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<p>(1) Report</p>	<p>Response to NSSM 202</p>	<p>6/21/74</p>	<p>A</p>

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
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NSC-U/SM-13C

June 24, 1974

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs.
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency
 The Director, US Information Agency

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The attached draft Memorandum for the President and the study which it transmits are forwarded for your comments and/or concurrence which may be telephoned to Mr. Jerome Kahan, Department of State, 632-8980. Your response is requested by c.o.b. Tuesday, July 2, 1974.


Brandon Grove, Jr.
Staff Director

Attachments:

As stated

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 23, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 202

TO: The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of State
 The Director, Arms Control and
 Disarmament Agency
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy concerning the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The study should review present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the NPT in the light of changed conditions since completion of NSSM 13, and, in particular, in light of India's announcement of its underground nuclear test. The study should consider the full range of issues posed by the changed circumstances affecting our posture toward non-proliferation and the NPT and present options for future U.S. policy. It also should consider specifically whether the U.S. should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now party to it and accession to the treaty by those not yet signators, and if so how and to what extent. The options should include consideration of public, congressional and diplomatic posture for the U.S.

The study should take into account the study done in response to NSSM 13 and subsequent work in connection therewith, particularly that in preparation for the 1975 NPT Review Conference. It also should take into account the work done in connection with NSSM 195 and the updating currently underway in connection with NSSM 156.

The President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and be forwarded not later than June 12, 1974.


 Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee
 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: National Security Study Memorandum 202:
U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy

In response to NSSM 202, this study reviews the present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in particular, in light of the recent Indian nuclear test. A recently updated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options and courses open to us in our dealings with India.

The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a consistent and important element of U.S. policy for the entire nuclear era. Simply put, our strong, repeated, resolve in support of this objective has been predicated on our belief that the instability of the world, and the danger of nuclear war, as well as the problems of arms control would significantly increase with an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons.

Technical developments and political trends will increase both the difficulty and the importance of deterring further nuclear proliferation during the coming decade. Nuclear power generation is coming into wider use throughout the world and U.S. dominance as a commercial supplier is diminishing. At the same time, we are entering a period when political barriers to non-proliferation appears to be weakening, given movements toward a multipolar world and the decreasing credibility that

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many nations have concerning security guarantees. Finally, as a result of the Indian nuclear test, other non-nuclear weapons states will tend to rethink their decisions regarding independent nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives programs.

Nonetheless, upon closer examination, a strong case can be made that policies aimed at deterring further proliferation can still be effectively pursued. Four key factors support this judgment:

1. Not all important non-nuclear weapons states have the necessary capabilities to produce nuclear explosives, and many nations with an incentive to undertake such programs may not be able to acquire in the near-term the necessary capacity to do so.

2. Nuclear materials and equipment essential to the production of nuclear weapons are still available only from a limited number of suppliers who generally oppose proliferation.

3. Political and security disincentives for nuclear weapons decisions continue to exist in many important non-nuclear states, and many nations with advanced capabilities may not choose to exercise the nuclear option for political, security, and legal reasons.

4. U.S. national security interests can be well served even with an imperfect and incomplete non-proliferation strategy which can defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded number of nuclear powers while seeking to create conditions

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which ultimately check further spread.

The NSSM 202 study describes a number of technical and diplomatic measures that can be usefully applied to help dissuade others from entering the nuclear weapons field. The study identifies high priority policy actions, important studies needed to underpin specific policies, and longer-term U.S. non-proliferation approaches. Based upon the NSSM 202 analysis, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you approve an action program consisting of the following elements:

First, that the U.S. adopt an intensified national policy designed to inhibit the further spread of independent nuclear weapons capabilities, with emphasis on obtaining wider adherence to the NPT but recognizing the necessity of pursuing a non-proliferation strategy outside the treaty's framework. In this connection, the U.S. on a priority basis should take immediate steps to

