambodia's efforts to defend its neutrality.

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LDX
UNCLASSIFIED
PEX'D

EMORY COBLENTZ SWANK

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

Emory C. ("Coby") Swank, of Washington, D.C., a career Foreign Service Officer, was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Cambodia on September 1. Mr. Swank has been serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs since June, 1969, and was most recently Deputy Chief of Mission at Moscow (from July, 1967).

Born January 29, 1922 in Maryland, Mr. Swank earned his Bachelor's degree at Franklin and Marshall College (where he later served as an English instructor) in 1942, and his Master's from Harvard in 1943. He served overseas with the U.S. Army from 1943-46 and is the recipient of a Bronze Star.

Mr. Swank was appointed Foreign Service Officer in July 1946. He has had tours in China (Shanghai, 1946; Tsingtao, 1948), Indonesia (Batavia, 1949; Djakarta 1950), the Soviet Union (Moscow 1953-55, 1967-69), Romania (Bucharest, 1957) and Laos (1964-67, as DCM). Home assignments have included: Research Officer (1955); Deputy Chief, Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe (1957); Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (1960), and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (1961). Mr. Swank attended the National War College in 1963.

Ambassador Swank is married (1949) to the former Katherine Whiting.

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BY WIRE (Please transmit on an urgent basis)

SECRET

September 4, 1970

TO: General Haig

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Swank

On re-reading draft talker, I realized one item which we had discussed earlier had not been covered. If possible, you might wish to add following talking point:

"-- You do not want to create a large American presence in Cambodia. Military assistance must be carefully managed but you do not want to establish a MAAG. The position of the Political/Military Counselor (Ladd) was established to meet this need."

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ED
sent to S/C BY WIRE
9/3/70

SECRET

Jordan

TO: General Haig

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

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SECRET

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FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN (JORDAN)
~~Ambassador to Jordan~~

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Talking Points

1. You might want to ask him about his past experience with moderate Africans. For instance, how does a moderate leader like Senghor see the U.S. at this time?

2. In relation to his next post, how does he view the U.S. relationship with the Palestinians? How does he plan to open enough of a door to the moderate Palestinians to make them feel that we are concerned without undercutting the efforts of the Jordanian government to bring them along in a Jordanian negotiation? You have long understood the need somehow to meet the sense of injustice of those Palestinians who have now spent much of their lives in the refugee camps. [Ambassador Brown, like most of us, recognizes the problem but realizes the difficulty of getting a handle on it without disrupting on-going relationships with the Jordanian government. His conclusion seems to be the right one: The Palestinian movement has a momentum that we are not likely to change but which we must be sensitive to.]

3. You send your best wishes to King Hussein. We will continue to do all we can to help achieve an honorable peace settlement.

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Ambassador to Jordan

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HHSaunders:tmt 9/3/70

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Sent by wire 9/3/70

SECRET/NODIS INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Talking Points - September 15 Appointment with Emory C. Swank, Ambassador to Cambodia

Background: Although Ambassador Swank has never visited Cambodia, he served as DCM in adjoining Laos from 1964-67 and is familiar with regional problems. Since his designation some six weeks ago he has had the opportunity to read-in comprehensively on current Cambodian problems and U. S. policy positions, consult with the appropriate U. S. officials in Washington, and to discuss Cambodian sentiments and problems with the resident Cambodian Ambassador and those few Cambodian officials who have visited Washington.

Your meeting with Mr. Swank will be an opportunity to give him a clear impression of your policy toward Cambodia. A firm statement by you will arm him for his difficult task and help him to overcome the attitude of reticence which has characterized our Embassy in Phnom Penh under Charge Rives up to now.

Talking Points: You may wish to make the following points:

-- You do not want to see a Communist government in Cambodia and want to do everything we can to prevent this.

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-- Lon Nol should be given no reason to question the firmness of your intent to support Cambodia in its effort to protect its neutrality.

-- You are going to continue to seek maximum possible help for Cambodia from its Asian neighbors.

-- The flow of U. S. military aid and economic assistance will continue; our air interdiction program will be broadly interpreted.

-- You want to stress the importance of the psychological benefits to Lon Nol and Cambodia which our aid can have.

-- Every effort should be made to get more balanced and objective reporting of the situation in Cambodia by the press. This is vital to our securing the understanding and support needed in the U. S. as basis for Congressional support of increased MAP and economic assistance to Cambodia.

-- The Lon Nol Government should be encouraged to make a greater effort to visit the countryside in order to rally popular support and counter the effects of enemy propaganda and organizational efforts.

-- You consider Ambassador Swank as your personal representative and the head of the Country Team. You will back him to the hilt and look forward to hearing from him directly on his impressions and any recommendations he may have on ways to strengthen our mission and to make our effort more effective.

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-- Ask Ambassador Swank to convey your personal warm best wishes to Lon Nol and your admiration for Cambodia's efforts to defend its neutrality.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Files

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

September 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Situation in Jordan

The situation in Jordan remains tense as of noon today. The following details are available: EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

1. [redacted] Fedayeen-controlled Palestine Liberation Army units attached to the Iraqi Army, the Al Qadissiya Forces, were moving into Amman today. Earlier in the day, Baghdad Radio had announced that regular Iraqi troops had moved into positions alongside Fedayeen units. Lt. General Ammash, the Iraqi Vice President, arrived in Jordan today, flying into Mafraq, a major military base used by Iraqi forces. Meanwhile, a Lebanese newspaper has reported that Iran has been reinforcing its military forces along the Iraqi border. [redacted] shortly before the outbreak of the current crisis, King Hussein had received assurances from the Shah of Iran that he would engage in a certain amount of saber rattling on the Iraqi border in the event the Iraqis attempted to interfere in Jordan. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

2. Following an emergency meeting of the Cabinet, Jordan today rejected an Iraqi demand that King Hussein order the Army to stop firing against the Fedayeen. The Jordanian rejection insisted that the firing was initiated by the Fedayeen and the Government counter-fire had stopped before the Iraqi note was received. Reports were circulating in Amman and Beirut that King Hussein is considering declaring martial law and has asked for the resignation of the Government and intends to replace it with a military regime. [redacted] Government armored forces were searching vehicles and arresting all occupants who were members of Fedayeen organizations or the Palestine Liberation Army.

SANITIZED EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 3.3(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 11-85/45/43 per sec. 3.3(b)(1)(3) Tr. 6/19/2014
By RJ NARA, Date 10/13/2016

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3. Jordanian security forces estimate 23 people have been killed in the fighting thus far. Most Government Ministries are closed and the Fedayeen are reportedly occupying the buildings of the Ministries of Economy and Public Works. Radio Amman has announced that Amman Airport is open to regular traffic. The U.S. Defense Attache reports that as of 0800 the Fedayeen were in control of a significant area of Amman and were establishing their own roadblocks.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

4. The Jordanians are apparently still uncertain of Syria's attitude toward the situation. [redacted]

SANITIZED EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
3.3(b)(3)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 300

SECRET/NODIS

July 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders HHS
Richard T. Kennedy RTK

SUBJECT: F-104 Delivery Dates for Jordan

At the end of Thursday's Special Review Group meeting on the Mid-East, I asked you whether your general go-ahead for completing the administrative arrangements on the Jordanian arms package included giving the Jordanians the delivery dates on the F-104's. Our impression was that you nodded your assent, but we just want to be sure.

You will recall that the State-Defense proposal is to make the following offer:

--first aircraft to be delivered in 15-18 months from contract signing with delivery completed within about two years or

--delivery within 12-19 months from signature but at a cost of $8.6 million additional to cover extra costs of accelerated rehabilitation.

Recommendation: Would you please confirm our understanding that you regard the above offer as included in the general go-ahead to take the next administrative step in moving the Jordanian package.

Approve RK Other _____

MICROFILM DATA
DO ✓
INIT BSM
DATE 7/14

ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF ✓
WHC
SUBF

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders HHS

SUBJECT: Information Memo on Jordan

During the height of the Jordan crisis, the President was promised a further analysis when the dust settled.

Recommendation: That you send the attached information memo to the President.

MICROFILM DATA
DO ✓
INIT
DATE 7/27

ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF ✓
WHC
SUBF

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-85/15144 Per Itr. 12/10/2014
By RS NARA, Date 10/18/2016

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MEMORANDUM JUL 14 1970 THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 13, 1970

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: The Situation in Jordan

During the peak of the Jordan crisis last month, I promised you an assessment of the situation as soon as it began to jell. It seems to have now reached the stage where one can begin to see more clearly what is evolving out of the June confrontation between the regime and the fedayeen.

Current Situation

King Hussein has reached a compromise settlement with the fedayeen. It is believed to include pledges by the government and the fedayeen of non-interference in each other's affairs. The agreement also reportedly calls for coordination of fedayeen plans with the army and to include provision for greater freedom of action by the fedayeen.

The fedayeen movement as a whole seems to have gained considerably from the crisis. The moderates, headed by Fatah's Yasir Arafat, have won important concessions of authority from Hussein, including substantial representation in the new cabinet. The role of the fedayeen extremists is subject to much interpretation, but they have clearly established that they have the capacity to play an important spoilers' role. The June crisis also unleased nationalist forces, other than the fedayeen, who want basic changes in Jordan's political structure.

There are several new factors in the Jordanian situation which should be especially noted. The fedayeen have, of course, gained considerable influence but less noticed has been the rather sudden rise of Army Chief of Staff Major General Mashur Hadiitha al-Jazi. He has been instrumental in heading off further confrontations and provocations between the fedayeen and the Army. More importantly there are signs that Hadiitha envisages himself becoming a dominant political power in the country, taking the

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initiative whenever vacuums appear and exploiting apparent fedayeen confidence in him. King Hussein still clearly controls the army but it is in a potentially volatile mood and even Hussein has recognized Hadiitha's potential by reportedly calling him an aspiring dictator.

The Future

The new compromise arrangement between the government and the fedayeen is likely to hold together for several months. This new working relationship, however, has only ushered in a new time of testing. The fedayeen will naturally seek to consolidate their shared de facto control of the country and some informal coordinating machinery may even be institutionalized.

If things do actually go this way, it will mean:

--The authority and prestige of the Hashemite regime will continue to decline.

--The international credibility of Jordan will be further compromised. King Hussein even now can only follow Nasser's lead on a peace settlement and the fedayeen can be expected to seek nothing short of putting Jordan on a full wartime footing, thus clearly rejecting all routes to a peaceful settlement.

--The U.S. will more and more become a scapegoat and the public will be further conditioned to focussing its wrath on us. Pressure to turn away from us and to the Soviets for arms may also grow. The army may in the final analysis be the most effective opposition to this and we will have other opportunities to offset and retard this probable anti-American trend.

--Greater fedayeen freedom of action will inevitably result in more serious breaches of the cease-fire in the Jordan valley. This is one of the more sensitive areas for the Israelis and they can be expected to strike back with ever more forceful retaliations. The embassy can even envisage a day coming when Jordan might become little more than a convenient battleground into which various fedayeen and Arab forces would move from time to time in order to attack Israel.

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Conclusion

At best, King Hussein faces an uncertain political future and forces actually or potentially opposed to him seem to be on the rise. At most all he can seem to do is to work to hang on a bit longer in hopes that the constellation of political forces in Jordan will begin to shift back in his favor, although this appears unlikely at this point.

The most immediate problem that this situation raises for the U.S. is our support for Hussein. How far to go with the arms package you approved is being discussed in the Special Review Group this week. Developments also add a new dimension to Hussein's and therefore Nasser's capacity to make a peaceful settlement with Israel. Finally, the time may have come for us to begin considering more seriously regular contact with the Palestinians, especially the moderates. I will send you a separate memo on that.

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237

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

July 8, 1970

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~~SECRET~~

HHSaunders:tmt 7/8/70

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INFORMATION

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SMH:HHSaunders:tmt 7/8/70

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13

HAK approved this!

July 6, 1970

Jordan

Dear Mrs. Greiner:

I appreciated your call last week and your desire to get word to the President of your recent talks in Jordan. Unfortunately, the President's schedule will make it very difficult for him to see you personally and I have been asked to speak with you and pass along to him whatever thoughts you may have.

I will await word from you as to what arrangements would suit you. I will be in my office regularly when we could arrange anything you may have in mind by telephone (Area Code 202, 395-3330).

Yours sincerely,

Harold H. Saunders

Mrs. Letitia Greiner
Sunburst
Left Hand Canyon
Boulder, Colorado 80302

HHSaunders:tmt 7/6/70

NSA review completed

No Objection To Declassification 2008/12/29 : NLN-NSC-615-1-22-7

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Crossref #300

Saunders
nsc

Saunders notified

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN11-85/15145 Per Itr. 9/29/2016
By RJ NARA, Date 10/18/2016

Secretariat

Close this file, please:

1. It was overtaken by disturbances in Amman.
2. It will be the subject of Special Review Group meeting on 7/9. A new memo will probably have to be prepared.

Hal Saunders

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 11 (also 10821 300)

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

July 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders Hal

SUBJECT: Jordan--Artillery and F-104s

The week of disturbances in Amman delayed final signing of letters of offer on the artillery package, and the U.S. military team was evacuated before final details were resolved. This week the Jordanian Government decided to sign the letters of offer in its possession and to send a Jordanian team here to resolve other details. This would include delivery dates for the F-104s.

The question is: Should we put the final administrative touches to this package? Should we complete the process of signing letters of offer in accordance with an undertaking already made?

Attached is a State Department memo, which I insisted on, arguing that we should go ahead for the time being and monitor deliveries in the light of the developing situation.

State's argument is that we should not send a negative signal now--by looking as if we are backing out--when rocking the boat could reduce chances for our diplomatic initiative. This package remains directed at the Jordan Army which will continue to be one of the two major political forces in Jordan.

In tactical terms this argument is hard to beat, but going ahead is increasingly difficult in the face of uncertainty about what political forces are coming out on top in Jordan. It is conceivable that there would be some sort of coalition between part of the army and the more moderate Palestinians. That might be the most stable thing that could happen in Jordan and the most conducive to a settlement with Israel, but that is a highly uncertain bet.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MICROFILM DATA
DO
INIT
DATE 7/16/07

ORIG) NSC
TO) PAF ✓
WHC
SUBF

7/14 OBE per Saunders

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Recommendation: Knowing your feelings on this subject, I know of no recommendation to make except to put this on the agenda of the Special Review Group next week. You may get a call from Sisco urging speedier action, but I should think you would want this group to face up to the fundamental questions involved.

Put on Special Review Group agenda HK

Other _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 9517

July 1, 1970

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Jordan Arms Package: Artillery and F-104 Aircraft

Recent disturbances in Jordan delayed finalization of our arms undertaking to Jordan. Earlier, letters of offer on most of the items in the package had been presented to the Jordanian Government, which, however, had elected to hold up signature pending resolution of certain details in connection with the remaining items. This week, however, the Jordanian Government decided to go ahead and sign the outstanding letters of offer in their possession and proposed the dispatch to Washington of a Jordanian Team to resolve the other details. We have, for obvious reasons, given the Jordanian Government no encouragement and had hoped to delay further action until the situation in Jordan had clarified.

A couple of weeks has now elapsed since the end of the disturbances. King Hussein continues to be the dominant figure in Jordan, albeit somewhat weakened following the recent confrontation with the Palestinian commando organizations. While he is to an increasing

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extent beholden to Yasir Arafat, head of the moderate, apolitical fedayeen faction, the King is strongly opposed by and opposed to radical fedayeen groups, such as George Habbash's PFLP. In the latter respect the King enjoys a community of interest with Arafat, who also is at odds with the PFLP. The King continues to command the support of the Army, which remains the backbone of his regime.

The Jordan Government, which has a new Cabinet, is now resuming "business as usual" after a hiatus during which time many Government departments closed down. High on the Government's priority list is the completion of formalities with regard to our arms package. In order to finalize this undertaking the Jordanian military Chief-of-Staff, on the instructions of King Hussein, has offered to send two or three officers promptly to Washington. King Hussein has urged rapid action in a meeting with our Charge on June 29.

It may be argued that since King Hussein has lost his grip somewhat and is no longer sole master of his own house, it would be inadvisable for us to sell arms which might ultimately fall into the hands of the fedayeen. The possibility of misuse of these weapons is something which we must keep in mind and which should be an important factor in determining whether we make final delivery. But for the time being this is not at issue: what we are faced with now is a decision as to whether to complete the process of signing letters of offer in accordance with an undertaking already made.

An overriding consideration in the weeks ahead is to avoid any actions which could prejudice Arab reactions to our current political initiative.

Nasser, even should he be so inclined, will not go along with our initiative unless Hussein does. We, therefore, need to do all we can to keep Hussein from

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despairing completely of going the political settlement route. Hussein has already begun to back away from Security Council Resolution 242, and the chances have decreased that he can accept our initiative and enter negotiations under Jarring. If he should decide to do so, however, he would have to move to suppress the fedayeen. In those circumstances, he would need the strongest possible evidence of our support - both for political reasons and to bolster Army confidence and morale.

Any indication now that we were having second thoughts about the arms package could adversely affect the chances of our initiative succeeding, which we recognize are already slim. Any delay in proceeding to finalize the arms package would be read by the Jordanian Government as a signal that we were reassessing our policy toward Jordan. We must in fact carry out such a reassessment on a continuing basis over the weeks ahead, while avoiding any hint to the King that we are doing so until we see how our political initiative fares. There will be time enough to suspend any significant shipments of arms to Jordan under the package if we conclude that shipments would not be in our interest.

A further consideration is that, if we appear to be dragging our feet on the arms package, the King may conclude that he has no option but to turn to the Soviets. It is still definitely not in our interests for the King to go this route. It is also not in our interests to alienate the Jordan Army, which is the one stabilizing force likely to remain in Jordan even after the King goes. Furthermore, at a time when we are engaged in a peace initiative--requiring the King's endorsement--it would be folly for us to seem to be cutting off his supply of arms. This would demoralize him and color his response to our initiative.

