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① Report	From: NSSM 202 Study Group	m.d.	A
② Memo w/attach.	Gathright to Chair- NSC Under Secretaries Committee	12/2/74	A
③ Memo	Distribution Lists	5/23/74	A

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

4578 ✓
NPT FILE
396


SECRET
NSC-U/SM-13D

October 3, 1974

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
The Director, US Information Agency

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NSSM-202)

The attached revised draft Memorandum for the President and the revised study which it transmits are forwarded for your comments and/or concurrence which may be telephoned to Mr. Jerome Kahan, Department of State, 632-8995. These revisions reflect comments received on the previous version of the study and also incorporate new issues which have surfaced during the past few months. Your response is requested by c.o.b. Wednesday, October 16, 1974.


Brandon Grove, Jr.
Staff Director

Attachments:

As stated

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D R A F T

SECRETNSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy

NSSM 202 directed a review of present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the Indian nuclear test. A recently updated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options open to us in dealing with India. The policy recommendations in NSDM 255 concerning the need for multilateral supplier controls over transfers of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment, have been taken into account in this review.

On the basis of the review done pursuant to NSSM 202, the Under Secretaries Committee, recognizing that the proliferation problem is at a crucial juncture, recommends an intensified program to inhibit the further spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities. This program would exploit the common interest of many key countries in inhibiting proliferation by providing for concerted action. The U.S. could both support such action and, where appropriate, catalyze more effective international coordination.

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In the short run, the most effective approach to slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons is for the advanced nuclear industrial states to tighten controls on weapons-grade material and related production capabilities. Proliferation can also be limited through maintaining and making more widely applicable the legal and political barriers to acquisition of national weapons capabilities. In addition to the policy actions presented below, a successful non-proliferation strategy will be affected by perceptions of non-nuclear weapon states regarding progress in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitations and particularly by the confidence of these states that their security needs can continue to be met without recourse to independent forces.

As a series of near-term non-proliferation steps, it is recommended that:

1. Through consultations with nuclear industrial states, particularly the USSR and France, and a conference of such states, the U.S. pursue coordinated policies designed to:

-- Ensure that international safeguards are both effective and widely applied to peaceful international nuclear cooperation by seeking to strengthen the political, financial, and technical base of the IAEA safeguards program, and by requiring that such safeguards be placed on nuclear material and equipment exported by these states or material derived from these exports,

consistent with guidelines issued by the Zangger (Nuclear Exporters') Committee.

-- Restrict the spread of independent national uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing facilities through: (a) reaching common principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology and equipment or supply or assistance in the construction of national reprocessing facilities; and (b) encouraging multilateral plants capable of satisfying future world demands for reliable and economic commercial services in these fields. In this connection, non-proliferation considerations should be factored into the review of U.S. policy with respect to future availability and supply or uranium enrichment services.

-- Impose special conditions on nuclear exports to countries in sensitive regions, such as the Middle East, in order to minimize the accumulation of plutonium and other special nuclear material.

-- Establish specific physical security standards to be included as a condition of nuclear cooperation, and strengthen international efforts to achieve widespread adoption of meaningful physical security measures on nuclear material. In this connection, a physical security convention, drafted by the IAEA, should receive U.S. support.

-- Minimize the risk of indigenous "peaceful" nuclear explosive (PNE) development in non-nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT through: (a) agreeing not in any way to assist any NNWS to develop or acquire PNEs; (b) requiring explicit confirmation that nuclear material exported, or derived from the use of exports, will not be used for any nuclear explosives; (c) establishing that all nuclear materials subject to IAEA safeguards may not be used for any nuclear explosives; and (d) agreeing on the need to establish within the IAEA framework further mechanisms for the assessment of PNE applications and the provision of PNE services by nuclear-weapon states,

2. In conjunction with other NPT proponents, the U.S. intensify efforts in support of the treaty and in seeking early ratification by key non-nuclear weapons states, through:

-- Support for the FRG, UK and other European countries in their high-level contacts with the Italian Government to convey both the importance of early NPT ratification and the relationship of such ratification to the ability of NPT parties to continue nuclear supplies to the European Communities.

