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DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	Memo	Carver to Lynn, Jr. (16 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/1 NLN 06-12/1	29 September 1969	B
2	Report	Duck Hook ⁵⁸ (70 pp) pages 1-41 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2 NLN 06-12/2 Declassified 8/10/07 letters	20 July 1969	B
3	Memo w/attach	Helms to Kissinger (63 pp) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/3 NLN 06-12/3	17 July 1969	B
2A	Report	Duck Hook p 42-58 MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2A NLN 06-12/2A	20 July 1969	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

National Security Council, Vietnam Subject Files

BOX NUMBER

89

FOLDER TITLE

Top Secret/Sensitive Vietnam Contingency Planning Henry A. Kissinger Oct. 2, 1969 (Folder 1 of 2)

RESTRICTION CODES

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1	memo	Carver to Lynn (16 pp.) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/1 SANITIZED per sec 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)] ltr. 3/30/2010	9/29/1969	B
2	report	DECLASSIFIED PER RAC 6/13/2008 Duck Hook (pages 1-41) (41 pp.) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 8/10/2007	7/20/1969	B
2A	report	Duck Hook (pages 42-58) (17 pp.) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/2 DECLASSIFIED per ltr. 6/29/2009	7/20/1969	B
3	memo w/ attach	Helms to Kissinger (56 pp.) MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 06-04/3 SANITIZED per sec 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)] ltr. 3/30/2010	7/17/1969	B

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[1] Top Secret / Sensitive Vietnam Contingency Planning: Henry A. Kissinger October 2, 1969 [1 of 2]

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

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[89/1/1]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
Assistant for Programs
National Security Council

SUBJECT : North Vietnam Target Inventory

1. In response to the request you levied during the course of our conversation on Friday, 26 September, attached is an inventory of major physical facilities in North Vietnam that could be viewed as potential targets. As you know, this inventory was prepared on short notice and the number of people working on it was held to an absolute minimum for security reasons. It should, therefore, be viewed as a quick rough cut rather than a finished study.

2. Per your ground rules, we did not address the probable political consequences or reactions of the North Vietnamese or others (e.g., the Soviets, Chinese, Western Europeans, South Vietnamese, other Asians, etc.) of attacks on any or all of these targets, though in some instances the near certainty of strong international reactions to attacks on certain targets is alluded to.

3. In the concluding paragraphs of the attached memorandum we do attempt a brief and summary analysis of the impact a loss of the inventoried facilities would have on North Vietnam. The key judgment here is a judgment derived from the analytic review of all available evidence undertaken in the course of preparing this paper and buttressed by our continuing analysis of evidence developed over the course of the years since 1965: namely that even destruction of all these facilities would not make it physically impossible for North Vietnam to continue the war. Thus, physical constraints would not foreclose Hanoi's options or necessarily dictate Hanoi's political response to such attacks.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Section 3.5

PER RAC

By JMR NARA Date 6/13/2008

[p. 1 of 15]

George A. Carver, Jr.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 September 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Significant Physical Facilities in North Vietnam

Introduction

Prior to 1965 North Vietnam offered only a limited number of lucrative targets for air attack. With the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program, the catalogue of significant installations became even more limited because of the damage sustained during the bombing programs and North Vietnam's extensive programs of dispersal and decentralization of key economic and military facilities. Since the bombing halt a number of the more important facilities have been restored or improved. This memorandum examines the current state of North Vietnam's economic and military plant in an attempt to identify those installations whose loss or neutralization might have a meaningful impact on the capability and willingness of Hanoi's leadership to continue with the war.

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
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[pg. 2 of 15]

I. North Vietnam as a Target System

1. The number of fixed facilities against North Vietnam that offer significant targets for air attack is limited. The economy of North Vietnam is essentially agrarian, lacking for the most part an indigenous economic base heavily committed to the support of military operations. Hanoi maintains a relatively small military establishment, and its primary contribution to the war in the South is in the provision of manpower and in serving as a control center for the direction of insurgency. In almost all other respects Hanoi's war making capabilities are dependent on the continued flow of military and economic goods from its Communist allies.

2. As a result of the previous US bombing campaigns and the countermeasures adopted by the North Vietnamese, the number of lucrative targets has fallen off since 1965. The pace of reconstruction has been slow and deliberate, not only because of the scope and complexity of the task but also because the regime appeared reluctant to rebuild large industrial targets until it was relatively confident that the bombing would not be resumed. Repair activities at such important plants as the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex and the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant have been at such a slow pace that neither facility is yet restored to the point that it would be a significant target. In other cases, such as the heavily damaged Nam Dinh Textile Plant and the Co Dinh Chromite Concentrating Plant, no reconstruction activity has been noted.

3. Another factor limiting the number of significant targets has been the extensive dispersal programs adopted to offset the effects of previous air attacks. Most of the major military barracks and ammunition and supply depots, for example, were dispersed early in 1965 so that when these target systems were taken under systematic attack the results, in terms of human or material losses, were minimal. Similarly, the early establishment of a widely dispersed petroleum storage system so effectively offset the destruction of North Vietnam's bulk storage system that most of these facilities were left unrepaired. As a result there are today probably only three petroleum storage areas -- Hanoi, Haiphong, and Vinh -- that are of some significance as potential targets. The widespread dispersal of small facilities such as vehicle repair and machine tool shops, as well as the relocation of some industrial plants has further reduced the number of installations available for air attack.

4. An important characteristic of the remaining target systems is that the most important of them would be considerably more difficult to take under attack today than they were during the Rolling Thunder program. All of the power stations in the

main electric power network, for example, have had protective blast walls constructed around them so that they are considerably less vulnerable to effective air attack. In addition a number of the more significant facilities are located in the heavily populated and heavily defended areas around Haiphong and Hanoi. Attacks against these targets not only risk the inadvertent killing of large numbers of civilians but also significantly increase the chances that losses of US pilots and aircraft will be extremely high. During the period from April 1967 to March 1968, targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas came under frequent attack. The US aircraft loss rate in these attacks was 7 times greater than the rate for operations over all of North Vietnam.

II. Major Facilities

5. This section discusses a selected number of facilities in North Vietnam that seem to be significant because their neutralization or destruction by air attack would meet one or all of the following objectives:

- a. A high degree of physical damage or extensive disruption of an important economic or military function.
- b. The implementation of countermeasures or restoration of the facility would be costly in terms of human and material resources.
- c. The attack could be expected to have a strong psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership.

6. The 29 installations selected are listed in the table.* The list is not intended to be all-inclusive but is judged to be one which would offer reasonably good prospects of maximizing the attainment of the above objectives. The specific targets are listed under several target systems and are listed by order of priority. The allocation of priority is obviously a highly subjective procedure, but the ranking in this listing is supported to some degree by the fact that it reflects the speed and intensity with which Hanoi chose to restore its bomb damaged facilities both during and after the US bombing campaigns. Although each installation is given a separate numerical ranking in many cases a successful campaign would require that several or all of the facilities in any one category be attacked simultaneously.

* Table follows on Page 11.

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Haiphong Port Area

7. The Haiphong port area was virtually untouched throughout the bombing campaign. The port is, however, of major significance because it is the entry point for about 85 percent of North Vietnam's annual imports. These imports are vital to the economy and are essential to the maintenance of lines of communication within North Vietnam. In addition, the Haiphong port area includes five shipyards, a naval base, an air defense center, a major railroad yard and six major storage areas. An initial attack in the Haiphong port area would be almost certain to destroy large quantities of stockpiled supplies. Although these supplies cannot be quantified with any precision, it is probable that at least 50,000 tons of miscellaneous cargoes are stored in the port area at any one time. The immediate disruption to established distribution systems resulting from a successful attack would be widespread and severe, and if the port area were kept under attack alternative means of importing goods and distributing them internally could not be implemented for at least 2-3 months. The attacks could not be expected to yield any long term reduction in the flow of imports into North Vietnam because of the existence of alternative means of supply such as the overland rail and highway connections with China or the use of other ports such as Hon Gai and Cam Pha.

8. There are important liabilities associated with this target system. It is so heavily defended that losses of US aircraft would undoubtedly be high. Since all of the targets are located within a radius of 1.5 miles from the center of Haiphong, a high number of casualties among North Vietnamese civilians probably could not be avoided. Finally, the attack would stand a high chance of damaging or sinking foreign shipping in port and conceivably forcing a US-USSR confrontation.

9. A variant to bombing the port facilities would be a mining program. A mining program would, of course, not yield the high levels of physical damage resulting from bombing. It would, however, avoid most of the risks associated with bombing and would be about as effective in terms of the disruption of North Vietnam's import trade and internal transport arrangements.

Electric Power System

10. The importance to North Vietnam of its electric power system is evident in the persistency with which it attempted to keep the main power system operative throughout the bombing, the measures (protective blast walls) devised to reduce its vulnerability to bombing, and the priority attached to restoration of

these facilities after the bombing halted. Although all electric power stations have significance as targets, the following stations were selected because they are the ones in which Hanoi has made the greatest efforts to regain pre-bombing generating capacity:

<u>Electric Powerplant</u>	<u>Pre-Bomb Capacity (Megawatts)</u>	<u>Operational Capacity (Megawatts) August 1969</u>
Hanoi	32.5	25
Uong Bi	24	24
Haiphong West	10	5
Hon Gai	15	6
Thai Nguyen	24	12
Bac Giang	12	12

11. The neutralization of these plants which constitute North Vietnam's main power network and represent a capital investment of about \$30 million would cripple most of North Vietnam's modern industry. The impact of bombing North Vietnam's electric power system would be maximized if strikes were carried out against all of these plants simultaneously. Successful attacks would not only undercut the results of 18 months of accelerated repair activity but would mean that another one to two years would elapse before the system could again approach pre-bombing capacity. The reconstruction effort is beyond the capabilities of North Vietnam's limited material and technical resources, particularly technicians. Even the resort to alternative power systems such as diesel-driven generating equipment would be adequate to meet only essential needs and would preclude the early restoration of normal industrial production. In addition the attacks could have a significant impact on the urban population of North Vietnam because of need to stagger work shifts to eliminate or strictly ration consumption by residential-commercial users, and transportation.

Airfields

12. Four of North Vietnam's ten jet airfields are judged to be significant targets. These are the airfields at Phuoc Yen, Bai Thuong, Kien An, and Yen Bai. The airfields at Bai Thuong and Yen Bai have been under construction since May 1966 and were serviceable by May 1968. The Kien An and Phuoc Yen airfields have been fully repaired and improved since the bombing halt. The construction of aircraft shelters and hardened facilities at these fields since the bombing halt has greatly increased their

operational flexibility. North Vietnam currently has an estimated 52 MIG-21's, 53 MIG-15/17's, 10 MIG-19's and 4 Il-28 bombers deployed in-country. All but one of the MIG-21's, as well as all of the bombers, and two-thirds of the remaining jet fighters are deployed at these four airfields. About two-thirds of these aircraft are deployed at Phuc Yen alone.

Haiphong Cement Plant

13. The Haiphong Cement Plant has an annual production capacity of 700,000 tons and its estimated replacement cost is \$30 million. It was one of the first industrial plants to be repaired after the bombing halt and it is currently operating at 50 percent of capacity. The plant is an important factor in North Vietnam's reconstruction program and as capacity is further restored should once again become an important source of foreign exchange. Severe damage to the plant would require more than a year to repair. Loss of production also would mean that North Vietnam would have to import about 400,000 tons of cement annually to meet domestic requirements.

Can Pha Coal Preparation Plants

14. Although this plant has been repaired since the bombing halt, coal exports have not reached more than half the levels of pre-bombing years. The failure of the coal industry to achieve pre-bombing production levels has been a matter of great concern to Hanoi and the subject of numerous commentaries in the Vietnamese press. Coal exports in past years have accounted for hard currency foreign exchange earnings of \$8-10 million a year. Successful attacks against the Can Pha facilities would be an effective means of frustrating Hanoi's attempt to revive the export trade of one of its major hard currency earners.

Hanoi Machine Tool and Engineering Plant

15. This plant built as a Soviet aid project in the late 1950's and expanded with Soviet assistance in 1966 is the largest and most sophisticated machine building plant in the country. It is valued at about \$8 million.

16. The plant has not been bombed previously because it is located in a heavily built-up area of Hanoi. Although we are uncertain as to the extent that its production has been dispersed, the plant is undoubtedly a significant factor in the maintenance of transport equipment. A successful strike against the plant should eliminate a large share of the country's output of diesel motors, small electric motors, generators, water pumps and spare parts.

An attack against this previously unstruck plant would undoubtedly have a deep psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership. It would, moreover, deprive North Vietnam of a major industrial facility regarded as one of the economy's showpieces of advanced technology.

Storage Facilities

17. There are a few important storage facilities that would make lucrative bombing targets. The yield from attacks on these targets would probably drop sharply after the initial attack, since the North Vietnamese would quickly revert to their practice of storing supplies in small and widely dispersed storage areas. Nevertheless, the initial attacks would probably cut deeply into North Vietnam's current cushion of essential goods such as petroleum, trucks, foodstuffs and construction materials.

18. The storage facilities selected are the following:

- Haiphong Chamber of Commerce Wharves
- An Khe Army Barracks
- Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage
- Hanoi Petroleum Products Storage
- Vinh Petroleum Products Storage

19. The storage facilities at Haiphong would represent a rich target in an initial surprise attack. At least 50,000 tons of supplies, much of it high value imports, are stored in these facilities at any one time. The storage facility at An Khe is occupied primarily by cargo trucks. Although there is a rapid turnover of vehicles at An Khe the number in storage at any one time is high ranging from about 800 trucks in May of this year to over 1,300 trucks in early August. The petroleum storage facilities at Hanoi and Haiphong are under reconstruction and by June 1969 these facilities had an estimated storage capacity of 37,000 tons. If this capacity is being fully used these facilities would account for almost 40 percent of North Vietnam's estimated stockpiles of petroleum. The facility is significant because it is a major source of petroleum supplies for the Panhandle areas of North Vietnam.

Transportation Targets

20. There are a large number of bridges along North Vietnam's lines of communication whose neutralization would impede the internal distribution of economic and military supplies. For the most part interdiction of these bridges would be only a minor harassment. The North Vietnamese have demonstrated extreme skill in offsetting the effects of previous interdiction and during the bombing built a great deal of redundancy into

their transport system. There are, however, three bridge targets that play key roles in maintaining the flow of Hanoi's imports either overland from China or through the port of Haiphong. These are:

Hanoi Railroad/Highway (Doumer)
Bridge over Red River

Hanoi Railroad/Highway
Bridge over Canal des Rapides

Haiphong Railroad Bridge
at Hai Duong

21. All of these bridges could be easily by-passed and the disruption to normal traffic flows would not be sustained for a long period. The importance of interdicting these bridges could become highly significant, however, if they were attacked simultaneously with an interdiction of the Haiphong Port area through a bombing or mining program.

22. In addition to these bridge targets, the major rail yards at Hanoi and Haiphong represent significant targets in North Vietnam's transport system. Successful attacks could achieve significant results in terms of damage to equipment and supplies. These rail complexes not only contain large quantities of materials but account for the bulk of North Vietnam's capacity for the repair of rolling stock and equipment. The effects of these strikes would be short-lived. Traffic flows could be resumed within days and needed transport equipment could be imported from Communist China.

Levees in the Red River Delta

23. The rice fields and populated centers of the delta are protected by an elaborate system of levees which have greatly reduced flooding from natural causes. A successful attack against the dikes in the Red River Delta could, at the proper time of the year, have exceedingly disruptive effects in the short run.

24. A highly successful campaign could destroy as much as 25 percent of the annual rice crop. Most economic and military activity in Hanoi and its suburbs would be temporarily halted. Key transport routes leading south and west from Hanoi would be disrupted. Sizable diversions of labor would be necessary for a period of weeks to repair flood damage.

25. The most significant results would be accomplished by a

breaching of the levees during the high water period between mid-July and mid-August. The fact that this period has passed explains the bottom ranking of this target system. But, the levee system is also given a low ranking because the technical problems of breaching levees by aerial bombing are so complex and the required sortie and ordnance effort so large, that such an attack generally holds little promise of success. In addition, the certainty of extremely adverse international reactions to the bombing of dams and dikes would be extremely unfavorable to the United States.

III. Conclusions

26. A review of economic and military facilities in North Vietnam has resulted in the selection of 29 installations that could be significant targets for air attack:

Five complexes in the Haiphong Port Area

Six electric power stations

Four airfields

Three manufacturing facilities

Five storage facilities

Five transportation targets

The levee system in the Red River Delta

27. The loss or neutralization of these facilities could have a deep psychological impact on Hanoi's leadership. Renewed air attacks would not only signal a return of the hardships and frustrations of previous bombing programs but also would yield significant amounts of physical and material damage. The fruit of several hundred million dollars in capital investment and post-bombing reconstruction programs would be lost. Most modern industrial production would come to a halt as would most foreign exchange earnings. The potential loss of large quantities of essential economic and military goods would increase sharply North Vietnam's import requirements. Finally, there would be extensive disruptions to normal living, to the provision of public services and transport, and substantial displacements of both urban and agricultural labor forces.

28. Despite the possibilities of widespread damage and loss, the neutralization of these facilities would not have a vital impact on Hanoi's war-making capabilities. These facilities make

little direct contribution to the war because, with the exception of manpower, North Vietnam's military capabilities depend overwhelmingly on the continued flow of large amounts of economic and military assistance from its Communist allies.

29. The impact of attacks on these facilities would be highly dependent on the manner in which the program is executed. Hanoi has demonstrated an exceptional ability to adopt effective countermeasures to US bombing programs. Attacks against only one or two facilities in a target system would minimize the possible damage and fail to bite deeply enough into the available cushion of supplies or resources, thus easing the problems of recuperation. Therefore, an attack against all the facilities in a given target system (such as all powerplants) would be a more promising means of exerting pressure against the Hanoi regime. In other cases, the results to be expected from attacks against one target system (such as lines of communications) are maximized if they are combined with attacks against a complementary system (such as the Haiphong port facilities).

30. A neutralization program against these facilities would also carry liabilities. Most of the facilities are within heavily defended and densely populated areas around Hanoi and Haiphong. Attacks in these areas run a heavy risk of high losses of US aircraft and their crews, as well as the inadvertent killing or injuring of large numbers of Vietnamese civilians.

Table

Significant Targets in North Vietnam

Haiphong Port Area

1. Haiphong Docks
2. Haiphong Open Storage Areas
3. Haiphong Naval Base
4. Haiphong Shipyards
5. Haiphong Air Defense Center

Electric Power Stations

6. Hanoi
7. Uong Bi
8. Haiphong West
9. Hon Gai
10. Thai Nguyen
11. Bac Giang

Airfields

12. Phuc Yen
13. Bai Thuong
14. Kien An
15. Yen Bai

Manufacturing Facilities

16. Haiphong Cement Plant
17. Cam Pha Coal Preparation Plant
18. Hanoi Machine Tool and Engineering Plant

Storage Facilities

19. Haiphong Chamber of Commerce Wharves
20. An Khe Army Barracks
21. Haiphong Petroleum Products Storage
22. Hanoi Petroleum Products Storage
23. Vinh Petroleum Products Storage

Transportation Targets

24. Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over Red River
25. Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over Canal des Rapides
26. Haiphong Railroad Bridge at Hai Duong
27. Hanoi Rail Classification Yard
28. Haiphong Rail Yards

Agriculture

29. Levees in Red River Delta

NVN Targets
- CIA Assessment -

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

October 2, 1969

VIETNAM

Contingency Planning

BACKUP BOOK

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NVN Mining Plan


[89/1/2]

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DUCK HOOK

20 JULY 1969



Office of Chief of Naval Operations

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 02-04/2 v NLN 02-12/2 per letter 8-10-07
By *KML/z* NARA, Date *8-28-07* [for pages 1-4] only]

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

[p 1 of 4]

SUMMARY OF MINING PLAN FOR HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX

1. This paper summarizes a plan for mining the Haiphong Port Complex, including Cam Pha and Hon Gai.

BACKGROUND

2. In 1968 cargo throughput into Haiphong averaged 4100 tons per day. So far in 1969 this average has increased to 5200 tons per day. About 90 percent of all imports via sea into North Vietnam pass through Haiphong. USSR provides about 50 percent of this shipping. This cargo is estimated to consist not only of food and petroleum products which contribute to the prosecution of the war, but in addition, trucks, generators, and other war supporting materials. (See Tab A). The closing of the Haiphong Port Complex will have a major effect on the North Vietnam economy and the capability of the North Vietnamese to support the war in the South.

