

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 26, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President,
Saturday, December 26, 1970

1. Discuss conduct of meeting with Shultz on budget
Christmas Eve.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes ___ No ___

Comments: _____

2. Brief the President on details of your conversation
with Dobrynin previously not covered. Inform President you will
send him memcon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes ___ No ___

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President results of backgrounder Christmas
Eve.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes ___ No ___

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Inform President of call Haig received from President of World Jewish Congress re two Jewish/Soviet hijackers. Haig merely noted call.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President that the Soviet tender and submarine are now in Cienfuegos. Frigate departed Wednesday (late in the day). During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. (See summary at Tab A). Based on foregoing, you will instruct Defense and inform State of President's decision to launch Baltic Sea patrols and step up Black Sea patrols in January.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your conversation with Ambassador Smith.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss your conversation with Ambassador Rabin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
December 23, 1970

1. Discuss conduct of meeting with Shultz this morning on budget.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Brief the President on details of your conversation with Dobrynin not covered Saturday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President you will be giving a backgrounder this morning discussing accomplishments and problems of U.S. foreign policy during this year.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President that the Soviet tender, frigate and submarine are now in Cienfuegos. Frigate may have departed late yesterday. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. (See map at Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your conversation with Ambassador Smith.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss your conversation with Ambassador Rabin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Thursday} Wednesday,
December 23, 1970

1. ~~Discuss conduct of meeting this morning with Secretary Laird.~~ ^{Discuss conduct of meeting with Schultz This morning on budget}

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Brief the President on details of your conversation with Dobrynin not covered Saturday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform President of results of your meeting with Shultz last night.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President you will be giving a background on ^{accomplishments of problems of US} this morning discussing foreign policy during this ~~year~~ year

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

Frigate may have departed late yesterday

4. Tell the President that the Soviet tender, frigate and submarine are now in Cienfuegos. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your conversation with Ambassador Smith.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss your conversation with Ambassador Rabin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
December 23, 1970

1. Discuss conduct of meeting this morning with Secretary Laird.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Brief the President on details of your conversation with Dobrynin not covered Saturday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Inform President of results of your meeting with Shultz last night.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President that the Soviet tender, frigate and submarine are now in Cienfuegos. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your conversation with Ambassador Smith.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss your conversation with Ambassador Rabin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Wednesday} Tuesday
December 22, 1970

1. Discuss ^{conduct of meeting this morning with Secretary Seind} status of protective reaction strikes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President General Haig has returned and you would like to meet with the President as soon as convenient to give the President a rundown on General Haig's views on the situation in Southeast Asia and the status of planning for the dry season.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. ^{Brief the President on your} Tell the President of your conversations with Dobrynin, and that you will be meeting with him for lunch today. ^{NOT covered yesterday}

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

^{3. ~~inform~~ inform President of results of meeting with Shultz last mto.}
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 2 -

4. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President of your plans to spend next week in California.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group and your luncheon at the Washington Post.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell the President that the Soviet tender, frigate and submarine are now in Cienfuegos. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

8. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Brief the President on your conversation with Ambassador ~~R~~
Smith.

10. Discuss your conversation with Ambassador Rabin.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday
December 22, 1970

1. Discuss status of protective reaction strikes.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President General Haig has returned and you would like to meet with the President as soon as convenient to give the President a rundown on General Haig's views on the situation in Southeast Asia and the status of planning for the dry season.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President of your conversations with Dobrynin and that you will be meeting with him for lunch today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President of your plans to spend next week in California.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group and your luncheon at the Washington Post.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell the President that the Soviet tender, frigate and submarine are now in Cienfuegos. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

8. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

AMH:JTH:feg:12/21/70

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Tuesday*
December 21, 1970

1. Discuss protective reaction strikes, status of

2. Tell the President General Haig has returned and *you would like to* is scheduled to meet with the President and yourself today (tentatively 3:15 P.M.) *as soon as* to give the President *a* rundown on General Haig's views on the situation in Southeast Asia and the status of planning for the dry season.

Convenient

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Discuss Secretary Volpe's question concerning announcement of recommendations of Coast Guard Board of Investigation on defector incident. Two of the men will probably undergo court martial proceedings and the other will be reprimanded.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

4. Tell the President of your conversations with Dobrynin *and that you will be meeting with him for lunch today*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6 See next page

7 ~~5~~. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group and your luncheon at the Washington Post.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President that the Soviet ^{tender, freight and submarine} ~~ships in the Cuban area~~ are again operating near Cienfuegos. (See map at Tab A). During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates ~~that~~ it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. *now in*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

18. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Inform the President of your plans to spend ^{next} a week in California.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Saturday,
December 19, 1970

1. Discuss Secretary Volpe's question concerning announcement of recommendations of Coast Guard Board of Investigation on defector incident. Two of the men will probably undergo court martial proceedings and the other will be reprimanded.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President of your conversations with Dobrynin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President General Haig has returned and give him a rundown on General Haig's views on the situation in Southeast Asia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group and your luncheon at the Washington Post.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President that the tender and oiler are in Havana. The diesel submarine and frigate have left Havana. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

9. Review your meeting with Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Churdh.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ^{Saturday} Friday,
December 18, 1970

1. Discuss President's meetings this morning with Prime Minister Heath. Inform him that you received a message from General Goodpaster which indicates he shares the views contained in the President's talker related to European defense (Tab A). Tell the President you held a meeting on the Indian Ocean and of Thompson's cooperative participation.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss Secretary Volpe's question concerning announcement of recommendations of Coast Guard Board of Investigation on defector incident. Two of the men will probably undergo court martial proceedings and the other will be reprimanded.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President of your conversations with Dobrynin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

*General Haig has returned and give him
Hand*
Give the President a rundown on Haig's views on the situation in S. E. Asia
~~5. Inform the President that you have received an encouraging report from General Haig on South Vietnam and the benefits of the Cambodian operation (original at Left Flap). Tell the President Haig believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh and not return with him to Washington.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group *and your lecture at the Washington Post*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance which has been sent to the Delegation. (Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

*Re diesel submarine and frigate
have left Hammer.*
8. Tell the President that the tender, ~~F-class submarine, frigate~~
and oiler ~~are~~ *was* in Havana. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla,
the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data
indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in
the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the
Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP
Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

12. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Tals A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


24404

CONFIDENTIAL

December 16, 1970

To: Colonel Kennedy

Per our phone conversation this afternoon, I am returning the message of General Goodpaster. As I mentioned, page 5 of HAK's memo for the President contains the essence of the points made by the General. Consequently, the only further action to take might possibly be to inform the President that General Goodpaster shares the views contained in the memo relating to European defense matters. I leave it to your judgment whether this should be done.

 H. Sonnenfeldt

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL | EYES ONLY

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FM GENERAL GOODPASTERSHAPE BELGIUM

TO DR HENRY A KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON D C
ZEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SHP 3350 EYES ONLY

1. WHEN THE PRESIDENT SEES PRIME MINISTER HEATH, HE MAY WISH TO INDICATE A GENERALLY FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPEAN EVOLUTION IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER UNITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES, SUCH AS MOVEMENT TOWARD A JOINT EUROPEAN LOGISTIC SYSTEM, ADOPTION OF COMMON EUROPEAN TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (OR AS NEARLY COMMON AS POSSIBLE), AND FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD ADOPTION BY THE EUROPEANS OF COMMON MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, INCLUDING TANKS, APC'S, AIRCRAFT FOR VARIOUS ROLES, ETC. WHILE THE US MIGHT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO JOIN IN SOME PARTS OR PHASES OF THE FOREGOING, LIMITATIONS ARISE BASED ON OUR NEED FOR WORLDWIDE CAPABILITIES, AND THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES THEREFORE SEEM GREATER ON A EUROPEAN SCALE.

