

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	REPORT	INDO CHINA OPERATIONS STATUS REPORT	2/11/71	B
2	MEMO (w/ATTACH)	LAIRD TO KISSINGER	2/10/71	B
3	REPORT	INDOCHINA OPERATIONS STATUS REPORT	2/10/71	B
4	MEMO (w/ATTACH)	LAIRD TO KISSINGER	2/10/71	B
5	MEMO (w/ATTACH)	ELIOT TO KISSINGER	2/9/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES

BOX NUMBER

81

FOLDER TITLE

VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

VOL III
(FOLDER 2 OF 2)

①

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
6	REPORT	INDOCHINA OPERATIONS STATUS REPORT	2/9/71	B
7	TELEGRAM	GEN ABRAMS TO ADMIRAL MOORER	2/22/71	B
8	TELEGRAM	TO JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV	N/D	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES

BOX NUMBER

81

FOLDER TITLE

VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. III (FOLDER 2 of 2)

2

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- B. National security classified information.
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- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
NMCC

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

LATIMER
HM19
HOWE
HOUDEK
HOLDRIDGE
KENNEDY

10 February 1971
1600 EST



THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Status Report on Operations in Laos and Cambodia

Attached are status reports on operations in Laos and Cambodia.

Joseph C. McDonough

JOSEPH C. McDONOUGH
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

2 Encls
a/s

Distribution:

- WHSR
- SECDEF
- DEPSECDEF
- ASD/PA (Mr Henkin)
- ASD/ISA
- CJCS (5)
- DJS (2)
- J-3
- J-32
- J-33
- J-34
- J-36 (DDO)
- DIA
- CSA
- CSAF
- CNO
- CMC
- SECSTATE (For Mr Eliot or Mr Curran
EYES ONLY)
- VAdm Gayler
- PAC Div
- P&A Div

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

71 FEB 10 PM 4:24

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

①

10 February 1971

Subject: Operation LAMSON 719

1. General: This report covers the period 092400-100800 GMT (100800-101600 Saigon time, 091900-100300 EST) February 1971. The information herein is based on available combat reports and will be revised upon receipt of more complete information.

2. Summary of Current Operations:

a. General Situation: US and RVNAF forces participating in Operation LAMSON 719 continued operations with light enemy contact reported. Adverse weather conditions limited air activity and generally hampered operations during the reporting period.

b. Significant Combat Actions Reported:

(1) At Point 1, (see Attachment 1) an ARVN UH-1H helicopter crash landed on 10 February. Damage unknown. All personnel are missing.

(2) At Point 2, the ARVN 21st Ranger Battalion supported by helicopter gunships and tactical air, engaged an estimated reinforced enemy company on 9 February. Results of this incident were previously reported as eight enemy killed, one ARVN soldier killed and one wounded. An updated report lists 22 enemy killed and six ARVN soldiers killed and 17 wounded.

(3) At Point 3, on the 10th, the ARVN 3d Airborne Battalion engaged an unknown size enemy force capturing three trucks, one loaded with 120-mm ammunition. One ARVN soldier was killed and seven wounded.

(4) An ARVN UH-1H helicopter exploded in mid-air on 10 February at Point 4.

c. Progress of Friendly Forces in Achieving Objectives:

(1) The ARVN 9th Airborne Battalion combat assaulted into Landing Zone ALOUI and the 4th Battalion of the 1st ARVN Infantry Regiment and the 1st ARVN Infantry CP combat

assaulted into Landing Zone DELTA. Both were opposed by 12.7-mm antiaircraft fire. Other planned combat assaults were postponed due to weather. Ground operations are proceeding according to plan.

3. Statistical Data:

(1) No changes in statistical data were reported except for aircraft losses.

(2) Aircraft Losses:


<u>US TYPE</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>
AH-1G	1	1
UH-1H	2	5
OH-6	1	1

4. Remarks: It has been reported that casualties in the loss of the two VNAF UH-1H helicopters included the G-3 and G-4 of the ARVN 1st Corps and four unidentified newsmen. All personnel are currently carried as missing. The helicopter carrying the ARVN G-3 and G-4 crash landed and the aircraft carrying the newsmen exploded in midair.

Attachment:

Map

3



10 February 1971

Subject: TOAN THANG 01/71 NB

1. General: This report covers the period 092400-100800 GMT (100800-101600 Saigon time) 091900-100300 EST February 1971. The information herein is based upon available combat reports and will be revised upon receipt of more complete information.

2. Summary of Current Operations:

a. General Situation: No significant change from previous report.

b. Significant Combat Actions Reported:

(1) At Point 1, at 091708 EST, elements of the 5th Armd Cav Sqdn, 1st Inf Bn, and the 4th Inf Bn, 9th Regt engaged an unknown size enemy force. Small arms and automatic fire were exchanged. Enemy losses were 16 KIA, and two crew-served weapons and two individual weapons captured, and seven tons of rice destroyed. One ARVN was wounded.

(2) At Point 2, the 38th Rgr Bn, on a ground reconnaissance mission, engaged an unknown size enemy force with small arms and automatic weapons. Enemy losses were 19 KIA, one detained, and 100 field packs, nine individual weapons and five B-40 rounds captured. Friendly losses were nine killed.

c. Progress of Friendly Forces in Achieving Objectives:


No significant change from previous report.

3. No change in statistical data was reported.

Attachment
Map

5

OPERATION TOAN THANG 01/71 NB



ATTACHMENT I

February 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM : Bob Houdek

SUBJECT: Latest Figures on Enemy Strength in Laos

Secretary Laird promised the press after his Hill appearance to provide them the latest figures on enemy strength in Laos. They were released today at Defense and I wanted to bring them to your attention as the figures reflect a 30,000 increase over the last figures publicly released on North Vietnamese strength in Laos.

