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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
① Report	U.S. Non-Proliferation Treaty	9/27/74	A

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

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NSC-U/SM-13B

2/20/

May 24, 1974


TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

By National Security Council Study Memorandum 202 of May 23, 1974, the President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee undertake a review of US policy concerning the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The study should review present US policy concerning non-proliferation and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its underground nuclear test. The terms of reference are provided in the attached copy of NSSM 202.

The study will be conducted under the joint chairmanship of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Addressees are requested to designate their representative as soon as possible to Mr. Jerome Kahan, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, whose telephone number is 632-8980.

The study together with a covering memorandum for the President should be completed no later than Thursday, June 6, 1974 for circulation to the membership.


Brandon Grove, Jr.
Staff Director

Attachment:

As stated

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 23, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 202

TO: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S. should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public, congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.

The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13 and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.

The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

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SUBJECT: **V SEC Com RPT VJSM-013B re Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty NSSM-202**

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EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC		X		CONCURRENCE () by phone * X
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: 6/09
NSC PLANNING	X			COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				* designate NSC staff representative
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
30 Mar 74				MICHAEL GUTIN IS NSC REP. LODAL CONCURS.	
30 Mar				STATE HAS BEEN INFORMED 5/30/74	

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CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

also put in DM 255
cc in SM 202 folders

January 3, 1975

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: ACDA Recommendations on U.S. Enrichment Policy

ACDA was requested by an NSC Memorandum dated December 19 to submit its comments and recommendations on the interagency study U.S. Policy on Enriched Uranium prepared in response to NSSM 209 and on the earlier drafts submitted by AEC and State. This study, in contrast to earlier drafts, does reflect a heightened awareness of the foreign policy, non-proliferation, balance of payments, and international energy aspects of the decisions facing the U.S. in the area of future enrichment policy. The discussions and the range of options now proposed for consideration should provide an adequate basis for a decision on this important problem.

ACDA's views on the serious impact on our non-proliferation efforts of our past enrichment policy as well as the consequences of further delay in the U.S. commitment to the 4th and 5th major increments of enrichment capacity were outlined in our Memorandum to you of November 25. In view of the urgent need to resolve at an early date the present uncertainty surrounding the U.S. enrichment policy, ACDA believes that the non-proliferation interests of the United States would be best served by a modified version of option "b", proposed in the interagency's study, i.e.

"Defer private entry and obtain authorization for government construction of, at least, the next two enrichment plants."

The decision on the timing and technologies to be used should be based on a comprehensive and updated review by AEC of the projected supply and demand for enriched uranium. ACDA does not believe that a decision on the ultimate role

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of private ownership need necessarily be made at this time so long as our ability to continue international cooperation in uranium enrichment is not forced to await that decision.

This recommendation would permit the U.S. Government to take at the earliest possible time those actions necessary to assure both domestic and foreign customers of a reliable and continuous supply of enriched uranium. Most important, it would be fully responsive to our foreign policy requirements. For example, it would permit prompt implementation of the currently stalled NSDM 255 recommendation to initiate consultations aimed at encouraging, where appropriate, the construction of multi-national reprocessing and enrichment plants. Furthermore, it would be possible to apply the recommendations of the NSSM 202 study, if approved, to strengthen the NPT by implementation of the preferential treatment feature of Article IV of the Treaty. The ability of the U.S. to influence the application of effective safeguards and to control the spread of enrichment technologies among the non-nuclear weapon states would be significantly enhanced.

The U.S. efforts to influence enrichment developments abroad by encouraging multi-national enrichment plants, effective export agreements, improved safeguards, and controlled sharing of enrichment technology will continue to erode unless the United States is prepared in the near future to build the next major increment of enrichment capacity.

Fred C. Ikle

Fred C. Ikle

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