HAIPHONG COMPLEX MINE PLAN

3. The mining plan (Tab C) is designed to stop entry of deep draft shipping into the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha (all in Haiphong Complex), and to disrupt major attempts by the North Vietnamese to employ lighterage for offloading deep draft shipping which would be forced to anchor to seaward of the minefields.

4. Three options are specified in the Mining Plan, viz, A: Three CVA's; B: Two CVA's; and C: One CVA. Option A, using 154 mines/605 destructors, provides the most complete and effective mining of the Haiphong Complex and accomplishes the mission in one launch (except during brief period when no large CVA is available). Option A has disadvantage of longer reaction time because one of the three CVA's involved may be in port when the plan is initiated. (See Tab B for Reaction). Options B and C, using 98 mines and 400-600 destructors, provide effective mining of the deep water channels with much quicker response time. Disadvantages inherent in B and C are less dense minefields and elimination of certain shallow water destructor fields.

5. Arming delays of 72 hours are set on all mines to allow time for departure of third nation shipping.

6. The use of mines is not an offensive act since no weapons are specifically directed against any target. Any damage which occurred to either North Vietnam or third country shipping would be self inflicted resulting from their decision to penetrate waters that have been openly declared unsafe. There is no coercion on the part of U.S.

7. Plans provide for follow-on launches, when directed, to lay destructor fields. These are designed to disrupt lighterage if reconnaissance reveals that North Vietnam is offloading substantial amounts of cargo from ships at anchor. Destructors will not be delivered earlier than 48 hours after initial minefields are laid. (24 hours is maximum delay which can be set on destructors).
8. SAR (Search and Rescue) ships and PIRAZ (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone) ships will be positioned to the north to provide necessary support. BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrol) and TARCAP (Target Combat Air Patrol) will also be provided.
9. Tab A describes North Vietnamese Air Order of Battle which could be encountered. Considering the low level profile of the mission (approximately 300') there is little or no danger from either MIG aircraft or SA-2 emplacements. In most cases, minefields selected are outside the range of AAA, although some exits from target area will approach AAA defenses. Based on planned aircraft tracks and known locations of North Vietnamese air defenses, expected aircraft loss rate will be approximately 3 percent (conservative estimate).
10. Provisions are included in the plan for follow up reconnaissance to check on effectiveness of fields and reaction of the North Vietnamese. Reseeding operations will be executed as necessary to maintain the integrity of the various minefields.
11. For diversionary purposes, several weeks prior to execution, PIRAZ and SAR forces will be relocated to positions in the Tonkin Gulf which they will occupy during the actual mission. After about 12 hours on station they will return to current operating areas. This relocation will be repeated at random intervals (about every 10 days) to inure North Vietnamese defenses and entice them to lower their guard when mission is actually carried out.
12. Detailed rules of engagement are listed in Tab D. Flak suppression will be required against those AAA sites of greatest threat to own forces. Talos missiles are authorized over land against hostile MIG aircraft which threaten U.S. forces.
13. Possible reactions by USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam have been analyzed and appear in Tab E. An interesting conclusion of this analysis is that much of the uneasiness about Vietnam throughout the world has subsided and that it is likely that the mining of the Haiphong Complex would generally be interpreted as a show of determination, whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness.

14. Third nation shipping would have three options: Not to enter, enter with risk, or anchor outside. Many studies show that sufficient barges, sampans, and junks are available for lightering operations but this is a very difficult operation, requiring large numbers of people and excessive time. It is particularly difficult during the Northeast Monsoon season (September-May). Further, while moving from ship to shore, lighters are vulnerable to ship and aircraft attack without undue risk to third nation ships and without risk of killing civilians ashore. If decision is made to interdict lighters while they are moving from ship to shore, surface gunfire, as well as air, can be employed.

15. The rules of international law regarding mine-laying have been reexamined. The traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war. The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered laws of war, based on the "war or peace" dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore, the mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's and U.S. right of collective self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam. (See Tab F).

TABS

- A - Intelligence
- B - Execution Timing
- C - Mining Plan Concept
- D - Rules of Engagement for Mining Plan
- E - World Reaction to Mining
- F - Legal Ramification of Mining

A

TAB A

INTELLIGENCE

HAIPHONG

1. General Situation:

a. Air Threat: There are eight serviceable jet airbases in North Vietnam with an estimated 94 jet fighters of the MIG 15, 17, 19 and 21 variety. Strip alert is stood at five of the eight bases. The NVN GCI coverage of NVN and the Gulf of Tonkin is excellent but the NVN Air Force has only a limited all weather/night capability.

b. SAM Threat: There are three known active SAM sites which could take under fire aircraft over water conducting operations in the proposed minefield area. SA-2 operational effectiveness below 1000' is limited due to ground return.

c. AAA Threat: There is limited threat from NVN gun AAA over the minefield. There is known light AAA (effective range 4 NM) on Ile de Norway and the heavy AAA in the vicinity of Cat Bi/Kien An airfields and Hon Gai has an effective range of 7 NM to 25,000 feet.

d. NVN Naval Threat: (Haiphong Area)

Motor Gunboat (PGM)	11
Motor Torpedo Boat (PT)	9
Subchaser (SC)	2
Hydrofoil Motor Torpedo Boat (PTH)	1

(1) The PGM is capable of 43 knots for 1 hour. At 20 knots, range is 655 NM. Armament consists of 2 - ~~37MM~~ single mounts and 2 - 20 MM single mounts. It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD.

(2) The PT boat is capable of 50 knots for 350 NM. At 30 knots for 410 NM. Armament consists of 4 - 12.7 MM guns, 2 - 18" torpedoes, and 4 depth charges. It has surface search radar SKIN HEAD.

(3) The PTH is estimated capable of speeds in excess of 40 knots. Armament is 2 - 21" torpedoes and two twin 12.7 MM gun mounts. It has the POT HEAD surface search radar.

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2. Enemy Forces.

a. North Vietnam.

(1) Naval Forces: The North Vietnamese Navy was designed to be a coastal defense force, but has proved itself incapable of performing the task. Its P-4 Class PT's pose the only threat to large surface craft, but NVN tactics and torpedo readiness render this threat almost negligible. The Navy's SO-1 SC have ASW ordnance, but crews have not been trained to use it. The patrol craft (Swatow Class PGM and Shanghai Class PTF) provide 37 MM mobile platforms to supplement shore defenses, but have no significant anti-ship capability.

(2) Air Force: The North Vietnamese Air Force has grown considerably since the beginning of the Vietnam hostilities. The NVNAF combat inventory presently includes about 94 fighters and 4 IL-28 bombers located in North Vietnam.

3. Enemy Capabilities.

a. North Vietnam is capable of:

(1) Attacking with light jet bombers and jet fighters/ bombers opposing naval forces operating in the Gulf of Tonkin or the northwestern area of the South China Sea.

(2) Conducting limited harassment of opposing naval units operating in the coastal waters.

(3) Conducting limited defensive minelaying operations in coastal waters.

4. NVN Maritime Activity.

a. The Haiphong port complex handles some 90 percent of North Vietnamese seaborne imports. The war has caused North Vietnam's need for imports, particularly foodstuffs, petroleum, machinery, construction materials, trucks, earth moving equipment, and generators, to grow. The principal contribution of the North Vietnamese economy to the war has been as a manpower source and the maintenance of a logistics system capable of moving men and imported war material to the combat zones.

b. The bulk of military equipment used by the enemy in both North and South Vietnam continues to be imported from Communist countries. The value of such aid in 1968 is estimated at \$400 million, down from about \$600 million in 1967. The decline in military imports in 1968 probably reflects reduced needs for air defense weapons, particularly ammunition and surface-to-air

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missiles, since the U.S. bombing cutbacks of 31 March and 31 October 1968. There is evidence that large quantities of arms and ammunition have entered North Vietnam by rail from Communist China. Although there is no specific proof that pinpoints the import of arms into North Vietnam via the sea, this is still a strong possibility. It could be coming by sea and never be detected. Regardless of the fact that it cannot be determined what percentage of arms are coming from which nation and by which route, a reduction in food, petroleum, machinery, construction materials, trucks, and other war-supporting items will reduce the war-making potential of North Vietnam and have a direct effect on its ability to support the war in the South.

c. Haiphong continues to be important as the port through which the North Vietnamese economy is propped-up by its communist allies while its manpower is being drained off to the war in the south.

d. During 1968 seaborne imports to North Vietnam rose to a new high of 1,960,000 tons, 39 percent above the volume in 1967 and the largest increase recorded for any year. Imports from Free World countries remained at the same low level as 1967 (accounting for only 2 percent of the total), thus imports from communist countries provided the total of the increase.

e. More than half of North Vietnam's nearly two million tons of imports during 1968 comprised of food (790,000 tons) and petroleum (385,000 tons). The USSR supplied 77 percent of the petroleum (some 90 percent of which was motor gasoline and diesel oil). Communist China supplied 18 percent. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo (construction equipment, industrial machinery, trucks and motor vehicles, chemicals, cement, metal products and waterborne logistics craft) increased in 1968 for the fourth consecutive year and totaled 605,000 tons.

f. Imports of general and miscellaneous cargo increased from all parts of the communist world except Communist China, which showed an 11 percent decrease. Imports of this category from China showed a particularly steep decline in the second half of 1968. Motor vehicle imports from China, for example, dropped off from 6,000 tons in the first half of the year to 1,000 tons in the second half.

Tables 1 and 2 provide ship arrivals, by Flag, to North Vietnam since 1964.

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Table 1

North Vietnam:
Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, by Flag
1964-68

<u>Flag</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
<i>Total</i>	580	530	379	386	500
Communist countries	178	274	305	308	351
USSR	48	79	122	181	216
Eastern Europe	58	50	44	29	31
Albania	--	1	2	1	1
Bulgaria	2	5	9	4	4
Czechoslovakia	7	4	--	--	--
East Germany	1	--	--	--	--
Poland	48	40	33	24	26
Communist China	72	144	138	97	98
Cuba	--	1	1	1	6
Free World	402	256	74	78	149
Cyprus	--	3	12	5	13
Denmark	1	--	--	--	--
Finland	1	--	--	--	--
France	1	2	--	--	--
Greece	35	28	7	--	--
Indonesia	1	--	--	--	--
Italy	11	1	1	2	1
Japan	74	37	--	--	1
Kuwait	--	--	--	--	1
Lebanon	20	9	--	1	2
Liberia	7	3	--	--	--
Malta	--	2	4	3	1
Netherlands	8	5	--	--	--
Norway	43	29	--	--	--
Panama	12	1	--	--	--
Singapore	--	--	--	--	6
Somalia	--	--	--	--	9
Sweden	3	--	--	--	--
United Kingdom	177	136	50	67	114
West Germany	8	--	--	--	--
Illegal flag	--	--	--	--	1

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[p 8 of 41]

TABLE 2

BLOC SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM - 1969


<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SOVIET</u>		<u>POLISH</u>		<u>BULGARIAN</u>	
	<u>NO.</u>	<u>GRT. DWT.</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>GRT. DWT.</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>GRT. DWT.</u>
JAN	24	102,343 130,885	2	15,771 22,999	-	--
FEB	19	90,869 114,780	4	27,178 39,835	1	7,962 11,600
MAR	17	68,268 85,253	1	8,231 10,580	-	--
APR	21	113,695 140,591	2	13,564 20,359	-	--
MAY	21	97,656 122,841	1	6,904 10,086	2	6,303 6,496
JUN	15	65,373 84,879	1	9,267 12,407	1	5,920 9,200

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>E. GERMAN</u>		<u>CUBAN</u>		<u>CHICOM</u>	
	<u>NO.</u>	<u>GRT. DWT.</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>GRT. DWT.</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>GRT. DWT.</u>
JAN	-	--	-	--	8	31,012 44,260
FEB	-	--	-	--	8	39,584 57,610
MAR	1	8,810 10,130	-	--	15	59,341 85,650
APR	1	8,002 10,300	1	9,390 12,686	7	30,770 48,130
MAY	1	8,003 10,300	1	9,732 12,686	4	14,592 22,560
JUN	2	17,658 23,100	-	--	7	28,928 42,360

<u>TOTAL NO.</u>	<u>JAN 34</u>	<u>FEB 32</u>	<u>MAR 34</u>	<u>APR 32</u>	<u>MAY 30</u>	<u>JUN 26</u>
<u>GRT.</u>	149,126	165,593	144,650	175,420	143,550	127,136
<u>DWT.</u>	198,144	223,825	191,613	232,066	181,050	171,946

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
NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorage, and Shipping Channels



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NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR SITUATION AS OF 10 JULY 1969

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>8 IL-28/BEAGLE _____ 4 YUNNANI, 4 PHUC YEN
LIGHT JET BOMBER</p> <p>78 MIG-21/FISHBED _____ 33 YUNNANI, 39 PHUC YFN
JET FIGHTER</p> <p>122 MIG-15/17/FAGOT/FRESCO _____ 59 YUNNANI, 8 KIEN AN, 24 LIUCHOU,
JET FIGHTER</p> <p>40 MIG-19/FARMER _____ 10 KEP, 30 YUNNANI
JET FIGHTER</p> <p>6 UMIG-15/MIDGET _____ 1 YUNNANI, 3 KEP, 1 KIEN AN, 1 HOA LAC
JET TRAINER</p> <p>37 IL-14/LI-2/CRATE/CAB _____ HANOI/HAIPHONG/YUNNANI/
TRANSPORT</p> | <p>20 MI-1/4/HARE/HOUND _____ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
HELICOPTER</p> <p>4 MI-6/HOOK _____ VARIOUS AIRFIELDS PRIMARILY HOA LAC
HELICOPTER</p> <p>29 PROP TRAINER _____ YUNNANI</p> <p>3 AN-24/COKE _____ 1 YUNNANI, 2 GIA LAM
TRANSPORT</p> <p>1 IL-18/COOT _____ GIA LAM
TRANSPORT</p> <p>22 AN-2/COLT _____ HAIPHONG/LANG SON/HANOI
LIGHT TRANSPORT</p> |
|---|--|




⊕ SERVICEABLE JET
 ● SERVICEABLE LIGHT A/C
 ☆ UNSERVICEABLE
 ★ UNDER CONSTRUCTION

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11 JUL 69




DIA/AFSSIC

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
NORTH VIETNAM EW/GCI COVERAGE



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 18 JULY 1969



TAB B

EXECUTION TIMING

1. Response time will vary as a result of several factors: Location of CVA's, currently assigned mission of CVA's, location and readiness of mines, and configuration of aircraft. The response times in this plan range from 12 hours for options B and C to 86 hours for option A (when one CVA is in most distant port). Response for option A could be reduced to 18 hours provided an alerting message returned the third CVA to Tonkin Gulf.

2. Definition of Execution Terms:

M-Hour: DTG of message ordering mining plan implemented. (A subsequent order is required for launch of mining aircraft unless L-Hour is specified in this message).

L-Hour: Time launch of mining aircraft commences as ordered by appropriate authority. L-Hour may be pre-designated when M-Hour is signalled or may be ordered separately.

D-Hour: Time when all fields are in place for option selected.


A-Hour: Time when all fields are activated.

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3. Timing of pertinent events (M-Hour to L-Hour).

	OPTION A (assuming 1 CVA in port)	OPTION B	OPTION C
(1) All designated Forces in Tonkin Gulf	M +68 hrs (CVA from most distant port)	M +0	M +0
(2) All mines aboard CVA's in readiness condition "C"	M +74	M +0	M +0
*(3) All Surface Forces in launch position	M +77	M +3	M +3
* (4) All mines readied to Condition "A"	M +82	M +8	M +8
*(5) All mines loaded & aircraft ready for launch	M +86	M +12	M +12

* Events (3), (4) and (5) are proceeding concurrently.



4. Time available to higher authority to cancel the mining operation after it is ordered implemented:

a. Unlimited if message implementing mining plan did not specify an L-Hour and if no L-Hour has been signalled subsequently.

b. After L-Hour has been specified or signalled, the mining operation can be cancelled provided the cancellation order is received and understood aboard the CVA's by L +15 minutes.

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TAB C

MINE PLAN CONCEPT

1. Concept. When directed TF 77 will conduct offensive CVA aerial mining operations in the Haiphong Port Complex in order to interdict the maritime logistic support of North Vietnam. Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha comprise the complex to be mined and were selected because over 90 percent of the maritime support for North Vietnam enters throughout these ports.

a. The plan provides three mining options, i.e. ALFA (3 CVA's), BRAVO (2 CVA's), and CHARLIE (1 CVA). TF 77 can commence mining operations within 12 to 86 hours after receipt of an execute directive, dependent on which option is selected.

b. In each option the mine fields are armed 72 hours after planting and this fact will be publicly announced. This allows a safe passage period for shipping that desires to depart the area.

2. Mine Fields (See Chart - Appendix 7):

a. Haiphong - The port of Haiphong is mined with five fields. Two fields (A and B) close the main channel with sea mines. Fields 1 and 2 contain mines and destructors and are planted adjacent to the main channel. Field 3 is a destructor field which can be laid over field B in order to seal the main channel to lighterage craft as well as ocean shipping.

NOTE: Sea mine fields are lettered, destructor fields are numbered. Sea mines arm in 72 hours, destructors in 24 hours. No destructors are planted in main channels on the first launch for any option in order to ensure a safe departure channel during the grace period.

b. Hon Gai - Fields C, D and E are sea mine fields designed to block the ocean vessel principal access route. Destructor fields 4 and 5 will block the most used lighterage and anchorage areas serving Hon Gai.

c. Cam Pha - Fields F, G, H and I are sea mine fields designed to prevent access to Cam Pha 72 hours after planting. Destructor field 6 will interdict lighterage operations in the area.

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d. Mine/Destructor allocations - The following quantities of sea mines listed are required for fields A through I for options indicated:

	<u>MINE TYPES</u>			
	<u>MK 50-0</u> 500# ACOUSTIC	<u>MK 52-2</u> 1000# MAG IND	<u>MK 52-3</u> 1000# PRES MAG	<u>MK 55-2</u> 2000# MAG IND
A	10	67	12	25
B	10	42	12	14
C	10	42	12	14

Destructor fields 1 through 6 require the following assets:

	<u>DESTRUCTOR/MINE TYPES</u>		
	<u>DST 36</u> 500# MAG	<u>DST 40</u> 1000# MAG	<u>MK 50-0</u> 500# ACOUSTIC
A1/2*	564	40	30
B1	564	48	20
B2	402	40	20
C	358	36	20

*See paragraph 3a for further definition of options.

All mines/destructors required for the above options are currently aboard 7th Fleet CVA's or at the Naval Magazine, Subic Bay.

3. Forces:

a. Carrier requirements:

Option: A1 - 1 large CVA and 2 small CVA's
A2 - 3 small CVA's
B1 - 1 large CVA and 1 small CVA
B2 - 2 small CVA's
C - 1 large CVA

b. Other ships - The operation includes requirements for the following additional ships:

North SAR - 2 DD/DLG - North Search and Rescue,
Strike Monitor

PIRAZ - 1 CAG (TALOS) and 1 DD/DDG - Strike and Cap
Control

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c. Supporting Aircraft - Support aircraft required include:

Bar Cap/Tar Cap - To protect mining force and carrier force.
F4/F8

Tankers - Refuel fighters or mining aircraft as required.
EKA3/KA4/KA6

ECM/AEW - To provide radar following and to counter missiles and fire control radars.
EA6/E2A/E1B

IRON HAND/FLAK SUPPRESSORS - To provide mining force protection.
A4/A7/A6/F4

RECONNAISSANCE - To provide Post-Strike results/NVN reaction.
RA5C/RF8

4. Operations:

a. Plan Description - This is a three option plan providing a choice of 3, 2, or 1 carriers to mine the Haiphong Complex. Principal advantages/disadvantages of each option are presented in the following:

Option A

Advantages: A three carrier force provides the maximum flexibility in strike size and composition. In this concept, total mine requirements are not stored on the CVA's. Some of the required mines are held aboard an ammunition ship in the Tonkin Gulf thus allowing CVA's normal ordnance stowage and operations. Provides the most complete and effective mining of Haiphong Complex.