-- High-level communications with the Japanese designed to remove any doubt about the continued importance of such ratification to the U.S. and other NPT proponents as an essential contribution to international stability and long-

term progress toward nuclear arms control, and as helping to ensure a maximum role for Japan in international nuclear commerce and at the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.

-- Appropriate actions designed to achieve ratification by other prospective NPT participants, and encouragement of a common recognition by nations unlikely to adhere to the treaty in the near-term that the further spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities endangers the security of all states.

-- Establishment of visible ways, consistent with the policies set forth in recommendation 1 above, in which preferential treatment will be given to NPT parties in such areas as: (a) the availability of commercial nuclear facilities, fuels, and technological support; (b) potential PNE services; and possibly (c) credit terms. In connection with PNE services, the U.S. should continue to support an active IAEA role and take a more positive stance with respect to implementing Article V of the NPT, but be prepared to highlight the limitations as well as the potential benefits of PNEs.

-- Completion of negotiations with the IAEA on the agreement implementing the Presidential offer to permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to U.S. facilities in order to facilitate ratification by FRG, Japan, and others by demonstrating that the U.S. is not seeking a commercial advantage.

3. Coordinated multilateral approaches to be developed to ensure that the Indian nuclear explosion does not hasten further proliferation in Pakistan and elsewhere, by:

-- Endeavoring to persuade India to place IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports and not to export nuclear explosive technology or devices, or assist others in building national chemical reprocessing plants.

-- Seeking to dissuade India from undermining the NPT and deferral of any further Indian explosive tests, particularly in the period prior to the Review Conference.

-- Avoiding the implication that India's status as a world power has been substantially enhanced as a result of its nuclear test.

-- Seeking to hold India to its peaceful protestations and minimize the scope, pace, and military dimensions of its nuclear explosive program, through Indian acceptance of such measures as: (a) accountability for weapons-grade material; (b) deferral of further PNE production and limiting it to specified current needs; and (c) international observation arrangements.

-- Seeking Soviet and French cooperation in continuing not to supply India with long-range bombers or other sophisticated nuclear delivery capabilities.

4. The Under Secretaries Committee should continue to coordinate, review, and report on non-proliferation policy actions and plans, and conduct relevant studies needed to support our efforts in this field.

-- Urgent attention should be paid to further defining a U.S. policy on preferential treatment and to exploring the question of security assurances in time for the NPT Review Conference.

-- Studies should be made of sanctions as a deterrent to proliferation, the use of financing as a supplementary vehicle for imposing safeguards conditions on nuclear exports, and the possibility of multilateral controls on sophisticated nuclear delivery systems.

-- A series of "country studies" should be launched to investigate in detail the factors affecting potential nuclear weapons decisions in key NNWS, the preferred strategy for deterring such decisions, and options for the U.S. in the event these states acquire independent nuclear explosives.

-- The implications of Congressional concerns and actions for future U.S. policy on nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation should be examined.

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NSSM 202 STUDY

Executive SummaryU.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

In response to NSSM 202, the Under Secretaries Committee has prepared the attached study which reviews U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A NSSM 156 study, updated in light of the Indian nuclear test, is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options and courses open to us in our dealings with India.

Desirability and Feasibility of Non-Proliferation

Inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons has been a consistent and important element of U.S. policy for the entire nuclear era. The basis for our non-proliferation interest is the assessment that the danger of nuclear war as well as world instability would significantly increase with an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons. Acquisition of nuclear weapons would also give nations a sense of greater independence, thus complicating international diplomacy, diminishing American influence, and possibly eventually requiring extensive and costly restructuring of our defense posture. With additional nuclear weapons states (NWS), it would become more difficult to negotiate international arms control agreements, and progress in limiting the bilateral U.S.-USSR competition would be substantially complicated. Further spread of nuclear weapons would also provide increased opportunity for sub-national theft and blackmail. Finally, unless the risk that peaceful nuclear programs might be used to initiate weapons programs can be minimized, all nations will face security dangers and the continued expansion of international nuclear commerce could be threatened.

The problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and independent explosives capabilities is now at a crucial stage. Commercial nuclear power generation is coming into wider use throughout the world, stimulated by the energy crisis, and many industrialized nations are becoming suppliers of nuclear material and equipment. Particularly

SECRET

as a result of the Indian nuclear test, other non-nuclear weapon states may rethink their decisions regarding the acquisition of nuclear explosives. We are in general entering a period when political barriers to non-proliferation appear to be weakening, given movements toward a multipolar world and decreasing credibility with respect to security guarantees. These trends could adversely affect the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), through setbacks in the ratification process in Japan and the European Community countries, by reducing the longer-term efficacy of the treaty as a non-proliferation instrument.

Nevertheless, the Under Secretaries Committee has concluded that a policy aimed at deterring further proliferation can be effectively pursued without incurring significant costs or risks. In virtually all the important non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) there is presently a lack of either the capability or the motivation to develop nuclear explosives. This offers the opportunity to undertake policies aimed at deterring further nuclear proliferation through practical measures which can (i) deny non-nuclear states the full range of materials and equipment needed to produce nuclear explosives, and (ii) strengthen the political, legal, and security inhibitions against proliferation.

The nuclear material, equipment, and technology needed to produce nuclear weapons are still available only from a limited number of suppliers who generally oppose proliferation. Although it is essential that our supplier position and diplomatic influence be brought to bear, the U.S. cannot by itself establish an effective and durable non-proliferation regime. Such a program requires intensified concerted action, building upon existing international and multilateral mechanisms, to exploit the common non-proliferation interests of key NWS and NNWS.

The USC recognizes that we might only be able to delay further proliferation, however determined our anti-proliferation efforts may be, but concludes that U.S. national security objectives can be well served even with a non-proliferation strategy that is only partially effective. It would be desirable to defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded number of nuclear powers as long as possible, while seeking to create conditions which might ultimately check such expansion. At the same time, prudence dictates that the U.S. should begin to explore the problem of how to shape our security posture in a world environment of larger numbers

of independent nuclear states as a means of hedging against the failure to contain fully the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities.

This study emphasizes concerted efforts designed to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, consisting of concrete actions to contain technical capabilities, to strengthen legal, political, and security inhibitions, and to deal with the special issue of peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). These measures, which are summarized below, involve reliance on certain basic functional tools, such as IAEA safeguards, export controls, and the NPT, as well as approaches tailored to key countries. However, the success of a non-proliferation policy will depend in large part on whether NNWS believe that their security and political needs can continue to be met without recourse to independent nuclear forces. It will also depend on their perceptions regarding progress in U.S.-Soviet arms limitations. Thus, our overall foreign and defense policy, the relative stability of regions of potential conflict in the world, and the general structure of peace in the international system have an important bearing on the longer-term prospects for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

Containing Technical Capabilities

All manufacturers of commercial nuclear equipment and material, except France (and potentially India), are either NPT parties or signatories moving toward ratification, and support efforts to standardize safeguards applications. France has publicly declared that it will behave as if it were a party to the NPT, but it has apparently been lax in practice in adhering to this position in its nuclear export policy and has been reluctant to cooperate with other suppliers in developing export guidelines. There are signs, however, that the new French Government might be interested in adopting a more positive safeguards policy. Although this generally favorable situation will deteriorate to some extent in coming years, as NNWS acquire greater technical capabilities, it provides potential leverage for limiting the availability of weapons-grade material and technologies through nuclear export controls and international safeguards. Despite its apparent negative thrust, this approach can benefit all users of peaceful nuclear energy by permitting material and equipment to

be made available within a framework of credible and effective safeguards controls. Furthermore, selective controls over international transfers of delivery vehicles and related technologies could be effective in dissuading certain major powers from embarking on an independent nuclear arms program.