- reaffirm at high levels support for the NPT; urge prompt ratification by nations whose adherence is crucial to the efficacy of the treaty; and consult with the Soviet Union in order to ensure the consistency of our respective non-proliferation strategies.
- Aggressively implement NSDM 255 in an attempt to complement our efforts to increase the universality of IAEA safeguards applications

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by securing multilateral guidelines on nuclear export controls; approach the new French Government at high levels to seek cooperation in this endeavor; develop a more stringent approach to agreements on the provision of nuclear materials and technology to countries in troubled areas; and consider as a prominent factor in impending decisions on U.S. uranium enrichment supply policy the importance to non-proliferation of the continued availability of U.S. uranium enrichment services on attractive terms.

- Consult with Canada on the question of further nuclear cooperation with India; persuade other nuclear suppliers to obtain from India assurances with respect to non-use of nuclear export for peaceful nuclear explosives; and develop a position for use by the Secretary of State for discussions with India and Pakistan during the planned late summer visit.

Second, that the Under Secretaries Committee immediately undertake studies of U.S. PNE policy, security assurances, and sanctions as issues of special significance for our near-term non-proliferation efforts.

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Third, that a standing interagency working group on non-proliferation be established by the Under Secretaries Committee to: coordinate, review, and report on policy actions and plans; execute many of the actions identified in this report; and conduct relevant studies needed to support our non-proliferation policies.

Acting Chairman

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AMBASSADOR TAPE IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT JUNE MEETING OF IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS:

"MY GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED ME TO MAKE CLEAR AT THIS MEETING OF THE BOARD THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE WHATEVER IN THE LONG-STANDING POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE POST-WAR ERA TO DISARMAMENT AND WORLD PEACE. WE THEREFORE CONTINUE TO URGE THOSE STATES WHICH HAVE NOT ADHERED TO THE TREATY TO DO SO.

"I AM ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON MANY OCCASIONS DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE NPT AND WHICH IT REITERATED IN ITS FORMAL INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY OF TLAZELCO. "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS," WE SAID IN THAT DOCUMENT, "THAT THE TECHNOLOGY OF MAKING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES IS

INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE TECHNOLOGY OF MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS." FOR THAT REASON THE UNITED STATES AT THAT TIME EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE WITH PARTIES TO THAT TREATY, AS IT HAD EARLIER TO PARTIES TO THE NPT, IN CARRYING OUT EXPLOSIONS OF NUCLEAR DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES UNDER APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION AND IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH A POLICY OF NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITIES.

"GOVERNORS WILL RECALL THAT ON MARCH 1, 1972, THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE IN THIS BOARD PLACED ON RECORD THE UNDERSTANDING INHERENT IN ALL OF OUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION THAT THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES UNDER SUCH AGREEMENTS FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WAS PRECLUDED, AND THE UNDERSTANDING INHERENT IN THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS RELATED TO SUCH COOPERATION AGREEMENTS, THAT THE AGENCY WOULD VERIFY, INTER ALIA, THAT THE SAFEGUARDED MATERIAL



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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WAS NOT USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. THE CONTINUED COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD IS DEPENDENT ON THE ASSURANCE THAT THESE UNDERSTANDINGS WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPECTED IN THE FUTURE." SISCO

5/3/78
Tab B

Interests
PNE ISSUES

Under Article V of the NPT, the NNWS parties are assured that PNE services will be made available to them by the NWS parties for projects that are allowable under the LITEL. To date, no NNWS party to the NPT has requested such services, although some countries (parties and non-parties) have sought assistance from the U.S. and other NWS on PNE studies.

International meetings have been held periodically by the IAEA to disseminate and exchange PNE information. These meetings have been well attended, indicating an interest by many states in keeping abreast of technical developments in this field. In this regard, it is likely that most interested countries have a fairly good understanding of the current status of the U.S. and USSR PNE programs, and the likely range of costs and benefits associated with the principal PNE applications.

Following are brief descriptions of the PNE interests and activities of a number of NNWS and NWS.