2. IF CARRIED OUT WITH GOOD SENSE, THESE ACTIVITIES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAINTAIN, AND IN FACT OVER A PERIOD OF TIME ENHANCE, A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE -- SINCE THERE IS A LARGE MEASURE OF BASIC COINCIDENCE BETWEEN OUR SECURITY/DEFENSE INTERESTS AND THEIRS.

3. I WOULD ALSO ASSUME THAT, IF CARRIED OUT ON A BASIS OF WISDOM AND FAIRNESS, EVOLUTION TOWARD UNITY IN OTHER FIELDS, SUCH AS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, COULD ALSO BE SUPPORTED. SUPPORT OF THIS KIND COULD STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE OF HEATH IN WHAT HE IS DOING, AND HELP KEEP BRITISH FOCUS ON THE FUTURE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.

4. I AM NOT SUGGESTING FOREGOING BE DONE PUBLICLY, BUT RATHER DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.

5. BEST REGARDS.

GP-1

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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CONFIDENTIAL |

EYES ONLY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1970

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U. S. Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for Delegation at Helsinki (SALT III)

The President has decided that, in order to preserve bargaining leverage without indicating complete inflexibility on issues arising in the talks, the Delegation should inform the Soviets before the close of the Helsinki talks that:

-- both sides have emphasized the need to limit both offensive and defensive systems in a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement;

-- with respect to the Soviet "Basic Provisions" for an agreement on limiting the deployment of ABM systems, we continue to believe that to achieve the purposes of these talks an agreement should include limits on both offensive and defensive systems;

-- we expect to continue to negotiate toward the objective of limitations on both offensive and defensive forces;

and that:


-- only after all the main elements of an initial agreement on central strategic systems have been worked out, would we consider it possible to assess mutually satisfactory ways in which actions by either side relating to other nuclear delivery systems could be prevented from upsetting the strategic balance.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2

Our NATO Allies should be informed of these statements before they are given, if possible, or at about the time they are given. More complete consultations may be deferred until after the Helsinki phase of the talks is completed.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Attorney General

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,
December 18, 1970

1. Discuss President's meetings this morning with Prime Minister Heath. Inform him that you received a message from General Goodpaster which indicates he shares the views contained in the President's talker related to European defense (Tab A). Tell the President you held a meeting on the Indian Ocean and of Thompson's cooperative participation.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Discuss Secretary Volpe's question concerning announcement of recommendations of Coast Guard Board of Investigation on defector incident. Two of the men will probably undergo court martial proceedings and the other will be reprimanded.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Tell the President of your conversations with Dobrynin.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President that you have received an encouraging report from General Haig on South Vietnam and the benefits of the Cambodian operation (original at Left Flap). Tell the President Haig believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh and not return with him to Washington.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group/

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance which has been sent to the Delegation. (Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler are in Havana. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

12. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 18, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Situation in Southeast Asia

General Haig has provided an interim assessment of the situation in South Vietnam indicating that he is greatly encouraged by the progress since his last visit and especially impressed by the continuing benefits of the Cambodian operation. He reports that:

- The success of the Cambodian operation is particularly manifest in III Corps which has enjoyed almost complete respite from enemy military activity and is enjoying economic benefits from the improved security situation. Former enemy sanctuary areas are now devoid of main force activity.
- South Vietnamese execution of the Kampong Cham operation has been impressive.
- It is absolutely essential to insure the viability of the Cambodian regime to prevent enemy reestablishment of sanctuaries. Operations now planned for the dry season will guarantee this for at least another six months and have potential for achieving decisive results with respect to the entire conflict in Southeast Asia.
- Both drug and racial problems are real but amenable to management and sensitive leadership.
- Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams are solidly in tune with the President's thinking with respect to Cambodia and every indication thus far suggests that President Thieu and the South Vietnamese military share this view point.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


24404

CONFIDENTIAL

December 16, 1970

To: Colonel Kennedy

Per our phone conversation this afternoon, I am returning the message of General Goodpaster. As I mentioned, page 5 of HAK's memo for the President contains the essence of the points made by the General. Consequently, the only further action to take might possibly be to inform the President that General Goodpaster shares the views contained in the memo relating to European defense matters. I leave it to your judgment whether this should be done.

 H. Sonnenfeldt

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY

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FM GENERAL GOODPASTERSHAPE BELGIUM
TO DR HENRY A KISSINGER THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON D C
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C O N F I D E N T I A L S M P 3350 EYES ONLY

1. WHEN THE PRESIDENT SEES PRIME MINISTER HEATH, HE MAY WISH TO INDICATE A GENERALLY FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPEAN EVOLUTION IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER UNITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES, SUCH AS MOVEMENT TOWARD A JOINT EUROPEAN LOGISTIC SYSTEM, ADOPTION OF COMMON EUROPEAN TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (OR AS NEARLY COMMON AS POSSIBLE), AND FURTHER MOVEMENT TOWARD ADOPTION BY THE EUROPEANS OF COMMON MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, INCLUDING TANKS, APC'S, AIRCRAFT FOR VARIOUS ROLES, ETC. WHILE THE US MIGHT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO JOIN IN SOME PARTS OR PHASES OF THE FOREGOING, LIMITATIONS ARISE BASED ON OUR NEED FOR WORLDWIDE CAPABILITIES, AND THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES THEREFORE SEEM GREATER ON A EUROPEAN SCALE.

2. IF CARRIED OUT WITH GOOD SENSE, THESE ACTIVITIES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A WAY THAT WOULD MAINTAIN, AND IN FACT OVER A PERIOD OF TIME ENHANCE, A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE -- SINCE THERE IS A LARGE MEASURE OF BASIC COINCIDENCE BETWEEN OUR SECURITY/DEFENSE INTERESTS AND THEIRS.

3. I WOULD ALSO ASSUME THAT, IF CARRIED OUT ON A BASIS OF WISDOM AND FAIRNESS, EVOLUTION TOWARD UNITY IN OTHER FIELDS, SUCH AS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL, COULD ALSO BE SUPPORTED. SUPPORT OF THIS KIND COULD STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE OF HEATH IN WHAT HE IS DOING, AND HELP KEEP BRITISH FOCUS ON THE FUTURE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.

