

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

October 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 16, 1970

1. Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders on Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notices they gave to the President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President you received a call from Lucet on the possibility of the President seeing Schumann sometime next week. Also, discuss the timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can confirm this with Freeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probable pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

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5. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey & Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta (Tab A, left flap).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

AMH:feg:10/15/70

Tab A same as 10/15/70 memo

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Saturday, October 17,
1970

1. Remind the President you will be seeing Ambassador Dobrynin late this afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President that you have sent copies of the U. N. speech to Price and Safire and will have a final version on Sunday morning.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on the latest thinking with respect to Chile and tell him you will be meeting with the Review Group this morning.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders on Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notices they gave to the President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ - No _____

Comments: _____

5. Discuss the timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can confirm this with Freeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probably pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

8. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey and Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta (Tab A, left flap).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 16⁷, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Saturday} Friday, October ¹⁷ ~~16~~, 1970

4 ~~3~~. Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders on Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notices they gave to the President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5 ~~4~~. ~~Tell the President you received a call from Lucet on the possibility of the President seeing Schumann sometime next week. Also, discuss the timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can confirm this with Freeman.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6 ~~5~~. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7 ~~6~~. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probable pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig @

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ~~Monday~~ ^{Monday}, October 19, 1970

1. ^{Review} ~~Give the President a report on your meeting with Ambassador DeBrynin~~ and plans for meeting with Gromyko.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President you will be leaving Monday afternoon for California via New York and will be back Wednesday evening.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Discuss the status of U.N. speech.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. ^{Discuss} ~~Give~~ points made by Ambassador Rabin in his phone call last evening (at Tel A) _{Telcom}

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a rundown on your luncheon talk and discussion at the Los Angeles Times.

4. Brief the President on the latest thinking with respect to Chile, and the results of your Review Group meeting on Saturday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. ~~Inform the President that you met with Congressional leaders last Wednesday re Cuba and mention rave notices they gave to the President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle~~ ^{when you met with them on October 14 re Cuba} ^{Mention rave notices}

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Discuss the timing of the UK Prime Minister visit so you can confirm this with Freeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probable pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey and Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta (Tab A, left flap).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
October 22, 1970

1. Review plans for meeting with Gromyko.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

2. Discuss points made by Ambassador Rabin in his phone call last evening (Telecon at Tab A).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: Comments on letters

3. Discuss the status of U.N. Speech.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

4. Give the President a rundown on your luncheon talk and discussions at the Los Angeles Times.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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5. Brief the President on the latest thinking with respect to Chile.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Mention rave notices Congressional leaders gave to the President's performance during the Middle East and Cuban crises and brief Berlin hassle when you met with them on October 14 re Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on your meeting with Eban.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Mention to the President that Hanoi's reaction to the peace proposal was an obvious manifestation of their sensitivity and probably pique at being deprived of propaganda value on their own proposal.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Inform the President of the results of your meeting with Dewey and Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

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10. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta (Tab B, left flap).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October ²⁴ 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Saturday} ~~Friday~~,
October 23, 1970

1. ^{Recall} Mention that you will meet with Dobrynin after the UN speech ^{at 11:00} this afternoon and discuss timing and modalities of Summit announcement. ^{and received assurances on Cuba.}

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss Middle East problem with the President to condition him in direction of requirement to provide additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement on their proceeding with Jarring talks without rectification. If you have not done so, you may wish to mention to the President that you will breakfast with Golda Meir Sunday morning.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President that Rockefeller has asked you to give a talk in New York which would be beneficial to both the President and Rockefeller.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Review the routine for the ~~UN~~ ^{Sato meeting} today. ^{and give him update}
on status of textiles.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President you will remain in New York overnight and return to Washington tomorrow in time for the Sato visit. Give him a brief update on the textile exchange.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Review any significant aspects of Sato's dinner and morning's meetings.

6. Tell Pres. of State Reelama on Chile cable and action taken.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Mon} Saturday,
October 24, 1970

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss ^{Breakfast with Golda Meir in Sunday} ~~Middle East problem with the President~~ to condition him in direction of requirement to provide additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement on their proceeding with Jarring talks without rectification. ~~If you have not done so, you may wish to mention to the President that you will breakfast with Golda Meir Sunday morning.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Review the routine for Sato meeting and give him update on status of textiles.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Review any significant aspects of tonight's dinner and tomorrow's meetings.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken. *no statement. Kill Meyer Background.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta *(Tab A, left flap)*.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

*Dwight Eisenhower meeting today
Tell Pres you are sending
him important memo on
Resignation and Defense Deployment
and manpower problems*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

October 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *EH*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Tuesday* ~~Monday~~, October 26 ²⁷

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to ~~condition him~~ *Report President*
~~in dispatch of requirement to provide additional assistance to Israel in~~ *to be made*
order to obtain ~~movement on their proceeding with Jarring talks~~ *of* without
rectification. Mention Rogers discussion (tactfully). Mention Canal problem
and possible visit of Dayan *and yesterday's SRC meeting*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____ *with Mrs Meir*

3. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken, i. e.,
no statement. ~~Kill Meyer background~~ *on which we've heard nothing further.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. ~~Discuss Chruschev meeting today.~~ Tell the President you are sending him an important memo on Defense re-organization and Defense deployment and management problems.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

? 6 Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday and advise actions you will take between now and Friday - Manpower and Perry medals on left flap.

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

October 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, October 27

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal problem and possible visit of Dayan and yesterday's SRG meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken, i.e., no statement. Kill Meyer backgrounder on which we've heard nothing further.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday and review actions you will take between now and Friday -- manpower and reorganization memos on left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Attachments on left flap: #22769 & 22681
Attachment under #4 same as 10/26/70 memo

AMH:feg:10/27/60

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 30

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform President of problem of message to Allende.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday and review actions you will take between now and Friday -- manpower and reorganization memos on left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright *MW*

SUBJECT: Haile Selassie Request to see the President

Haile Selassie has personally expressed to our Ambassador his desire for a private meeting with the President. The Ambassador, of course, promised to tell Washington, but also made reference to the President's busy schedule, etc. This sounds exactly like the kind of problem you were talking about at this morning's staff meeting. Shall we, without further delay, inform Haile Selassie that the President will see him?

On a related matter, I am told by State that you told Alex Johnson that the President would be willing to see Olivier of Malta. Olivier has not asked to see the President. Do you want us to tell him that the President wishes to see him?

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we inform Haile Selassie forthwith that the President looks forward to a private meeting with him.

Approve *HC*

Disapprove _____

2. That we not stimulate a meeting with Olivier and defer any action on this until he requests a meeting with the President.

Approve *HC*

Disapprove _____

Let me check with Pres. on 2.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Tue* Tuesday, October ~~27~~ *30*

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement. *Mention that you and Sec State do not believe my initiative on S.E. Asia would be appropriate at this time.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal ~~problem~~ *proposal* and possible visit of Dayan *to US* and yesterday's SRC meeting. *To discuss.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell President of State reclama on Chile cable and action taken, i.e., no statement. Kill Meyer backgrounder on which we've heard nothing further.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. In form Pres. of Postern of message to
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY *Allende.*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 2, 1970

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U. S. to discuss.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender to be released this a. m., and Cramer speech yesterday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item which was carried in Washington Post small piece this a. m.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

-2-

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Glivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions with Gromyko. (Rush may be upset about channel and could complain to Rogers. Hal will talk to him this a. m.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

October 30, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 30

1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. mention Defense announcement on

3. Inform President of problem of message to Allende.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Sub-tender to be made this A.M.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
and Kramer's speech yesterday in Florida
was carried

in Wash. Post small print this a.m.

Comments: _____

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

3. Inform President of problem of message to Allende.

3. Inform President of problem of message to Allende.

Comments: _____

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

of Dagan to U.S. to discuss.

with Mrs. Meir (secretly). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit
der to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers discussion
to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in or-

5. Discuss proposal with Colby Meir in such a way to alert President

Comments: _____

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

time.

not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this
Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do
ceived assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of

1. Recall that you met with Borah after the UN speech and re-

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, October 30

FROM: AHN:lg

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE)

October 30, 1970

WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President you will not be going to New York on Wednesday and review actions you will take between now and Friday -- manpower and reorganization memos on left flap.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell Pres. of your message to Brandt covering discussions with Gromyko. (Rush may be upset about Channel and could complain to Rogers - Hal will talk to him this a.m.)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

**SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President,
Tuesday, November 3, 1970**

1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are considering this issue next week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released yesterday, and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a.m.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions with Gromyko.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President Walters is back and you will see him this a. m.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *@*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Tues* Monday, November *3* 2, 1970

- 1. Tell Pres your plans not to go to Florida until Tuesday to attend mutual work load.*
1. Recall that you met with Dobrynin after the UN speech and received assurances on Cuba and discussed timing and modalities of Summit announcement. Mention that you and the Secretary of State do not believe any initiative on Southeast Asia would be appropriate at this time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

- 2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U. S. to discuss. Tell Pres you are considering this issue next week.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

- 3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender ~~to be~~ *Sunday* released *yesterday* this a. m., and Cramer speech ~~yesterday~~ *yesterday* in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item which was carried in Washington Post small piece ~~this~~ *yesterday* a. m.)*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

-2-

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions with Gromyko. (~~Rush may be upset about channel and could complain to Rogers. Hal will talk to him this a.m.~~)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell Pres. matters is back & you
will see him this AM

7.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

**SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President
Wednesday, November 4, 1970**

1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are considering this issue next week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released Monday, and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a. m.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President that Walters is back and you have seen him. You will give President report prepared by Walters. He saw no signs of immediate action in either Brazil or Argentina, but noted relief at confirmation of U.S. stand.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President,
Tuesday, November 3, 1970

1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U. S. to discuss. Tell President you are considering this issue next week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released ^{Monday} yesterday, and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a. m.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell President of your message to Brandt covering discussions with Gromyko.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President ^{above w} Walters is back and you will see him ~~this~~
a.m. *you will see Pres report prepared by Walters. All good no*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

*request of immediate action in either Berlin or
Washington but noted relief at confirmation of
MS. Stavel.*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AKK

Be sure you
see items to discuss
Perry call on left flap.

WJF

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President
Thursday, November 5, 1970

1. Tell the President of your plans not to go to Florida until Tuesday due to interdepartmental work load.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss breakfast with Golda Meir in such a way to alert President to possible requirement of providing additional assistance to Israel in order to obtain movement without rectification. Mention Rogers' discussion with Mrs. Meir (tactfully). Mention Canal proposal and possible visit of Dayan to U.S. to discuss. Tell President you are considering this issue next week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Mention Defense announcement on sub-tender released Monday, and Cramer speech Sunday in Florida. (We'll stay mum on this item which was carried in Washington Post small piece yesterday a.m.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. Ask the President if he would like to see Prime Minister Olivier of Malta. (See attached memo)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President that Walters is back and you have seen him. You will give President report prepared by Walters. He saw no signs of immediate action in either Brazil or Argentina, but noted relief at confirmation of U.S. stand.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

*Cable reply
re: FIAP.*
6. Discuss Blount visit to Paris, meeting with Dobrynin, Bruce reaction on private meeting, and phone conversation with Percy. — *Statement re: flap.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell President you are briefing Congressional leadership *on Cuba* with Admiral Moorer this afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY


HAIC

SECRET

25X1

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ZNY MMNSH
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FM PARIS
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

S E C R E T 051524Z NOV 70 [REDACTED]
FM USDEL, PARIS AMB. BRUCE [REDACTED]
TO WHITE HOUSE, DR. HA. KISSINGER (EYES ONLY)
REF: WHO2175

25X1

DELAYED ANSWER TO YOUR MESSAGE UNTIL AFTER PLENARY MEETING TODAY ON REMOTE CHANCE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PRODUCE SOMETHING INTERESTING SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE. THEY REPEATED THEIR USUAL DREARY POLEMICS AND ADDED A NOTE OF PERSONAL CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT WHICH I DID NOT LET PASS AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM OUR REPORT ON THE MEETING.

DESPITE THIS, I FRANKLY SEE NO ADVANTAGE TO US IN POSTPOING PRIVATE MEETING FOR A WEEK. THEIR DELAY IN SETTING A DATE FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS WAS PROBABLY RELATED TO OUR ELECTIONS. THEY EITHER WANTED TO SEE THE RESULTS, OR PERHAPS THEY WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT WE MIGHT SOMEHOW CAPITALIZE ON A LEAK BY US TO INFLUENCE THE IMPENDING ELECTIONS. THESE PEOPLE PRETEND TO BE EXPERTS AT ANALYZING AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION OF WHICH THEY ARE ABYSMALLY IGNORANT.