Following is the text of the DOD release:

"The enemy threat in the LAMSON 719 area consists of approximately 15,000 enemy combat troops and approximately 10,000 administrative and logistical personnel for a total of 25,000 located generally between the 16th and 17th Parallels.

"In other parts of the Panhandle there are, in addition, perhaps more than 40,000 combat and logistical personnel.

"So the Panhandle total is about 65,000.

"In addition there are about 35,000 enemy personnel in Northern Laos. That would make the total enemy troops of all types in all of Laos approximately 100,000 with some two-thirds of these in the Panhandle of Southern Laos."

"There are perhaps up to 30,000 Pathet Lao, the bulk of which are in Northern Laos."
cc: RZiegler

RGH:nm:2/10/71

Ed

INFORMATION

February 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Bob Houdek *191*

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"There are perhaps up to 30,000 Pathet Lao, the bulk of which are in Northern Laos."

Ron Ziegler (copy)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1971


MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Status Reports on Operations in Laos and Cambodia

In order to provide the President with current and complete information on the two major operations being conducted by South Vietnamese forces in Laos and Cambodia, it is requested that a status report be sent to the White House situation room by 6:00 a. m. and 4:00 p. m. daily. Reports should include, as appropriate:

- Diplomatic reactions and developments. (State/CIA)
- Significant foreign public reactions. (State)
- Congressional and domestic reactions and developments. (State)
- Enemy reactions and disposition of forces. (CIA/Defense)
- Internal South Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian developments. (State/CIA)
- Progress of friendly forces in achieving objectives. (Defense)
- Plans for future operations. (Defense)
- Casualty figures, both daily and cumulative for U.S., RVNAF and enemy forces. (Defense)
- Quantities of materiel seized and destroyed (rounds of ammunition by type if known, numbers of individual and crew served weapons captured, food in pounds, vehicles, explosives, communications equipment, POL, medical supplies, etc.) for reporting period and cumulatively. (Defense)
- Enemy facilities destroyed (bunkers, structures, base camps, pipelines). (Defense)
- Extent of U.S. air participation, including results of B-52 and close air support efforts and aircraft losses. (Defense)
- Other information concerning the operations which might be of interest to the President.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Director, United States Information Agency

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L D X ' O

STATE

DEFENSE

CIA

FEB 9

1010 LOCAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

February 9, 1971


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Director, United States Information Agency

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25807 02 09 14

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS _____
 HAK _____ ROGERS _____ C _____ NODIS _____
 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____
 S _____ RES DATA _____
 TS _____ CODEWORD _____
 SENSITIVE _____
 PARIS MTG _____
 NO FORN _____

DOC DATE: _____ *Rogers, W 02/09* _____ *Kessiger* _____
 SUBJECT: *Req for Status Report on operations in Laos + Cambodia*

ENCLOSURES: (_____) (_____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			
NAME:			
	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
<i>HALDRIDGE</i>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

ACTION REQUIRED
 MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
 MEMO TO PRESIDENT (_____)
 REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE (_____)
 REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE (_____)
 MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
 RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
 JOINT MEMO (_____)
 APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY (_____)
 CONCURRENCE (_____)
 DUE DATE: _____
 COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
Log in + out

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
<i>02/09</i>			<i>HAK sig para to Rogers/Laird/Helms Dispatched via LOX</i>

MICROFILM DATA
 DO
 INIT *RJ*
 DATE _____
 11 FEB 1971
 ORIG) NSC
 TO) PAF
 WHC _____
 SUBF _____

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO *Rogers/Laird/Helms via ~~HAK~~ LOX*
 NOTIFY: _____
 COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
 NSC STAFF APPROVAL _____
 PAF HAK APP'L _____
 WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA _____
 SUBF NS3 FORM REQUIRED _____

Ruth~~e~~-

Per telcon. I have dispatched the copies, and I put one in Dr. K's chron. Ed did not get a copy though - assuming h^e will get this one. For Your Records - to log in and out or whatever. ~~John~~ Jon Howe was the action officer.

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Document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
nancy 2/9/71

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


CONFIDENTIALINFORMATION

February 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER 

SUBJECT:

Foreign Reactions to Lamson 719

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... 

The following is a brief summary of the official foreign reaction to Lamson 719 which we received this morning:

-- Laos: The RLG issued a press statement which said that "the RLG deplores once again that foreign troops belonging to the countries and governments which subscribed to guarantee the sovereignty, neutrality, and inviolability of Laos have deliberately made use of Laos as a battlefield" (At his February 4 press conference Souvanna Phouma stated that what was going on along the Ho Chi Minh trail is a problem for the North Vietnamese and Americans.)

-- North Vietnam: The North Vietnamese, the PRG and the Pathet Lao, have all issued sharp protests calling upon the international community to denounce the latest action and to order the United States and its "puppets" out of Laos. The Viet Cong radio called upon ARVN troops to mutiny and to stage anti-war struggles.

-- Cambodia: Lon Nol said he "positively approves" of the ARVN operation into Laos.

-- Thailand: The Thai Prime Minister "stated positively" his support of what was taking place.

-- Australia: Australian Prime Minister Gorton told the American Ambassador that he fully supported the operation.

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-- Communist China: Chinese statements, including an official government statement issued today, have denounced our action in sharp terms but avoided any suggestions that the Chinese would become directly involved. The statements have said that the "peoples of Indochina" would defeat us.

-- Soviet Union: A TASS report stated that "criminal" U. S. "aggression" in Indochina has entered a "new dangerous state" for which the U. S. Administration has assumed "heavy responsibility" to U. S. and world public opinion. (A February 6 Moscow broadcast to China denied Chinese charges of Soviet failure to support the Communist struggle in Indochina and stressed that Peking's anti-Soviet campaign was "particularly hazardous" at a time when the war in Indochina was being intensified.)

-- Japan: A Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed regret that North Vietnam's infiltration into Laos in violation of the Geneva Agreement and its intensified activities in South Vietnam led to fighting in southern Laos.

