

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 075

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00491 021340Z

50  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

094479

O 021315Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5791  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 491

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS EUCOM AND USDOCOSOUTH

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: HOLY SYNOD DEMANDS MAKARIOS, RESIGNATION

1. WE DESCRIBE IN SEPTEL BACKGROUND OF MARCH 2 MEETING OF HOLY SYNOD. SYNOD HAS JUST ISSUED COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCING THAT BISHOPS OF KYRENIA, KITIUM AND PAPHOS UNANIMOUSLY ASKED THAT MAKARIOS RESIGN AS PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS. COMMUNIQUE STATES MAKARIOS WILL REPLY AFTER STUDY.
2. A CLOSE RELATIVE OF ARCHBISHOP HAS TOLD EMBASSY EMPLOYEE THAT MAKARIOS WILL WAIT FIFTEEN DAYS, THEN ANNOUNCE HIS RESIGNATION. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THIS. WE ARE TOLD RATIONALE FOR THIS IS TO PRESERVE SOME STABILITY IN WHAT IS NOW HIGHLY VOLATILE SITUATION.
3. UNDER ARTICLE 44 OF CYPRUS CONSTITUTION OFFICE OF PRESIDENT BECOMES VACANT UPON WRITTEN RESIGNATION ADDRESSED TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. IN EVENT OF VACANCY IN OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT OF HOUSE OR REPRESENTATIVES (CLERIDES) ACTS AS PRESIDENT DURING VACANCY. VACANCY MUST BE FILLED THROUGH AN ELECTION WHICH MUST TAKE PLACE WITHIN 45 DAYS.

POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH

72 MAR 3 11:53  
WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITEHOUSE  
STUART ON ROOM

MK  
1 PM 2/25

SECRET 831

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00482 011133Z

18  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

084423

P R 011055Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5782  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 482

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CZECH ARMS

1. SUMMARY: PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENT PLACE NEW CZECH ARMS SHIPMENT UNDER INTERMITTENT UNFICYP INSPECTION SHOULD OFFER GOG A SATISFACTORY HALF LOAF IF IT IS WILLING CONSIDER COMPROMISE WITH MAKARIOS.

2. CYPRUS PRESS FEB 29 - MARCH 1 HAS CARRIED REPORTS THAT RESOLUTION OF CZECH ARMS PROBLEM IS IMMINENT. FROM FBIS M292147 WE NOTE ATHENS ARMED FORCES RADIO HAS PICKED THESE UP.

3. FROM CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE WE LEARN THAT NEGOTIATIONS OF UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL WITH FONMIN KYPRIANOU ON ARMS QUESTION ARE IN FACT WELL ADVANCED. STATE OF PLAY APPARENTLY AS FOLLOWS:

4. UNSYG HAS NOT SUPPORTED UNFICYP VIEW THAT MAKARIOS WHOULD BE PRESSED PLACE NEW SHIPMENT OF CZECH WEAPONS UNDER UNFICYP CUSTODY. INSTEAD, OSORIO INSTRUCTED WORK FOR ARRANGEMENT SIMILAR TO THAT OF FEB 1967 COVERING 1966 CZECH SHIPMENT.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00482 011133Z

5. IN DISCUSSION BETWEEN OSORIO AND KYPRIANOU, LAST OF WHICH TOOK PLACE FEB 28, KYPRIANOU HAS CONVEYED MAKARIOS' OFFER (A) COLLECT ENTIRE JANUARY SHIPMENT OF CZECH ARMS IN CYPOL ARMORY, (B) PROVIDE UNFICYP WITH SCOUT'S HONOR "COMPLETE LISTING", (C) PERMIT UNFICYP FORCE COMMANDER CARRY OUT INTERMITTENT INSPECTIONS. THIS TO BE REGARDED AS "PROVISIONAL" ARRANGMENT.

6. OSORIO HAS EVIDENTLY CABLED KYPRIANOU'S OFFER TO SYG RECOMMENDING SYG ACCEPT AND ENDORSE IT WITH GREECE AND TURKEY AS SATISFYING IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF POTENTIALLY INCREASED INSTABILITY ON CYPRUS CAUSED BY ARMS IMPORTATION.

7. COMMENT: STRIKES US THAT MAKARIOS' OFFER COULD PROVIDE GREECE WITH GOOD OPPORTUNITY EXTRICATE ITSELF GRACEFULLY FROM IMPASSE AND DILIMMA CREATED BY ITS EXAGGERATED FEB 11 DEMANDS ON MAKARIOS. THI KAMOUNTS TO A FAIR COMPROMISE ON ARMS QUESTION WHICH GREECE CAN CLAIM AS A VICTORY. IF IT ACCEPTS THIS AND EASES OFF ITS PUBLIC PRESSURE ON MAKARIOS, WE THINK MAKARIOS IS LIKELY IN DUE COURSE TO MAKE CABINET CHANGES WHICH, EVEN IF NOT COMPLETELY IN ACCORD WITH GOG RECOMMENDATIONS, WOULD ENABLE GOG ASSERT IT HAD SUCCESSFULLY PERSUADED MAKARIOS INTRODUCE BROADER REPRESENTATION INTO CYPRUS COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN LINE WITH ITS "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY" SUGGESTIONS. WE WOULD EVEN HAZARD THE GUESS THAT IN A RESHUFFLE MAKARIOS MIGHT BE WILLING REPLACE KYPRIANOU, WHO IS GREECE'S PARTICULAR BETE NOIR, ON PLAUSIBLE GROUNDS OF ILL HEALTH.

8. OPENING FOR COMPROMISE WOULD NOW APPEAR TO EXIST IF GREECE IS WILLING EXPLOIT IT. GP-3.  
POPPER



Department of State

TELEGRAM

22  
WH

SECRET 770

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00432 241231Z

3

51  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

039587

P 241125Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5755  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

SECRET NICOSIA 432

EXDIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS CZECH ARMS AND GREECE-CYPRUS RELATIONS

REF: STATE 31077, ATHENS 1015, 1036

1. SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE MAKARIOS WILL NOT GIVE UP CZECH ARMS WITHOUT A QUID PRO QUO. INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS UNLIKELY TO START UNTIL GREEK-GREEK CYPRIOT RELATIONS ARE PATCHED UP; FOR THIS TO HAPPEN, GREEKS MUST PLAY CARDS WITH MORE REGARD FOR CYPRIOT SENSITIVITIES. U.S. MAY BE ABLE HELP IN RAPPROCHEMENT.
- 2 WE THINK DEPT ASSTSEC DAVIES' RESPONSES TO NORWEGIAN COUNSELOR (STATE REFTEL) ARE AN EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF MAJOR FACTORS IN CURRENT CYPRUS SITUATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON SOME OF THESE, IN LIGHT ATHENS VIEWS EXPRESSED OTHER REFTELS.
3. WE NOTE EMBASSY ATHENS BELIEVES THAT TRADE-OFF OF CZECH ARMS FOR REMOVAL OF GRAVAS IN A NON-STARTER, BECAUSE IT WOULD INVOLVE UNACCEPTABLE LOSS OF FACE FOR GREECE, ASSUMING GREECE FULLY CONTROLS GRIVAS. ON OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION, IDEA THAT MAKARIOS WOULD VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP CZECH ARMS NO MATTER WHAT DEGREE OF DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE UN, U.S., UK, TURKEY AND GREECE TRY TO EXERT ON HIM SEEMS TO US EQUALLY A NON-STARTER. TO

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00432 241231Z

YIELD TO THIS KIND OF PRESSURE IS SIMPLY NOT THE MAKARIOS STYLE; MOREOVER, IT, TOO, WOULD INVOLVE A LOSS OF FACE. BASIC DIPLOMATIC PROBLEM IS HOW TO ARRANGE AN ACCOMMODATION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, IN WHICH BOTH SIDES GIVE SOMETHING AND GET SOMETHING IN RETURN. EMBASSIES ANAKRA, ATHENS AND NICOSIA HAVE ALL MADE SUGGESTIONS TO CONSIDERABLE EXTENT COVERING SIMILAR GROUND, LOOKING TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE.

4. SECOND POINT CONCERNS RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. CLEARLY, THIS IS MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR, BUT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT TALKS TO START WHILE THREAT OF CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS REMAINS IMMINENT. AT MOMENT WHEN ALL DIALOGUE BETWEEN CYPRUS AND GREECE HAS CEASED. IT IS MOST DOUBTFUL THAT THEIR REPS COULD USEFULLY SIT TOGETHER IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, OR THAT CYPRUS GOVT WOULD WANT TO AGREE TO EXPOSE ITSELF TO ISOLATION IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. CLEARLY, FIRST THINGS MUST COME FIRST; PRIORITY AS SEEN FROM HERE MUST GO TO PATCHING UP RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS AS PART OF OR FOLLOWING WHICH IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE A REASONABLE ARRANGEMENT ON SUPERVISION OF CZECH ARMS AND TO START INTERCOMMUNAL DISCUSSIONS.

5. THIRD POINT WE WOULD RAISE IS NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS. IT IS TRUE, AS EMBASSY ATHENS STATES, THAT GREEKS HAVE SPECIAL ROLE IN RELATION TO GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY (ATHENS 1015 PARA 5). BUT THIS IS NOT RELATED TO LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS UNDER WHICH GREEKS HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME RIGHTS AS TURKEY AND UK VIS-A-VIS CYPRUS, NO MORE NO LESS. IT IS DUE, RATHER, TO ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN CYPRIOT GREEKS AND MAINLAND GREEKS, AND IS THUS A POLITICAL FACT RATHER THAN A PECULIER LEGAL RIGHT.

6. IN THIS RESPECT VIRTUALLY EVERY GREEK CYPRIOT WILL AGREE THAT THE MAINLAND HAS A SPECIAL ROLE AND POSITION. BUT WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN RECENT WEEKS, AS SEEN FROM HERE -- THE BRUTAL ATTEMPT BY GREECE TO TREAT CYPRUS AS A GREEK COLONY -- HAS PROBABLY DONE AS MUCH TO INSTIL A SENSE OF RESISTANCE AND SEPARATE CYPRUS NATIONALISM AS ANYTHING WE HAVE RECENTLY SEEN. THIS IS A PITY, BECAUSE A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MUCH EASIER IF GREEKS COULD PLAY THEIR CARDS WITH MORE REGARD FOR PRIDE AND SELF RESPECT OF CYPRIOTS, AND WOULD UTILIZE THE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00432 241231Z

CHANNELS THEY HAVE FOR EXERCISING THEIR INFLUENCE MORE DISCREETLY.

7. IN NICOSIA RWJX#WE RECOMMEND THAT USG NOT ACT AS GOC MESSENGER BOY TO TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACTS BETWEEN GREECE

AND CYPRUS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT WE COULD APPROPRIATELY URGE BOTH SIDES TO GET ON WITH THIS TASK THEMSELVES. THIS STRIKES US AS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP IN REACTIVATING THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. IF GREEKS HAVE IN MIND A SECOND ROUND INVOLVING USE OF FORCE IN CYPRUS THEY MAY NOT BE RESPONSIVE, BUT IN ANY EVENT THE RECORD WOULD BE CLEAR AS FAR AS USG IS CONCERNED. POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED. VERIFICATION UPON REQUEST.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WN

SECRET 714

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00424 231445Z

45  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

P R 231345Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5750  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

031670  
WHITE HOUSE  
STATION ROOM  
2/23  
FEB 23 PM 4:01

S E C R E T NICOSIA 424

EXDIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: CONVERSATION WITH VENIAMIN

1. SUMMARY: VENIAMIN SUGGESTS USG RECOMMEND TO GOG THAT "COMMUNICATIONS DOOR" BE OPENED WITH MAKARIOS. WE DO NOT FEEL THIS WOULD BE IN US INTEREST. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPT'S PROMPT CONSIDERATION OF VENIAMIN PROPOSAL; INSTRUCTIONS RE REPLY TO BE MADE TO HIM.
2. FONOFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN ASKED DCM TO CALL FEBRUARY 23. VENIAMIN SAID HE WISHED MAKE PERSONAL SUGGESTION. COULD NOT USG ACT IN ATHENS TO RECOMMEND THAT A "DOOR OF COMMUNICATION" BE OPENED BETWEEN GOG AND GOC? PALAMAS PRESS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 19 (ATHENS 985) AND GOG REFUSAL SEND AN AMBASSADOR TO REPLACE PANAYOTACOS AS LONG AS MAKARIOS CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO CAPITULATE TO GOG FEBRUARY 11 DEMANDS, EFFECTIVELY SHUT DOOR TO ANY MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION BETWEEN TWO GOVTS ON HOW TO WORK THEIR WAY OUT OF PRESENT CONFRONTATION. COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE REESTABLISHED IN VARIETY OF WAYS, E.G. BY SENDING NEW GOG AMBASSADOR OR BY GOC SENDING CLERIDES OR SOME OTHER EMISSARY, WHICH IT QUITE WILLING TO DO IF GOG PREPARED DISCUSS REASONABLE COMPROMISE AND NOT MERELY INSIST ITS DEMANDS BE MET 100 PER CENT.
3. DCM REPLIED THAT IF GREEKS WANTED TO COMMUNICATE WITH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00424 231445Z

OTHER GREEKS THEY HAD NEVER LACKED FOR CHANNELS IN THE PAST. ALSO, OUR LOCAL READING OF PALAMAS STATEMENT IS THAT USG ADVICE NOT LIKELY BE WELCOME AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, SINCE VENIAMIN SO REQUESTING, WE WOULD PASS HIS REQUEST TO DEPARTMENT AND REPORT REACTION.

4. COMMENT: IN LIGHT OF PALAMAS' FEB 19 STATEMENT AND BECAUSE MAKARIOS DOES HAVE OTHER CHANNELS TO GOG IF IT WISHES USE THEM (E.G. NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER HARALAMBOPOULOS OR GREEK CHARGE) WE DO NOT FEEL IT IS IN US INTEREST TO GET INVOLVED IN THIS ONE.

5. RECOMMEND WE BE AUTHORIZED REPLY TO VENIAMIN THAT HIS PERSONAL SUGGESTION HAS BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BUT THAT ON BALANCE USG FEELS SUCH ACTION BY IT LIKELY BE MISCONSTRUED BY GOG AS A REFUSAL ACCEPT PALAMAS' WARNING; WOULD TEND COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN USG AND GOG IN A MANNER UNHELPFUL TO GOC PRESENT DELICATE JUNCTURE; AND WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR GOG TO GIVE RESPONSE, OR MERITS TO GOC SUGGESTION FOR ESTABLISHING NEW LINE OF CONTACT.

POPPER

592/03/88

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 684

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00419 231424Z

51  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 231000Z FEB 72 ZFD  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5746  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 00419

EXDIS

NOFORN

REF: STATE 29672, NICOSIA 396

SUBJECT: EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH GOC

1. AT RISK OF BEING TIRESOME, MAY I RAISE AGAIN QUESTION OF REQUESTING APPOINTMENT WITH MAKARIOS DISCUSSED IN REFTELS. SOVIET AMB HAS SEEN MAKARIOS; ATHENS 1012 IS EXCELLENT REPORT ON MEETING BETWEEN UK HIGH COMMISSIONER EDMONDS AND MAKARIOS; AND FRG AMB TOROK IS SEEING MAKARIOS TODAY FEB 23.

2. I UNDERSTAND FULLY DEPT'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN LOW PROFILE, AND THAT PURPOSE IS TO AVOID GIVING ANY GROUND FOR MISINTERPRETATION WITH RESPECT TO OUR ROLE IN QUARREL BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS. QUESTION I WOULD RAISE IS WHETHER MY FAILURE TO FOLLOW MY NORMAL PRACTICE OF SEEING MAKARIOS ONCE EVERY THREE OR FOUR WEEKS, AND OTHER HIGH CYPRIOT OFFICIALS MORE FREQUENTLY, WILL NOT IN ITSELF CREATE SUSPICION AMONG CYPRIOTS AND OTHERS OF BYZANTINE MENTALITY AS TO WHAT WE ARE DOING. SEEMS TO ME THAT RESUMPTION OF NORMAL ACTIVITIES IN LOW KEY MAY BE BEST WAY OF COPING WITH SUCH SUSPICION.

3. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR IS NEED TO SCOTCH MISREPRESENTATIONS ABOUT USG POSITION THROUGH DIRECT ASSERTIONS BY ME TO ARCHBISHOP

72 FEB 23 PM 4:01  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

031530

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00419 231424Z

AND OTHERS. OUR ENEMIES AND EVEN SOME OF OUR FRIENDS ARE NOT ABOVE ATTRIBUTING TO US RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPLICATIONS WHICH ARISE WHEN THEIR DESIGNS GO WRONG. MOREOVER, WE HAVE TO CONTEND WITH UNINFORMED FREE-WHEELING BY SOME OF OUR LOCAL COLLEAGUES WHICH IMPINGES ON USG POSITIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN FRG AMB TOROK LAST SAW MAKARIOS, WE UNDERSTAND HE TOLD HIM NATO HAD DECIDED TO FREEZE SITUATION IN CYPRUS. INQUIRIES WE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE PERMITTED US TO CORRECT THIS ERROR AROUND TOWN. ON FEB 22 TOROK TOLD ME HE INTENDED TO TELL MAKARIOS TODAY THAT NATO WANTED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT CRISIS AND THAT IT NEEDED NO BASES IN CYPRUS SINCE BRITISH WERE ALREADY HERE. I TOLD TOROK THAT WHILE I HAD NO DOUBT NATO NATIONS WOULD ENDORSE HIS STATEMENT, HE SHOULD NOT CONVEY THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ORGANIZATION AS SUCH HAD TAKEN ANY RECENT DECISIONS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION WITH ARCHBISHOP HELPS TO STRAIGHTEN THE CYPRIOTS OUT ON SUCH MATTERS.

4. EVEN IF I ASK FOR APPOINTMENT WITH MAKARIOS NOW, IT WOULD NOT BE SCHEDULED PRIOR TO SOME TIME NEXT WEEK. BUT MERE FACT THAT I HAVE SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WILL ITSELF UNDERCUT HARMFUL SPECULATION.

POPPER

10:4 AM  
15 FEB 73  
SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

592/03/90



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 292

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00416 230938Z

11  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

029256

R 230905Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5744  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

72 FEB 23 PM 4:01  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET NICOSIA 416

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: DISCUSSIONS ON CZECH ARMS.

REF: STATE 30413, NICOSIA 409

IN NICOSIA 409, WHICH CROSSED STATE REFTEL, WE REPORTED ON CURRENT FORMAL STATUS OF CZECH ARMS PROBLEM. GOC COMMENTS TO OSORIO HAVE ALL BEEN INFORMAL. GOC POSITION ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRIVAS AND ARMS HAS BEEN STATED NOT ONLY TO OSORIO BUT TO US AND PRESUMABLY TO OTHERS. AS RECENTLY AS EVENING FEB 22 FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN REPEATED TO DCM THAT "THE ARMS WILL BE NO PROBLEM IF GRIVAS LEAVES CHPRI AND GREECE CEASES ITS SUPPORT OF CLANDESTINE GROUPS."  
POPPER

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 819

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00399 191447Z

53  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

011838

R 191045Z FEB 72 ZFD  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5732  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 0399

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH

SUBJECT: CYPRUS CZECH ARMS

1. SUMMARY: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT CYPRUS ORDERED CZECH ARMS BEFORE GRIVAS' RETURN. REASON FOR THIS WAS THAT MAKARIOS HAD COME TO FEEL HE COULD NOT TRSUT HIS

FORCES CONTROLLED BY MAINLAND OFFICERS.

2. IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE AT SOCIAL AFFAIR FED 18, DCM RECALLED TO FONOFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN LATOR'S REMARKS OF FEB 11 (PARA 5, NICOSIA 302) CONCERNING NOTIFICATION GIVEN GOG OF MAKARIOS' INTERNTION PURCHASE ARMS IN EASTERN EUROPE. DCM ASKED IF VENIAMIN COULD BE MORE PRECISE AS TO WHEN TRANACTION WAS NEGOTIATED. AGAIN ASKING THAT HE NOT BE QUOTED AS SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION AND SPEAKING VERY CAREFULLY VENIAMIN SAID: "I WAS THE NEGOTIATOR. NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT TAKE PLACE IN PRAGUE. TRANSACTION WAS CONCLUDED WITHIN THE PAST YEAR. GOVT OF GREECE WAS INFORMED. GOC WOULD NOT TRY TO ASSERT THAT GOG HAD EVER INDICATED EXPLICIT APPROVAL."

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

2  
3

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00399 191447Z

3. BY USING THE PHRASE "WITHIN THE PAST YEAR" VENIAMIN WAS CANDIDLY PASSING UP A CHANCE TO LINK ARMS TO GRIVAS'

RETURN, SUBSTANTIATING PALAMAS' ASSERTION TO AMB TASCA (ATHENS 866).

4. COMMENT: WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT, EVEN ABSENT THE RETURN OF GRAVAS TO CYPRUS, MAKARIOS FELT THAT HE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FOR A MODEST FORCE WHICH WAS CLEARLY LOYAL TO HIM. WE KNOW THAT AFTER MARCH 1970 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FOR WHICH HE HELD GREECE RESPONSIBLE, IT EVIDENT HE COULD NO LONGER TRUST HIS PERSONAL SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF HIS GOVT TO THE HANDS OF FORCES CONTROLLED TO A GREATER OR LESSER EXTENT BY GREECE, THE MORE SO SINCE MAINLAND OFFICERS WERE KNOWN TO BE INDOCTRINATING CYPRIOT RECRUITS AGAINST MAKARIOS. GP-3. POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH.

592/05/92

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 671

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00396 191037Z

10  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

010910

R 191000Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5729

S E C R E T NICOSIA 396

EXDIS

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED RESUMPTION OF NORMAL CONTACTS WITH GOC

1. FONOFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN INFORMED ME AT SOCIAL AFFAIR EVENING FEB 18 THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD HAD MOMENTS OF DOUBT ABOUT USG POLICY IN CYPRUS CONFRONTATION WITH GREECE. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT FOLLOWING MY PRECIPITATE RETURN TO CYPRUS THERE HAD NOT BEEN THE CONTACT WITH ARCHBISHOP AND OTHER CYPRIOT OFFICIALS WHICH GOC WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED NORMAL IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. I TOLD VENIAMIN THAT THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATE. AS IN PAST MOMENTS OF CRISIS I HAD FELT THAT DIRECT CONTACT WITH HIS BEATITUDE WOULD HAVE TENDED ESCALATE THE SITUATION. MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT MAKARIOS' OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO COOL THINGS DOWN. MY OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO CONTRIBUTE TO HIS EFFORTS.

3. AS LAST WEEK'S ACUTENESS HAS LARGELY GONE OUT OF THE ATMOSPHERE, I FEEL THAT I AND MEMBERS OF EMBASSY STAFF SHOULD BEGIN TO SLIP BACK INTO NORMAL PATTERNS OF CONTACT EARLY NEXT WEEK. IF WE DO NOT DO SO, "MOMENTS OF DOUBT" AS MENTIONED BY VENIAMIN COULD TURN INTO GENERALIZED, ACTIVE SUSPICIONS.

4. SPECIFICALLY, RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH MAKARIOS FOR MID-WEEK FOR GENERAL REVIEW OF SITUATION.

GP-3,  
POPPER

2  
3

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 683

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00394 191050Z

17  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 1026 W

R 190920Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5727  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN

010974

S E C R E T NICOSIA 394

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - DISCUSSIONS ON CZECH ARMS

REF: ATHENS 967, USUN 613

1. AT SOCIAL AFFAIR EVENING FEB 18 UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL TOLD ME OF HIS EFFORTS TO WORK FROM THIS END TOWARD SOLUTION OF CZECH ARMS PROBLEM. AS FALLBACK HE INDICATED HE WAS ABOUT TO PROBE CYPRUS GOVT RE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ARRANGEMENT FOLLOWING GENERAL LINES OF 1967 AGREEMENT FOR HANDLING FIRST CZECH ARMS SHIPMENT. WHILE WE HAVE NOT HAD CHANCE TO RESEARCH DOCUMENTS WE UNDERSTAND THIS INCLUDED TEMPORARY

SSURANCE AGAINST DISTRIBUTION; COMMITMENT TO DISTRIBUTE SMALL ARMS ONLY AFTER ADVANCE NOTICE TO UN; AND ARRANGEMENT FOR PERIODIC INSPECTION OF ARMS BY UNFICYP COMMANDER. NATURALLY OSORIO IS TRYING IN FIRST INSTANCE FOR ACTUAL UNFICYP CUSTODY OF ARMS, BUT BOTH UN AND OOC ARE NECESSARILY INFLUENCED TO SOME DEGREE BY PRECEDENT.

2. UNVARYING POSITION OF CYPRUS GOVT SO FAR IS THAT THE ARMS WERE IMPORTED ONLY TO GIVE PRESIDENT MAKARIOS DEGREE OF PROTECTION HE NEEDS AGAINST ATTACKS ON GOVT AND HIMSELF PERSONALLY. AS SOON AS GRIVAS AND HIS SUPPORTERS ARE REMOVED AS THREATS, GOC SAYS, IT WILL BE WILLING TO DISCUSS ARMS IN SPIRIT OF ACCOMMODATION.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00394 191050Z

3. OSORIO IS CONTINUING HIS CONSULTATIONS OVER WEEKEND.

GP-3.

POPPER

EXDIS

3 5 0 5 1 NICOSI 334

PERMISSION FROM  
YHEWYSSA GMDOK  
YHEWYSSA YIHENS  
IHEO YHEWYSSA YIKYBY  
TO SECURE MYDHC 2321  
EW YHEWYSSA NICOSI  
B 1300000 000 15

INSD DCI-81 185 M

YHEWYSSA  
15

YHEWYSSA NICOSI 00394 191050Z

SECRET

hh/cj/eb

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WX

SECRET 972

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00361 161808Z

47  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
-----

OIR 161750Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5706  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN

972 FEB 16 PM 5:11  
02  
3  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
17935

S E C R E T NICOSIA 361

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PANAYOTACOS HAS LEFT CYPRUS

REF: ATHENS 897

1. PANAYOTACOS LEFT BY SHIP FOR PIRAEUS AT ABOUT 4 P.M. THIS AFTERNOON. WHILE IN LIMASSOL HE DID CALL OF BISHOP OF KITIUM - SIMPLY TO TAKE LEAVE, ACCORDING GREEKEMB.

2. COMMENT: HOLY SYNOD MEETS PERIODICALLY AND FREQUENTLY CLASHES WITH ARCHBISHOP SINCE ITS MEMBERS ARE STRONGLY PRO-ENOSIST. WHETHER GREEK ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE SETTLEMENT ON GOC WILL AFFECT BISHOPS IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY. WORTH NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS MAKARIOS HAS ALWAYS MANAGED TO OVERCOME BISHOPS' OPPOSITION.  
POPPER

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WN

SECRET 787

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00389 181633Z

42  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

P R 181600Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5723  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T NICOSIA 389

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- NEW ELEMENT

REF: ATHENS 923, NICOSIA 226

1. WE READ WITH GREAT INTEREST ATHENS 923. WE AGREE THAT AS WE SAID IN NICOSIA 226, COOPERATION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY ON CYPRUS IS AN IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT IN SITUATION. ATHENS RIGHTLY MAKES POINT THAT THIS REPRESENTS MAJOR ELEMENT OF CONSTRAINT UPON MAKARIOS.

2. HOWEVER, EVERYTHING WE HAVE SEEN INDICATES GREEK-TURKISH COOPERATION AS IT ACTUALLY EXISTS IS FRAGILE PLATFORM FOR ACTION AGAINST SHREWD AND STUBBORN OPERATOR LIKE MAKARIOS. ERALP'S TALK WITH AMB. HANDLEY (ANKARA 1168), AND INFOR FROM TURKISH EMBASSY HERE (NICOSIA 316 AND 390) APPEAR TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WHILE THERE MAY BE LOOSE AGREEMENT AS TO OBJECTIVES THE TWO GOVTS ARE NOT IN TOUCH ON TACTICS.

3. IT STRIKES US THAT IMMEDIATE NEED MAY BE TO GIVE GREEKS A HAND TO EXTRICATE THEM FROM THEIR PRESENT EMBARRASSING POSITION, SO THAT THEY ARE NOT TEMPTED TOUNDERTAKE SOME RASH OR PREMATURE ACTION. WE WONDER WHETHER USG, WITHOUT ENGAGING IN ANY PUBLIC DISPLAY OF DIPLOMACY, MIGHT NOT APPROACH PARTIES PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED, INCLUDING PERHAPS BRITISH, WITH KIND OF PACKAGE PROPOSAL DEPT, ATHENS, ANKARA AND WE WERE DISCUSSING LAST WEEK (OUR VERSION IN NICOSIA 311).

72 FEB 18 PM 7:32  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
004177

2  
3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00389 181633Z

4. OUR OWN VIEWS, REVISED AND EXPANDED, WOULD COVER FOLLOWING POINTS DESIGNED TO HELP PATCH UP ATHENS-NICOSIA RIFT AND GET CONSTITUTIONAL TALKS UNDER WAY:

(A) DISPATCH OF EMISSARY, PERHAPS CLERIDES, TO ATHENS TO TALK THINGS OVER -- THIS TO SYMBOLIZE MAKARIOS' WISH TO HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING WITH GOG.

(B) STERILIZATION OF ARMS -- UNDER UNFICYP CUSTODY.

(C) SOME MODIFICATION OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, BUT AFTER THE OBVIOUS PRESSURE IS OFF.

(D) REMOVAL OF GRIVAS FROM CYPRUS, AND CESSATION OF GOG SUPPORT FOR CLANDESTINE GROUPS.

(E) ASSURANCE BY MAKARIOS, PERHAPS IN SPECIFIC TERMS, OF REAL FLEXIBILITY IN NEW PHASE OF TALKS.

(F) ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. DECONFRONTATION PROPOSAL.

(G) PUBLIC STATEMENT BY MAKARIOS, APPROPRIATELY TIMED, THAT THERE IS NO RIFT BETWEEN HIM AND ATHENS.

(H) PRIVATE ASSURANCE BY MAKARIOS TO GOG THAT HE WILL HOLD LYSSARIDES AND CYPRIOT COMMUNISTS MORE AT ARMS LENGHT. POPPER

3  
JAN 18 1981  
11

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

96/03/96



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WX

SECRET 745

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00381 181611Z

42  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 181345Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5720  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T NICOSIA 381

EXDIS

SUBJ: REPORT THAT GREEK GOVT DOES NOT KNOW WHEREABOUTS OF  
GRIVAS

REF: ATHENS 931: STATE 28387

004009

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 18 PM 7:32

WE REGARD REPORT OF GREEK ARMY HQ AS EITHER UNINTENTIONALLY  
WRONG OR A DELIBERATE FALSE SCENT. THERE IS TOO MUCH  
EVIDENCE ON THE OTHER SIDE TO SHOW GOG'S IDENTIFICATION IN  
SOME FORM WITH GRIVAS' RETURN TO CYPRUS AND HIS ACTIVITIES HERE.  
WE WOULD NOTE, INTER ALIA, NKA 2124, 2131, 2134 (NONE  
ABSOLUTELY CONCLUSIVE, WE WOULD AGREE) AND QUITE CONCLUSIVELY,  
WE BELIEVE, PANAYOTACOS' DIRECT STATEMENTS TO UNSYG SPECIAL  
REP OSORIO-FATALL (PARA 3 NICOSIA 296 AND PARA 6 NICOSIA  
302) AND TO US CHARGE (PARA 4 NICOSIA 305). GP-3.  
POPPER

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET  
3.5

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 549

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00356 161323Z

47  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

P 161205Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5702  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T NICOSIA 356

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ROUND ONE TO MAKARIOS

1. SUMMARY: ON BALANCE MAKARIOS HAS REASON FEEL SATISFIED WITH RESULTS OF FIRST PHASE OF HIS NEWEST ENCOUNTER WITH GREEK GOVT; BUT HE MUST BE WELL AWARE HE IS FAR FROM OUT OF THE WOODS, AND NEXT CRUNCH MAY BE MORE DANGEROUS.

2. FROM A QUICK BALANCE SHEET OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE USG, ON FEB 8, FIRST LEARNED THAT GREECE HAD DECIDED USE CZECH ARMS IMPORTS AS GROUNDS FOR AN EFFORT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE MAKARIOS' AUTHORITY OR REMOVE HIM ENTIRELY, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT BY SHREWD EXERCISE OF HIS POLITICAL WITS MAKARIOS HAS SO FAR MORE THAN HELD HIS OWN AGAINST HIS STRONGER ADVERSARY.

3. PLUSES ON MAKARIOS' SIDE OF THE LEDGER ARE:

A. HE HAS GIVEN NO GROUND TO GOG DEMANDS YET MANAGED APPEAR REASONABLE TO NEUTRAL PARTIES BY SUGGESTING WILLINGNESS COMPROMISE IF GREECE WILL REMOVE GRIVAS.

B. GOG DEMANDS ARE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE NOT -- AS PANAYOTACOS PREDICTED -- CLAMORED FOR MAKARIOS TO COMPLY. ON CONTRARY, CYPRUS COUNCIL OF

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

FBK

16 PM

1:25

115913

L.L.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00356 161323Z

MINISTERS AND PUBLIC AT LARGE APPEAR TO BE SUPPORTING MAKARIOS' REFUSAL ACCEPT DEMANDS.

C. AMONG MOST GREEK CYPRIOTS, WHAT THEY TERM THE JUNTA IN GENERAL AND PANAYOTACOS IN PERSON ARE SEEN AS THE VILLAINS

D. AS WAS THE CASE FOLLOWING MARCH 1970 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT, MAKARIOS IS ARTFULLY EXPLOITING A THREAT FROM OUTSIDE TO UNIFY HIS PEOPLE AND WHIP UP EMOTION IN SUPPORT OF HIS PERSONAL POSITION.

E. HE HAS CAREFULLY AVOIDED GIVING GOG A TARGET BY KEEPING LOCAL COMMUNIST SUPPORT AND POSSIBLE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN DEEP RESERVE.

F. HE IS GETTING EXTENSIVE SOV BLOC -- INCLUDING YUGOSLAV -- PROPAGANDA SUPPORT BUT WITHOUT CUTTING INTO POTENTIAL HELP FROM WEST. USG, WE THINK HE FEELS, IS NOT COMMITTED TO GREEK GOVT SIDE AND MAY EVEN BE PREPARED BE MILDLY HELPFUL.

G. INTERNATIONAL PRESS IS PROMINENTLY SEIZED OF THE ISSUE; AT LEAST SUCH AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS AS ARE GATHERING IN NICOSIA START WITH A MARKED BIAS AGAINST GOG.

H. PANAYOTACOS LEAVE DEFINITELY FEB 16.

I. THERE REMAINS ONE VERY LARGE NEGATIVE FOR MAKARIOS: HE CAN ASSUME GREEKS WILL MAKE ANOTHER MOVE AGAINST HIM AND, AS WE POINTED OUT IN NICOSIA 328, GOG HAS LARGE EDGE OVER MAKARIOS IN TERMS OF LOCALLY APPLICABLE MILITARY POWER.

J. GAINS FOR THE GOG SEEM TO US MUCH MORE LIMITED. IT HAS EXPOSED THE CZECH ARMS SHIPMENT AND BUILT AND PUBLICIZED A RECORD OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY MAKARIOS WITH ITS POLITICAL DEMANDS. IT HAS SO FAR BEEN ABLE COUNT USG AS ESSENTIALLY NEUTRAL, WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT IN THIS SITUATION TO DENYING MAKARIOS THE DEGREE OF PROTECTION FROM GREEK POWER PLAY WHICH USG INVOLVEMENT IN GOOD OFFICES ROLE WOULD ENTAIL. IF CZECH ARMS WERE GOG'S ONLY OR MAJOR OBJECTIVE, IT COULD BE MILDLY GRATIFIED BY FACT UNSYG HAS VOLUNTEERED PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00356 161323Z

6. MOST OF MAKARIOS' PLUSSES CAN BE CONSIDERED MINUSES FOR JUNTA. IN ADDITION:

A. AFTER TODAY, GOG WILL NOT HAVE AMBASSADORIAL REPRESENTATION HERE IF IT FOLLOWS THROUGH ON THREAT TO LEAVE RELATIONS IN HAND OF CHARGE D'AFFAIRES UNTIL MAKARIOS ACCEPTS ITS PROPOSALS. GREEK COUNSELOR ZAPHIRIOU HAS ONLY JUST ARRIVED AND HAS LITTLE BACKGROUND.

B. GOG CAN NO LONGER CONVINCINGLY PRETEND GRIVAS IS AN INDEPENDENT AGENT. PANAYOTACOS' DIRECT STATEMENT TO OSORIO-TAFALL AND TO US, AS WELL AS PALAMAS MORE CAUTIOUS AND OBLIQUE REMARKS, HAVE PRETTY MUCH BLOWN GOG COVER ON THAT ASPECT.

C. CYPRUS SITUATION IS NOW INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT. THIS MAKES CONSEQUENCE OF USING FORCE, EITHER THROUGH GRIVAS OR NATIONAL GUARD, FOR COUP D'ETAT OR PERSONAL ATTACK ON MAKARIOS, MUCH MORE SERIOUS. GIVEN DEGREE TO WHICH GOG HAS PUBLICLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO ACHIEVEMENT OF ITS DEMANDS, INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ALSO MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR GREECE TO BACK OFF.

7. WITH PANAYOTACOS' DEPARTURE, FIRST PHASE OF CURRENT SITUATION HAS ENDED. NEXT MOVE IS UP TO GREECE. ONE POSSIBILITY IS THAT ATHENS WILL SWALLOW HARD, LIMIT ITSELF TO DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION AND TRY TO WORK OUT BEST ARRANGEMENT IT CAN WITH MAKARIOS AND ANKARA, VERY MUCH AS IT HAS BEEN DOING FOR ALMOST A YEAR. SECOND POSSIBILITY, WHICH SEEMS TO US SOMEWHAT MORE LIKELY, IS THAT LEADERS IN ATHENS WILL NOT BE CONTENT TO ACCEPT REBUFF FROM MAKARIOS AND WILL MAKE ANOTHER TRY AT NEUTRALIZING OR GETTING RID OF HIM. DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE HAVING FAILED, USE OF FORCE WOULD BE A DEFINITE POSSIBILITY -- EITHER GENERALIZED, THROUGH COUP D'ETAT INVOLVING BOTH NATIONAL GUARD AND GRIVAS SUPPORTERS, OR PINPOINTED AND INDIRECT, THROUGH EFFORT BY GRIVAS' MEN TO ATTACK ARCHBISHOP.

8. SITUATION THUS CONTINUES FUNDAMENTALLY UNSTABLE. I WOULD RAISE QUESTION WHETHER, IF WE HAVE A LITTLE TIME, USG MIGHT NOT SEEK THROUGH ACTIVE DIPLOMACY TO STEER PROBLEM TOWARD A DIPLOMATIC RATHER THAN A DYNAMIC SOLUTION.  
GP-3. POPPER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 410

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00340 151119Z

17  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O P 151035Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5696  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

SECRET NICOSIA 340

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SOVIETS REPORTEDLY WARN GOG NOT TO INTERVENE IN  
CYPRUS; OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

1. GREEK CYPRIOT PRESS FEB 15 REPORTS SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO  
ATHENS YESTERDAY WARNED GOG NOT TO INTERVENE IN CYPRUS'  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN CALL ON PALAMAS FEB 14, SOV AMBASSADOR  
IS SAID TO HAVE STRESSED NEED TO RESPECT CYPRUS' INDEPENDENCE  
AND SOVEREIGNTY.

2. COMPARISON OF GOG FEB 11 NOTE PUBLISHED LAST NIGHT IN  
NICOSIA AND ATHENS WITH TEXT GIVEN EMBASSY ATHENS (ATHENS  
772) REVEALS ONLY ONE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE. CLAUSE HAS BEEN  
DELETED FROM PARA 3 OF EARLIER TEXT TO EFFECT MAKARIOS  
"EMPHASIZED HE DID NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL  
GUARD." COMMENT: EFFECT OF CHANGE IS TO SOFTEN NOTE  
SOMEWHAT AND TO PUT IN SLIGHTLY LESS STARK TERMS EXTENT OF  
GREEK-CYPRIOT RUPTURE.

3. MAKARIOS DID NOT MAKE RADIO OR TELEVISION ADDRESS  
LAST NIGHT, CONTRARY TO CYPRUS BROADCASTING CORP EXPECTATION  
REPORTED NICOSIA 331.

4. GRACE NOTE TO PANAYOTACOS' FEB 14 PRESS CONFERENCE

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 15 PM 5:14  
106675

2/3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00340 151119Z

WAS REQUEST TO REPORTERS THAT THEY FORGIVE HIM IF "IN MOMENTS OF NERVOUSNESS" HE MIGHT HAVE USED EXPRESSIONS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED "TOO AUSTERE OR CRITICAL."

5. DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS, TURK CYPRIOTS HAVE INTENSIFIED RESTRICTIONS ON PEOPLE LEAVING THE NICOSIA ENCLAVE. THOSE LACKING PRESSING BUSINESS ON THE GREEK SIDE HAVE BEEN TURNED BACK BY TURK CYPRIOT POLICE. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND TMT FIGHTERS VISITED HOMES IN THE TURKISH QUARTER LAST NIGHT ADVISING RESIDENTS TO STOCKPILE THREE-DAY FOOD SUPPLY.

GP-4.  
POPPER

YHNEBVSSA WOSCOM 6810811A  
RSHWISSON NY10 6810811A  
OSWISSION NY10 6810811A  
YHNEBVSSA WOSCOM 6810811A  
YHNEBVSSA WOSCOM 6810811A  
INFO YHNEBVSSA YHNEBVSSA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6838  
BY YHNEBVSSA NICOSIA  
15 151119Z 683 15

SECTION THREE  
MAIL ROOM  
11-21-68

02/50

TELETYPE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

592/03/100

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 945

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00334 150325Z

88  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O P 150255Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5694  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T NICOSIA 334

EXDIS

1. BUILD-UP OF PRO-MAKARIOS DELEMENTS AROUND ARCHBISHOPRIC IS CONTINUING. UNFICYP REPORTS THAT AS OF 0430 LOCAL (0230 GMT) 20 BUSLOADS OF UNARMED CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN CLEARED THROUGH CYPOL PERIMETER CHECK POINTS AND ARRIVED IN AREA OF ARCHBISHOPRIC. MORE APPARENTLY EN ROUTE INTO CITY. UNFICYP HAS JUST BEEN INFORMED BY CYPOL THAT THIS TRAFFIC INTO NICOSIA IS FOR PURPOSE OF A "SPONTANEOUS" PRO-MAKARIOS DEMONSTRATION FEB 15.

2. TURKISH CYPRIOTS NOW SENSITIZED TO THIS MOVEMENT BUT ARE OBSERVING ONLY.

3. WE NOTE THAT SUMMARY TEXT OF ITS FEB 11 MEMORANDUM TO MAKARIOS RELEASED BY GOG AND CARRIED ATHENS ARMED FORCES RADIO 2100 GMT FEB 14 (FBIS KYRENIA M142221) APPEARS DESIGNED EMPHASIZE INTRANSIGENCE OF MAKARIOS AND RESULTANT SHARPNESS OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN GOG AND GOC.  
POPPER

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1972 FEB 15 AM 7:43

104344

02

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 817

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00333 150210Z

91  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W

-----  
O 150150Z FEB 72  
FM AMEVASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5693  
INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 333

EXDIS

1. AS OF 0330 LOCAL (0130 ZULU) UNFICYP SOURCE (PROTECT) ADVISES:

2. CYPOL HAS ESTABLISHED POLICE CHECKS ON ALL MAJOR ROADS INTO NICOSIA.

3. 5-6 BUSLOADS OF CIVILIANS HAVE ARRIVED AT ARCHBISHOP'S RESIDENCE.

4. NATIONAL GUARD CHECK POINT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SET UP OUTSIDE CYPOL PERIMETER STATION ON LARNACA-NICOSIA ROAD.

5. MERCHANT VESSEL ANCHORED OFF MORPHOU BAY HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SOVIET FLAG, REGISTERED IN ARCHANGEL, 5,000 - 6,000 TONS.

