

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
216	cable	Intelligence Information Cable EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	3/27/72	B
217	cable	Intelligence Information Cable EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	3/11/72	B
218	cable	Intelligence Information Cable EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	3/10/72	B
219	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	2/11/72	B
220	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	2/11/72	B
221	cable	Intelligence Information Cable EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	3/18/72	B
222	memo	to Kissinger EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	2/7/70	B
223	memo	to Kissinger EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	1/20/70	B
224	memo	to Kissinger EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	1/19/70	B
225	memo	to Kissinger EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	1/16/70	B
226	memo	re Makarios EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	1/13/70	B
236	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	7/3/72	B
237	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	6/28/72	B
238	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	3/10/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NJC

BOX NUMBER

592

FOLDER TITLE

(3)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
2a	report	Biography MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST MLN 08-38 DECLASSIFIED PER PAC 6/13/08	N/D	B
6	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	4/24/72	B
9	cable	FBI to White House	10/19/71	B
15	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	6/14/71	B
20	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	12/1/70	B
24	memo	Kissinger to the President SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 2/17/2009	N/D	B
25a	memo	Helm to Kissinger EXEMPTED PER 3.3(b)(1)(6); HR. 7/3/12	9/23/70	B
31	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	10/05/73	B
32	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008	3/18/74	B
35	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	5/18/73	B
47	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 6/15/2008	9/15/72	B
50	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	8/17/72	B
51	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	7/13/72	B
53	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	6/30/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE NSC	BOX NUMBER 592
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FOLDER TITLE
③

RESTRICTION CODES

- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
161	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	8/20/70	B
168	telegram	USDAO to RUCRJS	3/25/70	B
172	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	8/12/69	B
178	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	1/19/74	B
180	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	10/2/73	B
181	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	5/16/73	B
182	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	4/12/73	B
184	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	6/27/72	B
188	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	3/8/72	B
200	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	9/25/71	B
201	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	9/23/71	B
215	cable	Intelligence Information Cable EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1) ltr. 7/3/12	3/27/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE NSC	BOX NUMBER 542
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FOLDER TITLE (3)

RESTRICTION CODES

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|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
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6	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	4/24/72	B
9	cable	FBI to White House	10/19/71	B
15	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	6/14/71	B
20	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	12/1/70	B
24	memo	Kissinger to the President SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 2/17/2009	N/D	B
25a	memo	Helms to Kissinger	9/23/70	B
31	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	10/05/73	B
32	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 6/12/2008	3/18/74	B
35	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	5/18/73	B
47	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 6/15/2008	9/15/72	B
50	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	8/17/72	B
51	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	7/13/72	B
53	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	6/30/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE <u>NSC</u>	BOX NUMBER <u>592</u>
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FOLDER TITLE
(3)

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
54	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	6/20/72	B
55	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	6/16/72	B
57	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	6/11/72	B
60	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	4/28/72	B
69	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	3/21/72	B
70	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	3/22/72	B
72	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	3/21/72	B
84	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 6/13/2008	3/11/72	B
89	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/23/72	B
95	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/19/72	B
105	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/14/72	B
112	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/14/72	B
113	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 4/13/2008	2/12/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

592

FOLDER TITLE

(3)

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
117	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/11/72	B
122	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/10/72	B
123	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/8/72	B
128	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/3/72	B
130	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	1/31/72	B
131	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	1/31/72	B
132	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	1/27/72	B
136	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	1/17/72	B
141	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER PAC REVIEW 1/22/2009	10/29/71	B
144	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	10/15/71	B
154	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	7/14/71	B
156	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	2/20/71	B
159	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	12/17/70	B

FILE GROUP TITLE NSC	BOX NUMBER 592
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FOLDER TITLE (3)

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161	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	8/26/70	B
168	telegram	USDAO to RUCRCS	3/25/70	B
172	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	8/12/69	B
178	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	1/19/71	B
180	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	10/2/73	B
181	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	5/16/73	B
182	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	4/12/73	B
184	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	6/27/72	B
188	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	3/8/72	B
200	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	9/25/71	B
201	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	9/23/71	B
215	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	3/27/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE <u>NSC</u>	BOX NUMBER <u>542</u>
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FOLDER TITLE <u>(3)</u>

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217	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	3/11/72	B
218	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	3/10/72	B
219	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	2/11/72	B
220	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	2/11/72	B
221	cable	Intelligence Information Cable	3/18/72	B
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223	memo	to Kissinger	1/20/70	B
224	memo	to Kissinger	1/19/70	B
225	memo	to Kissinger	1/16/70	B
226	memo	re Makarios	1/13/70	B
236	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate	7/3/72	B
237	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	4/28/72	B
238	telegram	Nicosia to Secstate SANITIZED PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008	3/10/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE <u>NSC</u>	BOX NUMBER <u>592</u>
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FOLDER TITLE <u>(3)</u>

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
280	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia	7/23/74	B
286	telegram	Secstate to Nicosia SANITIZED <small>PER RAC REVIEW 9/5/2008</small>	7/1/72	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NSC

BOX NUMBER

592

FOLDER TITLE

(3)

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|--|---|

0733

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET


March 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Joseph N. Neubert
NSC Contingency Planning
Department of State

SUBJECT: Contingency Study for Cyprus

The NSC staff approves the Contingency Study for Cyprus with the provision it be amended (1) to describe what influence the Soviets might gain through "naval diplomacy" (see pp. 30, 34, and 35) and what options of this sort are open to the USG, and (2) to reflect more recent events (i.e., possible changes in EOKA-B since the death of Grivas, propagandistic Soviet demarches on Greek support for enosis, and potential shifts of policy by the finely balanced new government in Ankara and the military regime in Athens.)


Richard T. Kennedy
Deputy Assistant to the President
for NSC Planning

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO DA	MO DA HR		
3 28	4 1 13	7400733	Kennedy

SOURCE / CLASS / DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: ROGERS UNCLAS _____ LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

KISSINGER _____ RICHARDSON _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____

SCOWCROFT _____ SCHLESINGER _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____ EXDIS _____

ELIOT _____ S _____ ✓ _____ CODEWORD _____

TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: Contingency Study for Cyprus

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			MEMO FOR HAK..... ()
STAFF SECRETARY			MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST			REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
EUROPE / CANADA			RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO..... ()
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC			CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			DUE DATE: _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING			<u>Barban/stukel advised that</u>
CONGRESSIONAL			<u>Kennedy memo closed by</u>
OCEANS POLICY			<u>orig action & intern unknown</u>

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/28				C Kennedy rpl ltr to Reubert	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D _____ BY _____

4/2/74

CYS FOR) SA _____

) HP _____

ORIG) WH _____

TO) PA X

) SF _____

) NS _____

) EP _____

DESTROY) DY _____

4474

June 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Appointment for David Popper (S/S 7209365)

Mr. Kissinger regrets that his schedule is such that he will not be able to meet with Ambassador Popper.

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

cc: Mr. Saunders

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
4474

CONFIDENTIAL

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for You from
Ambassador Popper (Cyprus)

David Popper, US Ambassador to Cyprus, is here on consultations, June 6-16, and has asked for an appointment with you (attached); you were unable to see him when he was last here.

I know your schedule is busy with the trip to Japan and in any event I have seen him. You are also pretty well up to date on the Cyprus problem, after the last go-around which began in February.

However, Cyprus remains basically unstable and we will probably be living with tensions there and between our two NATO allies for the foreseeable future. The main reason for your seeing Popper, apart from getting his personal assessment, would be to get a feel for his command out there and to impart some of your own views as to what we want. Since his personal role on Cyprus was the subject of discussion during the last crisis, you may want to get your own sense of how he operates.

RECOMMENDATION: That you schedule a short appointment with Popper any available time beginning today through June 16.

Approve _____

Saunders' regret due to Japan trip _____ *✓*

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

4474
7209365

May 30, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment for Ambassador Popper

Our Ambassador to Cyprus, David Popper, will be in Washington June 6 - 16 for consultations. He has asked for an appointment with you during that period.

The Cyprus situation is now reasonably calm. The February-March confrontation between Athens and Nicosia is in abeyance and the intercommunal negotiations will very likely be resumed in early June. The local talks will have a significant effect on Greco-Turk relations and the general situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

An appointment with Ambassador Popper will provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on the Cyprus problem.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic sketch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ambassador David H. Popper

Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director of the Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States Representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs (USUN), Director of the Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969.

During the period June-August 1971, Ambassador Popper led a team of Department and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs experts in consultations with key European, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian governments. The consultations were designed to mobilize support for strengthening the 1969 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG	INITIAL ACTION OFF
MO DA	MO DA HR		
5 30	5 30 19	4474	

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
 S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *David Popper, app to Cyprus requests stg
 w/ HAK while in Wash June 6-11
 7209365*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
STAFF SECRETARY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO FOR PRES. ()
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR SIGNATURE ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ()
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO TO ()
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE ()
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: (6/3)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
NSC PLANNING				
CONGRESSIONAL				

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
6/6/72	Saunders	HAK	X	Decision (6/8)	
6/9				HAK disapproved app	
6/9	S	SAUND	S	Further action (6/10)	
6/12	HAK	USCS	S	HAK disapproved app	DAVIS
6/12/72	Saunders	Davis	S	To inform State that HAK not able to see Popper. HHS (06/13)	
6/12				gwd signed memo to Eliot	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA, HP, HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

DO

INIT *Sm*

DATE _____

ORIG _____ NSC _____

TO) PAF

WHC _____

SUBF _____

JUN 13 1972

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
2876

✓ Memo sent to
HAK by
Dan S
May 30, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HS*
SUBJECT: Appointment with Dr. Kissinger for
Bob McCloskey (New US Ambassador
to Cyprus) this Saturday, June 2

You will recall yesterday having killed a recommendation that the President meet with Bob McCloskey, new US Ambassador to Cyprus, before his June 3 departure. State was so informed.

State is asking whether McCloskey could have an appointment with Henry.

Perhaps you could bring this to Henry's attention for a possible appointment Saturday, since he may just have interest, although I can imagine how much you will be trying to cram into those days between Iceland and Paris.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
2876

CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Appointment With You for Bob McCloskey,
New US Ambassador to Cyprus

Bob McCloskey is leaving Sunday, June 3, for Cyprus as the new US Ambassador and has indicated through State he would appreciate a short call on you. This would mean probably Saturday, June 2, given your own schedule.

This would be a chance for you to express your thoughts on the Cyprus situation, although it is not essential. Makarios would probably be pleased.

Tensions on the island continue as the intercommunal talks have failed thus far to achieve a settlement. The Turk Cypriots demand local autonomy (which Makarios believes goes too far in violating his concept of a unitary national government) and Greek Cypriots demand control. Complicating this impasse is right-wing insistence on nothing short of total union with Greece. Turkey and Greece remain vigilant to their communities' needs. The main point is that the Cyprus problem retains the potential for dragging these NATO allies into confrontation so it is of continued interest to the US.

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate your preference on having Dick Campbell schedule a short appointment with you for McCloskey on Saturday, June 2.

Approve appointment _____

Regret on basis of schedule _____

CONFIDENTIAL

May 30
9:45 a.m.

Mr. Saunders -

Mr. Murphy says that this action was a "comedy of errors."

He had a call from State Dept. this morning in which they told him that they had not requested an appointment with the President but with Dr. Kissinger. Their memo does not clearly state which it is, but since it is addressed to Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Murphy says that it probably intended that.

Mr. Murphy understands that Dr. Kissinger thinks very highly of McCloskey and might want to see him. Dr. Kissinger will be back from Iceland ~~and~~ will be in the office on Saturday, June 2nd,

Mr. Murphy has reopened the action and suggests a memo to Kissinger by June 1st requesting an appointment for June 2nd, if you think this is proper.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2876

May 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador McCloskey
(S/S 7309483)

The President regrets that his schedule will not permit him to meet with Amb. McCloskey prior to the latter's departure for his post.


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
2876

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

May 25, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *HHS*
SUBJECT: Appointment for New US Ambassador
to Cyprus, Robert McCloskey, with
the President

As you know, Secretary Rogers' former press secretary, Bob McCloskey, is going to Cyprus as the new US ambassador. He has asked to call on the President (attached) before his June 3 departure.

As usual, this would be a nice gesture which would please Makarios if the President had time, but it is not essential and State does not press. Besides, the President doesn't usually see outgoing ambassadors, and given his preoccupations and absences in the coming week, I would not be inclined to recommend this.

RECOMMENDATION: That you kill the attached schedule proposal.

Approve *HHS*

Send the attached forward _____

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

VITA

ROBERT J. McCLOSKEY

Mr. McCloskey is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary. In this capacity he is responsible for the direction, development, and execution of news policy, plans, and programs. In addition to serving as principal adviser to the Secretary and other officials of the Department on all aspects of the Department's press relations, he has been responsible for maintaining liaison on press matters with the White House and other Government agencies.

A Foreign Service Officer, Mr. McCloskey joined the Department as a Foreign Service Staff Officer in September 1955 and was assigned to the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. He returned to Washington in January 1957 to serve in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

A former news correspondent, Mr. McCloskey served with the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942 to 1945. He was graduated from Temple University (B.S. 1953) and later (1958-1959) studied at George Washington University. He was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November 25, 1922.

He is married to the former Anne Taylor Phelan of Chevy Chase, Maryland, and has two daughters.

April 1973.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 7309483

2876

May 22, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment for Ambassador-designate McCloskey

The newly appointed Ambassador to Cyprus, Robert J. McCloskey, will be departing for Cyprus on June 3. He is attending a series of briefings to familiarize himself thoroughly with the Cyprus situation and has asked for an appointment with you before he goes to Nicosia.

Tensions on Cyprus have increased in recent months as a result of the low-grade insurrection of the supporters of General George Grivas who call for union (enosis) with Greece and counterviolence from backers of Archbishop Makarios. The Turkish Cypriot side has reacted by hardening its positions in the local talks. The intercommunal talks, which recommenced in an expanded format on June 8, 1972, have limped along and made little progress. If a constitutional solution is near which excludes enosis, General Grivas has threatened to exercise his option of violence to undercut the talks. As the record of the 1950's and 1960's indicates, violence on Cyprus has brought NATO allies Greece and Turkey into confrontation, engaged the United States and Russia diplomatically, and de-stabilized the Eastern Mediterranean.

An appointment with Ambassador-designate McCloskey will permit an exchange of views on the Cyprus problem.

R. Miller for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic sketch.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

Date:

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

VIA: David N. Parker

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEETING: Courtesy Call by Robert McCloskey, your new ambassador to Cyprus

DATE: At your convenience until his June 3 departure

PURPOSE: Permit a brief exchange of view on the Cyprus problem which has the potential for engaging our two NATO allies in confrontation. Since we do not have frequent opportunities to focus on Cyprus, this would provide one convenient peg.

FORMAT: Oval Office
5 minutes

SPEECH MATERIAL: Talking points would be provided.

PRESS COVERAGE: Routine Ziegler announcement; White House photographer

STAFF: Dr. Kissinger or General Scowcroft

RECOMMEND: State Department. Dr. Kissinger does not believe it is essential.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Bob McCloskey is well known as Secretary Rogers' press spokesman.

BACKGROUND: Cyprus tensions continue, and the US could become involved in another Cyprus crisis. Also, Makarios would doubtless appreciate knowing McCloskey had seen you.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

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SUBJECT: Request for appt w/ HAK for new US amb to Cyprus
Robert J McCloskey to discuss the Cyprus situation

REFERENCE: S/S 7309483 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			ACTION REQUIRED	
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ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK..... (<u>X</u>)
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MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>	MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
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CONGRESSIONAL				
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
5/25	Shanders	HAK	<u>X</u>	sgd sp (6/1)	
5/28				Account disappeared SP	
5/29	<u>S</u>	DAVIS	<u>S</u>	Hak / State (5/31)	
5/29			<u>C</u>	Davis sgd memo to Eliot	
5/30				Re-ophw	
5/30	<u>S</u>	Shanders	<u>S</u>	Memo to HAK! (6/1)	

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

5/30		HAK	<u>X</u>	Decision (6/02)	
6/16			<u>C</u>	Close per NSC/S	

NSC/S DISPATCH INSTR

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OR RECORD COMMENT: _____

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JUN 18 1973

3873

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

SECRET/EXDIS

HAIG

*2/5/72
HAIG*

May 5, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL HAIG

FROM:

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS *Hal*

SUBJECT:

Cyprus Situation

I understand that you asked Sam about the attached cable reporting that Ambassador Bush, at Joe Sisco's apparent instigation, had told Waldheim we do not support Turkey's "tougher line" on the Cypriot-Czech arms and resumption of the intercommunal talks. I understand the concern that State may be edging instinctively toward unconsidered involvement in the Cyprus situation, and we need to keep a hand on that. We also have an interest in not souring our relationship with Turkey, especially after the Prime Minister's successful visit. Those concerns stand alongside our general interest in avoiding a confrontation over Cyprus and since some of the elements in the situation seem to have changed in recent days, it may be worth putting the present problem in perspective.

Background

Early last week the UN finally got Makarios to agree to an arrangement for its control over the Czech arms which also satisfied the Greeks. It goes considerably further than a simple UN "inspection" arrangement worked out in a similar situation in 1966, and the UN representative in Cyprus felt that it should satisfy Turkish requirements and clear the way for resumption of the intercommunal talks.

With the Czech arms issue presumably resolved, Waldheim then issued an appeal for resumption of the intercommunal talks according to the format agreed upon before the recent crisis broke last February. That format, you will remember, called for participation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainland Greek and Turk representatives and a UN representative. Waldheim was especially concerned to get the intercommunal talks restarted before the semi-annual Security Council meeting next month for renewal of the UN peace-keeping mandate on Cyprus. He is particularly worried that some of the governments that contribute troops to the peace-keeping force will begin withdrawing them if there seems to be no effort to move toward a settlement. The Canadians, who supply one of the most effective units, are talking about pulling out this summer.

SECRET/EXDIS Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

The Greek Cypriots and Greece have both indicated their interest in starting the new intercommunal talks. But--to the UN's surprise--the Turks have shifted now to a much tougher posture which threatens the whole concept. To begin with, the Turks say that the UN-Makarios agreement on control of the Czech arms does not go far enough and is not satisfactory. Then in a reversal of their agreement last fall, the Turks are demanding that Waldheim obtain advance assurances from Makarios that (1) the Greek and Turk Cypriots negotiate on the basis of full equality; (2) the intercommunal talks be predicated on the understanding that the outcome will be an independent Cypriot state in which the two communities are "partners"; (3) enosis as an eventual solution be explicitly excluded; (4) the agenda focus on Turk interests (constitutional compromise) only. These Turkish preconditions are probably more than Makarios, or even the mainland Greeks, can accept. They actually amount to getting advance substantive commitments which the UN assiduously avoided in arranging the five-party format last fall and winter.

The toughening of the Turkish position results in part from the change of government in Turkey. There is, in effect, no government right now, and none of the caretakers wants to shoulder responsibility for beginning talks on a basis that would make them look soft on the Cyprus issue.

It was under these circumstances that Sisco and Bush decided--without asking us--to inform Waldheim that we do not support the tougher Turkish line. Sisco has laid down the principle that we do not want to get out in front and therefore want Waldheim to carry the ball. However, he has taken the line with the Turks--again without checking with us--that we thought the UN-Makarios agreement on the Czech arms was sufficient and that we felt the intercommunal talks were the best hope for progress. He has also pointed out the desirability of Turkey's avoiding the appearance before the Security Council debate of being the party that killed the intercommunal talks.

Conclusions

The problem is how to keep the Turkish position from isolating Turkey, damaging Greek-Turkish harmony and creating a renewed sense of crisis on Cyprus. Whereas in February the Turks stood back with some confidence that the Greeks would not double-cross them, the present situation re-introduces the old aspect of Greek-Turkish confrontation. The Turks seem disillusioned with Greek handling of the Cyprus issue in the last two months and suspect that Athens, Makarios and Grivas may all be secretly lining up behind enosis. The fact that Turkey is without a government means that no one is available with the courage to put down these suspicions.

State is naturally concerned to see a new impasse in the way of talks, but the issue is how far we go in making this an issue in US-Turkish relations. State has started out taking the position that the Turkish stand is too rigid and has suggested to the Turks that they not get themselves in a box. Ambassador Handley in Ankara notes, however, that the prospects of successful demarches at this time are "very dismal." To begin with the government crisis immobilizes them for the moment. Moreover, they appear determined not to see the Cypriot intercommunal talks restarted just for the sake of reducing immediate tension but want them to deal constructively with the Cyprus problem. Until now the Greeks have been doing Turkey's work of softening up Makarios, but now the Greeks seem to have backed off and the Turks apparently may be moving to apply pressure themselves--if one can ascribe any strategy to their moves at all in the current political crisis.

The danger in State's approach is that if we oppose the Turks too obviously, it will appear that we are ganging up with the Greeks and Makarios against them. So the art is not to encourage them on their present course but to avoid confrontation with them.

As I deduce your position, it would be that.

--we should let Waldheim carry the main brunt of the argument with the Turks now;

--we should not give the Turks the impression we are ganging up against them;

--we could talk to the Turks when the new government gets its feet on the ground about avoiding isolation when the Security Council debate nears;

--we can take a straightforward position, as we have for some time, of favoring intercommunal talks as long as we can do so in a low-key way without putting ourselves in open opposition to the Turks.

Is this a fair statement of the position?

Yes JK

No _____

But above all I want the firmest possible demands and I want all of them cleared here.

continued

SECRET/EXDIS

- 4 -

RECOMMENDATION. If you have not already done so, that you call Sisco and make sure he understands that we want a crack at any additional moves he is considering concerning Cyprus. Unless he gets this word from the right level he is likely to keep moving us into a position that challenges Turkey.

SECRET/EXDIS

1972 MAY 2 23 29

CONFIDENTIAL

HCE247

PAGE 01 STATE 076361

ORIGIN SS-25

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5/2/72 EXT 20512
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO
IO/UNP - MR. ARMITAGE
NEA/CYP - MR. LONG
S/S-0: J.BRIMS

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Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 076361

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS

REF: A. STATE 074139 B. STATE 074438 C. NICOSIA 953
D. USUN 1577 E. ANKARA 3107

1. AMBASSADOR BUSH TELEPHONED SYG FROM WASHINGTON MAY 1
TO ADVISE HIM THAT WE FELT GOT WAS TAKING TOUGH LINE ON
CZECH ARMS QUESTION AND RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.
BUSH TOLD SYG THAT ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT WANT GET INTO MIDDLE
OF THIS MATTER, WE WANTED SYG TO KNOW THAT WE DO NOT SUPPORT
THIS TOUGHER TURKISH LINE. SYG INFORMED BUSH TURKISH
CHARGE AT UN HAD GIVEN HIM EIGHT POINT LIST OF PRE-
CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. SYG HAD
EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT TO TURKISH CHARGE, SAYING
SUBMISSION OF SUCH PRECONDITIONS INDICATED GOT NOT
INTERESTED IN RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 076361

2. FOR ATHENS AND NICOSIA. UN SECRETARIAT HAS PASSED GOT LIST OF PRECONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS TO GREEK AND CYPRIOT MISSIONS TO UN WHICH HAVE REFERRED THEM TO CAPITALS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. REQUEST EMBASSIES' ASSESSMENT PROBABLE REACTION OF HOST GOVERNMENTS TO TURKISH PRECONDITIONS.

3. FOR ANKARA, ATHENS, NICOSIA. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS RETIMING AND SUBSTANCE APPROACHES US AND/OR UN MIGHT MAKE TO GET PARTIES TO AGREE RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN NEAR FUTURE. IRWIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL EXDIS

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROGERS, W _____ LOU _____ BUO _____ EXDIS
 HAIG LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
SAUNDERS S CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Review of Current Situation On Cyprus*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APPT'S: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

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INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

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5/8	SAUNDERS	HAIG	X	Decision (5/8)	
6/6				then approved record	
6/6		SAUNDERS	S	Any further action (6/7)	
6/6	SAUNDERS	NSC/S		close file. This is over taken by Turkish agreement to join the intercommunal talks.	

DISPOSITION

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

SECRET

February 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR.

DR. KISSINGER

FROM.

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
ROSEMARY NEAHER

SUBJECT:

The Cyprus Situation

You have been reading in your brief of new elements of tension in Cyprus. We promised you a fuller picture. The situation is beginning to move more quickly; the following should bring you up to date.

The talks

The new and expanded intercommunal talks have been held up by haggling over their format. Turkey's final assent is expected soon, and talks could begin before the month is out unless present tensions prevent that.

The new talks would have a UN representative, a mainland Greek and a mainland Turk constitutional law expert join the Greek and Turk Cypriots. As you may recall, the genesis of this was in the meeting between the Greek (Palamas) and Turk (then Olcay) foreign ministers at the UNGA last fall. They agreed to add the mainland representatives, thereby creating a four-party format. U Thant insisted on the inclusion of a UN person in order to make the format sellable to Makarios who sees protection in a UN role. It is this five-party arrangement that has bounced around for several months.

The Greeks accepted outright and have said they will go along with any arrangement which would launch new talks. Makarios agonized at the thought of being pressured in new talks by mainland representatives; he sought assurances that the UN would indeed be involved and then stole the thunder from Turkey by promptly accepting. Turkey was left as the chief hold-out.

Turkey's problem is the inclusion of the UN representative. They feel this will undercut new pressure on Makarios injected by the mainland representatives. Recalling their problems with past special UN mediators,

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

Excellent paper. 1440

I want to be told before 40G is given any more advice I am afraid our meddling will lead us squarely in situation?

Turkey has insisted on clarifications from the Secretary General's special advisor on Cyprus that any UN representative not be a "mediator" per se but be on hand with his "good offices" and that the mainland representatives be actively involved. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken said this week that Turk needs on this score were on the point of being met and opined that talks could begin by the month's end. Matters stand there.

This procedural debate has been lengthy, but even if talks now begin, there will be a long debate over the agenda. On the one hand, Makarios has made it clear he does not believe mainland representatives belong in talks between the local parties on the constitutional questions at stake, on which he believes he has already made maximum concessions to the Turk Cypriots. He is lobbying for broad discussion including the international aspects of the problem such as withdrawal of Turk mainland support. The Turks, on the other hand, are adamant that new talks zero in precisely on the constitutional stalemate; they want none of the past treaties (London-Zurich accords) or constitutional points already agreed upon undercut. Assuming progress at that level, they could envisage broadening the agenda at a later date.

The UN special representative who will be involved has been turning over possible new approaches to the talks beyond the simple reliance on the trading of position papers between the two locals which characterized the last phase. He is thinking of (a) trying to consolidate areas of common agreement from past talks and (b) talking about interim or permanent measures which would help the communities live together without confrontation in the current situation of de facto separation. State has also been developing some ideas on deconfrontation--mutual withdrawal by the two communities from lines of confrontation around the island--if there came a time when they might help the UN representative. Interest by the parties in deconfrontation has been evident but Ambassador Popper now feels the issue has been dealt a blow by the reports of Makarios' new Czech arms.

Grivas

The clandestine re-appearance of General Grivas on Cyprus and the resulting war of nerves between him and Makarios has added a new element of tension.

To put this in perspective, Grivas was the famous pro-enosist and fanatical anti-communist Greek Cypriot who fought against the British in the mid-50s, almost hand in glove with Makarios' struggle on the political level. With independence and the guarantees given to the Turk Cypriots he

SECRET

- 3 -

pressed on for enosis and became heavily involved in the terrorism of the sixties which twice brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Those events convinced Makarios and Greece to drop their campaign for enosis and turn to intercommunal talks. Grivas, anathema to the Turk Cypriots and to Makarios by then as a political rival, was moved to confinement in Greece where he remained until his "escape" last fall.

A number of factors have made Makarios certain if not all but sure that Greece is behind the plot. We do not really know.

For one thing, Grivas' escape came shortly after Makarios' resistance to Greek pressure last summer to be more forthcoming in the talks, immediately before the Olcay/Palamas talks in New York. These facts against a backdrop of increasing Greco-Turk consultation on the Cyprus problem have led the Archbishop to suspect a plot against him unless he reaches a compromise, presumably satisfactory to the Turk Cypriots. The alternative would be to risk confrontation with Grivas leading to enosis and, again assuming Greco-Turk dialogue, satisfactory results for the Turk Cypriots, i. e. double enosis or partition.

In reaction, Makarios has stiffened in the face of a threat. As you know, he has clandestinely imported sizeable quantities of Czech arms almost certainly for the arming of a private police force outside the Greek-controlled National Guard.

The introduction of these new arms has sparked reactions in Turkey and Greece. Whether these flow from the fact that they have been involved in the Grivas episode with the idea of precipitating double enosis or whether they view it as a further eroding factor for the new talks, the issue is that our allies are once again concerned enough about Cyprus perhaps to be moving toward some drastic step which would confront us with difficult choices.

Greek-Turk Relations and the New Situation

On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have recently embarked upon a new period of cooperation over Cyprus. Both sides have privately and publicly insisted that Cyprus not become an issue between them and both shared the initiative in reviving the intercommunal talks as the best framework for solution. It has been their reasonableness which has kept negotiations over procedures for the talks from breaking down. The US has encouraged these efforts.

SECRET

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- 4 -

On top of this cooperation, we have had reports that officials on both sides continue to talk about a so-called "dynamic" solution ending in double enosis (partition) as the best way out. Ambassador Popper hears this not only from Turks and Turk Cypriots but also from mainland Greeks and elements of the Greek-Cypriot establishment.

Makarios' recent importation of arms has upset both Greece and Turkey and reopened the possibility of a solution imposed on Cyprus by the two of them.

--The Turks have gone on record to express their grave concern and to indicate privately that they may have to ship new arms to their community. The Greeks are aware of this. We also have a reliable report that in its dialogue with Greece, Turkey has indicated that Makarios must go.

--Palamas has told Tasca Greece is urging Turkey to keep cool while it tries to deal with the situation. He also implied that Makarios was the obstacle. Tasca gained the impression Greece would like to see him replaced. Greece plans on the following steps.

--Makarios will be told tomorrow that he must turn the Czech arms over to UNFICYP control and that he must form a government of "national unity" (presumably involvement of the Turk Cypriots) in Cyprus.

--If Makarios refuses, the GOG will make its demands public and will also inform the UN and UK.

--Greece does not want violence nor will it make use of Grivas but if Makarios resists, the GOG will take its case directly to the Greek Cypriot people.

--If Makarios refuses to form a government acceptable to Greece and is backed by Greek Cypriots, then Greece may withdraw from the island.

Ambassador Tasca, who has already expressed hope to the GOG that they are not entertaining the thought of a "dynamic" solution, has now told Palamas he believes that the GOG plan is highly dangerous given the support Makarios has among Greek Cypriots.

SECRET

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- 5 -

To buy time, State--with our clearance--has instructed Tasca to make the following points to Papadopoulos. The GOG scenario may have the effect of consolidating support behind Makarios and impelling him towards Soviet support. All diplomatic options to resolve the Czech arms problem should be exhausted. One course could be a GOG-GOT demarche to the UNSYG which the US is prepared to support and would ask the UK, Canada and others to make parallel approaches to the UN. At a minimum, the US hopes that Greece will hold off with its scenario to permit discussions among the NATO allies.

Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot official has told Ambassador Popper that Makarios had acquired the arms because of overwhelming evidence of Greek complicity in Grivas' movement to precipitate double enosis. He maintained that Makarios had every right to defend himself and his regime and urged the US to help stop Greece from talking about a political settlement on the one hand while conspiring with Grivas on the other. He did suggest that there could be a trade-off of the Czech arms for a return of Grivas to Greece and urged the US to play a role in working this out. But he also said it is obvious to Cyprus that the Greeks are using the arms pretext as a first step toward partition in collusion with Turkey; he believes it would never work and would only set Greece and Turkey against each other.

The Situations the US May Face

We have traditionally maintained that the intercommunal talks best address the US interest in defusing tensions on Cyprus and hence tensions between Greece and Turkey. We have taken a position of supporting Cypriot independence, and we have cultivated a relationship with Makarios in that context.

The situation we now face is one of apparent increased Greek and Turkish interest in imposing a solution regardless of the fate of Makarios, or possibly even regardless of the independence of Cyprus. At the very least it seems that Greece and Turkey may have agreed that (a) Makarios must settle this problem in a way satisfactory to the Turks and Greeks (a national unity government which could mean either Turk Cypriot participation in it or, a step further, partition) or (b) Makarios must go. In short, if Greece and Turkey are determined to force a situation which would violate Makarios' view of a unitary independent state, or, further, partition Cyprus, the US will face difficult choices between the wishes of our allies and our established opposition to dismemberment of UN members.

SECRET

The following are the situations we may face and the principal implications:

Situation 1. There remains a chance simply to diffuse the tensions created by the arms issue. This could come about if we could focus attention on the tensions raised by the arms problem and get everyone back on the track towards resuming talks and forgetting any dynamic overall solution now. Our instructions to Ambassador Tasca to urge the GOG to hold off on its ultimatum to Makarios and concentrate instead on exhausting diplomatic options to resolve the arms problem are one step in this direction. The suggestion has also been made on Cyprus that a trade-off to diffuse tensions be arranged by returning Grivas to Greece in exchange for Czech arms being turned over to UNFICYP. The Cypriots have asked us to become involved in working this out with the Greeks.