I THINK WE MUST ASCERTAIN WHETHER HANOI HAS ANY INTENTION TO BEGIN GUNUINE NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THEY ARE PRESENTLY PREPARED TO DEAL SUBSTANTIVELY WITH THE PROBLEMS, NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD IN SECRET SESSIONS EXPLORE THEIR INTENTIONS AS THOROUGHLY AS POSSIBLE, AND IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO DO SO NOW THAN LATER. THEREAFTER, WE COULD MORE COMPETENTLY DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT TACTICS.

State Dept. review completed

Presidential Library Review of NSC
Equities is Required JUS 6/28/2012

WE HAVE PRESENTED A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION IN PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS, AND SHOULD NOW PURSUE THEM IN A WAY THAT DEMONSTRATES OUR FIRMNESS AS WELL AS OUR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IF POSSIBLE A SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE BEEN MOVING QUITE DELIBERATELY AND PATIENTLY; GOING INTO SECRET MEETINGS NOW WOULD NOT CREATE AN APPEARANCE OF ANXIETY OR LACK OF CONFIDENCE ON OUR PART. WE ARE IN A STRONG POSITION MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY, AND CAN PRODUCTIVELY EXPLORE HANOI'S ATTITUDE. FINALLY, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO BUILD UP A RECORD OF TRYING FOR NEGOTIATION THROUGH THESE MEANS. IF NOTHING EMERGES IT WILL CLEARLY BE CHARGEABLE TO THEIR INTRANSIGENCE.

IF THE PRESIDENT, NEVERTHELESS, WISHES TO POSTPONE THE MEETING I CAN DO SO BY A "DIPLOMATIC ILLNESS." THEY MIGHT DECIDE TO COUNTER BY FURTHER POSTPONEMENT. IT IS, OF COURSE, POSSIBLE THAT MY REQUESTING POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECRET MEETING COMING AFTER THE SHARP RESPONSE I MADE TO THUY'S REMARKS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT, WOULD LEAD THEM TO BELIEVE WE CALL IT OFF BECAUSE OF THAT. THEY MIGHT THEN FEEL THAT FACE IS INVOLVED AND THIS COULD MAKE HOLDING FUTURE SECRET TALKS MORE DIFFICULT.

GP-1
500
2581

SECRET

NNNN

MEMORANDUM


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 9, 1970

1. Discuss Korry message on Chile:

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss your meeting with Dobrynin and release of Generals.
(Soviets to announce at 3:00 p.m. today.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform the President you met with the Attorney General on the Ivanov case.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a read-out on the submarine tender.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President U.K. announced new Ambassador today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Discuss instructions to Bruce which you and Rogers discussed this morning. (Message at Tab C)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. I sent memos to Key Biscayne on President's meeting with Heath at Camp David and meeting with Dewey, Acheson, McCloy and Clay on Europe.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

8. Tell President you are having DPRC meeting today and that Laird has sent over a separate five-year defense strategy for the President designed to circumvent the established machinery and that you will give it to the President on Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

October 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright *MW*

SUBJECT: Haile Selassie Request to see the President

Haile Selassie has personally expressed to our Ambassador his desire for a private meeting with the President. The Ambassador, of course, promised to tell Washington, but also made reference to the President's busy schedule, etc. This sounds exactly like the kind of problem you were talking about at this morning's staff meeting. Shall we, without further delay, inform Haile Selassie that the President will see him?

On a related matter, I am told by State that you told Alex Johnson that the President would be willing to see Olivier of Malta. Olivier has not asked to see the President. Do you want us to tell him that the President wishes to see him?

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That we inform Haile Selassie forthwith that the President looks forward to a private meeting with him.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

2. That we not stimulate a meeting with Olivier and defer any action on this until he requests a meeting with the President.

Approve HK Disapprove _____

Let me check with Pres. on 2.

RICHARD PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 5A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

Dictated by Percy's office
11/5/70 jlj

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENT

When I made my statement in Limerick, Ireland, on October 4 concerning the United States commitment to NATO, I was certainly conscious of the meeting of the European Defense Ministers several days prior to that as well as the resolution unanimously adopted by the Economic Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly earlier this year endorsing the principle of budget contributions from European NATO countries to help meet the official requirements of the United States forces in Europe.

I commend the Defense Ministers on their efforts to find ways to provide financial assistance to help defray costs of United States forces in NATO. It is this type of step to which I was referring in Ireland when I said that "we will continue to talk with our NATO allies with regard to how, overall, we can meet our responsibilities together."

Our aim is to strengthen and unify NATO which requires military, political, and financial considerations. Financial sharing of United States NATO costs by our European allies will help achieve this goal.



SECRET
Classification

Department of State TELEGRAM

INDICATE:
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STATE _____

NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS

~~for xxx~~ FOR BRUCE FROM THE SECRETARY

1. We appreciate thoughtful views you have expressed in back channel message favoring maintenance of scheduled plans for private meeting Monday with Xuan Thuy. Nevertheless, and especially in view tenor of DRV remarks in today's meeting and subsequent press conference, it is our considered judgment that you should seek postponement for about a week.
2. Please provide us soonest with your recommendation concerning manner in which you would propose to arrange postponement and date on which you would suggest meeting be rescheduled.

GP-1

END

DRAFTED BY:

[Signature]
EA:WHSullivan:ms

DRAFTING DATE

11/5/70

TEL. EXT.

20272

APPROVED BY:

[Signature]
The Secretary per *[Signature]*

CLEARANCES:

S/S -

SECRET
Classification

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FM GENERAL HAIG
TO HENRY A. KISSINGER
ZEM

T O P S E C R E T SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY WH02196

MEMBER 12, 1970
NOVEMBER

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: GENERAL HAIG

- ① 1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD FROM AMBASSADOR KORRY THAT HE HAD BEEN NOTIFIED BY CHILEAN OFFICIALS THAT CHILE WOULD ANNOUNCE RECOGNITION OF CUBA THIS AFTERNOON AT 1800 LOCAL. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT PRESS LINE TO RESPOND TO THIS INEVITABILITY. ALSO INDICATIONS CHILES MOVING TO TAKE PUBLIC LINE IN SUPPORT OF PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE.
- ②
- ③ 2. GENERAL PURSLEY CALLED ME THIS MORNING REFERENCE BRIEFING ON SPECIAL PROJECT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER. HE STATED THAT THIS HAD BECOME A VERY COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THAT SECRETARY LAIRD FELT THAT HE AND THE CHAIRMAN SHOULD GET WITH YOU ON THIS SUBJECT RATHER THAN TO FOLLOW THE BRIEFING ROUTE WHICH WE PURSUED EARLIER. AFTER SOME PROBING ON MY PART, I GATHER THAT THE SECRETARY IS HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS, AT LEAST ON TIMING, WITH STRONG URGING FROM PURSLEY THAT AFFAIR BE POSTPONED. SIMULTANEOUSLY, I WAS APPROACHED BY
- ④ DICK CAPEN THIS MORNING AT MEETING ON SUPPLEMENTAL AND TOLD THAT SECRETARY LAIRD IS WORKING ON A PROJECT INVOLVING POW'S WITH A SWEDISH CITIZEN. ALLEGEDLY, A SWEDISH CITIZEN WILL MAKE AVAILABLE A SHIP TO CARRY U.S. POW'S FROM HANOI TO SAIGON. HE WILL ACT AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN, HOPEFULLY THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE SWEDISH RED CROSS. APPARENTLY, THE SWEDISH IS READY TO ANNOUNCE HIS OFFER IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, AND BOTH PURSLEY AND LAIRD FEEL THAT THIS SHOULD CHANGE PLANS ON THE OTHER PROJECT. I UNDERSTAND THAT SECRETARY ROGERS HAS BEEN CUT IN ON THIS PROJECT WHICH IS LARGELY OF PROPAGANDA VALUE IN MY VIEW. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, PLUS OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH PURSLEY DID NOT PROVIDE, HE STATED SECRETARY LAIRD BELIEVED YOU SHOULD MEET WITH HIM AND THE CHAIRMAN TOMORROW MORNING IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO DISCUSS THE PROJECT ON WHICH I REQUESTED THE BRIEFING. I HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THIS BUT TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED
- ⑤ 10:30 A.M. TOMORROW FOR YOU TO MEET IN SECRETARY LAIRD'S OFFICE WITH THE CHAIRMAN IN ATTENDANCE.
- ⑥ 3. PER OUR DISCUSSION, I MET FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD YESTERDAY WITH ADMIRAL MOORER. I BELIEVE WE HAVE FINALLY GOTTEN ACROSS TO HIM THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DPRC EXERCISE. HE WAS SOMEWHAT STUNNED BY THE TURN OF EVENTS AND HE NOW HAS THE JOINT STAFF WORKING FEVERISHLY TO PREPARE A RESPONSIVE PACKAGE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE IS 100 PER CENT BEHIND OUR EFFORTS AND WILL NEVER AGAIN STRAY.

800

NNNN

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Sullivan

8:05 p.m., November 10, 1970

K: LBJ called me and said that Ky had requested to see him.

S: Yes.

K: And wanted guidance. What do we tell him?

S: I see no harm, it would be after he sees President Nixon.

K: Think it would be a cheap thing to pay.

S: Two things, (1) definitely could not see him before he could see President Nixon and (2) would have to work it out on his own. He apparently called down there ..

K: Right.

S: The weekend after Thanksgiving, after he had been to Washington. Have you talked at all with him?

K: The President?

S: Yes.

K: No, but I will.

S: Have you talked with the Vice President?

K: No, but I will, right now in fact.

S: I got a call from Kent Crane urging ...

K: I got that meeting cancelled.

Telecon
Walt Rostow
11/10/70 3:30p. m.

R: I know you are busy.

K: Not at all.

R: Reason I'm calling, President Johnson has been approached in confidence by Bui Diem as to whether he would be prepared to receive Ky at the end of the month after he has been in Washington. The President's response was this: 1) he would be glad to do it, but only if it is regarded as a good idea by the President and 2) if you thought it a good idea, he wants to know the points President Nixon wants to underline with Ky. He wants to make no move whatsoever except as President Nixon wants it done.

K: Aren't you nice. I will ask the President, may I?

R: Sure. Do you have just another minute? Let me pass along . . . I have been to London. On Vietnam I suggest you give some thought in light of ~~in light of~~ intelligence coming from Hanoi, that they are having some difficult morale problems on the field as well as at home, that you give a real push in psychological warfare. I get word that for the first time in the whole thing leaflets saying go home, work the farms, grow some rice, raise some kids -- that's something the army in the field and the people at home may be ready to listen to.

K: Let me take a look at that.

R: Okay.

K: Nice to talk to you.

[At end of conversation with Rostow, Mr. Kissinger turned away from phone and said "David, make sure I do something about that."]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Joe Shergalis

SUBJECT: Representation at Memorial Service for General De Gaulle.