4. I AM NOT SUGGESTING FOREGOING BE DONE PUBLICLY, BUT RATHER DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.

5. BEST REGARDS.

GP-1

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

350

0014

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 12, 1970

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Senior Members, U. S. Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks Delegation

SUBJECT: Instructions for Delegation at Helsinki (SALT III)

The President has decided that, in order to preserve bargaining leverage without indicating complete inflexibility on issues arising in the talks, the Delegation should inform the Soviets before the close of the Helsinki talks that:

-- both sides have emphasized the need to limit both offensive and defensive systems in a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement;

-- with respect to the Soviet "Basic Provisions" for an agreement on limiting the deployment of ABM systems, we continue to believe that to achieve the purposes of these talks an agreement should include limits on both offensive and defensive systems;

-- we expect to continue to negotiate toward the objective of limitations on both offensive and defensive forces;

and that:

-- only after all the main elements of an initial agreement on central strategic systems have been worked out, would we consider it possible to assess mutually satisfactory ways in which actions by either side relating to other nuclear delivery systems could be prevented from upsetting the strategic balance.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2

Our NATO Allies should be informed of these statements before they are given, if possible, or at about the time they are given. More complete consultations may be deferred until after the Helsinki phase of the talks is completed.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Attorney General

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM

2. Discuss ~~the~~ Secretary Volpe's question concerning handling of recommendations of ~~Coal Board~~ ^{announcement} ~~Board of Investigation~~ ^{on} of defecter incidents. Two of the men will probably ~~be~~ ^{undergo} ~~undergo~~ ^{Court martial proceedings and neither will be repatriated.}

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday, December 17, 1970

1. Discuss President's meeting this morning with Prime Minister Heath. Inform him that you received a message from General Goodpaster which indicates he shares the views contained in the President's talker ~~related~~ to European defense (Tab A).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kongpong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia. Tell the President you held a meeting on the Indian Ocean and of Thompson's cooperative participation.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Inform the President that you have received preliminary reports from General Haig on the Cambodian leg of his trip and an encouraging report on South Vietnam and the benefits of the Cambodian operation. You have sent the President memorandums attaching these cables (Tab B). Tell the President Haig believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh and not return with him to Washington.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Tell the President your conversations with Volpe.

from General Haig

(Copy at Tab B)

4. Brief the President on your meeting with the Boston Globe group.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance which has been sent to the Delegation. (Tab C)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler are in Havana. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President last Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

December 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Situation in Southeast Asia

Attached is an interim assessment by General Haig of the situation in South Vietnam. He is greatly encouraged by the progress since his last visit and especially impressed by the continuing benefits of the Cambodian operation last May and June. The following points in his report are of particular interest:

- The success of the Cambodian operation is particularly manifest in III Corps which has enjoyed almost complete respite from enemy military activity and is enjoying economic benefits from the improved security situation. Former enemy sanctuary areas are now devoid of main force activity.
- South Vietnamese execution of the Kampong Cham operation has been impressive.
- It is absolutely essential to insure the viability of the Cambodian regime to prevent enemy reestablishment of sanctuaries. Operations now planned for the dry season will guarantee this for at least another six months and have potential for achieving decisive results with respect to the entire conflict in Southeast Asia.
- Withdrawal schedules between now and May 1 are sound. Future Future troop draw downs will be governed by the success of the dry season campaign and from estimates should be delayed until late February or early March when allied and enemy operations can be better assessed. US combat forces are not now under employed considering currently approved withdrawal schedules.

F TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

- Both drug and racial problems are real but amenable to management and sensitive leadership.

- Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams are solidly in tune with the President's thinking with respect to Cambodia and every indication thus far suggest that President Thieu and the South Vietnamese military share this new point.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of Situation in Cambodia

Attached are three reports from General Haig containing his initial impressions of the situation in Cambodia. Among the more significant observations in the cables at Tabs A and B are the following:

-- There is a lack of information in the capitol concerning the political and military situation in the rest of the country. Judgments are often made on the basis of rumors or stale factual data. Steps are being taken to improve collection but efforts may also be necessary in Washington to insure Embassy personnel get out into the field.

-- The military situation is serious but not critical.

-- The enemy obviously is determined to carry the battle to the Cambodian army and their goal appears to be maximum attrition of Cambodian forces.

-- Cambodian performance has been spotty. Tactics have been poor and command and control procedures weak. However, despite these shortcomings and recent setbacks there is no evidence of shaken confidence or morale problems. Lon Nol is much more self-assured but his basic confidence about the future may be somewhat unrealistic. Whether the enthusiasm and nationalism displayed is confined to the capitol, whether the basic optimism of the leaders is misplaced and whether a few serious military setbacks might unravel the situation is difficult to assess.

-- Sirik Matak is very concerned about the impact of continuing interdiction of road and water arteries on the economy and political loyalty of the people. He believes, however, that Hanoi may be ready to negotiate and cited the Sontay Raid as a contributing factor.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

-- Among the immediate military needs are: improved capability for evacuation and care of wounded, riverine forces to secure water supply routes, and improved South Vietnamese responsiveness to emergency requests. These and other Cambodian needs have been discussed with General Abrams and responsive measures are being taken in all areas. (See status report, Tab C).

-- A serious political problem is the continuing ARVN misbehaviour in Cambodia.

-- Under present circumstances it would not be wise for Mr. Ladd to return to Washington.

Attachments

RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 15, 1970

TO: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: B/Gen. Haig, MACV, Saigon

1. This will give you a few general impressions of our Cambodian stop and cover our second day activities which included long visits with Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, a lunch given in our honor by Lon Nol, and a tour of the Fank Training Camp at Kampol.
2. The basic impression I carry away from Cambodia is one of uncertainty as to just what is going on outside of the capitol either militarily or politically. I have already mentioned the serious problem of our attaches not getting outside of Phnom Penh and relying almost totally on the Fank who also appear to lack a good grasp of the situation. On the political side the Ambassador has made only one field trip to Kompong Cham and other officers have not been able to get out frequently either. The fundamental danger of our failure to acquire accurate assessments of the actual situation on the ground is that Lon Nol, the Fank, and to a degree, US Embassy Phnom Penh, are forced to make judgments largely on the basis of instantaneous rumors or very stale factual data which finally reaches the capitol at a point in time when operational or logistic decisions have already been made. I have discussed this problem with General Abrams and General Weyand, and they agree that they can assist

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

in the intelligence collection effort by making aircraft available to US Embassy Phnom Penh, supplementing intelligence collection through coordinating factual reports and, as necessary, launching observer aircraft from South Vietnam. I am meeting with J-2 this afternoon in an attempt to work out a detailed program for improving our collection effort. In any event, arrangements worked out here will have to be supported at the Washington level through State Department channels. In my view Ambassador Swank must be formally instructed by State to take immediate corrective action even at the risk of increased danger to attache personnel and possible public exposure of these activities.

3. Lon Nol was much more self-assured than when I saw him last May. He demonstrated a basic confidence about the future which might be somewhat unrealistic. Unlike May, he presented no exorbitant demands for military hardware, confining his requests to:

A. Requiring that RVNAF maintain the necessary float to insure that the six (6) helicopters now furnished to Fank remain available on a continuous basis. Last week five (5) of the six (6) assigned helicopters were inoperative, causing serious command and control problems and making the evacuation of casualties extremely difficult. Lon Nol actually asked for twelve (12) helicopters. I have worked out an arrangement this morning with MACV, approved through COMNAVUSC to CINCPAC and OSD,

which will guarantee the necessary float to keep six (6) helicopters available to Lon Nol on a full-time basis. This should relieve the problem to a large extent.

B. Immediate shipment of additional artillery within Map Program.

C. The provision of a bulldozer capability to enable Fank to prepare air strips in certain critical locations.

D. The immediate provision for some armor capability.

E. The immediate shipment of 50,000 small arms, (arrangements for which have already been made).

F. An improvement in VNAF responsiveness to emergency requests. This is a key item which I have discussed with General Abrams and Gen. Weyand, and based on this morning's discussions I am confident that remedial action is now underway.