Accordingly, we believe that we should go ahead for the time being with the arms package. Meanwhile, we

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would plan to monitor closely our deliveries in the light of the developing situation in Jordan. If it becomes desirable, we can suspend shipments at any time. Most deliveries, including the F-104 aircraft, are not due for another year. A few items are deliverable in a time frame of three to six months. They, too, could be stopped from being delivered if a negative decision were to be made over the next several weeks. In any case, their quantities are so small that by themselves they would make very little impact once delivered.

By following the above course of action we (1) enhance somewhat the King's chances of holding his own in the face of mounting pressures; (2) continue to keep active our connections with the Jordan Army; and (3) maintain a climate more propitious to a forthcoming GOJ response regarding our peace initiative. At the same time we keep the option open of cutting off the King's military supply line in the crucial three to six months ahead should the situation so recommend--e.g. should the fedayeen take over in Jordan.

Therefore, we recommend approval of the attached cable to Amman authorizing the Jordanian Team to come to Washington for the purpose of completing formalities relating to the arms package. We also recommend that you approve the F-104 delivery schedules that we submitted to you on June 4, 1970. It is important that we move as rapidly as possible in completing these undertakings.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Draft Cable to Amman

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Approved by Davis 7/10

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

INFO: CINCSTRIKE

STATE

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Jordanian Arms Package

1. You authorized inform Jordanians that we prepared receive Jordanian military team during week July 6-10 or anytime thereafter for purpose completing formalities relating to 1970 arms package.

2. FYI. You should understand, without informing GOJ, that we are agreeing to move ahead on arms package on conditional basis. We are doing so mainly in order avoid any actions which could prejudice Arab reactions to our current political initiative. Also we do not wish to add to King's problems in holding his own in face of mounting pressures, and we recognize that our failure

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NEA/ARN:TWSeelye/am	6/30/70	20695	NEA - Alfred L. Atherton

CLEARANCES:
NEA/RA - Col. Bunte
PM/MAS - Mr. Spiers
OSD/ISA - Mr. Pranger (substance)
White House -

S/S -
The Acting Secretary

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fulfill our commitment might induce him to turn to Soviets. However, we shall monitor delivery schedules closely and if circumstances require, will retain option to cut off pipeline at any time. END FYI.

END

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 10821

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

June 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Aircraft Delivery Schedule for Jordan

When I drafted the NSDM on the Jordan arms package, I inserted the requirement to check back with the President before giving Hussein delivery dates on 10 F-104's for Jordan in order to assure our control over relating timing to the Israeli decision.

At Tab B is State's memo requesting approval to offer the Jordanians now delivery beginning in 15-18 months with completion in about 24. An alternative of beginning delivery in 12 months is offered at an increased cost of $8.6 million which the Jordanians would have to pay. State would keep this arrangement secret for the time being.

Recommendation: That you send the memo at Tab A to the President.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Recommendation should be held up announcement until after Israeli [illegible]

JUN 22 1970

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 10821

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: Aircraft Delivery Schedules for Jordan

Pending since King Hussein's visit in April 1969 has been the question of delivering a second F-104 squadron for Jordan. At that time you authorized Secretary Rogers to commit the U.S. in principle to sell Jordan the aircraft for a second squadron. [The first squadron grew out of a 1966 agreement.] Since then, the Jordanians have been up and down on the subject but have now said they want only 10 planes--not the 16 that would be needed for a second full squadron. King Hussein has asked us in connection with making arrangements on the artillery package which you approved to provide delivery dates for those 10 F 104's. In conveying your approval of the artillery package to State, I told them not to provide any answers on the aircraft without checking back.

State and Defense now propose making the following offers to the King:

--first aircraft to be delivered in 15-18 months from signature of the contract with delivery completed within about two years or

--delivery within 12-19 months from signature but at a cost of $8.6 million additional to cover extra costs of accelerated rehabilitation.

State would keep this offer quiet for the time being. The Israelis were informed of the U.S. commitment on the second squadron in April 1969 and would be reminded of this after a final decision on their request is communicated. They have been told of the artillery package and have expressed no adverse reaction.

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The argument for providing these dates now is that this is part of the effort, so far successful, to keep the Soviets from gaining a foothold in Jordan. The nearest delivery date is a year off and, State feels, probably more since extra costs of early delivery seem likely to deter the Jordanians. Giving these dates promptly will not affect the military balance. Your recent assurances to Eban should offset any possible political problem raised by answering Jordan before Israel; full delivery two years hence would bring the Jordanian air force from 18 to 28 old F-104's and 23 subsonic Hunters while we are nearing completion of delivery of 150 of our best aircraft to Israel to bring its inventory above 250.

The argument against this tactical move is mainly the bad political imagery of giving Jordan an answer before Israel. Few critics would understand that the basic answer to Jordan is already a year past and we would be stringing out deliveries over another two years for ten planes or that the Israelis have already discounted this. They will not understand that you have no intention of cutting Israel off or that you are dealing mainly with a political problem in Jordan or that the Jordanian air force is not a significant factor in the military balance.

This is a relatively minor tactical step--since the basic commitment has already been made, and we can require further approval from you before actual delivery begins.

Recommendation: That you approve offering Jordan the delivery dates described above now with actual delivery subject to final approval from you.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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10821

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8117

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

June 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: F-104 Delivery Schedules for Jordan

Pursuant to the President's approval of an arms request for Jordan consisting primarily of anti-aircraft guns, medium field artillery and vehicles, a Defense Department negotiating team is now in Amman preparing the letters of offer on this equipment. None of this will be made public in the foreseeable future, and we have very much in mind that this transaction is related to the timing of our decision on the Israeli arms expected some time after June 15. The Israelis have been informed fully of this package and have expressed no adverse reaction.

When Zaid Rifa'i, King Hussein's private emissary, was in Washington several weeks ago, he asked on behalf of the King that letters of offer on the F-104 aircraft be submitted at the same time as the letters of offer on the artillery package.

As you recall, in addition to the squadron of F-104's already delivered in 1969 we have been committed in principle to the sale of a second squadron to Jordan at a time to me mutually agreed upon. This commitment derives from arms agreements signed in 1966 and 1968. With the President's approval, the commitment was subsequently confirmed by Secretary Rogers during King Hussein's April 1969 visit to the U.S. Later in the year King Hussein asked that only eight aircraft be provided from the squadron of sixteen aircraft. During Zaid Rifa'i's visit last month the number requested was increased to ten aircraft.

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When the President approved the 1970 Jordan arms request, he instructed the Secretaries of State and Defense in NSDM 61 to consult with him on final delivery schedules before informing the Jordanian Government. Enclosed is a telegram prepared by the State and Defense Departments authorizing the negotiating team in Amman to submit to the Jordanian Government a letter of offer providing for delivery of the ten F-104's in a 15 to 18 month time frame. It also contains an option of a slightly earlier delivery of the F-104's if the Jordanian Government is prepared to pay the increased costs which would result.

We believe that we must be able to offer the King, at least on paper, initial delivery within a period of 12 to 18 months. While we believe that the King would acquiesce in some eventual slippage in actual deliveries, we seriously doubt that he could accept a letter of offer involving deliveries beyond 18 months in view of strong pressures from his army for speedier arms deliveries. We would recommend, therefore, that the White House approve the enclosed telegram.

We will see to it that as in the case of the other Jordanian arms package, nothing is said in the near future with respect to the additional squadron. The Israelis were informed of this commitment on the second squadron in April 1969. We will again remind them sometime after we have made our decision on the Israeli arms request.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Joint State/Defense Message

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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

STATE

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Availability F-104 Aircraft

PASS THIEBURGER AND COL. BOZEMAN

1. You authorized submit to GOJ letter of offer for ten F-104 aircraft which provides for first aircraft delivery in 15 to 18 months from start of contract with follow-on delivery one every three weeks until delivery final aircraft in approximately two years. These deliveries based on prices quoted in letter of offer in hand JO-SAJ.

2. You also authorized inform GOJ that USAF has investigated compressing delivery time down to 12 months from start of contract for first aircraft and subsequent deliveries at a rate of one every three weeks thereafter until final aircraft delivery in nineteenth month. Following are estimated

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NEA/ARN:TJScotes:am/gl	6/3/70	21019	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:
OSD/ISA - Mr. Billings
NEA/ARN - TWSeelye
NEA/RA - Col.DBunte
DOD/MA&S - SManolas
White House -
NEA - RPDavies
PM - MR.RMatheron (subs)
DOD/AF - Col. Reberg
S/S -

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increased costs for earlier deliveries which reflect over-time and multishift work, etc: nine F-104A's at $806,672 total $7,260,048; one F-104B at $857,789 total $857,789; total material costs $8,117,837. In addition admin costs of $167,157 plus ~~admin~~ aircraft transportation cost of $350,00 for total $8,634,994.

3. If GOJ opts for shorter delivery times at increased costs, you authorized amend letter of offer accordingly.

4. USAF sending separate message on disbursement schedule.

5. FYI: USAF inventory J-79-11 engine is 10 (ten). Therefore, you should drop offer of spare engine. END FYI

END

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

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~~TOP SECRET~~

9/20

NOTE VERBAL

Pursuant to Ambassador Rabin's conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Sisco this morning and particularly to Secretary Sisco's words to the effect that the United States "agrees in principle to the Israeli operation by air and land," which action is deemed an "Israeli operation", the Embassy of Israel would appreciate receiving a response to the following questions:

1) Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?

2) Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and coordination between us?

3) How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

4) Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defence.

5) Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

6) Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

7) Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

To avoid unfortunate misunderstandings, it will undoubtedly be appreciated that it is in the mutual interest of both Governments that matters of such seriousness be clarified to the maximum degree possible.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLNJ-85/15/46 Per ltr. 12/10/2014
By RS NARA, Date 10/18/2016

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Richard T. Kennedy RTK
Harold H. Saunders HHS

SUBJECT: Noon Meeting on Jordan

Attached are:

Tab I - A full factual wrap-up of the situation with late cables attached.

Tab II - A memo for the President describing the present situation in brief and the actions taken since the last meeting.

Tab III - A list of a few issues that could be discussed at the meeting. You can hand this to the President or use it yourself as you wish.

State Dept. review completed

~~Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required~~
JUS 4/23/2012

NSA review completed

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders HHS

SUBJECT: Jordan Situation as of 11:30 a.m., September 22

At Tab A is a full run-down. The latest cables are at Tab B.

In brief, the main elements in the situation at this moment are:

1. We still have no answer from either the Israelis or King Hussein. The Israeli Cabinet was still in session as of 9 a.m. EDT with no hint of when action will be taken, if any, or what it may be. Ambassador Brown finally got through to Zaid Rifai who is attempting to arrange transport to the palace for the Ambassador to discuss with King Hussein his views on an Israeli ground attack in Jordan.

2. The military situation remains about the same. The Jordanian tanks and artillery remain in static positions in ring around the Syrians positions and armor in the Irbid area. The Syrians, according to the Israelis, attempted again today to advance toward Amman but again were beaten back by the Jordanian tanks and artillery. The Israelis also have an "unconfirmed" report that some 50 Iraqi tanks advanced westward from MAFRAQ toward the strategic Ramtha junction last night and that another 50 Iraqi tanks may also have moved westward. The situation in Amman apparently remains unchanged with some, but not heavy, fighting continuing.

3. We have nothing new on the Arab summit. It was scheduled to meet at noon EDT.

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Israeli Intervention: The Israelis appear to be in a high state of alert. Israeli troops, tanks and artillery were observed moving north yesterday in the general direction of the Golan Heights, from which they could easily reach the Irbid area if required.

25X1 [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] (Irbid is about 10 miles from Israeli positions in the Heights.)

Soviet Attitude: The Egyptians have assured us that the Soviets made a demarche in Damascus yesterday in an effort to get the Syrians to reconsider their actions in Jordan; this and other bits of evidence suggest that Moscow has made real efforts in the Arab capitals to localize the action in Jordan and bring it to an end. Aside from predictable naval activity in response to our fleet movements in the Mediterranean, the Soviets have made no threatening military gestures, and their public and private admonitions have in the main been temperate and cautiously worded.

In the event of western or Israeli intervention, the Soviets would probably consider demonstrative gestures such as shifting elements of their Mediterranean Squadron, reinforcing the Soviet military presence in the UAR, or moving a token military contingent by air into Syria. At the same time Moscow would resort to heavy diplomatic pressure and virulent propaganda attacks. There is no evidence that the Soviets are making even contingency preparations for direct military involvement. The Soviet reaction seems likely to be the same whether a western country or Israel intervened.

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25X1

[redacted]

Iraqi Attitude: The Iraqi attitude has been ambiguous since the start of hostilities. Except for a few minor and unconfirmed instances, the Iraqi forces in Jordan have gone to great lengths to keep clear of the fighting and have assured the Jordanians they have no intention of joining in. But the Iraqi Foreign Ministry has been assuring fedayeen representatives in Beirut that they have been arming Palestinians in Jordan and providing them with equipment. This morning some of the Iraqi units concentrated around Mafraq began moving westward toward Jarash; they assured King Husayn they would not be moving far and were simply protecting their flank. This movement,

25X1 [redacted] 25X1

has alarmed the Jordanians, whose situation in northern Jordan would be badly compromised if the Iraqi actions prove to be hostile.

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The Situation in Jordan

22 September 1970

Amman: Fighting in the city became general again this morning, and the curfew was reimposed at 1030. The Embassy area continues to be a main focus of the fighting, and the Jordan army has been unable either to bring in supplies or remove the wounded Bedouin guards. Amman airport was still subject to fedayeen sniper fire, and we have no clear idea of its security. Judging from the firing and

[redacted] 25X1

general situation of the city is probably as bad as the press has described it; Yasir Arafat told Nasir that 80 percent of the buildings in the Wahdat refugee camp had been destroyed and that 7,000 casualties were suffered in the camp alone.

3

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25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

Jordan Sitrep and CIB Contribution

Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean are keeping close tabs on the movements of US and NATO warships in the Mediterranean but have shown no hostile intent or active harassment. A Soviet missile cruiser and two missile destroyers which left the Black Sea on 20 September probably were sent into the Mediterranean in response to the ~~increased~~ increased tensions in the Middle East , but the Soviet Mediterranean squadron remains at a strength considered normal for this time of year.

25X1 [redacted]

4

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INFO RUQMKB/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3901
BT
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 5261

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EXDIS

HANDLE AS NODIS

REF: TEL AVIV 5248

PERIODIC CHECKS INDICATE THAT CABINET STILL IN SESSION AS OF 3:00 P.M. LOCAL WITH NO HINT OF WHEN ACTION WILL BE TAKEN, IF ANY, OR WHAT IT MAY BE. GP-1

ZIMMERMAN

BT

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-NSC-615-1-23-6

SECRET

Flash

NODIS

QSL

RECEIVED WHCA

VV SHA181
ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 5456Q 2651231
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 221229Z SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 221235Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1446
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3457
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5345

EXDIS - TREAT AS NODIS

SUBJ: SYRIAN THREAT

1. GOT THROUGH TO RIFAI AT 1355 LOCAL. SAID WE HAD TO GET TOGETHER AS I DID NOT THINK WE COULD DOUBLE-TALK SUBJECT.

2. HE WILL TRY TO ARRANGE TRANSPORT.

BROLN

BT

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EXEMPT

per sec 3.3(b)(1), E.O. 13526
per RAC Review 6/13/2008

Pages 9-14

JHS
4/25/2012

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532943 Date: 11/12/2014

NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

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#15147 9

~~SECRET~~
Classification

152449

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
- [ ] COLLECT
- [ ] CHARGE TO

17 SEP 70 05 23Z

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

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STATE 152449

NODIS

REF: Amman ~~4354~~ 4845

1. We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely, our judgment continues to be that active Iraqi military intervention against King ~~improbable~~ questionable.

2. Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What you propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely appropriate. ~~You should not rpt not altogether preclude the possibility of direct USG involvement in form~~ and you can be encouraging of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis, ~~you should not dash~~ about the prospects for material assistance. ~~It is important that he not be left with impression that he is being left in the lurch.~~ You may inform King that Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN-85/15/47 Sec 3.3(b)(6) Ltr 12/10/2014
By RAM NARA, Date 12/18/2014

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
NEA:TASK FORCE:TWSeelye:bdf	9/17/70	23172	NEA/TASK FORCE - Talcott W. Seelye

CLEARANCES:

NEA - Mr. Sisco
NEA - Mr. Atherton
White House - Dr. Kissinger
S/S - O - [illegible]

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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TELEGRAM

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ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH PAGE 2

3. XX Re para 4 reftel, you should not rpt not discourage King from taking stern measures against fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him xx alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen.

4. We agree that you should urge King to enlist all possible support from xxxxxx other Arab states. We recall Nasser's reported offer of assistance to King, made during latter's last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with critical internal situation. We take Nasser's assurances of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King should at this juncture at least test Nasser's earlier undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in

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CLEARANCES:

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current situation and their moral support would be of marginal value. ~~XXXX~~ Soviets cannot be expected to play useful role although it is our guess Soviets probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.

5. We wish you the best of luck in your first meeting ~~£~~ with King and believe your talk with him will be ~~XXXXXXX~~ useful at this juncture. King, as you know, tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be important at this point.

END

ROGERS

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532951 Date: 11/12/2014

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WH K

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

/0

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

Control: 5096Q

Recd : 21 Sep 70
7:38 a.m.

109472 SEP 70 ZFF4
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9207
IT
~~S E C R E T~~ TEL AVIV 5211

NODIS

REF: STATE 154454

1. AT ISRAELI REQUEST, CHARGE AND DATT MET 10:00 A.M. LOCAL SEPTEMBER 21 WITH BRIG GEN GILBOA, ACTING CHIEF IDF INTELLIGENCE, ASST DIR GEN MFA GAZIT, AND OTHER ISRAELI MILITARY STAFF OFFICERS. CHARGE HAD RECEIVED AND READ STATE 154448 PRIOR TO MEETING. REFTEL ARRIVED DURING MEETING AND SUBSTANCE WAS COMMUNICATED TO CHARGE BY TELEPHONE.