The U.S. is still the dominant international supplier of nuclear power plants and fuel, but our leverage in the international commercial nuclear field is diminishing. Loss of U.S. dominance in the peaceful nuclear area could allow customers to deal with other suppliers who impose less rigorous controls on sensitive material, equipment, and technology. Accordingly, there is now an urgent need to upgrade our safeguards and control policies and to consult with other nuclear suppliers on this matter.* Although informal contacts and the use of existing multilateral mechanisms should continue to be pursued, a conference of nuclear industrialized states would provide a unique opportunity for realizing such a coordinated approach. A restricted conference attended by the major current and potential nuclear suppliers, namely the U.S., France, the USSR, Japan, the FRG, the UK, and Canada would appear to be a preferable first-step that could later lead to a broader conference which included other nuclear industrial states. Soviet and French support of such an approach would be crucial and would dictate the need for advance consultations with both countries.

The most important substantive non-proliferation objectives to be achieved in a program of consultation and coordination among commercial nuclear suppliers can be summarized as follows:

1. Ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports of nuclear equipment and material to NNWS, particularly states who are not NPT parties, and strengthen the political, financial, and technical base of the IAEA's safeguards program. Of immediate importance would be gaining widest possible acceptance of the Zangger Committee export guidelines as well as agreed procedures for codifying, implementing, and modifying these guidelines. Consideration should

*NSDM 255 authorized consultations with other nuclear suppliers with the aim of minimizing risks of commercial nuclear transfers of sensitive material and technology.

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740 2064

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET - GDS

May 23, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 202

TO: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S. should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public, congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.

The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13 and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.

The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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LOG #: 2064
 DATE: 5/23/74
 CABLE #:
 Proliferation Treaty

MEMO/LETTER: SUBJECT: NSSM 202 Nuclear

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/GDS (CABLES ON)

TO:

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21

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CHAIRMAN, JCS	1			
DIRECTOR, CIA	1			
Chairman, AEC	1	5/24/74		Walter M. Moody
Room 1154 - 1717 H Street				
Director, ACDA	1	5/24/74	1100	Mr. Holm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: NSSM on Nuclear Non-Proliferation

In the light of the explosion of a nuclear device in India, it would be useful to review our policy toward the broad question of nuclear non-proliferation and the particular question of what we might do in support of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The last comprehensive look at these questions was done in 1969.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to sign the attached NSSM to update studies related to non-proliferation.

Bjorn APPROVE


_____ DISAPPROVE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETACTION

May 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY 
SUBJECT: NPT NSSM

Mr. Kissinger requested a study of the non-proliferation program. It should be a comprehensive review of the non-proliferation program.

The NSSM 156 update on the Indian Nuclear Developments appropriately focuses more specifically on the Indian issue itself. I have discussed the approach with State (Lord, Grove and Eagleburger). We all agree that the way to most effectively get what is needed and what HAK wants is to let the NSSM 156 exercise go forward, and while at the same time drawing on it and other work, go to the broader question of the worldwide implications for our policy. The Under Secretaries Committee is the place to do the latter -- it did the job the first time around and handled several subsidiary issues following the initial study in 1969.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Mr. Elliot and Mr. Huberman concur.


SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
W/ SECRET ATTACHMENTS

May 24, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: MRS DAVIS
FROM: Jack 
SUBJECT: Precedence Problems.

At Tab A is a memo dispatched last night w/incorrect ordering of the addressees, i.e. the SECDEF is behind the DEP SEC STATE. We didn't ask for a redo, and resigning, as General Scowcroft has NO signature matrix, and because of the 6 day suspense. Because of only two addressees, the Dep Sec State received the ORIGINAL, while the SECDEF received a xerox copy! We can well hear a small noise about this from Latimer, et al. (The ACTING SEC STATE would be o.k. for # 1 position!)

At Tab B is a signed NSSM, which either you or Dick Kennedy have for processing. The addressees are HOPELESSLY out of precedence! I can't figure what source this came from. It should be retyped, and resigned, prior to dispatch.

At Tab C is SP 48 on rank order for easy referral...

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Bite the bullet on Tab A - leave as is.
2. Redo Tab B (P.S. check rank order of info addees).
3. Return this so we can brief the secretary who typed these. I really can't expect the substantive staff to check out addressee precedence!