-- Republic of Korea: The ROK Government issued a statement in support of the operation.

-- New Zealand: The Prime Minister's office stated that "any extension of the fighting is to be regretted" but pinned the responsibility for the latest development on the North Vietnamese.

-- United Kingdom: Sir Alec Douglas-Home expressed "personal understanding and support" for the action to Ambassador Annenberg.

-- France: A French Foreign Ministry communique said the action has "no other effect" than to prolong the conflict and is another blow to Laos neutrality. It called for a political solution as proposed by the French on April 1, 1970.


MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

February 8, 1971



MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE *JHO*

SUBJECT: Foreign Reactions to Lamson 719

Attached at Tab A is a brief summary of the official foreign reaction to Lamson 719 which we received this morning.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President.

25777 02 08 16

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS
 HAK X _____ ROGERS _____ C X _____ NODIS
 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY
 S _____ RES DATA
 TS _____ CODEWORD
 _____ SENSITIVE
 _____ PARIS MTG
 _____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 02/08/71

Haldridge

SUBJECT: Foreign reaction to Lamson 719

ENCLOSURES: () () NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME:

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY FOR:
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
Haldridge			<u>X</u>

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK ()
- MEMO TO PRESIDENT ()
- REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE ()
- REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE ()
- MEMO _____ TO _____ ()
- RECOMMENDATIONS ()
- JOINT MEMO ()
- APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY ()
- CONCURRENCE ()
- DUE DATE: _____

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

due 02/08/71

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
02/08	Hald	HAK	sign info memo to Pres
2-9	HAK	Pres	Info
2/11			Noted by Pres

MICROFILM DATA
 DO X
 INIT [Signature]
 DATE 2/16

ORIG) NSC
 TO) PAF X
 WHC
 SUBF

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
 NOTIFY: _____
 COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC X _____ STAFF APPROVAL
 PAF X _____ HAK APP'L
 WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA
 SUBF X _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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MEMORANDUM

Ed
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 9, 1971

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...
A ✓

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HENRY A. KISSINGER HK

SUBJECT:

Operation LAMSON 719

MACV has provided a report on the Allied operation in Laos (Operation LAMSON 719) for the 24-hour period ending at 9:00 p. m. EST, February 8. Operational highlights include:

- Marginal weather conditions in the area have prevented a number of tactical air support missions from being flown. Fire support from artillery units within South Vietnam continues to be provided.
- U. S. casualties for the period were six KIA (10 cumulative) and 17 WIA (41 cumulative). Cumulative enemy casualties have been 56 KIA. Four of yesterday's U. S. KIA were the result of a helicopter crash in Laos.
- A total of approximately 8,000 pounds of assorted ammunition have been uncovered and 14 enemy vehicles have been destroyed.
- An estimated 100,000 gallons of POL have been destroyed. A U. S. helicopter gunship conducting a rocket run observed a large secondary explosion with fireball and flames rising to 1,500 feet. The fire was still burning ten hours later.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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RUEKJST+

ACTION

DISTR NMCC () FILE (1)

PLANS
PLANSSPECAT
EXCLUSIVE

ADV DISTR NMCC

TRANSIT/ Z/141451Z/ : TOR0451448

DE RUMHTA #9301 0451440

ZNY AAAAA

7 141435Z FEB 71 ZFF3

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEKJCS/CJCS

INFO RUHHHQ/CINCPAC

RT

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MOORER AND ADM MCCA IN FROM
GEN ABRAMS. DELIVER UPON RECEIPT.

REF: JCS 140130Z FEB 71 (TS/SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE)

1. (TS) REFERENCE REQUESTED MY PERSONAL APPRAISAL OF PROGRESS TO DATE OF LAMSON 719 AND FORECAST FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
2. (TS) A COMPARISON OF THE ACTUAL ARVN TROOP MOVEMENTS AND TIME PHASING WITH THOSE ORIGINALLY PLANNED REVEALS THAT THE EXECUTION TO DATE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT MORE DELIBERATE THAN ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED. THREE REASONS APPEAR PARAMOUNT: FIRST, GENERAL LAM CONSIDERED IT PRUDENT TO INSURE ADEQUATE FLANK SECURITY INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT OF FIRE SUPPORT BASES ALONG HIGHWAY 9. SECOND, THE ROADS ON THE LAOTIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER WERE IN FAR WORSE CONDITION THAN EXPECTED WITH MANY EROSION CUTS TWENTY FEET DEEP. THIRD, GENERAL LAM IS DETERMINED TO SECURE HIS LINES OF COMMUNICATION ON THE GROUND AGAINST THE CONTINGENCIES OF PROLONGED BAD WEATHER AND ENEMY INTERDICTION.
3. (TS) THERE HAVE BEEN MODIFICATIONS TO THE PLAN FROM THAT PRESENTED IN WASHINGTON. PHASE II OF LAMSON 719 (ASSAULT BY RVNAF ALONG ROUTE 9) WAS ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED AS BEING OF APPROXIMATELY 3 DAYS DURATION. THE TIME PHASING HAS BEEN EXTENDED FOR REASONS OUTLINED HEREIN: TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY SYSTEM, PRESIDENT THIEU HAS ALSO DIRECTED THAT ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS BE DEPLOYED ALONG ROUTE SEGMENTS 1032B AND 92C WITH THE MISSION OF DESTROYING ALL SUPPLIES IN THESE AREAS. EVEN SO, THE OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION REMAINS TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM DISRUPTION OF THE ENEMY SYSTEM WITHIN BASE AREA 604. A PRIME PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION WAS TO SEVER THE ENEMY LOC, AND BY CUTTING AND CONTROLLING ROUTE 92, THIS HAS TO A CERTAIN DEGREE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, AS EVIDENCED