2. GILBOA SAID THAT GOI WAS CONSIDERING ON CONTINGENCY BASIS WHAT IT HAD HEARD FROM USG AND FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, SUBJECT OF COURSE TO WHATEVER DECISION MADE AT GOVERNMENT LEVEL, IDF WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER USG WILL BE ABLE TO SET UP OPERATIONAL LIAISON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AS WELL AS POLITICAL LIAISON. IF GOI DECIDES IDF IS TO GO IN, IDF WILL NEED TO KNOW HOW TO IDENTIFY AND DISTINGUISH BETWEEN JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES AND WILL NEED TO KNOW LOCATION OF FRONT LINES. IDF ESPECIALLY NEEDS:

A. BY RADIO, DETAILED JORDANIAN POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS, I.E. WHETHER STANDING STILL, MOVING FORWARD, ETC; JORDANIAN KNOWLEDGE OF SYRIAN POSITIONS AND INTENTIONS.

B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR IDENTIFICATION ON GROUND, I.E. SIGNALS, COLORED ROCKETS, COLORED SMOKE, DAY AND NIGHT TO MARK JORDANIAN FRONT LINES.

C. WOULD USG CONSIDER IDEA OF COMMON STAFF FOR "PROJECT MANAGEMENT" OF OPERATION?

2. GILBOA AGAIN EMPHASIZED HE WAS MENTIONING THESE QUESTIONS ONLY IN CASE GOI WHOUDL DEICIDE TO TAKE PART.

3. GAZIT SAID GOI WAS BEGINNING TO HAVE DOUBTS WHETHER AIR OPERATION ALONE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE NOW. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE A DAY OF 36 HOURS AGO, BUT GOI NOW WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER USG BELIEVES AIR ACTIVITY, EVEN IF BY BOTH US AND ISRAEL, COULD BRING ABOUT SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532944 Date: 11/12/2014

NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RELEASED IN FULL

P 190900Z SEP 70
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8346
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ CAIRO 2147

CN: 4870Q
Rec'd: September 19, 1970
5:24 a.m.

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

NODIS

DEPT PASS AMMAN

1. ACCORDING TO UK EMBASSY OFFICER (WRIGHT), KING HUSSEIN HAS NOTIFIED LONDON THAT SYRIAN TANKS HAVE TAKEN POSITIONS 250 YARDS INSIDE JORDANIAN TERRITORY ON JORDAN'S NORTHERN BORDER AND ARE FIRING ON JORDANIAN ARMY POSITIONS.

2. LONDON HAS INSTRUCTED UK AMBS IN CAIRO AND BAGHDAD TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND REQUEST THEM TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS IN DAMASCUS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES.

BERGUS
BT

NOTE: PASSED THE WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

~~SECRET~~

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VV EHA058
OO ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 5838Q 2540144
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 2131432 SEP 70
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
Z 213124Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1398
ST
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4988

EXDIS

DEPT PASS INFO FLASH LONDON

(TREAT AS NODIS)

1. THE KING PHONED ME AT THREE A.M. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED ME TO PASS THE FOLLOWING MOST URGENT MESSGE DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT. MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

2. QTE SITUATION DETERIORATING DANGEROUSLY FOLLOWING SYRIAN MASSIVE INVASION. NORTHERN FORCES DISJOINTED. IRBID OCCUPIED. THIS HAVING DISASTROUS EFFECT ON TIRED TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL AND SURROUNDINGS. AFTER CONTINUOUS ACTION AND SHORTAGE SUPPLIES MILITARY GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF ADVISE. I REQUEST IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL INTERVENTION BOTH AIR AND LAND AS PER THE AUTHORIZATION OF GOVERNMENT TO SAFEGUARD SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF JORDAN. IMMEDIATE RPT IMMEDIATE AIR STRIKES ON INVADING FORCES FROM ANY QUARTER PLUS AIR COVER ARE IMPERATIVE. WISH EARLIEST WORD ON LENGTH OF TIME IT MAY REQUIRE YOUR FOCES TO LAND WHEN REQUESTED WHICH MIGHT BE VERY SOON. UNQTE

3. KING SAID HE UNABLE TO CONTACT BRITISH AND ASKED US TO GET THIS MESSAGE TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT MOST URGENTLY.

BROWN

BT

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

NNNN

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

0.010945Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 878
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4216

5 7 Q

1970 SEPT 1 AM 7 30

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NODIS

SUBJ: HUSSEIN SEEKS SUPPORT IN EVENT OF CONFRONTATION

1. KING HUSSEIN INFORMED EMBOFF EVENING AUG 31 THAT WHILE HE WOULD TRY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN, FURTHER INCIDENTS SUCH AS THOSE THAT TROUBLED CAPITAL ON AUG 29 WOULD MAKE THIS DIFFICULT. KING HAD FOUND HE COULD NOT PLACE TRUST IN COMMITMENTS OF FEDAYEEN BECAUSE THESE TENDED TO BECOME UNDONE BY THEIR UNDISCIPLINED SUBORDINATES. HE INDICATED HE WAS UNDER PRESSURE FROM ARMY TO RESPOND VIGOROUSLY TO RECENT FEDAYEEN PROVOCATIONS AND REMARKED FRANKLY THAT CONTINUED DISORDER IN AMMAN, TOGETHER WITH THE HARDSHIP THIS WOULD INFLICT ON CIVIL POPULATION, MIGHT AT SOME POINT FORCE HIS HAND.

70 SEP 1 AM 9:45

2. KING WAS AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT A CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN MIGHT RAISE POSSIBILITY OF INTERVENTION BY SYRIA OR IRAQI TROOPS STATIONED IN JORDAN. KING SAW THIS AS THREAT NOT ONLY TO HIMSELF OR TO HIS REGIME BUT ALSO TO PROSPECTS US PEACE INITIATIVE IN MIDDLE EAST. AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY KING HOPED HE COULD RELY ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT. EXPANDING ON THIS STATEMENT, KING SAID WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS US MAKING STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT, IF NECESSARY, WARNING AGAINST ANY HOSTILE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. HE THOUGHT, ALSO, THAT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR BENEFIT IF ISSUED JOINTLY WITH USSR AND, IN FACT, WOULD PREFER JOIN STATEMENT.

3. KING HAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH SOVIETS HIS CONCERNS ABOUT HOSTILE INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. SOVIETS ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THEY ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT GOJ ANY WAY THEN CAN SHOULD IT ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES.
(HUSSEIN DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK USSR'S VIEWS ON PUBLIC STATEMENT). HE WOULD LIKE US, HOWEVER, TO GO TO RUSSIANS AND INQUIRE IF THEY PREPARED TO JOIN US IN GNERAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT OF GOJ REGIME IF SITUATION WARRANTS. HUSSEIN ASSUMES WE WOULD INFORM SOVIETS THAT IN THIS MATTER WE RESPONDING TO PROPOSAL PUT TO US BY GOJ.

4. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION KING WAS NOT PREPARED COMPLETELY TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME POINT HE MIGHT BE DRIVEN TO REQUEST AMERICAN MILITARY ACTION IN HIS BEHALF. HOWEVER,

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior

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HE SEES THIS AS ONLY A "REMOTE POSSIBILITY." KING FELT THAT JORDAN ARMY COULD COPE WITH DOMESTIC SITUATION THREATS - AS THEY PRESENTLY STOOD. HE INDICATED ALSO THAT UAR PROMISE OF SUPPORT COULD BE USEFUL IN MAINTAINING HIS ASCENDANCY OVER POTENTIAL OPPONENTS, ALTHOUGH IN MATERIAL TERMS HE WAS AWARE SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NECESSARILY BE LIMITED.

6. KING URGED THAT THIS APPROACH TO US BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. GP3

ODELL

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~

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(10)

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5995Q
AUG 25, 4:12 PM 1970

R 251440Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 860
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3118
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4101

NODIS

SANDSTORM

REF STATE 137360

1. EMBASSY CONCURS WITH DEPT VIEW THAT HUSSEIN'S MESSAGE NOW NOT BE PASSED TO GOI. MOREOVER, WE SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN OURSELVES REOPENING WITH HM A SUBJECT WHICH HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY PASSAGE TIME AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. IF EITHER KING OR CHIEF OF DIWAN RIFA'I RAISE QUESTION AGAIN WITH US WE WILL DRAW ON GUIDANCE PARA 2 DEPT'S REFTEL. AT THAT TIME - OR SOME OTHER MOMENT THAT SEEMS APPROPRIATE - WE MAY SUGGEST TO ZAID RIFA'I OR HM THAT THEY CONSIDER REESTABLISHING DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAEL THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.

ODELL

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 8/25/70

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 253Q
RECD: SEP 1, 1970
6:37 P.M.

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Z 012136Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 887
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4241

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SEP 1 PM 8:05

NODIS.

SUBJ HUSSEIN REQUESTS BIG FOUR COMMUNIQUE IN VIEW POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION

REF A) AMMAN 4216 B) DEPT 142836

1. AT 2140 LOCAL CHIEF OF ROYAL DIWAN ZAID AL-RIFA'I PASSED FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO EMBOFF (HORAN): RIFA'I STATED THAT GOJ HAD DERERMINED THAT PDFLP BEHIND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON KING. ATTACK FORTUNATELY UNSUCCESSFUL AND KING HAS RETURNED HOME.

2. RIFAI SAID GOJ HAS SINCE THEN RECEIVED ULTIMATUM FROM IRQIS DEMANDING THAT THE GOVT STOP FIRING AT COMMANDOS AND STOP ANY PROVOCATIVE ACTION AGAINST THEM. OTHERWISE THE GOVT OF IRAQ AND THE IRAQI ARMY IN JORDAN WILL HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR PREVIOUS ATTITUDE AND TAKE ACTION.

3. RIFA'I STATED THAT JORDAN HAD REJECTED THE ULTIMATUM AND INFORMED THE GOI THAT THEY CONSIDERED IT RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY SITUATION THAT MIGHT ARISE AS A RESULT OF THE CONTENTS OF ITS MESSAGE.

4. GOJ, MOREOVER, IS NOW MEETING WITH FEDAYEEN TO ADVISE THEM THAT THEY HAVE TO GET OUT OF AMMAN IMMEDIATELY OR SUFFER CONSEQUENCES.

5. RIFA'I ARRIRMED HE HAD INFORMED THE ARAB GOVTS OF THIS MEETING AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADORS OF THE BIG FOUR. HIS MAJESTY BELIEVES THAT JOINT COMMUNIQUE FROM BIG FOUR, OR AT LEAST US-USSR, WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION IMPORTANT AND IT APPROPRIATE THAT ACTION BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY. RIFA'I SAID HE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH IF THERE WERE ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AND CLOSED BY SAYING THAT "WE ARE QUITE PREPARED TO TAKE ON THE WHOLE LOT IF REQUIRED." WHEN ASKED IF ANY PARTICULAR TIME FRAMEWORK IN MIND FOR FOUR POWER ACTION, RIFA'I REPLIED THAT IT SHOULD BE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior

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6. COMMENT: FRENCH AMB HAS SPOKEN WITH US ON THIS MATTER AND IT APPEARS THAT WHILE RIFA'I MESSAGE TO US IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT WHICH HE RECEIVED, BRITISH VERSION SPEAKS RATHER OF "THREATENED" ULTIMATUM FROM IRAQIS. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM THIS SLIGHT DISCREPANCY WITH BRITISH. FRENCH AMB ADDED HE BEMUSED BY SOVIET AMB'S STATEMENT - DESPITE RIFA'IS CLAIM HE HAD SPOKEN TO BIG FOUR REPS - TO HAVE HEARD NOTHING ON THIS MATTER FROM PALACE. FRENCH AMB CONJECTURED "BUT, THEN, HE MIGHT BE LYING."

7. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED ALONG LINES REQUESTED BY RIFA'I. SUCH EARLY ACTION MIGHT SUFFICIENTLY STRENGTHEN GOJ'S POLITICAL STANCE VIS-A-VIS ITS OPPOSITION AS TO CAUSE LATTER TO BACK DOWN AND NOT RISK ARMED CONFRONTATION.

8. WITH REFERENCE TO STATE 142836 JUST RECEIVED, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR ANY COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AT LEAST SOME MEMBERS OF BIG FOUR. SUCH MEASURE WOULD TEND TO KEEP EMPHASIS ON POLITICAL NATURE OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT WHICH IS WHERE EMPHASIS - PUBLICLY - FOR THE TIME BEING SHOULD REMAIN. GP3

ODELL

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

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WH 8

Department of State TELEGRAM

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Z 211120Z SEP 70 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9209
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ TEL AVIV 5213

5 0 9 7 Q
1970 SEP 21 AM 7 39

NODIS SANDSTORM

1. YAAKOV HERZOG, DIR GEN OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, CALLED CHARGE AT 12:30 LOCAL AND ASKED THAT FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE PASSED FROM ACTING PRIME MINISTER (ALLON) TO HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN. IF NOT POSSIBLE TO PASS DIRECTLY TO KING, HERZOG ASKED THAT MESSAGE BE GIVEN TO ZAID RAFAI FOR DELIVERY TO KING.

2. QTE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS WITH DEEP SYMPATHY AND GOOD WILL. IN VIEW URGENCY SITUATION SUGGEST IMMEDIATE MEETING WITH YOU OR YOUR AUTHORIZED COMPETENT REPRESENTATIVE AT PLACE, TIME YOUR CONVENIENCE. UNQTE..

3. CHARGE NOTED TO HERZOG THAT LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN MAKING IT EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR US EMBASSY TO BE IN TOUCH WITH KING OR ZAID. ALSO SAID IT APPEARED QUESTIONABLE WHETHER SENIOR JORDANIAN COULD GET OUT FOR MEETING UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. HERZOG SAID MEETINGS HAD BEEN ARRANGED PAST ON SHORT NOTICE UNDER DIFFICULTY AND HE FELT ZAID WOULD KNOW HOW TO ACCOMPLISH IT IF DECISION MADE.. HE REITERATED STRONG REQUEST USG TRY TO GET MESSAGE TO KING OF ZAID AND ASKED THAT HE BE INFORMED WHEN DELIVERY ACCOMPLISHED.

4. SINCE AMMAN HAS NO NODIS CAPABILITY, WE ARE SENDING THIS TO DAPARTMENT ONLY FOR DECISION WHETHER OR HOW TO TRANSMIT TO AMMAN.
GP-1.
ZURHELLEN
BT

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 9/21/70

~~SECRET~~

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NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

~~SECRET~~

TEL AVIV 5211, SEPTEMBER 21, NODIS, CN 5096

. IN RESPONSE QUERY AS TO PRESENT SITUATION, GILBOA SAID PHOTOT RECON MISSION WAS CARRIED OUT 0830 LOCAL THIS MORNING AND READOUT WILL NOT BE AVAIALBE BEFORE AFTERNOON. IN GENERAL, HE THOUGHT APPROXIMATELY 250-300 SYRIAN TANKS HAD COME INTO IRBID AREA. EBEN THOUGH SOME OF THEM HAD ENTERED CITY PROPER, HE THOUGHT THEY WERE STILL GROUPED TOGETHER AND NOT DISPERSED AMONG CITY STREETS. SECOND ECHELON NOW MOVING IN FROM SYRIA, SUPPLY VEHICLES, BULLDOZERS FOR DIGGING TANKS IN, ETC. WE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT IDF CONSIDERS THERE STILL VULNERABLE TARGETS BETWEEN IRBID AND SYRIAN BORDER BUT NOT SO VULNERABLE AS YESTERDAY. GILBOA SAID THAT IF "TAIL" OF SYRIAN MOVEMENT IS CUT OFF HEAD WOULD BE SERIOUSLY CRIPPLED.

5. GILBOA SAID THAT, PURELY FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT, HE THOUGHT PREFERRED OPERATION WOULD BE COMBINATION OVERLAND MOVEMENT OF ARMOR AGAINST SYRIAN FORCES IN VICINITY IRBID, ACCOMPANIED BY AIR AND HELICOPTER SUPPORT. AS TO MOVEMENT EXROSS GOLAN HEIGHTS INTO SYRIA WITH OBJECTIVE CAUSING SYRIANS TO TURN AROUND AND COME BACK, GILBOA SAID SUCH DECISION MIGHT BE TAKEN AS PREFERABLE ON POLITICLA GROUNDS BUT NOT MILITARILY; FACT WAS THAT SYRIAN FORCES IN SYRIA WERE NOT THREAT TO ISRAEL, WHILE SYRIAN FORCES IN IRBID WERE; MILITARY REASON THEREFORE PRESCRIBES HIT DANGER WHERE IT IS.

6. AT THIS POINT INFO STAT 154454 COMMUNICATED TO CHARGE BY TELEPHONE. CHARGE INFORMED GILBOA AND GAZIT. GILBOA SAID HE COULD NOT QUARREL ABOUT LOCUS FOR MAJOR DECISIONS BUT HE THOUGHT LIAISON ON OPERATIONAL MATTERS HE HAD BROUGHT UP WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED HERE.

7. AFTER MEETING BROKE UP, GAZIT TOLD CHARGE PRIVATELY HE THOUGHT GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE MAKE DECISION WITHIN HOUR OR TWO ON SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER TO US IN PRINCIPLE.

8. COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND DEPARTMENT FEELING IT ESSENTIAL TO CENTRALIZE COORDINATION WITH GOI AT WASHINGTON END. BELIEVE WE SHOULD REMAIN CLUED IN FOR INFO, HOWEVER, AGAINST CONTINGENCY THAT WE HAVE TO GET INTO ACT AT SOME LATER STAGE GP-1.