6. COMMENT: ACTIVITIES CITED PARAS 2 AND 3 APPARENTLY PRO-MAKARIOS DEFENSIVE MEASURES.  
POPPER

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 15 AM 7:43

2

103915

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 370

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00332 141938Z

45

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W

O 141925Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5692  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 332

EXDIS

REF: STATE 25489

CLERIDES INFORMED 2045 LOCAL. HE IS NOW TALKING TO  
PARLIAMENTARIANS AND HIS WIFE TELLS ME HE EXPECTS TO GO TO  
PRESIDENTIAL PALACE LATER TONIGHT. OTHER SOURCE SAYS GUARDS  
AROUND PALACE DOUBLED OR TREBLED. CLERIDES SAID HE WOULD  
CALL ME LATER IF HE HAD ADDITIONAL INFO TO CONVEY.  
POPPER

02  
72 FEB 15 AM 7:43  
WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
101859

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 238

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00330 141823Z

45  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W  
-----

O 141805Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WAHSDC IMMEDIATE 5690  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 330

EXDIS

REF: NICOSIA 322

AT 7:30 PM LOCAL CLERIDES TELEPHONED ME TO ASK IF I HAD RECEIVED ANY WORD FROM WASHINGTON RE OUR CONVERSATION. I SAID I HAD NOT BUT WOULD NOTIFY HIM AT ONCE IF I DID.  
POPPER

SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE  
101430

72 FEB 15 AM 7:43

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 144

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00328 141720Z

45  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /026 W

100994

3

P 141650Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5688  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

SECRET NICOSIA 328

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: UNFICYP ESTIMATE OF FORCE ALIGNMENT PRO AND ANTI  
MAKARIOS

1. IN A RECENT UPDATED ESTIMATE, UNFICYP HAS DRAWN THE  
BALANCE OF MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES FOR AND AGAINST  
MAKARIOS. CONCLUSION IS THAT GOG WOULD HAVE CLEAR UPPER  
HAND IN A POWER CONFRONTATION. UNFICYP ASSESSMENT AS FOLLOWS:

PRO-MAKARIOS FORCES: MAKARIOS CAN COUNT WITH CERTAINTY  
ON A PAID BODY OF 300-400 UN-UNIFORMED GUNMEN RECRUITED FOR  
LOYALTY TO HIM AND HAVING VARIOUS DEGREES MILITARY AND PARA-  
MILITARY FROM EOKA DAYS, NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE OR  
POLICETRAINING. IN ADDITION, HE CAN PROBABLY ALTHOUGH LESS  
CERTAINLY RELY ON HELP FROM COMMUNIST FIGHTER GROUPS  
ORGANIZED UNDER AKEL AND DR. LYSSARIDES. AT MAXIMUM THESE  
ARE ESTIMATED AT 1,000 MEN. FINALLY, MAKARIOS CAN EXPECT  
LITTLE OR NO HELP FROM 3,000 MAN CYPOL. ITS SENIOR  
LEADERSHIP IS LOYAL TO HIM BUT BELOW THAT LEVEL THERE ARE  
MAN GEORKADJIS APPOINTEES. UNFICYP ESTIMATES MAJORITY  
OF CYPOL WOULD EITHER STAY NEUTRAL OR SWING OVER TO OTHER  
SIDE IF IT SAW FAR SUPERIOR NATIONAL GUARD COMMITTED  
AGAINST MAKARIOS.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00328 141720Z

FORCES AT GOG DISPOSAL: GENERAL HARALAMBOPOULOS, MAIN-  
LAND COMMANDER 9,500 MAN NATIONAL GUARD, HAS AN ESTIMATED  
3,000 TROOPS POISED IN OR CLOSE BY NICOSIA. THESE  
ARE TROOPS JUDGED LOYAL TO THEIR MAINLAND OFFICERS AND  
GROUP INCLUDES ELITIST RAIDING FORCE. HARALAMBOPOULOS ALSO  
CONTROLS 27 TANKS AND ASSORTED ARMORED CARS AND ARTILLERY  
IN NICOSIA AREA. UNFICYP'S BEST GUESS IS THAT GRIVAS HAS  
RECRUITED 300-400 MEN SINCE HIS RETURN TO CYPRUS  
LAST YEAR.

2. GAME-PLANNING A GOG SCRIPT TO SEIZE POWER FROM MAKARIOS,  
UNFICYP CALCULATES ERUPTION OF SCATTERED ACTS OF VIOLENCE  
AT SELECTED LOCATIONS AROUND CYPRUS, CARRIED OUT BY GRIVAS  
FOLLOWERS, FOLLOWED WITHIN A MATTER OF FEW HOURS BY  
HARALAMBOPOULOS' SEIZURE ALL KEY INSTALLATIONS IN NICOSIA  
UNDER A DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. UNFICYP REASONS  
HARALAMBOPOULOS WOULD NOT WANT TO DELAY THIS ACTION AFTER  
FIRST VIOLENCE LEST CYPOL GET COMMITTED ON MAKARIOS' SIDE.

GP-3.  
POPPER

3

MH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

592/03/106

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WX

SECRET 908

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00321 141413Z

45  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W

0 141315Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5682  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

SECRET NICOSIA 321

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- A POSSIBLE UN MOVE TO DEFUSE CRISIS

1. SUMMARY: UNFICYP LEADERS SEEK OUR VIEW ON A PROPOSAL THEY WOULD LIKE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO MAKE TO MAKARIOS, TO TRANSFER CZECH ARMS TO UNFICYP CUSTODY TEMPORARILY, PENDING SETTLEMENT OTHER PROBLEMS. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPT RESPONSE.

2. I SAW UN SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL AND UNFICYP COMMANDER PREM CHAND TOGETHER, MORNING FEB 14. AFTER DISCURSIVE REVIEW OF GENERAL SITUATION THEY MADE INFORMAL SUGGESTION AS TO HOW PRESENT TENSION MIGHT BE EASED, WHICH I AGREED TO REPORT TO DEPT FOR REACTION.

3. THEIR THINKING STARTS FROM PREMISE THAT A SIMPLE "NO" BY ARCHBISHOP TO GREEK GOVT DEMANDS -- NOT UNLIKELY, GIVEN HIS STUBBORNNESS -- COULD PRECIPITATE A FULL-SCALE CRISIS SINCE GOG IS TOO PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO BACK DOWN WITHOUT ANY SATISFACTION. INITIALLY AND SUPERFICIALLY, CRISIS MIGHT SEEM TO BE BETWEEN GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS, WITH TURKISH SIDE LOOKING ON. BUT IN FACT UNFICYP KNOWS THAT TURKS ARE DEEPLY WORRIED BY EFFECT OF CZECH ARMS ON OVERALL POWER BALANCE IN CYPRUS. IF THESE REMAIN IN PICTURE, TURKS WILL REDRESS BALANCE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. SEEN IN THIS LIGHT, MOST IMMEDIATE AND URGENT ASPECT OF SITUATION

72 FEB 14 PM 1:25  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
099743

2  
3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00321 141413Z

IS TO DEAL WITH THE ARMS PROBLEM, AS MUCH FROM STANDPOINT OF PEACEKEEPING AS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS.

4. OSORIO AND PREM THEREFORE HAVE IN MIND POSSIBILITY OF INITIATIVE BY UNSYG IN FORM OF COMMUNICATION FROM HIM TO MAKARIOS PROPOSING THAT THE CZECH ARMS BE TRANSFERRED TO UNFICYP CUSTODY AS A TEMPORARY OR PROVISIONAL MATTER, PENDING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF SITUATION WITH A BEARING ON UN PEACEKEEPING. (THIS IS NOT THEIR EXACT FORMULATION, BUT THE BEST APPROXIMATION I CAN MAKE TO WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND.)

5. OSORIO AND PREM BELIEVE THAT IF MAKARIOS FEELS SUFFICIENTLY HEMMED IN, HE JUST MIGHT ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. HE WOULD BE GIVING UP THE ARMS, TO BE SURE, BUT IT WOULD THEN BECOME MUCH HARDER FOR GREEKS TO PRESS THEIR POLITICAL DEMANDS, AND THE TURKS WOULD HAVE NO GROUND FOR ANY FURTHER REACTION. THOUGH A "TEMPORARY" MEASURE, THE ARMS TRANSFER WOULD BE OPEN-ENDED IN TIME AND MIGHT WELL BECOME PERMANENT.

6. THE UN OFFICIALS RECOGNIZE THAT MAKARIOS WOULD BE VERY LIKELY TO REFUSE TO TAKE THIS STEP WITHOUT ANY EQUIVALENT GESTURE FROM OTHER SIDE. NEVERTHELESS, MAKARIOS WOULD HAVE TO REPLY TO SYG AND THUS AT VERY LEAST A NEW LINE OF DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER WOULD BE OPENED UP WHICH WOULD HELP TO AVOID HARD DEADLOCK.

7. COMMENT: WHILE CHANCES ARE SMALL, I CAN SEE NO HARM IN THIS AS A STRICTLY UN EXERCISE, AND IT MIGHT HAVE USEFUL SIDE EFFECTS. PLEASE ADVISE AS TO RESPONSE I SHOULD MAKE.  
POPPER

3

174

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

62/03/19

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W4

SECRET 920

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 00322 141426Z

42  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

Z O 141355Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5683  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 322

EXDIS

REF: NICOSIA 319

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MAKARIOS EXPECTS GREEKS TO MOVE TONIGHT

1. JUST BEFORE LUNCH CLERIDES ASKED TO SEE ME URGENTLY, AND I WAS UNABLE TO POSTPONE CONVERSATION BEYOND 3:00 P.M. LOCAL.
2. CLERIDES ASSERTED THAT EX-GREEK AMB PANAYOTACOS HAD NOT DIRECTLY REQUESTED ARCHBISHOP TO WITHDRAW FROM PRESIDENCY, BUT THAT HE HAD TRANSMITTED MESSAGE THROUGH OSORIO AND, THIS MORNING, THROUGH BISHOP OF KITIUM. WHILE FRAMED AS "ADVICE", PANAYOTACOS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF MAKARIOS DID NOT COMPLY, GREEK GOVT WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIS. IF HE DID, GRIVAS WOULD LEAVE.
3. MAKARIOS CONSIDERS THAT THIS DEMAND BY PANAYOTACOS HAS LEFT VITUALLY NO ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION. CLERIDES CONSIDERS THAT CONTINUATION OF HIS MEDIATION EFFORT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS SITUATION.
4. CLERIDES SAID ARCHBISHOP HAS LEARNED FROM RELIABLE SOURCE IN ATHENS THAT GREEKS PLAN TO MOVE TONIGHT. HE SAYS THAT ARCHBISHOP WILL NOT BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE. THEREFORE, ANY MOVE BY GREECE WILL MEAN VIOLENCE. COMMENT: WE CANNOT AT MOMENT ASSESS

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 14 PM 1:25

2/3

099831

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00322 141426Z

ACCURACY OF ARCHBISHOP'S INFO.

5. I SAID I WOULD REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: I URGE DEPT TO ASK AMB. TASCA TO SEEK IMMEDIATE ASSURANCE FROM GOG THAT NO SUCH ACT OF VIOLENCE WILL TAKE PLACE AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL CONTINUE. PLEASE INFORM ME YOUR REACTION SOONEST, TOGETHER WITH INDICATION OF WHAT I CAN TELL CLERIDES.

7. INCIDENTALLY, WE LEARN THAT TCPA HAS RESTRICTED ALL TURK CYPRIOTS TO ENCLAVES AS OF NOON LOCAL TODAY.  
POPPER

SECRET NICOSI 312

EXDIS

SECRET NICOSI 355

PERMISSION NICO IMMEDIATE  
PERMISSION NICO IMMEDIATE  
YHEMBYSSA TONOOO IMMEDIATE  
YHEMBYSSA YIKYKY IMMEDIATE  
INCL YHEMBYSSA YIHEE IMMEDIATE  
TO DECELYE NYBHOE EYBEN 2993  
EM YHEMBYSSA NICOSI  
STO 141322T 140-15

1440 001-01 280-00 000-00 1458-00 1458-00

YELLOW 28-52

SECRET NICOSI 00355 141426Z

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

2011/01/08

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 862

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00320 141328Z

42  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 141240Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5681  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMON USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

SECRET NICOSIA 320

EXDIS

1. SUMMARY: CLERIDES CONTINUING MEDIATION EFFORTS BETWEEN GOG (PANAYOTACOS) AND MAKARIOS. IMPORT OF OUR ALOOFNESS LIKELY BECOME APPARENT TO GOC SOON.

2. FROM AN ASSOCIATE OF SAMPSON WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CLERIDES-SAMPSON-PARASKEVAIDES EFFORT MEDIATE BETWEEN PANAYOTACOS AND MAKARIOS CONTINUING (DESPITE PANAYOTACOS REMARK TO UK HIGH COMMISSIONER EDMONDS FEB 13; PARA 3, NICOSIA 315). CLERIDES ET AL EXPECT CALL ON BOTH MAKARIOS AND PANAYOTACOS AGAIN FEB 14.

3. SAME SOURCE INFORMED OUR PAO FEB 14 THAT ACCORDING HIGH LEVEL OFFICIALS, GOC PLEASED THAT AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAD RETURNED AND LOOKED TO HIM TO PLAY HELPFUL ROLE IN THIS SITUATION. SOURCE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR HAD SOUGHT APPOINTMENT WITH MAKARIOS. PAO PARRIED THIS BY SAYING HE DID NOT KNOW.

4. USIS IS BEING BARRAGED BY REPORTERS SEEKING INFORMATION ON US ATTITUDES, PROSPECTIVE ROLE, ETC. WE REPLYING USING GUIDANCE FROM DEPT SAYING ONLY THAT USG FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY.

5. COMMENT: FACT THAT I AM NOT SEEKING TO SEE MAKARIOS COULD PRODUCE DIFFERENT REACTIONS IN DIFFERENT QUARTERS.

SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE

1972 FEB 14 PM 1:25

2  
3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00320 141328Z

PRESS AND PUBLIC COULD CONCLUDE THAT IT BETOKENS APPROVAL OF GOG ACTIONS, WITH CONSEQUENT REINFORCEMENT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE. WE HAVE SOME REASON BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AT THIS TIME ARCHBISHOP FORTUNATELY STILL SEES IT IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT. HIS TACTIC IS TO KEEP COOL, PLAY FOR TIME, DE-EMPHASIZE ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS, SUGGEST WILLINGNESS TO BARGAIN, ETC. -- ALL CALCULATED TO AVOID GIVING GOG PRETEXT FOR STIMULATION OF VIOLENCE. IN THIS SENSE, FACT THAT I HAVE NOT SOUGHT APPOINTMENT MAY EVEN BE MILDLY APPRECIATED AS CONTRIBUTION TO HIS EFFORTS PREVENT ESCALATION. FOR EXAMPLE, WERE I TO CALL, SOVIET AND OTHER CHIEFS OF MISSION WOULD FOLLOW SUIT. MEANWHILE MAKARIOS CAN BE IN TOUCH WITH US, AT WILL, THROUGH VENIAMIN. IF THIS AFFAIR SPINS ITSELF OUT THERE WILL COME A POINT, HOWEVER, AT WHICH ARCHBISHOP WILL SEE MY STAYING AWAY AS REFLECTING SOMETHING MORE OMINOUS THAN A SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF HIS TACTICAL APPROACH. WE WILL MONITOR CLOSELY THROUGH RELIABLE SOURCES IN EFFORT ASCERTAIN HOW LONG WE CAN STRETCH THIS BEFORE BALANCE TIPS.

GP-3.

POPPER

35:1 149 14 133 571  
MODRHOITAUT12

3  
166

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

592/03/109

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WX

SECRET 812

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00319 141237Z

12  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 141140Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5680  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

SECRET NICOSIA 319

EXDIS

1. CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION HAS ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH ORAL PORTION OF PANAYOTACOS' FEB 11 DEMARCHE TO MAKARIOS. IT WAS THIS PORTION OF PRESENTATION WHICH DEMANDED THAT MAKARIOS RESIGN AND LEAVE CYPRUS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.
2. ON SAME DAY THAT HE PRESENTED GOG DEMANDS TO MAKARIOS, PANAYOTACOS BRIEFED UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL, UNFICYP FORCE COMMANDER CHAND, UK HIGH COMMISSIONER EDMONDS AND US CHARGE CRAWFORD ON SPECIFICS OF HIS PRESENTATION. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MINDS OF THOSE WHOM PANAYOTACOS BRIEFED THAT HE WAS FAITHFULLY REPRODUCING THE FULL EMOTIONAL FLAVOR OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH ARCHBISHOP.
3. STRANGE AS THIS MAY SEEM IT NOW APPEARS THAT MAKARIOS DID NOT IMMEDIATELY INFORM HIS INTIMATES, INCLUDING FONMIN KYPRIANOU, OF FACT THAT GREECE HAD DEMANDED HIS RESIGNATION. PERHAPS HE FELT IT MIGHT HAVE DEMORALIZING EFFECT ON HIS SUPPORTERS. FIRST KYPRIANOU HEARD OF IT WAS FROM OSORIO LATE FEB 11. AT THE TIME, OSORIO HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT KYPRIANOU WAS UNAWARE OF THIS PORTION OF GREEK DEMARCHE, AND KYPRIANOU CAREFULLY DISGUISED THE FACT.
4. ALSO ON EVENING OF FEB 11, OSORIO MENTIONED IN VERY

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 14 PM 1:25

02  
3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00319 141237Z

GENERAL TERMS TO FRG AMB TOROK THE BRIEFING HE HAD RECEIVED FROM PANAYOTACOS. TOROK EVIDENTLY TOOK UPON HIMSELF TO CONVEY THIS TO ARCHBISHOP MORNING OF FEB 12, AS USUAL IN- ACCURATELY, IN THAT HE SAID KYPRIANOU HAD TOLD OSORIO.

5. OUTCOME OF FOREGOING WAS THAT GREEK DEMAND FOR ARCH- BISHOP'S RESIGNATION SURFACED AND WAS EVIDENTLY KEY ELEMENT OF DISCUSSION AT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' EMERGENCY MEETING FEB 12. WE UNDERSTAND THAT FOLLOWING MEETING, MAKARIOS (REALIZING HIS OPPORTUNITY TRIP PANAYOTACOS) SENT CLERIDES TO PANAYOTACOS TO ASK IF IT TRUE THAT HE HAD BRIEFED THE SPECIAL REP OF SYG ABOUT DEMAND FOR RESIGNATION AS WELL AS TRANSFER OF ARMS AND CREATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

6. LATE AFTERNOON FEB 12, PANAYOTACOS OBVIOUSLY BADLY SHAKEN, SOUGHT PRIVATE MEETING WITH OSORIO TO ASK WHAT HE HAD REPORTED TO NEW YORK. OSORIO TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD OFFICIALLY CONVEYED THAT PORTION OF PANAYOTACOS' BRIEFING DEALING WITH UNRICYP CUSTODY OF CZECH ARMS. BALANCE OF PANAYOTACOS' REMARKS HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED FOR BACKGROUND OF SYG.

7. OUR BEST ESTIMATE FROM ALL THIS IS THAT PANAYOTACOS DID ASK ARCHBISHOP'S RESIGNATION; GOG, REALIZING JUST HOW SENSITIVE THIS WOULD BE, AND ANXIOUS NOT TO OVERPLAY ITS HAND, INSTRUCTED PANAYOTACOS CONVEY THIS ORALLY WITH EVERY INTENTION OF ITS BEING KEPT SECRET AT LEAST IN SHORT RUN; PANAYOTACOS BLUNDERED IN INFORMING OSORIO AND OTHER FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES SINCE CONSEQUENCE WAS TO PLACE GOG'S HARSH REQUEST IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

8. WHEN I SAW OSORIO FEB 14 HE SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED FOREGOING. HE NOW REGRETS HE TOLD KYPRIANOU PANAYOTACOS WAS HIS SOURCE. OBVIOUSLY HE FEELS HIS RELATIONS WITH GREEK CYPRIOTS AND PANAYOTACOS HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY SHAKEN.

POPPER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 660

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00316 141019Z

18  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

098441  
SITUATION ROOM  
WHITEHOUSE  
172 FEB 14 AM 11:22

P R 140900Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5677  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 316

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: INHAN ON TURKISH VIEWS

1. SUMMARY: TURKISH CHARGE SAYS CZECH ARMS MUST BE REMOVED FROM GOC CUSTODY; GOT WAS SURPRISED BY GREEK DEMANDS ON MAKARIOS AND IS NERVOUS ABOUT GRIVAS; NO PROGRESS POSSIBLE ON INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS UNTIL CURRENT CRISIS RESOLVED, BUT IF GREEK DEMANDS MET PROSPECTS WOULD BE BETTER.

2. TURKISH CHARGE INHAN CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST FEB 13. HE SAID:

(A) CZECH ARMS SHIPMENT WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT IMMEDIATE ISSUE FOR TURKEY. IN MAKARIOS' HANDS THE SHIPMENT WOULD ARM 5,000 MEN (WE THINK THIS EXAGGERATED) AND THUS MATERIALLY SHIFT THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE ISLAND. THE ARMS MUST THEREFORE BE REMOVED FROM CYPRUS GOVT CUSTODY AND HANDED OVER TO UNFICYP.

(B) GOT WAS SURPRISED BY GREEK DEMANDS ON MAKARIOS AND IS NERVOUS AS TO IMPLICATIONS FOR TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY. INHAN COULD NOT FORGET THAT GRIVAS WAS AN EXTREME ENOSIST. HAVING LAUNCHED ITS DIPLOMATIC ATTACK ON MAKARIOS, INHAN WONDERS WHY GREEKS HAVEN'T FOLLOWED THROUGH, SINCE TIME LIKELY TO HELP MAKARIOS. (WE TEND TO WONDER, TOO.)

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00316 141019Z

(C) INHAN BELIEVES NO PROGRESS POSSIBLE IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AS LONG AS RIFT BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND ATHENS PERSISTS. IF GREEK GOVT DEMANDS WERE MET BY ARCHBISHOP, HOWEVER, HE THINKS THERE MIGHT BE REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR A SETTLEMENT RECOGNIZING TURK CYPRIOT PARTNERSHIP STATUS. GP-3. POPPER

DEMANDS MET BY ARCHBISHOP WOULD BE BETTER... COMMUNITY... GREEK... TURK... PARTNERSHIP...

SECRET

ADMISSION... LONDON... NICOSI... 141019Z

TELETYPE UNIT... 11/03/85

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 267

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00311 02 OF 02 121727Z

44  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W

093086

O 121645Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO XSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5672  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 311

EXDIS NOFORN

REF: EXDIS TOSEC 15

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY ROGERS IN KEY BISCAYNE

13. FIRST, CZECH ARMS WOULD BE STERILIZED -- NOT MERELY STORED SUBJECT TO OCCASIONAL SCRUTINY BY UNFICYP COMMANDER, BUT KEPT UNDER STEADY SUPERVISION -- UNTIL ALL PARTIES CAN AGREE ON SOME ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

14. SECOND, MAKARIOS WOULD REPLACE TWO OR THREE OF HIS MINISTERS WITH PERSONALITIES (ACCEPTABLE TO GOG) WHO WOULD BROADEN REPRESENTATION IN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF ALL NATIONALIST (I.E., NON-COMMUNIST) ELEMENTS OF GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

15. THIRD, GRIVAS WOULD BE REMOVED FROM CYPRUS, AND GOG WOULD PLEDGE ITSELF TO CEASE SUPPORT FOR CLANDESTINE GROUPS SEEKING TO SUBVERT GOVT OF CYPRUS.

16. FOURTH, IN ORDER TO AVOID FURTHER AND EVEN MORE FRUSTRATING DEADLOCK IN NEW INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, LEADING TO YET ANOTHER EXPLOSION, PARTIES TO TALKS WOULD AGREE TO EXERT THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO WORK OUT A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00311 02 OF 02 121727Z

PROVIDING REAL PROTECTION FOR TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY THROUGH LOCAL AUTONOMY MEASURES, WITHIN A GIVEN PERIOD OF TIME, SAY THREE MONTHS. SHOULD THIS EFFORT FAIL, THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT MODUS VIVENDI BASED ON PRESENT DE FACTO SITUATION, PLUS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BY GOC TO HELP TURKISH COMMUNITY TO STAND ON ITS OWN FEET.

17. FIFTH, PARTIES WOULD ACCEPT USG DECONFRONTATION PROPOSAL (STATE 13867).

18. FIRST AND SECOND POINTS ABOVE WOULD MEET GREEK GOVT DEMANDS; THIRD WOULD ACCORD WITH MAKARIOS' OBJECTIVES; FOURTH WOULD APPROACH MINIMUM TERMS DEMANDED BY TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS FOR TCPA. WE DO NOT PRETEND THAT ANY OF PARTIES WOULD TODAY BE INCLINED TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS, BUT WE DO NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT AS SITUATION DEVELOPS THEY MIGHT ULTIMATELY AGREE TO ARRANGEMENT ALONG FOREGOING LINES AND COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT IT. IN THIS CASE UN SECURITY COUNCIL COULD ENDORSE IT. UNFICYP ROLE WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED PENDING STABILIZATION OF THE NEW SITUATION CREATED BY ACCEPTANCE OF THE PACKAGE PROPOSAL.

POPPER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

11/30/65

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 078

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00307 121057Z

10  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W  
-----

Q 121028Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO RUEHCVSECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5667  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 307

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH VENIAMIN

1. I TELEPHONED VENIAMIN MORNING FEB 12 TO INFORM HIM OF  
AMBASSADOR POPPER'S IMPENDING RETURN. I NOTED THAT  
ARCHBISHOP HAD NOT MADE RADIO-TV ADDRESS TO CYPRIOT  
PEOPLE FEB 1, SAYING I TAKE THIS TO MEAN THAT HIS BEATITUDE  
WISHED POSTPONE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION IN HOPES THAT DIPLOMACY  
COULD PRODUCE AN ACCOMMODATION. VENIAMIN SAID THIS WAS

MAKARIOS' POSITION.

2. COMMENT: GOC IS OBVIOUSLY COUNTING ON UNITED STATES  
TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THIS SITUATION. PRO-GOVERNMENT  
PRESS REPORTING OF DISPUTE BOTH GREECE PROMINENTLY CITES  
AMBASSADOR POPPER'S IMMINENT RETURN. GP-3.  
CRAWFORD

72 FEB 12 PM 12:43  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
091950

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 916

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00306 120822Z

10  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 120800Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5666

S E C R E T NICOSIA 306

EXDIS

SUBJECT: USG ACTIONS UPON AMBASSADOR POPPER'S RETURN

1. I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH AMB POPPER BY TELEPHONE IN ATHENS. HE WILL BE BACK IN CYPRUS BY NOON. QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHETHER HE SHOULD REQUEST MEETING WITH MAKARIOS IMMEDIATELY AFTER RETURN. THERE ARE PROS AND CONS TO THIS ON WHICH WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S COMMENT SOONEST.
  2. TO SEE MAKARIOS WOULD BE TO DEAL OURSELVES IN FIRSTHAND ON HIS VIEWS, CONTRASTING WITH PRESENT SITUATION IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATING THROUGH FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN. THERE ARE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES TO ESTABLISHING DIRECT CONTACT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
  3. ON OTHER HAND, DO WE WISH VISIBLY TO MOVE INTO CENTER STAGE? TO DO SO WOULD BE TO SEPARATE OURSELVES SOMEWHAT FROM GREECE IN THE PUBLIC EYE AND TAKE ON FOR USG THE MEDIATION RESPONSIBILITY.
  4. I TEND TO FEEL THAT WE ARE IN THE CENTER LIKE IT OR NOT AND THAT WE SHOULD KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN BY HAVING AMB POPPER SEE MAKARIOS FOR TOUR D'HORIZON AS SOON AS APPMT CAN BE ARRANGED AFTER HIS RETURN.
- CRAWFORD

72 FEB 12 AM 8:40  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
091007

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 855

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 00293 111204Z

11  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

0 111135Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5659  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE

2/3  
72 FEB 11 AM 11:40  
082518

SECRET NICOSIA 293

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CZECH ARMS

1. I CALLED ON TURKISH CHARGE INHAN LATE MORNING FEB 11 TO REVIEW ALL ASPECTS OF CURRENT SITUATION. I FOUND HIM ONLY PARTIALLY INFORMED. HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY ANKARA THAT GOG AND GOT WERE IN TOUCH REGARDING SITUATION AND HE KNEW THAT GREECE WAS TRYING TO WORK OUT SOMETHING ON CZECH ARMS AND BROADER PARTICIPATION IN CABINET. HE DID NOT AT ALL HAVE THE FLAVOR OF THIS BEING AN ULTIMATUM WHICH MAKARIOS MUST ACCEPT OR FACE A "POPULAR" UPRISING. I SAID USG REGARDED GOG COURSE AS FOOLHARDY, BASED ON FALSE ASSUMPTIONS AND DANGEROUS, AND WE STRONGLY COUNSELLING GOG AGAINST IT.

2. INHAN REPEATED ANKARA LINE THAT THIS NOT A MATTER OF CONCERN TO GOT, BUT HE SAID HE SHARED OUR DOUBTS AS TO VALIDITY OF ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH GOG SAYS IT WORKING. HE PARTICULARLY THOUGHT GREECE IS WRONG IF IT BELIEVES CYPRIOTS WILL NOT RALLY OVERWHELMINGLY TO MAKARIOS.

3. I HAVE ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN TO INFORM HIM THAT USG IS MAKING REPRESENTATIONS IN ATHENS IN FAVOR OF A NEGOTIATED ACCOMMODATION. I TOLD VENIAMIN THAT I HAD FOLLOWED UP ON OUR LUNCHEON YESTERDAY (NICOSIA 281) BY RECOMMENDING USG PUT ITS WEIGHT BEHIND A PACKAGE RESOLUTION

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00293 111204Z

LINKING GRIVAS AND ARMS, BUT THAT I DID NOT YET HAVE DEPT'S FINAL REACTION. VENIAMIN ASKED THAT I KEEP HIM INFORMED, IF POSSIBLE, OF GOG REACTION TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS.

4. I BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO LET MAKARIOS KNOW IN THIS SITUATION THAT USSR IS NOT THE ONLY PARTY INTERESTED IN HIS WELL-BEING AND A FAIR RESOLUTION OF CURRENT DILEMMA.

5. COMMENT: I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S ADVICE AS TO HOW MUCH WE WANT TO SAY TO MAKARIOS, USING VENIAMIN CHANNEL.  
CRAWFORD

EXDIS

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET  
SECRET  
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

211/03/065

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WX

SECRET 775

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00288 111058Z

10  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O R 111000Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5657  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATIONROOM

72 FEB 11 AM 11:40

213

SECRET NICOSIA 288

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CZECH ARMS

1. PANAYOTACOS IS WITH THE ARCHBISHOP NOW. CALL BEGAN AT 1000 HOURS LOCAL (0800 GMT).

2. FROM HERE IT SEEMS PATENT THAT CZECH ARMS TRANSACTION IS ONLY A PRETEXT FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A LONG HELD GOG (PAPADOPOULOS) DESIRES TO UNSEAT MAKARIOS. IT LOOKS VERY MUCH AS IF GREECE HAS SET THE WHEELS IN MOTION AND IS UNLIKELY TO BE TALKED OUT OF ITS PLANS. FULL PICTURE IS NOT YET IN, BUT IT WOULD SEEM THAT NATIONAL GUARD UNITS LOYAL TO GREECE ARE BEING POSITIONED TO TAKE OVER KEY INSTALLATIONS IN NICOSIA ON SIGNAL. WE ASSUME THE SIGNAL WILL COME SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. GOG MUST REALIZE THAT DELAY WILL GIVE MAKARIOS MORE TIME TO MARSHAL HIS PHYSICAL AND DIPLOMATIC DEFENSE.

3. AS A MATTER OF NAKED POWER -- WHICH IT HAS SAID IT WILL NOT USE -- GREECE MAY BE ABLE TO PULL THIS OFF. IF GREECE INTENDS TO USE THE NATIONAL GUARD FOR THIS PURPOSE, IS NOT REALLY COUNTING ON MASS SUPPORT AND IS WILLING TAKE THE INTERNATIONAL ONUS, IT CAN PROBABLY SEIZE CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AND OTHER VITAL GOVT INSTALLATIONS. BUT IF THIS IS NOT ITS INTENT, ITS PLANNING IS BASED ON SOME INCREDIBLY BAD ESTIMATES. TWO COMMENTS MADE BY PALAMAS TO AMB TASCA STAND OUT.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00288 111058Z

4. PALAMAS QUOTES PANAYOTACOS AS BEING "QUITE CERTAIN GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD CHOOSE GREECE OVER MAKARIOS". IF WE ARE TALKING IN TERMS OF POPULAR WILL RATHER THAN RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE THAT IS RIDICULOUS. THE FEELING FOR HELLENISM IS STRONG HERE, BUT THE JUNTA IS HELD IN LOW ESTEEM AND THE ADMIRATION WHICH GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE FOR MAKARIOS WOULD, IF TRANSLATED INTO VOTES, TURN ANY WESTERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICIAN GREEN WITH ENVY.

5. PALAMAS' OTHER STATEMENT WHICH SEEMS BASELESS IS THAT BECAUSE OF CZECH ARMS DEAL MAKARIOS IS IN A WEAK POSITION TO APPEAL TO UN. TO US THE CASE SEEMS TO BE QUITE THE CONTRARY. MAKARIOS SHOULD NOT BE HARD PUT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ARMS WERE IMPORTED TO ENCOUNTER A CONSPIRACY AIDED AND ABETTED BY GOVT OF GREECE. IN A SECURITY COUNCIL CONTEXT WE THINK HE WOULD FIND MANY SUPPORTERS, NOT THE LEAST THE SOVIETS. WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE SOVIET AMB BARKOVSKY BE MAKARIOS' NEXT CALLER AFTER PANAYOTACOS.  
CRAWFORD

OP: 11 MAR 71 11:40  
MAIL ROOM  
TELETYPE UNIT

3

MT

TELETYPE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

592/03/119

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WN

SECRET 282

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00282 101756Z

47  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

076070

O P 101745Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5656  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 282

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS PRIORITY EUCOM AND USDOCOSOUTH

SUBJECT: US ACTIONS TO RESOLVE NEW CYPRUS CRISIS

REF: ATHENS 742

EVEN THOUGHT IT MAY TO SOME EXTENT HAVE BEEN BYPASSED BY  
EVENTS OF PAST HOURS, I WOULD NEVERTHELESS COMMEND THOUGHTS  
WHICH DEVELOPED IN MY CONVERSATIONS TODAY WITH OSORIO-TAFALL  
(NICOSIA 280) AS ONE PRONG OF WHAT MUST INEVITABLY BE MULTI-  
FACETED USG EFFORT TO PREVENT NEW CYPRUS CRISIS.  
CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OCT: NICOSIA 282 NOT PASSED ABOVE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WN

SECRET 298

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00281 101810Z

2  
3

47  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W 076100

O P 101730Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5655  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 281

EXDIS

DEPT PASS PRIORITY EUCOM USDOCOSOUTH

SUBJECT: CZECH ARMS

- 1. SUMMARY: CYPRUS FONOFF DIRGEN SEES MERIT IN LINKING CZECH ARMS AND GRIVAS. URGES USG PLAY GOOD OFFICES ROLE.
- 2. I LUNCHEd PRIVATELY WITH FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN FEB 10. AFTER SOME HEDGING HE ADMITTED TO THE KEY NEGOTIATING ROLE IN NEW CZECH ARMS DEAL, BUT INSISTED NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE IN PRAGUE. IN BLUNTEST TALK WE HAVE HAD TO DATE, HE EXCORIATED GOG FOR ITS STIMULATION AND DEMONSTRABLE SUPPORT OF GRIVAS AND HIS (DOUBLE) ENOSIS MOVEMENT; DEFENDED ARCHBISHOP'S RIGHT TO TAKE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR PROTECTION OF HIS PERSON AND HIS REGIME; ASSERTED USG COULD PUT A STOP TO GOG'S UNSAVORY DOUBLE-DEALING IF IT SPOKE LOUDLY ENOUGH IN ATHENS.
- 3. ON FINAL POINT I SAID USG VIEW AGAINST ADVENTURES HAD BEEN OFTEN AND FREQUENTLY PUT, AND THAT WHENEVER IT HAD BEEN WE HAD BEEN ASSURED GOG SHARED OUR EMPHASIS ON A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION OF INDEPENDENCE. VENIAMIN REPEATED THAT OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE (ARMS DISTRIBUTIONS FROM NATIONAL GUARD ARMORIES TO GRIVAS SUPPORTERS, SUBSIDIZATION OF PRO-GRIVAS PRESS, ETC.) PROVED GOG COMPLICITY.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00281 101810Z

4. I ASKED VENIAMIN ON PERSONAL BASIS IF THERE ANY CHANCE A TRADE OFF COULD BE ARRANGED BETWEEN PROBLEM (FOR MAKARIOS) OF GRIVAS AND PROBLEM (FOR GREECE AND TURKEY) OF CZECH ARMS. VENIAMIN SAID CERTAINLY; THE MOMENT GRIVAS SURFACED AWAY FROM CYPRUS THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTIONS OF A SPECIAL FORCE OR OF NEW ARMS DISTRIBUTION. HE URGED USG PLAY A ROLE IN TRYING TO WORK SOMETHING OUT. I SAID I WOULD THINK ABOUT SO RECOMMENDING TO DEPT; THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE PRECISE PRIOR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT ARCHBISHOP'S RESPONSE IN EVENT GRIVAS DID LEAVE. I POINTED OUT JUST HOW TRICKY THE MIDDLEMAN ROLE COULD BE, GIVEN GOG'S FIRM STATEMENTS TO US THAT IT HAD NO PART IN GRIVAS' RETURN. VENIAMIN URGED THAT WE TRY AND DO SO PROMPTLY. HE SAID IT SEEMS OBVIOUS TO GOC THAT GOG TRYING USE ARMS AS PRETEXT/FIRST MOVE IN IMPOSITION OF PARTITION SOLUTION IN COLLUSION WITH TURKEY. SUCH A SOLUTION, VENIAMIN WARNED, WOULD NEVER STICK AND IN THE LONG RUN WOULD SET TURKEY AND GREECE AGAINST EACH OTHER.

CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OCT: NICOSIA 281 NOT PASSED ABOVE.

3  
S

MK

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

121/03/06S

Department of State

TELEGRAM



SECRET 244

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
7:48 PM  
WA  
1:08  
2/3

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00237 041219Z

16  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

032822

R 040945Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5623  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T NICOSIA 237

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS DOD  
NOFORN

SUBJ: CYPRUS; BELGIAN ARMS

REF: NICOSIA 173

1. UNSYG'S OFFICE HAS SLIGHTLY SHIFTED ITS POSITION ON QUESTION OF BELGIAN ARMS FOR MAKARIOS. AS RESULT UNFICYP'S STRONG PROTEST AGAINST NEW YORK'S INDIFFERENCE, SYG'S OFFICE HAS NOW REPORTEDLY INFORMED BELGIANS THAT IT WILL NOT INTERVENE IN THIS MATTER BUT WOULD "PREFER" THAT GOB NOT AUTHORIZE ARMS SALE TO CYPRUS.

2. BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO CYPRUS (RESIDENT BEIRUT) HAS BEEN SENT IN TO DISCUSS WITH UNFICYP, WHICH EXPRESSING A MORE FORCEFULLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE THAN NEW YORK.

3. WE AGREE WITH WHAT WE UNDERSTAND IN UNFICYP'S ESTIMATE THAT QUESTION OF BELGIAN ARMS IS PROBABLY ACADEMIC IN VIEW MAKARIOS' IMPORTATION OF CZECH ARMS IN LATE JANUARY. IN LIGHT OF WHAT WE NOW KNOW, GOB'S APPROACH TO BELGIANS LOOKS AS IF IT MAY HAVE BEEN A TACTIC TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ITS REAL PURPOSE. GP-3  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T. NOT PASSED DOD.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE  
COMMUNICATIONS ROOM

FEB 72  
PM 1:08  
WV  
2/3

SECRET 360

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00238 041230Z

42  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

032887

R 041000Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5624  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T NICOSIA 238

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS DOD

NOFORN EXCEPT UK AND CANADA

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJ: CYPRUS: SECRET TRAINING CAMP IN TROODOS

REF: NICOSIA 192, 233

UNFICYP HAS BEEN INFORMED BY NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER  
GENERAL HARALAMBOPOULOS THAT SPILIA CAMP IS A NATIONAL  
GUARD INSTALLATION. CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OC/T: NICOSIA 0238 NOT PASSED DOD.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET LIMDIS

1972 FEB 7 PM 1 04

SECRET

HCE477

*Saunders*

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00258 071736Z

40  
ACTION NEA-06

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 IO-03 PM-03 NSC-10 NSCE-00 EUR-10 INR-05

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 DODE-00 MC-02 ACDA-10 L-02 SA-01

RSR-01 RSC-01 /069 W

-----  
050034

P R 071615Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5639  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO  
USDOCOSOUTH  
EUCOM

S E C R E T NICOSIA 258

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: CONSEQUENCES OF MAKARIOS' NEW ARMS DEAL WITH  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. SUMMARY: ASSUMING INFORMATION THAT MAKARIOS HAS IMPORTED A LARGE NEW CONSIGNMENT OF ARMS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS CORRECT, WE CONCLUDE THAT AN IMPORTANT NEW ELEMENT OF TENSION HAS BEEN ADDED TO AN ALREADY MOST UNSTABLE SITUATION. THERE WILL BE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS ON IMMINENT TURKISH CONTINGENT ROTATION, ENLARGED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, PROSPECTS FOR U.S. DECONFRONTATION PROPOSAL, GOG RELATIONS WITH MAKARIOS, AND TO MUCH LESSER EXTENT ON GOT RELATIONS WITH GOG. MAKARIOS' BID FOR MORE SECURITY IN THE LONGER TERM COULD PRECIPITATE AND HASTEN THE VERY KIND OF CHALLENGE HE IS SEEKING TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST.

2. IT NOW SEEMS ALMOST 100 PERCENT SURE THAT MAKARIOS HAS SECRETLY IMPORTED NEW WEAPONS TO ARM AN INTERNAL PROTECTIVE FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 2,000 MEN, THAT THESE ARMS CAME FROM CZECHO-

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00258 071736Z

SLOVAKIA, AND THAT TRANSACTION IS AT LEAST DOUBLE THE SIZE OF THAT CONCLUDED IN AUGUST 1966. BEING A SHREWD ANALYST AS WELL AS A DETERMINED BRINKMAN, MAKARIOS UNDOUBTEDLY CALCULATED THE ANGLES CLOSELY AND CONCLUDED THIS MOVE WAS ESSENTIAL TO PROTECT HIMSELF AGAINST A DIRECT CHALLENGE FROM GRIVAS, WHOM HE BELIEVES TO BE BACKED BY GREECE. BUT THE MEDICINE IS OF A SORT USED IN EXTREMIS; IT COULD PROVOKE THE CHALLENGE HE SEEKS TO DEFEND AGAINST; AND IT WILL CAUSE A LOT OF HEADACHES TO OTHERS, NOT LEAST TO USG. TO TAKE A QUICK LOOK AT SOME OF THE MOST LIKELY CONSEQUENCES:

3. NEXT ROTATION OF TURKISH TREATY CONTINGENT (TURDYK) IS SCHEDULED FOR FEB 23. (SINCE THERE WAS SEVEN MONTH GAP BETWEEN LAST TWO ROTATIONS OF 50 PERCENT OF CONTINGENT, THERE IS FIVE MONTH INTERVAL THIS TIME, TO KEEP ON 12 MONTH CYCLE FOR ROTATION OF ENTIRE CONTINGENT.) USUAL NEGOTIATIONS -- ANGRY BICKERINGS WOULD BE A BETTER DESCRIPTION -- ARE GOING ON ABOUT LIST OF EQUIPMENT GOC WILL AUTHORIZE FOR IMPORT WITH CONTINGENT. ACCORDING TURKISH EMBASSY, GOC, TRYING MAKE UP FOR ITS DISPLAY OF RELATIVE REASONABLENESS LAST TIME, HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY PICAYUNE IN INITIAL CUTS THIS TIME. ALSO FROM TURKISH EMBASSY WE AWARE TGS HAS LONG BEEN RESTIVE WITH HAVING SUBMIT ITS EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTINGENT TO GOC SCRUTINY AND -- IN ITS EYES -- DEMEANING CUTS. MAKARIOS' IMPORT OF ARMS GIVES GOT EVERY EXCUSE TO BE VERY TOUGH, PERHAPS TO POINT OF SAYING CONTINGENT WILL IMPORT WHAT IT WISHES WITHOUT GOC SCRUTINY, AND INTERFERENCE WILL BE MET WITH FORCE. WE ARE ALREADY HEARING NOISES ALONG THIS LINE AND UNFICYP, WHICH IS THE TRADITIONAL MIDDLEMAN IN WORKING OUT ROTATIONS, IS VERY APPREHENSIVE.

4. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST GIVEN ATMOSPHERE BY GUYER'S SUCCESSFUL TRIP, WITH ITS RESULTANT PROSPECT THAT NEW TALKS WILL BEGIN LATER THIS MONTH HAS BEEN BLUNTED BY ARMS IMPORTATION. FORTUNATELY, EVERYBODY HAD BEEN BROUGHT ON BOARD BEFORE THE NES BROKE; OTHERWISE TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND PROBABLY TURKEY WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOT HARDER TO CONVINCE. AS IT IS, TURKS BOTH MAINLAND AND LOCAL WILL START NEW PHASE WITH AN EVEN MORE THAN USUALLY BITTER TASTE IN THEIR MOUTHS ABOUT MAKARIOS' LIFE STYLE.

5. THE U.S. DECONFRONTATION PROPOSAL HAS BEEN DEALT A PARTICULARLY HARD BLOW. FROM UNFICYP COMMANDER GENERAL CHAND WE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00258 071736Z

UNDERSTAND GUYER CARRIED THE BALL AS WE HAD ASKED, SPEAKING TO THE PARTIES IN A GENERAL SENSE AND LEAVING THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS, IN WRITING, WITH UNFICYP FOR APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP. ONE HALF OF THIS WAS DONE PROMPTLY AFTER GUYER'S DEPARTURE. NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER HARALAMBOPOULOS PROMISED CHAND COMPLETE COOPERATION IF TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE WILLING MOVE AS PROPOSED. TURKS, AS CHAND NOTED TO US FEBRUARY 5, WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HARD TO MOVE ANYWAY. NOW THEY HAVE INTENSE EMOTIONAL AND SOME REAL JUSTIFICATION TO PERPETUATE THEIR PREFERRED INTRANSIGENCE.