Non-Nuclear Weapon State Interests

Algeria: Has commissioned a private engineering firm to study the possibility of PNE oil storage. The Soviet Union had previously discouraged Algeria from requesting PNE study assistance from the IAEA and the NWS.

Argentina:

Contacted the AEC, in 1972, through the Argentina Embassy, to discuss the possible use of PNE excavation to deepen a harbor on the northern coast near Buenos Aires. They were told that no off-hand assessment of the feasibility of such a project could be made. They offered to provide additional information to the AEC, but have not pursued the matter.

Australia:

Sent a team of four scientists to the U.S. in 1963 to review our PNE activities and recommend possible Australian use of PNEs. In 1969, at the request of the Australian Government, the U.S. agreed to join in a feasibility study of a PNE harbor at Cape Keraudren in Northwest Australia. This study was dropped when the industrial sponsor withdrew because of problems in marketing and mining the iron ore that was to have been shipped from the port. Dr. Alan Wilson of the AAEC has been active in IAEA's PNE meetings, chairing working group sessions, etc. There are many potential PNE applications in Australia.

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Brazil:

Has assumed a political stance similar to India's on the question of PNEs. In negotiations of the Latin America Nuclear Free Zone and the NPT, Brazil maintained the position that NNWS should have the freedom to develop "peaceful" nuclear explosives. Brazil has not contacted the U.S. regarding any PNE studies. There do appear to be possible uses for PNE in Brazil, including excavation and oil shale applications.

Canada:

Has expressed no official interest in the use of PNE technology. Occasional inquiries to the U.S. have been made by representatives of private firms, including a recent inquiry regarding the Athabaska Tar Sands which reported-likely Provincial Government backing for a U.S.-Canadian study.

Egypt:

Is initiating a full-scale feasibility study of the use of PNE to excavate a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Qattara Depression for the purpose of generating hydroelectric power. Is expected to request U.S. assistance with the study.

Germany:

The West German Reconstruction Loan Bank (analogous to our Export-Import Bank) is providing \$4 million to Egypt for the Qattara Project study. (The project was originally conceived by a professor at the University of Darmstadt who recently completed a several-year, preliminary engineering study of it.) Officials of the bank have requested a meeting with the USAEC to discuss the study and solicit U.S. participation.

Malagasy Republic:

Contacted the IAEA in 1971 for technical assistance in evaluating the use of PNE for construction of a harbor. The U.S., USSR, and France separately agreed to provide such assistance under IAEA auspices. However, Malagasy apparently lost interest in the project and did not utilize the assistance that was offered.

Thailand:

Authorized, in 1972, an economic and engineering study of a sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Kra to shorten the trade route around the Malay Peninsula. Two private U.S. firms were engaged to perform the study which was to include PNE excavation as a possible construction method. This study was completed in September 1973, but its findings have not been publicly reported.

Venezuela:

Described a possible PNE project in a paper at the third IAEA technical panel meeting on PNEs in December 1972. The project is a canal to connect the Orinoco and Rio Negro rivers. (U.S. advice to Venezuela was to consider more closely conventional construction methods, in view of the relatively modest excavation requirements of the project.)

Nuclear Weapon States -- Potential PNE Suppliers

U.S.:

Since the late sixties, has concentrated on the use of deep underground nuclear explosions for in-situ recovery of natural resources such as natural gas from tight formations, oil from oil shale, and copper from deeply buried ore deposits. Of these, only the first use has been subject to full-scale testing. Three nuclear, gas stimulation projects have been conducted with generally satisfactory results. In the early sixties, U.S. research focussed on nuclear excavation applications such as canal and harbor construction. That effort passed through a successful R&D phase prior to the

close of the 1964-1970 transisthmian canal studies. The U.S. has no plans currently for reactivation and completion of the demonstration phase of the excavation program.

The U.S., under Article V of the NPT, has offered to provide PNE services to NNWS Parties on projects allowed by the LTBT.