ZURHELLEN

BT

NOTE: Passed White House by OC/T.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532952 Date: 11/12/2014
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532937 Date: 11/12/2014

NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

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(5)

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

O 092032Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1044
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3210
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4521

2219Q
SEP 9, 8:20 PM 1970

NODIS

REF STATE 147107

FOLLOWING ARE OUR THOUGHTS ON QUESTIONS RAISED DEPT'S REFTEL:

1. WE ARE UNCERTAIN THAT HUSAIN WOULD BE WILLING AT THIS TIME - EVEN AT OUR INSTIGATION - TO UNDERTAKE FINAL MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN. THIS SUGGESTED WE BELIEVE BY HIS LACK OF RESPONSE TO THE MANY FEDAYEEN PROVOCATIONS OF PAST TWO WEEKS. SEVERAL OF THESE COULD HAVE FURNISHED PRETEXT FOR CONFRONTATION IF THIS HAD BEEN IN HIS MIND. MORE RECENTLY IT SUGGESTED ALSO BY HIS COMMISSIONING CHIEF OF STAFF TO ESTABLISH CEASE-FIRE ON BASIS PREVIOUS MUCH-ABUSED AGREEMENTS. KING'S UNRECEPTIVENESS TO SUCH PROPOSAL FROM U.S. FINALLY SUGGESTED BY OUR HAVING RECEIVED NO FEELERS FROM HIM THIS SUBJECT. IF DESTRUCTION OF FEDAYEEN WERE HIGH ON KING'S LIST OF PLANS, WE BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE RAISED MATTER WITH US BY NOW.

2. EVEN IF HUSAIN WERE TO IMPLY TO US THAT IT NOW PROPITIOUS TIME FOR STRIKE AGAINST FEDAYEEN, WE WOULD COUNSEL RESTRAINT. FEDAYEEN HAVE LARGE NUMBER CIVILIAN HOSTAGES - INCLUDING SEVERAL US OFFICIALS - IN THEIR HANDS. IF HUSAIN WERE NOW TO GIVE ARMY ITS LEAD, IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT MANY HOSTAGES WOULD BE KILLED AND THAT FORMER TWA/SWISSAIR PASSENGERS NOW AT AL-URDUN HOTEL MIGHT BE ENDANGERED. OUR HAVING GIVEN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO GOJ STRIKE AT SUCH INOPPORTUNE TIME, MOREOVER, WOULD SOONER OR LATER BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

3. IF ICRC RESCUE OPERATION FAILS, HOWEVER, AND HOSTAGES KILLED EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD THEN EMPHATICALLY URGE KING TO SETTLE FEDAYEEN HASH ONCE AND FOR ALL. SAFETY OF HOSTAGES IN FACT MIGHT BE PROMOTED IF GOJ MADE IT CLEAR THAT HARM TO THEM WOULD BE SIGNAL FOR REPRESSION OF ENTIRE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT.

4. IF HUSAIN SHOWS DISPOSITION - AFTER ENCUMBRANCE OF AIRCRAFT PASSENGERS REMOVED - TO CONTEMPLATE FEDAYEEN ROLL-UP WE BELIEVE JAA ADEQUATE FOR JOB. THIS JUDGMENT WOULD STILL HOLD EVEN IF IRAQIS JOINED OPPOSITION, EXCEPT THAT CONFLICT WOULD THEN BE BLOODIER ONE.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

~~SECRET~~

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NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

~~SECRET~~

5. IF CONFRONTATION SEEMED ADVISABLE OR IN THE OFFING, WE WOULD DISCOURAGE HUSAIN'S REQUEST FOR DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION AS FOLLOWS: WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE PROBABLY NOT NEEDED, AND THAT VICTORY ACHIEVED EVEN WITH TOKEN US PRESANCE COULD BE POLITICAL SUICIDE. ANY DIRECT US PARTICIPATION WOULD DISCREDIT KING IN ARAB EYES AND STRIKE AT BASE OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER FOR WHICH KING FEELS SELF DEEPLY RESPONSIBLE. WE COULD OFFER INSTEAD ASSURANCES OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WITH SOME OF HUSAIN'S ARAB NEIGHBORS. (IN FORMER CAPACITY WE COULD SEEK OBTAIN ASSURANCES OF AT LEAST NEUTRALITY OF USSR.) AT SAME TIME WE SHOULD CUUTION KING AGAINST LAUNCHING ONE-MAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST FEDAYEEN. WE SHOULD URGE THAT HE MAKE ANY DRIVE AGAIMDT THEM APPEAR LEGITIMATE INTER-ARAB POLICE ACTION AND SEEK PARTICIPATION OF AT LEAST SMALL UNITS FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR. IN AFTERMATH RECENT PFLP SUCCESSES AND PROBABLE LEFTWARD SHIFT OF WHOLE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT, BOTH THESE STATES MIGHT BE PREPARED TO COME OUT MORE STRONGLY AGAINST FEDAYEEN THAN HERETOFORE.

6. COMMENT: WE REALIZE THAT ACTION SUGGESTED PARA THREE (ABOVE) DIFFERS FROM RECOMMENDATION AMMAN'S 4495. PAST SEVEN HOURS OF VIOLENT CONFRONTATION, HOWEVER, SUGGEST TO US THAT STATUS OF PASSENGERS IS SHIFTING FROM THAT OF PAWNS IN TERRORIST PUBLICITY GAME TO THAT OF INSTRUMENTS TO BE USED BY FEDAYEEN IN POLITICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST GOJ. AS PASSENGERS' POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE INCREASES SO DO DANGERS TO WHICH THEY EXPOSED. FOR THIS REASON BELIEVE IT NOW APPROPRIATE TO ASK GOJ TO ISSUE WARNING OF MOST DIRE CONSEQUENCES IF PASSENGERS OR ANY OTHER HOSTAGES ARE HARMED.
ODELL
BT

~~SECRET~~

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532924 Date: 11/12/2014

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NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

RF

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

W/d 9

P 020720Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 891
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3145
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4248

CN: 345Q
Rec'd: September 2, 1970
4:29 a.m.

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

NODIS/SANDSTORM

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: IRAQI THREAT APPARENTLY DIMINISHES

REF: A. AMMAN 4245; B. DEPT 144329

1. EMBOFF (HORAN) SPOKE WITH ZAID RIFAI 0215 LOCAL SEPT 2 TO SAY THAT CHARGE WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON HIS MAJESTY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO REVIEW SUBJECT AMMAN'S REFTEL. RIFAI REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW IF THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SOME TIME BUT THAT HE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH EMBASSY. HE DEEPLY APPRECIATED OUR CONCERN. HE INDICATED ALSO THAT GRAVITY OF IRAQI THREAT SEEMED TO HAVE DIMINISHED. IRAQIS, HE SAID, HAVE APPARENTLY BACKED DOWN, ALTHOUGH CLAIMING THAT THEIR LESS AGGRESSIVE POSTURE RESULT OF JORDAN'S SUBMISSION TO IRAQI ULTIMATUM. RIFAI'S ADDED THIS, OF COURSE, WAS NONSENSE.

2. COMMENT: (A) WE IMAGINE THAT KING IN POSTPONING REQUEST FOR AUDIENCE PROBABLY CONCERNED ABOUT UNCERTAINTY OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN AMMAN AND AL-HUMMAR, WHICH LIES SOME 20 KILOMETERS OUT OF TOWN. FURTHERMORE, WITH IRAQI THREAT APPARENTLY DIMINISHING, KING MAY NOW WISH TO FOCUS GREATER ATTENTION ON FEDAYEEN ISSUE; (B) RECOMMEND WE LET SUBJECT EMBASSY'S REFTEL LIE UNLESS HM RAISES IT WITH US ONCE AGAIN.

ODELL

BT

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

~~SECRET~~

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(9) C

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

W/d

RELEASED IN PART
50X6,50X1

CONTROL: 0 2 7 0Q
RECD: SEP 1, 747PM'70

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

Z 0122502 SEP 70 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 888
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 3144
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4245

NODIS SANDSTORM

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT

SUBJ JORDANIANS INQUIRE RE POSSIBLE GOI AIR SUPPORT

SANITIZED
50X6
50X1

REF STATE 137360; AMMAN 4101

1. ACV RDING TO MESSAGE PASSED [redacted] BY ZAID RIFA'I, BAGHDAD RADIO BROADCASTING WORD THAT JORDAN ARMY SHELLING REFUGEE CAMP. RIFA'I CLAIMS THIS IS NOT TRUE BUT THAT BAGHDAD RADIO IS REPEATING THIS EXAGGERATION. ACCORDING TO RIFA'I, IRAQIS HAVE ALSO ISSUED ANOTHER ULTIMADOM SAYING SHELLING MUST STBP BY 2300 LOCAL OR THEIR ELEMENTS WILL TAKE ACTION TO STOP IT.

2. ACCORDING TO OTHER AGENCY SOURCE, RIFA'I THEN SAID THAT IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE JAA CONFRONTATION WITH IRAQIS, KING REQUESTS ISRAELI AIR FORCE TO STAND BY IF HM FINDS IT NECESSARY TO CALL ON THEM FOR AIR SUPPORT.

COMMENT: EMBASSY AT THIS POINT CANNOT GIVE ITS FULL SUPPORT TO JORDANIAN REQUEST. ADMITTEDLY IF RECOURSE TO ISRAELI AIR FORCE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE HUSSEIN'S CERTAIN OVERTHROW, WE MIGHT REGARD MATTER IN DIFFERENT LIGHT. WE REALIZE ALSO THAT IF MATTERS COME TO THIS PASS, PRESS OF TIME MAY, NOT RPT NOT PERMIT US LUXURY OF REFLECTION. NEVERTHELESS, WE COUNSEL PRUDENCE ON THIS MATTER FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:
A. WE THINK THAT JAA - EVEN THOUGH ALL UNITS MAY NOT BE UTTERLY PRO-MONARCHIST - WOULD RALLY BEHIND KING IN CASE NATION THREATENED BY IRAQI OUTSIDERS. IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT, MOREOVER, THAT JAA STRENGTH IN STRICTLY MILITARY TERMS IS SUPERIOR TO COMBINED FORCES OF ITS POTENTIAL FEDAYEEN AND IRAQI ENEMY.

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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~~SECRET~~

B. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES TO HUSSEIN HAVING BEEN SAVED BY IDF MIGHT PROVE IN THE EVENT JUST AS HARMFUL TO HIM AS ANYTHING THE IRAQIS HAD IN MIND. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE, THE IMPACT ON PEACE TALKS OF SUCH TRIPARTITE MUNEUVER BY GOI, GOJ AND OURSELVES COULD BE MOST HARMFUL. HOWEVER MUCH NASSER MIGHT SECRETLY BE PLEASED TO SEE IRAQIS GET A LICKING, WE CONJECTURE THAT AS ARAB LEADER HE COULD HARDLY STAND BY SILENTLY WHILE THIS ADMINSTERED AT HANDS OF IDF.

C. I PROPOSE TO REVIEW THIS MATTER WITH HIS MAJESTY AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, HOPEFULLY SEPT 3. IN MEANTIME I RECOMMEND THAT MATTER NOT BE PASSED OUTSIDE DEPT.

ODELL

BT

~~SECRET~~

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(9) RF

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

Z 162315Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1269
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4845

4008Q
SEP 16, 7:57 PM 1970

NODIS

1. I AM NOT SURE JUST HOW SERIOUS KING'S REQUEST IS. I CAN'T SEE ANY REAL THREAT FROM SYRIA. IT HAS VIRTUALLY NO TROOPS (ABOUT 600 MEN IN AA UNITS) IN JORDAN PLUS A SYRIAN-DIRECTED FEDAYEEN GROUP. KING IS, OF COURSE, CONCERNED BY RADIO REPORTS THAT SYRIA IS VOCALLY ATTACKING HIS GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE AND IS VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN.

2. WE HAVE ALREADY GONE THROUGH AN EXERCISE CONCERNING POSSIBLE IRAQI INTERVENTION ABOUT TEN DAYS AGAO.

3. I THINK KING WANTS HIS HAND HELD. THIS I PROPOSE TO DO, SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S APPROVAL. I'LL TELL HIM A) THAT WE WANT A STRONG, STABLE JORDAN CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AND TAKING A LEADING PART IN JARRING TALKS AS PRESIDENT TOLD ME IN SAN CLEMENTE, B) THAT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY HOSTAGE PROBLE, C) THAT IS IS BASICLY JORDANIAN DECISION AS TO HOW IT WILL RESTORE CENTRAL AUTHORITY, D) THAT I WANT HIS VIEWS ON OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM WHICH I WILL PROMPTLY REPORT TO USG, AND E) THAT I WANT TO ASSURE HIM AGAIN OF OUR DESIRE BE HELPFUL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC AND PLITICAL MEANS. IF NECESSARY, I WILL DISABUSE HIM OF POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT USG INVOLVEMENT IN INTERDICTING SYRIANS AND IRAQUIS.

4. FRANKLY, AND DESPITE ALL THE IMPLICIT DANGERS TO HOSTAGES, I HOPE I WILL NOT BE TOLD TO DISCOURAGE HIM FROM TAKING STERN MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN. IF HE DOES NOT, AFTER PUTTING IN OFFICE HIS OWN MILITARY, HIS REGIME AND MODERATION WE HOPE FOR FROM JORDAN WILL BE WEAKER THAN EVER BEFORE.

5. WE'VE TURNED OVER QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ANYONE ELSE--ESPECIALLY IN ARAB WORLD--CAN BE OF ANY HELP. IT DOESN'T LOOK LIKE IT. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK I SHOULD URGE HIM TO PROTECT HIS FLANKS BY ENLISTING WHATEVER SUPPORT HE CAN FROM OTHER ARABS. I ALSO HOPE I CAN TELL HIM THAT WE WILL BE USEFUL WITH SAUDIS, MOROCCANS, TUNISIANS, AND LEBANESE. FURTHERMORE, WE COULD ASK OTHER EUROPEAN STATES AND PERHAPS USSR TO FOLLOW OUR EXAMPLE. DEPARTMENT'S ADVISE REQUESTED ON THIS PARAGRAPH.

BROWN

BT

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior

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'70 SEP 3 PM 9:39

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

881Q

SEP 4:14 PM 1970

P 031655Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 913
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4299

NODIS

SUBJ: ~~FRENCH INTEREST~~ IN WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 4241

1. COUNSELOR FRENCH EMBASSY BERNARD (PROTECT) INFORMED EMBOFF THAT GOF HAD SHOWN SOME INTEREST IN POSSIBLE BIG FOUR COMMUNIQUE WARNING AGAINST THIRD COUNTRY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN. GOF HE SAID WAS INSTRUCTING ITS UN REP (KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET) TO RAISE MATTER WITH OTHER REPS BIG FOUR IN NEW YORK.

2. BERNARD HAD HEARD FROM FRENCH EMBASSY MOSCOW THAT US HAD REQUESTED USSR TO WEIGH IN WITH IRAQIS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN BAGHDAD, HE SAID, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO THE SAME.

ODELL

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9/3/70

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

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O 040802Z AUG 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 711
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 3707

CN-466
August 4, 1970
5:07 a.m.

NODIS

SANDSTORM

DEPT PASS TEL AVIV

TEL AVIV ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT TO AMMAN

SUBJECT: PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBILITY OF IRAQI INTERVENTION

1. KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN TAKING NUMBER PRECAUTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN MIGHT MOVE AGAINST REGIME. (INCIDENTALLY, IRAQI FORCES DID NOT RPT NOT CONCLUDE THEIR MANEUVERS ON AUGUST 2, AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, BUT HAVE DECIDED CONTINUE THEM). HE THEREFORE HAS ASKED USG TO POSI TO ISRAELIS A QUESTION PHRASED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: HE WANTS TO KNOW WHETHER ISRAELIS WOULD CONSIDER THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS SUGGICIENTLY THREATENED BY IRAQI MILITARY INTERVENTION AGAINST THE JORDANIAN REGIME TO WARRANT ISRAELI AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE IRAQI TROOPS. (IT IS CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN HOPES ISRAELIS WOULD ANSWER AFFIRMATIVELY).

2. IF THE ISRAELIS ANSWER AFFIRMATIVELY, KING WOULD HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN AMMAN AND TEL AVIV WOULD SERVE AS A QUICK COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL TO PERMIT COORDINATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL OF WHATEVER MILITARY ACTION SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY.

3. KING HOPES HE CAN BE SUPPLIED ANSWERS TO FOREGOING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE GP-1
BT ODELL

NOTE: NOT PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

NNNN

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NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

Department of State TELEGRAM

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wid

Control: 274 3 30

Recd: Aug 11 7 28AM

70 AUG 10 AM 10 25

P 100950Z AUG 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 747
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3107
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 3822

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 3707; TEL AVIV 4161

1. EMBASSY AGREES GOI POSITION ANTICIPATED PARA 1 TEL AVIV'S REFTEL LIKELY TO BE THAT WHICH GOI WOULD ADOPT IF ASKED ABOUT ITS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER INTERVENTION IN JORDAN PER AMMAN'S 3707. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, IF WASHINGTON CONCURS, THAT BECAUSE REQUEST CAME SPECIFICALLY FROM KING, AND SINCE CIRCUMSTANCES IN AREA HAVE CHANGED SINCE DAYAN HYPOTHETICALLY ADDRESSED QUESTION IN APRIL, QUESTION AMMAN'S REFTEL SHOULD BE POSED TO GOI FOR COMMENT.

2. IF GOI REPLIES THAT NO INTERVENTION COULD BE CONSIDERED WITHOUT US CONCURRENCE AND SUPPORT (PRESUMABLY POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC) WE WOULD THEN SUBMIT RECOMMENDATION ABOUT MANNER OF OUR REPLY TO HM.

3. THE WHOLE QUESTION HOWEVER, IS ONE IN WHICH WE RELUCTANT TO BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED. THEREFORE, WITH DEPT CONCURRENCE WE WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE TO JORDANIANS THAT THEY RESUME DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN THEIR AND GOI MILITARY AUTHORITIES. THIS PARTICULAR LINE OF COMMUNICATION FALLEN INTO DISUSE, BUT GIVEN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE THINK IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE FOR GOJ TO CONSIDER REESTABLISHING AVENUE FOR SUCH DIRECT CONTACTS.