PAGE 1

TOP SECRET

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19400

- BY THE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ALREADY UNCOVERED.
4. (TS) I WOULD ASSESS THE ARVN PERFORMANCE TO DATE AS A VERY GOOD AND PROFESSIONAL ONE. THEIR KILL RATIO IS ON THE ORDER OF TEN TO ONE AND THE NUMBER OF CAPTURED OR DESTROYED ITEMS IS BEGINNING TO RISE SIGNIFICANTLY. DETAILS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN OPERATIONAL SUMMARIES.
5. (TS) CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS, CHARACTERIZED BY NUMEROUS COMPANY-SIZE AND SMALLER GROUND ATTACKS. ALTHOUGH ENEMY REACTION TO DATE HAS GENERALLY FOLLOWED THE ASSESSMENT MADE IN THE PLANNING PHASE, THE EARLY CONTACT WITH THE 64TH AND 88TH REGIMENTS HAD NOT BEEN ANTICIPATED BY GEN LAM AND IS AN ELEMENT IN HIS DECISION TO BOLSTER HIS FLANK SECURITY. ENEMY FORCES WITHIN THE AO NOW NUMBER FIVE ENEMY REGIMENTS WITH ONE ADDITIONAL REGIMENT CAPABLE OF REINFORCING WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.
6. (TS) AS FOR AN ESTIMATE AS TO WHEN THE ARVN WILL ESTABLISH A BLOCKING POSITION ACROSS THE MAIN ENEMY SUPPLY LINES, ALTHOUGH AN IMPORTANT SEGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN BLOCKED AT ROUTE 92, I ANTICIPATE THAT THE BLOCK ON THE ROUTES THROUGH AND WEST OF TCHEPONE WILL NOT BE IN PLACE FOR ANOTHER 8 TO 10 DAYS.
7. (TS) THE ENEMY CURRENTLY HAS LIMITED SUPPLY RESERVES SOUTH OF THE OBJECTIVE AREA WHICH WILL ALLOW CONTINUATION OF PROTRACTED WARFARE AT AN EVER DECREASING RATE. OCCUPATION OF THE TCHEPONE AREA AND INTERDICTION OF THE LOC'S THEREIN WILL SERVE TO DISRUPT HIS ENTIRE LOGISTICAL STRUCTURE. THE ONLY EARLY ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUATION OF A VIABLE LOGISTIC PLAN WILL BE TO ESTABLISH HIS MAIN LOC FARTHER TO THE WEST WHERE HIS SUPPLY MOVEMENTS BECOME INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO INTERDICTION.
8. (TS) THE RELATIVELY HIGH AAA THREAT IN THE AO RESULTED IN CERTAIN HELICOPTER LOSSES. HOWEVER, THESE LOSSES HAVE BEEN LESS THAN ANTICIPATED CONSIDERING THE TOTAL HELICOPTER SORTIES FLOWN TO DATE. THE AIR CAV AND TACAIR EFFORT IS TARGETTED ON A CONCENTRATED AAA SUPPRESSION CAMPAIGN AND IS ACHIEVING GOOD RESULTS.
9. (TS) WEATHER HAD SOME ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATIONS DURING THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF LAMSON 719 RESULTING IN CANCELLATIONS OF COMBAT ASSAULTS. SINCE 10 FEBRUARY, HOWEVER, THE WEATHER HAS GENERALLY BEEN FAVORABLE FOR BOTH AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS AND HAS HAD MINIMAL IMPACT ON RVNAF ACTIVITIES. AS FOR THE FUTURE, WE EXPECT AN INCREASE IN CLOUDINESS IN THE SANH AND THE AREA WEST OF THE BORDER STARTING TOMORROW AND CONTINUING FOR THE NEXT FOUR TO FIVE DAYS. THIS SHOULD

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ALLOW HELIBORNE OPERATIONS FROM APPROXIMATELY 1100H TO 1900H DAILY. OBVIOUSLY, ANY FURTHER DETERIORATION OF WEATHER WILL HAMPER HELIBORNE OPERATIONS AND MAY REDUCE ROAD TRAFFICABILITY.

10. (TS) THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE OPERATION REMAINS TO CUT AND DISRUPT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE TRAIL SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH GENERAL LAM DOES NOT INTEND TO IGNORE ENEMY CACHES AND WILL SEARCH FOR AND CAPTURE OR DESTROY ENEMY SUPPLIES IN THE AREA AS THEY ARE UNCOVERED, THIS REMAINS SECONDARY TO THE OBJECTIVE OF BLOCKING THE MAJOR TRAIL SYSTEM.

11. (TS) BARRING AN UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENT IN THE ENEMY SITUATION OR WEATHER, GEN LAM IS PLANNING ON CONTINUING THE MOVEMENT OF HIS ARMOR WEST ALONG RTE 9 BUT IT IS GOING TO BE SLOWER THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY IN MOVING OFF OF THE ROUTE WITH FLANK SECURITY. THE DEEPER HELIBORNE THRUSTS WILL BE RESUMED WHEN THE ARVN LEADERS ARE CONVINCED THAT THEIR FLANKS, REAR AND LOC ARE SECURE AND THAT THEIR FORWARD SUPPLY POSTURE IS ADEQUATE. OUT SUPPORT OF THIS OPERATION IS PROCEEDING AT FULL AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO EXPEDITE THIS DEVELOPMENT.