The following Chiefs of State and Heads of Government had indicated that they planned to attend ceremonies for General De Gaulle in Paris:

Europe -

Belgium - King Baudouin
Italy - President Saragat; Prime Minister Colombo
U.K. - Prime Minister Heath; Prince of Wales
Luxembourg - Grand Duke Jean; Prime Minister Werner
Germany - President Heinemann; Chancellor Brandt
Ireland - Prime Minister Lynch
Netherlands - H.M. Queen Juliana; Foreign Minister Luns
Austria - President Jonas

USSR - Kosygin (Press only)

Middle East -

Turkey - Prime Minister Demirel
Lebanon - President Frangie; Prime Minister Saeb Salam
Israel - Prime Minister Shazar; Former Prime Minister Ben Gurion
UAR - Prime Minister Fawzi
Iran - Shah Pahlavi
India - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

Africa -

Ethiopia - Emperor Haile Selassie
Dahomey - President Maga
Ivory Coast - President Houphouet-Boigny
Gabon - President Bongo
Upper Volta - President Lamizana
Togo - President Eyadema
Tunisia - Prime Minister Hedi Nour
Malagasy Republic - President Tsiranana
Cameroon - Prime Minister (East Cameroon) Tchoungui
Mali - President Lamizana

Other Diplomats -

Mexico - Ambassador Siluio Zavala Vallado
Greece - Deputy Prime Minister Pattakos
Canada - Sec. of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp
Japan - Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi
Panama - Charge' Jorge Tulio Royo
Costa Rica - Ambassador Roman Jara
Ecuador - Ambassador Cesar Aluarez Barba
Guatemala - Ambassador Linarea
Brazil - Ambassador Lyra Tavares
Australia - Ambassador Alan Renouf
New Zealand - Deputy Prime Minister John Marshall
Honduras - Ambassador Tito Carcamo
Uruguay - Senator Eduardo Paz Aguirre
Nepal - Ambassador Shardul Shumshere J.B. Rana
Malaysia - High Commissioner To UK Tan Sri Abdul Jamil Rais
Jordan - Crown Prince Hassan
Zambia - Vice President Mainza Chona
Norway - Crown Prince Harald
S. Korea - Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Hah
S. Africa - Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller
Burundi - Foreign Minister Libere Ndadakwaje
Algeria - Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Ceylon - Ambassador Tissa Wijeyeratne
Nigeria - Commodore Nelson Bossman Soroh
Pakistan - Minister of Agriculture & Works Mahmud Haroon
Tanzania - Ambassador Tibandebage
Morocco - Director General Cabinet Driss Siaoui
Spain - Vice President of Government Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, November 20, 1970

1. Discuss the Pakistan situation. Latest report is on left flap. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U. S. delegation to Pakistan for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform the President that you will meet with Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer today to work out integrated public relations plan on weekend activities.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform the President that the Soviet tender has left Cienfuegos and also inform him of the plans re press handling.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

AMH:feg:11/19/70

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
November 19, 1970

1. Discuss conduct of this morning's NSC meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to Pakistan for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform President that you will meet with Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer ~~Friday morning~~ ^{Today} at 10:00 to work out integrated public relations plan on weekend activities.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Give the President the latest information on the position of the Soviet Tander which has left Cienfuegos.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Inform the President That Soviet Tander has left Cienfuegos and plans re press handling.

Chiles/40 Committee

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November ¹⁹ 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
November 18, 1970

Discuss conduct of this morning's NSC meeting.

1. Discuss conduct of meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moorer on the two Vietnam projects. You have sent a talker to the President for the meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to Pakistan for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leadership discussion yesterday morning and review procedures for conduct of bi-partisan meeting this afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear delineation of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the general outlines of the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident that if you raise this the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Mention to the President the incident yesterday with our reconnaissance aircraft.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
November 18, 1970

1. Discuss conduct of meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moorer on the two Vietnam projects. You have sent a talker to the President for the meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U. S. delegation to Pakistan for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leadership discussion yesterday morning and review procedures for conduct of bi-partisan meeting this afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear delineation of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the general outlines of the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident that if you raise this the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Mention to the President the incident yesterday with our reconnaissance aircraft.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Bunk ?

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Wednesday} Tuesday, November 17, 1970

Discuss conduct of meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moore
1. If you see the President before the meeting with Bunker, discuss the conduct of the Bunker meeting.

on the two Vietnam projects. You have sent a Talker to the President for the meeting.
I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. ~~Discuss the Pakistani assistance problem (package on left flap).~~
The latest information is in the daily brief. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U. S. delegation ^{to Pakistan} for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leadership discussion ^{yesterday} this morning *and review procedures for conduct of bipartisan meeting this*
which afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Discuss the conduct of the meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moorer tomorrow morning on two Vietnam projects. Fix with the President whether or not he wants to break the news to Rogers privately before the meeting of the whole group or concurrently during that meeting. This is a sensitive issue which might prove embarrassing to Secretary Rogers if he hears about it for the first time before the group. My suggestion is that the President ask Laird to brief both plans so that Laird will appear to have taken the initiative, which in fact he has, and so that your role remains neutral.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

5. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear delineation of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the general outlines of the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident that if you raise this the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

6. Inform President that the Vice President and former President Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

7. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, November 17, 1970

1. If you see the President before the meeting with Bunker, discuss the conduct of the Bunker meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss the Pakistani assistance problem (package on left flap). The latest information is in the daily brief. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U. S. delegation for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Recap the supplemental tactics in light of the Republican leadership discussion this morning.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Discuss the conduct of the meeting with Secretaries Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moorer tomorrow morning on two Vietnam projects. Fix with the President whether or not he wants to break the news to Rogers privately before the meeting of the whole group or concurrently during that meeting. This is a sensitive issue which might prove embarrassing to Secretary Rogers if he hears about it for the first time before the group. My suggestion is that the President ask Laird to brief both plans so that Laird will appear to have taken the initiative, which in fact he has, and so that your role remains neutral.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Discuss the Cuba-tender issue and the need to have a clear delineation of White House/State harmony and a confirmation of the general outlines of the Understanding with the Soviets. I am confident that if you raise this the President will have been alerted by Haldeman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Inform President that the Vice President and former President Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will send him a memo on Laird's private five-year program.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION ° 23576

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger *HK*
SUBJECT: Groundwork for East Pakistan Relief

Ambassador Farland has delivered your message to Yahya, and a chartered plane with an initial shipment of 1,000 tents and 10,000 blankets is on its way to Dacca. Ambassador Farland has received normal authority to use \$25,000 in AID contingency funds and \$100,000 in US-owned Pakistani rupees for immediate needs.

An interagency task force is in operation under Deputy AID Administrator Maurice Williams, and it is coordinating resources of private agencies. As a former AID Mission Director in Pakistan, he is our top economic assistance expert on that area.

Ambassador Farland has asked the Pakistani Government for the earliest possible indication of what assistance is needed. AID today has inventoried the resources available to the U. S. Government as follows:

1. Up to \$4.7 million equivalent in Pakistani currency for non-food expenditures. [This would leave no other local currency resources available for other emergencies this fiscal year.]
2. About \$35 million in Pakistani currency for development works. This would be for basic reconstruction rather than for purely relief activities.
3. Approximately \$10 million remains formally uncommitted for non-food relief goods under the AID Contingency Fund. But this amount has been tentatively earmarked for short-run Cambodian needs. Up to \$5 million could be made available, however.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. The PL 480 budget ceiling would have to be raised to respond to Pakistan's requests for food aid. This could be done on the basis of executive decision to meet Pakistan's initial request for 50,000 tons of wheat. Since you have just approved a \$72 million PL 480 agreement, it should be possible to speed up shipments under that agreement and replace what is drawn for emergency shipments later.

Against the background of these availabilities, AID is thinking about an initial commitment of up to \$10 million in dollars, food and local currency for immediate relief and for assistance in restoring lands to productive use. Until we have a Pakistani request, we do not know how this compares with their assessment of the needs. Also, it does not take account of private contributions (an effort will be made to bring the Center for Voluntary Action into their coordination).

There are two choices on the next move: One would be to ask President Yahya whether he would regard it as helpful for Maury Williams to go to Pakistan to assess possible U.S. contributions to relief and rehabilitation. The other would be to await the Pakistani Government's assessment over the next few days.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

15413

November 16, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: East Pakistan Disaster Relief

In response to the need to coordinate activities within the Government relating to disaster relief for the coastal areas of East Pakistan stricken by last week's catastrophic cyclonic storm and tidal bore, and to the President's desire to make the most generous possible combined offer of U.S. Government assistance to Pakistan promptly, I wish to inform you that an interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief, chaired by the Honorable Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of AID, has been established. All agencies directly concerned, including AID and the Departments of State and Defense, are represented.

Enclosed for your information are (1) a status report on American relief measures already taken or underway and (2) an assessment of additional resources at our disposal for meeting anticipated requests for assistance from the Government of Pakistan. Also enclosed is (3) the proposed text of a statement which the White House may wish to release bearing on the aforementioned actions and preparations.

Theodore L. Eliot Jr.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. East Pakistan Disaster Relief Measures
2. Assessment of Additional Resources
3. Proposed Statement

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

UNCLASSIFIED

East Pakistan Disaster Relief Measures Underway

Since the first reports of the disaster, the Disaster Relief Division of AID, in coordination with the Country Directorate for Pakistan in the State Department, has been arranging emergency relief measures and preparing to respond to anticipated requests for emergency assistance from the Government of Pakistan. As the enormity of the disaster became known, the White House requested a special message from President Nixon to President Yahya expressing sympathy over the loss and extending an offer to help within the limits of U.S. resources. The message was cabled to Islamabad on November 15 and has been conveyed to President Yahya.

An action group was established within the Disaster Relief Division, with participation by other concerned offices of AID, State and other agencies. Consultations have been held with the visiting Deputy Relief Commissioner of East Pakistan, who happened to be in Washington for an AID-sponsored seminar on National Preparedness Planning. Assessments of potential requirements are underway.

Established preparedness plans permit the American Ambassador and USAID Mission in Pakistan to use immediately \$25,000 in AID contingency funds and \$100,000 in U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees. Similarly U.S. registered voluntary agencies, particularly CARE, automatically assist the disaster victims at the scene.

In response to an initial request by the Government of East Pakistan to the American Consulate General in Dacca, AID is sending 1,000 tents and 10,000 blankets to Dacca by chartered plane on November 17. The AID Office for Private Overseas Programs has alerted American voluntary agencies, which are reviewing their resources to meet relief requests when received from Pakistan. The Center for Voluntary Action has been contacted in this connection. The American Red Cross is considering a request received from the Pakistan Red Crescent Society through the League of Red Cross Societies.

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Additional Resources Available

In addition to assistance already underway through AID and that may be provided by voluntary agencies and private parties, the following resources are available to the U.S. Government:

1. Up to \$4.7 million equivalent in Pakistan local currency could be provided from a global allocation for disaster relief non-food expenditure. However, if this full amount were found to be required and were committed, it would not leave any excess local currency resources available the rest of the fiscal year for emergencies in other countries.

2. About \$35 million in Pakistan local currency is available for development works (as opposed to relief activities), such as the construction of irrigation facilities and schools. We have no information at this time on how much local currency development assistance may be required or could be effectively used.

3. Additional dollar financing for required foreign exchange non-food imports of goods and services (such as additional blankets, tents, water purification kits, helicopters, etc.) would have to be charged to the Contingency Fund under the Foreign Assistance Act. Approximately \$10 million remains formally uncommitted under this account, but this amount has been tentatively earmarked for short-run Cambodian needs. Reserving a portion for subsequent contingency needs, up to \$5 million of this account could be made available for the Pakistan emergency if need for non-food imports in that amount were established.

4. There is no room for Pakistan's initial request for 50,000 tons of wheat for emergency relief under the current PL-480 budget ceiling. The current budget is fully encumbered--partly because of prior emergencies and partly because of commodity price increases. Therefore, in order to respond to Pakistan's requests for food aid, the PL-480 budget ceiling would have to be raised. Such action would not require appropriation but could be taken on an executive decision.

5. While it is premature, in the absence of a specific Pakistani request and a clear assessment of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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needs to announce a U.S. aid figure, we are thinking about an initial commitment of up to \$10 million in dollars, food and local currency for immediate relief and for assistance in restoring lands to productive use. Assuming that the PL-480 budget problem can be resolved, the proportions within the total would be determined according to requirements as they become clear.

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Suggested Statement

At the direction of the President, a special inter-departmental Working Group for East Pakistan Disaster Relief has been established to coordinate activities within the Government for relief and rehabilitation assistance to the coastal areas of East Pakistan affected by the catastrophic cyclonic storm and sea surge which devastated that area November 12-13. The Working Group is chaired by Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, and comprises senior representatives of the agencies most directly concerned, including the Departments of State and Defense in addition to AID.

The U.S. Government, through AID, has arranged for an emergency air shipment of 10,000 blankets and 1,000 tents to the disaster area on November 17. It is also considering urgently what it can do, within available resources, to provide additional emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance in response to anticipated requests from the Government of Pakistan. Such resources could include grants of Pakistani local currency for domestic procurement of relief supplies and subsequent reconstruction; emergency food assistance under the

UNCLASSIFIED

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PL-480 program; and an allocation to cover U.S. dollar costs of direct relief operations. We are awaiting the Government of Pakistan's assessment of its requirements, which understandably takes time in a catastrophe of these dimensions, before deciding specifically how we might assist.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Government is maintaining close liaison with, and advising, American voluntary agencies interested in helping in this relief effort.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday
November 16, 1970

1. Discuss your conversation with Dobrynin on Saturday and the reply you hope to make to his note.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

2. Inform President of your meeting with Laird on Special Project and contingency plans being prepared for retaliatory strikes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

3. Inform President that the Vice President and former President Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget and fact you will send him today memo on Laird's private five-year program.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform President of action taken in Pakistani disaster. Presidential message. Priority review of what we can do to help.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No _____

Comments: _____

6. You wished to discuss with the President whether or not we should keep Anderson as our Panama Canal Treaty Negotiator.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,
November 13, 1970

1. Discuss conduct of Echeverria meeting.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform President you are going to meet with Laird at 10:30 on Special Project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform President that the Vice President and former President Johnson will meet with Vice President Ky.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Raise with President the Cuba announcement and problem you are having with State on accepting concept of "understanding".