ODELL

BT

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532949 Date: 11/12/2014

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14

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Z 210547Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1403
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4993

5 0 5 1 Q
RECVD: 21 SEP 70
2:03AM

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

DEPT PASS LONDON FLASH

SUBJECT: KING'S LATEST MESSAGE

1. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT KING MEANS WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT BREAKDOWN. I IMAGINE THAT GOING THROUGH HIS MIND IS POSSIBILITY THAT DEFEAT OF HIS NORTHERN ARMY BY OVER-WHELMING SYRIAN FORCE WOULD SO DEMORALIZE HIS TIRED AND CONFUSED TROOPS HERE IN AMMAN THAT THEY WOULD CEASE TO FUNCTION AS AN EFFECTIVE FORCE. I SIMPLY CANNOT MAKE A JUDGMENT AS TO WHETHER THAT COULD OR WOULD HAPPEN.

2. AS BACKGROUND TO ABOVE IS FACT THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES IN AMMAN. IT WAS QUIET LIGHT DURING NIGHT BUT RESUMED AT DAWN ON A LESS INTENSE LEVEL THAN PAST FEW DAYS. AT PRESENT MOMENT (0800 LOCAL) ARTILLERY FIRE IS PICKING UP IN INTENSITY.

BROWN

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED LONDON BY OC/T
PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9-21-70

NNNN

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532949 Date: 11/12/2014

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532946 Date: 11/12/2014

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J. 13

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

Z 210510Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1399
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4989

5 0 4 9 Q
RECVD: 21 SEP 70
1:28AM

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

DEPT PASS INFO LONDON FLASH

1. RIFAI CALLED ME AT 0700L. HE READ TO ME STATEMENT FROM KING WHICH KING WISHES TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT. MESSAGE FOLLOWS.

2. QTE KING BELIEVES AIR STRIKE WILL TIP THE BALACE BUT IF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US BREAK AS RESULT OF COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN AMMAN THAN YOU HAVE MY ADVICE AND AUTHORITY TO LAND. UNQTE

3. WE HAD NO TIME TO TALK. HE SAID HE HAD TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID HE WOULD PHONE BACK SOON AND, IN ANY CASE, IF THERE ARE NEW DEVELOPMENTS. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION, I SAID THAT I HAD HAD NO REPLY YET BUT THAT I SURE IT WAS RECEIVING CAREFUL STUDY RDAT HIGHEST LEVELS.

4. COMMENT: THESE PHONE CALLS NECESSITATE A CROUCHED SPRINT OF A HALF BLOCK. IT'S EASIER AT NIGHT.

BROWN

BT

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T 9-21-70
NOT PASSED LONDON BY OC/T 9-21-70

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RECEIVED SAN CLEMENTE COMMCEN
6:30 A. M. PDT 2 SEPTEMBER 70

EIA163
OO WTE12
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O 021239Z SEP 70
FM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO WINSTON LORD FOR DR. KISSINGER
ZEM
~~S E C R E T~~ NODIS WHO1662

P 020940Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 895
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4257

NODIS

SANDSTORM

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ISRAELI ROLE IF IRAQIS INTERVENE IN JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 4248, 4245, 3:07; STATE 144329

1. AS NOTED AMMAN 4248, IT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT I WILL HAVE AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN TODAY. MOREOVER, URGENCY ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR, AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE, SUBJECT APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSIDED AGAIN AND WE THINK IT BEST TO LEAVE THINGS WHERE THEY ARE FOR TIME BEING.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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2. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT KING HUSSEIN MAY OR MAY NOT WAY WHEN HE DOES RECEIVE ME, I WISH RECORD THAT I AM VERY BEARISH ABOUT THE WHOLE IDEA OF GETTING USG INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE IDF ASSISTANCE TO JAA AGAINST IRAQIS. SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE REASONS FOR THIS VIEW ARE SET FORTH IN AMMAN 4245. ANOTHER REASON INVOLVES ROLE PLAYED BY CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT, ZAID RIFAI.

3. I HAVE COME TO REALIZE OVER PAST MONTHS THAT ALTHOUGH ZAID IS CERTAINLY A POWERFUL FIGURE, AND OUR CLOSE CONTACTS WITH HIM VERY VALUABLE, THE MESSAGES HE TRANSMITS ON HIS MAJESTY'S BEHALF ARE FREQUENTLY NOT EXACTLY THE SAME IN EITHER CONTENT OR MOOD AS THE MESSAGES ON SAME SUBJECT I GET DIRECTLY FROM THE KING. TWO EXAMPLES COME TO MIND:

(A) JUST BEFORE JUNE TROUBLES, THIS EMBASSY AND TEL AVIV WERE INVOLVED IN TRANSMITTING MESSAGES RELATING TO HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS CONTROL FEDAYEEN ATTACKS ON BEISAN VALLEY. A KEY MESSAGE INCLUDED ZAID'S ASSURANCE TO ME THAT JAA HAD BEEN GIVEN ORDERS TO "SHOOT TO KILL" FEDAYEEN WHO DISOBEYED KING'S ORDERS. THIS "ROBUST LANGUAGE" (TEL AVIV' PHRASE) APPARENTLY WENT FAR IN ASSUAGING THE ISRAELIS FOR THE TIME BEING. WHEN THE ATTACKS WERE RESUMED, I WENT TO SEE KING, WHO HAD ZAID AND FONMIN RIFAI PRESENT. KING WAS FORTHRIGHT, AND I BELIEVE HONEST, IN HIS DECLARATION OF INTENT TO MONTROL FEDAYEEN WITHIN LIMITS HIS ABILITY. BUT HE DID NOT USE SUCH "ROBUST LANGUAGE" AND LEFT SITUATION LESS CLEAR-CUT THAN ZAID'S VERSION HAD INDICATED WAS THE CASE.

(B) IN OUR ARMS RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, ZAID HAS TAKEN SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO COMPLAIN STRONGLY (IN KING'S NAME) ABOUT QUALITY OF EQUIPMENT, DELIVERY SCHEDULES, QUANTITIES AVAILABLE, LACK OF ADEQUATE CREDIT, ETC. INVARIABLY, WHEN I SUBSEQUENTLY DISCUSSED THESE POINTS DIRECTLY WITH KING HE APPEARED MUCH MORE RELAXED, UNDERSTANDING, AND WILLING TO ACCEPT OUR ASSURANCES, THAN DID ZAID.

END PAGE ONE

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4. THERE COULD BE A NUMBER OF REASONS FOR THIS AMBIGUITY IN OUR RELATIONS WITH PALACE. "LIFE STYLES" OF ZAID AND KING ARE QUITE DIFFERENT. ZAID MAY FEEL NEED, IS KING'S FRONT MAN, TO BE MORE CATHOLIC THAN THE POPE. ALSO HUSSEIN MAY DELIBERATELY USE HIM ON OCCASION AS STALKING HORSE. WHATEVER THE REASON OR REASONS, HOWEVER, IT LEADS ME TO ADVISE CONSIDERABLE CAUTION IN HANDLING MESSAGES DELIVERED BY ZAID ON BEHALF OF KING, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY DEAL WITH A SUBJECT CARRYING SUCH FORMIDABLE IMPLICATIONS IS IDF INTERVENTION AGAINST IRAQIS.

5. AS CHARGE, I WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO RECOMMEND DELIVERING SUCH A MESSAGE UNLESS I HAD DISCUSSED IT DIRECTLY WITH KING.

6. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER PASSING THIS TELEGRAM TO TEL AVIV.

ODELL

700

NNNN

HAVE AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN [illegible]
ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR, AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE, SUBJECT APPEARS TO HAVE SUBSIDED AGAIN AND WE THINK IT BEST TO LEAVE THINGS WHERE THEY ARE FOR TIME BEING.

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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R 051552Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 931
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4342

NODIS

SUBJECT: GOJ REQUEST FOR FOUR-POWER STATEMENT REGARDING IRAQIS

REF: AMMAN 4241

1. CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI TOLD CHARGE SEPT 5 THAT GOJ WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED USG HAD NOT ENDORSED IDEA OF BIG FOUR POWER STATEMENT OPPOSING IDEA OF IRAQI INTERVENTION IN JORDAN.

2. CHARGE DREW ON STATE 143328 AND EXPLAINED THAT US AMB IN MOSCOW AND US MINISTER IN CAIRO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HOST GOVERNMENTS.

3. RIFAI SAID GOJ POINT WAS THAT S.C. RESOLUTION 242 AND JARRING MISSION WERE AT STAKE. USG AND OTHER BIG POWERS HAD ENDORSED THESE PROPOSITIONS WHICH NOW, AS FAR AS JORDAN WAS CONCERNED, WERE IMPERILLED BY IRAQI THREATS. GOJ THEREFORE THOUGHT BIG FOUR SHOULD TAKE FIRM STAND. HE WELCOMED FRENCH INITIATIVE (AMMAN 4299). GP-3.

ODELL

BT

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

Passed W/House by OC/T

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

137360

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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

INFO.: Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE 137360

NODIS

EXDIS

SANDSTORM

REF.: Amman 3822

1. We have been giving further thought to question of passing to Israelis the Hussein query about possible Israeli action against Iraqis in Jordan. Seems to us there have been sufficient developments since Hussein's request originally put to us to raise question whether in circumstances it is desirable to pass his query to Israelis, or indeed whether GOJ still wishes us to do so. We have in mind the coming into effect of ceasefire and imminent start of peace talks, reports that UAR prepared

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NEA:ALAtherton,Jr.:lab	8/22/70	29464	NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

CLEARANCES:
ARN - Mr. Killgore (info) S/S - O: Mr. Holl

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior

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to back Hussein against Iraqi intervention against him, and reports that Hussein is considering calling xx for withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

2. We would like your present judgment on whether we should still put Hussein's query to Israelis. You may wish to raise question with Hussein following his return from Cairo, saying we delayed passing his message because it came at time we were fully preoccupied with getting ceasefire established and citing above new factors in situation as warranting reconsideration. If you decide to raise this matter again with Hussein or Zaid Rifai, you may wish to sound him out on alternative that GOJ reestablish direct contacts with Israel through military channels, which in any case strikes us as useful in present circumstances.

3. FYI - Principal problem in passing Hussein's message to Israelis is that raised by Embassy Tel Aviv; namely,

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ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

that Israel would probably reply that it would only act against Iraqis in Jordan with USG blessing, which we would certainly be reluctant to give though we could not rule it out in extremis. If Israelis replied as Embassy Tel Aviv anticipates, we would be faced with dilemma of whether, and if so in what terms, we should relay Israeli reply to Hussein. On balance, it seems to us that in present circumstances the best thing would be for Hussein to decide he did not wish us to pass message at this time. END FYI.

END

GP-1

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.

JOHNSON

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September 21, 1970

SUMMARY OF KING HUSSEIN'S RECENT REQUESTS FOR AID IN THE FACE OF INTERVENTION

TAB

A Hussein passed through USG: Would Israel consider air strikes if Iraqi military intervention seemed imminent. [August 4, 1970]

B Hussein hopes for outside help in face of threat by Iraqis
B1 and Syrians: Strong U.S. statement; U.S. demarche to Russians; possible U.S. intervention as "remote possibility; UAR support. [September 1]

C Hussein requests Israeli air force to stand by [September 1]

D French interest in Big Four communique [September 3]

E Jordanians have been in touch with Israelis re help [September 5]

F Jordanians press for Big Four stand; interested in French initiative [September 5]

G Hussein wants Israeli cooperation as he begins showdown with fedayeen. Hussein may require Israeli or USG help [September 15]

H Jordanians considering Israeli air force support [September 16] Our embassy feels it does not have formal request for US intervention.

I Hussein notifies London of Syrian moves. London to make demarches in Cairo and Baghdad [September 19]

J** Hussein requests U.S. intervention in face of Syrian
J1 moves -- air strikes and coverage. Pass message to
J2 British. [September 21]

K Israeli position [September 21]

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ACTION SS-45

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Z 152040Z SEP 70 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1240
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN NY 762

~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4808

EXDIS

DEPT PASS FLASH INFO TO BONN, LONDON, DOD AND CINCSTRIKE

1. KING HAS ADVISED EMBASSY HE IS MOVING TONIGHT TO ALL OR NOTHING SHOWDOWN IN ORDER QTE TO ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER UNQTE IN JORDAN. DURING EARLY HOURS 16 SEPT HE WILL ESTABLISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT WITH BRIGADIER MOHAMMAD DAUD AS MILITARY GOVERNOR, HABIS MAJALI AS CHIEF OF STAFF AND NAZAN AJLUNI AS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF.

2. MESSAGE WILL BE ANNOUNCED ON RADIO 0700 HOURS LOCAL SEPT 16 WITH ARMY UNITS PRE-POSITIONED AROUND CITY. KING WILL NOT FORCE ISSUE BUT IF FEDAYEEN REACT PREPARED TO USE ANY FORCE NECESSARY. HAVEING WAITED THREE DAYS, HE DETERMINED NOW COMPEL FEDAYEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND REMOVAL THEIR FORCES FROM AMMAN.

ARMY WILL ONLY ENTER CITY AGAINST FEDAYEEN IF NECESSARY. MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE OVER COMMUNICATIONS AND IF NECESSARY DECLARE CURFEW.

3. KING URGENTLY REQUESTS U.S. TAKE STEPS TO ASSURE ISRAELIS DO NOTHING THAT WOULD PREJUDICE OR AGGRAVATE SITUATION. HE ALSO EMPHASISES THAT, DEPENDING ON FEDAYEEN REACTIONS, HE MAY NEED CALL FOR USG AND ISRAELI ASSISTANCE. HE WILL ADVISE IF NEEDED. FURTHER DETAILS

1

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04808 152057Z

FOLLOW SEPTEL.

4. EMBASSY HAS MADE URGENT APPROACH TO KING WHO HAS AGREED TO INCLUDE IN 0700 ANNOUNCEMENT WARNING OF MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES SHOULD FEDAYEN INJURE ANY HOSTAGES THAT MAY NOW BE IN OR MAY FALL INTO THEIR HANDS.
BROWN

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

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ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

INFO: The White House

STATE 142836

NODIS

PLEASE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

SUBJ: Possible Support for King Hussein in Event of Confrontation with Fedayeen

REF: Amman 4216

1. Embassy should inform King Hussein that his views and concerns contained in reftel have been received in Dept and are under urgent consideration within USG. Strong public warning by US has many implications which must be carefully weighed, whether issued separately or jointly with USSR.

2. We note King's statement that UAR has promised support against potential opponents. Hussein may wish alert Nasser to seriousness current situation in Jordan and urge Nasser

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NEA/ARN:AIKillgore:bdf	9/1/70	20695	NEA - Rodger P. Davies

CLEARANCES:

NEA/ARN - Mr. Seelye
EUR/SOV - Mr. Dubs
S/S - Mr. Brewster

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE PAGE 2

do what he can to restrain Palestinian and fedayeen leaders with whom he has influence. Less extreme fedayeen leaders such as Arafat might try harder to control their more undisciplined followers if encouraged to do so by Nasser.

3. Dept also notes King's statement that Soviets have offered to help him should he encounter difficulties. King may wish to propose to Soviets that they make clear in Damascus and Baghdad that Soviets would disapprove of any possible action on part of Iraqi andSyrian troops stationed in Jordan to make trouble for Hussein. Given leading Soviet role in military supply picture for both countries, Soviet word of caution might have some deterrent effect. JOHNSON

4. In weighing King's request, it would be useful to have Embassy's assessment of possible effect on situation of unilateral rpt unilateral public statement by USG.

END

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Emb. Amman re Israeli Strike

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE [illegible]

INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3459

PORTIONS ILLEGIBLE

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~~C O N F~~ AMMAN 5049

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SUBJ: ISRAELI AIR/LAND STRIKE

REF: STATE 155166

I NOTE FROM REFTEL THAT USG RESPONSE TO FIVE OF SEVEN ISRAELI QUESTIONS HAS BEEN AFFIRMATIVE. THESE REYTONSES, MOREOVER, ARE PROBABLY THOSE IN WHICH GOI IS MOST INTERESTED. I WILL SEEK AN ANSWER TO REMAINING QUESTION - KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON OPERATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MEANWHILE, I THINK IT USEFUL TO PROFFER FOLLOWING VIEWS ON POSSIBLE IDF STRIKE AGAINST SYRIANS:

1. AT THIS POINT A MAJOR ATTACK BY IDF INTO JORDAN SEEMS LESS IMPERATIVE FROM STANDPOINT JORDAN'S SECURITY NEEDS. JAA IS NOW DOING BETTER AND I SUSPECT THAT GOVT INCREASINGLY OPTIMISTIC THAT SYRIAN THREAT CAN BE DISPOSED OF WITHOUT RESORT TO DRASTIC ISRAELI PURGE. JORDAN DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AIR STRIKE IS VITAL.

2. IF OPERATION CARRIED OUT, WE ARE UNCERTAIN HOW SOME UNITS OF JAA IN AREA WOULD RESPOND TO MAJOR ISRAELI LAND INVASION. (AFTER ALL THESE YEARS, HOWEVER, JORDAN TOLERANCE TO AIRSTRIKES FAIRLY HIGH).
SOME UNITS, AT LEAST, MIGHT DECIDE IDF THE GREATER THREAT; PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT IN NORTH JORDAN, THEREFORE, BETWEEN ISRAELIS ON ONE HAND AND JORDANIANS, SYRIANS (AND IRAQI SALAH AL-DIN DIVISION) CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED.

3. IF FIGHTING BECAME MORE GENERAL IN AREA, ISRAELIS MIGHT WELL NEED TO EXPAND AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR FRONT. WHERE WE COULD GO AT THIS POINT IN TERMS OF REACTIONS OF UAR AND OTHER ARABS IS ANYONE'S GUESS. AT LEASE US ALLIES SUCH AS TUNIS, LEBANON AND MOROCCO WOULD COME UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. THE RESPONSE FROM RADICALS COULD BE HYSTERIA OR WAR, OR BOTH.