USSR:

Has a very active PNE program with several applications in development or use: gas-well fire control; oil and gas stimulation; gas, oil and toxic waste storage; deep seismic sounding; and water resource development using nuclear excavation. In the last three years, the Soviets have conducted at least 20 PNE detonations and appear to have a technical advantage over the U.S. in all areas except gas stimulation, computer simulation of PNE effects, and, perhaps, explosive designs for some applications. Even in recent weeks, the Soviets appear to be preparing to do additional work on their proposed nuclear excavation project to join the Pechora and Kama Rivers in order to bring

Arctic water to the receding Caspian Sea.

The USSR, like the U.S., has offered to assist NNWS Parties to the NPT by providing explosion services for PNE projects.

France:

Has performed a number of PNE-related studies and has indicated a special interest in creating off-shore oil storage using PNEs. France has indicated an intention to become a supplier of PNE services and was the first country to offer to make an expert available to the Malagasy Republic in response to their request to the IAEA in 1971.

United Kingdom:

Has a group at Aldermaston who follow PNE developments in other countries and who perform PNE studies and analyses. There is some government and private interest in the U.K. in PNE off-shore oil storage. However, the U.K. has said that it does not intend to conduct an active PNE program or to provide PNE services to other states.

Peoples Republic of China: Has not indicated any interest in PNEs.

India: India's stated position over the last several years has been to keep open the possibility of developing PNEs. The May 18 test was described as an experiment to study cratering and cracking effects in rock and as part of an effort to keep abreast of a technology with industrial and agricultural uses. In 1970, at an IAEA meeting on PNEs held in Vienna, the Indian participant presented a short paper describing the possible use of PNEs in India in the mining of non-ferrous metals in a number of specified locations. Nuclear excavation for water resource projects was not discussed, but would be another possible PNE application in India.

It has been reported that India has offered to assist other nations with PNE projects, but it is obvious that India is not presently in a position to be a supplier of actual PNE services.

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

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NSC-U/DM-7A

December 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy

NSSM 202 directed a review of present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the Indian nuclear test. A recently updated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options open to us in dealing with India. The policy decisions in NSDM 255 concerning consultations regarding multilateral supplier controls over transfers of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment, have been taken into account in this review.

On the basis of the review done pursuant to NSSM 202, the Under Secretaries Committee, recognizing that the proliferation problem is at a crucial juncture, recommends an intensified program to inhibit the further spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities. This program would exploit the common interest of many key countries in inhibiting proliferation by providing for concerted action. The U.S. could both support such action and, where appropriate, catalyze more effective international coordination.

The Under Secretaries Committee recognizes that we might only be able to delay further proliferation however determined our anti-proliferation efforts may be, but concludes that U.S. national security objectives can be served even with a non-proliferation strategy that is only partially effective. It would be desirable

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to defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded number of nuclear powers as long as possible, while seeking to create conditions which might ultimately check such expansion.

In the short run, the most effective approach to slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons is for the advanced nuclear industrial states to tighten controls on weapons-usable material and related production capabilities. Proliferation can also be limited through maintaining and making more widely applicable the legal and political barriers to acquisition of independent nuclear explosives capabilities. In addition to the policy actions presented below, a successful non-proliferation strategy will be affected particularly by the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states that their security needs can continue to be met without recourse to independent nuclear forces. It will also be affected by perceptions of these states regarding progress in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitations.

As a series of near-term non-proliferation steps, it is recommended that:

1. Through consultations with nuclear industrial states, particularly the U.S.S.R. and France, and a conference of such states, the U.S. should pursue coordinated policies designed to:

-- Ensure that international safeguards are both effective and widely applied to peaceful international nuclear cooperation by seeking to strengthen the political, financial, and technical base of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program, and by requiring that such safeguards be placed on nuclear material and equipment exported by these states or material derived from these exports, at least to the extent indicated by the guidelines issued by the Zangger (Nuclear Exporters') Committee. Considerations should also be given to: (a) expanding these guidelines to cover sensitive nuclear technology and additional equipment; and (b) developing concerted policies to secure IAEA safeguards to the maximum extent possible on peaceful nuclear programs of non-nuclear weapons states who are not NPT parties.