Disadvantages: Requires mine transfer at sea with attendant delay in response to execute order. Current posture requires two CVA's at Yankee Station; Third CVA late arrival could delay execute up to 86 hours. Requires dedication of two AE's to partial mine load-out thus restricting conventional ordnance stowage and AE deployment.

Option B and C

Advantages: Mines are stored aboard CVA's thus speeding response time. Deep water fields are still effectively mined.

Disadvantages: Mines take up come CVA ordnance storage space - requiring increased replenishment or slight lessening of the normal Vietnam in country support capability.

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b. Aircraft Sortie Requirements - See Appendices I, II, III, IV and V to TAB C. It will be noted that "second launch" or "follow-on" sorties are included. These sorties would provide destructor fields to interdict lighterage craft but will not be launched until directed.

c. Reconnaissance and Replenishment:

(1) Reconnaissance flights/operations will be conducted subsequent to the mine laying operation to determine NVN/Foreign shipping reaction/response to the mining effort as well as results.

(2) In order to extend the maximum effectiveness of the fields as planted, replenishment operations should commence in about 4 months for sea mines and 2 months for destructors. Field attrition resulting from NVN sweeping or mine detonation may require earlier replenishment, but no replenishment will take place until directed.

5. Mine Logistics:

a. For option A, to ensure mine availability and preparedness, two AE's will be loaded with identical inventories of 101 mines; and one AE will always be at Yankee Station.

b. For other options carriers will have aboard a pre-assigned mine loadout and the assisting Mobile Mine Assembly Teams (MOMAT).

c. Subic Bay will support the programmed 4 month mine replenishment requirement and is capable of providing additional mine assets. COMSERVPAC/COMINEPAC will ensure that Subic mine inventories remain filled.

6. Aircraft Losses. Estimated maximum losses would be 3.2%, or for example, in option A2 with 3 launches and 15 support aircraft per launch included, the loss estimate is 6. Minimum loss estimate is 3 aircraft on option C.

7. Execution Diversion/Deception. If an option is approved for planning, TF 77 carriers/support vessels will be loaded to support the option selected. Additionally, CTF 77 will randomly move SAR/PIRAZ ships into the planned northern position in order to lessen NVN initial reaction to support ship positioning when the plan is executed. Normal surface escort and air cover will be provided during these incursions.

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TAB C

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APPENDICES

- I - Option A1 Sortie Requirements
- II - Option A2
- III - Option B1
- IV - Option B2
- V - Option C
- VI - Minefield Coordinates
- VII - Chart

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TAB C

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APPENDIX I TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION ALFA ONE

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN **</u>
3 A6	A*	6 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3	A1-A6 A7-A12
4 A6	B*	20 MK 50-0	B1-B20
1 A7	C	4 MK 55-2	C-C4
5 A7	D	7 MK 55-2 14 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3	D21-D27 D1-D14 D15-D20
2 A7	E	12 MK 52-2	E1-E12
2 A7	F	12 MK 52-2	F1-F12
4 A7	G	12 MK 52-2 9 MK 55-2	G1-G12 G13-G21
1 A7	H	5 MK 55-2	H1-H5
2 A7	I	11 MK 52-2	I1-I11
4 A6 (NOTE 1)	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
2 A6 (NOTE 1)	6	24 MK 40 (DST)	N/A
2 A7 (NOTE 1)	6	16 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
18 A4/7	1	180 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
6 A4/	1	30 MK 50-0	T1-T30

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

8 A4/7	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
10 A4/7	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4 AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

* THESE FIELDS ARE ASSIGNED TO A6 AIRCRAFT ON EACH OPTION OF PLANS A, B AND C IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A NIGHT ALL WEATHER CAPABILITY OF MINING THE HAIPHONG DEEP WATER CHANNEL IF DIRECTED.

** MINE CASE NUMBER

APPENDIX II TO TAB C
MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION ALFA TWO

27C CVA (CTG 77.X)

FIRST LAUNCH

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
13 A4/7	G	12 MK 52-2 9 MK 55-2	G1-G12 G13-G21
5 A4/7	H	5 MK 55-2	H1-H5
4 A4/7	I	11 MK 52-2	I1-I11

SECOND LAUNCH

8 A4/7	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
--------	---	----------------	-----

FOLLOW-ON

14 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
------------------	---	-----------------	-----

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

FIRST LAUNCH

4 A4/7	A	6 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3	A1-A6 A7-A12
4 A4/7	B	20 MK 50-0	B1-B20
16 A4/7	1	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
	1	30 MK 50-0	T1-T30

SECOND LAUNCH

8 A4/7	1	80 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
--------	---	----------------	-----

FOLLOW-ON

8 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
-----------------	---	----------------	-----

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

FIRST LAUNCH

4 A4/7	C	4 MK 55-0	C1-C44
14 A4/7	D	14 MK 52-2 6 MK 52-3 7 MK 55-2	D1-D14 D15-D20 D21-D27

[P23141]

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
4 A4/7	E	12 MK 52-2	E1-E12
4 A4/7	F	12 MK 52-2	F1-F12

SECOND LAUNCH

10 A4/7	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
---------	---	-----------------	-----

FOLLOW-ON

10 A4/7 (NOTE 1)	6	40 MK 40 (DST)	N/A
------------------	---	----------------	-----

NOTE: (1) FIELDS 3, 4, AND 6 WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

[P240741]

APPENDIX III TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION BRAVO ONE

INITIAL LAUNCH

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
1 A6/1A7	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
3 A6	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
1 A7	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
3 A7/1A6	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
		4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
1 A7	E	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
1 A7	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
2 A7	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
1 A7	H	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
1 A7	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A6	2	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
18 A4	1	180 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A4	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
4 A6	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
14 A7	4	140 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A6	6	48 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
10 A4	5	100 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

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APPENDIX IV TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION BRAVO TWO

INITIAL LAUNCH

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
2 A4	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
1 A4		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
10 A4	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
		4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
2 A4	E	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
3 A4	H	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
5 A4	2	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

4 A4	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
4 A4	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
2 A4	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
5 A4	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
2 A4	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A4	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20
3 A4	1	30 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

OPTION BRAVO TWO

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

27C CVA (CTG 77.Y)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
9 A4	1	90 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
5 A4	5	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
10 A4	6	40 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

27C CVA (CTG 77.Z)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
7 A4	3	70 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
11 A4	4	110 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

APPENDIX V TO TAB C

MINEFIELD ASSIGNMENTS

OPTION CHARLIE

INITIAL LAUNCH

LARGE DECK CVA (CTG 77.X)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
1 A7/1A6	A	5 MK 52-2	A1-A5
		6 MK 52-3	A6-A11
3 A6	B	10 MK 50-0	B1-B10
		3 MK 52-2	B11-B13
1 A7	C	4 MK 55-2	C1-C4
3 A7/1A6	D	12 MK 52-2	D1-D12
		6 MK 52-3	D13-D18
		4 MK 55-2	D19-D22
1 A7	E	6 MK 52-2	E1-E6
1 A7	F	6 MK 52-2	F1-F6
2 A7	G	6 MK 52-2	G1-G6
		3 MK 55-2	G7-G9
1 A7	H	3 MK 55-2	H1-H3
1 A7	I	4 MK 52-2	I1-I4
4 A6/7A7	1	20 MK 50-0	T1-T20
		70 MK 36 (DST)	N/A

OPTION CHARLIE

FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH (NOTE 1)

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>MINE/DST</u>	<u>MCN</u>
5 A7	1	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
5 A7	2	50 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
4 A6	3	72 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
2 A6/5A7	4	86 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
3 A7	5	30 MK 36 (DST)	N/A
3 A6	6	36 MK 40 (DST)	N/A

NOTE: (1) FOLLOW-ON FIELDS WILL BE LAID WHEN DIRECTED, BUT NO SOONER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO A-HOUR.

[0270741]

APPENDIX VI TO TAB C

MINING

1. Attrition minefields within 12 mile claimed territorial limits for the interdiction of ocean traffic in the Haiphong Deep Water Complex will consist of 9 minefields. A maximum of one mine/destructor field and 5 destructor fields are provided to interdict lighterage contingent upon which option is executed.

a. Minefield Coordinates: (Use H.O. Chart 3162, 5TH ED and H.O. Chart 3161, 7TH ED, REV 12/68).

- | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|------------|-------------|
| (1) Field "A" Coordinates | - | 20-47.5 N | 106-50.3 E |
| | | 20-47.5 N | 106-51.1 E |
| | | 20-45.8 N | 106-52.0 E |
| | | 20-45.8 N | 106-51.3 E |
| (2) Field "B" Coordinates | - | 20-45.2 N | 106-52.3 E |
| | | 20-42.6 N | 106-57.3 E |
| | | 20-42.3 N | 106-56.4 E |
| | | 20-44.85 N | 106-51.5 E |
| (3) Field "C" Coordinates | - | 20-47.6 N | 107-06.85 E |
| | | 20-47.6 N | 107-07.1 E |
| | | 20-46.9 N | 107-07.2 E |
| | | 20-46.9 N | 107-06.85 E |
| (4) Field "D" Coordinates | - | 20-48.05 N | 107-08.6 E |
| | | 20-48.5 N | 107-10.1 E |
| | | 20-47.5 N | 107-10.5 E |
| | | 20-47.1 N | 107-08.8 E |
| (5) Field "E" Coordinates | - | 20-50.15 N | 107-11.4 E |
| | | 20-50.15 N | 107-12.5 E |
| | | 20-49.7 N | 107-12.6 E |
| | | 20-49.7 N | 107-11.5 E |
| (6) Field "F" Coordinates | - | 20-50.0 N | 107-13.8 E |
| | | 20-50.0 N | 107-14.9 E |
| | | 20-49.5 N | 107-15.0 E |
| | | 20-49.5 N | 107-13.9 E |
| (7) Field "G" Coordinates | - | 20-55.7 N | 107-16.8 E |
| | | 20-55.05 N | 107-18.0 E |
| | | 20-54.2 N | 107-17.25 E |
| | | 20-53.4 N | 107-17.2 E |
| | | 20-53.4 N | 107-15.2 E |
| | | 20-53.0 N | 107-16.0 E |
| (8) Field "H" Coordinates | - | 20-53.2 N | 107-19.65 E |
| | | 20-53.2 N | 107-19.9 E |
| | | 20-52.5 N | 107-19.9 E |
| | | 20-52.5 N | 107-19.65 E |

[# 2808417]

(9) Field "I" Coordinates -	21-05.6 N	107-30.6 E
	21-05.3 N	107-31.1 E
	21-03.5 N	107-29.3 E
	21-04.9 N	107-28.9 E

b. Destructor Field Coordinates:

(1) Field "1" Coordinates -	20-42.1 N	106-47.8 E
	20-43.8 N	106-52.3 E
	20-41.7 N	106-56.0 E
	20-39.8 N	106-49.1 E

(2) Field "2" Coordinates -	20-43.8 N	106-52.3 E
	20-44.7 N	106-54.8 E
	20-42.5 N	106-58.7 E
	20-41.7 N	106-56.0 E

(3) Field "3" Coordinates -	20-44.7 N	106-54.8 E
	20-45.8 N	106-57.7 E
	20-43.0 N	107-00.6 E
	20-42.5 N	106-58.7 E

(4) Field "4" Coordinates -	20-53.8 N	107-01.7 E
	20-53.4 N	107-06.8 E
	20-52.3 N	107-06.9 E
	20-53.0 N	107-01.5 E

(5) Field "5" Coordinates -	20-53.4 N	107-06.8 E
	20-55.2 N	107-09.5 E
	20-55.0 N	107-10.8 E
	20-52.3 N	107-06.9 E

(6) Field "6" Coordinates -	20-59.0 N	107-21.55 E
	20-58.7 N	107-22.6 E
	20-57.1 N	107-20.0 E
	20-57.4 N	107-19.2 E

c. Mine Allocations: Option A

(1) <u>MINEFIELDS</u>	<u>MK 50</u>	<u>MK 52-2</u>	<u>MK 52-3</u>	<u>MK 55-2</u>
A	-	6	6	-
B	20	-	-	-
C	-	-	-	4
D	-	14	6	7
E	-	12	-	-
F	-	12	-	-
G	-	12	-	9
H	-	-	-	5
I	-	11	-	-
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>12</u>
				<u>25</u>

(2) <u>DESTRUCTOR FIELDS</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
1 (MIXED FIELD)	180	-	30

[#291141]

<u>DESTRUCTOR FIELDS</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
2	72	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	140	-	-
5	100	-	-
6	-	40	-
TOTAL	<u>564</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>30</u>

Mine Allocations: Option BRAVO

(1) <u>MINEFIELDS</u>	<u>MK 50</u>	<u>MK 52-2</u>	<u>MK 52-3</u>	<u>MK 55-2</u>
A	10	5	6	
B		3		
C				4
D		12	6	4
E		6		
F		6		
G		6		3
H				3
I		4		
TOTAL	<u>10</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>14</u>

(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 1

<u>FIELD #</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
1 (MIXED FIELD)	180	-	20
2	72	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	140	-	-
5	100	-	-
6	-	48	-
TOTAL	<u>564</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>20</u>

(3) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS OPTION BRAVO 2

<u>FIELD #</u>	<u>DST 36</u>	<u>DST 40</u>	<u>MINE MK 50-0</u>
1 (MIXED FIELD)	120	-	20
2	50	-	-
3	72	-	-
4	110	-	-
5	50	-	-
6	-	40	-
TOTAL	<u>402</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>20</u>

[P307417]

Mine Allocations: Option CHARLIE

(1) MINEFIELDS	MK 50-0	MK 52-2	MK 52-3	MK 55-2
A		5	6	
B	10	3		
C		12		4
D		6	6	4
E		6		
F		6		
G		6		3
H				3
I		4		
TOTAL	10	42	12	14

(2) DESTRUCTOR FIELDS	DST 36	DST 40	MINE MK 50-0
1 (MIXED FIELD)	120	-	20
2	50	-	20
3	72	-	-
4	86	-	-
5	30	-	-
6	-	36	-
TOTAL	358	36	40

d. Mine Descriptions:

- Mine MK 50-0: 500 LB acoustic influence mine
- Mine MK 52-2: 1000 LB magnetic induction mine
- Mine MK 52-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine
- Mine MK 55-2: 2000 LB magnetic induction mine
- DST 36: 500 LB magnetic influence mine
- DST 40: 1000 LB magnetic influence mine
- Mine MK 36-3: 1000 LB pressure magnetic mine

e. Mine Stocks:

<u>NAVMAG SUBIC</u>	<u>MINES</u>
Mine MK 50	148
Mine MK 52-2	330
*Mine MK 52-3	40 (enroute)
Mine MK 55-2	250
*Mine MK 36-3	66

* Mine MK 36-3 acceptable substitute for Mine MK 52-3.

f. Specific Mining Notes:

(1) Mine requirements listed under options B and C are considered the minimum acceptable number in the minefields.

(2) When CTF 77 assigns minefield responsibility by CTG, embarked MOMATS will ensure the mines are labeled with the proper mine case numbers (MCN).

(3) Field BRAVO. Delivery runs should be made to place mines within the buoyed ship channel.

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(4) Fields DELTA and GOLF. Mines MK 55-2 should be planted in the deep sections of the minefield (approximately 9 fathoms or deeper).


g. Replacement Mines. CVA/AE maintain 10 percent in excess of required mines for spares. Replacement mines will have operational adjustments preset. Spare mines may be substituted without further adjustment for the same MK Mod mine in any field. Spare Mine MK 52-2 may substitute for Mine MK 52-3 in addition to Mine MK 52-2.

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SENSITIVE



SEE APPENDIX VI TAB C FOR MINEFIELD COORDINATES

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

APPENDIX VII

~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB D

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

MINING HAIPHONG PORT COMPLEX

1. The following rules of engagement are effective for US forces operating in support of the mining plan.

2. Definitions:

a. **Territorial seas:** A belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the states claiming twelve-mile territorial seas, twelve miles shall be observed for these rules as if it were the width of their territorial seas. The following distance is presumed to be claimed as a territorial sea:

(1) North Vietnam - 12 miles (Presumed)

b. **Internal waters:** Waters to landward of the territorial sea.

c. **Territorial air space:** Air space above the land territory, internal waters, and territorial seas of a sovereign country.

d. **Immediate pursuit:** Pursuit initiated in response to actions or attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined in these rules of engagement. The pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasible over territorial/internal air space/seas as prescribed herein.

e. **Hostile aircraft:** An aircraft identified as non-US and non-allied which is observed in the act of attacking or acting in a manner which indicates with reasonable certainty an intent to attack US/friendly forces.

f. **Hostile vessel (surface or subsurface)**

(1) A vessel which is attacking or acting in a manner which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to attack US/friendly forces.

3. General Rules:

a. US forces executing this plan are authorized to attack and destroy any hostile vessel or aircraft as herein defined.

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b. Immediate pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible pursuant to the above, subject to the following conditions and limitations:

(1) In event US forces are attacked by hostile forces in North Vietnam, or over international waters, US forces may conduct immediate pursuit over internal waters or into territorial seas or air space of North Vietnam.

(2) No pursuit is authorized into Communist Chinese territorial seas or air space.

(3) US forces, which under the limitations of these rules enter unfriendly territorial land, sea, or air spaces in immediate pursuit, are not authorized to attack other unfriendly forces or installations encountered, unless attacked first by them, then only to the extent necessary for self-defense.

(4) Declaration of aircraft or vessels as hostile will be tempered with judgment and discretion. Cases can occur wherein the destruction of communist bloc forces would be contrary to US and allied interests. All available information and intelligence shall be considered in determining action to be taken in such cases.

4. Use of surface to air missiles against hostile aircraft.

Talos, Terrier, and Tartar equipped ships will attack and destroy aircraft as feasible which are positively identified as hostile in accordance with these rules of engagement:

a. Before firing, all indications must eliminate any possibility of firing on friendly aircraft, and must indicate the probable presence of a hostile aircraft. The above requirements may be satisfied by verifying the identity of aircraft through special and other intelligence sources or any other means available.

b. Authority is granted to fire Talos, Tartar or Terrier missiles over the North Vietnam land mass. Missiles will not be fired over territory of Communist China.

c. Missiles will be command destructed five seconds after passing the closest point of approach if intercept is not accomplished.

5. Use of ALQ-91 (SEE SAW) is authorized in accordance with CINCPACFLT 190001Z SEP 68.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
TAB D

[435941]

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6. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
TAB D

[A36941]

Effects of NVN Quarantine
- CIA Assessment -

W 06-04/3

YS-107

[89/1/3] ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
S-III



Memorandum For:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Per your request, we have redone the Quarantine Memorandum and carefully reviewed all the evidence, analysis and judgments contained therein. Two copies of our revised response to your initial request for this study are appended hereto. Knowledge of this memorandum's existence has been rigidly restricted to a very small circle, but those officers who worked on it embody, collectively, our best talent and expertise on the topics covered in this study. Unless you direct otherwise, we will make no distribution whatsoever of this memorandum apart from the two copies being forwarded to you by this transmittal slip.


A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dick".

Richard Helms
DIRECTOR

17 July 1969
Attachment
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~


NLN 06-04 /3

Secret



*The Effects of the Imposition
of a Quarantine on North Vietnam*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 06-04/3 per sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)] per ltr 3/30/2010
By JMR NARA, Date 5/18/2010
[p. 1 of 56]




SANITIZED
Per sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]

Secret

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16 July 1969





SANITIZED

PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]

PER LTR. 3/30/2010

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SANITIZED

PER SEC. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]

Per ltr. 3/30/2010

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Effects of the Imposition of a Quarantine on North Vietnam

CONTENTS

- I. Scope of Our Analysis, Working Assumptions and General Considerations
- II. North Vietnam's Dependence on Imports
- III. North Vietnamese Reserves and Stockpiles
- IV. Logistical Alternatives to Seaborne Imports
- V. Possible North Vietnamese Countermeasures
- VI. The Potential Burden to China and Costs to North Vietnam
- VII. Probable Political Reactions
 - a. Communist Chinese
 - b. Soviet
 - c. North Vietnamese
 - d. South Vietnamese
 - e. Other East Asian Countries
 - f. Western European Reactions

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]

Per Ltr. 3/30/2010

I. SCOPE, WORKING ASSUMPTIONS, AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. This memorandum constitutes our reply to the request that we assess the probable effects of imposing a quarantine on North Vietnam. In the preparation of this memorandum, a "quarantine" was construed to mean closing the port of Haiphong by mining and/or blockade. In preparing this reply, we have made the working assumption that whatever the means employed, access to the port is denied to both ocean-going and coastal shipping. We have also made the working assumption that this quarantine is carried out without any effort to interdict the key land lines of communication connecting North Vietnam and Communist China, i.e., the roads, air routes and two major rail lines.

