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
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING  
ON KOREAN SHOOTDOWN INCIDENT  
APRIL 16, 1969

Following is a list of attendees at subject meeting:

- The President
- The Vice President
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
- The Under Secretary of State
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Director of Central Intelligence
- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Ambassador Winthrop Brown (Deputy Asst. Secretary of State)
- Brigadier General Ralph D. Steakley (JCS)
- Colonel Alexander Haig
- Mr. Richard Sneider

The meeting was initiated with an intelligence briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in North Korea. He made the following points:

1. The North Koreans have never made a specific claim as to the extent of their air space.
2. There has been only limited North Korean military alerting concurrent with the shootdown incident. This includes:



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3. ~~Director estimated that~~ there have been few incidents in the long series of North Korean provocations which have surpassed

JCS review(s)  
completed.

NSC review(s)  
completed.

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this one in significance, with the possible exception of the Pueblo seizure.

4. *the* Director summarized recent provocations, starting with the seizure of the Pueblo, the attempted assassination attempt on the Korean President, ~~the~~ coastal infiltrations, and DMZ incidents, all suggesting a gradually intensifying pattern.

The Director turned next to the recent intelligence on ~~the~~ rescue operation, pointing out that there were two Soviet ships in the immediate area *which* had been conducting search patterns throughout the night and had been directed to debris ~~scattered~~ by U.S. aircraft. The Soviets permitted a low overflight pass by one of our aircraft which photographed debris on the deck of the Soviet destroyer, ~~including one of the wheels of the aircraft.~~ *Helms*

~~The Director~~ stated there was no indication that there were survivors. *JIP the Director* Mr. Helms then summarized the North Korean naval order of battle, emphasizing that their most potent naval weapons were ten high-speed Komar patrol boats. *Helms*

*Helms* estimated that North Korea and South Korea ground forces were roughly comparable, although the South Koreans had a preponderance in numbers. The North Koreans, ~~he pointed out,~~ *air* *have* a decided superiority in modern aircraft but ~~that~~ with U.S. support

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~~that~~ respective capabilities should balance out.

The President then asked about the 1965 U. S. reconnaissance plane incident in the same area and asked whether or not after we had repeated the missions with fighter cover <sup>or if</sup> there had been any additional provocations.

*Director of the JRC Center of the Joint Staff*

General Steakley confirmed that there had been none and stated in response to another question from the President that the air cover for these missions had been continued for a period of approximately six months but that the tactics of these missions had been modified to concentrate primarily on night missions where fighter cover was not considered to be required. Then, at the end of <sup>the</sup> ~~of~~ six month period, the fighter escorts were discontinued.

The President asked General Steakley to provide him with a history of the incidents that had occurred in this area, especially during the period following the Korean Armistice - 1953 through 1955.

The briefing was then turned over to Brigadier General Steakley, ~~Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center, JRC,~~ who utilized a map to review the <sup>EC121</sup> reconnaissance mission. He pointed out that there was an inconsistency in the northern leg of the approved track in that the

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U.S. reconnaissance aircraft orbited at the northern point of the approved track. He emphasized that this orbiting might have indicated that they were exploiting an electronic pickup and that this exploitation brought them to a point within 38 nautical miles of the North Korean coast.

He then described how the incident occurred. After making two orbits, U.S. tracking facilities picked up one North Korean aircraft and transmitted a condition 3 alert to the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. A Condition 3 alert signifies "fighters airborne, heads up". Three minutes later, the U.S. trackers picked up a second fighter on an intercept course towards our reconnaissance aircraft.

INVITEES FOR NSC MEETING WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1969

The Vice President

William Rogers, the Secretary of State

Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense

George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness  
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson

Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

Winthrop Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Col. Alexander Haig

Richard Sneider

Brig. Gen. Douglas Steakley