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

5. Discuss problems with Laird on Defense Budget.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig 

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
November 11, 1970

1. Discuss plans for the trip to Paris including timing of Pompidou appointment (2:20 for 40 minutes) and latest information on notables (list at Tab A). Tell the President that Ambassador Lucet will escort De Gaulle's grandson whose name is Charles De Gaulle to the aircraft and will be available if the President wishes to express a brief word of condolence to the Ambassador. (Lucet and young De Gaulle will be at foot of ramp when President enters plane.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

2. Discuss Korry message on Chile.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

3. Discuss with the President your phone call from Rostow indicating that President Johnson has been approached concerning whether he would receive Ky at the end of the month after Ky has been to Washington. President Johnson would only meet with Ky if it was regarded as a good idea by President Nixon. Smyser, you and Sullivan agreed on suitability and Haig so informed Sullivan. (Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

4. Inform the President you met with the Attorney General on the Ivanov case.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a read-out on the submarine tender.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. You may want to discuss your most recent meeting with Dobrynin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Inform the President that the regular Thursday meeting in Paris has been postponed a week because of the funeral and that the North Vietnamese have agreed to our proposal to hold a private meeting on November 16th due to Ambassador Bruce's "illness."

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Tell the President you have sent him memos on the possibility of meeting Heath at Camp David and meeting with Dewey, Acheson, McCloy and Clay on Europe.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

9. Discuss with the President your DPRC meeting on Monday. You may want to give him Laird's 5-year Defense Strategy Book which he has given you for the President and appears to be designed to circumvent the established machiner.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday,
November 24, 1970

1. Inform the President we have talked to Laird and Timmons on launching a major Congressional action on the prisoner of war rescue operation.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as an aspect of the "understanding."

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Discuss Pakistan situation which was covered for the first time quite favorably on the news last night. (Report on left flap.) We are working intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed and exploited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Inform the President that the Soviet tender left Cienfuegos is now in the port of Casilda. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) some positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, November 18 and then to depart immediately following the second business session. It would probably be preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon could be included without excessive loss of time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

AMH:feg:11/23/70

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

23775

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Pakistan Relief Effort

Latest Actions

Since your talk with Ambassador Hilaly there have been the following new developments on the Pakistan relief effort:

--After seeing you, Ambassador Hilaly appeared before the White House press corps to express his government's satisfaction and deep appreciation for everything the U.S. has done.

--We are awaiting the survey report of the initial medical team sent to East Pakistan and a formal central government request before we dispatch medical units to the disaster area. Three medical units with over 500 men are or have already been placed on 24-hour alert to be airlifted. This will be expensive so it is important to tailor the units to the exact need.

--The initial authorization of \$10 million is being rapidly drawn down and is running especially low on dollar funds. A report is being prepared on how much more will be necessary for the emergency relief phase and then recommendation will be framed on the best source of funds since the disaster relief fund is almost exhausted.

--A Boeing 747 aircraft is being loaded in New York with government and voluntary agency supplies. It will be flown to Pakistan free of charge to the donors.

--Maurice Williams, the chairman of the Working Group, spent most of the day in New York meeting with the voluntary agencies. He reports their judgment that the Pakistan disaster is much worse than anything they have experienced, both in terms of its magnitude and

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- 2 -

and the logistical problems of making relief supplies available. The voluntary agencies agreed that your National Center for Volunteer Action would serve as a central clearing house for information on the disaster and voluntary assistance. Final plans are also being drawn up for launching a major fund raising drive.

Conclusions

We are temporarily in a state of suspense on the biggest decision before us--what medical facilities to send into Pakistan. We are in a position to move quickly, however, just as soon as we get the go ahead from Pakistan.

On other fronts, the momentum of our relief effort is being maintained and should continue to increase as all our helicopters on the scene turn operational tomorrow. Public handling also seems to be improving as the facts become more widely known. Your meeting with Ambassador Hilaly and his press briefing should help.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 23, 1970

1. Discuss latest results of air strikes (Tab A).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Provide the President with yours and State's views on "understanding" issue.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Discuss P.A. status of special operation - Laird has been told to stay absolutely mum.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Discuss the Pakistan situation. Latest report is on left flap. Discuss the pros and cons of sending a U.S. delegation to Pakistan for relief purposes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President that the Soviet tender left Cienfuegos is now in the port of Casilda. ~~Also inform him of the plans to re press handling.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

22 November 1970

Preliminary Results of Strikes in
North Vietnam

(As of 0804 EST 22 Nov. 70)

A total of 260 aircraft in two waves participated. Deteriorating weather caused diversion to Laos of 50 of the second wave aircraft and cancellation of the third wave.

There were no aircraft losses from enemy action reported.

No SAM firings or MIG activity were noted and AAA fire was reported as moderate and generally inaccurate.

Bomb damage assessment based on pilot reports and limited photography is as follows:

Explosions

2 medium explosions and numerous secondary explosions

An intercepted enemy message reported that "an ammunition dump belonging to the infantry was hit and explosions are taking place."

Fires

4 large POL fires

1 large sustained supply storage fire

40 fireballs

numerous other secondary fires

Structures

1 POL warehouse destroyed and numerous military structures destroyed

Railroads

600 feet of railroad track destroyed

Roads

11 road cuts

Bridges

2 damaged

SAMS

An earlier report of 2 SAMS on transports destroyed needs further clarification because smoke, fire and poor visibility made it difficult to determine exact results.

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E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PER RAC REVIEW 12/29/2008

By JHS NARA, Date 6/29/2012

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE

2

Trucks

51 destroyed, 40 damaged

NV bombing results

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 November 1970 28
0650 EST



THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Report on Strikes in NVN

1. This MFR consists of a summary to date of FREEDOM BAIT strikes against NVN on 21 November 1970.

2. SORTIES	7AF*	TF 77	TOTAL
Scheduled	282	234	516
Completed	127	133	260
Diverted to Laos	32	18	50
Cancelled WX	123	83	206
Losses	0	0	0

*Includes 10 USMC sorties

3. A total of 260 aircraft in two waves participated. Deteriorating weather caused diversion to Laos of 50 of the second wave aircraft and cancellation of the third wave. A total of 206 sorties were cancelled. The first time over target (TOT) was 0110Z (0910H) by USS HANCOCK aircraft; the final TOT was 0800Z (1600H) with a final cross out time from enemy territory of 0828Z (1628H) for 7th AF aircraft.

2010 EST, 20 NOV

0300 EST, 21 NOV

TOTAL TIME
6:41:57

4. There were no aircraft losses from enemy action reported. No SAM firings or MIG activity were noted. AAA fire was reported as moderate and generally inaccurate.

5. Bomb damage assessment based on pilot reports and limited BDA photography is as follows:

- 7AF - Trucks - 39 destroyed/20 damaged.
- Secondary explosions - 2 medium and numerous lesser explosions.
- 3 large POL fires.
- 18 fires.
- 1 POL warehouse and numerous military structures destroyed.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY


TF 77 - Trucks - 12 destroyed/20 damaged.
40 fireballs.
Waterborne logistic craft - 4 destroyed/
4 damaged.
1 large sustained POL fire.
1 large sustained supply storage fire.
Numerous other secondary fires.
Approximately 600 feet of railroad track
destroyed.
11 road cuts.
2 bridges damaged.

1ST MAW - Numerous explosions and fires.

NOTE: Marginal to adverse weather limited pilot reports and BDA.

6. Weather conditions, which deteriorated earlier than forecast, closed most of the primary targets for the second wave and forced cancellation of the third wave.

7. The above information is based on reports received to date from CINCPAC forces.



W. P. ANDERSON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON EAST PAKISTAN DISASTER RELIEF

DAILY STATUS REPORT - NOVEMBER 21, 1970

1. Current Situation Report

Ambassador Farland, after personal reconnaissance over the devastated area, reports that although he saw many unburied remains, he was struck by the number of survivors on the islands resuming normal life, including road building and rice harvesting. This observation, he added, in no way deprecates extent of the disaster, but suggests the resiliency of the affected population and that their ability to cope with this disaster is greater than many of us had anticipated.

2. Status U.S. Assistance

The Government of East Pakistan has urgently requested four additional U.S. Army helicopters. The four UH-1 (Huey) helicopters which have been waiting on standby are leaving Pope Air Force Base this morning on three C-141s -- raising the total number of U.S. relief helicopters to ten. The U.S. are the first of the donor helicopters operating in the disaster area. The U.S. helicopters are flying from Begamganj base just north of Noakhali town; British helicopter support will be located near Patuakhali district; and French helicopters will operate out of Barisal town.

The first airshipments of high-protein survival biscuits have arrived in Dacca. Two more planes are departing New York this afternoon with 176,000 pounds of biscuits, and 6,000 pounds of one-quart plastic bottles to be used to carry drinking water to survivors. The biscuits were donated by the Office of Civil Defense.

At midnight tonight a third plane is leaving Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, with 50 sixteen-foot motorized relief craft. They should arrive in Dacca Monday night.

With regard to medical assistance, the U.S. has offered to provide medical and health care including mobile field hospital units. Prior to ordering forward such facilities and personnel, we have sent a medical team to survey and assess medical and health requirements in the disaster area. The Mission has stressed the need to emplace medical teams that are entirely self-contained.

3. Media Handling and Public Reaction

The Mission has reported that Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now fully aware of the unfavorable foreign press coverage and they have instructed appropriate officials in Dacca to improve the briefing of foreign correspondents.

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(Decontrol following 11/21/71)

NESA/SA:TSwayze:kls:11/21/70

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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Pakistan Relief Effort

U. S. Response

The initial requests for emergency assistance from the provincial government of East Pakistan have been met, and contingency plans are now being made to meet what would seem to be the longer range needs. The following is a status report on what we have done in meeting the first requests:

-- The first air shipment of AID-financed blankets (10,000) and tents (1,000) is due to arrive in Dacca today. A second air shipment is being planned which will include contributions from voluntary agencies and especially in such items as clothing where they are best prepared to help. This was in response to an urgent request for 10-30,000 blankets, an unspecified number of tents and as much warm clothing as possible (Other contributing governments have accounted for the difference.)

-- In response to an urgent need for helicopters to ferry relief into the disaster area, four U. S. military Huey helicopters have been dispatched by the U. S. Strike Command from Pope Air Force Base. They should be operational over the disaster area tomorrow. In addition, two reconnaissance helicopters, under AID contract in Nepal, are being prepared for relief operations and also reach Dacca by tomorrow.

[We received Pakistani clearance to use military helicopters and crews Tuesday morning, and the aircraft took off at 1:00 a. m. Wednesday (flight time 27 hours, assembly time 19 hours).]

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-- The East Pakistanis also requested 50,000 tons of wheat and some \$2 million in rupees for the local purchase of building materials and the repairing of coastal embankments.

The 50,000 tons of wheat have already been approved under the PL-480 program but it will take about a month to ship it. This does not raise a problem, however, since from all indications there are sufficient food stocks in East Pakistan for now, in part because of earlier PL-480 shipments. This additional wheat should arrive in time to replenish those stocks before they are drawn down too far. The major problem in the food relief effort is not an overall shortage but distributing what is already there in the disaster area. This is the job of our helicopters.

On the local currency requirements, Ambassador Farland has provided \$52,000 from his emergency fund for immediate needs and there is some \$35 million in Pakistani rupees available for reconstruction. We still do not have a specific assessment of reconstruction requirements. AID estimates that perhaps \$10 million could be spent over the next year because of the undeveloped state of the economy. Whatever we provide on this front would be in addition to the \$10 million that you have already authorized.