G. The immediate provision of a riverine capability to enable Lon Nol to maintain water supply routes more effectively. This is a difficult and high priority item which I am discussing with J-4 this afternoon and which will ultimately require action at the Washington level.

H. An increase in Fank manning levels from 210 thousand currently programmed to 260 thousand. As you know our supplemental request included direct support for 300 battalions for a ceiling of 125 thousand. Ambassador Swank and Ladd are acquainted with the request and will supply us with recommendations as to how it should be handled.

4. Lon Nol exercises firm control over the whole military campaign, down to the movement of battalions, working through Sak Sutsokanh, Fank Chief of Operations. In my view either Lon Nol does not quite comprehend the seriousness of the situation or he believes that a confident optimistic stance will elicit a more forthcoming US attitude. In either event, his optimism tends to influence overall attitudes of US Embassy Phnom Penh.

5. Sirik Matek was more realistic about his country's problems and is generally very concerned about the impact that the continuing interdiction of main road and water arteries will have both on the nation's economic viability and on the political loyalty of the Kymer people who will increasingly feel the effects of escalating inflation. Matek, who reportedly has good contacts, believes Hanoi may well be ready to negotiate and cited the Sontay Raid as a contributing factor. However, he did not give me anything concrete on why he felt Hanoi might negotiate. I told him we still hoped for negotiations but were not very optimistic at this point.

6. We constantly ran into the problem of ARVN misbehaviour in Cambodia which could become a serious political problem for Lon Nol. The Cambodian and South Vietnamese leadership both recognize the explosiveness of this issue. Lon Nol and the others know they must have GVN support over the near term to survive. In fact, Lon Nol was meeting the Cambodian

press yesterday afternoon in an attempt to get them to cool down the increasing anti-South Vietnamese articles and cartoons. Nevertheless, the stories and rumors about the grudging nature of some GVN help and the misbehaviour of the ARVN are running strong and I believe both countries must make greater efforts.

7. Despite their problems, the morale and cohesiveness of the Cambodian leadership remains good and if the spirit displayed at the training camp is representative, the enthusiasm and nationalism of the people persists. Whether these basic positive factors are confined to the capitol, whether the basic optimism of the leaders is misplaced, whether a few sharp military setbacks might start unraveling the situation -- these are all unknown. One doesn't get the answers in two days in Phnom Penh, and given the present state of our intelligence in the country I don't think one would get the answers during a much longer stay.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 15, 1970

TO: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: B/Gen. Haig, MACV, Saigon

1. General Abrams and his staff have proven totally responsive to problem areas developed as a result of visit to Phnom Penh and special requests made to me by Lon Nol. Brief status report follows:

A. Improved helicopter support: Starting immediately, six helos will be made available to Cambodians each day for command and control, liaison, MEDEVAC and other emergency requirements;

B. Artillery: MACV will update shipment of 6 tubes immediately with 2 additional batteries hopefully provided by 1 January. Remainder of artillery in program will be expedited;

C. Armor: MACV hopes to man 10 of 25 APC's in program as soon as possible, hopefully within the week with the balance by mid January;

D. Small Arms: 10,000 M-15 rounds will be moved by 1 January, and 45,000 M-1 carbine rounds should arrive by March;

E. Riverine Forces: Seven PBR's will be shipped immediately and the remainder of 19 in the program will be expedited. This may require pressure on the Department of Navy through DOD and JCS.

F. Bulldozers for Airport Repair: Kampong Cham is cut off entirely except for slow water entry and has no operating air field.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MACV indicates a special mission with aerial crane and borrowed ARVN dozer can and will be set up immediately;

G. Improved ARVN/VNAF Responsiveness: General Abrams, as a result of the letter he received last week from the President has placed General Weyand in overall charge of coordinating ARVN, Fank and U. S. activities in Cambodia. ARVN has appointed LGen Nguyen Van Manh to work in new coordinating triumverate and Cambodians will soon designate their representative. General Abrams envisions that group will meet in Phnom Penh or SVN at least weekly and on quiet basis to insure activities of all forces are well coordinated and requirements properly assessed. I am confident system will greatly facilitate exchange of information and more effective operational programs for ground, sea and air operations in support of Cambodia.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

Ke
Tell the President you held a meeting
on the Indian Ocean and of
Thompson's ~~co-operative~~ participation
December 16, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Colonel Kennedy

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Wednesday,
December 16, 1970

*1. Discuss President's meeting this morning with Prime Minister
Heath. You may want to inform him that you received a message from
General Hoopster which indicates he covers*
2. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of
Kompong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have
been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

*and an encouraging report on South Vietnam
and the benefits of the Cambodian
operation*
2. Inform President that you have received *preliminary* initial reports from
General Haig on the Cambodian leg of his trip. You have sent the President
a memorandum attaching these cables (Tab A). Tell the President Haig
believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh
and not return with him to Washington.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on your meeting with Hardin concerning the
Heath visit.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. ^{Brief} ~~Tell~~ the President ^{on your meeting with the} ~~you will be in Boston today talking to the~~ Boston Globe group.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. ⁶ Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance which has been sent to the Delegation. (Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler are in Havana. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. (See map at Tab C)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Brief the President on the Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meetings with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8 9. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President last Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9 10. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10 11. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11 12. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

RICHARD PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 2A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of Situation in Cambodia

Attached are three reports from General Haig containing his initial impressions of the situation in Cambodia. Among the more significant observations in the cables at Tabs A and B are the following:

-- There is a lack of information in the capitol concerning the political and military situation in the rest of the country. Judgments are often made on the basis of rumors or stale factual data. Steps are being taken to improve collection but efforts may also be necessary in Washington to insure Embassy personnel get out into the field.

-- The military situation is serious but not critical.

-- The enemy obviously is determined to carry the battle to the Cambodian army and their goal appears to be maximum attrition of Cambodian forces.

-- Cambodian performance has been spotty. Tactics have been poor and command and control procedures weak. However, despite these shortcomings and recent setbacks there is no evidence of shaken confidence or morale problems. Lon Nol is much more self-assured but his basic confidence about the future may be somewhat unrealistic. Whether the enthusiasm and nationalism displayed is confined to the capitol, whether the basic optimism of the leaders is misplaced and whether a few serious military setbacks might unravel the situation is difficult to assess.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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-- A serious political problem is the continuing ARVN misbehaviour in Cambodia.

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Attachments

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TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

December 15, 1970

TO: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: B/Gen. Haig, MACV, Saigon

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TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE

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which will guarantee the necessary float to keep six (6) helicopters available to Lon Nol on a full-time basis. This should relieve the problem to a large extent.

B. Immediate shipment of additional artillery within Map Program.

C. The provision of a bulldozer capability to enable Fank to prepare air strips in certain critical locations.

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This is a key item which I have discussed with General Abrams and Gen. Weyand, and based on this morning's discussions I am confident that remedial action is now underway.

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H. An increase in Fank manning levels from 210 thousand currently programmed to 260 thousand. As you know our supplemental request included direct support for 300 battalions for a ceiling of 125 thousand. Ambassador Swank and Ladd are acquainted with the request and will supply us with recommendations as to how it should be handled.

