

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	TELEGRAM	MOORER TO MCCAIN AND ABRAMS	2/13/71	B
2	MEMO	FAZIO TO HAIG DECLASSIFIED per PAC 2008/06/13	2/8/71	B
3	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/8/71	B
4	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/7/71	B
5	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/6/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES	BOX NUMBER 80
--	------------------

FOLDER TITLE
VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. II (FOLDER 1 OF 2) ①

- RESTRICTION CODES
- | | |
|--|--|
| A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy. | E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. |
| B. National security classified information. | F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes. |
| C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights. | G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material. |
| D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person. | H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material. |

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
6	MEMO	MOORER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	2/5/71	B
7	MEMO W/ATTACH	DONOHUE TO KISSINGER	2/6/71	B
8	MEMO W/ATTACH	HELMS TO KISSINGER	2/5/71	B
9	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/5/71	B
10	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/4/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES

BOX NUMBER

80

FOLDER TITLE

VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. II (FOLDER 1 OF 2) (2)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
11	MEMO	SOUTHERN RIGHTIST ACTIVITIES IN LAOS	2/4/71	B
12	REPORT W/ATTACH	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/3/71	B
13	MEMO W/ATTACH	HELMS TO KISSINGER CS 7/09004/71	2/3/71	B
14	MEMO W/ATTACH	HELMS TO KISSINGER S 317/09005/71 SANITIZED <small>per RJC 2025/06/13</small>	2/3/71	B
15	MEMO W/ATTACH	HELMS TO KISSINGER CS 7/09002/71	2/2/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES

BOX NUMBER

80

FOLDER TITLE

VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. II (FOLDER 1 of 2) 3

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
16	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	2/2/71	B
17	MEMO W/ATTACH	HELMS TO KISSINGER S 317/09003/71	2/2/71	B
18	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT SANITIZED per RAC 2008/06/13	2/1/71	B
19	REPORT	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SITUATION REPORT	1/31/71	B
20	MEMO W/ATTACH	HELMS TO KISSINGER SANITIZED per RAC 2008/06/13	1/30/71	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FILES : VIETNAM SUBJECT FILES

BOX NUMBER

80

FOLDER TITLE

VIETNAM OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA VOL. II (4) (FOLDER 1 OF 2)

RESTRICTION CODES

- A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
- B. National security classified information.
- C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
- D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

- E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
- F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
- G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
- H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

CHRON

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG

FROM: Jim Fazio *Jim*
SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Situation Reports

Attached is this evening's military situation report and foreign reactions to the operations in Southeast Asia. We will continue to update the operations overnight and include an item in the President's brief each morning. However, the evening situation reports can present a problem. Evidently State will contribute a daily diplomatic reaction report, CIA a daily enemy reaction report, and NMCC military wrap-ups. The problems are:

- no common cut-off times and
- no central coordinating point.

I recommend that Jean Davis inform the agencies that their inputs should be received NLT 1600 daily and that John Holdridge's office prepare the consolidated report.

Concur _____ Non-concur _____

Situation Room coordinate both AM and PM reports: _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
By BRAC 2008/02/13
By CB NARA, Date 198811

(p.141)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

February 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Southeast Asian Operations

Operation LAMSON

A total of five helicopter assaults were conducted by ARVN. All landings were made without contact, but one diverted to an alternate landing zone due to intense small-arms fire in the primary zone. There was one ground contact reported resulting in nine enemy KIA; five ARVN soldiers were wounded. Two U.S. Army helicopters were reported down and two crewmembers are missing. An ARVN reconnaissance company was inserted to search for the missing crewmembers.

Operation Toan Thang 01/71

ARVN units in a night defensive position (Point 1 on Map at Tab A) received 70 rounds of mixed 60/82-mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack. Casualties were 6 enemy KIA, 6 ARVN wounded.

ARVN units at Map Point 2 received a combined mortar and ground attack resulting in 1 ARVN KIA, 14 ARVN WIA. Enemy losses are unknown.

-- ARVN Task Force Headquarters on Route 22 received 10 rounds of 82-mm mortar fire resulting in heavy logistic losses including:


-- Approximately 4,700 gallons of gasoline, 4,500 Howitzer/mortar rounds, 3 trucks and two Howitzers. There were no casualties reported.