Implications. The US definitely has an interest in isolation of the arms issue and getting on with the talks. However, it is much less clear that we want to be in the middle in a dispute within the Greek-Greek Cypriot community. If we tried to negotiate the return of Grivas to Greece, we would have to take into account that Greece may well be taking advantage of Grivas' presence on Cyprus to pressure Makarios and may not want such a trade-off. [Intelligence reports suggest that the Greeks may even have Grivas in one of the Greek Cypriot National Guard camps--for release at the proper moment.] Athens has already tried privately to force Makarios on the arms question and has now surfaced its proposal to issue an ultimatum to him. We would have a question whether

--we want to pressure Athens off a course it may have already decided on;

--we want to line up with an initiative on trade-off that essentially meets Makarios needs but may not do much to produce his flexibility in the talks;

--we want at all costs to see the talks resumed even though Greece and Turkey are fed up with Makarios.

The argument for involving ourselves is that this may be far easier than dealing with either of the two situations that follow.

SECRET

- 7 -

Situation 2. The Greeks go ahead and issue their ultimatum to Makarios to conform or step down; he resists, rallies his people against external pressure and perhaps takes his case to the UN. The assumption here is that the Greeks take a strong stand hoping Makarios will acquiesce but waver before following their strategy through to the conclusion of quickly deposing Makarios.

The main implication here would be that the US would be caught between Makarios' call for support in the face of external pressure and Athens' defense that it is attempting to solve a problem as it sees fit. Makarios would get Soviet and perhaps Chinese support (their position is that the local parties solve their own problem) at the UN. The US would be allied with Greek and Turkish intervention. This situation would be the worst of two worlds. It would not involve decisive enough action to solve the problem and it would generate worldwide pressure on us to pull the Greeks and Turks off. Whereas there is a theoretical option of acquiescing in a decisive Greek move, the proposed Greek action of issuing an ultimatum and waiting for reaction seems doomed to failure.

Situation 3. Greece and Turkey have already decided to cooperate in a dynamic solution to impose a solution or partition Cyprus. They are beyond backing off from this course, actively engaged in deposing Makarios and installing a new Cypriot government.

This would put us squarely between our interests in having Greece and Turkey resolve the issue to the benefit of good relations between them and in not seeing intervention in or dismemberment of Cyprus by our two NATO allies. The US in the least would be faced with weathering the storm of intervention on Cyprus by NATO allies who would justify their moves as guarantor powers of the London-Zurich accords or worse, face a situation of partition or double enosis in opposition to our principle of not endorsing the dismemberment of UN nations. If there is to be action, however, this would be better than some indecisive intermediate step. The additional argument against acquiescing in any such move is that it stands a good chance of failing.

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- 8 -

In Conclusion

This memo is intended simply to provide background on steps taken to date and a framework within which to think about where events might go from here. If this heats up any more, it may be necessary to call a WSAG meeting.

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

Saunders X

SUBJECT: The Cyprus Situation: Greek-Turk Relations and the new situation

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

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<i>2/14</i>			<i>c</i>	<i>Noted by HAK w/ comments</i>	

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FEB 16 1972



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Subject: Progress on the Cyprus Problem

The news of crises invariably receives total attention while news of progress usually gets buried. I would like to call your attention to some quiet, but hopeful developments.

For several months we have been working hard to avoid another crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. As you know, this summer the local negotiations which were basic to the containment of the Cyprus problem broke down and violent incidents began to increase. In the face of a deteriorating situation, we suggested a third-party presence to reinvigorate the negotiations. This idea was developed by Greece and Turkey and then elaborated and formally proposed by U Thant as a new negotiating procedure. I supported this proposal during my bilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in October. Subsequently, we made diplomatic representations here and in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia urging acceptance by all parties.

On December 13 the Security Council met to consider Cyprus. We were successful in getting a noncontroversial resolution extending the UN force on Cyprus for six more months, which will aid greatly in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in which negotiations can proceed. In addition, Cyprus accepted the Secretary-General's proposal without qualifications. This breakthrough together with earlier acceptances by Greece and Turkey (the latter with qualifications) will in my view make possible the resumption of the negotiations in the near future. I believe our representations were very important, if not crucial, in getting the parties back to the negotiating table.

We will, of course, closely monitor the evolving situation in order to assist the parties whenever our efforts would be appropriate and helpful. On the Cyprus front the new year has a hopeful cast.


William P. Rogers

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
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SUBJECT: Progress on the Cyprus Problem

REFERENCE: S/S 7/20/11 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

31820

September 16, 1971

Cyprus

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Popper
(S/S 7112921)

This is to confirm my phone call that Dr. Kissinger will meet with Dave Popper on Wednesday, September 22, at 12 noon. It will not be possible to schedule an appointment with the President at this time.

JWD

Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

→ Jeanne Davis

Since this came in an Eliot-Kissinger, I assume you should notify S/S.

I have checked to assure that Popper's schedule is free at the appointed time. Do you want to confirm to Coleman?

Hal

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION
31820

HAL - I have set aside
12:00 noon on
Wednesday, 22 September
for meeting. Will you
handle with Popper,
please?
dsh

THRU
HAIG

CONFIDENTIAL

September 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM. Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT: Appointments for Ambassador Popper

Our Ambassador to Cyprus, Dave Popper, will be in Washington, September 20 - October 1 for consultations.

There are two aspects to his visit here which should be considered in deciding whether he should see you or the President.

1. This would be your opportunity to talk with him about Cyprus. Since you are trying to maintain control over this and have now dealt with it twice in the SRG, an appointment of this kind might be useful to both of you. The purpose would be to get a picture of Popper and his way of analyzing the problem.

2. Popper has just completed several trips for major consultations with selected European, Near Eastern and Asian governments to further the effort to amend the 1961 Single Convention on narcotic drugs. This is a special mission for which Popper was selected because of his past experience with international organizations rather than a job carried out in connection with his present ambassadorial duties.

Having checked with Bud Krogh, I judge that in the narcotics context a meeting with the President is not necessary, so in view of the President's normal practice of not seeing our ambassadors unless there is overriding substantive reason, I am not attaching a recommendation for a Presidential appointment. I do think, however, that it would be worth your time to have a brief chat with him about Cyprus. I have not pushed this during his other visits here, but now seems a particularly appropriate time.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That you schedule an appointment yourself with Ambassador Popper and his country director between September 20 and October 1.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

2. That you not suggest a meeting with the President.

Approve HK Recommend meeting with President _____

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Ambassador David H. Popper

Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs, USUN, Director Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969.

During the period June-August 1971, Ambassador Popper led a team of Department and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs experts in consultations with key European, Middle Eastern, and Southeast Asian governments. The consultations were designed to mobilize support for strengthening the 1969 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 20, 1971

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Appointment with President for
Ambassador Popper

Our Ambassador to Cyprus, David H. Popper, will be in Washington September 20-October 1 for consultations with government officials. During that time he will be available for a call on the President should the President wish to see him.

You may wish to consider the following in this connection:

A. Ambassador Popper will have completed major consultations with selected European, Near Eastern, and Asian governments in furtherance of a Presidentially-endorsed initiative to amend the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The Department feels that Ambassador Popper has made a significant contribution in our effort to garner support for these amendments. The President may wish to receive a first-hand report of the Ambassador's reactions.

B. As Under Secretary Irwin discussed with you earlier this month, we expect that the Cyprus situation will be passing through a delicate stage during the period late September-early October. The President may wish to discuss the situation with Ambassador Popper. In view of President Makarios' feeling of personal rapport with President Nixon, it would strengthen Ambassador Popper's hand in what may be difficult exchanges with Makarios if he could return to Cyprus after having had discussions with the President.

Parker W. Boy
for Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic Sketch

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: *Passable report w/Pres for Ambassador Pappas to discuss Drug Control*

REFERENCE: S/S *7/12921* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 13, 1971

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Cyprus

I am attaching for your information a telegram the Secretary today sent to our Embassies in Ankara, Athens and Nicosia which I thought you would like to see in the light of the recent Senior Review Group meetings on this subject.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.".

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

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SECRET/EXDIS

Saunders



Department of State

TELEGRAM

HAAL

SECRET 591

PAGE 01 STATE 167530

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DRAFTED BY: NEA: J. J. SISCO

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

IO: MR. DE PALMA

S/S: MR. ELIOT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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S E C R E T STATE 167530

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADORS TASCA AND CHARGES CRAWFORD AND CUTHELL

FROM SISCO

SUBJ: CYPRUS

1. AS A RESULT OF VERY GOOD AND DETAILED REPORTING, I BELIEVE WE NOW HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE BOTH OF THE RESULTS OF THE MAKARIOS-PAPADOPOULOS TALKS AND THE STRATEGY WHICH GOC INTENDS TO PURSUE OVER THE COMING WEEKS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT GOC WILL "SEEK THE ADVICE" OF THE SYG AND THAT THERE IS NOT APT TO BE TOO MUCH COMMON GROUND BETWEEN GOG AND GOT AS TO HOW TO KEEP THE PARTIES ENGAGED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO POSSIBLE FURTHER DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION.

2. IN REVIEWING ALL OF THE CABLES CAREFULLY, AND YOU ARE ALL

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
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 167530

TO BE CONGRATULATED ON THE REPORTING, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE NEED TO FOCUS ON TWO IDEAS THAT HAVE COME FROM YOU AT THIS STAGE. FIRST, AMBASSADOR TASCA'S SENSIBLE THOUGHT THAT WHEN SECRETARY SEES PALMAS AND OLCAY HE ENCOURAGE THEM BOTH TO COME UP WITH SOME KIND OF A MEDIATION PROPOSAL THAT IS SOMEWHERE WITHIN THE BALLPARK IN SO FAR AS GOC IS CONCERNED. IT SEEMS TO ME ALSO THAT THIS IDEA CAN BE COMBINED WITH THE OTHER IDEA WHICH YOUR CABLES ELUCIDATED, NAMELY THE IDEA OF A THIRD PARTY PRESENCE AT CONTINUING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. THE TRICK, OF COURSE, WILL BE TO TRY TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE IN "UN INVOLVEMENT OR NON-INVOLVEMENT" PLUS HAVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL DESIGNATE AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT STATURE, FORCE, AND SUBTLETY TO INJECT SOME FRESH IDEAS IN THE SITUATION. WE ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT THE CYPRUS ISSUE IS IMMEDIATELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL SOLUTION. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT OUR INTEREST WOULD BEST BE SERVED IF SOME FORM OF CONTINUING INSTRUMENTALITY KEEPING THE PARTIES ENGAGED CAN BE FOUND.

3. I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER FULLY WITH THE SECRETARY BUT WILL DO SO BEFORE WE GO TO NEW YORK, SINCE NOT ONLY WILL HE BE HEAVILY INVOLVED AS IN THE PAST IN ARAB-ISRAELI TALKS, BUT MUCH OF HIS TIME WILL ALSO (IN ADDITION TO CHINESE REPRESENTATION) BE TAKEN UP WITH INDIA-PAKISTAN MATTERS, AND NOW CYPRUS IN A MUCH MORE INTENSIVE WAY.

4. ASSUMING THAT WE WILL WANT TO ENCOURAGE GOG AND GOT TO DEVELOP A MEDIATION PROPOSAL ALONG THE ABOVE LINES, WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL THAT MIGHT BE NAMED BY SECRETARY GENERAL. WHILE I PERSONALLY KNOW AND HAVE RESPECT FOR OSORIO-TAFAL, HE DOES NOT STRIKE ME AS THE KIND OF INDIVIDUAL THAT CAN GIVE TALKS THE NEW STARCH THAT IS REQUIRED. IN PREPARATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S TALKS IN NEW YORK, I WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS AND ANY OTHER THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE.

5. I HOPE YOU WOULD INCLUDE IN YOUR OBSERVATIONS THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A NON-AMERICAN AS AGAINST AN AMERICAN BEING DESIGNATED. FROM THIS END, I CAN TELL YOU OUR PREFERENCE WOULD BE IN ANY NEXT STATE THAT IT BE A NON-AMERICAN, THOUGH WE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT AFFORD TO CLOSE ANY DOORS SINCE CYPRUS ISSUE CAN REACH A MORE NEW AND SERIOUS STAGE OVER COMING MONTHS.

GP-3. ROGERS.

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Ben King

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 4, 1971

SECRET/EXDIS


MEMORANDUM FOR

The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Papers on Cyprus

Attached are the following two papers, prepared by the Department of State, which will serve as the basis for discussion at the Senior Review Group meeting on Cyprus scheduled for Wednesday, September 8, at 3 45 p.m.:

- Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps,
- Cyprus: Contingency Plans for Violent Incidents.


Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary

Attachment

cc: Under Secretary of Treasury

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps

Situation

Ten years of experience with the Cyprus problem demonstrate one constant when the parties to the dispute are not negotiating, the probability of violence increases exponentially. Since June 1968, the local talks have kept the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context. In addition, this instrumentality has provided what is the unique advantage of having the people directly concerned discuss those problems which directly concern them.

On August 9, the Turk Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, tabled a paper setting forth the "final" Turkish Cypriot position. He insisted on and made all Turk Cypriot commitments made thus far contingent upon the establishment of a separate and autonomous Turk Cypriot administration from the village to the national level. He also raised the need for a specific GOC disavowal of enosis (union with Greece) and injected the question of international guarantees. Archbishop Makarios subsequently declared the talks "deadlocked", although neither party has made a move to break off negotiations.

With the local talks approaching termination and frustration levels rising on all sides, the possibility of an outbreak of violence is greater than at any time since 1968. Rather than react to a violent development the Cyprus situation would be better dealt with by seeking to revive US/UK/UN diplomacy. The goal of such a diplomatic effort would be preservation of negotiations to avoid a confrontation on the island which would sooner or later bring in Greece and Turkey on opposite sides. There are several options and variations thereon; all of them involve some form of mediation.

Mediation Option I: UN

UN mediation has clear advantages. First, the UN is already seized of the problem and is on the spot. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council are involved in the Cyprus problem as a result of the March 4, 1964 (and subsequent) Resolutions and the presence of the United Nations

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Group 3

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Force (UNFICYP) on the island. Second, with the UN out in front, Greek, Turk, and Cypriot fire would be concentrated on that organization rather than any specific country. Third, the UN provides a broad cover for both neutral mediation and, at a later stage, perhaps the guaranteeing of the results of that mediation. There are, however, problems with the UN being the focus of activity. The Turks/Turk Cypriots have already expressed their antipathy toward UN mediation, preferring instead the convening of the London-Zurich guarantor powers. Moreover, in a UN mediation effort U.S. inputs would necessarily be diluted by the views of others, and it is difficult for the UN as an institution to bring pressure to bear on the parties.

Variant A. By far the most preferable variation of the UN mediation option would involve consultations among the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots which would result in joint agreement on a mediator and the principles upon which mediation would be based. The initiative for the consultations could be undertaken by any one of the parties, preferably Turkey, or perhaps could be jointly undertaken by Greece and Turkey through their dialogue. Once the parties had agreed on a person and on guidelines, U Thant could formally give the individual his blessing, and the mediation would proceed. A retired senior statesman (e.g., Lester Pearson) or an internationally renowned legal expert (e.g., Edward Hambro of Norway or Pierre Laline of Switzerland) would be preferable to a currently active "super star." The latter might raise hopes too high with the danger that the failure of his mission would bring increased tension.

Variant B. Archbishop Makarios could unilaterally request U Thant either to undertake a mediation effort on the basis of the March 4, 1964 Resolution or to activate his good offices under the December 22, 1967 Resolution. The problem here would be that the Turks might reject the concept of mediation because it was a Makarios proposal. In any case, were the Archbishop to take a UN initiative, the U.S. would be forced to support the effort.

Variant C. It is possible that U Thant or his Special Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, might take the initiative to regenerate the SYG's good offices. The local talks were convened by Osorio-Tafall, acting under the SYG's good offices mandate, and he then withdrew stating that he would be available for mediation should the sides reach a deadlock. U Thant's next report to the SC on Cyprus will be in December in connection with renewal of UNFICYP's mandate. He could choose to move in this framework.

Mediation Option II: U.S.

The argument for U.S. mediation is that our position as NATO leader and primary ally of Greece and Turkey, as well as our active mediatory roles via the Ball and Vance Missions to defuse crises, give us the primary responsibility for the Cyprus problem. Since the U.S. is the repository of a great deal of experience with the Cyprus problem and the country most able to influence all the parties, it is incumbent upon us to shape the Cyprus situation in a positive way before there is a crisis and before we are compelled to intervene under the worst possible conditions. Theoretically, this position has much merit. However, as a practical matter in the present circumstances there should be no direct U.S. mediation. The reasons are that such an effort would immediately put the U.S. in the middle of a three-cornered struggle of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots and expose us to criticism from all sides. In addition, our influence would be wasted too early in the game. A direct U.S. intervention should be preserved as a last ditch option in the case of an uncontrollable outbreak of violence.

Mediation Option III: Independent

A third variant on mediation would be the appointment of a neutral, non-political third party (preferably European as mediator. This option would probably not emerge spontaneously, but could be stimulated by the U.S., acting in concert with the U.K., or within the NATO framework. For example, Italy, with its interest in playing a significant role in "Mediterranean" diplomacy, might be stimulated to perform the mediatory function. Also, Italy has outstanding candidates such as elder statesman Manlio Brosio or legal expert Roberto Ago. Independent mediation, like a UN effort, has the advantage of placing someone else out in front. Another positive factor is that lack of direct involvement with the UN would make an independent mediator more palatable to the Turks. The main problems would be the difficulty of finding a willing candidate and again the inevitable dilution of U.S. inputs and lack of influence on the countries concerned.

U.S. Diplomatic Strategy

Given the dangers inherent in the situation on the ground, the need for the U.S. to keep the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context and the considerations involved in mediation, it would be best for the U.S. quietly to reactivate its diplomacy vis-a-vis Cyprus. In general terms, our goal should be to insure that in the case of a real stalemate in the intercommunal

talks and increasing violence on the Island a mediation effort can be quickly and efficiently mounted. The ideal kind of mediation would be that outlined in Option I A, i.e., a UN-sponsored effort stimulated by the parties and involving a mediator and guidelines previously agreed upon. The next most feasible approach would be Option III. In either case the U.S. role should be that of an amicus curiae providing behind the scenes ideas and support.

At the very minimum, if we are successful in proceeding with mediation, the negotiating process will be spun out and time will be gained. At the maximum, breakthroughs might be achieved which would either solve the Cyprus problem or provide for a more stable modus vivendi.

Next Steps:

1. We believe Assistant Secretary Sisco should call in the Turkish, Greek, and Cypriot Ambassadors (with supporting actions in the capitals) and ask them to clarify their positions as reflected in the latest documents exchanged in the local talks. In addition, he should discuss with them where we go from here on the Cyprus problem, emphasizing the U.S. desire for diplomacy and negotiation and probing reactions to UNSYG good offices (which Makarios has already floated in the press).

2. The next step would be determined by events in the coming weeks. The Foreign Ministers of all the parties will be in New York for the UNGA and, if stalemate and crisis seem imminent, Secretary Rogers will consider exploring with the Foreign Ministers (particularly Olcay of Turkey) some form of mediation as generally outlined in Option I A.

Concurrences:

- NEA/GRK - Mr. Churchill (subs)
 - NEA/TUR - Mr. Pugh (subs)
 - IO/UNP - Mr. Armitage (subs)
 - EUR - Mr. Richard Davies (info)
 - NEA - Mr. Rodger Davies
 - NEA - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco
 - S/PC
 - NEA/CYP: TDBoyatt he
- X 20279, 8/27/71

SECRET

Cyprus: Contingency Plans for Violent Incidents

The historical record shows that serious intercommunal violence has often erupted in Cyprus. An action-reaction escalation of violence could bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation as in 1964, 1965, and 1967. With the local talks between Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot negotiators now approaching deadlock and with frustration and uncertainty increasing, the coming weeks and months will be particularly delicate.

Our contingency plans are based on past Cyprus crisis management and are geared for quick reaction to contain violence. U.S. responses vary depending on the kind and scale of the incident, which side initiated the violence and for what reason.

* Procedure in Case of Accidental Incidents: In the case of an accidental shooting incident, a small scale provocation, or a loss of control by the Greek or Turk Cypriot leadership of a sizeable portion of its military forces or civilian population, initial U.S. responses would appropriately focus on Cyprus itself.

1. The United Nations force on the ground (UNFICYP) has in the past, and could today, successfully interpose its troops between the local opposing groups.

2. Our Embassy in Nicosia would encourage rapid UNFICYP interposition and would make strong representations (probably in conjunction with other Embassies and U Thant's Special Representative) calling for either the GOC and/or the Turk Cypriot leadership to restore discipline and order within their ranks.

3. On the international diplomatic level we would encourage joint U.S., U.K., UN diplomatic démarches in London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara in support of efforts on the Island to contain the violence.

Procedure in Case of Premeditated Violence on a Small Scale: Premeditated violence, by either the GOC or the Turk Cypriots, is always a possibility. Because the vast majority of the mainland Greek troops on Cyprus were withdrawn in the

SECRET

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

wake of the 1967 crisis, Cyprus is today virtually defenseless relative to Turkey. For this reason Makarios would surely not go so far as to generate incidents which might invite mainland Turkish intervention. However, it is conceivable that His Beatitude might stimulate incidents simply to get the UN more involved by obtaining an increase in the size of UNFICYP and/or diplomatic intervention by the Secretary General or the Security Council. In such an event, the scale of violence would probably be kept as small as possible and U.S. reaction would be as described in steps 1, 2, and 3 in the above paragraph.

Procedure in Case of Large-Scale Violence. By far the most dangerous contingency would be a decision by the Turk/Turk Cypriot side to provoke violence as a prelude to Turk military intervention for the purpose of forcibly partitioning the Island. In this event our primary task would be to persuade the GOT that such a violent course of action would be self-defeating.

1. We would encourage UNFICYP to interpose its forces. If the fighting is on a large scale UNFICYP interposition might be futile (as in 1967). Certainly in the case of an invasion from Turkey UNFICYP would not take preventive action.

2. In concert with the U.K., and other interested parties, the U.S. would make representations in Ankara, Washington, and London to convince the Turks that the GOC's ability to generate a full scale international crisis would inevitably bring mainland Greece into conflict with Turkey, activate the international community against what would be regarded as stark aggression, and possibly involve the Soviet Union in a manner inimical to Turkish interests.

3. A corollary diplomatic move would be to activate the United Nations. U Thant's Special Representative on the Island and UNFICYP would no doubt be involved ab initio in efforts to stop the fighting. In addition, we could consider an emergency session of the Security Council with a view to mobilizing support for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

4. NATO would be involved in a full-blown Cyprus crisis. Since the 1963-64 period, the Secretary General has maintained a Watching Brief. If serious hostilities were to occur, we would activate the NATO Secretary General (as in 1967) to support our diplomatic efforts to counsel moderation and achieve an end to the fighting.

5. Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale

outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission. Both were crucial in stopping the shooting in 1964 and 1967 respectively. This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation caused by serious fighting on the Island.

The Soviet Dimension: The attitude of the Soviet Union in the event of serious intercommunal violence is difficult to predict. The Soviets appear to have two distinct and partially conflicting policy goals. On the one hand, a constant in Russian policy has been preservation of the independence and territorial integrity, i.e., the "non-NATOization", of Cyprus. On the other hand, the USSR has courted Turkey fairly consistently in recent years. The most probable course of Soviet diplomacy would be to make threatening noises against outside interventions while attempting to cool off Makarios in order to avoid the possibility of such interventions. In any UN activity they would probably come down on the side of a small independent nation but not strongly enough to badly irritate Turkey. In short, in the case of a Cyprus crisis, I would anticipate that the Soviet policy would be verbal as indeed it was in 1967.

Converting a Crisis Into Progress. In the past Cyprus has presented opportunity in crisis. If the situation either by accident or design, should deteriorate to the point where there is large scale fighting and the threat of Turk invasion, and if such a crisis can be defused by diplomacy, then we should give active consideration to steps which might subsequently be taken to assist in removing the basic causes of strife between the two communities. An example of this procedure was the successful US/UK/UN drive to initiate the local talks in 1968 following the Vance Mission's successful resolution of the 1967 crisis.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 30, 1971

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Gradual Worsening of Intercommunal
Relations -- Cyprus

In recent days there has been some increase in intercommunal tensions on Cyprus. This has been represented by a number of low-level provocations, principally by the Greek Cypriots. Although the situation has warmed up to some degree, we have not yet reached a "take-off" point in which intercommunal tensions begin to have a life of their own and can escalate into real violence.

The root cause of this increased tension is the continuing inability of the Turk and Greek Cypriot constitutional negotiators to bridge the very real gaps in their conceptions of an acceptable new governmental framework for Cyprus. This deepening stalemate has impelled the Turkish Government since April to declare publicly and rather often that the Turks are not prepared to carry on the negotiations for an unlimited period of time. In addition, a direct Cyprus dialogue between Athens and Ankara was initiated in June when Foreign Ministers Palamas and Olcay met in Lisbon. These new elements have produced a fear in the Greek Cypriot community that Turkey and Greece may be contemplating means to fundamentally change the status quo on the island. The recent Greek Cypriot provocations may be an attempt by Greek Cypriots to get the message to Turkey and Greece that pressure will not force them to compromise their negotiating position and that the Greek Cypriots continue to control the situation on the ground. The Greek Cypriots may also, however, be attempting to force Security Council consideration of a deteriorating situation on the island in order to enlist world public opinion

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

2

against possible attempts to solve the Cyprus problem from outside the island.

Our best estimate is that the situation may continue to deteriorate but at a relatively slow rate. In the meantime, we are seeking to defuse the situation by urging moderation on all concerned parties. Ambassador Tasca has conveyed to Prime Minister Papadopoulos our assessment of the need to continue the intercommunal negotiations. We are awaiting Ambassador Handley's views on carrying out a similar approach in Turkey, which would be followed up by an approach to Makarios that he exercise restraint in the current situation.

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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 27, 1971

SECRET Attachments

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The Cyprus Issue

I attach, for your information, a memorandum prepared for the Secretary on the present status of the Cyprus issue.

A handwritten signature in green ink that reads "Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.".

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Memorandum.

SECRET Attachments

SECRETBackground Information on the Cyprus Issue

Since early 1968, the Turk and Greek communities have been engaged in a long and difficult series of discussions designed to reach a new constitutional arrangement for the island. These talks were initiated after the serious crisis which erupted late in 1967. Our primary interest in Cyprus is to achieve a Cypriot solution which will remove Cyprus as a bone of contention between our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

The basic constitutional question which stubbornly resists resolution is the conflict between Turk-Cypriot demands for bi-communal autonomy and Greek-Cypriot demands for a unitary government within which the Turkish minority would be guaranteed fairly extensive civil rights. Neither party, nor their respective "parent countries", have budged from these basic stances. As a result, there have been no constitutional breakthroughs in the intercommunal talks, during the three years they have been underway. The negotiators from time to time have been forced to concentrate on less basic issues (e.g. partial refugee resettlement, freedom of movement between the two communal areas, and dismantling of quasi-military barricades).

There are now danger signs that mounting frustration on both sides may bring about complete impasse in the talks, and thus threaten renewed intercommunal strife. There are also intelligence indications, reported to you separately, that the new Turkish Government under Prime Minister Erim has come to the conclusion that partition and double enosis (annexation of the two parts to Turkey and Greece) represent the best solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turks are seeking a direct dialogue with Greece to discuss the future of Cyprus and will be meeting with the Greeks in this connection at the NATO Ministerial.

SECRET

We believe, and are emphasizing with the Greeks and Turks, that the Cypriot intercommunal negotiations continue to represent the best procedure for resolving the Cyprus problem. We believe a Greco/Turkish dialogue could serve a useful supportive role if restricted to giving new impetus and breathing new life into the Cypriot negotiations.

In the meantime we are consulting with our concerned Ambassadors in the interest of sharpening our contingency studies, and in Brussels have shared our apprehension with the Secretary General at NATO. Brosio also believes that the only practical approach to the problem is to plug away at the intercommunal talks, and will so stress at Lisbon in conversations with Olcay and Palamas.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

26099

February 22, 1971

The President did not see.
Paper rec'd at 11:59 AM +
mtg scheduled for 2-3
minutes' duration - stand up
only.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*

SUBJECT. Your Meeting with Ambassador to Cyprus, David Popper--
12:10 p.m., February 22

Background

Ambassador Popper will be calling on you mainly for the purpose of making his initial courtesy call and having the customary picture taken. You did meet briefly at your session with the Mediterranean Ambassadors in Naples, but Ambassador Popper did not have a chance to call on you before he left for his post last July. Since Cyprus is one of those problems which could become more active at any time, it is useful for you to have a firsthand sense of the man who represents you there.

Points Ambassador Popper May Raise

The Ambassador will probably express his gratitude for the attention you paid to Archbishop Makarios during his visit here for the UN celebrations. Because of the potential for crisis in Cyprus, the Ambassador was most anxious that you establish a personal relationship with Makarios that might be drawn on in the event of trouble.

The Ambassador may also describe briefly the state of negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Without making a great deal of progress, the two continue to engage.

Talking Points

You may wish to make the following points.

-- You enjoyed meeting President Makarios in October. He is an impressive individual.

-- Ask Ambassador Popper to carry your personal greetings to the President. You might, if you wish, ask him to say that you continue to watch with interest progress toward a final settlement on the island.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

-- You might wish to say a word about your feelings on the current state of Arab-Israeli negotiations since this was of concern to Makarios: While the course is difficult, you hope that we can complete the initial process of fully engaging the Egyptians and Israelis in negotiations. If this can be done, this will be the second major achievement of the U.S. peace initiative--the first having been the re-establishment of the cease-fire.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

26099

CONFIDENTIAL

February 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Harold H. Saunders *the*

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment with Ambassador Popper (Cyprus)

David Popper, our Ambassador to Cyprus, will be calling on the President, February 22 during the open hour (12:10 p.m.). The Department has submitted a request for an appointment with you either before or after his call on the President [Tab B].

This is not absolutely essential today, and Popper will be around for a few more days. However, if you can work him in it might be desirable. Cyprus is one of those problems which could explode as a result of an accident at almost any time. In a situation like that, there is always some value in your having a personal sense of the man representing the President on the scene.

The background on Popper, who used to be Joe Sisco's deputy in the Bureau for International Organizations, is in a copy of the memo for the President at Tab A. The main point of the meeting would be to give Popper a chance to tell you a little bit about where the situation on Cyprus stands. I believe you heard him once before during the Naples meeting of Mediterranean Ambassadors. I will be having lunch with him Wednesday.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That you send the memo at Tab A to the President if it is needed.
2. That you schedule a brief meeting with Ambassador Popper (not necessarily today).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

B



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 7102517

February 20, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Appointment with You
from Ambassador to Cyprus, David H.
Popper

Ambassador Popper will call on the President on Monday, February 22, at 12:10 p.m. While at the White House, the Ambassador would like to pay a brief call on you to discuss the situation in Cyprus as it affects our political and military posture on NATO's southern flank in the Eastern Mediterranean.

We therefore recommend that you meet with Ambassador Popper for five or ten minutes either before or after his meeting with the President to get his views on this protracted and potentially explosive problem.

For Ted
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch of
Ambassador Popper

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

David H. Popper

Ambassador to Cyprus

Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States Representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs, USUN, Director Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969.

24 FEB 13 AM 1 42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES HAK FROM: ELIOT ROGERS _____ LAIRD _____ CLASSIF: U EXDIS _____ C _____ NODIS _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____ S _____ RES DATA _____ TS _____ CODEWORD _____ SENSITIVE _____ PARIS MTG _____ NO FORN _____

DOC DATE: 02 20 71

SUBJECT: Request for App't with HAK by US Amb Papper

ENCLOSURES: () () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			
NAME:			
	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY FOR:
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
STAFF SECRETARY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
DIR SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()

MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()

REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()

REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()

MEMO _____ TO _____ ()

RECOMMENDATIONS ()

JOINT MEMO ()

APPROPRIATE ACTION ()

ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()

CONCURRENCE ()

DUE DATE: 02 22

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
A by-pass

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
2/22/71	Saunders	HAK Secretariat	Memo to Pres 02/22
2/22/71	HAK	PRES	To PRES

MICROFILM DATA

DO

INIT

DATE 26 FEB 1971

ORIG) NSC

TO) PAF

WHC

SUBF

DISPOSITION

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PAF HAK APP'L

WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA

SUBF NS3 FORM REQUIRED

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25503

CONFIDENTIAL

January 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: HUGH SLOAN

FROM: JEANNE W. DAVIS *JWD*

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment Request
for U. S. Ambassador to Cyprus

Ambassador David H. Popper will be in Washington during the period February 15-25 for consultations. Ambassador Popper did not see the President prior to his departure for Cyprus in July 1969, and he has not yet had the opportunity to meet the President at the White House.

Additionally, the President met with President Makarios at the White House in October. During their discussion, the President reinforced and substantially added to our friendly relations with Makarios. Should intercommunal strife erupt in Cyprus again, Makarios' willingness to accept a Presidential emissary and/or appeals from the President may again prove crucial to the restoration of calm locally and the prevention of a Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. In this context, it would be beneficial if Ambassador Popper could return to Cyprus with a personal greeting for Makarios from the President.