4. EVEN IF ISRAELI MOVE PROVES LIMITED IN SCOPE AND SUCCESSFUL, ITS AFTERMATH WOULD STRAIN KING'S PERSONAL STANDING WITH SUBJECTS AND FELLOW ARABS. ISRAEL'S ACTION WOULD CONFIRM IN ARAB EYES LIBEL SPREAD BY RADICALS FOR TWENTY YEARS THAT JORDANIAN MONARCHY CRYPTO ZIONIST AT HEART. KING'S POSITION WITH ARMY WOULD BE WEAKENED AND HE WOULD BE MORE VULNERABLE TO CAMPAIGN OF DISQUALIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE LAUNCHED FROM EVERY RADICAL CENTER IN ARAB WORLD. FEW ARABS, FURTHERMORE, WOULD RALLY TO ISRAELI SIDE.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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

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[illegible] SHOULD STOP, BUT THAT IDF SHOULD ONLY BE UNLEASHED AT TIME AND IN MANNER THAT SUITS OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. IF IT APPEARS THAT COMBINED THREAT FROM SYRIANS AND FEDAYEEN MAY BE TOO MUCH FOR HUSSEIN, THEN I WOULD SAY GIVE ISRAELIS THEIR HEAD. BUT IF HUSSEIN - BASICALLY ON HIS OWN - CAN MAKE HIS WAY TO SHORE, I THINK THIS WOULD BE THE MOST DESIRABLE RESULT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. OUTCOME OF HUSSEIN'S CURRENT CRISIS, I AM AFRAID, IS NOT AS CLEAR AS I WOULD WISH. BUT I DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD ELIMINATE MOST PROMISING ALTERNATIVE BY A PREMATURE ISRAELI INTERVENTION.

6. I AM SKEPTICAL OVER REASONS GIVEN BY GOI FOR PREFERRING STRIKE INTO JORDAN RATHER THAN SYRIA. FROM STANDPOINT OUR OWN INTERESTS AND PROBABLE REACTIONS IN ARAB WORLD, I BELIEVE BLOW AGAINST SYRIA WOULD HAVE FEWER REPERCUSSIONS THAN ONE TOWARDS IRBID. ISRAELIS MAY HAVE THEIR OWN REASONS FOR PREFERRING A JORDAN TARGET TO A SYRIAN ONE, BUT I HOPE AMMAN'S VIEWS AS
BE CONSIDERED BEFORE ANY DECISION ON VENUE IS REACHED.

7. FINALLY, AND I AM WRITING FROM PAROCHIAL VIEW OF AMMAN, KING'S DESIRE IS TO SEE SYRIANS SO HURT THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW. ISRAELI'S DESIRE MAY BE BROADER: TO SO SMASH SYRIANS THAT THEY WONT RISE AGAIN FOR LONG TIME. IF THIS IS INDEED ISRAELI AIM I CAN SEE WHY THEY ARE MASSING FOR GRAND ATTACK AT IRBID WHERE SYRIANS ARE STUPIDLY OPEN TO REAL DEFEAT. IF AIM, ON OTHER HAND, IS TO GIVE HELP TO HUSSEIN, THEN EITHER FEINT OR SHORT ATTACK INTO MUCH EASIER COUNTRY NORTH OF TIBERIAS WOULD HAVE SAME EFFECT WITHOUT SIDE DANGERS HERE.

BROWN

BT



UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532989 Date: 11/12/2014
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532947 Date: 11/12/2014

NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

RELEASED IN FULL

J2

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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14

CONTROL : 5048Q
RECEIVED : Sept 21, 1970
1:27A.M.

Z 210517Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1400
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4990

EXDIS (TREAT AS NODIS)

DEPT PASS INFO LONDON FLASH

RIFAI DID NOT ASK ME TO REPEAT KING'S MESSAGE TO UK. I WAS RATHER BREATHLESS AND DID NOT ASK HIM. I LEAVE QUESTION OF MESSAGE TO DEPT'S JUDGMENT.
BROWN
BT

PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T
NOT PASSED AMEMBASSY LONDON BY OC/T
HANDLE AS NODIS

NNNN

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532947 Date: 11/12/2014
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532950 Date: 11/12/2014

NLN-NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

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~~SECRET~~
Classification

Departments of State

184433

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

'70 SEP 21 AM 4:38

21 Sep 70 0556Z

14

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS (Treat as NODIS)

REF: Amman 4988

1. In connection with the King's message, you should inform him that: We have passed his message to the UK and that we have discussed its substance with the Israelis.

2. You should also inform the King that it is essential that he inform us continuously and systematically of the developments on the ground so that we will be as completely up to date as possible at all times.

3. FYI. We have been in touch with PM's party, through Rabin, and GOI is undertaking early morning reconnaisance of Irbid area. Current assessment, as conveyed to us by Rabin at 11 p.m. Washington time, was that GOI felt situation in Irbid area is serious. Israelis have taken no decisions to help either by air or land, but considering this possibility and will make decisions in light of what their reconnaisance shows. END FYI.

ROGERS

DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	APPROVED BY:
9/21/70	23173	J - U, Alexis Johnson

S/S-O:

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532950 Date: 11/12/2014

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532941 Date: 11/13/2014

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 39920
RECD: SEP 16, 1970
6:29 P.M.

RELEASED IN PART
50X1, 50X6

RETURNED TO PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY NLN

Z 162205Z SEP 70 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1266
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4844

NODIS

1. [redacted] REPORTS THAT GOJ CABINET PRESETNLY IN SESSION TO DEBATE CURRENT CRISIS. KING'S INCLINATION IS TO MOVE VIGOROUSLY AGINST FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT; CABINET'S IS LESS SO. TIMING BEING DISCUSSED AS EITHER DAYBREAK SEPT 17 OR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS LATER. 50X1

2. KING'S CONCERN CENTERS ON POSSIBLE INTERVENTION BY SYRIA ON SIDE OF FEDAYEEN. MORE REMOTE CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE SIMILAR MOVEMENT BY IRAQI FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, CONTINGENCY PLANS BEING DISCUSSED. QUESTION BROACHED CONCERNING POSSIBLE AIR STRIKE SUPPORT FROM EITHER USG OR ISRAELIS SHOULD ARAB NEIGHBORS INTERVENE.] SANITIZE

50X1
50X6

3. I REPLIED [redacted] TO EFFECT THAT I HAVE BEEN IN COUNTRY ONLY THRITY-SIX HOURS, BUT SINCE I HAVE JUST COME FROM WASHINGTON AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT AND OTHERS, I DESIRE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KING TO DISCUSS PROBLEM POSED FOR GOJ BY FEDAYEEN. I ALSO SAID KING SHOULD BE MADE WELL AWARE OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF REACHING DECISION ON QUESTION OF SUCH GRAVITY (COMMITMENT OF US FORCES) ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. MY MEETING WITH KING TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR MORNING SEPTEMBER 17.

4. I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THIS TO CONSTITUTE FORMAL REQUEST FOR US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AT THIS TIME.

5. EMBASSY COMMENTS FOLLOW SEPTEL.

BROWN

BT

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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2013-04278 Doc No. C05532927 Date: 11/13/2014
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NLN NSC DOS-615-1-9-6

Department of State TELEGRAM

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1514Q
1970 SEPTEMBER 5, PM 12

O 051550Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 929
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3152
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 4340

NODIS/SANDSTORM

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED ISRAELI AIR SUPPORT FOR GOJ AGAINST IRAQIS

REFERENCE: AMMAN 4245

1. CHARGE SAW CHIEF OF ROYAL COURT ZAID RIFAI SEPT 5. SAID HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH KING HUSSEIN, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT LATTER HAD BEEN TOO BUSY.

2. IN RESPONSE RIFAI'S QUESTION, CHARGE SAID PREPARED MESSAGE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN DELIVERED TO GOI. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON THE POINT, HE THOUGHT USG AGREED WITH HIM GENERALLY THAT THIS WAS POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE MATTER THAT NEEDED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND HANDLING. WHAT EXACTLY DID GOJ HAVE IN MIND WHEN IT SUGGESTED COLLABORATION WITH ITS AVOWED ENEMY, ISRAEL, AGAINST ANOTHER ARAB STATE?

3. RIFAI SAID HE AND KING PERSONALLY THOUGHT IRAQIS WERE BLUFFING, BUT THIS WAS ONLY AN ASSUMPTION, AND GOJ HAD TO BE READY FOR ANYTHING. RIFAI ADDED "WE HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED THIS WITH ISRAELIS AT THEIR RPT THEIR SUGGESTION."

4. CHARGE SAID HE THOUGH THIS QUESTION MIGHT WELL BE LEFT WHERE IT WAS AT MOMENT. RIFAI CONCURRED. GP-3.

ODELL

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Paul Hare, Senior Reviewer

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Doc No. C05532885 Date: 11/12/2014

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RECOMMEND FULL RELEASE WITH NSC CONCURRENCE

#15144
237

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

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July 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders Hal

SUBJECT: Information Memo on Jordan

During the height of the Jordan crisis, the President was promised a further analysis when the dust settled.

Recommendation: That you send the attached information memo to the President.

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TO) PAF
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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger HK

SUBJECT: WSAG Actions - Jordan

The following actions have been taken:

Diplomatic

--Jordan - We advised King Hussein that we would look promptly and with sympathy on requests for material assistance.

--Ambassador Brown has informed the King that his request for help is being actively discussed.

--Iran - Ambassador MacArthur has seen the Shah and has exchanged views on the situation with him.

--Israel - We are getting regular Israeli assessment of the situation and are obtaining reconnaissance and intelligence data from the Israelis.

--USSR and UAR - In response to the September 18 Soviet approach indicating that they believe all states both within and outside the region should avoid intervention and seek to bring an end of the fighting, Assistant Secretary Sisco conveyed an oral note September 20 urging the USSR to press the Syrians to withdraw. No further approaches to the Soviets have been made.

--The UN - The Jordanians have decided not to go to the UN for now. This action is in abeyance. After review, we still see no advantage in pressing.

--A diplomatic scenario has been prepared and reviewed in the WSAG for actions the U. S. would have to take if the Israelis strike.

--A scenario and talking points for Congressional briefing have been prepared, both a factual briefing before a strike and a policy briefing after.

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Military Supply

--Defense has prepared a package of material which Hussein might need; the material has been identified and can be shipped quickly. Defense and CIA have developed plans for air shipment of this material to Jordan if this is needed.

--A contingency plan has been prepared for the equipment Israel might need if the Israelis strike the Syrians and if the cease-fire breaks down on the Suez line.

--Contingency plans for coping with a possible Soviet counter to an Israeli attack on the Syrians have been reviewed in the WSAG.

Military Measures

--A "heads up" message has been sent to all commands to increase intelligence watch and general readiness.

--Airlift - Five C-130s have been moved from Incirlik to preposition them for evacuation; ten additional C-130s have been moved to Europe.

--The Fleet - Major elements of the Sixth Fleet have been positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean.

--The Saratoga and Independence are south of Cyprus along with the amphibious force with one Marine battalion landing team embarked.

--The Guam with another Marine unit embarked and with helicopters will pass through Gibraltar Straits on Saturday, 26 September.

--The Carrier Kennedy is enroute to the Mediterranean and will pass through Gilbraltar Straits on 25 September.

--An additional tanker and four destroyers have been ordered to the Mediterranean to support the Kennedy.

--Six additional land-based ASW aircraft have been positioned in the Mediterranean area.

--Officers from the Sixth Fleet flew Sunday night to Tel Aviv for a very successful intelligence exchange on target information.

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--The Fleet has been instructed to prepare plans for reconnaissance of the battle area and for attacking Syrian forces.

--Army Forces

--Airborne Brigade is on alert in Germany, one battalion could be in Jordan in less than 8 hours.

--Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg are on alert.

--Other Steps

--CIA/State have completed a study of likely outcomes of the contest between the King and the Fedayeen, the impact on the Middle East peace initiative and the implications for U. S. policy and action.

--Press guidance is being coordinated with State and Defense. Contingency statements have been drafted for use if Israel strikes.

--Sitreps are being issued every four hours.

--A paper on possibilities for providing economic assistance to Jordan has been prepared.

--Hospital units have been unloaded from U. S. aircraft pending resolution of the security situation in Amman. They can be reloaded in 24 hours.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

70 SEP 21 NODIS 16

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

HAK

~~TOP SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NOTE VERBAL

Pursuant to Ambassador Rabin's conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Sisco this morning and particularly to Secretary Sisco's words to the effect that the United States "agrees in principle to the Israeli operation by air and land," which action is deemed an "Israeli operation", the Embassy of Israel would appreciate receiving a response to the following questions:

1) Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?

2) Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and coordination between us?

3) How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

4) Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defence.

5) Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

6) Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

7) Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

To avoid unfortunate misunderstandings, it will undoubtedly be appreciated that it is in the mutual interest of both Governments that matters of such seriousness be clarified to the maximum degree possible.

NODIS

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLJI-85/15148 Rev. 12/10/2014
By RJ NARA, Date 10/18/2016

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

22057

TOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Options in Jordan

As you continue to think about the decisions we may face in Jordan, you may wish to consider some of the broader issues raised.

The Broader Situation and U.S. Interests

Two issues are now being contested in Jordan: (1) Who is to control the Palestinian movement? (2) What balance of political forces is to control Jordan?

The two are related. Whereas the less ideological groups focus on Israel and could make common cause with the government, the radicals are at least as dedicated to the overthrow of traditional regimes as to the destruction of the Zionist state. Although it is difficult to know exactly what the balance within the collection of fedayeen movements is, it seems relatively clear that the most active challenge to Hussein's regime comes from the radical fringe--the elements, for instance, responsible for the hijacking.

The outcome will determine whether there is a stable base for peace negotiations. The future political nature of Jordan will determine whether a Palestine settlement is possible or continuing war is inevitable. There seem to be several ways in which Jordan's political base could evolve:

--Hussein and the army could suppress the fedayeen and bring the non-fedayeen Palestinians into a settlement. This would ideally provide the most solid base, but it is doubtful whether there will be an outcome this decisive.

--Elements of the army, the King and the less militant Palestinians could make common cause. This would make for a less orderly negotiation but might make for a more enforceable peace if there is one.

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--Some combination of fedayeen elements could demonstrate the King's impotence and force on him a weak civilian government that would do its bidding. Negotiations would be out of the question.

It is the last outcome which seems most immediately at stake in the current crisis. Either of the first two could conceivably produce stability. The consequences of the third could include the following:

--Prospects for a Palestine settlement soon on terms Israel could consider would drop to almost zero. Attacks across Israel's eastern border would increase.

--Chances that Israel would at some point feel compelled to seize more territory in Jordan would increase sharply.

--Nasser's ability to negotiate a settlement with Israel and Soviet ability to support a negotiated settlement would be diminished sharply.

--There would be one more radical state in the Middle East where the U.S. is barred. A radical fedayeen base there would strengthen the movement against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf states.

In short, while it is not clear how the main political elements in Jordan will sort themselves out, it does not seem in the U.S. interest that a fedayeen movement urged on by radicals be permitted to impose its will on the government. It could not produce the stability that is necessary for peace.

The Three Principal Contingencies

A situation now exists in Jordan which may cause King Hussein to seek U.S. or other assistance in an all-out showdown with the fedayeen. These seem to be the main contingencies that will be faced:

1. The King and army vs. the fedayeen alone.

It seems generally agreed in the intelligence community and in the U.S. Embassy in Amman that the Jordanian army can manage the situation as long as only the fedayeen--and not outside troops--are ranged against the regime. It is possible in this situation that Jordanian forces might need some materiel support. It has been our assumption that there would be no strong argument against supplying any reasonable support. Such assistance could be airlifted both as a demonstration and for prompt delivery.

The main issue to be considered in connection with this contingency is: If the regime unexpectedly turns out to be too weak to win this battle with its own forces, should there be intervention to support it?

A key judgment to be made is how much difference outside intervention might make in such a situation.

The principal arguments for such intervention are: It would prevent--at least as long as U.S. troops are present--dominance by a group that would offer almost no hope of a Palestine settlement. It might still be possible that stability could be rescued with the help of the army. It is also important for the U.S. to demonstrate its support for responsible regimes. In short, a risky intervention would be preferable to the certainty of radical control over the situation.

The argument against such intervention is that if Hussein is too weak to stand up against domestic opposition, outside intervention can only save his regime for a limited period of time. Attempting to bolster it in the absence of sufficient internal strength could put whoever intervenes into a position of supporting a minority cause against effective majority guerrilla opposition in a country without access to the Mediterranean where the U.S. would have a difficult time supporting sustained military operations. Intervention could cause a fedayeen reaction against U.S. installations elsewhere in the Mid-East.

In any case, there may not be much of a real choice since if the King appears about to fall, the Israelis may very well intervene on their own or at least seize the heights from which the fedayeen have been shelling Israeli settlements.

2. The second contingency: King Hussein and the army vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops. Even if one judged that Hussein should not be supported if he cannot control the fedayeen alone, one might judge intervention quite justified if the 17,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan stepped in. Before considering the question of armed intervention, it would be prudent to look at the possibilities for non-military action that might precede armed intervention or perhaps even make it unnecessary. A request from Hussein for Soviet restraint on Iraq might help. Intelligence indicates that Nasser is prepared to give diplomatic and possibly military support

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in the event of Iraqi intervention. The Shah might mount a show of force on Iraq's border. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait might threaten to cut off financial support for the fedayeen. Finally, the greatest political assist to Hussein might well be the capacity to demonstrate hope for progress in peace negotiations..

If political actions fail, then a judgment must be made whether armed intervention seems in the U.S. interest.

The argument for is that--in addition to the basic objective of trying to save a regime that offers some hope of the stability necessary for peace--the U.S. would be supporting a responsible government against a threat from foreign forces. Such a stand is a necessary part of the U.S. posture. It would be possible to justify this as an in-and-out operation.

The main arguments against are the operational difficulty of sustaining such an operation and the possibility of a general Arab reaction. This operation would have to be sustained entirely by air (unless we used an overland route across Israel). It would require dipping into the reserve of strategic forces in the U.S. --leaving us little for other contingencies. Sustaining such an operation by air would be extremely difficult without a staging base in the eastern Mediterranean, and there is good reason to doubt their availability under these circumstances.