2. This memorandum analyzes the probable impact of such a quarantine on North Vietnam and the probable reactions to its imposition on the part of the North Vietnamese, the Chinese Communists, the Soviets, the South Vietnamese, other Asians, the British and other West Europeans. As indicated in the outline above, the analysis begins with an examination of North Vietnam's dependence on imports, its current reserves and its present stockpiles of goods not domestically manufactured. We then examine the logistical alternatives to seaborne imports open to North Vietnam and countermeasures it would be physically possible for Hanoi to initiate to offset the impact of a quarantine. Since the major logistical alternatives to seaborne imports require extensive Chinese Communist assistance and support, we analyze in some detail the potential burden to China and the potential economic costs a quarantine would impose on North Vietnam.

3. After examining what might be called the physical impact and consequences of the imposition of a quarantine, the memorandum attempts to assess the probable political reactions of the North Vietnamese, the Soviets, the Chinese Communists, the South Vietnamese, other Asians, and non-bloc Western Europeans.

4. Given the many complexities and interacting elements of the problem we were asked to address, it

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NLN 06-04/3

[p. 6 of 56]

SECRET

SANITIZED

Per Sec. 3.3(b)(1); 3.5(c) [50 USC 403(g)]
Per Htr. 3/30/2016

is hard to set forth any summary conclusions that do not have the ring of ex cathedra judgments. Our data and evidence make it quite clear that a closure of the port of Haiphong would disrupt North Vietnam's seaborne trade and force an extensive revamping of normal transport arrangements. The evidence available also demonstrates that the disruption to North Vietnam's import patterns would be severe. Nonetheless, as explained in detail in the body of this memorandum, the evidence also indicates that if the Chinese Communists provide the necessary cooperation and support--at levels well within China's present physical capabilities--North Vietnam could make the adjustments necessary to sustain its war-making potential within two or three months. The maintenance of necessary import levels without the current seaborne routes would be more costly than are present arrangements, but the evidence shows that the necessary added effort would, of itself, not be likely to become a major burden to Hanoi or its Communist allies.

5. As outlined in detail in section III below, North Vietnam's reserves of vital economic and military goods appear more than adequate to weather the necessary readjustment period. Enough transport equipment seems available so that by utilizing alternate railroad and water connections with Communist China, Hanoi has a capacity to handle import traffic levels almost three times greater than current requirements. In short--to compress a lot of detailed evidence and analysis into one summary sentence--the closing of Haiphong would not be likely to have a major impact on Hanoi's material capabilities to carry on the war unless China decided to deny its overland routes to supplies destined for North Vietnam, including supplies from Eastern Europe and the USSR.

6. The political reactions of the various parties that would be affected by, involved in or concerned with the imposition of a quarantine are even more complex and difficult to analyze than the quarantine's physical impact. To avoid the distortion inherent in conclusions divorced from their supporting evidence and analysis, we will not attempt to set forth summary judgments on these questions of probable reactions but, instead, refer the reader to the full discussion set forth in this memorandum's Section VII.

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II. North Vietnamese Dependence on Imports

7. The limited size of its modern economy and the fact that it has always been a food-deficit country have made North Vietnam highly dependent on imports. This dependence has increased greatly during the war because North Vietnam has had to rely almost completely on external sources for combat materiel and has had to divert large amounts of manpower to nonproductive, war-related activities.

Level of Imports

8. North Vietnamese imports during the 12 months ending in June 1969 totaled 2.2 million tons. Most of this traffic -- about 85 percent of total imports -- was brought in through the port of Haiphong. Although rail imports amounted to only a small share of the total, rail transport is of particular significance as the principal channel for the import of combat materiel.

9. Estimated seaborne imports for the period 1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969 are shown in the following tabulation:

<u>Goods</u>	<u>Thousand Tons</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Foodstuffs	890	47
Fertilizer	110	6
Petroleum	330	17
Timber	30	2
General and miscellaneous	530	28
<i>Total</i>	<i>1,890</i>	<i>100</i>
Daily average	5.2	

10. Estimates of rail imports by North Vietnam are much more tenuous than those for seaborne imports. On the basis of rather limited evidence, we estimate that rail imports for the period 1 July 1968 - 30 June 1969 were on the order of 300,000 tons, of which only about 50,000 tons were combat materiel. The information that is available indicates that rail imports,

particularly of military goods, have declined since April 1968. The decline is due in part to the reduced requirements for military aid after the US bombing program was restricted in March 1968 and finally halted in October. More recently we have also seen indications that some goods previously shipped from the USSR by rail are now being shipped by sea.

11. More than 97 percent of North Vietnam's imports are from Communist countries. The USSR provides the greater share -- 44 percent -- of these imports. The Soviets provide about one-third of North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs, almost all of its imports of petroleum, and about one-half of its imports of fertilizers. The USSR also provided about 40 percent of North Vietnam's imports of general cargoes such as construction materials, industrial machinery, metal products, and transportation equipment. Communist China accounts for almost 40 percent of North Vietnam's imports. China's trade with North Vietnam is dominated by foodstuffs which accounted for almost three-fourths of the volume of seaborne imports from China. China also provides substantial imports of industrial machinery, construction materials, and transport equipment. North Vietnamese economic imports from Free World countries are dominated by fertilizer imports -- mostly from Japan -- and by timber imports from Cambodia.

12. North Vietnamese seaborne imports have reached record totals because of sharp increases in imports of foodstuffs and petroleum. During the past 12 months, for example, imports of petroleum were about 2.5 times their 1965 level. Imports of foodstuffs show an even greater increase, being some seven times greater than they were in 1965.

Foodstuffs

13. North Vietnam's domestic output of rice has declined steadily from 3.0 million tons of polished rice in 1965 to 2.5 million tons in 1968. Output in 1969 should be somewhat higher, barring unforeseen circumstances, but a dramatic increase is not expected. Although an effort has been made to increase the production of subsidiary foodstuffs, it is doubtful that a significant increase was

achieved, because many of the same factors that adversely affected rice production would have affected subsidiary crops.

14. While domestic rice production has fallen since 1965 by about 15 percent, the North Vietnamese population has increased by about 5 percent. In addition, the war effort has required more and harder work -- thus requiring a greater intake of calories. To fill the widening gap, North Vietnam has been forced to increase imports of foodstuffs substantially. Imports of foodstuffs by sea increased from about 120,000 tons and 80,000 tons in 1965 and 1966, respectively, to about 460,000 tons in 1967 and to more than 890,000 tons for the year ending June 1969. Imported foodstuffs now supply one-fifth of the estimated total calories consumed by the North Vietnamese. With per capita food consumption at close to minimum levels, the continued accessibility to food imports is essential for the maintenance of the population's health and productive capacity.

Petroleum

15. Seaborne imports of petroleum during the past year totaled about 333,000 tons. Almost 85 percent of the petroleum imports originated in the USSR and 95 percent were delivered by sea. The high level of consumption of petroleum during the past year reflects the intensity of military activity and the greater use of trucks, construction equipment, and marine craft.

Military Imports

16. There is little hard evidence with which to quantify precisely the current level of North Vietnam's imports of military goods. Historically, however, there has been sufficient information -- when combined with aerial photography, data on ammunition expenditure rates, and changes in the enemy order of battle -- to permit estimates of the volume of military imports, and these estimates have proved to be compatible with other intelligence occasionally obtained from collateral sources. In addition, the intelligence community estimates that all of North Vietnam's imports of combat materiel and major items of military hardware are

delivered by rail rather than by sea. Large amounts of war-supporting materiel such as trucks and petroleum do, however, enter North Vietnam through the port of Haiphong.

17. Imports of combat materiel, ammunition, and missiles during the past twelve months have decreased from previous levels because of the reduced requirements for military goods needed for defense of North Vietnam against US bombing attacks.

18. By the end of 1968, adjustments to the cessation of the US bombing of North Vietnam had probably been completed, and imports of military equipment are now estimated to be at relatively constant levels, although well below the level of the first half of 1968. The high level of attacks flown by US aircraft in the Panhandle of North Vietnam between 1 April and 31 October and the continued attacks against Laos after the 1 November bombing halt indicate a relatively constant North Vietnamese requirement, so that imports of military goods such as ammunition have probably remained fairly stable during 1969. With the limited evidence on hand we estimate that in volume terms deliveries of military goods have probably leveled off at an annual rate of some 50,000 tons.

III. Reserves and Stockpiles

19. There is little direct intelligence to permit any precise quantification of North Vietnam's reserves of essential economic goods or its stockpiles of military goods. The information that is available, however, supports a general conclusion that with but few exceptions the supplies of economic and military goods are adequate to satisfy requirements for a period of at least several months.

Economic Goods

20. Analysis of open-storage areas at the port of Haiphong, the entry point for almost all economic goods, gives ample evidence of a large volume of stockpiled goods. At the time of the 31 March 1968 bombing pause, slightly more than 50 percent of the area near the commercial wharves at Haiphong was occupied by cargo. The bombing cutback facilitated the movement of cargoes from the wharf area as trucks and waterborne logistics craft could be used more intensively during daylight hours. At the time of the bombing halt, about 60 percent of the area was occupied by cargo. During the intervening period, although the monthly level of cargo in open storage fluctuated considerably because of changes in the discharge rate and the effects of monsoon weather on land transport and lightering, the volume of cargo in open storage has increased with about 70 percent of the available area occupied by cargo at the end of May 1969, despite the faster clearing of cargoes away from the wharf area.

21. Significant increases in imports of construction material (mostly steel products), vehicles, and earth moving equipment since the total bombing halt have considerably altered the types of cargo observed in open storage at Haiphong in 1969. Prior to the total bombing halt on 1 November 1968, heavy equipment and machinery, stockpiles of sacked grain, and stockpiles of tires dominated the open storage area. Most of this cargo remained in the area for many months at a time with little turnover. With the addition of the rail spurs in October and the total bombing halt on 1 November, much of the heavy equipment and machinery and tires were moved out

of Haiphong and replaced by incoming construction materials. Turnover of foodstuffs since November 1968 has been high, and turnover of most of the other cargo stored in the open has been at a relatively higher pace than before the 1 November bombing cessation.

22. With the principal exception of construction materials, we estimate that North Vietnam has adequate stockpiles of economic goods. Food supplies are currently at a high level because of the recent harvest of the fifth-month rice crop. The industrial equipment needed for restoring and/or maintaining industrial output has been imported during 1969 in increasing amounts, and limited observations of storage areas in May 1969 showed a variety of industrial equipment and materials on hand. A high level of petroleum imports and a well developed dispersed storage system also point to the availability of adequate supplies of petroleum.

Supplies of Foodstuffs

23. There is no direct intelligence on the stockpiles of foodstuffs in North Vietnam. It is apparent, however, that supplies of rice are usually abundant immediately after the two rice harvests in May-June and October-November. Moreover, some subsidiary crops that are harvested between the rice harvests help to take up the slack as rice supplies are depleted. With no measurable carryover of foodstuffs before the 1968 tenth-month rice harvest, a food balance, based on estimated production, imports, and consumption, shows the following changes in food reserves during 1969:

	Thousand Tons						
	Dec 1968	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
Carried over	1,900	1,640	1,355	1,065	795	505	225
Production	--	--	--	--	--	--	1,600 a/
Imports	100	75	70	90	70	80	90
Available	2,000	1,715	1,425	1,155	865	585	1,915
Consumption	360	360	360	360	360	360	360
Balance	1,640	1,355	1,065	795	505	225	1,555

a. Including both rice and subsidiary food crops.

24. Although the levels of any reserve supplies based on this estimated balance are subject to a considerable margin of error, the trend indicated would appear to be valid.

support the estimate that food supplies were low before the rice harvest in May 1969. Before the harvests, food supplies are at low levels -- possibly as little as one month's supply. Between harvests the import of foodstuffs offsets to some extent the rate of the drawdown of total stocks. If the import of food were cut off, the stocks on hand would be more quickly drawn down and supplies could reach dangerously low levels a few months before the harvest. The denial of food imports would be more critical during the first half of the year because of the longer growing season required by the fifth-month rice crop because of less favorable weather conditions.

25. North Vietnam has consistently been an importer of foodstuffs, the amount varying annually depending primarily on the fortunes of the rice harvest. Thus, good or normal harvests in 1965 permitted a reduction of imports in 1966, and subsequent poor crops called for heavy increases in import levels, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Thousand Tons				
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>Jan-May 1969</u>
Imports (foods)	120	80	460	790	385
Production (milled rice)	3,000	2,800	2,700	2,500	800

26. Estimates of rice production are admittedly tenuous. North Vietnam has not published production data on food crops since 1963. Although much of the discussion on agriculture in official publications and in periodicals refers to yields and goals for crop output, there are no published data concerning the acreage under cultivation to specific food crops. Therefore, the two annual rice crops are

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estimated relative to an average and relative to the crop of the previous year from statements by representatives of the regime concerning the progress of the crops and of the harvest as well as relative to weather conditions as we know them to have been. These estimates have generally been confirmed subsequently by levels of food imports.

27. Consumption of foodstuffs in North Vietnam has been closely rationed since the Communists took over. The basic ration for rice has remained relatively constant over the years, but the amount of rice available has varied and the percentage of substitutes has increased since 1965. Any short-fall in annual production of food and in the volume of imports therefore becomes rather critical within a few months because relatively little further belt-tightening can be done.

Supplies of Petroleum

28. On the basis of North Vietnam's imports of petroleum during the past year and estimates of consumption patterns, we estimate that the stocks of petroleum currently on hand total about 100,000 tons, equal to about 100 days of supply at the estimated 1968 consumption rate.

29. To keep stockpiles at these levels the North Vietnamese have maintained a highly diversified system of dispersed storage sites. This system includes more than 150 storage sites with an estimated capacity of at least 60,000 tons. In addition, an estimated 400,000 petroleum drums are now dispersed throughout North Vietnam. Finally, the North Vietnamese have recently begun to restore some of these bulk petroleum storage tanks in Hanoi and Haiphong. By June 1969 these restored facilities had an estimated storage capacity of 37,000 tons.

Industrial Supplies and Equipment

30. Scattered references to stockpiling of industrial equipment and supplies indicate that sufficient levels are on hand to meet North Vietnam's requirements for several months. Although current consumption requirements are difficult to gauge, the large amount of such goods in known storage and

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distribution areas and the North Vietnamese ability to adapt quickly to local shortages caused by the distribution system indicate sufficient stockpiling throughout the country. For example, photography of late May 1969 of the Kinh No transshipment and storage depot north of Hanoi, one of the major storage areas in the country, revealed more than 100 mobile generators; large quantities of mobile compressors, cables, pipe; and large stocks of crated industrial and agricultural equipment. A similar high level of supplies and equipment has been noted in storage areas in Haiphong. There has been no appreciable change in the amount of goods known to be stored during 1969.

Construction Supplies and Equipment

31. Most supplies for use in construction appear to be inadequate, although stockpiles of construction equipment and structural steel appear sufficient. Numerous articles critical of the progress of the construction industry have appeared in the North Vietnamese press since the beginning of the year. Domestic production of building materials such as bricks, tiles, and cement has not kept up with increased construction requirements resulting from the bombing years. Cement production, for example, is estimated to have been only about 100,000 tons for the first five months of 1969, and observed seaborne imports have added only 10,000 tons. Consumption of cement for a comparable period in 1965 and 1966 was equal to about 230,000 tons.

32. The shortage of construction materials may account, in part, for the slow pace in reconstruction activity since the bombing halt. Large amounts of construction equipment, such as cranes, bulldozers, graders, rollers, and compressors, however, have been consistently noted at Haiphong and other major storage areas. Some of this equipment has remained in the areas up to six months before being distributed. A rallier also reported seeing large amounts of structural steel in areas between Hanoi and Phu Ly in late 1968, much of which had lain unprotected for a sufficient time to become badly rusted.

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
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Military Goods

33. Since the bombing halt, the Communists have undertaken a major supply movement into the Southern Panhandle of North Vietnam using available rail lines, truck routes, waterways, and coastal shipping. This has produced a substantial military supply buildup, much of which is visible in open storage. On the basis of photography, our knowledge of actual logistics movements, and our estimates of imports and consumption, we feel certain that stocks available are more than adequate to support the war in South Vietnam without further imports into North Vietnam for several months.


34. Large volumes of supplies are stored in the open throughout the Southern Panhandle of North Vietnam, reflecting an apparent confidence that there will be no resumption of the bombing. At the same time, there is evidence that the North Vietnamese continue to disperse supplies and to build revetments around storage areas as insurance against any resumption of the air war. The increased volume of supplies moved into the southern part of North Vietnam has been accompanied by a substantial increase in throughput into southern Laos. An estimated 220 tons a day were moved into southern Laos during the past dry season (October 1968 - May 1969) compared with some 180 tons a day during the 1967-68 dry season.



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North of the 19th Parallel

38. Aerial photography has provided the best and most graphic evidence of the presence and extent of open storage of military goods in North Vietnam, although coverage has not been adequate to identify and quantify the types and amounts of supplies. Photographic coverage of storage areas in Hanoi and at the large storage/transshipment areas associated with the major railroad yards has pointed toward a continual and large, but unquantifiable, buildup of supplies at these points. At Hanoi, the main rail terminal has evidenced heavy activity and large amounts of supplies alongside the rail sidings, including tires, drums, unidentified boxes, crates, and large tarp-covered piles of supplies. At other points in downtown Hanoi, recent photography reveals considerable numbers of parked vehicles, construction equipment, crates, and large covered stacks of unidentified boxes and sacks.

39. Within the environs of Hanoi, particularly at Ha Dong and Kinh No, low-level drone photography in late May detected large open stores of equipment and covered supplies. At Ha Dong about 200 cargo and POL tanker trucks, tractors, and vans were recorded, while at the Kinh No rail transshipment area large numbers of mobile generators, tractors, rollers, van trailers, POL tanks, cable spools, drums, and an extremely large amount of probable POL-type pipe sections were seen.

40. Coverage of the P'ing-hsiang, China, and Dong Dang, North Vietnam, areas, located on the main rail line connecting China and North Vietnam, in 1967 and 1968 provided hard evidence of large numbers of motor vehicles stockpiled in the area. In May 1967, about 900 trucks were stored at P'ing-hsiang, but in September, 400 were noted near Dong Dang and 300 just over the border in China. In August 1968, about 450 vehicles were in a holding area at Dong Dang, but the areas in China were not covered.

41. After the bombing halt of 31 March 1968, the largest railroad yard near the 19th Parallel, located at Thanh Hoa, underwent rapid reconstruction. The numbers of railroad cars and the amounts of cargo noted in the yard increased significantly, with the turnover of supplies continuing at a relatively fast pace. At the same time, three

smaller rail transshipment areas were noted in operation south of Thanh Hoa to the 19th Parallel. With the total bombing halt of 1 November, rail activity at Thanh Hoa again surged in anticipation of opening service into Vinh. Supplies observed included 50 camouflaged petroleum tank cars, the highest number seen in the area since the start of the bombing. After the bombing halt, activity at Thanh Hoa continued at similar levels, and other logistics facilities were shifted south, toward Vinh.

South of the 19th Parallel

42. The identification of stockpiled supplies in the Panhandle of North Vietnam is necessarily restricted due to limitations in photographic coverage and the fact that the major supply/storage areas serving the flow of goods into Laos and South Vietnam act as transient stop-over points rather than hardened storage sites.

43. The largest and most significant supply/storage/transshipment areas in the Panhandle are Vinh, Bai Duc Thon, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi, which service Routes 137 and 1036 as well as Route 15 near the Mu Gia Pass. Prior to the bombing halt of 31 October 1968, these areas showed relatively little activity, with resupply activity dispersed, concealed, and largely occurring at night. Soon after the bombing halt, however, the North Vietnamese quickly capitalized on the development and immediately increased their supply movements into the area south of the 19th Parallel. The main lines of communication were restored and the logistic base shifted south. At Vinh, through rail service was quickly restored and several trains were noted entering and leaving the area.