Voluntary Agencies, Private Organizations, and Other Governments

The Working Group is in close touch with all of the major voluntary agencies in an effort to coordinate and maximize our public and private response. This includes CARE, Catholic Relief and other organizations with valuable experience in operating in East Pakistan. An organization called Pakistan Relief Fund, Inc. has been formed by a group including Robert Murphy, and other prominent Americans. They hope eventually to have about 50 prominent citizens as members and will raise funds to be channeled through U. S. voluntary agencies that are assisting in the relief effort.

Several other governments including India, Iran, Morocco, Great Britain, France and West Germany are contributing to the emergency relief effort. These sources, for instance, are complementing our shipments of blankets and medical supplies to meet initial requirements. We are keeping in touch with this effort so that duplication can be avoided.

CONFIDENTIAL

700/10/2550

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Problems Ahead

The central problem at the moment, as noted above, is one of distribution rather than of supply. In view of a possible request for additional helicopters, contingency preparations are being made for further airlift. These would probably either have to be diverted from Southeast Asia or sent directly from the U. S., which is expensive and takes at least three days before they are operational in the area.

The central government in Islamabad has still not produced a formal list of requirements. It is unclear what is holding up this necessary evaluation, although bureaucratic confusion and the fact that President Yahya has been in Dacca may be part of the problem. AID is attempting to make an independent judgment, but we can not go much further in the relief effort until we have a thorough evaluation from the scene. Ambassador Farland has now flown to Dacca, and Maurice Williams, the Deputy Administrator of AID and the head of our inter-departmental Working Group, is prepared to go to the scene if coordination remains a problem and we do not soon get the necessary response from the central government.

If additional food proves necessary when the assessment of need is complete, the current worldwide ceiling on PL-480 expenditures would probably have to be raised. This would require White House decision, but it is too early to know now.

Public Handling

The Working Group today has primed the State and AID press officers to background the press on the situation in East Pakistan and on what the U. S. has done.

Criticism of the Pakistani government's handling is increasing in the East Pakistan press. As you know, there is normally deep antagonism in East Pakistan for the central government in the West, and this has been exacerbated by the current election campaign as well as by the present tragedy.

CONFIDENTIAL

SMH:HHSaunders:tmt 11/19/70

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Wednesday} Tuesday, December 1, 1970

- 1. ~~1. ^{the} Inform the President~~ ^{You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rubin yesterday}
- 2. ^{the} Inform the President you have ~~arranged a briefing~~ for four of the newly elected Republican Senators and Buckley at 10:00 a.m. Sisco and Sullivan will also participate. Weicker won't be able to attend.

a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators - elect Rockefeller - elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

23955

- 3. Review Berlin ~~access~~ situation. (Left flap)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

- 4. Give President location of tender and ^{rundown on} other Soviet naval moves. ~~Subst upon Sec report Tab.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

- 5. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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7. Tell the President you've met with Messrs. Marsh,
Scaife, Frayer, McMichael, Thomas, Selman and
Barnett today.

8. Tell the President you will be meeting with
Vice Admiral Reikover today, ~~at his request~~

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday, December 1, 1970

1. Inform the President you have arranged a briefing for four of the newly elected Republican Senators and Buckley at 10:00 a.m. Sisco and Sullivan will also participate. Weicker won't be able to attend.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Review Berlin access situation. (Left flap)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Give President location of tender and other Soviet naval moves.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 29, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday, November 29

- 1. Review Berlin access situation. (Left flap)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

- 2. Give President location of tender and other Soviet naval moves.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No. _____

Comments: _____

- 3. Discuss "understanding" issue and our reconnaissance flights.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, December 18 and then to depart immediately following the second business session. It would probably be preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon could be included without excessive loss of time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

5. Discuss the Pakistan situation. We are working intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed and exploited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Inform the President you have arranged a briefing for the five newly elected Republican Senators Tuesday. You would plan to have Sisco and Sullivan also participate. Buckley will be included also.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

Ed

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, November 27

1. Inform the President of your discussion Tuesday with Ambassador Dobrynin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform the President that Time and Life as well as Look Magazine will carry major articles on the POW issue this week. You may want to tell the President that Sidey will be doing a story on the decision to undertake the rescue mission.

You also have received a phone call from Hobart Lewis in answer to a Presidential request that he write a story about the mission.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform the President that the Soviet tender which left Cienfuegos and visited Casilda, Cuba for five days returned Tuesday afternoon to Cienfuegos. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) ^{some} ~~some~~ positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, December 18 and then to depart immediately following the second business session. It would probably be preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon could be included without excessive loss of time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as an aspect of the "understanding."

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Discuss the Pakistan situation. We are working intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed and exploited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant on Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

-3-

8. Inform the President you hope to arrange a briefing for the five newly elected Republican senators early next week. You would plan to have Sisco, Sullivan and Haig also participate.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ NO _____

Comments: _____

AMH:JTH:feg:11/25/70

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Friday} Wednesday, November 25, 1970

1. Inform the President of your discussion ^{Tuesday} yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform President that plan to obtain Congressional support for POW operation has been discussed with both Timmons and Laird and is moving forward. Laird planned briefing yesterday in Senator Dole's office with General Gurney, Boggs, Hanson, Fannin, Griffin, Allott, Packwood, Murphy, Saxby, Mrs. Smith, Curtis, plus five Republican Senators-elect. This meeting was to provide details of the operation and plot strategy to obtain maximum support. Laird also briefed the Armed Services Committee in closed session and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open session on live T.V. }

In addition, Time and Life as well as Look Magazine will carry major articles on the POW issue this week. You may want to tell the President that you will be seeing Sidey this afternoon and that Sidey wants to do a will be story on the decision. to undertake the rescue mission

down

You also have received a phone call from Hobart Lewis in answer to a Presidential request that he write a story about the mission.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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3. Inform the President that the Soviet tender which left Cienfuegos and visited Casilda, Cuba for five days returned yesterday afternoon to Cienfuegos. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) some positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, December 18 and then to depart immediately following the second business session. It would probably be preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon could be included without excessive loss of time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as an aspect of the "understanding".

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Discuss Pakistan situation. We are working intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed and exploited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

7. The President is seeing Frank Shakespeare at 11:15 a.m. You may want to mention Shakespeare's concerns to the President.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant on Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Before the President you ~~planned~~ hope to ~~be~~ arrange ^{bringing of} ~~all to~~ ~~bring~~ the five newly elected Republican Senators early next week. You would plan to have DeLoach, Sullivan and Hoag also participate.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

November ²⁵ 24, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *Al Haig*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ~~Tuesday~~ ^{Wednesday},
November 24, 1970

1. Inform the President we have talked to Laird and Timmons on launching a major Congressional action on the prisoner of war rescue operation.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5 Inform the President that State and Defense are somewhat at odds on the "understanding" issue and the inclusion of reconnaissance flights as an aspect of the "understanding."

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Discuss Pakistan situation, which was covered for the first time quite favorably on the news ^{Monday} last night. (Report on left flap.) We are working intimately with Klein's people to ensure that continued good informational data is developed and exploited.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

Inform the President of your discussion yesterday with Ambassador Polunin

3 *for five days returned yesterday afternoon to Casilda, Cuba* *which* *admitted*
 4. Inform the President that the Soviet tender left Cienfuegos ~~is now in~~ the port of Casilda. Inform the President that you reviewed with Alexis Johnson the Congressional briefings to be given on this issue to ensure that (a) some positive steps have been taken by the Soviets and (b) continued pressure is applied with respect to the presence of the submarine tender.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Haldeman refused to reopen the issue of the luncheon at Camp David for Heath. He suggested that you raise it with the President. I think you should point out that it would look especially cool for the President to travel all the way to Camp David on Friday, November 18 and then to depart immediately following the second business session. It would probably be preferable for him to depart later on Friday morning so that a luncheon could be included without excessive loss of time.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant yesterday. ~~on~~ *on Monday.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2 Inform President ^{that} plan to obtain Congressional support for POW operation was discussed with both Timmons and Laird last night. Defense plans the following: At 9:30 this morning there will be a ^{Said planned} briefing in Senator Dole's office with Secretary Laird and General Vogt. ^{for} Included on the Congressional side will be Dole, Miller, Gurney, Boggs, Hanson, Fannin, Griffin, Allott, Packwood, Murphy, Saxby, Mrs. Smith, Curtis, plus five Republican Senators-elect. This meeting will ^{was to} provide details of ^{the} operation and plot strategy to obtain maximum support. ^{Laird also} ~~helped to~~ ^{helped} the Armed Services Committee in closed session and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open session on live T.V.

R In addition, Time and Life as well as Look Magazine will carry major articles on the POW issue this week. ^{You may want to Tell the President that you will be seeing Sides this afternoon and that Sides wants to do} I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

^{a story on the session}
Comments: _____

7 The President is ^{seeing} ~~meeting~~ ^{with} Frank Shakespeare at 11:15 a.m. ^{You may want to mention the Shakespeare's concerns to the President}

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
December 2, 1970

1. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Review Berlin situation. [Left flap]

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Give President location of tender and rundown on other Soviet naval moves. (See Map at Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

5. Discuss the possibility of the President's giving a small stag working dinner for King Hussein on December 8 or 9. Your memo to him is at Tab B.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell the President you will be meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

ACTION
23784 (Revised)

NOV 30 1970

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Visit of King Hussein
(Signed) HK

You have agreed to see King Hussein for an hour's talk at 3:30 p.m. on December 8 while he is here on his unofficial visit.

I believe it is highly desirable to include as a minimal gesture a small (12-15) stag working dinner for him as you did when he was here in the spring of 1969. There are some important substantive issues that could be profitably discussed in a forum like this.

I recognize that this increases your involvement in this visit. However, in view of the effort we expended in September to help the King maintain a stable basis for a negotiated settlement with Israel, it would be difficult not to go this extra step in helping him to feel that the U. S. is behind him.

RECOMMENDATION: That you invite Hussein to a small stag working dinner on December 8 or 9.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

SECRET/EXDIS

HHSaunders:tmt 11/30/70

Left flap
23955

SECRET

INFORMATION
December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Berlin Talks

There is attached at Tab A a status report on the Berlin talks. My memorandum of November 17 (Tab B) brought you up to date as of the meeting of November 16. Since then, there has been only one meeting, a particularly unproductive one, on November 23. The next scheduled meeting is December 10 which should provide us with a better basis to assess where things stand than the previous meeting.

Tab B is Log Number 23594

ATD:hsc

SECRET

SECRET

December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Four Power Talks on Berlin

There has been virtually no substantive progress during the past two Ambassadorial meetings (November 16 and 23), and indeed in the last meeting the Soviets took the toughest stance so far both in tone and substance. The Soviet approach seems to be to take the hardest possible line and then to mark time, as if they anticipated a shift in direction but were not exactly sure which way the direction would point. They are protected most, therefore, by taking the hardest possible line.

There are several factors that have been at play in recent weeks which may have caused the Soviets to pause:

-- There is a general assumption, fostered by pro-Ostpolitik forces in the FRG and especially Bahr, that Soviet policy has been impeded by GDR rigidity. The evidence on this is ambiguous but the frequent comings and goings between Soviet and East German officials do at least suggest that the Soviets are trying to get the GDR to take a more pliant attitude, at least in form. (We do know that the East Germans are unhappy about Polish and other East European efforts to normalize relations with the FRG without obtaining additional recognition for the GDR; this was reflected in the hard-line speech of the GDR delegate to the recent Hungarian Party Congress.)

-- A Warsaw Pact meeting will be held in East Berlin this week, and the prime focus there will be coordination on German affairs (and the NATO meeting will run almost concurrently).

-- The Soviets have viewed the Hessian and Bavarian elections as evidence of renewed strength for Brandt's coalition which, in their eyes, may make it easier for Brandt to secure ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty without significant progress on Berlin (a doubtful calculus, given CDU views).

-- Ulbricht's health, always a source of rumors, may in fact be failing, leading to more intense intra-party maneuvering in East Germany; the length of time Ulbricht will (and should) remain in command is relevant to Soviet decisions on Berlin.

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

-- The intra-German talks (between Bahr and Kohl) began November 27; the Soviets will probably wish to test in this channel whether the Germans will negotiate on Berlin access without an adequate Four Power mandate (Bahr reports that he was firm in insisting that he could not discuss Berlin access without this mandate); which would have a spoiling effect on the Four Power talks.

-- The Soviets may also have been hoping for a break in Allied Tripartite unity; especially since the Pompidou visit to the USSR in mid-October, the Soviets seem to have targeted the French for separate approaches (the French have not been unresponsive).