If political actions fail and if armed intervention of some sort in support of Hussein seems desirable, then there are two related questions:

a. Would air attacks against Iraqi forces be sufficient?

Pro. Iraqi forces are 60 miles northeast of Amman and, to be militarily effective would have to travel on an open road and would be vulnerable to air attacks which could presumably prevent their arrival in Amman. Also, air strikes are not likely to produce the same reactions either by other Arabs or by the Soviets as a major ground action would. Even Israeli air strikes would avoid the connotation of invasion and takeover.

Con. Air strikes are not operationally useful against the fedayeen. They are dispersed among the population and their concentrations and the fighting around them will be in such small areas as to make air targeting very difficult. If intervention had to reach beyond the Iraqis, air strikes would probably be inadequate.

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b. Should the U.S. or Israel intervene? The minimal operational form which this question might take is: If the Israelis seem about to move, should the U.S. make a special effort to head them off by moving first? Or should they be encouraged?

In answering this question, a distinction must be made between the ground and air attacks. Air attacks are likely to provoke less reaction because they do not have the connotation of invasion.

The arguments for U.S., as contrasted to Israeli, intervention are: While Israeli air attacks could probably be brought off with a minimum of sustained Arab reaction, Israeli ground action in Jordan would be taken as an invasion of Jordan and would tend to reunify the Arabs. The U.S. would be held responsible anyway. An Israeli ground action would almost inescapably be seen as a concerted U.S.-Israeli effort to put Israel in control of Jordan. It might even serve to unify forces in Jordan so that army and fedayeen alike would feel that they had to turn together against Israeli troops. A Hussein who had been saved by an Israeli invasion would probably not last long in Jordan.

The arguments for Israeli intervention are: It may be difficult to stop. Some believe the King already has clandestinely reached a tacit understanding with the Israelis that if the Iraqis intervene Israel will attack. If the U.S. were to intervene, the USSR would almost have to react in some way, even if not definitively. The USSR has no incentive to defend Jordan against Israeli attack. The Israelis have a great logistical advantage over the U.S. If we intervened and then had to bring supplies across Israel, we could have the worst of two worlds. Introduction of U.S. forces would put the U.S. in the middle of an intra-Arab war and we would still be viewed as collaborating with Israel.

If Israel intervened in Jordan, the U.S. would have to consider two kinds of support:

--It would be necessary to assure that Israel has the munitions and other supplies required to sustain the attack. It is the judgment of the group that Israel's war reserves would be sufficient to carry their operations through a prolonged operation. U.S. resupply could be provided within ample time.

--The more serious contingency would come about if the Soviets or Egyptians decided to take advantage of the situation by heating up the Suez front. The judgment was that their capability would be limited to re-opening artillery attacks, small harrassing raids across the Canal and some air attacks. Support for Israel in this contingency would be developed from the same kinds of packages that have been worked out in the event the ceasefire breaks down.

3. The third contingency: armed intervention for evacuation.

If there is complete chaos in Amman and Jordanian forces lose control, it is probable that armed intervention could not with assurance save either the American community or the hijacking hostages.

If, however, the army remains in control of parts of the city and Americans can collect there, armed intervention could save them. Even in this situation, it seems unlikely that the hijacking hostages could be saved.

There is one other important aspect of this option: It is possible that an intervention primarily for evacuation could temporarily bolster Hussein's regime. It could, if well timed, amount to a U.S. show of force without the political onus of sustained intervention. It seems most likely that if intervention comes it would come this way.

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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וושינגטון

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~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTE VERBAL

Pursuant to Ambassador Rabin's conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Sisco this morning and particularly to Secretary Sisco's words to the effect that the United States "agrees in principle to the Israeli operation by air and land," which action is deemed an "Israeli operation", the Embassy of Israel would appreciate receiving a response to the following questions:

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7) Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

To avoid unfortunate misunderstandings, it will undoubtedly be appreciated that it is in the mutual interest of both Governments that matters of such seriousness be clarified to the maximum degree possible.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLNIL-95/5149 Per Ltr. 12/10/2014
By RS NARA, Date 10/18/2016

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

September 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Jordan - Contingency Planning

It was agreed at the WSAG meeting of September 16 that fully integrated scenarios of diplomatic and military actions should now be consolidated for the following contingencies:

1. Materiel supply for Jordanian forces in the event of a continuing clash with the fedayeen.

2. U.S. armed intervention for the purpose of evacuation.

3. U.S. armed intervention (a) by air strikes and (b) by ground forces in support of King Hussein in the event of Iraqi intervention against Hussein.

4. Israeli armed intervention (a) by air strikes and (b) by ground forces in the event Iraqi intervention threatens Hussein's regime (to include provision for U.S. resupply of Israeli forces).

Along with the above, the "Scenario of U.S. Military Actions for Deterring Soviet Intervention" already provided for the WSAG should be refined into a scenario in which several stages of escalation are identified and points of decision are noted. These actions should also be reflected in the integrated scenarios described above.

The listing of contingencies and options above is not intended to suggest priority for implementation.

The foregoing plans and scenarios should be submitted not later than 1200 hours 18 September 1970 for further review by the WSAG.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: A Discussion of Issues

Following is a first cut at stating some of the issues raised by the Israeli note:

The Issues

1. Can we respond affirmatively to this proposal--even if we want to--without the King's explicit assent? The alternative would be to make our final approval contingent on agreement between the King and the Israelis.

Pro

--The King has asked for help. If the U.S. is not going to provide it, then Israel is the only source left. That being the case, the only recourse is to gamble that Israel's air attacks will be sufficient and Israel will not have to resort to ground action.

--Time is important now. If we wait for further arrangements to be discussed, it will be too late.

--If the Iraqis enter the fight, this will signify an all-out Arab war to dismember Jordan. King Hussein's chances of survival will be nil, and Israel must act to protect its interests.

Con

--Hussein must be the judge of what will help or hurt him. The King is reported by his aide to have said that if Israel attacks on the ground, it should be in Syria, not Jordan.

--Both the Jordanians and the Israelis have indicated a desire to talk with each other. Perhaps an attack could be worked out coordinating Israeli air attack with Jordanian follow-up on the ground. The responsibility should be theirs, not ours.

--Both sides insist on a meeting, so no time will be lost that will not be used anyway.

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2. Can the consequences of an Israeli ground attack now in Jordan be risked? The alternative--apart from U.S. intervention--is to hope that Hussein can hold his own and wait until some event like Iraqi intervention makes it clear that the situation has moved to an all-out contest to divide up Jordan.

Pro

--Jordan appears on its way to dismemberment. It is better to have some decisive move now before Syria (and Iraq) become too deeply entrenched.

Con

--If Israel moves on the ground now, Iraq will almost certainly respond, and a general Mid-East war will have begun again. If this happens at U.S. urging, the U.S. will have encouraged that outcome. It will become known.

--The consequences of an Israeli attack can only be risked if it appears that Jordan is on its way to dismemberment anyway.

--A ground attack, even if successful is at least as likely to bring the King down as to save him.

3. Can the U.S. Administration provide this kind of open-ended assurance against the Soviets? The alternative is to seek Congressional assent.

Pro

--An assurance in fact has already been given. It is implicit in the words of five U.S. Presidents that the U.S. would not stand by and let Israel be destroyed.

Con

--The Israelis are, in effect, asking a formal defense commitment to defend Israel against the USSR. While Israel's supporters are strong, making such a commitment would arouse major opposition in Congress.

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The Options

One way to make the choice more concrete is to try to crystallize the above arguments into possible courses of action--in this case possible responses to the Israeli note:

1. Tell the Israelis again we cannot assent until we are sure the course they propose is satisfactory to the King and suggest that a meeting be arranged. We would review any agreement they might reach.

2. Draw back and wait to see how Hussein fares on his own. If this left the Syrians and Iraqis in Jordan with his position further deteriorating, the option would still be open for Israeli intervention. If the situation became serious enough, Israel might move in its own interest. On the other hand, this might lose the last good chance to evict the Iraqis and Syrians.

3. Disengage from this exercise and provide U.S. air strikes now. This may in the end--with all of its potential consequences--prove the cleanest course, but if it failed to evict the Syrians and Israel had to move in, we would look foolish. The key would be the capacity of the Jordanian army to follow up air strikes with effective ground action.

At a following tab is a general memorandum arguing the pros and cons of Israeli vs. U.S. air strikes in Jordan. This will provide you with a useful review of the general arguments. [Tab marked "Pros and Cons of Israeli Air Strikes"].

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

Dear Al.

The enclosed was transmitted to J.S. at 1645 today.

Shlomo.

9/21/70.

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By RS NARA, Date 10/18/2016

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
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NOTE VERBALE

Pursuant to Ambassador Rabin's conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Sisco this morning and particularly to Secretary Sisco's words to the effect that the United States "agrees in principle to the Israeli operation by air and land," which action is deemed an "Israeli operation", the Embassy of Israel would appreciate receiving a response to the following questions:

1) Will the U.S. agree to approach Israel formally in this matter?

2) Will the King agree to request our assistance and to undertake to institute methods of communication and coordination between us?

3) How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

4) Is it understood that U.S. will side with us in the international political arena including the use of the veto in the Security Council on the grounds that the Syrian invasion of Jordan not only violates Jordan's integrity but also threatens Israel's security and therefore entitles Israel to take actions in her defence.

5) Is it clear that Israel shall not be held responsible for the fate of the hostages?

6) Is it understood that U.S. public statements on all matters pertaining to above questions shall be made on highest levels and not lower than Secretary of State?

7) Answers to above questions should be in the form of a secret memorandum of understanding.

To avoid unfortunate misunderstandings, it will undoubtedly be appreciated that it is in the mutual interest of both Governments that matters of such seriousness be clarified to the maximum degree possible.

Washington, D.C.
21 September 1970

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

By hand
Personal

General A. Haig.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ AMMAN 5424

EXDIS

FURTHER TO AMB'S CONVERSATION TODAY EARLIER TWO TELS; DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

A. TREATMENT OF FEDAYEEN ISSUE:

1. KING BELIEVED THAT EFFORTS OF ARAB MEDIATORS WERE GOING WELL. IT HAD BEEN AGREED--REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL TEXT OF AGREEMENT-- THAT WHAT APPLIED TO AMMAN WOULD APPLY TO ALL TOWNS OF NATION ALSO. THIS MEANT THAT ALL FEDAYEEN, THEIR BASES AND ARMS WOULD HAVE TO MOVE OUT OF ALL TOWNS TO APPROPRIATE AREAS WITH ASSISTANCE OF JAA/BRIG BIN-SHAIR BELIEVED THIS WOULD TAKE ABOUT A WEEK IN AMMAN. BIN-SHAIR AWARE OF DANGER FEDAYEEN MIGHT TRY TO SHED THEIR UNIFORMS AND MERGE WITH CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. FOR THIS REASON, HE SAID, CLOSE SUPERVISION WOULD BE EXERCISED OF FEDS, AND PARTICULARLY OF ALL THHIR ARMS AND ARMORIES.

2. KING MENTIONED THAT AMONG FEDAYEEN PRISONERS THERE WERE A NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS INCLUDING FRENCH AND CUBANS AND PERHAPS OTHERS.
(PRESUMABLY THESE FACTS WILL BE MADE PUBLIC DURING EXCLUSIVE MEETING KING PLANNING TO SET UP WITH US CORRESPONDENTS AFTERNOON SEPT 29.)

3. YASIR ARAFAT, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, HAD PROCEEDED FROM DAMASCUS TO IRBID AREA. BOTH KING ANN BIN-SHAKIR EXPRESSED GREAT RELIEF THAT ARAFAT HAD NOT (AS THEY FEARED HE MIGHT) COME TO AMMAN UNDER ESCORT OF BAHI LADGHAM. ARAFAT THEY EXPLAINED HAD BEEN SMUGGLED OUT BY NUMEIRY DRESSED AS

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By 12 NARA, Date 10/8/2016

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WOMAN: THEY DID NOT KNOW HOW THEY COULD ASSURE HIS SAFETY IF HE WERE TO RETURN. BIN-SHAKIR CLAIMED HE KNEW NO ONE IN JAA WITH WHOM ARAFAT'S LIFE WOULD BE SAFE - CERTAINLY NOT HIMSELF.

B. TREATMENT OF PALESTINE QUESTION AND REFORM GOJ INSTITUTIONS:

1. KING REMARKED THAT EVEN BEFORE 1967 WAR HE HAD BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO SOME SORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF STATE PERHAPS AFFECTING STATUS OF PALESTINIANS. AT TIME HIS ADVISORS HAD DISCOURAGED HIM FROM ACTION: AFTER JUNE WAR, THOUGH SUCH THOUGHTS HAD CONTINUED TO BE WEIGHED, THEY APPEARED PREMATURE AND INAPPROPRIATE TO CIRCUMSTANCES. KING NOW, THOUGH, WAS REFLECTING FURTHER ON WEAKNESSES IN STRUCTURE OF PRESENT GOVERNMENT APPARATUS. PARLIAMENT FOR INSTANCE SINCE 1967 A LAME-DUCK AFFAIR SINCE A QUORUM CANNOT POSSIBLY BE MUSTERED. KING DISHEARTENED AS WELL BY DISCOVERY--DURING LATEST CRISIS--OF HOW DEEPLY PENETRATED PRESENT STRUCTURES WERE BY FEDAYEEN APPARATUS. AS CONSEQUENCE, HM WAS THINKING OF TAKING SHARP LOOK AT PRESENT STRUCTURES, AND OF INVITING PARTICIPATION AND ADVICE OF FRESH YOUNG ELEMENTS--UNTAINTED BY EVENTS OF RECENT PAST.

2. COMMENT: KING'S REMARKS DELPHIC, AND THIS MOST GENERAL PART OF DISCUSSION. IT MAY BE THAT HE IS NOT YET CLEAR IN HIS OWN MIND ABOUT HOW JORDAN'S POLITICAL WEAKNESSES CAN BE MADE GOOD. ONE THING THOUGH IS CERTAIN - HE DISAPPOINTED WITH OLD POLS. DURING LUNCH, FOR INSTANCE, HM MENTIONED THAT WHEN PEACE RESTABLISHED, PRESENT TRAFFIC FLOW ON SOUTH ROAD WOULD REVERSE: ON HIS WAY TO AQABA, HE WOULD PASS ALL THE POLITICIANS RETURNING TO AMMAN. (THIS PROBABLY DIG AT EX-PM TALHOUNI, WHO LEFT FOR AQABA DAY BEFORE FIGHTING BROKE OUT).

C. POSSIBLE REHABILITATION OF EX-PM (BRIG) DAOUD.

1. SPEAKING IN ARABIC KING MENTIONED TO BRIG BIN-SHAKIR THAT HE MIGHT APPROVE RETURN OF DAOUD TO AMMAN. KING UNDERSTOOD QADHAAFI HAD TURNED DOWN DAOUD'S REQUEST FOR ASYLUM. BIN-SHAKIR ASTONISHED BY ROYAL CLEMENCY. KING BELIEVED GOJ COULD TAKE POSITION DAOUD RESINGED FROM PM-SHIP, NOT ARMY, REINSTATE HIM IN FORMER JOB WITH MAC, AND THENN LET HIM RETIRE AFTER A FEW MONTHS. AMONG FACTORS IN DAOUD'S DECISION TO RESIGN, KING EXPLAINED WAS PRESSURE FROM DAUGHTER WHO HAD REGARDED HIM AS TRAAITOR TO ARAB CAUSE FOR TAKING UP PM-SHIP. BRIG BIN-SHAKIR THEN REMARKED THAT NO ONE

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HAD FORCED DAOUD TO TAKE JOB. MOREOVER, WHEN DAOUD HAD SHARED ANGUISH OF CONSCIENCE WITH FIELD MARSHAL MAJALI, LATTER CONSOLED HIM WITH PROMISE THAT ID DAOUD'S DAUGHTER QURE DIVORCED OF HER ARAB NATIONALIST HUSBAND, HE - MAJALI - WOULD MARRY HER HIMSELF. (PROSPECT SEEMED ONLY TO INCREASE DAOUD'S DESPONDENCY.)
BROWN

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 5)

1. FOLLOWING IS FURTHER TO EARLIER TEL RE AMB-HM MEETING TODAY.

2. KING SEEMED GENUINELY GREIVED AT DEATH OF NASSER. HE ADMITTED THAT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES HAD EXISTED BETWEEN THEM, BUT THAT OUT OF THIS AND MORE RECENT EXPERIENCE, A PERSONAL BOND HAD SPRUNG UP. WITHOUT NASSER'S PRESENCE, KING FEARED THAT RADICAL ELEMENTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ WOULD SEEK TO EXPLOIT LEADERSHIP VACUUM, AND SEEK TO FILL IT THEMSELVES. HE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH STRUGGLE FOR LEADERSHIP NOT LIKELY TO BE WON BY RAISING VOICES IN MODERATION. FOR THIS REASON HE ANXIOUS ABOUT FUTURE OF ROGERS' PROPOSAL, WHOSE DEFENSE IN ARAB WORLD HAD BEEN LARGELY BORNE BY NASSER.

3. KING AND ALSO ADVISORS ZAID RIFAI AND MURRAYWID TELL EXPRESSED FEAR THAT FOLLOWING NASSER'S DEATH, EGYPT WOULD TURN INWARD AND WITHDRAW FROM AFFAIRS OF ARAB WORLD. HUSSEIN BELIEVED, IN FACT, THAT NASSER WAS ONLY ELEMENT THAT PRESERVED UAR'S CLOSE PARTICIPATION IN ARAB POLITICS. HE UNSURE WHO COULD SUCCEED HIM--OBVIOUS CHOICES TO HIM LAY BETWEEN SADAT, SABRI AND MUHEIDDIN; BUT HE WONDERED IF THIS MIGHT NOT BE TIME SOME UNKNOWN MILITARY FIGURE MIGHT BEGIN THINKING ABOUT MAKING HIS MOVE.