During the past 24 hours there were 22 U.S. combat support sorties and 85 VNAF combat sorties.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

A

OPERATION TOAN THANG 01/71 NB



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

February 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: The Situation Room

SUBJECT: Southeast Asia Operations

Operation LAMSON 719

All landings were made without contact. Subsequently, there was one minor ground contact resulting in light casualties on both sides.

Operation Toan Thang 01/71

ARVN units received sporadic mortar fire and ground probes overnight but there were no major contacts reported. Enemy mortars struck an ARVN headquarters causing a fire resulting in logistic and equipment damage; however, there were no casualties reported.

- Cumulative casualties for the Operation thus far are: 48 ARVN KIA, 199 WIA; and 440 enemy KIA.
- Cumulative combat support sorties are: U.S. 155, VNAF 219.

Attached at Tab A are Foreign Reactions to the Laotian operation.

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Library DECLASSIFIED

This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
 FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE
 SUBJECT: Foreign Reactions to Lamson 719

Attached at Tab A is a brief summary of the official foreign reaction to Lamson 719 which we received this morning.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send the memorandum at Tab A to the President.

JHH:WRS:WLS:eth:2/8/71

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Foreign Reactions to Lamson 719

The following is a brief summary of the official foreign reaction to Lamson 719 which we received this morning:

-- Laos: The RLG issued a press statement which said that "the RLG deploras once again that foreign troops belonging to the countries and governments which subscribed to guarantee the sovereignty, neutrality, and inviolability of Laos have deliberately made use of Laos as a battlefield" (At his February 4 press conference Souvanna Phouma stated that what was going on along the Ho Chi Minh trail is a problem for the North Vietnamese and Americans.)

-- North Vietnam: The North Vietnamese, the PRG and the Pathet Lao, have all issued sharp protests calling upon the international community to denounce the latest action and to order the United States and its "puppets" out of Laos. The Viet Cong radio called upon ARVN troops to mutiny and to stage anti-war struggles.

-- Cambodia: Lon Nol said he "positively approves" of the ARVN operation into Laos.

-- Thailand: The Thai Prime Minister "stated positively" his support of what was taking place.

-- Australia: Australian Prime Minister Gorton told the American Ambassador that he fully supported the operation.

CONFIDENTIAL

-- Communist China: Chinese statements, including an official government statement issued today, have denounced our action in sharp terms but avoided any suggestions that the Chinese would become directly involved. The statements have said that the 'peoples of Indochina' would defeat us.

-- Soviet Union: A TASS report stated that "criminal" U. S. "aggression" in Indochina has entered a "new dangerous state" for which the U. S. Administration has assumed "heavy responsibility" to U. S. and world public opinion. (A February 6 Moscow broadcast to China denied Chinese charges of Soviet failure to support the Communist struggle in Indochina and stressed that Peking's anti-Soviet campaign was "particularly hazardous" at a time when the war in Indochina was being intensified.)

-- Japan: A Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed regret that North Vietnam's infiltration into Laos in violation of the Geneva Agreement and its intensified activities in South Vietnam led to fighting in southern Laos.

-- Republic of Korea: The ROK Government issued a statement in support of the operation.

-- New Zealand: The Prime Minister's office stated that "any extension of the fighting is to be regretted" but pinned the responsibility for the latest development on the North Vietnamese.

-- United Kingdom: Sir Alec Douglas-Home expressed "personal understanding and support" for the action to Ambassador Annenberg.

-- France: A French Foreign Ministry communique said the action has "no other effect" than to prolong the conflict and is another blow to Laos neutrality. It called for a political solution as proposed by the French on April 1, 1970. President Pompidou said during a press conference today that "I deplore events in Laos and I and France condemn them." Pompidou added "the solution to the Asian problem is the end of foreign intervention; the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and the respect for people's independence."



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON 20547

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

February 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: First Foreign Media Reactions to the Laos Operation

The first reports of foreign media reaction to the move by South Vietnamese forces into Laos, with U.S. support, generally follow customary lines.


Le Monde's Washington correspondent summarized the Los Angeles Times report from Saigon alleging that the decision to move had been held up for a week while public opinion considerations were being weighed in the White House. Le Monde's story added that the U.S. Government's decision to let the South Vietnamese announce the operation is believed "due less to Machiavellianism than to embarrassment." Paris radio reported the Quai d'Orsay communique on the Laos operation and thought the move would "prolong the conflict" in Indochina.