12. (TS) ON BALANCE, THE OPERATION HAS GONE WELL TO DATE. SOME DELAY HAS BEEN CAUSED BY A COMBINATION OF FACTORS:

- WEATHER RESTRICTIONS ON HELICOPTERS LIFT INITIALLY,
- THE POOR CONDITION ON ROUTE 9 BETWEEN RVN/LOATIAN BORDER AND THE ROAD JUNCTION OF 9 AND 92 REQUIRING MAJOR ENGINEER EFFORT, AND A SOMEWHAT MORE DELIBERATE APPROACH TO THE ATTACK BY ARVN THAN WAS VISUALIZED IN OUR INITIAL CONCEPT. WE LEANED TOWARD EXPEDITIOUS BUT PRUDENT ATTAINMENT OF FINAL OBJECTIVE AREAS PRIOR TO COMMENCING SEARCH AND SPOIL OPERATIONS; HOWEVER IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE THE THIEU/LAM POINT THAT IT IS PRUDENT TO SECURE AND DEVELOP THE PRIMARY LINE OF COMMUNICATION FOR SUPPLY LINE ASSURANCE IN THE EVENT OF SUSTAINED BAD WEATHER OR ENEMY INTERVENTION. IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN VIEN YESTERDAY I POINTED OUT THAT WE SHOULD MOVE ON TO THE WEST AT THE EARLIEST TIME THAT GEN LAM FELT SATISFIED HE COULD DO SO AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS WILL BE DONE. IN MY VISIT TO QUANG TRI ON THE 12TH, I WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT I SAW. THAT OPINION HAS NOT CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING I HAD WITH GEN VIEN.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 7 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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S E C R E T

33014
COR COPY

ACTION J5(ADM WEINEL)(1)1
DISTR CJCS(ADM MOORER)(1)2 DJS(GEN VOGT)(1)3 J3(GEN ZAIS)(1)4
(007) SECDEF(MR LAIRD)(1)5 WHOUSE(DR KISSINGER)(1)6 CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)
(1)7 CNO(ADM ZUMWALT)(1)8 CSAF(GEN RYAN)(1)9 CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)(1)
10 FILE(1)11 ADV CY J3(GEN ZAIS) DJS(GEN VOGT)

COPY # 6

TRANSIT/220529Z/220712Z/001:43TOR0530704
DE RUHHQA #3031 0530535

ZNY AAAAA
O 220529Z FEB 71 ZFF-1

FM CINCPAC
TO RUEKJCS/CJCS
RUEASTA/AMEMB PHNOM PENH

IMMEDIATE

SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE

BT
S E C R E T/SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL MOORER AND AMBASSADOR SWANK
FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS
VISIT WITH LON NOL

A. AMEMB PHNOM PENH 796/210240Z FEB 71
1. IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MY STAFF AND MEMBERS OF LON NOL'S PARTY THE SUBJECT OF MY SCHEDULED MEETING WITH LON NOL CAME UP, THEY SAID THAT THE PREVIOUS MEETING HAD MADE LON NOL FEEL MUCH BETTER CONCERNING HIS HEALTH AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN INFORMATION ON HOW THINGS ARE GOING IN THE OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO VISIT HIM ON SUNDAY. I ACCEPTED AND MET WITH HIM THIS MORNING. HE LOOKED VERY GOOD AND I FOUND HIM IN BETTER SPIRITS THAN AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING. THROUGH HIS STAFF HE HAD REQUESTED THAT I MEET PRIVATELY WITH HIM USING MY INTERPRETER. ALL THE MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE, INCLUDING AMBASSADOR SONN VOEUNSAI WERE IN THE NEXT VIP SUITE AND AFTER A SHORT TALK WITH THEM, INCLUDING BRIG GEN KANG KENG, I WAS ESCORTED INTO LON NOL'S SUITE, WITH MY INTERPRETER. NONE OF THE MEMBERS OF HIS ENTOURAGE WERE INVITED IN AT ANY TIME. PRESENT WERE ONLY MYSELF AND TWO MEMBERS OF MY STAFF.
2. IN SPITE OF THE REQUEST FOR THE PRIVATE MEETING, THERE WERE NO DISCUSSIONS RELATIVE TO PERSONALITIES AND HE SEEMED MERELY INTERESTED IN THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF THE WAR. A SUMMARY OF THE MEETING IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. CONVERSATION BEGAN WITH NORMAL EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES. PRIME MINISTER WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN THE MILITARY SITUATION. WHEN I INFORMED HIM THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE A BRIEFING ON THE TOAN

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THANG 01/71NB OPERATION AFTER OUR CONVERSATION, THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED TO HEAR IT. WE THEN PROCEEDED WITH THE BRIEFING.

B. I TOLD LON NOL THAT DR. KENG AGREED THAT MAKING A WEEKLY REPORT TO CAMBODIA ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S HEALTH WOULD PROBABLY BE APPROPRIATE. LON NOL INDICATED SATISFACTION WITH THIS IDEA BUT DIDN'T COMMENT.

C. I EXPRESSED TO LON NOL THAT OPERATIONS APPEARED TO BE PROCEEDING WELL IN CAMBODIA AND THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE.

D. I PROVIDED LON NOL A BRIEFING ON THE PROGRESS OF TOAN THANG 01/71NB AND A SUMMARY OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF CAMBODIA.

E. LON NOL WANTS TO ENGAGE HIS FORCES MORE IN THE OPERATIONS AND POINTED OUT HE WAS CONTINUING TO TRAIN HIS FORCES. HE EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO EMPLOY HIS FORCES UP IN NE CAMBODIA TO BLOCK THE ENEMY MOVING INTO CAMBODIA FROM LAOS AND POSSIBLY FROM THAILAND.

F. LON NOL WANTED MY OPINION ABOUT WHETHER CHICOM OR NVN TROOPS WERE INFILTRATING THROUGH THAILAND INTO CAMBODIA, AND I REPLIED THAT I HAD NO INDICATION THAT THIS WAS TAKING PLACE.

G. LON NOL INDICATED BY POINTING TO THE MAP THAT IN THE FUTURE ENEMY FORCES WOULD MOVE IN A SOUTHWEST DIRECTION FROM THE CHUP AREA TO AN AREA EAST AND SOUTHEAST OF PHNOM PENH. AFTER THE ENEMY GOT HIS FORCES INTO THOSE AREA HE WOULD PROBABLY COMMENCE BOMBARDMENT OF THE PHNOM PENH AREA.