[REDACTED] a quota of an "average of 400 tons each day" for rail shipment, including water pipe (probable petroleum pipe), fuel, petroleum storage tanks, and TNT. The level of supplies in the rail yard increased significantly and transshipment areas were expanded. Large concentrations of trucks and watercraft also were noted in the region.

44. Bai Duc Thon, located 25 miles north of the Mu Gia Pass on Route 15, is the main marshalling point for convoys entering Laos via Mu Gia and thus is an excellent indicator of North Vietnamese resupply capability and of the amount of supplies

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available to be moved into Laos. Soon after the bombing halt, large-scale truck traffic into Laos and tram car use were noted in the area, and the supply/storage facilities became more active. Photography of December and January has shown extensive stockpiling in the area and improvements to logistics facilities. In January, when the highest level of supplies was noted in the area, photographic interpreters counted about 50,000 boxes/crates throughout the area, with extensive transshipment operations. The level of activity at this key facility during 1969 generally has remained at comparable levels. Recent coverage has revealed North Vietnamese attempts to harden the facilities at Bai Duc Thon, as at least 66 new storage buildings were noted in April. In addition, photography since April has revealed the existence of over 100 revetted or open storage areas along a ten-mile portion of Route 15 between Route 101 and Laos, about 15 miles south of Bai Duc Thon. These points can hold between one and three truckloads each, with the vast majority usually full when noted in photography.

45. Soon after the bombing halt, North Vietnam's small fleet of coastal merchant vessels and tankers began to move cargo from Haiphong directly to Vinh, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi. Deliveries by ship to the southern Panhandle in December 1968 and January 1969 may have reached 50,000 tons each month, an amount equal to almost eight times the monthly tonnage being moved into the Laotian Panhandle at that time. Since January 1969 the level of activity along North Vietnam's coast has decreased to a more moderate level, and we estimate that 10,000-20,000 tons per month is moving by sea into Vinh, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi, with the majority being food shipments into Vinh.

46. The shipments by coastal vessel into Quang Khe and Dong Hoi are rapidly moved out of the area and distributed to either Route 137 or 1036, about 30 miles inland. There is little evidence of extensive stockpiling in the port areas, but there is evidence of extensive storage areas along Route 137 and near Bat Lake at the head of Route 1036. In addition to the several larger storage/transshipment areas, there are at least several hundred small to medium sized supply sites dispersed throughout the Panhandle. These vary from small dispersed POL storage areas to extensive, well-developed logistic areas.

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IV. Alternatives

Introduction

47. A quarantine of the port of Haiphong and the minor ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha would force the North Vietnamese to depend primarily on the overland routes from China for the continued import of vital war-supporting materiel and economic goods. The North Vietnamese would not, however, have to depend entirely on the rail, road, and waterway connections with China. There are several other potential countermeasures that could be rapidly improvised by the North Vietnamese -- the use of lighters, the transshipment of goods in small craft from ports in South China, and/or the use of air transport for high-priority goods. These countermeasures are well within the capabilities of the North Vietnamese as long as they have the cooperation of the Chinese or unless the terms of the quarantine permitted US naval or air force to interdict the countermeasures.

48. Enemy countermeasures to new weapons and tactics introduced by the US during the more than three years of the air war over North Vietnam showed the North Vietnamese to be shrewd improvisors with a frequent ability to anticipate US actions. In view of the numerous press reports since 1965 of discussions within the US Government of the possibility of closing the port of Haiphong, it must be assumed that the North Vietnamese have prepared contingency plans to insure against such a possibility. It is probable that the North Vietnamese would not depend on any single countermeasure but would employ a number of alternatives. It would be difficult, for example, to move heavy machinery in small craft from ports in South China and lighter it over the beaches into North Vietnam. However, bulk food and fertilizer imports could be handled in this manner with relative ease.

49. At this time the major unknown in estimating North Vietnam's ability to counter a quarantine of normal seaborne imports is the degree of cooperation that would exist between the USSR and China in countering the quarantine. With the same limited cooperation as has existed in recent years, even a long-term closing of the ports would have little

impact on the viability of the North Vietnamese economy or the ability of the North Vietnamese to continue the war in the South or maintain a strong air defense and military posture in the North.

50. At this particular juncture in Sino-Soviet relations it can not be assumed, however, that the Chinese would permit the required amounts of POL, trucks, machinery, and other imports that North Vietnam normally imports by sea from the USSR to transit Chinese territory. For this reason, this report considers a "worst-case" -- one in which Soviet military and economic aid to North Vietnam is cut off and China picks up the tab for also supplying the equivalent Soviet military and economic aid as well as the aid China has supplied in the past. Thus Peking would have to supply not only the logistical support for alternative movements of goods to North Vietnam, which it would have to do even if greatly increased volumes of Soviet goods were allowed to transit China, but China would also have to supply the POL, trucks, food, and other supplies from indigenous sources or imports.

North Vietnamese Logistical System

51. North Vietnam's total rail and seaborne imports during the most recent 12-month period amounted to an average of about 6,000 tons a day. This volume of goods is equivalent to what can be carried by about 200 standard-gauge freight cars or about 1,800 trucks a day.

52. Even if the total volume of seaborne imports were shifted to the overland route with no belt-tightening with respect to food or reduction in fertilizer imports and no lightering across the beaches, the diversion of imports would not severely tax the capacity of the overland routes. In contrast to the total input of 6,000 tons a day, the combined capacity of the railroad, road, and water routes from China to the Hanoi area of North Vietnam totals almost 16,000 tons per day during the dry season and 13,000 tons per day during the wet season. As shown in the tabulation below, the capacity of North Vietnam's rail connections with China are alone one-third greater than the volume of goods that must

be imported. The roads and waterways provide an additional cushion that can be used to avoid bottle-necks and to establish additional routes for moving goods from various areas of South China into North Vietnam.

	<u>Tons per Day</u>
Daily average	6,000
Route capacities	
Railroads	9,000
Roads	5,400 (2,300) <u>a/</u>
Red River	1,500
 Total surface	 15,900 (12,800) <u>a/</u>

a. The capacity of the roads declines during the wet season, which extends from June through September in the northern areas of North Vietnam.

53. The capacities given above are conservative estimates based on a wide variety of factors including the extent and conditions of facilities, the availability of equipment, and the employment of a normal labor force. Improvisation can enable theoretical rail system capacities to be temporarily exceeded for considerable periods of time when the demand is great or the regime assigns a high priority to moving supplies over the system. Furthermore, the permanent capacities could be expanded by relatively simple additional construction and quickly installed expedients such as the construction of passing tracks at more frequent intervals. The capacities of the roads could be increased by improved grading or the more intensive use of manpower to repair road segments that got washed out during the rainy season. Furthermore, during the bombing of North Vietnam, up to 600,000 full-time and part-time employees were engaged in air defense or bomb damage repair. If even a small fraction of this labor force was mobilized to maintain and improve the main lines of communication with China, there is no doubt that the capacity of these lines could be rapidly expanded.

Railroads

54. The North Vietnamese railroad system between China and Hanoi consists of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line and its alternate route, the Kep-Thai Nguyen-Yen Vien line and the Hanoi-Lao Cai line. The Dong Dang line is dual gauged, 111 miles long, with an estimated capacity of 5,400 tons each way per day (EWPD).* The Communists are engaged in a major realignment of about 15 miles of this line south of Lang Son. The new rail segment will upgrade the line's capabilities by removing several sharp turns and a long steep grade. It is by far the most important route for overland imports via China. Its alternate corridor via Kep-Thai Nguyen-Yen Vien is 71 miles long and has an estimated capacity of 4,300 tons EWPD. The Lao Cai line currently is of minor importance for overland imports but it does provide access to the northwestern regions and China's Yunnan Province and would assume increased importance if the port of Haiphong were closed. This line is 170 miles long and has an estimated capacity of 3,400 tons EWPD.

55. Soon after the 31 March 1968 bombing restriction north of the 19th Parallel, the North Vietnamese took full advantage of the standdown to restore the rail system to its original status and in some cases actually to increase the capability of the system. The North Vietnamese have also increased their overall tractive inventory in the last few months by importing about 20 small diesel locomotives from the Soviet Union.

56. In late 1968 the North Vietnamese accelerated their construction efforts on the 57-mile Kep-Hon Gai meter-gauge rail line. By June 1969 the Communists had laid track on all but 19 miles of this line and had prepared the rail bed on most of the remaining alignment. There were only a few small bridges and culverts to be completed. Work has continued on the largest bridge on the line, a major one 340 to 400 feet long over the Song Nhat Duc.

* *The term dual-gauge refers to the use of three or four rails on the same roadbed, making possible the use of both meter-gauge and standard-gauge rolling stock. It is not to be confused with "double tracking" -- two separate tracks on two roadbeds with a total of four rails.*

57. Since October the eastern half of the line has been in service from the mining areas around Nhue Ho to the vicinity of the ferry slips under construction across the bay from Hon Gai. It will probably take no more than two to three months to complete the bridge over the Song Nhat Duc and permit through traffic from the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line to Hon Gai.

Highways

58. There are five major and several secondary transborder roads connecting the Hanoi-Haiphong area with the South China provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan. Together, this roadnet has an estimated minimum capacity of about 5,400 tons EWPD during the dry season (October-May), decreasing to approximately 2,300 tons EWPD during the rainy season. From one-half to two-thirds of this total cross-border capacity is associated with the northeastern routes leading from the large storage depots of Nanning and P'ing-hsiang.

Inventory of Railroad Rolling Stock,
and Motor Vehicles

59. North Vietnam's inventory of railroad rolling stock currently is estimated at 115-130 locomotives and 2,000-2,300 meter-gauge freight cars. The country's railroad system consists of dual, standard, and meter-gauge lines. The main rail link between China and Hanoi -- the dual-gauged Dong Dang line could be operated by drawing from China's inventory of standard-gauge rolling stock which is estimated (end of 1968) at 6,000 locomotives and 160,300 freight cars. An alternate route from the border to Hanoi via Kep and Thai Nguyen also could use Chinese standard-gauge equipment.

60. As of mid-1969 the estimated North Vietnamese motor vehicle inventory ranged between 6,500 and 11,500. The wide range stems mainly from a lack of import data, particularly overland shipments, and the uncertainties associated with confirming the large number of vehicles reportedly destroyed by air-strikes in Laos. A lack of any evidence of a vehicle shortage problem during 1968 through June 1969, plus a substantial amount of photointelligence revealing

continuing large vehicle stockpiles within North Vietnam suggests that a firm vehicle inventory probably would tend toward the upper limits of the estimated range.

China's Logistical Capabilities

Introduction

61. In the event of a cessation of normal seaborne imports, North Vietnam's most serious problem would be to establish an alternative flow of about 30,000 tons a month of POL from China. Stockpiles of POL in North Vietnam are presently estimated to be equivalent to about 100 days of supply at current consumption rates. The probable increased use of trucks to haul supplies from China would increase consumption rates, and shortages of gasoline or diesel fuels would probably occur in the northeast areas of North Vietnam in less than 60 days if overland imports were not greatly increased. We would expect, therefore, that the North Vietnamese and Chinese would give priority to establishing an overland POL artery. The dimensions of the problem in terms of distance, tank cars, and locomotives is discussed below. Next, it is assumed that all normal seaborne imports are shifted to the Chinese transport system to determine the magnitude of this additional burden on China's transportation system.

POL by Rail from China

62. POL supplied from within China would come from one or a combination of three major refineries at Shanghai, Lan-chou, or Ta-ching. The Chinese railroad authorities would probably have to institute a shuttle system by which a given number of tank cars and locomotives would be assigned to this movement and would not engage in any other operation. Such a shuttle would operate from the refineries to Hanoi via P'ing-hsiang, which is across the border from the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line.

63. The extreme case would require that all 30,000 tons a month move from Ta-ching in Manchuria to P'ing-hsiang, a distance of about 2,500 miles, or 5,000 miles a round trip. At 350 miles a day, about 15 days travel time would be required. One day for loading and one day for unloading at each end of

the haul would result in a turnaround time of 17 days. Thus, at an average load of 50 tons per tank car, about 350 cars would be required. This number of cars represents slightly more than 1 percent of the estimated 28,500 tank cars in China's inventory. About 25 locomotives would be needed, less than 0.5 percent of the estimated 6,000 locomotives in China's total inventory. The burden on China's rail system would be even less if these shipments were to originate entirely or in part from Shanghai and/or Lan-chou.

64. The rail line capacity from any of the refineries in China is more than adequate to handle this traffic in addition to the traffic currently moving over these routes. In terms of logistic capability alone -- holding the question of the availability of POL until later -- the Chinese could have a regular flow of POL moving toward North Vietnam well before any shortages would develop because of a cessation of seaborne shipments.*

Logistical Impact of all Supplies Coming from China

65. If all remaining Soviet, East European, and Chinese seaborne imports of food, fertilizer, machinery, and equipment were to come from North China and Manchuria, the average length of haul would be at a maximum about 4,800 miles per round trip.** At an average daily haul of 350 miles a day and allowing two days for loading and unloading, the turnaround time would be 16 days. Thus, with an average load per freight car of 40 metric tons,

* The following example shows how the logistical problem of moving POL to North Vietnam would be greatly eased if Soviet, Romanian, or other foreign tankers unloaded POL for North Vietnam at Fort Bayard. China would probably organize the same shuttle service but the round trip distance would be only about 570 miles and the turnaround time would be four days. Only 80 freight cars and 6 locomotives would be able to carry the monthly requirements of 30,000 tons.

** Again, an extreme case because imported food-stuffs which averaged almost 75,000 tons a month during the past 12 months would not have to come from North China or Manchuria.

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about 1,700 freight cars would be required in constant operation to carry the monthly shipments of 130,000 tons. This number of cars represents only about 1 percent of the freight cars in China's inventory.*

* *In addition, China would have to continue to transport the estimated monthly 25,000 tons of military and economic goods that presently enter North Vietnam by rail.*

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V. Other Countermeasures

Introduction

66. In the event that oceangoing shipping is denied access to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, a number of other measures could be introduced to counter the effects of the quarantine. The North Vietnamese could employ offshore lightering operations and use various shallow-water approaches to the ports and inland waterways or engage in over-the-beach operations. In addition to the use of the overland routes discussed above, diverted cargo could be transshipped in Chinese Communist ports into small craft for movement to North Vietnam, or funnelled through Chinese ports for shipment on the Chinese railroad system to North Vietnam. An airlift operated by the USSR with Chinese cooperation could also move a large volume of imports. An airlift operated exclusively by the Chinese and North Vietnamese, however, would be able to make only a small contribution without completely disrupting air transport operations in China. The capabilities of all of these additional alternatives, nevertheless, provide the North Vietnamese with a flexible system with which to continue the receipt of imports.

Lightering

67. If oceangoing ships were denied access to Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, they could still be offloaded in offshore areas by using the ships' gear and lighters.

68. We estimate that North Vietnam has more than 30,000 watercraft of all types. This inventory consists largely of junks and sampans although many modern lightering craft (obtained from other Communist countries) have been added in recent years, including 60 Chinese steel-hulled coastal vessels and 30 Soviet-built 35-40 ton capacity mechanized landing craft which are ideally suited for over-the-beach operations. Photography of shipyard facilities and data on imports indicate the North Vietnamese have been adding about 125 lightering craft to their inventory each month since November 1968. In addition to lightering craft, North Vietnam has nine merchant coastal ships with the largest having a capacity of 4,000 tons. Assuming normal

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conditions, we estimate approximately sixty 100-ton lighters would be required to offload the 5,200 tons of seaborne imports North Vietnam receives daily.

69. Adverse weather conditions and the likelihood that port facilities with cranes would be denied to lighters could both pose difficulties for the Communists. Most bulky supply items requiring cranes probably would move into North Vietnam by rail. Bulk POL could be lightered from tankers offshore. In fact, this is the normal way in which POL is unloaded in Haiphong harbor. Also, calm seas normally prevail in the northern section of the Gulf of Tonkin some 60-70 percent of the time throughout the year except for October when it is calm only about 50 percent of the time.

70. The waterway network in the delta (principally the Red River, the Song Thai Binh, and two connecting canals) provides a flexible system for the movement of lightered goods inland. There are ten entrances to the network from the Gulf and, although several are very shallow at low water, the depth over the bar increases to five to eight feet during high water in nearly all cases. If this network was denied to the enemy by mining, the lightering would be forced to the use of an over-the-beach operation which could be highly inefficient, particularly if suitable cranes were not available.

71. Oceangoing ships could anchor off the southern coast and offload into lighters which could then move to southern ports (including Ben Thuy, Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi), estuaries, and beaches. Anchorages in this area are less protected, but landing areas for lighters along the coast are more numerous than further north near Haiphong. Much of the cargo offloaded here, however, would have to be moved overland north some 100 miles to the major consuming areas.

72. Ports in South China such as Fort Bayard and Canton could also be used to transship from oceangoing ships to small craft for movement close in-shore along the coast south to North Vietnam. There are ample small craft available in China and North Vietnam for such an operation.

Air Transport

73. A sustained airlift could be organized to maintain a flow of high-priority goods to North Vietnam. There are 16 airfields in South China and six in North Vietnam (five in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and one at Kep) which could be used. All are near rail lines, major roads, or seaports. The short distance between the Chinese airfields and those in North Vietnam requires little flying time and makes this alternative reasonably economical in the requirement for aircraft. For example, airfields at Ning-ming and Nan-ning in China (which probably would be the fields most extensively used) both have runways of over 6,000 feet and are less than 30 minutes by air from Hanoi.

74. The Chinese inventory of air transports totals about 300 large fixed-wing aircraft, and about 140 small helicopters and about 400 small AN-2s. The large aircraft inventory consists principally of the IL-14 (96 aircraft), the LI-2 (57 aircraft), and a conglomerate of old C-46s, C-47s, Viscounts, and IL-18s. North Vietnam also has a small number of transports, including 22 small AN-2s and 37 IL-14s and LI-2s. An airlift could be conducted with these aircraft but it would have to be relatively small-scale since about 140 IL-14s alone would be required to airlift less than one-third of North Vietnam's seaborne imports of 5,200 tons per day. Even this effort would substantially disrupt airline service in China.

75. Helicopters could also be used to move essential supplies between P'ing-hsiang and Hanoi and between Ho Kou and Hanoi (roughly 110 and 170 miles, respectively). The helicopters most likely to be used are the MI-6 (Hook), with a payload of 5 tons and a range of about 390 miles, and the MI-10, which is capable of transporting 8 tons about 300 miles. The North Vietnamese have four MI-6s. They also have 20 MI-4s (Hounds), a helicopter with a maximum capacity of 1.6 tons. The total Chinese inventory is believed to be made up of about 130 MI-4s. The small payloads and large number of helicopters needed to move a significant amount of cargo would limit the use of them to high-priority goods.

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VI. Burden to China and Costs to North Vietnam

Economic Goods

76. During the past 12 months the Communist countries have supplied about 96 percent of North Vietnam's seaborne imports; about 44 percent came from the USSR, 36 percent from China, and 16 percent from the East European countries, North Korea, and Cuba. If China were also to assume the Soviet aid burden it would have to provide an additional 900,000 tons of goods, including large amounts of petroleum, foodstuffs, transport equipment, and industrial products.

77. In the event that a quarantine of ports prevented the USSR from supplying North Vietnam's POL requirements and China refused to permit Soviet POL to transit Chinese territory, the evidence clearly suggests that the great bulk of North Vietnam's requirements could be supplied from China. North Vietnam's imports of POL during the past 12 months totaled about one-third of a million tons, less than 3 percent of China's domestic production. However, China would have difficulty in supplying specific products such as aviation fuel and special lubricants that are in short supply in China. These and other products, if not available in Communist China, would have to be supplied by the East European countries or from non-Communist countries and transshipped to North Vietnam. The total cost of North Vietnam's imports of POL in 1968 was less than \$15 million. Thus the foreign exchange costs to China for petroleum products not domestically available would be minor.

78. During the past year, North Vietnam received about 47 percent of its total imports of about 110,000 tons of chemical fertilizer from the USSR, about 20 percent from North Korea, and about 24 percent from Japan. China is not known to have shipped any fertilizer to North Vietnam by sea.