6. IT SEEMS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE STATE OF REAL, AS OPPOSED TO ORATORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOG AND MAKARIOS COULD GET WORSE THAN IT HAS BEEN SINCE LAST SUMMER'S REFUSAL BY MAKARIOS TO ACCEPT GREEK SUGGESTIONS FOR COMPROMISE, AND GRIVAS' SUBSEQUENT RETURN (WE'RE NOT SAYING THE TWO ARE NECESSARILY RELATED, BUT SUCH IS NOW THE CASE. FROM GREEK EMBASSY, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNDERSTATING THE CASE, WE ARE AWARE GOG FEELS MAKARIOS HAS DISREGARDED ITS STRONG ADVICE AGAINST PURCHASING ARMS FROM THE BLOC; HAS ACTED BEHIND ITS BACK; IS THROWING DOWN A PUBLIC GAUNTLET BY SHOWING THAT HE DOES NOT TRUST INTENTIONS OF MAINLAND NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AND THEREFORE OF GREECE ITSELF; AND IS PLAYING HIS OLD GAME OF BUILDING UP COMMUNISTS AGAINST "NATIONALISTS." DESPITE PUBLIC DENIALS, SOME HARSH WORDS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SAID BY HARALAMBOPOULOS AND PANAYOTACOS, AND MORE ARE LIKELY TO BE.

7. GOG-GOT RECENT AND CAUTIOUSLY EVOLVED UNDERSTANDING, ABOUT NOT LETTING CYPRUS BE THE DETERMINANT OF THEIR RELATIONS AND A POSSIBLE CAUSE OF WAR, IS NOT VERY ROBUST. THE SUSPICIONS, PARTICULARLY IN ANKARA, THAT GREEKS WILL IN THE LAST ANALYSIS GET TOGETHER AGAINST TURKS, WHATEVER THE TEMPORARY REALISM AND REASONABLENESS IN ATHENS,

IS OMNIPRESENT. GOT WILL, WE SUSPECT, FEEL GOG SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE TO PREVENT THIS, AND WILL EXPECT MORE THAN IS POSSIBLE TO REMEDY IT. WE DOUBT THE BETTER UNDERSTANDING ABOUT CYPRUS WILL RUPTURE BECAUSE OF ARMS TRANSACTION, BUT THERE SEEM LIKELY TO BE SOME STRAINS.

8. FINALLY, THE CORE ISSUE IS WHETHER MAKARIOS HAS REALLY IMPROVED HIS SECURITY SITUATION. ONCE 2000 OR WHATEVER NUMBER OF MEN HE INTENDS FOR SPECIAL CONSTABULARY HAVE BEEN RECRUITED AND TRAINED IN USE OF THESE NEW WEAPONS, THE ANSWER WILL PROBABLY

SECRET

SECRET


PAGE 04 NICOSI 00258 071736Z

BE YES, WHETHER ONE IS CONSIDERING A THREAT FROM GRIVAS AND/OR A DYNAMIC SOLUTION PUSH BY GREECE AND TURKEY. UNTIL HIS NEW FORCE HAS BEEN CREATED, HOWEVER, MAKARIOS' DETERRENT IS AN INTENSE IRRITANT THAT COULD HAVE AN EFFECT OPPOSITE FROM THAT HE INTENDS.

9. WE WILL COMMENT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE ON WHAT STEPS USG MIGHT TAKE TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE CONSEQUENCES, REVIEWED IN FOREGOING, MAKARIOS' LATEST MOVE, AND TO KEEP PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION MOVING FORWARD.  
CRAWFORD

SECRET LIMDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

WPH

TELEGRAM

SECRET 220

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00255 071534Z

47  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

049126

R 071440Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5637  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN

SECRET NICOSIA 255

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: FURTHER REPORT ON STATUS OF CZECH ARMS  
PURCHASED IN 1966

REF: NICOSIA 248

1. UNFICYP SOURCE HAS CONFIDENTIALLY PASSED US INFO CONTAINED  
IN FORCE COMMANDER'S REPORT OF HIS NOVE 1971 INSPECTION OF CZECH  
ARM'S REMAINING IN CYPOL CUSTODY FROM 1966 TRANSACTION.  
QUANTITIES/TYPES ISSUED AND THOSE REMAINING IN STORE WERE  
AS FOLLOWS. (THIS IS MORE PRECISE THAN AND SHOULD SUPERSEDE  
INFO CONTAINED PARA 2 REFTEL):

TYPE	ISSUED	REMAINING
7.65 MM SUB-MACHINE PISTOL M61	50	NONE
7.62 MM SELF-LOADING RIFLE M52/57	500	NONE
7.62 MM SUB-MACHINE GUN M58	500	NONE
9 MM SUB-MACHINE GUN .25	200	NONE
7.92 MM MAUSER RIFLES M98	500	500
7.92 MM LIGHT MACHINE GUN M26	50	50
7.92 MM HEAVEY MACHINE GUN M37	2	38
M27 ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER	4	26

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00255 071534Z  
82 MM M52 MORTAR

2 28

2. THIS CONFIRMS THAT DISTRIBUTIONS FROM STORE TOOK PLACE  
(A) AT TIME OF INITIAL IMPORTATION AND (B) IN THE MONTHS  
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MARCH 1970 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.  
UNSYG WAS INFORMED AND APPARENTLY APPROVED SECOND PHASE  
DISTRIBUTION.  
CRAWFORD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

52103/127

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 JAN 21 PM 2024

SECRET 200

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00135 210945Z

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

057947

R 210855Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5567

SECRET NICOSIA 135

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS

REF: STATE 001185

1. I DELIVERED ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO MAKARIOS JAN 20. ARCHBISHOP EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTFULNESS. HE WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED BY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO GOC ROLE IN RESUMING CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

2. ARCHBISHOP NOTED WITH INTEREST POINTS MADE ON PRESIDENT'S PEKING VISIT. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE WOULD CURTAIL OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ROC. I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD NOT, AND PARTICULARLY THAT US WOULD CONTINUE TO MEET ITS COMMITMENTS TO ROC. OBVIOUSLY, WHAT ARCHBISHOP HAS IN BACK OF HIS MIND IS HIS OWN CURRENT INTENTION TO MAINTAIN A PRIVATE ROC TRADING COMPANY IN CYPRUS DESPITE CYPRUS GOVT RECOGNITION OF PRC. GP-3.  
POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 264

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 00061 120749Z

2

12  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 120700Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5525  
INFO USMISSION USUN

117457

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 JAN 12 AM 9:54

SECRET NICOSIA 061

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJ: GOC'S CONTINUING CHAGRIN OVER UNGA CHIREP VOTE

REF: NICOSIA 029, STATE 4070

1. DCM HAD RETURN SESSION WITH VENIAMIN JAN 10, COVERING ALL POINTS IN REF DEPTTEL WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON NEED FOR POSITIVE ATMOSPHERICS BEFORE NEXT PHASE OF TALKS (I.E. IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY ARCHBISHOP AND GOC OFFICIALS) AND FLEXIBILITY ONCE THEY UNDER WAY. URGED THAT GOC RETHINK WHETHER IT GAINING OR LOSING BY BEING SO CONCERNED NOT TO GIVE TOO MUCH TO TURKISH CYPRIOTS ON SELF-ADMINISTRATION. HAD NOT CONSEQUENCE OF POLICY TO DATE BEEN TO GIVE TURKS PRETEXT FOR STEADY CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR SEPARATNESS?

2. VENIAMIN FOLLOWED PRESENTATION CAREFULLY, EXPRESSING AGREEMENT WITH MUCH OF IT. WE THINK HE WILL CONVEY THESE THOUGHTS TO ARCHBISHOP -- WITH UNCERTAIN RESULT SINCE, AS WE HAD SURMISED IN REF EMBTEL, VENIAMIN'S INITIAL APPROACH NOW LOOKS EVEN MORE AS IF IT HAD BEEN INTENDED CUSHION EFFECT OF JAN 12 ANNOUNCEMENT PRC-GOC RELATIONS (NICOSIA 056).

3. ON CUBAN SHIPPING, VENIAMIN SAID FON MINISTRY SUGGESTIONS FOR TIGHTENING LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REREGISTRATION OF FOREIGN VESSELS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT, AND BY ATTORNEY GENERAL (WHOSE LAWYER SON IS RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE A MAJOR FIGURE IN SETTING UP THE DUMMY CYPRIOT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXD-15



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00061 120749Z

CORPORATIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR REREGISTRATION). ARCHBISHOP HAD RECENTLY ORDERED CREATION OF INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE UNDER AEGIS OF LABOR MINISTRY'S CAPABLE BUT OVERWORKED DIRGEN SPARSIS. VENIAMIN DID NOT SEEM OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS WOULD PRODUCE ANY EARLY RESULT IN TERMS OF LESSENER PARTICIPATION OF CYPRUS FLAG VESSELS IN CUBAN TRADE. POPPER

0104 STATE 1982 14001N 132E

NOLOBN

EXD18

2 E/C B E J NICOSIY 891

INFO REVISION/UBUN TO RECEIPTS 2282 2100N 132E00E 27 MAR 1982 132E

INFO 001-01 1850 N

YCLION 88-52

488E 01 NICOSI 00061 120749Z

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

592/03/132



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WA

SECRET 132

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00029 061008Z

17  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

078112

R 060915Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5510  
INFO USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T NICOSIA 029

EXDIS - NOFORN

SUBJECT: GOC'S CONTINUING CHAGRIN OVER UNGA CHIREP VOTE.

REF: NICOSIA 021

1. SUMMARY: GOC CONTINUES TO EXPRESS EMBARRASSMENT OVER FONMIN KYPRIANOU'S FAILURE HONOR ARCHBISHOP'S COMMITMENT SUPPORT US IN UNGA CHIREP VOTING; SAYS IT IS ANXIOUS MAKE AMENDS. DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS REQUESTED.

2. FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN ASKED DCM CALL JANUARY 3 AND AT CONCLUSION OF TOUR D'HORIZON SAID THERE WAS IMPORTANT MATTER HE WISHED RAISE ON OWN INITIATIVE, ON PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. ARCHBISHOP, HE SAID, REMAINED PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED BY CLOUD IN CYPRUS' RELATIONSHIP WITH US CAUSED BY FONMIN KYPRIANOU'S FAILURE SUPPORT US ON CHIREP CONTRARY PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES. ARCHBISHOP FEARED THAT RAPPORT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRESIDENT NIXON, TO WHICH HE ATTACHED SUCH GREAT IMPORTANCE, MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROKEN BY THIS ONE UNFORTUNATE MISTAKE. WHAT, VENIAMIN WONDERED, COULD GOC DO TO RESTORE PREVIOUS HARMONY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN THE CYPRUS-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP? HE ASKED THAT DCM CONSULT WITH ME AND GIVE HIM OUR PRIVATE VIEWS UPON HIS RETURN FROM OFFICIAL VISIT TO RUMANIA. (HE WILL RETURN IN ABOUT A WEEK.) VENIAMIN SAID IT WAS URGENT THAT SOME WAY OF DISPELLING CLOUD BE FOUND, AS CERTAIN TROUBLEMAKERS WHO DID NOT WISH TO SEE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND CYPRUS WERE TRYING TO WIDEN THE GAP BY CARRYING TO KYPRIANOU STORIES OF DEROGATORY COMMENTS.

2  
72 JAN 6 PM 3:31  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00029 061008Z

CONCERNING HIM ALLEGEDLY MADE BY US EMBOFFS.

3. DCM SAID HE WOULD CONVEY VENIAMIN'S CONCERN TO ME AND PROMISED WE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH AFTER HIS RETURN FROM RUMANIA. THERE NO DOUBT THAT US CONFIDENCE IN GOC HAD BEEN BADLY SHAKEN BY KYPRIANOU'S FAILURE HONOR A SPSTIFIC COMMITMENT THAT CYPRIOT CHIEF OF STATE HAD MADE AND SUBSEQUENTLY REAFFIRMED. AS AMBASSADOR BUSH HAD NOTED TO KYPRIANOU WHEN LATTER CALLED TO TRY TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTION, IT DIFFICULT ACT EFFECTIVELY FOR PEACE IF GOVERNMENTS DID NOT HONOR SOLEMN COMMITMENTS. AS AMBASSADOR POPPER HAD POINTED OUT TO ARCHBISHOP, IT WOULD NOT BE EASY FOR US WORK WITH KYPRIANOU.

4. VENIAMIN SAID HE COULD WELL UNDERSTAND THIS. UNFORTUNATELY, REPLACING FONMIN WAS SOMETHING ARCHBISHOP, AS HUMANE MAN, COULD NOT NOW DO. KYPRIANOU'S HEALTH FRAGILE AND, WITH HIS BAD HEART, SHOCK OF DISMISSAL COULD WELL KILL HIM. (KYPRIANOU ADMITTEDLY HAS A MODERATELY SERIOUS HEART CONDITION THAT CURRENTLY EXACERBATED BY HIS PROTRACTED LABORS IN NEW YORK, BUT WE THINK THIS IS AN EXAGGERATION.)

5. DCM COMMENTED THAT USG NOT VINDICTIVE. OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT ALL LEVELS NOT TO BE MINIMIZED BUT BEST WAY OF WORKING AWAY FROM THIS WOULD BE FOR CYPRUS TO TRY TO ACCENTUATE THE ENDURING POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. ALSO USG IS VERY MUCH CONCERNED TO SEE ALL PARTIES TAKE A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE WHEN

ENLARGED CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS START UP, PRESUMABLY LATER THIS MONTH. A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST. THERE UNDOUBTEDLY OTHER AREAS WHERE GOC COULD DEMONSTRATE ITS STATED INTEREST IN BEST POSSIBLE RELATIONS WITH US. WE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSION AFTER VENIAMIN'S RETURN.

6. COMMENT: THERE IS UTILITY IN NOT LETTING MAKARIOS -- ON WHOSE INSTRUCTION, DESPITE THE DISCLAIMER, IT WOULD APPEAR VENIAMIN WAS SPEAKING -- EASILY SLIDE OFF THE HOOK OF HIS EMBARRASSMENT. DESIRE TO DO SO NOW MAY BE RELATED TO GOC INTENTION TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH PRC (NICOSIA 017). WITHOUT PRETENDING THAT WE CAN FORGET THE CHICOM EPISODE, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT IS WITHIN POWER OF GOC TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US THROUGH DEMONSTRATION THAT IT IS CONCERNED TO RESPOND TO OUR CONCERNS.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00029 061008Z

7. OUTSTANDING AREA FOR GOC PERFORMANCE SEEMS TO US TO LIE IN FIELD OF CUBAN SHIPPING. AS DEPT KNOWS, CYPRUS FLAG OF CONVENIENCE NOW COVERS BULK OF FREE WORLD SHIP TRADE WITH CUBA. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY BEEN TOLD THAT CYPRUS WOULD TIGHTEN ITS MARITIME LEGISLATION AND TAKE STEPS BETTER TO CONTROL

THIS TRAFFIC, BUT EVIDENTLY BECAUSE OF STRENGTH OF VESTED INTERESTS INVOLVED, NOTHING HAS HAPPENED. VENIAMIN'S REQUEST GIVES US AN OPPORTUNITY TO URGE ACTION RATHER THAN WORDS ON THIS IMPORTANT SUBJECT -- ACTION WHICH WILL LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IF NOT ELIMINATION OF CYPRUS FLAG VESSELS' PARTICIPATION IN FREE WORLD TRADE WITH CUBA. IN ADDITION WE WOULD PRESS FOR FLEXIBILITY IN INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS TO FACILITATE REAL PROGRESS TOWARD A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, ALONG LINES PARA 5 ABOVE.

8. WE WOULD WELCOME DEPT'S VIEWS ON FOREGOING AND ANY OTHER THOUGHTS IT MAY HAVE.  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. BRIMS.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WA

SECRET 256

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00021 051146Z

12  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 051100Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5506

069548

S E C R E T NICOSIA 021

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS

REF: STATE 001185

1. SEPTTEL REPORTS JANUARY 3 CONVERSATION BETWEEN GOC FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN AND DCM WHICH SEEMS TO SHOW THAT MAKARIOS IS STILL ACTIVELY CONCERNED OVER EFFECT ON HIS RELATIONS WITH US OF FONMIN KYPRIANOU'S FAILURE HONOR ARCHBISHOP'S COMMITMENT SUPPORT US ON CHIREP VOTE IN UN. AS INDICATED SEPTTEL, WE HOPE USE OPENING GIVEN US BY VENIAMIN TO PRESS FOR BETTER GOC PERFORMANCE ON MATTERS OF DIRECT INTEREST TO USG, ESPECIALLY, CUBAN SHIPPING AND PROGRESS TOWARDS A CYPRUS SOLUTION. IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION WILL TAKE PLACE IN ABOUT A WEEK, FOLLOWING VENIAMIN'S CURRENT TRIP TO RUMANIA.

2. PRESENTATION NOW OF WARM CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD RUN COUNTER OUR EFFORT EXTRACT SOME ADVANTAGE FROM GOC'S EMBARRASSMENT. ACCORDINGLY, I HOPE I WILL BE AUTHORIZED DELAY MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 DAYS - TWO WEEKS, I.E. UNTIL AFTER OUR NEXT TALK WITH VENIAMIN HAS HAD A CHANCE SINK IN. PLEASE ADVISE.

GP-3.

POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 890

2

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01908 221455Z

44  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 221400Z OCT 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5307  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMSBASSY ATHENS 2879  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION UN

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1908

EXDIS

DEPT PASS TO EUCOM AND USDOCOSOUTH

SUBJECT: UNSYG INITIATIVE

1. SUMMARY. AS STOPGAP UNTIL I HAVE OPPORTUNITY SPEAK TO MAKARIOS, I HAVE URGED FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN AVOID CLOSING DOORS ON SYG INITIATIVE. VENIAMIN SPELLED OUT EXACT NATURE OF GOC COUNTER SUGGESTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. I SAW FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN EVENING OCT 21. I ASKED HIM IF IT WAS TRUE THAT GOC HAD GIVEN NEGATIVE, WRITTEN REPLY TO SYG'S OCTOBER 18 PROPOSAL. I COMMENTED THAT CYPRUS RISKS ISOLATION ON THIS MATTER IF IT DOES NOT KEEP THE BALL IN PLAY. AN END TO ALL NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CREATE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION.

3. VENIAMIN SAID GOC HAS NO INTENTION OF TERMINATING THE DISCUSSION WITH SYG AS TO NEW NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES. KYPRIANOU HAD REPLIED NEGATIVELY TO SYG'S SUGGESTION THAT CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERTS REPRESENTING GOG AND GOT BE ADDED TO TALKS. (VENIAMIN STRESSED THAT SYG HAD USED THE WORD "SUGGESTED" TO IMPLY EXPLORATORY RATHER THAN FINAL NATURE OF HIS PROPOSAL.) KYPRIANOU UNDER INSTRUCTIONS REVIEW WITH SYG ON OCT 21 FOLLOWING THREE APPROACHES TO FURTHER NEGOTIATION ON

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
058822

71 OCT 22 PM 2:34

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01908 221455Z

CYPRUS PROBLEM:

(A) GOC WOULD WELCOME PARTICIPATION OF UNSYG SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN ON GOING ON ISLAND CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GOC AND TURKISH COMMUNITY. IF SYG DEEMS IT ADVISABLE ALSO ADD A CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT OR EXPERTS, SHOULD BE FROM SYG'S OWN STAFF. CONSTITUTIONAL TAPDS SHOULD SET ASIDE POSITION PAPERS SO FAR TABLED BY DENKTASH AND CLERIDES AND START FROM SCRATCH WITH EVERYTHING OPEN FOR RE EXAMINATION.

(B) GOC CAN ACCEPT PARALLEL DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS IN NEW YORK UNDER SYG AND WITH PARTICIPATION OF GOC, GOG AND GOT.

(C) AS ALTERNATIVE TO (A) AND (B), GOC WOULD ACCEPT CREATION BY SYG OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF CYPRUS PROBLEM, BOTH CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL. THIS COMMITTEE TO CONSIST OF GOC, GOG AND GOT PLUS FOUR PERMANENT SC MEMBERS; OR GOC, GOG AND GOT PLUS ONE PERMANENT SC MEMBER AND UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF NON PERMANENT SC MEMBERS. VENIAMIN SAID HE REALIZED INCLUSION OF SOVIETS IN NEGOTIATING BODY WOULD BE SENSITIVE AND BITTERLY DISTASTEFUL TO WESTERN POWERS AND THEREFORE GOC WOULD NOT PRESS FOUR PERMANENT MEMBER VERSION.

4. FOLLOWING VENIAMINS DISCUSSION OF GOC'S IDEAS ON ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES, WE ARGUED BACK AND FORTH AT LENGTH ON RELATIVE MERITS (MORE PROPERLY DEMERITS) OF THESE AS CONTRASTED WITH SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES SYG HAD PROPOSED. I EMPHASIZED OUR VIEW THAT ANY SC COMMITTEE WOULD BE A CUMBERSOME DEVICE, UNLIKELY TO BE PRODUCTIVE. AS TO SYG'S SUGGESTION, WE WENT OVER WAYS IN WHICH PROPOSAL MIGHT BE MADE SAFER AND MORE SATISFACTORY TO GOC, INCLUDING MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF ROLES OF GOG AND GOT TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND SPECIFICATION THAT AGENDA OPEN FOR DISCUSSION OF INTERNATINAL AS WELL AS CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS ON AD REFERENDUM BASIS. VENIAMIN CONTINUED TO RESIST FIVE PARTY APPROACH, CITING GOC FEARS OF COERCION IN SUCH A CONTEXT. HOWEVER I CAME AWAY WITH FEELING THAT IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT, SHOULD GOC FIND ITS ALTERNATIVES SHOT DOWN, IT MIGHT RELUCTANTLY BE BROUGHT TO CONSIDER SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF SYG PROPOSAL IF CAST IN MORE SPECIFIC TERMS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01908 221455Z

5. IN CONCLUDING, VENIAMIN REITERATED HIS ASSURANCES THAT GOC DOES NOT WANT TO CLOSE ANY DOORS ON NEW NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE.

POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED EUCOM AND USDOCOSOUTH.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

WH  
**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 751

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01874 180954Z

12  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

017965

R 151525Z OCT 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5287  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION UN  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1874

EXDIS

SUBJECT: GRIVAS SITUATION

REF: STATE 189029

1. DEPT IS OF COURSE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT: ACTION BY GRIVAS: COULD THROW OFF IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION WHICH NOW PRESENTED BY FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE. ALSO WE SHARE DEPT'S VIEW THAT OCT 28 COULD BE A BIG DAY FOR GRIVAS.
2. HOWEVER THERE IS LARGE ELEMENT OF BRINKMANSHIP IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND MAYBE FOR TIME BEING USG'S BEST INTERESTS: SERVED BY PLAYING ALONG WITH IT. IT IS A FACT THAT REGARDLESS: OF WHY HE IS HERE OR WHO SENT HIM, GRIVAS PRESENCE IS WORRYING MAKARIOS AND THIS MAY NOT BE WITHOUT ADVANTAGES.
3. MAKARIOS, FOR ONE, BELIEVES THAT QUESTIONS OF GRIVAS AND HIS ACCEPTANCE OR REFUSAL OF NEW NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE ARE LINKED. WITH ME ON OCT 8 (NICOSIA 1837) HE INTIMATED THAT HIS INTENTION DEFY GREECE AND TURKEY ON FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE MIGHT PRECIPITATE CHALLENGE BY GRIVAS. AT THAT TIME HIS MOOD WAS COMBATIVE. WITH UK HIGH COMMISSIONER EDMONDS OCT 14 (SEPTEL), AND WITH BETTER INSIGHT INTO JUST HOW MUCH SUPPORT THERE IS FOR FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE, HE TOOK THE IMPLICATION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE HIS

71 OCT 18 AM 11:50  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

EXD-15



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01874 180954Z

ONLY WAY OF AVOIDING A GRIVAS CHALLENGE. TO EDMONDS AND OTHERS HE HAS NOW SHOWN AWARENESS THAT IT BEHOOVES HIM GIVE PROCEDURE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

4. I WOULD SUGGEST WE REEXAMINE DESIRABILITY OF DEMARCHES ALONG LINES PARA 5 REFTTEL NEXT WEEK WHEN, THROUGH OSORIO-TAFALL, WE WILL HAVE BETTER PICTURE ON CHANCES OF ARCHBISHOPS ACCEPTING FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE. TWO ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ARE THAT, IF GOG IS BEHIND GRIVAS, IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER WE WOULD GET THE DESIRED RESPONSE. FURTHER WE STILL DO NOT FEEL ARCHBISHOPS REFERENCE, NOW PUBLIC, TO DEFENSE MINISTRY POST FOR GRIVAS IS SERIOUS OR WILL BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY GRIVAS. IT IS PART OF ARCHBISHOPS WE-COULD-WORK-TOGETHER GAMBIT DESIGNED TO APPEAR SWEETLY REASONABLE AND THUS CREATE HESITANCE AMONG GRIVAS SUPPORTERS.

5. WE WILL STUDY FURTHER FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR POPPER'S RETURN OCT 19. GP-4 CRAWFOREW

02 11 MA 01 11 20

1 copy - long 30 Aug 71

USSI Vol 1 x v

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

71 OCT 12 PM 1:00  
SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE

SECRET 700

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01841 121315Z

53  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

105756

PIR 121200Z OCT 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5274  
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO

SECRET NICOSIA 1841

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MAKARIOS RESISTS FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE

REF: NICOSIA 1840

1. GREEK AMBASSADOR PANAYOTACOS ASKED ME TO CALL OCT 12 TO HEAR RESULTS HIS OCT 11 DEMARCHE TO MAKARIOS. BEFORE SUMMARIZING, HE NOTED RUEFULLY THAT WE HAD UNFORTUNATELY BEEN CORRECT IN JUDGING THAT MAKARIOS WOULD TAKE HIS CASE INTO PUBLIC ARENA THROUGH DISTORTED LEAKS TO PRESS. (THIS MORNING'S PHILELEFTHEROS ANNOUNCES THAT PROPOSAL FOR FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE HAS BEEN LAUNCHED AND CHARACTERIZES IT AS AN UNACCEPTABLE GOT MANEUVER TO GANG UP ON CYPRUS - SEE FBIS ITEM BEING REPEATED.)

2. ACCORDING PANAYOTACOS, ARCHBISHOP TEMPORIZED. HE CLEARLY DISLIKED FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE, EVEN DRESSED UP AS ESSENTIALLY AN SYG GOOD OFFICES OPERATION. HE COUNTERED WITH HIS FUZZY BIG FOUR/SC COMMITTEE. PANAYOTACOS TOLD HIM IT RIDICULOUS EVEN SUGGEST THIS. ARCHBISHOP THEN CAME BACK TO IDEA OF GREEK AND TURKISH AMBASSADORS PLUS UK HIGH COMMISSIONER JOINING CLERIDES AND DENKTASH TO DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS. PANAYOTACOS SHOT THAT ONE DOWN AS PUTTING CART BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL HORSE.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01841 121315Z

3. PANAYOTACOS' GENERAL IMPRESSIONS WERE THAT ARCHBISHOP (A) KNOWS IT WILL BE A BIT TICKLISH REJECTING SYG PROPOSAL WHEN IT IS FORMALLY PUT, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HE HAS NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO SUGGEST; (B) WILL TORPEDO FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE BY OTHER MEANS; AND (C) HAS POOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH KYPRIANOU IN NEW YORK, SINCE HE SEEMS ONLY VAGUELY INFORMED OF SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS LATTER HAS HAD THERE.

4. GREEK AMBASSADOR AND I AGREE IT DESIRABLE THAT (A) SYG MOVE QUICKLY, (B) USG SIGNIFY HERE AS WELL AS IN NEW YORK ITS GENERAL SUPPORT OF PROCEDURE EVEN BEFORE SYG PROPOSAL FORMALLY PUT, TO TRY TO FORESTALL ARCHBISHOP BURNING ALL HIS BRIDGES BEHID HIM; (C) UK, IF POSSIBLE, COME IN AFTER SUG HAS ACTED TO SPACE OUT APPROACHES SO THAT MAKARIOS' NATURAL RESISTENCE NOT BE INCREASED BY EXCESSIVE APPEARANCE OF COORDINATED PRESSURE. CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

2110YLLION BOON  
MILLE NOISE  
00 1 19 51 120  
11 OCT 15 04 1:00

SH/00/65

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SITUATION ROOM

71 OCT 11 PM 1:00

SECRET 709

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01840 121329Z

2

53  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

105820

PIR 121205Z OCT 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5273  
USMISSION UN PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO UNN  
EUCOM  
USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1840

EXDIS

SUBJECT: GOG AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES OUTCOME OF NY TALKS

1. SUMMARY: GREEK AMB PANAYOTACOS SAYS TURKEY HAS AGREED TO PARTICIPATION OF UNSYG SPECIAL REP IN EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. AS CONSEQUENCE, U THANT HAS AGREED PUT GOG-GOT PROPOSAL FORMALLY TO GOC. PANAYOTACOS SEEING MAK-ARIOS OCT 11 TO TELL HIM TO ACCEPT, OR FORGET ABOUT A COMMON FRONT WITH ATHENS AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. PANAYOTACOS DOUBTS MAKARIOS WILL BEND. END SUMMARY.

2. ON OCT 11 PANAYOTACOS RECAPITULATED FOR ME UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED BETWEEN PALAMAS AND OLCAY AT THEIR NEW YORK MEETINGS, AS FOLLOWS: (A) GOG AND GOT TO JOIN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS THROUGH TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES; (B) LONDON ZURICH AGREEMENTS ARE THE "FLOOR"; (C) FOCUS TO BE ON CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS BUT DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK NOT RULED OUT; (D) THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSION OF TENTATIVE TRADE OFF BETWEEN AGREEING WITH TURKS THAT ALL ARTICLES OF 1960 CONSTITUTION NOT SPECIFICALLY AMENDED REMAIN VALID AND GETTING THEM AGREE TO TURKISH MINISTER OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION TO RESOLVE THAT CORE ISSUE; (E) JUNE 1972 IS DEADLINE FOR CONCLUSION NEW PHASE OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01840 121329Z

3. PANAYOTACOS SAID THAT AT 11TH HOUR AFTER HIS DEPARTURE FROM NEW YORK GOT HAD CONCURRED IN PARTICIPATION OF UNSYG SPECIAL REP PROVIDED TURKEY GIVEN A SAY IN HIS SELECTION. UTHANT HAS ACCORDINGLY AGREED RECOMMEND FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE TO MAKARIOS. PANAYOTACOS UNCLEAR FROM HIS TELS WHEN SYG WILL ACT.

4. PANAYOTACOS EXCORIATED KYPRIANOU, CALLING HIM MENTALLY UNBALANCED AND SAYING GOG VERY ANGRY AT HIS RESISTENCE TO FIVE PARTY PROPOSAL AND HIS "ABSURD" COUNTER PLOY SUGGESTION OF SEVEN PARTY FORUM INCLUDING SOVIETS. FURTHER REASON FOR GOG ANGER WAS SECRET MEETING BETWEEN KYPRIANOU AND MRS HELEN VLACHOS IN NEW YORK, WHICH PANAYOTACOS TERMED UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOR.

5. GREEK AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD APPOINTMENT WITH MAKARIOS FOR LATE SAME MORNING TO TELL HIM, ON INSTRUCTIONS, THA HE MUST ACCEPT FIVE PARTY PROPOSAL. EMPHASIS WILL BE ON PARTICIPATION OF SYG SPECIAL REP; GOG-GOT INVOLVEMENT WILL BE PLAYED DOWN ("INTERMITTENT ASSISTANCE OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS"); PROPOSAL WILL BE BILLED AS OUTGROWTH OF SYG'S LAST REPORT TO SC AND AS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARCHBISHOPS DESIRE THAT TALKS CARRY ON UNDER SYG GOOD OFFICES MANDATE. ON THE STICK SIDE, MAKARIOS WOULD BE TOLD THAT CONSEQUENCE OF HIS REFUSAL WOULD BE RUPTURE OF COMMON FRONT WITH ATHENS, WITH MAKARIOS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHATEVER ENSUED FROM HIS GOING IT ALONE.

6. IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION, PANAYOTACOS ADMITTED IT IMPROBABLE ARCHBISHOP WOULD BEND. WE AGREED THAT HE IS MORE LIKELY INDULGE IN HIS CHARACTERISTIC TACTIC OF LEAKING FIVE PARTY PROPOSAL IN DISTORTED FORM, DEPICTING IT AS AN EFFORT COERCE CYPRUS INTO ABANDONING SACRED HELLENIC INTERESTS, ETC, WITH OBJECT OF SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION WHICH HE CAN THEN USE TO JUSTIFY HIS NON-COOPERATION.

7. PANAYOTACOS WILL INFORM ME OCT 12 OF RESULTS HIS MEETING WITH MAKARIOS. WE AGREED THAT SYG'S INITIATIVE AND US AND UK SUPPORTING REPRESENTATIONS WILL HAVE TO COME SOON IF THEY ARE TO HAVE ANY EFFECT IN SHIFTING MAKARIOS NEGATIVE POSITION AND FORESTALLING HIS PROBABLE MOVE INTO THE PUBLIC ARENA.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01840 121329Z

8. IF THIS NOT ALREADY DONE, RECOMMEND WE URGE SYG MOVE PROMPTLY TO PROPOSE FIVE PARTY PROCEDURE FORMALLY TO GOC. FURTHER, IN ADDITION SUPPORTING COMMENTS ON IT ALREADY MADE TO KYPRIANOU BY SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO (USUN 3391), BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I WERE INSTRUCTED PASS USG VIEW (FAVORING FIVE PARTY AND DISCOURAGING SEVEN PARTY APPROACH) TO FONOFF DIRGEN FOR ATTENTION OF ARCHBISHOP. PLEASE ADVISE.  
CRAWFORD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

w/h  
**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 811

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01682 01 OF 02 150703Z

23 HAT

16  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

029796  
WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATIONROOM

71 SEP 15 AM 9:49

R 150540Z SEP 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5184  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSYATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION UN  
USMISSION NATO UNN  
EUCOM  
USDOCOSOUTH

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1682

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

SUBJECT: CYPRUS

REF: STATE 167530

1. SUMMARY. WE FULLY SUPPORT IDEA THAT SECRETARY EXPLORE CYPRUS PROBLEM DEVELOPMENTS WITH OLCAY AND PALAMAS IN CONNECTION THEIR SCHEDULED MEETINGS. UN-CONNECTED FORMAL, HIGH LEVEL MEDIATION IS PROCEDURAL ALTERNATIVE TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HOWEVER, UN PRESENCE IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AS DEVICE TO GET THEM MOVING AGAIN MAY BOTH SATISFY US INTEREST AND BE EASIER TO ACCOMPLISH. GRIVAS RETURN SOMEWHAT CLOUDS THE PICTURE. END SUMMARY.

2. I HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON YOUR MESSAGE, WITH WHICH WE HERE ARE IN ACCORD.

3. FORMAL UN-CONNECTED MEDIATION VERSUS INFORMAL MEDIATION THROUGH THIRD PARTY PRESENCE IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. ON SURFACE, FORMAL MEDIATION LOOKS AS IF IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE - BECAUSE OF GREATER ELEMENT OF

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01682 01 OF 02 150703Z

COMPULSION - THAN MORE PROSAIC "THIRD PARTY PRESENCE" IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HOWEVER, FORMAL MEDIATION WOULD BE RESISTED HERE AND IN ANKARA. ALSO FORMAL MEDIATION AS THEORETICALLY MORE PRESTIGIOUS PROCEDURE, AS ADDENDANT DISADVANTAGE OF DRAWING MORE PUBLIC ATTENTION AND POTENTIALLY OF REINFORCING INTRANSIGENCE. CURRENTLY, PARTIES HAVE WRITTEN THEMSELVES INTO EXTREME AND INFLEXIBLE POSTURES. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A RETURN TO QUIET TALKING OUT OF THE LIMELIGHT, WITH NUDGING FROM THIRD PARTY TO HELP ERASE THE HARD EDGES OF THESE POSITIONS. THIRD PARTY PRESENCE CONCEPT ALSO HAS ADVANTAGE OF CARRYING ON THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WHICH, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS ASIDE, REMAIN MOST IMPORTANT CHANNEL FOR MAINTAINING STABILITY ON ISLAND.

4. FOR FOREGOING REASONS, I SHARE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT EASING INTO A TYPE OF MEDIATION THROUGH APPOINTMENT OF THIRD PARTY TO SIT WITH CLERIDES AND DENKTASH. IN THIS REGARD, WE NOW HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT OSORIO-TAFALLS RESIGNATION AS SYG'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED EFFECTIVE IN DECEMBER AFTER SC MEETING ON UNFICYP RENEWAL. OSORIOS RETIREMENT MAY BE OPPORTUNE. OSORIO HAS MADE MANY CONTRIBUTIONS HERE, BUT I WOULD AGREE HE IS NOT IN POSITION TO REINVIGORATE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. THROUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN, BUT SIMPLY BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN HERE SO LONG WHILE PROBLEM HAS MUSHED ALONG, EVEN A LARGER ROLE FOR HIM IN TALKS WOULD BE SEEN AS "MORE OF THE SAME" AND WOULD NOT BE STIMULATIVE. THERE SEEMS EVERY REASON TO CHOSE AS OSORIOS SUCCESSOR SOMEONE WITH THE QUALIFICATIONS TO PLAY THIS EXPANDED THIRD PARTY ROLE IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

5. AMERICAN VERSUS NON-AMERICAN. ASSUMING IT IS CONCLUDED THAT OSORIO'S SUCCESSOR AND UN-APPOINTED THIRD PARTY TO LOCAL TALKS SHOULD BE SAME INDIVIDUAL, HE SHOULD NOT, IN MY VIEW, BE AN AMERICAN. THE TIME FOR INVOLVING AN AMERICAN WILL BE IF ALL ELSE FAILS AND OR WE ARE THROWN INTO A CRISIS NECESSITATING ALL-OUT US DIPLOMACY A LA VANCE MISSION. CHOOSING AN AMERICAN AS SYG'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE CUM THIRD PARTY PRESENCE WOULD RISK DISSIPATING OUR INFLUENCE; WE WOULD BE PLAYING CARD WE SHOULD HOLD IN RESERVE. WE COME BACK TO IDEA OF AN EMINENT WEST

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01682 01 OF 02 150703Z

EUROPEAN OR SCANDINAVIAN JURIST WITH PROVEN DIPLOMATIC SKILLS. BUT POLITICAL REALISM AND FORCE OF PERSONALITY PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN SPECIALIZATION. TO BE NOTED THAT BOTH CLERIDES AND DENKTASH HAVE AT VARIOUS TIMES PRIVATELY INDICATED READINESS CONSIDER INVOLVEMENT IN TALKS OF AN INDIVIDUAL WITH THIS KIND OF SKILLS AND FROM THAT GEOGRAPHIC AREA. WE DO NOT THINK HE SHOULD BE BRITISH SINCE THAT WOULD SMACK TOO MUCH OF NEGOTIATING PATTERN DURING PRE-INDEPENDENCE COLONIAL PERIOD.

6. NICOSIA 876 CONTAINED SOME IDEAS ON CANDIDATE FOR FORMAL MEDIATION BUT MOST WOULD SEEM TO BE TOO PROMINENT TO ACCEPT SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE CUM THIRD PARTY PRESENCE ROLE. AUSTRALIAS SIR PAUL HASLUCK AND NETHERLANDS HENRIK BOON ARE POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS. HASLUCK IN PARTICULAR WOULD START OUT WITH ADVANTAGE OF APPRECIATION HERE FOR AUSTRALIAS SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN UNFICYP. SOME OTHER THOUGHTS ARE CONTAINED IN AMBASSADOR POPPER TO COUNTRY DIRECTOR LETTER OF AUGUST 18. DEPT WILL HAVE CLEARER IDEAS ON POSSIBLE CANDIDATE THAN WE FROM LIMITED CYPRUS HORIZON.  
CRAWFORD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 828

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01682 02 OF 02 150747Z

12  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 1026 W

030067

R 150555Z SEP 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5185  
INFO AMEMBASSYANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION UN  
USMISSION NATO UNN  
EUCOM  
USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1682

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

SUBJECT: CYPRUS

REF: STATE 167530

7. ACCEPTABILITY OF THIRD PARTY PRESENCE MEDIATION. GOC HAS BEEN STEADILY PULLING BACK FROM EARLIER PRE-DILECTION FOR ACTIVE ROLE BY UNSYG. IT IS SHOWING INCREASING AWARENESS THAT IN MULTILATERAL PROCEDURE LAUNCHED BY HIM, GOC WOULD BE BUT ONE VOICE AMONG SEVERAL INTERESTED PARTIES AND MIGHT CONFRONT STRONGER PRESSURE FOR COMPROMISE THAN IT HAS TO DATE. MAKARIOS CURRENTLY WANTS A FLIRTATION, NOT AN AFFAIR, WITH SYG. IN ALL, HOWEVER, WE THINK GOC WOULD FIND IT HARD REJECT THIRD PARTY ROLE FOR NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE GIVEN ITS POSTURE THAT (A) IT WANTS TALKS TO GO ON AND (B) NEXT STEPS WOULD BE WITHIN CONTEXT SYG'S GOOD OFFICES ROLE. AS REGARDS GREECE AND TURKEY, SOUNDINGS BY EMBASSIES ATHENS AND ANKARA MAKE IT SEEM UNLIKELY THAT EITHER GOG OR GOT HAS UP ITS SLEEVE FOR NEW YORK MEETINGS. ANY PROPOSAL LIKELY LEAD TO BREAKTHROUGH. EACH SIDE SEEMS TO EXPECT THE OTHER TO PRODUCE A NEW AND PROMISING FORMULA.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01682 02 OF 02 150747Z

IN CIRCUMSTANCES, OLCAY-PALAMAS MEETINGS COULD WELL TURN OUT TO BE GREATLY OVER-ADVERTISED EVENT AND THERE COULD BE CLIMATE OF RECEPTIVITY FOR US THOUGHTS.

8. SECRETARYS TALKS WITH OLCAY AND PALAMAS. WE WOULD RECOMMEND SECRETARY DISCUSS CYPRUS WITH BOTH, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE THEIR FIRST FORMAL MEETING ABOUT CYPRUS ON OCT 1. WE WOULD SUGGEST SECRETARY TALK TO THEM ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD, WE THINK, BE GIVEN PAT ON THE BACK FOR USEFUL UPHILL WORK THIS SUMMER IN HELPING TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN CYPRUS.

B. GREECE IS TO BE CONGRATULATED FOR ITS INITIATIVE WITH MAKARIOS TO INDUCE HIM TO COMPROMISE (ALTHOUGH INITIATIVE COULD HAVE BEEN HANDLED BETTER).

C. WITH OLCAY IT WOULD PERHAPS BE ADVISABLE MENTION THAT IF TURKISH CYPRIOTS REMAIN UNWILLING COMPROMISE DOWN FROM "EVERYTHING IS NONNEGOTIABLE" STAND CONTAINED IN DENKTASH AUGUST 9 LETTER, PROGRESS IS A LONG WAY OFF.

D. BOTH OLCAY AND PALAMAS SHOULD BE ASKED FOR PREVIEW OF THOUGHTS THEY INTEND TO PRESENT WHEN THEY MEET.

3. FOLLOWING ON "D", SECRETARY COULD WITH BOTH EXPLORE REACTIONS TO FORMAL MEDIATION (WE WOULD EXPECT TURKEY TO BE NEGATIVE), AND POSSIBILITY OF THIRD PARTY PRESENCE THROUGH NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE PROBABLY MORE PALATABLE TO ALL.

9. PUTTING TEETH INTO THE EFFORT. THERE ARE WAYS IN WHICH US CAN HELP PUT TEETH INTO THIRD PARTY PRESENCE FORM OF MEDIATION. CERTAINLY US SHOULD BE DISCREETLY ACTIVE IN SELECTION OF A NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. ALSO, TO MAXIMUM EXTENT THIS APPOINTMENT AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES ADDED FUNCTION OF SITTING IN ON TALKS SHOULD BE BUILT UP AS AN IMPORTANT AND HOPEFULLY DECISIVE NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATION, PLACING ON THE PARTIES A RESPONSIBILITY FOR REAL FLEXIBILITY AND COOPERATION. OUR THOUGHTS IN PARA 6 OF NICOSIA 1842 REMAIN RELEVANT IN THIS REGARD. CLERIDES VIEW

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01682 02 OF 02 150747Z

OF MINIMAL ROLE OF THIRD PARTY PRESENCE (NICOSIA 1648) SHOULD OF COURSE NOT BE ACCEPTED. WE SHOULD ALSO REALIZE THAT OVER THE LONGER TERM, IF THIS TYPE OF MEDIATION IS TO DO MORE THAN BUY TIME (NO BAD THING IN ITSELF), USG WILL HAVE TO OPERATE IN BACKGROUND TO INDUCE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN CURRENT FUNDAMENTAL POSITION, WHICH ARE WORLDS APART. THIS WILL MEAN EFFORTS WITH TURKEY AS WELL AS MAKARIOS.

10. GRIVAS RETURN. THIS THROWS LARGE ELEMENT OF TH IN-CALCULABLE INTO SITUATION. WHAT HE AND THOSE BEHIND HIM, WHOEVER THEY ARE, INTEND IS CURRENTLY UNKNOWN. WE THINK THAT AT MINIMUM HIS PRESENCE LIKELY BE DISRUPTIVE ALTHOUGH, IN A CONTEST, MAKARIOS HAS MUCH HIGHER CARDS. UNTIL GRIVAS AFFAIR HAS BEEN RESOLVED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, WE FACE AN ADDED PROBLEM IN GETTING PARTIES TO THINK CONSTRUCTIVELY ABOUT HOW TO RQCOMPROMISE THEIR DIFFERENCES. ACCENT WILL BE ON KEEPING THE LID ON. WITHOUT PREJUDGING OR BEING ALARMIST, WE THINK US WOULD DO WELL TO BEAR IN MIND POSSIBILITY THAT CONNECTED WITH GRIVAS RETURN THERE IS UNFOLDING HERE A SCENARIO PERHAPS BACKED BY GREECE AND EVEN TURKEY, THAT AIMS AT DOUBLE ENOSIS AND HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH DIPLOMACY OF THE KIND WE HAVE IN MIND.