The autobahn slowdown in recent days in connection with the CDU meeting in Berlin probably was the least the Soviets could do to placate the East Germans (and to save their own face). At the same time the Soviets hoped that the political nature of the problem (a CDU meeting) would create further division between Barzel and Brandt. In the end, however, the autobahn stoppages probably serves the cause of Allied unity and pulled German opinion together in insisting on something concrete from the Berlin talks.

As of the last Ambassadorial meeting, the Soviets were still unhelpful on access. While the Four could agree on general principles, the specific commitments according to the Soviets, would have to take the form of agreements between the GDR, the FRG and the Berlin Senat, i. e., the Soviets continue to refuse to take formal responsibility for access, insisting that this is a GDR sovereign right. Before the Soviets would offer specific thinking on a possible FRG-GDR agreement they wanted assurances that there would be movement by the West to meet Soviet requirements for removing the Federal presence from Berlin. Abrasimov has clearly linked Federal presence with access. On the issue of Federal presence the Soviets have continued to insist that all federal agencies be removed (though there is some indication they may accept the Bahr concept of a cosmetic change to tuck all federal offices under the auspices of a Federal "representative" in Berlin (a position Bahr himself expects to hold as the present FRG official responsible for Berlin). There is increasing indication that the Soviets want to have a greater role in West Berlin, including assurances that the NPD and similar offensive organizations are eliminated and that the Soviets should have a consulate and other official officers in West Berlin. So far the Soviets have flatly refused to consider representation abroad of Berlin by the FRG. However, they have expressed some interest in learning more about our proposal that FRG passports issued in West Berlin bear an additional stamp indicating that they were issued under the authority of the respective Allied commandant (another Bahr idea). The Soviets also insist that we agree that Berlin is not only not a land of the FRG but not "a part" of the FRG.

SECRET

-3-

The advisers of the Four Ambassadors met on November 30 for a discussion that centered largely around the format of any eventual agreement. There would be three general elements: the first would entail a Four Power statement on general principles, the second would be the unilateral communications by the Soviets (on access) and the Three (on Federal presence) together with the results of the negotiations between the German authorities, and the final element would again be a Four Power statement tying together the other two elements. During the advisers meeting, the Soviets hinted that the situation might be clearer in a week or so and perhaps there could then be another advisers meeting. This hint tends to confirm other indications that the Soviets may be trying to prepare a new stance for the Ambassadorial meeting of December 10. This will then be the last meeting for a month or so. Following that meeting (and assuming that the Warsaw Pact meeting this week supports a new Soviet line, or confirms the old one) we will be in a much better position to take a new look at where we stand in the talks and where we ought to be heading.

ATD:mm

SECRET

SECRET/NODIS

INFORMATION
November 17, 1970

23594

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Analysis of Latest Round of Berlin Talks

Attached is an analysis of the November 16 Ambassadorial meeting (Tab A). It did not seem to advance the negotiations; indeed if anything the lines seem to have hardened somewhat.

In general, apart from the points in the attached analysis, I would stress the following, perhaps obvious points:

1. There will be no written agreement on Berlin that (a) does not diminish the FRG presence in West Berlin, (b) does not increase de facto GDR control over access and (c) does not contain "guarantees" of access, no matter how artfully drafted, that cannot be reversed at a whim by the Soviets and/or the GDR. More than ever the deterrent to such a reversal will be essentially subjective, i. e., it will rest on the Soviet calculus of the probable adverse consequences.

2. We must be more than ever careful (and Rush is doing well) not to get out in front of the Germans in offering concessions relating to the FRG's Berlin presence or we will get caught in German internal politics.

3. We must be careful not to be tempted into bilateral dealings with the USSR. This would demoralize the allies. More than that, given the realities noted in paragraph 1 above any resultant agreement (other than a general understanding not to have crises, for what that is worth) will produce a net concrete loss for our side.

4. We must recognize that if, by an off chance there should be an agreement acceptable to the allies and we say so, we will thereby be sanctifying Ostpolitik and all its implications. For as soon as the Allies, and especially the US, say that there is an acceptable Berlin agreement the CDU cannot refuse to ratify the Moscow treaty.

SECRET//NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

* * * * *

None of the foregoing need preclude efforts, including by the FRG-GDR, at piecemeal humanitarian improvements, e. g., in intra-city traffic nor, indeed in access modalities. Nor, as noted, need it preclude some understanding with the Soviets to exercise restraint on both sides. But any formal agreement, as far as I can see, is bound to have one, several or all the pitfalls listed in paragraphs 1 to 4 above.

HS:mm

SECRET NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

November 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Ambassadorial Talks on Berlin, November 16, 1970

The talks on Monday, November 16, concentrated on the access question and the West German presence in West Berlin. On both issues the basic differences have emerged more clearly, and in effect, an impasse has been reached.

The Access Issues

On November 4, we presented a statement of principles to govern access to West Berlin, making it clear that any agreement on access would have to include a fairly precise definition of the procedures. Thus, we have included in our position the assertion that in the case of transit traffic for goods and persons, any controls should be limited to identification only, including sealed vehicles and trains, abolition of visas, freedom from inspection, etc. All of this would be part of a four-power agreement, on the theory that the four powers are ultimately responsible for unhindered access. Following the four-power agreement, there would be intra-German negotiations, under a four-power mandate, which would then be approved or sanctioned in some manner by the four powers.

The Soviet position, as spelled out by Abrasimov in the November 16 session, is that this approach is fundamentally unacceptable because it infringes on the sovereignty of the GDR which, since it "owns" the access routes, has the sole responsibility for civilian access; there is not, and never has been a four-power right to control civilian access.

On this juridical basis the most the Soviet side could do would be "reach agreement" with the GDR that access should proceed unhindered, and be given preferential treatment subject to "norms" of international law and GDR procedures. The three Western powers could take note of this agreement, and could, for their part, give a mandate both to the FRG and to the West Berlin Senat to negotiate the details. In this light the Soviets contend there is no basis for spelling out details of access since there is no four-power responsibility.

Thus the impasse is: if we cannot commit the USSR to any responsibility for the access of civilians, and on that basis turn the negotiations over to

over access. Then the pressure for agreement would shift away from the USSR to the West Germans who would have to negotiate the details, knowing that success of the talks would depend on their willingness to conclude an agreement so that the German-Soviet treaty can be ratified. In this case East Germany, already having gained further de facto acceptance, would drive the toughest bargain possible.

The only glimmer of hope is that the Soviets have mentioned a "gentlemen's agreement" that the details as we spell them out will be incorporated into the GDR-FRG agreement, but on the condition that there is satisfactory settlement of Soviet demands to restrict and reduce West German political presence in West Berlin.

West German Presence

The Soviets proceed on the principle that the four powers should agree on those activities that are specifically prohibited. Since we have resisted the right of the USSR to have a say in the matter of how we run the Western sector, the agreement would take the form of a commitment by the three powers to take certain actions which the Soviets will "take note of."

On November 4, the Soviets submitted their list of restrictions and prohibitions. The main demands are to prohibit the "activities of all FRG parliamentary or other political organs" -- Bundestag, Bundesrat (including committees and factions which the Germans want to continue on the grounds that they do not derive from the Basic Law), Bundesversammlung, Cabinet meetings, as well as functioning of Federal offices and agencies. In addition, "neo-Nazi" and other "revanchist" organizations would be prohibited. Though the Soviets insist on the principle of listing prohibitions, Abrasimov has indicated that this does not mean that the Soviets renounce the right to raise objections to activities not specifically listed.

The nub of the matter in this last point is that we have, at West German insistence, gone along with the idea of a list of prohibited activities, on the grounds that we have such responsibilities in West Berlin in any case, and that it is better to list prohibitions than try to list what is permitted.

In private talks, the Soviets have indicated some flexibility on the question of Federal offices in West Berlin. Apparently at the instigation of the West Germans (perhaps through the clandestine contacts with Bohr) the Soviets said they might settle for simply renaming all the various ministries and agencies into one innocuous sounding organization.

The Outlook

Abrasimov said yesterday (Monday) that his reformulation of our access proposal was the maximum Soviet position, but urged that the advisors continue to negotiate for a common position -- thus suggesting that there may still be some give in the Soviet position. The Soviets are apparently walking a tight rope between their desire to gain some agreement to promote the treaty ratification, and their refusal to repudiate their age-old position that the GDR has sovereignty over civilian access.

As noted above there may still be some room for negotiation on the gentlemen's agreement that Abrasimov mentioned, but this is a slender reed to lean on, and, of course, could be wiped out at any future point since it is conditional on the deal on West German presence.

Even if these two basic issues were somehow resolved through fuzzy compromises, which are not beyond the ingenuity of our negotiators, there remains the question of representation of West Berlin abroad. This has not really been touched on. The Soviets have been hot and cold, sometimes saying this is impossible, sometimes saying that there might be some room for a consular understanding. (De facto, the FRG can do it anyway outside Eastern Europe.) Similarly, the West Germans have shifted around on this. They told us (through Bahr) that this was not essential, but later have said it was the main issue. All of this is greatly complicated by the fact that even if consular representation is agreed to by the Soviets, there will arise the issue of who speaks for West Berlin in the UN when both German states are admitted.

In sum, almost any conceivable outcome is going to increase the status of the GDR, weaken the juridical basis for our presence, and diminish, at least psychologically, the links between West Berlin and West Germany, in return for somewhat tighter access procedures, still at the mercy of the Soviets and GDR, and some better procedures for movement between East and West Berlin, with these latter issues being negotiated on our behalf between the West Berlin Senat and the East Germans.

Though the West Germans, and Bahr in particular, have claimed the Soviets are under great pressure for an agreement, the record thus far suggests that the Soviets are willing to protract the talks, and the pressures will grow on the West Germans. (This may explain Bahr's rather frantic efforts to deal with the Soviets behind our back.)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
December 3, 1970

1/ Tell the President you have forwarded to him by separate memorandum the reports of the Secretaries of State and Transportation. Discuss press handling and additional steps which should be taken within the bureaucracy. Caution the President that it is important that we be prudent in our public statements in order not to prejudice the formal investigations and possible future legal proceedings.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin Tuesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender and the other group of ships which may be rendezvousing with it. (See map at Tab A) Inform him of the possibility that a nuclear submarine is accompanying the Soviet guided missile frigate and oiler.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a rundown on your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 3, 1970

*Ed - add'l cables
added to Left flap
material for Dist.
Wil*

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Rundown*
December 3, 1970, ~~Wednesday~~

1.

You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin ~~yesterday~~ *Tuesday*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Review Berlin situation. [Left flap]

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Give President location of tender and rundown on other Soviet naval moves. (See Map at Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

5. Discuss the possibility of the President's giving a small stag working dinner for King Hussein on December 8 or 9. Your memo to him is at Tab B.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell the President you will be meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

ACTION
23784 (Revised)

NOV 30 1970

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Visit of King Hussein

(Signed) HK

You have agreed to see King Hussein for an hour's talk at 3:30 p.m. on December 8 while he is here on his unofficial visit.

I believe it is highly desirable to include as a minimal gesture a small (12-15) stag working dinner for him as you did when he was here in the spring of 1969. There are some important substantive issues that could be profitably discussed in a forum like this.

I recognize that this increases your involvement in this visit. However, in view of the effort we expended in September to help the King maintain a stable basis for a negotiated settlement with Israel, it would be difficult not to go this extra step in helping him to feel that the U. S. is behind him.