STAFF PROCEDURE

RANK ORDER LISTING OF U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

The following is a revised rank order listing of U.S. Government officials provided as guidance for the listing of addressees of NSSM's, NSDM's and other NSC or White House memoranda. This SP supersedes the memorandum on the same subject, March 9, 1974.

The Secretary of State (Alternate: Acting Secretary of State*)

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Secretary of Defense

The Attorney General

The Secretary of the Interior

The Secretary of Agriculture

The Secretary of Commerce

The Secretary of Labor

The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development

The Secretary of Transportation

The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Deputy Secretary of State

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Director of the Federal Energy Office

Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs

* Acting Secretary of State should be clearly identified and so listed at the top of the action addressees

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET - GDS

National Security Study Memorandum

TO:

- Should be* → {
- ① The Secretary of Defense
 - ⑤ The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 - ④ The Director of Central Intelligence
 - ② The Deputy Secretary of State *(or "ACTING" & then # 1)*
 - ③ The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency


SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S. should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public, congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.

The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13 and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.

The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET (XGDS)

May 23, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

- Should be* } **ACTING?**
- ② THE ~~DEPUTY~~ SECRETARY OF STATE
 - ① THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Supply Policy Toward Pakistan


The Department of State memorandum S/S 7403441 of February 20, 1974, concerning the treatment of certain categories of items under our existing military supply toward India and Pakistan, has been considered. The Departments of State and Defense are authorized to continue to apply the criteria described in the second of the three options presented in that memorandum, pending a further review of this matter.

To facilitate a further review and decision, the Departments are requested to prepare a memorandum examining two additional aspects of this issue:

--Analysis should be provided as to the types and quantities of items that might be expected to flow to each of the two countries under each of the three possible courses of action outlined in the memo.

--The question of whether "components" and "accessories and attachments" should all be treated under identical criteria should be considered.

A memorandum amplifying the Department of State's memorandum of February 20, 1974, and examining the foregoing issues should be submitted by May 30, 1974, for consideration by the President.


Brent Scowcroft
Major General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine

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NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7402064	
5	21	5	21	19		

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Kennedy KISSINGER, H _____ S/S _____ REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

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SCOWCROFT X _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS

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TS SENSITIVE

SUBJ: NSSM-202 re Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
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EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				
<u>Index</u>				

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
5/21		S'craft	X	Pres for decision (5/30)	
5/23		NSC/S		SCOWCROFT sqd NSSM for Pres	
5/23		DAVIS	S	Distribution & Dispatch	(5/30)
5/24	DAVIS	NSC/S	C	Distributed (5/24)	

See ID sheet

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH _____	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D _____ BY _____
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____	
	NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____	
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____	
	CROSS REF W/ _____	
	SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: <u>X</u> _____ FOLDER: _____	

Stamp: MAY 28 1974
Initials: Aoe, SA, SF, HP, NS, WH, EP, PA, DY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/GDS

June 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEANNE DAVIS
FROM: MICHAEL GUHIN ^{my}
THRU: DAVID ELLIOTT ^{E.E.}
SUBJECT: Extension of NSSM Due Dates

As discussed with you yesterday:

- The due date for NSSM 202, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be extended from Friday, June 14 to Friday, June 21, 1974; and
- The due date for NSSM 194, Review of Certain Conventional Weapons, should be extended from July 3 to August 16.

I have discussed this with Dick Kennedy and the key interested agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you inform State (Brandon Grove) by phone that the due date for the NSSM 202 report on the Non-Proliferation Treaty is extended to June 21, 1974.
2. That you sign the memorandum at Tab A extending the due date for NSSM 194.

SECRET/GDS

SECRET

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

May 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Jerome Kahan, S/P
Co-Chairman, NSSM 202

SUBJECT: Brandon Grove's Memorandum of May
23 on the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, NSSM 202

As you know, Mr. Charles Van Doren, of
ACDA, has been designated Co-Chairman of the
subject study.

A. M. Christopher
A. M. Christopher
Special Assistant

cc: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
~~The~~ Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

CLASSIFIED BY ~~.....A. M. Christopher.....~~
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31, 1992.