The London Financial Times had several questions about the value of the incursion into Laos, while the London Observer recognized the importance of demonstrating to America's allies that U.S. power could be relied upon.

Japan's Mainichi thought the U.S. purpose in this operation was "to show a position of strength ... in order to drive the Communist side into making concessions at the conference table."

COPIES 2 11 8 73

The independent Indian Express (Bombay) claimed that "the Nixon Administration has resolved on a serious escalation of the war in cynical disregard of its own commitment to bring the conflict to an early end." Radio Iran noted that the South Vietnamese action was a violation of Laotian territory, but that Laotian neutrality "was violated long ago" by the Communists.



Frank Shakespeare

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL FILE

NUMBER MO DA HR
 25811 02 09 12

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT _____ CLASSIF: U X _____ EXDIS
 HAK X _____ ROGERS _____ C _____ NODIS
 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY
 S _____ RES DATA
 TS _____ CODEWORD
 _____ SENSITIVE
 _____ PARIS MTG
 _____ NO FORN

DOC DATE: 02/08/71 Shakespeare, Frank

SUBJECT: First foreign media reaction to the Laos operation

ENCLOSURES: (_____) (_____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Holdridge

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
<u>Far East</u>	<u>X</u>		

ACTION REQUIRED

- MEMO FOR HAK (X)
- MEMO TO PRESIDENT (_____)
- REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE (_____)
- REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE (_____)
- MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
- RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
- JOINT MEMO (_____)
- APPROPRIATE ACTION (_____)
- ANY ACTION NECESSARY (_____)
- CONCURRENCE (_____)
- DUE DATE: 02/10/71

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
unless OBE'd

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	ACTION REQUIRED
<u>2/11</u>	<u>Hold.</u>	<u>NSC/</u>	<u>OBE MFE 2/10/71</u> <u>covered in daily status reports</u>

MICROFILM DATA
 DO ✓
 INIT 2/11/71
 DATE 2/11/71
 ORIG) NSC
 TO) PAF ✓
 WHC _____
 SUBF _____

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____ NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL
 NOTIFY: _____ PAF X _____ HAK APP'L
 COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA
 SUBF _____ X NS3 FORM REQUIRED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7101870

February 8, 1971

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Foreign Reactions to Operation Lamson

There follows a summary of foreign reactions received to date on Operation Lamson. You will note that the East Asian reaction has been very good. The British put out a good statement. The Communists were predictably negative, but with no specific threats. The French and U Thant were as unhelpful as usual. The news broke too late for editorial comment.

EAST ASIA

Australia: Australian Prime Minister Gorton, when informed well in advance of the actual operation, reacted most positively, Ambassador Rice said that his statements were "hawkish" and that he fully supported the operation. According to preliminary reports, an Australian government spokesman said the government appreciated the military reasons for the operation.

Cambodia: Lon Nol told our Ambassador he "positively approves" of the ARVN operation into Laos and that his government will comment in positive terms.

Communist China: The Chinese statement said Communist China would spare no efforts in support of the Indo-China people's fight against the "US aggressors and its running dogs."

CONFIDENTIAL

Japan: The Foreign Office spokesman made an official statement noting recent intensification of North Vietnamese military activity in Laos, and expressing the strong hope that the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference and the ICC will undertake effective action so that all foreign troops may be withdrawn from Laos and peace restored to that country.

Korea: The Korean Foreign Ministry issued an official statement in support of the operation, pointing out that the Southern sector of Laos had long been used by the Vietnamese Communists and noting that the purpose of the ARVN operation was to secure the safety of Allied forces, including South Korean troops fighting in South Viet-Nam.

Laos: The Laotian Government issued a statement expressing RLG regret that "foreign troops of countries which signed the Agreements recognizing the sovereignty, neutrality, and inviolability of Laos have deliberately made use of Laotian territory as a battlefield". It noted that the "primary responsibility" for this development rested on the DRV, but said this should in no way be used "as an excuse" for violating the borders of Laos. The statement concluded by requesting all foreign troops to leave Laotian territory and asking "those powerful countries responsible for implementation of the Geneva Agreements on Laos to take appropriate measures to insure that all Geneva signatories respect and implement the Agreements".