4. DEATH OF NASSER WOULD ALSO UNDO A SERIES OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF WHICH EGYPT HAD BEEN FOCAL POINT. LIBYA AND SUDAN WOULD TEND TO GO THEIR OWN WAY, AND SLIP FROM UAR'S ORBIT. ALGERIA WOULD PERHAPS TRY TO FURTHER ITS CANDIDACY FOR LEADERSHIP, BUT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WAS TOO FAR AWAY TO ACT EFFECTIVELY. NOR COULD INTROVERTED PERSONALITY OF BOUMEDIENNE EVER FILL GAP LEFT MY ROBUST EXTROVERT NASSER.

5. ONE MINOR GOOD CONSEQUENCE OF NASSER'S PASSING WAS THAT IT MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY COLLAPSE OF UPSTART QADHAAFI - WHO HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY NASSER'S PRESTIGE AND PROXIMITY. KING SEEMED TO FEEL CONTEMPT FOR COLONEL AND HIS GREAT SENSE OF SELF-IMPORTANCE. HE DESCRIBED THAT QADHAAFI HAD BEEN REPORTED BY UAR PRESS TO HAVE WRITTEN BOOK CRITICIZING ROMMEL'S TACTICS (MUCH LAUGHTER FROM ARMORED BRIGADIER BIN-SHAKIR.) WHAT PARTICULARLY NETTLED HM, THOUGH WAS QADHAAFI'S (AND NUMEIRY'S) CHEEK IN LECTURING TO HIM ABOUT EVILS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT. KING'S MILITARY AIDE DE CAMP FINALLY PUT FOX AMONG CHICKENS BY ASKING NUMEIRY QTE AND HOW AMNY PEOPLE DID YOU SLAUGHTER AT ABBA ISLAND? UNQTE KING CLOSED THESE REMARKS BY STATING THAT IN HIS OPINION QADHAAFI WAS LOSING HIS MIND AND THAT HIS MEGALOMANIA WOULD EVENTUALLY DESTROY HIM.

DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

GP-3. BROWN

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

DEPT PASS AS DESIRED

AT 1300 LOCAL AMBASSADOR BROWN PROCEEDED TO AL-HUMMAR PALACE (IN TRACKED VEHICLE - PHOTOS FOLLOW) TO PRESENT CREDENTIALS TO KING HUSSEIN. CEREMONY BRIEF AND UTTERLY INFORMAL, WITH PRESENTATION TAKING PLACE WHILE BOTH MEN SITTING ON COUCH DISCUSSING OTHER SUBJECTS. DURING THAT TIME, AND AFTERWARDS AT LUNCH WITH PM AND NUMBER OF ROYAL ADVISORS, FOLLOWING SUBJECTS RAISED WITH AMBASSADOR BROWN:

1. SECURITY SITUATION AND NEEDS OF JAA:

A. AT EARLY POINT IN DISCUSSION KING MENTIONED GOJ DOING BEST TO RETURN LIFE IN CITY TO NORMAL PATTERNS. VEHICLES MIGHT BE PERMITED ON STREETS OF AMMAN AS EARLY AS TOMORROW: WATER AND ELECTRICITY MIGHT TAKE LONGER, BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER WIRING. KING RELIEVED THAT CASUALTIES FAR LOWER THAN PUBLICIZED FIGURES: NUMBER OF KILLED - OF ALL CATEGORIES - 531, AND WOUNDED IN VICINITY 850. (GEN ZAID BIN SHAKIR AT LUNCH SCOFFED AT FIGURE 15-20,000, REMARKING THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE UP IN FEDAYEEN MINDS MONTHS BEFORE FIRST SHOT FIRED.) KING THANKED AMB FOR US MEDICAL AID.

B. KING THEN ABRUPTLY TURNED TO WHAT HE SAID WAS HIS FIRST CONCERN AND ABOVE ALL ELSE, JORDAN'S NO. 1 PRIORITY: NEEDS OF JAA. ARMY STOCKS, HE EXPLAINED HAD BEEN BADLY DEPLETED OF MUNITIONS, AND ARMY HAD TAKEN SOME FAIRLY SIZEABLE LOSSES IN

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ARMOR AS RESULT OF FIGHTING BOTH IN NORTH AND STREETS OF AMMAN. WEAKNESS OF JAA COMMON KNOWLEDGE TO JORDAN'S NEIGHBORS, AND HUSSEIN WAS MOST CONCERNED LEST ONE OF THEM - EITHER SYRIA OR IRAQ - SHOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MOMENTARY EMBARRASSMENT TO AGGRADIZE SELF AT JORDAN'S EXPENSE. KING DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF IRAQIS AND STILL WANTS THEM OUT. IN AMBASSADOR'S PRESENCE KING INSTRUCTED JORDAN AIR FORCE TO FLY CONSTANT RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS ABOUT SALAH AL-DIN FORCES TO WARN AGAINST ANY SUSPICIOUS MOVES. KING CONCERNED, MOREOVER, ABOUT FURTHER POSSIBLE TROUBLE FROM SYRIANS IN NORTH. HE ADDED THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE HAS REVEALED IRAQ IS ONCE AGAIN HARBORING ACQUISITIVE DESIGNS AGAINST KUWAIT - AS IT HAD IN JUNE, 1967.

C. KING MENTIONED THAT EXPERIENCE OF PAST TWO WEEKS HAD TAUGHT HIM LESSON ABOUT FUTURE RESTRUCTURING OF JAA. ARMY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE EXPANDED EVEN POSSIBLY CONTRACTED. BUT ALL POSSIBLE WOULD BE DONE TO INCREASE ITS MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER. THERE WOULD BE MORE ARMOR UNITS, MORE SPECIAL FORCES UNITS, AND MORE APC'S. HE ADMITTED TO BRCI. BIN-SHAKIR THAT LATTER HAD BEEN RIGHT IN HOLDING OUT FOR APC'S (M-113) FOR SPECIAL FORCES UNITS.)

D. WHILE GIVING MOST OF CREDIT FOR RESULTS OF FIGHTING TO ARMOR, KING ALSO PLEASED TO STATE THAT ROYAL AIR FORCE HAD THROUGH ITS PERFORMANCE ALSO WON PLAUDITS EVEN FROM THEIR RIVALS IN ARMORED UNITS. KING BELIEVED JAF'S SUPPORT FLIGHTS ABOUT IRBID HAD BEEN USEFUL AND WELL EXECUTED.

E. PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS PROMPT DELIVERY 50 CALIBRE, 30 CALIBRE AND 105 MM, ALL TYPES.

2. REPORT OTHER SUBJECTS FOLLOWS.
BROWN

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TO: GENERAL HAIG

FROM: COLONEL KENNEDY

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SITUATION ROOM

FOLLOWING ARE TALKERS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS BROWN AND SWANK PREPARED BY SAUNDERS AND HOLDRIDGE. BIO DATA ON SWANK WHILE IN TAB A TO MEMO IS BEING DEXED SEPARATELY. RECOMMEND YOU SIGN OFF FOR HAK.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM, HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR L. DEAN BROWN (JORDAN)

BACKGROUND

AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST RETURNED FROM BEING U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SENEGAL. BEFORE THAT HE WAS ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING YOUNGER COUNTRY DIRECTORS IN THE AFRICAN BUREAU. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN OUR DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION IN MOROCCO FROM 1962-1965. IN ADDITION TO HIS RECENT TOUR AS AMBASSADOR, HE HAS IN THE PAST YEAR CHAIRED ONE STATE DEPARTMENT TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION AND WORKED ON ANOTHER DEALING WITH REDUCING U.S. PERSONNEL OVERSEAS, WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER DIPLOMATIC COVER.

TALKING POINTS

1. YOU MIGHT WANT TO ASK HIM ABOUT HIS PAST EXPERIENCE WITH MODERATE AFRICANS. FOR INSTANCE, HOW DOES A MODERATE LEADER LIKE SENGHOR SEE THE U.S. AT THIS TIME?

2. IN RELATION TO HIS NEXT POST, HOW DOES HE VIEW THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PALESTINIANS? HOW DOES HE PLAN TO OPEN ENOUGH OF A DOOR TO THE MODERATE PALESTINIANS TO MAKE THEM FEEL THAT WE ARE CONCERNED WITHOUT UNDERCUTTING THE EFFORTS OF THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO BRING THEM ALONG IN A JORDANIAN NEGOTIATION? YOU HAVE LONG UNDERSTOOD THE NEED SOMEHOW TO MEET THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE OF THOSE PALESTINIANS WHO HAVE NOW SPENT MUCH OF THEIR LIVES IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS. (AMBASSADOR BROWN, LIKE MOST OF US, RECOGNIZES THE PROBLEM BUT REALIZES THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING A HANDLE ON IT WITHOUT DISRUPTING ON-GOING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS CONCLUSION SEEMS TO BE THE RIGHT ONE: THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT HAS A MOMENTUM THAT WE ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE BUT WHICH WE MUST BE SENSITIVE TO.)

3. YOU SEND YOUR BEST WISHES TO KING HUSSEIN. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP ACHIEVE AN HONORABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

END PAGE ONE

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SECRET/NODIS INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS - SEPTEMBER 15 APPOINTMENT WITH EMORY C. SWANK, AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA

BACKGROUND: ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR SWANK HAS NEVER VISITED CAMBODIA, HE SERVED AS DCM IN ADJOINING LAOS FROM 1964-67 AND IS FAMILIAR WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS. SINCE HIS DESIGNATION SOME SIX WEEKS AGO HE HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ-IN COMPREHENSIVELY ON CURRENT CAMBODIAN PROBLEMS AND U.S. POLICY POSITIONS, CONSULT WITH THE APPROPRIATE U.S. OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON, AND TO DISCUSS CAMBODIAN SENTIMENTS AND PROBLEMS WITH THE RESIDENT CAMBODIAN AMBASSADOR AND THOSE FEW CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE VISITED WASHINGTON. BIOGRAPHS INFORMATION IN TAB (A).

YOUR MEETING WITH MR. SWANK WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE HIM A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF YOUR POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA. A FIRM STATEMENT BY YOU WILL ARM HIM FOR HIS DIFFICULT TASK AND HELP HIM TO OVERCOME THE ATTITUDE OF RETICENCE WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED OUR EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH UNDER VHARGE RIVES UP TO NOW.

TALKING POINTS: YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- YOU DO NOT WANT TO SEE A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA AND WANT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO PREVENT THIS.

-- LON NOL SHOULD BE GIVEN NO REASON TO QUESTION THE FIRMNESS OF YOUR INTENT TO SUPPORT CAMBODIA IN ITS EFFORT TO PROTECT ITS NEUTRALITY.

-- YOU ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO SEEK MAXIMUM POSSIBLE HELP FOR CAMBODIA FROM ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS.

-- THE FLOW OF U.S. MILITARY AID AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL CONTINUE; OUR AIR INTERDICTION PROGRAM WILL BE BROADLY INTERPRETED.

-- YOU WANT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS TO LON NOL AND CAMBODIA WHICH OUR AID CAN HAVE.

-- EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GET MORE BALANCED AND OBJECTIVE REPORTING OF THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA BY THE PRESS. THIS IS VITAL TO OUR SECURING THE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT NEEDED IN THE U.S. AS BASIS FOR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OF INCREASED MAP AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA.

-- THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO MAKE A GREATER EFFORT TO VISIT THE COUNTRYSIDE IN ORDER TO RALLY POPULAR SUPPORT AND COUNTER THE EFFECTS OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS.

-- YOU CONSIDER AMBASSADOR SWANK AS YOUR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE HEAD OF THE COUNTRY TEAM. YOU WILL BACK HIM TO THE HILT AND LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM HIM DIRECTLY ON HIS IMPRESSIONS AND ANY RECOMMENDATIONS HE MAY HAVE ON WAYS TO STRENGTHEN OUR MISSION AND TO MAKE OUR EFFORT MORE EFFECTIVE.

-- ASK AMBASSADOR SWANK TO CONVEY YOUR PERSONAL WARM BEST WISHES TO LON NOL AND YOUR ADMIRATION FOR CAMBODIA'S EFFORTS TO DEFEND ITS NEUTRALITY.

1000

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Gen Haig:

Cairo reply to message proposing Peterson visit.

JF.

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HAIG

WMS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

HAK

* URGENT

8

P 160945Z SEP 70
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8325
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 2119

CN-3760
September, 1970
6:47 a.m.

SEP 16 10:00
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

SISCO FROM BERGUS

1. YOUR 151077 ARRIVED HERE THIS MORNING 45 MINUTES AFTER BOTH RIADS EMPLANED FOR MADRID.

2. AT 1130 I CALLED ON AHMED OSMAN, LEGAL ADVISOR AT FONOFF WHO IS HOLDING DOWN MOHAMED'S DESK IN HIS ABSENCE, AND MADE PRESENTATION BASED ON PARAS ONE AND TWO OF REFTEL. OSMAN WAS IMPRESSED BY SECRETARY'S PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE EXERCISE. HE TOOK CAREFUL NOTES IN ENGLISH WHICH I LATER REVIEWED FOR ACCURACY.

3. OSMAN SAID HE WOULD PASS MESSAGE TO HIGHER AUTHORITY URGENTLY AND MAKE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON OUR PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME.

4. HE THEN WENT ON TO COMMENT THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS AN OFFER TO ANSWER ONE OF THE GROUPS OF QUESTIONS RAISED BY FONMIN RIAD IN OUR TALK ON SEPTEMBER 4. HE NOTED THAT FOLLOWING QUESTIONS RAISED BY FONMIN REMAINED UNANSWERED.

A. WHAT ABOUT ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE/STANDSTILL?

B. WHAT ABOUT A USG GUARANTEE THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT ATTACK EGYPT?

C. WHAT WILL BE THE US ATTITUDE IF ISRAEL ATTACKS EGYPT?

D. WHAT ABOUT US DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL DESPITE ASSURANCES GIVEN AT TIME OF PRESENTATION OF US INITIATIVE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT GIVEN TO ISRAEL FOR DURATION OF INITIATIVE?

BERGUS

BT

Wow!

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 103

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42
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

106922

'70 SEP 30 PM 5:07

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

R 301540Z SEP 70
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1803
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5478

EXDIS

REF: STATE 160633

1. MUCH APPRECIATE DEPTEL AND GENEROUS SUPPORT FOR EMBASSY OPERATIONS.

2. JUDGMENTS THIS TELEGRAM BASED ON PROPOSITION WE DO NOT YET KNOW MAGNITUDE OF MEDICAL-RELIEF PROGRAM. APPEARS PROBABLE MEDICAL SITUATION MAY BE WELL IN AMMAN

AND RESOURCES AMPLE WITH. HOWEVER, CONTINUING NEED FOR SOME MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND EXTRAORDINARY REQUESTS. WITH RESPECT RELIEF, SITUATION STILL SO UNCLEAR DO NOT YET WISH TO ASSUME THERE IS MAJOR LONG TERM RELIEF NEED.

3. DO NOT BELIEVE, THEREFORE, CAN YET DETERMINE NEED FOR A RELIEF COORDINATOR PER PARA 1A REFTEL. WOULD PREFER HOLD THIS POSSIBILITY IN RESERVE FOR WHEN SITUATION CLARIFIES.

4. SEPTELS INDICATE DEVELOPMENT GOJ COMMITTEE COORDINATING ARRANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN MEDICAL TEAM. BELIEVE THIS SITUATION SORTING ITSELF OUT, MEDICAL STAFF OF ATH-MASH WORKING IN MEDICAL COORDINATING ENTERPRISE AND NO REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIALISTS (PARA 1B REFTEL).

5. WOULD APPRECIATE DESPATCH EXPERIENCED B&F OFFICER PER PARA 1C REFTEL. IN VIEW OUR NECESSITY LIMIT STAFF AMMAN, HOWEVER, AND DIFFICULTIES MAINTAINING PHYSICAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF RECEIPTS AMMAN AT THIS TIME, WISH TO STATION B&F OFFICER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05478 301640Z

BEIRUT AND HANDLE AID PAPERWORK THERE USING B&F OFFICER, STRACHAN AND SALADA.

6. AM PLANNING BRING WOLLE BACK TO AMMAN SOON WITH JOINT ECON/AID/RELIEF RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPERATIONS ON GROUND. BELIEVE THIS MOST EFFICIENT IN TERMS WOLLE'S BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE HERE AND ARABIC COMPETENCE.

7. WOULD APPRECIATE ASSIGNMENT YOUNG, ENERGETIC PROGRAM OFFICER FROM AID/W SOONEST TO BE STATIONED INITIALLY BEIRUT BUT WITH VIEW TO BRINGING TO AMMAN AT EARLY DATE TO WORK WITH WOLLE. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND IN LIGHT CRANE LONG AND ARDUOUS TOUR HERE ALREADY AND UNCERTAINTIES RE FUTURE ORGANIZATION BELIEVE IT FAIREST TO HIM HE BE REASSIGNED.

BELIEVE CHANGE MAKES SENSE IN ORDER BRING NEW PROGRAM OFFICER IN AT THE BEGINNING OF AN ENTIRELY NEW AND POSSIBLY ARDUOUS BALLGAME. TRUST WE CAN CALL ON EMB BEIRUT FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE IN BACKSTOPPING ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE.

8. NO REQUIREMENT FOR FRED THOMAS AND BELIEVE HIS RELATIONSHIPS AMMAN NOT MOST USEFUL NOW.

9. I AM CONCERNED WITH ESTABLISHING ADEQUATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING RE ACTUAL PHYSICAL DISPOSITION AND END USE US RELIEF ASSETS AMMAN, HOWEVER, GREAT DIFFICULTIES OF FREE MOVEMENT, AND CONTINUING REAL SECURITY PROBLEM BELIEVE ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS AS MUCH AS WE CAN NOW ATTEMPT. I CONTEMPLATE MAINTAINING MOST OPERATIONS IN EMB HOUSES JEBAL AMMAN FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD MAINTAINING ONLY SKELETON STAFF AT CHANCERY, JEBAL LUWEIBDEH, FOR NECESSARY FUNCTIONS THERE.
GP-3. BROWN

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