11. I KNOW YOU WILL WISH TO FACTOR INTO THIS SITUATION THE VIEWS OF AMBASSADOR POPPER WHO WILL BE REACHING WASHINGTON SEPT 20 FOLLOWING FAR EAST NEGOTIATIONS ON NARCOTICS CONVENTION. GP-3  
CRAWFORD

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 097

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01482 01 OF 02 181017Z

19  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

087077

P R 180600Z AUG 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5082  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION UN  
USMISSION NATO

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

71 AUG 18 AM 9:41

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1482

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 147911

1. SUMMARY. WITH DEADLOCK OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, PROSPECT IS FOR MORE UNSYG INVOLVEMENT POSSIBLY LEADING TOWARD DESIGNATION OF UN MEDIATOR. DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN NOW AND LATE SEPTEMBER, WE TEND FAVOR THIS COURSE AS OPPOSED TO AN AMERICAN MEDIATION INITIATIVE.

2. OUR CONSIDERED VIEWS ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION FOR US IN PRESENT CYPRUS SITUATION ARE CONTAINED IN NICOSIA 1275. DEVELOPMENTS OF PAST THREE WEEKS HAVE NOT CHANGED GENERAL THRUST OF OUR THINKING.

3. AS MATTERS STAND, CONTINUED NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION SEEMS MOST LIKELY PROSPECT AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT EIGHT OR TEN WEEKS. WE HAD BECOME CONCERNED THAT TURKEY ACTING ALONE OR IN CONCERT WITH GREECE MIGHT GIVE UP ON DIPLOMACY IN FAVOR OF AN ATTEMPT AT QUICK MILITARY SOLUTION. OBVIOUSLY LATTER NOT RULED OUT, AND WE MUST REMAIN ALERT FOR INDICATIONS GOT HAS SIMPLY PUSHED ITS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01482 01 OF 02 181017Z

CONTINGENCY PLANNING FURTHER UNDERGROUND OR ONLY DELAYED ITS PREPARATIONS. BUT USG'S TIMELY REPRESENTATIONS IN ANKARA AND ATHENS AND THE COMMON REALIZATION OF THE DANGERS OF A DYNAMIC POLICY, APPEAR TO HAVE MINIMIZED LIKLIHOOD OF SURPRISE INITIATIVES, AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING.

4. PRESENT TRACK APPEARS TO BE LEADING TOWARD SOME FORM OF GREATER ACTIVITY IN UN CONTEXT, NOW THAT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS HAVE DEADLOCKED LOCALLY. PARTIES HAVE DIFFERENT OPTIC RE DESIRABILITY OF UN ACTION. GOC VIEW (MOST RECENT READING OF WHICH WAS OBTAINED BY FRG CHARGE FROM FONMIN KYPRIANOU AUGUST 13) IS THAT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS GREW OUT OF SYG'S GOOD OFFICES PURSUANT DEC 22, 1967 SC RESOLUTION AND THAT GOOD OFFICES ROLE NOW AUTOMATICALLY RESUMES. THIS THESIS AVOIDS GOC APPEARING AS A SUPPLICANT FOR UN MEDIATION PROVIDED OTHERS CONCERNED ACCEPT IT. GOC HAS PROBLEMS WITH RESUMED UN ROLE (ANKARA 5567) BUT MAY FIND IT HARD WIN SUPPORT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH SUCH AS ERIM'S PREFERRED RECONVENING OF LONDON-ZURICH SIGNATORIES. WE GUESS GOG IS IN UNEASY PUSH-PULL POSITION BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND ANKARA. IF REMARKS OF UNSYG SPECIAL REPOSORIO-TAFALLI (NICOSIA 1467) ARE AN INDICATION, U THANT IS WELL AWARE THAT HE HAS TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY, HEEDING GREECE AND TURKEY AS WELL AS MAKARIOS. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT A GOOD DEAL REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE PARTIES CONCERNED CAN BE LINED UP IN SUPPORT OF A MEDIATION PROCEDURE, AND THAT THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE VERY MUCH CHANCE OF ARRANGING IT BEFORE PALAMAS-OLCAY MEETING AT UNGA.

5. MEDIATION HAS UNDOUBTED VALUE AS A TIME GAINER AND AS A MEANS OF PROLONGING DISCUSSIONS. WE SEE SEVERAL VARIANTS AND STAGES AS POSSIBILITIES. IF UN AUSPICES ARE DESIRED, SECGEN COULD DIRECTLY OR THROUGH A HIGH SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL EXERCISE GOOD OFFICES TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT ON A MODERATOR OR MEDIATOR, AND TRY VARIOUS NAMES ON FOR SIZE WITH VIEW TO OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL. A MODERATOR, AS GREEK CYPRIOTS USE THE TERM, REFERS TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHO SITS IN ON MEETINGS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01482 01 OF 02 181017Z

PARTIES (IN THIS CASE, CLERIDES AND DENKTASHI), LISTENS TO BOTH SIDES, AND OFFERS SUGGESTIONS FOR RESOLVING DIFFERENCES. A MEDIATOR WOULD CONSULT SEPARATELY WITH EACH SIDE, WORK OUT ON HIS OWN PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN, AND ATTEMPT TO INDUCE THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THEM. VERY MUCH THE JARRING TECHNIQUE, EXCEPT FOR PERHAPS GREATER WILLINGNESS TO INJECT HIS PERSONAL IDEAS. AN ARBITRATOR, WHOSE DECISIONS BOTH SIDES WOULD BE BOUND TO ACCEPT, IS A THIRD POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, WITH ADHERENCE TO THIRD PARTY JUDGMENT AS COMPLETELY OUT OF STYLE AS IT IS IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL WORLD, IT SEEMS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT PARTIES TO PUT THEIR FUTURE SO UNRESERVEDLY IN SOMEONE ELSE'S HANDS.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



Department of State

(11)

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NOV 7 PM 12:26

CONTROL 15670  
6 NOV 7 25 0Z

P 062250Z NOV 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 1878  
BT  
SECRET STATE 183426

NODIS

EMB MAY INFORM ACTING PRES CLERIDES AND BRITISH HICOM  
THAT AT REQUEST KYPRIANOU DEPT PROVIDING LATTER IN TOKYO  
WITH TEXT NICOSIA'S AGREED CONTINGENCY STATEMENT  
(NICOSIA 1952). FYI EMB CYPRUS INFORMED END FYI.  
GP-1. JOHNSON  
BT

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP:TWDavis:he  
CLEARANCES: S/S- Mr. Brewster  
APPROVED BY: NEA:Rodger P.Davies

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS



Department of State

WA (6)  
TELEGRAM  
LL

SECRET

CONTROL: 3 3 7 6 Q  
RECD: 13 FEB '72, 5:03PM

O 132153Z FEB 72 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 3414  
BT  
SECRET STATE 225339

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

1. YOU CAN BE ASSURED THAT FACTORS CITED IN YOUR PARA 5 OF NICOSIA'S 313 ARE AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WEIGHED AS OUR DAY-BY-DAY REVIEW CONTINUES.
2. IF YOU RECEIVE A DIRECT OR INDIRECT REQUEST FROM MAKARIOS, YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DELAY MEETING AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, HOPEFULLY AT LEAST UNTIL FEBRUARY 15. IF MEETING UNAVOIDABLE, YOU SHOULD LISTEN AND REPORT. WE SHOULD AVOID ANY INDICATION OF POSSIBLE US ROLE.
3. WITHOUT RAISING MATTER WITH GOC WOULD APPRECIATE POPPER'S VIEWS ON ELEMENTS OF POSSIBLE GOG-GOC DEAL AS DESCRIBED IN ATHENS 800.

GP-3. IRWIN  
BT  
5339

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSisco  
→ W/H-Mr. Saunders  
S/S-O:Mr. Magee

APPROVED BY: JJSisco  
Act. Secretary (subs)

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 263

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01482 02 OF 02 181225Z

53:11  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

P R 180600Z AUG 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5083  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

087998

2  
71 AUG 18 AM 11:37

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1482

EXDIS

C O R R E C T I D I C O P Y (TEXTS)

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 147911

6. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE DESIRABLE FOR UN OR OTHER MEDIATOR TO BE ARMED WITH AS STRONG A COMMITMENT AS POSSIBLE FROM THE PARTIES THAT THEY WOULD GIVE FULLEST WEIGHT TO HIS EVENTUAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. EVEN A SIMPLE DECLARATION BY THE PARTIES TO THIS EFFECT WOULD BE HELPFUL. EVEN MORE HELPFUL WOULD BE ADVANCE INDICATION FROM THE US AND OTHER OUTSIDE INTERESTED PARTIES THAT THEY MIGHT TAKE SOME ACTION TO DISADVANTAGE THE SIDE WHICH REJECTS AS MEDIATORS PROPOSALS. WHETHER AND HOW THIS CAN BE DONE AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IS WORTH CONSIDERATION. ANOTHER MEANS OF HELPING TO PREVENT A PARTY FROM CAPRICIOUSLY REJECTION A MEDIATORS REPORT WOULD BE TO REQUIRE BOTH PARTIES TO ACCEPT A GENERAL SET OF PRINCIPLES ON WHICH AGREEMENT WOULD BE BASED BEFORE A MEDIATOR ACCEPTED TASK OF UNDERTAKING MEDIATION. (TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERS ARE ALREADY TELLING US THAT THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN MEDIATION WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01482 02 OF 02 181225Z

PRIOR ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PRINCIPLES -- REJECTION OF ENOSIS, RETENTION OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND PARALLEL REPRESENTATION AT CENTRAL GOVT LEVEL -- AS TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR MEDIATION EFFORT).

7. IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE OF SOLUTION, SERIOUS THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO POSSIBILITIES AND ADVANTAGES OF CUTTING MEDIATOR FREE OF PAST HISTORY BY HAVING HIM SEEK A SOLUTION STARTING WITH THE EXISTING SITUATION AND RSUVMENDING ADJUSTMENTS TO BRING GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS INTO A MORE HARMONIOUS CO-EXISTENCE AND CREATE AN ULTIMATE SENSE OF COMMON IDENTITY. IF THIS MEDICINE IS TOO STRONG FOR PARTIES TO SWALLOW (TURKS WOULD FIND IT MUCH MORE SO THAN MAKARIOS), MODIATOR SHOULD AT LEAST CARRY OUT A SPLIT-THE-DIFFERENCE OPERATION AIMING AT SOLUTION OF APPROXIMATE TYPE WE DESCRIBED IN A-31 (MARCH 3, 1970).

8. AS REGARDS A US MEDIATION EFFORT, WE SEE THIS AS HIGH RISK LOW POSSIBILITY OPTION AT PRESENT STAGE. IN THE PAST WE HAVE BEEN OPENMINDED AND AT TIMES FAVORABLE TO THE IDEA. WE HAVE SEEN IT AS ADVANTAGEOUS BECAUSE IT WOULD SHOW OUR SERIOUSNESS OF INTENT THROUGH ACTIVIST DIPLOMACY. IT WOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN GREATER US CONTROL, AND IT COULD EARN GRATITUDE OF OUR FRIENDS IF IT WORKED. ON OTHER HAND, US MEDIATION AT PRESENT STAGE WOULD CARRY WITH IT GREAT DISADVANGES. WE DOUBT IT WOULD SUCEED UNLESS WE WERE WILLING TO THROW REAL WEIGHT INTO EFFORT. WE WOULD BE OPERATING IN FACE OF INTENSE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA BARRAGE. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, WE WOULD RUN STRONG RISK OF ALIENATING ONE OR BOTH SIDES.

9. ACCORDINGLY, TODAY AS IN 1970 WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO FAVOR A BEHIND THE SCENE ROLE FOR US WITH RESPECT TO MEDIATION. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A DISTINGUISHED AND DISINTERESTED EUROPEAN SERVE AS MEDIATOR. IT WOULD BE A SIMPLER OPERATION IF HE DID NOT OPERATE WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK, BUT GIVEN GOC ATTACHMENT TO IDEA OF UN INTERVENTION IF GOING GETS ROUGH, AND VIEW THAT UNDER 1967 RESOLUTION SYG MAY HAVE CONTINUING MANDATE, IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW MEDIATION TODAY COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01482 02 OF 02 181225Z

LAUNCHED WITHOUT SOME UN CONNECTION. WHAT THIS ADDS UP TO IS THAT WE OUGHT TO BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN IMPARTIAL NON AMERICAN MEDIATOR OPERATING WITHIN A UN FRAMEWORK, AND WE OUGHT TO GIVE HIM AS MUCH PROTECTION AND AID ALONG LINES DISCUSSED PARA 6 AS POSSIBLE. ONLY WHEN SITUATION HAS ENTERED CRISIS STAGE WHEN PARTIES ARE FRIGHTENED ENOUGH TO UNLATCH FROM POSITIONS RIGIDLY MAINTAINED TODAY-SHOULD US STEP FORWARD AS IT DID IN 1967 TO PLAY DIRECT MEDIATORY ROLE.

10. AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO TEST THINKING OF SYG AND GUYER ON MEDIATION PROSPECTS.

GP-4  
POPPER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 594

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01275 01 OF 02 221134Z

18  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 1046 W

013052

R 220900Z JUL 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4959  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUL 22 AM 11:51

Handwritten scribble

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 1275

EXDIS:

DEPARTMENT PASS USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FOR SISCO FROM POPPER

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR A CRISIS.

REF: NICOSIA 1214, ANKARA 4869, ATHENS 0627, STATE 127419

1. SUMMARY: GIVEN REAL PROSPECT OF A CYPRUS CRISIS NEXT FALL OR WINTER, THIS CABLE SUGGESTS THREE POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO BE PURSUED BY US, PERHAPS IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER. FIRST, SEEK TO ASCERTAIN TURKEY'S INTENTIONS MORE PRECISELY AND REQUEST TURKS CONSULT WITH US BEFORE USE OF FORCE; SECOND, REACTIVATE US DIPLOMACY IN EFFORT ALONE OR WITH OTHERS TO OBTAIN COMPROMISE SOLUTION; THIRD, IF SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY, CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS IN UN FRAMEWORK TO PRESERVE LEAST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR SOLUTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND NON-ALIGNMENT FOR CYPRUS, WITH QUASI-AUTONOMOUS, GUARANTEED STATUS FOR TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.  
END SUMMARY:

2. I WELCOME DEPT'S INQUIRY AND EMBASSIES ANKARA AND

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01275 01 OF 02 221134Z

ATHENS ILLUMINATING COMMENTS ON OUR REPORTS OF POSSIBLE TURKISH MILITARY ACTION TO ESTABLISH ZONE OF UNBROKEN TURK CYPRIOT TERRITORY IN NORTHEAST AREA OF CYPRUS. WE AGREE THERE IS NO APPARENT PROSPECT OF SUCH ACTION BEFORE SEPTEMBER OR MORE LIKELY SOMEWHAT LATER, AND THAT IF ITS OBJECTIVE IS FEDERAL OR BI-CANTONAL CYPRUS STATE IT WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO CAUSE SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS THAN IF IT AIMS TO ESTABLISH PARTITION AND SINGLE (TURKISH ONLY) OR DOUBLE ENOSIS.

3. WHAT SOME TURKS APPEAR FROM OUR EVIDENCE TO HAVE IN MIND IS A "SURGICAL OPERATION" IN WHICH THE FACT ACCOMPLI OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF A TURKISH ZONE IS ESTABLISHED SO QUICKLY THAT THIRD PARTIES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CANNOT REACT UNTIL AFTER THE EVENT. MORE OR LESS TACIT COMPLICITY OF MAINLAND GREEK OFFICERS AND CONTINGENTS IS CONSIDERED A PROBABLY PLUS. ONCE TURKS/TURK CYPRIOTS HAVE ESTABLISHED THEIR DEMARCATION LINE, GOT THE THINKING GOES, COULD WITH HELP OF ITS FRIENDS WITHSTAND PRESSURES SOVIETS OR OTHERS MIGHT TRY TO APPLY.

4. WE ARE REMINDED BY THIS LINE OF THOUGHT OF PLANS FOR THE PERFECT CRIME -- SO OFTEN CONCEIVED IN THEORY, SO SELDOM ACHIEVED IN PRACTICE. WITHOUT PRETENDING TO ANY EXPERTISE RE TURKISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION, WE QUESTION WHETHER TURKS HAVE CAPACITY TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AND CLEANLY AS THEY PLAN, WHETHER GREEK CYPRIOT OPPOSITION TO TURK CYPRIOTS INSIDE PROJECTED TURKISH ZONE AND OUT WILL NOT RESULT IN SLOW AND MESSY MILITARY ACTIONS, AND WHETHER MAINLAND GREEK MILITARY IN CYPRUS AND GREECE WILL BE ABLE TO STAND ENTIRELY ASIDE AT ACTUAL MOMENT OF COMBAT. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES US MIGHT DO BETTER TO ASSUME THAT A TURKISH MOVE IS NOT 100 PER CENT SUCCESSFUL. THEN, AS FIGHTING CONTINUES, GREECE, US, UK, THE USSR, UN AND NATO WILL ALL GET INTO THE ACT IN THEIR VARIOUS WAYS. IN SHORT, WE WILL HAVE ANOTHER CYPRUS CRISIS ON OUR HANDS.

5. AS ALL OF US HAVE RECOGNIZED, A CYPRUS CRISIS IN 1971 OR 1972 WOULD BE A MUCH MORE AWKWARD BUSINESS FOR THE US THAN IT WAS IN 1963-64 AND 1967. POWER BALANCE HAS SHIFTED ADVERSELY TO US IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN; WE ARE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of state

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01275 01 OF 02 221134Z

SERIOUSLY PREOCCUPIED WITH LARGER ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM; VIETNAM WAR-WEARINESS HAMPERS OUR INITIATIVE; IT SEEMS ESPECIALLY BAD MOMENT TO CONTEMPLATE A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH USSR; NO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IS TO BE EXPECTED FROM NATO AND UN ACTION IS MORE LIKELY TO HINDER THAN TO HELP US IN REACHING A SOLUTION.

6. CONCLUSION WE DRAW FROM ALL THIS IS THAT IF TURKS HAVE IN MIND A "DYNAMIC SOLUTION" BY ARMED FORCE, WE FACE A DANGER TO US INTERESTS WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK. IN RECENT MONTHS WE HAVE RESPONDED TO THIS POTENTIAL THREAT BY URGING GREEK AND TURK CYPRIOTS TO CONTINUE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS. BUT THIS IS JUST WHAT TURKISH SIDE IS NOW SAYING IT WILL NOT DO INDEFINITELY, AND NO ONE HAS DISCOVERED HOW THE TWO SIDES CAN BE INDUCED TO INVIGORATE THE TALKS BY REAL GIVE-AND-TAKE COMPROMISE. IF WE LIMIT OURSELVES TO WHAT LOOKS INCREASINGLY LIKE INCANTATION TO STAY WITH THE TALKS AND ONLY THE TALKS, OUR VOICE IS LIKELY TO SOUND LESS AND LESS PERSUASIVE.

7. WHAT MORE CAN WE DO? I WOULD LIKE TO SEE USG GIVE CONSIDERATION TO FOLLOWING THREE COURSES OF ACTION, WHICH COULD BUT NEED NOT BE FOLLOWED IN CONSECUTIVE ORDER.

8. FIRST, AND MOST URGENT, WE NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT TURKISH INTENTIONS FOR THE AUTUMN 1971 PERIOD AND BEYOND. THE GUT QUESTION IS WHETHER TURKEY PLANS TO USE FORCE TO BRING ABOUT THE DEFINITIVE CYPRUS SOLUTION IT SAYS IT IS SEEKING. COULD WE NOT TRY TO GET A BETTER INDICATION OF THE ROAD AHEAD AS THE TURKS SEE IT? AS TURKEY'S PRINCIPAL SHIELD AGAINST THE USSR, SURELY WE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHETHER TURKS ENVISAGE ACTION WOULD COULD INVOLVE US IN A MAJOR STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANENA. WHILE IT IS NOT UNPRECEDENTED, THERE IS SOMETHING ILLOGICAL ABOUT OUR BEING PUSHED INTO CONFRONTATION SITUATIONS BY ALLIES DEPENDENT ON US FOR SUPPORT.  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USDOCOSOUTH AND ECOM.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE SECRET AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 627

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01275 02 OF 02 221147Z

42  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

71 JUL 2 12 39 AM 11:51

013146

R 220900Z JUL 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4960  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
USMISSION NATO

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 1275

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM

9. I AM NOT PROPOSING THAT WE REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE OF 1964 WHEN THROUGH THE "JOHNSON LETTER" AND NAVAL MOVEMENTS WE DEEPLY ANTAGONIZED THE TURKS BY RESTRAINING THEM FROM INVADING CYPRUS. WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT WE MAKE IT PLAIN THAT WE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW AND BE CONSULTED BEFORE TURKEY ENGAGES IN ANY DANGEROUS ADVENTURE IN CYPRUS. THE LINE WE SHOULD TAKE IS THAT THE MORE COMPLETELY WE ARE INFORMED REGARDING TURKISH THINKING AND PLANNING, THE MORE HELPFUL WE CAN BE IN SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH WILL STICK.

10. A SECOND COURSE OF ACTION, COMPLEMENTING THE FOREGOING, WOULD BE TO USE THE IMPENDING CRISIS NEXT FALL AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REACTIVATE AMERICAN DIPLOMACY WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS AND TO MOVE IN MORE STRONGLY THAN WE HAVE IN THE LAST THREE YEARS TO SEEK A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. PERHAPS THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS, FOLLOWING IN THE WAKE OF PAST PRECEDENTS, IS TO DESIGNATE A RESPECTED AMERICAN OF GREAT STATURE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PARTIES. ALTERNATIVELY, US COULD SEEK TO MOBILIZE SUPPORT AMONG INTERESTED PARTIES FOR AN IMPARTIAL EUROPEAN MEDIATOR, AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED. STILL ANOTHER INITIATIVE FOR A NEGOTIATED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01275 02 OF 02 221147Z

SETTLEMENT COULD TAKE THE FORM OF CONVENING AN INFORMAL ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE OF INTERESTED PARTIES, SAY IN NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE OLCAY-PALAMAS TALKS OF LATE SEPTEMBER. IN SUCH A CONFERENCE REPRESENTATIVES OF US AND UK COULD LEAN HEAVILY ON REPRESENTATIVES OF GREECE AND TURKEY, AND OF THE TWO CYPRUS COMMUNITIES, TO BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT ON A QUASI-FEDERAL SYSTEM WITH APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES FOR THE TURKISH COMMUNITY WITHIN AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS STATE.

11. SHOULD THESE STEPS PROVE UNPRODUCTIVE AND THE SITUATION DETERIORATE FURTHER, WE WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO GO IT ALONE, ESSENTIALLY AS WE DID IN THE PAST, OR TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS TO OURSELVES BY ENGAGING OTHERS. IF WE PREFER THE LATTER, A THIRD COURSE OF ACTION FOLLOWS: QUITE LOGICALLY, THEORETICAL THOUGH IT MAY BE TO SUGGEST IT. THIS IS TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE BENEFITS OF SEEKING TO CONCERT WITH THE SOVIETS WITH A VIEW TO DETERMINING A COMMON POLICY LINE THAT WOULD BE MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE US AND THE USSR. THE OBJECTIVE OF SUCH A MOVE COULD BE TO BUILD UPON THE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST BOTH SUPER-POWERS SHOULD HAVE, AT LEAST IN THE SHORTER TERM, OF MAINTAINING AN INDEPENDENT, NON-ALIGNED CYPRUS STATE. THIS IS A SOLUTION WHICH, FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT, WOULD AVOID EXTENDING NATO POWER IN THE FAR EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN THROUGH DOUBLE ENOSIS, AND FROM THE WESTERN STANDPOINT, WOULD HELP FEND OFF THE GROWING SOVIET AND INTERNAL COMMUNIST THRUST FOR CONTROL OF THE ISLAND. FOR BOTH SIDES THE PRESERVATION OF AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS MIGHT BE MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE THAN THE RISKS EACH WOULD RUN IF CYPRUS SHOULD TOUCH OFF A FULL-SCALE SOVIET-AMERICAN CONTROVERSY.

12. SINCE MAKARIOS WILL IN ANY CASE RESORT TO THE UN FOR SUPPORT IF HE IS PLACED UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE, THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT BE THE BEST VEHICLE FOR WORKING WITH THE SOVIETS, AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT. THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING UNSC ACTION WOULD BE THAT, VARIOUS PEACEFUL METHODS OF COPING WITH THE CYPRUS PROBLEM UNDER CHARTER ARTICLE 33 HAVING FAILED, IT BECAME INCUMBENT UPON THE MAJOR POWERS, ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR CHARTER RESPONSIBILITIES, TO TAKE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01275 02 OF 02 221147Z

PRESERVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

13. WE RECOGNIZE THE STRAIN THAT ANY SUCH SOVIET-AMERICAN COLLABORATION WOULD CAUSE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND GREECE. I AM CERTAINLY NOT SUGGESTING THAT WE ANTAGONIZE TWO FAITHFUL ALLIES BY MOVING PRECIPITATELY IN THIS DIRECTION. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN CASE OF AN APPROACHING CRUNCH SIMPLY TO CONVEY TO THE TURKS THE SENSE THAT WE HAVE LARGER INTERESTS WHICH MIGHT BE IMPERILLED BY THEIR EMBARKING ON A UNILATERAL ACTION WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH US. SHOULD THE TURKS PERSIST I THINK SUCH FRANKNESS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO ALLOWING OURSELVES TO BE PULLED INTO AN ADVERSARY-TYPE CRISIS WITH THE USSR OVER CYPRUS.

14. I RECOGNIZE THAT ALL OF THESE PROPOSALS ARE MORE OR LESS CONTROVERSIAL, THAT THEY INVOLVE RISKS AND COSTS TO US, AND THAT NONE OF THEM MAY IN THE END BE SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING FAIRLY LARGE SCALE VIOLENCE. NEVERTHELESS, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT EVEN THE PROCEDURES THEMSELVES CAN HAVE AN INHIBITING EFFECT, AND THAT IN THE LONG RUN THEY WOULD ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO PREVENT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM FROM TRIGGERING OFF CONSEQUENCES FAR LARGER THAN THE PROBLEM WARRANTS.

15. WOULD APPRECIATE ADDRESSEES' REACTIONS. GP-3.  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NICOSIA 1275 NOT PASSED USDOCOSOUTH EUCOM.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

WH  
**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 061

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 01232 160746Z

12  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

098179

R 160650Z JUL 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4933  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN  
ZEN USNATO POUCH

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1232

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; TURK CONTINGENT COMMANDER ON MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PARTITION.

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

REF: NICOSIA 1214

1. SUMMARY: COMMANDER TURKI CONTINGENT CLAIMED SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM "SIMPLE" AND SAID CONTINGENCY PLANS WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT IF STALEMATE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS CONTINUED. HE IMPLIED TIME LIMIT EXISTS AND SOLUTION WOULD BE FOUND WITHIN NEXT EIGHT MONTHS. END SUMMARY.

2. COL. DOGU, COMMANDER OF AUTHORIZED MAINLAND TURKISH CONTINGENT IN CYPRUS, TOOK EXTREMELY HARD LINE WITH EMB OFF JULY 14 ON LACK OF PROGRESS IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND SAID MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT IF STALEMATE CONTINUED. HE CLAIMED TURKS COULD IMPOSE MILITARY SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM WITH MINIMUM DIFFICULTY. AT MOST OPERATION WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN THREE DAYS.

3. HE IMPLIED DISAGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN TURKISH

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01232 160746Z

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS OVER ANALYSIS CURRENT SITUATION. MILITARY FEELS MAKARIOS' EFFORT TO ENLISH SOVIET SUPPORT VERY DANGEROUS FOR TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION. HE SAID "MAKARIOS IS TRYING TO TURN CYPRUS INTO A MEDITERRANEAN CUBA. WE WILL NOT LET THIS HAPPEN." DOGU SAID HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT CIVILIAN POLITICIANS SAID, THERE IS DEADLINE ON INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. TURKS CERTAINLY WILL NOT ALLOW NEGOTIATIONS TO DRAG ON FOR ANOTHER THREE YEARS. STATED HE EXPECTED FINAL SOLUTION TO BE REACHED, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, DURING HIS TOUR OF DUTY (I.E. NEXT EIGHT MONTHS). CRUNCH WOULD PROBABLY COME AFTER OLCAY-PALAMAS SEPTEMBER MEETING IN NEW YORK.

4. EMBOFF TOLD DOGU THAT, WHILE NO ONE DOUBTED TURKISH STRENGTH, ANY DYNAMIC SOLUTION WOULD CAUSE GRAVE DIFFICULTIES FOR TURKEY'S FRIENDS, COULD MISFIRE, AND WOULD CERTAINLY RESULT IN DEATH OF MANY TURKISH CYPRIOTS. HE BRUSHED ASIDE FIRST TWO OBJECTIONS AND COMMENTED THAT, IN ANY NATIONAL STRUGGLE, THERE HAD TO BE SOME SACRIFICES.

5. COLONEL DOGU'S REMARKS IN NICOSIA BEAR STRIKING SIMILARITY TO TURKISH GENERAL STAFF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY BRIGADIER SOLE, BRITISH DATT IN ANKARA, AT LAST WEEK'S CONFERENCE OF CANADIAN, US, UK MILITARY UROQCHES IN LONDON. SOLE STATED THAT TGS IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT HIGH CASUALTIES AMONG TURKI CYPRIOT COMMUNITY TO PROTECT TURKISH STRATEGIC INTEREST IN CYPRUS, I.E. TO PREVENT ISLAND FALLING INTO "UNFRIENDLY HANDS". HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT TURKISH MILITARY MAY FEEL ITSELF FORCED TO ACT AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL PRIDE IF ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE CANNOT SOON BE FOUND.

6. COMMENT: WE HAVE ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT TURKISH MILITARY TOOK A HARDER LINE REI CYPRUS THAN TURKISH CIVIPHIAN OFFICIALS. BUT AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE, WHEN SOME OF OUR TURKISH EMBASSY CONTACTS HAVE A SIMILAR ZGO-GO ATTITUDE, WE MUST FACE UP TO POSSIBILITY THAT THIS MAY BE MORE THAN JUST WAR OF NERVES TALK. RE ANKARA 4869 JUST RECEIVED, WE AGREE THERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD ANY BIG GOT PUSH BEFORE END OF SEPTEMBER.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 01232 160746Z

WHAT WE FEAR IS WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN THEREAFTER. GP-3.  
POPPER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Sanders*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 523

PAGE 01 NICOSI 02212 010911Z

2

22  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

041463

P 301100Z DEC 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4319

S E C R E T NICOSIA 2212

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING TALKS

REF: STATE 209988 (BEIRUT 10932)

1. I HAD NOT INTENDED TO MAKE FURTHER COMMENT ON NICOSIA AS POSSIBLE SITE FOR NEW JARRING TALKS, BUT IN VIEW AMB BUFFUM'S EXCELLENT MESSAGE VERY PROPERLY POSING QUESTION OF LOCAL SECURITY FOR SUCH TALKS IN CYPRUS, FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST.

2. HAVE CONFERRED WITH OFFICERS ON MY STAFF WHO WORK ON SECURITY PROBLEMS AND DEAL WITH POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES HERE. THEIR JUDGMENT, IN WHICH I CONCUR, IS THAT WHILE THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT INCIDENTS WILL NOT OCCUR, SECURITY SITUATION WOULD ON BALANCE BE AS GOOD IN NICOSIA AS IN NEW YORK FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. UNDETECTED ENTRY INTO CYPRUS OF TERRORISTS WOULD NOT BE TOO EASY. ONLY AIRPORT IS AT NICOSIA. STRINGENT AIRPORT CONTROLS INSTITUTED TO COMBAT 1970 HIJACKING DANGER HAVE BEEN FULLY MAINTAINED. EVERY SUSPECTED ARAB ARRIVING HERE IS NOW KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY POLICE. WHILE CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES ARE ENDEMIC HERE, CONCEALMENT AND COVERT OPERATIONS ARE PROBABLY MORE DIFFICULT FOR NON-CYPRIOIS ON THIS SMALL ISLAND THAN IN NEW YORK CITY. LANGUAGE, NON-FAMILIARITY WITH ENVIRONMENT, AND RELATIVELY HIGH VISIBILITY WOULD HAOHER THEM. ARABS BEARING FORGED OR STOLEN PASSPORTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT OF COURSE ESCAPE INITIAL DETECTION.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 02212 010911Z

B. ONLY OTHER METHODS OF ENTRY WOULD BE CLANDESTINE LANDING BY BOAT OR NOCTURNIT AIR DROP. BOTH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT SUCCESSFULLY AND COMMANDOS ON ARRIVAL WOULD HAVE NO READY BASE FROM WHICH TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS.

C. SINCE GOC PRESTIGE WOULD BE COMMITTED TO MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY DURING TALKS, IT WOULD PROVIDE HEAVY OVERT AND COVERT POLICE PROTECTION. EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICER CONSIDERS SUCH POLICE ACTIVITY HERE REASONABLY EFFICIENT.

D. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT SECURITY MEASURES UN WOULD TAKE, BUT UNFICYP APPARATUS WOULD PRESUMABLY ASSIST. FYI ONLY. WE UNDERSTAND UNFICYP HAS BEEN ASKED BY UN TO START CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE TALKS. END FYI.

E. WE THINK IT HIGHLY DOUBTFUL COMMANDOS COULD PICK UP MUCH SUPPORT FROM CYPRIOTS. THEY MIGHT TRY TO UTILIZE RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS OPPOSING MAKARIOS, BUT OUR ESTIMATE IS LATTER WOULD BE COLD TO WHAT THEY WOULD REGARD AS DIVERSIONARY MANEUVER.

F. OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE AMONG CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY AND THIS MIGHT HAMPER TALKS THOUGH IT WOULD NOT AFFECT PERSONAL SAFETY OF THE NEGOTIATORS. IN OUR OPINION, BASED ON ALL COUNTRY TEAM EVIDENCE, NEITHER TURKISH CYPRIOTS NOR RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS ARE PLANNING VIOLENT ACTIONS IN SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM.

3. CONCLUSION HERE IS THAT SECURITY PROBLEM EXISTS IN CYPRUS AS ELSEWHERE, BUT DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE GREATER THAN IN NEW YORK. IF THIS IS ACCEPTED, DEPT MAY WISH TO MAKE ITS DECISION MAINLY ON BASIS OF OTHER FACTORS SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED BY AMB BUFFUM, JARRING AND OTHERS, PRO AND CON. I AGREE THAT ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE BOTH WAYS AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO MAKE SITE QUESTION A MAJOR ISSUE.

4. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED. GP-1.  
POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

LS11 00/265



Department of State

*Carroll*  
**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 513

PAGE 01 NICOSI 02001 131501Z

51

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 ARA-12 EUR-20 SS-20 NSC-10 CIAE-00 INR-08

NSAE-00 RSC-01 E-15 L-04 AID-28 RSR-01 /135 W  
..... 002486

R 131450Z NOV 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4197

CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 2001

SUBJ: CYPRUS: FOLLOW-UP ON MAKARIOS' CALL ON PRESIDENT

I EXPECT TO BE SEEING MAKARIOS SOME TIME NEXT WEEK. ASIDE FROM CUBAN SHIPPING PROBLEM WHICH I WILL RAISE PURSUANT STATE 177175, IS THERE ANYTHING ON WHICH WHITE HOUSE OR DEPT WOULD WISH HAVE ME FOLLOW UP MAKARIOS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AND WASHINGTON VISIT IN GENERAL?

GP-4  
POPPER

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 239

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01856 151539Z

50  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /046 W

082565

O 151510Z OCT 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4131

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 1856

SUBJECT: HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AT 25TH UNGA  
EXDIS

1. FONMIN KYPRIANOU HAS JUST ASKED ME URGENTLY TO REQUEST THAT USG AGREE MAKARIOS CAN MENTION FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO DATE OR PLACE, IN PRESS COMMUNIQUE GOC PLANS ISSUE OCT 16. COMMUNIQUE WOULD INCLUDE REFERENCE TO MAKARIOS MEETINGS WITH U THANT, AND WITH CERTAIN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ALSO VISITING UNGA.

2. PURPOSE IS TO FORESTALL AWKWARD QUESTIONS CORRESPONDENTS MIGHT OTHERWISE ASK ARCHBISHOP AS HE LEAVES FOR US OCT 17.

3. REPLY REQUESTED 9AM LOCAL OCTOBER 16.  
POPPER

NOTE: EXDIS ADDED PER SSO - MR. WILLIAMSON 10/15/70.

SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE  
10 OCT 15 PM 7:10  
2/3

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

SAW

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1970 MAR 8 13 25Z

CONFIDENTIAL HCE935

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00301 081315Z

51  
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CPR-02 PM-05

NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 SS-20 PRS-01 RSR-01 /059 W  
----- 105420

O 081255Z MAR 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3277

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 301

FOR DAVIS, NEA/CYP

SUBJ: CYPRUS: ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF MAKARIOS

REF: NICOSIA 299, 300

WE RECOMMEND EARLIEST TRANSMITTAL THROUGH EMBASSY OF APPROPRIATE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO ARCHBISHOP, RE MAR 8 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.  
POPPER

*Called Sanders at 0810- he said to call w/State re draft message and I will call back in about an hour 0845 - Called State re draft message*

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**



CONFIDENTIAL  
Classification

Department of State  
**TELEGRAM**

INDICATE:

- COLLECT
- CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy NICOSIA Immediate  
 INFO: AmEmbassy ANKARA Priority  
 AmEmbassy ATHENS "  
 AmEmbassy LONDON "  
 USUN New York "  
 US Mission NATO "

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: Attempted Assassination of President Makarios

REF: Nicosia 301

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. Please convey to President Makarios following message from President Nixon. QUOTE Your Ecattitude: I was appaied to learn of the shocking attempt on your life. I am gratified, however, that you have escaped unharmed to continue your leadership at this important time in your country's history. Such acts as this attempt on your life must be condemned by all. Please accept my most sincere best wishes for your continued safety and good health. UNQUOTE
2. At your discretion you may release text of President Nixon's message ~~to local press~~ <sup>TO LOCAL PRESS, FBI DEPARTMENT</sup>. The Department does not plan formal

DRAFTED BY: <i>WHP</i> NEA/CYP: KTorp/TWDavis:sen	DRAFTING DATE 3/8/70	TEL. EXT. 20279	APPROVED BY: NEA/CYP: T. W. Davis <i>TW</i>
--	-------------------------	--------------------	--

CLEARANCES:  
 NEA/P: WHarris (sub) *WH*  
 S/S-O: RRich  
 NEA: RDavies (sub) *RD*  
 NSC: HSaunders  
 USIA: ACarter (sub) *AC*



CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

INDICATE:

COLLECT

CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy NICOSIA

release of President's message, although spokesman may draw upon contents if subject raised at regular noon briefing. END FYI

END

DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT. APPROVED BY:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

MSG. NO.

1. TRANSMITTED BY:

2. TO: WH

271

DATE & TIME:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'70 MAR 8 PM 1:32

1970 MAR 8 1:32

3. ORIGINATOR: ~~██████████~~ NEA

4. RECEIVED BY:

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

DATE & TIME:

5. DESCRIPTION:

Draft Cable to Nicosia - Presidential Message to Makarios

6. CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS:

CONFIDENTIAL

7. NO. OF PGS: 2

8. PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

9. VALIDATED BY:

S/S-0 Ric

10. DELIVER TO:

~~██████████~~

FOR:

CLEARANCE XX

Mr. Saunders

INFORMATION

PER REQUEST

Revised: 9 Jan. 197

1970 MAR 8 09 54Z

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

HCE928

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 00300 080941Z

22  
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 IO-13 EUR-20 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 CCO-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10

P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 SY-03 RSR-01 /106 W  
----- 105039

O P 080855Z MAR 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
USMISSION NATO  
USUN NEW YORK 1427

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 300

REF: NICOSIA 299

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON ARCHBISHOP  
MAKARIOS

1. RE ATTEMPT ON MAKARIOS LIFE THIS MORNING, CYPRUS BROAD-  
CAST COMPANY (CBC) REPORTS POLICE FOUND SUBMACHINE GUN  
AND "OTHER WEAPONS" ON ROOF OF LIBRARY OF PAN CYPRIAN  
GYNASIUM ACROSS FROM ARCHBISHOPRIC. STILL NO ARRESTS

ANNOUNCED.

2. CBC ALSO ANNOUNCED GOC HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WILL  
HOLD EXTRAORDINARY SESSION AT 1600 HRS TODAY (MAR 8).  
SESSION WILL PRESUMABLY CONDEM ATTACK AND EXPRESS SUPPORT  
FOR PRESIDENT. MAKARIOS SCHEDULED TO DRIVE FROM MAKHERAS TO  
LIMASSOL TO REVIEW CARNIVAL PARADE THIS AFTERNOON. THERE  
NO INDICATIONS YET HE PLANS CHANGE HIS SCHEDULE. I WILL  
ATTEND.

3. LIASON WITH GOC POLICE INDICATES THEY DISMISSING  
POSSIBILITY ATTACK ON ARCHBISHOP HAS ANY INTERCOMMUNAL  
DIMENSION. GP-4

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1970 MAR 8 08 21Z

UNCLASSIFIED

HCE926

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00299 080814Z

10  
ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00  
CCO-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01  
PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 SY-03 EUR-20 RSR-01 /106 W  
----- 104902

O P 080755Z MAR 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3275  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
USMISSION NATO  
USUN NEW YORK 1425

UNCLAS NICOSIA 299

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON MAKARIOS

1. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS' HELICOPTER WAS FIRED UPON BY UNKNOWN ASSAILANTS AT 7:10 MARCH 8 AS IT LIFTED HIM FROM ARCBISHOPRIC IN NICOSIA EN ROUTE TO MAKHERAS MONASTERY. ARCHBISHOP NOT HURT, BUT PILOT WAS WOUNDED AND HELICOPTER DAMAGED.
2. ASSAILANTS APPARENTLY FIRED ON HELICOPTER FROM ROOF OF PAN CYPRIAN GYNMASIUM OPPOSITE ARCHBISHOPRIC. POLICE RETURNED FIRE, BUT NO ARRESTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED.
3. ARCHBISHOP PROCEEDED TO MAKHERAS BY CAR. BEGAN CONDUCTING SERVICE THERE AT 9:30.  
POPPER

UNCLASSIFIED

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 138

PAGE 01 STATE 046974

18  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66663  
DRAFTED BY:NEA/CYP:RALONG  
APPROVED BY:NEA:JOSEPH J. SISCO  
NEA/CYP - TDBOYATT  
S/S-O - MR. C. MAGEE

092650

R 180243Z MAR 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 046974

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: SISCO-ROSSIDES DISCUSSION MARCH 16

1. CYPRIOT AMB ROSSIDES CALLED ON ASST SECY SISCO MAR 16 FOR DISCUSSION OF US POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS IN LIGHT OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. SISCO BEGAN BY SAYING THAT USG HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED WHEN WE HEARD OF THE GREEK NOTE TO GOC BECAUSE OF OUR BELIEF IT WOULD PRODUCE NEW DIFFICULTIES. SISCO STATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT REMEMBER A COMPARABLE PERIOD WHEN WE HAVE MORE STUDIOUSLY AND CAREFULLY AVOIDED INVOLVEMENT IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THIS IS BECAUSE WE HAVE SEEN CURRENT SITUATION AS BASICALLY AN ARGUMENT WITHIN THE GOG-GOC SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD BEST BE RESOLVED BY TWO PARTIES THEMSELVES. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY ACCUSATIONS OF BIAS, THEN, WE HAVE MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION THAT OUR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 046974

AMBASSADORS IN GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY ACTIVE. OUR CONCERN HAS BEEN THAT TOO MUCH ACTIVITY WOULD LEAD US TO APPEAR INVOLVED AND THEN PROMPT ONE PARTY OR ANOTHER TO REQUEST OUR ASSISTANCE IN THEIR DIFFICULTIES WITH ANOTHER PARTY. OUR RELATIONS WITH PARTIES ARE TOO GOOD TO PERMIT SUCH INVOLVEMENT AS THIS INVOLVEMENT WOULD NECESSARILY BREED MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION.

2. WHEN ROSSIDES ASKED IF AMB POPPER HAD SEEN MAKARIOS (HE SEEMED GENUINELY NOT TO KNOW ONE WAY OR THE OTHER), SISCO SAID NO BUT THAT AMB POPPER IS AVAILABLE IF MAKARIOS WISHES TO SEE HIM. THE POINT IS, SISCO SAID, THAT WE WANT NEITHER THE FACT THAT POPPER HAS NOT TAKEN INITIATIVE TO SEE MAKARIOS NOR THE FACT THAT HE DOES GO TO SEE HIM IN THE FUTURE TO CREATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT OUR ROLE; WE DO NOT WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED AND WANT PARTIES TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY.

3. SISCO THEN CHARACTERIZED SITUATION AS SOMEWHAT MORE ENCOURAGING NOW, BECAUSE AT LEAST SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS ARE BEING WORKED OUT THROUGH DIPLOMACY. HE CITED THE REPORTED ARMS AGREEMENT (AND GAVE ROSSIDES RUNDOWN GIVEN TO AMB ESENBEL IN STATE 45024) AND THE FACT THAT THE GOC CAREFULLY STUDIED THE FEB 11 NOTE AND REPLIED TO IT IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AS INDICATIONS OF THIS ENCOURAGING ASPECT. WITHOUT UNDERESTIMATING REMAINING DIFFICULTIES, SISCO REITERATED HIS HOPE THAT DIFFERENCES CAN BE PEACEFULLY RESOLVED.