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-- Restrict the spread of independent national uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing facilities through: (a) reaching common principles regarding the supply of sensitive technology, equipment and assistance in the construction of national facilities; and (b) encouraging multinational plants (or bilateral plants involving the U.S.) capable of satisfying future world demands for reliable and economic commercial services in these fields. In this connection, non-proliferation considerations should be factored into U.S. policy decisions with respect to future availability and supply of uranium enrichment services.

-- Impose special conditions on nuclear exports to countries in sensitive regions, such as certain areas in the Middle East, in order to minimize the accumulation of plutonium and other special nuclear material. These conditions would include such provisions as requiring that reprocessing, storage and fabrication of plutonium derived from supplied nuclear material or equipment take place in mutually-agreed facilities outside the country or region in question. In the case of NPT parties, less stringent conditions should be arranged, if compatible with our overall non-proliferation interests.

-- Establish specific physical security standards to be included as a condition of nuclear cooperation, and strengthen international efforts to achieve widespread adoption and maintenance of meaningful physical security measures on nuclear material. In this connection, the U.S. should advocate that the IAEA be the forum for drafting a physical security convention.

-- Minimize the risk of indigenous "peaceful" nuclear explosive (PNE) development in non-nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT through: (a) seeking agreement by non-NPT parties that they will not in any way assist any NNWS to develop or acquire PNEs; (b) requiring explicit confirmation that nuclear material exported, or derived from the use of exports, will not be used for any nuclear explosives; and (c) establishing that all nuclear materials subject to IAEA safeguards may not be used for any nuclear explosives.

2. In conjunction with other NPT proponents, the U.S. should intensify efforts in support of the treaty and in seeking early ratification by key non-nuclear weapon states, through:

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-- Support for the FRG, UK, and other European countries in their high-level contacts with the Italian Government to convey both the importance of early NPT ratification and the relationships of such ratification to the ability of NPT parties to continue nuclear supplies to the European Communities.

-- High-level communications with the Japanese designed to remove any doubt about the continued importance of such ratification to the U.S. and other NPT proponents as an essential contribution to international stability and long-term progress toward nuclear arms control, and as helping to ensure a maximum role for Japan in international nuclear commerce and at the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.

-- Appropriate actions designed to achieve ratification by other prospective NPT participants, and encouragement of a common recognition by nations unlikely to adhere to the treaty in the near-term that the further spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities endangers the security of all states.

-- Development of visible ways, consistent with the policies set forth in recommendation 1 above, in which preferential treatment could be given to NPT parties in such areas as: (a) the availability of commercial nuclear facilities, fuels, and technological support; (b) potential PNE services; and possibly (c) credit terms.

-- Taking a more positive stance with respect to implementing Article V of the NPT, but being prepared to highlight the limitations as well as the potential benefits of PNEs.* Without prejudging the scope of the future U.S. indigenous PNE program and bearing in mind that the U.S. program has been inactive for several years, this approach would involve: (a) participating more readily in selected studies of proposed PNE projects; (b) making clear our intention to meet our Article V obligations; and (c) supporting IAEA efforts to devise procedures for implementing PNE services, should such services appear warranted. On all these issues, consultations with the Soviets should

*This recommendation is presently being reviewed in the context of a more comprehensive study for the Verification Panel of U.S. policy regarding international aspects of PNEs.

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be held in an effort to develop common policies. The question of PNE services may well be affected by the outcome of negotiations with the Soviet Union on Article III of the TTBT. Evolving U.S. PNE service policy must be carefully coordinated with our test ban objectives to preclude taking actions that might, in view of the probable greater exploitation by the Soviet Union of peaceful nuclear explosives, place the U.S. in a relatively disadvantageous position with respect to nuclear weapons development and deployments.