If the President's schedule permits, we recommend an appointment with a photo opportunity.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7101361

CONFIDENTIAL

January 29, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment with President for Ambassador
Popper

Our Ambassador to Cyprus, David H. Popper, will be in Washington February 15-25 for consultations with government officials. During that time he will be available for a call on the President should the President wish to see him.

You may wish to consider the following in this connection:

A. Ambassador Popper did not see the President prior to his departure for Cyprus in July 1969, and has not yet had the opportunity to meet the President at the White House.

B. The President met with President Makarios at the White House in October 1970. During their one-hour discussion, the President reinforced and substantially added to our friendly relations with President Makarios. Should intercommunal strife erupt in Cyprus again, Makarios' willingness to accept a Presidential emissary and/or appeals from the President may again prove crucial to the restoration of calm locally and the prevention of a Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus. In this context, it would be beneficial if Ambassador Popper could return to Cyprus with a personal greeting for Makarios from President Nixon.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

Ambassador David H. Popper

Born in New York City in 1912, Ambassador Popper received his Bachelor's and Master's degrees from Harvard University. He joined the Department of State in 1945 following service in the United States Army during World War II. Prior to appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus he held a number of Department positions relating to the United Nations. These included Director Office of United Nations Political and International Organizations in Geneva, Deputy United States Representative to the Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Senior Adviser on Disarmament Affairs, USUN, Director Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Popper presented his credentials in Cyprus in July 1969.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROCEDURE

NUMBER MO DA HR

25503 01 29 16

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT X CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS
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 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY
 S _____ RES DATA
 TS _____ CODEWORD
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 _____ PARIS MTG
 _____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 01/29/71

SUBJECT: appt. with Pres for Amb. Popper

ENCLOSURES: 5/5 (7101361) () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Saunders

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY		X	
DIR SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK (X)
 MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
 REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
 REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
 MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
 RECOMMENDATIONS ()
 JOINT MEMO ()
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
 CONCURRENCE ()
 DUE DATE: 02/02/71

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

CROSSED REF:
 2/26 [initials]

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
1/29	Saunders	Jeanne Davis	For memo to Chapin as agreed on the phone. HHS
1/29	Davis	Sloan, H	Appropriate idea
2/26			Opz per 26099

MICROFILM	DATA
DO	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
INIT	[initials]
DATE	3/1
ORIG)	NSC
TO)	PAF <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	WHC
	SUBF

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____ NSC X STAFF APPROVAL
 NOTIFY: _____ PAF _____ HAK APP'L
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 SUBF _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED

Tab A
see Pakistan

Ed Tab C
see China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

November 13, 1970

Memorandum for Jeanne Davis

From: Winston Lord *W*

Subject: Memcons of Meetings Between the
President and Foreign Leaders

As indicated on the attached, HAK has
approved the attached three memcons for
distribution to:

- the State Department;
- the President's files (I have the *started*
action memo on the Yen meeting, but
don't know where the other ones are);
and
- the relevant operators.

I would appreciate it if you would make this
distribution.

Attachments

Jeanne - please

SECRET/NODIS

*return my memo
to HAK (no fair
Xeroxing it 1st)
we didn't
jus*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

SECRET/NODIS

November 10, 1970

Ⓚ

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Winston Lord *W*

SUBJECT: Assorted Memcons

Attached for your approval for bureaucratic distribution are memoranda of conversation for the meetings between the President and Yahya, Makarios and Yen. You were the only other person present at these meetings and I have boiled down and sanitized your personal notes. Your full records will go into your personal files.

I recommend that the attached versions be distributed to the State Department, the President's file, and the relevant NSC operators.

Yahya memcon (Tab A)

Approve *W/L* Other _____

(We already gave State your approved brief highlights of this session for Ambassador Farley's November 5 meeting with Yahya.)

Makarios memcon (Tab B)

Approve *HK* Other _____

Yen memcon (Tab C)

Approve *HK* Other _____

This package will complete the official records for the President's meetings of the October 24-25 weekend, since the State Department interpreter did the Cheng Heng meeting and Wright/Nachmanoff did the Selassie/Lakas meetings.

NOV 13 1970

SECRET/NODIS

B

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Richard Nixon
Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DATE & PLACE: 10:00 a.m. Sunday, October 25, 1970, in
the President's Oval Office

The President opened the conversation by giving background on his offices in the White House and Executive Office Building. He then turned to substance.

The President said, "We follow your development with great sympathy. We understand your foreign policy of technical neutrality." Archbishop Makarios replied "Because of our geography and our peculiar conditions we follow a non-aligned policy but by history and tradition and conviction we belong to the West. We are not like other non-aligned countries that **are really pro-east**. At the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries we defended the Western point of view so much that I was afraid we would lose our non-aligned status."

The President said he hoped that the Middle East would not explode. He appreciated Cyprus being made available as a staging place during the evacuation of the airline hijacking hostages from Jordan. Archbishop Makarios responded that Cyprus was always available for any peaceful purpose in the area. He added that while, of course, he was strongly for peace in the Middle East it was important to understand the Israeli point of view. Israel felt extremely threatened.

The President then said, "We are working very hard to get the ceasefire extended and eventually to get **talks** started," and asked for the Archbishop's advice. Makarios said, "I don't give advice to the President of the United States. However, peace in the Middle East will take time. First, some Arab countries disagree with the initiative for domestic reasons; these are usually countries far away. Second, the U.S. proposal provides a good and fair basis for a settlement. However, in your desire for a settlement you may have been too pro-Arab and therefore may have emboldened them too much. The crisis would be more easily settled if the two super-powers would agree." The President added: "Still the moral influence of small countries is important. We are grateful for your support of the decent principles in the West."

SECRET/NODIS

Makarios commented, "Some people feel we are moving left. Of course, Communists exploit every problem but we will not become like Cuba, partly because Cypriots are a deeply religious people." The President said, "The tragedy in the world is the flight from religion. You can't fight Communism with materialism."

Makarios said, "People who are for Communists are not necessarily the pro-Communists. They don't know what Communism is. For example, I had banned atheists from the voting rolls and a Communist had protested to me that he was not an atheist. Most Cypriots think it means improving life, but the main thing to remember is that Communists support me because I am popular; I don't support them to become popular; I have never appointed a left-wing person to any significant post. They support me because they can't do otherwise and I accept their support because it is a good way of keeping them under control. The simple people of Cyprus have more confidence in me than in anybody. I don't rely on the army or on the police force; my strength is my goodness. I am Archbishop for life, and the fact that I don't particularly want to continue as President makes me stronger."

Makarios commented that the U.S. Ambassador to his country "is an excellent person." The President said, "I want very close relations." In response to Makarios' remark that Cyprus was one of the smallest countries in the world, the President said, "But it has a wise leader."

Makarios then spoke about his plans to visit Japan and about his education at Boston University where he had had to interrupt his studies to return to Cyprus for the independence struggle. He noted that "They brought me back, even though I didn't have the degree, to get an honorary degree."

STATE S/S-O

ATTENTION

This Copy For BOB BROWN
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NEWS CONFERENCE #788

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'70 OCT 25 PM 3:02

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

Cyprus

AT 12:20 P.M. EST

OCTOBER 25, 1970

SUNDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We will give you a general rundown on the first two meetings that the President had this morning; first, with the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios.

Accompanying the President of Cyprus to the White House was the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and also the Ambassador to the United States from Cyprus, Ambassador Rossides. We will post the spelling of the names of the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister.

From the United States side, also present at the White House this morning, were Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and Thomas Davis, Jr., from the State Department -- he is the Country Director at the State Department -- and also Hal Saunders of the National Security Council staff. Of course, Dr. Kissinger, who sat in on the meeting.

President Nixon and President Makarios, in the meeting which lasted from five minutes past 10 until 10:45, discussed, of course, the eastern Mediterranean area and the importance of stability in the eastern Mediterranean area.

President Nixon expressed interest in the success of the intercommunal talks which are taking place in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities, and the President received an assessment of these talks from Archbishop Makarios.

This is a matter which we hope will continue to make progress. This, of course, as the President expressed, is a matter for the parties involved to work out, but the President did express hope that the discussions would continue and make progress.

President Nixon thanked Archbishop Makarios for his government's facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages. As you recall, following the release of the hijack hostages they flew directly to Cyprus.

President Nixon expressed his desire for continued friendly relations with Cyprus and his belief in a unified and democratic Cyprus. He also expressed the fact that the United States respects Cyprus' policy of independence and nonalignment.

MORE #788

The meeting today, of course, allowed President Nixon and Archbishop Makarios to develop a personal relationship.

This is the first opportunity of this kind that they have had to meet, and President Nixon appreciates the opportunity to establish these personal ties and his personal relationship with Archbishop Makarios.

I think I should mention that they also talked about generally other international matters, including, of course, the Middle East.

We will move on now to the President's meeting with the President of Pakistan.

The meeting with Yahya Khan lasted from 10:50 until approximately 11:45. President Nixon last met Yahya Khan on his trip to Pakistan, to Lahore, Pakistan, as you recall. He was there from July 31 until August 1 of 1969 on his Asian trip.

This allowed President Nixon and President Yahya Khan to renew their personal relationship. Yahya Khan reported to President Nixon on the progress being made in restoring democratic government in Pakistan.

As you may know, elections will be held in Pakistan in December for the election of a constituent assembly. They also discussed economic aid, economic assistance, and the President reaffirmed his recent decision wherein he approved PL 480 assistance for Pakistan.

They also talked about economic aid or loans to Pakistan.

Q What is PL 480?

MR. ZIEGLER: PL 480 is the commodity assistance, such as wheat and edible oils. It is the normal PL 480 assistance.

Q Were the amounts mentioned?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't have the detailed amounts to give you. AID would have those figures.

President Nixon indicated United States continuing understanding of Pakistan's independent foreign policy maintaining harmonious relations with major powers.

During the course of their discussion they, of course, talked about the Middle East, Indochina. President Nixon emphasized the United States efforts to promote peaceful solutions to the situation in both the Middle East and Indochina.

MORE #788

They also discussed generally the one-time exception that the United States is making to our embargo policy relating to the sale of arms to India and Pakistan. As you know, State just recently made public the one-time exception of the sale of unsophisticated equipment to Pakistan.

Q In that connection, Ron, can you say if the President of Pakistan requested that the United States sell them tanks or spare parts for tanks as a further extension of this limited exception?

MR. ZIEGLER: The one-time exception?

Q Yes.

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not aware that he did. I was not in the meeting. But the details on this are still being worked out, as you know. But the point that I made earlier, this is a one-time exception of relatively unsophisticated material and replacements to Pakistan.

Q Would that include tanks, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, not necessarily tanks, as such. I quite frankly don't know what the breakdown of the unsophisticated equipment or replacement equipment is. That is still being worked out.

Q Is it being worked out in the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: It is being worked out between the two governments.

Q Here in Washington?

MR. ZIEGLER: In Washington and in Pakistan, in our diplomatic contacts and so forth. But I think primarily the discussions are taking place here in Washington.

Q Ron, when the State Department announced the one-time exception, it specifically said tanks were not included. Are you leaving the door open?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I am not leaving the door open at all. I think they did make it clear at that time, that tanks were not included. I am simply saying that the details have not been worked out. I don't intend to leave it open from what the State Department initially said.

Q Perhaps my question is confused. What I was really more interested in was whether or not it would include spare parts needed for the existing equipment they have there.

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know. I don't have the details of the discussions.

Q Did the two Presidents go into details here today?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, they would not have taken their time to talk about the details of such a decision. They would talk more at the Presidential level, which would be in general concept.

Q Are you including jet fighters under this term of unsophisticated equipment? I think the State Department said that at least there is some discussion of providing some jet fighters of some sort.

MR. ZIEGLER: I said replacement and relatively unsophisticated equipment. But I am simply not familiar enough with the negotiations to get into detail with you. State had a rather relatively lengthy briefing on this some time ago. I simply want to convey to you that this was discussed between Yahya Khan and President Nixon.

Q Ron, your use of the words "one-time exception" sounds pretty flat out that this is a one single shot deal. Is that a correct interpretation?

MR. ZIEGLER: It is a one-time exception over 1965 and again reaffirmed in 1967 in the embargo policy of the sale of arms to India and Pakistan, yes. That was made clear, I think, by State when they announced this.

Q Ron, can you give us any idea of what assessment Archbishop Makarios conveyed to the President on the progress of talks between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I can't. I wouldn't want to convey what Archbishop Makarios' assessment was in private to the President, except I would say that we hope that they will continue to make progress in these discussions.

Q On a parallel situation, President Khan, did they discuss the progress of negotiations between Pakistan and India, various differences?

MR. ZIEGLER: That wasn't on the agenda, that I saw, and it wasn't indicated to me when I got a readout of the meeting. So, I don't believe they did.

Q Was there any discussion of the Indian reaction to Pakistan?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't believe they did.

Q Was the Pakistan President's proposed visit to China or Pakistan's relations with China touched upon?

MORE #788

MR. ZIEGLER: I would think it would have been, yes. President Khan, of course, has just returned from Moscow, in June, I think. He had a visit there and is planning a visit to China. President Nixon, no doubt, conveyed to President Khan his general feeling about China.

Q Mr. Ziegler, there is an interview in the New York Times in which President Sadat of the UAR is bringing some kind of message from Egypt to President Nixon. Could you comment?

MR. ZIEGLER: I mentioned earlier that they did talk about the Middle East. Yahya Khan has, of course, just visited with President Sadat of the UAR. So, no doubt, in the course of their discussions, Yahya Khan did convey some of his impressions of the UAR and of his discussions with President Sadat to the President. But I am not prepared to amplify on that.

Q Ron, in connection with their talks about China and the President conveying his feelings about China, is there any kind of a message that President Yahya Khan might take with him when he visits ---

MR. ZIEGLER: No formal message, as such, no; nor, to follow up your question, I am not aware of a formal message that was conveyed to President Nixon from President Sadat through President Khan, except that I am sure he reported on his talks in the UAR to the President and of his conversations with President Sadat.

Q His ideas and assessment?

MR. ZIEGLER: An assessment, that is the word I used, yes; not a formal message.

MORE #788

Q Can you tell us who was present at the talks between the President and the President of Pakistan?

MR. ZIEGLER: They met alone, with the exception of Dr. Kissinger, who was present at the meeting.

Q Secretary Sisco?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. Secretary Sisco met with the other representatives of the Pakistan Government who were here. Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs was here, and the Ambassador of Pakistan was here. We will post those spellings for you.

Q Is Archbishop Makarios planning any trips of this sort that President Khan has recently made?

MR. ZIEGLER: Not that I am aware of.

That is all I have. We will give you a rundown of the other meetings later.

Q In the picture session with President Lakas, there seems to have been some conversation between the President and President Lakas of football.

Is President Lakas another football fan?

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe he is. He attended a university here in the United States.

Q Do you know where? They were talking about Texas Tech.

MR. ZIEGLER: President Lakas attended Texas Wesleyan College and Texas Technological College, and they were referring to his Alma Mater's football.

Q Do you know which Alma Mater it was?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will post that. I don't recall.

Q Ron, has the President sent any messages of congratulations or any acknowledgements to President Allende of Chile on his election?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't believe there has been any formal message sent.

Q Are there any additions to the schedule today?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. We have posted the schedule. He is meeting with President Lakas of Panama now. He meets with His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia at 2 o'clock and C.K. Yen, Vice President and Premier of China at 3:15, and His Excellency, Cheng Heng Chief of State of Cambodia at 4 o'clock.

Q Could you sort of characterize the pattern of this whole series of appointments today? Each one of these seems to be a past or present sensitive spot. Could you characterize what the President is trying to do today with this series of appointments.

MR. ZIEGLER: Each of the heads of government or chiefs of state is here for the UN celebration. As I mentioned when I initially announced the schedule, the meetings the President is having today are with those which we could work out a mutually convenient time for such a meeting with.

I think that is the basis for the meetings today.

Q The Star this morning names Theodore Koop of CBS as the gentlemen who in time of emergency would be the government censor and I think it also quotes Herb Klein as saying that airing this gentleman's name in public would be a healthy thing.

Do you have a comment?

MR. ZIEGLER: I had a comment on that before in Florida. I have no objection to sometime moving to a declassification of that. That is my personal view. However, it is still classified. So I cannot comment on that report.

We are having discussions on that now within the government. My view would be, I think, parallel to Herb Klein's. In that particular instance, my personal view would be that I would have no objection to naming this individual. But it is still classified.

Q Ron, has there been any discussion of setting up a hot line with Japan in the event of military uses of Okinawa and Japanese bases in the event of an emergency?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know if that subject was covered yesterday or not. There was some reference to that, I know, the last time President Sato was here. But I think that if there was, the basis of that discussion would be looking into the technical aspects of accomplishing this.

But it was not a major part of the agenda yesterday. Indeed, I don't know if it was discussed at this time.

Q You can't confirm it.

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q There is a published report to that effect in Japan.

MR. ZIEGLER: As you recall the last time President Nixon met with President Sato, there was reference to the possibility of this. Perhaps there was again in this session, as a small part of their discussion.

But it would have, I am sure, evolved around simply agreeing to pursue the technical aspects of this.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 12:40 P.M. EDT)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

32923 MW

HL
Cyprus

MEMORANDUM FOR COLEMAN HICKS

September 22, 1971

FROM. Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

SUBJECT. Appointment with Ambassador Popper

I gather you have had to scrub Ambassador Popper's appointment today.

In rescheduling, it may help you to know that Ambassador Popper has to be in New York next Tuesday and Wednesday so that an appointment here on Thursday or Friday, September 30 or ^{October 1} 31, would work best. The rest of this week is pretty full in his schedule as I imagine it is on Henry's.

I do recommend that Henry try to see Ambassador Popper since he is concerned about Cyprus and this will be his one chance soon to discuss it with the Ambassador.

cc. Jeanne Davis

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC	RECD	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ U LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____
 KISSINGER _____ ROYERS, W _____ LOU _____ NO FORN _____ NODIS _____
 HAIG _____ LAIRD, M _____ C _____ EYES ONLY _____ LIMDIS _____
Hicks *Sounders* S _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Follow-up Request for appt with HAK for Arms paper*

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG				MEMO FOR HAK	(_____)
STAFF SECRETARY		X		MEMO FOR PRES.	(_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE	(_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH	(_____)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA				MEMO _____ TO _____	(_____)
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS	(_____)
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO	(_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE	(_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY	(_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE	(_____)
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

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<i>9/30</i>				<i>[Signature]</i>	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: SA _____ HP _____ HM _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO

MICROFILM DATA

DO *[Signature]*

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OCT 04 1971



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

14361

October 23, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: President Nixon's Meeting with
President Makarios, 10:00 a.m.,
October 25

We have been informed that the following will
accompany President Makarios to the White House:

- Spyros Kyprianou, Foreign Minister
- Zenon Rossides, Cyprus Ambassador to the
U.S. and the UN.

In view of this representation, the following
State Department officials will be present at the
White House:

- Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State
- Thomas W. Davis, Jr., Country Director for
Cyprus and Presidential aide-de-camp.


Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

1. When message comes in from State, please attach.
2. Give to Gen. Haig who will try to clear with HAK by phone.

March 8, 1970

CYPRUS

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR: DAVID YOUNG FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: HAIG AND SAUNDERS

Thanks.

Hal Saunders

President Makarios safely escaped an assassination attempt earlier today. So far, there have been no public repercussions ^{in Cyprus.} on the island. As you know, CIA a month ago warned Makarios of reported plotting against him. Makarios appeared to have decided to let plotters incriminate themselves. ^{rather than rounding them up.} Greek Prime Minister Papadopoulos and Turkish community leader Denktash have both issued statements condemning the attempt, which was apparently mounted by an extremist Greek group.

following

Ambassador Popper, State and we recommend/x brief message to be passed quietly from President Nixon to Makarios:

Cabled cleared by Haig
with HAK -
Files

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LDX CHANNEL MESSAGE COVER FORM

MSG. NO.

1. TRANSMITTED BY:
DATE & TIME:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2. TO: WH

271

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1970 MAR 8 PM 11 32

3. ORIGINATOR:

~~NEA~~ NEA

4. RECEIVED BY:
DATE & TIME:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

5. DESCRIPTION:

Draft Cable to Nicosia - Presidential Message to Makarios

6. CLASSIFICATION & CONTROLS:

CONFIDENTIAL

7. NO. OF PGS:

2

8. PRECEDENCE

ZMME01075

9. VALIDATED BY:

S/O Rich

10. DELIVER TO:

~~Mr. Sanders~~

Mr. Sanders

FOR:

CLEARANCE XXX

INFORMATION

PER REQUEST

Revised: 9 Jan. 1970



CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
 COLLECT
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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy NICOSIA Immediate
INFO: AmEmbassy ANKARA Priority
AmEmbassy ATHENS "
AmEmbassy LONDON "
USUN New York "
US Mission NATO "

STATE _____

SUBJECT: Attempted Assassination of President Makarios

REF: Nicosia 301

FOR AMBASSADOR

- Please convey to President Makarios following message from President Nixon. QUOTE Your Ecatitude: I was appaled to learn of the shocking attempt on your life. I am gratified, however, that you have escaped unharmed to continue your leadership at this important time in your country's history. Such acts as this attempt on your life must be condemned by all. Please accept my most sincere best wishes for your continued safety and good health. UNQUOTE
- At your discretion you may release text of President Nixon's message: ~~We do not press.~~ ~~THE~~ Department does not plan formal TO LOCAL PRESS. FYI DEPARTMENT

DRAFTED BY: NEA/CYP:KTorp/TNDavis:ssn	DRAFTING DATE 3/8/70	TEL EXT 20279	APPROVED BY: NEA/CYP: T. W. Davis
CLEARANCES:			
NEA/P:WHarris (sub) WH	NEA:RDavies (sub) PD		
S/S-O:HRich	NSC:HSaunders		
	USIA:ACarter (sub) AC		



CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Department of State

TELEGRAM

PAGE 2

INDICATE:
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DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AmEmbassy NICOSIA

release of President's message, although spokesman may draw upon contents if subject raised at regular noon briefing. END FYI

RUS

SMALLER: []

DRAFTING DATE: [] TEL EXT: []

APPROVED BY: []



S/S-4669

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Info
Lem

March 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cyprus--Tension Subsiding

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum
about the current situation in Cyprus.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated

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Cyprus--Tension Subsiding

The events of last week constitute the story of a coup d'etat that did not occur. In the wake of the attempted assassination of President Makarios and the murder of the leading suspect, former Interior Minister Georkadjis, the air became heavy with rumors of a coup.

A composite of our own intelligence reports for this period describes a Greek Cypriot plot possibly involving some mainland Greek elements in a conspiracy to eliminate Makarios and bring about union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) or partition of the island and union of its respective parts with Greece and Turkey (double enosis). By last Friday the permutations of this basic plot began to seem endless.

This week we are beginning to recognize the outlines of a self-generated mini-crisis in which traditional suspicions induced the Turks and the Soviets to credit intelligence reports and rumors with a validity that could not be sustained by close analysis and cool judgment. The Turkish Government, assuming that the profusion of smoke implied the existence of at least some flame, called out the fire engines--just in case. The Turks publicly threatened that any enosis-oriented coup in Cyprus would provoke an "immediate" response.

And, if the Turks fear enosis, so do the Soviets, but for different reasons. Their fear of any kind of enosis

SECRET

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

solution is based on their opposition to "NATOizing" Cyprus. This produced a series of low-key Soviet demarches supporting Cyprus' sovereignty and integrity. With more than a hint of opportunism, the Soviets peddled the coup rumor and the story of their demarches and thereby put some money in the bank with Makarios, catered to Turkish fears, and struck a propaganda blow at the "imperialists."

Fortunately throughout this characteristically Byzantine episode of spontaneous combustion the bedrock elements of stability (close contacts between the Greek and Turkish Governments) were preserved and the risk of miscalculation minimized through timely and relatively sympathetic Greco-Turkish communications. Also, on Cyprus itself, political violence and recrimination remained in the intracommunal sphere and did not involve the Turkish Cypriots, who took positive measures to reduce the risk of an intercommunal incident. For our part, we kept the parties informed of our less alarmist assessment and of our acceptance of official Greek denials of any complicity in coup plots and enosis schemes.

On a positive note Ambassador Popper in Cyprus informs us that the Greek Cypriot negotiator in the on-going talks with the Turkish Cypriots has linked the resolution of the present crisis with the need to achieve rapid progress in the negotiations as a bulwark against future problems of this nature.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

s/s 4185

March 18, 1970

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cyprus - Recent Developments and
Current Assessment

8442
Encapsulated
in daily Brief
CVPRUS HS

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DO	✓
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Recent Developments:

On March 8 as-yet unidentified assailants narrowly missed assassinating President Makarios when they peppered his helicopter with bullets as it took off from the Archbishopric in Nicosia. After the attempt, suspicion focused on former Interior Minister Polycarpus Georkadjis and a right-wing terrorist organization, the National Front. Makarios forced Georkadjis to resign his ministerial post in 1968 after the Greek Government implicated him in an abortive attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The National Front is a secret terrorist group that vehemently opposes Makarios' policy of abandoning enosis (union with Greece) and negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of a "feasible" (independent) solution to the Cyprus problem.

After being prevented by police from leaving Cyprus on March 13, Georkadjis was gunned down outside of Nicosia on March 15. The murderer or murderers have not been identified but the most plausible theory at this point suggests that co-conspirators in the Makarios assassination attempt were responsible for Georkadjis' death.

Greco-Turkish Implications:

Since Turkish Cypriots are not suspected of involvement in either of the recent shootings, the impact on the volatile intercommunal situation has been marginal. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are expected

SECRET

Group 3

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to continue although little progress is expected in view of the entrenched positions of the respective protagonists.

While Athens and Ankara are concerned over recent events, they appear determined to continue their commitment to resolving the Cyprus question peacefully through the local talks. In spite of a growing volume of evidence implicating mainland Greek military officers in Cyprus in the recent shootings, we believe the Papadopoulos government does not condone such activities and that it is taking steps to bring such dissidents to heel.


Outlook:

We expect Makarios to retain his preeminent position as political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots and to continue to play a major role in the sensitive on-going negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. For all his faults--and they are many--only he commands the overwhelming popular support that is a stabilizing factor within the Greek Cypriot community and a base from which compromise and flexibility are at least possible in the talks. In the longer run, however, his narrow escape will set a precedent and remove a psychological restraint on others with similar intentions.

The Georkadjis murder is likely to lead to more intra-communal bloodletting as loyal former EOKA henchmen seek vengeance for the slaying of their patron and leader. Again, however, although it cannot be completely ruled out, we do not foresee this violence spilling over to the Turkish Cypriot community which is still uninvolved in the gun-toting turmoil of the Greek Cypriot community.

U. S. Position:

We are monitoring events closely and encouraging Athens and Ankara to continue pursuing their positive approach to this problem. We see little benefit in actively inserting ourselves into the situation in Cyprus at this time. In fact, we would like to conserve our capital at this time since we may find more pressing occasions to spend it in the future.



Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

6761



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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

January 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Terrorism in Cyprus

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum analyzing the background and implication of recent terrorism in Cyprus.

TL

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

SECRET

MICROFILM	DATA
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TO) PAF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

6761
January 19, 1970

SUBJECT: Terrorism in Cyprus - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Background

Since last summer a resurgence of terrorist activity within the Greek Cypriot community has threatened the internal security of Cyprus. Fanatic Greek Cypriots who favor enosis (union with Greece) and oppose President Makarios' policy of tolerating the communists and negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of independence have formed a terrorist group called the National Front. A recent increase in the pace, scope, and seriousness of terrorist incidents and threats is cause for concern.

Current Situation

With President Makarios in East Africa on a good will tour, the National Front boldly looted a mine storehouse of its dynamite and raided a mountain village stealing its small arsenal of authorized arms. In the wake of these incidents, Acting President Clerides seized the initiative and ordered a concerted police campaign to confiscate all arms held by Greek Cypriot civilians. Clerides has denounced the National Front and is now seeking special legislation to broaden the Government's power to impose "preventive custody."

The Immediate Future

The Cyprus Government claims to possess National Front documents which order its strike groups to sabotage infrastructure targets on January 15, the anniversary of the 1950 plebiscite in which virtually 100% of the Greek Cypriots voted for enosis. Clerides' decisive actions combined with press speculation anticipating a commemorative gesture from the Front amount to a challenge that is likely to elicit a response from the terrorists within the next few days. Embassy Nicosia concludes that the chances of an incident--possibly serious--during this time are "quite high."

Prospective Problems

The fragile peace that has characterized Cyprus since the last large scale crisis (November-December 1967) could be shattered if law and order disintegrate jeopardizing the present leadership and the

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functioning of the Greek Cypriot-controlled government. With Cyprus' recent history of private armed bands and political gangsterism, an unstable internal situation might tempt other disgruntled Greek Cypriot elements to use violence to further their own parochial political aims. Another ominous possibility is that the current terrorist activity may be directed against the Turkish Cypriots thus embroiling the two Communities in another full-blown Greek-Turkish confrontation.

Impact on the Intercommunal Negotiations

Local talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots which began under UN auspices in June 1968 have dragged on without significant results and ultimately reached a virtual deadlock in December 1969 over the crucial issue of local autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots. Since then the negotiators have agreed to shelve temporarily the local autonomy issue and move on to other internal constitutional issues. Limited progress has subsequently been achieved on organizing the judiciary giving rise to some hope that an ultimate solution may yet be possible. However, if internal security continues to disintegrate and involves Turkish Cypriots as targets of Greek Cypriot terrorists, the fate of the talks which offer the most promising procedure for solving the Cyprus problem will be uncertain at best.

We consider the continuation of these talks, which are currently adjourned while President Makarios is absent from Cyprus, to be a genuinely important prop for the maintenance of intercommunal peace. So far, our role in the talks has been to monitor them closely, make our concern for their success known, feed in ideas informally, and make our good offices available should the parties feel we can be of assistance. We shall continue to play this supportive role during this unstable period and shall express our hope that the talks will resume on schedule (January 26) in an atmosphere conducive to further progress.

US Actions

We have been and will continue playing an active role in a set of sensitive relations to help discourage a further deterioration. We will ask the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as the Governments of Greece and Turkey to continue their efforts to prevent any precipitous action that might further endanger Cyprus' internal peace and the intercommunal negotiations. We shall express our concern over the present situation and our hope that all concerned will act to restore calm and continue their efforts to arrange a permanent solution. We will ask U Thant and the UN to take parallel actions. We shall also initiate the following specific actions:

1. We will ask Embassy Nicosia to reiterate to Acting President Clerides or President Makarios our growing concern over the threat to law and order and state our view that the actions thus far taken by the Cyprus



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Government seem appropriate under these circumstances. We shall also ask if there is anything we can appropriately do to assist in this regard.

2. We are asking Embassy Athens to seek an appropriate opportunity to welcome Prime Minister Papadopoulos' recent condemnation of the local terrorists and to ask what else the Greek Government might do to improve the local situation.

3. We will caution the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Cyprus concerning the possibility of random acts of violence committed by Greek Cypriots in opposition to the Makarios regime's clear policy of avoiding such incidents. We will ask them not to overreact should such an incident occur and to continue their policy of seeking a peaceful settlement through the intercommunal negotiations.



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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 3432

PAGE 01 NICOSIA 01224 271213Z

62
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

051094

R 271015Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8717
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USMISSION USUN

SECRET NICOSIA 1224

EXDIS/

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS PFOR GY CY
SUBJECT: GREECE-CYPRUS RELATIONS

REF: ATHENS 3936, ANKARA 5012

SUMMARY: WE AGREE WITH ATHENS AS TO GRAVITY NICOSIA/ATHENS CONFRONTATION. APPARENTLY WE ALL AGREE THAT FORMAL DEMARCHES NOT USEFUL AT THIS STAGE. DECONFRONTATION DEMONSTRABLY SERVES USG INTERESTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF GOGREECE AND GOCYPRUS. WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO GET MESSAGE TO MAKARIOS AND PARTICULARLY TO IOANNIDES (AND NOT JUST FOREIGN MINISTRY) AS TO DAMAGE A CRISIS COULD DO TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

1. WE WISH TO FLAG SOME POINTS THAT LOOK PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FROM HERE, TO POINT OUT ONE CHANGE IN SITUATION, AND TO COMMENT ON ATHENS PROPOSAL REFTEL.

2. KEY POINTS:

(A) WE AGREE WITH ATHENS THAT MAKARIOS-IOANNIDES SHOW-DOWN MAY WELL BE ON THE WAY.

(B) CONFRONTATION IS WITH NATIONAL GUARD AND IOANNIDES, NOT WITH EOKA-B. WE THINK EOKA-B LARGELY A FROSTING (THOUGH

74 JUN 28 AM 7:18

WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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BRITISH THINK OTHERWISE). LOCALS SEE CONFLICT AS DIRECTLY BETWEEN GOCYPRUS AND GREEK JUNTA, AND THAT IS WHY CENTER-RIGHT IS WAVERING AS IT DID NOT DURING GRIVAS CONFRONTATION.