79. China produced about 5 million tons of chemical fertilizer in 1968, but this output does not satisfy domestic requirements, and another 2 million

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tons of fertilizer were imported from Japan. In the event Soviet shipments of fertilizer were cut off the Chinese would be faced with the following alternatives: (1) ship to North Vietnam domestically produced fertilizer at the expense of China's agricultural production, (2) increase imports from either North Korea or Japan and transship these imports to North Vietnam, or (3) substitute increased shipments of food for fertilizer. About \$4 million of foreign exchange would be the cost to China to replace Soviet fertilizer shipments to North Vietnam if purchased abroad. Furthermore, while North Vietnam's agricultural output has been lagging there is no reason to believe that even a total ban on fertilizer imports would result in an immediate deterioration in North Vietnam's agricultural output.

80. North Vietnam's imports of foodstuffs have been almost evenly divided between the USSR and Communist China, with the USSR supplying mostly wheat flour. Communist China could easily increase exports of foodstuffs -- either rice or wheat flour -- to North Vietnam with only minor internal adjustments. Total grain production in China during 1968 was estimated at 185-195 million tons, while total foodstuffs imported by North Vietnam during the past 12 months amounted to less than 900,000 tons of which the USSR provided some 300,000 tons. Wheat is imported by Communist China, and the export of wheat flour to North Vietnam in place of that from the USSR would cost China the foreign exchange paid for such imports, approximately \$15 million. On the other hand, Communist China could replace Soviet supplies of wheat flour with rice or corn at no direct foreign exchange costs, but an indirect cost represented by the loss of potential earnings from rice exports to Free World consumers.

81. The data on the number of trucks imported by North Vietnam are incomplete because trucks arrive both by sea and overland by rail and there is little firm information on the extent of overland deliveries. The USSR, East European countries, and China have all been major suppliers of trucks to North Vietnam. China, currently producing at an annual rate of roughly 60,000 trucks a year, would be hard pressed to supply all of North Vietnam's requirements. China would find it especially difficult to supply large numbers of four-ton cross-country trucks.

82. On balance, if China were to prevent Soviet trucks from moving by rail overland across China the North Vietnamese would have to solicit additional trucks from the East European countries or from China. China in the short run could draw on its inventory of about 350,000 trucks or cut into its current production to meet North Vietnam's needs. Under any circumstances there would be no immediate shortage of trucks in North Vietnam. The present rainy season in Laos reduces North Vietnam's truck losses due to air attacks. Furthermore, as noted earlier, there is considerable evidence from aerial photography that there is a large inventory of trucks, including heavy and specialized types, in storage in North Vietnam.

Foreign Exchange Implications

83. For China to supply North Vietnam with the economic goods presently being imported from the USSR would probably involve some expenditure of foreign exchange, as noted above. However, the most important foreign exchange implication for China would be the presumed loss of potential hard currency earnings as a result of increased shipments to North Vietnam of food and textiles. The direct foreign exchange cost for Communist China to replace North Vietnam's supplies of wheat flour would be approximately \$15 million at the levels supplied in 1968. This would be in addition to the present cost of the possible forgone sales of 225,000 tons (1968 levels) of rice on the world market that would have brought China an estimated \$37 million.

84. Amounts of textiles shipped by China in 1968 were not significant. However, if China were to supply the amounts that came from the USSR in 1968, the loss in potential foreign exchange earnings might reach an estimated \$10 million.

Military Goods

85. In itself a quarantine of North Vietnam's ports would have no effect on the volume of either Soviet or Chinese munitions being shipped to North Vietnam. Although war-supporting goods -- trucks and bulldozers and occasionally helicopters -- arrive by sea, an analysis of all available evidence

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suggests strongly that the great bulk of munitions have entered North Vietnam by rail. However, it is possible that the Chinese might use the quarantine of North Vietnam's ports as a pretext for cutting off all Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. The Chinese might seek to embarrass the USSR and force a Soviet-US confrontation.

86. However, at the current level of hostilities, a cutoff of Soviet military aid would have little immediate impact on North Vietnam's military capabilities. Communist China continues to be the principal supplier of infantry weapons to Communist forces in both North and South Vietnam. Moreover, China could provide substitutes for every item of equipment in North Vietnam's military inventories, although many of these, particularly technical equipment for air defense, would be of lower quality or less advanced design. Over a period of time some of North Vietnam's military capabilities would be eroded. China's capacity to supply equipment for air defense systems probably is limited to the extent that for many types of air defense weapons only spare parts for maintenance and replacements for normal attrition could be supplied.

87. Deliveries of equipment for North Vietnam's surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery defenses have declined markedly since mid-1968 to little more than that necessary for repair and replacement -- a level of requirements that Communist China probably could meet adequately. China could provide spare parts necessary to keep North Vietnam's MIG-19s and MIG-15/17s -- numbering about 40 and 115, respectively -- in combat-ready condition, but the effectiveness of the approximate 65 MIG-21s undoubtedly would deteriorate if the supply of spare parts from the USSR were cut off. The period of time for such deterioration would depend on the supply of spare parts on hand and the rates of use of the aircraft. Replacements for early warning and ground controlled intercept radar probably could be supplied by China, but limited productive capacity would preclude China's meeting any more than a minimum external demand for fire control and missile control radars.

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88. As North Vietnam's Soviet equipment wears out or is destroyed in combat, many of the replacements provided by China as substitutes would be of poorer quality and less advanced technical design. For example, as North Vietnam's MIG-21s became non-operational for lack of spare parts, China could substitute the less advanced MIG-19. China's production of MIG-19s, would be adequate to permit the total replacement of North Vietnam's MIG-21 inventory. Much of China's radar production consists of copies of earlier, less efficient Soviet designs, and the eventual resupply with such equipment might degrade somewhat the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery and of the air warning system. Types of air defense equipment and probable Chinese replacements are given in the attached table.

89. In the event the US bombing of North Vietnam were resumed and North Vietnam's requirements reached the levels of 1967 or early 1968, Communist China undoubtedly would not be able to meet North Vietnam's requirements for surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery ammunition. Production of SA-2 missiles by China is believed to be little more than enough to meet the basic load requirements for China's 20-25 SAM battalions, only a fraction of the nearly 4,000 SA-2s fired by North Vietnam in 1967. No firm estimate of capacity for artillery ammunition production is available, but it is believed that China would have great difficulty supplying anti-aircraft artillery ammunition at the high 1967 expenditure rate in North Vietnam.

90. A halt in Soviet munitions shipments to North Vietnam would not diminish the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army military capability in South Vietnam or produce a significant change in the character of the ground war. A halt in Soviet munitions shipments would require the Communists to substitute Chinese Communist 107-mm rockets and the RPG-2 antitank grenade launcher for Soviet 122-mm and 140-mm rockets and the more advanced Soviet RPG-7. China would also be required to increase its shipments of anti-aircraft artillery up to 57-mm and howitzer and field gun munitions, most of which have been supplied by the USSR. Although the Soviet conventional field guns and anti-aircraft guns have

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predominated in South Vietnam, their Chinese counterparts are similar in design and performance and could be used without reducing firepower.

91. The Communists would not be forced to change their battlefield tactics in South Vietnam which currently emphasize standoff attacks by fire. The acquisition of more Chinese Communist 107-mm rockets, in addition to the large number of heavy weapons currently in use and in stockpiles, would enable the Communists to continue to use economy of force tactics and would provide them with added mobility at a small cost in firepower. The Soviet 122-mm rocket and RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers have greater range and destructive power than the Chinese 107-mm rocket and RPG-2, but the Chinese weapons have the advantage of being lighter and easier to transport.

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North Vietnam's Air Defense Equipment

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>North Vietnamese Inventory</u>	<u>Probable Communist Chinese Replacement</u>
<u>Aircraft</u>	MIG-21 MIG-19 MIG-15/17	MIG-19 MIG-19 MIG-17
<u>SAM missile systems</u>	SA-2 battalions SA-2 replacement missiles	SA-2 battalions SA-2 replacement missiles
<u>Antiaircraft artillery</u>	100-mm 85-mm 57-mm 37-mm 14.5-mm	85-mm - 100-mm 57-mm - 85-mm 57-mm 37-mm 14.5-mm
<u>Radar</u>		
Missile control	Fan Song	Fan Song
Fire control	Beam Track Whiff Fire Can	Fire Can
Early warning/ground controlled intercept	Barlock Big Bar B Dry Rock Flat Face Long Eye One Eye Score Board Side Net Spoon Rest Witch Four Cross Slot Dumbo Knife Rest Moon Face Rock/Stone Cake	Cross Legs Rice Cup Cross Slot Dumbo Knife Rest Moon Face Rock/Stone Cake

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VII. PROBABLE POLITICAL REACTIONS

Additional Working Assumption

92. The political reactions of all parties affected by, concerned with or interested in the imposition of a quarantine on North Vietnam would be materially influenced by the general situation prevailing at the time the quarantine was imposed. One set of reactions would be produced if, for example, the postulated quarantine was imposed soon after (and in apparent retaliation for) some blatantly provocative Communist military and/or terrorist action--e.g., a frontal, multi-divisional assault across the DMZ, the public execution of a large number of American prisoners in North Vietnam, widespread attacks on South Vietnamese cities and civilian population centers, or systematic, coordinated attacks on American and Vietnamese hospitals throughout South Vietnam. Quite a different set of reactions would almost certainly be produced if the imposition of the quarantine closely followed, and appeared to be the US response to, some major, superficially sincere and forthcoming North Vietnamese peace initiative--e.g., an unconditional acceptance of President Thieu's election proposals. Ringing the changes on all possible permutations of prior circumstances would require a memorandum of inordinate length. To simplify the analysis and assessment of probable reactions, we have therefore made the additional working assumption that the quarantine is imposed under circumstances essentially similar to those now prevailing, i.e., that North Vietnam's propaganda, political, military and negotiating posture remains essentially what it is in mid-July 1969.

Probable Chinese Communist Reactions

93. The primary object of the reaction analysis portion of this memorandum is to assess Hanoi's probable response to the imposition of a quarantine. Hanoi's range of options will be so heavily affected, however, by the responses of Peking and, to a slightly lesser extent, Moscow that the probable view from Hanoi can be seen in considerably clearer

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perspective if we first look at the probable reactions of the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.

94. As outlined above, the evidence available shows that China has the physical resources and capabilities to provide North Vietnam with the assistance necessary to overcome the physical impact of a quarantine imposed under the conditions assumed in this memorandum's opening section. Since physical constraints would not appear to inhibit or limit its policy choices, Peking's political options would range from shutting off virtually all of North Vietnam's imports to providing Hanoi with all assistance possible. For a time, at least, Peking would be very much in the driver's seat; for all bulk, war-essential supplies reaching North Vietnam--including arms, ammunition, POL, trucks and some foodstuffs--would have to come overland via Chinese territory.* Without overland imports from China, once North Vietnam's reserves and stockpiles were depleted, Hanoi could no longer wage war; for the contribution of her own industrial plant to North Vietnam's war making potential is negligible.**

**If the quarantine involved only mining Haiphong and not a complete naval blockade some goods and supplies might be lightered ashore from Soviet vessels at minor ports such as Campha. Such action would partially attenuate Hanoi's near-total dependence on Chinese assistance, but unless the quarantine were of very short duration, the basic picture would be essentially that just described in the text above.*

***A Soviet support effort effected by sea lift through Cambodia might perhaps provide enough war materiel for Communist forces in South Vietnam to continue the military struggle at present levels, but the evolution of such a support system would require Sihanouk's open assistance (or replacement of his regime with a Communist-dominated Cambodian government). Even under such circumstances, without overland imports from China, North Vietnam would have severe and mounting internal economic problems. Our memorandum hence does not further address the theoretical alternative of a "Cambodian solution" to the problems that would be created by the imposition of a quarantine of North Vietnam.*

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95. Despite her current dispute and border problems with the Soviet Union and despite the fact that the situation here postulated would afford Peking a tempting opportunity to impale Moscow on the horns of an intriguing dilemma--let Hanoi founder or risk a direct military confrontation with the United States by forcing the US blockade--shutting off North Vietnam's essential supplies and driving Hanoi to the wall would probably not be viewed in Peking as a politically profitable course of action. Even more importantly, Peking would probably view such a course of action as unacceptable ("incorrect") on doctrinal grounds. The economic follies of the "Great Leap Forward" (e.g., backyard steel mills) and the record of the "Cultural Revolution"--show that some of Peking's major policy decisions are influenced by doctrinal considerations or what might really be called theological considerations.

96. For years, Peking has urged Hanoi to follow the doctrinally pure ("correct") policy of unrelenting struggle against the imperialist enemy and to forswear the revisionist Soviets' cowardly heresy of premature resort to negotiations. Under the situation postulated at the outset of this memorandum, Peking could not refuse to aid North Vietnam without thereby virtually forcing Hanoi to adopt a policy Peking has always unremittingly opposed. Conversely, by coming to Hanoi's rescue, Peking would lend tangible support to its doctrinal arguments and, at the same time, greatly increase Chinese influence over North Vietnam. Thus Peking would probably see the quarantine as a golden opportunity to improve its standing in Hanoi, at Moscow's expense, and hence would provide the aid that would make it possible for North Vietnam to cope with the physical problems created by the quarantine. In the propaganda field, Peking would almost certainly attack the quarantine as the latest "proof" of US wickedness, would accuse the Soviets of being too cowardly to contest it, and would take the general line that North Vietnam and other "fraternal" parties could now clearly know who was the real stalwart in the "socialist" camp.

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97. Chinese foreign policy in recent years has displayed a number of not always consistent attributes. Doctrinally-inspired bombast is clearly one. Pragmatic prudence, however, is usually another. Keeping the supply lines open to North Vietnam and providing Hanoi with all possible material assistance would almost certainly strike Peking as a politically profitable course of action involving minimal risks. Peking would also certainly mount a high decibel propaganda campaign against the US, possibly one interlaced with "warnings" or threats. Taking actual physical action against US forces imposing the quarantine, however, would be an entirely different matter. A time of burgeoning tension along the Soviet border would hardly be an opportune moment to run the risk of any sort of armed conflict with the United States. The record of Chinese responses to air space intrusions indicates that Communist China would probably fire on any US ships or planes that encroached on Chinese territory and China would probably aid North Vietnam to some extent in mine-clearing operations, but Communist China is unlikely to dispatch its own warships or aircraft to contest US naval operations off the coast of North Vietnam.

Probable Soviet Reactions

98. In responding to the imposition of a quarantine on North Vietnam, Moscow would have to select a course of action from a range of options that would extend from urging Hanoi to abandon the struggle and seek the earliest possible settlement in Paris to using military force to break the quarantine and, perhaps, threatening armed retaliation in other areas (e.g., Berlin) if the quarantine were not promptly lifted. Moscow's choice of the optimum Soviet response, however, would not be determined exclusively by the specific issues or considerations directly related to the quarantine. Instead, Moscow's choice would be made within the total context of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern

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policy, relations with North Vietnam, posture toward China and toward the United States.

99. It seems increasingly clear that the reassertion of Soviet interests in Vietnam, signalled by Kosygin's visit to Hanoi in February 1965, was not prompted by a simple, opportunistic desire to join what then appeared as a Vietnamese Communist effort on the verge of success. Rather, this reassertion of Vietnam interests was part of a broad new Soviet policy to "encircle" and contain Communist China. This consideration has become increasingly apparent in Soviet policies throughout South and Southeast Asia and in the Soviet military buildup on the Chinese border, which also began in 1965. We now have confirmation from highly reliable sources that the containment of China has become the priority Soviet foreign policy objective.

100. This policy of containing China, however, does not automatically lead to collaboration with the US. In particular it does not necessarily lead to Soviet pressures on Hanoi to end the Vietnam war. While the war in Vietnam does present some obstacles to US-Soviet collaboration in areas of interest to the USSR, ever since the talks first began in Paris (and particularly since the 31 October 1968 bombing halt), the Soviets have not chosen to regard the Vietnam struggle as an impediment to doing business with the US on important matters such as the Middle East or arms limitation talks. Moreover, it is important to the USSR, in the context of its anti-Chinese policy, not to offend Hanoi and to maintain a Soviet presence in North Vietnam. Hanoi is a prickly pear, jealous of its autonomy within the Communist world, and demonstrably capable of playing the Chinese against the Soviets in order to defend and advance its own interests. Moscow appears well aware of Hanoi's sensitivities and to our knowledge has never pressured Hanoi to adopt positions which the Vietnamese Communists might consider prejudicial to their interests.

99. Furthermore, Moscow probably sees some positive benefits in the prolongation of the war in Vietnam. The war is distracting to the US, it serves to erode US influence in Europe and in other

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areas of interest to the USSR, and Moscow can only take comfort from the internal strains within the US which the world attributes, in part at least, to the war.

102. For these reasons, if none other, we believe that the Soviet response to the closure of Haiphong would be conditioned primarily by a desire to keep in step with Hanoi. Added to this, however, would be the question of Soviet "face" as a great power. Its ships are the principal users of the port and Soviet prestige would be directly involved in any mining or blockade. Because Hanoi would almost certainly request it, and because face required it, the Soviets would feel compelled to provide assistance--with equipment and personnel, probably in a semi-overt role--for mine-sweeping operations and other countermeasures (e.g., by having Soviet pilots fly North Vietnamese aircraft.)

103. A blockade would confront the USSR with the most difficult decisions, decisions which might well produce severe strains within the Soviet leadership. Unless it challenged the blockade with its own escorted convoys, the USSR would open itself to propaganda attack from Peking charging that the Soviets were chicken-hearted or secretly working in collusion with the US. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders would recognize that the USSR does not have naval forces capable of challenging a US blockade in that area effectively, and that the attempt to do this would provoke an unprecedented, direct confrontation with the US under very disadvantageous circumstances. During the past five years the Soviets have never given any indication that they consider the issues involved in Vietnam worth the risk of such a confrontation with the United States. (For example, the Soviets have never made an issue of, or even mentioned, casualties suffered by Soviet personnel manning SAM sites or assisting in the defense of North Vietnam during the bombing). Thus a review of all evidence available weights the odds heavily against the Soviet's offering a direct physical challenge to a US quarantine or even a US blockade. Nonetheless, the USSR would almost certainly issue grave warnings and attempt to create the impression that a major world crisis could soon result if the US quarantine were not speedily lifted.

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104. To give point to these warnings, the USSR would probably assert that the US quarantine had generated very severe obstacles to US-Soviet collaboration in any area, thus reversing Moscow's current stance that circumstances are presently favorable for attempting to resolve a variety of difficult issues through negotiation. Following this new tack, the Soviets might alter, or at least perceptibly chill, their attitude toward exchanges which have been taking place on such matters as the Middle East, Vietnam negotiations, and arms control. They might go further and say that they perceived a radical turn toward aggressiveness in US policy, with the implied threat that if this continued, critical situations would inevitably be generated at points of confrontation in other areas. While moves to provoke counter crises elsewhere can never be entirely excluded, it seems more likely that in the circumstances postulated, the Soviets would see more advantage in demonstrating that the US move could not bring Hanoi to its knees and in stimulating political pressures in the US and elsewhere to impel the US Government to desist.

Probable North Vietnamese Reactions

105. If the analysis outlined above is correct, soon after the imposition of a quarantine Hanoi would have reason to be confident of securing enough additional Chinese, and Soviet, assistance to be able to minimize the quarantine's physical impact. Thus Hanoi's decision on how to react could be made primarily on political grounds and would probably not be dictated by physical constraints.

106. In making its decision, Hanoi would have a fairly broad range of options to choose from. For example, it could move swiftly to seek a negotiated settlement in Paris. Or it could develop and mount a general, last-gasp type military offensive in South Vietnam. Or Hanoi could protest loudly in the propaganda field, but basically sit tight in the action arenas--both in Paris and on the battlefield in South Vietnam--continuing present policies and programs while waiting to see how the quarantine affected the over-all political climate and, particularly, the political mood in the United States.

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107. There is abundant evidence indicating that Hanoi follows the course of political developments in the United States with careful and detailed attention. The evidence available does not show just how much weight Hanoi attaches in making basic policy decisions to its calculations of US domestic political factors, but the broad outlines of the frame of reference within which Hanoi views such matters are fairly clear.