4. WHEN QUERIED BY ROSSIDES AS TO TURKEY'S ROLE IN CURRENT SITUATION, SISCO REPLIED THAT HIS IMPRESSION IS THAT THE GOC HAS BEEN ON SIDELINES. ALTHOUGH TURKS MADE DEMARCHE TO UNSYG ON CZECH ARMS, THEY SEEMED TO VIEW REST OF GREEK NOTE AS PROBLEM BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS.

5. ROSSIDES LEFT SEEMINGLY QUITE SATISFIED WITH ABOVE LINE; HE IS OBVIOUSLY NOT BEING KEPT INFORMED BY HIS GOVT. GP-3. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

592/03/185

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 010

PAGE 01 STATE 030413

81  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66633  
DRAFTED BY:NEA/CYP:TDBOYATT  
APPROVED BY:NEA:RPDAVIES  
S/S-O:SEFRY

027567

R 230243Z FEB 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 030413

EXDIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: DISCUSSIONS ON CZECH ARMS

REF: NICOSIA 394

IN PARA 2 OF REFTEL, EMBASSY REPORTS GOC'S UNVARYING  
POSITION THAT REMOVAL OF GRIVAS IS TRADE-OFF  
FOR SEQUESTERING OF CZECH ARMS. HAS GOC COMMUNICATED  
THIS POSITION EITHER FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY TO OSORIO?

GP-3. IRWIN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 230

PAGE 01 STATE 025489

42  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

66603  
DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECD FROM WHITE HOUSE  
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NEA - MR SISCO (SUBSTANCE)  
S/S - MR CURRAN

101417  
WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
72 FEB 15 AM 7:43

Z 141818Z FEB 72 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS FLASH  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 025489

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

REF: NICOSIA 322

1. PLEASE INFORM CLERIDES THAT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT GOG IS MOVING TONIGHT. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM HIM THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE ANY INFORMATION HE MIGHT HAVE ON THE SUBJECT. ROGERS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

WT  
TELEGRAM

SECRET 294

PAGE 01 STATE 025299

47  
ORIGIN SS-25

LL 2/3

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 /027 R

66603

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSISCO  
APPROVED BY: NEA - JOSEPH J SISCO  
S/S - MR CURRAN  
S/PRS:CBRAY

093411

O 121928Z FEB 72 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 025299

EXDIS TOSEC 22

PLEASE PASS SECRETARY ROGERS AT KEY BISCAYNE

IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT STORY RE CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS IS  
BEGINNING TO BREAK, WE ARE BEGINNING TO GET INQUIRIES. WE INTEND  
TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO HOLD ON THE FOLLOWING LINE OVER  
THE WEEKEND: QUOTE WE ARE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY  
UNQUOTE. POSTS SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ABOVE. GP-3. IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 869

PAGE 01 STATE 025248

19  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66664  
DRAFTED BY NEA/INC: ACEQUANTON  
APPROVED BY: NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO  
NEA/CYP - ROGER LONG  
S/S - CH THOMAS

72 FEB 12 AM 8:39  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

090710

R 120308Z FEB 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 025248

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTION BEGINS WITH PARA 2 THRU  
PARA 4)

SUBJ: CYPRUS CRISIS

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO BRIEFED BRITISH CHARGE TEBBIT  
FEBRUARY 11 ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. SISCO NOTED THAT  
GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD DELIVERED DEMARCHE TO MAKARIOS DEMANDING  
HE TURN OVER TO UN CZECH ARMS AND ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT OF  
NATIONAL UNITY WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT ALL POLITICAL ELEMENTS.  
REACTION OF MAKARIOS HAD BEEN ONE OF STONEY SILENCE. WE HAVE  
INDICATED TO GREEKS OUR CONCERN OVER COURSE THEY HAVE EMBARKED  
UPON AS DANGEROUS AND TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO DELAY PRESENTATION  
OF NOTE TO ALLOW FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH US.

2. QUESTION, SISCO SAID, WAS WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE; WE ARE  
CONCERNED THAT WE ARE AT BEGINNING OF FIRST-CLASS CRISIS.  
WE EXPECT CYPRUS TO MOVE TO UN AND ATTEMPT TO MOBILIZE WORLD  
OPINION AND OBTAIN POLITICAL SUPPORT OF BOTH SOVIETS AND CHINESE.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 025248

AT UN BRITISH, FRENCH AND US WILL BE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO SUPPORT OUR NATO ALLIES.

3. TEBBIT ASKED WHAT GREEK AIMS WERE. SISCO REPLIED THEY WANTED MAKARIOS TO STOP PLAYING FOOTSY WITH COMMUNISTS AND SEEM TO WANT TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT IN CYPRUS MORE RESPONSIVE TO ATHENS. TEBBIT NOTED THIS HAD BOTH GOOD AND BAD FEATURES. GREEKS WANTED TO KEEP COMMUNISTS OUT, BUT IT ALSO MAY SEEK TO KEEP CYPRUS LESS GENUINELY INDEPENDENT THAN BEFORE. PROBLEM, SISCO SAID, WAS HOW TO KEEP CRISIS LOCALIZED WITHOUT VIOLENCE OR GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT.

4. SISCO SAID HE THOUGHT CYPRUS WOULD FAVOR UN INVOLVEMENT. GREEKS PROBABLY WANT NEITHER UN NOR USG TO BECOME INVOLVED.

QUESTION WAS, COULD UN DO JOB. WALDHEIM WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO TAKE IT ON, SINCE UN IS COMMITTED TO PRESERVATION OF UNITY AND INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS. SISCO OPINED THAT IF GREEKS AND TURKS DECIDED TO INTERVENE THEY COULD DO IT AND THERE WOULD BE VERY LITTLE ANYONE COULD DO TO STOP THEM.

5. SISCO MADE CLEAR VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES UNDER ACTIVE REVIEW, BUT NO DECISIONS AKEN AND THAT WE ARE IN A WATCHFUL-WAITING POSTURE. GP-3. IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

592/03/193

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 144

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 12 PM 12:43

PAGE 01 STATE 025268

47  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

66603  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP:TDBOYATT  
APPROVED BY: NEA - JOSEPH J SISCO  
NEA - RODGER P DAVIES  
S/S - MR CURRAN

092480

Z 121330Z FEB 72 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH

SECRET STATE 025268

EXDIS

SUBJECT: US ACTIONS UPON AMBASSADOR POPPER'S RETURN

REF: NICOSIA 306

THERE WILL BE FURTHER REVIEW HERE THIS MORNING OF CYPRUS  
SITUATION IN LIGHT OF OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS. WE ARE ALSO  
AWAITING REPORT OF AMB TASCA'S TALK WITH PM PAPADOPOULOS.  
IN MEANTIME EMBASSY SHOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE TO CALL ON  
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS. GP-3. IRWIN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 568

PAGE 01 STATE 016994

82  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66644  
DRAFTED BY:NEA/CYP:TDBOYATT  
APPROVED BY:NEA-RODGER P DAVIES  
NEA/TUR:RLPUGH  
NEA/GRK:WJSILVA  
EUR/FBX:EJBIEGEL  
S/S-O:RDCHRISTIANSEN

18114  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
JAN 29 AM 8:10

R 290249Z JAN 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USUN NY

SECRET STATE 016994

EXDIS NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MAKARIOS SEEKING BELGIAN ARMS

REF: NICOSIA 173

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES INFORMATION CONTAINED REFTEL. WE AGREE WITH POLICY LINE SUGGESTED BY AMBASSADOR POPPER IN PARA 4. USG SHOULD TAKE NO INITIATIVE IN DISCUSSING MAKARIOS' EFFORT TO BUY BELGIAN ARMS. IF SUBJECT IS SURFACED BY UN OFFICIAL OR OTHER COMPETENT AUTHORITY (SUCH AS BELGIAN), WE SHOULD TAKE POSITION THAT INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL ARMS INTO CYPRUS BY ANY ONE FOR ANY ONE SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED.

2. DEPARTMENT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING DISPOSITION OF CZECH ARMS WHICH WERE IMPORTED INTO CYPRUS IN MID-60'S AND STORED BY CYPOL UNDER UNFICYP CONTROL. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THESE WEAPONS WERE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 016994

CLANDESTINELY DISTRIBUTED TO CYPRUS POLICE UNITS AND SOME OF THE ISLAND'S PRIVATE ARMIES. IN EITHER CASE, WE ASSUMED PORTION OF WEAPONS WERE PUT INTO HANDS OF MAKARIOS' LOYALISTS.

GP-3. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 525

PAGE 01 STATE 016992

85  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66636

DRAFTED BY NEA/CYP TDBOYATT  
APPROVED BY NEA: RODGER P DAVIES  
NEA/GRK GTCHURCHILL S/S-O RDCHRISTIANSEN

972 WH  
JAN 29 AM 8:18  
SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE

117901

R 290209Z JAN 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T STATE 016992

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: VIEWS OF PANAYOTAKOS:

1. LIKE ADDRESSEES, DEPARTMENT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT HARD-NOSED AND SIMPLISTIC VIEWS OF CYPRUS PROBLEM EXPOUNDED BY EX/GREEK AMBASSADOR (NOW FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNDER SECRETARY) PANAYOTAKOS. AFTER RECEIVING NICOSIA 136 WHICH REPORTED ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF PANAYOTAKOS' PREFERENCE FOR FORCIBLY IMPOSED PARTITION IF COMMUNAL TALKS NOT SUCCESSFUL BY JUNE 1972, DEPARTMENT DECIDED TO PASS WORD TO GOC THAT US COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO THIS LINE OF THINKING.

2. ACCORDINGLY, CYPURS COUNTRY DIRECTOR BOYATT CALLED IN GREEK COUNSELOR GREGORIADES JANUARY 26 TO DISCUSS SITUATION. BOYATT MADE IT CLEAR HE IN NO WAY MAKING OFFICIAL DEMARCHE. HOWEVER, ON INFORMAL AND PERSONAL BASIS HE WISHED TO SHARE FRANKLY WITH GREGORIADES US CONCERN THAT NEW GREEK FOREIGN AFFAIRS UNDER SECRETARY TAKING LINE ON CYPRUS OPPOSITE TO USG POLICY AND CONTRARY TO STATED GOG POLICY AS WELL. BOYATT TOLD GREGORIADES THAT PANAYOTAKOS HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SUPPORTED "SOLUTION/ TO CYPRUS PROBLEM BASED ON FORCIBLY IMPOSED

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 016992

PARTITION GIVING 20 PERCENT OF ISLAND'S TERRITORY TO TURK CYPRIOTS. PANAYOTAKOS HAD EXPRESSED PERSONAL BELIEF THAT NEITHER UNSC NOR SOVIETS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO REACT EFFECTIVELY.

3. BOYATT EMPHASIZED TO GREGORIADES THAT USG CONTINUED TO SUPPORT POLICY BASED ON PROPOSITION THAT ONLY REAL SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM WAS THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY AND AGREEABLE TO THE PARTIES. THESE CONCEPTS WERE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S AND ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS' JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF OCTOBER 1970 AND THIS WAS STILL VERY MUCH USG POLICY. IN ADDITION TO OTHER REASONS, USG AGAINST IMPOSED SOLUTION BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO PANAYOTAKOS' VIEW, USG BELIEVES ANARCHY WOULD RESULT AND SOVIETS AND UNSC WOULD BE IN POSITION INTERVENE TO DETRIMENT OF BEST INTERESTS OF EVERYBODY.

4. GREGORIADES APPEARED GENUINELY SURPRISED THAT GREEK DIPLOMAT WOULD EVEN MENTION PARTITION MUCH LESS SUPPORT TERRITORIAL DIVISION OF CYPRUS. WHILE EXPRESSING HIMSELF IN CAREFUL AND CAUTIOUS MANNER, GREGORIADES DID STATE THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW GOG POLICY CONTINUED TO BE ONE OF SUPPORT FOR NEGOTIATED SOLUTION PEACEFULLY ARRIVED AT BY PARTIES THEMSELVES. BOYATT RESPONDED HE WAS SURE THIS WAS CASE AND THAT GOG POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED.

5. COMMENT: BOYATT/GREGORIADES MEETING WAS ARRANGED BEFORE DEPARTMENT RECEIVED ATHENS 444. OUR HOPE IS THAT US POSITION WILL BE PLAYED BACK THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANNELS, THUS REINFORCING AMBASSADOR TASCIA'S EXCELLENT REPRESENTATIONS TO PRIMIN PAPADOPOULOS ON THIS SUBJECT (PARA 5, ATHENS 444). ON CYPRUS PANAYOTAKOS' FULMINATIONS WERE UNHELPFUL. IN HIS NEW POSITION HIS VIEWS ARE EVEN MORE DANGEROUS.

GP-3. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Handwritten notes and stamps: "2/17/71", "11/11/71", "592/03/196", and a large "SECRET" stamp.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 354

PAGE 01 STATE 004070

91  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66638  
DRAFTED BY: NEA R A LONG  
APPROVED BY: NEA RODGER P DAVIES  
NEA/CYP T D BOYATT  
ARA/CCA MR. LANDBERG (DRAFT)  
S/S-O SEAN HOLLY

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

JAN 8 AM 9:12

092416

R 080200Z JAN 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 004070

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: GOC'S CONTINUING CHAGRIN OVER UNGA CHIREP VOTE

REF: NICOSIA 029

1. BELIEVE YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED POSSIBLY SIGNIFICANT OPENING WHICH CAN BE USED TO FURTHER USG POLICY GOALS. TWO AREAS TO PUSH WHICH YOU HAVE SUGGESTED (CUBAN TRADE AND INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS) STRIKE US AS MOST USEFUL TO PURSUE. WOULD SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR ORDER OF IMPORTANCE BE REVERSED, WITH TALKS TAKING PRECEDENCE.
2. REVIVED TALKS EXTEND NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND COULD RESULT IN PROGRESS ON POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND/OR NORMALIZATION/ DECONFRONTATION. IT ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, THAT ATMOSPHERE BE IMPROVED AT THIS JUNCTURE IF PARTIES ARE TO APPROACH TALKS IN CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. OBVIOUSLY, MAKARIOS CAN DO GREAT DEAL TO EITHER IMPROVE OR POISON THIS ATMOSPHERE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 004070

3. VENIAMIN SHOULD BE INFORMED OF USG VIEW THAT CYPRIOT-AMERICAN RELATIONS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY GOC EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE WHAT WE FIRMLY BELIEVE TO BE IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS-- PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ON CYPRUS. GOC COULD MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THIS REGARD BY TAKING STEPS TO CONVINCe TURK CYPRIOTS GOC APPROACHING RESUMED TALKS WITH FIRM INTENTION REACH VIABLE SOLUTION. FOR EXAMPLE, POSITIVE INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO MOVE FORWARD ON REFUGEE RE-SETTLEMENT OR OTHER NORMALIZATION/DECONFRONTATION MEASURES WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL. IF GOC CAN AMELIORATE TURK CYPRIOT DISTRUST AT THIS STAGE. WE FEEL CHANCES FOR SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ALL WILL BE MATERIALLY IMPROVED.

4. QUESTION OF CUBAN SHIPPING SHOULD ALSO BE BROUGHT UP WITH VENIAMIN. HE SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT ACTION BY GOC TO REDUCE PRESENT LARGE FLEET OF CYPRIOT FLAG VESSELS ENGAGED IN CUBAN TRADE WOULD ALSO BE CONCRETE WAY FOR GOC TO DEMONSTRATE ITS DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USG.  
GP-3. IRWIN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

592/03/197

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 720

PAGE 01 STATE 206107

83

ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66636

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP: TWDAVIS

APPROVED BY: NEA: CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN

PM/ISO: MR. STODDART (SUBS)

S/S: MR. BREWSTER

INR/DDC/RPS: MR. CURL (SUBS)

COMNAVSECGRU: CDR. JACKSON (SUBS)

101853

R 182233Z DEC 70

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

SECRET STATE 206107

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MEDITERRANEAN: READINESS: PLANNING

REF: NICOSIA 2161


1. RE PARA 3 REFTEL EMBASSY CORRECT IN REFERRING ALL SUCH MATTERS TO DEPT TO ENSURE REQUIRED INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND DEPT'S APPROVAL.

2. DEPT HAS BEEN INFORMED APPROACH TO AMBASSADOR WENT BEYOND THAT INTENDED. NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED AT THIS TIME.  
GP-1. ROGERS

70 DEC 19 8:23 AM  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET  
45

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

wk

SECRET 201

PAGE 01 STATE 147911

82  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66634  
DRAFTED BY: NEA CYP TDBOYATT  
APPROVED BY: NEA JSISCO  
NEA TUR PUGH  
S S MILLER  
NEA GRK CHURCHILL

71 AUG 13 10:25  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

..... 047135

R 122229Z AUG 71  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NY  
USMISSION NATO

SECRET STATE 147911

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: NEXT STEPS

1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE ISLAND HAVE CREATED NEW AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. LOCAL TALKS ARE VIRTUALLY DEADLOCKED OVER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE OF AUTONOMY FOR TURK CYPRIOTS AND INTRODUCTION BY TURK CYPRIOTS OF ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES CREATES NEW SET OF PROBLEMS.

2. DEPARTMENT IS REVIEWING POLICY OPTIONS WHICH MIGHT PERMIT USG TO CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORTS TO KEEP CYPRUS SITUATION IN NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION CONTEXT. IN BROAD TERMS WE ARE INVESTIGATING SOME FORM OF MEDIATION AS MOST LIKELY VEHICLE TO KEEP INTERESTED PARTIES TALKING. QUESTIONS CONCERNING TYPE OF MEDIATION AND FRAMEWORK IN WHICH IT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT, SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS WE WOULD HOPE TO ACHIEVE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 147911

AND PRECISE ROLES OF USG BEING EXPLORED IN DETAIL. AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE ADDRESSEES' VIEWS ON THESE PROBLEMS. ROGERS

EXDIS  
STATE 147911

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
20520

NEW YORK CHURCHILL  
W W WIPPER  
NEW YORK ROOM  
FORWARDED BY NEW YORK  
TELETYPE UNIT NEW YORK  
05234

1960 OCT 01 10 55 AM

ORIGIN 25458

STATE 147911

SECRET

25-10-1960  
13 000 17  
TELETYPE UNIT  
WHITE HOUSE

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

*C. W. B. ed*  
**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 944

PAGE 01 STATE 187017

17  
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 NSC-10 ARA-12 CIAE-00 INR-08 NSAE-00  
RSC-01 RSR-01 /068 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP: K.H.TORP  
APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/CYP: MR. DAVIS (SUBS)  
S/S: MR. CURRAN  
66650

----- 007760

R 140135Z NOV 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 187017

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON MAKARIOS CALL ON PRESIDENT  
REFERENCE: NICOSIA 2001

THERE ARE NO ISSUES OTHER THAN CUBAN SHIPPING PROBLEM WHICH YOU SHOULD SPECIFICALLY RAISE DURING YOUR UP-COMING CALL ON MAKARIOS.

GP-3. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL  
3



Department of State

*Procc*  
**TELEGRAM**  
*Ed*

CONFIDENTIAL 839

PAGE 01 STATE 185358

18  
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08  
L-04 NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12  
AID-28 /143 R

66662  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/TUR: GOGDEN  
NEA/CYP: TWDAVIES  
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/TUR: MR. CASH

----- 118644

R 110323Z NOV 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION NATO  
EUCOM  
USDOCOSOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 185358

SUBJ: CYPRUS: GOT ANXIETY OVER MAKARIOS VISIT

1. IN FOURTH DEMARCHE DURING PAST TEN DAYS TURKISH DCM TEZELI CALLED ON DEPT ASST SEC DAVIES NOV 9 TO EXPRESS ANKARA'S CONCERN OVER MAKARIOS' NEW YORK COMMENT TO SEC ROGERS CONCERNING GOC PREFERENCE FOR ENOSIS.

2. SPECIFIC COMMENT HAD BEEN QTE WE WOULD LIKE ENOSIS BUT WEI RECOGNIZE TURKEY WILL NOT ACCEPT SO WEI HAVE SET THIS ASIDE UNQTE (USUN 3123). INTERPRETING STATEMENT AS ULTIMATE GOC INTENTION, RATHER THAN OFT EXPRESSED THEMEI TO WHICH GREEK CYPRIOTS PAY HOMAGE, GOT WISHED MAKE CLEAR THAT IS OWN OBJECTIVE MUST BE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT FUTURE ENOSIS.

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 185358

3. IN RESPONSE TO COMMENT THAT GOC HAS ABANDONED ENOSIS AS UNREALISTIC GOAL, TEZEL STATED THAT TO CONTRARY IN GOT'S VIEW GREEK CYPRIOTS WILL NEVER ABANDON DREAM OF ENOSIS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS DISTURBING INDICATORS TO SUPPORT TURKISH SUSPICIONS: APPOINTMENT OF PETRIDES AS MIN EDUCATION, GOC CHARGES OF TURK SEPARATIST TENDENCIES, AND CURRENT PROPAGANDA ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

4. TURNING TO MAKARIOS STATEMENT TO AKROPOLIS SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT TEZEL ASKED WHAT MAKARIOS HAD MEANT IN SAYING PRESIDENT NIXON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CYPRUS' INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. DAVIES EXPLAINED THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD BE READ ONLY AS AN EXPRESSION OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.

5. AT END OF CONVERSATION WE VOLUNTEERED THAT PRESIDENTIAL MEETING HAD BEEN INITIATED BY MAKARIOS; THAT WE CONSIDERED IT USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH RAPPORT BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND PRESIDENT; THAT NO RPT NO NEW INITIATIVES OR PROPOSALS FROM EITHER SIDE HAD TAKEN PLACE; AND THAT WE CONTINUE BELIEVE THAT CURRENT TALKS BETWEEN TWO COMMUNITIES OFFER BEST HOPE FOR SOLUTION.


GP-3. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

59/03/005

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 962

PAGE 01 STATE 170530

82  
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /046 R

66633  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP: TWDAVIS  
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES  
S/UN-MR. BROWN  
S/S-MR. BREWSTER  
WHITE HOUSE - MR. WRIGHT  
NEA/TUR-MR. PUGH

70 OCT 16 AM 8:20  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

085674

O R 152347Z OCT 70 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION USUN NY  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 170530

EXDIS

HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AT 25TH UNGA

USUN FOR SISCO

REF: A) STATE 169861 (NOTAL)  
B) NICOSIA 1856

DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR AT OPENING OF BUSINESS: 10/16/70

1. CYPRUS EMB HAS INFORMED DEPT PRES MAKARIOS ACCEPTS  
OCT 25 AT 10 A.M. FOR PRESIDENTIAL MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE.  
FYI THIS MEANS ARCHBISHOP WILL REMAIN WASHINGTON FOLLOWING  
OCT 24 DINNER PARTY FOR MEETING FOLLOWING MORNING. END FYI.

2. RE REF B, THERE NO OBJECTION SHOULD ARCHBISHOP ACKNOWLEDGE  
TO PRESS THAT WHILE IN US HE WILL HAVE MEETING WITH PRES  
NIXON.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 170530

3. ANKARA MAY INFORM GOT MEETING WAS REQUESTED BY MAKARIOS,  
AND BEING HELD IN CONJUNCTION SIMILAR BRIEF APPOINTMENTS WITH  
OTHER VISITING CHIEFS OF STATE.

GP-3 IRWIN

FROM: ANKARA

INFO:

TO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO:

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO: WASHINGTON

INFO:

INFO: WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

52/03/00



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 876

PAGE 01 STATE 169307

81  
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66634  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP:TWDAVIS  
APPROVED BY: NEA -RIDGE P. DAVIES  
S S - MR. CURRAN

WASH DC HOUSE  
STATION ROOM

OCT 15 AM 8:29

R 142025Z OCT 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

076778

SECRET STATE 169307

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM DAVIS


REF: NICOSIA 1826

1. WE KNOW YOU PLAN TAKE OCCASION OF EUROPEAN VISIT TO US MILITARY HEADQUARTERS TO EMPHASIZE NEED FOR LOW US POLITICAL MILITARY PROFILE IN CYPRUS, AND TO CAUTION AGAINST THINKING IN TERMS OF US USE OF SBA'S FOR OTHER THAN MOST CRITICAL SITUATIONS.

2. FYI WE WERE ASKED DURING PAST WEEK TO APPROVE US PARTICIPATION IN JOINT MILITARY EXERCISE AT SBA'S. IN OPPOSITION US PARTICIPATION WE STRESSED THAT US USE OF SBA'S GIVES CREDENCE TO LOCAL AND REGIONAL COMMUNISTS AND RADICAL ARAB PROPAGANDA WHICH ALLEGES NATO OR US PLANS FOR USE OF BASES FOR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST ARABS OR FOR NATIONILIZATION OF CYPRUS. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT OUR PARAMOUNT POLICY TO REMOVE CYPRUS AS THREAT TO GRECO-TURKISH SOLIDARITY ON ANTO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK, EMPAHSIZING THAT TO EXTENT WE EXPOSE OURSELVES TO HOSTILE PROPAGANDA ON CYPRUS AND INDEBT OURSELVES TO MAKARIOS WE LIMIT OUR CHANCES OF ACHIEVING THAT GOAL. END FYI. GP-3: ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

14-2A 8

O 060920Z MAY 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 186  
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 792  
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 116  
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8488  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 806

1 4 1 2 Q  
06 MAY 74 209 47

NODIS CHEROKEE

REF: SECTO 194 (AMMAN 2619)

1. MAKARIOS WELCOMES SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO CYPRUS, EXTENDS INVITATION TO LUNCH OR DINNER. (I PROMISED TO RELAY, BUT PLEADED EXTREME TIGHTNESS OF TIME.) HE EXTENDED INVITATION FOR COURTESY CALL BY SECRETARY.
2. SUGGEST I BE GIVEN PROPOSED TIME FOR COURTESY CALL, PLUS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS NICOSIA 801. IF DECISION MADE TO USE HILTON OR LEDRA PALACE, NEED MAXIMUM LEAD TIME TO SEE THAT SPACE CAN BE CLEARED, AND WOULD HOPE TO SPEAK TO MANAGER BEFORE NEWS RELEASE.
3. SECTO 206 JUST RECEIVED. SEEKING MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR. NOTE THAT MAKARIOS DID NOT VOLUNTEER USE OF PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ALTHOUGH I TOLD HIM IN RESPONSE HIS INQUIRE THAT SITE NOT FIXED. GRANT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET



Department of State

WJH  
file  
**TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

6

O 141600Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5687  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 327

3523Q  
FEB. 14, 1972  
12:10 PM

NODIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- COMMENTS ON ELEMENTS OF A PACKAGE DEAL

REF: STATE 25339, ATHENS 800

1. SUMMARY: ATHENS FORMULATION OF PACKAGE PROPOSAL SEEMS TO US TOO ONE-SIDED. IT MAY BE IMPOSED BUT NOT NEGOTIATED. MODIFICATIONS SUGGESTED.

2. THE PROBLEM WITH ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE GOG-GOC DEAL, AS I READ ATHENS' EXCELLENT 800, IS THAT IT RESEMBLES LESS A DEAL THAN A SETTLEMENT IMPOSED ON MAKARIOS BY GREECE. LOOKING AT IT FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, MAKARIOS GIVES UP CZECH ARMS, HIS HERETOFORE UNCHALLENGED CONTROL OF CYPRUS GOVT, HIS RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT KIND OF AN INTERCOMMUNAL SOLUTION THERE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE AND WHATEVER AUTHORITY HE HAS TO SAFEGUARD HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS A NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERED BY MAINLAND GREEKS OF DOUBTFUL LOYALTY TO HIM. IN RETURN, GREECE CALLS OFF THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY OF GEN. GRIVAS AND HIS FOLLOWERS -- WHICH IT SHOULD NEVER HAVE STARTED -- AND ALLOWS MAKARIOS TO REMAIN AS PRESIDENT BUT WITHOUT PREEMINENT AUTHORITY. IF MAKARIOS ACCEPTED THIS BARGAIN HE COULD BE TOPPLED THE REST OF THE WAY BY THE GREEKS WHENEVER THEY WISHED.

3. PARA 4D (2) OF ATHENS 800 MAKES THE RATIONALE FOR THIS QUITE CLEAR. GREEKS FEEL STRONGLY; THEY ARE MORE POWERFUL; THEIR VIEWS SEEM CLOSER TO THOSE OF TURKS -- SO GREEKS SHOULD PREVAIL. MAKARIOS CAN PERHAPS BE EXCUSED FOR SEEING THE PICTURE IN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT LIGHT. TO HIM IT MUST LOOK LIKE GROSS INTERVENTION BY A LARGER POWER IN THE AFFAIRS OF A SMALL ONE. GIVEN HIS NATURE, HE WILL NOT AGREE UNLESS HE FEELS HE IS IN A MOST DESPERATE POSITION, AND VERY POSSIBLY NOT EVEN THEN.

4. GREEKS CAN DOUBTLESS IMPOSE THEIR DEMANDS BY FORCE IF THEY WISH. BUT IN MY JUDGMENT A REALISTIC PACKAGE WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY BE SOLD THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WOULD FOLLOW

**SECRET**

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- SECRET NICOSIA 327

GENERAL LINES OF ONE WE SUGGESTED IN NICOSIA 311. FIRST POINT OF ATHENS PACKAGE -- FREEZING OF CZECH ARMS WHILE GREEKS AND GRIVAS STAY THEIR HANDS -- WOULD BE LOGICAL STARTING POINT. FOLLOWING ON FROM THAT, NICOSIA PACKAGE WOULD BRING ABOUT SOMETHING LIKE WHAT ATHENS 800 DESCRIBES IN PARA 4D (1) AS PROBABLY ACCEPTABLE "LESS THAN MAXIMUM OBJECTIVE" SOLUTION.

5. WE NOTE THAT ATHENS TEL GOES FARTHER THAN GREEKS DO IN THEIR DEMAND FOR GOVT OF NATIONAL UNITY. IT SPELLS OUT, PARA 4 D 2 (B), HOW MAKARIOS WOULD BE CHECKED BY SUCH A GOVT. UNDER PRESENT CONSTITUTION GREEKS WOULD HAVE TO CONTROL AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO DO THIS. WE PROPOSED CHANGING TWO OR THREE MINISTERS; THIS IS WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD GREEKS WERE AFTER.

6. MOREOVER, ATHENS FORMULATION, IN PARA 4 D 2(C) IN EFFECT SAYS THAT MAKARIOS WILL BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSAL TURKISH SIDE MIGHT ACCEPT. WE ARE ALL FOR A COMPROMISE CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION, BUT MUST POINT OUT THAT AS FAR AS WE KNOW IT CANNOT BE ASSUMED GREEKS AND TURKS CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON ONE. THAT IS WHY WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MODUS VIVENDI FALLBACK WE SUGGEST IN PARA 16 NICOSIA 311 KEPT IN THE PICTURE.

POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

NODIS-S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

3 3 5 2 Q

13 FEBRUARY 7 47 AM

O 131147Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5674.  
BT  
S E C R E T NICOSIA 313

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
FEB 13 PM 4:14

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM POPPER

REF: ATHENS 793

1. I AM GLAD HENRY TASCA INVITED NICOSIA COMMENT ON ATHENS 793, SUBSTANCE OF WHICH HE AND I DISCUSSED WHEN I PASSED THROUGH ATHENS YESTERDAY FEB, 12.
2. ALL OF US AGREE ON IMPORTANCE OF STRONG NATO SOUTHERN FLANK AND OF GREEK-TURKISH COOPERATION AS REGARDS CYPRUS AND OTHER POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE ISSUES. WE WOULD AGREE, TOO, THAT A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD BOLSTER US POSITION IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AGAINST SOVIETS AND GENERALLY.
3. I THINK HENRY OVER SIMPLIFIES THE PICTURE WHEN HE SUGGESTS THAT BECAUSE MAKARIOS IS INTRANSIGENT AND THUS STANDS IN THE WAY OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT, HE SHOULD BE BRUSHED ASIDE. IF WE LOOK AT THE MATTER SOLELY IN THIS WAY, WE ARE TAKING A VERY BIG GAMBLE. WE ARE WRITING OFF THE POSSIBILITY THAT MAKARIOS MAY DIG IN AND RESIST; THAT A CIVIL WAR MAY BE STARTED AMONG THE GREEKS OF CYPRUS; THAT IT MAY VERY WELL SPILL OVER TO INVOLVE TURKS; AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL MOVE IN.
4. MOSCOW RADIO (FBIS KYRENIS OF M122012) IS ALREADY SETTING THE STAGE FOR POSSIBLE ACTION. IT IS SAYING THAT THE STRINGS OF THE PLOT AGAINST THE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF MAKARIOS ORIGINATE IN THE US AND NATO AND PASS THROUGH ATHENS. GOG ACTIVITY IS DESCRIBED AS INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AN INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE UN IN ORDER TO REPLACE MAKARIOS WITH A CYPRUS GOVT OBEIDENT TO HIS AND NATO, WITH THE ISLAND TO BECOME A US AND NATO BASE. THE USSR CONTINUES TO OPPOSE SUCH MOVES ON PRINCIPLE.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- NICOSIA 313

5. WHILE DISTORTED THOUGH ALL THIS IS, IT POINTS UP THE BASIC QUESTION WE NEED TO FACE. IT IS PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE TO LOOK AT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN BALANCE OF POWER TERMS, BUT WE HAD BETTER BE SURE WE HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH THE RISKS OF A GREEK POWER PLAY DIRECTED AGAINST MAKARIOS. IF MAKARIOS DIGS IN AND THE GREEKS ROLL OVER HIM, IS IT OUR ESTIMATE THAT THE USSR WILL SIMPLY RANT PUBLICLY AND GRUMBLE PRIVATELY AND LET ANOTHER NATO FOOTHOLD BE ESTABLISHED IN AN AREA IT NOW CLAIMS IS WITHIN ITS SECURITY ZONE? WILL THIS BE HELPFUL IN THE TALKS THE PRESIDENT WILL BE HAVING IN MOSCOW IN MAY? CAN WE JUST WRITE OFF THE UN REACTION, AND ITS EXPLOITATION BY THE COMMUNISTS, SO SOON AFTER WE WENT TO BAT IN THE UN FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN?

6. WHAT I AM SUGGESTING IS THAT THERE ARE MORE FACETS TO THE PROBLEM THAN REFTEL INDICATES. THERE ARE ENOUGH DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN SIMPLY RATIFYING THE GREEK PLAN OF ACTION AS IT UNFOLDS (EXCEPT FOR AMB PANAYOTACOS HERE, THEY APPARENTLY DID NOT EVEN HINT AT IT TO US) FOR US TO BE JUSTIFIED IN AT LEAST TRYING TO HOLD THE GREEK GOVT DOWN A BIT. THERE IS STILL A GOOD CHANCE TO WORK THIS PROBLEM OUT BY DIPLOMACY, AND I THINK WE CAN PLAY A PART. THIS ENTAILS RISKS FOR US, TOO, BUT I HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES OF THE EQUATION WILL BE FULLY WEIGHED IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

7. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED. GP-3.

POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

N  
O  
N  
S  
I  
S  
S  
I  
O  
N  
S



Department of State

9  
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

R 011530Z DEC 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6791  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 2181

0 1 7 6 Q  
01 DEC 72 Z16 09

NODIS

SUBJECT: GENERAL GRIVAS

REF: ROME 7306, RPTD AS STATE 217750

1. FOLLOWING COMMENT FROM CYPRUS VANTAGE POINT ON KING CONSTANTINE'S REMARKS RE GEN, GRIVAS MAY BE HELPFUL IN ASSESSING INFO CONTAINED REFTEL.
2. WE BELIEVE GRIVAS IS AS WELL PREPARED AS HE IS EVER LIKELY TO BE. WHILE HIS POLITICAL FRONT IS SHRILL, POORLY ORGANIZED AND UNIMPRESSIVE, HIS CLANDESTINE MILITARY FORCE OF SOME HUNDREDS OF ARMED CONSPIRATORS IS NOW TRAINED, EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED FOR ACTION ON SHORT NOTICE. AT LEAST THAT IS WHAT HIGH GOVT OFFICIALS TELL US IN THEIR MORE NERVOUS MOMENTS, AND OTHER EVIDENCE CORROBORATES IT.
3. WE ESTIMATE GRIVAS FORCES COULD CARRY OUT ISOLATED ACTS OF VIOLENCE SUCH AS ATTEMPTS ON LIVES OF GOVT LEADERS, SEIZURE OF POLICE STATIONS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, UTILITIES, AND AIRPORT; BUT CRITICAL FACTOR FOR SUCCESS OF ANY COUP WOULD BE POSTURE OF MAINLAND GREEK-OFFICERED NATIONAL GUARD AND OF LARGE CYPRUS POLICE FORCE. THIS REMAINS SOMETHING OF AN ENIGMA, BUT WE TEND TO BELIEVE REPORTS THAT AS LONG AS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE PROCEEDING WITH PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS, GREEK GOVT AND NATIONAL GUARD WILL KEEP GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL.
4. CONTRARY TO WHAT KING SAID, MAKARIOS AND GRIVAS HAVE HAD ONLY ONE MEETING, ON MARCH 26, AS FAR AS WE KNOW. IT PRODUCED NO AGREEMENT.
5. KING APPARENTLY SAW FONOFF DEPDIRGEN PELAGHIAS WHILE IN LONDON. IF PELAGHIAS SAID CYPRUS GOVT COULD NOT MOVE AGAINST GRIVAS BECAUSE OF HIS "FOREIGN" (EVIDENTLY GREEK) SUPPORT, HE WAS TAKING A LINE IN SHARP CONTRAST WITH MAKARIOS. LATTER TELLS US HE COULD MOVE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST GRIVAS IF HE WISHED, BUT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

NODIS-1 NODIS-1 NODIS-1



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- NICOSIA 2181, DEC 1, NODIS

STATES HE IS HOLDING HIS HAND IN ORDER NOT TO PROVOKE GRIVAS INTO MILITARY RESPONSE WHICH COULD UPSET TRANQUILLITY, DIVIDE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY, DESTROY PROSPECT OF INTERCOMMUNAL AGREEMENT, AND PERHAPS ULTIMATELY RESULT IN PARTITION OF ISLAND.

6. VERY DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE WHEN GRIVAS MIGHT MAKE HIS MOVE. ON THE ONE HAND, HE CANNOT SIT STILL INDEFINITELY. ON OTHER, HE DOES NOT PRESENTLY SEEM TO HAVE CLEAR GREEK GOVT SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR HIS PROPOSES. HIS PUBLICITY ORGANS HAVE COME OUT AGAINST HOLDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION SCHEDULED FOR NEXT FEBRUARY, ON GROUND THIS WOULD CONFIRM MAKARIOS -- WHOM THEY REGARD AS TRAITOR TO HELLENISM -- IN OFFICE FOR FIVE MORE YEARS. YET THEY ARE UNABLE TO PRESENT A CANDIDATE WHO WOULD MAKE AN IMPRESSIVE SHOWING AGAINST MAKARIOS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE CAN SEE KING'S POINT THAT GRIVAS MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO STRIKE AGAINST MAKARIOS BEFORE ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE. SHOULD HE DO SO, WE THINK IT WOULD BE A DESPERATE OPERATION, WITH GREEK GOVT REACTION THROUGH NATIONAL GUARD AND CYPRUS POLICE THE CRUCIAL FACTOR.

7. FROM OUR INFO WE ARE UNABLE TO JUDGE EXTENT TO WHICH CONSTANTINE OR MONARCHIST ELEMENTS ARE INVOLVED IN GRIVAS MOVEMENT.

8. DEPT MAY WISH PASS THIS CABLE TO ATHENS AND ROME.  
XGDS-1 DECLAS. POPPER

POPPER

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

NODIS  
-  
S  
-  
NODIS  
-  
S  
-  
NODIS  
-  
S



Department of State

WH  
**TELEGRAM**

SECRET

R 071235Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5824  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 545

CONTROL: 1684 Q  
REGD: 7 MAR 13 31Z

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, MOSCOW

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: IMPORTANCE OF GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH IN  
POLITICAL MATTERS AFFECTING U.S. INTERESTS.

REF: ATHENS 1262, REPEATED AS STATE 38010

1. WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR COMPETENCE AND CERTAINLY NO DESIRE TO COMMENT ON MAJOR ISSUE PRESENTED IN DISCUSSION BETWEEN EMBASSIES ATHENS AND ANKARA OVER FUTURE OF ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHY. HOWEVER, STATEMENT IN REFTEL THAT "THE GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH" HAS BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED IN STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAKARIOS AND GREEK GOVT MAY BE OPEN TO MISCONCEPTION.

2. STUDENTS OF CYPRUS WILL RECALL THAT EVER SINCE COUNCIL OF EPHEBUS IN 431 ORTHODOX CHURCH OF CYPRUS HAS BEEN AUTO-CEPHALOUS, THAT IS, INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED, INTER ALIA WITH ABILITY TO SELECT ITS OWN ARCHBISHOP. THUS CALL BY HOLY SYNOD OF CYPRUS FOR MAKARIOS' RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT, CITED REFTEL, IS NOT ACT OF GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH BUT PURELY INTERNAL ACTION. EVEN IF SYNOD SHOULD STRIP MAKARIOS OF HIS ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITY AND HE SHOULD APPEAL TO OVERALL EXTRANORDINARY SYNOD, PATRIARCHS FROM SEVERAL OTHER CHURCHES AS WELL AS GREEK WOULD PARTICIPATE IN EXTRAORDINARY SYNOD (NICOSIA 503). CONCEPT OF AUTOCEPHALY OF CYPRIOT CHURCH HAS BEEN FIERCELY CONTESTED AND FIERCELY DEFENDED THROUGH CENTURIES, BUT ALWAYS MAINTAINED HERE.

3. IT FOLLOWS THAT WHATEVER USG MAY DO WITH RESPECT TO ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHY WILL HAVE VERY LITTLE INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL OR EVEN RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS.

4. INCIDENTALLY, IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING THAT WITH EXCEP-

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

-2- S E C R E T NICOSIA 545, NODIS, MAR 7

TION OF THE THREE BISHOPS AND ONE OF CYPRUS ABBOTTS,  
PRINCIPAL CHURCH FIGURES IN CYPRUS HAVE MADE CLEAR THEIR  
SUPPORT FOR MAKARIOS.

POPPER

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED ATHENS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL AND MOSCOW BY OC/T - MAR 7

**SECRET**

**NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM 9

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
MAR 3 AM 10:36  
WIF

R 031125Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5804  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 512

CN-720Q  
3 Mar 72  
1152Z

NODIS

NOFORN

REF: STATE 35955

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: RETURN OF COL. PAPADOSTOULOU.

1. CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE CONFIRMS THAT IRISH  
CONTINGENT OFFICERS HAD CONTACTS WITH COL. PAPAPOSTOULOU  
FEB. 22 AND 25. NO CONTACT SINCE.

2. DEPT PLEASE PASS AMEMBASSIES ANKARA AND ATHENS.

POPPER

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED ANKARA AND ATHENS BY OC/T.

NNNN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODDISNODDISNODDIS



Department of State

Wit  
10  
**TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

WHITEHOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

2 MAR 7 9:31

R 011115Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5783  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 433

4 9 Q

1 MARCH 7 13 AM

NODIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - RETURN OF COLONEL PAPAPOSTOULOU

1. CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE ADVISES THAT HELLENIC ARMY COLONEL PAPAPOSTOULOU HAS BEEN SEEN IN CYPRUS BY TWO IRISH CONTINGENT OFFICERS WHO KNEW HIM DURING HIS 1969-1970 ASSIGNMENT HERE AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF CYPRUS NATIONAL GUARD RAIDING FORCES WITH SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF PRESIDENT MAKARIOS.
2. IN CONVERSATION WITH IRISH OFFICERS, PAPAPOSTOULOU, IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES, DID NOT EXPLAIN REASONS FOR HIS RETURN TO CYPRUS BUT SPOKE OF GOG'S INSISTENCE THAT MAKARIOS GIVE UP PRESIDENCY.
3. COMMENT: IF MAKARIOS IS AWARE OF PAPAPOSTOULOU'S RETURN TO CYPRUS, IT WILL NOT CAUSE HIM TO SLEEP MORE SOUNDLY. HE REGARDS PAPAPOSTOULOU AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR WORKING OUT WITH GEORKADJIS THE DETAILS OF MARCH 1970 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT.
4. OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT PAPAPOSTOULOU "RESIGNED" FROM HELLENIC ARMY SOME TIME AGO AND WENT TO WORK AS DEPUTY TO GOG DIRECTOR OF ATHLETICS, ASLANIDES, WHO HIMSELF SEEMS TO HAVE FIGURED IN GREEK MACHINATIONS IN CYPRUS.
5. DEPT MAY WISH PASS ATHENS AND ANKARA. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY COMMENTS FORMER MAY HAVE RE PAPAPOSTOULOU'S RECENT WHEREABOUTS AND ACTIVITIES. GP-3.