New Zealand: The New Zealand Prime Minister's office issued a statement in which the responsibility for this latest development was pinned clearly on the North Vietnamese. Holyoake said that "any extension of the fighting is to be regretted" but that Laos has long been involved in the war because of the actions of the North Vietnamese. His statement ended by calling upon the North Vietnamese to accept President Nixon's offer of October 7.

North Viet-Nam: The North Vietnamese, the PRG, and the Pathet Lao, have all issued sharp protests calling upon the international community to denounce the latest action and to order the United States and its puppets out of Laos.

SEATO: Unger called a special meeting of the SEATO Council on February 8 and provided them the gist of our circular telegram. The only reaction he reported was that of the French representative who said that "France is against any extension of the conflict."

Thailand: Although Unger was unable to arrange a meeting Sunday evening he did relay the contents of our advance message to the senior Thai hierarchy at a meeting Monday morning. The Thai Prime Minister "stated positively" his support of what was taking place.

OTHERS

Denmark: The Copenhagen independent Kristeligt Dagblad commented that the "purpose of the action was to close NVN supply route to SVN...the result will be a failure... Nixon has Vietnamized all of Indochina."

France: The Quai D'Orsay issued a communique stating that "the intervention in Laos by South Vietnamese troops with U.S. support has no other effect than to prolong the conflict". It adds that, as they have reiterated since the Phnom Penh declaration only a political solution is capable of putting an end to the conflict. It reaffirms French Government support for their declaration of April 1, 1970, which states that Laos like Cambodia must remain outside the conflict.

United Kingdom: The Foreign Office in an official statement recalled the constant violation of Laotian territory by North Vietnamese troops and their increasing use

of the trails in Laos since the closing of Sihanoukville. The statement concluded: "In light of this the reaction of the South Vietnamese is fully understandable. Her Majesty's Government support the policy of Vietnamization and American troop withdrawals and this operation seems likely to ensure its continued progress."

USSR: Moscow TASS commentator Kharkov said the "outright invasion of Laos by American-Saigon troops... ushers in a new stage of the American aggression in Indochina". While admitting that US combat troops had not entered Laos, he accused the US of grossly violating international law, the UN Charter, and the Geneva Agreements and concluded "the conscience and common sense of the human race cannot put up with this crying imperialist piracy!" A New York TASS report in similar vein concluded that "the US administration has assumed heavy responsibility to world and American public opinion". A February 6 Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin to China, on the other hand, used the presumed incursion as further proof of the damage the Chinese attempt to alienate the peoples of Indochina from the USSR has done to the anti-imperialist struggle.

U Thant: U Thant's spokesman called the incursion "one more deplorable episode in the long history of the barbarous war in Indochina." The spokesman noted that "the Secretary-General fears that the intervention of South Vietnamese and other forces in Laos might be the final blow to the 1962 Geneva Protocol". In response to questions, the spokesman said that by "other forces" U Thant meant also intervention by North Vietnamese personnel.

For Ted
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL FILE

NUMBER 25789 MO 2 DA 8 HR 19

DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: ELIOT CLASSIF: U _____ EXDIS _____
 HAK ROGERS _____ C NODIS _____
 LAIRD _____ LOU _____ EYES ONLY _____
 S _____ RES DATA _____
 DOC DATE: _____ TS _____ CODEWORD _____
 _____ SENSITIVE _____
 _____ PARIS MTG _____
 _____ NO FORN _____

SUBJECT: Foreign Reactions to Operation LANSON —
 LAOS
 7101870

ENCLOSURES: (_____) (_____) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

NAME: Waldridge

	ACTION	INFO	RCD CY
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			FOR:
STAFF SECRETARY			
DIR, SECRETARIAT			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
PLANNING GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
<u>FAK EAST</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK (_____)
 MEMO TO PRESIDENT (_____)
 REPLY FOR HAK SIGNATURE (_____)
 REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE (_____)
 MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
 RECOMMENDATIONS (_____)
 JOINT MEMO (_____)
 APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
 ANY ACTION NECESSARY (_____)
 CONCURRENCE (_____)
 DUE DATE: 2/12

COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)

INTERNAL ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO
02/11	Wald	NSC/IS

ACTION REQUIRED
 OBE covered in daily status reports MFF 2/11

MICROFILM DATA
 DO
 INIT DATE 2/16
 ORIGIN NSC
 TO J PAF
 WHC _____
 SUBE _____

DISPOSITION

DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____
 NOTIFY: _____
 COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)