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press yesterday afternoon in an attempt to get them to cool down the increasing anti-South Vietnamese articles and cartoons. Nevertheless, the stories and rumors about the grudging nature of some GVN help and the misbehaviour of the ARVN are running strong and I believe both countries must make greater efforts.

7. Despite their problems, the morale and cohesiveness of the Cambodian leadership remains good and if the spirit displayed at the training camp is representative, the enthusiasm and nationalism of the people persists. Whether these basic positive factors are confined to the capitol, whether the basic optimism of the leaders is misplaced, whether a few sharp military setbacks might start unraveling the situation -- these are all unknown. One doesn't get the answers in two days in Phnom Penh, and given the present state of our intelligence in the country I don't think one would get the answers during a much longer stay.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

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D. Small Arms: 10,000 M-15 rounds will be moved by 1 January, and 45,000 M-1 carbine rounds should arrive by March;

E. Riverine Forces: Seven FBR's will be shipped immediately and the remainder of 19 in the program will be expedited. This may require pressure on the Department of Navy through DOD and JCS.

F. Bulldozers for Airport Repair: Kampong Cham is cut off entirely except for slow water entry and has no operating air field.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MACV indicates a special mission with aerial crane and borrowed ARVN dozer can and will be set up immediately;

G. Improved ARVN/VNAF Responsiveness: General Abrams, as a result of the letter he received last week from the President has placed General Weyand in overall charge of coordinating ARVN, Fank and U. S. activities in Cambodia. ARVN has appointed LGen Nguyen Van Manh to work in new coordinating triumverate and Cambodians will soon designate their representative. General Abrams envisions that group will meet in Phnom Penh or SVN at least weekly and on quiet basis to insure activities of all forces are well coordinated and requirements properly assessed. I am confident system will greatly facilitate exchange of information and more effective operational programs for ground, sea and air operations in support of Cambodia.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday,
December 15, 1970

1. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kompong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Tell
2. Inform President ^{*that you have received*} of initial Haig report, from Phnom Penh. ^{*General Haig on the Cambodian leg of his trip*} ~~Tell~~ the President Haig believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh and not return with him to Washington. (Left flap)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

^{*You have sent No headed a memorandum attacking these cables (Tab A)*}
3. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance which has been sent to the Delegation. (Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

~~3. Brief the President on your meeting with Hardin concerning the Hester visit.~~

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

~~4. Tell the President you will be in Boston today talking to the delegation.~~

5. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler have left Antilla and will probably arrive in Havana this morning. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. (See map at Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on the Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meetings with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President last Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

¹⁰8. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

¹¹9. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

¹²10. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday,
December 15, 1970

1. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kompong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform President of initial Haig report from Phnom Penh. Tell the President Haig believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh and not return with him to Washington. (Left flap)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance which has been sent to the Delegation. (Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler have left Antilla and will probably arrive in Havana this morning. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. (See map at Tab B)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on the Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meetings with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President last Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Brief the President on your meeting with Senator Church.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

AMH:RTK:JTH:feg:12/14/70

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 14, 1970

HAK:

A brief report from General Haig. We have summarized for the President but I suggest we hold it until we receive the further details on meetings with Lon Nol and Matak which Haig says follows. We can then send in both together in a single summary.


RTK

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT:

Initial Haig Report on Southeast Asia

Attached is an initial report from General Haig concerning his trip to Phnom Penh. He indicates that:

- The military situation is serious but not critical.
- The enemy obviously is determined to carry the battle to the Cambodian army at this early point in the dry season and enemy tactics confirm that their goal is maximum attrition of Cambodian forces.
- Cambodian performance has been spotty, tactics have been poor and command and control has been very weak. However, despite shortcomings and recent setbacks there is no evidence of shaken confidence or morale problems.
- A major problem is the inability of the Cambodian army to evacuate and care for their wounded.
- The Cambodian Chief of Operations believes the enemy has rebuilt their forces and logistic support and are adjusting their tactics to minimize the effectiveness of allied air operations.
- Under present circumstances it would not be wise for Mr. Ladd to return to Washington.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3A ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 13, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *AKS*

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Tuesday* ~~Monday~~,
December 14, 1970

1. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kompong Cham operation. Tell the President bombing operations have been stepped up in Cambodia.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform President ^{*of initial Haig report from*} ~~Haig is in~~ Phnom Penh. ~~During his trip he will see Abrams, Bunker, Thieu and Lon Nol. Tell President we should hold off on Ladd return pending Haig's assessment. Ladd has been altered however.~~ *Haig believes that under present circumstances Ladd should remain in Phnom Penh and not return with him to*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Washington
Comments: _____

3. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting ~~with~~ the Verification Panel last Monday and the guidance ^{*which has been*} ~~now going~~ to the Delegation. **(TAB A)**

sent

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President ^{and with} that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate ^{probably arrive in Havana this morning} and oiler have left Antilla. During its time alongside the tender in Antilla, the submarine may have undergone engine repairs. Analysis of data indicates that it is unlikely that more than one F-class submarine is in the vicinity of Cuba. (See map at Tab **B**.)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Brief the President on the Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meetings with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President last Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Brief the President on your meeting with Sen. Church -

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 11, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday,
December 11, 1970

1. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kompong Cham operation. Tell the President you have asked Defense for a stepped-up plan for bombing operations in Cambodia and an inventory of air assets for close air support.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Inform President Haig is going to Southeast Asia tonight, will include State representative and will see Abrams, Bunker, Thieu and Lon Nol. Tell President we should hold off on Ladd return pending Haig's assessment. Ladd has been alerted however.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Discuss handling of Yost resignation today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

4. Discuss President's meeting with General Dayan this afternoon.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler are anchored or in port at the southeastern tip of Cuba and that there may be two other F-class submarines in the area (see map at Tab A).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Discuss message received from Ambassador Hilaly.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molina of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Brief the President on the Review Group Meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meetings with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President Wednesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Review your meeting with Governor Dewey and General Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11. Give the President a rundown of your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

12. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

13. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
December 10, 1970

1. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kompong Cham operation. Tell the President you have asked Defense for a stepped-up plan for bombing operations in Cambodia and an inventory of air assets for close air support.

Inform Pres Haig is going to SE and tonight will include state up and will see

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments:

Always remember, Haig, how to tell Pres. we should tell Pres. that when pending stage assessment, read the book

2. Review most likely press conference questions. Tell him to mention Moose-Lowenstein report which reportedly gives a gloomy assessment for Cambodia, and which may be released by the Foreign Relations Committee today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments:

3. 4. Discuss President's meeting with General Dayan this afternoon

4. 4. You may want to brief the President on Haig's trip as well as the planning now underway for preemptive strikes in Cambodia and the parhandle. This afternoon. He will spend two days in Phnom Penh and then on South Vietnam, as well as stopping briefly at ANCPAC Headquarters.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments:

Discuss planning now underway for preemptive strikes in re parhandle.