108. For almost 25 years the Vietnamese Communist leadership has consistently displayed a seemingly ineradicable penchant for repeating strategic or tactical gambits that have proved successful in the past. The writings of the Vietnamese Communists' leaders--Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, and General Giap--all indicate strongly that the Vietnamese politburo believes the Franco - Viet Minh war was lost by the French in Paris as much as it was won by the Vietnamese on the battlefields in Indochina. In essence, the present Hanoi leadership seems convinced that one of their most successful strategies during the 1946-1954 struggle against the French was the utilization of politico-military pressure as political abrasive burring on the will of the French people and the French Government, a strategy which eventually made continuation of the struggle a politically unsaleable commodity in Paris. When this point was reached, the French Government then in power opted out with hasty dispatch. (Mendes-France took office in the summer of 1954 with a public pledge to end the war within a month or resign.) Despite occasional disclaimers or remarks about the difference in the two situations, the writings and statements of the Hanoi leadership over the past few years demonstrates a strong and continuing inclination on Hanoi's part to see (and look for) parallels between the mood in France in the early 1950s and that developing in the United States in the late 1960s.

109. We know from captured notebooks, internal party directives, and reports of cadre indoctrination sessions that the Vietnamese Communist Party is spreading within its own ranks the thesis that

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Communist actions in Vietnam have produced a climate in the United States which "toppled" (or, sometimes, "defeated") Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland, and President Johnson. In propaganda pronouncements, cadre indoctrinations, party directives, and even in statements in public and private negotiating sessions in Paris, the Vietnamese Communists quote US newspaper articles and editorials and Congressional speeches critical of the Vietnam war, constantly playing the theme that the "liberation struggle" is receiving a rising tide of support from "progressive elements" within the United States. The available evidence is not conclusive, but a very strong case can be made for the thesis that Hanoi has a lot of political chips riding on a calculation that if North Vietnam sits tight and more or less stonewalls on its present political posture (buttressed by its present levels of military activity), within a finite time frame (measured in months) rising political pressures within the United States will force the US Government to make major concessionary gestures to Hanoi or accept North Vietnamese demands that involve major allied concessions.

110. It is within the context just outlined that Hanoi views the developments of the past 18 months: Secretary McNamara's resignation, the 1968 Tet offensive, General Westmoreland's recall from Vietnam, the 31 March partial bombing halt accompanied by President Johnson's call for negotiations and personal withdrawal from the electoral arena, the opening of talks in Paris, the full bombing halt on 31 October, the lack of US military response to Hanoi's fudging on the "understandings" with respect to the DMZ and shelling South Vietnam's major cities, Governor Harriman's public criticisms of the Saigon Government and the US negotiating rigidity, the US Government's frequent public endorsements of the concept of negotiated settlement, Mr. Clifford's article, the initial withdrawal of US troops, current public debate over how fast US forces in South Vietnam can or should be withdrawn. Given Hanoi's attitudes and perspective, there are ample grounds for making the strong presumptive inference that Hanoi believes the US is moving steadily down a road of de-escalation and disengagement and, further,

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probably considers it unlikely that the US Government would be politically able to initiate any significant "re-escalation" of the struggle.

111. Under present circumstances, therefore, and in the absence of any major new provocation from Hanoi of a type discussed above in paragraph 90, Hanoi would almost certainly be surprised at the imposition of a quarantine. Furthermore, Hanoi would almost certainly calculate that the quarantine's imposition would swiftly become a topic of acrimonious debate within the United States and would prompt a widespread series of public attacks on the Vietnam policy of the US Government.

112. Since Hanoi could probably withstand or minimize the physical impact of the quarantine (if China and the USSR were willing to provide the necessary aid), Hanoi would probably wait to see how events unfolded and the political climate developed before making any definitive decisions on North Vietnam's optimum response. Hanoi would not want to rush to settlement in Paris, for this course of action would make Hanoi lose face, appear to be acting out of weakness, and probably involve Communist political concessions Hanoi would not want to make unless unfolding events proved that such concessions were unavoidable. On the other hand, Hanoi would probably see little advantage in immediately launching heightened offensive activity in South Vietnam-- a course of action that, in any event, would take some time to organize and prepare.

113. In sum, Hanoi's initial reaction would probably be to gamble that the US would not be politically able to sustain the quarantine for any appreciable length of time. Such a gamble would involve relatively few risks for Hanoi and would be reinforced by the calculation that if the US lifted the quarantine without obtaining any major concessions from North Vietnam, Hanoi's political image, prestige, and position would be materially enhanced at Washington's expense. The Soviets would probably counsel Hanoi to take such a gamble and, in this instance, Hanoi would find Soviet advice attractively congenial.

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114. While waiting for events to ripen before deciding on its final course of action, Hanoi would certainly mount a strident propaganda campaign shrilly attacking the US quarantine as an act of "aggression" and proof positive of America's "neo-colonialist," "imperialist" perfidy. Hanoi's propaganda chorus would be energetically joined by Communist China, the Soviets and Communist governments and parties throughout the world. Hanoi would also probably suspend--or at least temporarily walk out of--the Paris talks, partly because "face" would require some response and partly because this action would fan worldwide apprehension that peace prospects had been dashed.

115. If the US Government turned what appeared to be a deaf ear to the criticisms the quarantine would inevitably provoke at home and abroad and persisted in the quarantine through a period of weeks stretching into months, the arguments within the Hanoi politburo would become increasingly nervous and sharp. These arguments would not revolve around the physical impact of the quarantine but around the extent to which its continuation called into increasing question certain fundamental calculations about the political staying power of the US Government on which Hanoi's present strategy is largely based. Contingency plans for prolonged struggle unquestionably exist in Hanoi, but despite a public posture of implacable determination to fight on forever until total victory (e.g., General Giap's recent speech), the abundant evidence of mounting stresses and strains within North Vietnam and within the Communist movement in South Vietnam makes it debatable (at least) whether Hanoi really is prepared to carry on the struggle for a time span measured in years without scaling down its present minimal political demands in order to achieve an earlier settlement. Imposition of a quarantine would almost certainly not induce Hanoi to opt promptly for a negotiated settlement. Persistence in the quarantine over a period of months would--at a minimum--almost certainly compel Hanoi to review its basic strategy and the political calculations on which that strategy is based. Any final decisions on strategic options made after such a review, however, would not hinge on the quarantine alone but would reflect Hanoi's net analysis

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of all relevant factors--including levels of Chinese and Soviet aid, the course of events in South Vietnam, trends in the fortunes of the Communists' southern organization, manpower loss rates, the world political climate and Hanoi's assessment of the political temper within the United States.

Probable South Vietnamese Reactions

116. President Thieu and his associates are clearly convinced that domestic US opinion is a major factor in determining the course and pace of US policy in Vietnam. Thieu believed last year that the decision to end the bombing of North Vietnam was a move the Johnson administration felt it had to take for domestic political reasons. Thieu has also stated in private to his advisers that he understands the need for President Nixon's administration to withdraw some American troops this year in order to assuage public opinion in this country.

117. This view of domestic US political considerations helped Thieu take calmly what he saw as the failure of the US to retaliate when the Communists violated the "understandings" which led to the bombing halt. He appears to have reconciled himself to the likelihood that the US will not resume the bombing of North Vietnam or escalate the war by attacking North Vietnam in any fashion.

118. Thieu's estimate of the political constraints under which he believes the US Government is operating seems to be generally shared by his associates and, for that matter, by most politically conscious South Vietnamese. Thus the imposition of a quarantine against North Vietnam (without some prior Communist provocation or other major change in existing circumstances) would come as a surprise to Thieu, his associates, and most of his fellow countrymen. The initial reaction of non-Communist South Vietnamese would probably be one of exultant delight. There would be a lift in confidence about the future and about the willingness of the US Government to stay the course (two concepts most Vietnamese view as inextricably intertwined). This lift would certainly improve South Vietnamese morale and would probably have a beneficial effect on South

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Vietnamese performance in some areas. On the other hand, the fact of the quarantine might somewhat diminish South Vietnamese interest in seeking accommodation with the enemy or lessen the sense of urgency with which they viewed the need to set their own house in order to gird for a period of political competition.

119. The longer term impact of the quarantine on South Vietnamese attitudes, policies and performance would hinge on the course of events. If the quarantine should eventually prompt significant political concessions from Hanoi, these concessions (more than the quarantine itself) would enhance non-Communist political prospects in South Vietnam. On the other hand, if the quarantine should be imposed and then lifted without any obvious reciprocal gesture from Hanoi, virtually all politically concerned South Vietnamese would read this course of events as a major US political defeat which greatly enhanced the Vietnamese Communists' prospects of success.

Probable Reactions of Other East Asian Countries

120. Virtually all informed East Asians would see the postulated action as a certain sign that prospects for an early negotiated end to the war had faded. Few would expect the US move to affect decisively Hanoi's will to continue the war, or, at least in the short term, its ability to do so.

121. The more hawkish US allies in East Asia, Thailand and South Korea, would welcome the US action as an earnest of its intention to persist in seeking a favorable outcome of the war. In the other countries reactions would be somewhat ambivalent. While there is clearly a general desire to see the Communists stopped in South Vietnam, most governments want to see an end to the war and its attendant perils. The increased possibility of a US-Soviet military confrontation in the region would be particularly unnerving to them. Thus, support of the US action would be at best lukewarm. Leftist and anti-US elements, of course, would react vociferously wherever possible.

122. Japan is a special case. In coping with vigorous leftist opposition on security issues over the past year or so, Prime Minister Sato has been strengthened by the apparent reduction in the threat of any major expansion of the Vietnamese war. Any move which appeared to run counter to this trend would provide his opponents with ammunition for their attacks on his commitment to the US alliance and to the continued US military presence in Japan and Okinawa. Fears of Soviet military involvement in Vietnam would be especially susceptible to leftist exploitation, particularly if the US had instituted an active blockade rather than relying on mining the approaches to Haiphong. Furthermore, the opposition would emphasize the likely deterioration of prospects for US-Soviet moves toward nuclear disarmament, a politically effective charge in Japan.

123. In response to all this, the Sato government would probably feel compelled to mute what little overt support it now gives to the US position in Vietnam and to adopt an even firmer public posture in its security negotiations with the US, particularly on the Okinawan issue. More important, on the island itself, it seems certain that heavy local agitation against the basing of B-52s at Kadena would be renewed. As leader of a great maritime nation, Sato might also find it necessary to voice displeasure with the US effort to close the sea lanes to Haiphong. Over the longer term, the impact in Japan of the Haiphong action would depend on subsequent developments. For example, if the US move came to be viewed in Japan as the first link in a chain of actions which greatly prolonged the shooting war, political elements advocating a loosening of security ties with the US would almost certainly gain supporters.

Probable UK and Other Western European Reactions

124. The dominant reaction in the UK, in official circles as well as among the populace at large, would be grave concern and disappointment over what would be generally viewed as a distinct setback to hopes for any early peace in Vietnam. The most hostile criticism would be focused on the challenge being posed to the USSR and its implications for European security (e.g., Berlin), nuclear

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
disarmament negotiations, and the East-West detente in general. Violent large-scale leftist demonstrations would once again plague the authorities. The fact that a number of British-flag dry-cargo vessels (based in Hong Kong) call regularly at Haiphong would probably not be a major factor in the UK reaction to the US move, because these vessels for the most part are owned or leased by firms controlled by the Chinese Communists.

125. Elsewhere in Western Europe, reactions would be about the same as in the UK, with the degree of antagonism toward the US probably greatest in the Scandinavian countries. In France, however, the reaction might lead to a reversal of the warming trend in Franco-American relations since the advent of new governments in both countries.

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TAB E

WORLD REACTIONS TAB

1. This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the U.S. mining of the Haiphong Port Complex.

2. General Comments.

a. Mining of the Haiphong Port Complex would be regarded as an "escalation" of the war and would be so treated by the Communist world in its propaganda. It would be accepted as such by most of the rest of the world as well - particularly the neutrals such as Sweden and India.

b. Much of the uneasiness concerning Vietnam which was important in world affairs approximately a year ago has now subsided. In the present world climate it is likely that this act would be generally interpreted as showing determination, whereas a year ago it might have been regarded as recklessness. It is still possible that charges of "recklessness" would be directed against the U.S. Small powers would, in general, manifest more disapproval than large powers who would be more likely to appreciate the dilemma which pushed the U.S. to this action. Large powers would not be likely, however, to "speak out" on behalf of the U.S.

c. It would be interpreted by all discerning governments as primarily a challenge to the USSR. Few would really consider it as sufficient to disturb the peace of the world, but many would act as if they so regarded it. In recent decades, the world has seen a number of examples of the application of force clearly calculated to signal resolve rather than recklessness. The majority of the world's leaders have become inured to the kind of propaganda which inevitably follows this use of force. In the end, those who have no direct interest in the matter take precautions to ensure that they will not become involved. Those who have an interest, but no capability, propagandize. Those governments which have both interest and capability are addressed below.

3. North Vietnam.

a. NVN has only a limited, unsophisticated capability to counter the mining program. Anti-mine warfare efforts should not have any appreciable effect on the program overall.

b. NVN has a considerable capability to attempt circumvention of the mining program through the use of small (mostly wooden) boats and lighters. Some of these would be lost, of course, but this would not deter NVN from putting forth a major effort in this respect.

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c. To the extent that the mining affected the flow of goods into NVN, a maximum effort to compensate for the reduction would be undertaken via the overland and coastal-water routes from Communist China.

d. NVN could be expected to attack US units engaged in the mining. They are not capable of preventing such a US effort, but they could attempt harassment of US ships and aircraft. The expected aircraft loss rate is 3 percent or less.

e. NVN would probably consider that it was in its interest for a Russian ship to be sunk (or appear to have been sunk) by U.S. mines. To this end -- and in this eventuality -- NVN might foster a situation that would encourage a U.S.-USSR confrontation over the mining issue. Russian failure to stand up to the Americans, if that should occur, would be unsettling to NVN, but it would not drive them into the arms of China.

f. To the extent practicable, NVN would probably respond to the U.S. escalation with some escalation of its own elsewhere, probably in Laos.

4. Communist China.

a. Communist China is beginning to figure less and less as a factor in NVN policy surrounding this war. CHICOMS are still the most important suppliers of small arms (up to the size of mortars and some rockets) and ammunition to NVN, but they no longer retain any discernible political influence with Hanoi in return for their arms support.

b. Chinese reaction to the mining is expected to be negligible, except in the propaganda areas, which should also have negligible impact.

c. The Chinese might be persuaded by NVN to step up their aid, if that is required, but Chinese aid and support of any kind would not be likely to compensate NVN for the possible loss of Russian support. (Political and psychological support is perhaps as important as material). In short, NVN is not likely to risk the loss of Russian backing by too ready a dependence on Communist China. At the same time, China would be asked to do more of what she is now doing.

d. If the shipments of Russian goods across China are now encountering difficulties, as reports indicate, then the act of mining, per se, would not be expected to affect that situation. Other factors, such as the Russian-Chinese border talks, would be expected to be of much greater direct importance. The current problems between the Russians and the Chinese are surely bigger than the future of South Vietnam; they may even be bigger than the future of North Vietnam.

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5. The USSR.

a. If the Russians are willing to risk some ship losses in crossing the minefield in order to demonstrate their resolve to support NVN, little will have been gained as regards the NVN war. Russian-U.S. relations will have suffered a setback, but even that should not be serious. The Russians will know that by flaunting the U.S. minefield they are not running a great political risk: that they would primarily be showing only the depth of their own determination. They already know well the depth of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, and while they might be momentarily surprised at our mining decision in the light of current U.S. policy, they will soon recover and see it as a challenge thrown down to them to abandon their North Vietnamese ally.

b. If necessary to prove their commitment to NVN, the USSR might cross the minefield. At the very least, they would provide assistance to the NVN in their efforts to circumvent the mining program, perhaps even to the extent of dispatching mine-sweepers. In Russian eyes, it would be, from a political/psychological point of view, a Berlin-Blockade in reverse. Thus the probability is that no open confrontation between the U.S. and Russia would result because none would be necessary.

c. At the same time -- once proper allowance has been made for "face" on both sides -- the Russians would probably be further disgusted with the whole business of the war (which has always been of much less importance to them than to us). The net effect could be to prompt the Russians to put more political pressure on NVN to end the war: to accept a "political settlement." They could not force NVN, and they certainly would not cut off visible support of NVN; but the war in Southeast Asia is becoming an annoyance to the Russians in their current foreign policy aspirations, which primarily seek support against China. The mining of Haiphong would provide them with one more good excuse to put added pressure on Hanoi for a settlement. This pressure would not be visible pressure, for the world to see, and it would not be likely to be instant. It might not even be decisive, but it could be an important factor at this time.

d. Russia's most visible reactions would probably occur outside of Southeast Asia and impinge upon the question of U.S.-USSR relations in general. They might, for example, freeze progress toward such on-going matters as SALT, or they might become more difficult on matters having to do with solutions to the Middle East problem. They could even decide on a course of no cooperation with the present Administration in an attempt to embarrass it politically.

6. U.S. Counter Actions

a. The U.S. can blunt the anticipated propaganda by the

USSR, Communist China, and others by explaining, at the time the mining of the Haiphong Complex is announced, that the U.S. has gone to great lengths to end the war in Vietnam, by the bombing halt, the withdrawal of combat troops, and political accommodations. These attempts have met nothing but intransigence on the part of North Vietnam and her allies. U.S. patience and understanding have reasonable limits which are now being strained. The mining of the Haiphong Complex is a low order response to the complete lack of cooperation by the North Vietnamese government and its allies.

b. If the USSR suffers ship losses in attempting to run the minefield, the U.S. can express sincere regrets and point out that the loss was completely unnecessary since the original announcement by the U.S. provided sufficient time for all shipping to depart Haiphong safely. Point out that the USSR callously sacrificed the loss of their men and material in spite of all U.S. attempts to protect third nation shipping.

c. If the USSR provides minesweepers to North Vietnam, or sweeps the minefield herself, this will be detected by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Upon completion of the sweeping operation, the U.S. can reseed the field as necessary.

d. If, as is most likely, the Soviet ships anchor just to seaward of the minefields and leave the off-loading to the North Vietnamese via lighterage, the U.S. can respond by seeding the lighters' routes with MK 36 destructors. All of the normal routes will have been seeded in the initial mine lay. Follow-on seeding would be needed if the North Vietnamese select alternate routes.

e. There is little the U.S. could do to prevent the USSR from delaying SALT or withdrawing from Mid-East talks. In the case of SALT the USSR might well decide that her vital interests are at stake in gambling on a nuclear arms race and therefore go ahead with the negotiations. If the USSR drops out of the Mid-East talks, the U.S. can express regrets and make plans to continue to seek peace in the Mid-East without Soviet participation.

f. The U.S. could accept the use of Chinese ports by the USSR and transshipment of material by rail from China to North Vietnam. Such an arrangement would delay the arrival of material in Haiphong and Hanoi and could further strain the relations between Communist China and the USSR.

g. A Soviet blockade of Berlin should be addressed as a separate issue without relation to U.S. action in Southeast Asia. The U.S. response would parallel those actions taken in the past to all threats by the Soviets and East Germany to a closure of access to Berlin.

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h. The US could destroy North Vietnamese lighterage with gunfire from US destroyers as the lighters depart the deep water anchorages for the beach. There would be no threat to third nation shipping and no loss of civilian lives.


i. Adverse weather conditions, particularly during the Northeast Monsoon period from September to May with attendant high sea states, would make NVN lighterage operations both dangerous and inefficient. In addition both people and resources would be diverted from other tasks, like fishing and inner harbor transportation, if an extensive lighterage operation were attempted. This diversion and the delay in the arrival of imports would have a cumulative adverse effect on the North Vietnamese economy and their ability and willingness to continue the war effort in the South.

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TAB E

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SENSITIVE

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DUCK HOOK

20 JULY 1969



Office of Chief of Naval Operations

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 06-04/2 per ltr. 6/29/2009
By JMR NARA, Date 10/30/2009

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SENSITIVE

LEGAL RAMIFICATION OF MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR
AND ITS APPROACHES

1. The traditional international law doctrines, particularly as codified in Hague Convention VIII (1907) impose the following restrictions, among others, on the use of mine warfare:

a. The use of mines presupposes the existence of a state of war.

b. The laying of mines with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping is prohibited.

c. The use of mines in time of peace could be considered an act of war by third countries.

d. Interference by mines with movements of international shipping on high seas is prohibited.