NSC _____ STAFF APPROVAL _____
 PAF HAK APP'L _____
 WHC _____ HAK MARGINALIA _____
 SUBF _____ NS3 FORM REQUIRED _____

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN~~

INFORMATION

February 7, 1971

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER #
SUBJECT: Diplomatic Consultations on
Lamson 719

As a result of the briefing given to him by Ambassador Rice on Lamson 719, Prime Minister Gorton made the following comments:

- He expressed appreciation for the early notification.
- Stated he would prepare a public statement of support for release after the GVN announcement.
- Gorton's private reaction was highly favorable and hawkish. He welcomed the action and thought it should have been taken long ago.
- Noting the limited scope and duration and the circumscribed role of U.S. forces, said when we fight we ought to fight to win.
- Gorton was pleased that the terminal date had not been specified as in the Cambodian operation.
- He suggested, wishfully, it might be hard to get the ARVN out of Laos once they are in.
- He anticipated negative reaction from usual U.S. Congressional critics but believed public emotion on Indochina has calmed down markedly, remarking that the Cambodian operation proved to be a great thing.

In sum, the Prime Minister did not dissent on any point and his reaction was totally favorable.

Ambassador Watson has consulted with Prime Minister Chaban Delmas in Paris this afternoon. Delmas expressed great pleasure at having

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

been informed ahead of time but stated he could not comment on US/GVN decisions. He did assure Watson that he would inform President Pompidou and maintain secrecy.

I will have a complete wrap-up of foreign reactions to our consultations for you early tomorrow morning.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 4 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 5 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 6 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 7 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 8 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 5, 1971

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY KISSINGER

CC: GENERAL HAIG ✓
BOB HOUDEK

FROM: RON ZIEGLER

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELATIONS SCENARIO FOR PHASE II

It is my understanding that the following was agreed to in the WSAG meeting held February 5, 1971:

1. President Thieu will announce ARVN operation on Monday, 8 a.m. Saigon time (7 p.m. Washington time Sunday) or sooner if required.
NOTE: If Thieu for some reason wishes to wait until later in the day to release his statement, the GVN spokesman would release statement at 8 a.m. Saigon time. This is not a desired course of action, and is not recommended.
2. Immediately following President Thieu's statement, the GVN announcement and the MACV announcement regarding U. S. air support would be made.
3. Shortly after MACV statement is issued and operation becomes public knowledge, Dan Henkin at Defense will, in response to queries, issue a statement which will not expand on, but confirm GVN and MACV announcement. DoD will not provide information beyond proposed statement. There would be no further announcements or information released by White House, State or Defense Sunday evening.

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

NOTE: Pressure will mount heavily Sunday evening to determine whether or not President Nixon made the decision for ARVN to move into Laos with U. S. support. We will want to discuss advisability of Ziegler responsibility Sunday night.

The following are proposed statement for GVN spokesmen, MACV spokesmen, and Dan Henkin, reflecting WSAG discussion:

Sunday, February 8 Saigon time:

It is suggested that President Thieu issue statement 8 a.m. Saigon time or earlier if necessary regarding operation, and that the GVN would hold a briefing with U. S. participation. The GVN spokesman would issue a statement along the following lines, without elaboration, if felt necessary following President Thieu announcement:

"Armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam today are conducting interdiction operations against sanctuaries in enemy occupied areas of Southern Laos.

"The purpose of these interdiction operations is to disrupt supply depots, base camps and lines of communications through which enemy materiel and forces have been moving to threaten Military Region I in the RVN.

"Another objective of the operation -- called (insert Vietnamese name to distinguish from joint GVN-US operations to date) is to prevent the establishment of additional sanctuary areas further south.

"Successful interdiction of this supply route will enhance the safety and security of the RVN as the United States prepares to withdraw additional thousands of its personnel as part of the Vietnamization program.

"It can be reported that more than ____, ____, 000 ARVN ground forces, supported by VNAF and U.S. air activities, are involved. No U.S. ground forces or advisors are involved.

"The GVN intends to provide additional information about RVNAF actions and to provide access for members of the press as the security situation permits."

As soon as the statement is issued, MACV will release the following statement to newsmen:

"The Republic of Vietnam has announced earlier today that its ground and air forces are involved in interdiction operations against enemy occupied sanctuary areas in Southern Laos.