H. I REMINDED LON NOL ABOUT OPERATIONS IN LAOS (LAMSON 719) AND THAT THIS OPERATION AND THE ONES IN CAMBODIA WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE ENEMY.

I. LON NOL ASKED IF I THOUGHT ENEMY OPERATIONS WOULD CEASE IF THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL WERE CUT, AND I REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT CEASE BUT CERTAINLY WOULD BE REDUCED.

J. LON NOL SEEMED DESIROUS OF WANTING TO DO MORE WITH HIS PEOPLE IN SUPPORT OF THE WAR EFFORT. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO MILLION ETHNIC CAMBODIANS KHMERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT HIS PEOPLE HAD VERY GOOD RAPPORT WITH THEM. HE SAID HE COULD TRAIN 30,000 OF THESE PEOPLE TO HELP IN THE AREA OF THE BORDER BETWEEN SOUTH VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA.

3. I AM LEAVING TOMORROW FOR A QUICK TRIP TO NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON. I TOLD LON NOL THAT I WOULD SEE HIM AGAIN THURSDAY OR FRIDAY AND UPDATE HIM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. MY STAFF IS READY AT ANYTIME TO GIVE HIM AN UPDATE IF REQUIRED; HOWEVER, ONE OF THE MAIN PURPOSES OF HIS BEING IN HAWAII IS TO EXPEDITE HIS RECUPERATION, SO WE DO NOT PLAN ON GIVING THESE BRIEFNGS EXCEPT AT HIS PERSONAL REQUEST. I HAVE BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO NOT INCLUDE ANYTHING THAT I FELT WOULD CAUSE HIM SERIOUS

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CONCERN IN ORDER TO KEEP HIS WORRIES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. HE APPEARS VERY ALERT AND I CAN SEE IMPROVEMENT IN HIS CONDITION SINCE MY VISIT ON FRIDAY.

4. FOR AMBASSADOR SWANK:

LON NOL WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR CONCERN AND THE EXPRESSIONS OF YOUR PERSONAL GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES. I WILL CONTINUE TO FORWARD REPORTS ON HIS CONDITION ON A REGULAR BASIS BUT WILL NOT NECESSARILY MAKE THEM EACH DAY UNLESS THERE IS SOME SIGNIFICANT ITEM TO REPORT.

5. VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

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ANNOTES

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ACTION

DISTR CJCS(ADM MOORER)(1)1 DJS(GEN VOGT)(1)2 J3(GEN ZAIS)(1)3
() SECDEF(MR LAIRD)(1)4 ASD:ISA(MR NUTTER)(1)5 ~~WHOUSE(DR KLSSINGER)(1)~~
6 CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)(1)7 CNO(ADM ZUMWALT)(1)8 CSAF(GEN RYAN)(1)
9 CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)(1)10 FILE(1)11

ADV DISTR NMCC ADV CY J3(GEN ZAIS) DJS(GEN VOGT)

TRANSIT/211918Z/211936Z/000:18TOR0521934

DE RUHHHQA #3014 0521917

ZNY AAAAA

Z 211918Z FEB 71 ZFF-3

FM CINCPAC

TO RUMUHITA/COMUSMACV

INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS

RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RHCOAAA/CINCSAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUMMRSAC/CMDR 7AF

BT

T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL ABRAMS INFO ADMIRAL MOORER,
GENERAL NAZZARO, GENERAL HOLLOWAY, ADMIRAL CLAREY, AND
GENERAL CLAY, FROM ADMIRAL MC CAIN
DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

LOUISVILLE SLUGGER EXECUTE MESSAGE (U)

A. JCS 9204/ 012146Z JAN 71 (NOTAL)

B. JCS 3254/ 041711Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

C. CINCPAC 050240Z FEB 71

D. JCS 4496/ 201656 FEB 71 (NOTAL)

E. CINCPAC 201851Z FEB 71

F. JCS 4504/ 211631Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

G. COMUSMACV 211415Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REFS A THRU C AUTHORIZED ONE-TIME STRIKE AGAINST
LOCATED SAM/AAA TARGETS ALONG SELECTED ROUTES IN RP-1 OF NVN.
REFS D & E RENEWED THE ONE-TIME STRIKE AUTHORITY UNTIL
1200Z 22 FEB 71. THIS AUTHORITY EXPIRED WITH THE CONDUCT
OF STRIKES FLOWN ON 21 FEB 71.
2. (TS) YOU ARE AUTHORIZED ARMED RECCE FOLLOWED BY A ONE-TIME
STRIKE AGAINST ONLY THOSE SAM/AAA TARGETS IN NVN WHICH POSE A THREAT TO
AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING LAMSON 719 OPERATIONS. THIS AUTHORITY IS
EFFECTIVE UNTIL 1200Z 22 FEB 71. REF F PERTAINS.
3. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE AND REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS
IN REF A APPLY.
4. (TS) ACTION ON REF G WAS TAKEN BY MY 202313Z FEB 71.