2. Whatever the historic worth of these prohibitions, a modern legal analysis of the use of mines in present day international conflict requires an examination of several additional factors. The international laws of war have evolved throughout history out of an interaction from disputes between nations, conflicts between military efficiency and humanitarianism, and changing weapons technology. Since the end of World War II, these laws have been subjected to the unprecedented pressures of cold war international politics and introduction of modern weapons. Because of the resulting revolutionary changes, the traditional laws of war have been rendered obsolete, but no fixed principles have yet been internationally accepted to replace them.

3. However, the national right of self-defense, which has existed since time immemorial, has been recognized in the U.N. Charter and strengthened in international practice. Also, the former simple dichotomy between state of peace and state of war no longer has legal or political validity. Therefore, in assessing the legality of an act of coercion, the rigid formulas of pre-World War II are irrelevant, and new standards for legality must be sought.

4. South Vietnam, a sovereign nation, possesses the inherent right to defend itself against aggression. In the exercise of this right, South Vietnam requested U.S. assistance in repelling the aggression which has been waged by North Vietnam with increasing ferocity for several years. Therefore, the United States and South Vietnam have the right under international law to participate in the collective defense of South Vietnam against armed attack.*

*Department of State Bulletin, dated March 4, 1966, entitled The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam.

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5. A principal source of supplies for the continued prosecution of that aggression is the Port of Haiphong. The aggression could be greatly reduced by effectively denying to North Vietnam these necessary supplies. As part of its self-defense effort, therefore, South Vietnam and its allies would be justified in employing a reasonable method of denying this flow of supplies. The mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, can properly be considered such a method. Mine emplacement should extend seaward of Haiphong Harbor only so far as is necessary to halt the entrance of shipping to the harbor. Advance notification must be given to all shipping concerning time of activation of mines laid. All shipping entering Haiphong after that time would do so at its own peril.

6. The fundamental test of any act in international law is reasonableness. The reasonableness of self-defense actions is gauged by the standards of necessity and proportionality. It is clear beyond dispute that South Vietnam is deeply engaged in self-defense action against the overt hostilities of North Vietnam. Thus, the necessity for action is clear. In assessing the proportionality of the mining of Haiphong, the following elements are pertinent:

- a. Mining is a passive, not aggressive, measure.
- b. Advance notice will be given to third countries.
- c. Mining will be restricted to the area around Haiphong.
- d. Potentially, no loss of life or property need be incurred.
- e. This defensive measure will reduce loss of life and material elsewhere in the zone of hostilities.

7. In summary, the traditional laws of war do not cover mining except in a state of war. The political and technological history of the cold war has rendered the laws of war, based on the war or peace dichotomy, obsolete and irrelevant. Acts in self-defense are lawful under international law. Therefore, mining of Haiphong Harbor and its approaches, as described in this plan, is considered to be a lawful exercise of South Vietnam's right of self-defense against the aggression of North Vietnam.

S H A N O U K V I L L E

SUMMARY OF INTERDICTION (QUARANTINE) PLAN
FOR PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE

1. This paper summarizes a plan for the interdiction (quarantine) of all war material entering the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville.

BACKGROUND

2. The bulk of arms and ammunition coming from out-of-country sources to the enemy in III and IV CTZ is obtained by NLF agents from, or through, Cambodian sources. There is ample evidence that much of the military equipment entering Sihanoukville, ostensibly for the Cambodian armed forces, is in fact intended for the Communist war effort in South Vietnam. (See Tab A). The following table shows the estimated munitions deliveries to Sihanoukville since late 1966 based on Navy intelligence analysis.

MUNITIONS TONNAGE SUMMARY

1966 (4th Qtr.)	950
1967	4500
1968	8000
1969 (to date)	4500 to 9000

INTERDICTION (QUARANTINE) PLAN

3. To stop the flow of military material through Sihanoukville, interdiction (quarantine) of ships destined for coastline of Cambodia will be initiated. Interdiction (quarantine) is defined as a selective blockade, i.e., it would deny access of certain types of material to Cambodia. Ships will not be allowed to enter Sihanoukville unless they have previously obtained a Certificate of Clearance (NAVICERT) from U. S. State Department at last port of departure; or, unless they received clearance in the approaches to Cambodia as consequence of a search of ship by U. S. interdiction (quarantine) forces.

4. To carry out interdiction (quarantine), six destroyers will be equally spaced along barrier line approximately 60 NM from Cambodian coast. A 6-plane P3A detachment operating out of U-Tapao or Sattahip will provide maritime air patrols to give timely warning of approaching shipping to barrier forces. (See Tab B for details).

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5. Rules of engagement contained in Tab C, and include provisions for increasingly severe measures to insure successful execution of the interdiction (quarantine) plan.

6. Interdiction (quarantine) is a defensive measure and must be subject to twin tests of necessity and proportionality imposed by international law. These tests require that action be necessary to meet the clear and present threat, and proportioned to the threat. The interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville appears to meet these criteria. (See Tab E).

7. Possible reactions by the USSR, Communist China, and North Vietnam have been analyzed and are covered in Tab D.

TABS

- A - Intelligence
- B - Quarantine Plan
- C - Rules of Engagement for Quarantine
- D - World Reaction to Quarantine
- E - Legal Ramifications of Quarantine

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A

TAB A

INTELLIGENCE

SIHANOUKVILLE

1. **Enemy Forces.** The Cambodian Navy, Marine Royale Khmere (MARK), including riverine forces, is composed of about 50 ships, about 30 of which are amphibious craft. The naval forces also include about 12,000 general service personnel and 200 naval infantry. The main naval operating base and headquarters is located at Chruai Changvar Krau (11-35N/104-55E), near Phnom Penh. Secondary bases are at Kampot, Kep Lem Dam, and Ream. The Navy is capable of only moderately effective patrol of major inland waterways, a small capability for coastal patrol, and a limited transport capability for the Army. The effectiveness of the Navy is low due to deficient training and maintenance, lack of spare parts, budgetary limitations, and small size. The 1,500 man Cambodian Air Force, Aviation Royale Khmere (AVRK), has about 140 aircraft, including about 12 MIG-17's, about 14 T-28D's, about 12 AlH (AD-6) aircraft, about 20 transport aircraft, and about 23 French Morane-Saulnier trainers. AVRK units in Cambodia are located at Pochentong Base, six miles west of Phnom Penh. Siem Riep airfield in northwest Cambodia is reportedly being improved to acquire primary status. Kampot, Kratie, and Prek Kak are secondary fields. The AVRK is capable of providing a limited air defense capability and of supporting army and aerial activities in civic action programs. AVRK effectiveness is considered marginal. Maintenance is from satisfactory to poor, and parts, ammunition, and fuel are in short supply.

2. **Sihanoukville Maritime Intelligence:**

a. The USIB has estimated that Cambodian sources supply as much as 15 percent of the daily food requirements of all communist forces in South Vietnam.

b. Recently, a reliable source reported that two types of contracts exist between Cambodian authorities and the Viet Cong. The first involves the shipment of non-military goods to the communists; the other governs the shipment of arms and ammunition. In addition, the recent visit of a high level Viet Cong leader (Phat) to Phnom Penh for talks with Sihanouk, allegedly related to delays in shipments caused by the Cambodians, lends further credence to past reports that Sihanouk, himself, has been a party to some

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kind of an understanding with the communists on this subject. Other recent reports from fairly reliable sources refer to arms and ammunition being held back by the Cambodians pending the negotiation of new controls with the Viet Cong. Taken together, all the evidence adds up to the picture of some kind of official Cambodian involvement in a regularized munitions movement to the enemy forces in and around South Vietnam. The evidence suggests that the tonnages of arms and ammunition involved over the past year or so have constituted an important, and at times a major, proportion of communist requirements in III and IV Corps.

c. The USIB has recently concluded that there is little doubt that the importance of the Cambodian logistics route to the enemy war effort has grown significantly over the past two years or so.

d. Total shipping activity at Cambodian ports increased in 1968 above the level of 1967. Ship calls were up 10 percent (from 568 to 627), and imports increased by 27 percent, from 582,000 tons to 742,000 tons. Free World ships made 95 percent of all calls at Cambodian ports. For the first year since 1965, ship arrivals and total imports at Sihanoukville exceeded those at Phnom Penh. Imports handled at Sihanoukville were 80 percent greater than in 1967. Petroleum, cement, and coal were the most important bulk imports, accounting for 62 percent of the total.

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TAB A

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B

TAB B

INTERDICTION (QUARANTINE) PLAN FOR SIHANOUKVILLE

1. General. Intelligence reports continue to indicate that war materials intended for use by enemy forces in Republic of Vietnam are moved by sea to Cambodia for transshipment within Cambodia to enemy base areas located within Cambodia or astride the border within Vietnam. Although there are alternate points of entry into Cambodia at Kampot and Ream, Sihanoukville, because of both political and geographic factors is virtually the sole ocean terminus of Cambodian commerce. Alongside berths at Sihanoukville can accommodate four ocean-going ships and four lighters simultaneously, which provide an estimated military port capacity of 2700 long tons per day. Use of the alternate points of entry of Kampot and Ream would dictate either off loading from seagoing merchantmen to junks off the entrance to Sihanoukville or intermediate points of origin within the range of small coastal junks.

2. Mission. Establish control of ocean traffic by interdiction (quarantine) in the vicinity of Sihanoukville, Cambodia, in order to deter or prevent military supplies from arriving in Cambodia via the sea.

3. Execution. Commander SEVENTH Fleet will alert and deploy Navy combat forces as directed, in order to maintain control of ocean traffic by interdiction (quarantine) of the approaches to Sihanoukville, Cambodia.

a. Cruiser-Destroyer Group SEVENTH Fleet (TG 70.8). Plan, and when directed, conduct naval operations, including:

(1) Provision of necessary destroyer forces.

(2) Exercise command and control of the patrol and interdiction/quarantine forces.

b. Patrol Force SEVENTH Fleet (TF 72). Plan, and when directed, conduct naval operations, including:

(1) Provision of patrol aircraft, aircrews and logistics support as required.

(2) Position VP detachment when directed.

c. Logistic Support Force SEVENTH Fleet (TF 73).

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(1) When directed provide logistic support to all forces and elements as required.

(2) Make timely recommendations to minimize logistic complexity in accomplishing this task.

4. Definitions. For the purpose of this plan, Interdiction (quarantine) is defined as follows: A peacetime act (in contrast to a belligerent blockade which is a wartime act) wherein all shipping suspected of carrying military supplies to the quarantined ports are subject to visit and search. Those ships carrying prohibited materials to the quarantined ports are not captured, but are directed to proceed to another destination of their own choice. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody by use of such force as is necessary for that purpose.

5. Concept. This operational concept provides for Pacific Fleet control of maritime traffic within the Gulf of Thailand to counter the flow of military supplies to the VC/NVA forces through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. These maritime control operations are envisaged under conditions short of general war.

a. To carry out an interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville a surface ship barrier will be established around Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. High seas shipping bound for Cambodia will be denied passage into Cambodia unless they have previously obtained a clearance certificate (NAVICERT) from the U. S. State Department at their last port of departure or have been inspected by U. S. interdiction (quarantine) forces and found free of military supplies. Any shipping which fails to satisfy requirements for passage will be turned back or diverted. U. S. forces assigned will conduct minimum offensive action to insure compliance. Rules of engagement are discussed in Tab C.

b. The barrier line for the interdiction (quarantine) will be established approximately 60 NM from the coast of Cambodia in the Gulf of Thailand. This line will extend from the southern-most tip of South Vietnam to the seaward extremity of the Island of Poulo Panjang, thence to a position 11°N, 102°E, thence along longitude 102°E to the coast of Thailand (See attached map). Maritime air patrols will be flown to cover the seaward approaches to the Gulf of Thailand in order to provide timely warning to the barrier

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forces off the coast of Cambodia.

c. With Cambodia situated between the two friendly countries of South Vietnam and Thailand there is little threat to U. S. forces engaged in the interdiction (quarantine). It is not anticipated that protection beyond that inherent to the ships in the barrier line would be required.

6. Forces Required. The following forces are required to establish the barrier line in the Gulf of Thailand and provide the associated surveillance patrols:

6 P3A

8-12 Destroyers (or suitable forces presently assigned to Market Time).

a. Six destroyers will be equally spaced along the barrier line. The barrier line will be approximately 300 NM in length with 50 NM between destroyers. The remaining destroyers will provide periodic relief.

b. With 6 P3A's based at U-Tapao it is possible to patrol 60 to 75 NM outboard (to seaward) of the surface barrier and provide a revisit time which will guarantee 100 percent coverage of shipping approaching the barrier line. (See attached map).

c. The A0 which normally supports the southern Market Time forces can also support the barrier destroyers.

7. Operating Instructions.

a. Close surveillance.

(1) Action, while keeping shipping under close surveillance, will be designed to obtain information only and should involve no damage to property or personnel casualties.

b. Stopping of ships.

(1) Use all available communication means to signify intent to stop ship: International code signals, flag hoists, blinking light, loudspeaker, radio, etc.

(2) This failing, warning shot across bow may be used.

(3) This failing, use minimum force required to cause ship to stop.

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TAB B

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c. Diversion of shipping.

(1) Diversion instructions shall be at the discretion of CINCPACFLT.

(2) Ensure that ship responds to diversion as directed.

(3) If ship fails to respond, stop ship, board, and declare intent to sequester ship by use of force.

d. Seizure of ships.

(1) In the seizure of ships, the objective is to take these ships to a designated port without damage. The optimum would be to escort ships to port. If this cannot be done, the following actions are authorized;

(a) Put boarding party aboard to supervise ship's crew.


(b) Forceful boarding and control of ship's operations.

(2) The above failing destroy.

e. Destruction.

(1) If necessary to destroy, give ample warning of intentions to permit sufficient time for debarkation of ship's crew and passengers. Assist as operational conditions permit.

3. Scene of action commander keep appropriate commanders advised.



BURMA

THAILAND

VF PATROL

DD STATIONS

Saigonville

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NOTE

CAUTION:
 1. This chart is intended for reference and general information only. It is not to be used for navigation.
 2. The scale in the vicinity of the Bay and Gulf is 1:100,000.
 3. The scale in the vicinity of the Gulf of Thailand is 1:200,000.

GULF OF SIAM
 From various sources to 1961
 SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS
 SOUNDINGS IN METERS ABOVE MEAN SEA LEVEL
 For Symbols and Abbreviations, see Chart No. 1
 SCALE 1:100,000 AT LAT. 12°N

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C

TAB C

MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

SIHANOUKVILLE

1. Rules of Engagement

a. Actions must be completely and successfully consummated with use of minimum force required to accomplish missions assigned.

b. Be alert and prepared for hostile action/reaction.

c. Take action in a manner to minimize personnel casualties and render all possible assistance to personnel in distress.

d. Minimize interference with other shipping.

e. Nothing in these rules modifies in any manner the requirements of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate action against the attacking force.

f. Be prepared to take increasingly severe measures. In so doing, and recognizing language difficulties, allow sufficient time between actions for ship masters to realize full consequence for failures to respond properly.

g. Take offensive action against enemy surface ships and aircraft in the immediate area of operations only as necessary to counter direct interference with the execution of the assigned military actions.

h. Territorial limits are defined as extending to the limits of the territorial sea, which is a belt of sea adjacent to a coastal state three miles in breadth, measured from the low water mark along the coast. However, in the states claiming over three mile territorial seas, that distance claimed shall be observed as if it were actually the width of their territorial seas if that claimed width does not exceed twelve miles.

i. Immediate pursuit is pursuit initiated in response to actions or attack by hostile aircraft or vessels. The pursuit must be continuous, uninterrupted and feasible and may be extended as necessary over territorial/internal air space/seas. Immediate pursuit is authorized as necessary and

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feasible into territorial/internal seas and air space of Cambodia.

j. Instructions for visit and search, boarding, and control of crew are in accordance with Naval Warfare Publication (NWP-50A) and Naval Warfare Information Publication (NWIP 10-2).

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TAB C

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TAB D

WORLD REACTIONS TAB
(SIHANOUKVILLE)

1. This Tab reviews possible reactions in response to the U.S. interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville.
2. Interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville would generally be regarded as an escalation of the conflict, but it should not prove as controversial as mining because it would clearly discriminate between ships carrying contraband and those which do not.
3. All shipping which is of no concern to U.S. would be able to obtain a NAVICERT and thus proceed unmolested. The ChiCom shipping presumably would not be able to obtain a NAVICERT, and thus probably would not attempt to enter the quarantined port. In the end, it is improbable that any serious confrontation on the high seas would actually occur.
4. It is considered likely that Soviet shipping would not challenge the U.S. interdiction (quarantine). The Cuban example would suggest that the Russians have already provided an historical as well as a legal precedent for this judgment. Moreover, Russian shipping would probably qualify for a NAVICERT in virtually all cases; thus, both the U.S. and the Russians would enjoy the advantage of a face-saving device being built into the quarantine.
5. The question does arise as to what political or psychological benefits might accrue to the U.S. vis-a-vis Russian willingness to continue its support of NVN in the war. With Russian interest now focused more and more on matters outside of Southeast Asia, it is expected that, aside from the propaganda value, the Russians would view this U.S. act with relative equanimity. They would not regard the quarantine as much a direct challenge as the mining of Haiphong. They probably would recognize the quarantine as a demonstration of U.S. resolve and might, therefore, put more pressure on Hanoi to reach a speedy settlement.
6. Cambodia probably would object to such an interdiction (quarantine) and again break off diplomatic relations with the U.S. Conversely, Sihanouk could use such a U.S. act as a convenient means to discontinue his current relations with the North Vietnamese, if he desired. It is difficult to forecast his choice. In either event, Cambodia has no means to counter the successful execution of the quarantine.

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7. NVN has a considerable capability to compensate via Laos for the loss of Sihanoukville as a logistics route for arms and ammunition. This would not be without considerable effort, and perhaps some sacrifice in overall capabilities, in light of the fact that the enemy logistics system is already heavily burdened by the present demands upon it.

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TAB D

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TAB E

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF QUARANTINE (INTERDICTION) OF

SIHANOUKVILLE, CAMBODIA

1. As a sovereign nation, South Vietnam has the right to act in self-defense against aggression. Pursuant to this right, South Vietnam may request other nations to come to its assistance. The United States has responded to South Vietnam's request for assistance in acting against the aggression from North Vietnam.
2. The legality of the acts of self-defense by South Vietnam and its allies is judged by applying the dual tests of necessity and proportionality. The necessity for forceful acts in self-defense has been demonstrated beyond argument by North Vietnam's unrelenting aggression against South Vietnam during the past several years.
3. The uninterrupted furnishing of military supplies to North Vietnamese and NLF troops constitutes the sole means whereby the aggression against South Vietnam can be sustained. The function of this supply system is in fact part of the continuing aggression. Therefore, any reasonable step taken to stem this flow of supplies, and thereby eliminate the capability to continue the conflict would be an act in self-defense.
4. It has been shown that the port of Sihanoukville, **Cambodia** plays a significant role in the furnishing of military supplies to NLF and North Vietnam troops. This plan prescribes the procedures for an interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville for the purpose of intercepting military supplies destined for NVN/NLF forces through that port. As indicated above, such action can be considered an act of self-defense provided it is proportionate and does not excessively impinge on the rights of other nations.
5. The international precedent for an interdiction (quarantine) was established in the international community when the United States quarantined Cuba during the US-USSR missile crisis in October 1962. As in the Cuban precedent, this plan provides for the following restraints and safeguards:
 - a. No ships carrying non-military supplies will be kept from entering Sihanoukville.
 - b. Ships carrying military supplies for North Vietnam will be diverted to any other port of their own choosing.
 - c. No force will be employed in the interdiction (quarantine), unless a ship carrying military supplies refuses to comply with these procedures; and in that case, only so much force as is required to ensure compliance will be employed.

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d. There will be no intrusions into the territorial waters of Cambodia.

e. The inconvenience offered to international shipping will be minimal because of the use of certificates of clearance (NAV-ICERTS).

6. Based on these carefully prescribed limitations, it is clear that the sole purpose of the interdiction (quarantine) is the interception of military supplies destined for North Vietnam. No other object is intended; no other effects should be experienced. This plan represents a limited, measured, proportioned response to one source of North Vietnamese aggression.

7. In view of the conclusions reached above, and the international acceptance afforded the United States quarantine of Cuba, the prototype of this plan, it is clear that the interdiction (quarantine) of Sihanoukville is supported by international law and practice.

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TAB E

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