"No U.S. ground combat forces are or will be involved, and no U.S. advisors are or will be with ARVN ground combat units.

"The U.S. will provide whatever air combat, air logistics and Medevac, including fixed wing and helicopters support is required to augment the capabilities of the RVNAF.

"U.S. ground force units in Military Region I of South Vietnam continue in a high state of alert in defensive and blocking positions within the Republic of Vietnam.

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

-4-

"We anticipate that most of the news concerning operations against sanctuary areas in enemy held territory in Southern Laos will come from the GVN.

"Details will be provided by MACV concerning the U. S. supplementary air support which has the objectives of helping to protect the lives of U. S. military personnel in South Vietnam, enhancing Vietnamization, and facilitating an environment in which thousands of additional Americans can be returned home from Vietnam.

"MACV will provide additional details when available and consistent with security.

Sunday night, D. C. Time

Dan Henkin issues the following prepared statement. All other U. S. officials remain silent. The proposed statement follows:

" United States air power is being used to supplement the Air Force of the Republic of Vietnam in providing support to South Vietnamese ground forces now operating against enemy occupied sanctuaries in Southern Laos.

"Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary Laird have stated that the United States would provide air support when it would contribute to the security and safety of American military men in South Vietnam as

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

we continue to withdraw thousands of additional Americans from Vietnam.

"I want to emphasize that no U.S. ground combat personnel or advisors will be involved. Ground operations are being conducted exclusively by forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

"Secretary Laird authorized the use of U.S. air support to the Vietnamese forces because it was deemed essential to help protect our men in South Vietnam and to prevent the continued buildup of enemy sanctuaries from which our men could be threatened in the weeks and months ahead.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 9 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 10 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 11 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 12 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 13 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : [80/5/14]
NLN-NSC-80-5-14-6

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Attached for your information is a report dealing with possible reactions of the North Vietnamese and Soviets to a South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. We are restricting field dissemination of this report to our Ambassadors in Saigon, Vientiane and Phnom Penh, Generals Abrams, Potts and Admiral McCain. Washington dissemination is being limited to you, Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, Lt. General Vogt and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sullivan.

Rich

Richard Helms

3 February 1971
(DATE)

Attachment
No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 :

NLN-NSC-80-5-14-6
FORM 10-101
BY BE USED.

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-NSC-80-5-14-6

25X1

Page Denied

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-NSC-80-5-14-6

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-NSC-80-5-14-6

25X1

Page Denied

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : NLN-NSC-80-5-14-6

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 15 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 16 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 17 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

Page Denied



Public Reaction

7. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong propaganda began to register alarm about an allied move into Laos on 1 February. Citing western press accounts, the Communists warned that the US was planning "to rush

-2-

SECRET SPOKE SENSITIVE

in and massacre the Laotian people." The Communist broadcasts pointed to increased American airstrikes, Secretary Rogers' press conference last Friday and troop and ship deployments as clear signs of new US military adventures. The propaganda predicted characteristically that US plans would fail militarily and prove counterproductive politically.

8. Moscow was quick to pick up press speculation about allied plans to attack in Laos. A Soviet domestic broadcast on the 31st claimed that such an invasion already is underway. Though the Soviets have not yet issued any authoritative statements, they clearly are laying the groundwork for a vigorous anti-US propaganda campaign in the event that a major operation in Laos materializes.



NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 19 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 14021) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 : 5/207


NLN-NSC-80-5-20-9

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Following our telephone conversation Friday morning, I asked George Carver to give me a piece of paper on the facts about the Route 9 operation as best he was able to put them together from the Pentagon briefing and from our own records. I send this paper to you for whatever use it may have.

Rich

Richard Helms



25X1

30 January 1971

(DATE)


SECRET

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/13 :

NLN-NSC-80-5-20-9 MAY BE USED.

(47)

SECRET



25X1



29 January 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: Enemy Capabilities to Interfere with Phase I
of Operation ASHAU/LAM SON 719**

1. As we understand it, the concept of operations for Operation ASHAU/LAM SON 719 includes a development stage -- Phase I -- which involves the positioning of troops earmarked for use in subsequent phases. Part of the Phase I plan requires the reopening of Route 9 from its present motorable terminus at Khe Sanh to the Lao border and the development of Khe Sanh as a forward base for the contemplated deployment of ARVN assault forces westward toward Tchepone. The preparatory phase itself is vulnerable to harassment by enemy troops which are currently located in or near the south trace of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Vigorous enemy activity against the US forces designated to secure and repair Route 9 could upset the present timetable for ASHAU/LAM SON 719.