POPPER

**SECRET**

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S



Department of State  
**SECRET**

**TELEGRAM**

O 131005Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5673  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 312

72 FEB 13 PM 4:15  
HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
GN-3351  
13 Feb 72  
1107Z

NODIS

REF: STATE 25316

1. I SEE ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS AHEAD IF WE SEEM TO BE AVOIDING THE KIND OF CONTACT WITH MAKARIOS WHICH WOULD BE NORMAL IN A TENSE SITUATION.
2. NKI 588 INDICATES MAKARIOS IS HOPING USG CAN BE HELPFUL. STAYING IN TOUCH WITH HIM AS WITH OTHER KEY PLAYERS NEED NOT MOVE US INTO A GOOD OFFICES ROLE UNLESS OR UNTIL DEPT WISHES. BUT FACT THAT I BROKE OFF LEAVE TO RETURN TO CYPRUS BECAUSE OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IS WIDELY KNOWN. I AM SURE MAKARIOS WILL BE EXPECTING ME TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT TO INFORM MYSELF OF HIS VIEWS. FOR TODAY THERE WILL BE UNDERSTANDING OF FACT THAT IT IS A SUNDAY AND I WILL HAVE REQUIRED SOME TIME TO READ MYSELF INTO SITUATION. IF, HOWEVER, I WERE TO LET TOMORROW, FEB 14, PASS WITHOUT PUTTING IN FOR AN APPOINTMENT, MAKARIOS WOULD -- CORRECTLY -- BEGIN TO READ POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE INTO MY UNCONCERN.
3. IF I DO NOT TAKE INITIATIVE IN SEEING MAKARIOS, I WOULD EXPECT HIM VERY SHORTLY TO SIGNAL INDIRECTLY THAT HE WISHES TO SEE ME. IF I THEN CALL ON HIM AND CLEARLY PUT HIM OFF EVEN IN MINIMAL TERMS OF FRIENDLY CONCERN, MAKARIOS WILL SURELY CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE GIVEN GREECE A GREEN LIGHT TO INTERVENE IN CYPRUS. (THIS COULD, OF COURSE, HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES ON OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH GOCJA SUCH AS RETENTION OF COMMUNICATIONS FACILITES, ETC. IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, HE WOULD BE PRESENTED WITH A SHARP DILEMMA: EITHER TO CAPITULATE TO GREEK DEMANDS -- WHICH IS NOT NORMALLY IN HIS NATURE -- OR TO FIGHT BACK WITH ALL THE MEANS AT HIS DISPOSAL INCLUDING ENGAGEMENT OF SOVIETS.
4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I STRONGLY RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED, ON FEB 14, TO PUT IN FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH MAKARIOS. PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE ONLY TO SEEK HIS VIEWS ON PRESENT SITUATION, WHILE AVOIDING ANY SUGGESTION AS ANY TYPE OF USG ACTION AT THIS TIME. I BELIEVE THIS WILL MINIMIZE OUR RISKS AND KEEP OPTIONS OPEN.

5. DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED. GP-3. POPPER

**NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**

**SECRET**

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S



Department of State

W 7A  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

9

R 031045Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5615  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 226

0776Q  
FEB 3, 1972 - 11:13AM

NODIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: HOW TO HANDLE PARTITION PROPOSALS

REF: (A) STATE 16992, (B) 14493, (C) NICOSIA 929, JUNE 7, 1971  
(D) NICOSIA 826, MAY 21, 1971

1. SUMMARY: WHILE APPROVING USG OPPOSITION TO A PARTITION SOLUTION FOR CYPRUS, EVEN IF IMPOSED BY GREECE AND TURKEY WORKING TOGETHER, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ONLY HALF A POLICY. WE SUGGEST PLANNING EXERCISE TO WORK OUT AN ALTERNATIVE TO UNENDING CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK, PREFERABLY ONE STARTING FROM PRESENT DE FACTO SITUATION AND GRADUALLY DEVELOPING NEW INTER-COMMUNAL TIES.
2. WE CERTAINLY AGREE WITH REFTELS (A) AND (B) THAT FLIRTATION BY ANY HIGH GREEK OFFICIAL WITH DEADLINES FOR INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, DYNAMIC SOLUTIONS, AND PARTITION REPRESENTS DANGEROUS AND RISKY LINE OF THINKING, AND THAT GOG SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT WHATEVER AS TO HOW WE FEEL ABOUT IT. AT SAME TIME THERE ARE ONE OR TWO ASPECTS OF WHAT HAS DEVELOPED WITH REGARD TO AMB PANAYOTACOS' STATEMENTS (REFTEL A AND B) WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO CALL TO DEPT'S ATTENTION.
3. FIRST POINT IS THAT BY ZEROING IN SO SPECIFICALLY ON PANAYOTACOS, BOTH IN ATHENS AND IN WASHINGTON, USG HAS NOT ONLY MADE ITS DISPLEASURE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS AT ISSUE CLEAR; IT MAY ALSO HAVE SERIOUSLY ANTAGONIZED THE MAN WHO WILL IN EFFECT BE NO. 2 IN GREEK FONOFF, AS WELL AS GREEK EMBASSY IN NICOSIA. HOW IMPORTANT THIS IS TO EMBASSY ATHENS I DO NOT KNOW, BUT I AM AFRAID THAT EFFECT OF RECENT MOVES HERE WILL BE TO CLOSE OFF OUR GREEK EMBASSY CHANNEL OF INFORMATION ABOUT SENSITIVE GREEK RELATIONS WITH CYPRUS GOVT AND GREEK EMBASSY VIEWS REGARDING RIGHT-WING ENOSISTS, GRIVASITES, ETC. THIS HAS BEEN VERY IMPORTANT SOURCE FOR US, AND WE WOULD BE SORRY TO SEE GREEK EMBASSY CLAM UP.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2- S E C R E T NICOSIA 226

4. SECOND POINT IS MORE SERIOUS. IT IS NOT ONLY MAINLAND GREEKS WHO TALKS TO US OF A POSSIBLY DYNAMIC SOLUTION, BUT TURKS, TURK CYPRIOTS AND CERTAIN GREEK CYPRIOT ESTABLISHMENT TYPES AS WELL. PROPONENTS OF SUCH A SOLUTION PERSIST IN SEEKING IT BECAUSE THEY ARE UTTERLY FRUSTRATED BY INABILITY OF PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION TO INTERCOMMUNAL PROBLEM, AND BECAUSE THEY ARE DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW CYPRUS PROBLEM TO TRIGGER OFF A GREEK-TURKISH WAR. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE PROSPECTS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION IN UPCOMING, EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WILL BE MUCH IF ANY BETTER THAN THEY WERE DURING THE 3-1/2 YEAR CLERIDES-DENKTASH EXERCISE. IF THE EFFORT IS MADE AND FAILS ONCE AGAIN, THEY REASON, IT WILL BE CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT SINCE THE PARTIES CANNOT AGREE TO LIVE TOGETHER IN CYPRUS, THEY MUST LIVE SEPARATELY. IN THEIR FRUSTRATION HARDLINERS ON BOTH SIDES THUS LOOK TO GREEK-TURKISH COOPERATION TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION AS ONLY WAY OUT OF ENDLESS IMPASSE. THEY SEE GREECE AND TURKEY MOVING FAIRLY STEADILY ALONG THIS PATH.

5. THIS IS SOMETHING RATHER NEW, AND IT CALLS FOR SOME SHIFT IN OUR CONTINGENCY THINKING. IN YEARS PAST OUR "WORST CASE" SCENARIO ENVISAGED A GREEK-GREEK CYPRIOT STRIKE FOR ENOSIS, A TURKISH INVASION TO COUNTER IT, AND QUICK SOVIET AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RESULTING IMBROGLIO. THAT IS NOT THE PROSPECT TODAY. ON THE CONTRARY, ADVOCATES OF GREEK-TURKISH COOPERATION MAINTAIN THAT DANGER TO USG INTERESTS AND NATO WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED -- AS COMPARED WITH PREVIOUS CYPRUS CRISIS CONDITIONS -- PRECISELY BECAUSE GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD BE WORKING TOGETHER. THERE WOULD BE NO FALLING OUT AMONG NATO ALLIES, NO WEAKENING OF NATO FLANK, AND MILITARY OPERATION COULD BE CONCLUDED IN A FEW HOURS -- TOO QUICKLY TO PERMIT ANY THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION. RESULT WOULD BE ACTUALLY TO STRENGTHEN NATO FLANK, SINCE DANGER OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN CYPRUS WOULD BE EXTINGUISHED. TRUE, A UN MEMBER STATE WOULD BE DISMEMBERED AND PERHAPS DESTROYED, BUT A LARGE PROPORTION OF ALL CYPRIOTS WOULD APPROVE OR ACQUIESCE. RECENT EXPERIENCE ONLY RE-EMPHASIZES IMPOTENCE OF UN IN SUCH CASES.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- S E C R E T NICOSIA 226

6. I HAVE DEVELOPED THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT NOT IN ORDER TO ACCEPT OR SUPPORT IT BUT TO INDICATE THAT WE SEEM TO BE DEALING WITH A CAREFULLY THOUGH OUT AND STRONGLY HELD VIEW BASED ON WHAT APPEAR TO ITS PROPONENTS TO BE IRREFUTABLE CONSIDERATIONS. IF BY OBJECTING WE ONLY DRIVE THE EFFORTS OF THESE PROPONENTS FURTHER UNDERGROUND, WE WILL NOT BE DOING OURSELVES ANY SERVICE. IN THE END WE MAY FIND OURSELVES FACED BY A DISAGREEABLE SURPRISE. WE KNOW THAT GREEK-TURKISH PLANNING ON CYPRUS IS CONTINUING ON A VERY PRIVATE BASIS.

7. THE FACT IS, IN MY OPINION, THAT OUR PRESENT COURSE REQUIRES US TO SIT ON THE LID OF A BOILING POT WITHOUT PROVIDING A SAFETY VALVE. WE INDULGE IN GENERALIZED EXHORTATION TO ALL CONCERNED TO REACH A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, WHEN IN FACT NEITHER SIDE IS PREPARED TO RESTORE CONSTITUTIONAL UNITY ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER. AT THE SAME TIME WE BLOCK OFF THE ALTERNATIVE OF A SETTLEMENT IMPOSED BY GREECE AND TURKEY. THUS WE CONDEMN THE PARTIES TO CONTINUE WITH THE SAME FRAGILE AND UNSATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIPS THEY SUFFER TODAY. IT IS A SITUATION RIPE FOR EXPLOITATION BY SOVIETS AND LOCAL COMMUNISTS ON ONE SIDE, AND GRIVAS SUPPORTERS ON THE OTHER.

8. IS IT REALLY IN OUR INTEREST TO PERPETUATE THIS DEADLOCK? WILL WE BE ANY BETTER OFF IF WE LET THE MOMENT PASS WHEN GREECE AND TURKEY HAVE SOME HOPE--BY NO MEANS A CERTAINLY-- OF BEING ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A SOLUTION? WE HAVE BUILD UP NEGATIVE DEFENSES AGAINST A DYNAMIC SOLUTION, BUT THAT IS ONLY HALF THE ANSWER. SHOULD WE NOT INJECT SOME CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENT INTO THE PICTURE, AS PART OF THE LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY OF A SENIOR ALLY?

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-4- SECRET NICOSIA 226

9. THIS IS THE PROBLEM I WOULD LIKE TO SEE ADDRESSED AS A PLANNING MATTER. NO OPTIONS SHOULD OR NEED BE CLOSED OFF AT THIS STAGE. AS OF NOW, MY OWN FEELING IS THAT IF A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT PROVES TO BE OUT OF THE QUESTION-- A CLEAR PROBABILITY -- WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO APPROACH ALL PARTIES WITH A MODUS VIVENDI OR INTERIM SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD START FROM WHERE WE ARE AND SET UP PROCEDURES AND SCHEDULES FOR GRADUALLY KNITTING THE TWO COMMUNITIES TOGETHER. DECONFRONTATION AND NORMALIZATION MEASURES WOULD BE ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF ANY ARRANGMENT.

10. BEFORE WE CAN DO THIS WE OUGHT TO REVIEW INTERNALLY THE WHOLE RANGE OF CYPRUS CONTINGENCIES. I HOPE OCCASION WILL ARISE THIS SPRING WHEN AMBS HANDLEY AND TASCA AND I CAN CARRY ON SUCH A DISCUSSION, WITH INTERESTED DEPT. OFFICERS. THEREAFTER WE WOULD HAVE TO DO SOME FRANK TALKING WITH GREEK AND TURKISH GOVTS. WE WOULD HAVE TO TELL THEM THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ADVENTURES, BUT THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT THEM IN WORKING WITH ON-ISLAND COMMUNITIES TO BUILD GREATER STABILITY, AND MORE EQUITY, INTO PRESENT DE FACTO SITUATION IN CYPRUS -- SINCE THE PARTIES CAN'T AGREE ON HOW TO END IT.

11. I AM THE FIRST TO ADMIT THAT ALL THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY PRODUCE A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT. WHAT IT WOULD DO IS TO GIVE GREECE AND TURKEY AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DANGEROUS GAMES SOME OF THEIR PEOPLE SEEM TO BE PLAYING. IF WE LIMIT OURSELVES TO NAY-SAYING, THESE GAMES ARE GOING TO SEEM INCREASINGLY ATTRACTIVE. WE HAVE A FEW MONTHS IN WHICH TO THINK IT OVER, WHILE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE THRESHED OUT IN THE IMPENDING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. IT WOULD BE WELL TO USE THE TIME PROFITABLY.

12. DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED.

POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

NOV-1963



Department of State \* TELEGRAM

SECRET CA0930

PAGE 01 STATE 160214

70  
ORIGYN CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 R

Copy \_\_\_ of 18 copies

DRAFTED BY CTF MR. STABLER  
APPROVED BY CTF - MR. BARBOUR  
S/S-01 RKUCHEL

098546

Z 240327Z JUL 74 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH

CONTROL: 6672Q  
RECD: July 23, 1974  
11:45 PM

S E C R E T STATE 160214

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS

E.O. 11652: CDS  
TAGS- PFOR, CY  
OURJ:  
REF.: NICOSIA 1606

SINCE WE HAVE TOLD GREEKS, SEE NO REASON WHY YOU  
SHOULD NOT TELL CLERTOPS ABOUT TURKISH ASSURANCES.  
MOROVER, IF YOU THINK IT WOULD DO ANY GOOD, YOU ARE  
ALSO AUTHORIZED TO TELL DENKTASH. KISSINGFR

NOTE BY ANALYST: CCO PASS COPY TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S

Z O 232310Z JUL 74 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUQMGG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA FLASH 6041  
INFO RUQMGGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7628  
RUOTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7742  
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6914  
BT

CONTROL: 6 6 1 00

SECRET STATE 159994

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CY

SUBJECT: YOUR APPROACH TO CLERIDES  
FROM SECRETARY FOR AMBASSADOR

1. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR REPORT THAT CLERIDES WAS SWORN IN AS ACTING PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS. WE INFER FROM THIS THAT HE WILL BE PERFORMING HIS DUTIES UNDER THE AEGIS OF PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE 44, OF THE CYPRUS CONSTITUTION. GIVEN THIS DEVELOPMENT, I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT YOU SHOULD BE EXTREMELY FRIENDLY TO CLERIDES AND THAT YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS AND CONTACT WITH HIM, STOPPING JUST A SHADE SHORT OF RECOGNITION.

2. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED YOUR REPORT THAT CLERIDES WILL HAVE CYPRIOT SUPPORT AND CAN PROBABLY MAINTAIN HIMSELF IN OFFICE. I WOULD APPRECIATE URGENTLY YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL FORCES ON THE ISLAND AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MAKARIOS AND CLERIDES RESPECTIVE POLITICAL POSITIONS.  
KISSINGER


P:EPDJEREJIAN:BDF  
7/23/74 EXT 20356  
THE SECRETARY

P:JJSISCO  
S/S - SRGAMMON

EUR - MR. HARTMAN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

SECRET

O 200243Z JUL 74 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUOMOS/AMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 5959  
INFO RUOMAT/AMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6809  
RUQWGU/AMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7532  
BT  
SECRET STATE 157921

CONTROL: 5620Q  
RECD: July 19, 1974  
1143 PM

NODIS.  
TOPCL 41

E.O. 11652:GDS  
TAGS: PFOR PINT CY  
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: GLAFOS CLERIDES  
FROM THE SECRETARY

PLEASE PASS TO SISCO

REF: NICOSIA 1520

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO SEE CLERIDES AGAIN AND INDICATE TO HIM  
THAT WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO SOME OF HIS IDEAS. WE ARE  
PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS THAT CLERIDES KNOWS THAT UNDER NO  
CIRCUMSTANCES DO WE THINK HE SHOULD RESIGN HIS POSITION AS  
PRESIDENT OF PARLIAMENT. INGERSOLL

D:MASAMUELS:CM  
EXT. 28930 7/19/74  
THE ACTING SECRETARY

EUR - MR. STADLER  
S/S - MR. FRY

S/AM - AMB. MCCLOSKEY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 608

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00206 010911Z

18  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 /026 W

004690

72 FEB 1 AM 8:59  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

R 010815Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5606  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T NICOSIA 206

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- GUYER VISIT

1. SUMMARY: UN UNDER SECRETARY GUYER'S REAL PURPOSE IN TRAVELLING TO AREA IS TO OBTAIN GOT AGREEMENT TO SYG'S FORMULA FOR EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE IS PRESSING FOR DECONFRONTATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNFICYP.
2. I MANAGED TO GET A HALF HOUR ALONE WITH UN UNDER SEC GEN GUYER JAN 31. HE CONSIDERS HIS VISIT TO ATHENS PURELY A COURTESY, HIS VISIT TO NICOSIA NEARLY AS MUCH SO. REAL PURPOSE OF TRIP IS TO WIN TURKISH ACQUIESCENCE IN ANKARA TO SECRETARY GENERAL'S FORMULA FOR EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, JUST AS IT STANDS. ANY TAMPERING WITH IT WOULD OPEN A PANDORA'S BOX. THAT WAS WHY HE HAD STRESSED TO TURK ACTING PERMREP IN NEW YORK (USUN 333) THAT IF FAILURE OF TURKEY TO COME ALONG SHOULD FORCE PROBLEM INTO SECURITY COUNCIL, STATUS OF LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE JEOPARDIZED. I TOLD GUYER WE BELIEVED ON BASIS OUR INFO THAT HIS CHANCES OF SUCCESS WERE FAIRLY GOOD (CF NICOSIA 198).
3. OSORIO-TAFALL'S ROLE IS TO BE LIMITED STRICTLY TO GOOD OFFICES IN CLASSICAL SENSE. IT WILL NOT BE MEDIATION; GALD PLAZA FIASCO IN 1965 HAD CLOSED OFF THAT AVENUE.
4. GUYER HOPES THAT AFTER A FEW FORMAL MEETINGS AT OUTSET, INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WILL BE CARRIED ON INFORMALLY AND PRIVATELY.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00206 010911Z

COLLEGE TRY MUST BE MADE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT BUT IF THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE, "IT WILL NOT BE THE END OF THE WORLD." HE UNDERSTANDS THAT AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT OR MODUS VIVENDI MAY BE BEST WE CAN GET.

5. GUYER IS TALKING UP DEPT'S DECONFRONTATION PROPOSAL, AS SUGGESTED BY AMB. BENNETT. HE FOUND MAKARIOS AND KYPRIANOU FAVORABLY DISPOSED; WILL DISCUSS IT WITH TURK CYPRIOTS FEB 1. I EXPLAINED WHY PROPOSAL WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT FOR TURKISH SIDE.

GUYER NOW REALIZES THAT BEST CHANCE TO BRING TURK CYPRIOTS AROUND IS TO STRESS THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD BE WITHDRAWING FORCES TO MUCH GREATER EXTENT THAN TURK CYPRIOTS, AND TO EXPLORE WHAT OTHER CONCESSIONS MIGHT BE MADE TO TURK CYPRIOTS IN EXCHANGE FOR THEIR AGREEMENT. GUYER AGREES DECONFRONTATION IS SUITABLE SUBJECT FOR EARLY DISCUSSION IN OR ALONG WITH INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

6. GUYER RAISED QUESTION OF CYPRUS CONTRIBUTION TO UNFICYP WITH MAKARIOS. RECEIVED EQUIVOCAL AND UNENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE.. I SAID I WOULD PRESS MATTER WITH KYPRIANOU; GUYER HEARTILY APPROVED. HE WILL MENTION PROBLEM AT FEB. 1 WORKING LUNCH. ON LUNCH, INCIDENTALLY, HIS VIEWS REMAIN AS REPORTED BY AMB. BENNETT, THOUGH WITH LESS FIRE.

7. MAKARIOS TOLD GUYER HE WAS ORGANIZING A "STRATEGIC RESERVE." GUYER SENSED THAT ARCHBISHOP IS DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF GREEKS. HE WILL LEAVE CYPRUS WITH A MUCH MORE LIVELY APPRECIATION OF THE FACT THAT TROUBLE IN CYPRUS IS AT LEAST AS LIKELY TO BE TOUCHED OFF BY FIGHTING WITHIN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AS IT IS BY INTERCOMMUNAL INCIDENTS.

POPPER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

592/03/129



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 437

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00526 041954Z

50  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 7026 W

113855

Vertical stamp: SITUATION REPORT  
Handwritten: 2 MAR 72 5 PM '72

O R 041910Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5814  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T NICOSIA 526

EXDIS

REF NICOSIA 523, STATE 37781, DIA 3948

1. EMBASSY [ ] HAVE NO FURTHER REPORTS OF TROOPS MOVEMENTS  
SUBSEQUENT TO THOSE DESCRIBED NICOSIA REFTEL.

2. UNFICYP CONFIRMS NO TROOP ACTIVITY HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE MID-  
AFTERNOON. HOWEVER, IT REPORTS ELDYK (MAINLAND GREEK CONTINGENT)  
AND NATIONAL GUARD UNITS AROUND NICOSIA ARE IN HIGH STATE  
OF READINESS. EARLIER MOVEMENTS INTO NICOSIA HAVE TERMINATED WITH  
NO APPARENT PATTERN.  
POPPER

State Dept. review completed

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

25X1



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 276

Handwritten mark resembling a checkmark or 'L'

Handwritten number '3' with a horizontal line above it

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00311 01 OF 02 121755Z

47  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 1026 W

093176

0 121645Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5671  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 311

EXDIS NOFORN

REF: EXDIS TOSEC 15

WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY ROGERS IN KEY BISCAYNE

SUBJECT: CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS

1. OUR THOUGHTS ON QUESTIONS POSED IN STATE 025233 ARE AS FOLLOWS.

2. GOG OBJECTIVE CLEARLY GOES FAR BEYOND CZECH ARMS PROBLEM AS SUCH. AS GREEK UNDER SECY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PANAYOTACOS PUT IT TO CHARGE EVENING FEB 11, CZECH ARMS ISSUE HAS PROVIDED GOG WITH THE OPPORTUNITY PRESS OTHER, BROADER OBJECTIVES. AS WE INTERPRET IT, GREEKS MIGHT BE SATISFIED WITH AN APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CZECH ARMS PROBLEM AND CREATION OF GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY COMPLIANT WITH GOG DESIRES. IF THESE OBJECTIVES CANNOT BE ATTAINED, PANAYOTACOS HAS MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT AS GOG SEES IT MAKARTOS WOULD HAVE TO BE REMOVED.

3. WE CANNOT DOCUMENT GOT COLLUSION BUT THERE IS STRONG CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THAT CONCLUSION:

State Dept. review completed

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS





Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00311 01 OF 02 121755Z

7. IN CONTRAST, U.S. GOOD OFFICE WOULD GIVE US GREATER CONTROL AND INFLUENCE OVER EVENTS, CARRYING ON PRACTICE ESTABLISHED IN 1964 AND 1967-68. IF WE WERE TO SHIRK THIS ROLE TODAY, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN NATIONS GENERALLY WOULD TAKE IT AS SIGNAL THAT POWER BALANCE IN THIS AREA HAD MATERIALLY CHANGED.

8. AS TO TIMING, IF U.S. IS TO TAKE THE LEAD, IT SHOULD MOVE SOONEST, IF POSSIBLE BEFORE GREEK GOVT SHOWS SIGNS OF TAKING DRASTIC ACTION TO ENFORCE ITS "ULTIMATUM" TO MAKARIOS. WE HOPE THAT AS RESULT OF AMR TASCA'S CONVERSATION WITH PM PAPADOPOULOS WE SHALL HAVE BETTER FEEL FOR EVENTS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

9. WE THINK DEPT IS CORRECT IN ASSUMING MAKARIOS IS LIKELY TO MOVE TO UNSC AND USG WILL BE INVOLVED AT FAIRLY EARLY STAGE. THIS POINTS UP FACT THAT BOTH US AND UN HAVE HAD A ROLE IN PREVIOUS CYPRUS CRISES AND BOTH WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE ONE IN THIS ONE. PROPERLY FORMULATED, QUESTION IS WHETHER AS IN PAST UN ROLE SHOULD BE LARGELY SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. ACTION, OR THE REVERSE.

10. FINALLY, WE THINK A MOVE TO UN BY MAKARIOS MIGHT WELL PRECIPITATE GOG AND/OR GOT COUNTER ACTION. IF AT THAT STAGE KFG DID NOT HAVE ITS OWN GOOD OFFICES PROPOSAL ON THE TABLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE, IT MIGHT BE CONFRONTED WITH NEED FOR EMBARRASSING DECISION ON WHETHER AND HOW TO OPPOSE COMMUNIST-INSPIRED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST GREECE AND/OR TURKEY FOR SEEKING TO DISMEMBER CYPRUS.

11. AS TO FIFTH QUESTION, WE BELIEVE A REALISTIC PACKAGE MUST CALL FOR ROUGHLY COMMENSURATE SACRIFICE BY ALL THREE PARTIES CONCERNED AND MUST GIVE EACH ROUGHLY COMMENSURATE SATISFACTION. EVEN BEST BALANCED PACKAGE WILL BECOME REALISTIC ONLY WHEN DEVELOPMENT OF CRISIS PRESENTS PARTIES WITH EVEN LESS DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVES IF THEY REJECT IT. THUS PACKAGE WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE TODAY MIGHT, IF SITUATION DETERIORATES, COME TO BE MUCH MORE PALATABLE, AT LEAST AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION.

12. WE SUGGEST THAT FOLLOWING PACKAGE PROPOSALS COULD BE PROPOSED OR STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY US OR BY UN IF SECRETARY GENERAL RATHER THAN SECURITY COUNCIL WERE THE OPERATING UN ORGAN:

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

WH  
TELEGRAM

SECRET 799

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00145 211630Z

51  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

060797

P R 211535Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5574  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
USMISSION USUN  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 145

EXDIS/NOFORN

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO FROM POPPER

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: NEED FOR PROGRESS ON DECONFRONTATION

1. I THINK YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PITCH ON DECONFRONTATION COMES AT A PROPITIOUS TIME AND THAT IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO BROACH IT TO PARTIES IN NEAR FUTURE.

2. I WOULD, HOWEVER, JUSTIFY THE PROPOSAL ON GROUNDS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM THOSE YOU HAVE CITED. INCREASED TENSION IN CYPRUS TODAY IS DUE LESS TO INTERCOMMUNAL CONFLICT AND DIFFERENCES THAN TO CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY WITHIN GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY ITSELF. RECENT GREEN LINE SHOOTING HAS AGAIN DEMONSTRATED WHAT AUG 1970 TRILOMO INCIDENT INDICATED -- THAT EACH COMMUNITY, ACTING UNDER MAINLAND PATRON'S GUIDANCE, CAN CONFINE AND CONTROL INCIDENTS WHEN THEY OCCUR, IF IT WISHES TO DO SO. UNFICYP IS AN IMPORTANT ADJUNCT OF THE PROCESS. AS I SEE IT, YOUR PROPOSAL IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL NOW BECUASE IT WOULD COME AT A TIME WHEN ALL PARTIES ARE CASTING ABOUT FOR SOME SUGGESTIONS OR STEPS WHICH WOULD SERVE THEM AS ALTERNATIVES TO FLATLY NEGATIVE CONFRONTATION WHEN NEW INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS GET UNDERWAY. APPARENTLY WITH THIS OBJECTIVE, BOTH SIDES ARE TALKING IN TERMS OF DE-CONFRONTATION, NORMALIZATION, "FREEZE", OR MODUS VIVENDI

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00145 211630Z

AS SUBJECTS FOR EARLY DISCUSSION.

3. THUS, DENKTASH HAS HINTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING FIGHTERS BY POLICE ON GREEN LINE (NICOSIA 132). MAKARIOS IS LOOKING TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION WHICH WOULD END WITH DISBANDMENT OF ON-ISLAND MILITARY FORCES (NICOSIA 2228 AND 137). AND WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS GENERAL HARALAMBOPOULOS, GREEK NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER, MUSED TO UNFICYP ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF THORNTON THAT HE WONDERED HOW UNFICYP WOULD VIEW A UNILATERAL VOLUNTARY PULL-BACK BY NATIONAL GUARD FORCES TO THEIR CAMPS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND, ADDING THAT HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THIS. (PREDICTABLY, INDICATION THAT HARALAMBOPOULOS HAS RAISED MATTER WITH CYPRUS GOVERNMENT. WE WONDER WHETHER HE HAS DISCUSSED IT WITH GOG DURING HIS RECENT SHUTTLE TRIPS TO ATHENS.)

4. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT EACH PARTY APPROACHES DECONFRONTATION ON A BASIS STRONGLY TILTED AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE. MAKARIOS LINKS IT TO WITHDRAWAL OF MAINLAND CONTINGENTS, THUS INCREASING FREEDOM OF GREEK CYPRIOT MAJORITY TO DEAL WITH TURK CYPRIOT MINORITY ON ITS OWN. DENKTASH THINKS OF IT IN CONNECTION WITH FINANCIAL ADVANTAGES TO TURK CYPRIOTS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MAINLAND GREEK OFFICERS ARE TOYING WITH IT IN TERMS OF FUTURE MOVES BY ENOSIS-DOUBLE ENOSIS GROUPS. IN SHORT, WHEN BOTH SIDES ARE PRESENTED WITH A BALANCED AND COMPREHENSIVE FORMULA, THE ODDS ARE THAT THEY WILL BOGGLE AT IT RATHER THAN AGREE. NEVERTHELESS, AS INDICATED ABOVE, I THINK THE TIME IS RIGHT TO MAKE A REAL TRY.

5. I BELIEVE THE FORMULA CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM IS EQUITABLY BALANCED. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT FORMULA BE MADE MORE SPECIFIC WITH RESPECT TO HOW FAR BACK TURK CYPRIOT FIGHTERS MOVE. IN ENCLAVES THIS SHOULD BE A MEANINGFUL DISTANCE, THOUGH IN AN AREA LIKE ARTEMIS ROAD, LARNACA, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE LESS. UNFICYP WOULD MONITOR AND SUPERVISE RATHER THAN GUARANTEE EXECUTION, AND IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IF EITHER SIDE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION TO CHANGE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO, THE OTHER WOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY FREED FROM ALL DECONFRONTATION RESTRICTIONS AND GUARANTOR POWERS (AND/OR UN SECURITY COUNCIL) WOULD AFFORD FULL SUPPORT TO RESTORE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00145 211630Z

STATUS QUO ANTE.

6. I FULLY AGREE THAT A PROPOSAL OF THIS CHARACTER WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF IT WERE MADE BY THE UN AND SUPPORTED BY OTHERS. BUT RATHER THAN RAISE IT IN NEW YORK AND NICOSIA SIMULTANEOUSLY, I SUGGEST THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER IF THE PROPOSAL WERE WORKED OUT IN NEW YORK WITH GUYER ALONE AND IF THEN GUYER BROUGHT IT WITH HIM AS HE WENT ROUND THE NICOSIA-ATHENS-ANKARA CIRCUIT. DEPENDING ON INITIAL REACTIONS, OSORIO COULD THEN UNVEIL BEST POSSIBLE OFFICIAL PROPOSAL AT EARLY STATE IN RESUMED TALKS. GP-3.  
POPPER

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 522

72 W N  
JAN 20 5:22 PM '72

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
050091

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00127 201325Z

51  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 201250Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5564  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL  
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 127

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF, JCS WASHDC, SHAPE, USCINCEUR  
AND USDOCOSOUTH

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; TURKISH CONCERN RE F-4S FOR GREECE.

REF: ATHENS 0287

1. I APPRECIATE EMBASSY ANKARA'S THOUGHTFULNESS IN REPEATING TO NICOSIA ITS 7823 AND 003. IF WE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF F-4 DEAL IN NOVEMBER, WE WOULD HAVE MADE OUR COMMENT AND RAISED OUR QUESTIONS AT THAT TIME. AS THESE QUESTIONS INDICATE, WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO CLARIFY, FOR OUR OWN BACKGROUND, RATIONALE FOR F-4 PURCHASE IF IT OCCURS. IF WE ARE TOLD THAT WE WILL JUST HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE REVERBERATIONS IN CYPRUS, SO BE IT.

2. PARAGRAPH ONE B OF REFTEL AND ANKARA TELS SEEM TO CONFIRM OUR POINT THAT SUPPLY OF F-4S LIKELY TO CHANGE MILITARY SITUATION. IN SPECIFIC GREEK-TURKISH TERMS IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE AS ATHENS STATES THAT BALANCE WOULD BECOME MORE EVEN. OVERALL, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE TURKS ARE TODAY RESTRAINED FROM VENTURESOME MILITARY POLICY LESS BY GREEK FORCES THAN BY SOVIET DETERRENT AND PRESUMED US, NATO AND NON-ALIGNED REACTION. KNOWLEDGE THAT GREEK FORCES WERE TO BE STRENGTHENED IN NEXT FEW YEARS MIGHT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00127 201325Z

LEAD TURKS TO CONCLUDE THEY HAD BETTER TAKE RISKS NOW THAN WAIT. THAT IS THE POINT WE WANTED TO MAKE, AS WE ARE GLAD TO NOTE THAT EMBASSY ANKARA HAD ALREADY ADDRESSED ITSELF TO IT. GP-3.

POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

REF: VIKENS 8581

SUBJECT: CYPRIOTE TURKISH CONCERN RE L-49 FOR GREECE\*

VND 08000001H

DEPT 07000001H

EXDIS

S E C R E T NICOSI 151

PERMISSION INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO UNEMBASSY LONDON

UNEMBASSY VIKENS

UNEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECRETARY WASHDC 0204

FM UNEMBASSY NICOSI

08 013200Z JAN 75

INFO OCT-01 1959 H

ACTION 88-58

12

BYOC 01 NICOSI 00127 201325Z

SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE  
ISS: 2/10/75  
MIL. ST.

SECRET 855

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

592/03/135

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WV

SECRET 069 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00081 141335Z

51  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

0066

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 JAN 19 PM 11:18

R 141245Z JAN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5537  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL  
USMISSION NATO  
SECDEF  
JCS WASHDC  
USCINCEUR  
USDOCOSOUTH

S E C R E T NICOSIA 081

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - TURKISH CONCERN RE F-4'S FOR GREECE

REF: STATE 3022, 1186

1. SUMMARY: GREEK PURCHASE OF F-4'S WOULD CHANGE BALANCE AND HAVE DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT OF CYPRUS PROBLEM. INFO REQUESTED ON STATUS OF MATTER, AND UPDATING OF AMBASSADOR'S BRIEFING SUGGESTED ON CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS AND NATO DEFENSE.

2. WHILE EXCEPT FOR REFTELS WE ARE WITHOUT BACKGROUND INFO ON POSSIBLE MAP SALE OF F-4'S TO GREECE, IT SEEMS PROBABLE TO ME THAT THIS ISSUE WILL CREATE ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN CONNECTION WITH CYPRUS PROBLEM FOR SOME TIME TO COME. EVEN POSSIBILITY OF A SALE EVIDENTLY WORRIES TURKS. IF NEWS SHOULD GET ABOUT THAT GREECE WERE ACQUIRING AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD OPERATE OVER OR NEAR CYPRUS FOR ATTACK OR INTERCEPTION, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IF NOT MILITARY BALANCE IN CYPRUS WOULD BE APPRECIABLY CHANGED. IN OUR OPINION THE EFFECT WOULD BE DESTABILIZING.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE BROADER AND PERHAPS MORE

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00081 141335Z

IMPORTANT FACTORS UNDERLYING GREEK PREPARATIONS TO ACQUIRE MORE MODERN AIRCRAFT AND THAT THERE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF F-4'S. THIS WILL NOT MATERIALLY AFFECT CYPRUS ASPECT OF MATTER. IN THEIR CYPRO-CENTRIC WAY, THOSE CONCERNED WITH THIS PROBLEM WILL BE CAPABLE OF ASSUMING ONLY THE WORST AND OF PLANNING ACCORDINGLY.

4. WE DEDUCE FROM REFTELS THAT GREEKS ARE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATING PURCHASE OF MIRAGES IF F-4'S NOT AVAILABLE. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN USG ESTIMATE OF EXTENT TO WHICH CYPRUS PROBLEM IS MOTIVATING GREEKS IN THIS MATTER. FOR OUR OWN GENERAL INFO IN CONNECTION WITH FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, WOULD BE HELPFUL IF WE COULD ALSO HAVE ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. IS IT NATO REQUIREMENTS OR FORCE GOALS WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR GREEK DESIRE TO BUY PLANES? DO THEY CALL FOR LONGER-RANGE CRAFT? IF SO, WHY? OR IS IT A MATTER OF SOPHISTICATED?

B. CAN F-4'S BE CONFIGURED TO PERMIT EFFECTIVE OPERATION OVER OR AROUND CYPRUS? CAN MIRAGES?

C. CAN TURKS MAKE CASE THAT THEY HAVE EQUAL REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE, LONG-RANGE PLANES?

D. WOULD COMPARABLE OFFER OF PLANES OR OTHER MODERN EQUIPMENT TO TURKS HELP DEFUSE THEIR APPREHENSIONS?

E. OVER WHAT TIME FRAME DOES DEPT FORESEE THIS PROBLEM EVOLVING?

5. WE ASSUME IT IS JUST NOT IN THE CARDS TO IMAGINE FRENCH COULD BE BROUGHT AROUND TO WITHHOLDING MIRAGES IF WE DID SAME FOR F-4'S. OR PERHAPS IF THEY DID, GREEKS WOULD SIMPLY LOOK TO OTHER SUPPLIERS, MUCH LESS PALATABLE.

6. SINCE 1970 I HAVE NOT HAD OPPORTUNITY TO UPDATE MY INFO OR EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH U.S. COMMANDERS ON RELATIONSHIP OF CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS TO NATO DEFENSE. IF DEPT AND COMMANDS AGREE, I WOULD LIKE TO VISIT APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE FOR THIS PURPOSE DURING THE SPRING.  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. CHRISTIANSEN.

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

59403/137

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RECEIVED  
WHCA

CONFIDENTIAL

HCE 790

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 01935 291158Z

1971 OCT 29 12 17

44  
ACTION INR-06

*Sonnenfeldt*  
*HAK'D*

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 SS-14

PM-06 SR-02 ORM-03 SCA-01 VO-03 CIAE-00 NSAE-00

DODE-00 EUR-14 RSR-01 RSC-01 /061 W

106165

O R 291110Z OCT 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5320  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 1935

SUBJECT: CZECH REFUGEE PETER CHMELAR PPT 5010290, DPOB:  
JUNE 24, 1943, GOTTWALDOV, CZECHOSLAVAKIA

REF: NICOSIA 1931 (NOTAL)

25X1

1. SUBJECT ARRIVED NICOSIA EVENING OCTOBER 28 EN ROUTE BAGHDAD. CONTACTED EMBASSY MORNING OCTOBER 29 TO SEEK REFUGEE STATUS ENTER US TO JOIN WIFE ANNA CHMELAR, NEE WOZNIAK. WIFE ENTER US 13 MONTHS AGO ON TOURIST VISA AND PRESENTLY RESIDES

416 B WEST WORTHINGTON, CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA. CHMELAR IS PRESENTLY IN EMBASSY AND DESIRES PROCEED SOONEST TO LONDON WHERE HE WILL APPLY FOR US IMMIGRANT VISA.

2. CZECH CHARGE CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTRY EARLY MORNING OCT 29 IN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN CUSTODY OF SUBJECT. CHMELAR CLAIMS CZECH "SECRET POLICE" MADE ATTEMPT FORCE HIM BACK ON PLANE AT NICOSIA AIRPORT LAST NIGHT.

3. CHMELAR SERVED CZECH ARMY SEPTEMBER 70 - AUGUST 71, 2ND LIEUTENANT. HE IS ALSO CANDIDATE MEMBER CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

State Dept. review completed

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01935 291158Z

SINCE MAY 71. HE CLAIMS THIS MEMBERSHIP INVOLUNTARY AND SAYS HE APPLIED SOLELY TO OBTAIN PERMISSION LEAVE CZECHOSLTVAKIA WITH INTENTION DEFECTING AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

4. AT GOC REQUEST, CHMELAR SUBMITTED WRITTEN APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY STAY IN CYPRUS AS POLITICAL REFUGEE. THIS APPLICATION HAS BEEN APPROVED AND HE HAS PERMISSION REMAIN CYPRUS UNTIL NOVEMBER 2. WE UNDERSTAND THIS CAN BE EXTENDED.

5. WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS, CHMELAR WANTS TO GO TO UK WHERE HE FEELS HE CAN OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT WHILE WAITING FOR US IMMIGRANT VISA.

6. PENDING FURTHER CLARIFICATION HIS STATUS, WE ARE CHECKING WITH BRITISH AS TO HIS ELIGIBILITY TO ENTER UK AND ARRANGING

FOR HIS HOTEL ACCOMMODATION CLOSE TO EMBASSY. GOC DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION HAS ASSURED US OF HIS PROTECTION.

7. ADVISE BY IMMEDIATE TEL WHETHER DEPT HAS ANY PROBLEM WITH OUR PROCEDURE OR ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS.

8. REQUEST DEPT SEEK CONFIRM CHMELAR'S STATEMENT AS TO WIFE'S STATUS (PARA 1).

POPPER

CONFIDENTIAL

**CONFIDENTIAL**

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

SECRET 533

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00412 170618Z

11  
ACTION: SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

R: 170600Z MAR 71  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4517

SECRET NICOSIA 412

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE

REF: ATHENS 1143

1. OUR PAROCHIAL CONCERN REGARDING ISSUE OF PATRIARCHAL SUCCESSION IS THAT IT NOT CAUSE NEW FRICTION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY THAT WOULD SPILL OVER TO AFFECT THEIR FRAGILE UNDERSTANDING ON HANDLING OF VERY TOUCHY CYPRUS PROBLEM. AS WE SEE IT, BEST ROLE FOR USG IS TO CONVEY IN NON-INTRUSIVE MANNER HOPE THAT THIS IS SOMETHING OUR TWO FRIENDS CAN WORK OUT AMICABLE BETWEEN THEMSELVES. WE FEEL USG ROLE GOING BEYOND THIS LIKELY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND THEREFORE UNDESIRABLE.

2. DEPT PLEASE PASS ANKARA, ATHENS, ISTANBUL, MOSCOW.  
GP-3  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

064294  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
21 MAR 17 AM 8:20

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 219

PAGE 01 NICOSI 02194 241013Z

19  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 /046 W

002775

P 240940Z DEC 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4308

SECRET NICOSIA 2194

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING TALKS

REF: STATE 208217

1. DEPT PLEASE PASS AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, LONDON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, USUN.

2. AS DEPT KNOWS, CYPRUS GOVT HAS IN PAST EXPRESSED POSITIVE INTEREST IN HAVING JARRING NEGOTIATIONS RESUME IN CYPRUS. THIS WAS REITERATED BY FONOFF DIRECTOR VENIAMIN IN CONVER-

SATION WITH DCM (MEMCON POUCHED NEA/CYP) AS RECENTLY AS DEC ONE. ON THAT OCCASION, VENIAMIN SAID HIS GOVT HAD FORMALLY OFFERED CYPRUS AS A SITE IN MESSAGE TO JARRING AND THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. REPLIES HAD BEEN POSITIVE EXCEPT FROM JORDAN WHICH HAS NO DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ON CYPRUS AT PRESENT. CYPRUS HAD REPLIED OFFERING TO ACCEPT A JORDANIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSION OR EVEN AN "OFFICE" IF THAT WOULD HELP. VENIAMIN POINTED OUT THAT CYPRUS OFFERED GREAT ADVANTAGES AS A MEETING PLACE IN THAT REPRESENTATIVES COULD FLY HOME AND BACK WITH EASE AND MINIMUM WASTE OF TIME, ETC.

3. PLUS FACTORS FOR A CYPRUS VENUE REMAIN IN OUR VIEW AS EXPRESSED NICOSIA 1280 (NOTAL). GP-3  
POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

SECRET

6

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

70 DEC 24 PM 12:24  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 727

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01218 171107Z

02  
3

12  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

101449

R 171155Z JUL 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3744

SECRET NICOSIA 1218

EXDIS

NICOSIA 1216 WAS INTENDED AS COMMENT ON ATHENS 3759  
AS WELL AS OTHER REFTELS AND SHOULD BE READ IN THIS CONTEXT.  
DEPT PLEASE INFORM ATHENS.  
POPPER

70 JUL 17 PM 12:38

SITUATION ROOM

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 339

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01464 261217Z

SI  
ACTION SS-45

INFO: OCT-01 /046 W

103766

70/AUG 26 PM 5:51  
NICOSIA

R 261045Z AUG 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3900

SECRET NICOSIA 1464

EXDIS

State Dept. review completed

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; MAKARIOS RELATIONS WITH GREEK GOVT

1. WHEN I SAW GREEK AMB ALEXANDRAKIS AUG 24, HE TOLD ME VERY CONFIDENTIALLY THAT GREEK GOVT WAS IRKED BY DIFFICULTY IT HAD EXPERIENCED IN GETTING MAKARIOS TO PUT FORTH DEFINITE VIEWS AS TO WHAT HE WANTED TO OBTAIN OUT OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN NEXT ROUND. ALEXANDRAKIS IMPLIED GREEK GOVT STRONGLY WANTED A SETTLEMENT, BUT FOUND MAKARIOS RELUCTANT TO MAKE NECESSARY COMPROMISES.