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5. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

GP-1

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ANNOTES

TERM SV PLS ANS FOR ZFF

JAB

REF C IS 89633

REF E IS 31287

REF G IS 32338

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T O P S E C R E T

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LDX

ACTION J3(GEN ZAIS)(1)1
DISTR CJCS(ADM MOORER)(1)2 DJS(GEN VOGT)(1)3 SECDEF(MR LAIRD)(1)4
() WHOUSE(DR KISSINGER)(1)5 CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)(1)6 ~~EXCLUSIVE~~
CNO(ADM ZUMWALT)(1)7 CSAF(GEN RYAN)(1)8 CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)(1)9
FILE(1)10

SPECAT

ADV DISTR NMCC ADV CY J3(GEN ZAIS) DJS(GEN VOGT)
TRANSIT/211050Z/211144Z/000:54TOR0521141
DE RUSVAGA #6585 0521055

ZNY AAAAA
Z 211050Z FEB 71
FM 366 TFW DOI DANANG AFLD RVN
TO RUEKJCS/JCS
RUHHHQA/CONCPAC
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RUMUHTA/COMUSMACV
RUSVBAA/COMDR 7AF
RUHGOAA/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMFRBA/CTF 77

COPY NO. 5

FLASH

BT
T O P S E C R E T SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MOORER (CJCS), ADM
MCCAIN (CINCPAC), GEN ABRAMS (COMUSMACV), GEN NAZZARO (PACAF),
ADM CLAREY (PACFLT), GEN CLAY (7 AF), VADM WEISNER (SEVENTHFLT),
AND VADM BARDSHAR (TF 77)/DELIFER DURING WALKING HOURS
SUBJ: STORMY DISUM FOR 21 FEB 71. JOPREP JIFFY 0249. DISUM 032.
LL P RTS EXCEPT P RTS I AND II RD NDGATHVE.

P BT H: SIGNIFIGANT INTELLIGENCE.
A. STORMY 01/0806/0600-0623Z/R -1.
D XD649868 STOBMY OBSERVED TWO TR NRPORTERS POCCIBLX WIT MICCILEC;
OND OF THE TR NS ORTEBC, W ACH PPEARED TO B PPROXIMATELY 40FD

P GE 2 RUSVAGA6585 T O P S D C R E T/SPDB T
LONG, WAS ORIEFDED EAST1WEST, AFD THE OTHER WAS OBIENTED NOBTHWEST-
SOUTHEAST. BODH TRANSPORTERS WERE CAMOUFLAGED; EXTENSIVE ADDITIONAL
CAMOUFLAGE WAS ADDED TO THE TRANS ORTERS AND MISSILES BETWEEN THE
TIME OF VICUAL RECCE AT 0615Z AND THE STRAKE AD 720Z. STORMY ALSO
OBSERVED AN OXDIZER TRAILER BEING PULLED OFF THE ROAD INTO THE AREA
OF XD658867.

PART II: MISSION STRIKE RESULTS.
A. STORMY 1/0816.

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(1) GUNFTR 12-13-14-15, 22-23-24-25, 40-51-42-43, 60-61-62-83/ 536, 0528, 542, 0540, (2) 11XF4E, 5XF4D, (3) N/A, (4) 0725Z, (5) 1036B, (6) XD649869, 500MTR RADIUS, (7) IN THE VICINITY OF 1R-06881, (8) PARTIALLY PREPARED SAM SITE, (9) N/A, (10) VIS, (11) 50PCT TGT COVERAGE, (12) 10XLARGE SEC FIR, 1XVERY LG SEC EXPL (REACHED 3000FT; PROBABLE SAM), (13) NO EFFECT, (14) STORMY RECOMMENDS RE-STRIKE OF AREA; A SUPPORT VEHICLE (PROBABLE OXIDIZER TRAILER) WAS SEEN GOING INTO AREA OF XD658867; THIS AREA WAS MARKED AS A TGT, BUT ORDN NCE WAS EXPENDED ON THE OTHER MARK.

GP-2

BT

#6585

ANNOTES

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PAGE 2

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T O P S E C R E T

LD7

32323

ACTION J3(GEN ZAIS)(1)1
DISTR CJCS(ADM MOORER)(1)2 DJS(GEN VOGT)(1)3 SECDEF(MR LAIRD)(1)4
() WHOUSE(DR KISSINGER)(1)5 CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)(1)6 CNO(ADM ZUMWALT)
(1)7 CSAF(GEN RYAN)(1)8 CMC(GEN CHAPMANO)(1)9 FILE(1)10
ADV CY J3(GEN ZAIS) DJS(GEN VOGT)

ADV DISTR NMCC
TRANSIT/211330Z/211408Z/000;38TOR0521407
DE RUMOUBA #1480 0521345
ZNY AAAAA
Z 211330Z FEB 71

EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT

COPY NO. 5

FM 8TFW DOIN UBON AFLD THAI
TO RUEKKCS/JCS
RUHHHQ/CINCPAC
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV
RUMMRSA/CMDR 7AF
RUHGOAA/COMO7 7TH FLEET
UMFRBA/CTF 77

CLASS

BT
T O P S E C R E T SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MOOREC (CJCS), AM MCCAIN
(CINCPAC), GEN ABRAMS KCOMUSMACV), GEN NAZZARM (PACAF), ADM CLAREY
(PACFLT), GEN CLAY (7AF) VADM WEISNER (SEVENTHFLT), AND VADM BARDSHAR
(TF77)/JPCCO/JOPREP JIFFY/DOIN/

SUBJECT: TARGET COORDINATES CORRECTION (U)
REFERENCE: 8TFW OPREP-4 21/0955Z FEB 71
8TFW WOLF DISUM 21/1200Z FEB 71

ON THE BASIS OF POST-DEBRIEF FAC HARGET ANALYSIS, CHANGE
COORDINATES OF TARGET ON RTE. 137 (XE 283 183) TO READ THE
COORDINATES OF SAM SITE VN 374 (XE 2862 1944).