2. As we understand it, the old camp at Khe Sanh which figured in the 1967/1968 siege is not now occupied by either friendly or enemy forces. There is an automatic radio relay station on Hill 950, north of the old base camp, which requires only two men to service the unit. Available evidence suggests that there are currently some 3,000 plus enemy troops in the general Khe Sanh area. Two North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiments, the 246th and 27B, with a combined strength of about 2,600 men, are located respectively, about 15 miles north and 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.




25X1

25X1

Copy No. 7

25X1

SECRET



25X1

SECRET

One other element, the B-5 Front, a command and control entity, is located in a position to perform a senior command and control function for tactical entities in this general area. (See Map 1). In short, the enemy does have available in reasonable proximity to the Route 9/ Khe Sanh area a pool of forces he could draw on to harass Phase I of the Ashau operation and inflict casualties on the allied troops charged with executing Phase I.

3. Route 9, the principal road which will be utilized by friendly forces striking toward Tchepone, is generally in motorable condition with the exception of a stretch on both sides of the Lao border. The segment from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh Village (35 miles) is probably in the best condition with about two-thirds of it, from Dong Ha to the Route 556 junction, receiving regular military maintenance. The stretch from the 9/556 junction to Khe Sanh Village, some 13 miles, receives occasional military maintenance. From Khe Sanh to the junction with Route 92 in Laos, roadability is marginal, requiring engineering troops to repair. Route 9 from the 9/92 junction is in fair condition, but will probably need some attention if used by heavy traffic. In general, however, Route 9 will probably be easy to maintain assuming good protection from enemy harassment and where repairs are required will be well within the means of engineering troops. (See Map 2)

4. The enemy has not used Route 9 for much traffic either this year or last year. The areas east and west of the Laos/South Vietnam border, as noted above, are in disrepair but could be quickly made motorable. There are border-crossing trails in the Route 9 area and we presume some supplies are portered along these trails. Sensor detections on the exit routes from Laos into SVN have been very light thus far this dry season. The only significant detections have been on Route 922 -- where for the past few weeks detections have been running some 30 trucks per day.


for A. C. 2.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs


Attachments

SECRET

25X1



SECRET



Map 2

SECRET

Page Denied

Page Denied

TOP SECRET



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

29 January 1971

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

We expect that there may be some stories this weekend on the movement of troops to MR1. Because of this, it seems wise to advise members of Congress that such moves are taking place. Attached is a statement which is essentially what we propose to say to members of Congress. Also attached is a list of Congressional contacts. I intend to speak to Senators Cooper and Church. Dick Capen will call the others.

I would like to have your comments on this statement as soon as possible and would hope to call these congressmen today or tomorrow.

Sincerely,

David Packard
David Packard

Enclosures
As stated

Copy 2 of 6 Copies
Page 1 of 1 Pages

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
DOD Dir. 5200.10

TOP SECRET

0415
Sec Def Cont Nr. X-_____

General Abrams and the Joint General Staff of the Republic of Vietnam have determined that because of the increasing enemy threat to free world forces in the northern portion of South Vietnam and also because of the continuing need for redeployments of allied forces related to Vietnamization and to withdrawals of U.S. Forces, it is desirable that some allied forces be shifted in South Vietnam.

General Abrams has imposed a strict news embargo on public discussion of these precautionary movements designed to protect American and allied lives. I am sure you will recognize the need for the strictest security on these movements.

But, the Secretary wanted you to know in advance that some allied troops are being moved around within South Vietnam. Some of these movements involve major units.

As soon as he deems it safe for his troops, General Abrams will, of course, make these facts public. American newsmen will be covering the troop shifts. But, we did want you to know in advance that these movements are taking place over this weekend.

TOP SECRET

Sen. John C. Stennis

Sen. Margaret Chase Smith

Sen. George D. Aiken

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (Packard)

Sen. Frank Church (Packard)

Sen. Hugh Scott

Sen. Allen J. Ellender

Sen. Milton R. Young

Rep. F. Edward Hebert

Rep. Leslie C. Arends

Rep. George H. Mahon

Rep. Frank T. Bow