5. Discuss message received from Ambassador Hilaly.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler are anchored or in port at the southeastern tip of Cuba and that there may be 2 other F-class submarines in the area (see map at Tab A). ~~Tell the President you have sent him a memo covering the handling of the Soviet naval activity and the "understanding" at the press conference.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

~~5. Discuss with the President your call from Mr. Molera of the Ford Motor Company concerning their Chile project.~~
6. Brief the President on the Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meeting with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President ^{Wednesday} yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Review your meeting with Governor Dewey and General Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley ~~last Tuesday.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 3 -

12-20. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9-10. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

December 10, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

**SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Thursday,
December 10, 1970**

1. Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and status of Kompong-Cham operation. Tell the President you have asked Defense for a stepped-up plan for bombing operations in Cambodia and an inventory of air assets for close air support.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Review most likely press conference questions. Tell him to mention Moose-Lowenstein report which reportedly gives a gloomy assessment for Cambodia, and which may be released by the Foreign Relations Committee today.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. You may want to brief the President on Haig's trip as well as the planning now underway for preemptive strikes in Cambodia and the panhandle.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

4. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate and oiler are anchored or in port at the southeastern tip of Cuba and that there may be 3 other F-class submarines in the area (see map at Tab A). Tell the President you have sent him a memo covering the handling of the Soviet naval activity and the "understanding" at the press conference.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Brief the President on the Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meeting with Thompson.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Review your meeting with Governor Dewey and General Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley last Tuesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- -
- 3 -

9. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with the Verification Panel Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

AMH:JTH:feg:12/9/70

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

HAK

General Haig:

U.S. battle deaths for the week ending ~~December~~ 5 will be approximately 27. That represents a decrease of 5 over the previous week's total. We will have a memo to the President when the figure is confirmed this afternoon.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, ~~Wednesday~~ ^{Thursday},
December 9, 1970

*Keppel upland
inches for this*

Brief the President on the Cambodian situation and
1. Tell President ~~Thompson will join SRG on Indian Ocean~~
today. ~~status of Kompong Cham operation.~~ Tell the President ~~you have~~
asked Defense for a stepped up plan for an operation in Cambodia
I have discussed this with the President: Yes No
and an inventory of our assets for close air support

Comments: _____

2. Renew monthly press conference questions you may want to tell
him to mention more - Soviet Union reports which may be released
by Foreign Relations Committee today.
3. You may want to brief the President on your ~~Senior Review~~
at Kompong Cham

Group meeting ~~Thursday~~ and Haig's trip as well as the planning now
underway for preemptive strikes in Cambodia and the panhandle. Mention
~~critical situation around Kompong Cham.~~ *17.9 11.5 1 Camb.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

4. Tell the President that the tender, F-class submarine, frigate
and oiler are anchored or in port at the southeastern tip of Cuba and that
there may be 3 other F-class submarines in the area ~~although they have not~~
~~been sighted visually~~ (see map at Tab A). Tell the President you have sent
him a memo covering the handling of the Soviet naval activity and the
"understanding" at the press conference.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

4. Review your meeting with Governor Dewey and General Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley last Tuesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with Verification Panel ^{Monday} yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5 & 8. Brief the President on The Review Group meeting on the Indian Ocean and your subsequent meeting with Thompson.

6.9. Tell the President you briefed the Vice President yesterday.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 8, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Tuesday,
December 8, 1970

1. Discuss President's meeting with King Hussein at 11:00 a.m.
Brief President on latest reports on fighting in Jordan.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. Tell the President that Dobrynin cancelled your meeting with
him yesterday at the last minute.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No _____

Comments: _____

3. Review state of play on POW announcement for Thursday and
possibility for holiday ceasefire extension. (Message at Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No _____

Comments: _____

*1. Tell Pres. Thompson will give
SRG on Sudan
today.*

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

8. Brief President on Laird's testimony re assistance team in Cambodia (no numbers).

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

9. Inform President of discussion with Passman.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

d 10. Review your meeting with Governor Dewey and General Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

g 11. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley last Tuesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

b 12. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

- 4 -

7
13. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki and your meeting with Verification Panel ~~today~~ *yesterday*.

cc I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

~~74. Tell the President you~~

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

VIA CAS CHANNEL

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

FOR: Ambassador Bunker EYES ONLY
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
REF: Saigon 774 and previously

1. Upon further reflection and interagency coordination here the President believes we should modify the POW initiative that you have discussed with Thieu, ~~on the basis of our exchanges in this channel.~~ You will be receiving a State cable asking you to obtain Thieu's concurrence for a joint US-GVN initiative at December 10 plenary which would (1) recall the POW proposal in October 7 speech for immediate unconditional release all POW's both sides; (2) re-emphasize worldwide concern this humanitarian issue as reflected in recent United Nations vote, (3) note that holiday season is especially appropriate time for movement on humanitarian problem; (4) make a specific offer of the immediate release of the 8,200 NVA held in SVN in exchange for the immediate release of all US and Free World personnel held in Indo-China and all GVN personnel ^{outside South Vietnam;} held ~~in NVN;~~ (5) say our side is prepared for daily meetings on this subject.

2. The President has decided to shift to this proposal rather than singling out POW's held in North Vietnam alone because he believes the latter initiative might be construed as setting higher priority for some American men over others, though this of course would not be the intent and the universality of the October 7 proposal would still apply.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

3. We regret change on this, and recognize that it somewhat complicates the proposals. However, we hope you can obtain Thieu's concurrence, explaining our political problem.

Warm regards.

'70 DEC 7 PM 3:50

SECRET/CHEROKEE

TO: AMEMBASSY SAIGON
INFO: USDEL PARIS
FROM: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUBJECT: Prisoner of War Initiative

References: A. State 198683 NODIS
B. Saigon 19270 NODIS

1. This supersedes guidance contained ref A.

2. In order further to underline our desire for earliest possible release of PWs in all of Indo-China, the President would like to make a joint US/GVN proposal which would consist of following elements:

-- Recall the PW proposal in the President's October 7 speech, approved by the Governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, for "the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides."

-- Underline that this humanitarian issue need not -- and should not -- await resolution of other military and political issues.

-- Point to last week's United Nations resolution on this question which reflected global concern.

-- State that the holiday season is a particularly apt occasion for movement on this humanitarian issue.

-- Make a specific offer of ^{THE} immediate release of ^{THE} 8,200 NVA held ^{FREE WORLD} ~~FWAF~~ personnel ^{HELD} in SVN in exchange for ^{THE} immediate release of all US and ^{HELD} personnel in Indo-China and all GVN personnel held ^{HELD} ~~in NVN.~~ outside South Vietnam.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTIONSECRET/CHEROKEE

December 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

DOD has now sent its proposal for the POW initiative (Tab A).

This is very much like the draft we were working on this morning, it has two essential differences with that draft:

sick and wounded

-- It does not call for a unilateral release of/NVA POW's.

-- It says that we should "make a specific offer of the immediate release of the 8,200 NVA held in SVN in exchange for the immediate release of all US and Free World personnel held in Indo-China and all GVN personnel held outside South Vietnam.

As you can see, this is a far cry from our original proposal, but we believe that we should accept it. The main reason is because we fear that there may be some reaction among some of the wives if their husbands are not specifically included in our offer, and DOD will probably leak to them that the White House was playing favorites with our POW's in North Vietnam.

There are two problems with the proposal, but we think they can be taken care of:

-- First, it is somewhat confusing. It is not as neat as our original idea of a straight exchange of North Vietnamese for US and GVN prisoners in North Vietnam. However, we think we can take care of this by saying that it deals essentially with "external" forces.