GP-1
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#1480
ANNOTES
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SECRET

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RUEKJST+

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COR COPY

ACTION:

DISTR: CJCS(ADM MOORER)(1)1 DJS(GEN VOGT)(1)2 J3(GEN ZAIS)(1)3
(007) J5(ADM WEINEL)(1)4 SECDEF(MR LAIRD)(1)5 WHOUSE(DR KISSINGER)(1)6
STATE(MR ROGERS)(1)7 ASD:PA(MR HENKIN)(1)8 CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)
(1)9 CNO(ADM ZUMWALT)(1)10 CSAF(GEN RYAN)(1)11 CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)
(1)12 FILE(1)13 ADV CY J3(GEN ZAIS) DJS(GEN VOGT)

ADV DISTR NMCC
TRANSIT/202220Z/202313Z/000;53TOR0512245
DE RUHHQA #2932 0512220

SPECAT

ZNY AAAAA

Z O 202220Z FEB 71 ZFF-1

IMMEDIATE

EXCLUSIVE

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEASTA/AMEMB PHNOM PENH

INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS

RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC

RUMUHTA/COMUSMACV

COPY NO. 6

BT

SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR SWANK INFO ADMIRAL

MOORER, GENERAL ROSSON, GENERAL ABRAMS FOM

ADMIRAL MCCAIN

DELIVER UPON RECEIPT TO ACTION ADEE

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS TO INFO ADEES

STATUS REPORT ON LON NOL HOSPITALIZATION

A. AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 767/190825Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

B. SECDEF 4398/191621Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

C. AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 656/130600Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

D. CINCPAC 200403Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

E. AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 788/20600Z FEB 71 (NOTAL)

1. I FORWARDED THE FIRST REPORT REQUESTED BY REF YESTERDAY AND TRUST IT WAS HELPFUL IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO MY ADVISING LON NOL THAT I AM KEEPING YOU ADVISED OF HIS CONDITION SO THAT YOU CAN KEEP GKR COMPLETELY INFORMED. I VISITED LON NOL YESTERDAY AFTER NOON AND FOUND HIM IN GOOD SPIRITS AND LOOKING VERY WELL. REF D CONTAINED MY REPORT TO CJCS. THE DOCTORS REPORTED THIS MORNING THAT HE DID NOT SPEND A VERY COMFORTABLE NITE BUT IT WAS TO BE EXPECTED AS THEY WERE GIVING HIM MEDICATION FOR A SERIES OF BARIUM STUDIES TO BE COMPLETED TODAY. HE WILL ALSO BE GETTING HYPERTENSION STUDIES TODAY AND BY THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK THE DOCTORS FEEL THAT MOST OF THEIR DIAGNOSTIC STUDIES WILL BE COMPLETED. IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DOCTORS YESTERDAY THEY FEL THAT HE IS PROGRESSING VERY WELL ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY FOND OF THE DIET THEY HAVE GIVEN HIM. LON NOL COMMENTED

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YESTERDAY THAT HE WAS GETTING EXCELLENT TREATMENT AND THAT THE DOCTORS WERE OUTSTANDING AND THEN ADD THAT WHILE A GENERAL COULD RUN THINGS ON THE BATTLEFIELD THE DOCTORS WERE HIS GENERALS RIGHT NOW AND HE WAS FOLLOWING ORDERS.

2. CONCERNING THE COMMENTS IN PARA 3, REF B. THESE TWO MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF SPECIAL COORDINATION, CAPT SARAY BUNKY AND MAJOR TAN SUOR, ADVISED ON ARRIVAL THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY. IN LINE WITH YOUR GUIDANCE IN PARA 3, OF REF C WE ADVISED THEM THAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THEY WOULD ARRANGE FOR THEIR OWN ACCOMMODATIONS. THEY ACTED VERY SURPRISED AND STATED THAT THEY HAD MADE NO ARRANGEMENTS. WE TOLD THEM WE HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH A CAR AND AN ESCORT TO MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS. WE DID THIS ON SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE TRIP TO TOWN AND ALSO WHILE REGISTERING CAPT. BUNKY, WHO SPEAKS ENGLISH, ADVISED OUR ESCORT THAT THEY WERE MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY AND COULDN'T AFFORD TO STAY AT THE HOTEL BECAUSE OF THE EXPENSE. WHILE AT THE HOTEL THEY WERE CALLED QUITE A FEW TIMES TO SPEND TIME WITH LON NOL. A REQUEST WAS MADE BY A MEMBER OF THE CAMBODIAN GROUP, THAT THEY BE QUARTERED AT TRIPLER WITH THE REST OF THE PARTY, AND THIS HAS BEEN DONE. AS THERE WAS NO ADVERSE REACTION FROM BRIG GEN KANG KENG WE ASSUMED THIS WAS CORRECT. THEY HAVE ALSO GIVEN US THEIR RANKS AS MAJOR BUNKY AND LTCOL TAN SUOR. IT IS NO PROBLEM TO ACCOMMODATE THESE TWO OFFICERS WITH THE REST OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE SET UP A CINCPAC PROTOCOL OFFICE AT TRIPLER TO ASSIST THE ENTIRE PARTY AND WE HAVE SPLENDID RELATIONS WITH ALL OF THEM. BUT IN VIEW OF THE COMMENTS IN PARA 3, REF B AND YOUR COMMENTS IN REF E I THOUGHT BEST CHECK WITH YOU TO SEE THAT WE ARE COMPLYING WITH THE DESIRES OF THE GKR IN THIS MATTER. DURING MY VISIT WITH LON NOL MAJOR BUNKY WAS PRESENT AND WAS INTRODUCED BY LON NOL AS HIS ASSISTANT. LTCOL CHIV HENG, LON KENG, MAJ BUNKY AND LTCOL SUOR HAVE SET UP A SCHEDULE WHERE ONE OF THEM IS IN THE ROOM WITH LON NOL AT ALL TIMES. LON KENG IS WITH HIM FROM 0600 TO NOON. MAJ BUNKY HAS THE 1200 TO 0100 SHIFT. LTCOL SUOR COMES ON AT 1800 TO MIDNIGHT AND LTCOL HENG FROM MIDNIGHT TO 0600. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH BRIG GEN KENG AS THE PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT.

3. VERY RESPECTFULLY. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

BT

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REF A IS NOT IDENTIFIED
REF B IS SECDEF(ISA) 4398
REF C IS 17650
REF D IS 30212
REF E IS 30428

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