(C) ANKARA PROBABLY EVEN MORE DISTRUSTFUL OF IOANNIDES THAN PAPADOPOULOS, AND MORE LIKELY TO REACT QUICKLY IN PRESENT MOOD AGAINST ANYTHING THAT LOOKS LIKE "ENOSIST COUP." (SEE STATE 103030 PARA 5 AND ANKARA 5012.)

(D) IF IOANNIDES' OBJECTIVES ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST, HIS MEANS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, SINCE HE IS FORCING MAKARIOS TO SEEK SUPPORT WHERE HE CAN FIND IT, AND INCIPIENT POLARIZATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY COULD BREAK INTO CIVIL WAR PARTICULARLY IF MAKARIOS ELIMINATED, WITH COMMUNISTS HAVING ALMOST ALL ADVANTAGES EXCEPT (WE HOPE) IN GUNS.

(E) TALKING TO GREEK FOREIGN MINISTRY UNPRODUCTIVE, SINCE BY ALL ACCOUNTS IT VIEWS SITUATION MUCH AS WE DO.

3. RECENT CHANGE IN SITUATION IS THAT MAKARIOS IS PRESENTLY COUNTERATTACKING AFTER PERIOD (WHICH LED TO STATE 103030) IN WHICH INCREASING NG ACTIVITIES RAISED REAL CONCERN THAT IT IS OUT TO GET HIM. USG INTERESTS ARE BY NO MEANS ENTIRELY CONGRUENT WITH MAKARIOS' IN THIS SITUATION (SEE NICOSIA 1153).

4. AS TO WHAT USG SHOULD DO: WE ALL APPARENTLY AGREE THAT FORMAL USG DEMARCHE NOT DESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE. PRESENT ISSUE IS HOW TO GET TO IOANNIDES (SEE QUESTION STATE 103030, PARA 7) AND TO MAKARIOS WITH WARNING THAT CONFRONTATION IS DISSERVICE TO THEIR INTERESTS. WE CAN GET TO MAKARIOS' CONFIDANTS WITH EASE AND BELIEVE THAT AMBASSADOR DAVIES' INITIAL INTERVIEW WITH MAKARIOS WOULD BE IDEAL TIME TO MAKE OUR POINTS DIRECTLY AND FORCEFULLY. WE DON'T KNOW HOW TO GET TO IOANNIDES, BUT BELIEVE IT VERY IMPORTANT TO DO SO. (IN FACT, WE THINK MAKARIOS IS WILY ENOUGH, WILL PROBABLY DRAW BACK FROM ULTIMATE CONFRONTATION, BUT IOANNIDES IS UNKNOWN QUANTITY AND EVEN MAKARIOS COULD MISCALCULATE, PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ARE IMPRESSED BY REASONING PARA 4 ATHENS 3936 AND WE FEAR IOANNIDES MAY BE EMBARKED UPON DELIBERATE CRUSADE TO WIPE OUT MAKARIOS.) WE THINK IOANNIDES SHOULD BE REACHED DESPITE EMBARRASSMENT CITED PARA 8 ATHENS 3936. ANY HELP NATO

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CAN PROVIDE IS FINE, BUT WE WONDER IF LUNS HAS ALL THE ARGUMENTS AT HIS FINGERTIPS.

5. IN ADDITION TO OBVIOUS ARGUMENTS IN THIS AND OTHER CABLES AS TO WHY CONFRONTATION DANGEROUS FOR BOTH NICOSIA AND ATHENS, WE SUGGEST A NEW LINE WHICH POTENTIALLY USEFUL. AS PARA 5 ATHENS 3936 SUGGESTS, ATHENS COULD HAVE TROUBLE WITH SOVS AND THIRD WORLD IF IT WENT AFTER MAKARIOS. DOES ATHENS REALLY WANT TO EARN ARABS' EMNITY AT THIS STAGE IN HISTORY? (IN SOMEWHAT SIMILAR VEIN, WE HAVE REMINDED GOCYPRUS THAT KEMALIST PERIOD IS OVER, THAT TURKEY IS MAKING REAL GAINS WITH GO-RELIGIONISTS, AND THAT GOCYPRUS COULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TROUBLE WITH ARABS IF IT GETS TOO ROUGH WITH ITS MOSLEM MINORITY.)

6. AS TO WHAT USG WANTS ANTAGONISTS TO DO, WE THINK THIS IS REALLY QUITE SIMPLE. IF GOGREECE WOULD GIVE ITS OFFICERS MEANINGFUL COMMAND NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANTI-MAKARIOS PROPAGANDA, DISSOCIATE THE NG FROM EOKA-B ACTIVITIES, AND FIND SOME MEANS TO RECOGNIZE LEGALITY OF GOCYPRUS COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' ROLE IN SELECTION OF CADET OFFICERS, WE THINK MAKARIOS (PROBABLY ALREADY SHAKEN) WOULD BE GLAD TO DEFER ANY LARGER PLANS FOR ASSERTING CONTROL OVER NG. ACTION ON THE CADET OFFICER POINT IS CRITICAL (AND CRISIS DATE IS DEFINABLE; SEPTEMBER, WHEN THEY GRADUATE). WITH CONCESSION ON THAT POINT ALONE, ATHENS/NICOSIA RELATIONS WOULD PROBABLY SUBSIDE TO THEIR NORMAL BAD LEVEL.

GRANT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

6761
Cyprus

January 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Terrorism in Cyprus

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum analyzing the background and implication of recent terrorism in Cyprus.

for
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

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**NO ACTION REQUIRED NOW,
SAUNDERS KEPT ORIG FOR
FURTHER ACTION in FUTURE.**

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SECRET 154

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01087 091058Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

013057

R 091015Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7362
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1087

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS IS
SUBJECT: PASSENGER SHIPPING AS POSSIBLE PALESTINIAN TARGET

REF: STATE 80073, 65060, 61604

SUMMARY: POST IS TRANSMITTING INFO VIA DAO ON CRUISE SHIP MOVEMENTS. REQUEST GUIDANCE WHETHER MORE INTENSIVE EFFORT REQUIRED. END SUMMARY

1. UPON RECEIPT OF DEPT INFO, EMBASSY NOTIFIED FON MIN DIR GEN AND CHIEF OF CYPRUS POLICE OF POSSIBLE HIJACK OF PASSENGER VESSEL IN MEDITERRANEAN. WE PROMISED TO PINPOINT ANY VESSELS ABOUT WHICH WE HAD SUSPICIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT CYPOL ONCE ALERTED IS MAINTAINING CLOSER PORT WATCH. WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND ADVISING THEM OF SPECIFIC SHIPS UNLESS WE HAVE REASONS FOR SUSPICIONS. IN ORDER TO AVOID CRYING "WOLF" TOO OFTEN. IN SUSPICIOUS CASES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE SOME SPECIFICS AS TO OUR REASONS.

2. WE HAVE SET UP PROCEDURE TO ASSIST DAO REPORT CRUISE VESSEL MOVEMENTS. EMBASSY DAO MESSAGE 1 R 6 823 0029 73 FURNISHED INFO ON PASSENGER SHIP SCHEDULES IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. ADDITIONAL SCHEDULES WILL BE FORWARDED AS AVAILABLE.

3. IF NECESSARY, EMBASSY COULD TELEGRAPH DAILY SCHEDULES

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OF ALL VESSELS (MOSTLY FREIGHTERS) ARRIVING AND DEPARTING FROM FAMAGUSTA AND LIMASSOL, AS POSTED EACH DAY BY GOVT HARBORMASTER. (THIS INFO AVAILABLE ONLY AT FAMAGUSTA AND WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE STAFF TIME.) HOWEVER, BEFORE DOING SO WE WOULD WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT DEPT REQUIRES INFO BEYOND CRUISE SCHEDULES PARA 2, AND THAT THIS DOES NOT DUPLICATE INFO ALREADY AVAILABLE TO NAVAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER (NOSIC) AND FLEET OCEAN SURVEILLANCE INTELLIGENCE CENTER (FOSIC).

4. INCIDENTALLY, FEW PASSENGER SHIPS ORIGINATE OR TERMINATE JOURNEYS AT CYPRUS PORTS. WE WOULD SUPPOSE PIRAEUS MIGHT BE BEST SOURCE OF INFO RE EASTERN MED PASSENGER SHIPS' PORTS-OF-CALL AND ROUTES.

5. PLEASE ADVISE. IF ADDITIONAL COVERAGE REQUIRED, PLEASE INFORM US OF TERMINATION DATE. DAO REQUIREMENT TERMINATES JULY 1.
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ACTION SS-25

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W

071641

P 141115Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7239

S E C R E T NICOSIA 866

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PFOR CY IS
SUBJECT: REPRESENTATION ON ARAB TERRORISM

REF: STATE 68076

BEGIN SUMMARY: FON OFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN STATES ARAB
TERRORISTS SEIZED APRIL 9 WILL BE TRIED AND JAILED,
AND DEPORTED ONLY IF NECESSARY TO AVOID BLACKMAIL
BY FURTHER VIOLENCE. MEANWHILE, CYPRUS IS SCREENING ALL
ARABS AND ISRAELIS NOW IN CYPRUS AND THOSE ENTERING BY AIR.
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WELCOMED
BY CYPRIOTS. END SUMMARY

1. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENTS WITH MAKARIOS
ON SHORT NOTICE DURING THIS PERIOD OF INTERNAL STRESS IN
CYPRUS, BUT I AM SEETING HIM MONDAY MORNING, APRIL 16.

2. MEANWHILE, HAVING IN MIND URGENCY OF SITUATION, I
CALLED ON FON OFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN (AT MOMENT IN
CHARGE AT FON OFF AND DE FACTO COORDINATOR OF
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN RE ARAB TERRORISM) AND GAVE HIM
GIST OF MESSAGE I WAS INSTRUCTED TO PASS TO ARCHBISHOP;
EXPRESSED PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR STALWART REACTION
OF CYPRUS GOVT TO ARAB TERRORISM CASE THUS FAR; AND
EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ACTIONS CYPRUS MIGHT TAKE IN
FUTURE WOULD BUTTRESS AND NOT HAMPER ONGOING BATTLE AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH MUST BE CARRIED OUT ON
ALL FRONTS.

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3. VENIAMIN TOLD ME THAT AT HIGH LEVEL MEETING APRIL 13 CYPRUS GOVT HAD DECIDED TO PROCEED WITH TRIAL OF EIGHT TERRORISTS NOW IN CUSTODY. HE ANTICIPATED THEY WOULD BE KEPT IN JAIL JUST AS LONG AS CYPRUS GOVT COULD AFFORD TO DO SO WITHOUT BEING SUBJECTED TO INTOLERABLE BLACKMAIL. AT SAME TIME EGYPT AND SYRIA HAVE BEEN TOLD (AS WE HAVE REPORTED) THAT FUTURE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES INVOLVING CYPRUS WOULD LEAD TO TOTAL EXCLUSION OF ARABS FROM CYPRUS.

4. VENIAMIN THEN OUTLINED FOR ME STEPS CYPRUS GOVT HAS BEGUN TO TAKE TO DISCOURAGE FUTURE TERRORISM IN CYPRUS. ALL ARABS AND ISRAELIS RESIDENT IN CYPRUS ARE BEING SCREENED, AND SUSPECTS WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE. IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AT AIRPORT ARE AUTHORIZED TO REFUSE ADMISSION TO ALL SUSPICIOUS PERSONS AND WHERE DOUBTFUL TO ALERT CIS (CYPRUS INTELLIGENCE). GOVT SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING ASKING ANOTHER COUNTRY WITH MISSIONS IN BEIRUT, DAMASCUS AND JERUSALEM OR TEL AVIV TO ADMINISTER A REQUIREMENT THAT ARABS BOUND FOR CYPRUS REQUEST VISAS TO BE OBTAINED FROM NICOSIA PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. (CYPRUS HAS ITS OWN MISSION IN CAIRO.)

5. VENIAMIN SAYS SURVEY SHOWS ABOUT 400 ARABS NOW LIVING IN CYPRUS, OF WHOM CLOSE TO 200 ARE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED. MOST OTHERS ARE GENUINE TOURISTS MAINLY FROM LEBANON BUT SOME MAY BE AFFILIATED WITH TERRORISTS. THERE ARE ONLY 60 OR 80 VISITING ISRAELIS ON THE ISLAND.

6. VENIAMIN STATES CYPRUS GOVT EAGER TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION WITH US RE TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM. WE WILL PURSUE THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS. HE REMARKED THAT TERRORISTS NOW IN CUSTODY HERE HAD CARRIED POLISH WEAPONS OF A TYPE NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN THIS COUNTRY. EXPLOSIVES, HOWEVER, ARE OF TYPE COMMONLY FOUND EVERYWHERE AND ORIGIN NOT IDENTIFIABLE.

7. VENIAMIN WAS FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF THESE MEASURES, COMBINED AS THEY ARE WITH WARNINGS TO EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN GOVTS ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF FUTURE TERRORIST VIOLENCE IN CYPRUS. CYPRIOTS CONSIDER PUBLIC EGYPTIAN RESPONSE ENCOURAGING. VENIAMIN SAYS THEY HAVE HAD PRIVATE

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EXPRESSION OF REGRET OVER APRIL 9 INCIDENT FROM SYRIAN GOVT AND SOME SORT OF REASSURING WORD (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED) FROM ARAFAT. VENJAMIN IS WORRIED, HOWEVER, RE POSSIBLE

FUTURE LIBYAN CONNECTION WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HERE. NOTES THAT 400-500 CYPRIOT WORKERS AND TECHNICIANS ARE EMPLOYED ON PROJECTS IN LIBYA, AND THAT CYPRUS HAS A TIDY EXPORT/TRADE TO LIBYA. HOWEVER, LIBYA HAS NOT YET FIGURED IN LOCAL ARAB ACTIVITIES.

8. COMMENT: I BELIEVE CURRENT CYPRUS GOVT ATTITUDE, AS DESCRIBED BY VENJAMIN, IS ABOUT AS FAVORABLE AS WE COULD EXPECT. CYPRIOTS OBVIOUSLY FEEL THAT THEIR STRONGEST POINT IN RESTRAINING ARAB IS UTILITY OF CYPRUS AS MEETING AND TRANSIT POINT FOR THEIR PEOPLE -- WHICH WOULD BE GREATLY DIMINISHED BY AN EXCLUSION POLICY. WHEN I SEE ARCHBISHOP APRIL 16, I WILL URGE HIM TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON TRIAL AND DETENTION OF TERRORISTS. DEPT SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS, HOWEVER; IF THE PRESSURES ON CYPRUS BECOME STRONG ENOUGH, THE CYPRIOTS WILL IN MY OPINION RELEASE AND DEPORT THEIR CAPTIVES IN HOPE OF AVOIDING FURTHER VIOLENCE, WHATEVER WE OR OTHERS MAY SAY.
POPPER

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

021839

73 APR 25 AM 8:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

P R 241930Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7291
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
USDOCOSOUTH
USEUCOM
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 NICOSIA 970

EXDIS

NOFORN

TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

E.O. 11652; XGDS 1
TAGS: PINS, PFOR, CY, GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS; GRIVAS AND GOG

REF: STATE 741173 ATHENS 2227 AND 23933 ANKARA 3069; NICOSIA 937

BEGIN SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE THAT CLERIDES' RESIGNATION
THREAT WAS EFFORT TO FORCE GOG TO CURB GRIVAS, AND TO ARREST
LOCAL TREND
TOWARD VIOLENCE. DOUBT HE WILL MAKE GOOD
ON THREAT UNLESS SITUATION WORSENS. WE RECOMMEND USG
CONSIDER MAKING CLEAR TO GOG IN WASHINGTON AND ATHENS WHY
WE THINK ITS AMBIVALENCE TOWARD GRIVAS DAMAGES ITS INTERESTS
AND OURS. OUR PRESENTATION SHOULD NOT BE BASED UPON
CLERIDES' RESIGNATION THREAT, NOR SHOULD IT SUGGEST THAT
WE THINK IMMEDIATE INTERCOMMUNAL AGREEMENT IN SIGHT ONCE

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GRIVAS PROBLEM REMOVED. WE BELIEVE TIME WILL BE NECESSARY TO RESTORE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. END SUMMARY

1. REF DEPTTEL CITED NUMBER OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS PROBABLY PUSHING GREEK GOVT TO CONTROL GRIVAS OR AT MINIMUM DIASSOCIATE ITSELF FROM HIS ACTIVITIES. TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN ADDED A) STIFF TURKISH DEMARCH IN ANKARA ASKING GREEK AMB WHETHER CONTINUING GRIVAS TERRORISM SIGNIFIES CHANGE IN ATHENS POLICY TOWARDS ANKARA, B) APPARENT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM GREEK AMBS IN ANKARA AND NICOSIA THAT GREEK GOVT PUBLICLY DENOUNCE GRIVAS AND HIS ACTIVITIES, AND C) UNSYG'S REPRESENTATION TO GREEK PERM REP PANAYOTACOS ON GRIVAS.

2. CLERIDES' THREAT TO ABANDON TALKS WAS PRESUMABLY MOST CONSEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FROM GREEK GOVT STANDPOINT, THOUGH LESS EFFECTIVE DOUBTLESS THAN IF SAME THREAT HAD NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE. IN ANY EVENT, ATHENS DID NOT EXPLICITLY DISSOCIATE ITSELF FROM GRIVAS, BUT MADE ANOTHER IN SERIES OF EQUIVOCAL STATEMENTS WHICH OPPOSING GREEK CYPRIOT FACTIONS INTERPRET TO SUIT THEIR PURPOSES (NICOSIA 956). EFFECT OF GREEK GOVT STATEMENT HERE HAS BEEN TO RE-ENFORCE CONVICTION THAT ATHENS CONSENTS TO GRIVAS TERRORISM. SOME GREEK CYPRIOTS MAY ACCEPT ARGUMENT THAT ATHENS IS POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS3 NO ONE HERE WOULD MAINTAIN GOG LACKS POWER TO DENOUNCE HIM.

3. WHILE CLERIDES HAS NOT YET SAID HE WILL STAY ON, WE THINK HE WILL. HE HAS MADE HIS MOVE AND IT HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE HE IS PREPARED TO ABANDON ADMITTEDLY SLIM PROSPECTS OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ALSO, APPEALS THAT HE REMAIN BY UNSYG AND GOG WILL SWEETEN PILL OF HAVING HIS BLUFF CALLED.

4. EMBASSY ATHENS HAS ASKED FOR OUR EVALUATION OF THE THOUGHT THAT CLERIDES AND GREEK GOVT HAVE MUTUAL INTEREST IN HEIGHTENING CRISIS SO AS TO BRING CLERIDES TO POWER AND RESTORE HARMONY BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT GREEK AND TURKISH EMBASSIES HERE HAVE ENTERTAINED THAT POSSIBILITY SINCE BEFORE RECENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND BOTH WOULD BE PLEASED AT IDEA OF

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CLERIDES AS PRESIDENT. AS WE HAVE TOLD TURK EMB, THIS BEGUILING THOUGHT SIMPLY IGNORES LOCAL POLITICAL REALITIES. AMKARIOS IS THE POLITICAL POWER HERE FOR FORE-SEEABLE FUTURE, BARRING VIOLENT REMOVAL. IT WOULD BE POLITICAL SUICIDE FOR CLERIDES TO PIT HIMSELF AGAINST MAKARIOS, PARTICULARLY ON "PRO-TURKISH" PLATFORM INTO WHICH HE WOULD BE FORCED BY HIS INVOLVEMENT IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. CLERIDES HIMSELF RECOGNIZES THIS REALITY AND HAS AVOIDED BEING DRAWN INTO CONTEST WITH ARCHBISHOP. HE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSOR THAN COMPETITOR, AND ONE OF TRAGEDIES OF PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT MODERATES LIKE CLERIDES ARE LOSING GROUND IN POLARIZATION OF POLITICS BETWEEN GRIVASITES AND LEFT.

5. WE BELIEVE CLERIDES' OBJECTIVE TO BE TWO-FOLD: TO BRING GREEK GOVT INFLUENCE TO BEAR AGAINST GRIVAS AND TO HAVE MAKARIOS CALL OFF ACTIVITIES OF ARMED GROUPS SYMPATHETIC TO HIM, PARTICULARLY LYSSARIDES FACTION. CLERIDES UNDOUBTEDLY EXPECTS THAT MAKARIOS WILL CLAMP DOWN ON PRO-GOVT COUNTERVIOLENCE IF GRIVAS TERRORISM CEASES, BUT NOT UNTIL THEN.

6. ATHENS' REFTELS SPEAK OF "INTERVENTION" AND USE OF NATIONAL GUARD TO HANDLE GRIVAS THREAT. GOC MAKES CLEAR THAT IT SEES SITUATION IN REVERSE (SEPTTEL TO FOLLOW). TI BLAMES ATHENS FOR CONNIVANCE IN GRIVAS' ACTIVITIES. WHAT IT WANTS IS FOR ATHENS TO REMOVE GRIVAS, FORCE HIM TO STOP OPERATIONS, OR AT LEAST DISAVOW HIM. FROM NATIONAL GUARD, IT SEEKS END OF ANTI-MAKARIOS PROPAGANDA, BUT NOT ASSISTANCE AGAINST GRIVAS. GOC ASSUMES SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY IF ATHENS TOOK ONE OF THREE STEPS ABOVE. DIRECT GREEK INTERVENTION OTHER THAN THAT ABOVE WOULD BE UNPOPULAR HERE EXCEPT AMONG EXTREME RIGHT WING, WHO OF COURSE WANT ATHENS' INTERVENTION FOR VERY DIFFERENT REASONS THAN TO IMPROVE ATHENS/MAKARIOS RELATIONS, (IN EVENT OF THREATENED TURKISH ATTACK, OF COURSE, WE ASSUME CYPRIOTS WOULD EXPECT GREEK ASSISTANCE, AND THAT ATHENS WOULD FIND IT POLITICALLY NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING IT COULD IN FACE OF TURKISH

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

021781

P R 241930Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7292
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
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USMISSION NATO
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 970

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TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

7. DEPT HAS ASKED FOR VIEWS AS TO WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS CALLED FOR AT PRESENT TO PREVENT GRIVAS TERRORISM FROM WRECKING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND OBSTRUCTING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. ESSENTIALLY OUR ANSWER IS THAT UNITED STATES, AS GREECE'S PRINCIPAL ALLY, SHOULD CLEARLY TELL GOG THAT WE BELIEVE ITS HANDLING OF GRIVAS ISSUE IS DAMAGING ITS INTERESTS AND OURS. WE BELIEVE VOICE OF USG, ADDED TO THOSE OF UNSYG, TURKISH GOVT AND SOME OF ATHENS' OWN AMBASSADORS, MAY EVENTUALLY PERSUADE GREEK GOVT THAT RISKS OF COUTENANCING GRIVAS OUTWEIGH UNDERSTANDABLE PROBLEMS IN MOVING AGAINST HIM.

8. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS INFORMALLY, AND BELIEVE THEY MAY INFLUENCE GOG IF MADE IN DEPT AND ATHENS:

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A. GRIVAS VIOLENCE IS WEAKENING THOSE ON ISLAND (INCLUDING CLERIDES) WHO WOULD ACCOMMODATE WITH TURKEY, AND GRIVASIST ATTACKS ARE FORCING GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS INTO INCREASINLY STRONG ENOSIST STATEMENTS, WHICH IN TURN MULTIPLY TURKISH SUSPICIONS OF BOTH NICOSIA AND CYPRUS.

B. LOW-GRADE INSURRECTION IN CYPRUS PRECIPITATED BY GRIVAS ENDANGERS CAREFULLY NURTURED GREEK-TURKISH ACCOMMODATION. SHOULD VIOLENCE ESCALATE, STABILITY OF NATO SOUTHEAST FLANK COULD ONCE AGAIN BE THREATENED.

C. GRIVAS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE TOUGHENED TURKISH DEMAND, AND WHILE THEY CONTINUE, RULE OUT REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATED INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT.

D. INSOFAR AS GRIVAS SUCCEEDS, HE THREATENS TO PRESENT GOG WITH NIGHTMARE IT WOULD MOST WISH TO AVOID: CIVIL STRIFE ON ISLAND, WITH GRIVASISTS CALLING ON ATHENS TO TAKE CYPRUS IN NAME OF HELLENISM, AND ANTI-GRIVASISTS CALLING ON UN, US, USSR, AND EVEN TURKEY TO PREVENT IT.

E. ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF COUNTERACTING INFLUENCE OF CYPRUS COMMUNISTS AND LYSSARIDES IS TO IMPROVE GREEK-CYPRUS RELATIONS BY BRINGING GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL SO THAT ARCHBISHOP IS NOT FORCED TO RELY ON LEFT AS HIS ONLY BUTRESS AGAINST GRIVAS.

9. IN ADDITION, BELIEVE WE SHOULD COUNTER ANTICIPATED GREEK RESPONSE BY MAKING CLEAR THAT USG DOES NOT ACCEPT THAT GREEK GOVT IS POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS TERRORISM. REMOVING GENERAL MIGHT AT MOMENT PRESENT UNACCEPTABLE RISKS3 HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE COMPELLING HIM TO CEASE HIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WOULD DO SO.

10. A FINAL WORD ON TIMING. WE ENVISAGE ABOVE AS EXTENDED DIALOGUE WITH GOG AND CLARIFICATION OF US POLICY, NOT AS SINGLE DEMARCHE. WE WOULD NOT TIE IT DIRECTLY TO CLERIDES' RESIGNATION THREAT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT USG SHOULD AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT GREEK ACTION

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WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. AT THIS STAGE, WE BELIEVE SOME TIME WILL BE NECESSARY TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG PARTIES BEFORE ANY ONE OF THEM WILL RISK COMMITTING ITSELF TO A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT.

11. DURING MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE THOUGHT IT BEST LET CLERIDES AND GREEK ENVOYS HERE AND IN ANKARA STATE THEIR CASES THEMSELVES, RATHER THAN JOINING FRAY. HOWEVER, WE THINK CLEAR ELABORATION OF US POSITION ON GRIVAS, JOINED WITH INFLUENCE OF OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES, WOULD ALTER PRESENT GREEK POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS.

12. AMBASSADOR POPPER MAY WISH TO COMMENT FROM TEHRAN.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 343

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 250922Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

P R 241930Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7292
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
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73 APR 25 AM 8:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
025996

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 NICOSIA 970

EXDIS

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA. 8.A., LAST LINE, LAST WORD)

TEHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

7. DEPT HAS ASKED FOR VIEWS AS TO WHAT, IF ANY, ACTION IS CALLED FOR AT PRESENT TO PREVENT GRIVAS TERRORISM FROM WRECKING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND OBSTRUCTING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY.

ESSENTIALLY OUR ANSWER IS THAT UNITED STATES, AS GREECE'S PRINCIPAL ALLY, SHOULD CLEARLY TELL GOG THAT WE BELIEVE ITS HANDLING OF GRIVAS ISSUE IS DAMAGING ITS INTERESTS AND OURS. WE BELIEVE VOICE OF USG, ADDED TO THOSE OF UNSYG, TURKISH GOVT AND SOME OF ATHENS' OWN AMBASSADORS, MAY EVENTUALLY PERSUADE GREEK GOVT THAT RISKS OF COUTENANCING GRIVAS OUTWEIGH UNDERSTANDABLE PROBLEMS IN MOVING AGAINST HIM.

8. WE HAVE BEEN MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS INFORMALLY, AND

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 00970 02 OF 02 250922Z

BELIEVE THEY MAY INFLUENCE GOG IF MADE IN DEPT AND ATHENS:

A. GRIVAS VIOLENCE IS WEAKENING THOSE ON ISLAND (INCLUDING CLERIDES) WHO WOULD ACCOMMODATE WITH TURKEY, AND GRIVASIST ATTACKS ARE FORCING GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERS INTO INCREASINLY STRONG ENOSIST STATEMENTS, WHICH IN TURN MULTIPLY TURKISH SUSPICIONS OF BOTH NICOSIA AND ATHENS.

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C. GRIVAS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE TOUGHENED TURKISH DEMAND, AND WHILE THEY CONTINUE, RULE OUT REALISTIC CHANCE OF NEGOTIATED INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT.

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E. ONLY EFFECTIVE WAY OF COUNTERACTING INFLUENCE OF CYPRUS COMMUNISTS AND LYSSARIDES IS TO IMPROVE GREEK-CYPRUS RELATIONS BY BRINGING GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL SO THAT ARCHBISHOP IS NOT FORCED TO RELY ON LEFT AS HIS ONLY BUTRESS AGAINST GRIVAS.

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9. IN ADDITION, BELIEVE WE SHOULD COUNTER ANTICIPATED GREEK RESPONSE BY MAKING CLEAR THAT USG DOES NOT ACCEPT THAT GREEK GOVT IS POWERLESS TO CONTROL GRIVAS TERRORISM. REMOVING GENERAL MIGHT AT MOMENT PRESENT UNACCEPTABLE RISKS3 HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE COMPELLING HIM TO CEASE HIS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES WOULD DO SO.

10. A FINAL WORD ON TIMING. WE ENVISAGE ABOVE AS EXTENDED DIALOGUE WITH GOG AND CLARIFICATION OF US POLICY, NOT AS SINGLE DEMARCHE. WE WOULD NOT TIE IT

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DIRECTLY TO CLERIDES' RESIGNATION THREAT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT USG SHOULD AVOID ANY SUGGESTION THAT GREEK ACTION WOULD LEAD DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY TO NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. AT THIS STAGE, WE BELIEVE SOME TIME WILL BE NECESSARY TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE AMONG PARTIES BEFORE ANY ONE OF THEM WILL RISK COMMITTING ITSELF TO A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT.

11. DURING MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE THOUGHT IT BEST LET CLERIDES AND GREEK ENVOYS HERE AND IN ANKARA STATE THEIR CASES THEMSELVES, RATHER THAN JOINING FRAY. HOWEVER, WE THINK CLEAR ELABORATION OF US POSITION ON GRIVAS, JOINED WITH INFLUENCE OF OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES, WOULD ALTER PRESENT GREEK POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS.

12. AMBASSADOR POPPER MAY WISH TO COMMENT FROM TEHRAN.
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 790

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00198 010504Z

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15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADR-00 /026 W

093071

R 311105Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6949
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T NICOSIA 198

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CHRISTOPHIDES VISIT TO ATHENS

REF: NICOSIA 175, 112, 87

1. SUMMARY: AT MEETING LATE JAN 30 FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES WAS MUCH MORE CIRCUMSPECT THAN HIS SUBORDINATE (REFTEL 175), BUT CONFIRMED THAT HIS VISIT TO ATHENS HAD NOT ELICITED ANY ASSURANCE OF GREEK ACTION TO CONTROL GRIVAS OR ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS RE GREEK GOVT POSITION IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. SUGGESTS MAKARIOS MAY SEEK TO UNIFY MODERATES AND RELY LESS ON COMMUNIST SUPPORT.

2. CHRISTOPHIDES PUT SITUATION IN FOLLOWING TERMS: HE HAD DESCRIBED GRIVAS ACTIVITIES BUT HAD NOT SOUGHT ASSISTANCE FROM GREEK GOVT; ON ITS SIDE GREEK GOVT HAD NOT OFFERED ASSISTANCE. FURTHER, GREEKS HAD AGREED ANY INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT MUST NOT OPEN DOOR TO PARTITION, BUT SINCE BASIC DISCUSSION PAPER ON LOCAL GOVT HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED, THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF WHAT SORT OF LOCAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS GENERAL PRINCIPLE.

3. DURING OUR MEETING CHRISTOPHIDES REITERATED HIS FEARS CONCERNING GRIVAS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO UPSET LOCAL STABILITY, PREVENT OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR MAKARIOS IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, AND SABOTAGE INTERCOMMUNAL

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NEGOTIATIONS. NEW NOTE WAS REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE DANGERS FROM RECENTLY CREATED PRO-MAKARIOS ARMED GROUPS WHICH MIGHT EXPLOIT PRESENT CLIMATE OF INSTABILITY TO SETTLE FACTIONAL SCORES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES UNRELATED TO THE BIG PICTURE.

4. FONMIN AND I DISCUSSED ONCE AGAIN PARADOX OF APPARENT GREEK TOLERATION AND PERHAPS EVEN SOME COVERT SUPPORT OF GRIVAS, WHEN LATTERS OBJECTIVES WERE AT SUCH VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF GREECE, WHICH CLEARLY WANTED AGREED SETTLEMENT. I MADE POINT THAT POSITION OF COMMUNISTS IN CYPRUS, AND IN ADDITION DISREPUTABLE ACTIVITIES OF MAVERICK LEFTIST LYSSARIDES MUST WEIGH HEAVILY IN DETERMINING GREEK GOVT POSITION. FORMER AMB PANAYOTACOS HAD MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR A YEAR AGO THAT GREEK GOVT WAS HIGHLY DIS-SATISFIED WITH THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. CHRISTOPHIDES AGREED HE HAS ALWAYS FAVORED CURBING COMMUNISTS IN CYPRUS. SAID MAKARIOS HAD TOLD HIM IN CONFIDENCE THAT AFTER THE ELECTION HE INTENDED TO UNITE THE TWO MAJOR CENTER-RIGHT PARTIES AND RELY ON THEM AS MAIN BASE OF HIS SUPPORT EVEN IF THIS SHOULD FORCE THE COMMUNISTS INTO OPPOSITION.