-- Second, we will be asked whether this proposal departs from our October 7 stand. We think we can handle this by saying that October 7 still stands and that we have merely broken out one part of the package in order to get some movement. In order to clarify this to Bunker, we are adding a paragraph to the outgoing telegram.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the DOD proposal (Tab A) with the additional paragraph.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SECRET/CHEROKEE

SECRET / CHEROKEE

- 2 -

2. That you approve the back channel to Bunker at Tab B, explaining the shift in our proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

AMH:WRS:WL:ms:12/7/70

SECRET / CHEROKEE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

December 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright *MW*

SUBJECT: Security Council Resolution Condemning Portuguese
Raid of Guinea

Attached is a self-explanatory memo to the President transmitting a memo from Secretary Rogers on this subject. We are recommending that the U.S. abstain -- and try to reduce the backlash effect both in Africa and in Portugal by an artful explanatory statement.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you initial the memo for the President at Tab I.

Note: Hal Sonnenfeldt concurs in the recommendation, but urges that we make a "highest level" approach to the British and French to make certain they abstain with us. I do not think that is necessary - but have Sam de Palma checking again tomorrow morning.

MW

I

CONFIDENTIALACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Security Council Resolution Condemning Portuguese
Raid of Guinea

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from the Secretary of State on this subject, which he discussed with you this afternoon. Secretary Rogers recommends that we abstain on the resolution, and make a statement in the Security Council to reduce the adverse effect in Africa and Portugal.

Early this evening, the African resolution was somewhat moderated and it now appears altogether likely that it will receive the 9 votes necessary for passage. We expect no negative votes, although the U.K., France and Spain will probably abstain. The vote is expected Tuesday afternoon.

We are between the rock and the hard place on this resolution. The Portuguese denial notwithstanding, we know for a fact and everybody else accepts as a fact that the Portuguese mounted this mini-invasion of Guinea. The obvious fact that the raid was aimed at the assassination of President Sekou Toure and at the overthrow of his government has created a situation in which African feelings are running very high, indeed. The African Foreign Ministers are meeting in Nigeria on Wednesday to consider further action that they might take in view of the Portuguese invasion. Anti-Western sentiment is building up, and the stand that we take on the UN resolution will probably be viewed as the real test of our attitude toward Africa. A veto by us would have disastrous effects upon our African interests. In fact, we can expect some serious difficulties to flow even from our abstention.

The last minute changes in the resolution have removed the danger that it would be considered a mandatory Security Council resolution. Therefore, although the resolution is still very strong, I do not believe that our relationship with Portugal requires that we cast a veto.

CONFIDENTIAL

On balance, an abstention and an explanatory statement seems to be the least harmful course that we can follow. I concur in Secretary Rogers' recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve our abstaining, and the issuance of the explanatory statement along the lines of the suggested draft.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

K

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

16487

December 7, 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Security Council Meeting on
Guinea.

The African Security Council members have circulated and will probably introduce this afternoon (December 7) a resolution which, inter alia, (a) endorses the report of the Security Council Mission, (b) "strongly condemns the Government of Portugal for its invasion of the Republic of Guinea", (c) demands full compensation, (d) declares Portuguese colonialism a "serious threat to the peace and security of the African continent", (e) urges all states to refrain from providing Portugal "military and material assistance" and (f) warns that the Security Council "shall take appropriate measures under Chapter VII" in the event of a "repetition of such acts".

The Africans may press the resolution to a vote this afternoon, even though it appears unlikely that it can command the necessary nine votes. The British and the French have indicated that they will abstain if the resolution does not have the nine-vote majority, and that they would not want to be alone in vetoing the resolution even if it could obtain the majority.

This is an extreme resolution which we can certainly not support, especially as it carries implications that mandatory measures under Chapter VII are appropriate. However, it does not actually institute mandatory measures, and we could apply the veto later if an attempt were made to do so.


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I recommend that we join the British and the French in abstaining on this resolution. Our veto would have serious implications for our interests in and relations with African nations, as well as being unnecessary. In explanation of our vote we would make a statement along the lines of the attached draft, also making clear our objections to the resolution's implication of Chapter VII situation and our rejection of any such implication. We would also wish to comment that we could not accept any obligation to refrain from providing Portugal with military and material assistance.

It is possible that the Africans will seek to obtain a nine-vote majority by amending the resolution. It is most unlikely that modifications sufficient to make the resolution acceptable to us will be made, and I would recommend that we also abstain on an amended resolution.



William P. Rogers

Enclosures:

1. Draft Security Council Resolution
2. Draft Security Council Statement

CONFIDENTIAL

The Security Council,

Having considered with appreciation the report of the Security Council Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea established under Resolution 289 (1970) contained in Document S/10009 and Addendum 1,

Having heard further statements by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guinea,

Gravely concerned that the invasion of the territory of the Republic of Guinea of 22-23 November 1970 from Guinea Bissau was carried out by naval and military units of the Portuguese armed forces and by the armed attack against the Republic of Guinea on 27 and 28 November 1970,

Gravely concerned that such armed attacks directed against independent African states pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of its responsibility to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to international peace and security,

Recalling its Resolutions 218 (1965) and 275 (1969) which condemned Portugal and affirmed that the situation resulting from the policies of Portugal both as regards the African population of its colonies and the neighboring states adversely affect the peace and stability of the African continent,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau to freedom and independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Grieved at the loss of life and extensive damage caused by the invasion of the Republic of Guinea,

1. Endorses the Report of the Special Mission to the Republic of Guinea and its conclusions;
2. Strongly condemns the Government of Portugal for its invasion of the Republic of Guinea;

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3. Demands that full compensation by the Government of Portugal be paid to the Republic of Guinea for the extensive damage to life and property caused by the invasion and requests the Secretary-General to assist in the assessment of the extent of the damage involved in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Guinea;

4. Declares that the presence of Portuguese colonialism on the African continent is a serious threat to the peace and security of the African continent;

5. Urges all states to refrain from providing the Government of Portugal with military and material assistance as such assistance enables it to continue its repressive actions against the peoples of the territories under its domination and against independent African states;

6. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to apply without further delay to the peoples of the territories under its domination the principles of self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council;

7. Solemnly warns the Government of Portugal that it shall take appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the event of any repetition of such acts;

8. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to comply fully with all the resolutions of the Security Council and in particular the present resolution in accordance with her obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and requests all states to exert their influence on the Government of Portugal to ensure compliance with the provisions of the present resolution;

9. Appeals to all states to render moral and material assistance to the Republic of Guinea to strengthen and defend its independence and territorial integrity;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of this resolution;

11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Mr. President:

The armed raid made on the Republic of Guinea which led to the creation of the special mission whose report is now before us is a matter of serious concern to the United States. I should like to emphasize at the outset that the Government of the United States deeply deplores the loss of life and injuries that resulted from the action, as well as the physical destruction that it caused. We view in the most serious way an attack of this nature, which appears to have been prepared and mounted outside the country.

My Government cannot condone an attack such as this on a sovereign member of the United Nations. President Nixon made this clear in the message he sent President Toure declaring:

"On behalf of my Government and the American people, I would like to express sympathy to you and to the Government and people of the Republic of Guinea in this difficult period. I would like to take this opportunity to renew to you my assurances that the United States opposes any infringement of Guinean national sovereignty or outside interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Guinea."