3. Coordinated multilateral approaches should be developed to ensure that the Indian nuclear explosion does not hasten further proliferation in Pakistan and elsewhere, by:

-- Endeavoring to persuade India to place IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports and not to export nuclear explosive technology or devices, or assist others in building national chemical reprocessing plants.

-- Seeking to dissuade India from undermining the NPT and to defer any further Indian explosive tests, particularly in the period prior to the Review Conference.

-- Avoiding the implication that India's status as a world power has been substantially enhanced as a result of its nuclear test.

-- Seeking to hold India to its peaceful protestations and to minimize the scope, pace, and military dimensions of its nuclear explosive program through Indian acceptance of such measures as: (a) accountability for weapons-usable material; (b) deferral of further PNE production and limiting it to specified current needs; and (c) international observation of PNE tests, recognizing that such observation procedures would not be expected to constitute a technically sound basis for distinguishing between PNEs and nuclear weapons.

-- Seeking Soviet and French cooperation, and the cooperation of other potential suppliers, in continuing not to supply India with long-range bombers or other sophisticated nuclear delivery capabilities.

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4. Appropriate interagency mechanisms should be established to formulate and oversee future U.S. non-proliferation policies, support relevant consultations and negotiations, and conduct necessary policy studies.

-- Prompt study should be undertaken of U.S. policy on implementing Article V of the NPT and PNE services generally in a manner consistent with our test ban objectives.


-- Urgent attention should be paid to further defining a U.S. policy on preferential treatment for NPT parties in such areas as fuel supply and technical assistance.

-- Studies should be made of sanctions as a deterrent to proliferation, measures which should be taken to assure the credibility and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, the use of financing as a supplementary vehicle for imposing safeguards conditions on nuclear exports, and the possibility of multilateral controls on sophisticated nuclear delivery systems.

-- A series of "country studies" should be launched to investigate in detail the factors affecting potential nuclear weapons decisions in key NNWS, the preferred strategy for deterring such decisions, and options for the U.S. in the event these states acquire independent nuclear explosives.

-- The question of how best to handle the problem of security assurances at the NPT Review Conference should be examined.

-- There should be consideration of further steps to maintain a strong U.S. public posture against nuclear proliferation.


Robert S. Ingersoll
Chairman

Attachments:

1. Executive Summary
2. NSSM 202 Study

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 4, 1974

TO: The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
 Agency
 The Director, United States Information
 Agency

SUBJECT: US Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The Chairman has forwarded the attached memorandum to the President. A copy is hereby provided for your information.

Wreatham E. Gathright
Staff Director

Attachment:

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SUBJECT: U/DM-007A v sec Com Memo to Pres on US Nuclear non-proliferation policy of NSSM-156

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION		REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT			MEMO FOR HAK ()
STAFF SECRETARY		✓	MEMO FOR PRES () ✓
FAR EAST		✓	REPLY FOR ()
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			APPROPRIATE ACTION ()
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA		✓	MEMO TO ()
EUROPE / CANADA		✓	RECOMMENDATIONS ()
LATIN AMERICA			JOINT MEMO ()
UNITED NATIONS			REFER TO FOR ()
ECONOMIC			ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ()
SCIENTIFIC	+	✓	CONCURRENCE ()
PROGRAM ANALYSIS		✓	DUE DATE: <u>12/20</u>
NSC PLANNING		✓	COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) <u>An SRC was held on this study. No further action is required. D.E. 6-17-76</u>
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			
INTELLIGENCE		✓	

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<u>6/17</u>				<u>C A. FAR per Elliott</u>	

DISPATCH INSTR

DISPATCH _____

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____

NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

CROSS REF W/ 7405944

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: U/DM/7

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D _____ BY _____

CRT ID: _____ SA _____ SF _____

OPEN ML HP _____ NS _____

CLOSE TS WH _____ EP _____

PA _____ DY _____