2. DURING MY MEETING WITH MAKARIOS AUG 25, ARCHBISHOP PUT THE SHOE ON THE OTHER FOOT. HE SAID HE WAS SENDING HIS MEMORANDUM ON AN INTERCOMMUNAL PACKAGE DEAL TO THE GREEK GOVT AND THAT WHEN HE TALKED IN ATHENS IN SEPTEMBER HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE DEFINITE GREEK VIEWS ON AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT. HE SOMETIMES WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS ONE GREEK GOVT POLICY OR TWO. OFFICIALLY, HE WAS URGED TO BE FORTHCOMING IN SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT, BUT UNOFFICIALLY HE WAS SOMETIMES REBUKED FOR COMPROMISING TOO MUCH AND FOR NOT PRESSING HARD ENOUGH FOR ENOSIS. HE WAS SIMILARLY SQUEEZED BY BOTH SIDES IN CYPRUS.


3. I SAID I RECOGNIZED HIS PROBLEM, WHICH WAS ONE NOT UNCOMMONLY FACED BY STATESMEN, BUT THAT I KNEW HE WOULD DEAL WITH IT IN A RESPONSIBLE WAY. HE KNEW OUR FEELING: WE UNDERSTOOD THE EMOTIONAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF ENOSIS AS AN IDEA, BUT LIKE HIM WE WERE CONVINCED THAT THE ONLY PRACTICABLE FUTURE FOR

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01464 261217Z

CYPRUS LAY IN INDEPENDENCE WITH HARMONIOUS INTERCOMMUNAL RELATIONS.

4. COMMENT: IT IS UNUSUAL FOR ARCHBISHOP TO REVEAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND ATHENS, [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] INDICATE SUCH DIFFERENCES EXIST. REMARKS MADE BY ALEXANDRAKIS AND MAKARIOS FORESHADOW SOME FAIRLY TOUGH TALK WHEN ATHENS MEETING OCCURS.

5. DEPT PASS ATHENS. GP-4. POPPER

25X1

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 754

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01678 241200Z

2

54  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

70 SEP 24 PM 7:06  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
056190

P 241040Z SEP 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY  
INFO AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY  
SECSTATE WASHDC 4041  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 1678

EXDIS

REF: ROME 5209; STATE 156214

- 1. DELIGHTED ATTEND SUBJECT MEETING. WILL BE TRAVELLING ALONE.
- 2. WILL ARRIVE ROME SEPT 29 VIA ATHENS ON AZ 481 DUE 1610. THIS IS ONLY SEPT 29 CONNECTION FROM NICOSIA. AM REQUESTING ROME-NAPLES AZ 182 LEAVING ROME 1755. IS THIS BEST CONNECTION? PLEASE RESERVE ACCOMDATIONS NAPLES NIGHT SEPT 29.

- 3. I PLAN RETURN NAPLES-ROME AZ 246 SEPT 30 AT 1555. PLEASE RESERVE SINGLE ROME NIGHT SEPT 30. WILL LEAVE ROME FOR ATHENS AND NICOSIA OA 406, 0930 OCTOBER 1. POPPER

NOTE: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER SSO, MR. MC GAFFEY, 9/24/70.

CONFIDENTIAL

24

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

*Ed.*  
**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 307

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01068 251307Z

52

ACTION NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 10-13 CPR-02 PM-05 H-02 NSC-10 O-03 OPR-02

P-03 RSC-01 SS-20 SY-03 USIA-12 PRS-01 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 DODE-00 RSR-01 /101 W

091588

R 251250Z JUN 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3658

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 1068

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MAKARIOS' VISIT TO US

REF: STATE 100271

I TOLD FONMIN JUNE 24 MAKARIOS REQUEST TO MEET WITH  
PRESIDENT NIXON WAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION IN WASH-  
INTON. AM SEEING MAKARIOS JULY 2. WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL  
TO US HERE IF I COULD PASS ON TO HIM AT THAT TIME SOME  
INDICATION RE SYMPATHETIC TREATMENT HIS REQUEST.

GP-3  
POPPER

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 575

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00577 101549Z

41  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

049411

P R 101510Z APR 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 3410

70 APR 10 PM 2:49

MANE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 577

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

SUBJECT: PRESS ASPECTS YOUR CYPRUS VISIT

1. LOCAL PRESS CARRYING FRONT-PAGE REPORTS YOUR IMPENDING VISIT CYPRUS ALTHOUGH DATE NOT PUBLIC. WE HAVE ISSUED PRESS RELEASE INCORPORATING WIRELESS BULLETIN APRIL 8 MEF 61 WITH ADDITION OF FOLLOWING PARA: "MR. SISCO WILL SPEND A FEW HOURS IN CYPRUS AND MAY HAVE TALKS WITH OFFICIALS HERE. HE IS BRINGING WITH HIM NO PLANS, NO NEW PROPOSALS FOR CYPRUS. HE IS SIMPLY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS MIDDLE-EAST TOUR TO MAKE THIS BRIEF STOP IN CYPRUS FOR ORIENTATION."

2. IF YOU AGREE I WOULD SUGGEST YOU PROPITIATE PRESS BY MAKING VERY BRIEF ARRIVAL STATEMENT AT AIRPORT. EXCEPT FOR THIS, WE WOULD INFORM PRESS GROUND RULES ARE NOT QUESTIONS WILL BE ANSWERED AND NO OTHER STATEMENT MADE. ARRIVAL STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES WOULD DO VERY NICELY:  
"I AM DELIGHTED THAT MY CURRENT ORIENTATION TRIP IN THIS AREA GIVES ME THE CHANCE TO RETURN TO YOUR BEAUTIFUL ISLAND. ALTHOUGH MY STAY WILL BE MUCH SHORTER THAN I WOULD WISH, I LOOK FORWARD TO RENEWING CONTACT WITH HIS BEATITUDE PRESIDENT MAKARIOS AND WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT. THESE CONTACTS WILL ENABLE ME TO OBTAIN FRESH INFORMATION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CYPRUS, AND ON PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THE TALKS BETWEEN MR. CLERIDES AND MR. DENKTASH TO WHICH WE ATTACH SO MUCH IMPORTANCE. IT REMAINS THE FIRM VIEW OF MY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00577 101549Z

GOVERNMENT THAT THESE TALKS OFFER CYPRIOTS THE BEST MEANS OF OBTAINING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM-- A SETTLEMENT SO MUCH TO BE DESIRED IN THIS ISLAND AFTER ITS YEARS OF STRIFE."

3. MAY WE LET PRESS KNOW YOU WILL BE MAKING BRIEF ARRIVAL STATEMENT BUT NOT OTHERWISE TALKING TO PRESS?

4. IF TIME PERMITS, PLAN TO HAVE YOU MEET FOR 10 OR 15 MINUTES WITH COUNTRY TEAM FOLLOWING CALLS ON MAKARIOS AND KUCHUK AND BEFORE GOING UPSTAIRS FOR PRIVATE LUNCHEON.

GP-4.  
POPPER

01 5 10 5:10  
1969

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
CONFIDENTIAL

991/03/169

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 063

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00522 031438Z

42  
ACTION SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 W

R 031410Z APR 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3377

004282

70 APR 3 PM 4:18

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 522

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SISCO ORIENTATION TRIP

REF: STATE 48525

1. DELIGHTED YOU WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO STOP IN NICOSIA PRIOR TO CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE. I LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING YOU TO LUNCH APRIL 14.
2. YOUR SCHEDULED ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE TIMES NICOSIA CONFIRMED. TIME IN NICOSIA TOO SHORT TO MAKE ADVANCE PLANNING FOR OFFICIAL MEETINGS WITH CYPRIOTS ADVISABLE. ARRIVAL TIME OF CAIRO PLANE IS UNRELIABLE, AND EL AL SECURITY OFFICIALS REQUIRE ALL PASSENGERS TO BE AT AIRPORT WELL BEFORE DEPARTURE; ALSO, FOR SECURITY REASONS, THEY HAVE HABIT OF ALTERING DEPARTURE TIME AT LAST MINUTE. IN ADDITION TO TIMING UNCERTAINTIES, WE WOULD HAVE PROTOCOL PROBLEMS WITH YOUR CALLS ON GREEK CYPRIOT OFFICIALS AS WELL AS WITH QUESTION OF BALANCING SUCH CALLS WITH VISITS TO TURK CYPRIOT SIDE.
3. IF IT MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL, THEREFORE, I WOULD LIKE TO SETTLE DEFINITELY ON LUNCH AT RESIDENCE WITH MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL FAMILY. IN ADDITION, I WOULD INFORM CLERIDES AND DENKTASH OF YOUR ARRIVAL AND, IF TIME PERMITS, TRY TO ARRANGE FOR YOU TO DROP IN ON EACH OF THEM INFORMALLY FOR BRIEF CHAT.

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
CONFIDENTIAL

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00522 031438Z

4. THOUGH BREVITY OF YOUR STAY WILL TEND TO DISCOURAGE FAR-OUT PRESS SPECULATION, YOU WILL STILL ATTRACT MUCH ATTENTION AS HIGHEST RANKING US OFFICIAL TO VISIT CYPRUS SINCE VANCE WAS HERE IN 1967. PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT SHORTLY BEFORE YOU LEAVE US SETTING CYPRUS TRANSIT STOP IN FRAMEWORK OF ENTIRE TRIP WILL BE HELPFUL.

GP-4  
POPPER

01:4 19 8 99A 07-

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

591/03/167



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 425

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00305 041126Z

17-S

ACTION NEA 15

INFO IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,  
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, EUR 15, AF 12, ACDA 16, SR 01,  
ORM 03, MC 01, RSR 01, /142 W

----- 101618

R 040940Z MAR 69  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2373  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T NICOSIA 305

DEPT PASS CAIRO AS NICOSIA 30

REF: STATE 32959

FROM BERGUS

1. UNABLE CONFIRM FROM HERE WHETHER SULZBERGER INTERVIEW WAS FIRST OCCASION NASSER PUBLICLY USED TERM "LASTING PEACE." USE OF TERM DOES NOT SURPRISE ME HOWEVER. GUAR LEADERSHIP HAS TRIED PERSUADE SKEPTICAL US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS FOR OVER A YEAR THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES 242 AS A PACKAGE WOULD LEAD TO LASTING PEACE. MOREOVER GUAR MEDIA HAVE FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY HELD OUT "JUST PEACE" AS SOMETHING EMINENTLY DESIRABLE BUT BEING OBSTRUCTED BY ISRAELI EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS.

2. I STILL HOLD TO VIEW THAT NASSER REVIVED PHANTOM ISSUE AS PART OF HIS CAMPAIGN PERSUADE BRITISH DESIST FROM SUPPLYING TANKS TO ISRAEL. IT STILL POSSIBLE THAT FAIRLY CLEARCUT STATEMENT FROM USG SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD STIMULATE NASSER TAKE INITIATIVE FOR RESUMPTION RELATIONS. IT FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT IN ABSENCE SUCH USG STATEMENT RESUMPTION WILL CONTINUE ELUDE BOTH EGYPTIANS AND OURSELVES. SUGGEST DEPT TAKE LOOK AT PRESIDENT NIXON'S B'NAI BRITH SPEECH OF LAST SEPTEMBER. IF MEMORY SERVES, MR. NIXON, WHILE SUPPORTING ISRAEL'S NEED FOR MILITARY STRENGTH, ALSO SAID CON-

SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00305 041126Z

TINUED ISRAEL OCCUPATION ARAB TERRITORIES WOULD BE A "TRAGIC MIS-  
TAKE." DEPT MIGHT WISH CONSIDER UP-DATING THIS LANGUAGE WHEREBY  
WE WOULD: A) DEMONSTRATE OUR MATERIAL CONCERN FOR ISRAEL'S SEC-  
URITY; B) EXPRESS VIEW THAT SUCH SECURITY MUST BE ACHIEVED BY MEANS  
OTHER THAN TERRITORIAL.

3. ASSUME USINT WILL ANSWER QUERY IN PARA 3 REFTEL. BELCHER

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

SECRET

592/03/173



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 392

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00220 150950Z

14

ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JP 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /153 W

004540

P 150740Z FEB 69  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2336  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
USMISSION NATO

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 220 Cyprus

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: LOCAL TALKS -- POSSIBLE CLERIDES RESIGNATION

1. OBVIOUSLY TENSE AND VERY DISTURBED CLERIDES TELLS ME THAT HE CAN NO LONGER SERVE AS GREEK CYPRIOT NEGOTIATOR IN LOCAL TALKS, AND IS PREPARING LETTER OF RESIGNATION FOR MAKARIOS. FINAL FRUSTRATION WAS WHAT HE CONSIDERS BE INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE THAT GREEK SECRET SERVICE (KYP) HAS BEEN ACTIVELY UNDERMINING HIS POSITION AS LEADER OF UNITED PARTY (UP). WHILE HE RECOGNIZED THIS ACTIVITY RESULTS FROM GREEK ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS GEORKADJIS, IT REPRESENTS GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF CYPRUS AND HAS MADE HIS POSITION UNTENABLE. HE CLAIMS TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF KYP INTERVENTION IN WHAT HE HAD HOPED WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH ANDREAS AZINAS AND PEK WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO SOME SORT OF ALLIANCE, BUT WHICH NOW HAS RESULTED IN A DECLARATION OF A SEPARATE PARTY. IN ADDITION, HE SAYS IT WAS KYP'S INFLUENCE ON FAMAGUSTA SEK LEADER CHRISTODOULIDES WHICH RESULTED IN THE ADHERENCE OF THAT DISTRICT'S RIGHT-WING LABOR ORGANIZATION TO THE PEK GROUP. HE ALSO CLAIMS TO KNOW THAT KYP THREAT-

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00220 150950Z

ENED SEK CENTRAL OFFICES WITH WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK SUBSIDY IF THEY LENT THEIR SUPPORT TO THE CLERIDES ORGANIZATION. HE ADDED THAT THE PRINCIPAL KYP OFFICER HERE (SIDERIDES) HAD BEEN ACTIVE PERSONALLY IN THIS CAMPAIGN, WHICH ALSO INCLUDES ALLEGATIONS THAT USG IS BACKING UNITED PARTY.

2. AS A RESULT OF ALL THIS, CLERIDES SAID THAT HE FELT THAT HE NO LONGER ENJOYED CONFIDENCE OR SUPPORT OF THE GOC

AS A WHOLE. THE VALUABLE RELATIONSHIP HE THOUGHT EXISTED BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PIPINELLIS COULD NO LONGER BE MAINTAINED AND IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL CONCERNED IF HE WERE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. IN ADDITION TO HIS STRONG REACTION TO KYP ACTIVITIES ON THE CYPRIOT POLITICAL SCENE, HE EXPRESSED STRONG SENSE OF FRUSTRATION RESULTING FROM HIS INABILITY TO OBTAIN ANY FLEXIBILITY IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT DURING A THREE-HOUR CABINET SESSION THURSDAY, THE ONLY DECISIONS TAKEN WERE NEGATIVE. HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO AGREE TO REASONABLE DENKTASH SUGGESTION THAT SUB-COMMITTEE BE SET UP TO EXPLORE QUESTION OF RE-INTEGRATION OF TURK CYPRIOTS INTO ELECTRICITY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY. (HE REMINDED ME THAT DENKTASH AGREEMENT TO SETTING UP COMMITTEE TO WORK ON QUESTION OF EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATURE HAD BEEN CONTINGENT ON GREEK APPROVAL OF ABOVE-MENTIONED COMMITTEE ON INTEGRATION.) WHEN HE PRESSED HIS COLLEAGUES WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, HE COULD NOT GET AUTHORITY TO INDICATE ANY FLEXIBILITY IN THE PREVIOUSLY-STATED GOC POSITION. THE ONLY THING CABINET AGREED TO DO WAS SET UP SUB-COMMITTEE TO "EXAMINE THE QUESTION FURTHER" AND HE NOTED THAT THIS SUB-COMMITTEE INCLUDED ONLY THOSE WHO WERE MOST VOCAL AGAINST COMPROMISE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE DID NOT SEE HOW ANY FURTHER PROGRESS COULD BE MADE.

4. I TOLD CLERIDES THAT I HOPED HE HAD CONSIDERED VARIOUS REPERCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM HIS RESIGNATION COMMENTING THAT WE CONSIDERED THAT HIS SPECIAL PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DENKTASH WAS AN INVALUABLE ASSET WHICH NO ONE ELSE IN COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE. HE COUNTERED WITH COMMENT THAT NO ONE IS INDISPENSABLE AND IT WAS OBVIOUS HE HAD FAILED. I

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00220 150950Z

SAID I FEARED THAT ONCE HIS RESIGNATION BECAME PUBLIC IT WAS QUITE LIMELY THAT TURKISH SIDE WOULD NOT ATTRIBUTE IT SOLELY TO INTERNAL POLITICS AND GREEK INTERFERENCE THEREIN. DENKTASH WAS WELL AWARE OF HIS DIFFICULTIES WITH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THIS AWARENESS WAS CERTAINLY SHARED BY OTHERS IN AUTHORITY ON TURKISH SIDE. IT WAS ONLY LOGICAL THAT THEY WOULD ASSUME HE WAS RESIGNING BECAUSE OF HARD LINE BEING MAINTAINED IN CABINET. IF MY FEARS IN THIS RESPECT WERE CORRECT, I COULD FORESEE DEFINITE DETERIORATION IN SITUATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY SENSE OF HOPELESSNESS AND FRUSTRATION ON TURKISH SIDE. EXPRESSED HOPE, WHICH I WAS CERTAIN WOULD BE SHARED IN WASHINGTON, THAT HE WOULD RECONSIDER. HE CLAIMED HIS MIND WAS MADE UP, THAT HE HAD FAILED AND HAD NO CHOICE, WOULD SUBMIT LETTER IN "NEXT FEW DAYS."

5. GREEK AMBASSADOR ALEXANDRAKIS CALLED ON ME IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY RETURN FROM MEETING CLERIDES AND INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD JUST HAD VIRTUALLY SAME CONVERSATION WITH HIM. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY MUCH DISTURBED AND QUITE VEHEMENT IN HIS DENIALS THAT HIS KYP HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN ALLEGED ACTIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT UNFORTUNATELY WE HAD HAD INFORMATION FROM NUMBER OF SOURCES, NOT JUST CLERIDES, THAT KYP HAD IN FACT BEEN INVOLVED. THESE SAME SOURCES HAD TOLD US KYP WAS ALSO LINKING THIS EMBASSY AND THE UNITED PARTY. ALEXANDRAKIS SAID HE COULD NOT BELIEVE THIS. HE WENT ON TO SAY HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO REASSURE CLERIDES OF ATTITUDE OF HIS GOVERNMENT TOWARDS HIM BOTH INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEGOTIATOR AND HAD READ HIM VERY WARM TELEGRAM FROM PIPINELLIS EXPRESSING FIRM SUPPORT FOR HIM IN HIS NEGOTIATING ROLE. DESPITE ALL HIS ARGUMENTS (WHICH MORE OR LESS PARALLELED MINE) AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD BEEN UNABLE DISSUADE CLERIDES FROM WHAT SEEMED TO BE MOST UNFORTUNATE DECISION. HE SAID HE HAD ASKED FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, IF POSSIBLE FROM PRIMIN PAPADOPOULOS HIMSELF, TO EXPRESS AGAIN TO CLERIDES FULL CONFIDENCE OF GOG IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS. HE HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME BENEFICIAL EFFECT.

6. ALEXANDRAKIS SHARED MY ASSESSMENT THAT CLERIDES HAD NEVER SEEMED UNDER SUCH TENSION. WE SPECULATED AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD ACTUALLY SEND HIS LETTER AND REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT HE WAS DETERMINED TO SEND IT BUT THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME CHANCE THAT BETWEEN ARCHBISHOP'S PERSUASIVENESS AND

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NICOSI 00220 150950Z

HIS HOPED-FOR MESSAGE FROM PAPADOPOULOS WE MIGHT YET AVOID AN ACTUAL RESIGNATION. QUITE ABVIOUSLY MAKARIOS WOULD USE ALL HIS EXTENSIVE PERSUASIVE ART TO GET HIM TO WITHDRAW IT.

7. COMMENT: WHILE IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT H AT CLERIDES IS MAKING THIS MOVE AS MEANS OF RALLYING SUPPORT AND PERHAPS IN LONG RUN EMERGING IN STRONGER POSITION, IT DOES SEEM TO ME HIS FRUSTRATIONS HAVE REACHED VERY DANGEROUS LEVEL. IT MAY HAVE OCCURRED TO HIM HOWEVER THAT BY HITTING THE ARCH-BISHOP WITH HIS LETTER AND BY INFORMING THE GREEK AMBASSADOR ANY MYSELF AND PROBABLY OTHERS, WE MIGHT BRING ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THE ARCHBISHOP AND ON GOG TO MODIFY THEIR POSITIONS. IN CASE OF ARCHBISHOP (AND CABINET), TO GIVE HIM SOME FLEXIBILITY IN HIS NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS AND IN THAT OF GREEK GOVERNMENT, TO GIVE SOME VISIBLE INDICATION OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIM WHILE AT SAME TIME DESISTING FROM THEIR BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACTIVITY AGAINST HIS PARTY.

8. RECOMMENDATION: IT WOULD SEEM NECESSARY FROM POINT OF VIEW OF OUR OVERALL INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES TO TAKE SOME ACTION DESIGNED TO AVOID WHAT SEEMS TO BE AN IMPENDING BREAK-DOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS. A CONVERSATION AT HIGH LEVEL IN WASH-INGTON WITH AMBASSADOR PALAMAS WOULD SEEM IN ORDER. IN IT WE COULD SAY THAT EVIDENCE OF KYP'S ACTIVITIES HERE APPEARS INCONTROVERTIBLE AND THAT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS FACTOR IN CLERIDES' FRUSTRATIONS COULD BE REMOVED. HERE IN NICOSIA, I MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED TO EXPRESS THE VIEW TO MAKARIOS, ONCE IT BECOMES SOMEWHAT MORE WIDELY KNOWN THAT CLERIDES IS SENDING OR HAS SENT HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION, THAT WE BELIVE THAT ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR HIS ACTION WAS HIS INABILITY TO OBTAIN NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY WHICH MIGHT GIVE HIM SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN TALKS. I COULD EXPRESS VIEW THAT IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE HAS BEEN SINGULAR LACK OF IMAGINATION IN THEIR APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM AND THAT WE FORESEE NOTHING BUT DIFFICULTIES AHEAD IF MORE POSITIVE APPROACH IS NOT TAKEN. BELCHER

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library



Department of State

*Cyprus*  
SUMMARY  
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 910

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00205 131650Z

45  
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AF 12, ACDA 16, AID 28, OPR 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04,  
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,  
SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /171 W

----- 122278

P 131500Z FEB 69  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2237  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 205

REFERENCE: NICOSIA 202

SUBJECT : CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL INCIDENT

1. ACCORDING UNFICYP WE ARE NOW PROBABLY OUT OF WOODS IN SHORT TERM AT LEAST REGARDING POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMS ESCALATION AND CLASH RESULTING FROM OMORPHITA INCIDENTS FEB. 10, 11, 12 DESCRIBED REFTEL. AFTER ALL-DAY CONSULTATION WITH PARTIES FEB. 12 UNFICYP BELIEVES IT HAS WORKED OUT SATISFACTORY FORMULA UNDER WHICH BOTH SIDES WILL TEMPORARILY SUSPEND PATROLLING. CREDIT FOR ARRANGEMENT, WHICH BEING CONFIRMED IN UNFICYP TO MAKARIOS FEB. 13 LETTER, GOES IN PART TO CONSTRUCTIVE BEHIND-SCENES ASSISTANCE FROM TURKISH EMBASSY. HOWEVER, IT IS UNFICYP ESTIMATE AND OURS THAT UNDERLYING PROBLEMS REMAIN UNRESOLVED, I.E., THERE ARE THOSE ON GREEK SIDE SUCH AS DIRGEN MININT ASASTASSIOU WHO DISAPPROVE AND MAY GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO DISRUPT CLERIDES' EFFORTS IN COOPERATION WITH DENKTASH GET REFUGEES BACK TO THEIR HOMES IN OMORPHITA AND ELSEWHERE, AND SIMILARLY THERE ARE ON TURKISH SIDE THOSE SUCH AS MINDEF OREK WHO WOULD WILLINGLY SABOTAGE DENKTASH'S CAMPAIGN FOR SUCH NORMALIZATION.

CONFIDENTIAL  
31



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00205 131650Z

2. IN THIS WEEK'S INCIDENTS, NEVERTHELESS, IT CAN BE FAIRLY SAID THAT TURKISH COMMUNITY MORE AT FAULT THAN GOC. TURKISH EMBASSY ASSERTS IT IS GOC WHICH RESPONSIBLE FOR HAVING STEADILY STEPPED UP (FROM ONCE A MONTH TO DAILY) ITS CYPOL PATROLS IN THE TROUBLED AREA IN AN ALLEGED EFFORT TO INTIMIDATE REFUGEES WHO HAVE BEEN MOVING BACK INTO OMORPHITA HOMES DURING PAST THREE MONTHS. BUT AT SAME TIME, TURKISH EMBASSY ACKNOWLEDGES (A) FEB. 10 INCIDENT HAPPENED AS RESULT ORDERS OF AN INCONSEQUENTIAL LOCAL TMT COMMANDER WITHOUT PRIOR CONCURRENCE TCPA, (B) OREK HIMSELF GAVE ORDERS FOR FEB. 11 CONFRONTATION "AS MATTER OF HONOR," (C) TURKISH EMBASSY DID NOT EVEN LEARN OF FEB. 10 INCIDENT UNTIL THAT OF FOLLOWING DAY ALREADY UNDERWAY, AND (D) WHATEVER THE PROVOCATION FROM GOC SIDE, PROPER TURKISH RECOURSE WAS UNFICYP NOT TO DISPATCH ARMED PATROLS INTO AREA.

3. THREE MORALS OF THIS STORY -- AND HERE TURKISH EMBASSY IS IN ABASHEDLY FULL AGREEMENT WITH US AND UNFICYP -- ARE THAT (A) INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO BE JEOPARDIZED BY HAIR-TRIGGER REACTIONS OF TURKISH COMMUNITY WHICH MUST LEARN USE UNFICYP TO GAIN REDRESS WHEN IT THINKS IT HAS CAUSE FOR COMPLAINT, (B) DESPITE PRESENCE OF TURKISH MAINLAND OFFICERS WITH TMT WHICH TURKISH EMBASSY SO OFTEN JUSTIFIES AS NECESSARY FOR CONTROL IN JUST SUCH CASES AS THIS, THE CHAIN OF COMMUNICATIONS AND COMMAND INTO TURKISH EMBASSY IS FAULTY, AND (C) UNFICYP MUST HAVE SOME FAIRLY HIGH AND RESPONSIBLE POINT OF CONTACT IN TMT IN CHAIN OF COMMAND WITH WHICH TO WORK TO PREVENT INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT GETTING EVEN MORE OUT OF HAND. SUCH LACK WAS WOEFULLY APARENT DURING FEB. 11-12 AND UNFICYP HAS ASKED TURKISH EMBASSY CONSIDER HOW COORDINATION MIGHT BE IMPROVED. LATTER HAS CONFLICTING FEELINGS BUT CONSIDERING SUGGESTING THAT UNFICYP CONTACT BE WITH CHIEF OF STAFF TO "BOZKURT," THE SUPPOSEDLY ANONYMOUS MAINLAND OFFICER WHO HEADS TMT STRUCTURE. BELCHER

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State  
SUMMARY

TELEGRAM

Cyprus

CONFIDENTIAL 701

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00202 121126Z

19  
ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,  
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SAH 02, ACDA 16,  
RSR 01, /155 W

----- 113190

P 121020Z FEB 69  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2326  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 202

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: INTERCOMMUNAL INCIDENT

1. MOST SERIOUS INTERCOMMUNAL INCIDENT IN SEVERAL MONTHS OCCURRED DURING LAST 36 HOURS. SUCCESSIVE CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN UNARMED CYPOL PATROLS AND TMT FIGHTERS IN OMORPHITA AREA (FOR DETAILS SEE DATT C-0031 FEB 69 SENT PRIORITY) TOOK PLACE ON FEBRUARY 10, 11, AND 12. UNFICYP HAS MOVED ADDITIONAL TROOPS (20 FINNS) INTO INTERPOSING POSITIONS AND IS NEGOTIATING WITH BOTH SIDES TO RE-ESTABLISH STATUS QUO.
2. THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT DEFINITION OF STATUS QUO WITH GREEK SIDE CLAIMING THEY HAVE BEEN SENDING UNARMED CYPOL PATROLS DOWN NOOUSSA STREET SINCE 1964 UNDER AGREEMENT WORKED OUT WITH UNFICYP. TURKS CLAIMING GREEKS HAVE LATELY GREATLY INCREASED FREQUENCY AND SIZE OF PATROLS WHICH REQUIRED ACTION ON THEIR PART. UNFICYP IS CHECKING ITS RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHETHER ORIGINAL AGREEMENT, IN FACT, PROVIDED FOR ONCE-A-WEEK PATROLLING BY CYPOL.
3. AMBASSADOR MADE PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED CALL ON VICE PRESIDENT KUCHUK THIS MORNING AND DISCUSSED DEVELOPMENTS WITH MINDEF OREK WHO, AS USUAL, WAS SPOKESMAN FOR TURK CYPRIOTS. OREK INITIALLY COMPLAINED ABOUT INCREASED FREQUENCY OF CYPOL PATROLS CLAIMING THAT

CONFIDENTIAL





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NICOSI 00202 121126Z

THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT WITH UNFICYP ON FREQUENCY. HE SOON CHANGED HIS TUNE ASSERTING CYPOL HAD NO BUSINESS IN AREA (I.E., PROCEEDING ALONG NOOUSA STREET) IN PRINCIPLE. WHEN AMBASSADOR ASKED OREK WHY TURK CYPRIOTS RESPONDED TO PROBLEM BY SENDING ARMED MEN INTO UNARMED ZONE RATHER THAN REQUESTING UNFICYP TO INVESTIGATE AND MEDIATE, DEFMIN REPLIED THAT DECISION WAS TAKEN AT LOW LEVEL (PRESUMABLY BY LOCAL TMT LEADER).

4. COMMENT: AMBASSADOR HAD IMPRESSION KUCHUKERY OFFICIALS ON DEFENSIVE ON THIS ONE PARTICULARLY SINCE OREK COULD NOT SATISFACTORILY EXPLAIN WHY TURK CYPRIOTS RESORTED TO ARMED INTERVENTION BEFORE RESORTING TO UNFICYP MEDIATION. IN ANY CASE, UNFICYP INFORMS US THAT BECAUSE TURK EMBASSY IS TAKING CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, THEY ARE REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC THAT RETURN TO "ONCE-A-WEEK PATROLLING FORMULA" CAN BE ARRANGED, PARTICULARLY SINCE UNFICYP OFFICIALS CONFIDENT RECORD WILL SHOW THAT THIS WAS PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENT.

5. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT SITUATION CAN BE DEFUSED BY RETURN TO "ONCE-A-WEEK FORMULA" AND ARE ENCOURAGED BY CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE BEING TAKEN BY TURK EMBASSY. UNFORTUNATELY, HARDLINERS ON BOTH SIDES ARE POINTING TO INCIDENT TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITIONS. OREK CLAIMED TO AMBASSADOR THAT GOC HAD, IN FACT, INCREASED FREQUENCY OF PATROLS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WANT TURK REFUGEES RETURN OMORPHITA. THERE MAY BE SOME JUSTICE TO THIS CLAIM SINCE GOC HARDLINERS (AND INTERIOR MINISTRY DIRGEN ANASTASSIOU IS ONE OF THEM) DO NOT WANT TURK REFUGEES RETURN BECAUSE THEY CLAIM TURKS WILL ENLARGE THEIR ENCLAVES IN THIS MANNER. OTHER TURK CYPRIOT HARDLINERS ARE USING INCIDENT AS PROOF OF THEIR CONTENTION THAT ENCLAVES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND TURKS KEPT WITHIN THEM.

6. MILITANCY OF TURK CYPRIOT REACTION TO CYPOL PATROLS COMING ON HEELS OF DENKTASH'S RECENT CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS AND ACCEPTANCE OF CONCEPT OF RETURN OF TURK REFUGEES (NICOSIA 192) LEADS US SPECULATE THAT ENTIRE INCIDENT COULD BE TURK CYPRIOT PROVOCATION GENERATED BY HARDLINERS (EITHER IN KUCHUKERY OR AT LOWER TMT LEVEL) IN EFFORT "GET" DENKTASH AND/OR HIS POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION. SUCH ACTIONS, OF COURSE, GENERATE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM HARDLINERS ON GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE, WHERE CLERIDES HAD ALREADY BEEN HAVING ROUGH TIME SELLING DESIRABILITY OF GOC AID TO TURKISH REFUGEE RETURNEES. IN ANY CASE, UNFICYP APPEARS TO HAVE SITUATION

CONFIDENTIAL

25



*Department of State*

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00202 121126Z

IN HAD ALTHOUGH TENSION WILL BE HIGH FOR A WHILE. BELCHER

CONFIDENTIAL



EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 1254

PAGE 01 STATE 044274

12  
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/CYP:RWERDMAN:MJB  
APPROVED BY NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/CYP - T.D. BOYATT  
NEA/EX - T. W. DAVIES (DRAFT)  
L - A. T. BROWN (DRAFT)  
NCR - E. FITZGERALD (DRAFT)  
INR/DDC/RPS - R. CURL (DRAFT)  
OC - W. NAEHER (DRAFT)  
S/S - SRGAMMON

74 MAR 6 PM 3:04

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

----- 000325

R 052254Z MAR 74  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

SECRET STATE 044274

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: OGEN, CY  
SUBJECT: RRO PHASE-DOWN

REF: A. NICOSIA 203; B. NICOSIA 294; C. STATE 038963

1. IN INTERESTS OF PRESERVING US CREDIBILITY AND MINIMIZING APPEARANCE OF CHANGE, DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD TREAT DIRECT HIRE AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEES OF REORGANIZED RRO IN SIMILAR FASHION AND THAT WE SHOULD INFORMALLY APPROACH GOC, IN CONTEXT OF GENERAL REVIEW OF PHASE-DOWN, ON MATTER OF NEW PERSONNEL ARRANGEMENTS. APPROACH SHOULD UNDERScore OUR VIEW THAT CONTEMPLATED CHANGES ARE PURELY INTERNAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND SHOULD AIM AT ELICITING TACIT OR INFORMAL GOC AGREEMENT TO CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF 1968 AGREEMENT TO ALL AMERICAN RRO PERSONNEL.

2. DEPARTMENT REQUESTS EMBASSY MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS AT

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY


SECRET

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 044274

APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTRY:

A. TO REDUCE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, WE PLANNING TO STAFF REORGANIZED RRO IN PART WITH DIRECT HIRE USG EMPLOYEES AND IN PART WITH "USG CONTRACT EMPLOYEES" PROVIDED BY RADIATION INCORPORATED, A US ELECTRONICS FIRM WHICH HAS MANUFACTURED MOST OF THE RRO'S EQUIPMENT. ON AN "IF ASKED" BASIS, POST MAY INFORM GOC THAT WE THINKING IN TERMS OF APPROXIMATELY SEVEN USG EMPLOYEES AND TWENTY-THREE

USG CONTRACT EMPLOYEES. (WE BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE TO BE FORTHCOMING ON USG RELATIONSHIP WITH CONTRACT EMPLOYEES SO AS TO AVOID ANY FUTURE CHARGE OF MISREPRESENTATION.)


B. THESE "USG CONTRACT EMPLOYEES" WILL TRAVEL ON GOVERNMENT (DOD) ORDERS, PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES AS PART OF THE MISSION, AND BE SOLELY UNDER CONTROL OF USG OFFICIALS WHILE IN CYPRUS. IN EFFECT, ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIRECT HIRE AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEES IS THAT LATTER WILL BE PAID INDIRECTLY RATHER THAN DIRECTLY BY THE USG (I.E., VIA FIRM CONTRACTED BY USG).

C. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ALL AMERICAN PERSONNEL AT RRO WOULD CONTINUE TO BE COVERED BY 1968 AGREEMENT.

3. OWING TO OFFICIAL NATURE OF SERVICES PROVIDED TO GOVERNMENT BY RADIATION INCORPORATED, FACT THAT RADIATION WILL HAVE NO REPEAT NO CORPORATE PRESENCE IN CYPRUS, AND LIKELIHOOD THAT CYPRUS TAXES IN EXCESS OF US TAXES WOULD BE DIRECTLY PASSED ON TO USG IN FORM OF HIGHER CONTRACT FEE, THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR ARGUING THAT RADIATION INCORPORATED SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE LIABLE TO GOC TAXATION. DEPARTMENT THEREFORE BELIEVES WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT TAKE INITIATIVE IN RAISING THORNY QUESTION OF RADIATION'S POSSIBLE TAX LIABILITY TO GOC AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REQUEST FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ASSISTANCE AT THIS TIME IN OBTAINING WAIVER OF GOC REGULATIONS CONCERNING FOREIGN BUSINESS OPERATIONS. IN SHORT, OUR APPROACH IS ONE OF "LETTING SLEEPING DOGS LIE."

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 044274

4. IN EVENT GOC DOES RAISE ISSUE OF RADIATION'S TAX LIABILITY, CHARGE SHOULD ATTEMPT DISSUADE GOC FROM THIS COURSE BY ARGUING ON PERSONAL BASIS POINTS RAISED IN FIRST PART OF PARAGRAPH 3. IF THIS APPROACH UNSUCCESSFUL, POST SHOULD PROMISE TO CONVEY GOC POSITION TO DEPARTMENT AND TO SEEK FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. LIKewise, IN EVENT GOC ARGUES AGAINST APPLICABILITY OF 1968 AGREEMENT TO CONTRACT PERSONNEL, POST SHOULD REITERATE USG VIEW THAT AGREEMENT DOES APPLY AND SAY THAT IT WILL REQUEST FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 566

PAGE 01 STATE 215249

62  
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EX:MPJONES:EMP  
APPROVED BY NEA/EX:LEAMON R. HUNT  
NEA - MR. CRAIG  
S/S - MR. MILLER

130487

0 010205Z NOV 73  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE  
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 215249

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: APER  
SUBJ: TDY CAIRO

PLEASE HAVE MS. BEVERLY J. MELANI PROCEED TO CAIRO  
PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 4 FOR TEMPORARY DUTY THERE BEGINNING  
NOVEMBER 4 AND ENDING ON OR ABOUT NOVEMBER 8 UNDER NEA  
TA 4401-400117 DATED OCTOBER 31, 1973, CHARGE: 1940113-  
4401-400117-2155. KISSINGER

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
CONFIDENTIAL





# Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 068076

B. AS ARCHBISHOP IS AWARE, US, BECAUSE OF FIRM BELIEF THAT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS HAS NO PLACE IN RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND KEEPING IN MIND THAT MANY US

CITIZENS BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HAVE SUFFERED AT HANDS OF TERRORIST ATTACKERS, HAS TAKEN A STRONG POSITION AGAINST TERRORISM IN ALL OF ITS FORMS. US POSITION IS AND WILL REMAIN THAT SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE TERRORIST ACTS MUST BE STERNLY DEALT WITH BY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS. IN VIEW OF RECENT SAVAGE AND TRAGIC EVENTS PERPETRATED ON CYPRIOT SOIL, GOVT OF US IS ENCOURAGED BY INDICATIONS THAT GOVT OF CYPRUS WILL FULFILL ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BY PROSECUTING THE TERRORISTS WITH THE FULL VIGOR OF CYPRIOT LAW.

2. FYI: AS PART OF OUR OVERALL EFFORT TO COMBAT TERRORISM, USG HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN AS MUCH FACTUAL DATA REGARDING TERRORIST INCIDENTS AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HOPE EMBASSY NICOSIA WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM INFORMATION AVAILABLE REGARDING APRIL 9 ATTACKS (NAMES, ALIASES, PICTURES, FINGERPRINTS, MODUS OPERANDI, ETC.). SUBJECT YOUR VIEWS AFTER CONSULTATION

25X1

EMBASSY OFFICIALS, WE BELIEVE SUCH INFORMATION IS OF ENOUGH IMPORTANCE TO USG TO WARRANT YOUR RAISING SUBJECT WITH MAKARIOS IF EMBASSY UNABLE OBTAIN DATA THROUGH EXISTING CHANNELS.

25X1

3. AS NICOSIA 815 POINTS OUT, FACT THAT GOG NOW HOLDING SEVERAL ARAB TERRORISTS IN JAIL INCREASES POSSIBILITY OF KIDNAP/RANSOM OPERATION AIMED AT US PERSONNEL OR DESTRUCTION OPERATION AIMED AT US FACILITY. WE ARE SURE YOU ARE TAKING EVERY PRECAUTION. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET


Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified

0811/001/065

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 962

PAGE 01 STATE 135854

72  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/CYP:RALONG:CMH  
7/26/72 X 22300  
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES  
NEA/CYP:TDBOYATT (SUBS)  
S/S-O: R-VIETS

027744

72 JUL 27 AM 8:13  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

R 270030Z JUL 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T STATE 135854

EXDIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: FIRST ROUND OF RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

REF : NICOSIA 1387

1. PARA 6 REFTEL OUTLINED POSSIBLE COMPROMISE BY WHICH  
TURK CYPRIOT EMPLOYEES MIGHT RETURN TO ELECTRICAL AUTHOR-  
ITY. ACCORDING CLERIDES, HE AND DENKTASH MIGHT BE ABLE  
REACH SUCH COMPROMISE BY JULY 14 MEETING AND PUBLICLY  
ANNOUNCE IT BEFORE JULY 21 RECESS. SINCE SUCH PUBLIC  
ANNOUNCEMENT NOT MADE, WE ASSUME AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE  
REACHED.


2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION YOU MIGHT BE ABLE  
FURNISH ON STATUS OF THIS ISSUE.

3. DECLASSIFICATION: EXEMPT CAT 3. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELETYPE

SECRET 537

PAGE 01 STATE 107109

60  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/CYP:TDBOYATT:VH  
6/15/72 EXT 20279  
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES  
NEA/TUR:RSDILLON (DRAFT)  
S/S - MR. MILLER

72 JUN 16 AM 8:39

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

116392

R 152152Z JUN 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
EUCOM  
USDOSOUTH

SECRET STATE 107109

EXDIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: TURKISH MOVES REGARDING RESUMED CYPRUS  
TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 1201


1. DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH EMBASSY NICOSIA'S POINT THAT  
EFFORT BY TURKS TO INTRODUCE OFFICER FROM TURKISH EMBASSY  
IN NICOSIA OR FROM GOT FONMINISTRY IN ANKARA AS INTER-  
PRETER WOULD BE MOST UNHELPFUL AT THIS POINT. MAKARIOS  
AND PROBABLY UN AS WELL, SURE TO REGARD SUCH A MOVE AS  
EFFORT BY TURKS TO UPSET DELICATE BALANCE OF SYG'S  
FORMULA AND TO CAUSE TILT TOWARD GOT INTERPRETATION THAT  
TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT IS GOT REPRESENTATIVE.

2. WHILE NO DIRECT ACTION BY U.S. SEEMS CALLED FOR AT  
THIS POINT, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF OSORIO WERE APPRAISED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELETYPE

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 107109

IN A GENERAL WAY OF ALDIKACTI'S LANGUAGE PROBLEM. IF MATTER IS DROPPED AND ALDIKACTI APPEARS AT JULY 3 MEETING WITH GOT FONMINISTRY INTERPRETER, TALKS NOT LIKELY TO GET OFF TO AUSPICIOUS BEGINNING.

3. AT SOME POINT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO REMIND GOT THAT LARGEST AND BEST-QUALIFIED GROUP OF ENGLISH SPEAKING TURKS IN WORLD IS FOUND IN TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY ON CYPRUS. ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

59/03/185

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WTT

SECRET 419

PAGE 01 STATE 042055

45  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66636  
DRAFTED BY NEA/CYP: TDBOYATT  
APPROVED BY NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES  
S/S: MR. MILLER

034100

R 102340Z MAR 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T STATE 042055

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CONVERSATION WITH SAMPSON

REF: NICOSIA 578

1. DEPT RECEIVED YESTERDAY (MAR 9) NICOSIA'S EXCELLENT  
A-24 AND WE WILL BE RESPONDING IN AIRGRAM CHANNEL.

2. REGRET MISTAKE IN PARA 3 OF STATE 39422. SENTENCE  
SHOULD HAVE READ, "IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT PANAYOTAKOS  
DID SAY TO SOMEONE BEGIN INSERT --IN GOG OTHER THAN  
KYPRIANOU-- END INSERT GOG WANTED MAKARIOS' OUSTER."  
GP-3. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
SECRET

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 801

PAGE 01 STATE 026065

91  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66638  
DRAFTED BY: NEA J J SISCO  
APPROVED BY: NEA MR. SISCO  
WHITE HOUSE MR. SAUNDERS  
S/S MR. CURRAN

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 FEB 15 AM 7:49

103949

P 150123Z FEB 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 026065

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: POSSIBLE UN MOVES TO DEFUSE CRISIS

REF: NICOSIA 321

1. IN RESPONSE TO OSORIO-TAFALL'S INQUIRY, YOU SHOULD TELL HIM THAT WE HAVE HAD WORD THAT GOG AND GOT HAVE ALREADY REFERRED MATTER OF UN ROLE ON QUESTION OF CZECH ARMS TO SYG. (PARA 5, ANKARA 1021) WE UNDERSTAND THAT WALDHEIM HAS THIS MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION ON THE BASIS OF THIS GOG-GOT INITIATIVE. GP-3. ROGERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 141

PAGE 01 STATE 002878

84  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66644  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP: RALONG  
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/CYP: TDBOYATT  
S/S-MR. MILLER  
WH-MR SAUNDERS

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

72 JAN 7 AM 7:17

02

----- 082571

R 062330Z JAN 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

SECRET STATE 002878

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER


REF: NICOSIA 021

TIMING OF YOUR CALL ON ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS LEFT TO YOUR  
DISCRETION. GP-3. IRWIN

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 515

PAGE 01 STATE 001185

82  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 R

66650  
DRAFTED BY:NEA/CYP:RALONG  
APPROVED BY:S/S:RHMILLER  
NEA:JOSEPH J SICSO  
NEA:ALFRED L ATHERTON JR

065925

R 042335Z JAN 72  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

S E C R E T STATE 001185

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS  
FOR AMBASSADOR

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS AND EXPLAIN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED YOU PERSONALLY TO MAKE THIS PRESENTATION.