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5. COMMENT: WE ARE SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL ABOUT THIS LAST STATEMENT. MAKARIOS HAS SPOKEN OF UNIFYING HIS NON-COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS BEFORE BUT WE DOUBT THAT HE WOULD CARRY THROUGH IF RESULTS SHOULD BE TO BUILD UP CLERIDES TOO MUCH, OR TO FORCE AKEL INTO OPPOSITION. COMMUNIST SUPPORT HAS BEEN HELPFUL TO MAKARIOS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CYPRUS. AKEL WOULD BE FORMIDABLE THREAT TO HIM IN OPPOSITION. MOREOVER, CENTER AND RIGHT ARE LED BY INDIVIDUALISTS WHO FIND TEAM PLAY DIFFICULT AND TURN TO POLITICS IN FITS AND STARTS RATHER THAN FOR SUSTAINED PERFORMANCE. MOST WE WOULD EXPECT IS SOME TILT TOWARD CENTER-RIGHT ALONG LINES ALREADY APPARENT BUT WITHOUT ANY ABRUPT OR DECISIVE TURN.

6. AS TO MAJOR POINT -- RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS -- WE WOULD JUDGE THAT FROM NICOSIA ANGLE THEY CONTINUE TO BE JUST AS CLODED BY MISTRUST AND SUSPICION AS THEY WERE BEFORE CHRISTOPHIDES TRIP. REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW MUCH GRIVAS ACTIVITY WILL BE STEPPED UP IN NEXT FEW MONTHS AND HOW MAKARIOS WILL REACT IF STRESS ON HIM INCREASES. GDS.

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 320

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00175 301048Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

074238

R 301015Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6943
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T NICOSIA 175

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES VISIT TO ATHENS.

1. FRG AMB TOROK HAS HAD HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL TALK WITH FONOFF MEMBER OF FONMIN CHRISTOPHIDES PARTY DURING ATHENS VISIT LAST WEEK. HIS INFORMANT STATES CYPRIOTS REGARD VISIT AS AN UTTER FAILURE. THEIR MAIN PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO OBTAIN GREEK SUPPORT IN CONTROLLING GRIVAS ACTIVITIES; THEY GOT NO SATISFACTION ON THIS. NOR DID THEY SUCCEED IN TALKING SPECIFICS ON INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS.

2. COMMENT: NONE OF PUBLIC COMMENT HERE ON CHRISTOPHIDES VISIT REFLECTS THIS START ASSESSMENT; ON CONTRARY, IT IS VAGUELY REASSURING. I AM SEEKING EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH FONMIN AND WILL REPORT FURTHER.
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TELEGRAM

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STATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 NICOSI 02204 071638Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

091377

R 071530Z DEC 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6799
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T NICOSIA 2204

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: "SECOND STAGE- CONFERENCE AND MAKARIOS
OBJECTIVES

REF: ATHENS 6967

1. SUMMARY: IN RE-EMPHASIZING NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, MAKARIOS SEEKS TO PROTECT HIMSELF BY ENSURING PARTICIPATION OF GREECE IN DE FACTO RENUNCIATION OF ENOSIS THIS WOULD ENTAIL, AND TO MOVE TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION OF ISLAND WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM FREER HAND WITH TURK CYPRIOTS. NON-ALIGNMENT IS HIS CURRENT OBJECTIVE, BUT U.S. CAN HELP NUDGE HIM CLOSER TO WEST. END SUMMARY

2. IN OUR OPINION EMBASSY ATHENS IS QUITE CORRECT IN ATTACHING SIGNIFICANCE TO ARCHBISHOP'S EMPHASIS ON SECOND ROUND OF CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS, FOLLOWING INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CYPRUS PROBLEM.

3. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT IN AUTUMN 1971, WHEN GREECE AND TURKEY WERE FORCING EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS DOWN RELUCTANT THROAT OF THEN FOREIGN MINISTER SYPROS KYPRIANOU, LATTER REPEATEDLY MADE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTEREST OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM, WHILE IT WAS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES ON ISLAND TO SOLVE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS. AS EXPANDED TALKS WERE FINALLY ORGANIZED, THIS

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DISTINCTION WAS BLURRED BY INCLUSION OF GREEK AND TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERTS AMONG PARTICIPANTS. BUT KYPRIANOU POINT REMAINS VALID TO THIS EXTENT: ANY CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT MUST SOMEHOW BE FACTORED INTO EXISTING TREATY STRUCTURE FOR CYPRUS AND INTO PRESENT OR ALTERED SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES.

4. AS REFTEL INDICATES, IN REFERRING TO "SECOND STAGE" NEGOTIATIONS MAKARIOS IS CERTAINLY ASSUMING THAT FIRST STAGE NOW HAS SOME CHANCE OF SUCCESS. IT IS QUITE CLEAR HOWEVER FROM BOTH HIS PUBLIC AND HIS PRIVATE UTTERANCES THAT HE IS LESS INCLINED THAN GREEK CYPRIOT NEGOTIATOR CLERIDES AND SOME OF HIS OTHER OFFICIALS TO COMPROMISE ON CRITICAL ISSUE OF LOCAL GOVT, NOT YET TACKLED BY NEGOTIATORS, AS WELL AS ON OTHER POINTS IN CURRENT ROUND OF TALKS. WE BELIEVE IT IS STILL DOUBTFUL THAT FULL AGREEMENT ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES CAN BE REACHED. BUT IF IT IS REACHED, ARCHBISHOP CAN BE EXPECTED TO HOLD UP FULL IMPLEMENTATION PENDING WHAT HE PROBABLY REGARDS AS EQUALLY CRITICAL SECOND (INTERNATIONAL) PHASE.

5. ARCHBISHOP'S INTEREST HERE IS TO ASSOCIATE GREECE UNEQUIVOCALLY WITH THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF A CYPRUS REPUBLIC WHICH WOULD BE A BAR TO ENOSIS AS LONG AS IT EXISTED. SECOND STAGE CONFERENCE WOULD PRESUMABLY GIVE HIM BOTH GREEK AND TURKISH BLESSING FOR SUCH A SET-UP. AT SAME TIME IT WOULD ALLOW HIM TO MOVE TOWARD ANOTHER LONG HELD OBJECTIVE, THE PROGRESSIVE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND. ARCHBISHOP WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO HAVE ALL FOREIGN TROOPS REMOVED FROM CYPRUS. IN FIRST INSTANCE MAINLAND TURKISH AND GREEK CONTINGENTS, AND AT SOME SUITABLE LATER STAGE UK BASES AND FORCES. THIS WAS CLEARLY IN HIS MIND WHEN IN APRIL 1964 HE ANNOUNCED THAT CYPRUS HAD TERMINATED THE 1960 TREATY OF ALLIANCE (BUT NOT TREATY OF GUARANTEE). IF MAKARIOS COULD GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF ISLAND, AND IF HE COULD THUS OPERATE AS HEAD OF AN ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT STATE, HE PROBABLY CALCULATES THAT HIS LEVERAGE ON TURKISH MINORITY IN CYPRUS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED, AND HIS ABILITY TO MAKE THE MOST OF A NON-ALIGNED POSTURE MAXIMIZED

6. FOREGOING IS OUR OWN EXTRAPOLATION OF WORDS AND THOUGHTS

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OF ARCHBISHOP AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ARCHBISHOP WOULD HASTILY DISPOSE OF PROFITABLE BRITISH BASES OR THAT HE WOULD INEVITABLY HEW TO NON-ALIGNED POSITION. LIKE SOME OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS IN THIS REGION, HE WILL WANT TO RETAIN FREEDOM TO DO SO. BUT BY SAME TOKEN WE BELIEVE HE WILL ALWAYS LEAVE HIMSELF ENOUGH MANEUVERING ROOM TO MOVE, HAVING REGARD FOR ATTITUDE OF GREECE AND TURKEY, TOWARD WESTERN FOLD IF THIS SHOULD APPEAR TO OFFER MORE TO CYPRUS AND TO HIM. FUNDAMENTAL TASK FOR USG AND WESTERN ALLIES IS TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WILL IMPEL MAKARIOS TO TAKE UP THIS OPTION. GDS.
POPPER

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TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 898

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01617 300919Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

004343

R 300840Z AUG 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6457
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA

CONFIDENTIAL NICOSIA 1617

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MINTOFF ON CYPRUS SITUATION

REF: STATE 157495, 158232

1. MINTOFF IS RIGHT IN HIS IMPRESSION THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS BEING MADE TOWARD A PERMANENT SOLUTION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM. BUT TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE HE IS ENTIRELY WRONG IN HINTING THAT MAKARIOS MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO A TURKISH APPROACH AS LONG AS IT EXCLUDED PARTITION. OR PERHAPS THERE IS A SEMANTIC PROBLEM HERE; MAKARIOS WOULD DOUBTLESS DEFINE ANY TURKISH PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL OR CANTONAL AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS AND BINATIONAL PARTNERSHIP (THE CENTRAL FEATURES OF ALL TURK CYPRIOT THINKING ON THE PROBLEM) AS A PRELUDE TO POSSIBLE PARTITION AND HENCE UNACCEPTABLE. HE HAS SHOWN NO DISPOSITION EVEN TO CONSIDER SUCH ARRANGEMENTS.

2. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, WE CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE AT ALL IN HELPING MINTOFF TO INJECT HIMSELF INTO THIS PICTURE. HE HAS NO SPECIAL CREDENTIALS FOR THE TASK. IF MAKARIOS WISHES TO START A SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH THE TURKS THERE ARE BETTER WAYS FOR HIM TO GO ABOUT IT; AND IF WE ARE TO ENCOURAGE SUCH A DISCUSSION WE CERTAINLY DO NOT NEED MINTOFF AS AN INTEREDIARY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, WE SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH TO HAVE AMB

72 AUG 30 PM 12.17

WHITTINGTON ROOM

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 01617 300919Z

GETZ TAKE LINE WE APPRECIATE MINTOFF'S INTEREST, BUT BELIEVE THAT AT THIS CRITICAL STATE IN INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO REFRAIN FROM OUTSIDE INTERCESSION. GDS POPPER

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
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TELEGRAM

SECRET 128

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01471 271620Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

032883

R 271550Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6375
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION UN
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1471

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PROPOSAL FOR ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY AGREEMENT

REF: STATE 135854

1. DEPT ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT. ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY ARRANGEMENT BEING WORKED OUT IN CYPRUS INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS WAS STALLED, APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF NEW DEMANDS EACH SIDE SAYS THE OTHER IS MAKING. FURTHER PROGRESS APPEARS DEPENDENT ON CLEARING UP FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES PRECIPITATED IN LAST NEGOTIATING MEETINGS PRIOR TO JULY 21 RECESS (NICOSIA 1446, 1452).

2. WHEN DEPASSTSEC MARTIN HERZ AND I VISITED CLERIDES AND DENKTASH JULY 27 WE RECEIVED FILL IN ON ELECTRICITY PROBLEM. WHILE VERSIONS DIFFER SOMEWHAT, IT SEEMS CLEAR DENKTASH NOW SEEKS NOT ONLY RE-EMPLOYMENT OF ALL TURK CYPRIOT FORMER ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES BUT ALSO A GUARANTEE THAT WITHIN A FEW MONTHS 20 PERCENT OF ALL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES WOULD BE TURK CYPRIOTS. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE GUARANTEES AGAINST DISCHARGING TURK CYPRIOTS FOR POLITICAL REASONS. OTHER PROBLEMS HAVE ARISEN OVER DENKTASH DEMANDS THAT PORTION OF ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY REVENUES BE PAID TO TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNAL CHAMBER, AND OVER

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 01471 271620Z

HIS DISCLOSURE THAT FUNDS COLLECTED BY TCPA AS ELECTRICITY CHARGES AND SUPPOSEDLY HELD IN ESCROW HAVE BEEN PAID OUT TO FORMER TURK CYPRIOT ELECTRICITY EMPLOYEES AND PERHAPS FOR OTHER PURPOSES. FOR HIS PART, DENKTASH HAD EARLIER TOLD US GOC IS CLAIMING 3 MILLION POUNDS FOR PAST ELECTRICITY CHARGES AS ELEMENT OF ANY AGREEMENT.

3. THESE NEW COMPLICATIONS MAKE A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON ELECTRICITY UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME. WE HAVE IMPRESSION NO FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE UNTIL NEGOTIATORS SETTLE PROBLEM CREATED BY DENKTASH INSISTENCE ON NEW START FOR TALKS ON BASIS OF QTE DE FACTO SITUATION UNQTE. GDS.
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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 421

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01456 250936Z

14
ACTION SS=25

INFO OCT=01 /026 W

012994

R 250855Z JUL 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6367
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

SECRET NICOSIA 1456

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: BAYULKEN'S ALLEGED PROPOSALS TO PALAMAS

REF: ATHENS 4047

WE WOULD LIKE TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH OBSERVATIONS REFTEL. WHILE SHARING DEPT'S CONCERN THAT GOG-GOT CONSULTATION COULD IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES LEAD TO THOUGHTS OF CYPRUS SOLUTION BY MEANS OTHER THAN NEGOTIATIONS, MAIN DANGER OF CYPRUS PROBLEM FOR USG HAS HITHERTO BEEN THAT IT COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. IF OUR TWO ALLIES HAVE NOW BEEN ABLE DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO POINT OF APPROACHING THIS PROBLEM WITH DETERMINATION TO PREVENT IT DRAWING THEM INTO CONFLICT, AND ARE CONSULTING TO THAT END, WE THINK THIS IS FUNDAMENTALLY IN US INTEREST. IT IS ALSO IN KEEPING WITH CURRENT USG EMPHASIS ON NEED FOR STATES INVOLVED IN REGIONAL DISPUTES TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOLUTION OF THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. GDS
CRAWFORD

72 JUL 25 AM 11:39

WHITE HOUSE
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13

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 285

PAGE 01 NICOSI 01234 160525Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

118325

R 160555Z JUN 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6232
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION UN
USMISSION NATO
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EUROM

72 JUN 16 AM 8:30
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T NICOSIA 1234

EXDIS

SUBJECT: GOT UNLIKELY PRESS TO HAVE CAREER DIPLOMATIC OFFICER SIT WITH TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT IN EXPANDED TALKS

REF: NICOSIA 1201

1. WITH A LARGE ASSIST FROM UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL, I BELIEVE WE HAVE HEADED OFF THOUGHTS OF TURKISH EMBASSY (AND GOT) OF TRYING TO INSIST THAT TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT ALDIKACTI BE ACCOMPANIED IN EXPANDED TALKS BY A TURKISH CAREER DIPLOMATIC OFFICER.

2. AFTER MY CONVERSATION WITH TURKISH CHARGE INHAN ON JUNE 8 IN WHICH HE HAD MENTIONED NEED FOR A TURKISH DIPLOMATIC OFFICER TO HELP ALDIKACTI IN VIEW OF LATTERS LACK OF ENGLISH, I TOLD OSORIO OF THIS CONVERSATION. AT HIS NEXT MEETING WITH INHAN, AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER CONVERSATION, OSORIO NOTED ALDIKACTIS PROBLEM AND VOLUNTEERED TO SERVE AS INTERPRETER HIMSELF AS NEED ARISES.

3. ON JUNE 14 INHAN INDICATED TO ME THAT ANKARA WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT OSORIOS OFFER ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUED

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 01234 160525Z

FEEL ALDIKACTI WOULD BE WORKING AT A DISADVANTAGE WITHOUT HIS OWN INTERPRETER. INHAN SMILED WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT HE COULD HAVE KNOWN ALL ALONG THAT UN COULD NOT POSSIBLY AGREE TO PRESENCE OF A GOT OFFICIAL WHOSE ATTENDANCE WOULD MARKEDLY UPSET BALANCE IN SYG'S FORMULA. NEVERTHELESS, INHAN STATED ALDIKACTI TO BE BACKED-STOPPED, OUTSIDE OF MEETINGS, BY FULL TIME OFFICER ASSIGNED TO TURKISH EMBASSY HERE. GP-3
CRAWFORD

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TELEGRAM

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WHITE HOUSE
STUART ROOM

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00978 031205Z

51
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

039590

O R 031130Z MAY 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6067
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 978

EXDIS

SUBJECT: REACTION TO TURKISH CONDITIONS

REF: STATE 76361

1. SUMMARY: WE ARE CONVINCED GOC COULD NOT ACCEPT TURKISH PRECONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. WE BELIEVE UNSYG, SUPPORTED BY US, UK AND GREECE, SHOULD URGE TURKEY REFORMULATE CONDITIONS AS UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF TURKISH POLICY.

2. IN REFTEL DEPT REQUESTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF GOC REACTION TO TURKISH PRECONDITIONS. WHILE GOC OFFICIALS EVIDENTLY ARE NOT YET FULLY APPRAISED OF LATEST TURKISH POSITION, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IN FORM IN WHICH WE HAVE THEM (STATE 77438) THEY WOULD DEFINITELY BE UNACCEPTABLE HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE OFFICIAL TEXT OF TURKISH POINTS SOONEST. SINCE VERSION UK HICOM HAS JUST RECEIVED FROM UK DEL NEW YORK IS SOMEWHAT BLANDER THAN OURS.

3. IN OUR JUDGMENT GOC COULD NOT ACCEPT LANGUAGE WHICH DIRECTLY ASSERTED VALIDITY OF LONDON ZURICH AGREEMENTS, NOR WOULD IT SPECIFICALLY RENOUNCE ENOSIS AS AN ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE, THOUGH IT MIGHT AGREE TO SOME FORMULATION IMPLYING CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE FOR SOME INDEFINITE PERIOD. WHILE

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 00978 031205Z

EQUAL PARTICIPATION OF TWO COMMUNITIES IN THE TALKS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT AGREE TO DISREGARD MAJORITY STATUS OF GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OR TO ANY DEFINITION OF PARTNERSHIP WHICH LOOKS TOWARD FEDERAL OR CANTONAL STATUS FOR TURK CYPRIOTS.

4. SEEMS TO US BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE FOR UNSYG, SUPPORTED BY US, UK AND GREECE, TO SEEK TO PERSUADE TURKEY TO REFORMULATE ITS POINTS AS A UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF TURKISH LEGAL AND POLITICAL POSITION. THIS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH UNDERSTANDING APPARENTLY REACHED AD REFERENDUM BY GUYER DURING ANKARA VISIT EARLY FEBRUARY (PARA 3 ANKARA 850) UNDER WHICH GUYER WOULD SUBMIT TO UN A POSITION PAPER DESCRIBING ITS VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS. IF EACH PARTY TO INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD AGREE TO PRESENT SUCH A POSITION PAPER FOR THE RECORD, A SITUATION MIGHT BE CREATED IN WHICH TALKS COULD GO FORWARD.

5. AS TO TIMING, SOONER SUCH REPRESENTATIONS COULD BE MADE, BETTER CHANCE THEY WOULD HAVE OF SUCCEEDING. WE WOULD LIKE TO INFORM CYPRUS GOVT IF AND WHEN DECISION TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION IS TAKEN, IN ORDER TO FORESTALL ANY PRECIPITATE REACTION.
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CONFIDENTIAL 388

STATEHOUSE
STATION ROOM

12 APR 29 AM 8:52

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00951 290635Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W 014519

P R 281625Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6047
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO
EUCOM
USDOCOSOUTH

C I O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 951

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; GOT REFUSAL RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

REF: ANKARA 3080

1. SUMMARY. WE SUGGEST REASONS ADVANCED BY BAYULKEN FOR GOT UNWILLINGNESS RESUME INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. IN PARTICULAR, THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE TURK CYPRIOTS WILL AS IN PAST HAVE TO FOLLOW TURKISH LEAD ON TALKS, AND THAT TURKS DO NOT THEREFORE NEED TO "JUSTIFY" RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS TO TURKISH COMMUNITY. WE RECOMMEND GOT BE URGED AGREE TO ENLARGED TALKS AT ONCE AND WITHOUT RESERVATIONS. OTHERWISE WHATEVER PROSPECTS EXIST FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF CYPRUS PROBLEM MAY BE LOST. END SUMMARY.

2. REASONS GIVEN AMBASSADOR HANDLEY BY FONMIN BAYULKEN FOR PUTTING OFF RESUMPTION OF ENLARGED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS DO NOT SEEM TO US PERSUASIVE. FRANKLY, WE WONDER IF THEY ARE NOT PRETEXTS TO ENABLE BAYULKEN TO STALL WHILE TURKEY IS WITHOUT A GOVERNMENT. WHILE EMBASSY ANKARA IN BEST POSITION EVALUATE CERTAIN JUDGMENTS OF BAYULKEN (E.G. ANY TURKISH GOVERNMENT "WOULD BE TOPPLED" IF IT NOW

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AGREED TO RESUME TALKS, WE OFFER FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON POINTS RELATING TO CYPRUS.

A. CZECH ARMS. UN'S EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL UNFICYP CUSTODY OF CZECH WEAPONS, EXCEPT FOR EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION, WHICH IS WHAT TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS HAVE ALL ALONG SAID THEY WANTED. TRUE, IT IS CUSTODY WITH UNDERSTANDING GOC HAS RIGHT TO WITH DRAW WEAPONS ON DEMAND, BUT THAT SEEMS IMPLICIT IN ANY CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT. (AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT, IT HARD TO IMAGINE GOC DEMANDING WITHDRAW ARMS EXCEPT IN GRAVEST THREAT TO ITS SECURITY FUNCE DEMAND ITSELF WOULD IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES BE REGARDED BY TURKS AS VIRTUAL SIGNAL HOSTILITIES WERE IMMINENT.) FACT THAT UNARMED CYPRUS POLICE HAVE TECHNICAL SUPERVISION OF WEAPONS IS FACE-SAVING FORMULA. POINT IS THAT UNFICYP HAS ACKNOWLEDGED RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL (BY FORCE IF NECESSARY ACCESS TO CAMP IN WHICH ARMS ARE STORED. WE HOPE GOT IS FULLY CLEAR ON THIS POINT. IT SEEMS TO US MISLEADING IN THE EXTREME TO CHARACTERIZE UN AGREEMENT AS SIMPLY "GOOD EFFORT."

B. 1) DISARRAY IN ATHENS-MAKARIOS RELATIONS HAS NOT IN ITSELF NOTABLY DISTURBED TURK CYPRIOTS. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME SENSE OF INSECURITY AMONG COMMON PEOPLE, BUT TCPA LEADERSHIP HAS CLEARLY RELISHED PROSPECT THAT GREEK PRESSURE ON MAKARIOS WOULD LEAD TO IMPOSED SOLUTION. EITHER BY FORCE OR THROUGH GRECO-TURKISH PRESSURE IN ENLARGED TALKS. IT SEEMS TO US TURK CYPRIOT LEADERS HAVE GENERALLY ACTED ON ASSUMPTION THAT IN LAST ANALYSIS THEY WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW TURKEY'S ORDERS AND PARTICIPATE IN TALKS IF TOLD TO DO SO. ONLY FEW DAYS AGO, VICE PRESIDENT KUCHUK INDICATED TO UNSYG THAT CZECH ARMS CONSTITUTED "MAIN OBSTACLE TO RESUMPTION OF TALKS" AND ASKED THAT THEY BE PLACED UNDER UNFICYP FULL CUSTODY (USUN 1509). AS NOTED ABOVE, PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS COME CLOSE TO FULL CUSTODY.

2) WHATEVER FEELINGS OF TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY TOWARDS ATHENS-NICOSIA DISPUTE, IT DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY DISARRAY AMONG GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD FROM MAINLAND TURK VIEWPOINT STAND IN WAY OF RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE FREQUENTLY ARGUED THAT LITTLE WILL COME OF NEW TALKS WITHOUT INTENSIVE CONSULTATION BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY

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PAGE 03 NICOSI 00951 290635Z

ON OUTLINE OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT. NOW WOULD APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY PROPITIOUS TIME FOR SUCH COOPERATIONS.

C. ROLE OF GRIVAS. CONTACTS BETWEEN GRIVAS AND NLMAKARIOS AND POSSIBILITY OF RAPPROACHEMENT BETWEEN THEM IS NATURALLY DISQUIETING TO TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS. HOWEVER, FROM TURKISH STANDPOINT, THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD SEEM TO ARGUE FOR PROMPT RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. RENEWED TALK SHOULD TEND DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN GRIVAS AND MAKARIOS, FOR ONCE THEY ARE IN TRAIN ARCHBISHOP WOULD BE UNLIKELY MAKE CONCESSIONS TO GRIVAS ON ENOSIS ISSUE. WE WOULD NOTE, INCIDENTALY, THAT GRIVAS DID NOT REITERATE HIS ESPOUSAL OF ENOSIS IN CONCERT WITH MAKARIOS, BUT STATED IT UNILATERALLY IN ACKNOWLEDGING ARCHBISHOP'S NAME DAY CONGRATULATIONS. IN OUR READING, THE TWO MEN ARE STILL FAR FROM BEING ON COMMON WAVE LENGTH.

3. WE FEAR GOT SUGGESTIONS AIMED AT "CLEARING ATMOSPHERE SO THAT TALKS CAN TAKE PLACE "WILL HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT. DEPARTMENT IS AWARE HOW DELICATELY BALANCED UNSYG'S FORMULA IS AND WHAT GREAT EFFORTS WERE REQUIRED TO GET ALL PARTIES ON BOARD. CYPRUS ITSELF ONLY OVERCAME FINAL HURDLE AND AGREED FORMALLY TO REACTIVATE TALKS TWO DAYS AGO (USUN 1510). WE ARE QUITE CERTAIN ASSURANCES TURKEY IS CONTEMPLATING RELATING TO ARMS, ENOSIS, AND STATUS OF COMMUNITIES, WOULD UPSET PRESENT BALANCE AND MAKE IT

IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOC, IF NOT GOG, TO AGREE TO NEW TALKS.

4. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER TURKISH REPRESENTATIONS FORESHADOWED REFTEL HAVE YET BEEN MADE. WE HOPE DEPT WILL SUPPORT IN STRONGEST TERMS RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON PRESENTLY PROPOSED BASIS WITHOUT DELAY OR CONDITIONS. PERHAPS SAME POINT COULD BE CONVEYED TO BRITISH AND UNSYG. GP-3.
POPPER

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SECRET 277

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00887 210935Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

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P R 201430Z APR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6007
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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USMISSION UN PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO
USDOCOSOUTH
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SECRET NICOSIA 887

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 2. B.)

NOFORN

SUBJECT: TIGHTER AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS

1. SUMMARY. UNFICYP EXPECTS CONCLUDE APR 20 A SECOND AGREEMENT ON STERILIZATION OF CZECH ARMS IMPORTED TO CYPRUS IN LATE JANUARY. IT IS FAR TIGHTER THAN THE FIRST, WHICH WAS IN ITSELF A DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER 1967 ARRANGEMENT, AND IS TANTAMOUNT TO UNFICYP CUSTODY. WHEN SIGNED AND COMMUNICATED TO TURKEY AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS, IT SHOULD SATISFY EVEN THE LATTER THAT THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN REMOVED AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. THIS INFO STRICTLY NOFORN UNTIL RECEIVED THROUGH SOME OTHER CHANNEL.

2. FROM CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE WE LEARN THAT AT APRIL 19 MEETING WITH UNSYD SPEC REP OSORIO-TAFALL AND UNFICYP FORCE CMDR CHAND, ARCHBISHOP THEATRICALY ANNOUNCED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE DELAYS BY GOC OFFICIALS OVER DETAILS OF NEW CZECH ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT, AND AGREED WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF NEW PROPOSAL DRAWN UP BY UNFICYP.

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 00887 210935Z

ARCHBISHOP PROMISED HE WOULD SIGN THIS AT FURTHER MEETING APRIL 20. OUTLINE OF AGREEMENT, WHICH WE WOULD HOPE TO HAVE OFFICIALLY FROM OSORIO IN NEXT DAY OR TWO, IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. PREAMBULAR PARA OF AGREEMENT WILL STATE THAT GOC ESCHEWS USE OF THESE ARMS EXCEPT IN CASE OF FOREIGN ATTACK. (EXACT LANGUAGE OF THIS PARA WAS ONLY ITEM NOT FINALLY DECIDED AT APR 19 MEETING. MAKARIOS DICTATED HIS THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE, WHICH OSORIO THEN TOOK AWAY FROM MEETING TO REWORK.)

B. THERE WILL BE NO QUESTION OF PARTIAL REMOVAL OF ARMS: EITHER ALL WILL BE REMOVED FROM STORAGE UNDER EVENTUALITY CITED IN PREAMBULAR PARA, OR NONE.

C. ALL RPT ALL ARMS, FUSES AND SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION WILL BE REMOVED TO STORAGE SITE WITHIN PERIMETER OF UNFICYP BASE CAMP (ADJACENT NICOSIA AIRPORT).

D. WITHIN PERIMETER OF UNFICYP BASE CAMP, ACTUAL BUILDING DESIGNATED FOR STORAGE WILL BE HEAVILY WIRED, FLOODLIT AND UNDER CONTROL OF UNARMED RPT UNARMED CYPOL.

E. STORAGE BUILDING WILL HAVE TWO LOCKS: ONE BEING UNFYCIPS. ACCESS OF UNARMED CYPOL GUARDS AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF GOC INTO BASE CAMP WILL BE CONTROLLED BY UNFICYP BY MEANS OF PASSES ISSUED BY IT.

F. IT IS AGREED THAT UNFICYP HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF ITS CAMPS AND INSTALLATIONS AND WILL PREVENT, WITH USE OF ARMS AS MANY BE NECDGSARY, ANY ATTEMPT BY UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS TO ENTER BASE CAMP.

G. HIGH EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION WILL BE LOCATED IN EXISTING BUNKERS AT ATHALASSA. THESE ALSO WILL BE DOUBLE LOCKED AND SUBJECT TO INSPECTION WHENEVER DESIRED; WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION BY UNFICYP FORCE COMMANDER AND/OR CHIEF OF STAFF ACCOMPANIED BY OTHERS THEY MAY DESIGNATE.

3. OUR UNFICYP SOURCE POINTS OUT THAT 400 UNFICYP SOLDIERS CURRENTLY RESIDE AT BASE CAMP. AS CONSEQUENCE OF NEW ARMS AGREEMENT, NORMAL GUARD OF CAMP WILL BE AUGMENTED BY ONE

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BRITISH AND ONE AUSTRIAN PLATOON.

4. COMMENT: IF FOREGOING IS SIGNED TODAY WITHOUT CHANGE, UNFICYP WILL HAVE ACHIEVED, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS MADE TOUGH BY BACKING AND FILLING TACTICS WHICH MAKARIOS PRETENDED WERE RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS SUBORDINATES, AN AGREEMENT FOR CONTROL OF ARMS IMPORTED IN LATE JANUARY WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY UNFICYP CUSTODY. THAT SO MUCH WAS WRUNG FROM GOC IS PRIMARILY RESULT OF PERSISTENCE ON PART OF UNFICYP LEADERSHIP LOCALLY BASED ON (A) ABIDING SUSPICION OF MAKARIOS' TRICKS, (B) AWARENESS THAT ANYTHING OTHER THAN A REALLY TIGHT AGREEMENT WOULD NOT SATISFY GOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND THEREBY REMOVE CZECH ARMS AS OBSTACLE TO RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. OFFICE OF UNSYG WAS REPORTEDLY FAINTHEARTED THROUGHOUT AND WOULD WILLINGLY HAVE SETTLED FOR LESS. WE BELIEVE MAKARIOS WENT ALONG BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH DISPOSED TO QUIBBLE ABOUT THE DETAILS SO FAR AS THEY MIGHT APPEAR DEROGATE FROM GOC SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVES, HE GENUINELY WANTED ARMS ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY. WE BELIEVE HIS OBJECT IN SO DOING WAS TO PUT HIMSELF ON SIDE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO RESUMED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, LEAVING GREEK GOVTS DEMANDS FOR RESHUFFLE OF GOVT, PURGE OF COMMUNISTS, AND "OBEDIENCE TO THE CENTER", IN HIS WAKE.

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S E C R E T NICOSIA 844

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - T E X T

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - CRISIS REVIEW

REF: STATE 60808

1. WE THINK REFTEL IS EXCELLENT ANALYTICAL DOCUMENT, WRITTEN WITH BALANCE AND PERSPECTIVE. WE HAVE VERY FEW COMMENTS ON ITS SUBSTANCE.
2. IN PARA 2 REFTEL ASSUMPTION IS MADE THAT SECOND STAGE AGREEMENT FOR CONTROL OF CZECH ARMS HAS BEEN COMPLETED. AS WE PREDICTED IN NICOSIA 748, CYPRUS BUREAUCRATS HAVE NOT YET FOLLOWED THROUGH ON ARRANGEMENTS. OSORIO-TAFALL KEEPS PRESSING, AND WE DO WHAT WE CAN TO SUPPORT HIM IN DISCREET WAY, BUT UN EFFORTS HAVE SO FAR BEEN MET WITH DELAYS ON ACCOUNT OF HOLIDAYS, DISAGREEMENT ON DETAILS, ETC. OSORIO THINKS HE WILL GET WHAT HE WANTS IN THE END, BUT IF HE IS UNSUCCESSFUL CZECH ARMS ISSUE MAY STILL HAUNT US.
3. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT WHILE GREEK SIDE WAS SATISFIED EVEN WITH FIRST STAGE ARRANGEMENTS, TURKISH SIDE HERE CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE DEMAND FOR FULL UN CUSTODY OF CZECH ARMS AS NECESSARY MEASURE TO SAFEGUARD TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

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THIS WAS REPEATED TO US BY VICE PRESIDENT KUCHUK AND DEFENSE MINISTER OREK DURING COURTESY CALL TODAY. PRIVATELY, UNFICYP SOURCES STATE THEY WOULD NOT WELCOME ACTUAL CUSTODY, WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE UN FORCE INTO CENTER OF CRISIS SITUATION IF ARMS WERE EVER SEIZED BY GOVT BECAUSE OF PURPOSED EMERGENCY SITUATION.

4. IN PARA 7 REFTEL STATEMENT IS MADE THAT MAKARIOS MAY BE IN CONCILIATORY FRAME OF MIND. WE HOPE THIS IS SO, BUT ASIDE FROM TANGENTIAL REFERENCE TO WHAT HE TERMS NEED FOR FRESH APPROACH, WE MUST SAY WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGN HE IS WILLING TO PROPOSE OR ACCEPT ANY NEW SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS (CF NICOSIA 840). AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL NEITHER GREEK NOR TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP IS SHOWING MORE FLEXIBILITY TODAY THAN WAS THE CASE LAST SUMMER, WHEN CLERIDES-DENKTASH DISCUSSIONS FADED AWAY. AT SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT AS TACTICAL MATTER EACH SIDE MIGHT WISH TO PRESERVE HARDEST POSSIBLE PUBLIC POSTURE FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES, BEFORE NEW TALKS BEGIN.

5. RE PARA 8 REFTEL, WE ARE FRANK TO SAY WE MUST RESORT LARGELY TO SUBJECTIVE ESTIMATES IN TRYING TO ASSESS STRENGTH OF MAINLAND GREEK MILITARY INFLUENCE ON CYPRUS, AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF MAKARIOS. BASED ON OUR CONVERSATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS, WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT MAINLAND GREEK CONTINGENT, PLUS MAINLAND NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AND UNITS THEY COULD MOBILIZE WOULD BE VERY POWERFUL FACTOR INDEED. IN CASE OF REAL TROUBLE WE THINK OFFICERS COULD AT LEAST ENSURE THAT MANY GUARD UNITS WOULD SIMPLY STAND ASIDE. AND WE HAVE NOTED THAT WHEN THINGS ARE TENSE FACTION-RIDDEN CYPRUS POLICE ELEMENTS TEND TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT MAKING THEIR SYMPATHIES KNOWN. IN SUM, WE WOULD RATE MAINLAND GREEK MILITARY POWER HIGHER THAN NEA/CYP, BUT WE AGREE WITH REFTEL THAT WITH SO MANY ELEMENTS HOLDING THEMSELVES ALOOF TO SEE WHICH WAY CAT JUMPED, GREEKS COULD PROBABLY NOT DEPEND ON "QUICK SURGICAL SUCCESS." WE AGREE ALSO THAT THIS MIGHT BE FACTOR WHICH DETERRED GREEDS FROM RESOLVING FEBRUARY CRISIS BY RESORT TO FORCE.

6. IN THIS CONNECTION, DATT HAS GIVEN US FOLLOWING ESTIMATE OF THE POSITION AS HE SEES IT. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, GREECE CAN COUNT ON ALL THE NATIONAL GUARD UNITS IN THE NICOSIA AREA. THESE ARE MAINLY ARMOR, ARTILLERY, AND RAIDING FORCES UNITS AND 211 INFANTRY BATTALION (GREENLINE WHOSE MEN ARE SCREENED FOR POLITICAL RELIABILITY AT THE TIME OF INDUCTION. LESS RELIABLE

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GUARDSMEN ARE ASSIGNED TO UNITS WHICH ARE DEPLOYED ELSEWHERE, MAINLY AROUND THE TURK CYPRIOT ENCLAVES. THESE UNITS WOULD EITHER NOT BE INVOLVED AT ALL IN A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH MAKARIOS OR AT MOST WOULD PLAY ONLY A MINOR SECURITY ROLE. THE KEY UNITS WOULD SURELY BE RESPONSIVE TO MAINLAND GREEK ORDERS. THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THESE UNITS IS ABOUT 3,000 TO WHICH IS ADDED THE NATIONAL CONTINGENT (ELDYK), GIVING A REACTION FORCE STRENGTH OF ABOUT 4,000. SUCH A FORCE SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF FORCING MAKARIOS TO ACCEPT GREEK DEMANDS OR STEP DOWN WITHOUT HAVING TO SHOOT IT OUT WITH LOYALIST POLICE ELEMENTS OR ARMED BANDS. END OF DATT COMMENT.

7. FINALLY, WE AGREE THAT PERIOD JUST AHEAD LOOKS LIKE ONE OF PAUSE AND CONSOLIDATION, THOUGH UNEXPECTED INCIDENTS ARE ALWAYS POSSIBLE. EARLY RESUMPTION OF LOCAL TALKS IS CLEARLY MOST DESIRABLE. FOR THIS TO HAPPEN, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SECOND STAGE CZECH ARMS ARRANGEMENT PUT INTO EFFECT, AND CYPRUS CABINET CHANGES CONSUMMATED. THESE STEPS WOULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON TURKISH SIDE WHICH, AS FAR AS WE CAN RECALL, HAS NOT YET FORMALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY ACCEPTED SECGEN'S FORMULA FOR NEW TALKS. TURKS AND TURK CYPRIOTS MIGHT STILL INSIST ON FULL UN CUSTODY FOR CZECH ARMS AS MINIMUM CONDITION FOR RESUMING TALKS, AND RESUMPTION MAY THEREFORE NOT COME QUICKLY.

8. ONCE NEW TALKS HAVE BEGUN, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON SKILL WITH WHICH GREEK AND TURKISH "EXPERTS" CAN PRESS THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF SOME TYPE OF COMPROMISE PROPOSAL. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION INDICATING THAT GREEK AND TURKISH GOVTS EVER SOUGHT TO WORK OUT IN DETAIL SOME TYPE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY SOLUTION, SUCH AS CREATION OF A TURKISH CYPRIOT MINISTER FOR LOCAL OR TURKISH COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, ALONG LINES DISCUSSED LAST AUTUMN. WE SUGGEST THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE, SO THAT WITH SKILLFUL COOPERATION OF UN REP A JOINTLY SUPPORTED PROPOSAL COULD BE PRESENTED WITH MAXIMUM EFFECT AT PROPER MOMENT IN INTERCOMMUNAL DISCUSSIONS. WHILE CHANCES FOR SUCCESS ARE NOT HIGH, WE DOUBT THAT ANY ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL WOULD RECEIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION UNTIL A LOCAL AUTONOMY SOLUTION UNDER A MODIFIED CYPRUS CONSTITUTION WERE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED. AS DEPT KNOWS, OUR OWN VIEW IS THAT SUBSEQUENT FALLBACK MIGHT BE ONE BUILDING UPON MODUS VIVENDI CURRENTLY EXISTING BETWEEN TWO COMMUNITIES ON ISLAND.

9. IN FOREGOING PROCESS, US ROLE SHOULD IN OUR VIEW CONTINUE TO BE TO URGE ACCOMMODATION AND MODERATION ON ALL PARTIES AND

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TO MAKE WHAT WE THINK WOULD BE HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS, IN LOW KEY,
AS APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITIES ARISE. JUDGING BY RECORD OF PAST
FEW YEARS, ONE CANNOT BE TOO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF SUCH
INTERCESSION. IF MATTERS DETERIORATE, WE MIGHT BE REQUIRED
RESORT TO MORE STRENUOUS MEASURES AS WE DID IN 1964 AND 1967.
THE TIMING AND NATURE OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN A TRUE CRISIS
SITUATION IN CYPRUS ARE COVERED IN EXISTING POLICY PAPERS.
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INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REP OF CYPRUS AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY INTERVENTION DIRECTED AGAINST IT." THOUGH ADOPTED BY LESS THAN OVERWHELMING VOTE, THIS RESOLUTION HAS BEEN GOC'S CONSISTENT GUIDELINE FOR CYPRUS POLICY AND PROCEDURE IN UN GENERALLY.

4. AS TO MAKARIOS DISARMAMENT STATEMENT, IT MERELY PUTS IN MORE FORMAL WORDS WHAT GOC, WITH TONGUE IN CHEEK, HAS OCCASIONALLY ADVOCATED -- THAT IS, REMOVAL OF THE MAINLAND CONTINGENTS AND DISARMAMENT OF ALL LOCAL FORCES, LOOKING TOWARD EVENTUAL DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND. ONLY REAL NOVELTY IN APRIL 2 STATEMENT IS ITS EXPLOITATION OF INACCURATE VERSION OF PRIMIN ERIM'S REMARKS. MAKARIOS MAY PERHAPS BE EXCUSED FOR USING THIS VERSION SINCE, AS ANKARA TELEGRAMS INDICATE, NO ONE BOTHERED TO CORRECT WIDELY QUOTED VERSION FOR SOME TEN DAYS, OR UNTIL AFTER MAKARIOS, THROUGH ACT OF POLITICAL GAMESMANSHIP, HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF IT.

5. IN SHORT, WE SEE NO INDICATION FROM ROSSIDES LETTER AND DISARMAMENT STATEMENT THAT, AS ATHENS REFTEL STATES, MAKARIOS IS OPENING A NEW PHASE IN HIS STRUGGLE FOR SUPREME CONTROL OF A FULLY SOVEREIGN AND AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS. THAT HAS BEEN THE NAME OF HIS GAME EVER SINCE THE 1960 CYPRUS CONSTITUTION BROKE DOWN IN 1964, AND PROBABLY EVEN EARLIER. NO ONE HERE REGARDS THE ROSSIDES LETTER AND THE MAKARIOS STATEMENT AS ANYTHING MORE THAN FAIRLY ROUTINE REAFFIRMATIONS OF STANDARD CYPRIOT POSITIONS.

6. AS TO OTHER POINTS RAISED IN REFTELS, WE HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS. SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS GIVEN STRONG VERBAL SUPPORT TO MAKARIOS IN AND OUT OF UN; HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANYTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT SOVIET CONDUCT IN CURRENT CRISIS, IT IS SOVIET FOREBEARANCE AND CAUTION IN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO AVOID ACTION THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS SERIOUSLY ROCKING CYPRUS BOAT. CERTAINLY A CYPRUS INITIATIVE IN SECURITY COUNCIL IS POSSIBLE IF MATTERS DETERIORATE FURTHER; APPEAL TO NON-ALIGNED AND COMMUNIST WORLD IS ONE OF GOC WEAPONS IN THE CYPRUS POWER STRUGGLE. ANY EFFECTIVE MOVES SOVITES AND CHICOMS MIGHT TAKE TO PRESERVE CYPRUS INDEPENDENCE WOULD HAVE TO USE INSTRUMENTALITIES WHICH WERE MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN INITIATIVE IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

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7. AMB. TASCA'S POINT IN ATHENS 1935 IS WE THINK QUITE CORRECT; MAKARIOS UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS TO DOMINATE AND ULTIMATELY INTEGRATE TURKISH COMMUNITY, AND TO MOVE FROM FULL INDEPENDENCE, THE ONLY CURRENTLY "FEASIBLE" SOLUTION, AS HE SEES IT, TOWARD EVENTUAL ENOSIS. WHILE HE WOULD NEVER ADMIT IT, I BELIEVE HIS DRIVE FOR POWER IS SUCH THAT HE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY, SOME DAY, OF ASSUMING A POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ROLE IN GREECE. OUR EARLIER DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT WITH DEPT HAS PRODUCED A WIDE RANGE OF OPINION ON THIS POSSIBILITY, AND IT COULD HARDLY BE SAID TO BE A NEAR-TERM EVENTUALITY.

8. I ALSO AGREE WITH AMB TASCA THAT MAKARIOS IS FOLLOWING A POLICY WHICH APPEALS TO SIZABLE SEGMENTS OF GREEK AND CYPRIOT PUBLIC OPINION. THE ARCHBISHOP DOMINATES THE CYPRUS STYLE DEMOCRACY HE RUNS ON THE ISLAND. WHILE IT IS FAR FROM A MODEL OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION, IT LOOKS PRETTY GOOD IN THIS REGION OF THE WORLD, WHERE EVERYTHING IS RELATIVE. COMPARED TO GREECE, CYPRIOTS ENJOY SUBSTANTIAL FREEDOM, AND RECENT EVENTS HAVE TENDED TO EMPHASIZE THE POINT HERE.
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 771

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SUBJECT: CLERIDES SEES HOPE FOR RECONCILIATION WITH GREECE

- 1. SUMMARY: CLERIDES HOPES THAT BY AGREEING TO CABINET CHANGES MAKARIOS CAN INDUCE GREEK GOVT TO SEND AMBASSADOR TO NICOSIA. SUGGESTS PRESIDENT MIGHT STEP DOWN IN 1973 TO ALLOW A SELFLESS REPLACEMENT (READ CLERIDES) TO MAKE NECESSARY COMPROMISES FOR AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT.
- 2. WHEN I SAW CYPRUS HOUSE OF REPS PRESIDENT CLERIDES MARCH 31 FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON, HE TOLD ME THAT MAKARIOS HAD JUST ASKED TO SEE HIM, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL WEEKS. CLERIDES SAID HE BELIEVED MAKARIOS WANTED TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE RESHUFFLE OF CYPRUS COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
- 3. CLERIDES BELIEVES THAT WITH TIGHTER CONTROL OF CZECH ARMS AN IMMEDIATE PROSPECT, STAGE IS SET FOR ADDITIONAL STEPS WHICH MIGHT GIVE SATISFACTION TO GREEK GOVT AND THUS PAVE WAY FOR SUFFICIENT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA TO PERMIT DESPATCH OF A NEW GREEK AMBASSADOR TO CYPRUS. NEXT MOVE, IN CLERIDES OPINION, MUST BE TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CERTAIN CHANGES IN GOC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AS DEMANDED BY GREEKS WITH VIEW TO FORMATION OF "GOVT OF NATIONAL UNITY". CLERIDES THINKS IT

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WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OPERATE A GOVT INCLUDING EXTREME RIGHT-WING ENOSISTS ALONG WITH SUPPORTERS OF INDEPENDENCE AS ONLY FEASIBLE CYPRUS SOLUTION, BUT HE WOULD BE QUITE WILLING TO SEE MINISTERS PARTICULARLY OBNOXIOUS TO GREECE REPLACED ALONG WITH ONE OR TWO OTHER HIGH GOVT OFFICIALS.

4. WHAT CLERIDES HAS IN MIND WOULD BE TRANSFER OF FONMIN KYPRIANOU TO AN AMBASSADORIAL POST, AND RESIGNATION OF PERHAPS TWO OTHER MINISTERS (I ASSUME HE WAS REFERRING TO EDUCATION MINISTER PETRIDES AND FINANCE MINISTER PATSALIDES, BOTH OF WHOM APPEAR TO HAVE AROUSED GREEK IRE.) THESE CHANGES WOULD BE MADE OVER PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS BUT AN INDICATION OF THINGS TO COME WOULD BE GIVEN TO GREEKS IMMEDIATELY. CLERIDES SAYS GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU HAS HINTED THAT IF THIS COURSE WERE TAKEN, MEDIATION COMMITTEE SET UP IN FEBRUARY BY CLERIDES MIGHT BE REACTIVATED AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SEND A NEGOTIATOR TO ATHENS, PRESUMABLY CLERIDES HIMSELF, TO PATCH THINGS UP WITH PRIMIN PAPADOPOULOS.

5. FOREGOING IS WHAT CLERIDES SAYS HE INTENDS TO RECOMMEND TO MAKARIOS. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT WITHOUT SOME RESPONSE TO GREEK GOVT DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF ATHENS AS "NATIONAL CENTER" WHICH SHOULD HAVE PRIMACY IN ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS RELATING TO HELLENISM. CLERIDES SAID HE HOPED THIS ABSTRACT ISSUE MIGHT BE FINESSED IF CYPRUS GOVT WERE REORGANIZED AND IF EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS COULD GET UNDER WAY.

6. THIS GAVE ME OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT THAT UNDERLYING CURRENT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS WAS VERY REAL SENSE OF FRUSTRATION FELT BY BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY BECAUSE OF ARCHBISHOP'S FAILURE, IN 3 1/2 YEARS OF EARLIER INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, TO SHOW SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO MEET DEMANDS OF TURKISH COMMUNITY FOR AUTONOMY AND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS. I WAS NOT IMPLYING THAT TURKISH SIDE WAS NECESSARILY ANY MORE FLEXIBLE, BUT IF NEW INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE SIMPLY TO BE RERUN OF OLD, SAME PRESSURES WHICH HAD LED TO RECENT CRISIS WOULD INEVITABLY RECUR.

7. CLERIDES AGREED. SAID HE RECOGNIZED NEED FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT AS ETHNARCH MAKARIOS SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD TO SIGN

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ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENT WHICH LIKE LONDON-ZURICH TREATIES WOULD EXCLUDE ENOSIS AND PERPETUATE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS. HIS OWN THINKING ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, HE CONTINUED, LED HIM TO CONCLUSION THAT IF SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WERE EVER TO BE REACHED, IT WOULD BE WITH SOMEONE ELSE IN THE PRESIDENCY. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO PROPOSE TO ARCHBISHOP THAT LATTER STATE HE WOULD NOT RUN FOR A NEW TERM IN FEBRUARY 1973, WHEN HIS PRESENT TERM EXPIRES. SOME OTHER LEADER WOULD HAVE TO COME FORWARD AND BE ELECTED AT THAT TIME, IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WOULD BE HIS DUTY TO MAKE THE DISAGREEABLE COMPROMISE REQUIRED FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH THE TURKISH SIDE. IN DOING THIS, THE NEW INCUMBENT WOULD BE SACRIFICING HIS FUTURE POLITICAL CAREER, BUT HE WOULD BE PERFORMING A SERVICE TO GREEKS IN BOTH CYPRUS AND GREECE. IF ARCHBISHOP COULD MOVE ALONG THIS TRACK, INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WOULD PROCEED INCONCLUSIVELY FOR REST OF 1972 AND MARCH TO CONCLUSION SHORTLY AFTER NEW ADMINISTRATION INSTALLED IN EARLY 1973.

8. CLERIDES AGREED TO KEEP ME INFORMED OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ARCHBISHOP.

9. COMMENT: AS FORESHADOWED IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS, CLERIDES CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT HE CAN RESTORE NORMAL RELATIONS WITH GREEK GOVT IF ALLOWED TO DO SO AND THAT HE COULD BRING ABOUT AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT IF THROUGH ASSUMPTION OF PRESIDENCY HE WERE TO HAVE A FREE HAND IN NEGOTIATIONS. ARCHBISHOP HAS ALL ALONG SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE CHANGES IN HIS CABINET IN DUE COURSE, IF NOT REQUIRED TO DO SO UNDER GREEK PRESSURE. HE MIGHT THERE ACQUIESCE IN THIS PORTION OF CLERIDES' SCENARIO. WHAT IS LESS CLEAR IS THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO STEP DOWN IN FEBRUARY 1973. ON CONTRARY, BRIEF CONVERSATION I HAD WITH PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDANT GEORGE PELAGHIAS A FEW DAYS AGO LEFT ME WITH IMPRESSION THAT MAKARIOS MAY BE CONSIDERING SOME NEW PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN FOR USE IN EXPANDED INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.
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SECRET NICOSIA 723

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SUBJECT: CYPRUS: VIEWS OF TASSOS PAPADOPOULOS

REF: NICOSIA 716

1. SUMMARY: FROMER LABOR MINISTER CONFIRMS THAT MAKARIOS' CURRENT INTENTION IS TO RESIGN PRESIDENCY IF BISHOPS INSIST, BUT TIMING IS UNCERTAIN. SPECULATES MAKARIOS WILL BACK HELLENIC MINES DIRECTOR PASCHALIS PASCHALIDES, RATHER THAN CLERIDES AS NEXT PRESIDENT. END SUMMARY:

2. AT A DINNER ON MARCH 24 I ASKED UNIFIED PARTY FLOOR LEADER AND FORMER LABOR MINISTER TASSOS PAPADOPOULOS ABOUT REASONS FOR AND STATUS OF HIS CURRENT JOINT EFFORT WITH CLERIDES PRODUCE AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD RESIGNATION OF MINISTERS. PAPADOPOULOS (WHO HAS A TENDENCY TO EXAGGERATE CENTRALITY OF HIS ROLE IN ANY SITUATION) SAID THIS IDEA HAD BEEN HIS. HE HAD SOLD CLERIDES ON IT AND BOTH HAD THEN PRESENTED IT TO MAKARIOS. OBJECT WAS TO INTRODUCE FLEXIBILITY INTO OTHERWISE LOCKED-IN SITUATION. IF ALL MINISTERS RESIGNED VOLUNTARILY, MAKARIOS WOULD HAVE A FREE HAND TO PICK A NEW CABINET WITH NO LOSS OF FACE.

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3. PAPADOPOULOS SAID HE HAD ALSO FELT THIS MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO CLERIDES, WHO UNFORTUNATELY BEING REGARDED AS WORKING WITH GREECE THIS SITUATION BECAUSE OF AMBITION REPLACE MAKARIOS. THEIR JOINT GAMBIT IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD LEAVE MAKARIOS IN POWER, WITH A NEW CABINET IN WHICH CLERIDES WOULD BE BUT ONE (ALTHOUGH AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR, THE MOST IMPORTANT) OF SEVERAL NEW FACES. IN THAT CASE, THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS WORKING WITH GREECE TO GET MAKARIOS' JOB WOULD BE SOFTENED AND EVENTUALLY FORGOTTEN. GOG NEITHER INFORMED NOR INVOLVED IN THE CLERIDES-PAPADOPOULOS INITIATIVE. (THIS WOULD SEEM CORROBORATED BY GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU'S IGNORANCE ON THIS SCORE WHEN I SAW HIM EARLIER IN DAY - SEPTTEL).
4. PAPADOPOULOS SAID THAT IN CLERIDES' CONTINUING SOUNDINGS OF MINISTERS ALL NOW IN LINE ON WILLINGNESS TENDER RESIGNATION IF OTHERS DO, EXCEPT KOMODROMOS. PAPADOPOULOS ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT PROSPECTS FOR HIS INITIATIVE RE CABINET NOT GOOD, PARTICULARLY SINCE IDEA PROBABLY DOES NOT REALLY APPEAL TO MAKARIOS.
5. PAPADOPOULOS EXPECTED AS DOES EVERYONE ELSE, THAT BISHOPS WILL PERSIST IN DEMANDING MAKARIOS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT ON BASIS HIS MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH MAKARIOS HE ESTIMATES IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN PRESIDENT WILL RESIGN IF CONFRONTED BY RENEWED REQUEST FROM BISHOPS. TIMING, HOWEVER, IS UNCERTAIN. MAKARIOS IS REFLECTING ON TWO POSSIBILITIES: REMAINING IN OFFICE FOR FURTHER PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS BEFORE RESIGNING; ANNOUNCING HIS INTENTION RESIGN WHEN HIS CURRENT PRESIDENTIAL TERM EXPIRES IN FEBRUARY 1973.
6. AS REGARDS A SUCCESSOR IF AND WHEN MAKARIOS RESIGNS, PAPADOPOULOS FELT ARCHBISHOP MORE LIKELY THROW HIS INFLUENCE BEHIND PASCHALIS PASCHALIDES THAN CLERIDES.
7. AT CONCLUSION OF OUR CONVERSATION, PAPADOPOULOS REPEATED A THEME WE ARE HEARING EVER MORE OPENLY FROM CLERIDES THOSE AROUND CLERIDES: MAKARIOS HAS REMARKABLE ABILITIES

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 NICOSI 00723 251108Z

IN SOME FIELDS AND HAS MADE A CONTRIBUTION NO OTHER MAN
COULD HAVE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF CYPRUS AS AN INDEPENDENT
STATE. WITH ALL HIS QUALITIES, HOWEVER, TIME HAS COME
FOR HIM TO STEP ASIDE, GIVING WAY TO SOMEONE WITH A
MORE MODERN-MINDED, LESS INERTIAL APPROACH TO GOVERN-
MENT. INCLUDED IN THE CHANGEOVER MUST BE A SOLUTION OF
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM TO FREE CYPRUS FROM THIS ONCE AND
FOR ALL SO THAT IT CAN FULFILL ITS PROMISE AS A
DEMOCRACY FOSTERING RAPID SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

8. COMMENT: PAPADOPOULOS' READING OF SITUATION TENDS
BEAR OUT THAT GIVEN US EARLIER BY VENIAMIN (REFTEL).
REFERENCE TO PASCHALIDES IS INTRIGUING. PASCHALIDES
IS VERY MUCH A SILENT STRONG MAN ON THE CYPRUS SCENE.
AS DIRECTOR OF HELLENIC MINES, WHICH IS IN FACT A
VERY LARGE HOLDING COMPANY WITH A VARIETY OF INTERESTS,
HE HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE A TOUGH-MINDED, SOMEWHAT INSCRUTABLE
EXECUTIVE. HE IS ALSO GENERALLY REGARDED AS ARCHBISHOP'S
BUSINESS MANAGER. IN ADDITION HIS EXECUTIVE ABILITIES, HOWEVER, HE
ALSO HAS POLITICAL ACUITY. IN MANY WAYS HE WOULD BE A
GOOD NO-NONSENSE PRESIDENT. IN BACKING HIM, WERE
THIS TO COME TO PASS, MAKARIOS WOULD BE NEATLY GETTING BACK AT
REVENGE ON CLERIDES FOR HAVING, AS HE IMAGINES, DISLOYALLY
TRAFFICKED WITH GREECE. GP-3.
CRAWFORD

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 448

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00722 250915Z

22
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

2

R 250815Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5920
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION NATO
USDOCOSOUTH
EUCOM

014402
SITUATION ROOM
72 MAR 25 AM 11 49

SECRET NICOSIA 722

EXDIS

SUBJ: CYPRUS: CONVERSATION WITH GREEK CHARGE

1. I CALLED ON GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU MARCH 24 FOLLOWING HIS RETURN PREVIOUS DAY FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS IN ATHENS.
2. ZAPHIRIOU IS UNDERSTANDABLY BEING EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS. HIS POSITION IS NOT AN ENVIABLE ONE AND HE IS CLEARLY FOLLOWING ORDERS AND KEEPING HIS MOUTH SHUT. HE DID, HOWEVER, PROVIDE FOLLOWING, WHICH WAS EVIDENTLY THE LINE FOR PUBLIC USE WHICH HE HAD BEEN GIVEN IN ATHENS.
3. GREECE IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER MAKARIOS STAYS OR GOES. IT CONTINUES TO INSIST UPON INSTALLATION OF A GOVT IN CYPRUS WHICH WILL COOPERATE FULLY WITH ATHENS, IN DEEDS AS WELL AS WORDS, SETTING ASIDE THE DEVIOSNESS AND DECEITS THAT HAVE TOO OFTEN CHARACTERIZED ITS PAST PERFORMANCE. BISHOPS' REQUEST FOR MAKARIOS' RESIGNATION FROM PRESIDENCY IS AN ECCELESIASTIC MATTER OF NO CONCERN TO GOG.
4. ON THE LATTER POINT, ZAPHIRIOU SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN

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ANY OF THE BISHOPS SINCE HIS INTRODUCTORY CALLS AND WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO DO SO. STORIES OF HIS SECRET MEETINGS WITH THEM, OF CARRYING MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH, ETC., WERE NONSENSE. ZAPHIRIOU COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT BISHOPS WERE RELIABLE REPORTED TO BE "QUITE EMOTIONAL" ABOUT NEED FOR ARCHBISHOP'S RESIGNATION AND IT APPEARED LIKELY THEY WOULD INSIST. NEVERTHELESS, IT NOTED THAT THEY HAD DELAYED IN REPLYING TO MAKARIOS AND THIS COULD CONCEIVABLE MEAN THEY TRYING TO WORK SOME NUANCE INTO THEIR EXPECTED LETTER TO HIM WHICH MIGHT PERMIT SOME GRACE PERIOD OR DISCUSSION. COMMENT: FLAVOR OF THIS WAS THAT GREECE WOULD IN NO WAY REDUCE ITS DEMANDS ON MAKARIOS TO CLEANSE HIS GOVT AND SUBORDINATE HIS POLICIES TO ATHENS, AND IN RELYING ON THE THRUST THROUGH THE BISHOPS TO PRODUCE COMPLIANCE OR RESIGNATION.

5. GREEK EMBASSY AS SUCH IS OBVIOUSLY VERY MUCH ISOLATED. AS INDICATED SEPTEL, ZAPHIRIOU TOTALLY UNAWARE THAT ARCHBISHOP'S ASSOCIATES HAVE BEEN POINTING OUT ALL OVER TOWN THAT FINAL PHRASE OF HIS MARCH 19 LETTER TO BISHOPS WAS NOT A PROMISE TO RESIGN. ALSO, WHEN I ASKED FOR HIS OPINION OF CLERIDES' CURRENT EFFORT TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR MAKARIOS TO COMPLY WITH GREEK DEMAND BY ROUNDING UP CABINET RESIGNATIONS, ZAPHIRIOU REPLIED WITH APPARENT SINCERITY THAT HE COMPLETELY UNINFORMED. COMMENT: SINCE MOST ASPECTS OF GOG OPERATION AGAINST MAKARIOS WOULD SEEM TO BE HANDLED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS AND SINCE ZAPHIRIOU HAD BEEN AWAY PART OF THE WEEK, THIS COULD BE TRUE.

5. ZAPHIRIOU DID ACKNOWLEDGE INDIRECTLY A ROLE IN HAVING ARRANGED FOR ARCHBISHOP TOTAFV#THE SALUTE AT GREEK EMBASSY AT TODAY'S MARCH-PAST ON OCCASION OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY. IT WOULD SEEM HE BROUGHT WORD BACK FROM ATHENS THAT MARCH 25 COMMEMORATES A MOMENTOUS EVENT IN GREEK HISTORY, DIVORCED FROM CURRENT POLITICS. AFTER ZAPHIRIOU'S RETURN ARCHBISHOP DECIDED ALLOW PARADE TO PASS GREEK EMB AND ACCEPTED ZAPHIRIOU'S INVITATION GIVEN HIM IN THE STANDS.GP-3.

CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OC/T: #AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 741

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00721 241630Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

R 241550Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5919
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 721

EXDIS

NOFORM

SUBJ: CYPRUS: KYPRIANOU AND PETRIDES REPORTEDLY TELL
CLERIDES THEY WOULD RESIGN, KOMODROMOS HOLDS OUT

REF: NKI-639

1. STELIOS TEHOCHARIDES, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE AND CLOSE FRIEND OF CLERIDES, TOLD ACTING
DCM AT DINNER MARCH 23 THAT CLERIDES HAD SPENT WEEK
SOLICITING CABINET MINISTERS VOLUNTARILY TO RESIGN IN
ORDER OPEN DOOR TO MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE.
BOTH FONMIN KYPRIANOU AND MINEUCATION PETRIDES HAD
FINALLY AGREED, ALBEIT WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE, ON CONDI-
TION THAT DECISION TO RESIGN WAS UNANIMOUS. LONE HOLD-
OUT WAS MININT KOMODROMOS.

2. COMMENT: EVEN IF CLERIDES SHOULD SECURE THE
RESIGNATIONS OF THE WHOLE CABINET, WE HAVE SOME DOUBT
WHETHER MAKARIOS WOULD GO ALONG WITH
PLAN. IT IS NOT HIS STYLE TO ALLOW THE SITUATION TO
BE MANAGED BY SOMEONE ELSE -- PARTICULARLY CLERIDES.
HE IS MORE LIKELY, WE THINK, EITHER TO CONTINUE DEFY
GREECE OR RESIGN. GP-3
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SECRET 776

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00716 241613Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

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02
172 MAR 25 AM 9 50

R 241515Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5914
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION UN
USMISSION NATO
USDOCOSOUTH
EUCOM

S E C R E T NICOSIA 716

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - TOUR D'HORIZON WITH VENIAMIN

1. SUMMARY. FONOFF DIR GEN VENIAMIN UNCONCERNED AT NIXON-ERIM JOINT STATEMENTS REFERENCE TO TREATIES. VENIAMIN EXPECTS BISHOPS WILL REITERATE REQUEST THAT MAKARIOS RESIGN AS PRESIDENT AND THINKS IT "90PC CERTAIN" ARCHBISHOP WILL THEN ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION RESIGN AFTER RPT AFTER PRESIDING OVER ELECTIONS IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE. VENIAMIN BELIEVES PAPADOPOULOS TOO FAR COMMITTED TO HIS EFFORT REMOVE MAKARIOS TO DEFLECT NOW, EVEN IF THIS ENTAILS USE OF FORCE.

2. I CALLED ON VENIAMIN MARCH 23 TO PROVIDE TEXT OF CYPRUS PORTION NIXON-ERIM MARCH 22 JOINT STATEMENT (STATE 49213). I EXPLAINED THAT LANGUAGE ON TREATIES WAS COMPARABLE THAT USED IN 1967. AS DEPT HAD INFORMED ROSSIDES AND NICOLAIDES, USG STRESSED PEACEFUL NEGOTIATION AND TREATIES COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS. VENIAMIN SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD FROM EITHER

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ROSSIDES OR NICOLAIDES BUT IN ANY CASE USG REFERENCE TO TREATIES NOT A MATTER OF CONCERN.

3. DISCUSSING PROBABLE NEXT STEPS IN ATHENS-NICOSIA CONFRONTATION, VENIAMIN SAID THAT, PRODDED BY GREECE, BISHOPS ALMOST CERTAIN TO REITERATE THEIR REQUEST FOR MAKARIOS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT. IF THEY DO SO, MAKARIOS PRESENT DISPOSITION IS TO ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION RESIGN AFTER PRESIDING OVER PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN WHICH HE WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE. REASON FOR NOT RESIGNING BEFORE ELECTIONS IS HIS FEAR GREECE WOULD INTERVENE TO PREVENT THEIR BEING HELD: MAINLAND GREEKS HAD NOT HAD PRIVILEGE OF ELECTIONS IN RECENT YEARS.

4. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENTS MARCH 13 REPLY TO GOG FEB 11 REQUESTS, HIS MARCH 19 REPLY TO MARCH 2 SYNOD REQUEST, AND OTHER SKILLFUL PREPARATIONS LEFT HIM IN RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION TO DEFY PRESSURES ON HIM, VENIAMIN AGREED. HE REMARKED THAT ARCHBISHOPS THINKING HAS GONE IN CYCLES. FOR A FORTNIGHT AFTER FEB 11 HE HAD BEEN INCLINED TOWARD RESIGNATION. THEN HIS MOOD SHIFTED TO COMBATIVENESS. NOW, WHILE HE HAS LAID ALL THE NECESSARY GROUNDWORK TO KEEP OPEN THE OPTION OF RESISTANCE, HE IS 90PC DISPOSED TO RESIGN, 10PC INCLINED TO RESIST. WITH GREECE UNRELENTING IN ITS DEMAND FOR SUBSERVIENCE, WITH BISHOPS ALIGNED AGAINST HIM AT ATHENS IMPORTUNING, AND WITH TURKEY WAITING IN THE WINGS WITH POLITICAL DEMANDS, IN TERMS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, THAT HE CANNOT MEET, ARCHBISHOP FEELS ODDS AGAINST HIM ARE TOO GREAT.

5. VENIAMIN SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW PAPADOPOULOS IS NOW TOO FAR COMMITTED IN HIS EFFORT TO REMOVE MAKARIOS TO DEFLECT. IF HE FAILS CARRY THROUGH THE EFFORT HE HAS BEGUN, HIS POSITION IN GREECE COULD IN LONGER TERM BE UNDONE. IT PROBABLE, THEREFORE, HE W

L PRESS ON, USING FORCE IF NECESSARY AND JUSTIFYING INTERVENTION ON SOME PRETEXT PROVIDED BY PRO-MAKARIOS, ANTI-MAKARIOS (GRIVAS) OR RIGHT LEFT CLASHES.

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6. VENIAMIN PREDICTED THAT EVEN IF GREECE SUCCEEDED IN REMOVING MAKARIOS BY PRESENT NON VIOLENT PRESSURES OR USE OF FORCE, IT WOULD QUICKLY RUN INTO REAL DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING CYPRUS. HAS NOW SHOWN BZ WIDESPREAD HOSTILITY DIRECTED AT CLERIDES BECAUSE OF BELIAT THAT HE IS WORKING WITH GREECE, RESENTMENT AT GOG HIGH-HANDEDNESS WOULD LEAD ENOUGH CYPRIOTS TO ACTIVE RESISTANCE TO CREATE CHRONIC INSTABILITY WITH LIKELIHOOD OF SPILL OVER INTO INTERCOMMUNAL ARENA. AND IF THIS BROUGHT TURKEY IN RUSSIA WOULD BE IN TOO, QUITE POSSIBLY IN MILITARY SENSE. (COMMENT: VENIAMIN WAS EMOTIONAL AND RATHER THREATENING AT THIS POINT IN CONVERSATION. I DID NOT FEEL HE WAS REFLECTING ANY FIRM UNDERSTANDING WITH SOVIETS BUT, RATHER, HIS HOPES AS TO HOW THEY WOULD ACT9)

7. VENIAMIN DID NOT FEEL THAT CYPRUS POLICY FIGURED IN ANY IMPORTANT WAY IN PAPADOPOULOS DISMISSAL OF ZOITAKIS.

8. IN RESPONSE MY NON-SPECIFIC QUESTION ON STATUS UNFICYP GOC NEGOTIATIONS FOR TIGHTER CONTROL OF CZECH WEAPONS, VENIAMIN SAID VAGUELY PAPER HAD GONE FORWARD TO ARCHBISHOP FOR DECISION. VENIAMIN HIMSELF OPPOSED TO FURTHER CONTROLS ON GROUNDS SOVEREIGN GOC HAS NO OBLIGATION ACCOMMODATE TURKS, BUT ARCHBISTOP UNFORTUNATELY INCLINED BE GENEROUS.

9. VENIAMIN INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD BEEN SCHEDULED LEAVE MARCH 25 FOR TWO WEEK VISIT TO JAPAN (OVVICIAL) AND HONG KONG (VACATION), BUT THIS HAD BEEN CANCELED AT LAST MINUTE ON ORDERS OF PRESIDENT WHO FELT HE SHOULD NOT LEAVE COUNTRZ AT THIS TIME.

10. RE ARCHBISHOPS DISPOSITION TO RESIGN, IT CERTAINLY SEEMED THAT VENIAMIN WAS REPORTING -- SADLY -- WHAT HE FELT TO BE THE CASE. HOWEVER, WE WONDER IF MAKARIOS HAS IN FACT MADE UP HIS MIND TO 90/100 DEGREE INDICATED. AT OTHER TIMES SINCE FEB 11 HE HAE TALKED RESIGNATION TO TO LAY A FALSE SCENT AND BUY MORE TIME. GP-3 CRAWFORD

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 081

W/A
MAR 22 AM 8:17
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2/3

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00684 211650Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

110827

R 211540Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5901
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKRA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION UN
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T NICOSIA 684

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR POPPER

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - PROSPECTS FRO PROGRESS TOWARD RESUMED
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

1. SUMMARY: SINCE ALL CONCERNED USG ELEMENTS SEEM IN ACCORD
RE DESIRABILITY OF MOVING FROM PRESENT STAGE OF GOG-MAKARIOS
CONFRONTATION TO POINT WHERE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS CAN BE
RESUMED, WE EXAMINE QUESTION OF WHOSE TURN IT IS TO MOVE.

2. MAKARIOS HAS NOW REPLIED TO GREEK DEMANDS OF FEB 11.
MARCH 13 REPLY WAS ALONG EXPECTED LINES. MAKARIOS HAS COM-
PROMISED ON ARMS AND INDICATED WILLINGNESS MAKE CERTAIN
CABINET CHANGES. HE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ATHENS TO BE CENTER
OF HELLENISM. PALAMAS EVIDENTLY DOES NOT FAULT MAKARIOS
REPLY IN THESE RESPECTS (PALAMAS CONVERSATION WITH BRITISH
AMBASSADOR -- LONDON 2479).

3. MAKARIOS HAS, HOWEVER, HELD FIRM AGAINST BLANKET DEMAND
FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ATHENS DIRECTIVES ON MATTERS RELATING
TO CYPRUS PROBLEM, EVIDENTLY FEELING THAT
COMPLIANCE IN THIS RESPECT WOULD STRIP HIM OF HIS
PREROGATIVES AS DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED CHIEF OF STATE.

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4. IF GREECE WERE INTERESTED IN MOVING PROMPTLY TO RESUMED TALKS, IT COULD CLAIM TO HAVE GOTTEN MUCH OF WHAT IT WANTED FROM INITIATIVE LAUNCHED FEB 11. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, BURDEN OF PALAMAS REMARKS TO BRITISH AMB AND GOG REPLY TO MAKARIOS ON MARCH 16 WOULD SEEM TO RULE OUT COMPROMISE. IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE GREECE THE PARTY WHOSE ATTITUDE AND POLICIES ARE CURRENTLY HOLDING UP (#)

TURKISH CYPRIOTS (NICOSIA 659, 678) NOW LOOM AS AN ADDITIONAL LARGE OBSTACLE UNLESS THEY CAN BE SATISFIED ON ARMS CUSTODY.

5. WE OFFER ONE COMMENT ON PARA 3 ATHENS 1526. IF, AS EMBASSY ATHENS POINTS OUT, MAKARIOS IS MANEUVERING TO KEEP CURRENT DISPUTE WITHIN FRAMEWORK SERVING HIS OWN INTERESTS, THIS WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE BECAUSE HE OPPOSES RESUMPTION OF INTERCOMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT BECAUSE HE IS TRYING AGAINST ODDS TO PROTECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE CYPRIOT STATE.

6. FOREGOING IS IN A SENSE ACADEMIC SINCE GREECE APPARENTLY DETERMINED PRESS ON AGAINST MAKARIOS AND NEXT ACT IN ITS INITIATIVE, FURTHER MEETING OF HOLY SYNOD TO CONSIDER MAKARIOS REPLY TO REQUEST HE RESIGN PRESIDENCY, IS SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 22. IN THIS REGARD, PRESS REPORTS THAT PALAMAS WAS IN TOUCH WITH GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU BY TELEPHONE FOLLOWING MARCH 20 MEETING ON CYPRUS CHAIRED BY PAPAPOPOULOS, AND ZAPHIRIOU SAW BISHOP ANTHIMOS SAME EVENING. ZAPHIRIOU EVIDENTLY RETURNED TO ATHENS MORNING MARCH 21.

GP-3
CRAWFORD

NOTE BY OC/T: NICOSIA 684. (#) OMISSION IN PARA 4. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 930

172
14 AM 11 90
STATE HOUSE
STATION 1004

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00614 140912Z

21
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

053488

P R 140840Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5862
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION UN PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO
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EUCOM

SECRET NICOSIA 614

EXDIS

SUBJECT: UNFICYP-GOC AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS

1. UNFICYP'S SENIOR POLITICAL ADVISER, JOHN MILES, MAR 13 PROVIDED US AND TURKISH EMBASSY SEPARATELY WITH RUN-DOWN ON MAR 10 AGREEMENT BETWEEN GOC AND UNFICYP CONCERNING CZECH ARMS. ON ALL ESSENTIAL POINTS, BRIEFING GIVEN US DUPLICATED THAT PROVIDED EARLIER BY A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE (NICOSIA 599). ACCORDINGLY, NOFORN STRICTURE REGARDING SUBSTANTIVE PORTIONS OF AGREEMENT MAY BE REMOVED. UNFICYP'S POSSESSION OF PURPORTED SALES CONTRACT, AND FACT IT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO EMBASSY, REMAINS NOFORN.

2. SHORTLY AFTER MILES BRIEFING OF TURKISH EMBASSY, LATTER SENT COUNSELOR TUNABAS TO US IN HOPE THAT WE COULD PROVIDE CLARIFICATION ON SOME POINTS OF CONFUSION. FROM TUNABAS REVIEW IT WAS OBVIOUS TURKISH EMBASSY HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN AND/OR HAD FAILED PERCEIVE RESPECTS IN WHICH MAR 10 AGREEMENT IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER 1967 PROCEDURE. KNOWING THAT GOT AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO REJECT AS UNSATISFACTORY ANYTHING SHORT OF FULL UNFICYP CUSTODY, WE TRIED HARD TO SHOW TUNABAS WHEREIN PRESENT AGREEMENT

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

092652

O P 181105Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5889
USMISSION UN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T NICOSIA 661

EXDIS
NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - CZECH ARMS

REF: ATHENS 1520, NICOSIA 645, 639

1. WE WOULD REMIND ADDRESSEES THAT ALL INFORMATION CONCERNING EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN OSORIO-TAFALL AND GOC FONMIN KYPRIANOU MUST BE HELD AS NOFORN, IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD FUTURE UTILITY OF SOURCE.
2. WE SUGGEST PROPER COURSE IS TO WORK ENTIRELY FROM TEXT OF PUBLISHED UNSYG CZECH ARMS REPORT AS BASIS FOR STRENGTHENING ARMS AGREEMENT. REPORT CONTAINS KEY SENTENCE READING "IT WAS FURTHER MADE CLEAR THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE REGARDED AS PROVISIONAL AND WOULD NOT PRECLUDE A SUBSEQUENT IMPROVED ARRANGEMENT."
3. I ASKED UNSYG SPEC REP OSORIO TAFALL HOW UNSYG REPORT HAD BEEN RECEIVED. HE SAID HE HAD HAD A DIFFICULT SESSION WITH TCPA LEADERS KUCHUK AND DENKTASH MARCH 17, BUT THAT IN THE END HE THOUGHT HE HAD SOFTENED THEM BY STRESSING THAT REAL POSSIBILITY EXISTED FOR IMPROVING ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENT.

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4. OSORIO TOLD ME HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE CONCLUDED. AFTER SOME PROBING HE DISCLOSED THAT BASIS OF HIS HOPEFULNESS WAS CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH UK HIGH COMMISSIONER EDMONDS. LATTER SAW MAKARIOS MARCH 17. ARCH-BISHOP EVIDENTLY TOOK LINE THAT QUESTION OF CZECH ARMS WAS NO LONGER IMPORTANT, AND THAT CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE TIGHTENED. WE LEARNED FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT A SIMILAR GENERAL STATEMENT WAS MADE TO UNFICYP BY FONOFF DIRGEN VEN-IAMIN, WITH WHOM SPECIFICS NOW BEING DISCUSSED.

5. AT SAME TIME, OSORIO TOLD ME ATHENS ATTITUDE TOWARD PRESENT ARRANGEMENT HAD HARDENED. THIS APPEARS TO REPRESENT CHANGE IN GREEK THINKING: ACCORDING TO BRITISH SOURCES (LONDON 3231) WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT GREEK UNDEL HAD WELCOMED ARMS AGREEMENT. THIS CORROBORATED BY USUN 905. CAS INFO INDICATES GUG WILL ACCEPT MY ARRANGEMENT APPROVED BY UN.

6. SINCE UN IS ACTIVELY NEGOTIATING WITH CYPRUS GOVT AND SEEMS OPTIMISTIC, WE THINK BALL SHOULD BE LEFT IN THEIR HANDS FOR TIME BEING. CONTRARY TO UN SECRETARIAT VIEW (USUN 988) WE THINK THERE IS CHANCE FOR REAL IMPROVEMENT AND IT WOULD BE PITY IF OSORIO WERE REINED IN BY NEW YORK. WE AGREE USG VIEW ON THIS SCORE SHOULD BE EXPRESSED TO SYG. WE WILL FOLLOW NEGOTIATIONS HERE ON THIS MATTER CLOSELY.
POPPER

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 934

MAR 17 AM 11:40
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PAGE 01 NICOSI 00613 140914Z

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

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140805Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5861
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS

SECRET NICOSIA 613

EXDIS

OFORN

SUBJECT: NKA 2173 ON "PRESIDENT MAKARIOS' CONTINUING RELIANCE ON LYSSARIDES"

• PARA 1.A OF REF NKA TO EFFECT MAKARIOS INSTRUCTED LYSSARIDES ARRANGE FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO GIVE HOM VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IS NOT BORNE OUT BY FACTS, OR IS IT PALUSIBLE.

• AS REPORTED NICOSIA 518, MARCH 3 RESOLUTION CALLING ON MAKARIOS TO CONTINUE AS PRESIDENT WAS SUBMITTED BY UNIFIED PARTY, PROGRESSIVE FRONT AND INDEPENDENTS (I.W., COALITION OF NON-COMMUNIST MR'S NOT INCLUDING LYSSARIDES' EDEK PARTY). RESOLUTION WAS PATTERNED AFTER ONE ADOPTED BY REPRESENTATIVE OF RIGHT-WING INTEREST GROUPS AND NON-COMMUNIST DEPUTIES EARLIER IN DAY. PROCEDURE OF HAVING RIGHT TAKE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE RESOLUTION TO PARLIAMENT (WHICH LEFT THEN SUPPORTED) WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED EMPHASIZE TO GREECE NON-COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR MAKARIOS AGAINST GREEK PRESSURE. IDEA, WE UNDERSTAND, WAS CLERIDES'. IN ANY CASE WE FINE IT INCONCEIVABLE THAT MAKARIOS WOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO HOUSE THROUGH LYSSARIDES SINCE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES EFFECT WOULD BE TO ALIENATE SERIOUSLY RIGHT-WING PARLIAMENTARIANS. MOREOVER, CLERIDES IS LAST MAN TO TAKE ORDERS FROM (OR BY WAY OF) LYSSARIDES. GP-3.
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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5852
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 599

EXDIS

NOFORN

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CZECH ARMS

1. SUMMARY: GOC AND UN HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS. DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR UNFICYP CUSTODY BUT IS MORE FORMAL AND CONSIDERABLY TIGHTER THAN 1967 ARRANGEMENTS. THIS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR GOT TO SWALLOW WITHOUT EXCESSIVE PROTEST.

2. CONFIDENTIAL UNFICYP SOURCE ADVISES EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCLUDED MORNING MARCH 10 BETWEEN GOC AND UNFICYP ACTING FOR UNSYG COVERING CZECH ARMS IMPORTED INTO CYPRUS LATE JAN 1972.

2. MAKARIOS REFUSED ACCEPT IDEA OF UNFICYP CUSTODY AT THIS TIME IMPLYING TO OSORIO THAT REASON FOR TRANSACTION -- SUSPECT LOYALTY OF CYPRUS FORCES UNDER GREEK MAINLAND OFFICERS -- PRECLUDES THIS PARTICULARLY AS LONG AS GRIVAS REMAINS ON ISLAND. MAKARIOS DID, HOWEVER, ACCEPT AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONSTITUTING MORE FORMAL AGREEMENT THAN THAT REACHED IN FEB 1967 AND PROVIDING FOR MUCH TIGHTER UNFICYP CONTROL THAN IT HAS HAD OVER FIRST CZECH SHIPMENT.

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4. SPECIFICALLY: (A) UNFICYP MAY INSPECT WITHOUT WARNING AND AT ANY FREQUENCY; (B) CHIEF OF STAFF AS WELL AS FORCE COMMANDER AND ONE ATTENDANT OFFICER ARE AUTHORIZED INSPECT TOGETHER OR INDIVIDUALLY (ONLY FORCE COMMANDER HAD INSPECTION ROLE UNDER 1967 AGREEMENT); (C) GOC AGREES TO NO DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT ADVICE TO UNFICYP; (D) POSSIBILITY OF INSPECTION BEING CONVERTED INTO A DIFFERENT ARRANGEMENT AT LATER DATE IS NOTED (THIS IS TO SUGGEST LIKELIHOOD OF MOVE TO FULL UNFICYP CUSTODY AT SUCH TIME AS GRIVAS LEAVES CYPRUS); (E) GOC STATES ALL RPT ALL ARMS IN RECENT CONTRACT ARE TO BE AVAILABLE FOR UNFICYP INSPECTION. WE UNDERSTAND (E) INCLUDED AT UNFICYP'S INSISTENCE TO COVER EVENTUALITY OF SOMEONE DISCOVERING ADDITIONAL ARMS THAT ARRIVED WITH SHIPMENT BUT WHICH ARE NOT SHOWN IN ALLEGEDLY COMPLETE LIST GIVEN UNFICYP BY GOC.

5. UNFICYP HAS BEEN GIVEN COPY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN GOC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (BUYER) AND A SELLER WHOSE NAME DELETED. ARMS LIST IS APPENDED TO THAT CONTRACT WHICH IS DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1971 AND IS SHOWN AS HAVING BEEN CONCLUDED IN NICOSIA. CONTRACT STATES TOTAL VALUE OF TRANSACTION IS POUNDS STERLING 582,705.

6. UNFICYP IS HOPEFUL THAT EVEN THOUGH AGREEMENT FALLS SHORT OF UNFICYP CUSTODY, AS DEMANDED BY GOW, IT WILL BE SEEN IN ANKARA AS MAXIMUM THAT COULD BE OBTAINED AT THIS TIME AND AS ACCEPTABLE SINCE IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY TIGHTER THAN 1967 ARRANGEMENT. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT, IN ADDITION, ARMS ARE EFFECTIVELY UNDER SCRUTINY OF MAINLAND OFFICERS WITH NATIONAL GUARD SINCE LATTER COHABIT ATHALASSA COMPOUND WITH CYPOL.

7. OSORIO-TAFALL HAS INFORMED ME HE IS TEMPORARILY EMBARGOED FROM GIVING US DETAILS ON ARMS AGREEMENT SINCE UNSYG WISHES ANNOUNCE IN NEW YORK IN A DAY OR TWO OR ALTERNATIVELY GOC MAY ANNOUNCE. PENDING ANNOUNCEMENT, ALL FOREGOING DETAILS MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY PROTECTED AS NOFORN.

6. TEXT OF ARMS CONTRACT AND ATTACHED LIST BEING POUCHED NEA/CYPR. GP-3.
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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5847
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 593

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: END OF ROUND TWO

1. SUMMARY: WE THINK ROUND TWO IN GREEK GOVT'S CONFRONTATION WITH MAKARIOS HAS EFFECTIVELY COME TO AN END. ROUND THREE COULD, THOUGH IT NEED NOT NECESSARILY, INVOLVE VIOLENCE.

2. FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, CYPRUS EVENTS SINCE PRESENTATION OF GREEK DEMANDS TO MAKARIOS ON FEB 11 CAN BE CONSIDERED TO FALL INTO PHASES. FIRST BEGAN WITH PRESENTATION OF GREEK NOTE, AND WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MAKARIOS' ADOPTION OF POSTURE

OF BLAND IMMOBILITY IN FACE OF GREEK DEMANDS, COUPLED WITH ASSIDUOUS CULTIVATION OF POPULAR SUPPORT AGAINST ATHENS. SECOND ROUND WAS INTRODUCED BY MARCH 2 ACTION OF HOLY SYNOD, INSTIGATED BY ATHENS, REQUESTING ARCHBISHOP'S RESIGNATION. THIS WAS FOLLOWED, ON MARCH 3, BY GOG'S DEMAND, SUBMITTED TO MAKARIOS BY GREEK CHARGE THROUGH CLERIDES THAT MAKARIOS IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT GREECE'S FEB 11 CONDITIONS.

3. AS OF MARCH 10, OUR FEELING IS THAT ROUND TWO IS NOW ESSENTIALLY OVER. WE KNOW, AND CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT GREEKS

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DO AS WELL, THAT MAKARIOS' WRITTEN REPLY TO FEB 11 DEMANDS, WHEN IT IS DELIVERED, WILL SHOW HIM UNYIELDING ON ESSENTIALS RELATING TO SOVEREIGNTY OF CYPRUS AND PREROGATIVES OF HIS OFFICE. WE EXPECT THAT WITHIN NEXT DAY OR TWO MAKARIOS AND UNFICYP WILL HAVE CONCLUDED AND PUBLISHED A REASONABLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON CZECH ARMS -- NOT GOING AS FAR AS TO PROVIDE FOR UNFICYP CUSTODY BUT NONTHELESS AN IMPROVED AND TIGHTER VERSION OF 1967 ARRANGEMENT FOR INSPECTION. (SEPTEL.) REVELATION THROUGH NEWS MEDIA THAT GOG REP GEN HARALAMBOPOULOS CONSPIRED WITH CYPRIOTS TO IMPORT ARMS AND THEN DENY KNOWLEDGE OF DEAL IS TELLING BLOW AT CONFIDENCE OF TURKISH GOVT IN GREECE.

4. ARCHBISHOP'S PROBABLE TACTIC IN DEALING WITH HOLY SYNOD'S REQUEST IS ALSO NOW COMING INTO FOCUS. HIS APPROACH LIKELY BE TWO-FOLD. WITH REQUEST ITSELF, HE WILL TEMPORIZE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THERE MAY, IN CANON LAW, BE GROUNDS FOR DEBATE ON PROPRIETY OF HOLDING A PRESIDENTIAL AS WELL AS ECCLESIASTIC OFFICE, BUT THAT FOR HIM TO RESIGN AS "SUGGESTED" AFTER TWICE BEING DULY ELECTED WOULD BE TO THROW CYPRUS INTO CHAOS. OTHER PRONG OF HIS APPROACH SEEMS LIKELY TO BE MANEUVER TO UNSEAT YENNADHIO, BISHOP OF PAPHOS, AND WIN ACCEPTANCE OF THESIS THAT THREE SEPTUAGENARIAN BISHOPS ARE NOT THE CHURCH OF CYPRUS, WHICH IS CYPRIOT PEOPLE AND PRIESTHOOD IN TOTALITY.

5. UNLESS GOG IS MUCH LESS WELL INFORMED OR MORE SELF-DECEIVING THAN WE THINK, WE JUDGE THAT IT IS READING EVENTS ABOUT AS WE ARE. WE CONSIDER THAT SUDDEN RETURN TO ATHENS OF GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU MORNING OF MARCH 10 IS RELEVANT.

6. WHAT OF ROUND THREE? AGAIN, IT IS PAPADOPOULOS' MOVE. CARDS HE PLAYED ON FEB 11 AND MARCH 2 HAVE NOT PRODUCED THE DESIRED RESULTS. WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER HE WILL SEIZE OPPORTUNITY OF ARCHBISHOP'S REPLY, WHICH WE ARE SURE WILL BE DRAFTED WITH AN EYE TO LEAVING GREECE SOME GRACEFUL EXITS, TO REDUCE CONFRONTATION AND SEEK COMPROMISE, OR WHETHER HE WILL ESCALATE USING VIOLENCE. SOME CYPRIOTS FEAR THAT BEING A MILITARY MAN AND FRUSTRATED BY SEEMING FAILURE OF HIS FIRST TWO MOVES, HE WILL RESORT TO PRE-PLANNED VIOLENCE USING, IN FIRST INSTANCE, GRIVAS. IN THIS REGARD, INTERESTING ARTICLE IN GOG CONTROLLED MISIMVRINI

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MARCH 9 (FBIS M092018) COULD BE CONSTRUED AS TELEGRAPHING THE PUNCH. ARTICLE SAYS GRIVAS GETTING READY TO STRIKE BECAUSE HE CANNOT TOLERATE CYPRUS SLIPPING FURTHER TOWARD COMMUNIST ANARCHY AND ENSLAVEMENT . . . GRIVAS SUPPORTERS ADEQUATELY ARMED AND READY TO MOVE . . . MAKARIOS MUST GO TIMING OF THE IMPENDING STRIKE IS UP TO GRIVAS.

7. ON HIS SIDE, MAKARIOS IS ACTING AS IF HE ALMOST WELCOMES A SHARPENING OF CONFRONTATION BROUGHT ON BY HIS REFUSAL TO BEND. HE CAN EVEN BE SEEN IN SOME RESPECTS TO BE GOADING GREECE ON. IN PAST COUPLE DAYS THE MAKARIOS CONTROLLED PRESS IN CYPRUS HAS BEGUN INTENSIVE NEEDLING OF GOG, SUGGESTING SPLITS WITHIN THE MILITARY ELEMENTS OF ATHENS REGIME, DISCREDITATION OF PALAMAS AND PANAYOTACOS, GRIVAS' ALLEGED REFUSAL LEND HIMSELF TO GREECE'S TRAITOROUS, ANTI-ENOSIS OBJECTIVES, ETC. KANELLOPOULOS, MAVROS, ZIGDHIS, ET AL, ARE BEING CITED AS THE TRUE VOICES OF GREEK PEOPLE. AND IN ANOTHER JAB, PAPADOPOULOS IS CHALLENGED TO LET ANYONE WHO DOUBTS THIS GO TO THE POLLS.

8. IN SUM, IT SEEMS TO US THAT WE ARE MOVING INTO THIRD ROUND -- ROUND IN WHICH LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED. COMPROMISE IS STILL POSSIBLE, BUT ODDS IN FAVOR OF IT SEEM SMALLER. WE WONDER WHETHER EMBASSY ATHENS WOULD SHARE THIS ASSESSMENT. GP-3.
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PAGE 01 NICOSI 00578 091641Z

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R 091620Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5843
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T NICOSIA 578

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: DEPT'S CONVERSATION WITH SAMPSON

REF: STATE 39422

1. IN REGARD CONVERSATION REPORTED IN REFTEL WE WOULD NOTE THAT SAMPSON, WHILE NOT FAR FROM THE CENTER, SAW ONLY PART OF THE ACTION ON FEB 11 AND IN SUCCEEDING DAYS. FULLEST DESCRIPTION OF ABORTIVE MEDIATION EFFORT BY PARLIAMENTARIANS IS CONTAINED IN NICOSIA'S A-24 OF FEB 29. OTHER MESSAGES THAT BEAR ON PARLIAMENTARIANS' INITIATIVE ARE NICOSIA 296, 302, 315, 319 AND 377.

2. IN THE SAME CONNECTION, WE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY DEPT'S STATEMENT, PARA 3, "IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT PANAYOTACOS DID SAY TO SOMEONE GOG WANTED MAKARIOS' OUSTER." AS CONTAINED IN REPORTING AT THE TIME, PANAYOTACOS DID SAY THIS QUITE SPECIFICALLY AND SEPARATELY ON FEB 11 TO UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIOA-TAFALL, UK HICOMER EDMONDS AND US CHARGE (PARA 4, NICOSIA 305). IT WAS IN THE LAST OF THESE CONVERSATIONS THAT PANAYOTACOS ALSO SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GRIVAS WHO HAD ASSURED PANAYOTACOS HE WOULD DEPART FROM CYPRUS IF ARCHBISHOP LEFT. PANAYOTACOS ALSO REFERRED TO LIKELIHOOD OF CYPRIOT PEOPLE KILLING MAKARIOS IF HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH GREEK DEMANDS.
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R 091555Z MAR 72
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5842
INFOHUESGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2784
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 577

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CONVERSATION WITH GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU

1. SUMMARY: GREEK EMBASSY IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS CONFINE CONTACT WITH GOC TO ABSOLUTE MINIMUM TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION GREEK DEMANDS ARE IN ANY WAY NEGOTIABLE.

2. GREEK CHARGE ZAPHIRIOU CALLED ON DCM MARCH 8. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT SEEMED TO BE TO ASCERTAIN, FOR ATHENS, WHETHER USG LETTING ITSELF BE DRAWN INTO THE MIDDLE. HE HAD APPARENTLY HEARD OF DIMITRIOU'S MARCH 6 CALL ON ME (NICOSIA 531). WE ASSURED HIM THIS NOT THE CASE: USG HOPING ITS FRIENDS CAN WORK OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES, WE CONTINUE OPPOSE RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE AND SUPPORT NEGOTIATION.

3. NOTING THAT ON MARCH 3 ZAPHIRIOU HAD APPARENTLY DELIVERED MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVT FOR MAKARIOS THROUGH CLERIDES RATHER THAN FOREIGN MINISTRY CHANNELS, WE ASKED WHAT ZAPHIRIOU'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE REGARDING CONTACTS WITH GOC AND FONMIN KYPRIANOU PARTICULARLY, DURING THIS AWKWARD PERIOD. ZAPHIRIOU REPLIED THAT HE AUTHORIZED CARRY ON NECESSARY ROUTINE BUSINESS CONTACT WITH GOC MINISTRIES, BELOW THE

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5839
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 572

EXDIS

SUBJECT: CYPRUS - CZECH ARMS

REF: NICOSIA 556, 563

1. DEPT WILL HAVE NOTICED OSORIO REPORT RE HISTORY OF CZECH ARMS DEAL AND THAT PROVIDED BY CANADIAN HICOMER MCGAUGHEY DIFFER IN ONE SIGNIFICANT RESPECT. FORMER STATES GREEK NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER HARALAMBOPOULOS BELIEVED ARMS WERE DESTINED FOR NATIONAL GUARD, LATTER FOR CYPRUS POLICE. UNABLE TO RECONCILE THESE REPORTS DIRECTLY, I SOUGHT ELWCIDATION FROM OSORIO. HE STATES ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO DIVIDE ARMS BETWEEN GUARD AND POLICE, FORMER GETTING HEAVY WEAPONS AND MUCH NEEDED SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION. BUT WHEN HARALAMBOPOULOS REFUSED TO ALLOW NATIONAL GUARD TO BE USED TO PREVENT TURK CYPRIOTS FROM BARRING GREEK CYPRIOTS FROM THEIR LAFA IN CHATOS-MARATHOVOUNO AFFAIR, ARCHBISHOP DECIDED NOT TO RELEASE ANY OF ARMS TO NATIONAL GUARD.

2. OSORIO STATES ARCHBISHOP NOW WILLING TO PLACE CZECH ARMS UNDER UNFICYP CUSTODY, RATHER THAN MERELY GIVE UNFICYP RIGHT OF INSPECTION, IF NECESSARY TO COMPOSE DIFFERENCES WITH GREECE. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO CHECK OUT THIS REPORT.
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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5833
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 562

EXDIS

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SUBJECT: CYPRUS -- LABOR MINISTER SUGGEST U.S. INTERCESSION

1. SUMMARY: GOC LABOR MINISTER MAVROMMATIS URGES EMBASSY RESUME OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH CYPRUS GOVT; SEEKS USG INTERCESSION TO PREVENT CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH MIGHT ACTUALLY LEAD TO COMMUNIST DOMINATION IN CYPRUS. LINE OF REPLY TO THIS TYPE OF IMPORTUNITY IS PROPOSED.