RECOMMENDATION: That you invite Hussein to a small stag working dinner on December 8 or 9.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

SECRET/EXDIS

HHSaunders:tmt 11/30/70

1970 DEC 2 11 09

CONFIDENTIAL

HCD036

PAGE 01 BERLIN 01861 021053Z

21

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00
 CCO-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-08 L-04 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01
 PRS-01 SS-20 IO-13 ACDA-19 NIC-01 RSR-01 /114 W
 ----- 119771

O 021028Z DEC 70

FM USMISSION BERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6750

AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

CINCUSAREUR FOR POLAD & OPS/HEIDELBERG

CINCEUR FOR POLAD & OPS/VAIHINGEN

CINCUSAFE FOR POLAD & OPS/WIESBADEN

USELMLO/CASTEAU

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 1861

NATO FOR HILLENBRAND AND SUTTERLIN

SUBJECT: BERLIN ACCESS - DELAYS RESUMED DECEMBER 2

REF: BERLIN 1857

1. AFTER NIGHT OF RAPID CLEARANCE (80 TO 120 TRUCKS PER HOUR) AT ALL CHECKPOINTS EXCEPT LAUENBURG (WHERE 12 TO 18 HOUR DELAYS CONTINUED), SLOWDOWNS RESUMED MORNING OF DEC. 2. AS OF 0900 CHECKPOINTS REPORTED CLEARANCE RATE HAD BEEN RUNNING FIVE OR TEN PER HOUR SINCE ABOUT 0630, WITH VEHICLES WAITING AT ALL POINTS. HELMSTEDT REPORTS ABOUT 50 TRUCKS, DREILINDEN 70 TRUCKS AND 50 PASSENGER CARS WAITING.
2. AT TWO CONTROL POINTS OFFICIALS REPORT COMMENTS RELAYED FROM EAST GERMANS TO EFFECT THAT DELAYS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL DECEMBER 6 BECAUSE OF "NPD MEETING" IN BERLIN. CHECK WITH SENAT CAS, AND MISSION SOURCES REVEALS ONLY THAT BERLIN NPD HAS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BERLIN 01861 021053Z

ASKED MEMBERS TO "STAND BY DURING PERIOD DECEMBER 4-6."
SENAT BELIEVES NPD MEMBERS PLAN TO DISTRIBUTE ELECTION MATERIALS
AND COLLECT SIGNATURES FOR NPD CANDIDACIES. NO SPECIFIC
MEETING OF NPD PLANNED.

3. SENAT HAS INFORMED MISSION OF SCHEDULED VISITS BY FEDERAL
MINISTER OF INTERIOR GENSCHER TO BERLIN DECEMBER 2 AND FEDERAL
MINISTER OF INNER-GERMAN AFFAIRS, FRANKE DECEMBER 6 AND 7.
PRESIDENT HEINEMANN IS SCHEDULED TO VISIT BERLIN DECEMBER 6
THROUGH 8. ANY ONE OR ALL OF THESE VISITS MIGHT PROVIDE FURTHER
EXCUSE FOR ACCESS INTERFERENCE.

4. USCOB CONCURS. GP-3
MORRIS

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CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

HCD038

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1970 DEC 2 11 26

11
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE 00
NSC-10 INR-07 NSAE-00 PM-03 ACDA-10 IO-04 PRS-01 L 02
RSC-01 RSR-01 /072 W

119775

O R 021005Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5735
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 16701

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: UNILATERAL FRENCH ACTIONS RE BERLIN

BRUSSELS FOR SECRETARY ROGERS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLENBRAND

1. SUMMARY: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO PRESENT THE FACTS, AS WE AND THE BRITISH HERE AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PIECE THEM TOGETHER, ON THE UNILATERAL FRENCH ACTIONS RE BERLIN IN MOSCOW AND BONN ON SATURDAY, 28. IN MOSCOW, THE FRENCH RESPONDED TO A UNILATERAL SOVIET PROTEST WITHOUT INFORMING OR CONSULTING THE US OR UK ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET PROTEST OR OF THE FRENCH RESPONSE THERETO. IN BONN, THE FRENCH TOLD THE FRG THE NOVEMBER 30 CDU/CSU FRAKTION MEETING IN WEST BERLIN WOULD BE INOPPORTUNE, AGAIN WITHOUT INFORMING OR CONSULTING THE US OR UK. WERE THESE MOVES (A) A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO BREAK AWAY FROM TRIPARTITE SOLIDARITY, (B) A CHANGE IN FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS, (C) THE BEGINNING OF A FRANCO-SOVIET "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" FOLLOWING POMPIDOU'S MOSCOW TRIP (BERLIN 1830), OR (D) FRENCH SUBMISSION TO SPECIAL SOVIET PRESSURE? THE ANSWER, AS WE SEE IT, TO EACH PART OF THIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 16701 01 OF 02 021050Z

QUESTION IS NEGATIVE, EPN THOUGH IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT ON THE PARTICULAR ISSUE OF FRG PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN THE FRENCH HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN LESS FORTHCOMING THAN WE OR THE UK.

2. PICTURE HERE IS ONE OF FRENCH EMBARRASSMENT AND REGRET OVER LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN QUAI, BONN AND MOSCOW AND FAILURE TO CONSULT OR INFORM ALLIES. RATHER THAN HIGH-LEVEL CRITICISM OF FRENCH ACTIONS, WE RECOMMEND SECRETARY REITERATE IN LOW-KEY TO SCHUMANN DURING DECEMBER 2-4 NATO MINISTERIAL OUR SURPRISE AND CONCERN OVER THIS LAPSE IN CONSULTATION AND MAINLY LISTEN TO WHAT LATTER HAS TO SAY. END SUMMARY.

3. CALLING ATTENTION TO CONCERN, ALREADY EXPRESSED BY US AND UK TO FRENCH OVER LATTER'S UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN MOSCOW AND BONN RE BERLIN AND ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION, POLCOUNS CALLED ON QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS JURGENSEN DECEMBER 1. AT NOVEMBER 30 LUNCHEON, WE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THESE FRENCH ACTIONS TO PRIME MINISTER'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR DE LA FOURNIERE, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM POLAND AND WAS BAFFLED BY WHOLE STORY. ESSENTIALLY, PICTURE WHICH EMERGES FROM THEIR COMMENTS IS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION AND LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN QUAI, BONN, AND MOSCOW ON NOVEMBER 28-- WHEN FONMIN SCHUMANN, POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DE BEAUMARCHAIS, DIRECTOR ARNAUD AND OTHERS WERE STILL IN POLAND WITH PREMIER

CHABAN DELMAS AND TOP FRENCH DIPLOMATS IN BONN WERE AWAY ON A DIPLOMATIC CORPS HUNT. JURGENSEN REGRETTED TEMPORARY CONFUSION IN FRENCH RANKS AND LACK OF CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES, EMPASIZING THAT ON NOVEMBER 29 AFTER SCHUMANN'S RETURN, FRENCH WERE BACK ON RAILS IN BONN GROUP. HE STRESSED "IMPORTANT THING" WAS THAT AN ALLIED RESPONSE WAS EVENTUALLY GIVEN TO THE SOVIETS. (FOR THIS SESSION, WE DID NOT GO AFTER JURGENSEN ON REASON FOR FRENCH REFUSAL TO ACCEPT LAST CLAUSE OF UK-UK RESPONSE.) JURGENSEN UNDERSCORED CONTINUED FRENCH DETERMINATION, DESPITE UNTOWARD EVENTS OF PAST WEEKEND, TO CONCENTRATE THEIR ACTIONS ON BERLIN IN BONN GROUP AND FOUR-POWER TALKS IN BERLIN AND TO DENY SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY OF SPLITTING UNITY OF THE THREE ON BERLIN QUESTION.

4. UNILATERAL ACTION IN MOSCOW: JURGENSEN BLAMED AMB. SEYDOUX IN MOSCOW FOR FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH US AND UK AMBASSADORS

SECRET

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PAGE 03 PARIS 16701 01 OF 02 021050Z

BEFORE DELIVERING "HARD" RESPONSE TO SOVIET DEMARCHE OF NOV .26. IN ATTEMPT TO DISMISS THOUGHT OF ANY FRANCE-SOVIET DEALING HE ADDED QUAI HAD SENT "STRONG WARNING" TO SEYDOUX TWO WEEKS AGO TO STOP TRYING TO NEGOTIATE ON BERLIN IN MOSCOW EACH TIME SOVIETS APPROACHED HIM BILATERALLY. ASKED ABOUT FRENCH EMB REP'S COMMENT IN BONN (BONN'S 13318) THAT QUAI "REJECTED IDEA OF A PROPOSED TRIPARTITE REPLY TO SOVIETS," JURGENSEN DENIED QUAI HAD SENT "INSTRUCTIONS" TO THIS EFFECT. HE POINTED OUT THAT CONFUSED FRENCH ACTIONS IN BONN AND ELSEWHERE HAD TAKEN PLACE DURING "A MATTER OF HOURS" WHEN QUESTION WAS RAISED ABOUT NECESSITY OF "SECOND FRENCH REPLY TO SOVIETS," AND THAT THE NOV. 29 INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOWING SCHUMANN-CHAIRED MEETING HERE WAS NOT A REVERSAL OF QUAI ATTITUDE TOWARDS A TRIPARTITE REPLY.

SECRET LIMITS

SECRET

12
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 SS-20 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 PM-03 L-02 NSC-10
INR-07 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 DODE-00 IO-04 ACDA-10 PRS-01
RSR-01 RSC-01 /072 W

----- 119811

O R 021005Z DEC 70
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5736
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 16701

LIMDIS

5. BRITISH DCM PALLISER TELLS US HE EMPHASIZED TO DE
BEAUMARCHAIS DEC 1. HIS "SURPRISE AND DISMAY" OVER QUAI'S
INSTRUCTING SEYDOUX TO RESPOND TO SOVIET DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW
WITHOUT ENSURING THAT CONSULTATION HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH ALLIES.
IN UNUSUAL COMMENT WHICH PALLISER SAID MUST BE CAREFULLY

PROTECTED, DE BEAUMARCHAIS SAID HE FULLY AGREED WITH PALLISER BUT
COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO GO BEYOND THAT. DE BEAUMARCHAIS
WENT ON TO INDICATE AN "INEXCUSABLE TECHNICAL SLIP" HAD OCCURRED
WHEN QUAI FAILED TO REPEAT TO BONN, LONDON AND WASHINGTON
ITS NOV. 28 INSTRUCTION TO SEYDOUX. DE BEAUMARCHAIS HAD THIS
MESSAGE REPEATED TO THESE POSTS ON EVENING OF NOV. 28 IMMEDIATELY
AFTER HIS RETURN FROM POLAND.

6. UNILATERAL
ACTION IN BONNBY NEITHER JURGENSEN NOR QUAI DEP
DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL W. EUROPE PROVIDED A CLEAR RESPONSE TO OUR
QUERIES AS TO WHY FRENCH UNILATERALLY APPROACHED WEST GERMANS
"IN FRIENDLY MANNER" ON SAME DAY TO SAY THEY CONSIDERED NOVEMBER

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16701 02 OF 02 021101Z

30 CDU/CSU MEETING "INOOPORTUNE". BOTH LAMELY EXPLAINED THIS ACTION WAS PART OF OVERAL BREAKDOWN, WITH A STILL EMBARRASSED JURGENSEN CLAIMING THIS WAS, AFTER ALL, ALLIED VIEW AND NOT A CHANGE IN ALLIED POLICY. BOYER TOLD EMBOFF NOV 30 THAT IN DECIDING ON THIS APPROACH TO FRG, QUAI HAD BEEN INFLUENCED BY VON STADEN REMARKS (BONN'S 13579) RE SOVIET IRRITATION CONCERNING THE MEETING AND FRG DESIRE FOR ADVICE FROM ALLIES.

7. COMMENT: RE FRENCH ACTION IN MOSCOW, WE AND BRITISH BELIEVE THAT WITH ALPHAND IN CHARGE OF QUAI, POMPIDOU HIMSELF MIGHT WELL HAVE DECIDED THAT SHARP SOVIET NOTE REQUIRED FAST AND STIFFEST POSSIBLE FRENCH REPLY TO SHOW THAT FRENCH WOULD NOT BOW TO SOVIET PRESSURES TO SPLIT TRIPARTITE SOLIDARITY IN BERLIN. POMPIDOU WOULD NOT HAVE BOTHERED WITH THE MECHANICS OF

COORDINATING FRENCH ACTION WITH ALLIES -- A PROCESS WHICH CLEARLY APPEARS TO HAVE BROKEN DOWN LAST WEEKEND. IN VIEW OF OBVIOUS QUAI EMBARRASSMENT AND REGRETS EXPRESSED TO US AND BRITISH, WE DO NOT BELIEVE STRONG ADDITIONAL CRITICISM OF FRENCH ACTIONS WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. WE AGREE WITH BONN (13896) AND BERLIN (1830), HOWEVER, THAT THESE ACTION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED WITHOUT HIGH-LEVEL US APPROACH. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY REITERATE IN A LOW KEY TO SCHUMANN

DURING NATO MINISTERIAL, OUR SURPRISE AND CONCERN OVER THESE EXAMPLES OF LAPSE IN FRENCH CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES AND MAINLY LISTEN TO WHAT HE HAS TO SAY.