Mr. President, I should like to join in the remarks that have been made commending the work of the special

mission and to thank its members for a most useful report. The charges that the Council is considering are extremely serious, and it is fitting and proper that the Council made an independent effort to determine the facts before considering what action it wished to take. Clearly the special mission was not able to investigate all of the possible elements of this situation, but we congratulate it for its success in gathering a substantial body of data concerning the events of November 22-23.

It is evident that in drawing up its conclusions, the special mission considered all information made available to it with the care and considered judgment that a matter of this gravity deserves. Its conclusions were not arrived at lightly or in haste. My Government has no reason to question the mission's considered opinion and judgment concerning responsibility for the attack. The report concludes that elements of the Portuguese armed forces participated in the armed raid, an action which my Government must condemn as contrary to the Charter's injunction that we refrain from the use or threat of force directed against the territorial integrity

or political independence of any state and in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

An event of this nature leads us to ask why it occurred and what can be done to prevent its recurrence. In considering these questions, my Government can agree with those who believe we should view the particular events under discussion in a broader context. That context involves the unrest and violence to which differences over the question of the future of the Portuguese territories have given rise over almost a decade. My Government has repeatedly made clear, and it reaffirms now, its support for the exercise by the people of those territories of their legitimate right to self-determination. The United States continues to support this principle and will continue to work with those concerned to see it carried out.

In working toward this goal, however, my Government believes that we must avoid violence and seek peaceful solutions. Violence can only bring counter violence with the attendant misery and suffering. No one involved in this situation, least of all the people of the territories whose interests we are trying to advance, can gain through resort to force. It is for this reason that the United States provides no arms to Portugal for use in Africa and is unwilling as well to provide them to those who would use them against the Portuguese territories in Africa.

I would appeal once again to all concerned to examine their consciences and exert renewed efforts to develop fresh, imaginative approaches to the basic problem underlying so much of the violence that disturbs the normal lives of so many of the people of Africa today. The attack on Guinea must not be repeated. But beyond that, we must all redouble our efforts to resolve the more fundamental problem. The spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations commits us -- and the parties here concerned -- to seek, first of all, a solution to disputes likely to endanger peace and

security by discussion and by a common will to look for and find peaceful means of settlement.

In our view the resolution now before us would be more realistic and do far more to promote a peaceful settlement if it also took this view into account.

TAB D -- Laird/Kissinger Telcon
6:04 p. m. , December 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Monday,
December 7, 1970

- 1. Discuss President's meeting with King Hussein at a Ham
- 2. Brief President on latest reports on fighting in Jordan.
Tell the President that Dobrynin cancelled your meeting with him yesterday at the last minute.
- 2. Give the President report on the processing of discrepancies in State and Transportation reports on defector case and plans for release of the reports.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Renew ~~status~~ state of play on POW announcement for Thursday and possibility for holiday cease-fire extension. (Missy TAB)

4. You may want to brief the President on your Senior Review Group meeting Thursday and Haig's trip as well as the planning now underway for preemptive strikes in Cambodia and the panhandle.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender ^{and} (See map at Tab A). Inform him that the Cubans ~~have~~ announced that the Tanker, ~~freighter~~ ^{frigate}, and a submarine (presumably F class diesel) ~~will~~ ^{could} visit Cuba on Monday and remain until December 23.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

8 ~~6~~. *Full Review your meeting with* Tell the President that Governor Dewey and General Clay, will be down for most of the day for their periodic foreign policy updating. You will meet with them prior to the 4:00 p.m. meeting of Acheson, McGloy, Dewey and Clay.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

9. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley last Tuesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

10. Review your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

11. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki, *and your meeting with Verification Panel Today.*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

Buy Pres on Laid's testimony re assistance given in Cambodia (no numbers)

7 inform Pres. of discussion at

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, December 4, 1970

1. Tell the President that Ehrlichman's office is in the process of reviewing the report, questions concerning discrepancies are being raised with the two departments, and it is hoped that a report will be available for release on Monday.

1. Give the President report on state of play on ~~review~~ ^{Processing}
I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: *of report discrepancies discrepancies in State & Transportation reports on defects case*

2. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin Tuesday and your Senior Review Group meeting ~~yesterday~~ ^{the Tuesday}.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

3. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender and the other group of ships which ^{have} rendezvoused ~~yesterday~~. (See map at Tab A) ~~Inform him that a diesel-powered attack submarine was spotted on the surface with the group yesterday.~~

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley *on Tuesday*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a rundown on your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. The President will be seeing Governor Connally at 10:00 a.m. You may want to mention points you raised at the FIAB luncheon yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 5, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Saturday,
December 5, 1970

1. Give the President report on state of ploy on processing of discrepancies in State and Transportation reports on defector case.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin Tuesday and your Senior Review Group meeting Thursday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender and the other group of ships which have rendezvoused. (See map at Tab A)

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley on Tuesday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a rundown on your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week:

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, Friday, December 4, 1970

1. Tell the President that Ehrlichman's office is in the process of reviewing the report, questions concerning discrepancies are being raised with the two departments, and it is hoped that a report will be available for release on Monday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

2. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin Tuesday and your Senior Review Group meeting yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

3. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender and the other group of ships which rendezvoused yesterday. (See map at Tab A) Inform him that a diesel-powered attack submarine was spotted on the surface with the group yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

4. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a rundown on your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7. Brief the President on the state of play at Helsinki.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

8. The President will be seeing Governor Connally at 10:00 a. m. You may want to mention points you raised at the FIAB luncheon yesterday.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

MEMORANDUM

*Have sit on boys
attach new maps
in A.M.*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

December 3, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Items to Discuss with the President, *Friday* Thursday,
December 3, 1970

1. Tell the President that Ehrlichman's office is in the process of reviewing the report, questions concerning discrepancies are being raised with the two Departments, and it is hoped that a report will be available for release on Monday. Directive concerning actions to be taken has been delivered to State and Transportation

1. Tell the President you have forwarded to him by separate memorandum the reports of the Secretaries of State and Transportation. Discuss press handling and additional steps which should be taken within the bureaucracy. Caution the President that it is important that we be prudent in our public statements in order not to prejudice the formal investigations and possible future legal proceedings.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: *Directive concerning*

Transportation

2. You may want to brief the President on your discussion with Ambassador Rabin Tuesday *and your senior review group meeting yesterday*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

3. Give the President the location of the Soviet submarine tender and the other group of ships which may be rendezvousing with it. *of yesterday* (See map at Tab A) Inform him of the possibility that a nuclear submarine is *being moved attack* accompanying the Soviet guided missile frigate and oiler. *was spotted on the surface with the group yesterday*

I have discussed this with the President: Yes No

Comments: _____

4. Give the President a rundown on your briefing of the four GOP Senators-elect and Senator-elect Buckley.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

5. Give the President a rundown on your meeting with Vice Admiral Rickover.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

6. Give the President a rundown of your discussion with Lord Carrington and his assistant last week.

I have discussed this with the President: Yes _____ No _____

Comments: _____

7 Brief the President on the state of play on ~~SAB~~
at Helsinki.

8. ~~Pres~~ President will be seeing Governor ^{Connelly} ~~Conolly~~ at
10:00 a.m. You may want to mention
points you raised at PIAB luncheon yesterday.