BEGIN MESSAGE

PRESIDENT NIXON WISHES TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO LET YOUR BEATITUDE KNOW WHAT HE IS DISCUSSING DURING HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE HEADS OF SEVERAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO HIS TRIPS TO MOSCOW AND PEKING.

MOSCOW VISIT

THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS CURRENT CONSULTATIONS IS REVIEWING THE GENERAL STATE OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, PREPARATORY TO HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN MAY 1972. THE PRESIDENT IS INDICATING DURING THE CONSULTATIONS THAT SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS MIGHT BE MADE EITHER BEFORE OR DURING THE MOSCOW VISIT, IN SUCH BILATERAL AREAS AS ARMS CONTROL AND ECONOMIC

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 001185

RELATIONS.

PEKING VISIT

A. THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT IS THAT THE PRC AND OURSELVES ACHIEVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHERS' POSITIONS, AND THAT WE ESTABLISH A CONTINUING MEANS OF REMAINING INFORMED ABOUT THESE POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, HE HOPES THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL BE ABLE TO AGREE ON AT LEAST THE BEGINNING OF EXCHANGES IN NON-POLITICAL FIELDS SO THAT OUR TWO PEOPLES WILL BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER. GIVEN OUR DIFFERENCES, HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL NOT ARISE.

B. THE PRESIDENT IS EMPHASIZING THAT NEITHER SIDE IS UNDER ANY ILLUSIONS AS TO THE DEPTH AND COMPLEXITY OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT SEPARATE US. HAVING BEEN TWO DECADES IN DEVELOPING, THESE DIFFERENCES WILL NOT BE EASILY RESOLVED. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPE TO MAKE A BEGINNING TOWARD CLARIFYING OUR POSITIONS AND TOWARD WORKING OUT THE REAL DIFFERENCES THAT STAND BETWEEN US. TO THE EXTENT WE ARE SUCCESSFUL, WE BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE HELPED REDUCE TENSIONS IN ASIA AND THE WORLD, WHICH SHOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO ALL NATIONS.

ECONOMIC ISSUES.

THE PRESIDENT IS EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE REALIGNMENT OF EXCHANGE RATES. THIS AGREEMENT -- WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR A RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY -- IS A MANIFESTATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE MAJOR TRADING NATIONS TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF ALL. IT IS, FURTHER, EVIDENCE THAT ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES WHICH WE MAY HAVE WITH OUR TRADING PARTNERS CAN AND WILL BE SOLVED AMICABLY IN A SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. IT WOULD BE INCORRECT FOR CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, OR ANY OTHER NATION TO SEE SUCH ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES AS REPRESENTING AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIVIDE FREE WORLD NATIONS.

CYPRUS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 001185

THE PRESIDENT IS GRATIFIED TO NOTE THE VERY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GOC IN THE EFFORT TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. END. MESSAGE

2. USG DOES NOT INTEND TO MAKE DELIVERY OF MESSAGE PUBLIC. WOULD APPRECIATE HOST GOVERNMENT ALSO MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH FACT AND CONTENT OF MESSAGE. (FYI- SIMILAR MESSAGES ARE ALSO BEING SENT TO SELECTED OTHER LEADERS. END FYI)  
ROGERS

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 222

PAGE 01 STATE 169861

43  
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1046 R

66603  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/RA:WAHELSETH  
APPROVED BY: S/UN - ROBERT BROWN  
NEA:MR VAN HOLLEN  
SH:MARSHALL WRIGHT (SUBS)  
S/S:MR CURRAN  
NEA/CYP - MR DAVIS

OCT 15 PM 7:18  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
2/3

082546

O R 151532Z OCT 70 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 169861

EXDIS

SUBJECT: HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AT 25TH UNGA - MAKARIOS  
APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT

APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT SCHEDULED AT 10:00 AM SUNDAY OCTOBER  
25. PLEASE CONFIRM ACCEPTABILITY. ROGERS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 476

PAGE 01 STATE 166454

80  
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 NSC-10 SS-20 USIA-12 IO-13 CPR-04 PRS-01 SSO-00  
RSC-01 /077 R

66648  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP:TWDAVIS 10/8/70  
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/RA-MR. HELSETH  
NEA/P-MR. SMITH (INFO)  
THE WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS  
S/UN-MR. BROWN  
S/S-MR. CURRAN  
USIA-MR. CONGLETON (SUBS)

040219

O 082341Z OCT 70 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 166454

DELIVER TO AMBASSADOR OPENING OF BUSINESS OCT 9

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM DAVIS

REF: NICOSIA 1794

SUBJECT: CYPRUS- PRESIDENTIAL MEETING

IN CONFIRMING PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS  
YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT FOR TIME BEING WE CONSIDER INFO  
PRIVILEGED AND NOT RELEASABLE TO PUBLIC PRIOR USG-GOC  
CONSULTATION AS TO TIMING. FYI WE ARE NOT PREPARED FOR  
RELEASE AT THIS TIME END FYI. GP-3. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

Ed  
**TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 285

PAGE 01 STATE 165083

53  
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 NSC-10 SS-20 RSC-01 IO-13 CPR-04 /064 R

66605  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP: TWDAVIS  
APPROVED BY: NEA: RPDAVIES  
NEA/RA: MR HELSETH(SUBS)  
S/UN: MR BROWN  
WHITE HOUSE: MR WRIGHT  
S/S: MR CURRAN

\*\*\*\*\* 028343

R 071839Z OCT 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 165083

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM DAVIS

REF: NICOSIA 1758, 1768

1. HAVE YOU INFORMED MAKARIOS OF AGREEMENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL MEETING?
2. IF NOT, YOU MAY DO SO WITH CONFIRMATION TO DEPT.
3. SCHEDULING INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW AS SOON AS AVAILABLE.
4. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TALKING POINTS BY C.O.B. OCT 8.

GP-3.  
ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 635

PAGE 01 STATE 100271

92  
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 IO-13 CPR-02 PM-05 H-02 NSC-10 O-03  
OPR-02 P-03 RSC-01 SS-20 SY-03 USIA-12 PRS-01 /113 R

66645  
DRAFTED BY:NEA/CYP TWDAVIS  
APPROVED BY:NEA RODGER P DAVIES  
NEA/GRK MR VIGDERMAN (INFO)  
IO/UNP MISS JONES (INFORMED)  
NEA/TUR MR CASH (INFO)  
S/CPR MR CODUS (INFO)

088414

R 250000Z JUN 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 100271

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - MAKARIOS' VISIT TO US

REFERENCE: STATE 83414, NICOSIA 923

1. CYPRUS COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY NICOLAIDES INFORMED DEPT JUNE 23 THAT MAKARIOS' VISIT TO US (IN CONJUNCTION WITH UN ANNIVERSARY) WILL BE OCT 18 THROUGH 24.
2. A WORKING GROUP UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP ASST SEC DEPALMA HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO COORDINATE VISITS OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND PREPARE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THOSE PRESIDENT SHOULD SEE.
3. NICOSIA WILL BE INFORMED AS SOON AS DECISION AVAILABLE ON MAKARIOS' REQUEST TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT NIXON IN NEW YORK.

GP-3. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

5



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 524

PAGE 01 STATE 109925

42  
ORIGIN NEA-15

INFO OCT-01 CPR-02 PM-05 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 SS-20 USIA-12  
PRS-01 /070 R

66606  
DRAFTED BY:NEA/CYP:KHTORP  
APPROVED BY:NEA/CYP:MR DAVIS  
S/S:MR PEAY  
NEA:MR LONG

058419

R 101425Z JUL 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 109925

SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO PRESIDENT MAKARIOS:

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MAKARIOS:

QUOTE YOUR BEATITUDE: YOUR CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES ARE MOST APPRECIATED. YOU MAY BE SURE THAT THEY ARE WARMLY RECEIVED AND HEIGHTEN THE PRIDE WE TAKE ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF OUR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. RICHARD NIXON UNQUOTE

2. FYI FOLLOWING IS TEXT MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT MAKARIOS ON JULY 4: QUOTE ON THE 194TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE AMERICAN NATION THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS JOIN IN THE REJOICING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTES A GREAT LANDMARK IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD. MAY I CONVEY ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF CYPRUS, MY GOVERNMENT AND MYSELF HARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS AND WARMEST WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL HAPPINESS AND THE PROSPERITY OF THE FRIENDLY AMERICAN PEOPLE IN PEACE. ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS UNQUOTE

3. DEPT DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE


PAGE 02 STATE 109925

BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS RELEASE BY GOC.  
JOHNSON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TELEGRAM

11e/02/e65



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 717

PAGE 01 STATE 024888

49  
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,  
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NIC 01, AID 28, ACDA 16,  
/153 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA: SWROCKWELL  
APPROVED BY: NEA - STUART W. ROCKWELL

006724

R 151911Z FEB 69  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
USMISSION NATO  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 024888

REF: NICOSIA 220 *Dana Cyprus*


SUBJECT: SITUATION OF CLERIDES

1. ROCKWELL SPOKE WITH AMBASSADOR PALAMAS FEBRUARY 15, SAYING WE CONCERNED BY APPARENT STRONG INTENTION OF CLERIDES TO RESIGN AND ASKING WHETHER, IF PALAMAS AGREED THIS WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE STEP, THERE WAS ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO BE HELPFUL. PALAMAS SAID IT WOULD HELP HIM VERY MUCH IN REPORTING TO ATHENS TO KNOW WHAT STEPS THE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT MIGHT BE USEFUL. ROCKWELL SUGGESTED THAT THE GOG TRY TO DISSUADE CLERIDES FROM RESIGNING, TELL KYP NICOSIA TO STOP WORKING AGAINST HIM, AND TRY TO PERSUADE MAKARIOS TO GIVE CLERIDES MORE FLEXIBILITY IN HIS NEGOTIATING ROLE. PALAMAS AGREED TO SUGGEST THESE STEPS TO ATHENS.

2. PALAMAS EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW, NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, THAT MAKARIOS THINKS THAT CLERIDES' INCREASED STATURE MAKES

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 024888

HIM A POTENTIAL RIVAL AND WANTS TO SEE HIM CUT DOWN TO SIZE.

3. YOU AUTHORIZED SPEAK TO MAKARIOS AS SUGGESTED PARA 8 REFTEL.

GP-3. ROGERS

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

592/90/1918



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 447

PAGE 01 STATE 041668

82  
ORIGIN SS-45

INFO OCT-01 /046 R

66641  
DRAFTED BY: NEA/ JJSISCO  
APPROVED BY: JOSEPH J. SISCO  
S/S MR LEVITSKY  
IO/UNP MISS B J JONES INFO

055332

P R 210036Z MAR 70  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T STATE 041668

EXDIS

1. POSTS MAY PROCEED ON BASIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED 3(A), (B) AND (C) OF AMBASSADOR POPPER'S 422. REPORTING CABLE OF SISCO-ESENBEL CONVERSATION FOLLOWS. BASED ON ESENBEL'S DEMARCHE, TURKS SEEM VERY RELAXED.
2. WE LEAVE IT TO POPPER'S DISCRETION AS TO HOW STRONG A PITCH HE MAKES WITH MAKARIOS REGARDING MEASURES THAT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR GOG TO TAKE, SINCE YOU HAVE A BETTER FEEL AS TO HOW SHARP A REACTION RAMSBOTTOM RECEIVED IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH MAKARIOS.
3. WE ARE ASKING BRITISH HERE TO CONCERT WITH OUR AMBASSADORS IN ATHENS, NICOSIA AND ANKARA WITH A VIEW TO MAKING PARALLEL APPROACHES. GP3.  
ROGERS

70 MAR 21 AM 11:51  
WHITE HOUSE  
STATION ROOM

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

CIA

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10983]**

(8 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 215 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /MIH  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10984]**

(3 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 216 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB [initials]  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10985]**

(2 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 217 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mih  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10986]**

(4 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 218 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /m H  
10/8/2014

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM  
THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED  
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY  
NUMBER 219 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD  
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET  
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM  
THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED  
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY  
NUMBER 220 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD  
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET  
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10989]**

(5 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 221 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB *mlh*  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10990]**

(1 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 222 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /MTH  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10991]**

(3 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 223 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB / mll  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10992]**

(2 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 224 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mlh  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10993]**

(2 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 225 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mll  
10/8/2014

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

**ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER**

**MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10994]**

(1 p.)

**EXEMPTED** per 3.3(b)(1), ltr. 7/3/2012

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 226 ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB / WML  
10/8/2014

NODIS

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S



17 JAN 74Z 20 00  
Department of State 003923

WH I.O.

(5)

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CA0372

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00098 171927Z

64  
ACTION CCO-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

*Sewerdt  
McFARLANE*

003987

Z O 171920Z JAN 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO USINT CAIRO FLASH  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8138

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 98

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

EO 11652: DECON 2/1/74  
TAGS: OVIP (HAK)  
SUBJECT: MAW TRANSIT

MAW ETA 2250 LOCAL CAIRO, ARRIVING CAIRO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT  
VIA EGYPTIAN AIRLINES COMET SU-ALM.  
GRANT

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

W145



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CA0299

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00092 171302Z

45

ACTION CDD-00

INFO OCT-01 PASS-00 /001 W

130931

O 171250Z JAN 74  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8133  
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T NICOSIA 92

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

EYES ONLY PICKERING FROM CHARGE

E.O. 11652: DECON 2/1/74  
TAGS: OVIP (HAK)  
SUBJECT: MAW TRANSIT

REF: NICOSIA 91

EGYPTIAN EMBASSY HAS BEEN INFORMED PICKUP AIRCRAFT WILL  
LEAVE CAIRO 1500 GT (1700 LOCAL), ETA NICOSIA 1645 GMT  
(1845 LOCAL).  
GRANT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library  
DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NODIS-NODIS-NODIS-NODIS-NODIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

WHL (7)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL: 4340Q  
RECD: SEP 19, 1973  
0905Z

P 190810Z SEP 73  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7799  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA P965

NODIS

FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FROM AMB. MCCLOSKEY

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
SUBJECT: TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON

REF: STATE 182238

1. FOLLOWING IS FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR RETURN TO WASHINGTON:  
DEPART NICOSIA 0755 SEPT. 20 OLYMPIC AIRWAYS 332 VIA  
ATHENS TO NEW YORK TWA 841 ARRIVING 1635. NEW YORK  
TO WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRLINES 403 ARRIVING 1900 SEPT.  
20.

2. PLEASE INFORM MRS. ARTHUR PHELAN, TELEPHONE OL 2-5067,  
WHO PLANS TO MEET. IF DELAYED, I WILL TELEPHONE HER FROM  
NEW YORK.

MCCLOSKEY

73 SEP 19 PM 12:44  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NON-CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

WH  
(S, E)

TELEGRAM

'73 SEP 14 AM 10:38

MAIL  
SCANKROFT  
How  
McFarlane

O 140935Z SEP 73  
FM ANEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7783  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 1937

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM 147 Q

RECD: 14 SEPTEMBER 73 -

NODIS

6 36 AM

EYES ONLY FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FROM AMB. MC CLOSKEY

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
SUBJECT: TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON

1. BELIEVE HANDLING MY DEPARTURE AS REQUESTED MANAGEABLE WITH GOVT HERE, AND WOULD PROPOSE INFORMING FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES PRIVATELY AT DINNER I AM GIVING FOR HIM SEP 17 PRIOR HIS LEAVING FOR UNGA. WILL HAVE EMBASSY ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT ALONG LINES YOU SUGGEST, CLOSER TO TIME MY ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

2. PENDING REARRANGEMENT SEVERAL ENGAGEMENTS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK HERE, BELIEVE I CAN MEET APPROXIMATE TIME SUGGESTED FOR ARRIVAL WASHINGTON. WILL SEND TRAVEL SCHEDULE WHEN FIXED.

3. APPRECIATE THAT HONOR OF RECALL IS TEMPORARY.  
MC CLOSKEY  
BT  
#1937

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

WH  
(S, E)



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

**CONFIDENTIAL**

'73 SEP 14 AM 10:38

O 140935Z SEP 73  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7783  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 1937

WHITE HOUSE  
SI CONTROL: 003 1 4 7 Q

*Wait*  
*Sankro*  
*Have*  
*m. Fader*

RECD: 14 SEPTEMBER 73

NODIS

6 36 AM

EYES ONLY FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FROM AMB. MC CLOSKEY

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
SUBJECT: TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON

1. BELIEVE HANDLING MY DEPARTURE AS REQUESTED MANAGEABLE WITH GOVT HERE, AND WOULD PROPOSE INFORMING FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES PRIVATELY AT DINNER I AM GIVING FOR HIM SEP 17 PRIOR HIS LEAVING FOR UNGA. WILL HAVE EMBASSY ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT ALONG LINES YOU SUGGEST, CLOSER TO TIME MY ACTUAL DEPARTURE.

2. PENDING REARRANGEMENT SEVERAL ENGAGEMENTS SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK HERE, BELIEVE I CAN MEET APPROXIMATE TIME SUGGESTED FOR ARRIVAL WASHINGTON. WILL SEND TRAVEL SCHEDULE WHEN FIXED.

3. APPRECIATE THAT HONOR OF RECALL IS TEMPORARY.

MC CLOSKEY  
BT  
#1937

**CONFIDENTIAL**

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS  
NODIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM  
THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED  
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY  
NUMBER 236 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD  
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET  
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER

WHT



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

JUN 29 PM 12.50

SECRET

R 281145Z JUN 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6271  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 1305

CN: 7566Q  
Rec'd: June 29, 1972  
4:15 a.m.

NODIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: TURKISH HELICOPTER FLIGHTS AND SUSPECTED  
ARMS DELIVERIES

25X1

REF: STATE 116003

1. PASSAGE TO BRITISH [redacted] WITH INR APPROVAL AND S/S CONCURRENCE, OF NICOSIA TELS 905, 1041 AND 1145 IS HIGHLY EMBARRASSING TO US AND EVEN MORE SO TO OUR CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE. WE BELIEVE OUR ABILITY IN FUTURE TO LOOK INTO AND BEHIND UNFICYP OPERATIONS HAS BEEN CRITICALLY JEOPARDIZED.

2. TO BE SPECIFIC AND INDICATE EXTENT OF DAMAGE DONE BY THIS APPALLING VIOLATION OF SECURITY, EXAMPLE OF CARELESSNESS AND ERROR IN JUDGMENT, WE WOULD RECALL THAT OUR SOURCE IS A VERY SENIOR ALLIED OFFICER IN UNFICYP. IN BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING IN CYPRUS, SOURCE'S GOVT APPROVED HIS DEALING WITH US ON BASIS OF TOTAL CANDOR ON ASSURANCE HIS CONFIDENCE WOULD BE PROTECTED. FOR PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS, IT HAS BEEN. THROUGH HIM WE HAVE HAD ACCESS TO VIRTUALLY ALL IMPORTANT UNFICYP COMMUNICATIONS, IN POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY SPHERE.

3. ALSO, SOURCE HAS PASSED TO US ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY INFORMATION GIVEN HIM BY BRITISH. LATTER HAVE NOT BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING TO US IN NICOSIA UNDER PRESENT HIGH COMMISSIONER BUT HAVE BEEN COMPELLED COOPERATE WITH SOURCE TO VERIFY THEIR OWN INTELLIGENCE AND GENERALLY OBTAIN INFORMATION ON SECURITY SITUATION ON ISLAND. BRITISH HAVE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF, BUT HITHERTO UNABLE DOCUMENT, EXTENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. THEY NOW KNOW; AND KNOW ALSO THAT INTELLIGENCE OF THEIR OWN WHICH THEY HAD NOT CHOSEN TO FURNISH US WAS REACHING US BECAUSE OF OUR SOURCE'S CONVICTION THAT USG SHOULD BE INFORMED OF ANYTHING LIKELY TO DISRUPT STABILITY IN CYPRUS.

State Dept. review completed

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-34-9



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

**SECRET**

--2- NICOSIA 1305, JUNE 29

4. WHILE OUR SOURCE IS ABOUT TO BE TRANSFERRED, ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO CONTINUE CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SUCCESSOR. THESE ARRANGEMENTS, ALSO, ARE NOW BOUND TO BE JEOPARDIZED IF NOT DESTROYED.

5. LEAST WE COULD HAVE EXPECTED WAS THAT MESSAGES SLUGGED EXDIS AND NOFORN, AND CONTAINING TEXTUAL WARNING RE HIGH SENSITIVITY, WOULD NOT BE PASSED WITHOUT FIRST CONSULTING WITH EMBASSY. WE ASSUME BUREAU FEELS EQUALLY AGGRIEVED AND HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. WE WILL MAKE WHAT DAMAGE LIMITATION EFFORTS WE CAN HERE.

6. TO BE NOTED THAT EVEN WITH OUR INFO IN HAND BRITISH STILL DO NOT APPEAR FULLY CANDID IN THIS MATTER, EITHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON. IT WAS A BRITISH INTELLIGENCE REPORT -- PASSED TO OUR SOURCE AND EVALUATED AS LIKELY TO BE ACCURATE, AND RECONFIRMED JUST BEFORE MY JUNE 19 TALKS WITH HICOMER EDMONDS (NICOSIA 1252) -- THAT CITED DELIVERY OF TWELVE 75MM PACK HOWIZERS. THIS WAS GIVEN SOURCE WITH REQUEST UNFICYP SEEK TO CONFIRM. MOREOVER, FROM SOURCE, WE ARE AWARE THAT BRITISH HAVE MORE FAITH IN THEIR RADAR SURVEILLANCE OF ISLAND THAN EDMONDS CARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE TO ME. AND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIALLY THEIR INFORMATION CONVEYED TO SOURCE WHICH LED TO SOURCE'S ASSESSMENT THAT MINIMUM OF 20 NIGHT HELICOPTER FLIGHTS FROM TURKEY HAD TAKEN PLACE THIS SPRING.

POPPER

BT  
#1305

**SECRET**

**NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**

No Objection To Declassification 2008/09/05 NLN-NSC FILES-592-3-34-9

NON-SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 100835Z MAR 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5844  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 580

CN: 2730Q  
Rec'd: March 10, 1972  
4:13 a.m.

72  
MAR 10 1972  
4 13  
25X1

NODIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: RETURN OF COLONEL PAPAPOSTOULOU

REF: STATE 39415

2. ALTHOUGH PAPAPOSTOULOU HAS ALLEGEDLY RETIRED, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT GIVEN MAKARIOS' KNOWN VIEWS ABOUT HIM, A RETURN BY HIM TO CYPRUS LIKELY BE PURPOSELESS OR WITHOUT APPROVAL OF SOMEONE HIGHER UP IN GOG. CONCEIVABLY, IT WAS INTENDED THAT ARCHBISHOP LEARN OF PAPAPOSTOULOU'S PRESENCE. HE DOES NOT MISS MUCH, AND PAPAPOSTOULOU DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE MADE ANY PARTICULAR EFFORT TO CONCEAL HIS PRESENCE. (OTHERWISE HE WOULD HARDLY HAVE TALKED ON TWO OCCASIONS TO IRISH CONTINGENT OFFICERS WHO KNOW HIM IN 1970). INTENT OF HIS VISIT COULD, THEREFORE, HAVE BEEN TO INTRODUCE INTO SITUATION ANOTHER INGREDIENT DESIGNED THROW ARCHBISHOP OFF BALANCE. OR IT COULD HAVE BEEN SOMETHING MORE SINISTER. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BEFORE HIS RETIREMENT SOME MONTHS AGO, COLONEL PAPAPOSTOULOU WAS WELL KNOWN IN HELLENIC ARMY FOR HIS TALENTS IN FIELD OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS. GP-3.

POPPER

State Dept. review completed

BT  
2730Q

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S

NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S  
NODIS  
S



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

L.L. W H

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
FEB 16 PM 2:40

O 161400Z FEB 72  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5703  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 358

CONTROL: 4092  
RECD: 16 FEB 14 38Z

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR

REF:STATE 25339

WITH LAPSE OF TIME AND TEMPORARY DECREASE OF TENSION, I  
THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EMBASSY BEGIN TO READ ITSELF  
BACK INTO LOCAL THINKING RE SITUATION. UNLESS DEPT OBJECTS  
I PLAN TO SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH CLERIDES, DENKTASH AND  
OTHER SOURCES BEFORE WEEKEND, THOUGH I WILL NOT ASK FOR  
APPOINTMENT WITH ARCHBISHOP UNTIL THINGS BECOME A BIT  
STEADIER. STAFF WILL SIMILARLY BEGIN TO LOOSEN UP. GP-4.

POPPER

BT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



Department of State

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM TELEGRAM

WJH

SECRET

170 JUL 27 PM 3:17

R 271520Z JUL 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3784  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 1280

Control: 6 4 1 5Q

Recd: July 27 11 52AM

NODIS

REF: STATE 119651

1. WHILE WE ARE NOT EQUIPPED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE OF DEVELOPMENTS RE US PEACE PROPOSAL, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT US INITIATIVE HAS DRAMATICALLY UNFROZEN LONG-STANDING DIPLOMATIC DEADLOCK AND OPENED UP REAL ROOM FOR MANEUVER AMONG PARTIES CONCERNED. AS TO PROCEDURES IN PARTICULAR, WE APPLAUD CONCEPT OF A MORE ACTIVIST ROLE FOR JARRING AND A DEPUTY, AS WELL AS DEPT'S INTENTION TO PUT POLITICAL NEGOTIATION IN TRAIN EVEN IN ADVANCE OF A CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL.

2. NICOSIA WOULD BE A GOOD SITE FOR MEETINGS BETWEEN JARRING AND REPRESENTATIVES OF PARTIES. WE KNOW FROM PAST DISCUSSIONS THAT GOC WOULD WELCOM IT IF JARRING WERE TO CONTINUE TO MAKE NICOSIA HIS NEGOTIATING HEADQUARTERS. COMPARED WITH NEW YORK, IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE MORE CONVENIENT FOR PARTIES, FREER AFTER OPENING PHASE FROM INUNDATION BY PRESS AND MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES, AND LESS SUBJECT TO INFLUENCE FROM FOUR POWERS, OTHER DELEGATIONS AND UNSYG. BUILDING UPON UNFICYP STAFF IN NICOSIA, UN SHOULD FIND IT RELATIVELY EASY TO PROVIDE WHATEVER SERVICES NEGOTIATORS MIGHT NEED.

3. THIS EMBASSY WOULD LIKE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE BUT WILL NOT OF COURSE MAKE ANY MOVES PENDING AGREEMENT ON TALKS, DECISION ON SITE AND SUBSEQUENT DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS. GP-3.

POPPER

BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE 7/27/70

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WH 13

P 141250Z APR 70  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3415  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 590

3 6 4 1  
1970 APR 14 AM 9 27

70 APR 14 PM 5:41  
SITUATION ROOM  
WHITE HOUSE

NODIS

DEPT PASS TO AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT LONDON MOSCOW  
PARIS JIDDA AND USMISSION USUN PRIORITY

1. DURING FAREWELL CONVERSATION WITH UNDER-SECRETARY GOHAR AT ACIRO AIRPORT, SISCO SAID THERE WERE A FEW POINTS HE HAD TOUCHED ON IN MEETING WITH FONMIN RIAD WHICH HE WANTED TO RE-EMPHASIZE, SINCE HE KNEW THEY WERE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO UARG, TO MAKE CERTAIN OUR POSITION NOT MIS-UNDERSTOOD. GOHAR TOOK CAREFUL NOTES.
2. FIRST POINT, SISCO SAID, WAS QUESTION OF UAR SOVEREIGNTY AT SHARM-AL-SHAYKH. OCT 28 DOCUMENT SPEAKS CLEARLY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM UAR TERRITORY. IT ALSO CALLS FOR PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE PRACTICAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN AND AROUND SHARM-AL-SHAYKH, TO ACHIEVE WHAT IS CALLED FOR IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242: GUARANTEE OF FREE PASSAGE FOR SHIPS OF ALL COUNTRIES THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN. THIS PROVISION WAS NOT INTENDED TO PLACE IN QUESTION UAR SOVEREIGNTY OVER UAR TERRITORY.
3. GAZA. SISCO SAID THAT FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST OUR POSITION REMAINS THE SAME, NAMELY THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT CONCEPT THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE NO VOICE IN DISPOSITION OF GAZA. WE DO NOT PRECLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR IDEAS AND THOSE OF UAR WOULD COME CLOSER AT SOME POINT. CHANCES OF THIS HAPPENING WOULD BE ENHANCED IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE PARTIES HAD INITIATED DIALOGUE ABOUT GAZA UNDER AUSPICES OF AMBASSADOR JARRING. US HAD IDEAS ON GAZA QUESTION WHICH WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH KING HUSSEIN, BUT WE CAN ONLY BEGIN TO EXERCISE OUR INFLUENCE WHEN THERE ARE NEGOTIATIONS. SISCO REPEATED THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE NO VOICE IN THIS MATTER; AFTER ALL, IT IS NOW IN CONTROL OF GAZA.
4. SYRIA. OUR POSITION, SISCO SAID, IS THAT SYRIA CAN PLAY NO REAL ROLE IN SETTLEMENT SO LONG AS IT HAS NOT ACCEPTED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, AND HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO RECEIVE JARRING. IF COMMON GROUND CAN BE ACHIDVED ON UAR JND JORDANIAN ASPECTS OF SETTLEMENT, IT POSSIBLE SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND FOR THERE TO BE SOME APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO SYRIAN ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT PRECLUDE THIS POSSIBILITY AT SOME STAGE BECAUSE WE FIND IT HARD TO

SECRET

SECRET

-2- NICOSIA 590 , NODIS

BELIEVE THAT SYRIA COULD STAY OUTMOYLTHE SETTLEMENT IF COMMON GROUND WERE FOUND ON UAR QUESTION AT THIS STAGE, SISCO SAID, SINCE IT IS A COMPLICATING FACTOR. WE RECOGNIZE THAT UAR FEELS SOME REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO SYRIAN APSECT. OUR RESPONSE, IN BRIEF, IS THAT THIS IS PREMATURE FOR NOW, BUT WE ARE NOT CLOSING ANY DOORS.

5. JERUSALEM. SISCO NOTED THAT PRESIDENT NASSER HAD SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT SETTLEMENT GIVING JERUSALEM TO ISRAELIS. AS HE HAD SAID TO PRESIDENT NASSER, HE HOPES UAR CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS THAT US PEACE PROPOSALS LEAVE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM COMPLETELY OPEN FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO POSITION OF EITHER SIDE. US CONTINUES TO HOLD WHAT HAS BEEN CONSISTNT US POSITION THAT WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE SOVEREIGNTY OF EITHER ISRAEL OR JORDAN IN JERUSALEM. AMERICAN PROPOSALS DO NOT GIVE JERUSALEM. AMERICAN PROPOSALS DO NOT GIVE JERUSALEM TO ISRAEL AND SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE THAT THERE SHALL BE JORDANIAN ROLE IN CITY.

GP-1

POPPER

NOTE: NOT PASSED AMMAN CAIRO TEL AVIV BEIRUT LONDON  
MOSQOW PARIS JIDDA USUN BY OC/T

SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 250 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142 ) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER



Department of State

WH 9  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

R 291030Z DEC 69  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3140  
BT  
SECRET NICOSIA 1991

5 0 0 0 Q  
1969 DEC 29 AM 7 57

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR FOR HENRY KISSINGER

SUBJECT: ADMIRAL ANDERSON'S VISIT

REF: STATE 204310

1. FOLLOWING RECEIPT REFTEL, I ARRANGED FULL SCHEDULE FOR ADMIRAL ANDERSON DURING HIS BRIEF STAY. HE HAD THREE-HOUR BRIEFING WITH APPROPRIATE MEMBERS COUNTRY TEAM, SHORT TOUR OF NICOFIA GREEN LINE AREA, LUNCHEON WITH MARSHAL SIR DENIS SMALLWOOD WHO COMMANDS BRITISH BASES HERE AND BRITISH FORCES NEAR EAST, TEA WITH OSMAN OREK, TURK CYPRIOT EX-MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND NUMBER TWO IN LOCAL TURKISH COMMUNITY, AND DRINKS WITH GROUP INCLUDING GOC SPOKESMAN (MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND SOMETIME ACTING FONMIN NICOS DIMITRIOU), FONOFF DIRGEN VENIAMIN, UK AND CANADIAN HICOMERS AND BRIG LISLIE, CHIEF OF STAFF UNFICYP.

2. THIS WAS A GRUELING WORKOUT, BUT THE ADMIRAL NEVER TIRED. HE ASKED MANY PERCEPTIVE QUESTIONS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM; US, UK AND SOVIET OPERATIONS IN CYPRUS; IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO; AND MORE BROADLY, MEANS OF MAINTAINING US INFLUENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. THERE WAS NO PUBLICITY. CONTACTS WITH GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE HIGHEST WE COULD ARRANGE WITHOUT RISKING NEWSPAPER COMMENT.  
GP-1.

POPPER

CONFIDENTIAL

WHT



Department of State

COPY 8 OF 15 COPIES

TELEGRAM

'73 SEP 18 AM 8:38

CONTROL: 39030

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

HAK  
SCOWCROFT

O 172158Z SEP 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 5001  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 184655

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON

REF: STATE 183093

FOR AMBASSADOR MCCLOSKEY

1. TA 1001-400822, SEPTEMBER 14, AUTHORIZES YOUR TRAVEL FROM NICOSIA TO WASHINGTON, D.C., TEMPORARY DUTY FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THIRTY DAYS, AND RETURN UPON COMPLETION OF THE TDY PERIOD.

2. CHARGE 1940113, 1001, OBLIGATION 400822. RUSH

S/S-EX:RMMILLER:JFP  
9/17/73 EXT. 20982  
S/S-EX:RMMILLER

S/S:SRGAMNON

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S  
  
N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NOV-1973



Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

O 141631Z SEP 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 4998  
BT  
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 183093

CONTROL 3 27 6 Q  
RECD: 14 SEP 73Z 16 42

73 SEP 14 PM 8:28  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652 GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
SUBJECT; TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON

REF: (A) NICOSIA 1957; (B) STATE 182238

1. WE ARE PLEASED THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE CARRY OUT PROGRAM  
ENVISAGED PARA 1 REFTEL B. YOU SHOULD PROCEED WITH TRAVEL  
PLANS AND EMBASSY STATEMENT AS DESCRIBED REFTEL A.

2. WE WILL SEND TRAVEL AND TEMPORARY DUTY ORDERS BY SEPTTEL.

RUSH

BT

#3093

DRAFTED BY: S/S:SRGRAMMON  
CLEARANCES: NEA - MR. SISCO

APPROVED BY: S/S:MR. PICKERING

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS-NODIS-NODIS-NODIS-NODIS



CONFIDENTIAL  
Department of State

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES  
*W H Scowcroft Eagleburger*  
**TELEGRAM**

O 132026Z SEP 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 4995  
BT  
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 182238

73 SEP 12 9 8 80  
CONTROL:  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
PM 11:14

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OGEN  
SUBJECT: TEMPORARY DUTY IN WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

1. SECRETARY-DESIGNATE, AS HE DISCUSSED WITH YOU AT SAN CLEMENTE, WISHES VERY MUCH TO HAVE YOU RETURN FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LONGER THAN 30 DAYS TEMPORARY DUTY WITH HIM. PURPOSE WOULD BE TO ASSIST IN BREAKING IN A NEW SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEPARTMENT, AND GENERALLY ASSISTING WITH MAJOR PRESS RELATIONS ISSUES, INCLUDING, IF REQUIRED, TRIPS TO UNGA AND CHINA.
2. ACTING SECRETARY FULLY CONCURS IN YOUR RETURN ON BASIS OF UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS IS PERIOD OF TEMPORARY DUTY ONLY AND THAT YOU WILL THEREAFTER RETURN TO YOUR POST.
3. WISH TO HAVE YOUR OWN JUDGMENT ON IMPACT YOUR DEPARTURE FOR SUCH PERIOD OF TIME ON OUR RELATIONS WITH CYPRUS. YOU WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO INDICATE TO CYPRUS GOVERNMENT THAT YOUR DEPARTURE IS FOR 30-DAY PERIOD FOR PURPOSE INDICATED ABOVE. IN ADDITION, IF YOU THOUGHT IT REQUIRED, YOU WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT ON YOUR DEPARTURE.
4. PENDING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL REACTION, AND ASSUMING THAT SUCH PROBLEMS AS MAY BE RAISED COULD BE HANDLED, WE WOULD WISH TO HAVE YOU IN WASHINGTON FOR DUTY ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 21.
5. PLEASE REPLY BY RETURN CABLE THIS CHANNEL. RUSH

THE ACTING SECRETARY {SUBS} S/S:TRPICKERING:AL | NEA - MR. SISCO {SUBS}  
WH - MR. EAGLEBURGER {SUBS} 9/13/73 22540  
S/S:TRPICKERING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

WA 8  
72



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

AM

R 010003Z JUL 72 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 3833  
BT

CONTROL: 8 5 7 7  
Received: June 30, 1972 839 PM

SECRET STATE 119422

NODIS

NO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: TURKISH HELICOPTER FLIGHTS AND SUSPECTED  
ARMS DELIVERIES 25X1

REF: NICOSIA 1305

2. AS EXPLAINED TO YOU IN STATE 116003, ACTION TAKEN WAS NOT CLEARED WITH NEA NOR WAS NEA INFORMED AFTER THE EVENT. DEPARTMENT HAS TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE. WE ALSO CONSIDERING WHAT DAMAGE LIMITATION EFFORTS WE CAN TAKE ON THIS END.

3. BASIC PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE THAT BRITISH NOT BEING CANDID WITH US REGARDING CYPRUS. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT POSSIBLE APPROACH TO BRITISH EMBASSY INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICER HERE WITH FRANK STATEMENT THAT IT IS HIGH TIME WE REVERTED TO LONG-ESTABLISHED INFORMATION EXCHANGE POLICY ON CYPRUS AND THAT UK HIGH COMMISSION IN NICOSIA BE INSTRUCTED TO ACT ACCORDINGLY.

State Dept. review completed


CLASSIFIED BY T. D. BOYATT; EXEMPT FROM GDS OF E.O. 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1). IRWIN  
BT

Drafted by: NEA/CYP: TDBoyatt Approved by: NEA:RPDavies  
Clearances: INR/DRR- Mr. Mark (draft) J- Mr. Peck (draft)  
S/S- Mr. Curran

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

O 182354Z JUL 74 ZFF4  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO RUQMOC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUEFPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUEHNA/USMISSION NATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000  
 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR NIACT IMMEDIATE  
 RUEHEX/THE WHITE HOUSE NIACT IMMEDIATE

CONTROL: 5171Q  
 RECD: July 18, 1974  
 11:06 PM

BT  
 S E C R E T STATE 156312

MODIS  
 TOPOL 20% TOSEC 4

WHITE HOUSE PASS SAN CLEMENTE FOR EAGLEBURGER FOR SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
 TAGS: PROR CYP  
 SUBJECT: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN CYPRUS SITUATION

1. OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES AT THIS TIME ARE (A) TO PREVENT A TURKISH DECISION TO INTERVENE MILITARILY, AND (B) TO AVOID THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR IN CYPRUS. IN EITHER EVENT, THE SOVIETS WOULD EXPLOIT THE SITUATION TO THEIR ADVANTAGE, THUS ENHANCING THEIR POSITION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND STRENGTHENING THE COMMUNISTS IN CYPRUS.
2. WE MUST, THEREFORE, SEEK TO SLOW DOWN ACTIONS EITHER BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR WITHIN THE UN WHICH MIGHT TEND TO PRECIPITATE EITHER OF THE ABOVE TWO EVENTS AND ENDEAVOR TO GAIN TIME TO DEVELOP A SITUATION WHERE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF CYPRUS CAN BE ACHIEVED. THE IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE TO OBTAIN A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UK, TURKEY AND GREECE AS THE GUARANTOR POWERS.
3. THE SITUATION IS THAT WHILE MAKARIOS REMAINS THE DE JURE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS, A DE FACTO REGIME EXISTS ON THE ISLAND AND IT HAS ESTABLISHED FULL CONTROL. IT SEEMS UN-

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-2 - State 156312

LIKELY THAT MAKARIOS CAN REESTABLISH HIMSELF WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT. IF THE UN IS PERMITTED TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION WHICH LEGITIMIZES MAKARIOS' POSITION AND CALLS FOR HIS

RETURN ON THE POSSIBLE PAIN OF SANCTIONS, THEN IN THE WAKE OF CERTAIN REFUSAL OF THE WESTERN POWERS TO UNDERTAKE THIS MISSION, THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENDEAVOR TO FILL THE VOID, WITH ALL ITS IMPLICATIONS. MAKARIOS' RETURN TO CYPRUS UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WOULD ONLY ENHANCE THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THAT OF THE COMMUNISTS IN CYPRUS.

4. WHILE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS PRESENTLY SUPPORTING THE RETURN OF MAKARIOS, ITS DEMANDS TO IMPROVE ITS STRATEGIC POSITION ON THE ISLAND WOULD NOT BE VIABLE SINCE IF MAKARIOS SHOULD RETURN UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, HE WOULD BE LIKELY NOT TO APPEAR AS A TURKISH SATELLITE AND WOULD LOOK TO OBTAIN SUPPORT, IN ALL PROBABILITY THE COMMUNISTS, TO COUNTER-BALANCE THE TURKISH POSITION. WE MUST, THEREFORE, URGE THE TURKS TO TAKE A LONG-RANGE VIEW OF THE SITUATION AND RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PRESENT POSTURE COULD BE SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL TO THEIR INTERESTS.


5. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE UK, IN CONSIDERING ITS PRESENT COURSE, MUST FACE UP TO THE PROBABILITY THAT MAKARIOS CANNOT BE RESTORED BY POLITICAL MEANS AND MUST RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT IT DOES NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN ANY OTHER FORM.

6. WITH RESPECT TO GREECE, IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE RETURN OF MAKARIOS WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE SINCE THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF THE REGIME HAS BEEN THE REMOVAL OF MAKARIOS. MOREOVER, MAKARIOS' RETURN COULD ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE REMOVAL OF THE SAMPSON REGIME AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK OFFICERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. IF MAKARIOS WERE RESTORED UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, THE INFLUENCE OF ATHENS IN CYPRUS WOULD BE REDUCED, AND THE CONSEQUENT WEAKENING OF THE BALANCE OF FORCE WOULD TEND TO MAKE MAKARIOS PLACE GREATER RELIANCE ON THE COMMUNISTS AND ON THE EASTERN BLOC.

7. THE SAMPSON REGIME IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE TURKS AND TO A GOOD PART OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE US ALSO CANNOT ACCEPT THE SAMPSON REGIME. HOWEVER, IT

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SEC



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

-3- State 156312

IS NOW IN PLACE AND WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO SEEK THE REMOVAL OF SAMPSON UNTIL A SUBSTITUTE SOLUTION IS IN SIGHT. WITH REGARD TO THE GREEK OFFICERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TAKE ANY POSITION ON THAT MATTER FOR THE REASON OUTLINED IN PARA 6 ABOVE AND PENDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT COMMITTED TO THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF GREEK OFFICERS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD.

8. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES UNDERSTAND THAT ANY COURSE OF ACTION RELATING TO CYPRUS WHICH RESULTS IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE GREEK REGIME, OPENS UP THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO SOVIET MEDDLING AND EXPLOITATION, AND INVITES ACTIVE TURKISH INTERVENTION WOULD INITIATE A COURSE OF EVENTS WHICH WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE, DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL, AND WHICH WOULD HAVE SERIOUSLY DAMAGING EFFECTS ON WESTERN INTERESTS.

9. THE TRUST OF OUR POSITION AT THIS TIME, THEREFORE, IS TO AVOID ASSUMING A PUBLIC POSTURE WHICH COMMITS US TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. WE VIEW AS UNLIKELY THE RESTORATION OF MAKARIOS AND WE DO NOT ACCEPT A SAMPSON REGIME. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SITUATION IN FAVOR OF EITHER ONE OR THE OTHER SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FREEZE, THUS CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPROMISE AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE MAINTENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CYPRUS, BOTH IN THEIR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS.

10. FOR AMBASSADORS OR CHARGES: ABOVE SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIGHEST LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT TO WHICH ACCREDITED.

11. FOR AMBASSADOR RUSFELD: YOU MAY USE ABOVE IN BRIEFING LUNCH ON US ANALYSIS OF CYPRUS SITUATION, BUT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS CANNOT BE USED IN NAC SESSION. HOWEVER, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED IN NAC SESSION TO SEEK TO SLOW DOWN ANY MOVES WHICH MIGHT COMPROMISE OUR OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED.

BERBOLL  
EU - LSTABLER:ENT  
7/28/74:21010  
S - THE SECRETARY  
S/S - MR. FRY  
S/AM - AMB. MCCLOSKEY

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET