

~~4. Tell the President of Rogers' new plan on Middle East and the need to review interdepartmentally before proceeding. Rogers thinks he can get Israelis and Egyptians to agree to new 20 KM missile zone. He may have told Eban yesterday and may tell Gromyko later this week.~~

~~I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_~~

~~Comments: \_\_\_\_\_~~

5. You may wish to raise your specific concerns about the Middle East if the President's demeanor suggests he can listen.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: Agrees but won't give order

6. You told Senator Javits that you would let him know how the President desired to handle the announcement of the 1% target for development in the UN. You may want to ask him if he wishes to announce this prior to his UN speech (copy of your telecon is at Tab B).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Brief the President on your meeting with the Greek Under Secretary Palamas yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Show the President the letter from Galbraith (Tab C).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

9. Show the President the response from Prime Minister Gorton on the President's peace initiative (Tab D).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

10: Give the President a rundown on the latest situation in Bolivia. You authorized early contact with new leadership which appears to be somewhat more moderate than we feared.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

11: Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta (Tab E).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

- 4 -

12: You may also want to raise Senator Javit's suggestion that we begin to open the door a little more to China (see copy of your telecon at Tab B).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

13. Tell the President that you will be having lunch with Governor Dewey and General Clay and will brief them on current international problems.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1970

General Haig --

HAK did make some notations on the attached and I thought you would want to look at it before filing.

Florence

*[Handwritten signature]*

OLD ITEMS TO

DISCUSS -

NOT CURRENT!

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be in the public interest.

SECRET/NODIS

EYES ONLY

FOR AMBASSADOR KORRY FROM DR. KISSINGER AND ALEX JOHNSON

1. Highest levels here continue to be very concerned that, with October 24 rapidly approaching, anti-Allende forces in Chile do not seem to be coalescing around any effective action to block his election. We understand from your previous messages that military are entirely aware that if Allende is elected they can expect no further MAP or other support from us. If there is any doubt whatever in their mind in this regard, you should use the channels available to you to make this clear. You have also, in accordance with your recommendation, been authorized to inform them that we are already "holding in abeyance" all MAP, including military training and visits not already underway. You have also been informed that we are suspending action on all requests for processing munitions-control-export licenses for Chilean military. You have also previously been authorized to inform the military that if the effort to block Allende from taking office is successful, the Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship. As you know, we have also done our best to encourage American

SECRET/NODIS

firms and financial institutions now to make it clear within Chile the economic and financial consequences that will inevitably flow from an election of Allende.

2. In addition to the foregoing, you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean armed forces. In addition to materiel chargeable to MAP, we also have in mind increased ship loans. If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and materiel that might be immediately required. Obviously we cannot, and we assume Chilean forces would not want, support of American personnel in such a contingency.

3. Although we realize from your report that the odds are very long against the Chilean military taking any effective action, we do not want them to be deterred by what they may feel is any ambiguity with respect to our attitude toward the election of Allende. We therefore, leave it to you and your discretion on how in light of above guidance this can best and most promptly be communicated to the military.

END

10/7/70

SECRET/NODIS

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

W

EYES ONLY

Send to WL \_\_\_\_\_

for information. This must be returned to A. M. Haig  
within twenty-four hours.

No reproduction permitted.

Telecon  
Senator Javits  
10/13/70 3:40 p.m.

J: I called because the news has come through this morning that the President has opted for the one percent target in the development business at the UN.

K: Once in a while youk have got to lose an argument just to prove you don't win them all. But it's essentially your recommendation.

J: That's right. Here is the question: How are they to handle this? I thought I would ask you and then go to Rogers. Rogers apparently passed word to the delegation that he thinks the President ought to say this on the 23rd. They thought they were immediately authorized to use this in private and have already done so. If nothing is said about this before the 23rd, they may be attacked for not doing it when we are going to. But then, if that's all the President's speech has, it would be a lead balloon.

K: No, that's not all it's got.

J: It can come out as the President's statement. He can release it. Then all we do is . . .

K: May I check with the President and let you know tomorrow?

J: Yes, please do. There's another question, a totally new line-up on China. I had lunch with the Chinese Ambassador and Minister of External Affairs and we discussed this subject. They are still of course solidly against anything. The question is whether the U.S. may want to begin to open the door . . . This is very important, especially with the Russians cheating the hell out of us. I am in charge of this, but don't want to say anything if it's not the President's policy. ~~I think~~

K: What do you recommend?

J: I think we should do as the President has done -- begin to open the door a little, give a feeling that a posture is developing. The real implication of this is that the Chinese are beginning to show that they want in. Our case has been that they don't want in. I think we should begin to say this is a developing situation, which may bring on changes.

K: Let me talk to the President about that one too.

J: Okay, but there's more urgency about the former.

K: I'll get you an answer on the former by tomorrow noon.

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

*Put in red folder  
for Pres.*

September 25, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

It is not altogether easy to judge the affair in the Middle East during the last week from here. But one can tell enough to know that the Administration has behaved with great, I would almost say inspired, calmness and restraint. And as one who is familiar with the folkways and rat-warrens of Washington I know how much advice you must have had to the contrary. There are many people who must prove their bravery on occasions such as this -- whatever the cost. And there are many others who must prove their willingness to act. And there are yet others for whom life is so dull that any crisis must be seized upon and made worse for its generally exciting effect.

There was, I am persuaded, no conceivable gain (for the United States, for Israel, for the Arabs themselves, or for the hostages) in our intervening with military force in an intra-Arab row. Everything would have been worse and there would have been more blood on the desert.

I somehow doubt that the President expects thanks from me but if you don't think the effect will be too disastrous, do give them on my behalf.

Yours faithfully,

John Kenneth Galbraith


JKG:pdm

**AIR MAIL**



Dr. Henry Kissinger  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

207 LITTAUER CENTER  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS



Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA

IN REPLY QUOTE :

7th October, 1970

Dr Henry Kissinger,  
White House Executive Offices,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Dr Kissinger,

....

On behalf of the Ambassador of Australia, Sir James Plimsoll, I attach the text of a statement which has been issued by the Prime Minister of Australia concerning the address on Southeast Asia delivered tonight by President Nixon.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads 'J L Lavett'.

(J.L. Lavett)  
Counsellor



STATEMENT BY RIGHT HONORABLE

JOHN GORTON

The Australian Government holds strongly to the belief that a just and permanent settlement can only be finally achieved around the conference table.

For this reason we warmly welcome these initiatives taken by President Nixon to bring peace and tranquility to the states of South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and their neighbours.

I emphasise that our view about a negotiated settlement has been based on two fundamental democratic principles: The right of the people of these war-torn states to determine their own future and as a corollary that we will not be a party to imposing on other nations a form of government which the people do not want.

We understand the President's proposals envisage that the people of South Viet-Nam should freely vote for their own government and that candidates of any party should be free to stand at such elections.

We also understand that the people of South Viet-Nam will by their own vote decide whether or not they will eventually join with any other state.

Success or failure of President Nixon's new initiative will depend on the agreement by the Communists to accept the basic principles put forward and on their willingness to abide by them.

Particularly we welcome the proposal for the return of all prisoners of war, journalists and other civilians, without exception and without condition to the place of their choice.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright *MW*

SUBJECT: Haile Selassie Request to see the President

Haile Selassie has personally expressed to our Ambassador his desire for a private meeting with the President. The Ambassador, of course, promised to tell Washington, but also made reference to the President's busy schedule, etc. This sounds exactly like the kind of problem you were talking about at this morning's staff meeting. Shall we, without further delay, inform Haile Selassie that the President will see him?

On a related matter, I am told by State that you told Alex Johnson that the President would be willing to see Olivier of Malta. Olivier has not asked to see the President. Do you want us to tell him that the President wishes to see him?

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1. That we inform Haile Selassie forthwith that the President looks forward to a private meeting with him.

Approve *HK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

- 2. That we not stimulate a meeting with Olivier and defer any action on this until he requests a meeting with the President.

Approve *HK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Let me check with Pres. on 2.*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

October 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *ah*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,  
October 14, 1970

1. Review the procedures for handling this morning's NSC meeting and the discussion on Cuba following the regular meeting. Insure that the President is aware of the subtleties in handling the Cuban information. Tell the President that you plan to brief the five Senators on Cuba later this afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

2. Brief the President on your meeting with Korry. Tell the President that you will be conducting a 40-Committee on Chile and the Philippines today as well as a Special Review Group on Chile. You may want to show the message to Korry cleared last Wednesday (Tab A).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

3. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

Ed for file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

October 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

*Meeting  
Steaus*

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, October 13, 1970

1. Tell the President of Rogers' new plan on Middle East and the need to review interdepartmentally before proceeding. Rogers thinks he can get Israelis and Egyptians to agree to new 20 KM missile zone. He plans to tell Eban today and Gromyko later this week. I will turn off Monday a. m., but expect reclama  
at your level immediately.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

2. You may wish to raise your specific concerns about the Middle East if the President's demeanor suggests he can listen.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Brief the President on the latest situation report on Cuba. Tell him that General Haig has briefed Secretaries Rogers and Laird.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

4. Show the President the letter from Galbraith, Tab A - left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Show the President the message to Korry cleared last Wednesday, Tab B - left flap. Tell the President that Korry will be back for a 40 Committee meeting on Wednesday. Tell the President you will meet privately with Korry, also.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Show the President the response from Prime Minister Gorton on the President's peace initiative, Tab C - left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Give the President a rundown on the latest situation in Bolivia. You authorized early contact with new leadership which appears to be somewhat more moderate than we feared.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

*which he approved of your follow up on the*

8. Inform the President ~~that Defense has jointly developed an~~ anti-SAM package for Israel as a follow-up to the President's meeting with Golda Meir. Ambassador Rabin has indicated to General Haig that they are very satisfied with the package although there may be one or two items still under consideration that you will bring to the President's attention through a separate memorandum.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

9. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (Tab D - left flap)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright *MW*

SUBJECT: Haile Selassie Request to see the President

Haile Selassie has personally expressed to our Ambassador his desire for a private meeting with the President. The Ambassador, of course, promised to tell Washington, but also made reference to the President's busy schedule, etc. This sounds exactly like the kind of problem you were talking about at this morning's staff meeting. Shall we, without further delay, inform Haile Selassie that the President will see him?

On a related matter, I am told by State that you told Alex Johnson that the President would be willing to see Olivier of Malta. Olivier has not asked to see the President. Do you want us to tell him that the President wishes to see him?

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we inform Haile Selassie forthwith that the President looks forward to a private meeting with him.

Approve *HK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That we not stimulate a meeting with Olivier and defer any action on this until he requests a meeting with the President.

Approve *HK* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Let me check with Pres. on 2.*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

October <sup>12</sup> 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *(Signature)*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday,  
October 12, 1970

*T. Haig to President 13*

1. Discuss your most recent meeting with Dobrynin and weekend developments with respect to Cuba and the need to develop carefully a public line on events. Also tell the President that you plan to inform the bureaucracy and Congressmen of what really happened. Gen. Haig will tell Rogers, Laird, and the Chairman today--Senior Review Group Tuesday and Congressmen Tuesday or Wednesday dependent on their schedules.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*2. You*

2. Tell the President of Rogers new plan on Middle East and the need to review interdepartmentally before proceeding. Rogers thinks he can get Israelis and Egyptians to agree to new 20 KM missile zone. He plans to tell Eban Tuesday and Gromyko later this week. I will turn off Monday a.m., but expect reclama at your level immediately.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

*2. Brief the President on the latest situation report on Cuba. Tell him that General Haig has briefed Secretaries Rogers and Laird.*

3. Show the President the letter from Galbraith, Tab A - left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

4. Show the President the message to Korry cleared last Wednesday, Tab B - left flap. Tell President Korry will be back for a 40-minute <sup>Committee</sup> meeting on Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Show the President the response from Prime Minister Gorton on the President's peace initiative, Tab C - left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Give the President a rundown on the latest situation in Bolivia. You authorized early contact with new leadership which appears to be somewhat more moderate than we feared.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Give the President a rundown on the situation in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

8. Inform the President that Defense has jointly developed an anti-SAM package for Israel as a follow-up to the President's meeting with Golda Meir. Ambassador Rabin has indicated to General Haig that they are very satisfied with the package although there may be one or two items still under consideration that you will bring to the President's attention through a separate memorandum.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

9. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta? (Tab D)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

October 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,  
October 8, 1970

1. Show the President the letter from Galbraith, Tab A - left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

2. Show the President the message to Korry cleared last night, Tab B-left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

3. Show the President the response from Prime Minister Gorton on the President's peace initiative, Tab C - left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

4. Give the President a rundown on the latest situation in Bolivia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

5. Give the President a rundown on significant points raised during your meeting with the 40 Committee to consider Chile and the Philippines.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Give the President a rundown on the situation in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Inform the President that Defense has jointly developed an anti-SAM package for Israel as a follow-up to the President's meeting with Golda Meir. Ambassador Rabin has indicated to General Haig that they are very satisfied with the package although there may be one or two items still under consideration that you will bring to the President's attention through a separate memorandum.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

8. Tell the President your weekend plans and the fact that you briefed House Republican members this morning and will brief the Senate Republican members at noon today, and will meet with six Congressional leaders on Friday to discuss the trip and Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH  
HARVARD UNIVERSITY  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

*Put in red folder  
for Pres.*

September 25, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

It is not altogether easy to judge the affair in the Middle East during the last week from here. But one can tell enough to know that the Administration has behaved with great, I would almost say inspired, calmness and restraint. And as one who is familiar with the folkways and rat-warrens of Washington I know how much advice you must have had to the contrary. There are many people who must prove their bravery on occasions such as this -- whatever the cost. And there are many others who must prove their willingness to act. And there are yet others for whom life is so dull that any crisis must be seized upon and made worse for its generally exciting effect.

There was, I am persuaded, no conceivable gain (for the United States, for Israel, for the Arabs themselves, or for the hostages) in our intervening with military force in an intra-Arab row. Everything would have been worse and there would have been more blood on the desert.

I somehow doubt that the President expects thanks from me but if you don't think the effect will be too disastrous, do give them on my behalf.

Yours faithfully,

*[Handwritten signature]*  
John Kenneth Galbraith

JKG:pdm

SECRET/NODIS

EYES ONLY

FOR AMBASSADOR KORRY FROM DR. KISSINGER AND ALEX JOHNSON

1. Highest levels here continue to be very concerned that, with October 24 rapidly approaching, anti-Allende forces in Chile do not seem to be coalescing around any effective action to block his election. We understand from your previous messages that military are entirely aware that if Allende is elected they can expect no further MAP or other support from us. If there is any doubt whatever in their mind in this regard, you should use the channels available to you to make this clear. You have also, in accordance with your recommendation, been authorized to inform them that we are already "holding in abeyance" all MAP, including military training and visits not already underway. You have also been informed that we are suspending action on all requests for processing munitions-control-export licenses for Chilean military. You have also previously been authorized to inform the military that if the effort to block Allende from taking office is successful, the Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship. As you know, we have also done our best to encourage American

SECRET/NODIS

firms and financial institutions now to make it clear within Chile the economic and financial consequences that will inevitably flow from an election of Allende.

2. In addition to the foregoing, you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean armed forces. In addition to materiel chargeable to MAP, we also have in mind increased ship loans. If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and materiel that might be immediately required. Obviously we cannot, and we assume Chilean forces would not want, support of American personnel in such a contingency.

3. Although we realize from your report that the odds are very long against the Chilean military taking any effective action, we do not want them to be deterred by what they may feel is any ambiguity with respect to our attitude toward the election of Allende. We therefore, leave it to you and your discretion on how in light of above guidance this can best and most promptly be communicated to the military.

END

10/7/70

TELEPHONE: (202) 797-3000  
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: AUSTEMBA  
TELEX: W. U. 089501

1601 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA

IN REPLY QUOTE:

7th October, 1970

Dr Henry Kissinger,  
White House Executive Offices,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Dr Kissinger,

.....  
On behalf of the Ambassador of Australia, Sir James Plimsoll, I attach the text of a statement which has been issued by the Prime Minister of Australia concerning the address on Southeast Asia delivered tonight by President Nixon.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "J. L. Lavett".

(J.L. Lavett)  
Counsellor



STATEMENT BY RIGHT HONORABLE  
JOHN GORTON

The Australian Government holds strongly to the belief that a just and permanent settlement can only be finally achieved around the conference table.

For this reason we warmly welcome these initiatives taken by President Nixon to bring peace and tranquility to the states of South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and their neighbours.

I emphasise that our view about a negotiated settlement has been based on two fundamental democratic principles: The right of the people of these war-torn states to determine their own future and as a corollary that we will not be a party to imposing on other nations a form of government which the people do not want.

We understand the President's proposals envisage that the people of South Viet-Nam should freely vote for their own government and that candidates of any party should be free to stand at such elections.

We also understand that the people of South Viet-Nam will by their own vote decide whether or not they will eventually join with any other state.

Success or failure of President Nixon's new initiative will depend on the agreement by the Communists to accept the basic principles put forward and on their willingness to abide by them.

Particularly we welcome the proposal for the return of all prisoners of war, journalists and other civilians, without exception and without condition to the place of their choice.

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

October 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,  
October 7, 1970

1. Inform the President of your plans for backgrounding on his Vietnam initiative. This includes discussions with: a) White House staff, b) TV commentators, c) regular White House press corps and d) the NSC staff. Tell the President you will be present for his Cabinet and Congressional briefings but will have to leave the Congressional briefing at 6:30 p.m.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Give the President a rundown on the latest situation in Bolivia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Give the President a rundown on significant points raised during your meeting with the 40 Committee today to consider Cuba, Chile and the Philippines.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. Give the President a rundown on the situation in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Inform the President that Defense has jointly developed an anti-SAM package for Israel as a follow-up to the President's meeting with Golda Meir. Ambassador Rabin has indicated to General Haig that they are very satisfied with the package although there may be one or two items still under consideration that you will bring to the President's attention through a separate memorandum.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

October 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, October 6, 1970

4. Give the President a rundown on the situation in Jordan. ~~Sit Rep~~  
~~on left flap.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

2. Give the President a rundown on the latest situation in Bolivia. ~~We are informed that the Armed Forces Chiefs have asked for the resignation of both President Ovando and Army Commander General Miranda, who led the coup against Ovando. This solution can be interpreted as a compromise to avoid civil war. Reportedly, the Armed Forces Chiefs are considering General Banzar to replace Ovando as President. Banzar is currently the Director of the military school in La Paz.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

3. ~~Inform the President that you are meeting with the 40 Committee today to consider Cuba, Chile and the Philippines.~~ *Give a rundown on significant points raised during your*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

4. Inform the President you are sending him a game plan for the processing of his Vietnam initiative, <sup>of your plans for backgrounding on</sup> on Wednesday. This <sup>includes</sup> provides for back-grounding by you of: a) White House staff, b) six Congressional leaders, c) TV commentators, and d) regular White House press corps, <sup>and for NSC staff. Tell the President you will be present for his Cabinet and Congressional briefings</sup> and for NSC staff. Tell the President you will be present for his Cabinet and Congressional briefings. I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
*but will have to leave the Congressional briefing at 6:30.*  
Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

5. Inform the President that Defense has jointly developed an anti-SAM package for Israel as a follow-up to the President's meeting with Golda Meir. Ambassador Rabin has indicated to General Haig that they are very satisfied with the package although there may be one or two items still under consideration that you will bring to the President's attention through a separate memorandum.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

6. Discuss status of Secretary Laird's proposal for immediate Supplemental which was the subject of a separate memorandum to the President.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Discuss weekend plans for Key Biscayne and determine whether or not the President wishes you to be in Key Biscayne.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

September 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,  
September 25, 1970

1. Give the President a rundown on the situation in Jordan. Sit Rep on left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Discuss with the President the situation which has developed with respect to the Note Verbale to Israel. You have sent the President a separate memorandum on this (copy at Enclosure #1). Personally, I think it is a shame the President has to be bothered with such tripe.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Inform the President of the actions taken yesterday with respect to (a) Cuba, (b) Chile and (c) the Philippines. Concerning the Philippines, you should know that Mrs. Marcos urgently wanted to meet with you to get a \$300 million credit guarantee. She did not mention this in the meeting with the President because she was not aware of the requirement. I asked Holdridge last night to get with State on a urgent basis to see what can be done to provide her with something she can take home which might be of assistance.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

4. Review details re trip to include:

- (a) The books and Presidential statements.
- (b) Decision you made yesterday on the Kennedy.
- (c) Your personal plans for the weekend.
- (d) The change with respect to Sisco on Laird's portion of the trip.
- (e) Your meeting with Ky Saturday afternoon and the position you intend to take.
- (f) Your plans to leave Ireland on Sunday after the Bruce meeting and marry up with the Presidential party at the time of the luncheon in Dublin.
- (g) Inform the President that Sisco will brief the Middle Eastern Ambassadors before they meet with the President.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Update the President on the textile directive which was sent out yesterday putting Flanigan in interim charge while you are away and asking that a new interdepartmental position be readied for the President by October 6.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Discuss with the President the need to get an interdepartmentally agreed-upon game plan for future actions on the Middle East to ensure that a new rash of ad hoc steps are not undertaken in his absence and to

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

be sure that he has an opportunity to carefully consider the full range of actions and their implications before they are undertaken (you are sending him a separate memorandum on this).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Tell the President that Laird has come forward with a recommendation that we move on a supplemental now. You have a memorandum on this which you should review before seeing the President.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Enc.  
#1

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

FOR ACTION

SECRET/NODIS

September 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Points to be made to Israeli Ambassador Rabin

Events have overtaken the need for a precise response to the Israeli Note Verbale which was received on September 22 and which was related to the possible provision of Israeli air attacks on Syrian forces in Jordan. As you know, on the afternoon of September 23 Ambassador Rabin suggested that the matter of Israeli military action in Jordan be held in abeyance in view of the withdrawal of Syrian regular forces from Jordan. In order to clear the record with respect to this and prior exchanges with the Israelis, State has proposed that Assistant Secretary Sisco deliver orally to Ambassador Rabin the message at Tab A. I do not believe that paragraph 4 of the proposed State text is acceptable for the following reasons:

(1) It would raise serious questions in the minds of the Israelis as to our fundamental willingness to defend Israel against Soviet attack.

(2) It is an especially abrasive and unnecessary affront to the Government of Israel in the light of the cooperative attitude they maintained throughout the recent crisis.

(3) Most importantly it could seriously hamper future cooperation with Israel at a time when the situation in Jordan remains tense and before we can be absolutely certain that it may not be necessary to call upon Israel again to take military action in Jordan.

I am informed that paragraph 4 was written personally by the Secretary of State because he believes that paragraph 3 of our earlier Note Verbale of September 21 to the Government of Israel constituted an open-ended commitment to protect Israel against Soviet attack (Tab B). I do not agree with this interpretation.

SECRET/NODIS

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize a new and terser response to Israel which will clearly clean the slate with respect to commitments made this week but which will avoid an unnecessary irritant and would not jeopardize future cooperative action if required.

An alternate text for your approval is at Tab C.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve alternate text.

\_\_\_\_\_ Retain proposed State language.

SECRET/NODIS

The following points would be made orally to Ambassador Rabin today:

1. According to the latest available information, the forces which invaded Jordan have withdrawn to Syria. It is our understanding that Israel agrees with us that there is no need for any Israeli military action against the Syrian forces in Jordan either by air or on the ground.

2. We appreciate the prompt and positive Israeli response to our approach. We believe that the steps Israel took have contributed measurably to the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The United States appreciates this further positive demonstration of Israel's willingness' to work towards common aims. We believe, as we are confident Israel does, that it will serve our mutual interest if King Hussein can himself establish law and order throughout the country.

3. We believe the situation should be kept under continuing review.

4. We consider that all aspects of our exchanges with Israel with regard to the Syrian invasion of Jordan, including those relating to the problem of possible Soviet military intervention, applied only to the situation which arose from the Syrian invasion and therefore no longer apply.

5. Finally, Israel's helpful and responsive approach in our exchanges, as well as the continuing threat on this and other fronts, will be taken fully into account as we give prompt and sympathetic consideration to additional Israeli requests for military assistance.

September 24, 1970

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/EXDIS

QUESTION #3:

How will the U.S. act to prevent Soviet participation or involvement?

ANSWER:

On September 20 the U.S. Government called upon the Soviet Government to take appropriate steps in Damascus to bring about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Jordan. Secretary Rogers made a public statement to this effect on September 20. We have and will continue to make clear to the Soviets our support for Israel's security and integrity and its right to live within defensible borders. In the present crisis, the U.S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet; it has also taken other readiness measures. These clearly imply a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for specific measures the U.S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention, these would depend on the circumstances and the situation that exists at the time. We have contingency plans for these eventualities.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/NODIS

According to the latest available information, the forces which invaded Jordan have withdrawn to Syria. We believe that the steps Israel took have contributed measurably to that withdrawal.

We appreciate the prompt and positive Israeli response to our approach. Because circumstances will be different if there is another attack, we consider that all aspects of the exchanges between us with regard to this Syrian invasion of Jordan are no longer applicable, and we understand that Israel agrees. If a new situation arises, there will have to be a fresh exchange.

SECRET/NODIS

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 8A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

TO PRESIDENT NIXON FROM KING HUSSEIN

Sir:

May I express my deepest appreciation for your friendship and sympathy and general concern over the problems and difficulties which my country faces. Our only consolation lies in any determination to make of these tragic efforts a turning point that will enable us to rebuild Jordan on a dynamic solid basis. We are and have been fully aware of our responsibilities not only to defend with our lives our sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and also our responsibilities in the area, and towards its future as well as the cause of justice and peace, here and in the world.

We appreciate above all your help and support during the very crucial, anxious moments when the odds appeared to grow too numerous against us. We felt in our struggle of life and death that we were not alone. We continue to need help and support to rebuild and face the multitude of human demands and requirements, and to replenish our losses on the military level. Believe me, Sir, I have a strong conviction that this country, its people, and its armed forces will continue to be a very hard nut to crack. This may have begun to dawn on many around us and the world.

God bless you. With all my respect. Best wishes and regards.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

Al Haig 

SUBJECT:

Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,  
September 24, 1970

1. Give the President a rundown on the situation in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

*Sit upon  
flap.*

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Give the President your thinking with respect to the situation

in Cuba *and PLANS for preparing public officials PEN.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Tell the President about the Alexis Johnson message sent to Korry yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President of your plans for <sup>this</sup> ~~next~~ weekend, including departure on ~~Friday~~ evening.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Give the President the latest on the textile situation, including putting Flanigan in charge.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. You may want to briefly discuss the President's appointment today with the Yugoslavian Ambassador. (See Chapin memo at Tab A.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. The President was quoted at the at country club last night as saying the situation in the Middle East is now stable. Ask him how to get this in focus this morning.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

(Books, ~~papers~~ Toasts etc. for Trip)

033P/01/1000

A

NIJON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 9A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

September 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,  
September 18, 1970

1. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Review scenario for today's meeting with Golda Meir. Quiet head-to-head session after meeting, perhaps in Rose Garden. Haig will move others out door.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Review trip scenario. Latest version is at Enclosure #1. Raise Laird issue re Air Force One. Announce Irish leg Saturday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: OK

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

*Use the study...*  
*Wong jin*  
*10/24*  
*Date for Conference*

4. Give the President a run-down on your recent meetings on Chile.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: Not tell Chile

---

5. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise the Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited. He is also trying to get to President by other means.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

No /

Issued:  
9/16/70  
6:00 p. m.  
(Rome)

ROUGH

PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULE

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1970

ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, WASH. D.C. TO ROME, ITALY

7:30 a. m.  
EDT

Depart Andrews Air Force  
Base.

Flying Time: 8:20 minutes  
Time Change: + 5 hours

8:50 p. m.

Arrive Rome, Italy, Ciampino  
Military Airport.

NOTE: There will be no honors  
or reception at the airport.

9:00 p. m.

Depart by helicopter for  
Quirinale Palace.

9:10 p. m.

Arrive Piazza del Quirinale.

You and Mrs. Nixon are greeted  
by President Saragat.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1970 (Cont.)

ROME, ITALY

9:15 p. m.

President Saragat will escort you and Mrs. Nixon (followed by the official party) into Quirinale Palace.

Directly inside the main gate of the Palace is the courtyard. The Quirinale Palace Guard will form the Honor Guard for the arrival ceremonies.

You and President Saragat will move into the courtyard for Honors and the playing of both National Anthems, followed by a Review of the Palace Guard.

REMARKS.

NOTE: Mrs. Nixon and the official party will be located in the VIP area of the courtyard.

9:30 p. m.

Arrival ceremony concludes.

President Saragat will escort you and Mrs. Nixon to your quarters within the Quirinale Palace.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1970

ROME, ITALY

9:30 a. m.

President Nixon calls on President Saragat. This meeting will take place in the Ceremonial Office of President Saragat in the Quirinale Palace.

NOTE: President Saragat will request the presence of the Italian Foreign Minister, Moro, in this meeting.

QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED:

Will there be a simultaneous Joint Advisers Meeting? If so, who will be present? What U.S. Officials should be present? The Italians will have a large group. Italians expect the President to join this meeting for a few minutes at the conclusion of the meeting.

10:30 a. m.

Depart Quirinale Palace by motorcade for Villa Madama.

10:50 a. m.

Arrive Villa Madama.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1970 (Cont.)

ROME, ITALY

11:00 a. m.

Call on Prime Minister Colombo.

QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED:

Will there be a simultaneous Joint Advisers Meeting? If so, who will be present? What U. S. Officials should be present?

12:00 noon

Depart Villa Madama.

12:20 p. m.

Arrive Quirinale Palace.

Return to suite.

STAFF TIME.

1:00 p. m.

President Saragat will host a State Luncheon for approximately 40 U. S. and Italian Officials in the Quirinale Towers.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1970 (Cont.)

ROME, ITALY - (Meeting with the Pope)

2:55 p. m.

President Saragat will escort you to your motorcade.

NOTE: Party separates into two groups. One small group will accompany the President to the Vatican. The remainder stays at Quirinale Palace and will motorcade to the Vatican arriving at 4:10 p. m.

NOTE: Departure ceremony will consist of a walk-by of the Palace Guard. No remarks on departure and no anthems. March music will be played as the two Presidents move through the courtyard.

3:00 p. m.

Depart by motorcade for the Vatican.

3:15 p. m.

Arrive the Vatican.

Archbishop Giovanni Benelli, Secretary of State for the Vatican, will meet you and your party and escort you to the Papal apartments.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1970 (Cont.)

ROME, ITALY - (Meeting with the Pope)

3:30 p. m.

Enter the Pope's Library.

You will be met at the threshold by Pope Paul VI for substantive talks.

NOTE: The Vatican indicated they would like their Secretary of State to meet with Secretary Rogers and asked about the possibility of other members of the official party meeting with their counterparts in the Vatican during this one-hour session.

4:10 p. m.

Remainder of the official party arrive at the Vatican.

4:20 p. m.

Secretary Rogers, Kissinger, etc. join your meeting with the Pope:

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1970 (Cont.)

ROME, ITALY - (Meeting with the Pope)

4:25 p. m.

Mrs. Nixon will join you and the Pope and the three of you join other members of the official party in the St. John's Room.

BOTH YOU AND THE POPE  
MAKE BRIEF REMARKS.

Exchange of gifts.

The Pope will then escort you and Mrs. Nixon to the door and take leave at this point.

4:45 p. m.

You and Mrs. Nixon accompanied by the official party will be led through the Clementine Hall where members of the North American College will be assembled.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1970 (Cont.)

ROME, ITALY - CRUISIER SPRINGFIELD

5:00 p. m.

Depart by motorcade for helicopter located in St. Peter's Square.

5:05 p. m.

Arrive helicopter.

5:10 p. m.

Depart by helicopter for the Cruisier SPRINGFIELD of the Sixth Fleet located in the Mediterranean.

NOTE: Party members not accompanying the President return to the Grand Hotel.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (Tentative) 9/16/70

Tuesday, September 29

8:00 a. m. Private breakfast

9:00 a. m. President to flight deck. Full honors on flight deck. Remarks to the fleet upon completion of honors.

9:30 a. m. Tour of the ship to include:

Each type aircraft displayed on hangar deck, crews standing by crews berthing, mess, and sick bay.

Pilot's ready room.

Wardroom to greet ships/air group officers.

Flag bridge/CO bridge.

Note: Tour is people and facility oriented, no technical briefings.

10:30 a. m. Fleet Review.

The fleet review will consist of the carrier passing a column of ships to observe the following evolutions:

A destroyer refueling from USS Seattle, a brand-new, all-purpose replenishment ship.

A helicopter will launch from Seattle to conduct a vertical replenishment on the next ship in column.

Two ships will fire assorted weapons.

A destroyer will launch a DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) to track a submarine.

ASW weapons will be demonstrated.

At the conclusion of the above events, the carrier will turn into the wind and launch aircraft for an aircraft firepower demonstration.

The air group will then be recovered.

Note: Precise timing and order of the events is being worked out and will be submitted for approval.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/16/70

Tuesday, September 29

12:30 p. m.            Review complete.  
Private lunch  
Staff time

1:15 p. m.            Depart by helo for Springfield

1:25 p. m.            Arrive Springfield  
minimum honors

1:30 p. m.            Commanders Conference (Rogers, Laird,  
Kissinger, Moorer, Goodpaster, Zumwalt,  
Wendt, Kidd)

3:30 p. m.            Conference complete

4:00 p. m.            Depart by helo for Naples, Italy

                          Note: Bad weather alternate - Conference in  
                          morning on Springfield or Saratoga,  
                          fleet review in the afternoon.

4:30 p. m.            Arrive Naples via helo  
Note: Helicopter site in close proximity to  
                          residence.

4:35 p. m.            Motorcade departs for Villa Rosebery  
(President Saragat's Naples residence)

4:45 p. m.            Arrive Villa Rosebery

                          Note: Staff staying with President:  
                          Haldeman, Kissinger, Hughes, Higby, Lord.

                          Staff time

                          Private dinner

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1970

NAPLES, ITALY TO BELGRADE YUGOSLAVIA

9:00 a. m. Motorcade departs for Helicopter site

9:10 a. m. Arrive helicopter site.

9:15 a. m. Depart for NATO Headquarters.

9:20 a. m. Arrive NATO Headquarters.

Arrival Honors.

REMARKS.

9:45 a. m. Meet with NATO Commanders.

(Length: 1-1/2 hours.)

11:15 a. m. Meeting concludes.

STAFF TIME: 30 minutes.

11:45 a. m. Meet with U. S. Ambassadors.

(Length: 1-1/2 hour s.)

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1970 (Cont.)

NAPLES, ITALY TO BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA

1:15 p. m.

Meeting concludes.

OPTIONS:

1. Move to private area.  
Staff work - light lunch.
2. Attend luncheon which Secretary Rogers may hold for U. S. Ambassadors.
3. President may want to meet privately with one or two Ambassadors.

2:50 p. m.

Depart NATO Headquarters for Naval Air Station.

3:05 p. m.

Arrive Naval Air Station.

Minimum honors on departure.

(NOTE: All members of Party having stayed in Rome will be on Air Force One when it arrives Naples.)

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1970 (Cont.)

NAPLES, ITALY TO BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA

3:15 p. m.	Depart for Belgrade.
4:50 p. m.	Arrive Belgrade. Arrival Ceremony
5:05 p. m.	Motorcade
6:00 p. m.	Brief Courtesy Call on President Tito
6:30 p. m.	Depart for Residence (State Guest House) Staff Time
8:00 p. m.	State Dinner hosted by Tito

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Thursday, October 1

8:00 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
9:00 a. m.	Meeting with Tito (Simultaneous Meeting of Advisors)	
10:30 a. m.	Call on Premier Ribicic	
11:00 a. m.	Depart for Federal Assembly Building	
11:15 a. m.	Call on Assembly President Popovic	
11:45 a. m.	Possible brief talk to Assembly if in session	
12:00 noon	Depart for Belgrade airport	
12:20 p. m.	Depart Belgrade (Air Force #1) (lunch aboard aircraft)	50 minutes
1:10 p. m.	Arrive Zagreb Motorcade through city	
2:00 p. m.	Call on Croat leaders	
2:30 p. m.	Motor to Tito's birthplace - Kumrouec	
3:15 p. m.	Arrive Kumrouec national shrine	
3:45 p. m.	Depart birthplace by helo	
4:15 p. m.	Arrive airport. Depart for Belgrade	50 minutes
5:05 p. m.	Arrive Belgrade. Motor to residence.	
5:30 p. m.	Staff Time.	
8:00 p. m.	Dinner hosted by President	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/77

Friday, October 2

7:30 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
8:30 a. m.	Motor to airport	
8:45 a. m.	Departure Ceremony at Airport	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Belgrade (lunch on plane)	3 hours 5 minutes
12:05 p. m.	Arrive Madrid Airport Arrival Ceremony	
12:30 p. m.	Begin motorcade	
1:45 p. m.	Motorcade ends - Staff Time at Residence	
3:00 p. m.	Call on President Franco (simultaneous meetings with officials)	
4:00 p. m.	Depart for Residence	
4:30 p. m.	President called on by Vice President Carrero Blanco	
5:00 p. m.	President called on by Prince Juan Carlos	
5:30 p. m.	Appropriate color event or Greet Embassy Staff	
6:30 p. m.	Staff time	
8:00 p. m.	State Dinner hosted by Franco	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/16/70

Saturday, October 3

7:30 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
8:30 a. m.	Depart Madrid by auto	
8:50 a. m.	Departure ceremony airport	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Madrid	2 hours 5 minutes
11:05 a. m.	Arrive Brize Norton AFB, England President helos to Checquers (Rest of party remains with aircraft)	
11:15 a. m.	Meeting with Prime Minister Heath	
12:30 p. m.	Lunch with Prime Minister Heath	
2:45 p. m.	Depart for Brize Norton	
3:00 p. m.	Depart for Shannon	1 hour 15 minutes
4:15 p. m.	Arrive Shannon Depart for Castle	
4:30 p. m.	Arrive Castle	
	Private Dinner	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (Tentative) 9/16/70

Sunday, October 4

Personal Time

Selected visits to places determined  
by the President

4:30	Meet with Bruce and Habib, Kissinger, Rogers
7:00	Private Dinner

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/16/70

Monday, October 5

8:00 a. m.	Breakfast	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Shannon	
9:35 a. m.	Arrive Ceremony Dublin	
9:50 a. m.	Motorcade	
10:30 a. m.	Call on President deValera	
11:00 a. m.	Call on Prime Minister Lynch	
11:30 a. m.	Motor to family birthplace	
12:45 p. m.	Helo to Dublin Airport	
1:00 p.m.	Depart Dublin (lunch enroute)	
4:00 p. m.	Arrive Andrews Air Force Base	8 hours (minus 5 hours time change)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

September 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,  
September 16, 1970

1. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation in Jordan and on hijaekings. Tell him of exchange with British last night and special WSAG meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

2. Review scenario for today's foreign policy briefing of editors and Nothing with Golda Meir  
broadcasters. Quite good to head at end of meeting perhaps in Rose Garden. Haig will make statement door.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Review trip scenario. Latest version is at Enclosure #1. Tell the President you will see the Irish Ambassador this morning to discuss the visit to Ireland. Raise Kaid issue re A.F.#1, AARoomce, Irish Leg Saturday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a run-down on your recent meetings on Chile.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

~~5. Discuss Golda Meir's visit, Sisco and Haig to sit in. Tell the President Rogers still reluctant.~~

~~I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_~~

~~Comments: \_\_\_\_\_~~

---

6. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise the Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited. He is also trying to get to President by other means.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Sunday, September 27

7:30 a.m.	Depart Andrews AFB	8 hours 20 minutes (Plus 5 hour time change)
8:50 p.m.	Arrive Rome Airport arrival Ceremony	
9:15 p.m.	Depart Airport Proceed by helo to Quirinale Palace (30 minutes by auto)	
9:30 (approx.)	Call on President Saragat for 30 minutes Remain overnight.	

Monday, September 28

8:00 a. m. Breakfast (private)

9:45 a. m. Call on President Saragat  
(Quirinale)

10:45 a. m. Depart for Chigi Palace

11:00 a. m. Call on Prime Minister Colombo  
(simultaneous conversations with advisors)

12:00 p. m. Depart Chigi Palace

12:15 p. m. Arrive Quirinale Palace

1:00 p. m. Lunch Hosted by Italians  
(Saragat, Colombo, Fanfani, Moro, etc.)

2:30 p. m. Staff Time

3:30 p. m. Depart for Vatican

3:45 p. m. Arrive Vatican-met by Benelli  
Depart for St. Peters

4:00 p. m. Call on Pope (private meeting)

5:00 p. m. Other advisors join

5:15 p. m. Proceed to Clementine Hall

5:30 p. m. Greet Assembled American Clerics

5:45 p. m. Depart for helo pad

6:00 p. m. Depart by helo for Cruiser SPRINGFIELD 1 hour

7:00 p. m. Arrive Flagship SPRINGFIELD, Honors

7:30 p. m. Private Dinner

Tuesday, September 29

8:30 a. m.	Breakfast	
9:00 a. m.	Commanders Conference (Rogers, Laird, Kissinger, Moorer, Goodpaster, Zumwalt, Wendt, Kidd)	
10:30 a. m.	Transfer to aircraft carrier SARATOGA	
10:45 a. m.	Tour selected areas of ship	
11:30 a. m.	Brief Remarks to Assembled Crew (e. g. on flight or hangar deck)	
11:45 a. m.	Visit wardroom with ship and air group officers	
12:30 noon	Private Lunch	
2:00 p. m.	Review Fleet Exercises to include fire power demonstration, anti-submarine warfare tactics, and flight operations	
5:30 p. m.	Depart Sixth Fleet by helo	1 hour
6:30 p. m.	Arrive NATO Headquarters (Southern Europe) Adm. Rivero, USN. Arrival Ceremony to include NATO and Naples officials.	
7:00 p. m.	Depart for Villa Nike (home of Admiral Rivero USN, CINCSOUTH)	
7:05 p. m.	Arrive Villa Nike	
7:30 p. m.	Dinner (private) Personal Time	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Wednesday, September 30

8:00 a. m. Breakfast (private)

8:55 a. m. Depart Villa Nike

9:00 a. m. Arrive NATO Headquarters, Southern Europe  
Meet with NATO Military Commanders (Adm. Rivero,  
USN; Gen. Dean, USAF; Gen. Cassone, Italian Army;  
Adm. Lorenzini, Italian Navy; Gen. Harrell, USA;  
V/Adm. Kidd, USN; and Senior Allied Staff (Italy, Greece,  
Turkey, UK and US).

10:30 a. m. Depart NATO Headquarters

10:35 a. m. Arrive Villa Nike - Staff time

11:00 a. m. Meet with Mediterranean Ambassadors  
Western Med: Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Malta  
Eastern Med: Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus  
Middle East: Lebanon, Israel, UAR , Libya

12:30 p. m. Lunch -  
- Private in Villa Nike

2:00 p. m. Helo to US Naval Air Station

2:15 p. m. Depart for Belgrade 1 hour 35 minutes

3:45 p. m. Arrive Belgrade  
Arrival Ceremony

4:00 p. m. Motorcade

5:00 p. m. Brief Courtesy Call on President Tito

5:30 p. m. Depart for Residence - (State Guest House)  
Staff Time

8:00 p. m. State Dinner hosted by Tito

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Thursday, October 1

8:00 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
9:00 a. m.	Meeting with Tito (Simultaneous Meeting of Advisors)	
10:30 a. m.	Call on Premier Ribicic	
11:00 a. m.	Depart for Federal Assembly Building	
11:15 a. m.	Call on Assembly President Popovic	
11:45 a. m.	Possible brief talk to Assembly if in session	
12:00 noon	Depart for Belgrade airport	
12:20 p. m.	Depart Belgrade (Air Force #1) (lunch aboard aircraft)	50 minutes
1:10 p. m.	Arrive Zagreb Motorcade through city	
2:00 p. m.	Call on Croat leaders	
2:30 p. m.	Motor to Tito's birthplace - Kumrouec	
3:15 p. m.	Arrive Kumrouec national shrine	
3:45 p. m.	Depart birthplace by helo	
4:15 p. m.	Arrive airport. Depart for Belgrade	50 minutes
5:05 p. m.	Arrive Belgrade. Motor to residence.	
5:30 p. m.	Staff Time	
8:00 p. m.	Dinner hosted by President	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Friday, October 2

7:30 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
8:30 a. m.	Motor to airport	
8:45 a. m.	Departure Ceremony at Airport	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Belgrade (lunch on plane)	3 hours 5 minutes
12:05 p. m.	Arrive Madrid Airport Arrival Ceremony	
12:30 p. m.	Begin motorcade	
1:45 p. m.	Motorcade ends - Staff Time at Residence	
3:00 p. m.	Call on President Franco (simultaneous meetings with officials)	
4:00 p. m.	Depart for Residence	
4:30 p. m.	President called on by Vice President Carrero Blanco	
5:00 p. m.	President called on by Prince Juan Carlos	
5:30 p. m.	Appropriate color event or Greet Embassy Staff	
6:30 p. m.	Staff time	
8:00 p. m.	State Dinner hosted by Franco	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Saturday, October 3

7:30 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
8:30 a. m.	Depart Madrid by auto	
8:50 a. m.	Departure ceremony airport	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Madrid	2 hours 5 minutes
11:05 a. m.	Arrive Brize Norton AFB, England President helos to Checquers (Rest of party remains with aircraft)	
11:15 a. m.	Meeting with Prime Minister Heath	
12:30 p. m.	Lunch with Prime Minister Heath	
2:45 p. m.	Depart for Brize Norton	
3:00 p. m.	Depart for Dublin	1 hour 15 minutes
4:15 p. m.	Arrival Ceremony at Dublin airport Motorcade	
5:00 p. m.	Arrive Residence - Staff time	
7:00 p. m.	Call on President De Valera	
7:30 p. m.	Call on Prime Minister Lynch	
8:00 p. m.	State Dinner hosted by Irish	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/15/70

Sunday, October 4

Personal Time

Selected visits to places determined  
by the President

Monday, October 5

8:00 a. m.	Breakfast	
9:00 a. m.	Meet with Habib, Bruce, Kissinger and Rogers	
11:00 a. m.	Depart Shannon	8 hours (minus 5 hours time change)
2:00 p. m.	Arrive Andrews AFB	

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Tell him of exchange with British last night and special W/SAG meeting*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

September 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, <sup>Wednesday</sup> ~~Tuesday~~,  
September 16, 1970

*7. Review scenario for today's foreign policy meeting of editors and cross-section*  
~~3. Review trip scenario. Latest version is at Enclosure #1. Tell the President you have coordinated draft press announcement with countries involved (less Ireland) and hope to have their final clearance this morning. You will see the Yugoslavian Ambassador this morning to discuss the itinerary for that stop. Tell the President you will see the Irish Ambassador this morning to discuss his visit to Ireland.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

~~2. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation on hijackings and in Jordan. Tell the President you will be meeting with the WSAG at 9:15 this morning to discuss Jordan.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

~~3. Review game plan for Foreign Aid Message signature at 10:00 a. m.~~

~~4. Give the President a run-down on the 40 Committee meeting on Chile and your breakfast meeting with Edwards, Kendall and the Attorney General. your recent meetings on Chile.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

*Inform the President of your call from Greenhill and your meeting with Paskard, Mover, and DeLoach last night*

5. Discuss Golda Meir's visit, Sisco and Haig to sit in. Tell the President Rogers still reluctant.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

~~6. Discuss scenario for trip announcement this afternoon.~~

~~I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_~~

~~Comments: \_\_\_\_\_~~

7. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise the Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited.

*He is also trying to get to pass by other means.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/14/70

Sunday, September 27

7:30 a.m.	Depart Andrews AFB	8 hours 20 minutes (Plus 5 hour time change)
8:50 p.m.	Arrive Rome Airport arrival Ceremony	
9:15 p.m.	Depart Airport Proceed by helo to Quirinale Palace (30 minutes by auto)	
9:30 (approx.)	Call on President Saragat for 30 minutes Remain overnight.	

*Flow put  
in 9/15/70  
version*

Monday, September 28

8:00 a. m. Breakfast (private)

9:45 a. m. Call on President Saragat  
(Quirinale)

10:45 a. m. Depart for Chigi Palace

11:00 a. m. Call on Prime Minister Columbo  
(simultaneous conversations with advisors)

12:00 p. m. Depart Chigi Palace

12:15 p. m. Arrive Quirinale Palace

1:00 p. m. Lunch Hosted by Italians  
(Saragat, Columbo, Fanfani, Moro, etc.)

2:30 p. m. Staff Time

3:30 p. m. Depart for Vatican

3:45 p. m. Arrive Vatican-met by Benelli  
Depart for St. Peters

4:00 p. m. Call on Pope (private meeting)

5:00 p. m. Other advisors join

5:15 p. m. Proceed to Clementine Hall

5:30 p. m. Greet Assembled American Clerics

5:45 p. m. Depart for helo pad

6:00 p. m. Depart by helo for Cruiser SPRINGFIELD 1 hour

7:00 p. m. Arrive Flagship SPRINGFIELD, Honors

7:30 p. m. Private Dinner with Participants  
(Rogers, Laird, Kissinger, Moorer, Goodpaster,  
Zumwalt, Wendt and Kidd)

Tuesday, September 29

8:30 a. m.	Breakfast	
9:00 a. m.	Commanders Conference	
10:30 a. m.	Transfer to aircraft carrier SARATOGA	
10:45 a. m.	Tour selected areas of ship	
11:30 a. m.	Brief Remarks to Assembled Crew (e. g. on flight or hangar deck)	
11:45 a. m.	Visit wardroom with ship and air group officers	
12:30 noon	Private Lunch	
2:00 p. m.	Review Fleet Exercises to include fire power demonstration, anti-submarine warfare tactics, and flight operations	
5:30 p. m.	Depart Sixth Fleet by helo	1 hour
6:30 p. m.	Arrive NATO Headquarters (Southern Europe) Adm. Rivero, USN. Arrival Ceremony to include NATO and Naples officials.	
7:00 p. m.	Depart for Villa Nike (home of Admiral Rivero USN, CINCSOUTH)	
7:05 p. m.	Arrive Villa Nike	
7:30 p. m.	Dinner (private) Personal Time	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/14/70

Wednesday, September 30

8:00 a. m. Breakfast (private)

8:55 a. m. Depart Villa Nike

9:00 a. m. Arrive NATO Headquarters, Southern Europe  
Meet with NATO Military Commanders (Adm. Rivero,  
USN; Gen. Dean, USAF; Gen. Cassone, Italian Army;  
Adm. Lorenzini, Italian Navy; Gen. Harrell, USA;  
V/Adm. Kidd, USN; and Senior Allied Staff (Italy, Greece,  
Turkey, UK and US).

10:30 a. m. Depart NATO Headquarters

10:35 a. m. Arrive Villa Nike - Staff time

11:00 a. m. Meet with Mediterranean Ambassadors  
Western Med: Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Malta  
Eastern Med: Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus  
Middle East: Lebanon, Israel, UAR, Libya

12:30 p. m. Lunch -  
- Private in Villa Nike

2:00 p. m. Helo to US Naval Air Station

2:15 p. m. Depart for Belgrade 1 hour 35 minutes

3:45 p. m. Arrive Belgrade  
Arrival Ceremony

4:00 p. m. Motorcade

5:00 p. m. Brief Courtesy Call on President Tito

5:30 p. m. Depart for Residence - (State Guest House)  
Staff Time

8:00 p. m. State Dinner hosted by Tito

Thursday, October 1

8:00 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
9:00 a. m.	Meeting with Tito (Simultaneous Meeting of Advisors)	
10:30 a. m.	Call on Premier Ribicic	
11:00 a. m.	Depart for Federal Assembly Building	
11:15 a. m.	Call on Assembly President Popovic	
11:45 a. m.	Possible brief talk to Assembly if in session	
12:00 noon	Depart for Belgrade airport	
12:20 p. m.	Depart Belgrade (Air Force #1) (lunch aboard aircraft)	50 minutes
1:10 p. m.	Arrive Zagreb Motorcade through city	
2:00 p. m.	Call on Croat leaders	
2:30 p. m.	Motor to Tito's birthplace - Kumrouec	
3:15 p. m.	Arrive Kumrouec national shrine	
3:45 p. m.	Depart birthplace by helo	
4:15 p. m.	Arrive airport. Depart for Belgrade	50 minutes
5:05 p. m.	Arrive Belgrade. Motor to residence.	
5:30 p. m.	Staff Time	
8:00 p. m.	Dinner hosted by President	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/14/70

Friday, October 2

7:30 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
8:30 a. m.	Motor to airport	
8:45 a. m.	Departure Ceremony at Airport	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Belgrade (lunch on plane)	3 hours 5 minutes
12:05 p. m.	Arrive Madrid Airport Arrival Ceremony	
12:30 p. m.	Begin motorcade	
1:45 p. m.	Motorcade ends - Staff Time at Residence	
3:00 p. m.	Call on President Franco (simultaneous meetings with officials)	
4:00 p. m.	Depart for Residence	
4:30 p. m.	President called on by Vice President Carrero Blanco	
5:00 p. m.	President called on by Prince Juan Carlos	
5:30 p. m.	Appropriate color event or Greet Embassy Staff	
6:30 p. m.	Staff time	
8:00 p. m.	State Dinner hosted by Franco	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/14/70

Saturday, October 3 (Omit Rota)

7:30 a. m.	Breakfast (private)	
8:30 a. m.	Depart Madrid by auto	
8:50 a. m.	Departure ceremony airport	
9:00 a. m.	Depart Madrid	2 hours 5 minutes
11:05 a. m.	Arrive Brize Norton AFB, England President helos to Checquers (Rest of party remains with aircraft)	
11:15 a. m.	Meeting with Prime Minister Heath	
12:30 p. m.	Lunch with Prime Minister Heath	
2:45 p. m.	Depart for Brize Norton	
3:00 p. m.	Depart for Dublin	1 hour 15 minutes
4:15 p. m.	Arrival Ceremony at Dublin airport Motorcade	
5:00 p. m.	Arrive Residence - Staff time	
7:00 p. m.	Call on President De Valera	
7:30 p. m.	Call on Prime Minister Lynch	
8:00 p. m.	State Dinner hosted by Irish	

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

(Tentative) 9/14/70

Sunday, October 4

Personal Time

Selected visits to places determined  
by the President

Monday, October 5

8:00 a. m.

Breakfast

9:00 a. m.

Meet with Habib, Bruce, Kissinger and Rogers

11:00 a. m.

Depart Shannon

8 hours (minus 5  
hours time change)

2:00 p. m.

Arrive Andrews AFB

September 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the Attorney General at Your Luncheon Meeting at 1:00 p. m. , Monday, September 14, 1970

1. Compliment the Attorney General on his superb performance on the Dick Cavett show last week. From all reports, he was forceful and ~~huddled~~ huddled himself skillfully in dealing with a variety of tough questions relating to drugs, politics, law and order, and the Administration.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

2. Give the Attorney General a rundown on what you hope to accomplish during today's 40 Committee meeting on Chile, including the President's current views, anticipated positions of various meeting participants, and the line you hope the Attorney General will take.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

3. Give the Attorney General a rundown on the Middle East situation, including:

- the latest information on the hijackings and your plans for dealing with the situation. (Ask the Attorney General if he has had any fresh thoughts on how to deal with the hijacking problem over the long term.)

- the Soviet/Egyptian missile movement problem (Saunders' recent memorandum giving chronology of missile buildup is at Tab A);
- problems associated with assistance package for Israel;
- outlook for the initiative;
- your difficulties in dealing with State on the subject.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

4. Give the Attorney General the broad outlines of the President's trip contemplated for the September 27-October 5 period.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Give the Attorney General a rundown on the President's strategy with regard to Vietnam negotiations.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Tell the Attorney General that Assistant Attorney General Bill Rehnquist has been a tremendous help to your staff in dealing with the legislative problem concerning war powers.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Ask the Attorney General what might be done legally against members of Congress and their staff who leak classified information. There have been a number of blatant examples, including Congressman Lowenstein's public release of classified USIA opinion polls on Cambodia (Tab B).

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

8. Brief the Attorney General on the continuing evidence of a lack of discipline within the bureaucracy and the unilateral policy decisions that have been made, as evidenced by cables without reference to the President.

I have discussed this with the Attorney General: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

Attachments

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT  
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 10A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

B

# CAMBODIAN DRIVE HURT U.S. PRESTIGE

## Polls Taken by U.S.I.A. Find Drop in 7 of 8 Countries

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 9—An official opinion poll commissioned by the United States Information Agency in Europe and Asia disclosed that confidence in the United States declined significantly overseas as a result of the two-month American ground operation in Cambodia.

Parts of this classified document were made available to The New York Times today by Representative Allard K. Lowenstein, Democrat of Nassau, after much careful deliberation of the consequences.

The polls were taken in late June—shortly before the withdrawal of all United States troops from Cambodia—West Germany, France, Britain, Sweden, India, Japan, the Philippines and Australia. The agency, which has been sponsoring overseas polls at least since the nineteen-fifties, considers the samplings to be as trustworthy as the Gallup or Harris polls in this country.

According to Mr. Lowenstein, the agency refused on several occasions to give him a copy of the document. Now, he said, it has been made available to him by a source within the executive branch.

### 2 Questions Cited

Mr. Lowenstein made available the answers to two questions, which asked foreign citizens whether their confidence in the United States had increased or decreased as a result of the Cambodian action and if they approved or disapproved of United States policy in Southeast Asia.

Only in the Philippines did the polls find confidence in the United States increased.

And only in that country did confidence in the United States increase.

Both Australia and the Philippines have been allies of the United States in Vietnam and have had military personnel there. The Filipino engineer units, which cost the Pentagon \$3.6-million for additional pay, returned home last year.

Representative Lowenstein, a vigorous critic of the Cambodian action and long-time antiwar leader, said he was making the classified information public because he believed the American people had the right to know and base their judgements on such information.

### Agency Won't Comment

A spokesman for the Information Agency said that the poll was classified and he could not therefore comment about it. "If Mr. Lowenstein wants to release it, then it is his responsibility," Edward Weintal, special consultant to the director, said.

According to sources within the agency, the United States feels it might embarrass host countries if the results of polls were known. A review of the necessity for secret polls is also said to be under way, with the possibility they might be discontinued.

Representative Lowenstein said he decided to make public parts of the classified polls at this time for two reasons: the continuing statements by President Nixon and other members of Administration that the Cambodian operation had bolstered confidence in the United States abroad and the use of secret negotiations by the Administration to continue its operation of military bases in Spain.

In his television announcement on April 30 of the drive by United States troops into Cambodia, President Nixon said that if the United States did not act its credibility "would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression."

The President also indicated in an interview with newsmen from the three major networks on July 1 that Southeast Asia countries had been bolstered by the American move.

"Now the truth of the matter is that this Administration has taken polls in regard to our prestige after Cambodia," Mr. Lowenstein declared today. "They show very clearly that we have taken a great loss in the confidence other countries have in us."

The two questions made public by Representative Lowenstein today were: "Has your confidence in the United States gone up or down in the last month or two?" and "All things considered, do you approve or disapprove of United States actions in all of Vietnam?"

Country	Confidence	
	Up	Down
West Germany	4	27
France	5	29
Britain	6	27
Sweden	3	58
Philippines	26	24
India	12	22
Australia	14	26
Japan	3	58

Country	On the second question of general approval:	
	Approve	Disapprove
West Germany	22	52
France	12	51
Britain	29	38
Sweden	8	72
Philippines	45	24
India	16	43
Australia	43	27
Japan	7	43

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, September 14, 1970

1. Review trip scenario. Latest version is at Enclosure #1. Tell the President you will meet with the Italian Ambassador this morning to iron out details of Italian leg. Flanigan is handling arrangements with Papal Nuncio, and should have answers today. Will jog Yugoslavs today also. We should move on Irish today. Tell the President you are preparing a special message for Brandt so that he will not feel slighted. *have graduated draft press announcement with ~~Italy~~ countries involved (less Dutch) and hope to have*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

*their final clearance this morning. You will see the Yugoslav Ambassador*  
Comments: *This morning to discuss the schedule for itenary for that stop.*

*2. Discuss scenario of trip announcement this afternoon.*

2. Discuss the press announcement of the trip to Fleet with other possible stops. Discuss desirability of announcing countries as well as Fleet if appropriate replies have been received.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation on hijackings and in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*3. Review game plan for Foreign and*  
*Mr. Kissinger*

4. Tell the President that Ambassador Annenberg has proposed that the President meet with Heath at Sunnylands, California during the weekend of October 17-18 or October 25-26. A negative reply proposed by Sonnenfeldt to Annenberg is at Tab A of Enclosure #2.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

5. Give the President a run-down on the 40 Committee meeting on Chile ~~scheduled for this afternoon. President will see McCombe also this afternoon at 5:00.~~ *ad your breakfast meeting into Edwards, Kendall, and No Attorney General.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

6. Discuss Golda Meir's visit, Sisto and Haig to sit in. *Tell Russ Rogers. still reluctant.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

~~7. Inform the President of Director Helms' request that he be allowed to travel to the Far East for about three weeks, beginning on September 27. (Enclosure #3)~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

8. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise the Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Mediterranean Trip Schedule

<u>Date/Time</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>
<u>Sunday, September 27</u>		
7:30 a. m.	Depart Andrews AFB	8 hours 20 minutes (plus 5 hour time change)
8:50 p. m.	Arrive Rome	
<u>Monday, September 28</u>		
a. m.	Call on Italian Officials	
12:00 Noon	Lunch	
2:00 p. m.	Depart for Vatican	
2:15 p. m.	Call on Pope	
4:30 p. m.	Depart Vatican by helicopter	1 hour
5:30 p. m.	Arrive Flagship <u>Springfield</u> Remain overnight at sea	
<u>Tuesday, September 29</u>		
9:00 a. m.	Strategy Conference	
11:00 a. m.	Transfer to Aircraft Carrier <u>Saratoga</u>	
12:00 Noon	Lunch	
1:00 p. m.	Review Fleet Exercise	
4:30 p. m.	Depart Sixth Fleet by helicopter	1 hour
5:30 p. m.	Arrive Naples - Motorcade Personal Time Remain overnight	

Wednesday, September 30

9:00 a. m.	Visit NATO Headquarters (CINCSOUTH) Meet with Allied Military Commanders	
11:00 a. m.	Meet with Mediterranean Ambassadors	
12:30 p. m.	Lunch	
2:00 p. m.	Depart Naples	1 hour 35 minutes
3:35 p. m.	Arrive Belgrade - Motorcade Remain in Belgrade for evening	

Thursday, October 1

Calls on Yugoslav officials  
State dinner

Friday, October 2

9:00 a. m.	Depart Belgrade	3 hours 5 minutes
12:05 p. m.	Arrive Madrid - Motorcade	
1:30 p. m.	Motorcade ends	
p. m.	Calls on Spanish officials State Dinner Remain overnight Madrid	

Saturday, October 3

9:00 a. m.	Depart Madrid	2 hours 5 minutes
11:05 a. m.	Arrive London	
3:00 p. m.	Depart for Dublin	1 hour 15 minutes
4:15 p. m.	Arrive Dublin	

Monday, October 5

9:00 a. m.	Depart Dublin	1 hour 35 minutes
10:35 a. m.	Arrive Paris	
11:00 a. m.	Call on President Pompidou	
Noon	Lunch	
2:00 p. m.	Visit U. S. Delegation	
4:30 p. m.	Depart Paris for U. S.	8 hours (minus 5 hours time change)
7:30 p. m.	Arrive Andrews AFB	

Enc.  
#2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday, September 10, 1970

*Latest version based on your conversation with Haldean*  
 1. Review trip scenario. Discuss alternatives for Rome, Fleet and Naples ~~game plans~~. Tell the President that you have met with the Yugoslavian Ambassador and will meet shortly with the Spanish Charge. *Spanish Ambassador this morning* In addition, you discussed the problem with the Italian Ambassador last night. *morning to receive reply. Flanigan has contacted Pope's representatives* Flanigan will handle the Papal Nuncio for the Pope and we should move tomorrow with the British, French and Irish. *Flanigan is handling arrangements with Papal Nuncio. We should move on Britain, France, and Irish Today.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
*Tell President you are preparing <sup>speech</sup> message for Brandt so that he will*  
 Comments: not feel slighted.

2. Discuss the press announcement of the trip to Fleet with other possible stops. Situation in the Middle East may favor announcement as early as Friday, *however President was leaning toward Monday. Consider* desirable *desirability* desirability of announcing countries as well as Fleet *if the press have been secured*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*4* 4. Discuss Flanigan project and fact that now that it is underway you feel that it should be handled primarily by Flanigan. *This will be a Flanigan will*  
*by partisan meeting with the President to discuss ~~by~~ this morning.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation on hijackings and in Jordan. ~~Tell the President you will have another meeting of WSAG today to further enhance readiness measures.~~ If situation has continued to deteriorate, consideration should be given today to alerting forces despite adverse publicity. Tell the President you have prepared a separate update memorandum ~~for him.~~ *will continue to send periodically during the day. No delay in updating him on the situation.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

5. Give the President a run-down on the 40 Committee meeting on Chile.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

6. Discuss Golda Meir's visit. If opportunity presents itself, you may wish to suggest some of the pitfalls of including Rogers in meeting with Mrs. Meir. You might wish to suggest that Haig or Saunders sit in with President to avoid whatever sensitivities President thinks may exist on this problem.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

7. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

ED ROBERTS  
FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

*September 9*  
~~September 8~~, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *(Signature)*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ~~Tuesday~~, *Wednesday*,  
September ~~8~~, 1970

1. Give the President a run-down of the results of your discussions *on Sunday. (He has read your memo and commented on this - Ky seems as pivotal to problem (Job #))*  
I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*Give a run-down on the*  
3. Inform the President that ~~you will be conducting a 40 Committee meeting on Chile and a Senior Review Group meeting on the Middle East this afternoon.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation on hijackings and in Jordan. Tell the President you will be meeting with the Senior Review Group at 11:30 AM.*  
3. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation on hijackings and in Jordan. Tell the President you will be meeting with the Senior Review Group at 11:30 AM.  
I have discussed this with the President: Yes  No

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

*Tell him we have prepared by separate memo an update for him.*

4. Discuss possible plans for Presidential trip.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Discuss Golda Meir's visit in light of the President's edict that he not be left alone with her at any time and that you, Secretary Rogers and Joe Sisco remain in attendance throughout. (The President passed this instruction through Haldeman to me on Air Force <sup>one</sup> ~~One~~ last night and Haldeman said "be sure that Henry does not fight the President on this.")

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Inform the President that Robert Murphy has agreed to be the U.S. Representative at the Zagreb Fair.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,  
September 9, 1970

1. Give the President a run-down of the results of your discussions on Sunday. (He has read your memo and commented on Thieu-Ky regime as pivotal to problem.) (Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

2. Bring the President abreast of the latest developments in the Middle East, especially the situation on hijackings and in Jordan. Tell the President you will be meeting with the Senior Review Group at 11:30 a.m. (Tell him you have prepared by separate memo an update for him.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

3. Give the President a run-down on the 40 Committee meeting on Chile.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

4. Discuss possible plans for Presidential trip.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

5. Discuss Golda Meir's visit in light of the President's edict that he not be left alone with her at any time and that you, Secretary Rogers and Joe Sisco remain in attendance throughout. (The President passed this instruction through Haldeman to me on Air Force One Sunday night and Haldeman said "be sure that Henry does not fight the President on this.")

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

6. Inform the President of Frank Lincoln's request that the President see Carver concerning his trip to Moscow. He will undoubtedly raise Gleason case during meeting. Soviets have made it clear that no formal extension of August 31 deadline is possible. However, they agreed not to cancel contracts and accepted Carver's suggestion that "day-to-day" extensions be granted. Carver believes that time remaining is very limited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---

7. Inform the President that Robert Murphy has agreed to be the U.S. Representative at the Zagreb Fair.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

---