WATSON

SECRET

SECRET LIMITED

SECRETINFORMATION
December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Berlin Talks

There is attached at Tab A a status report on the Berlin talks. My memorandum of November 17 (Tab B) brought you up to date as of the meeting of November 16. Since then, there has been only one meeting, a particularly unproductive one, on November 23. The next scheduled meeting is December 10 which should provide us with a better basis to assess where things stand than the previous meeting.

Tab B is Log Number 23594

ATD:hsc

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December 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Four Power Talks on Berlin

There has been virtually no substantive progress during the past two Ambassadorial meetings (November 16 and 23), and indeed in the last meeting the Soviets took the toughest stance so far both in tone and substance. The Soviet approach seems to be to take the hardest possible line and then to mark time, as if they anticipated a shift in direction but were not exactly sure which way the direction would point. They are protected most, therefore, by taking the hardest possible line.

There are several factors that have been at play in recent weeks which may have caused the Soviets to pause:

-- There is a general assumption, fostered by pro-Ostpolitik forces in the FRG and especially Bahr, that Soviet policy has been impeded by GDR rigidity. The evidence on this is ambiguous but the frequent comings and goings between Soviet and East German officials do at least suggest that the Soviets are trying to get the GDR to take a more pliant attitude, at least in form. (We do know that the East Germans are unhappy about Polish and other East European efforts to normalize relations with the FRG without obtaining additional recognition for the GDR; this was reflected in the hard-line speech of the GDR delegate to the recent Hungarian Party Congress.)

-- A Warsaw Pact meeting will be held in East Berlin this week, and the prime focus there will be coordination on German affairs (and the NATO meeting will run almost concurrently).

-- The Soviets have viewed the Hessian and Bavarian elections as evidence of renewed strength for Brandt's coalition which, in their eyes, may make it easier for Brandt to secure ratification of the Soviet-FRG treaty without significant progress on Berlin (a doubtful calculus, given CDU views).

-- Ulbricht's health, always a source of rumors, may in fact be failing, leading to more intense intra-party maneuvering in East Germany; the length of time Ulbricht will (and should) remain in command is relevant to Soviet decisions on Berlin.

SECRET

-- The intra-German talks (between Bahr and Kohl) began November 27; the Soviets will probably wish to test in this channel whether the Germans will negotiate on Berlin access without an adequate Four Power mandate (Bahr reports that he was firm in insisting that he could not discuss Berlin access without this mandate); which would have a spoiling effect on the Four Power talks.

-- The Soviets may also have been hoping for a break in Allied Tripartite unity; especially since the Pompidou visit to the USSR in mid-October, the Soviets seem to have targeted the French for separate approaches (the French have not been unresponsive).

The autobahn slowdown in recent days in connection with the CDU meeting in Berlin probably was the least the Soviets could do to placate the East Germans (and to save their own face). At the same time the Soviets hoped that the political nature of the problem (a CDU meeting) would create further division between Barzel and Brandt. In the end, however, the autobahn stoppages probably serves the cause of Allied unity and pulled German opinion together in insisting on something concrete from the Berlin talks.

As of the last Ambassadorial meeting, the Soviets were still unhelpful on access. While the Four could agree on general principles, the specific commitments according to the Soviets, would have to take the form of agreements between the GDR, the FRG and the Berlin Senat, i. e., the Soviets continue to refuse to take formal responsibility for access, insisting that this is a GDR sovereign right. Before the Soviets would offer specific thinking on a possible FRG-GDR agreement they wanted assurances that there would be movement by the West to meet Soviet requirements for removing the Federal presence from Berlin. Abrasimov has clearly linked Federal presence with access. On the issue of Federal presence the Soviets have continued to insist that all federal agencies be removed (though there is some indication they may accept the Bahr concept of a cosmetic change to tuck all federal offices under the auspices of a Federal "representative" in Berlin (a position Bahr himself expects to hold as the present FRG official responsible for Berlin). There is increasing indication that the Soviets want to have a greater role in West Berlin, including assurances that the NPD and similar offensive organizations are eliminated and that the Soviets should have a consulate and other official officers in West Berlin. So far the Soviets have flatly refused to consider representation abroad of Berlin by the FRG. However, they have expressed some interest in learning more about our proposal that FRG passports issued in West Berlin bear an additional stamp indicating that they were issued under the authority of the respective Allied commandant (another Bahr idea). The Soviets also insist that we agree that Berlin is not only not a land of the FRG but not "a part" of the FRG.

SECRET

-3-

The advisers of the Four Ambassadors met on November 30 for a discussion that centered largely around the format of any eventual agreement. There would be three general elements: the first would entail a Four Power statement on general principles, the second would be the unilateral communications by the Soviets (on access) and the Three (on Federal presence) together with the results of the negotiations between the German authorities, and the final element would again be a Four Power statement tying together the other two elements. During the advisers meeting, the Soviets hinted that the situation might be clearer in a week or so and perhaps there could then be another advisers meeting. This hint tends to confirm other indications that the Soviets may be trying to prepare a new stance for the Ambassadorial meeting of December 10. This will then be the last meeting for a month or so. Following that meeting (and assuming that the Warsaw Pact meeting this week supports a new Soviet line, or confirms the old one) we will be in a much better position to take a new look at where we stand in the talks and where we ought to be heading.

ATD:mm

SECRET

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INFORMATION
November 17, 1970

23594

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Analysis of Latest Round of Berlin Talks

Attached is an analysis of the November 16 Ambassadorial meeting (Tab A). It did not seem to advance the negotiations; indeed if anything the lines seem to have hardened somewhat.

In general, apart from the points in the attached analysis, I would stress the following, perhaps obvious points:

1. There will be no written agreement on Berlin that (a) does not diminish the FRG presence in West Berlin, (b) does not increase de facto GDR control over access and (c) does not contain "guarantees" of access, no matter how artfully drafted, that cannot be reversed at a whim by the Soviets and/or the GDR. More than ever the deterrent to such a reversal will be essentially subjective, i. e., it will rest on the Soviet calculus of the probable adverse consequences.
2. We must be more than ever careful (and Rush is doing well) not to get out in front of the Germans in offering concessions relating to the FRG's Berlin presence or we will get caught in German internal politics.
3. We must be careful not to be tempted into bilateral dealings with the USSR. This would demoralize the allies. More than that, given the realities noted in paragraph 1 above any resultant agreement (other than a general understanding not to have crises, for what that is worth) will produce a net concrete loss for our side.
4. We must recognize that if, by an off chance there should be an agreement acceptable to the allies and we say so, we will thereby be sanctifying Ostpolitik and all its implications. For as soon as the Allies, and especially the US, say that there is an acceptable Berlin agreement the CDU cannot refuse to ratify the Moscow treaty.

SECRET//NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

* * * * *

None of the foregoing need preclude efforts, including by the FRG-GDR, at piecemeal humanitarian improvements, e. g., in intra-city traffic nor, indeed in access modalities. Nor, as noted, need it preclude some understanding with the Soviets to exercise restraint on both sides. But any formal agreement, as far as I can see, is bound to have one, several or all the pitfalls listed in paragraphs 1 to 4 above.

HS:mm

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SECRET/NODIS

November 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Ambassadorial Talks on Berlin, November 16, 1970

The talks on Monday, November 16, concentrated on the access question and the West German presence in West Berlin. On both issues the basic differences have emerged more clearly, and in effect, an impasse has been reached.

The Access Issues

On November 4, we presented a statement of principles to govern access to West Berlin, making it clear that any agreement on access would have to include a fairly precise definition of the procedures. Thus, we have included in our position the assertion that in the case of transit traffic for goods and persons, any controls should be limited to identification only, including sealed vehicles and trains, abolition of visas, freedom from inspection, etc. All of this would be part of a four-power agreement, on the theory that the four powers are ultimately responsible for unhindered access. Following the four-power agreement, there would be intra-German negotiations, under a four-power mandate, which would then be approved or sanctioned in some manner by the four powers.

The Soviet position, as spelled out by Abrasimov in the November 16 session, is that this approach is fundamentally unacceptable because it infringes on the sovereignty of the GDR which, since it "owns" the access routes, has the sole responsibility for civilian access; there is not, and never has been a four-power right to control civilian access.

On this juridical basis the most the Soviet side could do would be "reach agreement" with the GDR that access should proceed unhindered, and be given preferential treatment subject to "norms" of international law and GDR procedures. The three Western powers could take note of this agreement, and could, for their part, give a mandate both to the FRG and to the West Berlin Senat to negotiate the details. In this light the Soviets contend there is no basis for spelling out details of access since there is no four-power responsibility.

Thus the impasse is: if we cannot commit the USSR to any responsibility for the access of civilians, and on that basis turn the negotiations over to the Germans, the effect would be to recognize East German sovereignty

over access. Then the pressure for agreement would shift away from the USSR to the West Germans who would have to negotiate the details, knowing that success of the talks would depend on their willingness to conclude an agreement so that the German-Soviet treaty can be ratified. In this case East Germany, already having gained further de facto acceptance, would drive the toughest bargain possible.

The only glimmer of hope is that the Soviets have mentioned a "gentlemen's agreement" that the details as we spell them out will be incorporated into the GDR-FRG agreement, but on the condition that there is satisfactory settlement of Soviet demands to restrict and reduce West German political presence in West Berlin.

West German Presence

The Soviets proceed on the principle that the four powers should agree on those activities that are specifically prohibited. Since we have resisted the right of the USSR to have a say in the matter of how we run the Western sector, the agreement would take the form of a commitment by the three powers to take certain actions which the Soviets will "take note of."

On November 4, the Soviets submitted their list of restrictions and prohibitions. The main demands are to prohibit the "activities of all FRG parliamentary or other political organs" -- Bundestag, Bundesrat (including committees and factions which the Germans want to continue on the grounds that they do not derive from the Basic Law), Bundesversammlung, Cabinet meetings, as well as functioning of Federal offices and agencies. In addition, "neo-Nazi" and other "revanchist" organizations would be prohibited. Though the Soviets insist on the principle of listing prohibitions, Abrasimov has indicated that this does not mean that the Soviets renounce the right to raise objections to activities not specifically listed.

The nub of the matter in this last point is that we have, at West German insistence, gone along with the idea of a list of prohibited activities, on the grounds that we have such responsibilities in West Berlin in any case, and that it is better to list prohibitions than try to list what is permitted.

In private talks, the Soviets have indicated some flexibility on the question of Federal offices in West Berlin. Apparently at the instigation of the West Germans (perhaps through the clandestine contacts with Bohr) the Soviets said they might settle for simply renaming all the various ministries and agencies into one innocuous sounding organization.

The Outlook

Abrasimov said yesterday (Monday) that his reformulation of our access proposal was the maximum Soviet position, but urged that the advisors continue to negotiate for a common position -- thus suggesting that there may still be some give in the Soviet position. The Soviets are apparently walking a tight rope between their desire to gain some agreement to promote the treaty ratification, and their refusal to repudiate their age-old position that the GDR has sovereignty over civilian access.

As noted above there may still be some room for negotiation on the gentlemen's agreement that Abrasimov mentioned, but this is a slender reed to lean on, and, of course, could be wiped out at any future point since it is conditional on the deal on West German presence.

Even if these two basic issues were somehow resolved through fuzzy compromises, which are not beyond the ingenuity of our negotiators, there remains the question of representation of West Berlin abroad. This has not really been touched on. The Soviets have been hot and cold, sometimes saying this is impossible, sometimes saying that there might be some room for a consular understanding. (De facto, the FRG can do it anyway outside Eastern Europe.) Similarly, the West Germans have shifted around on this. They told us (through Bahr) that this was not essential, but later have said it was the main issue. All of this is greatly complicated by the fact that even if consular representation is agreed to by the Soviets, there will arise the issue of who speaks for West Berlin in the UN when both German states are admitted.

In sum, almost any conceivable outcome is going to increase the status of the GDR, weaken the juridical basis for our presence, and diminish, at least psychologically, the links between West Berlin and West Germany, in return for somewhat tighter access procedures, still at the mercy of the Soviets and GDR, and some better procedures for movement between East and West Berlin, with these latter issues being negotiated on our behalf between the West Berlin Senat and the East Germans.

Though the West Germans, and Bahr in particular, have claimed the Soviets are under great pressure for an agreement, the record thus far suggests that the Soviets are willing to protract the talks, and the pressures will grow on the West Germans. (This may explain Bahr's rather frantic efforts to deal with the Soviets behind our back.)

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