2. AT SOCIAL AFFAIR EVENING MARCH 7 I RAN INTO GOC LABOR MINISTER MAVROMMATIS, WHO IS ONE OF STRONGER FIGURES IN MAKARIOS CABINET. ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT HE WOULD SEE ME, HE IMMEDIATELY TOOK ME ASIDE FOR A TALKS.

3. HIS FIRST OBSERVATION WAS THAT HE KNEW I HAD NOT BEEN TO SEE ARCHBISHOP, AND HE STRONGLY URGED ME TO DO SO.

4. MAVROMMATIS THEN MADE A PLEA FOR U.S. ACTION TO DEFUSE CRISIS BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS. IF MAKARIOS WERE FORCED BY THE GREEKS TO RESIGN, HE SAID, HE FORESAW POSSIBILITY OF CHAOS ON ISLAND. GREEKS WERE CARRYING ON THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST MAKARIOS UNDER BANNER OF ANTI-COMMUNISM. IN FACT, IF MAKARIOS

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RESIGNED AND A NEW ELECTION WERE CALLED COMMUNISTS HAD REAL CHANCE TO COME INTO POWER THROUGH LEGAL ELECTORAL PROCESSES. CLERIDES, WHO WOULD BE ACTING PRESIDENT, WOULD RUN VERY BADLY IN ANY ELECTION SINCE MAKARIOS SUPPORTERS WOULD REGARD HIM AS HAVING BEEN LESS THAN FAITHFUL IN MANEUVERS LEADING UP TO PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION. THUS, PARADOXICALLY, GREEK ACTION MIGHT LEAD TO ELECTION OF PRESIDENT CLOSE TO COMMUNISTS WHO WOULD GIVE THEM PREPONDERANT ROLE IN GOVT. IT WAS IMPERATIVE, HE THOUGHT, THAT THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS BE INTERRUPTED.

5. MAVORMMATHIS SAID THIS COULD BEST BE DONE BY RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A REAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN ATHENS AND NICOSIA, HE HOPED AT LEVEL OF PAPADOPOULOS AND MAKARIOS. GREEK GOVT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THEY DID NOT WANT TO TALK, EXCEPT TO RECEIVE MAKARIOS' ACQUIESCENCE TO THEIR DEMANDS. ONLY A WORD FROM U.J. COULD BRING THE TWO SIDES INTO CONTACT WITH VIEW TO WORKING OUT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD RESTORE ATHENS-NICOSIA AMITY, FACILITATE SETTLEMENT WITH TURKS AND PRESERVE WESTERN INTERESTS IN CYPRUS.

6. I REPEATED TO MAVROMMATHIS LINE I HAD USED WITH NICOS DIMITRIOU EARLIER (NICOSIA 531) IN SUMMARY, THAT USG WAS RELUCTANT TO INTERVENE IN FAMILY QUARREL BETWEEN GREEKS, AND THAT PROGRESS ON ARMS ISSUE AND INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT WAS BEST MOVE CYPRUS GOVT COULD MAKE TO END CRISIS.

7. COMMENT: I EXPECT TO RECEIVE INCREASING PRESSURE WITH REGARD TO OUR ABSOLUTE LACK OF OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH CYPRUS GOVT, AND WITH REGARD TO WHAT CYPRUS GOVT CONSIDERS REGRETTABLY PASSIVE ATTITUDE OF USG. AS TO OFFICIAL CALLS, DEPT SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT OUR CONTINUED ABSTENTION IS BEING BUILT UP INTO AN IMPORTANT LOCAL ISSUE. AS TIME GOES ON IT WILL BE INCREASINGLY INFERRED BY OUR FRIENDS THAT WE ARE DELIBERATELY STANDING ASIDE WHILE GREECE TRIES TO RUN OVER MAKARIOS, THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. SOME NOT SO FRIENDLY TO US WILL ASSERT THAT U.S. IS ACTUALLY BEHIND THE GREEK EFFORT, AND THEY WILL BE ALL TOO READY TO ATTRIBUTE OUR PASSIVITY TO THE MOST UNPALATABLE CAUSES.

8. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT POSITION OF SUBSTANTIVE ALOOFNESS IF WE COULD RESUME NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CYPRUS GOVT. WHILE I CAN SEE ADVANTAGE IN DISCREET USG INTERCESSION AT PROPER TIME, I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE RIGHT

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MOMENT FOR IT. I PLAN TO CONTINUE TO RESPOND TO THE INCREASING IMPORTUNITIES I EXPECT SOMEWHAT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. USG DEEPLY TROUBLED BY CURRENT DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS. WE HAVE ALWAYS SUPPORTED AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS AND CONTINUE TO DO SO; BUT CYPRIOTS WILL RECOGNIZE WE HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN GREECE AFFECTING PEACE OF THIS REGION AND FREE WORLD SECURITY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE FELT IT PREFERABLE NOT TO INJECT USG INTO A FAMILY QUARREL BETWEEN GREEKS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, COUNSELED GOG AGAINST USE OF FORCE, AND WE EMPHASIZE OUR BELIEF THAT DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE WORKED OUT PEACEFULLY.

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INFO OCT-01 /026 W

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FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5828
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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S E C R E T NICOSIA 556
EXDIS
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: CZECH ARMS

REF: NICOSIA 539 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: CZECH ARMS TO BE PLACED UNDER UN INSPECTION. GREEKS HELPED PREPARE ORIGINAL ARMS LIST. THEY COULD NOW EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE ARMS.
2. UNSYG SPECIAL REP OSORIO-TAFALL, AS WELL AS AMBASSADORS OF AUSTRIA AND SPAIN AND CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER, SAW MAKARIOS MARCH 8.
3. OSORIO TELLS ME MAKARIOS CONFIRMED THAT GOC WILLING TO PLACE CZECH ARMS UNDER UNFICYP INSPECTION AS A FIRST STEP. OSORIO NOW NEGOTIATING WITH FONMIN KYPRIANOU TO DETERMINE HOW AND WHEN THIS COMMITMENT SHOULD BE FORMALIZED. CYPRIOTS ARE RESISTING A FORMAL AGREEMENT, BUT OSORIO WANTS AT LEAST AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES DETAILING UNFICYP RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO CARRY OUT PERIODIC INSPECTION.
4. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION WITH ARCHBISHOP OSORIO ASKED HOW UN COULD BE SURE ARMS TO BE INSPECTED REPRESENTED ENTIRE QUANTITY OF ARMS IMPORTED. MAKARIOS SAID THIS WAS SIMPLE MATTER. GOC WOULD GIVE UNFICYP LIST CONTAINED IN ORIGINAL CONTRACT. IT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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COULD BE CHECKED WITH GREEK NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDER GEN. HARALAMBOPOULOS, WITH WHOM LIST HAD BEEN WORKED OUT BY CYPRIOTS.

5. COMMENT: OSORIO SPECULATES, RIGHTLY WE BELIEVE, THAT HARALAMBOPOULOS WAS ORIGINALLY UNDER IMPRESSION ARMS WOULD BE GIVEN TO NATIONAL GUARD. AT SOME POINT, PROBABLY AFTER ARRIVAL OF GRIVAS, THE SIGNALS WERE EVIDENTLY CHANGED. IF THIS VERSION OF EVENTS BECOMES PUBLIC AND GOES UNCHALLENGED, GOG CASE ON THE ARMS WILL LOSE SOME OF ITS FORCE. GOG WILL NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THAT CYPRUS GOVT ERRED IN SECRETLY AND INDEPENDENTLY ORDERING ARMS, WHICH ON ARRIVAL HAVE IMPAIRED CYPRUS STABILITY AND PROSPECTS FOR INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT. IT WILL LOGICALLY BE COMPELLED, WE WOULD THINK, TO LIMITING ITS PROTEST TO FACT THAT MAKARIOS HAS KEPT ARMS OUT OF MAINLAND GREEK CONTROL -- QUITE A DIFFERENT POINT AND ONE WHICH WOULD BE MUCH LESS REASSURING TO TURKS.

6. IN ACTUALITY, GREEK ARE ABLE TO ASSUME EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF ARMS SINCE THEY ARE NOW LOCATED IN ATHALASSA COMPOUND, HEADQUARTERS OF BOTH POLICE AND NATIONAL GUARD. A RAIDING FORCES BATTALION OF NATIONAL GUARD HAS JUST BEEN MOVED FROM BELLAPAIS TO ATHALASSA. POPPER

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. MAGEE, 3/8/72.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 NICOSI 00531 061242Z

BISHOP MUST BE PREVAILED UPON TO CHANGE HIS MIND AND REMAIN IN OFFICE.

4. CONTINUING, DIMITRIOU STATED HE COULD ENVISAGE A COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT WHICH COULD SAVE THE SITUATION. THIS WOULD INVOLVE MAKARIOS AGREEING NOT TO SEEK RE-ELECTION WHEN HIS TERM OF OFFICE EXPIRES IN EARLY 1973; STARTING TALKS ON URGENT BASIS; SETTLING ARMS DEAL IN SATISFACTORY WAY; AND AGREEING TO CABINET REORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD REPLACE SOME MINISTERS. IF SUCH A COMPROMISE OFFER WERE MADE, EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON REACTION OF GREEK GOVT.

5. STATING HE WAS SPEAKING AS AN INDIVIDUAL, DIMITRIOU EXPRESSED HOPE USG WOULD MOVE INTO SITUATION TO HELP SETTLE QUARREL BETWEEN GREECE AND CYPRUS. IN PAST, USG HAD BEEN INFLUENTIAL IN SHAPING GOVTS AND POLICIES IN GREECE, HE SAID; SINCE AN IMPOSED SETTLEMENT OF CURRENT CRISIS WOULD NOT WORK, WOULD NOT U.S. BE BETTER OFF IN HELPING TO AVOID IT?

6. I SAID THAT WITH HIS LONG EXPERIENCE IN GOVT DIMITRIOU SHOULD APPRECIATE EXTREME DELICACY OF SITUATION AS FAR AS U.S. WAS CONCERNED. THIS WAS NOT A DISPUTE BETWEEN NATO ALLIES OF THE KIND WHICH HAD COMPELLED U.S. INTERVENE IN CYPRUS CRISES IN THE PAST. IT WAS A FAMILY QUARREL BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF HELLENISTS, EACH OF WHICH PROCLAIMED ITS ESSENTIAL UNITY WITH THE OTHER. DIMITRIOU KNEW WHAT HAPPENED TO PEOPLE WHO STEPPED INTO FAMILY QUARRELS. I WOULD GIVE EVERY CONSIDERATION TO WHAT DIMITRIOU HAD SAID AND WOULD KEEP MY GOVT FULLY INFORMED, BUT HE SHOULD REALIZE THE DIFFICULTIES.

7. DIMITRIOU RETURNED TO THE CHARGE, AND I USED THE OCCASION TO PROBE HIM AS TO EXACTLY HOW LEADING GREEK CYPRIOTS VIEWED THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO GREECE AS THE "NATIONAL CENTER". DIMITRIOU SAID ALL HIS FRIENDS FELT GREEK AND WANTED TO BE GREEK, BUT THEY WERE DISILLUSIONED WITH GREECE. GREEK GOVT WAS NOT WILLING TO GIVE CYPRUS A SQUARE DEAL; ITS GOVT WAS DICTATORIAL; IT WAS ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE A DIKTAT ON GREEK CYPRIOTS BY APPOINTING A STOUGE AS PRESIDENT. WHILE GREEK CYPRIOTS WERE HELLENISTS, TWELVE YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE HAD FOSTERED AN INDEPENDENT WAY OF THINKING ON ISLAND. IT WAS TRUE THAT GREECE HAD LARGER RESPONSIBILITIES THAN CYPRUS, BUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SHOULD BE SOLVED BY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TO REACH COMMON DECISIONS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 NICOSI 00531 061242Z

ATHENS MUST NOT IGNORE FACT THAT MAKARIOS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN CYPRUS.

8. I ASKED DIMITRIOU HOW HE EXPLAINED MAKARIOS' DEPENDENCE ON COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN CYPRUS, REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO ADDRESS BY DR. LYSSARIDES TO CROWD BEFORE ARCHBISHOPRIC MARCH 3. DIMITRIOU MADE IT CLEAR HE THOROUGHLY DISAPPROVED OF CONNIVING WITH COMMUNISTS (FROM LONG ACQUAINTANCE WITH HIM I AM SURE THIS IS THE CASE), AND SAID NOT ONLY ARCHBISHOP BUT COMMUNIST LEADER PAPAIOUANNOU HAD BEEN UPSET BY LYSSARIDES' ACTION. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION I REMARKED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME PERSONALLY A MISTAKE FOR MAKARIOS NOT TO GET THE CZECH ARMS QUESTION SETTLED QUICKLY ONCE AND FOR ALL, AND EQUALLY A MISTAKE FOR THE ARCHBISHOP TO HAVE TURNED DOWN FLATLY THE COMPROMISE INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL MADE BY THE GREEK GOVT IN SUMMER OF 1971

9. CONCLUDING OUR CONVERSATION, DIMITRIOU SAID HE NOTED THAT I HAD NOT SEEN ARCHBISHOP SINCE MY RETURN FROM AFRICA, WONDERED WHY NOT AND STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT I DO SO. I SAID HE MUST APPRECIATE THAT I WAS IN A VERY DELICATE POSITION, HIGHLY VISIBLE ON ISLAND, AND THAT I FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FROM USG STANDPOINT TO AVOID ANY MISINTERPRETATION THROUGH MY ACTIONS. DIMITRIOU SAID HE COULD APPRECIATE THIS BUT MY CONTINUING FAILURE TO SEE ARCHBISHOP MIGHT NOT BE PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. ALREADY THERE WERE RUMORS THAT U.S. WAS BEHIND GREEK ACTION AND THAT WE MIGHT BE DESIROUS OF SEEING MAKARIOS REMOVED. I ASSURED DIMITRIOU THERE WAS NO TRUTH WHATEVER IN STORIES, MANY OF THEM SPREAD BY COMMUNISTS, THAT U.S. WAS CONNIVING WITH GREEK GOVT IN THIS AFFAIR.

8. DIMITRIOU ASSURED ME THAT HE HAD COME TO SEE ME ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN VOLITION AND WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF ANYONE IN CYPRUS GOVT. HE INTENDS TO TRY TO SEEK MAKARIOS TO URGE HIM NOT TO RESIGN. COMMENT: I AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE DIMITRIOU WAS NOT ASKED BY GOVT TO COME TO SEE ME. IT IS A FACT, HOWEVER, THAT HE SEES ARCHBISHOP FREQUENTLY TO DISCUSS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS.
POPPER

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Cyprus

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of the Republic of Cyprus that the appointment of Nikos C. Dimitriou as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.



Brent Scowcroft

Major General, USAF

Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5953

November 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*
SUBJECT: Agreement for Cyprus Ambassador

The State Department has recommended granting of agreement to Nikos C. Dimitriou as the new Ambassador of Cyprus to the U.S. (Tab B). Attached for your signature at Tab A is a memorandum for the Secretary of State concurring in the appointment.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

5953

November 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: Jeanne W. Davis
SUBJECT: Agreement for Cyprus Ambassador

Attached for your signature is a memorandum for the Secretary of State concurring in the appointment of Nikos C. Dimitriou as the Ambassador of Cyprus to the US.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

5953

October 29, 1973


CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Nikos C. Dimitriou as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Cyprus to the United States. A biography of Mr. Dimitriou is enclosed. A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

I believe this appointment would be satisfactory. If you concur, I shall be pleased to inform the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Respectfully,



Kenneth Rush

Enclosure:

Biography.

The President,
The White House.

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GDS

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BIOGRAPHY - Mr. Nikos C. Dimitriou

Republic of Cyprus

Dimitriou was born in Larnaca on July 20, 1920. A member of one of Cyprus' most prominent families, he is married and has three daughters, one of whom is currently studying sociology at Fordham University. His wife's name is Nadina. Dimitriou is Greek Orthodox, speaks Greek and English, and is interested in photography, journalism, riding, swimming and golf.

Mr. Dimitriou has had a distinguished and varied career in business, banking, and government. At the time of his ambassadorial appointment, he was serving as Chairman of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus, Chairman of the Regional Advisory Board of the National and Grindlays Bank Ltd., and Honorary Consul General of Denmark. Formerly, he served as Minister of Commerce (1968-?), Chairman of the Cyprus Development Bank (1966-68), Chairman of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1958-62), and District Governor of Rotary International. One of Cyprus' leading businessmen, Dimitriou has also been successful in expanding the family's business interests.

Dimitriou is a moderate in political and economic affairs. In articles written for the local press, he has repeatedly expressed the view that the Cyprus problem can only be solved on the basis of independence and accommodation between the Greek and Turk Cypriots. He also believes strongly in the role of the private sector in economic development.

Cosmopolitan in outlook, intelligent, and well-read, Dimitriou is known for his candor as well as for his organizational and commercial talents. Long a friend of the U.S. and of U.S. officials in Cyprus, Dimitriou seems an excellent choice for ambassador. A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PER PAC Review 6/13/08

By MIH NARA, Date 5/8/12

NW 08-38/10932 [p. 1 of 1]

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: Agreement for Nikos C Dimitriou as Amb of Cyprus to US

REFERENCE: S/S 1320361 OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

DISTRIBUTION / INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO FOR HAK. ()
STAFF SECRETARY		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO FOR PRES. (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)
FAR EAST			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MEMO _____ TO _____ .. ()
EUROPE / CANADA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	JOINT MEMO .. . ()
UNITED NATIONS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ANY ACTION NECESSARY? .. ()
SCIENTIFIC			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE ()
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DUE DATE: <u>11/03</u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
NSC PLANNING			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>* Follow agreement procedures</u>
CONGRESSIONAL			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
OCEANS POLICY			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
<u>Protocol, State</u>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE:

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING / ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
11/8	QUAN/ST	DAVIS			
11/8		Scowcroft	X	Sgn memo to Kissinger (11/16)	
11/10		Saunders	S	Further action per request (11/16)	
11/12		Scroft	X	Sgn memo to Kissinger (11/16)	
11/12		DAVIS	S	Further action per telcon w/ McFarlane (11/17)	
11/13		Scroft	X	Sgn memo to Kissinger (11/17)	
11/14		C Scroft		+ sgd memo to Kissinger	

NSC / S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH done NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION) _____

OR RECORD COMMENT:) _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

CROSS REF W/ _____ JOINED BY LOG # _____

SEE # _____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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 TS _____ CODE WORD _____ RES DATA _____
 SENSITIVE _____

SUBJECT: *Info memo to Sec. Rogers on the present status of the Cyprus issue.*

REFERENCE: S/S *7107965* OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION				ACTION REQUIRED	
	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			MEMO FOR HAK (_____)	
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES. (_____)	
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE (_____)	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH (_____)	
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)	
EUROPE/CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)	
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO (_____)	
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO STATE (_____)	
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY (_____)	
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE (_____)	
LR PLANNING				DUE DATE: _____	
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)	
NSC PLANNING					
CONGRESSIONAL					

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: _____ SA, _____ HP _____ HM _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES _____ NO _____

MICROFILM DATA

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

22986

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*


SUBJECT Your Meeting with Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus

State Dept. review completed

Background

The principal U S concerns in Cyprus have been: (1) that tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not erupt and draw Greece and Turkey into war, (2) that the well organized Communist party not achieve predominance As long as Makarios is there, the latter seems under control. But in 1964 and 1967 when Turkey was on the brink of invading Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority (20%), it was to a large extent the intervention of the U S President or his emissary which helped to resolve the crisis The main purpose of this meeting is to establish a personal relationship--which Makarios has sought--as a basis for such future action if unhappily it should become necessary

25X1



Makarios follows a non-aligned foreign policy but inclines toward the West. He speaks English well.

ON FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY JHS 5/2/2012

Issues Makarios May Raise

1 He may ask that the U S press Turkey to force more flexibility into the Turkish Cypriot line in the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. [These talks began after the 1967 crisis to try to re-write the constitution and devise a governmental structure so as to provide more workable guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority. We have tried to stay out of the middle]

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25X1

Talking Points

1 I appreciate the opportunity to establish personal ties. These have been important in times of past crisis I also value the views of a non-aligned leader who understands the Western view of the world

2 Your Beatitude appreciates our concern over Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and our hope that Cyprus will maintain its independent and non-aligned stance The main objective of the U S vis-a-vis the USSR is to achieve a balance which will permit the nations of the area to make peace and to enjoy freedom from external domination.

25X1

3 I appreciate your government's facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] We will continue our efforts to get peace talks started. We negotiated a basis for talks last summer, but that has been undercut.

4 The negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on Cyprus are for President Makarios and his countrymen to work out. The U S cannot help but have a concern for their successful outcome--both because of our desire to see violence avoided among our friends and because of the importance of a stable Cyprus to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean I am counting on Your Beatitude's wisdom to achieve a positive result.

5. I appreciate removal of Cypriot ships from trade with North Vietnam Trade with Cuba remains a continuing concern of the United States and I hope that it may be possible for Cyprus to reduce its involvement in that commerce. These restrictions are both important to U S policy [The U S has pressed persistently for the removal of ships flying the Cypriot flag from the North Vietnam trade (successfully) and from their growing involvement in the Cuban trade (65% of non-Communist shipping)]

Secretary Irwin's memo is attached. Its main points are reflected above.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1970

SECRET

14246

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject Bilateral Meeting with President Makarios
of Cyprus, October 25, 10 a.m.

President Makarios' appointment with you is important
for the following reasons

Makarios is the key personality in the Cyprus dispute.
In past crises, Makarios' acceptance of U.S. Presidential
emissaries has been crucial to the maintenance of stability
in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a meeting will give you
the opportunity to emphasize the need for Makarios to lead
the way to an early negotiated settlement of the Cyprus
problem.

In your conversation you may wish to give emphasis to
the following points


A. We attach great importance to the intercommunal
negotiations and look to Makarios to demonstrate magnanimity.

25X1

B. We appreciate His Beatitude's cooperation in receiv-
ing hostages from the Middle East

25X1

C. The removal of Cyprus ships from the North Vietnam
trade permits us to consider requests from the World Food
Program for PL-480 aid to Cyprus, but we are concerned over
Cyprus' growing role in the Cuban trade.


Acting Secretary

Enclosures

Issues and Talking Points
Biographic Sketch

SECRET

Group 3: Downgraded at 12-year inter-
vals, not automatically declassified.

Cyprus

Issues and Talking Points

Issues We Should Raise:

1. Settling the Cyprus Problem - The intercommunal talks which seek to design a new governmental structure within which the 80 percent Greek Cypriot majority can co-exist peacefully with the 20 percent Turkish Cypriot minority are foundering on the issue of local autonomy. Nevertheless the talks provide a rationale for avoiding conflict and offer the best hope for a viable solution. We recommend that you:

--state that we attach great importance to continuation of the negotiations which we strongly support as the best procedure for solving the Cyprus problem and ask Makarios for his analysis of the prospects for progress in the talks.

--note our view that both sides must exercise continued restraint and greater flexibility and that we look to His Beatitude, as leader of the more powerful side, to demonstrate magnanimity.

2. Cyprus and the Middle East - The GOC has played a cooperative role in receiving released hostages [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted]
recommend that you:

--thank His Beatitude for facilitating the reception of hostages from the Middle East and inform him that we appreciate his cooperative attitude [redacted]

25X1

25X1

--state clearly that Communist propoganda alleging U.S. or NATO interest in using Cyprus for military purposes is completely without foundation, and declare our support for Cyprus' independence and non-aligned stance.

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- 2 -

3. Cypriot Shipping to North Vietnam and Cuba -
The GOC, at our urging, has recently removed its flag ships from the North Vietnam trade. However, we remain concerned over Cyprus' growing involvement in the Cuban trade. For example, during the first six months of 1970, Cyprus flag vessels constituted 65 percent of the total non-Communist shipping to Cuba. We recommend that you:

--note our appreciation for the removal of Cyprus flag shipping from the North Vietnam trade and inform Makarios that the USG can now consider requests from the World Food Program for PL-480 aid for Cyprus.

--declare our distress, however, over the extent of Cyprus' involvement in the Cuban trade and ask that Makarios review this for possible remedial action.

Issues He May Raise:

1. Turkey's Role in the Intercommunal Talks -
Makarios may ask that the USG put pressure on the Government of Turkey to be more flexible and forthcoming in guiding the Turkish Cypriot line in the intercommunal talks. We recommend that you:

--say that we do not believe it would be appropriate for us to become involved in substantive issues at this time. However, we would like all parties concerned to be as flexible as possible.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE

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DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

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 S X RES DATA
 TS _____ CODEWORD
 _____ SENSITIVE
 _____ PARIS MTG
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DOC DATE: 102370 IRWIN

SUBJECT: Talkw for Pres Meeting w/
 Makarios

ENCLOSURES: () () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: saunders

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA	X		
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ()
 MEMO TO PRESIDENT (X)
 REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
 REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
 MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
 RECOMMENDATIONS ()
 JOINT MEMO ()
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
 CONCURRENCE ()
 DUE DATE: 23 Oct
 COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO
10/23	HAK	Pres
10/26	Pres	NSC

MICROFILM DATA
 DO X
 INIT SA
 DATE 10/27

ORIG) NSC
 TO J PAF X
 WHC
 SUBF

ACTION REQUIRED

info
 close out

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

NOTIFY: _____

COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL
 PAF X HAK APPL
 WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA
 SUBF _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED

→ NANCY : Action completed.
The appointment was set up, and
the info in this memo was included

Mr. Saunders = FOR ACTION - OUTSIDE

THE SYSTEM

Copy sent to Gen. Haig & Dr. K for info.

nancy

in the President's talking
points for his meeting
with Makarios on 10/25.

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library

**NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD**

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 08-38 [ID: 10938]

(1 p.)

EXEMPTED per 3.3(b)(1)(6), ltr. 7/3/2012

~~3.5(c)~~

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 25a ON THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (NA FORM 14021) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CB /mjh
10/8/2014



Department of State

TELEGRAM

MAR 10 10 53 PM '74

SECRET 7898

PAGE 01 NICOSI 00459 181535Z

53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

000027

R 181515Z MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8305 State Dept. review completed

S E C R E T NICOSIA 459

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: OGEN CY
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

25X1

REF: STATE 44274

1. I MADE POINTS 2 (A) AND 2 (B) PER REFTEL TO FONMIN DIRGEN VENIAMIN IN COURSE OF A BRIEFING TO HIM ON PHASEDOWN PLANNING. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

2. I DID NOT USE PARA 2 (C) SINCE VENIAMIN DID NOT EXPRESS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN CONTRACT EMPLOYEE QUESTION.

3. I BELIEVE THAT NOTICE WILL HELP TO ASSURE FOREIGN MINISTRY SUPPORT IF POLICE SHOULD RAISE QUESTION ABOUT GRANTING PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO [REDACTED] EMPLOYEES WITHOUT OFFICIAL PASSPORTS, OR IF CUSTOMS CHALLENGES RIGHT TO 90-DAY DUTY FREE PRIVILEGES. IF ISSUE ARISES WE WILL OF COURSE TAKE POSITION SUGGESTED PARA 2 (C). WE HOPE TAX AND CORPORATE OBLIGATION QUESTIONS WILL NOT ARISE.

25X1

4. BRIEFED VENIAMIN FAIRLY EXTENSIVELY ON LIBERAL SEPARATION PROVISIONS FOR THOSE EMPLOYEES BEING RELEASED, EXPRESSED REGRET AT NECESSITY TO LET THEM GO. HE RAISED NO QUESTIONS. GRANT

NSA, NAVY reviews completed

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 341

PAGE 01 NICOSI 02450 051151Z

20
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

73 DEC 5 PM 12:24
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

0 051135Z DEC 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8033

S E C R E T NICOSIA 2450

EXDIS

FOR ASST SECRETARY SISCO FROM AMB. MC CLOSKEY

EO 11658: GDS
TAGS: OGEN CY
SUBJECT: CALL BY AMB OF LEBANON

1. LEBANESE AMBASSADOR MOUNIR TAKIEDDINE, COUSIN OF PRIME MINISTER AND BROTHER OF MINISTER OF INTERIORPN RETURNING TO BEIRUT TO ASSIST IN PREPARATION FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY TO LEBANON. ACTING ON INSTRUCTION, HE CAME TO MY OFFICE TODAY TO ASK WHETHER WE HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS WHICH WOULD BE OF BENEFIT TO HIS GOVERNMENT IN ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. TWO SPECIFIC SUBJECTS HE MENTIONED WERE PALESTINIANS AND SYRIA: ON LATTER, HE SAID THAT LEBANON WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE ANY APPROPRIATE STEP TOWARD ASSISTING IN NORMALIZING WASHINGTON/DAMASCUS RELATIONS.

2. REPLYING THAT I WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY OFFICIAL SUGGESTIONS, I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS APPROACH AND GET BACK IN TOUCH IF THERE WERE ANYTHING TO SUGGEST.

3. COMMENT: TAKIEDDINE UNANIMOUSLY REGARDED AS ABLEST DIPLOMAT HERE. LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC WITH PROSPECT SECRETARY'S VISIT AND ENDEAVORING SCRUPULOUSLY INSURE ITS SUCCESS.
MC CLOSKEY

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EXDIS
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EXDIS

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
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(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 142) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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NUMBER 35 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
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19/00/472

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

FLASH
ESA791QVA585
DE RUQVHN #0796 0991505
Z 091500Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

*James
Saunders*

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7208

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 607
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2014

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NICOSIA 796

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINS CY

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON ISRAELI AMB'S RESIDENCE

REF: NICOSIA 793, 792

I HAVE JUST TALKED TO ISRAELI AMB TIMOR. HE TELLS ME
TERRORISTS WERE WAITING FOR HIM TO LEAVE RESIDENCE FOR
OFFICE AND MISSED HIM BY ONE MINUTE. HE AND HIS FAMILY
WHO LIVE ON THIRD FLOOR OF APARTMENT ARE UNIJURED BUT
SHAKEN. ASSAILANTS DROPPED TWO CHARGES AS THEY RUSHED
THROUGH GROUND FLOOR OF APT IN PURSUIT OF AMBASSADOR.
LANDLORD LIVING IN THAT APT WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED, HIS
APT WRECKED, AND APT ABOVE VERY BADLY DAMAGED, THIRD
FLOOR APT LESS SO. POLICE GUARD, SHOT IN BACK, WAS
CRITIKY
NY WOUNDED. ISRAELI AMB UNDERSTANDS ONLY
TERRORIST KILLED WEREYJT AIRPORT NOT RPT NOT AT
RESIDENCE, BUT HAS BEEN TOLD THAT THREE OR FOUR OF
RESIDENCE ASSAILANTS WERE CAUGHT AND POSSIBLY WOUNDED.
RENTED CAR WAS USED AND ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES FOUND IN TI.
POPPER
BT

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SAUNDERS,LL

RECALLED

PSN:025622

PAGE 01 OF 01

TOR:099/15:25Z

DTG:091500Z APR 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

21/50/82

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

FLASH
ESA620QVA572
DE RUQVHN #0789 0991355
Z 091350Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7202

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 604
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2011

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NICOSIA 789
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PINS CY

SUBJECT: ISRAELI AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE BOMBED
ABOUT 3:15 P.M. RESIDENCE OF ISRAELI AMB IN NICOSIA WAS BOMBED.
FIRST REPORT INDICATES CYPRIOT POLICE GUARD INJURED,
AMBULANCES PROCEEDING TO SCENE. WILL REPORT
FURTHER.
POPPER
BT

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SAUNDERS

PSN:025610 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:099/14:11Z DTG:091350Z APR 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 NICOSI 01715 151516Z

MOVEMENT IN CYPRUS COULD INTENSIFY ISLANDS PROBLEMS.

4. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED. GDS.
POPPER

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

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SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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NUMBER 51 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
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NUMBER 53 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
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NUMBER 54 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 55 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 42) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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21/00/92

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY

FLASH
ESA697AAB842
DE RUQVHN #0793 0991435
Z 091430Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7206

INFO AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 606
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2013

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NICOSIA 793

EQ 11652: NA/A

TAGS: PINS CY

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON ISRAELI AMBASSADORS RESIDENCE

REF: NICOSIA 789

BOMB ATTACK ON ISRAELI AMB'S RESIDENCE WAS CARRIED OUT BY FOUR ASSAILANTS PRESUMED TO BE ARABS. ACCORDING TO INFO OBTAINED BY EYEWITNESSES, POLICE GUARD AT RESIDENCE SAW ASSAILANTS PLACING EXPLOSIVES AND FIRED AT THEM AS THEY RAN. TWO SAID TO HAVE BEEN KILLED OUTRIGHT. ONE SHOT AND INJURED WHEN ESCAPE VEHICLE WAS BLOCKED, AND ONE STILL AT LARGE.

POPPER

BT

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SAUNDERS,LL

PSN:025606 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:099/14:49Z DTG:091430Z APR 73

*****C O N F I D E N T I A L*****S COPY